Précis W O R L D B A N K O P E R A T I O N S E V A L U A T I O N D E P A R T M E N T S U M M E R 2 0 0 3 N U M B E R 2 3 3 Toward Country-Led Development: A Multi-Partner Evaluation of the CDF C entral to the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) is the belief that the way aid is delivered, not just its content, has an important influence on its effectiveness, and that poverty reduction is the fundamental goal of international aid. The CDF consists of four principles--a long-term, holistic development framework; results orientation; country ownership; and country-led partnership--each of which responds to past development assistance shortcomings and presents an approach for improvement. A recent multi-stakeholder evaluation of the CDF tracked its progress, and crafted recommendations to inform its continuing implementation. Background As donors and recipients began explor- In the mid-1990s, the aid community ing paths to improvement, President began a candid self-assessment, James Wolfensohn of the World Bank prompted by growing concerns about proposed the CDF in January 1999 as a how aid was used and managed. After new way for the Bank to do business. The some 15 years of structural adjustment, framework was based on the assumption there seemed to be too few positive and that all development actors (government, sustainable results, particularly in Sub- multilaterals, bilaterals, civil society, and Saharan Africa. Criticism was mounting, the private sector) play a part in poverty most notably among nongovernmental reduction and in equitable, sustainable organizations, that aid-supported adjust- development. None of the four individual ment programs were at best ignoring the elements of the CDF was new. The CDF poor, and at worst further impoverishing innovation was to weave them together in them. Others noted the strain on devel- a common, balanced framework for oping countries as they tried to meet the poverty reduction, and to vigorously pro- separate requirements of the many aid mote that framework as an organizing organizations working within their bor- principle to inform World Bank work and ders. The clear conclusion was that the to coordinate with other aid agencies and full potential of international aid was not developing country governments (box 1). being realized, and remedial action was The CDF was initially somewhat con- needed. troversial, but its core principles ultimately 2 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department broad array of stakeholders--representing donor and recip- Box 1. The CDF Principles: What Do They Mean? ient countries, multilateral agencies, and civil society and Long-term, holistic development: Development strategies should private sector organizations--designed and funded the be comprehensive and holistic, and shaped by a long-term multi-partner evaluation. The work was overseen and the vision. Past emphasis on short-term macroeconomic stabilization findings were endorsed by a 30-member Steering Commit- and balance of payment pressures overwhelmed longer-term tee and a 5-member management group. OED and the structural and social considerations (such as expanding and Bank's Development Economics Research Group provided improving education and health facilities, maintaining infrastruc- the evaluation secretariat. ture, and training a new generation of public officials). Develop- Intensive field studies were carried out in six countries, ment frameworks should no longer focus only on short-term utilizing surveys, literature reviews, focus group meetings, macroeconomic issues, but should also embrace social and struc- structured interviews, and feedback workshops. Surveys of tural issues in a long-term vision for society. government-donor relations, with a focus on aid transac- Results Orientation: Development performance should tion costs, were carried out in five former CDF pilot coun- not be measured by inputs and outputs, but assessed by out- tries. At the same time, academics and practitioners from comes and impacts, by results on the ground. The traditional both North and South prepared thematic studies on each of emphasis on disbursement levels and project inputs has meas- the CDF principles. And a pioneering attempt was made to ured resource allocation and consumption. What really mat- use quantitative analysis to assess the effects of CDF-like ters is impact on people and their needs. practices in a wide range of countries. Country Ownership: Development goals and strategies should be "owned" by the country, based on broad citizen Main Findings and Recommendations participation in shaping them. While donor-driven aid deliv- The evaluation's main findings and recommendations are ered under structural adjustment was sometimes effective, in listed below, grouped by principle. many cases painful and lengthy adjustment measures were eventually undone. When countries have greater say in shap- Long-Term Holistic Development Framework ing reforms, governments and their citizens will be more A long-term development framework has operational committed to seeing them through. meaning only when it is translated into affordable priorities Country-Led Partnership: Recipient countries should lead through a disciplined budget process. aid management and coordination through stakeholder part- nerships. Donor-recipient relationships should be actively Recipient countries: Strengthen the link between managed by the recipient country as a partnership and not medium-term frameworks (such as the PRSP) and dominated by donor preferences. Partnerships built on budgets. mutual trust and consultation can improve aid coordination and reduce the inefficiencies, asymmetrical power relation- Donors: