Report No. 7685-AFR Intra-Regional Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa May 23, 1941 Economics and Finance Division Technical Department Atrica Region FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Document of the World Banl This documenrt has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. 4 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ADB African Development Bank ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nat onc CACM Central American Common Market CET Common External Tariff EAC East African Community ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States EFTA European Free Trade Association FIAS Foreign Investment Advisory Service FIAS Foreign Investment Advisory Service FOSIDEC The development fund of CEAO GATT General Agreement on tariffs and trade IOC Indian Ocean Commission LAFTA (LAIA) Latin American Free Trade Association (Latin American Integration Association) LOC Letters of Credit NTB Non Tariff Barrier OAU Oroanization of African Unity OGL Open General Licence PE Pub;ic Enterprise PTAFCCI Preferential Trade Area Federaticn of Chambers of Commerce and Industr-y QR Quantitative Restriction RCA Revealed Comparative Advantage RCTD Road Customs Transit, Document SAC Structural AdDust.ment CredIt SACU Southern Africa Customs Union SAL Structural Ad3ustment Loan SECAL. Sectoral Adiustment Loan EITC Standard International Trade Classification SSA Sub Saharan Afri-ca UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Pfrica UNSO United Nations Statist-cal Office WDR W*rld Developmenlt Report FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY INTRA-RECIONAL TRADE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFKXCA TABLE OF CONTENTS Paa- No. EXECUTIVE SUNMARY Analytical issues iv Scop of the report ..vi Operational issue . . .vi Next steps . ..vii I. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEX . . . . . . . 1 A. Motivation for this study. 1 B. Scope and coverage. 3 C. Outline of the report. 4 II. THE RATIONALE FOR BANK SUPPORT TO INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN SSA 4 A. Does Regional Integration in SSA Make Economic Sesno? . . . 4 B. Reconciling Regional Integration with Trade Liberalization 10 C. Risks and Limitations of a Regional Approach .14 D. Achieving Success Where the Regional Groupings Have Failed 23 A..I. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICY OF INTEGRATED AREAS . . 23 A. Present status of SSA arrangements .23 B. Economic Characteritice and Performance .24 C. General Comments . 43 IV. METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A. Description of data . 46 B. Revealed Comparative Advantage . 47 C. Other Measures .49 D. General Results . 49 V. THE MAJOR CONSTRAINTS ON INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE EXPANSION . . 56 A. Introduction .56 B. Natural Constraints .57 C. Market Failures .58 D. Policy Failures .64 VI. THE WAY AHEAD . 73 A. What could be done .73 B. Main Elements of a New Approach .74 C. Consistency with the Aims of the Existing Regional Groupings 76 L. Consistency with Ongo'.ng Bank Efforts .76 E. Some General Modalities .77 F. Compensation . 78 G. The nature of possible Bank intervention .79 H. Co)rdination with other efforts .81 I. Noxt steps . a82 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance I of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization - ii - Ann-x 1 Aitive Regional Intogration Organization in Africa . 384 Annex 2: Imports and Exports of th- countries of Sub-Saharan rest of the world .85-94 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................... . 113-115 Table 1: Market size of SSA Economic groupings (measured by GDP) . . 9 Table 2: C'anaification of SSA Countries According to Trade Restrictions . .11 Table 3: Experincic and Objectives of Bank-Supported trade liberalization efforts in SSA.. .. 16-21 Table 4: Basic Indicators for Selected Economic and Trade Group . .26 Table 5: Basic Indivators . .29 Table 6: Trade Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1965-1983 . 31-33 Table 7: Trade Flows in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1983 .34-36 Table 8: Intrak-Regional Trade and Degree of Openness . . . 45 Table 9: Trade Potential in SSA: 1983 . 51-53 Table 10: Trade Potential in SSA: 1983 ..54 Table 11: SSA Trade FlowB and the Share of Intra-Regional Trade, 1983 .55 Tii report was prepared by a team consisting of Messrs. Ali Mansoor (AFTTF), Salomon Samen (AFSIE), Paul Morawetz (Consult&nt), Mmes. Maneesha Vaishampayan (Consultant), Cristina Corado (Consultant), Muna Salim (AFTTF) - iii - Executive Summarv Qbiectives and Backcround 1. Links to the Long Term Perspective Study. The recently publitned Bank report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, A Long Term Perspective Study emphasizes the importance of Regional Cooperation and Economic Integration as a key ingredient for the next generation of development policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. This report concentrates on the trade related aspects of this issue. It is thus able to explore in some detail the key issues that need to be addressed in making the proposed strategy of the Long Term Perspective Study operational. 2. objectives. In particular, this report proposes an agenda to overcome the obstacles that have contributod to the stagnation at a low level of official intra-Sub-Saharan African trade. While it provides considerable statistical information on and a comprehensive account of the practical (non- tariff) constraints and barriers to intra-Sub-Saharan African trade, its main contribution is to link sustained increases in regional trade to the dismantling of the barriers that limit cross-border investment and labor flows. The report therefore analyzes the conceptual basis and efficiency implications of African economic tntegration initiatives. It sets out proposals on what needs to be done to overcome constraints limiting regional exchange of both products and factors of production. Making these proposals operational will require further analytical work in areas which the report identifies. 3. Background. The fragmentation of Africa has focussed attention on the benefits of economic integration. In practice, however, despite the rhetoric of African leaders and various attempts at market integration, little progress has been achieved. Thus, official trade among Sub-Saharan African countries has stagnated over the past two decades and amounts to a mere US$4 billion -- only 6 percent of total African trade. This, de!spite estimaces that up to a further US$5 billion of Africa's imports from the rest of the world could be supplied by other African countries that are already exporting similar products outside the region 1/. 4. Various regicnal organizations in Africa have been trying to achieve this potential a-nd several have approached the Bank for help. The initial requests correctly focus I on financing regional investment and on strengthening the payments mechar,-m amongst regional trading partners. 5. Increased foreign exchange availability from foreign sources in support of chronic deficits is not a sufficient response and it may, in fact, be dangerous as it will increase the likelihood of default. Instead it is necessary to make the deficits sustainable by strengthening the productive capacity of the deficit countries. 6. The Basic Problem. The lack of progress with regional trade liberalization stems mainly from inappropriate macroeconomic policies -- overvalued exchange rates, excessive fiscal deficits, distorted credit allocation, and neavy domestic market protection. These policies have also ;/ If the potential additional intra-regional exporLs of $5 billion was achieved this would result in a $10 billion increase in intra-regional trade to $14 billion. Thus, the share of intra-regional trAde would t.ebi. from b to 18 percent. - iv - had an adverse impact on productive investment and hence economic performance in general. At the same time they hLve spurred the growth in Africa's parallel markets and informal bordtr trade. Thus the prospects for regional integration are closely linked to general economic reform that addresses the macro-economic imbalanoes. 7. Unfortunately, experience suggestw that the required adjustments will be slow. In particular, African governments have found it difficult to restr&in fiscal and monetary policy sufficiAntly to implement an exchange rate policy that keeps the rate at a level which can be sustained without extensive payments restrictions. In turn, the administration of these restrictions seems to be biased against financing cross-border economic activity. In parallel, there is no incentive to trade at official relative prices when one currency is relatively over-valued. 8. Bene'its. There may, thus, be significant returns from implementing, during the transition period, second best solutions aimed at relaxing administrative barriers against increased intra-regional activity. Any such measures would be implemented in parallel with ongoing national adjustment programs. 9. African economies are economically small (the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa is no larger than the Netherlands). This implies that attempts to create regional barriers against third parties are doomed to failure. These would make African production even less competitive by encouraging trade diversion (substituting cheap third party imports with expensive regional imports). Instead, the main benefits of regional integration will arise from the restructuring of African economies that is associated with trade creation (the substitution of expensive domestic production with less expensive cagional imports). ADAiytical issues 10. The report argues that regional initiatives should promote efficient resource allocation and better integration into the world economy. The ultimate objective should be to create conditions which would allow the private sector to freely work, invest and trade across African borders and with relatively low barriers against third parties. Thus a shift is needed by African governments and regional organizations from the concentration on selective tariff cuts to measures that promote factor mobility and support the free movement of goods and services. 11. Instead of relying solely on gradual liberalization of trade with the whole world on a unilateral basis, this approach would strengthen ind extend ongoing adjustment efforts by adding another dimension: the liberalization of regional factor and product markets. To compensate for the narrower scope in terms of partners, mutual (regional) liberalization should be extensive &nd rapid. This may be politically more demanding than current reform programs and capital mobility would be eaaier to achieve than labor mobility. 12. Nevertheless, support for integration initiatives should not aim at saving so far-failed efforts at regional import substitution behind high barriers against third parties, even though that might be politically more attractive. if extensive mutual regional liberalization (i.e. the minimum reform required for greater integration along efficient lines) is not palatable, it waild be preferable to concentrate on national efforts than to get involved wit} increasing trade discrimination against third parties which would either fai or be detrimental to efficiency 13. The prriposed apprcach relies on the pressure from a private sector constituency that would benefit from the focus on creating conditions conducive to legalizing and enhancing private cross-border economic activity. This and the voluntary and incremental mutual liberalization advocated could - v - contribute to increase political commitment by African Governments compared tO Lhe weak political support they extend to current efforts. 14. The basic premise of the report is that regional trade liberalization should be an intermediary stage towards general liberalization and thie suggests discouraging the formation of Customs Unions 2/. This is because future reform would be harder if lowering external tariffs required several governments to agree, such as in a Customs Union arrangement. Where a Cocmon External Tariff (CET) already exists, as in UDEA.C, its limitations will have to be accepted. Fortunately, the UDEAC CET itself does not appear to extend excessive regional preferences. Thus the promotion of efficient regional integratior could be achieved while leaving the CET in place, provided all other import taxes and charges are replaced with domestic taxes. 15. Temporary increases in regional preferences are acceptable providea this occurs as part of a general and significant lowering of external protection with an assurance that this increase in regional preference would indeed be temporary. Such increased regional preferences could also be accepted if the resulting discrimination remained reasonable. 16. Closer economic links should be based on existing and potential complementarities and trade flows. In this respect, existing Regional Economic Groupings in SSA, set up for a variety of, sometimes non-economic reasons, are not necessarily optimal. However, given that they exist and give4i the commitment of the member governments to them, to the extent possible, any new initiatives should work with and through the exist.ng sub- regional organizations. Nevertheless, new initiatives should promote factor mobility and thle free movement of goods and servicee within the group as well as generalized trade liberalization with the rest of the world; they should not aim at reversing the failure to activate customs unions with high barriers against non-members including those on the content. 17. Existing undertakings and agreements by the member states should be the startarig point. for a regional initlative and should be interpreted as the minimum commitment of member States. In consequence, existing organizations should allow and indeed encourage sub--groups of states to implement more rarpid and extensive elimination of trade barriers and obstacles to labor and capital mobility between them, while recognizing that some membere would not want tc proreed further than already agreed. To support these efforts, donors could assist thoes individual member States that are prepared to relax controls on cross-border flows of factors of production arid goods and services. 18. The repcrt estimates potential trade based on existing formal trade, This Revealed Conparative Advantage methodology impiicitly assumes efficiency in current trading patterns whereas i.n some instances imported inputs may be contributing to negative value added. Thus while the analysis is useful in indicating some orders of magnitude concerning the potential volume of trade that would occur in a liberalized trading regime, given the 2/ This is not to deny that Regional Integration has benefits that make it worthwhile to pursue as an objective in itself. Lachler (1989) argues that while size is not a substitute for openness, being big and open yields better growth performance than being small and open. This is because economic integration provides more room for internal competition through a larger internal market than could be achieved by uni-lateral liberalization. More imjportantly, labor and capital mobility within this larger market enhance the prosfocts of increased productive capacity and efficient use of factor resourcee. Further, there are viso pcl:tica&. imperRtivep that mas make integration desirable. The po.int here is simply that regiqnal trade liberalization should be seen 84 part of a wider procese of lowering barriers againest all t i-d parties tc avoid costly 4trade djixeer.i ou - vi - extensive diotortions, caution is required in judging spe'ific trading opportunities that might be apparent from the data. 19. More work could be dune to evaluate areas with actual comparative advantage that would be expected to lead to more regional trade. However, such an exercise is fraught with difficulty and the important message of the analysis is that substantial efficient *rade flows would materialize provided distortions to the incentive structure were eliminated. An example of the difficulty of identifying winners and losers is provided by Mauritius. Within a decade it became the third largest exporter of woollen knitwear without a previous tradition of knitting or weaving, with no domestic supply of wool and with no prior expertise in a related industry. 20. In emphasizing the role of private economic agents in bringing about regional incegration, the report advocates a new approach that is in line with the objectives of Bank supported adjustment. By establishing pre- set conditions for donor assistance, the proposed approach could br implemented in stages. As private interests respond to emerging regiona± business opportunities, they can become a local pressure group for further economic reform. Scooe of the report 2). The main purpose of the report is to identify barriers to intra- regional trade. In undertaking the study, it was realized that sustaining increased intra-regional trade requires extensive intra-regional liberalization of factor as w2ll as product markets. This is why a discussion of regional integration is a focal point of the report. Nevertheless, the focus of this discussion has been kept on those aspects of regional integration that are most relevant to promoting increased intra- regional trade. This should not be interpreted as an indication that other aspects of integration or regional cooperation are viewed to be unimportant. Qoerational issues 22. Political uncertainties, the need for further study of such key issues as factor mobility and the difficulties in harmonizing policies suggest great caution is required before moving ahead with any actual operation. Harmonization is likely to be particularly problematic since the relevant actions to achieve this -- particularly subsidy policy and the structure of incentives -- tend to be the most contentious issues in most national adjustment programs. 23. Until the political and other issues are better understood it would be wise for outside donors such as the Bank to consult closely with regional organizations and key governments in designing assistance to regional integration. Establishing a franework that countries would decide to adhere to at their own pace may also create operational difficulties that would need to be considered carefully. In some instances there mignt be actions tnat can only be taken at the regional level by the group of countries as a whole. In such cases it might therefore be necessary to insist on joint action. 24. The report identifies a range of possible actions going from areas for further studies to specific measures African governments can adopt and including forms of direct support by donors such as in risk sharing with commercial banks or financing of external inputs needed for restructuring of firms in a regional context. It will be helpful to keep this range of options in mind in designing any pcosible operation, and committed African governments and regional organizaticns could consider some policy reform even without external assistance. - vii - 25. This report should be seen as a vehicle to help carry forward a dialogue between the Bank, other donors, African gov-rnments and relevant African regional organizations. This process should facilitate the emergence of a consensus on how to advance the cause of efficient regional intagration efforts. Indeed, the report itself should be seen mainly as a vehicle to achieve this objective. 26. Much work will also need to be undertaken to obtain a better understanding of key issues and to deal with the various operational questions that need to be resolved before a program of assistance can be designed. 27. It would bce wis* to encourage all the member States to implement the rapid and extensiv, liberalization of factor and product markets advocated in the report. This would be fully consistent with provisions of the relevant Treaty to eliminate obstacles to the fr-e intra-regional flow of goods and factors of production. However, given the wide-ranging and politically difficult implication, of the proposals, it is possible that only a few governments would initially be able to embark on the suggeoted strategy. 28. Thus, the process of dialogue and further research will be critical in determining the eztent and nature of future Bank responses to the increasoing requests from African regional organizations and national Goverrments for assistance in this area. I. ENARAL BAgKGROUND AND CONTEXT A. Motivation for thig study 1.01 The recent economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been uneatisfactory. Over the period 1980-1986, avetage real per capita GNP has declined by 3 percent annually, partly reflecting an Average annual decline in recorded exports of 2 percent compounded by increasing debt burdens. in this environment, the shortage of foreign exchange has forced a contraction of recorded imports from US547 billion in 1980 to an estimated US$29 billion in 1986. To achieve sustained real per capita growth in SSA will require the easing of the foreign exchange constraints. This may involve increased external assistance, including more imaginative forms of debt relief. Nevertheless, without improved economic performance it is difficult to envisage a significant turnaround. 1.02 This is why, in the course of its ongoing policy dialogue with SSA country authorities, the Bank is supporting reforms that will make SSA economies more flexible. Specifically, the Bank has supported the adoption of market determined exchange rates, allocation of foreign exchange based on price signals instead of administrative fiat, the liquidation, privatization and/or rehabilitation of inefficient public enterprises, lower implicit and explicit taxation of export oriented activity, the reduction of barriers to trade axnd easing of price, profit margin and investment controls. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the authorities in SSA will increasingly restructure their economies along these lines. Thus the background assumed is one of a generalized trend towards liberalization even though this may not be uniform across countries or even over time. By the end of 1987, 32 countries in SSA had adopted some form of structural adjustment program with the support of the Bank and 16 countries had accepted the need to liberalize their trade regimes (see Chapter II, Table 3). However, despite these developments and some encouraging progress in countries that have implemented strong reform programs, far more could Still be done to improve the outlook for SSA. 1.03 This is why emphasis needs to be given to measures that will strengthen ongoing reform efforts to achieve more rapid and extensive improvements in efficiency. In practice this requires initiatives in many directions (3ee Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Landell-Mills, 1989) for details) including the strengthening and deepening of the adjustment process through regional integration and cooperation. While such efforts encompass many areas of activity, trade is a logical starting point as well as a natural focal point. This piovides the broad justification for interest in pron,cting efficient intra-African trade. 1.04 This report investigates the potential gains from dismantling or reducing barriers against such trade, while not losing sight of the benefits of greater outward orientation and integration into the world economy. 1.05 In this respect, it is assumed, as argued by Balassa (1979), that the greatest gains require general trade liberalization since intra-SSA trade is not in itself more valuable than other international trade. Nevertheless, the study will inve3tigate the extent to which, i a context of general liberalization, a greater degree of openness amongst SSA countries may yield significant benefits. This arises from the recognition that African countries, even under the most far reaching liberalization programs being considered, are unwilling and perhaps unable to reduce trade barriers close to the level in industrialized countries, let alone completely dismantle them. 1.06 This is mainly because, even in a distortion free environment, shorr run costs can nr.t be reduced to world levels for the bulk of existing manufacturing activity in SSA. Indeed, trade liberalization may be frustrated in SSA because it world accelerate the necessary but politicalJy difficult restructuring of a large number of non-viable enterprises, the bulk of which are in the public sector. Liberalization is also inhibited by fear of excessive specialization in primary coamiodities and the belief that many of the dynamic gains from trade come from industrial exports. 1.07 These considerations underlie the apparent de facto consensus, vs zeveales in the design of the relevant adjustment operations, that it is reasonaole to provide average protection of 40 to 60 percent with tariff rates of 5 to 100 percent, at least in the short to medium term. Such reform thus affords much greater protection than in industrial countries. More importantly, this degr-e of protection is high enough that there may be some scope for further reductions by pursuing a regional strategy that might result in greater unit cost reductions than achievable at the national level. 1.08 There is a significart trade potent'al estimateci at US$4 to US$5 billion among SSA countries, both on primary and industrial exports. This potential is not realized, at least in part because of market and policy failures which diseourage businessmen from identifying lower cost African suppliers to replace higher cost traditional partners. While continuation of commodity aid programs and special bi-lateral arrangements may prevent the i full potential from being realized, the orders of magnitude involved suggest a large scope for efficient intra-SSA trade expansion. 1.09 At the same time, there may also be scope for increased intra- regio dl trade because it may be politically more acceptable to improve efficiency by initially exposing domestic firms to import competition from other African producers instead of world imports. This may result in lower priced products from partners that would limit some expensive domestic production, even though it wil] not give the full benefit of replacing expensive domestic output with tne lowest priced goods on the world market. 1.10 Such considerations justify the speeding of trade liberalization towards other SSA countries. This would reverse the current trend of more rapid liberalization towards trade with non-African countries which arises from biases in the allocation of foreign exchange. 1.11 In the long run there must be an opening up to the discipline of the international market and therefore any regional trade preferences should not be excessive and should be reduced after a clearly specified adaptation period (say 5-10 years), to prevent significant diversion of efficient trade. This means that the eventual aim is to dismantle all non-tariff barriers against external partners and, where relevant, to reduce external tariffs towards the same low level granted to favored African partners. 1.12 To secure the competition needed for the restructuring of African firms through mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, emphasis should be on generalized regional liberalization including factor flows instead of being limited to trade. Such generalized liberalization is also e&ssential for eustaining increased regional trade by creating opportunities for generating the oAefsetting workers' remittances and investment flows to sustain the chronic trade deficits that some countrite would face in the short and medium term. 1.13 A regional approach may also be ralid in the current international climate when the free rider problem may limit future progress in the GATT. The emergence of a single European market in 1992, the US-Canada Free Trade Pact and suggestions for a Free Trade Agreement between the US and Pacific rim countries reflect concern that generalized concessions within the GATT may be harder to achieve now and in the future compared to the past. Indeed, the emergence of large blocs may help mitigate the free rider problem and thus facilitate the inovement to ever freer international trade. SSA as a whole has the economic size of a small industrialized country (such as the Netherlands) and so the relevance of a SSA bloc should not be overemphasized. However, to the extent that internal liberalization within SSA facilitates a lowering of external barriers, this reduction in external protection should - 3 - provide moral arguments for more favorable treatment of African exports including such itema ts Kenyan cut flowers which face ponal tariffs in the US which Colombia, for oxample, is exempt from. 1.14 r,egional liberalization may also be more politically acceptable than unilateral concessions because of the tradeoff wLth other countries. Further, "binding" reforms though an international treaty will make it harder for opponents to challonge than national lagislation. S. Scope and coveraoe 1.15 It is hoped that this study will be usrful in sharpening attention on key issues in the ongoing dialogue between the Bank, other donors and the relevant country authorities. to achieve this, the focus will be limited to broad irauos relevant for SSA as a whole (or the major ty of SSA countries). Further, special circumstances that are relevant only to particular countries will tend to be neglected; the expertile for tackling sucti issues resides with the Country Departments. 1.16 This study does not even attempt to doal with all relevant aspects of trade in SSA. Instead, the study will focus narrowly on the investigation of those barriers, to increased intra-SSA trade, whose removal would significa.,tly improve the growth potential of SSA. This means, for example, that the interesting and important issue of unrecorded trade is largely ignored on the grounds that without extensive field work it is impossible to obtain generalized data that reliably establish the magnitude of such flows and the share of unrecorded trade that arises from lack of harmonization of Government policies compared with that which is forced underground by bad policies. Therefore it is not possible to evaluate how changes In Government policy that affect such trade would contribute to growth. Barad (1988) provides an excellent review if what is known about unrecorded trade in SSA and the December 1988/January 1989 issue of the Southern African Econosist provides interesting illustrations for Southern Africa. 1.17 Suetainable increaaes in intra-African trade will require measures that allow all economic agents to freely trade, invest and work 3cross African boundaries. This and various requests by existing SSA groupings for Bank assistance with regional integration efforts suggest the importance of developing a framework for Bank support in this area. The study therefore elaborates an approach that could build on regional integration to strengthen ongoing adjustment efforts and restore growth in SSA. This framework emphasizes measures that would support sustainable and efficient increases in regional exchange, but is not meant to exclude other worthwhile forms of assistance for specific programs such as locust control or financing for regional public sector infrastructure. 1.18 The nature of the data, the time frame for conducting the study and the number of countries in SSA have imposed the necessity to adopt a sampling approach relying on the collection of anecdotal evidence and the formulation of broad hypotheses. It will be up to individual country economists to follow up on the issues raised while using their own judgement as to which issues are the most pertinent for a particular country. 