Water and Sanitation Program: Technical PaPer 59933 V2 WSP Sanitation Global Practice Team The Political economy of Sanitation: How can we increase investment and improve service for the poor? operational experiences from case studies in Brazil, india, indonesia, and Senegal February 2011 the Water and Sanitation Program is a multidonor partnership administered by the World Bank to support poor people in obtaining affordable, safe, and sustainable access to water and sanitation services. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations, or to members of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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Background and study objectives .................................................. 10 ii. conceptual framework and methodology ...................................... 13 2.1 Conceptual framework .............................................................. 13 2.2 methodology ............................................................................. 15 iii. Diagnostic findings from the field ................................................... 17 3.1 Country context ......................................................................... 17 Cultural and historical context .................................................... 17 Political opportunism and investment promotion ........................ 18 global policy debate and external aid agencies ......................... 18 3.2 Sector arena .............................................................................. 19 institutional challenges and opportunities ................................... 19 Budget allocations and disbursements ...................................... 24 Corruption and rent seeking ...................................................... 26 technological choice and pro-poor sanitation provision ............. 27 Private sector involvement ......................................................... 28 demand for sanitation services and willingness to pay ............... 28 Sanitation as vote winner or career maker? ............................... 29 3.3 Sector process .......................................................................... 32 Civil society participation and citizen oversight ........................... 32 evidence-based policy making in sanitation ............................... 33 relationship between accountability and sanitation investment ................................................................................. 34 Sector coalitions ........................................................................ 35 3.4 interplay of political and economic factors on sanitation outcomes .................................................................................. 35 iV. Operational implications ................................................................. 38 4.1 timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations ...... 38 4.2 Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis ................... 39 4.3 realigning accountability ........................................................... 40 4.4 Partnership strategy .................................................................. 41 4.5 Public debate and communication ............................................ 41 www.wsp.org 1 V. conclusions ................................................................................... 43 references .......................................................................................... 45 annex a - Methodology .................................................................... 47 a.1 research hypotheses and questions .................................... 47 a.2 research methods, analytical tools, and process .................. 52 a.3 research sampling and stratification ..................................... 55 a.4 Feedback, reporting, and dissemination ................................ 55 a.5 methodology modifications based on the experience of this study .......................................................................... 56 annex B - case study summaries .................................................... 57 B.1 Brazil .................................................................................... 57 B.2 india ..................................................................................... 59 B.3 indonesia .............................................................................. 62 B.4 Senegal ................................................................................ 65 annex c - Terms of reference ........................................................... 69 abbreviations ....................................................................................... 84 2 Global Practice Team of Sanitation List of tables, figures, and boxes table 5.1 added value from political economy analysis in support of pro-poor sanitation investment ...................... 44 table a.1 issues emerging from the desk review ............................ 47 table a.2 research hypotheses and questions .............................. 48 table a.3 overview of methods and stakeholders by framework element ........................................................ 55 Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for the political economy of sanitation .................................................... 13 Figure 3.1 institutional landscape of urban sanitation in Senegal (specific focus on dakar) .................................. 20 Figure 3.2 Sanitation sector stakeholders' ideological positions, Brazil ............................................................................. 21 Figure 3.3 Stakeholders, interests, and power in negotiations over provisions in the `Sanitation Law' to strengthen the role of municipalities ............................................................. 22 Figure 3.4 institutional map of the urban sanitation sector, indonesia ....................................................................... 23 Figure 3.5 organizational mapping of the budget process for urban sanitation in Senegal ...................................................... 25 Figure 3.6 Budget decisions and resource flows for sanitation investment grants and loans in Brazil ............................. 26 Figure 3.7 Power/interest matrix, rural sanitation investment, maharashtra, india ......................................................... 31 Figure 3.8 election poster in Senegal's local elections 2009 ............ 32 Figure a.1 Stakeholder mapping: interest in sanitation investment .. 54 Figure C.2 Political economy Framework ........................................ 83 Box 2.1 Sample question for political economy analysis of sanitation investments: diagnostic framework ........... 14 Box 2.2 Brief summaries of the four case studies ........................ 16 Box 3.1 Consumer action: the Cambérène treatment plant in dakar ................................................................. 29 Box C.1 Poverty and Social impact analysis (PSia): one approach to help better understand and address the political economy of sanitation .................... 71 www.wsp.org 3 4 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Acknowledgments acknowledgments This report presents the results of a Global Economic and Soreide (Economist, FEU, World Bank) and Daniel Alberto Sector Work (ESW) Study on the Political Economy of Benitez, (Senior Economist, FEU, World Bank). Guidance at Sanitation in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal that was the Concept Note stage was provided by the following Bank conducted by the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and staff: Eustache Ouayoro (Country Director, LCCHT), Junaid the World Bank. The purpose of the study is to help WSP Ahmad (Sector Manager Urban and Water, AFTUW), and and the World Bank--through a better understanding of the Meskerem Brhane (Senior Urban Specialist, MNSUR). political economy of sanitation--in their efforts to support partner countries and development practitioners in the de- WSP and World Bank colleagues actively contributed to the sign, implementation, and effectiveness of operations that case study design and reviewed the draft country case studies. aim to provide pro-poor sanitation investments and services These include Joseph Ravikumar (Senior Water and Sanita- to improve health and hygiene outcomes. tion Specialist, TWISA), J. V. Raman Murthi (Water Institu- tions Development Specialist, TWISA), Soma Ghosh Moulik This synthesis report was prepared by Sabine Garbarino and (Senior Institutional Development Specialist, SASDU), Jeremy Holland (Oxford Policy Management), with Simon Pierre Boulenger (Senior Water Supply Specialist, TWIAF), Brook, Ken Caplan and Alex Shankland (OPM consultants). Ousseynou Diop (Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist, The background literature review, the research strategy, and TWIAF), Isabel Blackett (Senior Water and Sanitation Spe- the report were authored by Jeremy Holland and Sabine cialist, TWIEA), Martin Gambrill (Senior Water Engineer, Garbarino, who also led the case studies for India and Sene- SASDU), Carlos Velez (Lead Economist, LCSUW), Thadeu gal, respectively. Kit Nicholson and Jeremy Colin provided Abicalil (Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist, LCSUW), valuable contributions to the research design. The case study Juliana Garrido (Infrastructure Specialist, LCSUW), and for Brazil was led by Alex Shankland and Ken Caplan, and Abel Mejia (Sector Manager, TWIWA). the Indonesia case study was led by Simon Brook. The case studies benefited from vital support from national sanitation The peer reviewers were Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez (Sector Manager, experts and researchers, namely, Ivan Paiva, Klaus Neder, EASCS), Ivo Imparato (Senior Urban Specialist, LCSUW), Hernán Gómez Bruera, and Luciana Lupo (Brazil); Padmaja and Ed Campos (Advisor, WBIGV). Written comments were Nair (India); Risang Rimbatmaja and Prathiwi Widyatmi received from Verena Fritz, Governance Specialist, PRMPS). (Indonesia); and Ousseynou Guène (Senegal). Alice Poole (Extended Term Consultant, PRMPS) provided comments during the review meeting. The study was conceptualized and financed by the WSP Sanitation Global Practice Team and the World Bank. The Funding for the study came from the Multidonor Trust Funds authors carried out their work under the leadership of Eduar- of WSP, the Sanitation Hygiene and Wastewater Support do A. Perez (Senior Sanitation Specialist, TWIWP, WSP), Services (SWAT) of the Water Partnership Program of the Sabine Beddies (Senior Social Scientist, MNSSO, World World Bank, the German Poverty and Social Analysis Trust Bank), and Pete Kolsky (Senior Water and Sanitation Spe- Fund, the Social Development Department (SDV), and the cialist, TWIWA, World Bank). Input was provided by Tina Finance, Economics and Urban Dept (FEU). www.wsp.org 5 The Political Economy of Sanitation Executive summary executive summary Background and objectives conceptual framework, methodology, and case study According to the Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP overviews 2006), 2.6 billion people--about half of the world's po- This study's conceptual framework combines a diagnostic pulation--lack access to basic sanitation. There is ongoing component with a typology of actions to help translate concern that governments, at many levels, are not devoting analytical findings into more effective support to operations enough attention and resources to sanitation services, par- and investments. The Diagnostic Framework aims to identify ticularly when compared to spending on water supply and political economy constraints as well as opportunities that other infrastructure services. Additionally, existing sanitation are entry points for subsequent operational actions. It does investments and service provision rarely place sufficient stress this by focusing on understanding country context, the sec- upon the distinct and urgent needs of the poor. Recent World tor arena--institutions that shape stakeholder relationships, Bank research shows that this limited focus on sanitation interests, and influence--and the sector process, which looks is driven largely by political motivation in the context of at information flows, public debate, coalition building, and competing demands for resources, and to a lesser extent by participation over time. The Action Framework illustrates technical or economic considerations. operational implications and practical advice to Task Team Leaders and practitioners to support sector investments. It This global study on the political economy of sanitation demonstrates how an analysis of the political economy of in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal--conceptualized sanitation can be translated into project design and action to and financed by the Sanitation Global Practice Team of better meet the sanitation needs of the poor. The Action Fra- the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and the World mework includes recommendations to improve the timing, Bank--attempts systematically to understand and thus help tailoring, and sequencing of support to sector investment, practitioners manage the political economy of pro-poor sani- informed by an understanding of the relevant institutional tation investments and service provision. It aims to provide constraints and opportunities as well as key participants in practical advice to World Bank Task Team Leaders and other the sanitation sector. The Action Framework furthermore sanitation practitioners to help them better manage stakehol- stresses the importance of strengthened relationships of ac- der relations and effectively maneuver within the complex countability among citizens, civil society organizations, and institutional relationships of the sanitation sector in order government and other service providers. Finally, a partners- to enhance the design, implementation, and effectiveness of hip strategy--often linked to an inclusive communications operations that provide pro-poor sanitation investments and strategy and measures to foster public debate--provides services. The ultimate goal is to improve health and hygiene opportunities to overcome institutional constraints and outcomes. stakeholder opposition to pro-poor sanitation investment and service provision. This study follows current approaches to political economy-- interdisciplinary inquiry drawing upon social and political The study was conducted through a qualitative analysis of theory and economic principles--to understand how poli- stakeholders, institutions, impacts, risks, and opportunities tical actors, institutions, and economic processes influence that was linked to processes and policy debate. This Synthesis each other. The "political economy of sanitation," therefore, Report is based on the findings from the secondary literature refers to the social, political, and economic processes and review and the results of primary research in the four case actors that determine the extent and nature of sanitation study countries, which examined how each had identified investment and service provision. and managed political economy risks and opportunities in 6 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Executive summary its sanitation interventions. The four country case studies analysis focuses attention on the sector arena - the formal were chosen purposively by the World Bank/WSP team and and informal institutional arrangements that govern relations represent a range of sanitation contexts. The Brazil case study and behaviors of stakeholders, as well as those stakeholders' analyzed the national-level political economy dynamics of interests in the choice, management, and implementation urban sanitation investment over the lifetime of the Water of sanitation service provision and investments. The study and Sanitation Sector Modernization Project (known in showed that perceived political rewards, organizational resis- Brazil as Programa de Modernização do Setor Saneamento, tance from the center of government, and/or implementers' PMSS). In addition to this national (policy) component, the lack of capacity to manage increased budget allocations sig- case study includes a regional (program) component that nificantly influenced whether and how policy priorities are focused on the Bahia Azul program, implemented by the translated into budget allocations and disbursements. Politi- Bahia state utility, Empresa Bahiana de Águas e Saneamento cally motivated decision making was found to be driven by a (EMBASA), in the Salvador Metropolitan Region in nor- preference for highly visible, big infrastructure investments. theastern Brazil. The India case study looks at the political In some but not all instances this is linked to opportunities drivers for the success of the Total Sanitation Campaign for influential individuals or groups to use these investments (TSC) in rural Maharashtra, contrasting it with earlier, failed to generate income by privileged access or politically created attempts to implement TSC in most of the country's states. monopolies (rent seeking).1 While all case studies came across In Indonesia the analysis focused on the reasons behind the evidence of corrupt practices and rent-seeking behavior, it recent increase in government interest in urban sanitation was overall not identified as the predominant feature distor- provision. While this interest has not yet translated into ting sanitation investment decisions. There is evidence that increased investment levels, it constitutes a major shift from civil society and the private sector not only can contribute the previous understanding that sanitation is a private matter to strengthening accountability but also can be reliable and for households. Finally, the Senegal case study took the water trusted partners for delivering sanitation services and creating and sanitation reforms at the end of the 1990s as the starting community demand for sanitation provision. point of the analysis and explored political economy factors that explained the increased investment in urban sanitation The sector process in this context refers to the dynamic and on- in the capital, Dakar. going process of negotiation, bargaining, and identification of political economy risks and opportunities by government Diagnostic analysis and development agency stakeholders. The study explores the Country context refers to a country's socioeconomic, poli- potential for community participation, incentives for collecti- tical, cultural, and historical characteristics, including its ve outcomes (an end to for example open defecation), and the development trajectory and the current development aid trade-offs that strong political backing can have in terms of architecture. Examining country context also involves a sustainable engagement with a range of local stakeholders, looking at political processes within the sanitation sector, including civil society and private sector organizations. The their potential links to national political institutions and sector process discussion looks in detail at the role of evidence stakeholders, the assumptions that underpin sanitation sector in decision making and considers when and how research was investment, and how and why sanitation investment was successfully used to inform investment decisions. Finally, this developed, and by whom. The research tests the influence study confirms the potential of individual sector champions of cultural and historical factors on sanitation attitudes and to secure higher priority for sanitation investments. behavior, outlines the multifaceted risks and opportunities that decentralization provides for sanitation investments, The research looked particularly for evidence of the impact and examines the extent to which political opportunism on distributional outcomes in pro-poor sanitation investment determines sector decision making. from the interplay of political and economic factors. Some case studies found that political incentives (for example, ca- Beyond sanitation's country context, a political economy reer advancement or electoral support) played a positive role 1 Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to productivity. www.wsp.org 7 The Political Economy of Sanitation Executive summary in the extension of coverage to the poor. Moreover, all the exchange of experience among countries and support case studies made the case that decentralized governance of local policy makers with studies that find resonance sanitation investment can create stronger incentives for, and with national debates. accountability in, pro-poor investment. Subsidies for sanita- · Strengthening accountability in the delivery and tion investment have proven successful when combined with accessibility of sanitation services is a vital element in information campaigns and community mobilization. the successful management of the political economy of sanitation investments. It includes horizontal ac- Overall, the study confirms the importance of assessing stake- countability mechanisms in which branches of the holder interests, identifying potential winners and losers, state engage in mutual oversight (for example, through identifying incentives, and examining formal and informal performance contracts or regulations) combined with institutions (such as norms and behavior). When such an vertical accountability relationships between citizens analysis is done well, by development practitioners in part- and policy makers whereby more systematic support ner countries or development organizations, it provides the to civil society and grassroots organizations can suc- empirical evidence for both the support of and opposition cessfully create a demand for sanitation services. to development, and the rationales behind them. · Thestudyhasconfirmedthatpoliticaleconomyanaly- sis in the sanitation sector can support a partnership Operational implications strategy that is based on sustained, flexible engage- The report presents a number of significant operational les- ment with strategic external support of acknowledged sons designed to inform future World Bank/WSP interven- government leadership. tions that support sanitation investment. Several interlinked · Wider participation and clear communication of elements have contributed to the success of the sector process key issues are two important tools to address the power in the case study countries. Combining understanding of the of vested interests who neglect the needs of the poor political economy risks and opportunities in the sanitation in sanitation investment and services provision. There sector with evidence marshaled on the economic, social, and is some experience of using related sectors (water su- political impacts of investment choices can promote greater pply, waste treatment) as an entry point for discussing accountability, partnership, and communication. sanitation provision with communities, particularly the poor. · Thecasestudieshaveshownthatunderstandingthe political economy of sanitation investment provides conclusion the basis for adequate timing, tailoring, and location The report presents a brief assessment of lessons learned of investment and operations. This process includes from the retrospective political economy analysis of the case recognizing windows of opportunity for formal and studies. It highlights how a better understanding of the risks informal engagement, identifying sector champions, and opportunities associated with institutions and stakehol- and strategically sequencing development partner der interests in the sanitation sector can be used to better support levels to create incentives for long-term in- support more pro-poor sanitation investment. In a sector vestments and institutional reform. whose default mode can be very technical, donor and lender · Donorsandinternationalinstitutionshavesuccessfully involvement can facilitate practical operational guidance for used their comparative advantage in providing timely political economy analysis of more pro-poor service delivery. and rigorous analysis to inform pro-poor sanitation Using the Action Framework, the following table--table 5.1 investments. Examples from the case studies show from the report's conclusion--summarizes value insights that how donors and lenders can successfully facilitate an political economy analysis can add. 8 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Executive summary AddEd vAluE from PoliTicAl Economy AnAlySiS in SuPPorT of Pro-Poor SAniTATion invESTmEnT action recommendations for donor/lender recommendations and added value insights support for pro-poor sanitation from political economy analysis investment Optimize timing, · Ensurethatsupporttosanitation · Managethepoliticaleconomyrisksandopportunitiestoincrease tailoring, and investment is aligned with existing impact on pro-poor sanitation investment. location of policy and planning cycles. · Ensurecarefulandstrategicsequencingofoperationstoincreasethe investment and · Recognizewindowsofopportunity overall impact of investments in later phases. operations for reform. · Lobbythroughpoliticaleconomyinsightsforsanitationinvestments that are effective in different locations. · Recognizeandsupportgovernmentcommitmentandlocal leadership to help partners succeed and scale up their impact. · Identifyopportunitiestosupportinvestmentthroughpolitical incentivizing. Understand the · Useavailableevidenceand/or · Donorsandlendersarewellplacedtoidentifyappropriateevidence sector through commission research to inform for different stakeholders and tend to