Support such linkages and make sure ships, and tensions of donor-led aid initiatives. assistance is aligned with national development strate- gies. Provide long-term assistance for capacity strengthening, including sustained support for public sector reforms and institutional development. gained the support of most donors and recipient countries, and it has been an important influence on the global devel- If recipient countries are expected to adopt a long-term opment agenda. It helped to shape such complementary ini- results focus in development planning, so should donors. tiatives as the Millennium Development Goals; the Monterrey Consensus (which included commitments by Donors: Provide reliable, predictable financing developing countries to good governance, by developed with transparent, multiyear indicators, based on clear countries to increased aid, and by all to poverty reduction, country performance criteria. mutual accountability, and responsibility for results); and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (a broad-based coun- Results Orientation try strategy, based on the CDF principles, that is required Results orientation is important for improved effectiveness to access debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Coun- and for public accountability. The weak capacity of central try Initiative). and regional public agencies, combined with competing budget priorities, inadequate incentives, and fragile Evaluating the CDF accountability structures, makes it difficult to implement a In late 1999, the Bank Board's Committee on Development government-wide results orientation, and indeed it was Effectiveness asked the OED to assess CDF implementa- found that implementation of this principle was the most tion, identifying which factors helped and which hindered challenging of the four for all the case study countries (box progress, and the impact of CDF principles on behaviors 2). While sectorwide approaches and medium-term expen- and outcomes. In keeping with the basis of the CDF, a diture frameworks have introduced a results orientation in Précis 233 3 the budget process, many recipient countries appear to have adopted the results approach primarily to satisfy Box 2. Results Orientation: Achievements and Innovations donors and have yet to embed results-based systems into Uganda's education expenditure tracking study was an the core operations of government. extremely effective tool for building government accountabil- ity and it is now being replicated widely. (A 1996 tracking Recipient countries: Strengthen results orientation study in Uganda found that only 38 percent of non-wage by increasing citizens' right to demand results and recurrent primary education spending actually reached the government's ability to respond. Train public servants schools. Today more than 80 percent does.) The government to open up information channels and educate the also publicized results of its comprehensive household survey public, strengthen systems for internal and external that quantified improvements in poverty outcomes; public accountability, and present development strategies access to these data deepened support for the government's through the media and in languages and forms that initially controversial pro-poor policies of the early 1990s. the general public will understand. The Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Program sits within the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Donors: No longer look to funds disbursed or Development and provides feedback on absolute and extreme inputs delivered as the only measure of success. poverty into the budgeting process on a timely basis. Results- Development programs should have measurable oriented disbursements--based on targets--are increasingly objectives linked to concrete outcomes, to which all applied at the central and local levels. But these systems still stakeholders hold themselves accountable. need to be aligned and made fully operational. Vietnam created its own timetable and indicators for Monitoring and evaluation activities are still mainly reaching Millennium Development Goals. These fit better donor-driven and funded, and are not well integrated into with Vietnam's development strategy and in some areas are normal government operations. There has also been little more ambitious than the generic MDGs. progress in harmonizing the donor reporting and results Civil society and the Catholic Church will take an active monitoring requirements that overburden recipient govern- role in monitoring Bolivia's Poverty Reduction Strategy ments (which is replete with specific monitorable targets). Indicators will be developed and monitored at the municipal level. Donors: Strengthen and use country-led monitor- Bolivia's Institutional Reform Program requires ministries to ing and evaluation systems and avoid setting up sepa- sign results agreements (with specific outcomes such as staff rate structures to service projects and special needs of reductions) and meet these goals before they can enter the individual donors. larger reform program. Country Ownership The relevance and sustainability of political and institu- tional reforms require breadth of ownership among a wide Country-Led Partnership range of stakeholders. The evaluation found evidence of The PRSP is helping to improve the alignment between progress; governments and donors increasingly consult donors and recipient countries, but the transaction costs of with selected stakeholder groups about development strate- delivering aid remain high and donors continue to engage gies. But ownership is not necessarily broad--in many in unproductive competition (box 3). Reform will require countries