1.19 The study identifies the impediments to trade that would be expected or. the basis of resource endowments and the current policy environment. This ic done by concentrating on selected products rather than trade as a whole to facilitate drawing general and usable policy r-conmmendations. The study imnplicitly raises questions regarding distributional issues, the political sustainability and phasing of reforms, fiscal and balance of payments implications of lowering barriers and the required supportive investruent and price policies that need to complement trade liberalization. While these issues are critical, especially if reforms are to be implemented and sustained, they can not be adequately dealt with in the framework of the current effort and will need supplementary work, perhaps in the context of a follow-up to the current exercise. -4- 1.20 The analysis covers a large number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and their recorded trade both with partners in established and active regional arrangements and other SSA countries. The active organizatlons either consist of the large multinational economxic and trade organizations (PTA and ECOWAS --the meaning of the acronyms useo here and a brief summary of the activities of these organizations is provided in annex 1) or smaller groups (CEAO, CEPGL, IOC arnd UDEAC). It also encompasses one multinational arrangement with a narrower agenda for coordination (SADCC) and a small trade organization and xiver basini developmerit group (MRU). These organizations share a common goal, namely to cooperate for enhancing economic development through trade and investment. The other regional arrangements in SSA, developmertal commissions for river basins or lakes, common services for research and/or tcnchnical services and financial institutions or monetary arrangsements are not directly relevant for our purposes and are therefore neglected (Berg (1989) provides a comprehensive review). The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) is neglected because of its domination by South Africa which im not considered part of SSA and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECrAS) is not dealt with since it is only now becoming effective and therpfore has no track record. C. Outline nf the rerort l121 rhe report is _r'Qan4zed into chapters that can stand alone eo that the reader may go directl.y tt- the issuEs that are of irnterest. 1.22 Chapter II explcre-s the rationale for regional integration efforts and proposes an approach cornsisternt with the free trade ideal while taking account of the constraints facing major iiberalization efforts. Chapter III summarizes the economic characterist-isa and the pattern of recorded trade irn SSA.N The changes that have occurred in trading patterns over the period 1965 !tefore most groupings were forme'ii to 1983 are reviewed to provide a ba Lg-ound for the ensunrig analysis as we7 1 as motivating a discussiorn of the dynvrres '>rid the fornaticon of the various regional groupings and some preliinary otservationre ;-,t the irtmpact of the various regicnal trade arrangett-nts in SSA Irn Charter TV, the basic trade dala is used to evaluate Revealed 'Sorparative Advantage (?CA) which is then used to select products which are stud.ed more extensivejy. Chapter V reviews the main barriers aga.nst int-2a-SSA trade for the se7ected products. This motivates a review, ir Chapter, 'vl of possible actions that might be taken on improve intra- req:o.na trade and integration prospe :te. 11. THE RATIONALE FOR BANK SU?PORT TO INTECRATION EFFORTS IN SSA A. Does Reoional Intewration in SSA Hake Economic Sense? 2 0i Regiona' integraticn ir justified by a variety of reasons that include political consideratione and the search for greater security. While these are valid in their own right and may even dominate other considerations, here the concern is over economic benefits. 2.02 Supporting regional integratio in SSA is a new area of invoivc'ment for the Bank and the approach is etill being developed. It is often argued that the benefits from greater intra-African exchange are limited given the similar economic structure based on primary commodity production for export outside the region. However, once the framework is extended to consider the different initial, endowments of land and capital (including human capital) the potential benefi.ts are more apparent. Economic integration may offer a means of re.lizing these benefitps by disnant'lng barr:ers to the free flow of goods and services, labor arid. eepectaily, capita) to promote industrial restructuring and allow tfhe emergen:e of etrong African firms through mergere, ,s gaeit one ' 2rt f .c.C'8css Afyic- fxoe-tlers. - 5 - 2. 03 This would support ongoing national struc,ural adjustment effort.s with special relevance for liberalization of economic policy and the mobilization of the privat3 Bectur- J/. For example. cur rencey convertibility may be re-established less pairitully through a gradual transition to a more realistic exchange rate if this is done collectively rather than individually. Similarly, a reform of investment laws would benefit from being carried out at the regional level. 2.04 Achieving these objectives requires significant reduction in external protection together with the free movement of goods and services that characterizes a Free Trade Area combined with the free flow of factor services that is a feature of a Common Market. A Common External Tariff (CET), that is characteristic of Customs Unions and Common Markets, should not be adopted where none exists so as to facilitate the lowering of external protection. A CET requires joint agreement by several countries for changes and this will needlessly complicate trade liberalization. However, where a CET is already in place, there would be no need to dismaitle it unless excessive regional preferences are involved that could significantly divert trade. (Trade diversion occurs when more expensive union partners substitute for less expensive external trade partners as a result of preferences). 2.05 This is particularly true of existing custons inions such as UDEAC. 4/ Instead, the ob-'ective should be to emphasize factor mobility while limiting regional preferences by getting agreement to lower the CEI where relevant. Care would be required, however, to avoid an increase in intra-union preferences by making its CET effective. In summary, with existing Customs Unions the end objective would be a transformation into a Common market with lower external protection than initially. 2.06 Previous and current attemipts to achieve regional integration in SSA identity the rneed "to adopt a t a-xtacb ing regional app oach based primarily on collective scf-reliance so as to make Africa leas Wu6keptible to "the economic and socisl crises i4uffe-ed by the indust ia: countries' (Lagos Plan of Action, Prearnble, article 1). They have thereforc emphasized the granting of selective inti-a-uniior taiiff preferences as a step to a Customs Union and eventually a Common Maiket with high protective barriers so as to achieve import substituting industrialization. 2.07 In contrast, experience suggests that maximizing the benefits from integration requires the emergence of more flexihble economies that are better integrated into the world e-onomy. The emphasis should be on increasing competition within SSA by laberal3lzng factor ana goods and services flows acrose African boundaries rathex than activatinq s o far faiiea eftforts to / Here we are concerned with integrat ior as a means of enhan7 i i,; regional exchange. the benefits of coordiriatinqg pudK inveetment e joint interventior teo fight 'ocusts and rl verbl:ndnese, for exam e, a.-: therefore ignored. Berg (l9f9 reviewe such 3saves ir. deptF> _4/ In any case the preferences accorded by the CET tend to be undermninea by other measures, -6- creato customs unions that would grant high external protection against third parties i/. 2.08 The proposed approach to regional integration is consistent with an outward-oriented strategy that "provides incentives which are neutral between production for the domestic market and exports" (WDR, 1987, page 8). In consequence, the supporters of regional integration in SSA, must reevaluate the argument that the failed policies of import substitution combined with indurtrial planning reflect problems of small market size rather than wrong policy choices. Experience shows that "the important lesson is that the strongly inward-oriented economies did badly." (WDR, 1987, page 8), a lesson whose validity is not affected by the size of the economy. In the short run there may be similarities between the two approaches, particularly regarding the dismantling of internal barriers that result in regional preferences. But in the approach suggested here, this is only a transitory phenomenon required to achieve broad based general liberalization. 2.09 This is why Customs Unions, with their potential for trade diversion behind a high CET, should not be the primary objective of integration efforts. Inevitably, a regional strategy will give some preference to regional partners, but avoiding Common External Tariffs will limit potential trade diversion and emphasize trade creation (the substitution of expensive domestic production by less expensive partner imports). In the absence of a CET, users of high cost regional imports can be expected to pressure their own national Government for a lowering of the national tariff on those items, thus helping to keep down trade diversion. Such pressure for lowering the common tariff of a customs union is likely to be resisted by the country with the high cost product protected by the high tariff. where a CET already exists, efforts should be directed to ensure I/ Mr. Jaycox has made several speeches emphasizing that "successful economic integration will be contingent on the implementation of policies that elicit the correct response from markets and which will boost regional production and demand. To strengthen that response, policy and institutional frameworks have to be put in place that facilitate the free flow of goods and factors of production within Sub-Saharan AfricM." (Speech to SADCC, January 28, 1988, page 5). In the same speech he emphasizes that Othe first imperative is for governments of the region to adjust their policy frameworks, to get their economies back on a growth track, make them as efficient and productive as possible, and to liberate the vast entrepreneurial potential of their people... Policy changes such as encouraging realistic exchange rate movements, liberalizing trade, designing price incentives for exports, improving public sector investment strategies and institutions, and increasing private sector activity must go hand-in-hand with specific investments in physical infrastructure and human resource development." (page 1). He laments that up to now "there has been too little effort to get traders, manufacturers, farmers and business people to participate in the process of cooperation and to establish commercial links among themse ves. The result of all this? Not nearly enough intra-African trade; markets that are too small; inefficient, unofficial cross-border exchanges; costly excess industrial capacity in many countries; growing dependence on non-African sources for food; and increasing unemployment and poverty." (SADCC speech pages 2-3). In another speech dealing with economic recovery in SSA, Mr Jaycox notes that "also critical is the harmonization of appropriate policies across national borders. These policies should be aimed at eliciting the correct response from markets and boosting regional production and demand. '.:e World Bank, through its adjuotment lending, is helping to facilitate the adoption of such policies and is keen to support further steps that will lead to enhanced regional cooperation." (Kevnote address to Inter- agency Task Force on UNPAAERD, February 22-23, 1988). - 7 - that the resulting intra-union preferences be libited (if necessary by lowering the CFT) to a differential that is not excessive, say no more than 20 percent. 2.10 Given the likely difficulties of later downward movement of the CIT, caution is require- in activating a CET that actually increases intra- union preferences, even where this is seen as transitory. Temporary increases in regional preferences should only occur as part of a general and significant lowering of external protection. Further, there should be reasonable assurance that the regional preference would indeed be reduced to a differential that is not excessive. It should be recognized that reaching this objective would re- - considerable external trade liberalization, and would usually involve lower barriers than currently envisaged in uni-lateral national reform programs. 2.11 In 1980 African Heads of State adopted the Lagos Plan of Action that advocated "a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance" (Preamble, Article 1). In the current climate of adjustment, the objectives of the Lagos Plan need to be interpreted even more broadly: "to achieve the goals of rapid self-reliance and self-sustaining development and economic growth" (Lagos Plan of Action, Preamble, Article 3) requires the emergence of strong African firms able to compete in the world market and thie is inconsistent with inefficient activity protected by high barriers. Thus, the spirit of the Lagos Plan is fully consistent with the promotion of extensive regional liberalization as the first step to generalized liberalization. 2.12 Economic integration may offer a powerful means for achieving an outward orientation 6/ in some SSA countries, given the reluct.nce to freely admit imports and the automatic de-facto monopolies created by the small size of virtually all SSA economies (except for Nige,ia and, perhaps, Cameroon). Regional cooperation should result in increased openness (and thus a reduction in protection vis-a vie the rest of the world) on the part of the member countries of the regional union, leading to a reduction in barriers to trade in services and factors of production in addition to trade in goods. 2.13 However, regional liberalization should be more intensive than world wide liberalization, in partitalar by being extended to factors of production. The two are not incomryatible, as demonstrated by the EC, for example. However, regional liberalization should take priority in terms of speed and degree. Such an approach could limit the possibility of increased dependence arising from a uni-lateral liberalization program. 2.14 Thus, the proposed strategy emphasizes extension of the size of all product and factor markets as a means of increasing competition and efficiency, thereby facilitating a lowering of external barriers. This contrasts witn traditional approaches that emphasize the extension of the market for selected products to exploit the economies of scale perceived to be necessary for import substitution behind high barriers. 2.15 The economies of scale argument is worth reviewing since it tends to underpin much of the discussion concerning regional integration in SSA. Such arguments usually overlook that economies of scale tend to bR more relevant for heavy industry and are irrelevant for agricultural goods and for services such as marketing and transport where significant increases in economic activity could be expected. Freeing agricultural trade is particularly important, both to support national reforms aiming to shift the i/ Outward orientation simply means not creating anti-export bias and many countries have achieved this by offsetting some of the ar.ti-export bias of import barriers rather than by totally dismantling such barriers (see WDR, 1987, page 81). - 8 - terms of trade in favor of the agricultural sector and to enhance food security by overcoming regulations, administrative problems and transport difficulties that prevent natural variations in output to be used to exchange temporary surpluses and deficits across SSA borders. 2.16 Notwithstanding these criticisms, it has been argued that "for large economies domestic trade may provide scope for adequate specialization, economies of scale, and enough competition to keep managers alert." (WDR, 1987, page 3). In that respect, In Brazil for instance, there is considerable 'water in the tariff". However, as also noted by the WDR, "even large economies, if cut off from international trade, would lack stimuli for efficient industrial development." (page 3). This explains why, despite occasional temptation to rely on scale economies for achieving import substituting industrialization, Brazil has tended to have an outward orientation (WDR, 1987, Figure 5.1, page 83). 2.17 In any case, none of the existing SSA sub-regional groupings are large enough to rely on internal trade as can be gauged from the experience of Nigeria which has a larger economic size than any of the groupings in SSA; even SSA as a whole would only achieve the size of Belgium or somewhere in between Indonesia and Korea, all very open and export oriented economies that do not aim at import substitution behind high barriers (see Table 1). Paradoxically, the economies of scale argument would dictate production for the world market, since there is no economic rationale for limiting scale economies to continental borders. Table 1: Comoarative Market Size of SSA Economic Grouvinags measured by GDP) GDP in 1988 Comparable cointries in ROW (USS millions) SS roinas Industrial -LDC SSA 149,550 Belgium Indonesia/Korea ZCOWAS 62,648 NHZ/D-nmark Yugoslavia Nigeria 29,370 Ireland Hungary ECOWAS without Nigeria 33,278 Iraland/NZ Pakistan CEAO 21,330 -- Morocco KRU 4,770 -- Costa Rica PTA 57,709 NHZ/Denmark Thailand SADCC 24,194 Ireland Singapore UDEAC 20,508 -- Bangladesh CEPGL 9,740 E- cuador IOC 5,799 -- Yemen Memorandum items Laraost African Economies Largest Non-African LDCs SSA 149,550 China 372,320 Nigeria 29,370 Brazil 323,610 Cameroon 12,900 India 237,930 Sudan 11,240 Mexico 176,700 Cote d'Ivoire 7,650 Korea 171,310 Kenya 7,380 Indonesia 83,220 Angola 6,759 Argentina 79,440 Zaire 6,470 South Africa 78,970 Zimbabwe 5,650 Poland 70,490 Ghana 5,230 Turkey 64,360 Senegal 4,980 Venezuela 63,750 Ethiopia 4,950 Yugoslavia 61,710 Thailand 57,950 In..srj.al CountrieS Algeria 51,900 US 4,847,310 Israel 44,96C Japan 2,843,710 Hong Kong 44,830 Germany 1,201,820 Portugal 41,700 ?'rance 949,440 Greece 40,900 Italy 828,850 Philippines 39,210 UK 702,370 Colombia 39,070 Canada 435,860 Malaysia 34,680 Spain 340,320 Egypt 34,330 Australia 245,950 Pakistan 34,050 Netherlands 228,280 Hungary 28,000 Switzerland 184,830 Peru 25,670 Sweden 159,88C Singapore 23,880 Belgium 153,810 Chile 22,080 Austria 12?,200 Morocco 21,990 Finland 91,690 Bangladesh 19,320 Norway 91,050 Syria 14,950 Denmark 90,530 Ecuador 10,320 New Zealand 39,800 Tunisia 8,750 Ireland 27,820 Oman 8,15C Fource: 1990 WDR, Table 2, pages 182-183 and staff estimates. - 10 - 2.18 In or out of economic unions, SSA countries, like all mall countria-, will therefore depend for their growth "upon their ability to trade relatively freely with tha rest of the world." (WDR, 1987, page Z). Notwithstanding any dynamlc or static gains from regional trade, the most important benefits reside in expanding external trade and regional integration should be supported as a mans of achieving greater eventual outward orientation. This is why the focus should be on creating competition in regional factor and product markets as a step to external liberalization. S. Reconcilina AReional Intearation with Trade Liberalization 2.19 The need for a regional approach is rooted in the difficulties in pursuing all out liberalization. After sight years of structural adjustment efforts in SSA, progress with liberalization has been slow and accompanied with reversals. In general, trade regims in SSA remain more restrictive than liberalized with less than half having eliminated all quantitative restrlctions (ILmport licensing and/or foreign exchange allocation system) (see Table 2). Table 2: Csefltictign of SSM Coymtries Accordin to Trade Retrictfom Fully 1/ Partially 2/ Limited 3/ Limited 4/ Partfily 5/ Yery 6/ Countr _ Liberolized Liberalized Liberalization Restrictidns RestrictRd Otders r Benin 1i K Sotawaa X Surkins fano 8urundi x Cmeroan x Cape Verde K Central African Republic X Chad Congo X Cote d'ivoire X Ethiopl* X Gabon X Gambfa X Ghana x Guinea K Kenya li/ x Lesotho X lilberia X Mali X Mauritanla X Mauritiwu X Wibila fIf K Niger X Nigeria lv/ X Ru nde --X_ Senegal v/ X Sierra Leone X Some ti X Sudavn X Tanzenia K logo vi; X Zaire X Zimbbbwil/ K i/ Senin would be classiffed as partially liberalized except for iqort licensing requirements on imports from non-frum zone, noan-ACP wid non-EEC countries; these are expected to be reiwved by end-1991. i Kenya would be classified as "portioity Itberaiized' after JUly 1991 as ORe oill be ltimted to pubilc health, pubtic scurfty *nd environment related controls and the average tariff would be tess than 70X iMi/ Limited information. ivJ Commodities such as rice, wheat, vegetable oil, textiles beer md soft drinks are benrwd from inportation, otherwise Nigeria woutd be classified as partiatly liberalized. v/ Senegal would be classified as pertially liberalized except for ORo granted uider special conventiona. viI logo would be classified as fully Iiberalized as of April 1, 1989, except for ORs that are imposed on a short list ot goods. vii/ In the process of eliminating trade restrictions. I/ Fi*lly liberalized: Absence of ORr (import lcensing anrid/or foreign exchange altocation system) nd average teriff of less than 30X Z/ Partially liberalized: Absence of ORs and average tariff of 30-70%. 3/ Limited liberalization: Absence of ORs and average tariff of over 70C or subsetantial exceptions with high tariffs. 4/ Limited restrictions: Lfmlted ORs. 5/ Partially restricted: Substantift ORs. 6/ Extensive gs. 7, Others: Insufficient information or not fitting into above categories. - 12 - 2.20 A regional approach may offer a new dimension t;o s upplement the uni-lateral and uncoordinated national efforts of the sorr currently being engaged in with World Bank and IMF support. Its bi- or multi-lateral nature may help make reforms more acceptable and 'bind' them against reversals by national pressure groups. 2.21 To evaluate this argument it is necessary to under'stand the adjustment problems facing SSA. According to Nellis (1986) and Steel and Evans (1984), African countries have attempted to industrialize by relying on the public sector to set up operations geared at small national markets. As a result, many public enterprise. in Africa are not only inefficient and badly managed but are overdimensioned. "The persistence of capacity underutilization... suggests that a temporary shortage of foreign exchange is not the fundamental problem. The underlying problems are the dependence of production on imported rather than domestically-produced inputs, and excessive growth of production relative to the growth of import capacity--and in many cases relative to the size of the market" (Steel and Evans, 1984, page 55). Under such circumstances privatization and rehabilitation efforts may offer only limited relief from overprotection and the resulting excessive consumption of foreign exchange. Such considerations partly explain the difficulties encountered by African governments in agreeing on the need for and in .mplementing trade liberalization. 2.22 Steel and Evans (1984) also note that high effective protection encourages new investment, even with unused capacity. In turn, "High cost operation is an inevitable consequence of these problems of capacity underutilization, inadequate infrastructure, declining productivity, and excessive capital intensity. At the same time, incentives to reduce costs have been blunted by high effective protection, import prohibitions, restricted competition, and administered pricing systems that base decisions on actual. costs plus a margin. As a result, a large share of industrial production in Africa takes place at costs that are not competitive in termB of world market prices, and it is not uncommon to find some firms that actuially use more foreign exchange than they save' (pages 59-60). 2.23 This supports the view of Nellis (1986) that. making firms competitive requires competition. However, he notes that in "most African countries internal markets are so small that at least large manufacturing firms frequently acquire automatically a monopolistic or oligopolistic position." (page 44). 2.24 Thus, at least in the short and medium term, gains will not arise from customs unions that create opportunities to trade in a larger market behind continued third party protection; rather benefits would arise from the opportuniities to rationalize production across borders through freer factor flows. In turn, larger regional markets may facilitate the adjustment and restructuring that African countries need to undertake as they move to an outward orientation. 2.25 In addition, a regional approach may be politically more acceptabie, not only by buiiding on the pan-African sentiment of the continent, but also by redu.ing the cost of adjustment. In the typical uni- lateral liberalization process, existing firms may need extensive restructuring to compete at world prices (plus some margin of protection). Thus, free importation, may result in short term losses of output and employment, even though over the medium term this will be more than offset ty the emergence of new firms and the expansion of restructured enterprises. 2.26 The analysis of Nellis (1986) and Evans and Steel (1984), leads to the expectation that the short term costs of restructuring may be high for the majority of existing firmes If so, this would expJain why, on the one hand, African government* seem to be aiming at average protection cf 30 to 40 percent compared with oese than 10 percent in industris' countries (WDR, 1987, page 136), while, on the other hand, it also explains the difficulties of getting meaningful implementation of even such limited - 1 3 - liberalization. For example, in Senegal all URs have been abolished except for those that protect entrenched (presumably) inefficient firmsl Similarly in Kenya, some items have been moved back and forth across different categories in subsequent trade liberalization episodes. Indeed, the latest trade liberalization initiative, envinagec leas liberalization than planned in the first such reform at the start of the decade. (Kenya, ISAP, Say 24, 1988, P-4819-KE). 2.27 In contrast, a program that liberalizes faster with regional partners may diminish the costs of adjustment by forcing competition first with firms that are of comparable levf'ils of (in)eff .ciency before exposition to the most efficient firms ir the world. This allows a reduction of costs, through mergers, acquisitionw end takeovers, that may be significant enough to facilitate survival in the world market. The poor financial condition of many African firms may constrain such restructuring, but an opening of factor and product markets within a program of gener&l liberalization may induce investment that would not be forthcoming in a purely national context. Therefore, restructuring could be facilitated compared to uni-lateral liberalization and, under efficient management possibly from a neighboring country, the restructured firm will have a large enough in4ernal demand to eliminate "wasteful overcapacity". 2/ In addition, the more dynamic firms that survive may takeover some of the plant and equipment of the less efficient firms a:nd keep portions of the workforce and sales network in the neighboring countries, something that does not happen when imports from outside replace domestic production. These benefits will be limited by the tendency of rationalization to lead to a concentration of production at one place, but there may be instances where existing facilities can be recycled to other uses, possibly throuqh intra-firm specialization. 2.28 Finally, it is worth considering the beiefits of a multi-- lateral approach as a means of "binding" any reform effort. It hae been widely reported that the main motivation for Mexico to join the GATT was to provide the defense of ani international treaty against powerful domestic pressore groups that could otherwise have forced a reversal of the libera'2zation effort. Similarly, it may be politically easier to defend trade 3iberalization proposals as well as resist proposals to roll them back if the Government can argue that it is getting some reciprocal benefits. In some cases the groups that will benefit trom concessions from neighbors may act as a counterforce to those arguing against liberalization. This may be especia.ly relevant for countries like Kenya (that. is again facing difficulties in implementing its latest liberalizdtion program) and Zinbabwe (that is timidly cunsidering liberalization) that have established firms that could berlefit from wider market access. 2.29 It is noteworthy that a slmilar approach has been advocated for the Central American Common Market (CACM) that until 1980 was the most successful regional grouping, in terms of generating intra-union trade, in the developing world (see Chapter II;, Table 4). Thus, it is argued that "even after ali reforms have beer carried uut, some external tariff barriers will still remain, partly to generate Government revenues. Domestic industries would , therefore, still be receiving a certain amount of protection against outside competition, both during the transition, while external trade barriers are being lowered, and afterwards. The removal of intza-*regional trade barriers in this context would enable efficiency ga.rna ... Moreover, the reduction in intra-regional trade barriers, as recommended here, would be accompanied by lower extra-regional trade barriers. i e 7/ This is not an argument in favcr of import su:stitution in a large internal market. Given exiet:ng widespread underutilization of capacia I p,i) '-y of regional 11beralization will lead tc fewer pl;snts at greate leveiL of capacity ut4lizat:.on, but this should p-o -ide tht basis fl exterra' trade liberalization rather tLan used Ft E tis . continued third party protection. - 14 - wou.d also reduce the danger of trade diversion ... These arguments present a case in favor of achteving regional reintegration in the context of an ovezall free trade environment, but not as an alternative to external trade liberalization mince Central America, oven if fully int-g-at-d, would still be better off by liberalizing trade with the rest of the world." (CODII, LAC & IDD, PPR (1989), pages iv & v). C. Rilks and Limitations of a Reaional Approach 2.30 The major risks of this approach are lack of interest by SSA Governments and Regional Organizations or an implementation that results in diverting trade from efficient suppliers because the expected generalized liberalization does not materialize. 2.31 It may be politically difficult for the majority of SSA Governments to implement the extensive liberalization required even on a regional basis. This is why it is essential to accept that different countries are unlikely to be able and willing to liberalize at the same rate. The failure of existing groups largely reflects the unrealistic expectation that it is feasible for many countries to simultaneously agree on major and rapid liberalization, especially when many of them do not have common interests or extensive mutual economic relations. Provided a few courAries might be willing to accelerate adjustment through a regional approach, it may be worthwhile co explore this option. The cost of eventual lack of interest is low compared with the alternative of putting financial resources in regional projects that make the situation worse than it would otherwise be, particularly if it retards ongoing or potential adjustment. 