W?Sabk,1 POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2814 Estimating the Endogenously Determined Intrahousehold Balance of Power and Its Impact on Expenditure Pattern Evidence from Nepal Gayatri Koolwal Ranjan Ray The World Bank Office of the Senior Vice President k Development Economics March 2002 IPOLIcy RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2814 Abstract The collective approach to household behavior relaxes The authors present Nepalese evidence that suggests that the restrictive features of the unitary model by specifying a woman's share of household earnings understates her household welfare as a weighted combination of the "power" in making household decisions. An increase in individuals' utilities. But the weights are assumed fixed the woman's educational experience leads to a rise in her or exogenous to the analysis. Koolwal and Ray extend bargaining power. The results also reveal some the collective approach by proposing and estimating a interesting nonmonotonic relationships between a framework where the weights are determined and woman's "power" and the household's expenditure simultaneously estimated with the household outcomes. outcomes. This paper-a product of the Office of the Senior Vice President, Development Economics-is part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand how gender affects development outcomes and to identify the causes of poverty. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Narin Jameson, room MC4-333, telephone 202-473-0677, fax 202-522-1158, email address njameson@worldbank.org. Policy Research WorkingPapersare also posted on theWeb athttp://econ.worldbank.org. The authors maybe contactedatgbkS@cornell.edu or ranjan.ray@utas.edu.au. March 2002. (15 pages) The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findintgs of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is toget thefindings out quickly, even if the presentationsare less thanfully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Produced by the Research Advisory Staff Estimating the Endogenously Determined Intra Household Balance of Power and its Impact on Expenditure Pattern: Evidence from Nepal* by Gayatri KOOLWAL Ranjan RAY Department of Economics School of Economics Cornell University University of Tasmania Ithaca NY 14853 GPO Box 252-85 USA Hobart Tasmania 7001 Australia Fax: 607 255 2828 Fax: 61-3-6226 7587 Email: gbk5icornell.edu Email: Ranjan.Ray()utas.edu.au JEL Classfifcation: C300, D100, D120, D190 Keywords: Unitary Model, Collective Approach, Female Power This paper is part of the project "Gender and Power Relations in the Household, Female Labour Supply and Child Welfare" coordinated by Kaushik Basu and sponsored by the World Bank. The authors thank Geoffrey Lancaster for painstaking research assistance and Kaushik Basu for useful discussions. Ranjan Ray acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council, and the hospitality of Cornell University's Economics Department during the work on this paper. 1. Introduction Empirical analysis of household expenditure has, traditionally, been based on the unitary model that assumes that family members maximise a single utility function. The assumption of common preference ordering among family members can be traced to Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1981). The unitary model has been increasingly challenged in recent years through attempts at modelling individual utility to incorporate the divergent and conflicting preferences of different family members. Examples include the cooperative bargaining models [Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Homey (1981), Moehling (1995)], the non cooperative bargaining models [Kanbur and Haddad (1994), Lundberg and Pollak (1994)], and the "sharing rule" approach based on a Pareto efficient sharing role between household members [Chiappori (1988), Browning and Chiappori (1998)]. Crucial to the non unitary models is the relative "power" of individual members in the household [see Pollak (1994)]. As Basu (2001a) has recently pointed out, a distinctive, perhaps limiting, characteristic of the literature on non unitary models is that the welfare weights assigned to the individual household members are fixed and exogenous to household decision making. To our knowledge, Basu (2001 a) is the first