have a comparative advantage rigorous analysis program design. in providing rigorous analysis to inform reform and sector choices. · Thetimingofinformationflowisimportant.Evenwhenrigorous analysis is undertaken dissemination of key findings can get lost, sidetracked, potentially misused, or captured if the timing is wrong (for example, at the start of a new political administration). · Useanalysisofcomparativeadvantageinglobalpracticetosupport local policy makers and administrations to learn lessons from elsewhere and refine their operational framework. · Supportstrengthenedhorizontalaccountabilitythroughcareful design of contracts and specification of roles and responsibilities. Realign · Supportstrengthenedtechnical · Supportinitiativestobuilddemandandstrengthenvertical accountability systems and information flows. accountability. · Supportdecentralizationand · Beflexible:Adaptandsupportmodelsofverticalaccountability clarification of technical roles and andapplytothecountrycontext.Thesectorprocessmaynotbe responsibilities. characterized by the kinds of vertical accountability relations central tomuchdonorandlenderthinking.Thismeansthatsupportfor accountability must be tailored to the country context. · Realignaccountabilitybycombininghorizontalaccountabilitywith vertical accountability to allow, for instance, top-down changes to be complemented by a more systematic attempt to engage with grassroots, collective association and mobilization for institutional change. Partner · Ensureeffectiveengagementwith · Ensurethatthepartnershipstrategyisbasedonsustained,flexible strategically key central and sector ministries. engagement with strategic external support. Support public · Supportinformationcampaigns · Gettheprocessofpoliticaleconomyanalysisright:Ensure,where debate and "from one to many" (policy makers to appropriate, that analysis is conducted with a broad group of communication public). stakeholders to ensure greater inclusion, and link this process to strengthened public debate and communication. · Supportwidetwo-waycommunicationtodemocratizedebate, prevent capture, and secure and sustain public support for institutional change. Source: Authors' analysis. www.wsp.org 9 I. Background and study objectives The Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP 2006) states All good sanitation has the same basic attributes, but di- that 2.6 billion people--about half of the world's popula- fferent contexts influence which form of sanitation works tion--lack access to basic sanitation. The majority live in best where. The "best" sanitation model is influenced by low- and middle-income countries: three out of five people population concentration (individual farms in remote in low-income countries, one in three in middle-income rural areas versus mega-cities), population density, site countries, and one in six in upper-middle-income countries characteristics (for example, the level of the water table), have no access to basic sanitation. Without a rapid increase the resources available to an individual, and the capacity in the scale and effectiveness of sanitation programs, the of government provision. Where sewerage systems in rural Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target for 2015 will areas are often not available, simple pit latrines and septic be missed by a wide margin.1 This will have severe impacts on tank latrines are plausible options. In high-density urban public health, social indicators, well-being, human dignity, areas, sewerage systems have obvious advantages. However, and economic development worldwide. where the reach of the sewerage network is limited and a large part of the population is not served, costs associated While 2.6 billion people do not have access to a pit latrine or with connecting all households can be substantial, although toilet in their homes, many more lack access to the kinds of this may be offset by the adverse impact on health if less than sanitation provision that minimizes the risk of excreta-related diseases. This difference between "improved" and "adequate" the entire community is covered. Often, sewerage systems sanitation shows the difficulties in knowing where and how are sold (at a high cost) as a solution to all the problems to define and measure who is adequately served by sanitation associated with the temporary storage of human waste and services.2 Needless to say, different standards for sanitation its collection, transport, treatment, and disposal. However, are associated with different levels of health risk. Moreover, they work well only if everyone is connected, and in many moving up the so-called sanitation ladder--starting from cases it is the poor who have no access. very basic pit latrines to improved pit latrines, pour-flush fa- cilities using water and septic tanks, through to conventional There is ongoing concern that governments, at many levels, sewers--has financial implications. According to the Human are not devoting enough attention and resources to sanita- Development Report 2006, it costs 20 times more to connect tion services, particularly when compared to spending on a household to a modern sewerage system than to purchase water supply and other infrastructure services. While there a basic pit latrine. Also, any form of improved sanitation has are no general figures showing on- and off-budget expenditu- to compete with cheap practices like defecating in the open res in the sanitation sector at regional levels, evidence at the or in a plastic bag. country level illustrates that investments and expenditures 1 Millennium Development Goal 7, Target 7c, calls on countries to «Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking-water and basic sanitation.» 2 For definitions and categories please see the WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation, http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions/ infrastructure.html. 10 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Background and study objectives are very low compared to those for water supply and other · Why are sanitation investments and service provision infrastructure services. Additionally, existing sanitation not given adequate priority in both lending and investments and service provision are not always pro-poor. nonlending work? Efforts to increase access to sanitation infrastructure provi- · When sanitation investments in such efforts are sion can benefit better-off urban residents at the expense of undertaken, why are they not strategically targeted the urban poor, slum dwellers or the rural population. Many toward increasing access to sanitation for the poor? documents suggest that governments' limited sanitation expenditures are determined largely by political, rather than The primary audience for this study includes World Bank technical or economic constraints in the context of compe- operational task teams engaged in projects, programs, ting demands for resources (Kolsky et al., 2005; World Bank and nonlending activities involving sanitation, as well as Country Management Units. The study aims to enhance 2006; Satterthwaite and McGranahan 2006). operational design and implementation for improved It is against this background that the Sanitation Global Prac- outcomes in the provision of pro-poor sanitation services tice Team of the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and by providing World Bank Task Team Leaders and other the World Bank commissioned a global study on the political sanitation practitioners with tools to understand and more effectively manage the political economy of sanitation. The economy of sanitation with case studies from Brazil, India, audience for this work will have diverse backgrounds and Indonesia, and Senegal. The purpose of the study is to help will include social scientists and sanitation engineers. The WSP and the World Bank--through a better understanding report therefore attempts to use language and terminology of the political economy of sanitation--in their efforts to understood by all readers. When political economy and support partner countries and development practitioners in sanitation-specific terminology is used, we provide expla- the design, implementation, and effectiveness of operations nations where necessary. that aim to provide pro-poor sanitation investments and services to improve health and hygiene outcomes. The term political economy itself is subject to multiple understandings and definitions. In its original use in aca- The study uses the strict definition of sanitation as "the safe demic literature, political economy referred simply to the management of excreta" only. This excludes consideration application of economic principles to the practice of public of drainage and solid waste management, which often have policy of nation-states. We follow the current common a higher political profile and expressed demand. We ack- understanding of political economy as referring to interdis- nowledge that the chosen definition has implications for a ciplinary studies that draw upon social and political theory, study of this sort. There are potential benefits to adopting a in addition to economic principles, in order to understand broader definition, for example, around mobilizing support how political actors, institutions, and economic processes for investment. There are also drawbacks of expanding the influence each other.3 definition, particularly if support mobilized for wider ele- ments, such as solid waste management, diverts resources The political economy of sanitation, therefore, refers to the away from excreta. social, political, and economic processes and actors that determine the extent and nature of sanitation investment Considering these tradeoffs, a political economy framework and service provision. Understanding and managing the is well suited to address the study's key questions: political economy of sanitation consists of identifying and 3 For an overview of political economy, see, for example, World Bank/OPM 2008. www.wsp.org 11 The Political Economy of Sanitation Background and study objectives addressing stakeholder interests and institutional deter- Section 3 uses the Diagnostic Framework to synthesize the minants of sanitation investment process and outcomes, case studies' findings with reference to a set of study hypo- including an assessment of the risks and opportunities for theses and specifically looks at evidence on the distributional better management of political economy toward pro-poor impact of sanitation investments. investment.4 Applying the Action Framework, section 4 outlines a number This Synthesis Report goes beyond a consolidation of the of significant operational lessons from the country case stu- four country case studies to provide common lessons and dies that can help inform future World Bank interventions concrete operational recommendations and guidance that that support sanitation investment. sanitation practitioners can apply to their work. It seeks to support and enhance policy dialogue as well as the design, Section 5 briefly concludes by pointing out the value that implementation, and performance of evidence-based and a better understanding of the risks and opportunities as- pro-poor sanitation operations. sociated with institutions and stakeholder interests in the sanitation sector can add to support sanitation investment The Synthesis Report is structured as follows: Section 2 pre- and service delivery. sents the study's conceptual framework, which is based on earlier work on the political economy of policy reform (World Annex A provides a detailed overview of the study's me- Bank/OPM 2008) and was tailored to this study. Section 2 thodology, and annex B presents summaries for the four case also briefly summarizes the study's methodology. studies in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal. 4 While the study's terms of reference define sanitation as «infrastructure and service provision required for the safe management of human excreta, for example, latrines, sewers, and wastewater treatment,» some of the case study country contexts or programs utilize different definitions that do not necessarily count as «safe management of human excreta» and are not considered as «improved» sanitation by the UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Program. 12 Global Practice Team of Sanitation II. Conceptual framework and methodology 2.1 conceptual framework 1. Country context refers to a country's socioeconomic, The conceptual framework for the research, illustrated political, cultural, and historical characteristics, in figure 2.1, describes how political economy influences including its development trajectory and the current sector investments. The framework was initially developed development aid architecture. It also looks at political by the World Bank Social Development Department and processes within the sanitation sector, the potential was tailored to the sanitation context within this study. It is links to national political institutions and stakeholders, one of several similar frameworks used by development and the assumptions that underpin sanitation sector research organizations for political economy analysis. investment, and how and why sanitation investment was developed, and by whom. 2. Sector arena comprises the institutions that govern relations FIGURE 2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SANITATION and behavior within the sanitation sector and the stakeholders, with their Diagnostic Framework Action Framework economic and political interests that both influence and are affected by the Timing, tailoring and location COUNTRY CONTEXT of investment and operations changes in sanitation service provision Country's socioeconomic, historical and and investment. cultural characteristics Political processes within the sanitation sector Understanding the sector 3. Sector process refers to change through rigorous analysis through information flows, public SECTOR ARENA SECTOR PROCESS Realigning accountability debate, coalition building, participation, Stakeholders & Dialogue & decision institutions: making transparency, communication, and the Economic interests (rents, asset, capture, Coalition building Partnership strategy interaction of actors in the sanitation etc) Participation sector arena over time. Political interest Public debate and (authority, clientelism, Public debate & etc.) information communication The Action Framework (right hand side of figure 2.1) illustrates operational implications and offers measures that development practitioners such as Source: Authors, based on World Bank/OPM 2008. World Bank Task Team Leaders and their government counterparts can use to design and implement pro-poor The Diagnostic Framework (left hand side of figure 2.1) sanitation services and investments. It demonstrates how focuses on analysis and understanding the country context, an analysis of the political economy of sanitation can be sector arena, and sector process. translated into project design and action to better meet www.wsp.org 13 The Political Economy of Sanitation conceptual framework and methodology the sanitation needs of the poor. Effective management of Box 2.1 Sample queStionS for political economy the political economy of sanitation, in the terms of this analySiS of Sanitation inveStmentS: DiagnoStic framework study, integrates a better understanding of the political country context economy and of policy impacts with actions that promote Historical legacies: What is the past history of the sector, greater accountability, partnership and communication. The including previous reform initiatives? How does this influence current stakeholder perception? Action Framework therefore emphasizes first the timing, Culturalandreligiouscontext:Towhatextentdoreligiousor tailoring, and locating of support to sector investment in cultural values shape public debate around sanitation and order to address political economy risks and opportunities. demand for services? Alongside the operational objective of identifying the Ideologies:Whatarethedominantideologiesthatshapeviews political economy risks to sector progress is the need to and debates around the sanitation sector? identify the social and economic risks of sector policy and Policy context: What is the policy context for sanitation? Is therea(pro-poor)visionforsanitation?Whatisitsrelationship investment in terms of distributional equity. Rigorous and to the water sector? transparent analysis of the poverty and social impacts of Sector arena--institutions and stakeholders policy impact is therefore an important element of this Decisionmakingandbudgetallocations:Howaredecisions Action Framework.5 around budget allocations made within the sanitation sector? National--subnational relationships: What is the institutional relationship between national and subnational governments? Ongoing analysis can continue to generate feedback for Aresubnationalgovernmentsaccountabletothenationallevel reflection and course corrections through monitoring and or local electorate? evaluation (M&E) and dissemination. Power relations: To what extent is power over investment decisionsvestedinthehandsofspecificindividuals/groups? Which interest groups and population groups do politicians The Action Framework also stresses the importance of represent when deciding over sanitation investments? How realigning accountability in sanitation investment to do different interest groups outside government (for example, private sector, NGOs, consumer groups, the media) seek to empower citizens to hold policy implementers (government influence policy? or private service providers) accountable. On the supply side Corruptionandrentseeking:Istheresignificantcorruptionand of this accountability equation, legislation and regulation rentseekinginthesector?Whereisthismostprevalent(for can reduce undesirable political economic influence. On the example, at point of delivery; procurement; allocation of jobs)? Who benefits most from this? What are the consequences demand side, mobilizing and empowering poor consumers (for example, preference of investment in big infrastructure and communities can increase access and strengthen the projects)? equity outcomes of sanitation investment. The sustainability, Financing: What is the balance between public and private investment?Howisthesectorfinanced(forexample,public/ effectiveness, and impact of sector investment are in large privatepartnerships,userfees,taxes,donor/lendersupport)? part a function of developing institutions and building the Whatarethediscussionsaroundcostrecovery? capacities of the actors involved. These institutions and actors Demand for services: To what extent is there a demand for can include government agencies, contractors and service sanitationservicesfromthecommunities?Whatarethefactors shaping community demand for improved sanitation? regulators, implementing/delivery agencies, and producer Sector process and consumer institutions. Sector champions: What role do champions play in raising the profile of sanitation and supporting increased sector in- vestment? Civil society: What roles do media, NGOs, and community- 5 The Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) approach was jointly developed basedorganizations(CBOs)playinthesector? within the Bank by the Social Development Department and the PREM Poverty Reduction Department, with collaboration from a range of bilateral development Developmentpartnerinfluence:Howdodonorsandlenders partners, such as the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) attempt to influence decision making and reform implementa- and the German Development Cooperation (see World Bank 2003). The political tion in the sanitation sector? economy framework used in this study is based on what might be termed «the social perspective of PSIA» and was developed by the Bank's Social Development Source: Authors, based on World Bank 2007, OPM 2009a, and DFID 2009. Department with Oxford Policy Management (OPM). See The Political Economy of See also annex A, table A.2. Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations (World Bank/OPM 2008). 14 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation conceptual framework and methodology The Action Framework stresses the need for a partnership hypotheses and questions were then tailored to each country case strategy to address and overcome blockages to pro-poor study context. A sample of political economy questions linked to sanitation investment. This broad-based partnership strategy the Diagnostic Framework is provided in box 2.1. can be linked to an inclusive and widespread public debate and communications strategy that ensures transparency and The fieldwork data collection was driven by two qualitative helps reduce suspicion, resistance, or ideological capture. research methods: semistructured key informant interviews In this way, evidence transparently produced and widely and focus group discussions. Interviews were conducted debated becomes an opportunity for a sector dialogue with with key informants from national and subnational a two-way communication that shapes service provision and government, private and public service providers, civil investment and moves communication away from a public society, international donors and lenders, and project teams. relations exercise. Focus group discussions were conducted with representatives from private sector and civil society stakeholder groups. 2.2 Methodology Two analytical instruments--stakeholder analysis and This Synthesis Report consolidates the findings from a organizational mapping--were used to examine the interplay secondary literature desk review (OPM 2009b) and the between political factors and economic factors by assessing results of fieldwork in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal. stakeholder influence and interests, formal and informal The fieldwork employed a mixed-method approach, primarily institutions, and respective dynamics and processes. using qualitative analysis of stakeholders, institutions, and processes, complemented by quantitative data and analysis The countries for case studies were chosen purposively by of budget allocation and coverage. Data collection was the World Bank/WSP team. The countries selected represent necessarily limited by the time and resources available for a range of sanitation contexts identified to generate useful the fieldwork phase. A fuller discussion of the methodology operational lessons learned through the application of is found in annex A. political economy analysis6. Within the selected countries, there was an element of initial stratification involved in the Using and refining the conceptual framework that was purposive sampling methodology. In the case of Brazil, for developed through earlier work (World Bank/OPM 2008), example, discussions of project contexts identified a typology the review included analysis of (1) key political economy of urban sanitation contexts and then purposively selected literature in the sanitation sector in general; (2) the main sites based on their learning potential. Annex B provides issues of the political economy of sanitation in Brazil, India, detailed summaries for all the case studies. Brief overviews Indonesia, and Senegal; and (3) an overview of the political are provided in box 2.2. economy issues regarding WSP and World Bank projects in the case study countries. The results from the review were used A time lag was deliberately built into the fieldwork schedule to identify research hypotheses and questions. A universal for the global study, with fieldwork conducted in India ahead set of research hypotheses and questions was developed of subsequent fieldwork in Brazil, Indonesia, and Senegal. during the inception phase of the study for each part of the Methodological lessons learned from India subsequently Diagnostic Framework. These are listed in annex A. These informed research in the other three case studies. 