2.32 This is why efforts should be redirected from the activation of customs unions or the granting of tariff prefereces. :-stead, emphasis should be put on the dismantling of non-tariff barriers to the free regional movement of factors of production and goods and services. In eliminating non-tariff barriers against regional partners as a first step to their eventual total elimination, governments would simply be adopting a different form of phasing from the current approach of distinguishing between types of imports exempced from QRs. However, since tariff reform does not aim at zero tariffs, implementing regional tariff cute would not be equivalent. It is therefore difficult to envisage how the Bank could support African governments in implementing tariff preferences. Bank management could not easily justify to the majority of member governments, including affected ones in Africa, why it urged a slib-set of African countries to discriminate against them in the course of trade liberalization. 2.33 The worst possible scenario would be the activation by existing unions of extensive regional preferences that result in diversion of trade from both African and extra-regional partners to union partners favored by tariff or quota preferences (oee Chapter III for details on which unions are most lik_ly to divert trade from other SSA countries) The tariff preferences that have been implemented so far have been modest and it seems unlikely that significant changes will occur for most of the SSA groupings. Therefore it is unlikely that there is much cause for concern in practice. Nevertheless, it would be advisable for African governments to ensure that regional tariff preferences do not become excessive. In any case, as argued in chapter V, tariffs are not a major obstacle to intra-African trade. 2.34 In the case of a grouping that already has a CET, the same approach should be adopted. If, as is often the case, the CET itself is relatively low, then attention should be focussed on tax reform involving the replacement of all other import taxes with non-discriminatory sales or value added taxes. Where the CET extends excessive intra-iinion preferences, Bank support could be more easily justified if the union were to reduce these. 2.35 From a purely theoretical perspective that ignores social and political costs, the first beet solution is likely to be rapid and far- reaching unilateral liberalization with the commensuratu *xchange rate - 15 - action. This would involve rapid and extensive restructuring driven by tho competition from imports that would channel factors of production to newly profitable activity. Such an approach would supersede any neod to specifically encourage regional economic integration. 2.36 Where possible, African governments should adopt such an approach. In practice, however, we are far from a first best situation as can be gauged from Table 3 which susmarizos the objectives and achiev m nts of Bank supported trade liberalization efforts in SSA. It is noteworthy that even the Bank's current objectives do not aLm at anything close to industrial country level of protection, let alone full liberalization. This is why the regional approach may have practical relevance. EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES Of BANK-SulPPORTED TRADE LIBERALI?ATIoN EFFORTS IN SSA CA!AEt OR, 1. L I BERAL I 2ED a/ O08JECTIVE OF TIE BANK COUNTRY ____ ACTION TAKEN AVERs RATE Of PROTECTION REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE CUtCOMPLEINCEMPLETE NONE IARGET AND SPREAD F T.C. OR 0 ACI IOW Burundi Still ORs on importa- Obj.: Reduction of effective The analytical uridserpiming tion of glass bottles, protection. Elimination of supporting the initial pharmaceutical and all QRs. Comment: partly proposal is weak. work textiles. Cotmsent: achieved. Nominal effective is on-going on a new proposal all these are pubtic protection spread 15-45X. to lower the average rnminal enterprises. Agreement Target: 10-351. rate of protection and to eliminate these by achieve target spread of 1990. 10-35X. Ghana N1o known OAs on Obj.: Use of FOREX auction iaports and exports rate for customs valuation. (except repatriation Elimination of all QRs. requirenntl. Cosuent: for most items, the duty rate is 20-25X. Luxury items att-act higher rates. Guinea All ORs have been Obj.: To replace ORs with eliminated. tariffs not to exceed 100X. Comnent: a uniform tariff rate rar.ff reform met all of about 10X is in place now. the expectations. Onyl a few luxury items attract a tarift rate of up to 30X. The mv. effetive rate of protection is only 15 since there is little or no dis- tortions due to tariff rates. Kenya July 1991 all QRs All impnrts still Obi.: Tariff to reptace atl SAL I and SAL 11 targets thought to eliminated except require licensing ORS and rot to exceed 100X- have been too ambitious, given the those reouired for Reduction of av. disoersion. short t. etable. The recent industriat priblic heatth, Comment: no import sector adjustment credit program. security awd items are currently subject followed by the export development envirormertal to duty rates in excess of credit, while retaining simitar targets, reasons. Auto- 100X. Range: 0-100l av.=40X. used a more cautious approach. Liberali- mtic licensefs Two studies provide two zation is now being achieved in phases; for almost alt different -stimates of net all DRs will be removed by July 1991, dis- tariff categories. effective rate of p'-otect-on. pertion in tariff rates is being reduced, one is 60% and the other i,s and two '-ecdctions in the average tariff 30X. More work is on-going rate of five percentage each were plamed; in this regard. one was completed in June 1990, and the other is due in Jve 1991. Madagascar Attl Rs on imports Obj.: Reduce max. tariff to Further work is stilt required for and exports have 80X and a min. of 10x. the reduction of average nominal been eliminated. Reduce av. nominal pro- protection rate, on-going dialogue. tection to 35' in 4 years with a distiersion arotM. the asv. of 1. Coement; tariff range of 10-80o is achieved. Lending is continuing. a/ Fully or partially liberalized, per Table 2. CATEGOERY ti1 LI BERALIZED (continued) OBjFCTIVE OF TrF BANK C0UN1rY ACTION TAKF4 _ - - AVER. RATF Of PRO'ECTION REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE CONPIE!E lNCOMPLEIE NONE TARGET AND SPREAD ET-C. OR NO ACTION mataw Atl ORs etiminated obj.: (1) Elimination of all local business interests are resisting with the exception atl ORs. wuth the exception reduction in domestic protection. Further of a small negattve of a small negative List, analytical work is also required to list comprising (2) Reduction in effective identify optimal tariff scenario luxury, health, or protection partii-ularly lowsr safety goodss tariff spread and elimination of domestic sur-tax suspension Comment: ORs eliminated and -ationalization of trade tax regime reing phased in over severa' years. Current tariff rate is moderate but varied, with an avg eff protection rate of 36X. Mauirl t js Ali QRs have been Obl Max. tarift 107X eliminated. Elirination of all ORs. Commenr: only few luxury items attract a tariff rate ot 107X. Most are much lower. Effective protection rate for imiport substitution ifxiustries ts in the range of 30 40%. Tarzan a Nearly alt ORs have Obj.: 4axianm tarift of 60 been etiminated. percent or less with 4 positive Short negative list rates. on (oGL (Open General Licerne). Broad positive list on own-funded i'mports. EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF BANK-SUPPORTED TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS IN SSA CATEGORY 2: MIXED b/ OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK COUNTRY ACTION TAKEN __ _ AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION REASObS FOR INCOMPLETE COMPLETE INCOMPLETE NONE !ARGET ANtO SPREAD E.T.C. OR NO ACTION Congo ORs exist in Obj.: Reptace import quotas Membership ir. IDEAC affects ability iqortation of 8-9 by tariffs. Replace export to influence individual tariff products. Ouned arnd irport ticensing system. mostly by a power- Reduce tariff range from fuLt industrialist. (0-200%) to (40-60%). Importers mist buy Comment: ORs removed except Lobbying effort by a powerful industrialist 80% of their need in the case of 8-9 products. Ministry of Comerce fear reversue loss. of these products Export and loport ticensing before they can stili exists. import 20%. Namibia Target ef4ective rate of Bank dialogue is recent. Action is protection will be in 20-30 envisaged ueder renegotiation of South African percent range on MFN basis. Custos uJnion protocols to be initiated through proposed Regionat Integratior project. Niger All ORs have been Obj: Dismantling of import el ie'riated except on licensing and "~rt mono- tne iiportation of poties. Couent: for 1986 petroltua. SAL, there was no tariff reform requiremnt. (1) Trade policy and incentives study completed 1988. No action taken but wilt be included in SAL It. (I1) Recommended trade policy reform to be refined in context of Sahel Trade Policy Study. Senegal A.lt Rs are Obj.: Conpletlon of tariff Some discrimination still exists in the tariff eliminated except reform with a new tariff law, rates because of sociat goals. Bank. while for products Harmonization of effective dissatisfied, is working to prevent misallo- produced by firma protection through tariff, cation of products ong the four different wider special Gradual elimination of ORs. tariff bands. convention0. Comnment: the new tariff (Minim specific reform is in place. It duties were however essentially reduced the Harmonization is difficutt because of different introdAued on t8O effective rate of protection effe,tiveprotectionratesamongmeaidersofCEAO. products from July from about 80% to 40%. Morecver, a true custom union is not expected 1989.) Harmonization refers to to emerge. This issue wilt be looked at again harmonization of effective in the Sehet Trade Policy Study. protection rate for ail members of the CEAO union. the special conventions are being renegotiated and no new ones granted. Somalia Free access to Partial adjustrment Import licensing Reduce tariff protection below Macro instability/war. foreign exchange. in tarif' -eduction formally remained 60%; free access tc foreign with most rates in place but in exchange complete elimination below 60%. practice it of ORs. applies to only limited goods. b/ Limited tiberatization or limited restriction, per Table 2. CATEGOR' 2; MIXED (continued) OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK COL"ITRY ACTION TAKEN _ _ AVER. RATE Of PROTECTION REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE COMPLETE IICO"PLETE NONE tARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C. OR NO ACTIOU Togo Fiscal study to raise imnort duty yields nd streamiine incentives and protection. Creation of export processing U ones . Ugalda Export licensing QRs Stilt exist for Objective of reform is to remove ORs used for the 7 items because eliminated. 7 products. Imports altl QRs and move to a tariff it is claimed that custoin are to stop being ti- regime with 4 levels of tariffs, ineffective and tariffs are not censed except for the maximum being 50X. paid. those on a small rwgative list. Max, tariff now =50X. Zaire In principle, all Obj.: 60 max. tariff, lOS Revenue problem has detayed URs have been min tariff. Target NRP-30X implementation. horeower, eliminated (except in 4 years. Comment: target the target spread of 10-601 in one instance for not yet achieved, tariff is to be achieved in potitical reasons). phases. EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF BANK-SUPPORTED 'RADF t t8ERALIZATION EFFORTS IN SSA CATEGORT 3: REtTRIQlID c/ F-Fj TIVE OF itE BANK COUNTRY ACTION TAKEN __ _ _[ PATE CF PROTECTION REASONS fOR INCOPPLETE C0MPLETE INCIWEOi,E iONEf IARG;[T ANP SPREAD E.T.C. OR NO ACTIOM 6?4e dlivni-e ORs apply to about hbj . ari>ff reform (accept- ORs reintroduced in 86/87 after a third of total abte tG the Bank). Target trade liieral zation in 1985 fol- inports, especialy efffectzve rate of protection; lowing a sharp deterioration in terms on conmuner goods 4D% for industry and 20% for of trade and ilmortant devaluations (textiles, shoes, agr,cuiture across the board. in neighbor countries. Work on a new food-..) EliFination of alt oiRs trade reform is on-going. Ethiopia No actions taken ensure privete sector access to Adjustment progra was not agreed to foreign exchange. Eliminate due to excessive fiscal deficit and f .exporttimport licensing. genreral political instabitity. Sudan Some multiple Adi usting the exchange rate to Political instability and failure of exchange rate e r~a'stic level: relaxirg talks with the IMF. practices; intro- iirport regulations; abolishing duction of own export licensing. finawiced schemes. Zimbabwe There is There is comple.te Obj.: Prepare 4 year tariff A new goverreent progrm is being a process foreign exchange reform aimed at establishing implemented. The bank is supporting of trade li- allocation. 30X mx NRP, through a SAL (soon to be beralization. appraised). c/ Fully or partially restricted, per Table 2. EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF BANK-SUPPORTED TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS IN SSA CATEGORY 4:_ OTHERS d/ OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK COtuTRY ACTION TAKEN AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION REASONS FOR INCOWPLETE CO0PLETE INCOMPLETE NONE TARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C. OR 0O ACTION Guinea Bissau Reduce state monopoly on imorts; increase stanp tax and customs duties. dt I iited informtion. t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ - 22 - 2.37 Nevertheless, the recent study of liberalization experiences sumrarized by Papageorgiou, Choksi and Hichaely (1987) and by Michaaly (1988) argues that one-shot liberalization may also be preferable for practLeal reasons. The study finds that expanding sectors grow fast enough to offset unemployment in the adjusting sectors when liberalization is i medlate, while phasing the process provides opportunities for contracting sectors to overturn the reform by providing opportunities to generate political resistance. 2.38 The Papageorgiou review includes no SSA countries, and SSA may not be comparable to other regions concerning the impact of trade liberalization. This is because, as discussed above, in S8A the economic base is so narrow, the distortions so extensive and the supply of investmnt so constrained, that there may be few sectors or firms that can provide an offset to the general contraction induced by the liberalization. In this regard, even in Nigeria, one of the most diversified and the largest economy in SSA, the experience with liberalization has been that unemployment rises in the short run since the expanding sectors grow from a low base while the contracting sectors involve larger firms (Zanini, 1987 and van Eeghen, 1988). 2.39 The case of Nigeria is also relevant in emphasizing that significant economic benefits cannot arise simply from extensive economic integration. None of the economic groupings (including ECOWAS without Nigeria) has as large and unified a market, total factor mobility, harmonized investment and tax codes and common external tariff, to the same extent as Nigeria (viewed as an economic unit). The poor economic performance of Nigeria reinforces earlier arguments concerning the importance of generalized liberalization to secure major economic benefits. Integration is only a useful means to that end. 2.40 The Papageorgiou findings notwithstanding, it is unrealistic to expect most SSA Governments to adopt inmnediate and extensive trade liberalization. It is this view together with the substantial progress still possible that leads to a pragmatic view that regional liberalization may yield more lasting and worthwhile results in some cases where extensive uni-lateral liberalization is resisted. 2.41 The Bank emphasis on regional cooperation is designed to strengthen current adjustment efforts in SSA and therefore should not be formulated as an alternative to programs at the national level. In particular, for the strategy to be effective, regional efforts will need to offset the smaller number of partners affected with a bolder and faster dismantling of barriers than envisaged in current national programs. Ideally, it will involve complete liberalization of trade And capital flows as well as full labor mobility with regional partners. At the very least all non-tariff trade barriers should be removed and firms from any partner country within the group should be treated as domestic firms rather than as foreign firms, with provision for the free flow of inputs and dividends across the national boundaries within the group. 2.42 The integration effort must also be placed within the framework of a general procens of liberalization to avoid diverting efficient trade with industrialized countries and other developing countries (including those in BSA not in the arrangement) in favor of relatively lses efficient regional partners favored mainly by high common external protection. At the same time, it is important to note that the traditional arguments about trade creation versus trade diversion assume perfect information and competitive market. The reality in SSA is that because of policy and market failures there may be a potential for nf.tiian& trade switchLng to less expensive African exporters from costlier traditional suppliers (see Chapter V for more detail. In Chapter III this potential is estimated at between US$4 and US$5 billion). There is also an unrealized - 23 - trade potential in agricultural commodities that is hind-red by national regulations on both tho export and import side. 2.43 The harmonization of policies is also important. A significant share of unofficial trado is the result of differences in Government policies that result in inefficient supplying of certain markets; for example, uaibian smuggling of rice to Senegal arises from the attempts of the Senegal-se to maintain above world market prices while the Gambians have a liberalized trade regime. Similarly, the Zambian subsidy on sugar encourages smuggling to Zaire. Harmonization of policies to eliminate such flows will also have to be an important element of any integration strategy. 2.44 It is also worth emphasizing that while economists have always agreed on the benefits of free trade, in practice no economic development experiment, including that of the NICo has ever involved systematic and extensive free trade. Movement to freer trade is indeed usually follows the attainment of a certain level of industrial development. Thus, the issue of the rate and scope of external trade liberalization should be seen in a practical context of movement towards a system that is more open and less biased against exports. D. Achieving Success Where the Regional Groupincs Have Failed 2.45 Berg (1989) argues convincingly that the likelihood of creating successful customs unions is low and that the expected benefits are small. Instead he suggests that a functional approach based on specific objectives (e.g fighting river blindness) would be more fruitful. Both conclusions should be endorsed white noting that his suggested approach is fully consistent with the proposals outlined here that call for small sub- groups of countries to mutually agree on extensive liberalization of factor and goods and services movements g/. The expectation should be that, especially initially, only a minority of countries would be willing tc go down this path. However, for that minority it would, unlike the activation of customs unions, provide an additional tool to deepen and strengthen ongoing adjustment efforts. 2.46 Successful implementation of the integration strategy described above requires accepting the existing broad parameters already agreed by African Governments. At the same time, nothing significant can be achieved by sticking to the current approach based on a consensus system which results in going no faster than the slowest performer. To make matters worse, superimposed on this weak structure is a lack of commitment to implement decisions that are not seen as of immediate benefit. Chapter 6 of an early draft of the Long Term Perspectives Study and Berg (1989) provide detailed information on the difficulties encountered. For current purposes it suffices to suggest that new approaches are required that will be inspired by the broad strategies and goals of existing groupingo but have an incentive structure for reform that is more flexible along the lines suggested above. More precise suggestions are made in Chapter VI. III. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICY OF INTEGRATED AREAS A. Present status of SSA arranoements 3.01 The seven arrangements covered in this study aim at industrial cooperation and trade liberalization in one form or another. Their objectives are generally consistent with the endorsement of collective 8/ The emphasis here is on measures relevant to increasing trade and facilitating greater outward orientation. This is not inconsistent with support for specific regional projects or _nitiatives along the lines suggested by Berg. - 24 - self-reliance by the Lagos Plan of Action in April 1980, even though most of them predated it. A list of these organizations and national members am well as the date of their formation is in Annex 1. Chapter 6 of the sub- zero draft of the Long Term Perspectives Study provides an excellent account of the history of these unions and why, except for the CEAO (Economic Conununity of West Africa), they have not achieved their main objectives. Therefore, it will not be productive to repeat the same type of analysis here. Instead, the emphasis in this chapter is placed on describing some of the economic characteristics of the unions and the pattern of recorded trade within the unions and with other African countries. While much of this chapter is descriptive in nature, the information does provide some insight into some of the element. required for succeesful integration and the appropriateness of various urions in view of existing patterns of recorded trade. 3.02 Although the t. iaties of six of these organizations envisage an across-the-board, high level form of integration, non e of them have so far achieved this objective. The most ambitious are UDEAC, CEPGL, ECOWAS and CEAO, a sub-region of ECOWAS (Acronyms and membership are detailed in the Annex). Most countries lowered some internal trade barriers, usually some tariffs, but failed to reach consensus on the Common External Tariff or the elimination of most binding non-tariff barriers. Capital and labor mobility have in general not been secured in practice, even wnere there is a formal commitment. The major exception iL the CEAO which is the only union to have achieved substantial labor mobility. Significantly, the CEAO is also the most successful grouping in terms of intra-union trade. The MRU is a smaller organization aiming to form a customs union. A less ambitious organization but a large one is the PTA; a preferential trade area started in 1984. The SADCC, launched in Lusaka in April 1980, gives priority to transport and conumunications and food security. Insofar as it aims at industrial cooperation, it does envisage growing trade on narrow lines of production covered by industrial planning. Recently, however, SADCC has developed an interest in liberalizing internal trade within the group. 3.03 In the description that follows, the analysis is based on recorded trade flowB. Some countries are not included for lack of information (for example the SSA memberE of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)--Botawana, Lesotho and Swaziland) and the trade that is recorded is not always reliable. In addition, the importance of unrecorded trade varies signifi.;antly from country to country. To avoid needless repetition, no reference is made below to the fact that the analysis is based on partial information, a factor that should always be borne in mind. B. Economic Characteristics and Performance 3.04 Introduction. To evaluate the performance of the existing groupings in SSA it is useful to consider the experience in other regions of the world. Table 4 summarizes some basic indicators for the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Pact, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Latin America.i Free Trade Area (LAFTA), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the European Community (EC6 for the initial membership of 6 countries and EC9 for the enlargement to 9 members; information for the current 12 member community was not readily available). 3.05 It is striking that the groupings in SSA have experienced the greatest degree of opening up of all unions. This is all the more remarkable given the rhetoric of self-reliance and de-linking from the world trading system that underlies much of the official lustification for such - 25 - groupings (oe- Chapter II) 1/ Both the share of regional trade and intra-union trade creation In BSA are generally lower than in other regions except for the Andean pact with its ill-fated attempts to take industrial planning to extremes through proposed sharing out of component industries. 3.06 It would appear that the opening up of the African groupings is more a reflection of the failure to achieve extonsive and efficient import substituting industrialization than of explicit policy docisions. In turn, this probably reflects the inappropriateness of such a strategy given the small market size of all the S8A groupings (se Chapter II, Tablo 1). It is noteworthy that the CACI achieved large increases in regional trade, that made it the most successful union in the developing world measured in terms of intra-union trade creation, by effectively pursuing an import substitution strategy. However, the gains were based on production of consumer goods at prices exceeding those on the world market. Tho inputs for this production were financed by buoyant commodity export receipts. 2i It should be noted that the heavy dependence on export commodity productlon, the increases of import prices, especially of fuels, and the increased reliance on food imports have importantly contributod to this result. It is also truo, that in some cases import substitution requires Imported inputs to produce output with negative value added at world prices. Nevertheless, regardless of such explanations this increased dependence on the world economy serves to emphasise the folly of autarchic policies for Africa. Tabte 4. smic Indicators for Selected Econimic eWd Yrode Grot%s (In percent) Group Share of D.eoee of Met Trade Crude Trudk Regionl Opewress Gains Trede Diversion C-) Ar-e Trade / (TredeIDP) I/ (Change in creation 3/ or Gains C,) __GDP POP GDP p.c. Distribution of GP in S (thousands Degree of with non- USS bits Averg. An. Growth Pts (mils) (USS) A1r Ind Hinuwfa of squ fe Openness) t artners 1966 1965-80 1960-86 mid-1986 1%66 19&6 1966 kmn) CACo 23 43 8 8 -- 22 4.6 - 24 914 n3 27 19 423 EC12 5SO -4 -5 3771 4.0 5.2 323 11675 6 3S 18 2256 EC9 S0 48 13 7 6 3057 3.7 1.5 264 11629 5 37 20 1527 EC6 42 31 3 5 -2 2508 3.8 1.2 196 12645 3 36 24 1169 EFTA 24 36 -1 2 -3 475 3.5 2.3 32 15017 S 38 23 1236 ASEAN 14 58 13 1 12 192 7.8 3.5 295 652 18 33 22 3064 AIIIAW P'ACT 6 41 9 1 8 120 5.6 - 83 1458 16 33 19 4719 LAFTA 11 iS -6 -- -6 550 5.3 0.1 351 1566 1S 35 22 19311 In~~ CIEAO 9 57 31 3 28 18 4.1 0.7 47 379 37 '2 13 444 Enn^M 6 33 30 2 28 78 6.3 -1.8 179 436 40 26 9 6093 PTA 7 41 18 1 17 33 3.9 2.1 146 22? 40 22 14 4913 UDEAC 2 42 35 1 34 18 5.9 6.2 23 805 19 36 5 1706 mu 1 42 35 1 34 4 3.3 0.2 12 346 41 23 3 429 CEPGL -- 47 11 -- 11 9 2.4 1.3 43 206 35 31 14 23$9 nC 5 42 na n no 7 no 2.5 13 517 no no no 562 I/ Data is for 19S3. J For SSA calculatiens are baed on difference between 1965 wnd 1963. for other groupings vsrious dates are used corresponding to a period before nd after the tnion became effective. H/ Here trade creation/diversion is mesured as the chanqe in trade relative to DP. A morr precise easure should take ccount of prodxction and dinnd in a wtll sprcified madet (see Corado wd te, Nebo (1966). Note that Met Trade Gains (colm.n 4) * Crude Trade Creation (column 5) * Trade Diversion (-) or Gains with non-Partners (colum 6). Crude Trade Creation is the change in the share of regionat trade in GDP following the creation of the Union. I/ Data for EC12 cosantries (1968) from World Develop nt Report 1990. Note: The Europen C_nmity is denoted by EC6 for the initiat * ership of six countries EC9, for the enlargement to nine membrs nd EC12 tor the current 12 member commurity. Sources: Wonacott and Lutz (1968). COOIRADE (A LUSO Dct rbae) and staff esti_tes. - 27 - When commodity prices collapsed in tho late 1970. and foreign financing became unavailable in the early 1980s, the earlier gains were reverosd (see CODII, LAC & IDD, PPR (1989)). 3.07 All the groupings increased their dogree of openness (trade expr-essd am a percent of GDP) except for LAFTA, with its emphasis on import substitution and RFTA that lost important members to the EC. Outside SSA, all organizations except for ASEAN and the Andean pact goneratod more internal than external trade while in SSA the roverse is true. In the came of ASBAN this result is not surprising given the negligible emphasis placed on intra-union trade liberalization. Despite this, the share of regional trade within ASZAN is relatively high, while ASZAN also displays the greatest degree of oponness. Similarly, the CIAO is both the most open group in SSA and the one with tho largest share of intra-r-gional trade. This suggests that regional *xchange may be favored by openness instead of requiring external barriers (also see paragraph 3.55 (e)). 3.08 This quick comparison suggests that unions in Africa have been le successful than those elsewhere, *scept for the Andean Pact which failed through overemphasis on industrial planning. Surprisingly, African unions have witnessed more external than internal trade generation and have moved from being relatively closed in the 19609 to about the same degree of openness as unions in other parts of the world. In evaluating the performance of the SSA unions, it will be useful to remember this background. 3.09 ECOWAS. With 16 members this is the grouping in SSA with the largest GDP ($63 billion). Its population of 190 million leaves it with a per capita income of US$330 (see Table 5). The organiz&tion was established in 1975 and regroups the relatively well integrated economies of the Communaute Economique de I'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) with the other countries of West Africa. Despite many revisions in the target date for achieving a single internal market, agreed decisions to liberalize internal trade and factor flows have not been implemented. As a result intra-ECOWAS trade has stagnated and the overall share of 6 percent mainly reflects the 10 percent intra-regional trade within the CEAO. The protocol on free movement of labor is not implemented in practice. When Nigeria benefitted from its oil boom, there was some degree of labor mobility involving inflows into Nigeria. When recession hit, Nigeria expelled other ECOWAS nationals. 