attempt at endogenising the welfare weight' in a model of intra household behaviour. The present study extends Basu (2001 a) in several ways: (i) Basu's framework is generalised to allow a simple test of his assumption that the female's share of adult wage earnings is a correct measure of her bargaining power, (ii) the woman's welfare weight is allowed to depend on the relative educational experience of the woman vis a vis the man, (iii) empirical evidence is presented on the endogenously determined welfare weight, on its variation with female education, and on its impact on household expenditure patterns2. The results are particularly significant since ' See, also, Pollak (1994) for a similar argument. In this paper, we treat the terms "welfare weight" and "power" synonymously. 2See Moehling (1995) for evidence on the impact of the child's work status, used as a proxy for her bargaining power, on the distribution of household resources. there exists little empirical evidence on household behaviour in an intra household model where the welfare weights are endogenously determined and simultaneously estimated with the other behavioural parameters. The significance of the impact of female "power" on expenditure allocation, conditional on all other household characteristics including aggregate household expenditure remaining constant, constitutes a test of the income pooling hypothesis underlying the unitary model [see Maitra and Ray (2000) for an alternative test]. The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes the estimation. The results are presented and discussed in Section 3. The paper concludes with Section 4. 2. The Intra Household Model with Endogenous Welfare Weights Let us consider a household with a woman, man and a child. We shall denote these individuals as 1, 2, 3 respectively. Following the "collective approach", the household welfare function is: W = 0(z)u (x) + (1 - O(Z))U2 (x) (1) where ul and u2 denote, respectively, the individual utilities of the woman and the man, specified as a function of goods and leisure, x. The balance of power in the household, 0 s [0, 1], is dependent on a set of household characteristics, z. As 0 increases, the 'power' of the woman increases, and vice versa. The "collective approach" either considers 0 to be fixed, or specifies the z variables to be exogenous to the analysis so that 0 is also exogrenous. The unitary model imposes the restriction of common preferences on (1), i.e., u, (x) = u2 (x) = u(x). Following Basu (2001a, Section 2), we endogenise 0 by allowing the z vector to include choice variables that are also contained in x. To simplify the exposition, let us specify the individual utilities to be functions of leisure hours, i.e. 1l, 12, 13 which are, respectively, the leisure hours of the 2 man, woman and the child. The individual utilities are specified as u(,,13),u2(122,13). The assumption made here is that, while the woman and the man do not care for each other's leisure, they both care for the "leisure" of their child (13) which includes time spent on her/his schooling. The household's welfare maximisation problem can, therefore, be written as: MAX O(Z)U1(1,13)+(1-O(Z))u2(12,13) (2) (w.r.t. 11,12,13) subjectto w,l, +w212 +w313 +i 1. Eqn (5a) allows, via 1, the female power parameter, *, to depend on the relative educational experiences of the woman and the man. Note, therefore, 3 Since the focus of this paper is on the adult welfare weights, child labour (e3) enters the analysis quite tangentially via the adult utilities, ul, u2. For more complex models of child labour, see Basu and Van (1998), Ray (2000) and Basu (2001b). that a test of Oo = 1, ¢ = 0 constitutes a test of Basu (2001a)'s assumption that the female's share of adult earnings is a correct measure of her bargaining power. Let us choose the following simple functional forms for ul, u2: u, (e, ,e3)=e -PIe-P3 (6a) PI>0, P3>0 u2(e2,e3) = e2 e3PeP3 (6b) P2>0, p3>0 After routine manipulation, the welfare maximisation exercise yields the following estimable female and male earnings equations, expressed as a share of total household earnings, E = (w1e1 + w2e2 + w3e3): w1e_ e1 {pOe-PI-1 -0 1 (e'PI - e-P2 )} E(1+3es +p pX~~2 (7a) E (PI + P30el P' -F (P2 + P3 Xl - 0)2-P2 W2e2 (1-0)p2e-P' -02e2(elP' -ePI ) (PI + P3e + (P2 + P3 X1 - 0)P2b where 0° =-> °, 02 =-<0 denote the responsiveness of the female's bargaining power to ael , e2 female and male labour hours, respectively. In conventional treatments of the "collective" model, 01 =02=0. The empirical exercise employs a two stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the female power function parameters (4'o, 1,), along with utility function parameters (pi, P2) by applying nonlinear SUR on equations (7a, 7b). Using the estimated values of +o and +1, we then generate via eqns. (5, 5a) the female power variable, 0. The second stage involves estimating, using 3SLS, the following set of simultaneous equations - the (N - 1) independent budget share equations (bsi, N being the number of items), the total per capita expenditure (tpc) equation, and the Lj. female power (0) equation, with bsi (i = 1,..., N-1), tpc and 0 being treated as jointly endogenous. Note in particular that we have allowed for the dependence of the "female power" variable, 0, on, among others, the household's aggregate expenditure variable, tpc. Note also the joint and mutual dependence of commodity demand (bsi), aggregate expenditure (tpc) and female power (0), via (8a) - (8c) in the empirical exercise. bs; = fi (wI,W2,W3, tpc, tpC2,0,02, n) (8a) i= 1,...N-1 tpc=fN(wI,w2,5w3, 0,02,d,r,n) (8b) 0 = fN+l (w,I w2w3, tpc, d, r, ed,, ed2, n) (8c) where n denotes the vector of household compositional variables, and d, r denote the characteristics of the household's region of residence. To simplify estimation, we assume linear functional forms in eqns. (8a) - (8c). 3. Data and Results The data on child labour comes from the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) conducted in June, 1995 by the Household Survey Unit of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The main objective of the NLSS is to collect data from Nepalese households and provide information to the government to monitor progress in national living standards and to evaluate the impact of various policies and programs on the living conditions of the population. The sample size for the NLSS is 3388 households. Further, this sample is divided into four strata based on the geographic regions of the country: mountains, urban hills, rural hills and terai. This study uses the following 7-item breakdown of total consumer expenditure: Tobacco, Food, Fuel, Housing, Education, Consumer Durables and Clothing. 5 Table 1 presents the results of estimating equations (7a, 7b). With the exception of p3, all of the other parameter estimates are well determined and highly significant. The Pi, P2 estimates show that the magnitude of the negative impact of male labour hours on his utility (P2) is higher than that of female labour hours on her utility or welfare (pi). The estimates of 4o, 4) convincingly reject the joint hypothesis: 4o = 1, 4) = 0 ie., that the wage earnings distribution between the woman and the man is an accurate measure of their bargaining power. The 4o estimate of 0.889 suggests that the woman's share of adult wage earnings is an understatement of her true bargaining power, while the 41 estimate shows that the magnitude of this understatement increases with an increase in the woman's educational experience vis a vis that of the man. Table 2 reports the results of the 3SLS estimates of the equation system (8a) - (8c). The 4 parameter estimates used in the 3SLS estimation, reported in Table 2, assumes 41 = 0 (see eqn. (5a)). The qualitative results are robust to the relaxation of this assumption (see footnote of Figure 1). The endogeneity of the female bargaining power variable, 0, is underlined by the significance of most of the household characteristics in the estimated equation (8c). Six features stand out, in particular: (i) the female's bargaining power (0) is significantly and positively affected by the woman's wage rate and negatively by the man's; (ii) the child wage rate has little impact on 0; (iii) women in the rural areas of Nepal have, ceteris paribus, higher bargaining power than their urban counterpart; (iv) the female's bargaining power is highly sensitive to household composition - that is, ceteris paribus, females enjoy greater power in households with more women and older children but less power in households with more men and younger children; (v) a ceteris paribus increase in the female's educational experience leads to a significant increase in her bargaining power inside the household; and (vi) a similar increase in the male's educational experience has an opposite effect. 