



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 08/17/2001	
PROJ ID: P002261		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Rw - Food Security	Project Costs (US\$M)	46.1	N/A
Country: Rwanda	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	19.1	18.91
Sector(s): Board: SP - Other social services (100%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	19.0	N/A
L/C Number: C2388			
	Board Approval (FY)		93
Partners involved : UNDP, WFP, UNICEF	Closing Date	06/30/1997	12/31/2000

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

Project objectives were revised twice, in response to the extreme events -- civil war and genocide -- in the country.

Phase 1: The Programme National d'Action Sociale (PNAS) was conceived in 1991 to help poorer groups cope with the impacts of structural adjustment. The original objectives of the project were to (a) improve the food security and social welfare of the poorest population groups, (b) improve the government's capability to monitor living standards, and (c) to initiate a long-term poverty alleviation strategy.

Phase 2: In 1995, as part of the international effort to support reconstruction after the genocide, project objectives were revised to focus on (a) food security and social welfare of the most vulnerable groups, (b) rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure, (c) promotion of public participation, and (d) creation of temporary and permanent employment.

Phase 3: Further adjustments were made in 1998, by which time most of the refugees had returned to their communities, and security conditions and public administration had improved. The government had engaged the international community in constructive dialogue and was committed to local involvement in development through establishment of Community Development Committees in all communes throughout the country. Objectives of the project in this third phase were to: (a) assist returnees and other vulnerable groups through a process of community-based reintegration and development, and (b) strengthen capacity at the community, commune and national levels for implementing development projects. The project aimed in particular to test new processes for participation and decentralization in an urban environment. This small-scale phase served as a pilot for the Community Reintegration and Development Project (CRDP), effective as of 3/99.

b. Components

Phase 1 (from 1993): At project appraisal, total costs were estimated at \$ 46.1 m for the following components: food aid and nutrition through the Programme Alimentaire et Nutritionnel (PAN), funded mostly by the World Food Program (WFP), the IDA contribution consisting of storage and transportation costs, technical assistance and operational support to improve targeting and support food aid policy development (35%), labor based works (45%), micro-enterprise support (8%), social surveys and studies (4%), and project management (5%).

In *Phase 2* (from 1995), the project was reduced to two components: food security through food aid, and an emergency social fund to finance community-based social and economic infrastructure subprojects, focusing on high labor intensity and income generating activities, and on local involvement in project planning and execution.

In *Phase 3* (from 1998), project components were adjusted again to include (a) support to community initiatives in each of 4 rural communes and 6 urban sectors and (b) institution and capacity building at the central and local levels.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

The ICR provides cost data only for IDA funding, of which 66% went to civil works, 4% to equipment and materials, 14% to training, studies and consultant services, and 6% to operating costs. WFP provided a total grant of \$ 15.9 m. for food security and nutritional activities but this was used for general emergencies related to the war rather than specifically for the PAN/PNAS. UNICEF supported the nutrition component, providing micro-nutrients and technical supervision, while CARITAS assisted AIDS victims and orphans, and United Nations Volunteers helped manage and coordinate PAN activities. The breakdown of costs between Phases is not available but it is deduced that the majority of funds were disbursed in Phase 2.

Despite the difficult conditions already existing when the project was prepared, the Bank and donors decided to

continue with their programs as a demonstration of support for the peace process . After the project became effective in 1993, continuing civil war conditions delayed project launch and implementation . When massive violence erupted in 1994, some project staff were evacuated, some were killed and others fled the country . Project property was stolen and project offices, files, and works were destroyed . Following the genocide, the Bank's local office was reopened in 1995 but was run by local staff until a representative from HQ was appointed in mid -1996. Difficult security conditions continued to affect project implementation at least through 1997. As a result of these constraints, and the need to restructure the project twice, the project closed in 12/00, three and a half years later than originally scheduled .

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The genocide rendered the full achievement of *Phase 1* objectives unattainable . Some improvements were made in food security and social welfare, and in the government's capacity to monitor living standards, but the long term poverty alleviation strategy could not be initiated .

Phase 2 objectives were mostly achieved but with some shortcomings . The food security component enabled the delivery of food to vulnerable groups (128,300 beneficiaries) through 120 centers, and provided training on nutritional activities to 540 staff in these centers, achieving temporary improvements in nutrition of the general population .

Small-scale infrastructure was improved through completion of 393 subprojects, most in the education sector, creating about 33,000 temporary jobs and reaching an estimated 1.5 million beneficiaries, although the quality of works was often poor. It is not known how these outcomes measure up to targets, or indeed if targets for *Phase 2* were set. Longer term impact on employment and incomes, including support to productive activities through microcredit, was weak. Three different approaches were tried : (i) contracting local NGOs to manage and oversee the subprojects and lending, (ii) use of a bank to manage affairs, and (iii) using a consortium of local commune members. Only the third approach, introduced late in the project, had partial success .The Bank had recommended to discontinue this component in the post-genocide period, given the highly complex country context . The objective of promoting public participation was not fully achieved .