6 Case studies were selected based on the following criteria: the existence of WSP and Bank sanitation operations, in order to assess how they have managed political economy issues; interest by task teams; the presence of political economy issues commonly faced by the sanitation sector, in order to draw transferable lessons for other countries and regions; the opportunity to examine basic access versus improved sanitation via urban/rural infrastructure investments; available information on both demand and supply side aspects of governance; different degrees of decentralization; community and private sector engagement, in order to learn from non­public sector schemes; and an urban/rural and regional mix of cases. www.wsp.org 15 The Political Economy of Sanitation conceptual framework and methodology The terms of reference made a distinct differentiation Box 2.2 Brief SummarieS of the four caSe StuDieS between projects with positive experience (Brazil, India, Brazil: The case study analyses the national-level political economy dynamics of urban sanitation investment over the and Senegal) and the Indonesia situation where political lifetimeoftheWaterSectorModernizationProject(knownin economy challenges had hindered increased investment. BrazilasProgramadeModernizaçãodoSetorSaneamento, However, during the case study preparation it was clear that PMSS).SincethePMSSlaunchin1993,Brazil'surbansa- nitation sector has undergone an institutional transformation the context in Indonesia was rapidly changing, with increased and gained a reputation for innovative and pro-poor sewerage government interest in and commitment to sanitation. This programs. In addition to this national (policy) component, the case study includes a regional (project) component that led to a change of focus from that initially envisaged, in focusesontheBahiaAzulprogram,implementedbythestate which the cases studies generated lessons for Indonesia on utilityEmpresaBahianadeÁguaseSaneamento(Waterand SanitationCompanyofBahia,orEMBASA)intheSalvador designing actions that help manage the political economy of metropolitanregioninnortheasternBrazil. sanitation. The new focus aimed at an examination of why india: The case study looks at the political drivers for the the current changes are occurring. This revised focus ensured successoftheTotalSanitationCampaigninruralMaharashtra. that equally important lessons were captured from a context Designedasasupply-drivensanitationprogram,thecampaign has a set of defined components that include information, of ongoing donor and lender efforts to encourage sanitation education and communication, community mobilization investment in the face of minimal initial government--and activities, construction of household toilets and community complexes, and provision of toilets in government schools public--interest in sanitation. and anganwadis.7 The India case study examines why the TotalSanitationCampaignfailedtotakeoffinmostthestates until 2004­05 and provides political economy insights on the The case studies were conducted by a multidisciplinary Maharashtrasuccessstory team of international and national researchers. International indonesia: Theanalysisfocusesonpoliticaleconomyconstra- social scientist led the research process and was supported ints that have limited investment levels for urban sanitation and by a national sanitation engineer. The Brazil case study team examines the factors behind the recent increase in government interestinsanitationserviceprovision.Whilethisincreased included an additional international sanitation expert. The interest has not yet translated into increased investment levels, case studies were conducted as part of a research process that it constitutes a major shift from the previous understanding (both within and outside government) that sanitation is a pri- aimed to gain in-country stakeholder interest, buy-in, and vate matter for households and not something for which the support for the political economy analysis. This included state has responsibility or obligations. World Bank/WSP country offices, which--to varying Senegal: Thecasestudylooksatthepoliticaleconomyrisks degrees--were involved in the case studies, contributing and opportunities influencing investment in Dakar's urban sanitation sector. Starting with the wide-ranging reforms of to the identification of research hypotheses and providing thewaterandsanitationsectorinthemid-1990sthestudy insights as key informants. Debriefing sessions or workshops explores the institutional environment, including the role of the innovative contractual arrangements regulating the water and held at the end of the fieldwork or following production of sanitationsector,aswellasmorerecentWorldBank/WSP- initial draft reports helped to validate findings and initiate supported initiatives of onsite sanitation that for the first time extendservicestoDakar'spoor peri-urban areas. dissemination. 7 An anganwadi is a government-sponsored child-care and mother-care center. 16 Global Practice Team of Sanitation III. Diagnostic findings from the field In this section the case study diagnostic findings are synthesi- of oppressed castes. Senegal's cultural and religious context zed and summarized with reference to the study hypotheses. places a high importance on privacy. Combined with a rapid The analysis is organized around the Diagnostic Framework growth in urbanization, it created a demand for increased presented in figure 2.1. The discussion includes general water and sanitation provision in urban areas, particularly in analytical findings and notes and explains differences bet- the capital city, Dakar. This combination was reinforced 2000 ween country case studies. Detailed summaries of the case by the new political leadership under President Wade with studies are presented in annex B. slogans such as "Sanitation is a matter of dignity." In socially and economically dynamic Brazil, persistence of sanitation 3.1 country context problems, although decreasing over time, remains a source A country's socioeconomic, political, cultural, and historical of embarrassment, as sanitation (especially sanitary sewerage) characteristics, including its development trajectory and the is associated with modern society. From a political point of current development aid architecture, make up the country view, since President Lula was elected, access to sanitation context. An analysis of this context also involves looking at has been linked to human dignity and a citizen's right, similar political processes within the sanitation sector, the potential to the case in Senegal. links to national political institutions and stakeholders, the assumptions that underpin sanitation sector investment, In contrast, sanitation investment in Indonesia has been and how and why sanitation investment was developed and constrained by a historical context of authoritarian rule, in by whom. which advocacy is difficult, and, crucially, a sociopolitical view both within and outside of government that sanitation cultural and historical context is a private responsibility. For cultural reasons, sanitation, in The research confirmed that the cultural and historical context terms of wastewater treatment and disposal, is also generally is a significant determinant of sanitation investment. In each not a subject that is discussed either widely or easily within country, contemporary attitudes and behavior toward sanita- Indonesian society. The central government had not sought to tion investment could be explained at least in part by histori- change the perception that sanitation was solely a household cal factors. Where an appropriate combination of historical matter. Awareness of and concern about what happens to cultural norms and devolved political authority prevailed, waste is low across all socioeconomic groups within Indone- these could be cultivated by progressive decision makers to sian society. Public sanitation investment in urban areas of generate demand for sanitation among citizens. In contrast, Indonesia has been low over many decades, and the majority where hierarchical political and social norms prevailed, they of the existing investment has been by private householders, created a block to progress in sanitation investment. who generally expect little from government. These factors have all had a significant, long-term effect on limiting public In India, for example, successful investment in sanitation in policy debates and maintaining a low demand for facilities Maharashtra could be attributed to a long history of social and services that effectively and safely treat and dispose of movements led by local leaders supporting the liberation wastewater among all sections of the population. www.wsp.org 17 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field Political opportunism and investment promotion investments, with a corresponding emphasis on cultural or There is evidence from across the cases studies that sanita- religious importance, are made in Dakar and other areas, tion investment promotion can be motivated by political and this emphasis undoubtedly appeals to a large number opportunism. This represents an encouraging shift, as it of voters. reflects a higher political visibility for sanitation investment in some contexts. With the exception of Indonesia, there is Global policy debate and external aid agencies increasing cross-party awareness of--and consensus over-- The research looked at the facilitating role of external aid the importance of sanitation investment. agencies and global policy debates for more pro-poor sanita- tion policies and investments. Global debates have impacted In Brazil, political parties that obtain support from poorer positively on national sanitation strategies and investments voters certainly have a different attitude to sanitation, but in contexts where they strike a chord with the progress of this is not necessarily associated with advocacy of different internal debates. Where sanitation debates are externally technologies or investment decisions. The main political initiated or seen to be ideologically imposed, claims that dispute in the Brazilian sanitation sector, not necessarily external agencies have an impact are less convincing. defined in terms of the traditional "right" or "left," concerns the respective roles of local municipalities and the water and It is important to note that in three of the four cases (India, sanitation companies controlled by the state governments. Brazil, and Indonesia) the international financial institu- The municipalistas emphasize the benefits of responsiveness tions (IFIs) are, unusually, small players with a facilitative and accountability associated with municipal control. The or supportive role. The authors would argue that political estadualistas emphasize the management and investment economy analysis is even more important for IFIs and donors capacity and economies of scale provided by state utilities. in smaller countries where they have stronger influence and Increased sanitation investment has benefited from a grow- a more critical role and therefore need to be more aware of ing cross-party consensus since President Lula's decision to these dimensions. include it as a priority sector in the 2007 Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC). International attention to sanitation in Senegal via the 2004 While Lula's Workers' Party (PT) is most clearly associated Global WASH Forum in Dakar kept water and sanitation in the minds of poorer voters with an emphasis on sanita- high on the country's agenda. This provided a platform for tion as an issue of dignity and citizenship, all parties benefit donor support and a clear demonstration of national com- from the opportunities to make political capital out of large mitment by the government, with President Wade himself sewerage contracts. attending the conference. In Maharashtra, the behavioral change among national and In Brazil, perceived enthusiasm by IFIs for privatization of local political leaders toward promoting and supporting state water and sanitation utilities in the 1990s contributed sanitation investment indicates a consensus across parties. to a backlash against "neoliberal" policies in the sector that It has been stimulated in part by an understanding of the succeeded in derailing the privatization process. IFIs such growing political importance among rural voters of sanita- as the World Bank had more success with their support for tion investment. As a consequence, there is little evidence of home-grown innovations such as the condominial approach,8 partisan politics in sanitation investment debates. sponsoring conferences and other events that helped to spread these innovations and legitimize their uptake by utilities such While there is no evidence that political considerations drive as EMBASA (the state company responsible for the successful pro-poor sanitation investments in Senegal, highly visible Bahia Azul investment program in Salvador). 8 Condominial systems refer to the process of implementing simplified sewerage service coupled with consultations and ongoing interactions between users and agencies during planning and implementation. The term is primarily used in Latin America, particularly in Brazil, and is derived from the term condominio (housing block). 18 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field In Indonesia, external agency influence has clearly been im- stakeholder interests in--the management and implemen- portant. Government interest has been stimulated through, tation of sanitation investments and service provision. The among other factors, a WSP comparative study on the eco- literature suggests that this political economy challenge can nomic impacts of sanitation, a WSP/US Agency for Inter- be particularly problematic in the sanitation sector, with national Development regional workshop in the Philippines, its need for cross-sectoral delivery and with a wide range of and the Indonesia Sanitation Sector Development Project delivery strategies from which to choose.9 (ISSDP) implemented by the Government of Indonesia together with the Water and Sanitation Program­East Asia institutional challenges and opportunities and the Pacific (WSP-EAP) (and cofunded by the Govern- The institutional complexity of the sanitation sector has long ment of the Netherlands). However, in the case of ISSDP, been recognized as a major obstacle to pro-poor sanitation donors' influence rests on their ability to understand and investment. Despite this, the cases studies illustrate that op- manage effectively their relationship with government. The portunities for institutional change have been recognized and consultant team employed by WSP to work on ISSDP, for supported. These changes have demonstrated that institutio- instance, physically sits and interacts with government on nal complexity need not be a barrier to increased investment a daily basis. While letting go of certain aspects of project and that Task Team Leaders and practitioners can work to planning, or accepting slower time frames, is not always support progressive change within complex landscapes, with comfortable for IFIs and donors, in a context where the decentralization often providing more room for institutio- government does not want to be seen in any way as donor nal maneuver. Despite political sensitivity and institutional driven, a back seat role is key to encouraging government constraints, there is still a space where pragmatic work can ownership and commitment. be done to support institutional change without huge loans. This work can support formal rule changes, as with regulatory The water and sanitation sector in India is heavily funded by reform in Senegal, or informal cultural change, as illustrated government and strongly government led. The policy debate by institutional support in Maharashtra. on the need for sanitation investment at the national level has been won and is government owned rather than being The research confirms the constraints that arise from a lack externally driven. The perceived urgency of this need is linked of a clear organizational home for sanitation investment. to external engagement with IFIs and donors on MDG This lack of a home can add to the complexity of sector commitments. At the state level in Maharashtra, WSP helped support pro-poor sanitation investment by introducing state planning and resource allocation processes while limiting and local government colleagues to promotional approaches organizational accountability for progress. In Indonesia, for and low-cost sanitation technologies. WSP then used the evi- example, there is no single national level ministry responsible dent success of the Maharashtra program in advocacy at the for sanitation policy; responsibilities are shared among at national level for a shift in emphasis in the Total Sanitation least five ministries. It is clear that urban sanitation has no Campaign from household inputs (toilet construction) to distinct organizational home, and so unsurprisingly there collective outcomes (an end to open defecation). In 2004, are historically and currently varying degrees of interest in significant changes were made to the Total Sanitation Cam- sanitation. In Senegal, in contrast, there was a consensus paign Guidelines to reflect this policy shift. among key informants that the National Sanitation Office (ONAS) was increasingly taking responsibility for urban 3.2 Sector arena sanitation policy and investment. One went as far as to say Beyond the sanitation country context, a political economy that "ONAS is the real `Ministry of Sanitation.'"10 Figure perspective focuses attention on the sector arena, meaning 3.2, from the Senegal report, maps institutional delivery of the formal and informal institutional arrangements for--and sanitation investment. 9 For a review of available literature, see OPM 2009b. 10 Under recent public administration reform, sanitation had been bundled together with other sectors into a single ministry (the Ministry of Urban Affairs, Housing, Water and Sanitation). www.wsp.org 19 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field The research findings emphasize the FIGURE 3.1 INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE OF URBAN SANITATION IN important status of decentralization SENEGAL (SPECIFIC FOCUS ON DAKAR) as a key determinant of the pattern De facto ONAS plays a bigger Policy and strategy Operations part in policy making than the and impact of sanitation investments. formal organisation suggests With the exception of Senegal, where sanitation is not decentralized,11 the Ministry of Urban Reporting ONAS case studies highlighted several facets Affairs, Housing, National Sanitation Office of centralization/decentralization. Water and Sanitation On the demand side, the strength of Sanitation Directorate Onsite Sewerage/ decentralized authority can empower sanitation network stakeholders to debate and contest Urban Rural (cell) (service) sanitation sanitation sanitation investment with which they Pilot-site Dakar (PADPUQ/GPOBA) are dissatisfied. Decentralized budge- tary authority can encourage pressure CONTRACT from regional government, civil socie- BILLING ty, and citizens to allocate budget to Local Government AGETIP sanitation investment. On the supply SDE plans on water side decentralization can keep politi- CONTRACT CONTRACT and sanitation cians and bureaucrats in touch with In Dakar (and their grassroots constituents. In all other urban centres) NGOs, Private cases, the positive influence of decen- this does not exist CBOs sector (more a reality in tralization on sanitation investment is `CREATING DEMAND' remote rural conditional upon the level of aware- CONSTRUCTION areas) INFORMATION ness and strength of demand among budget holders and citizens. While in some cases, as in Maharashtra and Private households, in Brazil, decentralization can prove bene ciaries to be hugely significant in promo- ting institutional arrangements that Notes: AGETIP: Agence d'Exécution des Travaux d'Intérêt Public (public works and employment agency) facilitate more effective cross-sectoral SDE: Sénégalaise des Eaux (Senegalese water utility) Source: Garbarino and Guène 2009. 11 In Senegal, local governments are tasked to develop local water and sanitation plans. However, a combination of capacity constraints at the local level and weak accountability between central and local government means that this hardly ever happens in practice. Remote rural areas are sometimes forced to take responsibility for their own sanitation services, as their needs are more easily ignored by the central Government in Dakar. 20 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field decision making at the subnational level, in other cases, such as in Indonesia, a lack of clarity over institutional authority figurE 3.2 SAniTATion SEcTor STAkEholdErS' idEologicAl PoSiTionS, BrAzil at the national level can be reproduced and magnified at State-level public sector operation subnational level. estadualistas Decentralization is long established in Maharashtra, and Public sector Commerial operation operation on capitalist lines some senior political leaders and officers have worked their way up though the hierarchy, bringing with them an unders- Federal Goverment mu tanding of, and commitment to, village-level action. Some tas nic Municipal public Private-sector maintain close links with their village. Indeed so strong was tis pai i va sector operation operation lis the decentralized nature of sanitation investment innovation pr tas in Maharashtra that the national program borrowed from the incentive program initiated at the local level rather Local-level operation than the other way around. Also in Maharashtra, a range Source: Cunha et al. 2006, our translation (graphic provided by and of social sector departments and programs including pres- reproduced by permission of Frederico Turolla) chool centers, education, health, and sanitation fall under the district council (Zilla Parishad) chief executive officer. This makes it easier to secure cross-sectoral bureaucratic The case study of the Bahia Azul investment program showed that in the 1990s it was possible for a state government to support for development programs and to maintain good rapidly scale up sewerage provision with a go-it-alone ap- coordination between the bodies concerned. proach. But with this approach came missed opportunities for cross-sectoral work, including synergy with advocates In Brazil, the federal government--which sets national for the upgrading of health and neighborhood services by sector guidelines and serves as the principal source of the municipal administration authority. In today's sector sanitation investment funds, whether through grants or arena this approach would no longer be possible, given the loans--functions more as a dynamic arena for struggles strengthened role of the municipalities and the need for im- between different stakeholders than as a stakeholder in its proved federal cooperation between states and municipalities own right. For example, the military regime from 1964 to under the 2007 Basic Sanitation Law, which also covers water 1985 used the resources of an authoritarian and highly cen- supply. Sanitation investments under the flagship Growth tralized state to push through national strategies such as the Acceleration Program (PAC) include a much greater focus National Water Supply and Sanitation Plan (PLANASA). on collaboration between state and municipal government In contrast, today's democratic, pluralist, and highly de- departments, though some cross-sector coordination issues centralized Brazil forces national policy making to respond remain. Stakeholder power and interest mapping (figure 3.4) to competing pressures from promunicipal municipalistas, clearly shows how political economy factors made it impos- prostate utility estadualistas, and pro­private sector privatis- sible for one side to prevail in the struggle over the 2007 tas. These advocates mobilize support across different levels law. Using information gathered through key informant of government and from different parts of political society, interviews, a graphical presentation of stakeholder interests civil society, and the private sector and can form tactical and power relations places stakeholders on a matrix; each alliances around points of ideological convergence. Figure stakeholder's position is determined by its interest (x-axis) 3.3 illustrates these competing pressures. and its ability to influence decision making (y-axis). www.wsp.org 21 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field figurE 3.3 STAkEholdErS, inTErESTS, And PowEr in nEgoTiATionS ovEr ProviSionS in ThE "SAniTATion lAw" To STrEngThEn ThE rolE of municiPAliTiES High 1 2 A 9 6 B 4 8 3 Power 10 5 C 7 D 11 Low Support Neutral Opposition Interest Stakeholder interests Stakeholder interests Stakeholder interests 1 President'soffice Guaranteelegaland 4 Associaçãodas Orient legal, policy, 8 Partido dos Orient legal, policy, policy framework to Empresas de and resource Trabalhadores and resource facilitate increased Saneamento allocation framework (Workers'Party, allocation frame-work investments in BásicoEstaduais to strengthen role of PT),leadpartyin to strengthen role sanitation, balancing (Associationof state utilities governing coalition of municipalities, demands from State Sanitation promote citizen different political Companies,AESEBE) oversight, and groups restrict private-sector 5 AssociaçãoNacional Orient legal, policy participation 2 Secretaria Nacional Establish control dosServiços and resource de Saneament of legal and Municipaisde allocation framework 9 PartidodoMovi- Guaranteeflowof Ambiental(National policy framework; Saneamento (National to strengthen role of mentoDemocrático sanitation resources Secretariat for strengthen role of Associationof municipalities Brasileiro(Brazilian to supporters in both Environmental municipalities MunicipalSanitation Democratic state governments Sanitation,SNSA), MovementParty, and municipalities, Services,ASSEMAE) a department of the PMDB),largestparty includingviaFUNASA MinistryofCities inPT-ledcoalition 6 AssociaçãoBrasileira Increasedinvestment controlledbyPT deInfra-Estrutura in sanitation 10 Partido da Social Orient legal, policy, (Workers'Party) eIndústriasde DemocraciaBrasileira and resource until 2005 Base(Brazilian (BrazilianSocial allocation framework Infrastructureand DemocracyParty, to strengthen role of 3 FundaçãoNacional Avoidcentralization HeavyIndustry PSDB),leadpartyin state utilities, promote de Saúde (National of policy control Association,ABDIB) opposition coalition technical regulation, Health Foundation, bySNSA; and boost private- FUNASA), increase scope 7 AssociaçãoBrasileira Orient legal, policy, sector participation executive agency for negotiating das Concessiónarias and resource oftheMinistryof sanitation PrivadasdosServiços allocation framework 11 PartidodaFrenteLi- Orient legal, policy, Health controlled investments in small PúblicosdeÁgua to strengthen beral(LiberalFront and resource byBrazilian municipalities eEsgoto,(Brazilian role of private-sector Party,PFL--changed allocation framework Democratic AssociationofPrivate concessions nametoDEMorDe- to boost private- MovementParty WaterandSanitation mocrats in 2007), part sector participation (PMDB) Operators,ABCON) of opposition coalition Source: Shankland et al. 2010. 