6 Of the other results in Table 2, the ones of particular interest relate to the impact of female power (0) on the budget shares of the 7 items, and on the household's per capita aggregate expenditure. With the exception of consumer durables, all of the other budget share equations reject the principal testable implication of the unitary model, namely, that the 0, 02 variables are jointly insignificant in their impact on the individual budget shares. While 0 is significant for aggregate household expenditure, the 02 term is not significant. The results also show that the relationship between budget share (bs,) and the female's bargaining power (0), while mostly non-linear, varies greatly between items. This is brought out clearly in Figure 1. Tobacco, for example, is an interesting example of a "private good" which is consumed (almost exclusively) by the adult male in the household. As female power increases, the share of tobacco falls continuously until it reaches a minimum (o = 0.7) when it starts to rise again. The sensitivity of the relation between the budget share and female power is seen more clearly in Figure 2, which involves a finer (14-good) disaggregation of the food items in a 3SLS re- estimation of equations (8a - 8c). The 3SLS estimates are available on request. These show [see footnote of Figure 2] that eggs and milk, cooking oil, and sweets (both of which are jointly consumed inside the household) do not reject the constancy of budget share with respect to 0 and 02 which the unitary model implies. Baby milk, which, like tobacco, has the features of a private good in that it is consumed exclusively by a child member, exhibits significantly non-monotonic relationships with respect to 0. Generally, items which have features of a "public good" in that they are consumed by all members (i.e., flour and rice, eggs and milk, and meat) tend to show greater monotonicity than other "privately consumed" items (i.e., baby milk, alcohol, and tobacco). The graphs presented in Figures 1 and 2 do not provide much support to the picture of a horizontal straight line that is implied by the unitary model. The idea of income pooling, underlying the traditional unitary model, with the female weights or bargaining power having no impact on 7 expenditure pattern, has only limited support, mainly from items (eg., consumer durables in Table 2) which are jointly consumecl inside the householi. 4. Summary and Conclulsions In the unitary model, the identity of the income recipient within the household is irrelevant in traditional analysis of household expenditure. Also, an unequal balance of power between men and women in making household decisions has little consequence for household outcomes. Consequently, the "power" of individuals in making decisions has attracted little attention in studies of household behaviour. The "collective approach" departs from these restrictive features by expressing household welfare as a weighted sum of individual utilities. However, the weights are considered to be fixed or exogenous to the analysis. One therefore overlooks the possibility that the weights could be altered by the outcomes themselves. This paper extends the collective approach by proposing and estimating a framework where the weights are endogenised and simultaneously determined with the household's expenditure and earnings decisions. Defining a female's "power" as her endogenously determined welfare weight, the study finds on Nepalese data that the woman's share of household earnings understates her true "power" in influencing household outcomes. Other interesting results include: (a) ceteris paribus, the rural woman enjoys greater power within the household than her urban counterpart, and (b) education plays an effective role in enhancing the power of women inside the household. The estimates of the "female power" equation provide considerable support to Basu (2001a)'s suggestion that the welfare weights should be estimated simultaneously with the household outcomes. The statistical significance or otherwise of the impact of female power on an item's budget share provides a convenient test of the income pooling hypothesis underlying the unitary model. The results provide little evidence in support of income pooling, especially for items which have the 8 characteristics of a "private good" in being primarily consumed by particular household members. Note, however, that limited support for income pooling does exist for items that are collectively consumed inside the household. The results reveal some interesting non-monotonic relationships between "female power" and budget share that vary a good deal between items. 