3.10 ln an attempt to overcome past inaction, at the 1990 summit, a decision was taken to implement a Monetary Cooperation Program that would lead to Monetary Union. While the three year timetable envisaged is unrealistic, the emphasis on the elimination of cross-border trade and investment barriers as a first step is consistent with the strategy proposed in this report (see Chapter VI) and offers a pragmatic approach that could reverse past inaction. The ECOWAS Secretariat has commissioned a study that would propose concrete actions for removing existing obstacles to the free flow of goods, servicas and investment within the ECOCAS region. It is expected that the results would be ready in time for submission to the next ECOWAS summit in mid-1991. This would then set the stage for ECOWAS to implement the measures at the national level. 3.11 ECOWAS contains Nigeria, Africa's largest economy (GDP of US$29 billion as well as several of its smallest, Cape Verde, Gambia and Guinea Bissau (GDP of about US$0.2 billion). It includes the Sahelian countries which depend heavily on agriculture and some of the more industrialized economies in SSA such as Senegal, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire (19, 18 and 16 percent of GOP from manufacturing, respectively). The population varies from one third of a million in Cape Verde to 110 million in Nigeria while per capita income ranges from US$190 in Guinea Bis.au to US$711 in Senegal. 3.12 ECOWAS countries as a group have registered the worst growth performance of all the groupings and, ironically, performance was better - 28 - before tha creation of the union--annual growth declined from 3.5 percent between 1965 and 1980 to 1.2 percent from 1980 to 1988. 3.13 With a market isa comparable to Yugoslavia and somewhat smaller than Denmark (see Chapter II, Table 1), ECOWAS in tho only groupin7 in SSA where the economies of scale argument might appear lustified (see Chapter 1). 3.14 Over the period 1965 to 1983, the degree of openness of ZCOWAS increased by 30 percentage points (Tablo 4). The creation of SCOWAS does not seem to have led to trade divorsion, since all but 2 percentage points of this increase is accounted for by greator trade with non-ZCOWAS partners. Total trade flows Increased by nine-fold for ECOWAS as a group. The share of trade with SSA rose almost twice as fast as overall trade over this period, with intra-union trade increasing slightly faster than this (see Table 6). Within ECOWAS, the exchanges between CZAO and other ZCOWAS members rose slightly lses rapidly than for EOOWAS as a whole while trade between the HRU and other ECOWAS members rose twice as fast. Overall, the creation of ECOWAS seems to have had a negligible Impact in lncreasing the share of regional exchange. - 29 - ?WS (0I J6I0A11 .. ... ... ................ ............ .. .. . I.. .. ..... . .. ..... .. ......... .......... I............... .................................. ,9 tIr~w.e ., tI, ,_ ............... ......... so ... .ro.... " r it co,pt-y 6'WJitl AI.fM.4ft¶ RIM(S) (l(LS) (U ) U11,"ve I- 00 1^ ll of (t4.s* . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 . I. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . I . . . _ s I ,,^ sf7?" . a Ii, 20a 1 7s 36 u 22 473 I .,424 .- 4Mie, 4,7mg .. .. 9.1 713 21 10 3 57% 1,277 6v,aw I ON0 1.6 4.3 1,1 IU 3.6 I5 10a 301 2 r Caw" .. . . t .. .. .a. 19 o w 1 WWI I3 37 D gw d 49 7 1.4 4 .4 1o 4*2 7 12 3x 21U2 19.98 F.30 6.4 4.2 22.4 329 3 1 N I2 411 MIS %"Ott" sac 5, r A,* 1. io 11 a Is 311, s 4"914 Dro Si 2.* @.7 ¶44 21 6 1. .x 36 64,4m 1,000 5.6 2.6 4.0 ¶3" ST is its¶4 fhwtlm I ,603 l.2 5,r 1.1 1, 41 13 33 2tt 159 a 9 _6sq ,100 . 2.0 ¶4. 4 2 N .2c 743 an - sinlri 1,90 . .,. I. ,1 Is 37 I 6tr 224 *.w 2,310 4.9 2. 6.7 r 345 U 2U ti 21n 2* rk is, on9 3,4 3,2 1.9 ¶6" id 9 5 'a us4 S.W 11,1~I .44 3.0 0.S 3.0S 412 33 1 5 8 ¶53 2,506 1.49.11I9VW 595 I . I . 0.7r 00 .. . . . I . , I¶7 re,rsws 2,' 44 37 2.0 o 4. r III ¶ 0 7 4 173 945 _prs X3,95a 0.4 1. ¶6,2 2" 2 7 6 ad 2 0_, 4,OcM t 'O 0.7 7.r 5r . ¶4 42 *0 49t * 3s I I a__ow 1.634 1.0 2.7 9.3 to ¶¶ 43 S 1 22 "9 tC:b 62.s1 3.3 1.2 (1o.6 n30 34 a 9 451 6,120 MAO 11,5 no 1.9 2.' 41. 4.2 37 21 In 4nn 4,4"4 6I,^ 1,10 2. 1 2.' 4.4 39 44 13 6 371 ¶13 rwil'f o.s. 1, Me 3.3 3. 5 0.1S 006 SO .3 is 3.4 274 043. 6 rI r,I ? 7,65 6.8 2.2 11,2 4.3 s6 2 14 3(s 323 R9( 1,940 3.9 3.2 6.0 243 49 12 I 4X0 1,24C os,o I t . 5900 2,0 (.6 1.9 74 38 it 871 1,031 6,0., 2,441 0. '1 7.3 Ulf 3s 6 13 0 3s 1,26r Soro", 4,69 2 0 3.3 1,0 ?11 22 29 1 3111 1 9 -, 47,' 3.3 0 6 11.', 401 S 4 4 451 429 0 , ,oO X2,5w 3.o 2. o .4 45r 30 3.0 5 415 24* - 8911. 960 3.3 1.3 0.4 4. 37 aN 2 rt2 I1I r,., . r 1,30 2.0 z ,2 3.' 3" s 6 1 1 21 r72 0'W11 1Ctr ou 36, 'A 4.3 0.s 129.4 232 Is 234 12 a 1 1,256 e ^, we 245 0. .. 251 4 r mmlo, . 1 . 0.4 20 six 55 I a,3 1.4 3.1 14.0 374 49 *r 10 mi D39 r Iu _. ,*-79 .. . c0.9 19" .. . . 2n 293,, 6.9 .1.1 I110. 0 *7 34 3* 8 4 51 924 1499 l,3w 4.5 0.5 3.4 40 34 2 a 55X 57 iAe to0,506 S1. 6.2 2X o rt. 29 as I1 4 3,0a ¶2 900 3..; i 4 11 2 1,53 26 3o 13 240 473 cP"'.. f4 cm Q., 1,O001 2.6 2a. 2.9 317 4 12 S 340 .3 P- tea-.- .'u 138 . 0.3 410 I3 2a cr4W, nek.4 6 869 2,13. 5.9 4.0 1 . 1,024 4 a 7 1 342 ch2 . 3,9 5.4 110 47 la 1s 56" I I a G.89, 5,3in 9.9 0.; I I 3,018 I I I I 463" 3" c0 . 9,.740 4.0 ? . 45.2 215 42 24 1 1 in I,3m lW' 91610 5.6 4.3 5.1 1 i 5n 11 o0 3 2r *_*"o 2,310 4,90 2. t .7 343. 3 22 is 21t 2a Ol'. 6,471 1.4 1. * 23.4 1t 31 36 7 041 0,365 16AM 24 ¶9h I 5.2 2.4 77. 342 3r 2 I4 69 4,936 UVOAS 9,719 I. ,. 9.5 73 P 10 3 571 1,27' rtosow 1,94 WS. 11.4 1.2 1,617 I is * 123 600 (.69tm 3o 3.7 2.9 1' 194 21 VI 13 30 PALMI 1,260 5.6 2. 0.0 o 33 3? is li t19 mo _*lew 1, ¶00 -2.r 1,9 74 63 N 20 742 602 11"I § kr%d5S" , . 0.7 410 . I . . I . 17 s089e40m 2,740 3 7 2.0 04,7 III 6 7 4 57S 945 Ufm 4, Om Il9 0o7 7.6 52* 4 .i 2a 49 753 2i 3. 6,50 3.0 2, i,3 "O I 1 43 31 12 S 39S lot 5,79 3.1 3.2 S3l1 4S 27 25 2 rt1 593 r c, ¶96 '!, .. 0.4 44 .. ..I . . 39 99I6C*#¢1, Me '.0 0.Q IC.9 7 n I 6 5r3 sst 1,600 5 2 5 7 ' .455 I3 33 25 1 39 2 i r , 1, MA. ,240 2 yw *ererqPleec25t . , 0,, o am .. ., , 5t*21161 4-1( 3.0.169rr 39"p.'It It. W9ord 9r4k Ati(8 1¶916, MP o2reCti-w' of "OM 111 1¶tle '917, am .1t.1 *ctl_ n 0 1961Wt6 1VI*O84bd 009t - - StOff 9n939l9t1 of 29 9 IJ*.1¶ 9e & 99Wt, f1W 15 4 F 9 3Plg, fT .4 113, llatatIl - 3rJ - 3.15 In 1983, Intra-Ecowas trade accounted for 91 percent of the African trade of ECOWAS membera and most of the remaindor was with UDEAC (see Table 7). Thu. ECOWAS treated as a whole appears to be a coherent union whose activation into a customs union would divert little African trade from non-members, although liberalizing trade with the UDZAC countries would be beneficial. For ECOWAS as a whole, intra-African trade only accounted for 6 percent of its total trade. Nevertheless this average masks a wide dispersion ranging at one extreme between loes than one percent and 4 percent for Cape Verde, Nigeria and Liberia and at the othex. extreme from 23 to 33 percent for Niger, Burkina Paso and Mali. Indeed, the average level of intra-SSA trade is unduly influenced by the low share for Nigeria which has a big weight because of its size. Except for the three countries at the bottom of the scale listed above and Gambia, Ghana and Guinea Bissau, the intra-SSA trade of all the 10 other EcOWAS members accounts for at least 10 perzent of the total trade and 7 members have shares of 20 percent or more. 3.16 It would appear that while ECOWAS has not generated much new regional trade, an important part of the trade of many of its members has been with other SSA countries, even though this is masked in the overall numbers hy the dominant position of some of the large economien that have little iogional trade, specifically Nigeria and Ghana. As an illustration, if the median were used instead of the mean, this would give an average share of about 11 percent for SSA trade of ECOWAS instead of 6 percent. 3.17 ECOWAS as a whole displays a degree of openness of 45%, close to the median of 41%. Mauritania is the moct open economy (trade is 87 percent of GDP) and Cape Verde is the most closed (trade is 25 percent of GDP). TAB2LE - IRADE GROWTH 4 IN LAB SARAIN AfFICA 1965-193 (Crouth of t,.d. oiU SSA .o-4tri.. *.,r... *. --tio of *o2h f oL.1 tr.4. .,Uh SSA; 0r-tlh ol t,.d. t*U SSA -. . t.o of *-.U of 0t.1 t,.d. e, *go.th of 6 t,.4. .,U tOK-ry. * 1 34 t- ro of to trd. .-Lk SSA C-ooth of i ... d". 6r.4. .th 55 * 2 I k-. roth of it. trod. iLh W.old.) PTA OlJ41 COMM DJIODJI El HIDPIA KF3YA mALAWI 42I6I4U RWANIDA Si1ALIA TANZIMIA UXANQA ZA4IA tIl6AE PIA PTA 09O lskIl gm im lFi ERR 0 53 E RR -0 OS fm om -O 09 FM Om i 47 COMRO iSI iM ERR fWM AR 1m E3R ER soZ fMf EAR E30 He f DJIOOII gm Be ERR 24 12 cm C. f3 4i ERR Em ff m Sm f m 234 45 ETHIOPIAA Om ESm 0 47 f6R 0 is FM -0 23 i-llR -I 431 Sm ERR ENO cm Ii 1I 2E4YA 134 Sm FHR 2 2r i 2? 73 102 788 t 1 i 1I Sm -& i72 10 42 2t 02 IALAWI S EIM ERR Sm 0 19 EHP Il Sm ERR 0 82 ESm -37 69 1 o 0 55 hITILIR it ES Sm fRtm 0 04 0 13 7 33 fH fR *FM -0 03 SmR I so 61 9t I 32 RWANDA -0.06 ESm Sm 01 3 it FM E61 4W 6J1 0 32 -0 09 F34S ESR A 93 SOlALIA sm ESm FH S 0 I 1E4 -1Hm 014 6R ERR EAR cmSRm Sm 0 5 SWAZILAN4D 134lAIA Sm S ERm F2W FM8 FYN Is 40 -O 22 0 7r FM Om Sm -346 23 Sm 17 E5 GANDSA -0 0C fm HIF F RR S 14S 0 06 O4 Sm Sm Sm Sm 20 62 ZAIA or 3m fRH Fm 0 18 a 46 -0 13 SEm t7N 0 3f Sm cm 3 I9 -O 13 lIIeAaj eV E67 FRQ cm 0 06 0 20 2 ?I 71 lSm Sm SmR S 2 03 SB -0 21 ECAIAA 3 13 cm 3 49 f1N14 ERR -0 il ERR or Sm SmR SRm ESm Sm -0 03 ERR ERR ESm 90 17 flNA46 F Sm Em ESm Om fR Sm Sm SH* Em fFm S Sm mf ERR Om 2906Y COA -0.07 Sm Em Sm 26 2 m SmR F ERR is 96 Sm -2f 22 ESm 20 84 MAI11 mFM m Sm Sm -t 03 Sm ESm Sm J14 Em Sm EW FM -0 50 !UUIITANI m ESm ESm ERR SM Om ESm SmF fSm SmR SmR Sf ESm Om N"a Om ERR Sm Sm fS FM ES 014 Sm W f3im Sm Sm FM SfEMECAL am -0 11 Sm Sm -0 03 ES m ! EffS Sm ERR 0 09 2 iS6 -0 40 FM 0 40 tXlliNEA Om ERR fHR FS M t Sm S m ESm Sm ESm Sm Em Sm tl1ffHIA Om FM SM FM t6* 2 23 Sm 0i4 Sm Sm Stm S LSm 8f 63 SISIRA LE am Sm EM ERR 04 -0 51 64 fSm Efm Sm Sm FM EF -0 31 OTHER EtlIAS 4 51 CAPE EPH ESm m SM FSM ESm EIR SmR ERR ERR fm EJm Sm BP M CA4IIA Swm FM fS 1 Sm SM 16 47 Sm Sm 4.fl4 Sm Sm Sm Y m 11 44 C4 -0 1s Em 0O 3 3! 10 SRR Sm 04 Sm I 268 000 2 42 5 54 12 06 OjliNEA-I1 ESm ERR fM Om Sm Sm EFSR Sm Sm ESR Sm S ER Fm f0 NiiCE§tlA -0 Sm E Eff 0 13 04S5 fiM SM SRR -1 43 mRR -0 09 3 24 5 f9 0 9< TOG7Fi Ew up P m H m S4 0 43 SmR SM Sm Sm Sm sm 6.95 12 34 LIDEAC 5i 55 CMEm014 ERm Sm Om 5 63 SRR SmR Sm ERR cm F e Ef4F EPS 244 69 CENIAL A ERR fm EW fSm tm S S ERf Sm Sm ERS Em EiYm Em tCHAD cmR ERR cm fmSm Sm Sm Sm Sm Sm Sm EFF Snm Cf1430 FM ESm FRR SW WS ESm Em ERR SmR ERS Sm am Or CA4 Sm or 0 00 Sm R1 Sm SmR E Sm f m 0 99 fW ESmi Sm 25 05 616806Y1A ERR FM Sm cm tm EAR EmE ESmm P m Sm SM ERm CEiL 2 96 IU I ESm Em SM FM 0 S3 Sm Bo -0 05 Esm m -0 0 ERR Sm 9 47 RW9ANDA -0 0 Sm ERR fm 3 i6 E14R SM Esm fm 0 32 -0 09 fM ESm 6 3 ZAlfE 0 If6 SW E}IR -0 I0 0 33 22 38 Sm -0.06 ERR 0 03 -0 09 3 19 5 96 -0 is OTH* S6A 2 62 A*OOLA ERR Em Sm E9m EfP Sm -O 26 fm F m F St E S 5 95 -0 62 mOTSWAKM MADACASA Sm -0 07 000 Sm 0 03 -0 62 0 14 ERS Em sFM Em Em 6 9 066 ff1A441) Em ESm ERS Sm 3 S/ 2 04 EH SM EfR ESm ESR 3 24 -27 63 2 92 so TOME EFm cm ERR Ei SM SM Sm Sm R ESm ERR m SW Sm am SC4-ifLuI EE SM EFR Sm 648O 24FF ERR ESm Sm 4 Sm -m ESm ESm Em SaNJ Sm Sm f" RR fR ERR° t3< Ei ff S ERR ESm EF ER cm Bo SS 2 ro D 1? 1 2 44 2 ii 0 87 0 64 0 36 2 17 2 9 -0 46 -0 09 0 55 060..> * 48 V % -, . -; 2 C. 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The PTA is the counterpart of ECOWAS in the Eastern and Southern part of Africa and has the largest membership (19) and population (207 million) of all the SSA groupings. The PTA was established in 1981 ta promote the development of its member states by creating a single internal market, undertaking regional development projects and programs, and encouraging cooperation in all fields of economic activity. Seventeen of twenty initially eligible Eastern and Southern African countries have joined (Angola, Burundi, Comoroa, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) as have Namibia and Sudan (not in the initial group of 20). The application of Zaire (also not in the initial group of 20; in being favorably considered IQ/. It is the second largest union with a GDP of US$33 billion (see Table 5), somewhat lareer than New Zealand and comparable to Thailand (see Chapter 1, Table 1). Thus its market size is insufficient to provide scope for an efficient import substitution strategy dependent on economies of scale. 3.19 The PTA ie a Union of contrasts and potential complementarities that suggests good prospects for economic speccialization. It is the second poorest Union (just ahead of the CEPGL) wi.h a per capita income of US$279, with variations from US$74 in Mozambique--the lowest in SSA--to US$1,455 in Mauritius--fitth from the top in SSA (Table 5). The population varies from less than 1/2 a million in the Comoros to over 47 million in Ethiopia while GDP ranges from less than US50.2 billion in Comoros to US$11 billion in Sudan. Together, the top 3 economies account for less than half the total for the group, so the fear of domination by one country is less pronounced than in the case of ECOWAS. Simi3arly, the PTA contains the top three manufacturers of SSA as well as the five that depend most on agriculture. 3.20 The growth performance of the PTA countries over the period 1965-80 of 4.2 percent a year on average was significantly below the 4.8 percent recorded by SSA as a whole, but in contrast, over the period 1980-88 the PTA grew by 2 percent a year on average while SSA stagnated. 3.21 Over the period 2965 tc 1983, befois the uliOn was effect.2ve, its degree of openness increased by 18 percentage points (Table 4) with virtual all the trade gains concentrated outaide the PTA. Trade flows for PTA countries taken as a group increased more than three fold. The ohare of trade with SSA fell over this period with intra-PTA trade rising in line with the growth of trade with SSA as a whole (see Table 6). In 1983, 86 percent of the African trade of PTA countries taken as a group was with PTA partners and therefore, as in the case of ECOWAS, this suggests that diversion of trade with non-PTA SSA countries is likely to be small in case of effective activation of the Union (Table 7). 3.22 Trade with SSA accounts for 8 percent of overall trade of the PTA countries treated as a group, thus Linplying that intra-PTA trade is equivalent to 7 percent of total trade. However, as in the case of other Unions, this masks country to count! variation . Thus between 1 and 3 percent of the total trade of Somalia. kuritius and Ethiopia is with SSA at one extreme while at the other end, aDout 20 percent of the trade of Uganda and Rwanda is with SSA partners. The median share of SSA trade is 7 percent, slightly lower than the mean. Unlike the case of ECOWAS, the divergences are much less marked between countries. Indeed, for all but 5 countries the variation in the share of SSA trade is between 5 and 14 percent. J&/ Mozambique joined in 2989 and Angola. Namibia and Sud,an in 199C. The trade analysis in this section, based on data before that time, is therefore limited to the other 15 members. - 38 - 3.23 The PTA has a degree of openness of 47% and varies from 15 percent in Sudan--the most closed economy of SSA--to 139 percent in Mauritius--the most open economy of SSA. Most PTA countries have a degree of openneer that is bunched between 30 and 57 percent. 3.24 Like BCOWAS, the PTA has postponed deadlines for implementing varlous intra-union liberalization decisions and has not achieved significant integration. The main focus of internal liberalization has been tariff preferences and the removal of non-tariff barriers for a limited list of products. A regional Clearinghouse and a PTA Trade and Development Bank for financing regional projects and trade have been established. The PTA Trade and D-velop ent Bank is located in Bujumbura, Burundi, far from the centers of economic and financial activity of the PTA. Recently, it has begun lending. On the trade side, the PTA Bank is trying to find ways of sharing risk with comme rcial banks to induce a resumption of credit lines and it has secured an arrangement with a Scandinavian Bank and with Citibank for opening letters of credit (LCs) in PTA members where international banks are normally reluctant to lend because of sover-ign risk. In addition, the agreement with Citibank envisages lending for trade, particularly pre-expv,rt financing. Some pro-export financing operations in Ethiopia are credized with an expansion of leather exports. In contrast, the investment portfolio may eventually end up with problems even though up to now such lending has been limited to a few loans in Zambia and Uganda. However, there is a danger that political pressure will induce financing of public enterprises engaged in inefficient import substitution. 3.25 The PTA Clearinghouse, operated by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in Harare, has also achieved significant progress in increasing the amount of intra-regiona1 trade it handled from SDRE 86 million (9 percent of intra-PTA trade) in 1984 to SDRE 284 million (57 percent of intra-PTA trade) in 1989. Further, the percentage of transactions settled in hard currency has dropped from 88 percent to 48 percent over the same period. However, the level of intra-regional trade over this period has almost halved (from about SDR 1 billion to less than SDR 0.5 billion), largely reflecting the tightening of NTBs that tend to affect regional trade more severely than trade with the rest of the world II/. 3.26 The PTA has, nevertheless, achieved significant progress, particularly in the area of trade facilitation and trade financing. It has undertaken activities for promoting co-operation in the field of trade and customs. These have embraced the establishment of the Common List of Commodities to be granted preferential treatment when traded between Member States, the publication by the Member States of PTA tariff rates in respect of the commodities in the Common List, formula for the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of customs duties on goods traded among the Member States, establishment of a time-table for the relaxation and eventual elimination of non-tariff barriers to intra-PTA trade, simplification of trade documents and procedures, removal of non-physical barriers to the free movement of cross-border traffic, establishment of a trade information center, undertaking of demcnd and supply surveys, holding of buyer/seller meetings and trade fairs and the establishment of a PTA Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 3.27 The PTA is making a substantial effort to achieve its objectives as reflected in the considerable honesty in discussing difficulties in implementing past decisions and the realism displayed at the latest meeting, in November 1990, towards the initial proposals of the Secretariat for immediate Monetary Union which were turned into a pragmatic jU/ In part, this is because bi-lateral donors tend to provide lines of credit that favor imports from their country. In addition, officials administering Import controls tend to favor imports from outside the region which are regarded as more essential (see Chapter V, paragraphs 5.48-5.52). - 39 - program to improve economic links. Other encouraging measures include: (i) a three year program for phasing out import licensing for goods on the comc.n list starting on January 1, 1992; (ii) proposals for developing a Monetary Harmonization Program including setting up a Monetary and Financial Cooperation Comlittee (MFCC) composed of technical experts from Central Banks and Ministries of Finance. The MFCC met in February 1991 to prepare a timetable of medium term actions, the first stop of which will be to find means of removing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and freeing cross-border investment flows; (iii) adoption of draft proposals for a legal framework allowing the setting up of Multinational Industrial gnterprisos (MIEs) within the PTA -- MISs can be private, public or mixed enterprises and would be able to operate and invest more freoly than foreign enterprises; (iv) understanding on expansion of the PTA Trade Information Network (TINET) and measures to make the private sector more aware of the facility; (v) agreement to implement a Customs Guarantee arrangement for PTA Transit Traffic; and (vi) adoption of suggested improvements to the Yellow Card Schem (for PTA road transport insurance) and of a framework to expand intra-PTA air traffic rights. 28 Nevertheless, the PTA has found it hard to convince its members to act decisively to deal witn the intra-regional barriers to trade and factor flows, particularly NTB5 12/. In part this is because, when left to itself, the PTA has to reflect the lowest common denominator; this limits the pace of progress and re_ults in too much emphLsis on interventionism by the State (e.g the proposals to set up multi-national public enterprises while national governments are trying to privatize; or the reluctance to let MIEs operate without government controls). Despite this, there is an increasing realization of the need to rely on private initiative, as evidenced by the rejection of a proposal to set up a Commercial Bank, the efforts to increase private sector use of TINET and attempts to facilitate transit and intra-PTA road insurance. 3.29 SADCC. The intra-regional trade performnnce of SADCC will not be covered since trade promotion is not one of its m tjor objectives and since all nine SADCC members except for Botswana have joined the PTA. SADCC was set up to facilitate the coordination, with the help of donors, of measures that would reduce dependence on South Africa. 3.30 With a GDP of $24 billion, the group a slightly ;Arger market size than UDEAC and the CEAO with a GDP of US$17 billion but its population of 78 million iH 3 times as large as that of the UDEAC and half again as large than that of the CEAO (Table 5). Its per capita income level is therefore US$312. 3.31 CEAO The CEAO is the only grouping in Sub-Saharan Africa to have achieved a reasonable degree of economic integration as evidenced by both trade creation and share of intra-union trade. This has been facilitated by (1) a (common) convertible currency -- the CFA Franc -- that is used by all the member countries (except for Mauritania, which interestingly has the lowest share of intra-union trade); (2) substantial intra-union factor mobility (both labor and capital); and (3) a workable compensation agreement -- that supported the initial stages of integration j2j Except for granting tariff preferences on a limited range o1 products. These preferenco re In turn nullified by the maintenance of N'rB. - 40 - although in curr-nt circumstances the compensation mechanism is starting to act an a brake against further integration 1/. 3.32 The CEAO countries are all members of ICOWAS and the continued existence of the CEAO (and the MRU, discusaed below) has tended to complicate ECOWAS liberalization. At the same time, the grouping is a response to the fear of domination by Nigeria which has a GDP one third larger than that of the C8AO as a whole while its population is twice that if the CEAO (Table 5). Except for extremes of Burkina Faso and Senegal, with a per capita income level of US$206 and US$711, reapectively, the per capita income distribution is bunched between US$339 and US$685, the smallest variation for any of the large groups (excluding those with only three members). 3.33 Population distribution also tends to be relatively uniform varying betw-en 7 and 8 1/2 million except for the extremes of Mauritania (2 million) and Cote d'Ivoir- (11 million) and 4 million in Benin. 3.34 The economic performance of the CEAO countries has been close to the average for SSA as a whole. Over the period 1965 to 1980 the group did alightly less well than ECOWAS as a whole but this wes reversed between 1980 and 1986. Furthermore, while in the initial period only Cote dIIvoire put in a performance above the average for SSA, in the later period, all but Niger performed substantially better than average. 3.35 Despite the small differences in income, the Union is characterized by significant differences in economic specialization. Thus, it includes the fourth and fifth most industrialized SSA economies (Senegal and Cote dIvoire, respectively) as well an the sixth most dependent on agriculture (Mali). 3.36 Over the period 1965 to 1983, trade flown for the CEAO countries treated as a group increased by more than 6 times (Table 6). The share of SSA in total trade increased over this period although intra-CEAO trade rose slightly more slowly than the overall share with SSA. The main beneficiary of this increased trade flow was the non-CEAO ccoponent of ECOWAS. In 1983, 51 percent of the African trade of the CEAO countries was with CEAO partners and 42 percent with non-CEAO ECOWAS partners (Table 7). Further, of its total trado, 18 percent was with SSA countries so that intra-CEAO trade account-d for more than 9 percent of total trade, the highest for all the groupings. 3.37 Despite the high level of intra-CEAO trade, the important share of trade with non-CEAO ECOWAS partners suggests that attempts to erect barriera around the CEAO would risk diverting important levels of trade from African, particularly ECOWAS, countries that are not CEAO members. 3.38 The CEAO countries taken as a group have a degree of openness of 57%, the highest for all the Unions in SSA. Further, the lowest degree of openness of 37% is the same level as the average around which most countries are bunched for other unions. II/ Since there is a widespread view that the main obstacle to integration is currency inconvertibility (hence the adoption of Monetary Cooperation programs by both ECOWAS and PTA), it is useful to note that the UDEAC countries also share the CFA Franc as their currency but have the lowest intra-union trade creation and share of intra-union trade of all the major SSA economic groupings (see below). This suggests that convertibility is not in itself the source of the good performance of the group. In addition to convertibility, the CEAO is also the only union with significant labor mobility and has the most effective compensation mochanism. It is likely that it is the combination of these three elements that accounts for the success of the Union. - 41 - 3. 39 The CZAO has achieved a high degree of integration. Zxcept for Mauritania, all its members also belong to UMOA (West African Monetary Union) and thus share a common central bank and have a common curroncy, whose convertibility is backed by France. Financial capital and labor are generally mobile within the union and there is a mechanism for compensating weaker states through regional projects funded by FOSIDEC, the Solidarity Fund of the union to which the stronger memkers, Cote dIvoire and Senegal are net contributors. A selected list of inClustrial products benefits from intra-union preferences while nearly all raw materials are traded on a duty free basis within the community. 3.40 ImEAC. It is ironical that the two unions that do not face the foreign exchange constraints blamed by many for poor egional trade performance should be at opposite ends in terms of trade creation and the share of recorded trade flows within the Union. UDZAC, unlike CZAO, has limited labor mobility and this may account in large part for the relative difference in performance. It is not possible to make a definitive link between labor mobility and importance of regional trade; nevertheless it is likely that with labor mobility countries with a regional trade deficit would be in a position to finance this through the export of labor. Indo-d it is alloged that within the CEAO this happens in the form, for example, of Mali and Burkina Faso exporting labor to Cote d'Ivoire in exchange for manufactures. 3.41 The UDEAC has been characterized by dissension on the sharing of benefits which has resulted in the withdrawal of Chad at certain points. In recent years the Union has added Equatorial Guinea as a member. The Union is characterized by the most extreme differentiation in wealth of all the Unions. It includes Gabovn, the third wealthiest SSA country, at one end with a per capita GDP of US$S CIO e Chad at the other end with a per capita income of $170, one of the lowest in SSA. (see Table 5). 3.42 With a population of 23 million and a GDP of US$21 billion, UDEAC has by far the highest per capita GDP of all the unions, namely US$890 (Table 5). It is also, the smallest of the major trade groupings (excluding the MRU and the CEPGL which each have only 3 members). Its economic size is similar to that of Bangladesh and abouit three quarters the size of Ireland, the smallest industrialized country (Chapter II, Table 1). 3.43 The economies of the union vary in size from one of the smallest in SSA (Equatorial Guinea with a GDP of about US$0.1 billion, to the second largest (Cameroon with a GOP of US$13 billion (Table 5). 3.44 The difference in economic size is reflected in the population distribution across the member countries with Cameroon accounting for half the total. Similarly, Cameroon is one of the moro heavily industrialized economies in SSA while Chad and Equatorial GuLnea have amongst the highest dependence on agriculture of all the SSA economies. Congo and Gabon rely largely on mineral resources for their income. 3.45 Over the period 1965 to 1983 the UDEAC countries treated as a whole made the largest gains of all the SSA unions in not trade gains. )espite this and despite being the only formal Customs Union in SSA, intra- union trade creation was no more than 1 percent (Table 4). Over this perLod the members of the union increased their trade flows by a factor of 10 (Table 6) while their trade with SSA rose between one and a half a d throe times faster than this rate, except for congo and Equatorial Guinea for which the increase in African trade volume was only half the overall increase. All the members of UDEAC increased their trade with Cameroon at a considerably faster pace than tho overall increase in trade with SSA countrios as a whole. Except for tho trade between Gabon and Equatorlal Guinea which collapsed, the trade betwoen the other members of the UDEAC either remained virtually non-existent or showed increases from a base of zero. - 42 - 3.46 The above analysis suggests that the Union has been successful in increasing the share of intra-union trada as a share of trade with SSA as a whole. Further, it suggests that the biggest gainer was Cameroon. Nevertheless, such increases were from a low base and in 1983 intra-UDtAC trade accounted for less than 44 percent of the total African trade of the Union (Table 7), the lowest for all the major unlons. rurther, the overall share of African trade was 'css than 5 percent of total trado thus implying that intra-union trade accounted for about 2 percent of total trado, by far the lowest for any union in SSA. 3.47 Interestingly, the largest share of UD!AC trade with Africa was with ZCOWAS and this amounted to almost 50 percont of the total African trade of the union, more than trade within UDEAC. Further, only 40 percent of this was with the CEAO countries that utiliza the CFA Franc like the UDEAC members. 3.48 As in other unions, the aggregate picture is distorted by the dominant position of the most important members. Thus, Cameroon and Gabon, whlch &-count fc- almost three quarters of the trade of the union, recorded 48 and 22 percent, respectively, of their African trade as being with UDEAC partners. CAR, Chad and Equatorial Guinea, by virtue of having Cameroon as their major SSA trading partner, achieve intra-UDEAC shares of African trade of about 90 percent or more. Nevertheless, given that there is virtually no exchange except with Cameroon and that ECOWAS accounts for more of the African trade of the v'..Lon than the partners in the group, it would seem petentiaily coat.Ly lr terms of intra-SSA trade to activate the Union. This point is reinforce by noting that: (a) over 65 percent of the African trade of Gabon is with Nigeria and Ivory Coast; (b) Zaire, Senegal. and Ivory Coast account for almost half the African trade of Congo; and (c) Guinea, Ivory Coast and Nigeria account for 45 percent of the African trade of Cameroon. 