22 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field In Indonesia, rapid decentralization gave greater administra- numbers enable clients to contact providers directly when tive independence to local governments and moved finan- there is a problem. cial resources and responsibility for the provision of many public services (including water and sanitation) directly to A further key issue faced due to decentralization in Indonesia the district level. However, the effects of the lack of clear is the increasing practice of redistricting, through which local responsibilities at national level are compounded by a lack politicians can petition for districts to be split into smaller of clarity over the roles of different levels of local government administrative units through a mechanism called pemekaran. and of different institutions within local governments. Fur- In theory this should facilitate better service delivery, more thermore, responsibilities of local agencies may vary between equitable resource distribution, and more representative go- vernment. While redistricting has increased revenues, local different districts and cities as there is no national policy on budget generally give priority to free education, (curative) institutional configuration or allocation of responsibilities for health services, and the construction of new government offi- sanitation between local bodies at the local level. figure 3.5 ces to house newly formed local administrations. These easily presents an institutional map of Indonesia's urban sanitation crowd out sanitation and other public health promotion issues. sector and clearly highlights the lack of clarity over responsi- This bottom-rung perception of sanitation is entrenched by bility. This reduces accountability for sanitation service deli- an attitude among mst local governments that responsibility very. It is unclear to ordinary members of the public whom for sanitation rests with others: NGOs, the private sector, or, they could approach and/or complain to. This contrasts to despite decentralization, the national government, and most electricity suppliers, for instance, where advertised hotline importantly perhaps, with individual households. figurE 3.4 inSTiTuTionAl mAP of ThE urBAn SAniTATion SEcTor, indonESiA infrastructure development and service delivery Sewerage and septic tanks Drainage**** wastewater community Communal Household SANIMAS toilets and sanitation treatment treatment system) local Sludge (urban toilets policy and strategy local government departments Bappeda X MunicipalDepartmentofPublicWorks(PU) X X MunicipalCleaningandLandscapingAgency(DKP) X X Neighborhoodadministrativeunits(RT/RW) X X EnvironmentalServicesAgency(DLH) X X X EnvironmentWatchBody(BPLHD)atprovinciallevel X WaterResourceBody(DinasSumberdayaAir)*** X local government enterprises PDPAL(sewerageutilities)* X X PDAM(waterutilities)* X X nongovernment stakeholders Private enterprises X** NGOs/CBOs/communitygroups X X Individuals/households X X Notes: * Depends on district / city arrangements (only two cities have PDPAL separated from PDAM--Jakarta and Banjarmasin). ** Pit emptying. *** Can take the role of managing septic tanks operators. **** As with sanitation, organizational responsibility for drainage is complex and depends largely on the grade of roads and associated drains. The Ministry of Public Works is responsible for drainage on first- and second-level roads (interprovince and intercity roads). Tertiary roads and local streets are often under local government responsibility but neighborhood streets are often neglected. Developers build drainage systems for new housing estates and formal developments, but drainage in informally growing settlements is often unaddressed. Sources: WSP-EAP 2009; Brook et al. 2010. www.wsp.org 23 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field Budget allocations and disbursements In contrast, these political economy gaps have been largely The research focused on the political economy factors that bridged at the federal level in India, with the government might explain the gap between sanitation as an expressed putting in place a transparent institutional mechanism of priority and actual changes in budget allocation and dis- disbursement and authority that ensures the transfer of bursement. The challenge of translating political statements government investment into various elements of the natio- into budget commitments was confirmed. In some cases this nal Total Sanitation Campaign. At the subnational level in is a function of the pressure to allocate scarce resources to Maharashtra, the ability of the Maharashtra government sectors with a traditionally higher perceived priority or with to secure strong and sustained bureaucratic support for its higher perceived political rewards. In cases where resource political commitments was fundamental to the progress of scarcity is less of an issue, the importance of organizational sanitation investment in the state. resistance from within the executive can become apparent. In these cases, executive ministries, departments, and In Senegal, budget allocation has been hampered by capacity agencies have insufficient pressure from above and from constraints at the policy and planning level as well as by com- below to allocate budgets to (more progressive) sanitation peting investment priorities with potentially greater political investment. Therefore, even where there is high-level buy- rewards, such as investments in Dakar's road network. An in, and demand generated within civil society, this will not organizational mapping, undertaken during the fieldwork, necessarily change political preferences within institutions identified key decision and political economy entry points implementing government policy. Another explanation for during the budget process, including the president's ability the funding gap is seen where implementing agencies lack to influence the budget process or the importance of line the technical and governance capacity to absorb and mana- ministries' capacity to present a sound budget proposal to the ge increased budget allocations. Where governments have Ministry of Finance. figure 3.6 summarizes this analysis and is successfully bridged these policy-to-funding gaps, national divided into three parts: the formal rules of the budget process or federal level sanitation programs can provide a protected (in the center), key points of decision making (in blue, on institutional vehicle for sanitation investment. the left), and a description of the informal processes (circled In Indonesia there has often been a huge gap between public in red, on the right). Moreover, cost recovery is subject to statements and budget execution levels. This is less a function much debate in Senegal's urban sanitation sector today. With of resource scarcity and more a matter of organizational re- little actual contribution from local government, ONAS gets sistance or lack of real interest within government. Despite its main revenue from the sanitation surcharge collected certain formal processes being in place, informal patron­ within the water billing. In August 2008 ONAS signed a client relationships play a key role in determining investment performance contract with the government confirming that priorities and funding from central to local governments. the state would cover the financing gap if ONAS performed This is particularly evident in the influence of provincial level satisfactorily.12 The sanitation sector has therefore followed government stakeholders and actors over budget allocations, the successful example of the water sector in designing con- where personal relationships and political considerations are tracts that shape stakeholders' incentives in order to protect key to obtaining funding. investments from adverse political economy impacts. 12 ONAS's performance was tracked in wastewater treatment, investment in the network (extension and rehabilitation), new connections and new onsite facilities, network maintenance, and financial management. 24 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field FIGURE 3.5 ORGANIZATIONAL MAPPING OF THE BUDGET PROCESS FOR URBAN SANITATION IN SENEGAL KEY POINTS OF DECISION-MAKING FORMAL PROCESS INFORMAL PROCESS AND PE ENTRY POINTS Budget envelopes are not MoF publishes budget envelopes published by MoF and line ministries make proposal `into the blue' Department capacity Budget proposal & preparation in to prepare sound budget proposal according to sector policy Ministry's Sanitation Department Submission of department budgets `NEGOTIATION' `Ministère de l'Urbanisme, de l'Habitat, de at intra-Ministry-level l'Hydraulique Urbaine et de l'Assainissement' prepares budget proposal President influences all stages of the budget process Submission of ministry budgets to MoF MoF influence MoF validates proposal according to sector policy to reduce line ministries' budget proposals and makes adjustments (usually cuts) `NEGOTIATION' Prime Minister & Council of Ministers at inter-Ministry-level Parliamentary approval process De-facto no changes at Parliament-level Source: Garbarino and Guène (2009). In Brazil there is a significant gap between the amounts celeration Program has, however, significantly increased earmarked for sanitation investment in congressional the availability of grant finance for investment by smaller budgets and those actually released by the national trea- and more heavily indebted utilities in poorer states and sury, with political as well as financial criteria governing municipalities. figure 3.7 graphically represents the mix of the ultimate decisions on disbursements. Most sector loans and grants with different institutional and political investment has historically derived from federal govern- pathways to decision and disbursement. (Where relevant, ment loans, with strict technical and financial viability sites or moments of political input to decision making are criteria that limit uptake to the larger and better-run state noted in red alongside the official technical and financial utilities. The inclusion of sanitation in the Growth Ac- decision pathways.) www.wsp.org 25 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field The key constraint to increasing both figurE 3.6 BudgET dEciSionS And rESourcE flowS for the quantity and the quality of sanita- SAniTATion invESTmEnT grAnTS And loAnS in BrAzil tion investment in Brazil is now percei- PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCING FLOW FROM FEDERAL TO STATE/MUNICIPAL LEVELS ved to be weak technical and financial 1. GRANTS Give instructions capacity resulting from the decades- President´s Parliamentary Earmarks of ce to release or retain the money based long neglect of the sector. While the on political negotiations private sector is already beginning to Mayor/ Deputy/ National Ministry of Release or retains respond to the new, more positive sce- the money based Governor Senator Budget Finance on budget/ nario, significant investments continue cash ow criteria to be needed in the technical and ma- CAIXA Mayor/ CAIXA nagement capacity of the public bodies Governor (at federal, state, and municipal levels) that commission, monitor, regulate, PAC call for proposals and in most cases operate sewerage and Mayor/ Ministry PAC CAIXA other sanitation services. Governor of Cities Management Committee Select projects Second selection based on regional Decisions based corruption and rent seeking on economic / based on technical distributive concerns nancial criteria A particular dimension to the budget criteria Decisions based on allocation and disbursement debate is political negotiations the incidence of corrupt practices based on rent-seeking behavior within organi- PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCING FLOW zations with control over budgets and FROM FEDERAL OR IFI TO STATE/MUNICIPAL LEVELS authority over sanitation investment 2. LOANS PAC call for proposal (national or regional scope) decisions. While all case studies came across evidence of rent seeking and Mayor/ Ministry of PAC BNDES corruption, it was not identified as the Governor Management State Cities Committee CAIXA predominant feature distorting pro- Company Select projects Second selection poor sanitation investments. based on based on regional technical criteria distributive concerns CAIXA Treasury In Indonesia sanitation investments Checks level of were said to be less popular with many indebtedness civil servants than other types of larger IFI lending infrastructure projects (for example, Fed. Gov Mayors/ roads and buildings), as they provided IFI Fed. Gov CAIXA program Governors fewer opportunities for corruption. One senior civil servant argued, "If you go Mayors/ into sanitation, you are signing up to COFIEX Governors/ IFI (Finance Ministry) Senate Treasury be poor." There are, however, corrupt State Companies Consulta- practices in sanitation investment: tion letter private sector interviewees involved in building sanitation infrastructure in the CAIXA = Caixa Econômica Federal (Federal Savings Bank); BNDES = Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento past explained that they were usually Econômico e Social (National Bank for Economic and Social Development); COFIEX = Comissão de Financiamentos Externos (Brazil's federal government external financing commission). asked for kickbacks of up to 20 percent Source: Shankland et al. 2010. of the total budget. Corruption is a 26 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field widely and often discussed topic within the national media, who finance politicians' election campaigns that they will be and there is a general public perception that someone always repaid out of inflated contracts when that particular politician gets rich with infrastructure investment. is successfully elected. While not covered in the case study (as it is not funded by World Bank or WSP), FUNASA, the Another opportunity for rent seeking is created in Indonesia Ministry of Health agency responsible for small-town sanita- through the ongoing decentralization process. The practice of tion, has been involved in numerous corruption scandals, and splitting districts into smaller administrative units should in its former administrative director was arrested by the Federal theory facilitate better service delivery, more equitable resource Police on suspicion of embezzling roughly US$30 million in distribution, and more representative government. However, spring 2010. as decentralization means more central funding is available, and more money is also raised locally through taxation, a key Technological choice and pro-poor sanitation provision motivation for splitting districts has often been control over The research explored whether and why decisions about pro- resources and rent-seeking opportunities for local elites. poor sanitation investment can also be derailed by technologi- cal preferences. Politically driven decision making was char- Within the low technology investment arena in rural sa- acterized by a preference for highly visible, big infrastructure nitation in India, opportunities for corruption prevail in investments, with in some instances rent-seeking opportunities the disbursement of a large central budget under the Total being an important incentive for those in power. Among Sanitation Campaign and for rent seeking in the approval of engineers, there is a strong technical bias for traditional sani- financial awards for clean village status. This study, with its tation investments, such as sewerage-based service provision, relatively brief period of fieldwork, did not elicit evidence of often at the expense of appropriate technological choices. The corruption in the disbursement of TSC budgets from central sector arena is therefore often characterized by political and to subnational administration. Nor was there any evidence of technological preferences that benefit the minority of well-off rent seeking by officials responsible for confirming clean village urban residents rather than the poor majority. status in Maharashtra. While it is reasonably safe to assume that corruption and rent seeking play their part in this sector, In cases where technological and political preferences are not as they do in others, the fieldwork team did not conclude that the same, an interesting debate emerges between sector stake- this distorted the process and its outcomes significantly. holders. In Senegal, many high-ranking politicians are sup- porters of investing in the expansion of the sewerage network In Senegal, the fieldwork team did not come across concrete and costly treatment plants, whereas many technical sector evidence for corrupt practices within the onsite investments. specialists and bureaucrats have been increasingly convinced Works are closely monitored through the Global Partner- by examples of onsite sanitation and condominial systems that ship on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) initiative. However, successfully work in poor semi-urban areas of Dakar. Anecdotal the overall preference of politicians for big infrastructure evidence suggests that this experience echoes the situation in investments--while on one hand explained by a technological many other countries. However, bureaucrats in Senegal have bias--is likely to be influenced by the opportunities created limited power compared to politicians. This lack of influence for rent seeking. over technological discussions by engineers and bureaucrats has limited the adoption of large-scale onsite sanitation and In Brazil the political commitment to condominial investment condominial systems and has undermined efforts to expand has been pro-poor while generally maintaining the appeal for sanitation provision to the country's poor outside the reach different stakeholders. For politicians, this creates relatively big of the network. public works programs for investment, and key informants in Bahia raised the issue of the closeness of the state government to In Brazil, a discourse of modernity shared by popular and particular construction companies. Moreover, according to key elite actors has favored investment in "modern" sewerage over informants, there are expectations by construction companies other forms of sanitation provision. Moreover, the engineer- www.wsp.org 27 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field ing community has initially resisted the condominial sewers and to encourage the participation of NGOs and the pri- technology; it was simply not what they have been trained in. vate sector in the implementation of crucial elements of the However, the resulting high costs of increased sanitation access program. In Maharashtra, however, sanitation promotion is and the bias away from pro-poor investment have been partially undertaken by government officers, not contracted to exter- offset by the use of innovative low-cost sewerage technologies nal organizations. This adds legitimacy to the promotional such as the condominial approach. campaign. NGOs are involved, but in the background, as resource centers for government. Similarly, in Senegal, the In India, the federal government has ensured that affordability World Bank/WSP Sanitation Program for Peri-urban Com- of rural sanitation technologies has not hindered the delivery munities of Dakar (PAQPUD) delegate the active role of of sanitation investment. Subsidies for household latrines for promoter and implementer to community-based organiza- designated (below poverty line) poor households are readily tions and private operators, which are trusted partners in available through the federal Total Sanitation Campaign. In many communities. Maharashtra these subsidies resolved affordability problems for many households, which was confirmed by observable In Brazil, both service provision and sector investment behavioral change and by below poverty line households finance are dominated by the public sector. However, the interviewed for this study. proportion of sewerage services provided by private-sector concession holders is growing, albeit from a very low base. In Indonesia, private investment is the norm in a context Private investment in the sector suffered from long-standing where sanitation is widely seen as a private and not a public uncertainty over the legal and regulatory framework, partially responsibility. The traditionally low political interest in sani- resolved by the 2007 National Basic Sanitation Guidelines tation means that there is little or no prominent discussion Law, which also includes water supply as part of basic on technological choice among political decision makers. sanitation. Evidence from Brazil has also highlighted that Between 1970 and 2000, government spending on sanitation long-term engagement with communities matters. The case averaged just Rp 200 (US$0.021) per person per year. It is study of the Bahia Azul program showed that the hard work not surprising then that the primary source of investment for of the community mobilizers in organizing neighborhood sanitation is households and communities, who invest in onsite meetings and pursuing individual households to ensure their sanitation. In the city of Jakarta, for instance, this results in adherence was very successful in creating the condominiums self-provisioned investments in septic tanks by households, and paving the way for investment and construction. while in rural areas, pit latrines are the most popular tech- However, the lack of any systematic links with community nological choice. associations and other neighborhood groups may have made it harder to mobilize subsequent collective action for Private sector involvement operation and maintenance in a sustainable fashion. The research tested the hypothesis that governments actively encourage nongovernmental and private sector actors in In Indonesia, where recently increasing political commitment sanitation infrastructure and delivery, with a focus on how has not yet translated into concrete actions, there is currently that relationship can be established in a way that effectively little role for private sector involvement in the sanitation sector. manages political economy risks and opportunities. The re- Not actively encouraged by the government, the private sector search confirmed the potential institutional effectiveness of is, however, involved through private investment in onsite fa- contractual relationships that provide flexible entry for the cilities or maintenance, for example, in those cases where septic private sector and NGOs in sanitation promotion, invest- tanks are operational and emptied on a regular basis. ment, and delivery. Demand for sanitation services and willingness to pay In India, the Total Sanitation Campaign has been designed The research considered whether communities and house- to be sufficiently flexible to allow for subnational autonomy holds are less interested in sanitation investment than in other 28 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field services and are less willing to pay for sanitation services. It ity and water supply has made room for sanitation to move is evident that while demand for sanitation has traditionally up the list of poor Brazilians' priority demands. Sewerage been weaker than for water and other services, demand in investment in informal settlements is now perceived as a key both urban and rural areas can be generated with a selection part of the transition from favela (slum) to bairro (neighbor- of rewards and sanctions, an affordable mix of technologies, hood) and from social exclusion to cidadania (citizenship). and a long-term strategy of engagement and promotion. The benefits of improved sanitation for both human health and dignity are now clearly present in the discourse of favela In Maharashtra the demand for water is much stronger than residents, as well as in high-profile statements by President that for sanitation. It is also highly significant, however, Lula. that under the state's Sant Gadge Baba scheme, commu- nity investments have been much larger than government Box 3.1 conSumer action: the camBérène treatment expenditure due to a careful combination of incentives and plant in Dakar sanctions. Indeed, the experience in Maharashtra has demon- FromDecember2001toMarch2002,theCambérènewas- strated that in this context, rewards for sanitation outcomes tewater treatment plant had problems with the pipe that are a key motivating factor for communities. Interest in and dischargedtreatedwastewaterintotheAtlanticOcean.The demand for sanitation in Indonesia has traditionally been pipe was broken, and treated wastewater was discharged into the sea directly on the shore instead of 200 meters from the low among communities, and stakeholder analysis confirmed coastasintended.ItfurthercametolightthattheNational low interest among the media, consumer groups, and within Sanitation Office proceeded to pass raw sewage directly to the sea during maintenance periods at the plant. households. Once people living nearby understood what was happening (and what caused the smell), they decided to physically block Rapid urbanization and population growth have put pres- andclogthelastmanholeleadingtotheshore.Thisdidnot sure on service provision in Senegal's cities. In most settings, leaveONASanychoicebuttostoppumpingrawsewageinto however, community demand for services focuses on what thesea,andtheCambérènetreatmentplantwaseventually closed down for four months. are perceived as more urgent