it remains confined to the executive branch of the both recipients and donors to change their behaviors and government, and consultation with sectoral and regional processes, giving up some individual interests to achieve authorities, elected officials and legislators, and marginal- better development outcomes through joint action. ized groups is selective, sporadic, or not timely. Recipient countries: Place responsibility for aid Recipient countries: Consult with a wider range of coordination at a high level of government, and give interest groups, the private sector, and those who lack this function sufficient resources, authority, and polit- an organized voice, including women and the poorest ical support to manage the aid process. and most marginalized citizens. Many donors face domestic political resistance to har- Donors: Work with the governments to devise an monizing procedures, providing budget support, or reduc- approach for consulting with elected officials, local ing the use of international consultants, and won't move to governments, and nongovernment representatives. In greater country leadership in the presence of corruption or order to enhance country ownership, the World Bank economic mismanagement. should clarify its role in reviewing PRSPs, as some Recipient countries: Implement and enforce pro- countries believe Board review constitutes approval, curement and other accountability rules that will and therefore inhibits country ownership. engender donor confidence. 4 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department Donors: Avoid micromanaging the country aid emerged for donors and recipients to move ahead, includ- process, and provide the capacity building and ing the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the resources countries need to assume aid manage- Monterrey Consensus. The World Bank can and should ment--for example, by supporting the creation of play a lead role in integrating the CDF principles into these independent country-level aid review panels. global initiatives, and in identifying additional avenues for progress. Next Steps The positive changes fostered by the CDF are fragile. Further research and exchange of experience among recipi- Implementing the principles requires changes in entrenched ent countries are needed on how to build up country- behaviors and institutional practices--never a quick or easy owned monitoring and evaluation systems and expand process. Dedicated and consistent attention is needed by involvement of civil society and the private sector in the top leadership in both donor institutions and recipient CDF process. Some promising opportunities have recently countries to ensure that momentum is sustained. Box 3. Three Donors, Three Sets of Procedures-- No Building A building project in Bolivia shows the high cost of current donor practices. Three major donors in the health sector agreed to cofinance construction of a building. The ministry put up the land, but each donor had its own procedures, which made it difficult to find a common approach to construction. The three donors could not pool their contribution in a com- mon fund, because the rules of the agencies prohibited chan- neling money to another agency. One donor did not require This Précis is based on Toward Country-Led Development: A Multi- Partner Evaluation of the Comprehensive Development Framework. competitive bidding, but the other two did. None of the agen- The evaluation was designed and overseen by a 30-member Steering cies could accept the procedures of any of the others, and two Committee drawn from a broad array of stakeholders representing of the agencies were unwilling to adopt Bolivian rules. donor and recipient countries, multilateral agencies, and civil society A "thematic" approach was considered. One donor would and private sector organizations, and guided by a five-person finance the design, another the construction works, and the management committee. third could contribute the equipment. As an alternative, to The full report is available at: avoid one agency blaming another if something went wrong, http://www.worldbank.org/evaluation/cdf/ it was proposed that each donor would finance particular Director-General, Operations Evaluation: Gregory K. Ingram Acting Director, Operations Evaluation Department: Nils Fostvedt floors, procuring the materials and hiring builders according Manager, Corporate Evaluation and Methods: Victoria Elliott to its own standards and procedures. This would have greatly Task Manager: John Eriksson prolonged the construction period. Précis are available to Bank Executive Directors and staff from the After long debates, one of the donors withdrew from the Internal Documents Unit and from regional information service project, and the other two signed an agreement for their centers, and to the public from the World Bank InfoShop. Précis are intentions of constructing the building. Thanks to revisions also available at no charge by contacting the OED Help Desk: of the regulations and numerous coordination meetings, the eline@worldbank.org or calling 1-202/458-4497. donor contributing the smaller amount has accepted the rules DISCLAIMER: The views in this of the other donor. paper are those of the Operations Evaluation staff and editors and After two years, the foundation stone has yet to be laid. should not be attributed to the World Bank, its affiliated organizations, or its Executive Directors. Source: Bolivia Country Case Study. Précis aussi disponible en français Series Editor: Caroline McEuen Précis en español tambien disponible @ http://www.worldbank.org/oed Précis 233 Toward Country-Led Development: A Multi-Partner Evaluation of the CDF ISSN 1564-6297