3.49 Indeed, except for all using the same CFA Franc currency, the logic for the existence of UDEAC is probably the weakest of all the major unions and may *xplaLn the ambivalence of many of its members to continued participation in the club. Under the auspices of the UNECA and inspired by the Lagos plan of action, the UDEAC countries ars also members of a so far non-functional counterpart to ECOWAS and the PTA (the Economic Community of Central African States, ECCAS). However, the abo,ve analyci suggests that given existing trade patterns a more productive arrangement would be the liberalization of trade between EZOWAS and UlDEAC. 3.50 The UDEAC countrioe display an average degree of openness of 42% when concidered as a whole (see Table 5), However, this fails to reflect the relatively closed Cameroon economy which is offset at the union level by the openness of Congo and Gabon, largely reflecting their dependence on mineral exports. 3.51 Like the CEAO, the members of UDEAC also benefit froo a commn central bank and the same convertible currency, the CFA Franc. UDEAC is also the only union in SSA to have established a Comnon External Tariff (CET). However, the effectiveness of the CET is undermined by the ability of individual countries to set different tax rates on productw traded within the union. Financial capital is relatively free of restrictions within the union but there is very little official labor mobility. 3.52 LQ& The IOC is an association of the islands of the Western Indian Ocean that was founded in 1982 by Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles to promote regional cooperation. In 1986 the Comoros and France - 43 - (Reunion) ;A/ Joined the group which set up a small Secretariat in April 1989. The membership of France makes this the only grouping with both developing and industrialized members and also limits the scope and objectives of the organization. Its main objective has been to facilitate regional exchange and it has concentrated its efforts on computer4zation and harmonization of tariff cod(**. 3.53 The IOC had been considering steps to multi-lateralize bi-lateral payments and clearing arrangements between Madagascar and Mauritius and Mauritius and Reunion. However, the recent changes in exchange rate policy aud trade liberalization in Madagascar have mado this unnecessary. 3.54 The short period of existence of the IOC precludes analysis of changes in intra-regional trade which accounted for only 3 percent of the total trade oi the group in 1983 (see Table 4!. The IOC has emphasized the role of private enterprise in bringing about increased regional economic activity. Thus, in 1988 the bOC set up a Federation of Chambers of Commerce and in November 1989 a meeting of businessmen in food processing industries was organized. The grouping would like to promote industrial cooperation that would center on cross-border investment into Madagascar. It is working on a charter that would automatically grant any regional firm access to the market in any other IOC country. IOC firms would be treated as any national firm; for example a Malagasy firm would be entitled to operate in Mauritius without the need to formally incorporate there and would be treated as any comparable Mauritian firm. 3.55 CEPGL and MRU. These two Unions will be treated together very briefly because neither of them has much economic justification. Both are made up of three countries. The CEPGL consists of the former Belgian colonies in Central Africa (Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi) and the HRU resulted from the personal relationship between the Presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinea joined recently giving it some extra impetus since the current Presidents of the founding members no longer entertain as close a relationship as their predecessors. 3.56 Both unions are very open with large gains in trade concentrated on external partners and only insignificant intra-union trade creation (Table 4). Further, only 5 and 11 percent of the African trade of the CEPGL and HRU, respectively, is with union partners demonstrating clearly the irrelevance of these groups (Table 6). The MRU in fact is part of ECOWAS with which its members undertake three quarters of their African trade. Similarly, 88 percent of the African trade of the CEPGI is with the PTA, of which Burundi and Rwanda are also members in addition to their membership of the CEPGL. It is interesting to note that Zaire, which is not a member of any active union except for the CEPGL, has about 45 percent of its African trade with the PTA and 28 percent with the UDEAC, almost all of it with the Congo. This suggests that Zaire is a potential big loser if either the PTA or UDEAC would erect significant enough barriers to divert trade to union partners. C. Gengral Comments 3.57 The major themes which emerge from this quick overview of the economic characteristics and performance of the existing Unions can be summarized as follows: (a) The only relatively successful union, the CEAO, is characterized by currency convertibility and capital mobility, features shared only by UDEAC, which- has been one of the least successful. The CEAO is also the only union with significant labor mobility. Thus it would appear that currency convertibilty and capitai mobility J4/ Reunion island is an overseas Department of France. - 44 - may be neceosary for success but are not sufficient. Similarly, it would appear that it may be necessary to Implement extensive labor mobi'lity to achieve successful integration and enhanced intra-union trade. (b) The erection of a common external tariff around any of the major unions is likely to lead to some diversion of recorded African trade, in addi%-ion to diverting trade from the rest of the world (ROW). This in most serious In the came of UDIAC and would also be an issue in the case of the CKAO. (c) Except for the CKAO, none of the Unions has been particularly successful in creating intra-union trade or achieving a large overall sharo of intra-union trade. At tho same time it is a myth that recorded intra-African trade iC always low. II/ The global figure tends to be distorted by the fact that of the top 10 largest economies in SSA, only Coto d'lvoire and Kenya have shares of intra-SSA trade above 6 1/2 percent. Indeed, 17 out of 39 SSA countries for which data was available, had more than 10 percent of their recorded trade with SSA partners. Further, 7 of these countries achieved a share of at least 20 percent. These figures also raise thw interesting question whether most of the unrecorded trade in SSA is connected with the largest economies. (d) The smallest ur,ionm, the MRU and CEPGL have little relevance for the promotion of intra-African trade and unless a compelling case can be made for other functions, it is unlikely that their continued existence could be justified. (e) There may be a positive relationship between degree of openness and the share of intra-regional trade. This would fit in with the observations of ITC based on work ir the Caribbean. However, while this appears to be true in comparing the performance of the different Unions, there is an opposite tendency observed at country level as observed in Table 8. The countries in Table 8 are ranked by share of trade with SSA and the degree of openness is calculated for the top, middle and bottom third. This suggests an inverse relationship betwee- the degree of openness and the share of SSA. It is possible that -his reflects the tendency for the landlocked countries (which tend to be more closed) to register more important shares of intra-regional trade. (f) Most of the countries with substantial shares of intra-SSA trade are located in West A rica. (None- of the Southern African countries has a share of intra-African trade exceeding 10 percent) and in (East and Central Africa except for Rwanda and Uganda all the countries have less than 15 percent of their trade accounted for by regional partners). It is possible that currency convertibility explains part of these variations since the ten West African nations with more than a ten percent share of intra-African trade are all members of the Franc Zone except for Sierra Leone, ;j/ This is not to deny that in general intra-African trade is lower than in Asia or Latin America. However, notwithstanding the possible dIstortions from re--xports to landlocked countries, one third of SSA countries achieve recorded trade with their neighbors that is not out of line with experience in other parts of the developing world. -. 4 ) - TABLE & : INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE AND DEGREE OF OPENNESS ___________________________________________________________________________ Country Trade with SSA Degree of Landlocked Average degree as a share of openness of openness Total trade (13 countries) MALI 33.4% 40% Landlocked 41% BURKINA 25.9% 54% Landlocked NIGER 22.5% 33% Landlocked RWANDA 20.5% 21% Landlocked SIERRA LEONE 19.9% 21% TOGO 19.7% 55% UGANDA 19.6% 21% Landlocked SENEGAL 18.9% 38% CONGO 17.6% 7L% COTE D'IVOIRE 15.8% 51% CHAD 13.4% 56% Landlocked BURUNDI 12.9% 30% Landlocked KENYA 12.6% 41% MALAWI 12.0% 66% Landlocked 49% BENIN 11.7% 37% MAURITANIA 10.3% 87% GUINEA 10.0% 41% GUIN-BISSAU 9.5% 29% GAMBIA 9.0% 55% CENTR.AFRPCAN R 6.9% 34% Landlocked ZIMBABWE 6.5% 52% Landlocked MOZAMBIQIUE 6.4% 74% GHANA 6.0% 38% ZAMBIA 5.8% 49% Landlocked CAMEROON 5.4% 24% 50% TLANZANIA 4.8% 57% GABON 4.8% 66% COMOROS 4.5% 39% LIBERIA 3,6% 72% EQ.GUINEA 3.2% 39% ETHIOPIA 3.2% 30% MALRITIUS 2.5% 139% NIGERIA 2.1% 47% ZAIRE 1.5% 64% SUDAN 1.0% 15% MADAGASCAR 0.9% 35% CAPE VERDE 0.8% 25% SOMALIA 0.e% 42% Sources: COMTRADE (A UNSO Database), World Development Report 1988 Oita not available for Dlibouti, Angola, Sao Tome, Seychelles, iesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. - 46 - Kauritania and Guinea. Further, Mauritania and Guinea have the lowest intra-African trade of this set. (g) The countries which are landlocke.. are those with the largest shares of regional trade iTable 8). Of the 11 landlocked countries for which data are available, all but three have at least a 12 percent regional trade share. While this is consistent with what might be expected, it is also possible that re-exports by neighbors might be inappropriately classified as exports from those countries and thus artificially inflatr, the recorded share of regional trade for these countries. Zimbabwe, Zambia and the Central Afrlcan Republic have unusually low shares of regional trade for landlocked countries, possibly suggesting large unrecorded trade flows. This is especially true for Zambia which has a very open economy. (h) Since 1965, the SSA countries have strongly increased their openness, conalstent with the development philosophy of the Bank and despite contrary rhetoric regarding the justification for these unions. The progress in this respect should be reinforced and great care is required in formulating any program of support for these organizations to ensure continued integration in the world economy, especially where customs unions are concerned. IV. METHODOLOGY A. Description of data 4.01 The data used In this study are taken from COMTRADE, a United Nations Statistical Office (UNSO) trade database. In principle, all trade is recorded as an export by one country and an import by another, so that every commodity is recorded twice (imports are reported at CIF prices and exports at FOB prices). In practice, however, it was found that imports are recorded more extensively than exports. Very often, a commodity is recorded as an import by one country, but is not recordid on the export side at all. Hence, for the purposes of this study, exports have been expressed as the dual of imports. In other words, the imports of Benin from Ghana, for instance, have been expressed as the exports of Ghana to Benin. 4.02 Commodities in COMTRADE are classified by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), available at 5 levels of dlsaggregation. The highest level of disaggregation (S Digit) is no doubt the most valuable, but data at this level are very poor. Trade reported at the 2 Digit level is not necessarily desegregated at the 5 Digit level, with the result that the latter suffers from large gaps. Most of the initial analysis, therefore, has been done with 2 Digit data, with a view to gaining a broad perspective of the situation. Having grasped these orders of magnitude, the analysis is then narrowed down to the 5 Digit level, to identify actual commodities for a few countries where data is availablu. It is important to bear in mind, though, that since 2 Digit categories are very broad, croseflows within a category are not reflected. Consider, for Instance, the 2 Digit category, textile yarn and fabrics. A country may import yarn and export fabric, implying that it has a comparative advantage in the latter; however, this fact may not come through in the 2 Digit analysis. 4.03 The data are far from satisfactory. Many SSA countries report only sporadically and a few not at all. Besides, substantial amounts of African trade go unrecorded. Most available numbers are therefore, an underestimation of actual trade. At the same time, even though re-exports are supposed to be reported separately, this is often not done so that re- exports may be included in reported export values. In view of theme shortcomings. it is necessary to exercise great caution while interpreting the results. Nevertheless, some data, if carefully uved, is better than no data and this is the premise adopted here. Berg (1985) discusses comprehensively the limitations and problems with African trade data and - 47 - compares COHTRADE with IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. For our purposes the IMF data generally are not helpful as they only report aggregate flows with no information on the commodity composition of trade. 4.04 The analysis is done with export and import data for 41 countries in sub-saharan Africa over the period 1981-85. Trade is measured in US. Petroleum and related products have been kept out of the analysis. B. Revealed ComDarative Advantace 4.05 Ideally, it would have been useful to examine the imports and exports of every country in SSA at the 5 digit level and determine overlapping products. However, the deficiencies of the data end the magnitude of thiu task warranted a process of product selection so that only a relevant subset of commodities need be examined. This wau done using a subjective and a more objective method. 4.06 The subjective method involved ids-tifying products which were exported to the Rest of the World (ROW i.e all the countries except for those in SSA) by any African country and rejecting any product that did not account for at least 1 percent of the exports of any one country. 16/ In addition, axports that seemed rather peculiar, like aircraft engines (possibly representing re-exports) were rejected. However, this task had to be performed at the 4-digit level, given the poor quality of data at the 5-digit level and to make the task manageable. To avoid the problems of averaging over such a large initial data set, 1983 was selected as the latest year for which data were generally available. The selected products were checked to eliminate all those that were not imported by at least one SSA country from the ROW. 4.07 The more objective method used the concept of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA). A product displays a Revealed Comparative Advantage if it is more heavily traded than average. Two versions of R,'ealed Comparative Advantage (RCAI & RCA21 were calculated. (a) RCAI, as developed by Balassa, is formulated as follows- RCAik = ( + -K9 l (EE, - EM,k/ tEEi +EM,) where E Exports M Imports i country k product The expression in parentheses is multiplied by -1 if there is a deficit in the trade balance. A positive RCA value indicates that country i nas a revealed comparative advantage in trading product k. Similarly, a negative RCA value points to a disadvantage. Stated simply, RCA1 measures the net trade of a country in a particular product, as a ratio of its total trade. J1/ The subjective method is only subjective to the extent that the cut- off was arbitrarily chosen. The one percent cutoff may appear too low. However, given the dominance of commodity exports and given that non- traditional exports, which may have a low base, often have the most growth potential, it seemed worth erring on the low side. This may, however, result in overstating the potential trade. However, the ITC using a similar method of 'matching products" reports much larger estimates for potential trade (seae Subregional Trade Potential in Africa South of the Sahara, Roelofeen, 1989). - 48 - 4.08 RCA1 is calculated for three separate groups -the trade union, sub- saharan africa and the world. At tha narrowest level, RCA1 (union) indicates that compared to the other countries in the union, country i hm the greatest advantage in trading product k. RCAl (SSA) helps determine if a country has a revealed comparative advantage within sub-saharan Africa, and RCA (world) determines the same with respect to the world. In all three groups, the normalization term is common for countries within a trade union so that the RCA values are comparable among the countries of a union, but not between unions. 4.09 In each case, RCA coefficients were calculated first for each country and then aggregated for all countries belonging to a trade union. This indicates whether the union an a whole has a comparative advantage. (b) RCA2 is based on exports only (unlike RCA1 which is based on net trade). The formulation is as follows RCA2 m dilWa_ -1 (EEik/MW.k) k i where E5k Country i's exports of good k to the world. Wak Total exports of good k in the world. As in RCAI, a positive value indicates a revealed comparative advantage. The emphasis here is on efficiency in world markets - a positive value for RCA2 means that country i has an advantage in exporting product k to the world. The focuq has shifted from union performance to the performance of an individual country in the world. The argument underlying this view is that if trade amoig African countries is to increase, they must be competitive in world markets. RCA1 almost always picks up more products than RCA2. Besides, the use of net trade in the definition cancels out the possible effects of re- exports. If a country imports a product only for re-export, then it can not be said to have a comparative advantage in that product. However, under the RCA2 definition, the product shows a positive RCA, which gives the wrong signal. The RCAl definition, on the other hand, will correctly rule out the above product, since it involves the measurement of net trade rather than just exports. Despite these advantages, RCA1 seems to suffer from a major weakness. When trade is balanced, or very nearly so, as in the case of Sierra Leone, the use of RCA1 results in inordinately large numbers. Similarly, a very large surplus or deficit leads to very small numbers as in Zaire. RCA2 was developed chiefly to counter this problem. In addition, RCA2 is more easily computable, a practically relevant factor when considering the immense amount of data to be processed. In general, RCA1 seemed preferable for the 2 Digit analysis, given the importance of eliminating offsetting imports at this broad level of aggregation. In contrast, at the 5 Digit level, RCA2 can be more reliably used, given the lower level of disaggregation and hence lower likelihood of problems with offsetting imports. 4.10 A word of caution about the relevance of RCA for policy RCA has no direct bearing on determining either potential growth areas or true comparative advantage. Given existing resource endowments, tax and subsidization policy and any other policy induced distortions, it measures items which are more heavily traded than average. Thus, for example, even though the EC is an inefficient sugar producer with a production cost more than twice that of efficient producers such as Brazil, the EC sugar sut3idization policy leads tc an RCA in sugar for the Community. - 49 - C. Qther_ Measures 4.11 A few more measures and i'..lices were also developed to analyze other arpects of trade in Sub Saharan Africa. Given the shortage of information on intra-African trade this analysis could be useful for country economists and others who want to look at specific aspects of regional trade. However the specific data can be neglected without losing the sense of this report. In consequonce, the complete analysis and presentation of detailed RCA results hava been reported in a technical annex that is available on request. This includes the categories of products selected by the two RCA measures at the 2 Digit level for 41 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the results of the RCA2 analysis done on 5 Dicit data for selected countries. Here we summarize the major findings. D. General Results 4.12 The RCA results at the 5 digit level were used as the basis for selecting products for which barriers were the most evident and upon which attention could be focussed in field work to determine the main barriers (as reported in Chapter V). The more subjective method was used to identify the potential trade between SSA countries. Potential trade is defined as the value of imports currently coming from the ROW and for which at least one SSA country is making significant exports (at least one percent of its exports) to the ROW. 4.13 The potential trade thus estimated should not be interpreted as the amount of trade that would be realized if all current barriers (as discussed in Chapter V) were eliminated. There may be problems of supply; fur example, total exports of Palm Oil to the ROW represent cnly 8 percent of imports from the ROW and it is not clear that SSA exporters wouild be able to satisfy total demand (see Table 9). There may also be problems of geography or transport, that would make it more economical for the main importers to keep purchasing outside the region. For example, the PTA is the main exporter of Bovine meat while ECOWAS is the main importer. There may be issues of differences in quality that can not be determined at the 4-digit level. Thus the Toys and Indoor Games exported by the PTA may be totally different from those imported by ECOWAS. Finally, there may be special bi-lateral tradIng arrAngements which sustain exports ever when the price may not be competitive with current suppliers outside SSA, as may be the case for sugar or rice. 4.14 Neverthelece the estimated potential of US$4 to US$5 billion tl6 percent of total exports) is large enough to warrant further exploration of the reasons why this potential is not exploited (Table 9). The RCA analysis, suggests a lower trade potential of US$1.6 billion, about 16 percent of the net exports of SSA for these mame commodities (see Table 10). This figure represents the amount of imports from the rest of the world for which some SSA country has an RCA at the 2 Digit level. The estimate is only one third that given by the subjective method, partly because the RCA approach has focussed on a narrower subset: those goods that tend to be traded more heavily than average. Even so, the RCA based estimate needs to be treated with caution since the analysis has had to be performed at the 2 digit level. It is therefore possible that the African exports to the ROW do not correspond to imports from the ROW within the same SITC category (e.g textiles may include different types of material, some of whil-h e tmported and others exported). 4.15 Despite all the qualifications the data belie the typical view that there are few products that could be traded between SSA countries. Further, these results provide some prima faciae evidence for the possibility of efficient trade switching (as opposed to trade diversion). It would be up to the relevant country teams to investigate the actual potential from the theoretical potential identified here. To help with this, the appendiX includes a comprehensive listing by country and by product of all potent.al exports and imports at the four digit level. AFTTF would be abie, l' - 50 - requested, to refine this analysis at the 5 Digit level for selected countries (subject to the important proviso that the data at the 5 Digit level are adequate for the relevant country). However, given the extensive distortions in 88A, caution is required in assuming that specific trading opportunities that are identified in the RCA or subjective analysis, would ind-ed materialize in a distortion free environment. rA 9 P T3tetAL nRof Of SA- i (", ., iI... of U48) PTA scow" CIAC PM ono O JSA C. 0Y9M 3M MA 0012 r I e MC OOAr%,LZ'v Itwe 29 2 0012 S0 AO COArS,4VU 2 C01 I 019 LJVt ANIMALS f f0O0 PM 1NOI e I I I @019 LIV! 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Is 30 a 33 i 5 63 I 3 =ON0 'A00 2t .,t 2 23 - 5 3 - (Cl. -1 Ioe of A6l) P"A f6C.10 CLAO K ' T ea AC C 0T)r 13. 5. 4514 SY" r'2 YW0,1WAJ1.P1OW.. I 17 6 4 5 2 2 6 S 6114 Sf P1E fW8,,BA.J4, L 2 Loa.". 6 6 4121 C 04 COb fUltXC 1 FA.IC 11 24 19 3 4 22 2 61 6121 tfE VV0V4 C0t7g FAW!C 2 U.o.t. G 11 11 7 1 19 43 6S75 CD10 AN .0AMACTL I Im so 5 21 3 1 17 2 1 10 39 6575 CDAD AIC ov^PACTLO 2 ib..., 14 14 6412 C TI las.rso 14 26 34 9 251 6 5 11 326 6612 C0S0 2 eaets 22 22 AT2 0DMaC6 NWDCST,LWW I Imports 3 3 6672 DSA@6 MOt 2WOX? 1.T 2 Ea.o.t. Up Ii 107 40 do 140 400 6673 PM., slM sT_ No I 1..'r. 2 2 1 1 4 un7 PC-, 54%-PnS 63 NU 2 bs.._ 21 1 2 26 4716 PO -4&..nS I S_,t I 4 2 8 6716 Po0.4LL.'S 2 Exeses 11 3 l15 6725 M.SfL ULO..S L ,FrC 1 mI._. 5 22 1 21 2 30 6725 M,l S7. OLD". T4W.I7C 2 Exots 14 A22 3 4731 IRON,STUL WIR RC 1 Za8w.tA J 20 b 1. 2 2 31 67321 ,5 Tn.. W US AM 2 seas 7 7 674 M,51L. "WV PLA,t MMLL I la..er%* 6 14 2 A 6 2 * 3 6744 VW. SL WP* r. 2 U._*wt 2 2 674 V. STtL M PLATE, OLLD 1 S_*_ * r I 1* 3 6741 M4, STL P FLA I.RL.. 2 Eaxepot 3 3 6744 M.S 7T1I4 PLTE l 0tL I X.. 54 1f? 11 .*4 3 . 17 24. 6744 14, 5TL 714N PLATE. M.LD 2 tab rt. 10 10 67.*9 OrW, FLATS.sT I I st.A 22 46 14 3 2 4 a 76 6744 0714 M,STL . 0,PLAT. 9 2 Emos."t I 6611 SILS L_D.PATLY OM 1 t...wt I I 66II SIL.t a6C7PARTLI W 2 be4" 10 1C 6A1 ASLtD4IX ALLO5.4720N4T 1 I 1d_o,%& 1 LS 1is '? 611 sn O n a 2 I..,~ 1If 109 6? 176 666 Z2WC,ALLD770 JP.GL.V4T I lam.,t 12 20 2 t. 1 33 6461 ZCP.MAL_tys J_IQ1U> 2 F'oot 22 2 2 U3 M, 06 ft.fct,jt00 6423 -- ROU 4t5" 17 LTC I mw-t.4 2 ,1 1 . . .a 6422 -- 7 5 RP6 . tRES EC 2 E.00e. 3 6 e 0 6424 -- xF5 6LAZMS F"C moa,ta. i 2 6424 - AO transactions, - 70 - 5.76 Central Banks in SSA seem unwilling to lose, capital to other 88A countries, and in the process block the natural evolution from exports to investment and further trade expansion by denying funds for investment. . Fears of Zconomic Domination 5.77 In all Unions in SSA, the fear of economic domination retards integration. ZCOWAS is particularly handicapped by this since Nigeria accounts for more than half the population end GL,P of the grouping. This is also a problem in UDEAC with fear of Cameroon obtaining most of the benefits reinforced by the pattern of intra-UDEAC trade (see Chapter III). The fear of falling behind is also a constraint, even where there is more balance, an in the PTA where Ethiopia has the largest population, Zimbabwe the largest manufacturing sector, Kenya the largest GDP and Mauritius the highest ?er capita income. The authorities in some countries argue that it is necessary not only to achieve an absolute increase in wealth but that their relative incomo should not deteriorate. 5.78 This approach is incompatible with the adjustment and economic specialization that joining a Union is geared to achieve and accounts for much of the lack of progress in significantly dismantling barriers. Such problems are worsened when factor mobility is limited. It is significant that the CEAO which has a much higher degree of labor mobility than the UDLAC, also has much more recorded trade. 6. Concentration on Fund Raising Rather Than Problem Solving 5.79 Berg (1987) notes that there is little commitment to regional organizations by the governments that set them up. Indeed, the proliferation of such organizations in Africa reflects the view that there is little fiscal cost and that these organizations can mobilize external rosources. 5.80 In SSA, the regional trade organizations are not exempt from these pressures and the Bank has recently been approached by the PTA, the CEAO and ECOWAS (through the ECOWASFUND) to finance various activities ranging from regional projects to providing trade financing and taking a share of capital in some institutions. The ECOWASFUND has also tried to obtain donor support for its headquarters building. 5.81 In Africa skilled labor is scarce and the diversion of attention of officials involved in reducing barriers to fund raising reduces their effectiveness in achieving the primary purpose that the Union is supposed to achieve. 7. Compensation of Relative Losers 5.82 integration has been retarded by the belief that this should lead to balanced growth with an equal share of industry in each member or at a minimum financial compensation to the less successful members. UDEAC has experienced the temporary withdrawal of Chad because it felt it was being inadequately compensated. The CEAO seems to have worked better than most Unions partly because Cote dlIvoire and Senegal were willing to shoulder an extra burden. Indeed, CEAO has performed less well since the recent economic crisis in Cote dlIvoire that led to a reduction in its willingness to subsidize the poorer members and a search is now underway for a new compensation formula. 5.83 In the EC, national income per capita varies from US$2,250 in Portugal to US$12,600 in Denmark while manufacturing accounts from 18 percent of output in the Netherlands to 32 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany. Even amongst the original six members who have had most time to equalize their position, income per capita ranges from US$8,550 to almust 50 percent more in the richest country. - 71 - 5.84 Regional and state by state variation. in industrialization and income are significant even in the US which has a single economy. Thus, the share of output arising from manufacturing varies from 3 percent to 26 percent with significant variation between theme extremes around a mean for the whole country of 15 percent. More surprisingly, even after accounting for Federal redistribution, per capita disposable income is uwice as large in the wealthiest state compared with the poorest. 5.85 Unlike the groupings in Africa (except perhaps for the CZAO) labor and capital can move relatively freely in the EC and even more so in the US, but even this is insufficient to equalize incomes levels. Regions which are more exposed to trade tend to have the highest income levels. In groupings which are more restrictive, regarding factor mobility, it would be expected that the variation would be even greater. 5. e6 Furthermore, the main economic rationale for integration is that it will lead to better resource use and allocation and therefore economic sp3cialization with a concentration of industry and benefits should be e:%pected, as is observed even within individual industrialized countries. 