problems: drinking water, solid waste collection, wastewater and drainage (in particular in Followingthisconcreteconsumeraction,ONASwasforced to install a new, flexible pipe with an outlet 200 meters from the rainy season), or acute environmental problems as the theshore.Inaddition,theministerresponsibleforsanitation case of the Cambérène treatment plant demonstrates (box had to personally negotiate with the community before the manhole was unblocked 3.1). However, in Dakar, NGOs and CBOs have successfully used community interest in better drainage and wastewater Source: Garbarino and Guène 2009. collection to stimulate demand for sanitation services. By offering a wide range of technological options13 (in different price categories) supported by a one-off subsidy, sanitation Sanitation as vote winner or career maker? provision is becoming more affordable. The research also looked at the incentives and interests of government stakeholders in relation to sanitation investment, In Brazil, demand for sewerage investments in high-density testing the hypothesis that within government, sanitation is urban informal settlements (favelas) has historically been perceived as a vote winner (or career maker). There was en- driven not by favela residents themselves but by downstream couraging evidence from the India and Brazil case studies of middle-class and elite communities. In the case study city of perceived political returns to sanitation investment, and some Salvador, a particular factor was these communities' concern progress apparent at the city level in Indonesia in generating about the discharge of raw sewage onto "their" beaches. There political incentives through the Indonesian Sanitation Sec- is evidence, however, that near-universal access to electric- tor Development Program. The political incentives operate 13 The available technology includes wash basins or showers with a «soak away,» which do not count under the MDG target or the «safe management of human excreta» (the definition of sanitation in the terms of reference for this study). www.wsp.org 29 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field where demand among the public has been generated or horizontal x-axis) and influence (on the vertical y-axis). This strengthened and/or where there is a higher visibility given shows high levels of support for rural sanitation investment to sanitation in national and international policy debates. among powerful state and district officials. In Maharashtra, stakeholder positions on sanitation investment have shifted In Maharashtra, the political returns to sanitation inves- over time to the point where there is now no significant stake- tment have become increasingly apparent. Some of the holder opposition to rural sanitation investment (illustrated senior officials committed to sanitation in the early years by the blank cells B and D). Fifteen or more years ago this have risen to more senior positions, albeit often to unre- type of stakeholder analysis would have shown active stake- lated sectors, and the government recognizes and rewards holder opposition, in particular from the state water board. officers who perform well in the sanitation program. Sig- The challenge now is not one of active opposition but of nificantly, this form of political incentive has started to agenda setting and prioritization in a resource-competitive be reflected in other states. The program also gives Gram environment. In this environment, the strongest push for Panchayat (village-level government) leaders greater access sanitation investment and creative programming has come to senior decision makers, raising their public profile if they from sanitation champions--state politicians and executive are sanitation supporters. This is clearly illustrated in the officials--within the Department of Drinking Water Supply country case study stakeholder analysis (figure 3.8), which and Sanitation, backed by supportive activities from the maps stakeholders according to their level of interest (on the donor community. 30 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field figurE 3.7 PowEr/inTErEST mATrix, rurAl SAniTATion invESTmEnT, mAhArAShTrA, indiA High 25 24 2 26 1 A B 4 5 12 3 6 8 7 16 11 19 9 Influence 17 13 29 14 10 20 15 27 28 C 22 18 23 D 21 30 Low Support Neutral Opposition Interest govErnmEnT And STATE AgEnciES 9 DistrictCoreTeam/TSCCell-(A:Support+highin- 19 GramPanchayatsecretary-(A:Support+influence) fluence; however, influence will be more toward neutral national because of relatively little decision-making power) 20 OtherGPlevelfunctionarieslikeANM,Anganwadi worker 1 MinistryofRuralDevelopment-(A:Support+ 10 fficialsofdistrict-levelunitsoftheDepartmentsof O (C:supportandinfluencemoretowardsneutral) high influence) Education(districteducationofficer),Health(chief medicalofficer),WomenandChildDevelopment PrivATE SEcTor 2 DepartmentofDrinkingWaterSupply(DDWS) (A:Support+highinfluence) (chief district project officer-integrated child develop- 21 Rural sanitary marts (community-based product sale mentschemes);(C:supportandinfluencebothmore centers)-(C:Highsupport+lowinfluence) 3 TheRajivGandhiNationalDrinkingWaterMis- toward neutral, as these have no authority over funds) sion 22 Sanitaryproductsuppliers(C:supportandinfluence (A:Support+highinfluence) 11 Districtheadsofongoingwatersupplyprojectsof more toward neutral) Jalswaraj/KfW/Mahajal-(A:Support+influence) State level 23 LocalMasons-(C:supportandinfluencemore 4 StateMinisterforDrinkingWaterSupplyand 12 MPsandMLAs-(A:Support+influence) toward neutral) Sanitation Block level donorS (A:Support+highinfluence) 13 JanpadPanchayat-(A:Support+influence) 24 WorldBank(JalswarajProgram)-(A:Support+high 5 StateWaterandSanitationMission(headedby 14 Blockdevelopmentofficer-(C:supportandinfluence influence) ChiefSecretaryofState)(A:Abilitytoinfluence high but neutral interest) both more neutral) 25 WSP-(A:Support+highinfluence) 6 WaterSupplyandSanitationDepartment 15 Officials of various government 26 UNICEF-(A:Support+highinfluence) (WSSD)* departments/agencieslikeeducation,health,and A:Support+highinfluence) womenandchilddevelopment-(C:supportand civil SociETy influence more neutral) District level 27 NGOs(capacitybuilding/KRC) 7 Zilla Panchayat village level (C:Highsupport+lowinfluence) (A:Support+highinfluence;influencecouldbe 16 GramPanchayat(GP):Sarpanchandelectedward 28 Consultants**(askeyresourcecenters) varied depending on the individual capacity of members-(A:Support+influence) (C:Highsupport+lowinfluence) the Sarpanch) 17 VWSCmembers-(A:Support+influence) 29 Media-(C:Significantsupport+influence) 8 DistrictWaterandSanitationManagement Committee(DWSMC) 18 SchoolManagementCommittee/PTA 30 Villageresidents-(C:neutralorsupportivewithlow (A:Support+highinfluence) (C:support and influence more neutral) influence) Notes: * In other states the nodal agency could be the Rural Development Department, The Panchayat Raj Department, or the Public Health Engineering Department. ** Technical consultants could go under the private sector category as profit-making stakeholders. Source: Colin et al. 2009. www.wsp.org 31 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field In Senegal, in contrast to the Maharashtra case, political incentives for supporting sanitation investment were low. figurE 3.8 ElEcTion PoSTEr in SEnEgAl'S locAl ElEcTionS 2009 While the political leadership with broad popular support for President Wade's Sopi (change) coalition decided to make infrastructure including sanitation one of the government's priorities, after the 2000 elections priorities seemed to be shifting with the government's decreasing popularity. Politi- cians notably emphasized other sectors in the local elections of 2009 (which took place during the fieldwork for the case study). The challenge of improving Dakar's strained road net- work was clearly believed to be the number one vote winner by President Wade's Sopi coalition (see figure 3.9). In Indonesia, in a context of low political prioritization of sanitation, progress has been made at the city level to create political incentives for support to sanitation. The ISSDP started a process of bringing together six cities to show and discuss what each had done and achieved. This process took on a dynamic of its own, and there is increasing friendly competition among the cities to perform well against each other. In one case, a mayor was embarrassed at the low level of achievement compared to the others, so he immediately instructed his local administration to address the issues. In some cities, sanitation is becoming a political electoral issue, with potential positive impacts on accountability-driven in- vestment. In Payakumbuh, for instance, the mayor is known as the "sanitation mayor" and sanitation investment has been Source: Photograph by authors. a campaign issue. 3.3 Sector process lopmental goals, the Sant Gadge Baba scheme incentivizes The sector process in this context refers to the dynamic and collective outcomes (an end to open defecation) rather than ongoing process of negotiation, bargaining, and identification household inputs (toilet construction). It does this not only of political economy risks and opportunities by government through financial rewards but through public and peer recog- and development agency stakeholders. nition of the achievement. The state government prioritizes other development assistance support to villages that attain civil society participation and citizen oversight Open Defecation Free status, as an additional reward. This The study examined the extent to which the promotion and is a "soft" approach, and benefits are not explicitly withheld use of civil society participation as an element of the sanita- from those that do not achieve Open Defecation Free status. tion sector strategy are key factors in accelerating progress. In Significantly, while officers and communities were incentiv- Maharashtra it is clear that social investment in civil society ized toward a common goal of ending open defecation, they participation (meaning, in this case, community participa- were given considerable latitude in how they achieved it. tion rather than NGO participation) has been essential to the success of the government's demand-driven strategy for The Brazil case study showed how the unique strength of the sanitation investment in the state. Among its other deve- political group behind Bahia Azul allowed it to ignore the 32 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field need to engage with municipal governments, civil society, that did not challenge powerful political economic interests and statutory citizen oversight institutions, and its political or was built into a well-designed decision-making process, it orientation influenced an approach to working with com- could be an effective tool for unblocking or revising policy munities that privileged top-down, short-term mobilization decisions and budget allocations. over sustained participation. While it enabled the program to scale up rapidly, it did not maintain and support the social In Indonesia, despite the country context that has limited capital created by the program at neighborhood level, which sanitation investment, decision makers within national gov- consequently may have exacerbated the challenges of system ernment were increasingly using and acting upon evidence operation and maintenance. The process also failed to seize regarding the impacts of low levels of urban sanitation opportunities to take advantage of community cohesion by investment, and particularly the economic impacts. While linking these investments with other programs for health evidence regarding the links between poor sanitation and and urban upgrading. poor health outcomes was not particularly powerful or dis- cussed much at the national level, economic evidence has In Senegal, the Millennium Water and Sanitation Programme played a greater role. A comparative study on the economic (PEPAM, Programme d'Eau Potable et d'Assainissement du impacts of sanitation in four Southeast Asian countries was Millénaire)--a framework for unified intervention in the consistently mentioned by stakeholders within government sector that aims to attract investments to reach the MDG-- and among lenders and donors as a key document in galvaniz- provides the platform for civil society and private sector ing government interest. This puts a figure on the economic participation in the sector's monitoring. PEPAM's annual losses caused to Indonesia due to poor sanitation, and in a review is usually well attended by government representa- country that is striving to maintain its regional status as an tives, donors, private sector actors, and civil society and economic leader, had a significant impact on government provides information to all stakeholders on how the water interest in sanitation.14 In December 2009, the National and sanitation sector develops. It is, however, criticized by Sanitation Conference was opened by the Indonesian vice some as having a backward-looking nature that prevents it president, who quoted extensively from this study, demon- from taking a more active role in shaping the sector's future strating increased high-level awareness of sanitation issues development. and political prioritization of the sector. In 2010 the national budget allocation for sanitation to local governments has The research confirmed the need for different approaches been announced as equal to the water allocation. Although to social investment between rural and urban communities. the overall water and sanitation budget has been reduced, the The operational approach in Maharashtra, for example, was sanitation portion has increased to Rs 376 billion (US$40 very effective for smaller, cohesive rural communities--the million) representing a fourfold increase over 2009. Such focus of this research--but has had less impact (so far) in an increase is unprecedented and confirms the increased larger, peri-urban areas. understanding among decision makers of the seriousness of underinvestment in sanitation. However, while these are evidence-based policy making in sanitation significant improvements in investment levels compared to The research also looked at whether governments listen to the past, this is still just 2 percent of the amount needed to evidence linking sanitation to development outcomes. It fund the sanitation road map outlined by the government. confirmed the observation that purely evidence-based policy making is unrealistic and naive. But it also revealed that when The Senegal case study has shown that donor support in the evidence generated assisted policy deliberations in a way providing evidence is particularly efficient if it is embed- 14 Comparisons with neighbours within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in terms of sanitation coverage and the MDGs have also had a significant impact on interest in increasing sanitation investment. A WSP/USAID conference was organized in the Philippines in 2006­7. Attended by national government stakeholders, there was a perception that if the Philippines could do something, then so could Indonesia, which contributed to the start of the 2007 national summit on sanitation. www.wsp.org 33 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field ded in a wider process for the sector's development. The critical role of accountability relations but did not promote wide-ranging institutional reform of the water and sanita- off-the-shelf, pre-determined approaches to strengthening tion sector in the mid-1990s was facilitated by the World accountability. Instead, they followed a learning-by-doing Bank through a range of carefully prepared and organized approach that was sensitive to different contexts for ac- workshops and informal meetings. Analyses on privatization countability. models and financing issues provided the basis for the design of the contracts and institutional arrangements, such as the Within India, for example, rural sanitation investment is separation of the water and sanitation sectors from each characterized by small-scale private household investment other. Including the sanitation sector in the responsibilities and therefore is outside of the citizen-and-service-provider of the private operator was seen as too burdensome, given model--also known as the "short route of accountability" the sector's poor state (Brocklehurst and Janssens 2004). (World Bank 2004). Hence, in the case of Maharashtra, Similarly, donor-supported analysis informed the design of the government created and strengthened demand outside the performance contract between the ONAS and the Gov- the governance framework of the "rights claimers and duty ernment of Senegal in 2008 (ONAS/Banque Européenne bearers" model of public service provision.15 Instead, the d'Investissement 2008). emphasis encourages private investment and private behavior change. In this way government accountability shifts from The national government in India reflected carefully on the delivery to outcomes. This has been achieved by having failure of the supply-driven Central Rural Sanitation Pro- the state focus on creating a demand-driven approach to gram and has devised a program that combines elements of sanitation investment, facilitated by the state using a mix of incentives and rewards to generate demand for sanitation consciousness raising, subsidies, collective financial rewards, investment. This has shifted the levers of power and influence "soft" conditionality, and enforcement. downward to local government bodies. In Indonesia--the least promising context for accountabil- In Brazil, a well-documented research piece on the health ity relations in sanitation investment--the political culture benefits of the Bahia Azul investment program (ultimately has discouraged demand-driven accountability hat would made available in the Lancet, see Barreto et al. 2007) found involve a stronger voice and greater advocacy from civil so- itself caught between two political administrations. The ciety. Some key informants working in the media suggested timing of the launch was unfortunate in that the incoming that advocacy is generally difficult and that the government political administration was not keen to give credit to the generally doesn't want to listen to opinions from the media investments of the previous administration. and civil society. So far, in the reformasi era, only the Agency for National Development Planning (Bappenas) and the relationship between accountability and sanitation Ministry of Women Empowerment were seen as being open investment to activists and academics. However, this needs to be put into The relationship between accountability and sanitation in- the context of extremely low demand (as outlined earlier) vestment was also explored through the case studies. Good and low awareness within civil society and the media itself "accountability relations" emerged as vital to securing the of sanitation issues. delivery of and accessibility to sanitation investments. They were important both as triggers of change and as a means of In Brazil, the emerging regulatory framework for the sector monitoring change. The research revealed a wide range of emphasizes the role of conselhos (oversight committees) or types of accountability relationship. On the whole, donors other types of institutionalized participatory mechanisms supporting sanitation sector investment recognized the with consultation/oversight roles and guaranteed service- 15 This is the approach that characterizes, for example, the World Bank's social accountability model of governance. 34 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field user participation. Despite the considerable potential of bureaucratic action. This translation was achieved largely these structures to enhance accountability, disputes remain through dynamic and committed political and bureaucratic over the appropriate balance between this kind of participa- leaders, many of whom had worked their way up from the tory regulation and the more technical approach favored by grassroots. Political leaders and departmental officials led the the arms-length regulatory bodies that are being set up by process, but they worked effectively with nongovernmental several state governments. The issue is further complicated partners toward a shared vision. This process was supported by the challenge of determining the correct representatives in a low-key but effective way by WSP. In Senegal, sector for participation. coalitions from the Ministry of Water, Ministry of Finance, the World Bank, and WSP played a crucial role in pushing While Senegal's urban water supply sector has been regulated through a successful organization and implementation of the by innovative contracts since the mid-1990s, the sanitation WSS reform process. Well-connected Bank staff members sector has recently followed this example by entering a per- based in Senegal were able to identify committed counter- formance contract between the ONAS and the Government. parts and engage with them on a continuous basis (through By contractually protecting sector investments in operations, formal and informal meetings) to prepare decision making this arrangement strengthens accountability between state and government support. In Indonesia, the ISSDP employed institutions and leaves fewer opportunities for adverse politi- someone able to facilitate and negotiate who was trusted cal economy influences. by different government stakeholders and understood their relationships with each other. This helped build and streng- Sector coalitions then partnerships and relationships between key government Finally, the research confirmed the importance in a wide ran- stakeholders in the urban sanitation sector. ge of contexts of sector coalitions in securing a high priority for sanitation investments. Sector coalitions are built within Evidence from all of the case studies has also shown the government and between government and nongovernmental importance of local champions and community leaders. actors. Sensitive lender and donor support can add value to Influential community members--once convinced of the the coalition-building process. Coalitions anchored all ele- benefits of better sanitation provision--become credible ments of the sector process discussed above, drawing on the advocates for sanitation services with their neighbors, rela- evidence base for pro-poor sanitation investment, encoura- tives, and friends. Local or state political leaders at the nexus ging civil society participation, and developing accountability of constituencies, providers, and policy makers played a key relationships to ensure investment and delivery. role in shaping the debates in Brazil. In Indonesia a few city mayors are increasingly committed to sanitation, increasing The common characteristics of sector coalitions across the local sanitation budgets, and contributing to increased pres- cases studies included a capability to translate a general vision sure being brought to bear upon the national government. into concrete steps: "they knew where they wanted to go," as one key informant in Senegal put it. Sector coalitions were 3.4 interplay of political and economic factors on often motivated by empathy with citizens or by a concern sanitation outcomes with distributive equity. They were able to stand outside the With its focus on pro-poor sanitation investment, the re- political economy of the sector while understanding and search looked for evidence of the impact of political economy manage the political economy risks and opportunities. They factors on distributional outcomes in access to sanitation. The had credibility and had earned respect from all stakeholders interplay of political and economic factors played a major involved in the process. role in influencing pro-poor investment. The emergence of political incentives--in the shape of career advancement or A striking feature of sanitation investment in Maharashtra electoral support--for extending coverage to the poor were has been its success in translating political commitment into apparent in the cases of Brazil and India. www.wsp.org 35 The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field There was evidence from all the case studies that decentral- not go to households without them, illustrates the progressive ized governance of sanitation investment can create stronger impact of this trend. incentives for, and accountability in, pro-poor investment. Household subsidies, targeted for sanitation investment in In recent decades in Brazil, millions of poor households below-poverty-level households, have been successful in have been connected to public sewerage networks through Maharashtra, but crucially only as a minor element of a the expansion of conventional services and the introduction community-based reward approach to incentivizing invest- of innovative alternatives, such as the condominial system. ment. Similar evidence emerged from Senegal, where the The Bahia Azul program, implemented by the Bahia state work of CBOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) was utility EMBASA in the Salvador Metropolitan Region in instrumental in creating demand. The experience with onsite northeastern Brazil between 1995 and 2007, was quick sanitation in Dakar also showed, however, that the poorest to adopt the condominial approach to providing sewerage households are unlikely to be able to move up the sanitation services to low-income neighborhoods, making significant ladder, despite the subsidies. investments in social mobilization work alongside construc- tion. In Bahia Azul as elsewhere, the technological shift to In contexts of sustained resistance to pro-poor sanitation as condominial systems has made the service more affordable a policy priority, an instrumental case for investment can be and more appropriate to the geography and social organiza- built, as illustrated by recent developments in policy debates tion of low-income communities. in Indonesia. Technological and social solutions to the chal- The inclusion of water supply and sanitation as a priority lenge of pro-poor investment are illustrated well in Brazil, sector in the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) in 2007, where a progressive administration has provided the funds backed by the allocation of R$40 billion (US$20 billion) and support for appropriate technology and social mobiliza- from the federal budget (R$8 billion), loans (R$20 billion), tion to extend sanitation investment into low-income urban and local funding (R$12 billion) over four years, signaled a communities. progressive shift in investment, although as discussed above, spending has lagged due to low absorptive capacity and the In the Maharashtra case study, the growing political recogni- absence of a clear policy and legal framework. Overall, with tion and reward for sanitation investment success, discussed a progressive government favoring poorer municipalities, the above, is closely linked to the success of the national and state increase in federal grant funding through the PAC provides campaigns to build demand for sanitation investment and so a political payoff as well as being a pragmatic response to improve distributional outcomes for the rural poor. This has limited local investment capacity. shifted political motivation from a point in the mid-2000s when policy makers in India perceived that a poverty-targeted In Indonesia the lack of interest across all sections of society sanitation program might actually lose them votes, sanitation (from metropolitan elites to the urban poor) in the notion not being a priority or a felt need among rural communities. of sanitation as a public good has hindered pro-poor or The design of sector investment, with community-level "clean indeed any significant investment. Encouragingly, this is village" awards backed by targeted subsidies for below-poverty- increasingly being challenged through, among other things, line households, has extended investment to poorer households a strong economic case for investment. With increasing within villages striving for clean-village status. This was a key evidence of improved economic and health outcomes from shift in approach away from the failed supply-driven subsidy extended sanitation coverage (or equally, the negative eco- format of the Central Rural Sanitation Program. The social nomic outcomes of poor sanitation), the political incentives stigma attached to households without pit latrines, illustrated for investment in sanitation are now increasing, including by the increasingly widespread expectation that brides should for low-income communities. 