Phase 3 In the few participating communes/sectors, the objectives of this phase were broadly achieved, as measured by (a) the extent of transfer of decision-making authority from the central to the community level, (b) the level of participation, through partnership between the local administration and the local population for sectoral planning and project implementation, and (c) the level of social capital, in terms of trust and cooperation between local government and the local population . 27 of the planned 38 subprojects were implemented .

Because of the apparent dominance of *Phase 2* in project disbursements, the final outcome rating is based on achievement of *Phase 2* objectives.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

In extremely difficult conditions, a significant impact was made in badly needed improvement of small -scale infrastructure and creation of short-term employment. Basic working conditions in infrastructure subprojects complied with standards, in that no children were found on construction sites, while women accounted for a substantial share (up to one third) of the 33,000 jobs and were paid the same salary as men . This access to employment for women was crucial because women comprised up to two thirds of the workforce and, in some communes, headed as many as 50% of households. Facilities financed under the project -- including schools, water supply, health centers, roads, and markets -- are reported to be still in operation and continuing to produce benefits .

Local capacity for financial and administrative management was enhanced through learning -by-doing and, especially under *Phase 3*, through training and capacity building efforts under the project .

By piloting new processes to involve local populations and administration in local development planning and decision-making, through Community Development Committees (CDCs), the project closely supported national policy for decentralization. Community development plans established by the CDCs and communities were helpful for local administration and some CDCs have contacted other donors to finance further activities in the plans . The CDC is now an integral part of government policy and is used for other development interventions, including new Bank-funded projects.

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

Microcredit activities were largely unsuccessful, owing to the difficult economic and financial conditions and the lack of competent implementing agencies. Inadequate or late training was cited as a factor by beneficiaries .

Other shortcomings in *Phase 2* included neglect of training and capacity building related to infrastructure works (at least until too late to have a substantial impact on the quality of works), and of M&E, with insufficient supervision effort on the part of the Bank. Beneficiaries in *Phase 2* expressed the need for more training in construction, financial management, enterprise management, and nutrition . The Beneficiary Assessment for *Phase 2* also found that communities were not playing their intended role in subproject selection decisions, design or monitoring -- most subproject proposals appeared to have originated from local officials and not the community . Although most of these shortcomings were substantially addressed in *Phase 3*, it was still felt that in *Phase 3* more time and resources should have been allocated to ensuring understanding of the new processes by CDCs, communities and local administrations.

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome :	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Institutional Dev .:	Modest	Modest	
Sustainability :	Likely	Non-evaluable	In the ICR, this rating is supported by the strong government commitment to CDCs . However, evidence presented on sustainability of the infrastructure subprojects is not sufficient to make an overall judgment, considering the poor standard of construction and the lack of stakeholder participation reported for Phase 2 of the project.
Bank Performance :	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Borrower Perf .:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

- In conflict-affected countries, project design needs to be adaptable to rapidly changing conditions . Despite the inherent inflexibility in a standard investment project, projects can evolve and adjust effectively to match shifting priorities and feasibility . Particular attention is needed to M&E, good documentation systems, and regular supervision missions, so that decisions can be taken quickly when necessary in a volatile environment .
- In crisis conditions, the trade-off between speed and ownership/sustainability needs to be managed carefully . An independent agency, such as a social fund, may be the most efficient in emergency conditions when local capacities are too weak to carry out the activities . By-passing sector ministries may help to expedite implementation, but Phase 2 of this project may have missed opportunities to build capacity at central and local levels and to strengthen government ownership by housing the project earlier in the Ministry of Local Government. Even when the project has primarily short term objectives, efforts should be made to work through existing channels as far as possible and to include training and capacity building geared to sustainability .
- To allow for rapid disbursement of funds in an emergency situation when government capacity and financial controls are weak, particular attention is needed to financial management . Supervision missions should include strong skills in fiduciary functions .
- The constraints to implementing microcredit programs should not be underestimated in post -conflict environments with severe poverty and very weak economic and institutional conditions . From the experience in Rwanda, microcredit activities have the best prospects of success in these conditions when they are based on community ownership; they must be administered by experienced and reliable agencies and allow for substantial relevant training .

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is of good quality, providing a clear account of a complex and evolving project, good explanation of ratings, and of the factors affecting implementation . Information from the first phase of the project is missing, because some files were destroyed in Rwanda during the genocide, while others were lost in the handover between task managers .