5.87 Attempts to redress this "uneven" pattern of development would be expected to result in trading off increases in general welfare for the sake of less inequality: in the extreme it would suggest limiting industrialization and incomes to the level of the least fortunate country. 5.88 It seems reasonable to conclude that successful economic integration will increase the economic specialization of each country compared to the no union case. While it is not clear if an economic union, once in equilibrium, would reduce the initial relative income gap, it is reasonable to hypothesis that substantial income inequality, reflecting differences in reeource endowments, will persist even in the steady state. Further, the less factor mobility prevails, the greater the likely income disparities. It is also likely, especially with continued restrictions on factor movements, that in the short run the income disparities would grow for some sub-set of countries, just as income inequality init>'2iy increases with developmf-nt. 5.89 One reason for lack of progress in achieving intra-union liberalization is that the relative "gainers" are unable to compensate the relative "losers" sufficiently unless they give up virtually all their gains. In arny case, as is evident from the consequences of the break up of the East African Community (EAC), the weaker countries do not necessarily improve their relative position outside the union while they do foregc some growth when on their own. 5.90 Thus in the heyday of the community, from 1966 to 1973 Kenya was growing 1 1/2 and 2 1/3 times as fast as Tanzania and Uganda, respectively. In the period of breakup, from 1976 to 1979 Uganda experienced negative growth while Tanzania could only manage less than half the growth of Kenya. After adjustment to the breakup, in the period 1980 to 1986, Kenya grew almost 4 times as fast as Tanzania and almost 5 times as fast as Uganda. However, the absolute performance of Kenya relative to other African countries seems also to have suffered from the breakup. Thus from 1966 to 1973 Kenya was growing twice as fast as all SSA countries while from 1976 to 1979 thie was reduced to only one and half times the average. Kenya does seem to have recovered, however, since it has achieved a 3.4 percent growth rate from 1980 to 1986 while on average SSA has stagnated. 5.91 Economic performance is the result of complex interactions and special circumstances other than the breakup of the EAC may explain some of these variations. However, it does seem that the strongest economy recovered better from the breakup. 5.92 From an econoiic perspective, call for compensation amount to paying the weaker countries to do something that is in their own interest. - 72 - Nevertheless, the experience to date shows that from a political perspective an effective compensation mechanism may be required to keep intra-union barriers down. 8. Unwillinanesg to Rely on the Private Sector 5.93 The Governments of many SSA countries are unwilling to rely on the private sector to achieve regional cooperation and economic intogration. This reflects general attitudes to the private sector that emphasis the role of the public sector. In part this reflects the political unacceptability of relative enrichment of the more economically dynamic ethnic and/or tribal groups. Nellis (1986, page 13) notea that "most of (the) commmercial agricultural and manufacturing base (that) existed was in the hands of aliens... This created deep resentments and sparked calls for controls and nationalization. In many countries across the region, one often encountered - and still encounters - attitudes which cannot be termed expressions of a coherent socialist position, but which nonetheless reveal a strong strain of anti-capitalism, a pronounced mistrust of the market and the profit motive." 5.94 This has led to the creation of public sector institutions and a desire to regulate private exchange across national borders. For example, rather than working out arrangemente to induce sxisting development and co^nercial banks to finance regional projects and regional trade, the PTA chose to set up a PTA Bank. Even where there is legitimate scope for government intervention, as in the case of the PTA Clearinghouse, insufficient attention is paid to devising incentives that would induce the use f the facilities and excessive efforts are put in devising regulations. 5.95 The PTA appears to be ready to respond to the private sector. The PTAFCCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry) attempts to influence government policy to the PTA through its national members and the exchange of views between Ministers and businessmen is an important part of PTA trade fairs. Nevertheless, the PTA, like ECOWAS, places ownership restrictions on firms that can qualify for preferential trade. This is a major point of contention between CEAO members of ECOWAS, particularly Cote d lvoire, and other members of ECOWAS, particularly Nigeria. It is also noteworthy that in the case of ECOWAS the private sector set up a bank (ECO- Bank) to finance regional trade instead of the public sector. 9. Insufficient Willingness to Promote Inctitutions such as the Clearinahouse 5.96 There is insufficient effort to designing incentives that would induce the private wector to use official channels for facilitating trade, as mentioned in D.ii.8 above. The PTA Clearing House is handling transactions equivalent to about 60 percent of the trade between the countries despite the intention that it should handle not only all the trade but also the service payments. The West Africa Clearinghouse of ECOWAS handled an average of 23 percent of transactions In its first six years but defaults and payments imbalances have driven this figure down to 9 percent in the most recent five year period. The ECCAS Clearinghouse is also experiencing similar problems in attracting transactions. 5.97 Too much reliance is placed on administrative decisions or on collective goodwill without figuring out if desired objectives at the regional and national level coincide with private interest at the transaction level. Again, the pricing of transactions tends to be ignored. - 73 - 10. Unwillinoness to Og-n Up to Non-residents and Zthnic Minorities the O=rtun as to Trade 5.98 The whole purposo of economic Unions is to make investment, including by foreigners and ethnic minorities, more attractive by providing a wider market. Restricting access to the wider market and discouraging investors at a time of net disinvestment by private capital makes no sonse. Buuiness confidence needs to be restorod if S8A is to reverie current economic decline. This will require encouraging the ethnic minorities to participate more fully as part of a process of attracting foreigners. Without this neither regional integration nor integration into the world economy can succeed. Where there aro legitimate concerns rogarding uncompetitive practices, these have to be dealt with through effective government intervention and regulation, but this should not be used as a pzetext to limit investment when SSA growth is suffering from a lack of investment. VI. THB WAY ANRAD A. What could bo done 6.01 Securing an increase in efficient recorded regional trade will require action on several fronts simultaneously. It is likely that some increase in observed regional trade would occur from a combination of measures dealing with the market and bureaucratic failures and easing the impact of the natural constraints discussed in Chapter V. Nevertheless, this increase is unlikely to be significant without a resolution of the political problems. Most of the constraints cou,a be dealt with by the national governments on a bi- or multi-lateral basis, within or outside the framework of existing organizations and without donor financial support. To justify external support, action on the political barriers will therefore bo a pro-condition. 6.02 The experience to date g4uggests that some countries will have chronlc trade deficits with their regional partners. Financing such deficits when the exchange rate is at an inappropriatO level is not a sustainable policy and indeed contributed to the deeline oi the Central American Common Market which had generated thi largest amount of internal trade of all unions ir the developing world (see CODII, LAC & IDD, PPR (1989) ). This is why increasing regional trade must be associated with the liberalization of capital and labor flows so that trade deficits can be at least p.rtlally offset with investment inflows or worker's remittances. II/ 6.03 National and donor resources should bo channelled where they havo a direct impact on facilitating such liberalization instead of providing financing to keep regional organizations active. 1A/ National governments noed to concentrate on policy actions that will create the pre- 12/ A full offset or, more usofully, a sustainable regional deficit will require exchange rate adjustment. Regional trade which will roma!n a small part of total trade need not be Ln balance provided the overall b5lance of payments situation is strong enough to support regional deficits. Neverthelsss, liberalizing non-trade current account and capital flows will contribute to make any given deficit level more sustainable I/ As argued by Berg (1989), donors should also encou'age cooperation in specific areas such as fighting river b.indness. Here, we ignore such issues and concentrate on actions that are most relevant to incroased regional exchange. Also, it Is not being suggested that financing be withhold from exliting regional organizations. Rather, tho point concerns the use of additlonal resources. - 74 - conditions for increased regional exchange identified In Chapter V. Donors could support such *f forts through technical assistance and by underwriting risk sharing scheme- in addition to the continued financing of relevant infrastructure. There may also be a came for program lending to finance purchases outside SSA that may be required to sustain regional activity by private economic agents. 6.04 There is a growing feeling in SSA that current *fforts at regional integration have not proceeded as rapidly as hoped for. Thus the Organization of African Unity states that "Five years after the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, very little progrome has been achieved in the implementation of the Plan and the Act" (OAU, 1985). This is why the regional organizations are increasingly turning to the Bank and other donors for support. Thus the Bank has received specific requests from PTA, ECOWAS, CEAO, UDEAC and SADCC. There is thus a need for African governments, regional organizations and donors to develop a framework for responding to such requests in a manner supportive of the basic objectives of integration and of national adjustment efforts. This framnwwork should build on the desire of Africans for cooperation and the increasing, though by no means universal realization in Africa that new approaches are needed. 6.05 Specific details and problems have to be resolved in a more concrete context, svch as the proposed regional SAL with UDEAC and possible Bank operations with the CEAO and PTA/SADCC. Nevertheless a general framework is required to ensure that integration contributes to improve growth prospects in SSA by strengthening and deepening ongoing national adjustment efforts. It is in this context that the followirg suggestions should be seen as a first step towards achieving a consensus on the critical elements. B. Main Elements of a New Approach 6.06 Regional integration should provide an additional means of moving groups of African countries towards overall economic liberalization by improving conditions for a more active role by private agents across the frontiers of Africa. The approach needs to be consistent with and promote liberalization efforts at the national level and not set back programs that any individual country may want to undertake on its own. 6.07 In view of tho strong interests that resist liberalization, it may be difficult, especially initially, to find many SSA countries that are willing or able to embark on such a course. This is especially true if the strategy adopted is aimed at strengthening and doepening the adjustment process by making it possible to liberalize the economy more rapidly and/or more extensively. There might, therefore, be a temptation to focus on the relatively easier issues concerning the rationalization of exirting tariffs and, esp^cially, the granting of regional tariff preferences. This would be unfortunate as the main justification for donors to support African requests would he to provide national authorities with the necessary leverage (arising from technical expertise and financial resources) to overcome political obstacles that would not otherwise be rsmoved and which hinder economic progress. 6.08 Closer economic links should be based on existing and potential complementarities and trade flows. In this respect, exioting Regional Economic Groupings in SSA, set up for a variety of, sometimes non-economic, reasons, are not necessaril.' optimal. This is especially true of the smaller ones (see Chapter III). How-ver, given that they exist and given the commitment of the member governmonts to them, it is not useful to question their existence. 6.09 Instead, to the *xtent possiblo, any new initiatives should work with and through the existing sub-regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, PTA, UDEAC and SADCC. Any arrangements for ECOWAS would _ 75 - automatically cover CZAO and HRU countries which are all members of ECOWAS. In turn, if the ZCCAS does become active, it may present a more attractive vehicle for Central African countries than UDEAC given the membership of Zaire and the bridge to the PTA provided by Burundi and Rwanda. Neverthelesa, new initiatives should promote factor mobility and the free movement of goods and services within the group as well as generalized trade liberalization with the rest of the world; they should not aim at reversing the failure to activate customs unions with high barriers against non- members including those on the continent. 6.10 This means that specific provision will have to be made for inter- union liberalization and to avoid excluding non-member African trading partners that may have more liberal trading arrangements and/or have extensive trade relations with some group members, such as Botswana and Zimbabwe in the context of the PTA and Zaire and Congo in the case of UDEAC. This is why it is importa lo establish a structure that is open to all SSA countries but where each is .llowed to proceed at its own pace. Also it may be preferable (and pract>:.ally it will be easier) for a few committed countries to voluntarily agree on far-reaching mutual liberalization rather than for these countries to wait for action by a large disparate collection. 6.11 To reconcile these elements, it is proposed that the starting point should be the existing undertakings and agreements by the member states. To date these have generally amounted to little more than declarations of intent to reduce tariffs. It would be desirable to encourage all the member States to implement mutual liberalization rapidly and in unison. However, there may be difficulties for some msmbers to proceed faster than already agreed. Therefore, existing organizations should allow and indeed encourage sub-groups of states to implement more rapid and extensive elimination of trade barriers and obstacles to labor and capital mobility between them, while recognizing that some members would not want to proceed further than alraady agreed. To support these efforts, donors could assist those individual member States that are prepared to relax controls on cross-border flows of factors of production and goods and services. 6.12 There are many possible options that could be pursued by donors and African governments and regional organizations. Indeed, many of these will not be mutually exclusive and different forms of intervention will be more effective in different circumstances. One approach that would be operationally consistent with the objectives suggested above would be to establish a blueprint defining the various steps that would eventually result in a regional agreement on the free movement of goods and services and factors of production while achieving a generalized lowering of barriers against imports from third parties. This blueprint could be turned into predetermined Articles of Agreement which would be structured so that, following voluntary negotiations between them, SSA Governments could select w'ich the sequence of clauses to adhere to on a reciprocal basis at any given time. ;9/ Preparing these Articles will require discussions involving key national governments, organization secretariats and interested donors. 6.13 Donors, including the Bank, would have to ensure that the Articles of Agreement are consistent with their objectives if they are to provide financial support to encourage implementation of the various liberalization measures to be defined by the Articles. Once this is done, however, any negotiations would involve only SSA governments on a bi-or multi-lateral 12/ To avoid the danger of establLshing a 'crazy quilt' of preferences, the proposed Articles will have to envisage a clear sequence of steps I*ading to the free flow of factors and products amongst participating co"ntries. It should also be envisaged that the agreements will gradually be multi-lateralized, as the number of bi-lateral deals achieving a given level of liberalization increases. - 76 - basis to decide which liberalization measures to implement at any given time. Indeed, where genuine mutual self-interest is involved, there may be no need for donor involvement, even though donors can facilitate the process by providing resources to get the proc-es going. The blueprint is already more or less defined by the steps envisaged in the Lagos Plan of Action and reflected in the various treaties setting up the existing sub-groupings. 6.14 No country would be required to agree on any of the measures envisaged in the Articles of Agreement and in exchange the States wanting to proceed only at the pace envisaged in current agreements would agree not to voto more extensive or rapid measures of liberalization amongst others; for example the liberal trading and investment agreement between Malawi and Zimbahw* could be reactivated under such a schme. C. CQnhis&ency with the Aims of the Ixistina Reaional Grouoinas 6.15 The groupings usually acknowledge, as in the case of the PTA, that 'unless simultaneously with the reduction and aventual elimination of tariffs, non-tariff barriers are also eliminated, the effort of eliminating tariffs can be easily nullified' (PTA S8-017, page 4). Therefore, i-. would be consistent with the agreed objectives to concentrate efforts on eliminating non-tariff obstacles to trade. 6.16 Similarly, the proposed emphasis on factor mobility is fully consistent with the broad objectives of the major economic groupings in SSA that see the current agreements "as a first step towards the establishment of a Common Market and eventually of an Economic Community ... to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of trade, customs, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, natural resources and monetary affairs with the aim of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of fostering closer relations among its Member States, and to contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.' (PTA Treaty, Chapter 2). 6.17 The major area of divergence concerns the granting of regional preferences. The objective of existing unions is to pursue import substituting industrialization behind high barriets against third parties, while the Bank would argue 'or a lowering of external barriers. Fortunately, in practice regional preferences to date have been few and generally insignificant. Further, given the increasing emphasis on adjustment programs by African governments, it does not seem difficult to envisage a new consensus where the previous objectives of high Common Extetnal Protection could be de-emphasozed. D. Consistency with Oncoino Bank Efforts 6.18 The Bank is supporting the efforts of SSA countries geared to the elimination of economic distortions and graater integration into the World Trading Sybtem. Amongst other measures, this involves: (a) greater reliance on market clearing prices for the allocation of resources, including foreign exchange; (b) efforts geared at rationalizing and reducing effective protection through tariff reform coupled :ith the elimination of quantitative restrictiona; and (c) measures designed to increase private sector economic activity. 6.19 The main elements required to ensure that a regional operation reinforces these actions will be summarized here based on the more extensive discussion in Chapter II. 6.20 Any proposed operation should ba formulated to provide another channel for those that may be unable to move far or fast on their own and - 77 - not be articulated as an alternative to current efforts at the national level. In particular, for the strategy to be effective, regional efforts will need to offset the smaller number of partners affected with a bolder and faster dismantling of barriers than envisaged in current national programs. Ideally, it will involve comglets non-tariff liberalization of trade jnn capital flows as well as full labor mobility with regional partners. 6.21 At the very least all non-tariff trade barriers should be removed and firms from any partner country within the group should be treated an domestic firms rather than as foreign firms, with provision for the free flow of inputs and dividends across the national boundaries within the group. Freer market access and greater factor mobility is needed to attract the foreign private investment that is sorely lacking in the region. Thirefore, current discrimination in the preferences according to ownership of firms or according to the nature of the traded good or service must end, at least for thors countries to benefit from Bank financial assistance. Where there are legitimate concerns over uncompetitive behavior, this must be dealt with by appropriate regulation without excluding potentially dynamic actors from contributing to increased regional economic activty. 6.22 Securing trade and investment flows that contribute to lasting growth will involve, amongst other measures, establishling some market clearing price mechanism for regional activity whenever it is not possible to move the exchange rate sufficiently to sustain a non-restrictive payments system. It will therefore be an important pre-requisite to allow free pricing of all transactions by the private sector including the principle of free tradirg of regional currencies against each other. 6.23 The value of the regional approach lies in its potential to immediately bring competition to firms that would otherwise be sheltered because of the extremely small market size of all African economies (except for Nigeria and possibly Cameroon). But limited competition from neighbors only makes sense If i.t is a step on the way to more open competition from the Rest of the World. E. Some General Modalities 6.24 It Is too early to be specific about the tranching of reforms, but the main elements to be embodied in any Articles of Agreement would involve the fnilowIng: (a) the implementation of non-tariff liberalization measures already a9r,.e,4 tc by the membLer 20/i b) rec.')9nition that. not all countries would be able and willing to liberalize at the same rate and therefore allowing those that want to move faster t-o do so without being subiect to the veto of those not wishing to proceed further than existing agreements; (c) treating any regional currency (of a participant in the proposed scheme) as domestic currency for purposes of exchange control and therefore allowing any such currency to be freely held and disposed of within the participating member States on the understanding that such funds can not be used to request foreign exchange from any participating Central Bank; (d) the creation of a 'second window" at the relevant Clearinghouse where private agents, acting through their commercial bank, can jQ/ Donor support for tariff discrimination against non-members would be hard to justify and in any case tariffs are not the major problem in generating official intra-African trade. - 78 - freely trade the currencies of participating members against each other; (e) abolition of all import and export restrictions for intra-group trade carried out through the second window and therefore not necessitating foreign exchange from the Central Bank; (f) the abolition of exchange controls for all intra-group investment undertaken through the second window and provision for the froe repatriation of dividends through the same mechanism; (g) adoption of legislation and regulations that would treat any firm operating in the participating member States, regardless of ownership, as a national firm in any participating country that it operates in through the second window. This implies repeal of ownership and other eligibility requirements; (h) implementing, on a phased basis, mobility for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor; (i) agreement to limit intra-group preferences to an effective protection differential of no more than, say 20 percent at the end of, say, five years 21/; (j) extending preferences to all goods and services instead of a restricted common list. F. Compensation 6.25 Evidence from the US and the EC suggests that the creation of larget economic units results in increased specialization with significant dispersion of per capita income to be expected. An issue for research, is whether income dispersion is actually increased through integration and if the outcome is dependent on the degree of factor mobility. 6.26 African integration efforts tend to want to go against this reality: they aim at sha-ing industrialization 'fairly" and equalizing per capita income, Efforts at industrial planning have failed not only in SSA b,t also elsewhere, most spectacularly in the Andean Pact. Other compensation mechanisms have been unsatisfactory, probably reflecting the conflict between these policies and natural economic forces. 6 .27 The purpoc- f integration should be to improve resource allocation and this will raise absolute incomes. Relative incomes of some pa tners may diverge and certainly the emergence of a few poles of industrialization should be expected. Any set of countries pursuing regional integration will have to accept this as a starting point. 6.28 This is not to say that there is no room for compensation mechanisme. However, the primary objective of compensation should be to equalize benefits to private economic agents rather than to national Governments. This can best be achieved by extending employment and investment opportt'nities and opening up goods and services markets in the more advanced countries to those from the economically weaker ones. Nevertheless, since successful regional integration will depend on the assent of Governments, there will also have to be workable means of transferring compensation between governments. In implementing any such Z1/ Any tariff preferences should be reasonable, and no particular significance should ce attached to the suggested 20 percent. The main point is that tariff differentials have to be limited, preferably by lowering the external tariff rates. - 79 - scheme, it will be essential to avoid negating the benefits that should accrue to the private sector. 6.29 Compensation schemes chould move away from the exieting pattern in SSA with emphasis on the financing of supposedly regional, projects in the poorer countries. In practice, it has been hard to find viable regional projects that could not have been financed by donors much as the World Bank or the ADB. The danger is that funds specifically set aside for regional projects could be spent for political reasons on schemes with a low or even negative rate of return. There is also a danger that such funds would finance plant and equipment that would be incompatible with a rational deployment of resources from a regional perspective. 6.30 A more attractive option would be a direct transfer to the budget of the weaker economies, on the model of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). SACU shares revenues with deliberate over-compensation to the weaker members and this seems to be a useful path to follow. Similarly, in the US, economic specialization has not created excessive tensions iargely because it is accepted that solidarity requires the provision of resources to the poorer parts of the nation to allow them to support similar levels of public services as in the wealthier parts of the country. 6.31 SACU shares trade taxes. To avoid conflicts between external trade liberalization and fiscal reveiue, it may be preferable to share total revenue or sales taxes (on the model of the EC which shares VAT receipts). This also has the advantage of moving from a "mercantilistic' view of compensation for l-sses of income arising from tariff concessions to a more broad based view oi the benefits of integration and the need to maintain regional solidarity. This is even more relevant in the sort of framework advocated here which emphasizes increased competition and factor mobility instead of tariff concessions to partners while maintaining high barriers against third parties. 6.32 African governments should avoid reliance on donors to finance compersation schemes to discourage countries from participating mainly to benefit from foreign aid and to ensure that the mechanism i.s sustainable. This should not preclude donors from financing regional projects or infrastructure, but such financing should be provided on the merit of the proJects and not as a rreans of providing compensation. With budgets remaining severely constrained for the foreseeable future, the temptation to renege on regional responsibilities may be difficult to resist. This suggests Bome urgency in devising a mechanism with some automacity in the transfers to weaker states. G. The nature of possible Bank intervention 6.33 Intervention along the proposed lines would be a new undertaking for the Bank and raises questions regarding the most practical approach to adopt. The most straightforward way of proceeding would be to make lines of credit available to individual governments as part of a project with a regional grouping, such as the proposed UDEAC SAL. Under the sort of scheme envisaged, there would be no need for providing foreign exchange to finance intra-group trade or inveetment since regional currencies could be freely held and exchanged by the private sector through the proposed "second window'. However, in line with achieving the objective of encouraging factor mobility and achieving the rationalization of industry through mergers, acquisitionr and joint ventures, there is room for providing foreign exchange that would be used for inputs and machinery -hat has to be imported from outside the region by joint ventures or in the context of regional operations of regionally based firma. 6.34 The financing of the regional currency component of such schemes would be through legalizing the second window and the foreign currency component would be by donors such as the Bank. There would, therefore, be no justification for requiring import licenses or inhibiting the outflow of - 80 - investment fund. to other participating regional partners, and so full liberalization of exchange controls could be justified for such undertakinge. 