36 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation diagnostic findings from the field In Dakar, access to sanitation facilities was traditionally pro- vided for those living in the areas covered (and connected) to the sewerage network. The PAQPUD for the first time brings onsite sanitation facilities and to a lesser extent con- dominial systems for the poor peri-urban areas of Dakar. The program offers technologically appropriate sanitation solutions, and households can chose from a range of differ- ent options in different price categories--although some of these solutions are not categorized as "improved" sanitation under the MDGs. The subsidies are a one-off investment subsidy and are not intended to cover either consumption or maintenance costs. Moreover, there is awareness within local communities that there is a clear difference between the willingness and the ability to pay for sanitation provi- sion. As one community leader in a semi-urban community in Dakar summarized: "Some of our neighbors don't have enough money for regular meals. How should they afford the expense of a latrine?" Some communities have responded to this problem by setting up a fund at community level (for example, the fund in Diamaguene led by UN HABITAT) to cover the contribution for those who cannot afford to pay for sanitation and encourage support from micro-finance institutions (for example, in Ngor). www.wsp.org 37 IV. Operational implications With these diagnostic research findings in mind we can draw Recognizing windows of opportunity for investment requires, a number of significant operational lessons to help lender at a minimum, long-term engagement and development and donor task teams to translate political economy analysis partner flexibility. This type of flexibility was demonstrated in (presented in section 3) into actions supporting pro-poor Senegal, for example, where the World Bank was also able to sanitation investment. Several interlinked elements have bring a loan forward in order to avoid losing an opportunity. contributed to the success of the sector process in the case Beyond this, the case studies have shown that where lenders study countries. We discuss the operational significance of and donors have understood the political economy and res- these below, drawing on elements of the Action Framework ponded appropriately, they have increased the acceptability introduced earlier. of funding mechanisms and eased negotiations. The case studies confirm and illustrate that effective ma- Furthermore, careful and strategic sequencing of operations nagement of sanitation investment processes integrates can encourage reforms that increase the overall impact of in- understanding and evidence with support for behavioral vestments in later phases. In Brazil, the conditions laid down and institutional change. This means combining a better for access to the relatively modest capital investment com- understanding of the political economy risks and opportu- ponent of the Water Sector Modernization Project (PMSS) provided sufficient incentive for institutional upgrading by nities in the sanitation sector with evidence marshaled on the Bahia state utility (EMBASA), which was then able to the economic, social, and political impacts of investment leverage much larger volumes of investment resources due to choices in order to support processes that promote greater its enhanced credibility and increased absorptive capacity. accountability, partnership, and communication. Tailoring support based on an understanding of political 4.1 Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and economy also means being more responsive to local policy operations and investment processes. The first step is usually to align and Political economy analysis can support Task Team Leaders and sequence operations and support with national planning and practitioners to identify and manage the political economy policy cycles. In Indonesia, for example, a 2009 government risks and opportunities for pro-poor sanitation investment. agreement that the lender-supported City Sanitation Strategy Task Team Leaders, who lead on investment dialogue, often approach could be replicated and scaled-up fitted with the recognize this and generally have a keen sense of political eco- next five-year planning cycle. Sequencing different inter- nomy that can support decision making on timing, tailoring, ventions over different time scales (for example, awareness and location. Some Task Team Leaders struggle to deal with raising and improving local planning capacity) has been a political risks, being more comfortable in a bounded technical necessary first step before making local investments for phy- relationship with a familiar ministry, department, or agency sical infrastructure in order to ensure they are appropriate, within government. Box 2.1 provides sample questions for a effective, and efficient. political economy analysis of sanitation investments based on the study's Diagnostic Framework and the research strategy Tailoring of support can also benefit from a better unders- developed and utilized for this study. tanding of the incentives and interests of stakeholders. One 38 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation operational implications consistent theme in the case studies was the importance of necessary to make a case for pro-poor sanitation investment recognizing and supporting progressive leaders or champions and to support policy makers in identifying what types of to succeed and scale up their impact. Stakeholder mapping, investment will have the biggest pro-poor impact. Moreover, of the type illustrated in this research project, can help Task evidence can be used strategically by donors and international Team Leaders identify champions, who may well be indivi- organizations to facilitate the dialogue and process in favor duals or organizations that the World Bank does not normally of more pro-poor investments and service delivery. do business with--for example, a Ministry of Health official rather than a Ministry of Water representative. In this way, Donors and international institutions in close collaboration stakeholder analysis can be a useful tool for seeking out with local entities are well placed to identify appropriate champions among a wider range of stakeholders. evidence for policy makers and tend to have a comparative advantage in providing rigorous analysis to inform reform and These commitments and the championing of sanitation sector choices. In Senegal, donors have successfully funded investment can be bolstered by political incentives, as is studies--for example, the tariff study by ONAS/Banque particularly evident in the case of Maharashtra. Through Européenne d'Investissement (2008)--using national and sustained engagement, WSP was able to tailor its support to international expertise, to offer policy choices to government this process of political reward for sanitation improvements. stakeholders and contribute to the evidence used during wor- Significantly, this form of political "incentivizing" is now kshops relating to institutional sector reform. A comparative being adopted in other states in India. study on the economic impacts of sanitation was undertaken by WSP-EAP in four Southeast Asian countries, including The case studies confirmed the significance of understanding Indonesia (WSP-EAP 2007, 2008). This was cited by key the location of sanitation investments when designing sani- informants (from both within government and international tation investments. Technical options and social investment lenders and donors) as having been a powerful tool in moti- (in incentives, demand generation, strengthened accoun- vating central government stakeholders into action. tability, and social mobilization) varied widely within and across urban and rural locations in the studies. The success Furthermore, the research has shown how lender and donor in rural Maharashtra of encouraging collective responsibility sector support can use analysis of comparative advantage for low-tech sanitation investment through a careful mixture in global practice to support local policy makers and admi- of rewards and sanctions was based on strong village identity nistrations as they learn lessons from elsewhere and refine and mutual accountability. In Brazil, program design in their operational framework. The kind of support provided Bahia Azul aimed to strengthen local social capital around by WSP in Maharashtra was geared toward lesson learning block-based condominial delivery of appropriate low-tech through exposure to Community-led Total Sanitation sanitation in densely populated communities. In Senegal, (CLTS) and scaling up of good practice. This, rather than onsite sanitation and condominial systems were extended capital investment or strong steering, was exactly what was to Dakar's urban poor, who were previously widely exclu- required from external partners in this context. ded from existing network-based service provision. Donor support for the City Sanitation Strategy in Indonesia has The timing of information flow is important when one seeks encouraged city administrations to base sanitation investment to influence sector dialogue. Even when rigorous analysis decisions on their own assessment of their location. is undertaken, dissemination of key findings can get lost, sidetracked, potentially misused, or captured if the timing is 4.2 Understanding the sector through rigorous wrong. This was the case with the Bahia Azul health impact analysis study, which was launched in the transition period between The case studies confirmed the utility of rigorous analysis of one political administration in Bahia and another. It is poverty and social impacts of sector policy and investment impossible to judge whether sanitation investments would (World Bank 2003). This analysis provides the evidence have achieved even wider traction had the results of this www.wsp.org 39 The Political Economy of Sanitation operational implications study been more widely acknowledged. However, neither contract between the government and the National Sanitation the World Bank nor the state government as a whole reali- Office guarantees state financing if certain performance crite- zed at the outset just how strategic effective communication ria are met. Financing for the sector's operations are therefore could be. Had they been so cognizant, a different timetable protected from potential adverse political influence. (for example, with release of interim findings based on mo- nitoring data) could have been agreed to with the research Moving to a decentralized system of decision making, resour- organization. This might have helped steer the debate on the ce allocation, service delivery, and regulation requires signifi- value of sanitation investments much more clearly toward cant attention. The Brazil case study has demonstrated that health benefits, which is now where the center of gravity of helping to further clarify the roles and responsibilities (or at this debate lies in Brazil, as elsewhere. least the pros and cons of different roles and responsibilities) at the federal, state, and municipal levels and the capacity The process of conducting analysis itself can be instrumental requirements at each level is an important contribution. in democratizing the policy process, building and sustaining consensus over change. This implies that, where possible, Vertical accountability focuses on the relationship between appropriate lenders and donors, in close collaboration with citizens and policy makers and between citizens and ser- local entities, should promote analysis that is conducted with vice providers. Vertical accountability mechanisms can be a broad group of in-country stakeholders to ensure greater strengthened by increasing transparency and information inclusion. They should link this process to strengthened availability, generating demand for sanitation investment public debate and communication. This is discussed further (and therefore for accountability in delivery of sanitation), in section 4.5. and strengthening institutional channels for oversight and redress. In Senegal, the World Bank/WSP partnership has 4.3 realigning accountability supported information campaigns in order to strengthen ac- The research has confirmed that it is vital in managing the countability initiatives from the private sector and from civil political economy of sanitation investment to create the con- society more broadly. The PAQPUD has relied on targeted ditions for strengthened accountability in the delivery of and information campaigns to generate demand for sanitation accessibility to sanitation services. This includes horizontal investments using local CSOs or the private sector. Despite accountability mechanisms in which different branches of these efforts, however, there are still few examples of citizens the state provide checks and balances. It also includes vertical actively demanding better sanitation provision. If upgrades accountability relationships in which citizens advocate for are made they are mainly driven by waste collection or ra- change or provide an oversight function of government or inwater drainage efforts rather than sanitation in the narrow service providers. Finally, it includes realigning accountability sense of the definition. by combining horizontal and vertical accountability to allow, for instance, top-down changes to be complemented by a In urban Indonesia and in rural India, traditional top-down, more systematic attempt to engage with grassroots collective supply-driven approaches to sanitation investments have association and mobilization for institutional change. often been unsuccessful or unsustainable. Additional social investments in bottom-up processes have helped to increase The research has illustrated the value of supporting accoun- accountability and the sustainability of investments even tability mechanisms as a means of managing the risks from when there is low initial demand. The City Sanitation Stra- political economy interests and influence. In Indonesia, tegy approach in Indonesia recognizes the difference between increasing clarity over institutional roles and responsibilities perceived demands, which often form the basis of top-down could help increase accountability between citizens and the approaches, and actual demands. state. In Senegal, the carefully designed contracts in the water and sanitation sector provided the right incentives and Perhaps the most significant lesson learned from the research strengthened accountability. A recently signed performance is the importance of maintaining a flexible approach to 40 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation operational implications strengthening accountability rather than going for a one-size- The case studies in this report illustrate well the instrumental fits-all approach. In the case of Maharashtra, for example, the value of partnerships for pro-poor sanitation investment. The government has encouraged a different type of relationship Maharashtra sanitation program, for example, is strongly in which the emphasis is on encouraging private investment government led. Nevertheless, technical and policy support and behavior change at household and community level. In from WSP has been strategically important. This support has this way government accountability shifts from delivery to helped to expose government officials and community leaders outcomes. This has been achieved by having the focus on to new ideas in order to improve program effectiveness. In Se- creating a demand-driven approach to sanitation investment, negal, long-term ongoing engagement has built trust among facilitated by the state using a mix of consciousness-raising key stakeholders and placed donors in a position where they efforts, subsidies, collective financial rewards, "soft" condi- can play the role of a facilitator of reform. Well-connected tionality, and enforcement. national donor staff can play a crucial role in understanding the government's position and negotiating with the main New forms of social oversight have been promoted by the stakeholders--both supporters and opponents of reform. current left-wing government in Brazil. The challenge is to Carefully organized and facilitated workshops combined with find ways to link the contributions these various stakeholders informal encounters have provided a vehicle for presenting have made toward effective regulatory mechanisms. The evidence on policy choices, managing potential resistance to government can help to inform and seek support from the reform, and allowing for continuous engagement. public about sensitive issues like tariff setting. Social oversight bodies provide a platform for discussions around the costs In Brazil, the World Bank is a potential convener or broker of providing the service in relation to the price and how this of unlikely marriages of convenience between seemingly links to further investments in upgrading and expanding the disconnected technical, political, and financial interests. system. Social oversight bodies, however, are not expected to make technical decisions about water quality and technical Historically the Bank could have done more to broker these standards, which is more clearly under the purview of the relationships, and admittedly it is not perceived to be neutral. regulatory body. Finding ways to ensure clarity around the The perception of being aligned with a political grouping may roles and responsibilities of these two mechanisms will remain have reduced the Bank's ability to leverage continuity bet- critical in the Brazilian context. ween programs created by different political administrations. That said, the Bank does bring institutional sector memory 4.4 Partnership strategy to the table and must remain supportive of the exploration The research has confirmed that effective management of of various options to enhance service delivery. In Indonesia, political economy in the sanitation sector requires a partner- continued strong long-term support and collaboration with ship strategy based on sustained, flexible engagement with the government on planning and policy issues, with the strategic external support. This strategy can also take Task Bank and government viewed as partners, is beginning to Team Leaders and practitioners outside their comfort zone show results. This approach has strengthened the capacity of engagement with technical ministries to include central and willingness of government (central and local) to scale up ministry partnerships. Ministries of Finance, in particular, sanitation planning, while ensuring high levels of national are usually far more influential than any sector ministry in ownership of the process. shaping public investment. Bank Task Team Leaders usually have good relationships in-country within their respective 4.5 Public debate and communication sectors, but the overall country dialogue takes place between Broad participation in sanitation dialogue prevents the de- the Country Management Unit and the Ministry of Finance. bate from being captured by powerful interest groups and at For this reason, Country Management Unit support is crucial the same time builds and sustains commitment to pro-poor to any attempt at placing sanitation firmly on a Bank country sanitation investment. To encourage this dialogue, develo- program, the starting point from which decisions on tasks pment partners are encouraged to support policy makers and budgets all flow. and bureaucrats in their efforts to secure and sustain public www.wsp.org 41 The Political Economy of Sanitation operational implications support for institutional change. The state government and district administrations in Maharashtra have sought to ensure that the sanitation program is well known across the state, and to this end have made extensive use of local mass media, with awards reported widely and given a high profile. This has been critical to the program's success and is reflected in the program budget allocation for communication. Investment in communication is crucial to generating "effec- tive demand" (linked to advocacy) for sanitation within low- income communities. Such engagement can enhance both program quality during implementation and sustainability by securing broader buy-in to program aims. In Senegal, using popular topics (water supply, drainage) can provide the platform for discussions around improving sanitation provi- sion with local communities, consumers, and champions of change within the communities. (For example, wastewater and drainage are a problem for many Senegalese communities during the rainy season) In Brazil, the World Bank achieved a strong partnership with the incumbent right-wing political grouping in Bahia. However, the Bank could have made more effort to demonstrate to the government's critics on the left that it was using its leverage with this grouping to push it toward greater openness to public debate and engagement with civil society. This would in turn have strengthened the Bank's credibility with future administrations from the left wing. Although the media in Indonesia are generally no more aware of sanitation issues than the general public and coverage is limited, there is potential to develop partnerships that enable sanitation messages to be conveyed effectively. The Indone- sian Sanitation Sector Development Program (ISSDP) has recognized this potential in the design of its second phase, which will have components on advocacy, campaigning, communications, and promotion. 