9 References Basu, K. (2001a), "Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously - Determined Balance of Power", CAE Working Paper, 01-01, Cornell University, USA. Basu, K. (2001b), "A Note on Multiple General Equilibria with Child Labour", forthcoming in Economics Letters. Basu, K. and P. H. Van (1998), "The Economics of-Child Labour", American Economic Review, 88, 412-427. Becker, G.S. (1981), A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Browning, M. and P. Chiappori (1998), "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterisation and Empirical Tests", Econometrica, 66 (6), 1241-1278. Chiappori, P.A. (1988), "Rational Household Labour Supply", Econometrica, 56(1), 63-89. Kanbur, R. and L. Haddad (1994), "Are Better Off Households More Unequal or Less Unequal: A Bargaining Theoretic Approach to 'Kuznets' Effects at the Micro Level", Oxford Economic Papers, 46(3), 445-458. Lundberg, S. and R. Pollak (1994), "Non Cooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage", American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 84(2), 132-137. Maitra, P. and R. Ray (2000), "Intra Household Resource Allocation and their Impact on Expenditure Patterns: Comparative Evidence from South Africa and Pakistan", School of Economics Discussion Paper 2000-09, University of Tasmania, Australia. Manser, M. and M. Brown (1980), "Marriage and Household Decision Making: A Bargaining Analysis", International Economic Review, 21(3), 31-44. McElroy, M. and M. Horney (1981), "Nash Bargained Household Decisions", International Economic Review, 22 (3), 333-350. Moehling, C.M. (1995), The Intra-Household Allocation of Resources and the Participation of Children in Household Decision-Making: Evidence from Early Twentieth-Century America, mimeo: North Western Jniversity, USA. Pollak, R.A. (1994), "For Better or Worse: The Role of Power in Models of Distribution Within Marriage", American Economic Review, 84(2), 148-152. Ray, R. (2000), "Child Labor, Child Schooling, and their Interaction with Adult Labor: Empirical Evidence for Peru and Pakistan", World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 347-367. Samuelson, P. (1956), "Social Indifference Curves", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 1-22. Table 1: Non Linear SUR Estimates of Earnings Share Equation Parameters [Eqns. (7a, 7b)J Parameter Estimate" fO 0.889 (0.024) ti -0.015 (0.004) Pi 0.863 (.029) P2 1.118 (.012) P3 -5.1 le-8 (5.15e-6) a Standard Errors in Brackets Table 2: 3SLS Estimates of Simultaneous Equationsa [Eqns. (8a) - (8c)] Coefficient Estimateb Variable Tobacco Food Fuel Housing Education Durables Clothing Female Wage Rate 2.37e-4 -0.002 1.33e-4 0.002 -4.3 1e-4 6.23e-5 5.66e-4 (4.47e-5) (2.30e-4) (2.24e-5) (1.74e-4) (9.57e-5) (7.19e-5) (1.36e-4) -1.32e-5 5.89e-4 -5.07e-5 -4.81e-4 7.46e-5 -7.17e-5 -4.6e-5 Male Wage Rate (1.38e-5) (7.66e-5) (7.05e-6) (5.85e-5) (2.99e-5) (2.17e-5) (4.2e-5) Child Wage Rate -5.73e-5 3.82e-4 -2.04e-5 -5.27e-5 -1.73e-4 1.09e-4 -1.87e-4 (3.35e-5) (1.84e-4) (1.7e-5) (1.4 1e-4) (7.23e-5) (5.27e-5) (1.02e-4) No. of Women 8.12e-4 -0.026 0.002 0.023 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 (7.1 Oe-4) (0.004) (3.61 e-4) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) No. of Men -0.004 0.030 -0.003 -0.021 0.009 0.003 -0.013 (8.48e-4) (0.005) (4.28e-4) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) J 36e-5 uo 111 3.7e-5 0.002 0.0 15 -0.002 -0.004 No. of Children (aged 10- 15 years) ).36e-5 -0.011.e5 .0 .05-.02-.0 (6.98e-4) (0.004) (3.56e-4) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) -0.002 -0.004 1.39e-4 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.006 No. of Children (aged less than 10 years) (3.88e-4) (0.002) (1.97e-4) (0.002) (8.38e-4) (6.14e-4) (0.001) Total Per Capita Consumption -2.39e-6 -1.61e-5 3.98e-7 9.2 1e-6 