6.35 This approach has the merit that it reinforces the liberalization being undertaken under structural adjustment programs while not requiring complicated new types of lending arrangements involving many partners since each country would be responsible for tho drawing down of the line of credit that benefits firms resident within its borders. It also ham the advantage that conditionality would be predetermined and that countries would freely, according to what is politically feasible, decide how far and fast they would want to proceed. This avoids the pitfalls of e-quiring joint agreement by several governments simultaneously which risks either getting bogged down or just lLmiting progress by all to the rate of the slowest. Finally, it solves the problem that some SSA countries qualify for IDA credits while others would benefit from IBRD loans. 6.36 An alternative approach would be to lend to regional financial institutions and the Bank has actually received requests to help activate the government created PTA Bank; to support FOSIDEC (the development fund of CEAO), to finance the ECOWASFUND and to participate, through IFC, in the expansion of the privately owned ECO-Bank serving ECOWAS. The advantages of acceding to such requests reside, on the one hand, in the precedents for the Bank to lend to regional development banks and, on the other hand, the liability would be held by one well identified agent. However there are offsetting disadvantages that suggest that this avenue should be avoided. 6.37 The agreement to set up such financial institutions typically results from pressure by the weaker states to have a mechanism where they could secure some direct benefits in the form of projects. This raises questions of susceptibility to political pressure to undertake projects that neither the World Bank nor ADB find justified and that other donors will not finance. 6.38 The most important objection, however, arisee from questioning if public money should be used to support such institution3. These institutions could, as just outlined, duplicate the role of the Bank and the ADB or might duplicate the role of the commercial banks in financing trade and investment or in the limit would duplicate the role of national Development Finance Institutions. 6.39 The scrongest case for 3uch institutions arises from the relucte-,ce of commercial banks to finance cross-border operations that reflects -st-1 risks that Central Banks may not release foreign exchange at the requizite time. Resolving this problem is crucial and should be addressed in the course of either a regional integration project or through other Bank operations. However, unless it can be shown that existing institutions cannot perform the required tasks, the creation of new institutions should be discouraged. 6.40 It would be more effective and less costly to encourage national Governments to reform tneir financial sector to allow private commercial banks to compete and to set up an arrangement for the public sector to carry sovereign risk while the commercial banks evaluate and carry commercial risk. Such a partnership in risk sharing would allow financing of trade and investment with limited additional resources required from donors. 6.41 In this respect, there is no compelling case to favor institutions such as the ECO-Bank, just because they want to specialize in serving a I ~~~~~~~~- 8 1 - regionil group 21/ Inot-ad, efforts should be directed at all the setablished commercial banks, some of whom have approached the ADS concerning risk sha-ing. 6.42 Some regional financial institutions in SSA, such as BOAD (West Africa Development Bank) do have a positive track record and are certainly worth supporting. However, BOAD has been successful because it has operated on sound financial principles and not because of its regional vocation. Thus, for example, lear than 16 percent of its loans have been for regional projects. The experience of BOAD highlights the dangers of directing financial institutions to specifically lend for regional projects. The key mossage is that financial support should be extended where it will improve efficiency and resource allocation and not according to the vocation of the institution to serve regional needs. If institutions exist or emerge that appear able to do this while also specializing on regional projects, they should cartainly be supported by national governments and donors. However, there is no compelling reason to channel scarce resources into creating regional public sector financial institutions where none exist and where existing private and public entities could be enticed or allowed to served the regional market. H. Coordination with other efforts 6.43 The ADB is actively seeking ways to promote economic Integration in Africa, a mission which is part of its mandate. In this context the ADB has undertaken or financed regional studies, financed multinational projects and provided lines of credit to regional financial institutions. More recently, the ADB has sought to promote regional integration .y spearheading the creation of Africa wide institutions in the field of housing, insurance and consultancy services and has been considering various options for increasing intra-regional exchange, including the possible creation of an Export-Import Bank. ThUiH there should be interest and likely areas for cooperation and possibly co-financing with the Bank. 6.44 The EC under its Lome agreement has made provision for financial support to regional integration efforts in Africa and funds earmarked under Lome III have not been fully used up, partly for lack of suitable projects. Preliminary informal contacts with the EC suggest room for joint efforts including, possibly, co-financing. 6.4S The ITC has been actively involved in identifying the trade potential in the region and bringing buyers and sellers together. They have helpeu~ organize 4 trade fair since 1987 that have generated US $ 70 mill or of pzoforma invoices. Actual trade has been constrained by restrictive impor% licencing and difficulties at the firm level in meeting contracts, altVough no detailed information is available. There is scope for cooperating with ITC, perhaps by participating in the financing or organization of more frequent rontacts between businessmen. 6.46 USAID has been actively seeking to find ways to enhance regional cooperation, especially in Southern Africa. They have abandoned a proposal to set up a regional export revolving fund (of the type operating in Zimbabwe with great success and set up with Bank support), on the grounds that the need for this reflects bad exchange rats policies whose continuance would not allow the fund to revolve. Unlike national schemes such as the one in Zimbabwe, a regional fund would earn non-convertible currencies while supplying convertible foreign currency. It is therefore likelv that USAID could be induced to support a regional operation that is well conceived and obtains significant policy reforms that allow private agents to invest and 2a/ The initiative by private businessmen to sot up the ECO-Bank should be welcomed. But there is no comnpelling reason to single it out Just because it intends to serve all of ECOWAS. - 82 - trade freely. This is even more likely if the discrimination against foreign ownership is ended. 6.47 It may be poasible to convince donors supportive of such efforts to make special proviuions to grant, in the context of international bids, a certain cost preference to regional undertakings based in participating countries. Further, donors and the Bank could also undertake, in parallel with the changes proposed earlier, to provide technical assistance and other aid to enable regional groupings to formulate sectoral strategies dependent on a regional approach. This may be most relevant for food security and infrastructure but could also be based on production and distribution of specific goods and services, such as fertilizer and transport services, for example. 6.48 The Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) set up by IFC and MIGA, has been trying to find ways to make SSA more attractive to foreign investment. Its efforts have tended to be focussed on the PTA/SADCC countries and in this context Martin Hartigan has formulated a SPURT proposal that has been informally circulated. SPURT diverges from the current proposals mainly in its view that liquidity is required to allow trade and investment by covering deficit positions, at least in the short term. Adoption of the second window eliminates the need for financing since it shifts the liabilities onto private agents who can sell these off at a market clearing price. Nevertheless there seems to be plenty of scope for coordinating these efforts with the proposed Bank approach. I. Next ateoe 6.49 The most important task ahead is to evaluate potential interest and benefit from current thinking in SSA concerning new approaches to achieve efficient economic integration. Donor interest in developing and su; porting such initiatives would also need to be more carefully assessed. To the extent that sufficient interest exists to justify an eventual Bank operation, it will become critical to undertake further research of several key issues raised by this report. (a) Understanding of the restraints to factor mobility and how harmonization of non-tariff barriers would impact on trade fbe is crucial, given their importance in the scenario outlined by the report. (b) Regional preferences could only be 3ustified as intermediate aqu to generalized liberalization. It will, therefore, be necessary to devise mechanisms that ensure any Bank support to regional integration does lead to generalized liberalization. (c) Compensation may be a key issue for the political feasibility of any regional effort. It will be important to study how various compensation mechanisms have been implemented and their strong ard weak points. (d) Understanding unrecorded trade better could be helpful in designing an eventual Bank operation. Given the high costs involved, it may be most productive to concentrate on specific countries and sectors that would be chosen on the basis of possible Bank intervention. (e) The institutional, as well as the practical, aspects of the payments arrangements needed to sustain interregional liberalization seem to require further exploration. In particular, it may be necessary tc get the support of the IMF whose "primary responsibility" in this area has just been reaffirmed. (f) It needs to be determined whether theze is any evidence that commercial banks are not providing adequate pre- and post-export - 83 - credlt for African exporters. If this is tho came, thero my be large benefits from repairing the market failuros and it would be useful to investigate the posuibLlity of sponsoring the refinancing of commercial banks' export pre-financing and lines of supplier and buyer credit or the insurance thereof. - 84 - Annox 1 Active Reaional Intearation Oroanization. in Africa ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States (16 membera - 15 initial but Cape Verde split from Guinea-Bissau). (Alao known as CEDEAO - Communaute Economique don Etata do l'Afrique de l'Ou-t). Founded: 1975 Benin, Burkina, Cape Verde, Coto d'lvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinoa, Guinea- Bissau, Libeiia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone and Togo. (Integrates the CEAO members and MRU members and Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guin*a-BLonau, Nigeria, Togo). P - Preferential Trade Area (16). Formed: 1982. Started 1984 (July 1) Surundi, Comoroc, Djib.outi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe CEAQ - Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (7) Founded: 1972. Established: 1.974 Benin, Burkina, Cote dlIvo re, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal IOC - Indian Ocean Commission (5) Founded: 1964. Established: 1966 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea. UDEAC - Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (4) Founded: 1964. Establish&: 1966 Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea CEPGL - Communaute Economique des Pays des Granda Lace (3). Founded: 1976 Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire MRU - Mano River Union (also known as Union du Fleuve Mano) (3). Founded: 1973. 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OThERA CEREALS JNMTS.tg m2 OCa' 0012 StCCP AMC =A.T, LIVE 42 GOC 04161 M?6.1T UZL) 10 *2 OCa8 00121 StCP L'VC U O2 w 041U2 SWRChU UNIL1.1O *2 O083 00122 QOAT5 LIVC U2 OOt0 045SO 0Th CSAIAUS UNMtLL1O MIS R2 O00C 0013 SWteI.L:VI 12 0011 044 w'i4AT tTC MIAL 0* PLOU* *2 0061 0014 LIVC POULTRY *2 0012 0400 -fA? rTC MEAL OR POIUJ *2 0012 00o1 LSV2 POULTRY UISS IlSS a .2 0013 04 40I PLOU* OP WWfAT 0O wgSLth *2 0063 0014S LIV1 POuLTRY OVER 18 GO 2 0014 04402 WCALJ..*A0hS OP WW"T CTC *2 0034 0C01 CC1L4d SPEC IS LIVC *2 003 047 OTHER C2S2EA MEALS. LOU1R 2 0061 OOt1 LIV9 AT?MA4.iS Pt P000 MIS i2 0016 0"40 OT42* ChENA1 UMaAL J LZR *2 0066 01 OCAT AND P0EP4AATZOP 12 0017 04701 CZ*UM PL.U*I,QN-*WAT) *2 006S Oal MEAT PRISM CMzLLZ. FWvN *2 001 04702 MEAL 0 @3GATS M0-W.eEA? *2 0068 0111 SV:NE MtAl PM.F 0*029N *2 OC1s 041 CZRIA4. ETC PR*PA&AT?O" *2 00S o0t t *V%N MEAT WIT10 ua.s uN R2 0020 0441 1P*1* WPLUAST POGG ETC *2 0100 01112 2VINI MEAT SONCLESS *2 0021 04111 C2RtAL PLAKED MOLL.D FtC 12 010 0112 MUTTOh ETC ITO CU ph 0022 04812 CEALA6 AGASTIO.PUFFEO *2 0102 0112 0I3 MEAT RuuSw PO .P *2 0022 0482 MALAT IhNC" tN PLUJR *2 01C3 0114 oCLAT! LAO P6tR CTS K2 0206 12'11 - OTHER "* tS P2 C268 0" 'EA AMC MATZ 62 0207 1212 OIACC STRIP.EO OR PA!T i 2 C5'- c'!1 TIA A2 0208 12121 - vIRG: "0, FLUE-CUJRED Pt c268 0142 MA"! 12 0201 12121 -D OIVER ?P!S 62 0262 71 SPICES 62 0210 : 12 TOICIC0 REFUSE 62 0290 0'Yt PEP!PR AMO P:mtmN¶ 62 0211 122 TOIACCO MAMUFAC1%NO 62 029 052 SPICCS ex PEPSIE PIMEN'TO 62 02t2 1221 C:"ARS COC.tOC!S CTC '2 0292 07121 'ANI. -A 62 0212 1222 Co: "AtRE11 P2 0213 07122 C::ikt ETC R2 02'4 1222 0Th MAMFACTUAID Tz5 CC- 62 0294 07S23 CLOVES A2 0211 2 t:RUOI MAT9RLS EXC. FUELS 6l2 021 01524 '4iThE0 MACE CAROMMS A2 02'S 2t I 013 SKIN1S FUtS UNOSSL3 62 0296 C7S21 SCILS OF *14251 CUaN 1C1 A2 02 17 211 t oIfS.SK:NS EXC FuRS 6AM 32 C291 071526 Q:N42E6IXC2PT 1IN SWCT R62 0218 2111 gCVINfIQUjNI '4?OES.AAW A2 0296 01921 CThERt SICIS ,rWYMI CTC 62 021t 2 12 CALF LAN KIP &KxNS,RAW 6 2 C271 08 Fl!0I1G STU4FF P06t A.4IMAL A2 0220 2114 GOAT SAN KID Sk t^:AW 62 0300 081 FEEDINo STUFF P0t ArMo AL 62 0221 2116 SCCp Sm Cm4 00* WiWOCL A2 3301 0911 MAY FOOCEP GREEN 06? 62 0222 211t7 S?'EP SKIN WI!l'U WOOL 6l2 0302 0111 CEREAL ST17A4 ETC uLPIEFO 62 0222 2111 SKI: 15 wAST!.USCD LT7MP 62 0303 08s12 *00016 MOCTS.MAY EtC 62 0224 2t112 WASt! UAO USCD LEA¶tEt6 2 Z304 0s81l FODDER OF VEG tC 0:N MES 62 0225 21111 .1OCS AMC SKINS NCMS RAW 62 0301 0312 SPAM POLLARO SAtR95 EtC 62 0226 212 FUASKZNS.AW 12 ^300 0812' SRAA C"C MAIZE 0 6t10 62 0227 2120 FURSKINS.6AA W2 c 08122 ISAN ETC OThEt CEREALS 62 0228 21201 MIW SKNS 6tAW 62 0208 08123 CR3AN ITC LEMI1CAUS VCG 62 0223 2'200 OTER PU6RSKPNS RAW 32 ^039 0813 OZLCA( uAO 0T RgSIDUES 62 0220 22 OIL S8IOS.OLEAGZtOUS F!T 32 03'0 0C121 -- OF SOYA BENS 62 A')71 222 SHEDS FQ6ISCFCFIXCD OIL A2 031 01132 - OF QAOUONOTJS 62 0232 2221 RCUtOCIUTS GRIEN 32 03 2 08133 --OF CO3 "'ON SEEDS A2 0232 2222 SOYA BEANS 62 02i3 06134 -- OF LINSEED 62 0234 2223 CO7ION SEEDS 62 .3'4 013 -- OF SUNFLOVER SCCCS A2 0231 2224 SUNFLOWER SEEDS 12 :25 08136 OF IAPI OR C=LZA SEED R2 0236 2221 SESANE SEEDS 62 026 0s 137 - - -I COCUT CCPRA 6 2 0231 2228 RAPt AMC COL.Z SEEDS 62 :3 i O5v5 or PALe V TS KENEi.s A62 ::38 271 SEesS PC* OTh 6iXEO S.,S 62 02 . 03139 - OF CTh CIL 5CC55 PwC 32 0231 221' =P6A ; . 0816 MEAT OR O:5S MtAL ':CCCIA R62 2.40. 322 PA6p N6-S AMC )efNLKS - 98 - 2224 L.NSEED U 0221 2111 *-A MAmSt TOW N WAStES U O4C 2221 CASTOR OIL SIlOS t2 0322 2S111 FL" UNo 0S **Tto U2 04C2 2238 O:L 5130S ACI FRUIT SFGS *2 0223 20912 FLAA U*CI1Vw S=TJ1CZ ETC *2 04C0 2221 CIL SCt0 FLW)U AND UIAL Al 0224 2913 FLAX ?oC WAST1E ETC 42 04C4 33 PuStSE MJ2E. SY'VTSC t2 0322 2tS14 *6ANI NOILS WAITt CTC %2 O&CS 232 NA?I1.6 iStn6 L Sai *2 0221 2612 rtUE ?4Cp TOW WASTE ETC 42 C'C6 2220 NTURAL U1jl6 MM *2 0322 2643 S:SAL, AVE PtlA*S WASTE *2 o'! 22201 NATURAL.L *S4G6 rATIX S2 0328 2611 NAmILA p1*l. roW wASTE *2 04CJ 23202 0OthE NATURAL. *UuIE* *2 0328 2611 vEC 7tXT FIBRE WASTEIS. *2 0C&1 23202 GALATA. .aTA - PtRM- *U11W RI 0o30 26SSI :* *13*t W&STE ITC U2 040 223 StUgg8 5YNTTC. *gECL.A R2 0331 26116 C0Th V.0 TEXT P1I3*6WASTE *2 0411 2221 NURSER SYNTHEtICL.6AT1 R2 0222 268 S'VPVTSC *13*1S 70 SpIt 42 0412 22S11 POLYIUTAt-S - 77RE LATU 13 0232 2411 0tSCS 5YNr) *23*6 IJ%0 42 0413 22212 0OT *14"t6 SYNTWTC.L.ATX 4.2 0334 2511 - PoLYAIoE *2 0414 22212 POLYINJTAOENg M1JIBIR(11) 13 0221 21612 - OLYESTER *2 0411 22314 POLYC)4LaOWJTAQt1ENC6 ) t2 0322 263 A04'rLdC R2 0416 23215 POLYOUTACtINI-STYh( S*) K2 0237 26418 -- OT%R 42 04I' 22216 SUTYL MUB81R SS) 12 0334 266 CKTIN PIfLAT TOW SY?tt#t 42 041t 23311 0Th 5IYNTI RUSSIA FACTsC 132 022 26661 -- OP POLYAI1oI PTI*S *2 041s 2322 *CJ.O SCRAP t LtAD S N *2 02-0 2666102 OF POLYESTER fStSIS *2 0420 23221 9CLACNttO R1S461 *.2 0341 26662 OP ACYLIC FPBS3S *2 0421 23222 SCAP UNlKAhINtO *JU58E1 t2 0242 26666 -- Of 0T 5STWC *21*1S R2 0422 24 C3Sx AMC w0o *2 0342 2667 OISC; N SyWrH *3t* rs OM *2 0422 24 GtK, NATURJAL.*tAW WASTE *2 034 26671 - POLYANICO t2 0424 2440 COm1C NATruAL. RAW WASTE S2 02A4 262 -- POLYEStER A2 0421 2440' =* UtfttCO WASTE *2 0244 26672 ACRYL.:C 42 0426 24402 =_R S:WL.Y WOKED t2 0347 264671 OThEA *2 042- 245 rUEL WCO AlE CHA=AL RI2 0344 267 OThaR AA-MAOt *25*1 *2 0428 2420 DPIUIL LWOO AMC CHARCAL. *2 0346 2171 *t101141A47 FISA TO SPItN 2 0429 24101 *1U LL WOOC IN LO tSTC Al2 0350 20711 01504 ft1t F*2tt UIJtLU0 R2 0420 24102 WOCO CXA*A. R*2 0211 26712 CZT:Mt ILAWT 'TOW *1G011 ;2 04at 26 " PULPwCCO S4PS w0QCWAST *2 0252 2671t 0:SCO *25tSt P2S3* t3HE *2 0422 2440 PULPWOOO -4IPS WCOWA-ST *2 03253 2672 WASTC Of MAN-MA40 tSltES 42 0623 2460 PULPWOOO *tCOtM 0S 5SPT *2 0214 28721 S- 1YN`g?C 42 Gt434 2402 PULPWOOD CKPS PARTICLES *2 01SS 26722 -- *1G011tO R2 0431 2i463 WaCO WASTE) IPCL SAWO.1S7 # 2 0216 218 WOL AMC ANIMAL 94AZ *2 0436 247 0Th WaCO 60LUl SMARCO P 2 0257 2681 t WOL REASY. fLESCt -W04E0 *2 041? 2471 SAW-. VIN9ER-k4tS tZPERt *2 032 26J2 WOOL CIGPIA.SIt L D4K O i2 0421 24711 -- pi THE *0O4 *2 021 2182 S INE AIeI XL 94*P* L t0 42 0438 24712 t2-- *LY 0t ALP S1QUA*ED *2 026 26" C0ARSE HAIRt LCO EEO *2 0410 2472 SAW-,VtN1AR-LC1GS NN-=H *2 0261 21811 HC*S134AR U43M*O WASTE *2 0441 24'21 -- PN THE *OUCJ *2 0362 2618 COAASI MAIN MtS UNl M159E *2 0442 24722 ^- 41LY 0* MALF SQUARED *2 0303 2186 WASTE OF WOOL.KAIR MIS *2 0442 2471 Pe*c5p POLES PI1mQ4ff`TC 12 0344 26861 -- NOT PULL OR GAXNET0 *2 044A 248 WC0 S)4CD SLEEPC*S *2 061 26862 -- PULLZO 0* MARt1T71O 42 0441 2481 RAILWAY SLEEPERS TIES t2 026 2687 WOOL 0* HtAIl tM6D ETC *2 044A 2482 LJM6gR SJAPED CNStCJR *2 0367 231 WASTE Of TXT`L.1 FAB*RCS *2 0447 24821 LJP6Et SAW NTC ZC.V41I *2 063 2660 WASTE Of TEXTILE AkI:CS *2 044A 24822 LLUM8F PLAMEO ETC COSIP* RI2 034 26101 SULK TET WSTE. OL0 CLTHO *2 0448 2482 Lum6eR SMAPED NO"-mNIpR k2 0370 26902 RAGS.WASTE CO*O*41 *C R2 0440 244381 "USSR SAW 9TC PSO-CZN 12 021 27 CRUODE FPRTL.RININLS 94S R2 0451 24482 6L;N6R PLAbACZ ETC NOW= *2 0272 27 1 PE*TtLZZRS CRUOE *2 0412 21 PULP AlC WASTE PAPnR *2 072 2711 AmEMAL.VEG FtCTLZX.CRUO9 *2 0463 291 PULP AND WASTt PAPER *2 0374 2712 NATURAL. SOODLM MITMAT¶ *2 0484 211' wASTE PPERf PPQCAR* tT0 t2 om1 2'12 NAr CALCb P9OSP9ATES CTC *2 0451 2112 M904AHICAL WCOO PULP *2 0276 27131 -- LICOA" *2 0410 2311 Q44m 0wo PULP O:SSaLYm R2 037 27122 -. GOSLM *2 0457 2IV7 SOOA.SULJPATt WOO PULP RI 0273 2714 MT*L POTASSC SUL?1. C4O *2 0418 2117 -- UNILUAC>D *2 0327 273 ST $ANC AMEC GRAVEL *2 0416 25172 -- RL O .55S0LVV *2 032 2731 *LO@.0M114 STOS4E *2 044 2116 SLJLPmZt WCO PULP *2 03s8 27311 ILATE.*CU4LY WOREO *2 0441 2s11 -- Ut6LLA4EO *2 0282 27212 MARIL1 .TC ILD0 STOW *2 0482 2S112 -8 *LEA*4E CNOISSOLVV4 R2 0232 27213 QAAMZTt IANOItOHE,ETC *2 0462 2511 OtHER CZLLLOSZC PULPI *2 0324 2122 CALCtA*2US STONE *2 0464 2 111 SENI-O'4N?CAL 'WCO PULP *2 0285 2?222 CALC.8EUS S70TN Mt4 *2 0481 25112 PULP 07)4 71.&% WaCO PULP *2 0386 27223 GYPSUM AMEC UYO:*TE *2 0466 26 T!XT?LE FbPLS EWASTES 0 *2 0387 27224 CALCINEo GYPSUM Pt.- RS R2 04.7 261 S:Lx *2 0248 27:3 SANG O.XCL MIETAL-41AMWN *2 04c8 2613 RAW SILK JNT 71)4*0~ *2 028o 2'24 GMAVtL. CRUS > 14 STONE TC *2 048T 2614 S;LX WORN C> J0l.WAS7Tt *2 .0210 274 SULPI.j UhNSTO IRM PYTEt *2 O4.0 2Q141 SILK WOOM COCOCAS 02 03S1 2741 Sw6p"n ECX SUI.P IN 12211 *2 04 t 26142 SILK =C=ON VASTE ETC *2 0232 2742 IRON PYRITES UN*CAStEO *2 0412 2SJ =OTTOt *2 03t3 2"7 NArURAL A8RAS:VES MI5 *2 o '3 2621 RAW COTTON EXCL LINTERS *2 0214 2771 t WUSTRIAL OIACN0S *32 O 4 262C2 C;O-CN 12:NTZRS R2 0316 277s2 NArU*AL AAAASVtS 93 42 043 2623 COt,ON WASTE U.41CIMO *2 0316 2772' O1ST AM POCOXR OF GEMS A2 04'S 2834 CO'TON CA6OCO 0R 1C=NO PI 033' 2`22 OCTHEl NAT ASRA.S:VES AiS *2 04 - 264 .TCj7.OTh TEX lAST :4KCS *2 0321 22S 07941 CRUOC MINEtALS A2 04-8 26440 UTt 074 rCX BAST 'lURES e2 0316' 232 REPIACTORY MINERALS %CS R2 04 9 268 VEO P 23* EXCL C=TH JATt *2 0400 27821 C..AY ETC *2 0440 - 99 - 22322 NATUBAL GAAPI'ITE R2 0461 212 CRUOC vtC MAI' U IALS NCS R2 :OS< 27823 OOLOUITE 32 0442 2122 NAT GMU5 CSINS LACS ITC 32 Si: 27124 MAW4ESI1T R2 0463 2123 VCG PL MAlTERIALS U2 Zsd3 27S2 COoM SLo ..T ETC R2 0464 2124 VCC US20 IN OIARNACY CTC tG 2 :36' 2734 ASStSTOS CXOC 5MPLY vR^5 R2 048S 2S21 SICOS tTC Ft 3LANTING R2 Isa5 2711 QUSATZ MICA PELSOIAR ICT R2 0430 212S LIVE OLANTS SULS ETC 32 !dSa 27311 NATUMAL QUARTZ QUARTZITE R2 048? 21261 SUL5S rUERgS CO3RN.ETC 32 cld- 273S2 MICA MICA WASTE 32 0438 21206 LIvE PLANTS wCS 32 *s5a 27352 CRYOLITg CPIOL:TC NTXL 42 0466 2527 cur FLoWERs POLUA48 12 e 27314 FELSPAM PLOUA3SPAM tTC 12 0430 2S271 CUT PLOWERS 3' ^ , 2736 SLAQ SCAL:NGS,ORCSS CTC 32 0411 23272 CuT ?OLIACE R2 :5a* 27361 SLAr ETC PAN IRON STL kF 42 0462 2129 ON CUOluO VEI MATtERALS 32 CS-: 27362 SLAG ASM. NISCtNCL KELP' 32 0432 21231 VEGETABULE SAPS EXTRACTS R2 C_3 273s MINERALS CR2U2C MIS 12 0414 21212 VCErT PAOCING MATEUSALS 32 0C14 27311 CHNAK 42 0406 23213 VIaI SUsM B "oM MArtIA2. 32 cslS 27662 tAT BARIUM SULPMAYI.CARl 32 0493 21213 OTF CRM VII MATIRIAh. NC$S R2 01 2733: rALC ATuRAL. STEATITt R2 0427 3 MINERAL PULILS ETC R2 0S 27314 CRuO0 NAruRAL SOlATrS R2 O4SS 32 COAL CQK1 AMC 8NI1T¶ES 32 o57J 278SS S:LCICEUS EART'S ETC R2 04s 222 COAL.LIMMItt AMC PtAT R2 55 Y 231SS NATURAL ASPSALr 3hrU1 tN 32 040 3221 AmyQAC:TI' NOT Am@ TO 32 01L0 27333 MINMRAL SUJSTAJ4CES NCS 32 OSOt 3222 0Th COAL OT AGGLOMRtAtO 32 0416 23 M9TALLSC!RMOUS 0315 SCRA R2 0502 2223 L:SQ'!2,MOT AGILOINRATIO 32 0512 231 SltOb 031 COICINITMATES R2 0103 3224 PtAT.OrT 'Q'l RRATED 32 0143 2314 ROASTEO IRON PYRITES R2 0904 322 IRIQUgTTE COKE SESI-COKE 32 0184 2315 RON4 ORE NC0 AGGLOMCRATO 32 C010 3231 URSOUtTTCSOVOIOS CTC 32 0131 2313 IRON 0R AGGLOMERATES R2 0301 32311 3RtOUITTES OF COAL 12 0O6' 2S2 13OP AMC STEEL SCRAP 32 0507 32312 LS4SITE.AGILOMRATIO K2 011' 2S20 IRON AM0 STEEL SCRAP R2 O0J0 32313 PIAT.AGII.1OMEAT R2 01a3 21201 -- oP IC 03 CAST :RON 32 a50s 3232 COIKE S ICDKE.RtRt CR3N 32 01S3 2820: -- Of ALLOY STECL 32 01tO 32221 COKE Of CO=AL.ATOT CR31 32 03SO 23202 -O O OThg IRON 03 S-ICL R2 0511 32322 COKE OF LZGNITS1.PAT R2 0521 23R WMAMIUM rlO'SIUM 03f CONC 32 0512 32 PTRTOLEUM NO P*ROfCrS R2 0322 2330 JRAMIUM T1OCIUM OR CZAIC 12 05l 335 CR.U0t OTROLE1.M 32 05133 23S BASE MtCTAL C!RE'SrONC NfS R2 0114 3320 CR1UO PETRCOLEUM 32 0941 2311 CPR OR ETC INC CEM4T CR 32 011S 334 PETIOLEUP PQCCOCTS,MPIN, 32 0515 2S371 CROPCR 0R3S CXCL MATTTI 32 0315 3341 5ASOLShC OTF LIGHT OSL 32 0196 23712 CO'CR MArTTEC9M9NT R2 Os1' 33411 MOtOR.AVIATION SPIXIT 32 0191 2372 NICKEL ORES C*NCENTRATES 12 011 33412 SPIRIT 7yPt JCET FUEL R3 01S$ 23721 N(CEL ORCS.IXCL MATrS R2 OS1 33413 OTH LI1'r PETROLEUM OILS R2 0531 22722 NICKEL MAAT-. S:NTERS ETC R2 0120 3342 KEIROSEN,OTh MCOIUM OSL 32 0600 2873 ALi.JMINIUM O3S AL4MZNA 32 0621 32421 KECROS"E INCL UCT UEL R32 OOCi 23731 ALUMINIUMt 0R' CONN4TMArt R2 0122 32421 OT MOZUN PETROLEUM OIL R2 06402 25/32 ALUMINA(A AMINIhUM OXIOC . 2 0123 3343 a5" OILS R2 0603 2874 LIAO ORES c=NCZTIkArtS R2 0124 3344 FUCL OILSL hS R2 o060 2371 Z:C C01S CONCI'T1RArES R2 0o25 3343 LUIS tTPTRCLEUM OILS NIS R2 O0CS 2376 T:r ORCS. CNCENTATIS R2 0126 33411 LUCS MHIGH OTALM COWNT) R2 0eo6 237- MAAANESE Olt0 CONCETrRE R2 OJ27 33452 LUIS (LCW P9TQLM CONTNTl 32 0o6o 2373 OT' tCNP!t ORE CONO4TtE I2 0123 33S RESIOAL PETMLO PIR30 hC$ R2 0C60 23111 CH'OSMIUM ORE CNCENtTRATE 32 OS23 3311 PETRLM .JEIt MLLMNIAL VAX R2 0606 26112 TUNIGSTEN OE CONCINTRAYE 32 0620 33111 PETROL.Ar-T 32 0610 23713 VANADIUM MOLYSO ETC ORCS 32 0131 32312 MINMRAL WAXES 32 061' 23711 OTN NFEI cat CDNC NIS 32 0632 3312 MINERMAL TARS AMC0 PfqOCTS 32 ' 12 286 NCN-FERROUS MCEAL SCAAP R2 013U 33S21 MINERAL TAX 32 0613 2161 MtTAL:FERCUS NCNFIR WTEt 02 0234 32122 *ENZOLE R2 0614 2182 O'TH NONFER MTL SCRAP MIS 32 0131 32322 TOLUOLI 32 o06s 23321 COPPER WASTE AC0 SCRAP 2 032 32524 XYLOLE 32 0616 23322 NICKIE. WASTE AMC SORAP 32 0127 32621 OILS.S 4 OT00SJCTS MIS 32 0617 23S23 ALUMI0NILM VITE AM0 SCRAP 32 0SsC 3323 MIN TAR PITCH,4 PITO COKE 32 0o01 23824 LEAO WASTt AM0 SCRA R2 0130 33231 PITCH PROM MINERAL TARS a, 0613 23821 ZINC WASTEt C0 SCRAP 32 0140 33532 PITCH COKE 32 0020 26823 TIN WASTS AC SCRAP R2 0141 3324 PCTOLI *ITUMEN.COKE MIdS 32 0e21 231 Pe1C MTAL ORES WASTE NEl 32 0642 32341 PETROLEUM BITUMEN 32 0022 230 PltEC MTAL ORTS WASTE N1S 32 0142 33242 PETROLEW COKE R2 0622 23301 PRECIOUS METAL ORES C*NC R2 0144 23143 BITUOINI0US MIXTURES ETC 32 0624 23302 PREC:uOS MTL SCRPS MSTtS 32 0641 34 GASNATURAL AtO MAPC? R2 0621 29 CRUOC ANMAL vEC MAT MIS 32 OS40 341 OAS.NATURAL AMC MA4UPCT R2 0626 211 CRUOC ANIMAL MTAIALS IS5 32 0147 3413 PETRO40 OASES L61UPIEtD 32 062" 2211 BONES IVORY 4e23NS ETC R2 0148 34121 LIQ2UIFEO PROPANE BUTANE 32 0629 21111 BONE ORN-CORE AM40 MAST! R2 0141 34132 OT HMYDROCARBON UAS LOFO R2 0621 2S11t CORAL.SNEL6 A1O WASTE R2 OSl0 3414 GAS NATURAL GASIOUS STAT R2 0630 21116 IVOMY TORTOT:SI-Smt1L CTC 32 O011 2411 "IS MANIJPACTUDEO 32 0631 231S 0T ANIMAL MATERIALS MIS 32 0512 21 ULECTRIC ENERaY R2 0632 20131 HUMAN MAIM UNWCRX-D CTC 32 0153 :S1 ELECTRIC ENERGY R2 0633 2S112 BRUSM-M*A4:NG MAIM ETC R2 0154 3110 ELECTRIC ENERGY R2 0634 23112 GUT ILAOCOES ETC NONFISN 32 01SS 4 ANIMAL VEGITAILI OIL,lAT R2 0631 21134 FISH WASTE R2 O'1 Al ANIMAL. OILS AMC PATS 32 0636 21111 f:ORS SKINS PEAT1CR5 ETC 32 0917 4'' ANIMAL OILS AC0 FATS R2 063' 219?1 NAr1J3AL SPONCtS R: 0113 41t1 OILS OF fPS1 W4ALES ''C 12 o633 21113 AMBERGAIS C:vE WtX c'C R2 oS2 01 4111 rF.S LIVEN OIL R2 0631 231tS AI41MAL P30OUC-- t.cE R2 1OO4 *t112 OTHER FP?' OILS A*M fATS R2 0o40 titit Mt INA MAt ALS OSL5,Arl 12 064' 5121 MA1.L1C YORON 12 0-2 4113 AI4IMAL 02.FATS 649A515 62 0642 St122 PwrMA:C 4PONOZ0 62 ' ,111 6.6 PSLATNy PAT UNAeOM 62 0643 163a O:ocT'L ol7*pwTrALA-ts 0 41,32 FATYS CF OVIk4.S549P ETC 12 0644 *114A TIEIPWr1A:C AC:o 157tE6 62 0-6 41123 L.AO ST9.A01aa AM o1.I *T 12 064S 6132 0Trh POLY7AOS ETC ORIIVS 12 :-5 4114 mOOt. WEAS 5 TC 1 2 066 S12 O1X-F'T 4 ACOS. O?v0YATVS 12 O:S 41136 *JI4AL OLS.FATS '415 12 0647 114 NS'w*OCIwS X2 0';7 42 p2xt3 vOlITAaI. OIL.PAT t2 O64 1166 AMINIZPW6NCTION =meau"S 12 0122 422 P2Xt8 VIG OSL5 SOCT R2 04 5144 OXY,t1-PIT AMNGC-85 62 0'.2 4222 SOYA 641A 011. SL2 0610 tt47 A0Ufl0CT .WC tXC UREA 12 5'20 423 COTTC% SEEO OIL 62 0661 1141 Oth h41TRO .FhP7w C t0mOs 42 O7'1 42A4 QA4PA1T' jP 'MT O.L 62 0612 11481 QUA? AN1U SALTr.S TC 62 0112 4226 OL:V% o:1. Al 06SL 11412 IMIOI- ?6103-PnCT Ce"s A2 o733 4234 SLU0PLOWgt 130 OIL 62 0614 21482 ACaVLOWZT1Q.I t2 0724 4226 OTm P:xIv VtO OSL'. 502 06 111 S1444 0Th MI7TIL4-"CTW CWMS 42 0732 42261 RAPT =LZAI WISTAA OILS 12 06" S1448 OtAZO- AO- AZXY-C,s 12 026 42362 SACS OIL 12 0467 St1484 NVO6AZn1 ETC an OtIVI R2 0'2' 424 p2x*1 viaO OSL. moOPr 62 0668 11448 'TQ GV-PWT *C1 NIS 62 0-24 4241 L:NS1tZ OCIL R2 0616 St1 Om-: aa CO CTC 42 0732 4242 PALM OIL 12 066 1164 0OGDM-SULPWJ CMOLW1 12 0'0 4243 COCNJT (=PKA 0 6SI2 061 5156 S T% O6G-iS cW0S..1 12 C u1 4244 PAA.. KE3P3L OIL 12 062 51gg¶ ORGAM-U31CURY COVUPS 12 0'42 4246 CASTCX OIL R2 041 511S5 C06-J"C ComJ51 "Cs 12 0743 4247 P2X1D VCCCTA4LZ CZ.S 3 R 62 0664 5114 MT3t*C=TCS.ZC C_OS CTC A2 074A 43 PtOCIWS ANI O L ET 62 0.6 11141 LAC`T A1 R2 0749 431 66C050 AtML 3ce o:L rt *: 066 51141 0Th MVTIlOC C C5v1 TC 12 0O48 4311 f00C150 A4L VCO OX NEI 12 066' S1S7 SIJLpIah"095.rTc 12 O47 4312 hYOR01ATtO OIL FAT 42 0668 11171 Ss.JLP*X6IgS 62 0744 4313 !Ar4 ACIDS CTC OCIAS 12 0668 11127 SJJL?ONIS AM SLWAS 12 0749 A31t1 F7T7rY 4C:I.AC:O :1.5 Pt2 067 iS OTitl O6GSC O4SICAJ 62 0710 43122 MISIMS OF rMCAT2'G FAT A2 06'' sll MT&M5,91POXZOE JACITA" 62 07!1 4314 AAM'AL v912E8LA AtAS 12 A:Y SIG61 CE 5T *cx-AL="ca. "F. 62 01S2 43143 VCEGtXA$L "AXIS 62 C46- 1'U12 ACTTAA.S WI?.ACTALSC T t2 0 713 43144 I'SuECT WtAXIS SPMtI-CV .2 046 5'613 MTYLPuS OXICU(OUMAN 6U 0714 )o.ImCAJL.S.,ILAOT2 P6600 62 06'!tg 5i4 6lO6t*VLt OXO 62 ISI 51 0CtSjC o41MICA& It2A 04?t Si1i CThi 1 61*0Ul ETC 62 071S -I, i * 6CARJt16 M1S OttIVS 12 Of" s112 ALODfY04 E FWC 06s" 6I2 0t71 .sill ACCL.C MYOftOCAAS6G M2 06r6 51621 OxYOV1-1AJCTION A.Om¶'0 12 o'ts 11 11 ET'f1E( 132 04111 51122 0Of-FW7 AA.0D4Vt OtEIVS 62 O0s6 Sill? PCPYLEW4 62 0640 31622 ACITS 12 0,70 !li'3 au$JLl"6. S UAOItNeS C-C R62 061 11124 'TWYL WETWYL KETI 12 o0lt gl1l. OTw ACICL:C 0fYO0OCAA1O,4S 62 0612 51122 0r71X KCTMS E7C.OC4yVS R2 0'02 5l12 C"YZ1C w4760CAR6CIS Q2 0683 5i63 ZW6Gt 3S1t65 S.AA V. EC 12 0Ct13 11121 CYCi.Z4X.AMd1 12 0664 51631 62t211lcR 1ESTERS, 1 62 0764 51122 IL)CNIM.O4091CALLY . Pl 12 0681 51623 CT" SPa.S.WANIC 15TE1S ETC 62 0'l5 61123 TOu;4914 O6NICAi.. L Nt 62 066 1 OlSC RI 0.641S 12 a l*124 I 1S' . P 62 0641 6 EltcM"Is 62 0?67 S1125 S-RlE1 12 068 46 SUGRS. M Mft6t FTC.Nes 62 0c66 11126 eYLSENZINE 62 Oda* 5666 0Th O6tIC CH"ICLI NIS A2 0169 11121 0-t VC:C Y0C.ARt MlS K2 0690 52 :NC6aMrC CHM S&A.I 12 0'70 9 1 u. x4 OEiv OF MV06 CAll 12 06)1 2: 1:0G 1LtT`5.OXZOKS.1TC 62 Ot?'1 51131 tV 4L CHL0104 62 0662 1221 CtEMZCAJ ELPINC I 62 07'2 S112 :2 0613 12211 2AS1S X*CL M*AL.OGV 62 0't^2 11133 rT1T;A01tX0tTChYLEM 62 064" 12212 MC.EALLDSOO '5 62 O74 61126 0Tw ouA64 14v0CAAS 0661tV 6 2 061 12212 O4LORZN .2 07eS 511 t Y7O6CARS O43V MO0WAA.OQ 62 06" 12214 FLLJ:PgOR . 3=6M1ZO 12 077' S12 ALP0L.S,CtL ETC A2 0687 32211 SULP'4A PUrIF?O 62 0?7'' S121 ACYCL.c .Co:>L.SS IR5V1 12 0666 12211 16R1RTY 1. 037' 11211 MIThI. A&CLw U1TAtL 12 0661 12217 ALAALZ 6* EAWTN MTALS 1U 0711 11212 PIR* L5 62 0700 12216 CAMMIMC. CAR8O 6LA) 42 0730 11212 SIJ?V. ALUTL1JThAMULS) R2 0701 1222 INCGMEIC ACIDS ETC M2 0761 11214 OCT71. AAO.MLSOCTAMLS) 12 702 12221 AWVQ0CNLC.M:C £A20 ETC r2 0762 11211 ETnLI 1LYCSIL L 012 0 j0 12222 SU6P"MZC AC:MOL1L *61 0762 11216 CThtL LC,0v6rm SPIRIT 12 0704 12223 NRTbC.3ULP4WIT1bC ACID It 0cl4 5t12t7 FAr - AiL0FLS 62 0706 52224 6'CSPAZ:C ACID05 ETC oas 11216 GLYCZACL ,.LYVCIML LYtS 62 0706 12225 CCXIC OXSO 4160 AMCS 62 ;*'6 11211 ACYCL;C AICOh NOS o5 rsv5 A2 0707 52229 o0t IPOlaAIC ArY'0S ETC 62 or' 5122 CYCL:C ALO16LS ORSVAT%S 62 070 S1223 MAL. WLPI4 00 mewaT 62 a'la 1123 P'4E LS,44MN ALC.05 RIVS 62 lot1 922321 AALOGIN X OCWS MON-OCTAL R2 0761 5t234 6w1M6CL PUM9.rTS SALTS 62 0V10 12222 SULPWUR CW"O9S MON-'3TAL 62 0710 51231 CIESOLS. M15.1 ThR SALTS 62 0711 1224 MITALL:C OxSCS1 62 01t 3 51231 or* PAINQLS AMC 94(N-ALC 62 0712 52241 Z.M K *101 6E6OX0t *2 0c12 S1277 OEIVATrVS OF 6O141L 6 TC 1.2 072 52242 04MOMIuM OxOt 0601cxX01 62 090 113 06lmZC ACD5 CTC 62 O716 12243 MANjAE3l Ox:013 S2 0'54 1317 MOPCACOS APD OIXSvAT:vS 62 C'S 12244 IRON OxIDE SYo0CX:oQS R: oils S1371 ACETIC A20D ITS SALTS 12 V' 12241 C:&ALT OXI0S 3 *5471X60 13 6l2 0.56 st272 ESERS or ACtTSC ACDO R2 071t 122" Tr'TANUM OXSDCS 62 0717 91312 MErThACOYt.C AC02 VrC 642 o*0s 92241 LEAD OX2015 62 0699 1 1371 WM mO6AC:0S ETC Dt6WS 62 ei 3I t 221 t140*QAMC BASES ITC NIS 12 Ql1s 5184 M.YACb:1 AND 0Of Z ATrT4 R2 o"O 2261 'AIMIA ANDWOO*S L' 02 Cs0= - Io I l 92232 CAUST:C SOCA SOL:0 O2 0401 '4,16 O54 I mcamtcs OCX:V5 CTC s2 'z 12223 CJSSZC SODA IN SOLUTON 12 OC2 $415 GLYCDS::CS QCL,S SER t2 Ai' 12214 C STIC POTAS2 ETC 52 0502 3414l QLYC :s it AMC OC:WAT"5 *2 dl S12218 OXSCS tTC O wOSX A 52 0O04 141e2 GLAMOS CTC AMC CXTRACTS 2 ^a 12211 ALLU2?tOMU 0YOoiX!Ou R2 o0ao 54''4 AMTt:SERA M:C5:^AL VC-%S s2 S2217 ARTIFICIAL CCOOCUCM 12 0504 s4165 'CX:NS MZCALBIAL CL%AIS 52 z2 12291 OrT OXSOCS EASES CTC NIl 42 050' 341, IEIOZCAMEINTS 42 ' 122 OChi NhOZtC CM9MICALS X2 050C 541"1 - CONTAINING UtT:a:r C5 2 !1i 1231 MITA4 =P0 OF OLCRG AC:0 x 2 O0O0 5 4'2 * - COTAINNG CX S 42-33S 12211 FLtCUX2OS ETC X2 0510 *41'3 - CNTAS9:NG ALXAL.O3S 42 0410 S2212 ChLOXtOCS 0XVO0LONICIS 02 0511 145-3 -CCNwTo F am SJISTAMCES 52 : 52313 04L1ORITS NcP0OC'4ORSnT 52 0512 3413 CAUtSAI. 