42 Global Practice Team of Sanitation V. Conclusions This report synthesizes analysis from four country case stu- for investment in sanitation are increasing, including such dies. In each case study the authors retrospectively applied investment for low-income communities. There was also political economy analysis to a sanitation sector investment evidence, that technological and social solutions can help process. Overall, the study confirms the importance of asses- address the challenge of pro-poor investment--for instance, sing stakeholder interests, winners and losers, and incentives. through a progressive administration that provides the funds It also confirms the importance of examining the activities and support for appropriate technology and social mobiliza- of formal and informal institutions (including norms and tion to extend sanitation investment into low-income urban behavior) while engaging in parallel dialogues and processes communities. Investment design that included community- to develop technically feasible and politically acceptable sa- level "clean village" awards, backed by targeted subsidies at nitation measures. When such an analysis and dialogue are below-poverty-line households, have been successful in some done well, by development practitioners in partner countries cases. The work of CBOs and CSOs was instrumental in or development organizations, it provides the empirical evi- creating demand in other cases. Table 5.1 summarizes the dence for and the rationales behind the following: added value of insights from political economy analysis in support of the Action Framework introduced in this report. · whysanitationinvestmentsandserviceprovisionare Good practice in aligning lender and donor support with not given adequate priority in lending and nonlending in-country policy and planning cycles can be enhanced by an work, and in-depth understanding--and effective management--of the · whensanitationinvestmentsinsucheffortsareunder- political economy dynamics underpinning the policy process. taken, why they are not strategically targeted toward Management in this context does not imply assuming greater increasing access to sanitation for the poor. control but means strategically supporting progressive pro- cesses and actors. This type of engagement can be enhanced The study found that the interplay of political and economic through the timing and tailoring of sanitation interventions. factors played a major role in influencing pro-poor inves- The introduction of evidence supports the case for pro-poor tment. The emergence of political incentives--in the shape sanitation investment, with lenders and donors well placed of career advancement or electoral support--for extending to help coordinate this flow of evidence. coverage to the poor was apparent in some case studies. There was also evidence that decentralized governance of Lender and donor attention to the institutional arrangements sanitation investment can create stronger incentives for, and for sanitation investment has been crucial in strengthening accountability in, pro-poor investment. accountability in the delivery of sanitation services. Politi- cal economy analysis can help lenders and donors support The study also showed that an instrumental case for sani- emerging systems of incentives and sanctions--including tation investment can be built in contexts where pro-poor regulatory mechanisms backed by greater civil society sanitation faces resistance as a policy priority. With increasing oversight--that fit the sanitation country context. Lenders evidence of improved economic and health outcomes of and donors clearly emphasize partnership in their support extended sanitation coverage (or equally, the negative eco- for sanitation investment: by focusing on processes, political nomic outcomes of poor sanitation), the political incentives economy analysis reinforces the importance of sustained and www.wsp.org 43 The Political Economy of Sanitation conclusions flexible partnership arrangements. Political economy analysis Political economy analysis is not a separate or competing further highlights the significance of going beyond partner- approach to economic, social, or financial analysis. It is simply ship to get the broader policy process right. This involves a supporting tool for designing and implementing sanitation supporting communication and public policy debate toward interventions. Political economy analysis cannot instruct Task securing and sustaining investments. This is not just about Team Leaders in what to invest, but it can help them, with the principle of democratizing policy discussion but about in-country partners, to navigate a process toward pro-poor overcoming organizational resistance or capture by seeing investment and service delivery in sanitation, while defining communication as an opportunity rather than a risk. realistic limits on what can be done in any given context. TABlE 5.1 AddEd vAluE from PoliTicAl Economy AnAlySiS in SuPPorT of Pro-Poor SAniTATion invESTmEnT action Donor support for pro-poor added value insights from political sanitation investment economy analysis Optimize timing, · Ensurethatsupportto · Managethepoliticaleconomyrisksandopportunitiestoincreaseimpacton tailoring, and sanitation investment is pro-poor sanitation investment. location of aligned with existing policy · Ensurecarefulandstrategicsequencingofoperationstoincreasetheoverall investment and and planning cycles. impact of investments in later phases. operations · Recognizewindowsof · Lobbythroughpoliticaleconomyinsightsforsanitationinvestmentsthatare opportunity for reform. effective in different locations. · Recognizeandsupportgovernmentcommitmentandlocalleadershiptohelp partners succeed and scale up their impact. · Identifyopportunitiestosupportinvestmentthroughpoliticalincentivizing. Understand the · Useavailableevidenceand/ · Lenders/donorsarewellplacedtoidentifyappropriateevidencefordifferent sector through or commission research to stakeholders and tend to have a comparative advantage in providing rigorous rigorous analysis inform program design. analysis to inform reform and sector choices. · Thetimingofinformationflowisimportant.Evenwhenrigorousanalysisis undertaken dissemination of key findings can get lost, sidetracked, or potentially misused or captured if the timing is wrong (for example, at the start of a new political administration). · Useanalysisofcomparativeadvantageinglobalpracticetosupportlocalpolicy makers and administrations to learn lessons from elsewhere and refine their operational framework. Realign accoun- · Supportstrengthened · Supportstrengthenedaccountabilitythroughcarefuldesignofcontractsand tability technical systems and specification of roles and responsibilities. information flows. · Supportinitiativestobuilddemandandstrengthenverticalaccountability. · Supportdecentralizationand · Beflexible:Adaptandsupportmodelsofverticalaccountabilityandapplyto clarification of technical roles thecountrycontext.Thesectorprocessmaynotbecharacterizedbythekinds and responsibilities. ofverticalaccountabilityrelationscentraltomuchlender/donorthinking.This means that support for accountability must be tailored to the country context. · Realignaccountabilitybycombininghorizontalaccountabilitywithvertical accountability to allow, for instance top-down changes to be complemented by a more systematic attempt to engage with grassroots collective association and mobilization for institutional change. Partner · Ensureminimumeffective · Ensurethatthepartnershipstrategyisbasedonsustained,flexibleengagement strategically engagement with key central with strategic external support. and sector ministries. Support public · Supportinformation · Gettheprocessofpoliticaleconomyanalysisright:Ensurewhereappropriate debate and campaigns from one to many that analysis is conducted with a broad group of stakeholders to ensure communication (policy makers to public). greater inclusion, and link this process to strengthened public debate and communication. · Supportwidetwo-waycommunicationtodemocratizedebate,preventcapture and secure and sustain public support for institutional change. 44 Global Practice Team of Sanitation Source: Authors' analysis. The Political Economy of Sanitation references references Barreto, M., et al. (2007). Effect of city-wide sanitation Kolsky, P., E. Perez, W. Vandersypen, and L. O. Jensen programme on reduction in rate of childhood diarrhea in (2005). 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Jakarta, Indonesia. 46 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology annex a - methodology a.1 research hypotheses and questions The desk review informed the research strategy in two ways: subsequently explored further through the fieldwork.16 Ta- it confirmed the usefulness of the conceptual framework as ble A.1 provides an overview of these issues following the guiding the methodology for this research, and it generated analytical distinctions among country context, sector arena, a set of issues for individual country case studies that were and sector process introduced in section 2. TABlE A.1 iSSuES EmErging from ThE dESk rEviEw country context Sector arena Sector process · Therelationshipbetweenpublic · Thedegreeofclarityofstakehold- · Theongoingnatureandextentof opinion regarding the importance er responsibilities for sanitation public debate and space for civil of sanitation provision and the policy at the federal level society participation in sanitation demand for better services · Thesignificanceofdecentraliza- decision making · Thesignificanceofcontextual tion and the relationship between · Therelationshipbetweenpartici- perceptions regarding whether institutions at the federal and patoryplanning/budgetingand sanitation is a public or private regional levels sanitation investment (household) responsibility · Thesignificanceofsubsidiesto · Thesectorprocessesunderpin- · Theimplicationsofstigmaat- provide incentives for pro-poor ning technology choices in sanita- tached to sanitation sanitation provision tion investment · Thecontextualimportanceof · Thenatureandimpactofpublic- · Theongoingandchanginginflu- sanitation compared to other private partnership institutional ence of international donors and infrastructure investments, includ- arrangements for sanitation provi- organizations on sanitation invest- ing water sion ment · Thevisibilityofsanitationinthe · Thedegreeofinstitutionalized · Therisksandopportunitiesasso- political discourse civil society involvement in service ciated with champions of change · Theimpactofthehistorical(in- provision and opponents cluding colonial) legacy · Theroleandimpactofregulation · Theroleofkeyeventsandturning · Theimpactofurbanizationon andqualitycontrol points sanitation sector challenges · Theimpactonsanitationsector · Theequityimplicationsofongoing · Thedegreetowhichthereisa investment priorities of institutional debates over cost recovery in the national vision and strategy for commitments to cost recovery sanitation sector sanitation · Thestrengthofthelinkbetween sanitation visions and pro-poor policies 16 This annex draws heavily on the research strategy (OPM 2009a) but does not repeat information provided elsewhere in the Synthesis Report. www.wsp.org 47 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology A set of research questions (presented in table A.2) has been theses. Under each framework area the country teams have developed to guide the country case study teams in testing identified a set of risks and opportunities for effective poli- and analyzing country-specific hypotheses. These questions tical economy management of sanitation sector investment emerged out of the desk study, from the study terms of refe- processes. The sets of country case-study-specific hypotheses rence, and from discussions with the World Bank team and were developed before going into the field, through detailed (national and international) consultants. This table represents conversations with World Bank/WSP staff in India (the a menu of questions from which individual country teams pilot country for this fieldwork), Brazil, Indonesia, and have selected a set to develop their country-specific hypo- Senegal. TABlE A.2 rESEArch hyPoThESES And quESTionS Overall · Whyaresanitationinvestmentsandserviceprovisionnotgivenadequatepriorityinlendingandnonlendingwork? research · Andwhensucheffortsareundertaken,whyaretheynotstrategicallytargetedtowardincreasingaccessto Questions sanitation for the poor? framework focus country context hypotheses · Theculturalandhistoricalcontextisasignificantdeterminantofsanitationinvestment(countryhypothesesneedto specify a key determinant). · Publicpolicydebatesonsanitationwithinandoutsidegovernmentareusuallylimitedinscopeanddepth,with negative implications for sanitation investment. · Thereisavisionforsanitation;theagendahasbeendrivenforwardatthenationallevelandisgovernmentowned. · Rapidurbanizationisanimportantdriverofsanitationinvestment. Questions · Whatistheculturalandhistoricalbackgroundtosanitationinvestment?Whatisconsidered"adequate" sanitation?Whatarethesocioculturaldriversfororconstraintstoimprovedsanitation? · Hastherebeenahighlevelofactivityaroundsanitationsectorinvestmentinrecentyears? · Howvisibleissanitationasanissueinpolicydebate/mediacoverage? · What(ifany)aretheelectoralreturnstosanitationinvestment?Wasimprovedsanitationdiscussedduringthe past election campaign? · Whatprioritiesdoesthenationalsanitationstrategysignal?Isitlinkedtothepovertyagenda? · Whoowns/maintainswhichassets(land,wastewatertreatmentplant,network,etc.)?Howarenetworks established and expanded, and what are the processes for connecting new households? · Howdopoorhouseholdsmanageandtreattheirsewage(pitlatrines,septicnetwork,etc.)?Dopoorhouseholds havechoicesregardingdifferentsanitationoptions?Whatincentivesexistforhouseholdstoconnectto sanitation networks (if this option exists)? How are these incentives perceived by households, central government,localgovernment,privatesector,civilsociety,andinternationaldonorsandorganizations?Whatis the balance between "hard" and "soft" investment in sanitation? framework focus Sector arena: institutions hypotheses · Sanitationhasnoinstitutional"home."Thisaddstothecomplexityofsectorplanningandresourceallocation processes and limits institutional accountability for progress. · Nationalpolicyhasonlyalimitedimpactontheplanningandtargetingofnewinvestments,andonservice delivery; cross-sectoral decision making for sanitation investment is more effective at the subnational level. · Increasedsanitationinvestmentsarenothinderedbyfundavailability. · Policymakersconsiderthatitispossibletoachievecostrecoveryinsanitationandthisinfluencestheleveland pattern of sanitation investment. · GovernmentactivelyencouragestheparticipationofNGOsandtheprivatesectorininfrastructuredevelopment andservicedelivery.Bothplayasignificantpartbutthenatureoftherelationship(e.g.,contractdesign)hasa major impact on investment. · National/subnationalinstitutionalrelationsmilitateagainstincreasedinvestmentinsanitation. · Investmentprioritizationisdrivenbytheavailabilityoftechnologyratherthanlocalneed. Continued 48 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology TABlE A.2 rESEArch hyPoThESES And quESTionS conTinuEd Questions Public investment · Whataretheinstitutionalconstraintsto(i)increasingallocationstosanitationinthenationalbudget,(ii)planning sanitation infrastructure, or (iii) constructing and maintaining sanitation infrastructure? · Isthereaneffectiveinstitutionalhomeforsanitationinvestment? · Doallocatedbudgetsnormallyreachtheirintendeddestination?Whatarethepoliticaleconomyinfluences(i.e., decision-makingprocessesbypowerfulstakeholders)ontheflowofbudgetsinthesanitationsector?Arethey captured or diverted and by whom? · Aregovernmentbudgetcommitmentsforsanitationfullyutilizedduringtheyear?Ifthereisanunder-spend,is thisafunctionofpoliticaleconomy(e.g.,rents)?Doesthegovernmentbudgethaveamechanismforfunding projectsthatlastformorethanoneyear?Doesthegovernmentbudgetincludeanexplicitsubsidyforthe recurrentandcapitalcostsofsanitationserviceprovisionandinvestments?Ifso,isthisidentifiedatcentralor local level? · Dogovernmentagenciesresponsibleformanagingtheoperationandmaintenanceofpublicserviceshave separateaccountsforsanitationservices?Ifyes,dotheyclearlydemonstratewhereinvestmentsaremadeand whobenefitsfrominvestments?Andaretheseeverreferredtoinpolicydebateordiscussedinpublic? · Canmunicipalitiesborrowmoney,floatbonds,orraisefundsinotherwaysforsanitationservices?Doonsite sanitationserviceshaveoptionsfordifferentformsoffinance?Arefinancespooledwithregardtopromotion, building, collection, treatment, and disposal (for either sewerage or onsite)? Or do they come from different arms ofthefederal,state,ormunicipalgovernment?Whatkindoffundingisavailablefordifferenttypesofproviders (municipal,state-runcompany,jointventurepublic-private,privatecompany)?Ifmostmunicipalitiesaccessloan funds to build their infrastructure; what are the sources, terms, and conditions? · Howishouseholdfinancingleveraged(viawaterbills,sanitationtax,etc.)? · Iscostrecoverypossiblebutnotintroduced?Whyisthisthecase? Questions Private investment · Towhatextenthastheprivatesector,orcommunities,beenencouragedtoparticipateinsanitationsector investment?Whatarethepoliticaleconomyconstraintsoropportunitiesforprivatesectorparticipation,including concessions, management contracts, or other forms of non-public-sector involvement (e.g., community-run schemes)? · Whatscaleandsizeofprivatesectororcommunityparticipationisinvolvedinsanitationinvestment?How successfullydoesthisfitwithpublicsectorinvestment?Whatarethemotivationsforandoutcomesofprivate sectorparticipation?Arethegovernmentandprivatesectororcommunityresponsibilitiesforsanitationstable? Doesanyuncertaintyoverthisaffectfinancingplans(e.g.,unknownfutureownershipofassetsorextentof continuing subsidization)? · Howareprivatesectororcommunitycontractsawarded--bydirectnegotiationorsomeformofcompetition? Ifthelatter,whatformandwhatwerethecriteria:informal/formal?Whowasresponsiblefortheaward?Have contracts been renegotiated and why? How do the terms of the contract benefit society or profit the private provide/company?Whatarethedifficultiesofoperationfacingthefirmonthepolitical/bureaucraticarenaandon practical/in-the-fieldarena?Istheprocessconsideredafairprocess? · Howarecontracts/licensesawarded,monitored,andrenegotiatedforprivateproviders? Continued www.wsp.org 49 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology TABlE A.2 rESEArch hyPoThESES And quESTionS conTinuEd Questions national--subnational institutional relationships · Inacontextofdecentralizedinvestment,howdotheinstitutionalizedpowerrelationshipsbetweennationaland subnationalgovernmentsaffectthepriorityaffordedtosanitationatregionalandlocallevel?Whatotherservices are managed in similar ways to sanitation (e.g., water, refuse, housing, power)? · Areintergovernmentaltransfers(fromcentraltosubnationalgovernments)allocatedtosanitation,ordothe subnational governments have discretion over how transfers are spent, and thus may not spend funds on sanitation? Can local government raise enough revenues to provide sanitation services? · Incontextsofdecentralizedsanitationdelivery:Whatistheregulatory/legalframeworkandhowdoesthis impact on sanitation investment and outcomes? · Iscross-sectoraldecisionmakingmoreeffectiveatthesubnationallevel?Aresubnationalgovernmentsable topredictrevenue(capitalandinvestmentbudgets)fromnationalgovernment?Ifnot,howdoesthisaffect theirdecisionmakingonsanitation?Aresupplementarybudgetsanimportantpartofpublicfinance?Ifso,do sanitation projects tend to get a higher share of the supplementary budget than the normal annual budget? · Aresubnationalgovernmentsprimarilyaccountableupwardtocentralgovernmentordownwardtothepeople theyserve?Isthereevidenceofsocialaccountabilitybetweensanitationserviceproviders(public,private, communities) and citizens? · Whatcharacteristicsofthepolitical(party)systemaffectincentivesforfederaltransferstostates/municipalities forsanitation?Issanitationpolicyeasiertoimplementwhenlocalandnationalgovernmentsarefromthesame party? framework focus Sector arena: stakeholders hypotheses · Withinthecenterofgovernmentthereiscompetitionoverresources,power,andauthorityassociatedwith sanitation,withnegativeconsequencesforinvestmentlevels. · Regulationofsanitationinvestmentbringspotentialbenefitsintermsoftransparency,accountability,learning, and feedback. · Communitiesandhouseholdsarelessinterestedinsanitationinvestmentthaninotherservicesandareless willing to pay for sanitation services. Questions Sanitation investment · Whichstakeholdershavepowerover(i)decision-makingauthorityaboutaccess,collection,treatment(including typeofsanitationserviceprovision:wet,dry),andinvestment:(i.e.,centralgovernment,localgovernment,private sector, civil society, international donors and organizations); (ii) regulation and licensing; (iii) implementation, investment,andmaintenance;and(iv)pricesetting?Whatarethepowerandinterestcharacteristicsofthese stakeholders in relation to sanitation implementation? · Whichstakeholders(public,private,communities,donors,IFIs,etc.)supportandwhichopposepro-poor sanitationservicesandinvestmentsandwhy?Whataretheperceivedbenefitsofprovidingservicesand investments to non-poor groups? How could this be changed? · Withinthecentreofgovernment,istherecompetitionoverresources,power,andauthorityassociatedwith sanitationbetween(i)lineministriesand(ii)centralandlocalgovernmentlevels?Whataretherecurrentkey pointsofcontention?Whichstakeholdershavewhatkindofstakesinthis?Why?Howcouldtheybesolved? · Howdependentissecuringahigherpriorityforsanitationinvestmentsandservicesonthepresenceof stakeholders who are sector champions? How can support for sanitation improvements be institutionalized? · Whatkindofregulationexists?Whatbenefitsdoesitbring?Whyandhow? Demand for sanitation · Whatmotivatescommunities,households,orothergroupings(e.g.,localbusinesses)tobeinterestedin sanitation investments (e.g., tourism, industry, environmentalism, health)? · Whatevidenceisthereofwillingness/abilitytopayforinformalsanitationservices?Whatfactorsaffect willingness to pay? · Whatarethetrade-offsforhouseholds(e.g.,limitedand/orinsecureincome,difficultieswithlong-term investments of promises, risk of maintenance expenses)? Continued 50 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology TABlE A.2 rESEArch hyPoThESES And quESTionS conTinuEd framework focus Sanitation sector process: Building coalitions for change hypotheses · Civilsocietyparticipationinnationalpolicyframeworksandprocessesisthemosteffectivewayofraisingthe profile of sanitation in central government. · Governmentslistentoevidencelinkingsanitationtodevelopmentoutcomes. · Governmentsfeelpressureforaccountabilityfromcivilsociety/externaladvocacyonsanitation. · Securingahigherpriorityforsanitationinvestmentsandservicesdependsheavilyonthepresenceofsector champions. · Socialinvestmentinlocalprocessesiscriticaltosustainabilityofsanitationinvestment. · Ruralandurbancommunitiesdiffermarkedlyandthisnecessitatesdifferentapproachestocommunity engagement when improving infrastructure and services. · Lendersanddonorsaremajordriversofpro-poorsanitationinvestments. Questions · Dogovernmentsfeelpressureforaccountabilityfromcivilsociety/externaladvocacyonsanitation?Ifcivilsociety does not push for sanitation, is this due to a lack of consciousness among the public about sanitation as a policy issue?Ordoesitreflectacommonperceptionthatsanitationisaprivateratherthanpublicresponsibility?Isthis due to a deficit in participatory governance? · Dodifferentcentralandlocalgovernmentministriescollaborateonsanitationprovision(e.g.,MinistryofFinance talkstoMinistryofHealthtalkstoMinistryofWater)?Whichministriesaresupportersandwhichareopponents ofsanitationinvestments(champions/opponents)?Whydotheytakethisstance?Howcouldnoncollaborationbe addressed? · Whatistheroleoflendersanddonors?Howdotheycollaboratewithcentralandlocalgovernment,privatesector, or communities on sanitation provision? · Incontextsofdecentralizedsanitationdelivery,islocalgovernmentmoreexternallyaccountablethannational government?Doeslocalgovernmentprovidepublicreports(includingbudgetallocationtosanitation)on(i)all services and (ii) sanitation services? · Ifgovernments(central,local)donotinvestinsanitation,ornotinpro-poorsanitation,isthisduetolowcapacityor low benevolence? · DoesthegovernmentactivelyencourageandsupporttheparticipationofNGOsandtheprivatesectorin infrastructure development and service delivery (e.g., via community-driven development support or community-led totalsanitationorsanitationmarketing)?(Seealsoquestionsonprivatesectorparticipationabove) · Donationalandsubnationalgovernmentsconsultnongovernmentstakeholdersonsectorstrategyandthe planningofnewinvestments?Whatlevelofparticipationexists?Doesthegovernmentsimplyinformthepublic, does it consult with civil society groups, or does it on occasion enter into forms of partnership with civil society stakeholders?Doesitrespondtodemonstrations?Iscivilsocietyparticipationlimitedto"invited"policyspaces,or isitmoreadvocacy-based?Aresomestakeholders(officiallyand/orunofficially)excludedfromthedebate? · Iscivilsocietyparticipationinnationalpolicyframeworksandprocessesthemosteffectivewayofraisingtheprofile of sanitation in central government? · Dogovernmentsandlenders/donorsinvestinlocalprocesses?Doesthisimpactthesustainabilityofsanitation investments?Issanitationinvestmentdrivenbycommitmentstotechnologicaloptionsthatarenotalwaystested for cost-effectiveness under local processes? · Howsignificantissocialinvestmenttotheimpactandsustainabilityofsanitationinvestments?Howdopoor householdsmanageandtreattheirsewage(pitlatrines,septicnetwork,etc.)