9.56e-6 6.60e-6 -7.23e-6 (3.65e-7) (1.80e-6) (1.8le-7) (1 .36e-6) (7.79e-7) (5.96e-7) (I. 12e-6) (Total Per capita Consumption)2 1 .46e-1 1 1.06e-10 -5.2 le-12 -5.13e- I -6.97e-1 1 -3.73e-11 4.3 le-l 1 (2.77e-12) (1.36e-I1) (1.37e-12) (1.02e-11) (5.91e-12) 4.53e-12 (8.48e-12) Female Power -0.132 1.361 -0.086 -1.111 0.321 -0.016 -0.338 (0.032) (0.167) (0.016) (0.126) (0.070) (0.052) (0.099) (Female Power)2 0.092 -0.939 0.057 0.780 -0.238 -0.002 0.250 (0.027) (0.138) (0.013) (0.105) (0.058) (0.043) (0.082) Constant 0.069 0.537 0.036 0.279 -0.126 -0.036 0.24 (0.009) (0.043) (0.004) (0.033) (0.018) (0.014) (0.026) 12 Table 2: (Continued) Per Capita Consumption (tpc) Female Power (0) Coefficient Coefficient Variable Estimateb ariable Estimateb Female Wage Rate 576.62 Female Wage Rate 0.003 Male Wage Rate -157.57 Male Wage Rate (6.i4e-5) -36.90) -2.714e-4 Child Wage Rate (49.52) Child Wage Rate (2. 16e-4) No. of Women 7299.98 No. of Women (0.047) No. of Men ~~~-8536.68 No fMn-0.053 No. of Men (2868.99) No. of Men (0.004) No. of Children (aged 10 - 15 years) (1223.36) No. of Children (aged 10 - 15 years) (0.005) No. of Children (aged less than 10 -691.09 No. of Children (aged less than 10 -0.007 years) (867.35) years) (0.002) DR' (Development Region) -2911.86 DRC (Development Region) (0.005) (959.08) 005 RURURB (I = rural, 0 = urban) (13333.37) RURURB (I = rural, 0 = urban) (0.015) Female Power -285274.6 Total Per Capita Consumption (5.30e-7) (Female Power)2 163658 edl (Years of Schooling of Most 0.004 (Female Power)2 (126122.3) Educated Female Member) (0.001) 67630.67 ed2 (Years of Schooling of Most -0.006 Constant (19005.46) Educated Male Member) (0.001) Constant ~~~~~~~~0.3 14 Constant (0.019) ' The Breusch Pagan test yields 2 = 2277.954, thus confirming the simultaneity of the nine equations. b Standard errors in parentheses c DR = I for Eastern Nepal, 2 for Central Western, 3 for Mid Western/Far Western Nepal as the region of residence of the household. 13 Figure 1. Relationship Between Household ]Expenditure Shares and Female Power (0)1 share of tobacco share of education 0.06- 0.15 0.04- 0.1 0.02 - 0.05 - 0 0- / 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 share of food share of consumer durables 1- 0.03 0.8- 0.6 0.02- 0.4 - 0.2 - 0.01 - 0- , 0 , 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 share of fuel share of clothing 0.04 0.2 0.03 0.15- 0.02 0.1 0.01 0.05- 0 60 0 0 - , 0 0.5 1 0 0.51 share of housing total consumption per capita 0.5 - 150000 - 0.4 - \ 100000 0.2- 50000 0.2 - O 0 0.1 0. 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 'Constant factors of 0.05 and 40,000 were added to the education expenditure share function and the total consumption per capita functions, respectively, to ensure nonnegative values at each level of female power. While results from the basic 3SLS model for 0 (where + is not dependent on anything) were used to produce the graphs, essentially the same graphs would have resulted from using the extended 3SLS model for 0 (where + = (+0 + +1 (maxfemed/maxmaled)) since the output for both models was almost exactly the same. All figures were calculated at the mean values for all of the other variables in each equation. Results for consumer durables with respect to 0 and 02 were not significant, and the coefficient for 02 in the total consumption per capita function was not significant. 14 Figure 2. Relationship Between Household Food Expenditure Shares and Female Power (0)1 share of flour and rice share of meat 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.08 0.4 0.06 0.2 0.02 00 0, . 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 share of pulses and beans share of spices and condiments 0.1 0.15 0.08 - 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0 0 0 O 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 share of eggs and milk share of sweets/candy 0.1 0.025 0.08 - 0.02 0.06 0.015 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.005 0 .0 0 , 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 share of baby milk share of non-alcoholic drinks 0.06 0.02 0.05 .1 0.04 0015 0.03 -_0.01_-_\ 0.02 0 0.01 0.005 0 0 0 O0 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 share of cooking oil share of alcohol 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 000 0 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 share of vegetables share of tobacco 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0 ,0 0 . 