00001 S 52 a32 S2314 ChL.OATES .5E504LD.OATEIS 12 013 14131 IAICAGE *POEPARO ETC R2 0333 S2311 SULPNIOES PVLYSULLPtOtS X2 014 94166 0Th P ASYTSCAL GOWOS R' 't 12316 O:TIOIwITt, Sw6"LmOxYL.AT9S 52 01S 3S PCtRtWE CLIhIShZG tCIr p0 52 043S 1221? SULPNI'TI ?N0OSAULP4ATIS 52 Olo *t CSSEkN T2L PESI 'UME ETC 12 oR a S2315 SODIUM SULP'4ATE tTC 52 OCt2 3111 KSSI'ETL OtL.SES?NCQ0 CTC 12 css1 1201 OTh SULP4AT!S ,55PPSTES 42 o0ts ItId W?XEO 'IlPUMI SQISTANCES 12 05& 1232 OTR WrL CO OF t100 A=0 12 OSo 1313 P*i tRESUNRY CCSwICS.g tc 42 OlSS 12221 tS4TRZTICS AND MITRATES 12 0520 5130 5tRuUs fRY CW3SWt IC$ ETC 12 010° 52322 P,CSIst!S tCSPtWATt!S 52 0521 154 SOAP CLIANSINS CTC PUPS R2 010 12323 NEUTRAL SODtUM CAA8OUATtE 2 0522 9541 SOAPS 12 0302 12324 CASIONATt PECRSONA'T NIS 12 0523 1542 WSING PIEPAtAT?ON5 CTC 52 0102 12325 CTAMI4OS =DLEX CYANIDE 12 0524 1143 PCL:tSM9S C* SMS,CTC 52 C104 12322 FULXINAtEr CrT AATS ETC 12 0421 5C FERTILIZERS IMJpACTUMO 52 o030 12327 SLI:CATIS 52 0526 162 F!AT?L:ZSIS. UAIJC?JUEO 12 zscO 12225 8OSATES AMC *C4SCOtArt 1 S2052? S421 CAIM M GIt PSTEt 5TL.Z R2 OSO- 32321 SALTS OF I*5 AC:OS NlS RI2 082S II211 AUFtZLU N4STltATE i2 0105 1232 METALLIC AC:O SALTS . TC 52 0522 S5212 AWQNtUM SULP.OITKATZ 12 O0c0 12231 SALrS OP MI;TAL6:C ACIOS 52 0520 5421t2 ASNUt SULPNAT1 52 0310 S2322 ALL PRECIOUS MITAL OHOS it2 0321 51214 CALCIUM trTUAt A tc ETC s2 09t1 123S :MOOG CN346 55OuC-5 NIS 012 0432 15211 CAtC:Lw CyAM:OI TC X2 g1C2 5223S1t MVOIOCt!t ~0XCC :5C2 0232 5216 oJ1A 2 09!i3 32212 *"OSP04IO1S 52 0824 152i5 CCEN I4IT*CGCN ppTL.R Ngl 52 0314 12323 CAL::UIN CAMISCE 52 0521 3522 COqE 0`4SP*Ar:TC FSTIL.ZU 52 0513 12394 CA*S:OS CXCL CALC:UM .2 043C 10221 SASIC SLAG ( AS SLAG) 12 Osl 1226S "4Y5ORDES.NITASZDS ETC 12 0537 14Z22 SUP.EP1SPkATS 12 0211 32239 OTh ZN5U COMWoUNDS NIS 5.2 0434 55223 CHIEN F.Stp pgnyZUS NIS 52 Oti1 52c4 RAO:oACT:VE ETC MATERIAL R2 0436 1123 2 EM PVTASSIC FERTILIZ:E x2 0ti 1241 SRAO?ACrTVE ELEMENTS ETC *2 02440 41231 OTTASSIUM 04.05:1 52 0920 5249 TrH IOCAOACTvt ('C MiTLS 52 041 51232 0TASSt:U SULjTC.ATt MS 52 0921 32431 STABLE :SCTOPvS ETC Pt2 0442 14221 CH 'OT&SSIC FOTL2I mIS 52 0922 32462 CT" 0EMES ASSOC SkCAIOACT K2 Q242 1523 PECPTtL:ZE3S MEl 52 0923 53 0Y!ES TA ING COLCLjS P50 R2 0444 S3211 NT-' S-nP0 r F!5TLR NMl 2 2 052' 1." SYNT ODY MAT INOC 6.ACS 02 0541 16232 NITROG-,"CS pESti'LZA 4ES 52 06-.5 12 11 SYNT'4Z 25:>C CYE3TUFF5 52 054 36212 N 'rmoa-KQT&S FE5'CRT N(t 12 C:6' 53'2 5'NTt- L4MIN,:S L'AXIS 52 0547 152" 04II FSIT?LIZERS ^ttS 52 s:- 13121 SYN ORtC LMN CTC r IN 52 041 S' EXPLOSIVES PYOTEf C pb I2 Ot21 52122 CCLOUR LAAKES 52 0543 S3 EXPLoSIVES PYROT1O0o O00 52 0321 322 OYES NIS lAN:ING 5500 52 0950 92' 0EttP54AEC WPLOS:VES 52 0233 9322 OYl 7A!* EXI5TRS- ThMINS R2 055 s72- 3Y PCwCjES 12 C03; 53222 YEG rN EXRCX S TANN.IN 52 0562 S"(2 ' P"tPAAO EXPLOSIVES NM, s2 09ui 53222 OYE ?G EXIXCTS Z0 IMAL 52 0O53 5 22 RUSIS PSO1ItR5SOtTOkTOA1 52 0l33 1223 SYN1rwe'c TAt:CND P5oC:TS t2 0054 S'12 9P"CTICMMC AStICLES 52 0O34 533 P1Q4NTS.PAUNTS ETC 52 021S S1 a LASTIC MATERIAi.S CTC D2 093t 2331 COLOURI0N MATERIAJ NIS 12 0454 552 50 OFP CONDENSATION CTC K2 01SJ S322 Ntt'imG ;!S It2 0S67 S122 P'.4'EDpt.ASTS X2 0327 9334 V"AN:304 OSTEISS ETC 52 065U 15211 -I- Z P5ZN5 pO53S R2 063S $5341 WATE,t-ThIN4E0 PAINTS 52 053 14212 -- PLATWSILiS VSRI ETC 52 0325 13342 OTH PAMTS,VAPISM.4S ETC 1.2 0860 1216 OThER FORWINC WAStTE 52 0940 53343 PIM S IN SAINT ENAMEL 52 .S51 1822 AINOPPLASTS 52 0o1v S3344 OISTEMER,OYIS NCS CTC 52 0562 15221 -IN S SII"M 0O5 R2 0142 9323 G4LAZ9S 0IE5 PUTTrT ETC *2 0563 $1222 ^ PLATES FILM STtIP fETC 52 043 332S1 PSEP50 PIG1MeKT OLAZI ETC 52 0654 55221 OTHgR FOltS INC WAIsft 12 0344 33232 4ATSTS CCLOW5S 52 053 3S223 ALKYOS.TCrMP PCLYC5TERS 42 0145 12212 PREPAREOD 5OIESS 2 0456 1123i IN PRIMARY FORMS 52 0149 23314 GLAZERS PUTTy CT0 FILLNG 12 0567 18222 -- PLATS FILM STRtP ETC 52 0147 S4 WECOIC:NL MAA PSCOUCTS 52 06I 51236 - OT741 PO"5 INC WASTE 52 0945 141 MEO?C:NA.L PSAAN PiOU>JCTS 52 0561 S124 POLY0AMOS 52 0141 5411 PIOV:TA:NS AMC ViTtAMINS 52 0210 SS241 -- EN PSIMAI Rooms 52 s33o 1413 AWTI&IOTSC5 IN su6h 52 0571 35242 PLATtS FILMt STRIP ETC 42 031t 34131 PNZMCLjNS AMC OERZVTVS R2 0572 15245 -0 OThtR FORS hINC WASTE 32 0C52 54132 STStPTOVYCINS AND OCltSVS 52 o072 1821 POLY ISTtNIAS It 0953 14133 TETRACYCLXNES W4 OESiVS 52 04'4 58251 -- N PRIMARY rOSMS it-t A O54 14121 0Tt415 AK:1S07CS 02 0571 51250 -- 5 FORMS :NC WASrT 27 0939 5414 VtG ALKAL:OS APO OSt*: IS 52 o'41 5420 15Oxt0 SES:ImS 52 1OS5 5411 "a5.IC SMAT 1YN EN SuLs. 52 S IN PS:0AY FORKS 52 0115 54131 INSULIN 52 CS'S 15250 -. 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Z 6321 - OP WOOL OR PINE NAZi 52 1231 6s NOIETAL MINER" UPS MtS 52 '3. 66522 Por CT'OP 52 1223 641 L:IN C2094T ILQ #*,0 s2 t:'2 68232 Of or gItAtD 5o 42 ¶292 "6t LIM, QUICK, LAS.N WOAULC 42 t13' c652 *- OP OTrHiR PleUs 52 1234 6612 CSlNT 52 3-4 6333 KNIT ETC PAB52ZC.LASTrC R12 1231 4412 oUULDES STONE EC woCV 52 31 4" LAC5 AIU0SS TULUS VTC 12 1296 SS6121 PLASTOUNS CTC AT STONt 32 !,S gCgo LACt P:SSC*S TULLX tTC 52 ¶21 7 442122 sUj:6:i STONE WORKED 52 :- 66 01 NARROW FASA:C5 NES 52 ¶2S3 6 6122 LAT. .WORNU ARTICLES OP 52 '3-8 63602 WOVEN LA8L.S ITC MIS 42 229 61e1 WOL LOG =AM uNPISO pos 02 ¶17' 6S303 TAPS ETC OT ELASTIC 52 1300 6611 ASPI4AT ETC POCUJT'S 52 '380 61604 mgI P45t2C0 P-AIN 52 1301 66182 MIXED V00-6*t. BLDG *C00 52 13281 63603 NgM FABRICS NS. LACI M2 1302 44163 "aSUSToS- .2S3*-CET *tPR 52 '382 61go6 ESM6OIOgRy R2 1303 662 C-6AY 5erPACT0y SLDO PRO 52 13S3 O67 SPECIAL TCXTILE TrC 0500 R2 1304 6623 REFRACTOY WSILODIG P50O R2 1314 3?7 PELT ANO ARTICLRS MIS 42 t30S 41221 tSL:C9OUS EARTHS.UCKX,5 52 t33S 6172 BCNOtO 1S3E rt!XLS MIlS 12 1306 642222 IEIATC0Y SNICK MIS 52 ' 6e H - CDATtZ ETC TtXTILES M$S 52 1207 64233 RSPRACtONY CMENT NOSTARA 52 I 3V 63721 =U iTC CIOATtD TtXT:L.S 12 t208 66H24 CSCX CTC wCNwEPACTORy 52 1288 65722 PLAST:C =0ATtO TtXT:L[S 52 130* 64241 UILaONG ISOcS 352 t291 IS723 XUgggM1Z!O TtXT NOT KNIT R2 1210 44242 700PNG TILIS tTC.CmXRAMIC 52 1310 65733 OTh COATED TEXTILES ETC 52 1311 66243 PtIING ETc.cOOSAMIC 52 '21 6s74 ELAST:C RAE ETC NOT KS I'r 2 1312 63244 N4GLAZD CtEA C SETr ETC M2 l 312 H S- C0050I AMC MANUFACrUCIS 52 t313 66245 GLAZEO CISAMIC SSTTS ETC 52 t1jj 69711¶ =RC50A CAJI. L5t. T'Wdrf 52 1214 442 MINERAL MAMJPCT¶SSES "es 52 214 61712 NITT:NG OP MOPE TWINE 52 1313 6431 GMINOZ:N STONES ETC 52 '131 61733 ARTICLES OP COMO5AS MIS 52 1216 4632 AStASIVE CLOTMS ETC 12 t336 6173 MAT 001t5 52 1217 4433 SNIML WS MIS NONCIPRAMC 12 ¶311 61761 WOSLCPUM PEL WAT 500135 52 1318 66 I1 ARTICLES OP PlASTtR R2 131p 65762 MAT 50021S NIS 12 1213 66322 CEEMNT ATPCL ST?ONC P5O 52 312 as?7 TEXTIlES P0k MA4042RMY 52 1320 44333 M:CA.W0CtD A ATICLIS OP 52 1400 s" iI TEXTILE WAOCINI NC$ ETC 52 1322 4433S 0Th :NML W5 OCRAIC 52 1401 17'2 TEtXoTL WIOCS ETC 52 1322 6636 5150L IMSJLATNG 0500 MIS 52 1402 63773 TEXTLS FOR MsAOINtS HIS 52 1323 6477 AEP5ACTZMY WARtE P LD 52 '402 6171 SPCCL. tEXT:LE tbO0 1S 52 13224 663 ASISTOS, !PICTION4 MAT%.S 52 144 61731 TIXTIL. WOSEPIPING TPC 52 ¶322 4361I AS8E5TOS UP5 NONFUICTION 52 '405 61732 MACtN:ERY NELTS CTC TEXT 52 1326 66422 PSICTOO4 MATERIALS 12 &CO as5 T!XT:Ll ARTICLES MIS 52 1327 663S CESAMIC ARTICLIS 'S 52 1407 a581 SAGS SAOCS OP TEXTILES 12 323 06301 CERAMIC APPAtAT NOP-AC¶ 52 1408 6612 sAZO-W* CANVAS X00S 52 122S 663<2 OTh CERAMIC ARTIC* ES MIS 52 ¶40c 61121 - oF CCT`TON 52 1230 664 GILAS 52 '410 61423 -- OTER T$4AN OP C0TTON *2 ¶321 6641 CLASS ¶OPTICAL PLAIN 52 '41 86513 LAW -TS ETC WMON ELICtUC 52 1222 60414 GLASS IN MAS SS p5PTICAL 42 ¶412 612 -- OP WOL 0 FINE NAIR R12 1333 66413 QLAS5 NIS 5001 ETC WAK0 52 14i3 633 -- o COTTON a2 1224 6042 OPTICAL GLASS UIftSOD ETC 52 ¶44 6322 -- OP SYNTHETIC laUts *2 1231 4443 ORAW00.ILOW GLASS uIfCO 12 1411 61823 -- oP OTHER planeS 52 1230 6644 GLASS SU1PACtC-2R0CW ETC 52 ¶416 6384 L:NfNS CTC 12 1327 6646 CAST,tOLLD O GLASS JWRKOD *2 I14' 95641 2SO LINEN OF CO TON 1m2 13¶8 J646 GLASS CONITWJCTIOO P*00S 52 1418 63142 HED LiNEN Of CTl` "ImaS 52 I33 "A4 SAPIfETY GLASS CJT 0 NOT 52 "'1 63U43 TABLE LINEN Of ct 52 1240 664J sM41T GLASS MITA-COATID 52 1420 18544 lAGLI LINEN OF CT" P 3Xg 22 11341 "As GLAS MIS 52 ¶421 63843 OTHER LINEN OP COT T R2 ¶142 64s 1 GLASS Zt S~V tS 52 422 63846 OTHER L:NEN OP OTh Piot 52 ¶343 6482 LAP ETC ENVELOPtES GLASS 52 1423 3^84 0THt NOjN ARTIC OP COTTON 52 144 684A3 CLAOC.WAYT4 GLASSES ETC 52 '424 61845 OTb P¶URN A or OP 0Th PT 5x A2 1246 6494 GLSS Pleat ANC Pr*ODCTS 52 1421 6583 oTH TEXTILE ARTICLIS NIS 52 48 663 GLASSWAAtE 52 1426 683', rAPESTRIS KAtO-MA0CE ErC 52 1247 6611 BOTTLES ETC er CLASS 52 ''2' 6ss13 KNITtEO ETC ARTICLES MlS 52 1344 161'1 GLASS BOTTLIS ETC NONVAC 512 ¶421 61463 CTH rtEXTILE P00.JCTS.493 R2 1343 66312 1501t5 PC* VACLAJ VESSEL M2 421 6SS PLOOR COVtA:NGS RTC 52 1330 4662 NCUSI)'LOZIOTtL ETC GLASS 52 1420 61S1 LINOLEUM, P=1. COVERIN:GS 2 ¶211 6J38 CLASS ARTICLES MIS *2 1423 61311 FLOOR COVER OP PAEtR ETC R2 ¶331 6a18t LA&CRArTOR ETC GLASS 52 '432 6s132 LNOLC"JU cTC rXTLE SASEO 52 1213 66582 GLASS CI4AMCNTS Ns 52 ''32 6132 CARWETS ETC KNOTTIO 52 ¶134 66313 OTHES GLASS ARTCLIS NIS 52 a3' 61321 -- OP WOOL 0O VINE ¶4A:M 52 '355 666 POTTERY 52 14* 65121 -- OP OTHE9S TEXTILE wTLS A2 t321 4 644 POSCELN CMtZA WCUSE WARE 52 d43t 6513 KELIM 5SC.JMACS ETC RUGS Pi 1317 666 COARSE CERAMIC OUSEWAEtt 52 143- 6134 WtOO CARPETS ETC MIS 52 ¶3$6 6666 CERAMIC O:tNE TS ET 02 '438 6fi34 .- TruFTO *2 1¶21 6s6 PEARL ,P4C1- SEI-P STONE 5t2 1432 65342 -- WOVtN 12 ¶; 671 PEARLS UNSET JNSTRUi 52 144C Ig-I OSACftCS wm:MST ;WNST 42 144 C -,V CTmt Alo ._1- S ![L W z721 - tCUCZ O$cRtC: ~~ ~~~~t2 144A -oo :* SCtN C1 S t t t: S ad,3 P41C_ StIMISp ST:sXS NIS *2 '445 1'5C2 --CP -413H CAMI"Ch S71. 02 ! ! *074 SywTb oqCC SCI"S- S_:N9 R2 444 a "Sr, 4 --z SA:Ns_JSS !-:5 R V 511tS AMC STEEL 42 *41 GS~^S --c :-OC A>f 4_:* S-!E_i 4-t tO S:4rXN PIOISN 9T.C 42 1441 0-5 RA:_ RA:LS 9", :MI S, *, !9 I' 12 I ZNC STL SPtCCtLC:SCn CC A -45 4-GC e* cIA' too.,v NIS; g:R . T,* 0i s !- S7!32 SltON. STEAL POVOCtS t- t.452 lt. :R STL W:Rf t xCL 40m 4o t2 53' 4-1I 3 SPONat :RON Oil STEgL *2 14sSz 61!10 IMN STL W:IRE lC hI1 _m;t t2 47142 9IAQO-SIL2:CC t; 'dZ -4 S'A:NLISS 91C S'r t2 ' *sslE 011411 91000-ALLCY5 42 i4s- S-CS --F01 OT>{ AL,Zy STtI., 42 53- *VI IRON.SrtIL 04:1AX OCRM 92 'As #I$ MIN ST L rusts PIPES AT: R2 '53J 4724 IAN SYL. INGITS LwUs5 ETC 42 '451 g CASr IOt TU8S slttS 42 ISSX 67241 IACJ4.SSMP`LI STIL. 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TC3tUM,A ALLOYS R2 1612 61612 BASE OCTAL SAFUS ITC 12 1612 6880 U3AtL., r?St L ,AL6O4Y 32 ¶1s: 66012 AlSI M?I CA03 ETC P77N`0 ax 1633 Gas "N-PINR 4AS& 0TAL4 MElS 32 11 662 :01N,WT ST. lAN AM MART1 12 ¶614 61JC T'WST, ! OLY3,?ATAL,A4k U2 lei 663 P??S4,C@KS'JEYtS.ttC 32 1666 61611 1'jCST71J UNWMJCU4T W^A3T 32 1lei 63631 PMt NitDLZSl2 1 12 16se 62912 CLYOEtJMIU UM.JNW3 1A.STt ft2 isI7? 6132 0" ASttlL KA:MPtMS iTC 02 II7' 46812 TAM?AJ.M1 UfftVO,4W WAS?T 32 113 l6C33 IASE TL 1OKS EYtS RTC 32 1694 6616 MAGNES:IUM WASTItSCAD 32 111 go66 SPOtf3 AMC 6dAVIS 32 1661 IAS1 MAGNESI2UM UM0U@C7T 32 1620 6S641 IO STElL. 1PQ1C3 tTC 32 ¶00 68ee 36.S8 METALS MES.CE91'S 12 1621 61942 =P003 SPRIM1S. 6.AVES 32 1'0i 61661 ICfYL6' UN U.At4T WA6STE 12 1622 6666 IASI Wrl. MISC AR7:CLIS 42 C02 61316 AS1 WTT. MI$S L*ftT wAST! 12 1623 6*661 1ASE M1 FLEXIELI ?UBP ml 12 102 6s METAL MAEJOAlC1A JIES Nil 32 1626 6662 IASE NfW% ELLS NCM-ELECT 32 1706 616 STRC& t13E5 AMC PARTS 4135 12 tC2S 660.2 BASE ETlAI. STlOPPERS. TC m:2 10CS soil 5NJUC7UfiS OAR15 :Am STL 32 1626 6664 BASE YTL kNE 1tC OfLAtES 1f2 1eI0 6612 S1TUC143ES PARTS A6~LLW 32 1622 66661 BASE WTL. WLC63R3: 3001 12 1.0 3R;2 METAL T7AWS,1CXKS I5TC 2 1623 6317 :O lETttL ARTICLlS 1415 32 "'0Z 6621 Mt4'A4. S'TOMA41 rAS ETC 32 1621 66171 t 30M, S3tL Aw0@C35 MOAR5 32 1 70 66211 STtEL STOXAG1 TA4&S TC R2 ¶630 166 IRNATIL M.A04.SACMKSl MIS 32 1*10 662'3 AL.4 t 513RAO TAM#S 170 32 1631 elsl NON$ NIS OF COPqI. LX.1C 12 t'l 6624 6 Ml. TRANSPORT BOXES (TC 02 1622 66861 =09Mi MAMJPAMOSC1. N5 12 12 '2 62241 ST. 3TAASPVtT IOXtS e-- 3 321633 69212 NOCKIL MAM4PAC1UXtIS 4S2 32 66242 A6UH4Mt 'MNOSt BOXIS E0 32 1636 63143 AilllNItNZUM MAMIPACTS 14S 652 I'4 50243 IRON XP GAS CY7SMCCIRt 12 162S 61644 LEAD AMM6PAC7TU.S J3E1 32 J's 63244 ALJW CO= GAS CYLSOt1S R2 1261 6661t ZINC "MpAM CTU3ES NIS 12 1'll 662 WINE PIOC*IlTS MM ELICiT R2 1627 63666 TIN MAIEJAC1¶.ES Nil S2 117 6621 wZ3e CAMLES MOPtS 1T0 32 1626 6106 01W BASE WLS Pt1 1WS 3TC 11 / 6so3i - Or ROF AMCG 11.0 1L 12 1626 62161 ?U1C TEN wROW MPRS Nil4 42 ., 66312 OF C=Pt0I U2 1640 66662 1CLY8OEa wOWT MWMS NiS 12 t'20 5e212 -- OP ALSZNIt 32 1641 66292 ?ATAJ.j.J Wl4! MFSh NIS 32 1¶2 6322 1ROW S'TEL PP4:MN wIRE 32 1642 63664 MA.NESIIL wRQVT¶MPNS MIS 32 1':2 6136 METAL PE?C:?4 GM.ZE E" 32 '643 63666 B1RYLLZum WAC3t.MP3S N"a 32 '23 61311 -- OF :Z 04 STIIL R32 1644 66661 IASE MiLS MIS N 4Ct. MPRS 32 ¶'24 61212 O- 0! COQP0t 12 1643 ? MACHZMS,? TRAhItPAT OWsP 02 ¶ U27 614 STL COPOO MA:LS, W3.rs, 32 1664 71 MOWiN GIN6RATING COL:M 32 U 226 44 STL COP04 NAZLS .LWtS i'C 32 1647 71t 5TEAM lOILIRS 4 AJX PLNT' 32 1'2' 6940' :RON STECL. MAILS ;-7 m2 1644 7111 STEAM BILSAS ItC 32 ¶'21 666Q2 :KN. 5TL WJS SCLTS EtC 32 ¶649 712 AJXZLSARAY COLU PLANT 32 '12S 6*403 C=PEN M.AI".S.S6OL 1.tC 32 16s0 t113 PT$ Nil OF APO OP 711 OU 1t30 Ise n OIc2 loll 27161 PT$ MNI OP *or Elrs 32 I2 1 6661 KuAC T'OLLS 44R10:, P S1. 32 16S2 7'16 PTS MIS OF AUX SOIL PLWT 12 1'22 12l5 CTs076 KANO tOCLS t2 1t3t 712 M7AN ChOIS.hC .JR6:M1S 32 1322 624J1 MAE SAAWS AMC BLACiS 32 1634 '2C S1t1A POWtR Qlk:tIEMGNS 32 1'34 61932 wR4ECMIS AMC SPAiERS 32 los I?N2 5 SINi 1Te PAR'5 NIS 32 1721 I533 P:.1uS AMC RMASPS 32 1666 -7 I T# COSUlS PST% E4:h 432 172 61534 PE'RS.PZNCtRS.SNIPSE1tC 12 166? 7T13 -- PCO ARCOAUT AND POTS 32 172? 66ta3 MANA rTOLS EtC Nil 32 16es 71311 -... AI>CXAFT 12 ¶728 6664 B,l:s. TIPS, ETC Pit 7L 32 l6s1 71211 ---- PART NIS OP Y1311 12 1736 66341 PA*TS tO INSENT IN tOOLS t2 16w 7122 - PC1 1CTO3 VINtCLIS 12 1?40 6S642 COJ1:ING ILACS P03 MAQCS 32 Ig61 7123 -- F0R MNINi P3OPiLUSION 32 1741 66543 CABItOI tOOL TAPS TC 32 16612 71322 ---- OUTWOARO 32 1742 666 CWTLJpZ 12 1643 ?713: .... OThER 114A O.TUOA C O 2 1 762 6660 CUTLERY V2 1664 7121 1" ENSINK,NIS 32 1¶44 66603 IAZONI RAZOR BLADES 12 16l6 II29 '' ARX1 NiS 42 141 61604 SC:SSC5 SC:SSCi BLADES 32 1664 714 E9GINES AMC MOtORS NlS 32 164 66065 CL.:.tRI CLSAVEIS 1TC 32 15C7 7'44 RIAC1.:ON E:INES 32 t,67 66606 TASL.EWA* 32 166 7'144 US tURBIN,S NIS t2 I'6 66607 BASE MTL CUTLERY A4MOCES 32 166S 7'461 TUJIUO-0*OC1PL6RS 32 1t45 6el68c KIVES ANO ILACES NIS 32 ¶670 7641 OT4A As rURBINls Nil 32 1'1O 637 BASE flT QOUS.S LNLD OUIP 32 I ST1 '143 PfiS of ENGINE MOTOR NIS 32 1 1 6372 3WSTC ,ttAtC, =OKQ AMPt 'S 32 162 ''.46 PA7S1 Nil OF '44A 71461 32 712 613t1 :' SL OCM CW 0K APPITS 32 1672 it663 PARTS NIS OP '686 71388 32 '713 61722 :RN.S 3 0X " MATO APMOtS 32 1! 6 is POTATING ILECTRIC PLANT 42 716 66732 PTS NlS Of LAM6A OP 6l6 32 161' "'61 OC MCTURS UhO GENiRAtORS 43 I-IS 66736 COP=Si X0 I.TC STOVES ETC 32 1676 ''62 AC NtIS, 0611,5 G1N II'S 32 ills 66721 ONStC WA7tR"IAT?S3 MONILE 32 1677 71621 AC MTRI INC LJNVISI. *TO 32 17 17 66'4 BASE NTL OsT5 LArlC NMI 02 1676 '122 AC GENERAtORS 32 -is 8§641 -- OP IRON O STEZL. 32 16' 7423 OEM 1SE1S WITh 01371 ENGP4 32 '"St 642 OF- oP COPER 32 ¶60 763 POtARY CNVERTIM?S 12 -1 - 1t7 - 9l Il TS NES OF OCT IL! PLUT 42 1"g1 '2132 zN7*:PG "'q OLAES fC 'rC 716 OTW POWER QINIRA7G MAO.! 1 2 1S2 '2e4 'lINT:NCG 1i55E 2: 'a.& 71¶a M.CL.ARt REACTORS PTS MIS 12 '"13 '2141 ROTAPY R *:Nr: I, ss 5SC 7is3 WZm WAT9A RTC INGN9S 12 1"34 "2642 0..ArIN PR:N7:W, PREsSES 1S 71681 WAlrtA IlJFI:hS R2 I'd$ "26 0* mTQ I ZC:_ 1., A a84' 71582 01'W MY0RAL:C CN&S NTIs 12 1'" "25"t 00:N7:ihG AACArNEIY -CS 346 ,'se CrT3l EtP :NS wOr:os 4tS 12 '6' -e -"6 WACN AC%,..AXV 70 7i881 P&7S NIS OF 71881 '38 1 2 12 ,$a "268 AoCXazNt:14G WAO.44 0417S ;t d 72 MAQ4S #OR SPOCL ZNUSlyS 12 "53 "2581 lOCKEI 401 W hOANERY 22 g84 721 AQAZC MACNY CXC riACTORS 12 1 70 '268 0TS NIS OP COCKIra N.S R: a 721' OULTIVATM4NG MACHINERY 12 1'71 ' 21 0S MIS OF MC5 OP 7223/7 R 2 85' i2lli 'LOUQ.s 12 1'?2 '2811 PT5 NIS of NO.1 OP 72631 12 1852 72112 SEIOERS. PLAPITIAS ETC R2 1-773 "233 PRINTING MAO4Y 94*r S o2 *8s3 72113 CULTIVATORS WiCOCAS RTC 12 1 "A '27 FOOD MAAPOY NaN-DOOCESTIC 12 J854 72t14 OTh AGCA MORTIC MACO"*Y R2 t'7 !2?1 2 GAAZ4 WORKING MC4 PATS 12 !853 2111 PTr5 hlS OP MAC>O1 OP 7211 12 1' 8 '2 tI GRAIN ITC VSLL:hC MAOC4Y 12 Tiso 7212 MARYESTN0 ETC MACO.hES 12 1t-7 '2'9i PT5 MIS OF mch OP 72711 P2 55s' 72121 LAW 17R7S 212 '"' '2'2 OTh PO0O *0C M0E4 PARTS 12 ag '2122 CCM6MSh MAAV9STV-7rNAIESJ 12 "'g 12"21 AMAL. vIIT OIL PAT C> 12 85i 72123 OTh -4A1VST UthCaW1S SALIM 12 1780 '2722 POOO-PtOCISS;NG MAO1 M4S 12 186s '2124 AO*ZC CLAN RAOL:NG "CHO 12 1781 72T23 PTS MIS OP NCOtY OP 72722 I? lol' 72121 Ts NIS OF MAONY OP 7212 12 1'82 '!2 OTh MAOCr FOR S.CL :NMOUS R2 1862 '213 oA'R' MAOC.1NERY MIS 12 "33 '251 AChN-TOiC.S Pt SPCL thDUS 12 '883 7t14 M:L%:MG MAOCNISe 12 114 !2211 MA.O4-TOO63S ro wIx MiNrLS R2 1s36 '2131 0Th ODAR2PY MACHINERY MIS 12 'ss 72812 MACH-TOCLS To Wtx WOOO 12 ad8s "2130 P7S 4IS OP 10C4Y COP '212 12 ¶ 84 "2811 P*5 MIS OP TOOLS OP 7281 12 l86s '211 A?A.=LFtUXE MACHINES MiS 12 1t17 "233 OT MINERASL WOAKO MAC4 R2 lg-' 7216, W:NI-MAK:74 ETC MACM.gEy 12 "3l8 '2831 MtNiAA. SC'NG ETC N4A0hY 12 1354 "2117 CT) As;: cTC MACHINERY R2 1"89 72332 MMINL RUSMINO ETC mAQIY 12 loss 72116 PT5 NMS OFP 04Y OF 21191 12 1I 0 "2832 WAIL M:XINMGKNIAQ1MG MuC 12 '3': 21t9 P7s NMI OP mCm` OP '21t7 12 1"3t "2834 MIShL MOULZSN@ CTC MAChY 12 1"-, 722 TRACTORS mON-COAO R2 1"32 "2133 PT7 NIlS OP wsoY OP 7233 12 1a . '223 rRACK-6AY:NG r1ACTOlS 12 i"33 "284 MACXY P01C SPCL Z1CUS NIS R2 i6"3 '2234 WilELE90 ttAC7lS NCE 12 1-§4 "2341 GLAS55-V0I:NG MA04INRY ct: 'Sa4 "23 C:a'.Z ECNhEERO fQup !C R2 i'"1 72S42 RUSUER PLASTICS WIN 5CH R2 2 18, "233 MICOAh:CA. RCOAO 401.1RS 2 1'95 "2843 TOSACCD wCtX:NG NAOI NgS 12 I8-l "234 CCNST MNING MAC)*4*Y NIS 12 1717 72S44 WOId r7gATrhc MAcmms NhS Y2 18"" 72341 SLP-PIOtCPLLO OCZERS. ETC 2 1?18 72345 M'TL CTC r1ATh0 4AC04 NIS 12 !8,3 "2342 SELP-°10P S0CVEtLS EXCAV 12 "3l '72346 OTh OC>n W2TH :hO:V PNCt Y2 ,'es '2324 $LFPPP CONST ETC 04 NMIS r2 1300 '2484 PT7 OP MAOCS OF 7284 ETC R2 gsc 2364 B0t12MG S:'MK :N MA04Z:R1 Y 12 loc0 "3 METALWOCNtKhQ CMAINIhRY 12 Iasi '2341 0:Lt O1tVERS EYC 12 IAC2 "23 MAC4MN T'FOOLS FOr METAL 42 1882 "2344 Cth C=NST MINING WO MiS 12 1C80 "36" Et4tL CUT`Tsbs W4CM-TOCLS 12 la82 '2348 PUUL'C WCOtXS MA"^C0 NS 12 6SO4 "381i ULTRA5.C ETC M`TLW( MC5 1t2 '8ss "231 CmSTR ETC WAO! DTS NIlS 12 680C "2312 OIAtM-CLTTG MAC>4mES 12 's3 "24 TEXT '.. !'EAT*N MA#CMN'Y 12 i3 "3313 .ATKHS MITALWK:OING 12 8sae 7243 SgtI:G MAO" NEEOLES ETC 12 1807 '3614 REAMING ETC M0S kTLWING 12 's8, 12431 Sc:tNG MA04hNIS R2 08 -3611 ODRILLING ETC NCO W`TLWRXK R2 !gaa 72439 SEW N04 NIE:LES,PUPJ ETC 12 180 "3611 SAWING MACHS METALWOIKNO R2 8aa9 "244 SPIN:IG ExTroN ET C NOI R2 'lt10 "331' PLANIG M.CS ,TLWCOftEz R2 '89c "2441 7!XT:LI EXTRAOMhC WAOIS 12 6si1 "3613 TAPPING, tiCR! 04"TM CtH 12 't9' '2442 '531! P74CESS! MACH Ng$S 12 1612 '3S14 OTh vTL c'UTrG MuC-T7OLS R2 83s2 7244A3 SP:NhMING1RIL:NG.TC Mt 12 1613 7362 MEtAL DUING MACt-70CLS 12 1893 -2443 P7S hCS OP MA04S OF 7244 12 tS14 "3621 PORG1NG ETC M05 WTLNtxa R2 t8S4 '245 WEAVMhO, PELT MG, ETC RNO. 12 Is81 "3622 BCINDIG ETC M05,*VMTLftKQ 12 5i3s "2411 WfAV:P4 WAC 4ZNES ILOOMS) f2 1816 73323 SMIAO:NG ETC MC.MTLWItK 12 1896 72432 KN:"F7:NG ACOIMI4I 12 147 '"328 0CTM MEtTALWOIXZMG P1RESSS 12 '89- "1453 5'2MG P ?WAROMO ETC MNS 12 Isi "33 OTh MITALW1%G ".CH0-TOOLS R2 *89S '2454 PELT MPG,P:hSMING MACKS 12 11i "368 WCMV,700.L "0LOiLS ETC 42 8959 "26 AUXZL TXTL wCh PARTS MIS 12 1482 7360 PT% MIS OP TOOLS OP 731 12 'lOC '2481 MAC' AUXfL T0 724b1/93 R2 1421 3?7 METALWORKING NACMO#Y EIS R2 9SO' 72443 LOON K047 MO.1 CTC PTS Nil 42 1322 '3'1 POUMGY tOuImwT 3'"5 NIS 12 '902 "247 TEXTILE MOAC1:NE1 MCS 12 1823 '22' PZOUNORY 101WIP"beN NIS 1: g9c '24" SNOIUST LO?Y NASMZG MCH5 R2 "824 P*3' P'S NIS OFP! OP 73'7' c, 90 72472 CRY-CLIANIMG WACH0MES 12 1325 7372 P0LLING MILLS AMC ROLLS R2 '9CS "24 "3 :NST OR1Y:G NAC>"S NIS R2 '326 73721 RCLlt.1.M WILL$ R.1 ' 906 "2474 0Tht fEXT:i*E WA0R'Y lty S R2 182' '3729 R0LL--ILL 07S NIS. RCL4S R2 SC' "24"9 TEx?LE 4ACP4:aN 0TS MIS R2 1623 '373 WELO2MG 81A.2MG. ETC OCHS R2 '9c8 "248 SKIN LEATrhE WOIKNG MA0C4 R2 t821 73121 OS OPRtATCO W11OilS ETC R2 '309 725 PAPER ETC MILL MACIMIR'!Y P2 1830 '3732 ELECTRIC WELOERS ETC P2 9C '211 P^fAP.PULA MAM:N4 MACFAY 12 ¶831 "4 GINIL :NCUSTNL MAC14Y NlS 2 is-9 72511 C!LL;LCSE fULP MPG MACMV 12 t832 '41 HEATING CZOL:NG ECOUOWT 12 S92 72512 OAP4t ETC MAJKShG ETC NO4 412 1323 741' GA5 fNERA7TOPS 12 92: '212 PAPER ETC PlOoc'! NP MAzC 12 '634 "412 BLRNERS, ME S'OKERS FTC 12 92 4 "251 P'S MtCS OP *A04S OP '2S R2 1635 413 INOUST PURNAC!S ETC POTS 12 '9's '2161 075 NES oF MAC1S OP "251 R2 '33 '4'31 ZMOUS PUINACGS ETC CLCrlt 12 I S'S 7251P P75 MIS OP MACFS cP 7222 R2 1g33 '4132 INDUST FQURACES GmIjLECT 02 S'9" 726 PRIN 3CK3INC1O NAOC4Y °TS R2 1338 "414 NONOOCM rEPQIZ 1t2pT PT$ R2 1ot8 7283 TVPESE'r MCM IT. 7rYPE ETc R2 '638 '4141 IRPIZO CQO:P C100MS"IS7TC 33 39' 72621 TYPE SIT POWNC ETC MAOCY 12 '84 "4'49 P's Nis or REPIG co EQp7 02 '92 7411 A:4.~~~~~?O~~~~ING MAO4EPY ~~~~ 42 11' 6' ~ u V4c:is42 2CC~ 7411 A7ZTIN =CL:M1G IOU 'i A2 122 ' -o* E 'V 4i McI:vii m2 IC '42 P%wI PCX LC: AlC -tz RADIO I4CAOCAS! R1CI'VR5 42 M 7421 iCvpRCA7:riG O1 Nil 42 '124 '02' WTO7 VAo 4AOZO 4iC:!4Rj 42 2C04 7422 cvT%:ru L. fs Nis R2 1i2 "022 'R'ALI 4AOo 4aCf'V,jS 42 20CC 7422 40TADI 5 4iCg v2 i42S 76;J ZrCRADIO ClIlVgS 42 zCCs 7421 07144 PQOPS Ira '.:1GU:S 42 712'1 $32 SCUPC RMCAS GNP2AP 42 2CC- 74261 GAA41-Yi i g, PUMPS 2 3928 '631 E"VR:C = ONM:PI S 17r 42 2CO0 7421 Pumps Pot 6.:OUZZS 4is 60e 42 '1223 '211 =IN0CP CIEC G4ADPiNCmS a2 2=Ce 7421 p5S Nil OF SPlump OF '42 M2 Is=0 -313 0Th I1IC GMrOiPo"CNfS ET' 42 2c00 743 4j_5 Ni.S CEP'dTIFUGI tr'e 2 132i "623 OTrI SIUNO AP*AATUS 1TC Z2 2011 74at owus P ro AS is'C 42 1t32 6381 A C 'V t1KAI,SMC0 APO 42 2012 7432 COW"Issca Pq413 Nils 42 ' 332 138 ODC"TATING Mt)NiS ETC 42 2C01 7433 PqI-0s5T% UN Pit 3.4 rJ I" '3s4 764 Tt?g15l EOP! P1I,ACC NIS 42 20'4 7434 PA,.1LiCRS Z1`C PA7T 42 leis '141 4% 7tLiPO 110 EOfU:1P 42 2C'S 742S cK7iP:rwG2S 42 $as 7R42 MICRPM 6OUMPKA.AMPO_ 42 20i6 7436 ahS LIQUID PLrtS ETC 42 132' 'GA3 V h 0 7RSATMZrS 1? 42 201- 7431 PTS NCS OF AP* of 7425.J 42 ¶132 '644 TCLICON IGUtPlgNT lS A2 2011 744 *qO4A4CAL J. NAAL:4G IOU 1321 7341 *AOIOTfLEP%OftNI rTo ICd 42 2C0 7441 Pc0U 6P"r r*=S F!C 4` 42 1344 76412 TELEVSION CA0ERA 42 2020 7"411 FORK i:r- TRUCKS (c7 42 i4 7S412 4.AZAR APIAAAUS ETC 42 202' 74.1g pTS gS1 OF VEIC OP 74411 MI 1942 '343 4t3 NeS oP EouZpWT or 76 42 2022 7442 L:Pw:'NG '.0A.O1` "A00 MIS 42 1t34 Pr$ MIS OP APIPA OF 7641 42 2023 74421 O`ULL.Zy T1CKLZ Wz?4S tTC 10 2 134 76432 "S 611 or QUSIP oP 7642 42 2024 74422 S£tP OE4RAIttS CIANES iC 42 '*41 734A3 T!.1l UIPWT PT5 NMIS 42 2025 '4422 PILfAtZWAC CLIVA!0A5 1rC 42 3'A4 16433 PARTS £TC OF Sow EoUIP A2 2026 '4424 L:'PF AC SXK:P C55'S 42 1t4- I LLZT:C UAt=VY MIES ETC 42 702" 74423 g$CALArO. MVING PAVEMENr T 2 *48 E' iLECTRIC POWER MAY 6ItS 42 2202 74423 OT, *NOLIN0 1C W0 MIS 42 It-it TRANSF0416MS ELE0CTRICAL 42 2029 7443 A 03 NiS OF MA,0 'V OP -.42 * t$ * '''' wUO OZELIC ?RAmS3F1bS 42 2CzC ,4* N0kfLtIC MA0`' TOOLS tIS 42 1!' C' -C orTA tLPC 1 oACPttRS 42 203' *451 t CAt OCLS 41C141E 0' t . 91 '-2 rth [LAC P0CWR W*04Y NIS 42 2C12 -4511 t vi MAmc 'OC.4 h'.AE.1c it ';57 --2' STATIC CNvIRATS ITC P2 2C32 74113 PT5 Mt5 OP 7OCL :` '431 4 t gS ''"22 IMOUiCRS A2 202' 7412 0T OC"NiLIC 0` P'S NIlS R3 loss -2 911C OCWiR MACO' P'!S NIS 42 2c05 74121 CALIN9RIF MWAC S TC 42 '154 'T2 SWZ1Tt8A (70.PAAT MIS l2 2026 74522 PAOKA4G ? N £ CM 42 *3t. -2, SWVT4.A1 170 42 20 f '4522 PACXO (7w0 0 3 Nl 429t 38 1s 22 ORIN?tI0 CMJZPITS' NS R2 20 74524 AUTMA70C vtl"4040 KA4>0 43 333 ''23 P'XgO V*ARA&LA 4ESIS?Oi A2 20~ 7412! WI:QN40~ 2d U 42 '300 I~E~1C¶t' DISTRIBUTING 6AC4 A2 2040 '4523 wt:2i04 5 V3 P"NS I R2 it36 -1 tWNIUSArt? :IM.CASLE A2 2041 74512 5P4,AYtM KAAONEMY 43 132 .2J2 IELCIRC IMSULATA1N EQUIP 42 2042 I&$ 4tILEC WA04 P'S 2= 4g 02 '32 -32 F.11T NSSULATtO CCUT 42 2043 7431 6A". MCL1 £k C C. 3EAP:%z 3 164 -322 OLASS C'. CCr*C ZStULATIO5 R2 2044 '432 =OCS VA~ES E'3C 0df 42 l6ss 'a322 0!RANC 6L.1 :"ULATORI A2 2045 7432 S4P' 2MA P44-I' fCC 42 9024 ;rA 6 1.11C`TC NhSULAro0S A2 2040 '433 0Q2 "Ct tC tml e'' *Nil 4 '337 '-125 GLASS iZC :NSU. P2T NMI 42 204" 74831 P0PCV417 W (U: N3 4 .2 MC6 RI l2os C -3 21A NSC L :tUL PT2 NIS 42 20A8 74912 09 *4A'LAS-C tiA-5ES 42 lost -12' 2.0 CLIC : .S.L FtTT U MIES A2 2049 '41 NA04 6401S 1tO 44u 42 '3' 4' i.1C:-"Ii0CL.XMAY 9OUzP A2 2OS1 CF:Z WA001 -rADo V " tOWZ *P2 t -~41 C1EcTRO-0*got"^ It1PmPT A2 209I 711 OPP:Ct A4INMS 42 Iz "l 42 X'tAY AP*PARATUS 42 2012 7511 "PIWAV114S OlOUEt-4Tt1s 42 *,I .1 NOU5I:LO T YPC EQUIP NIS 42 2053 76111 LIC 7 YP4t "4T 1 R5,ONMAL 42 ttS4 --Si "*JSVCLZ LO#Y EQUIP NIS 42 2054 91112 hgNCLtC ,YVtPWW7S MCONAS 42 ¶s-5 -111 OOMIST7C WAS4IP4O KMA00S 42 2053 7!I111 r7pwxr3Ds Nl 04IOSJi'WIT1 4: 1317 "-112 0tST72C ORTINO A NC MIS 42 2016 '112 CAL=L4TI.G A^=Q tC 14 r42 il" "3 2 OM NIFRPiRATMS. Pft4IZRS 42 201' !912' CALJ.LATING 64CH:NKS R. It's 1"21 D0OSTISC MIRP4GtRAT0JRS A2 201S 71122 AC0UWX Na MA0-'d19IS $k2 I3'3 "'522 DSOMSTIC OCIEP-P4IZt!S 42 2013 7S122 CASH llISTI5RS 42 '3s0 "13 O06T1 0100AS6N6N 64041 42 2060 71123 POST?41-4IRAM O t4 C S2 1081 ""4 11A ELI1T1C 5YKAVIKS.C1tPPS 42 2061 75'8 OP2:Cit :WAO S NES A2 9S42 t 00"6511c iLICTI gou NIS 42 2062 75181 OUP,`L:CAT 00M141CTZ SThC%= 42 1323 '7171 00 61IC VAC CIAMiPS ITC 42 2062 75112 PIMC'2t rME4X=P" 4APPRAT 42 '194 -72 MU6 3L C 4006 PAN$ RTC A2 2064 '?Ji OT)hA OF:F:= 6.4N12d NMIS 42 '83 "17Z MU6 610 PO NOIXhIS iTO 42 2065 712 A'0NT2_ ZAT4 'CC tOW:P 4;2 98s -'$ 0Th 0176ST 1 CL.C A£P. E'C 42 2066 '1S2 1 ANALOG HYBID = 1t'I4S 42 '937 '7S3 P'S Nis OF EQUIP or 7717 42 2C67 7122 0. 2z:AL ="O`UTCIS 42 1394 'Is3 ILICT£ 0-TNI4MMC AD*t. NiS 42 20o8 7122 ODGITL 0Nc7twR. P4OCCSS:4 42 1388 7-181 tLe VAT14 ITC NIATiRS 42 2060 7124 0310'. C4TlRM 5TOR .zSi 42 3C3 '1382 1L1C $CYL SPACI C iACtiRS m2 20'-5 '121 AOP 0ZSfEPAL J*I'S 42 Iq9' -3,63 L0C MAIN OR452M;G APRA4 42 20'' 7121 OP'W:f OATA 04CC 100.P 12 '932 ISA ELECTRIC SNOCTWING Mt4S5 42 2r-' 713 0PP~2Aor M" P11 40013 I 93 -383 ELEC-ZC ILAK7lS R2 20'3 '131 0rO 0CE MAC-:Nt PAA3 Ni *5 93 *1S3 LICTRICThCANM 006 APO Nil 42 2C' 71011 PfENT7 9T3 A40Z5 NIS 2 '961 "St' ICNCA44 CLIC 0CATO liS;S 02 2C 71611 0114 OFF 604 PTS ACO NIS 42 13o6 "133 !LIC1f5t11C 0APL P7S MIS 42 201C 71313S =PY 6hA0 POTS.ACZIS NIS R42 '31' "3S 'TAANS'IS iA#iLVS 10 42 2C0 ,1S30 AC'Q 110 £00 a P'S AC 4 ' 33"96' 'v PIC'e run116gs 42 2C-3 76 TIL1C SCINO CEou'"CN 42 '138 'U2 0`4 ILICTOON0C U8ICS TC0 42 2:'9 7f1 9LI.EVISZON 4iCC£:RS 42 20C0 '1123 0OOOS TRANSIAMS ITC 42 2080 - I (' - 7714 ILIC6040 wMRxt2CRu=:'S 62 20831 222 TANKES OP AL.. K:NO3 62 2'I' 7764 £C;'WC =W P;TS C1tYSTLS 62 2082 -S323 O3MEt UCAIOC VISSILS 62 2 Is : 7741 P!SEZC-CLC *YSTAL5 fto 22 208 3 "324 P:SZMIG VCES5CLS TC 22 2'63 77391 ILECTI;C =01PON P'S MS S 2 205L "3328 `t`!R SMtPS -Ar C 2 - "6 78 CLEI.- ICAUYC.A SCAO4Et1 NS 62 2081 S Y3 VESS'LS F0R 8X6AoN UP 62 2 '15 7'?S &AT`TIX:RS AC=MLArOnS 2 2 2086 83 SMht ANO 30ATS ME$ 2 :Is8 61St1 0:XANV lAr"'ItS CA CELLS 2 20C' 913 'lLGS 62 2'O- T78I2 tLgCCTt:C AC=JMULArCAS 62 2088 "9382 SPICCAL PURPOSE V9SS9LS 62 'g2 7' 781 CLIC AC=MULAT7O PTS NfS 62 2063 S3123 f!LOAr:W STAUCTUR s 2 *S 2 'T IU2 CLEC"'RC LAMS GULlS 62 200CSC MA ZPA M o 00001 62 2'' 78C21 CLIC :LAJOENT LAMPS NIS 62 209t 61 PLUJOO HIAGi.G L COU 62 :''i 77322 ELIC O:SZ.4AACE SAMPS NIS 62 2022 812 PLUNSf.M9ATY4 LOmT EQU 62 2-'2 77824 ULTtAVOLIZ AC C7C LOS 62 20S3 8121 CWTRAiL NIAT?NG IOUPM¶ 62 2i"3 '?29 PrT5 MIS OF LAMPS OF 7`62 62 2034 3122 CIOLAMIC OLL.WeSN PZX7lR.S 62 2,'4 7733 AUTOMOTIVE ELICT?6 IOU2P 62 20S1 8124 LQKIQTS IQUZpUgmT 62 2'1' '172t ItGNITIO STARING IOSp 62 2086 1124t L12t45G TC 4LAS5WA41 62 2''6 78332 ELICC VEMCLC LE W CW 62 2087 11242 6AJW5."T`r:NQS lCAS MCTL 62 2''' 7"34 IL!CAUO-UIO> Ft*0 TOOLS 62 2088 81243 PCRaILI 8A4T`TY LAS 62 '2 2 7781 0T ELEC MAO4V A0:P MIS 62 2088 12 PULjT'Z.jIPATS5 TMIAIOP 62 2" *' 768¶1 ILICTOj-MAITS ETC 02 210U 82* PURP4TI.Jt* 68s75 T-MIC OP 62 21t0 "'882 ELEC TRAPP:C C00rRL IOU 62 210- C 211 O4AIRS SEATS AM PAATS 62 2181 7*S23 CLIC StALLING IOU NIS 62 2102 C 2111 tAIRS A OT1ER SEATS *2 2132 '7m64 ELECTRICAL =kC9NSIAS 62 2103 12118 PT5 bCS OF CA:43 CTC 62 2133 '7688 *PAT:CL. ACCELERATORS 62 2104 21'2 btO PURN STUPPO PURPS'4S 62 214A 7781S OTh4 CLIC MAUC>t119ty scS R2 2108 *2121 MiOZCAL P1UkbSIUX9 64*5 62 2141 --ss LC`R:CAL CAACoP4s 62 210o 82'22 WAl`-CSSIS CTC 62 2188 '88- CL!C A0AC2sNC1 *AA'S NIS R2 214' 22'S PURTUEI t O PATS NIS 42 2148 '6 60A0 V!MrCLIS 62 2'04 £2191 METAL PURNrURI NIS 62 2168 781 PASS MOTOR VCq IXC IL.SIS 92 2108 82112 WOO PUkh:r8T NIS R2 2't9 9"10 PASS WOTOR VIM tXC ILSIS 62 2"10 82138 OThA PUA PuaN P4a#T NIS 62 2180 '82 ;.CNX!S SPCL 'T7 vC4 MIs 62 ".1' 63 TRAVEL W005,MAN0IA4s 62 2'S' "32' LZRRS "RtUCXS 92 2 ; 3' TRAYEV. C0CS0 ,AfUOtAC5 02 2'92 "822 SOCC:AL MOTCO vCtC'.S sc5 At 2- 831C 'RAVEL QCOO5 ^oACAaS 62 2'93 "32 9CAO C'Ot "ChtC_CS MS 92 2-4 531C01 i4ANCOA3 NIS 62 2184 "13' BUSES 6t2 VI 831C2 TRAVEL COS,701LIT-CASIS 62 219S -332 'TRACTORS P06 'm-TR6:AIRS 62 2'4' 83103 SATCMILS AMC 2RU-C.ASES 62 2196 834 WOrOM vEM POTS AC0C9 MIS 62 211 83108 0-hER TRAVEL 6*AS CASES 62 219" "341 MOTOR VEhICL! OASSIS 62 2712 84 CL.rO1N0 AMC ACSSOR:S R2 2!98 2842 WCTOR OfVVCLI SOCIS 62 211S 142 WINS OUTErtEAR NOT KMVI' 62 2199 -S48 OThCR MOTOR VE4CL PATS 62 2120 8421 -- OVIR=AT3SOT10ER COATS R2 220c $85 CY:C'.S Ilc MCT*.Z OR Ct 62 2V2' 84211 - Of WOOL.PTNI MAIM 2 220' "ISS 7 TOWCfrCLES IC 62 2122 84217 ---- oP OThER P23A5 t -2 2202 "8t2 ICCL!S C '5 CT J%-tdCP N2 2842 1 22 SuL1rs 32 2203 1'53 :'VAL CAR6 C"CLE ETC *'S 62 34 44229 OP WOOL,PFNI HAX6 R2 2204 "8531 :NVA6.= CAARtRAOIS 62 2'25 84222 OF or ",O 6 R2 2205 "8138 PA*$ SAC=ZS NIS OP "85 a2 i2'2 $4223 --O- oP MA-MAOE PMAIES 62 2206 ,sI 6A2 IIRS mo<"r Vt? 4S K2 2'2 14223 ---- Of OT)*MIR Pt los 62 220" "1S' 'RAI..IRS "RANSP 1N7AIM R.2 2128 8422 -- 'ROUSERS. INR99 S ETC R2 2208 ,861 41OS:NG CAMRNC TRAILEAS 62 2-28 A423 --" OF WOOL,PN9E mAIR 02 2208 -8812 OThEC TR AILRS 62 2'3C 84232 - OP CO:T- R2 2210 '"86' =NTA:N1S :NC tA-m:AL t2 2'3' 34233 OP MA*-MADI 23RCS 62 221' ,s88 :Th N POCTR Y&F!CLIS c'C 62 2,32 A4238 -* OP Oh)lR P:$O[5 62 2212 ,8681 0Tth NICO qTORs2Cc V!MCLS R2 2133 4124 -- ;A S 8LAZERS CTC 62 2213 '5888 P7TS MS OF TASL.IRS CTC 62 '34 344! ---- OP WOOL PINE MAIltR 62 2214 "9 OThO 7r.AASW3R'ER 0 C4:PRN' 62 2'15 84242 ---- OP CT"o 62 22'! "311 RAILWAY VEMICLIS -2 2'30 84243 --- OF WAM-UACI Plans 62 2216 "21S. t IEC L,01S "N-SILP-1m 62 ''l 8142 ---- OP O3TER Plt1 s 62 22'7 3J2 0TW RA:L. L0=610WIVIS E'C 62 2'28 1428 ^Tb416 oU'7re 53ARNtS R2 2218 'S93 M1ChNAR-PQ'P4L..0 Ry CAMS 6: 2*30 6428' -' WATIoP OO R2 22'S '114 9ASS511R CARS WOT PCQ0 R2 2'40 84212 ---- GP WQQLF.N. 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