0 0.5 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 share of fruits share of miscellaneous food expenditures 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 002 0.03 ooij 1 0. 0.02 0 0.4 0.6 0. o ~~~~0.5 1 o 0.2 0.4 0.6 e. I 'Food expenditure shares were calculated as the share of purchased value of these goods relative to total food expenditure. Constant factors of 0.05 and 0.02 were added to the functions for baby milk and alcohol, respectively, in order to ensure nonnegative expenditure share values. All figures were calculated at the mean values for all of the other variables in each equation. Results for eggs and milk, cooking oil, and sweets were not significant in the 3SLS estimation with respect to 0 and 02. Results for miscellaneous food expenditures were not significant with respect to 02. 15 Policy Research Working Paper Series Contact Title Author Date for paper WPS2791 The Static and Dynamic Incidence of Dominique van de Walle February 2002 H. Sladovich Vietnam's Public Safety Net 37698 WPS2792 Determinants of Life Insurance Thorsten Beck February 2002 A. Yaptenco Consumption across Countries Ian Webb 31823 WPS2793 Agricultural Markets and Risks: Panos Varangis February 2002 P. Kokila Management of the Latter, Not the Donald Larson 33716 Former Jock R. Anderson WPS2794 Land Policies and Evolving Farm Zvi Lerman February 2002 M. Fernandez Structures in Transition Countries Csaba Csaki 33766 Gershon Feder WPS2795 Inequalities in Health in Developing Adam Wagstaff February 2002 H. Sladovich Countries: Swimming against the Tide? 37698 WPS2796 Do Rural Infrastructure Investments Jocelyn A. Songco February 2002 H. Sutrisna Benefit the Poor? Evaluating Linkages: 88032 A Global View, A Focus on Vietnam WPS2797 Regional Integration and Development Maurice Schiff February 2002 P. Flewitt in Small States 32724 WPS2798 Fever and Its Treatment among the Deon Filmer March 2002 H. Sladovich More or Less Poor in Sub-Saharan 37698 Africa WPS2799 The Impact of the Indonesian Lisa A. Cameron March 2002 P. Sader Financial Crisis on Children: Data from 33902 100 Villages Survey WPS2800 Did Social Safety Net Scholarships Lisa A. Cameron March 2002 P. Sader Reduce Drop-Out Rates during the 33902 Indonesian Economic Crisis? WPS2801 Policies to Promote Saving for Dimitri Vittas March 2002 P. Infante Retirement: A Synthetic Overview 37642 WPS2802 Telecommunication Reforms, Access Antonio Estache March 2002 G. Chenet-Smith Regulation, and Internet Adoption Marco Manacorda 36370 in Latin America Tommaso M. Valletti WPS2803 Determinants of Agricultural Growth Yair Mundlak March 2002 P. Kokila in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Donald F. Larson 33716 Thailand Rita Butzer WPS2804 Liberalizing Trade in Agriculture: John S. Wilson March 2002 P. Flewitt Developing Countries in Asia and the 32724 Post-Doha Agenda WPS2805 To Spray or Not to Spray? Pesticides, John S. Wilson March 2002 P. Flewift Banana Exports, and Food Safety Tsunehiro Otsuki 32724 Policy Research Working Paper Series Contact Title Author Date for paper WPS2806 Dirty Exports and Environmental John S. Wilson March 2002 P. Flewitt Regulation: Do Standards Matter to Tsunehiro Otsuki 32724 Trade? WPS 2807 The Role of Natural Resources in Benoit Elosquet March 2002 D. Duff Fundamental Tax Reforrn in the 39506 Russian Federation WPS2808 A Capital Accord for Emerging Andrew Powell March 2002 E. Mekhova Economies 85984 WPS2809 On the Measurement and Impact of Robert D. Ebel March 2002 M. Morris Fiscal Decentralization Serdar Yilmaz 37285 WPS2810 Growth, Distribution, and Poverty Luc Christiaensen March 2002 N. Nouviale in Africa: Messages from the 1990s Lionel Demery 34514 Stefano Paternostro WPS2811 The Epidemiological Impact of an John Stover March 2002 H. Sladovich HIV/AIDS Vaccine in Developing Geoff P. Garnett 37698 Countries Steve Seitz Steven Forsythe WPS2812 Can Financial Markets be Tapped to Jerry Skees March 2002 P. Kokila Help Poor People Cope with Weather Panos Varangis 33716 Risks? Donald Larson Paul Siegel WPS2813 The Collective Model of the Household Kaushik Basu March 2002 N. Jameson and an Unexpected Implication for Ranjan Ray 30677 Child Labor: Hypothesis and an Empirical Test