?Dopoorhouseholdshavechoices regardingdifferentsanitationoptions?Whatincentivesexistforhouseholdstoconnecttosanitationnetworks(if this option exists)? How are these incentives perceived by households, central government, local government, privatesector,civilsociety,andinternationaldonorsandorganizations?Whatisthebalancebetween"hard"and "soft"investmentinsanitation?Dogovernmentsandlenders/donorsmakeaconnectionbetweeninvestmentin collective organization and networks and sanitation sustainability? How do they characterize this relationship? · Howdodifferingruralandurbancontextsinfluenceapproachestocommunityengagementwhendelivering sanitationinvestments?Havecommunity-basedapproachestosanitationbeentried?Iscommunityparticipation perceivedasmakingacontributiontoownershipandsustainability?Arethereanyconcernsaboutthelevelofcosts involved in community participation and the possible implications of this for financial sustainability and replicability? Continued www.wsp.org 51 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology TABlE A.2 rESEArch hyPoThESES And quESTionS conTinuEd framework focus Distributional impacts hypotheses · Sanitationpolicyhasapro-poordimensionbutthishaslimitedimpacttheontheplanningandexecutionofnew investments. · Subsidiesandcapitalprojectsearmarkedforthepoorarenoteffectivelytargeted. · Insufficientattentionispaidtothedesignofinfrastructureandservicessuitedtotheneedslow-income communities. · Therearesecondaryimpactsofsanitationinvestmentonemploymentthatshouldbeconsidered(gain/loss). · Thereisagreaterconcernwithdistributionalequityatsubnationallevelsofgovernmentcomparedwithnational government. Questions · Howisequityaddressedinsanitationsectorinvestment?Hasthegovernmentmadeadeliberateconnection between increased access to sanitation and pro-poor policy? · Whichstakeholderssupportoropposepro-poorinvestments?Whichstakeholderscapturebenefits? · Whichsocioeconomicgroupsinwhichgeographicallocationsbenefitfromsanitationprovision? · Dosubsidiesforthepoorexist?Ifyes,whatkindofsubsidiesexist?Howeffectivelyarethosesubsidiestargeted tothepoor?Whichpowerfulinterestsdeterminetargetingandaccordingtowhichformalandinformalrules? · Incontextsofdecentralizedsanitationserviceprovisionandinvestment,isthereagreaterconcernatsubnational levelsofgovernmentthatthoseservicesandinvestmentsaredistributedequitably? · Istheequitabledeliverymeasuredandreportedeffectively?Istheimpactofimprovedsanitationmeasured? Whatarethepoliticaleconomydimensionsthataffectmonitoringandreporting? a.2 research methods, analytical tools, and process through a snowballing process in which initial key infor- *Two analytical tools--stakeholder analysis and organi- mants identified other interviewees connected to the sector. zational mapping--were conducted with a subset of key Key informants with different positions and perspectives informants, generating qualitative data on stakeholders, bring their own sets of interpretive biases and analysis of the institutions, and processes and quantitative data on the flow political economy of sanitation. In this type of qualitative of money and resources. These are introduced in detail in research--where there is no single absolute truth and where the following. difference (rather than standardization) is actively sought-- trustworthiness in interpretation can nonetheless be streng- 1. research methods: Semistructured interviews and thened by cross-checking--or triangulating--the views and focus group discussions analysis of different key informants and focus groups. Semistructured interviews · Key informants were selected from the following Semistructured interviews were conducted with key infor- categories of stakeholders: mants drawn from stakeholder groups inside and outside · Government stakeholders/sanitation policy makers: of government in each of the four case studies. Some were national and subnational governments, Parliament, directly engaged in sanitation sector policy development etc. or implementation, some were well-informed observers of · Serviceproviders:publicandprivate developments in the sector, and others have been involved · Consumers:householdsandbusinesses in sanitation project design/implementation. · Civilsocietyorganizations(CSOs),includingNGOs, consumer associations, research organizations Interviewees were identified with the help of World Bank/ · International donors, organizations, and project WSP in advance of the fieldwork, with further identification teams 52 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology The interview followed the form of a free-flowing conver- not include participants who are close friends, as this might sation with structure provided by the set of hypotheses reduce independent thinking and expression. As with se- and accompanying research questions. Notwithstanding a mistructured interviews, triangulating the findings from commitment to clear and plain language, semistructured one focus group with one or two additional focus groups interviews, as an interactive method, allow for questions to held with different participants from the same interest group be clarified with the interviewee during the interview. Inter- increases the trustworthiness of those findings. viewers can encourage the interviewee to seek clarification so that a shared understanding is developed, increasing the 2. analytical instruments: Stakeholder analysis quality and reliability of the answers provided. matrices and organizational mapping Qualitative and quantitative narrative analyses were aided Focus group discussions by the use of a set of two standardized analytical tools that Focus group discussions were conducted with a small num- examine stakeholders, institutions, and processes: stakeholder ber of interest groups connected to the sanitation sector, analysis matrices and organizational mapping. with prioritization given to perspectives from residential community members and civil society organizations (for Stakeholder analysis matrices example, consumer protection groups and NGOs involved A "stakeholder" refers to an individual, community, group, in awareness raising on the importance of sanitation). or organization with an interest--or stake--in a particular outcome. The stake is rooted either in the fact that they will Several areas of this research--with associated hypotheses-- be affected positively or negatively by the outcome or in their lent themselves to being explored through focus group ability to influence the prospects for the outcome. discussions. These include questions regarding the nature of demand for sanitation, perceptions of what is considered Stakeholder analysis is a systematic methodology that uses "adequate sanitation," more general perceptions of sanitation qualitative data to determine the interests and influence of investment processes and outcomes, and the extent and im- different groups in relation to a policy or sector. A stakeholder pact of community participation on sanitation investment interest or power matrix maps two variables that describe a decision making and outcomes. stakeholder's interests and power relationship to a particular policy or sector. (See figure A.1 for an illustrative example Stakeholder analysis (discussed below) has informed the from one of the case studies.) We have selected to map the purposive sampling of interest groups for focus group discus- sions. These discussions were organized with specific goals, interests and power of different stakeholders in relation to structures, time frames, and procedures and with a group of sanitation sector outcomes. The power dimension refers to the people with a common interest: for example, civil society extent to which a stakeholder party can affect the outcome organizations that are advocating for pro-poor sanitation (on the vertical y axis), while the interest dimension refers to investment. whether the stakeholder is positively or negatively affected by the outcome (horizontal x axis). There are a number of principles that were applied to the selection and facilitation of the focus group discussions. Stakeholder analysis matrices follow a series of steps and Groups were typically composed of six to twelve partici- can be conducted with individual key informants or in pants. With larger groups it becomes difficult to ensure focus groups. We have worked with a selected subset of key that all participants can contribute freely and meaningfully. informants to populate and explain the matrix. A political With fewer than six people, on the other hand, one or two economy narrative that interprets this matrix for the reader individuals might tend to dominate. The facilitators ensured was then developed through the further key informant and that, although the groups have a common interest, they do focus group discussions. www.wsp.org 53 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology Senegal have identified and managed the political economy risks and op- portunities through their engagement High with the sanitation sector. 1 Organizational mapping aims to make A B 12 flows of decision-making processes around sanitation investment, resour- 2 ces, information, and activities explicit 3 14 (via flow diagrams) and to identify 6 bottlenecks and constraints, as well Influence 11 as opportunities for change. When 4 used carefully, it can illustrate often- intricate connections and sequences C D 13 clearly. The tool's focus on the inter- 9 vening processes between cause and 10 effect makes it an indispensable tool 8 7 in political economy analysis. 5 Low Organizational mapping was in some Support Neutral Opposition instances also applied more specifi- cally, as a modified form of public- Interest expenditure tracking, to describe and Notes: A = High Power and Support explain quantitatively the flow of B = High Power and Opposition budget allocations and investments in C = Low Power and Support D = Low Power and Opposition the sanitation sector over a given time period. As envisaged, this activity was hindered by limits to the amount of useful and accessible sanitation data Organizational mapping (including time series data) that was available. Organizational mapping is a qualitative method for ma- pping and tracing the cause-effect flow of resources and 3. research process decision making following policy and investment decisions. The research was implemented flexibly in order to respond It provides an overview of the formal and informal insti- to contextual variation in each case study country and tutional framework and organizational practices within to the variation in interviewees and focus groups. Table which sanitation sector behavior and decision making takes A.3 provided the country teams with an overview of the place. Drawing on our understanding of the stakeholders methods and analytical instruments available to answer and institutions involved, their interests, and the existing the questions under each element of the framework. The power dynamics, this tool traces a sequence of decisions to columns to the right also indicate which stakeholders are describe and explain how institutions and processes operate most likely to be able to provide relevant insights. At the in each case study country and how these have impacted same time talking to different stakeholders allowed the sanitation investments and outcomes. This analysis has cross-checking of information. These insights were addi- generated findings on how policy stakeholders, including tional to the objective analysis provided by key informants World Bank and WSP in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and on all areas of the framework. 54 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology TABlE A.3 ovErviEw of mEThodS And STAkEholdErS By frAmEwork ElEmEnT framework element / analytical method Stakeholders question instrument Lenders/ SSI FGD SAM OM Government Service provider Consumers CSOs Donors Country context Sector arena: institutions Public investment Private investment National/subnational institutional relationships Sector arena: Stakeholders Sanitation investment Demandforsanitation Sector process Distributionalimpacts Notes: SSI=semistructured interview, FGD=focus group discussion, SAM=stakeholder analysis matrices, OM=organizational mapping. a.3 research sampling and stratification of political economy analysis. Within the selected countries, The research strategy built on a series of purposive (as oppo- there is an element of initial stratification involved in the sed to random or probability-based) sampling steps. Given purposive sampling methodology. In the case of Brazil, for the relatively modest resource envelope for this four-country example, discussions of project contexts identified a typology research, the study used a "fit for purpose" sampling me- of urban sanitation contexts and then purposively selected thodology that we believe captured sufficiently the variability sites based on their learning potential. of stakeholders connected to the sanitation sector in each country and project context. a.4 Feedback, reporting, and dissemination The principle of dissemination was an important feature of Key informants, stakeholder interviewees, and focus groups the research methodology, enabling knowledge exchange and were initially identified through consultations with the na- reflection among key stakeholders in each case study country tional team consultants and secondary clients. Further key and in Washington, D.C. The study design and terms of informants and sanitation sector stakeholders were identified reference did not envisage sophisticated dissemination stra- through a snowballing approach and on the back of the tegies, however, and the production of the research outputs stakeholder analysis. The selected stakeholders represented will need to be part of a broader World Bank dissemination different "types" of stakeholders (as mapped in the stakehol- strategy that will include commitments by the team of con- der analysis). sultants as follows. The country case studies were chosen purposively by the At the end of the fieldwork period, the team--in each World Bank/WSP team. The countries selected represent a country--offered to facilitate a small debriefing workshop range of sanitation contexts and outcomes, identified to gene- (maximum half a day) providing initial findings, inviting rate useful operational lesson learning through the application comments and questions, and providing room for discussion www.wsp.org 55 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex A - methodology on the recommendations. This helped country stakeholders and appropriate for prompting diagnostic discussion, to internalize the research findings while providing an op- and portunity for the research teams to validate the case study · shouldnotgetstuckintoa"oneshot"deductiveappro- findings. Debriefings took place in all case study countries at ach to testing and confirming/refuting the research the end of the mission with the exception of Brazil where-- hypotheses, but should instead embrace a more fluid, due to country office availability--the debriefing took place iterative, and inductive approach to developing and after the draft report had been submitted. revising/refining/rejecting working hypotheses. a.5 Methodology modifications based 2. Site selection on the experience of this study A further methodological reflection concerned the challenges The fieldwork for this study was staggered, with the Maha- of identifying and visiting "average" communities once the rashtra fieldwork conducted first in order to allow for me- samples had been stratified. The fieldwork team members in thodological reflection and modification ahead of fieldwork Maharashtra found that their visits were given a high profile in the remaining three countries. The field team identified by district authorities keen to demonstrate the success of their three areas for methodological reflection: the treatment of sanitation investment strategies by directing our field visits research hypotheses, site selection, and case study selection. toward high-performing/celebrated villages. This was partly We discuss these below. a function of a research process that was rapid rather than 1. Treatment of research hypotheses involving a longer period of exposure to a range of villages. It was difficult when being hosted by district officers to insist on The application of the research hypotheses was originally being exposed to average villages in each stratified group. designed with a scoring element to allow interviewees to score each hypotheses on a four-point scale (strongly agree, agree, The implication for the next round of fieldwork was that disagree, strongly disagree) as the basis for cross-country research teams should do more groundwork ahead of time comparison. It quickly became apparent that in the context to identify and select sites for field visits in order to avoid last of research conducted with a wide range of stakeholders in minute "engineering" of field visits by host authorities. different contexts, this scoring would be of limited compa- rative value. 3. case study selection This realization prompted a broader reflection on the use of A final methodological reflection concerned the importance hypotheses as the basis for the research process. The field team of having detailed discussions with the WSP (or World Bank) found that the detailed thinking and discussion that genera- country team pre-departure, to ensure local ownership of the ted the set of hypotheses and attendant research questions was work and check that the case study selection was appropriate invaluable for framing and focusing the research. The team and would maximize opportunities for learning. also found, however, that the process of testing the hypo- theses was more inductive than deductive. In other words, In the case of Maharashtra, the working title of the cases stu- rather than focusing on proving or refuting the hypotheses dy--"Community-Led Total Sanitation in Maharashtra"-- and providing empirical evidence (as in deductive research), caused some initial confusion as CLTS was not a term used the research process was more fluid; the research team found in that state and the operational approach was quite different itself generating working hypotheses, which were tested and to CLTS as it is commonly understood. refined on a more incremental than envisaged in the research strategy document. WSP in India also expressed some concern that the case study should have been concerned with the Total Sanitation The team therefore adjusted the methodology, recommen- Campaign nationally, not on a single operational approach. ding that the fieldwork The Indian country context is one in which lender/donor- funded projects are less significant in advancing progress than · shouldnotbeconcernedwithelicitingscoresforhypo- the governments' own national program. WSP colleagues felt theses, unless the scoring process was seen as useful that the latter should have been the focus of the study. 56 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries annex B - Case study summaries B.1 Brazil of innovative alternatives such as the condominial system. While Brazil is currently on track to reach the sanitation Overview MDG in 2015, a significant investment will be required to This study examines the political economy of investment achieve universal access to sanitation services, particularly in sanitation (with a particular focus on sewerage) in Brazil in rural areas. The inclusion of sanitation as a priority sector over a period of roughly one-and-a-half decades, since the in the current government's flagship Growth Acceleration launch of the Water Sector Modernization Project (known Program (PAC) in 2007, backed by the allocation of R$40 in Brazil as Programa de Modernização do Setor Saneamen- billion (US$20 billion) of resources over four years for basic to, PMSS) in 1993. During this period, Brazil transformed sanitation and water, appeared to signal that the challenge was the institutional landscape of its sanitation sector, gained a at last being taken seriously. However, spending has lagged reputation for innovation in pro-poor sewerage programs, behind the increase in budget allocations, as it has proved and began to make up some of the huge deficit in sanitation hard to achieve rapid increases in the absorptive capacity of investment that it had accumulated by the end of the "lost a sector that has long had unstable and unpredictable levels decade" of the 1980s. of investment. In addition to this national (policy) component, the case Diagnostic findings study includes a regional (program) component that focu- The study's analysis of the country context shows that on sed on the Bahia Azul program, implemented by the Bahia the demand side there is an association between sanitation state utility EMBASA in the Salvador Metropolitan Region (particularly sewerage) and modernity, and while coverage in northeastern Brazil over approximately the same period for urban water supply is almost universal, Brazil's delivery (1995­2007). of sanitation has lagged far behind. Achieving universal coverage in Brazil is, however, complicated by a number of Brazil has been a major recipient of World Bank lending for technological, social, and economic factors. Social capital and WSS investment, both at national and subnational levels, social cohesion are important in mobilizing communities with the Bank supporting key federal government programs to invest in sanitation and critical to their ability to lobby (including the PMSS and PROSANEAR) and significant and exert pressure on local leaders. From a political point investments by state governments and utilities, principally of view, since President Lula's election a more rights-based in urban sanitation in major cities and metropolitan regions rhetoric, which depicts access to improved sanitation as an (including Salvador, the focus of the Bahia Azul program). issue of human dignity and a citizen right, has become more Although, given Brazil's size, the overall proportion of total prominent. Moreover, poor municipalities generally have the sector investment in the country that has derived from World highest level of support for the Lula government; the increase Bank lending is modest (and indeed the Bank provided only in federal grant funding through the PAC can therefore pro- around 12 percent of the total resources invested in the Bahia vide a political payoff as well as being a pragmatic response Azul program), the Bank was perceived as an important to limited local investment capacity. actor at certain times and in certain places within the broad sector processes. On the supply side, while there is a clear technological preference for sewerage, the modified application through In recent decades millions of poor Brazilian households condominial sewerage (in which groups of household- have been connected to public sewerage networks through ers assume responsibility for the final links in the system) the expansion of conventional services and the introduction can change the nature of how services are provided, with www.wsp.org 57 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries greater expectations placed on the role of householders. The sector process analysis begins at the macro level with an Condominial systems also make the service more affordable outline of budget decision processes and resource flows for generally and maintain the appeal for different stakeholders: grants and loans from federal government and IFI programs, for politicians, for example, it creates relatively big, visible which account for the largest share of investment in the sector. public works programs for investment. Public and private While the sector suffers capacity issues around limited viable operators, construction firms, and other private contractors projects, the report also argues that political pressures come benefit from these capital works programs. into play at various points along the pathways to approval of projects and disbursement of funds. These may reflect Looking at the sector arena, the study found that political publicly announced policy criteria such as PAC allocations economy factors at the national level have not resulted in by region, which have led to an increase of resources allocated opposition to increased sanitation investments per se. Indeed, to the northeast that, while justifiable on equity and poverty they now appear to be converging around a broad-based reduction grounds, has according to some interviewees led commitment to such investments that includes support at to the supply of funding outstripping the absorptive capacity the highest levels of government. However, the study did find of state and municipal utilities in the region, with negative a significant influence of political economy factors (linked consequences for quality and efficiency. The study goes on to both to stakeholder interests and broader ideologies) in the examine the meso level of political economy factors shaping disputes among advocates of municipal, state, and private- program implementation, taking Bahia Azul as an example. sector operations that left the country without a clear policy It concludes by examining the micro level of the delivery of and legal framework for the sector during most of the period sewerage services in low-income communities, focusing on of one-and-a-half decades covered by the study. The combi- the condominial sanitation component of Bahia Azul and nation of the 2007 (Water and) Environmental Sanitation comparing it with the Environmental Sanitation Company Law with other legislation on concessions, tendering, public of the Federal District's (CAESB) condominial sanitation consortia, and private-public partnerships seems in the view strategy in Brasília. of most interviewees to have finally established the legal and policy clarity needed to underpin increased investment, Operational implications though some areas of dispute remain. Based on the diagnostic discussion, a number of significant operational lessons can be drawn from the Brazil case study At regional level, the analysis of the Bahia Azul program in order to help to inform future World Bank/WSP inter- showed that it was a broadly successful example of political ventions. economy management, which included technically compe- tent and politically astute handling of relations with the nu- Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations merous different sources of national and international fund- Careful and strategic sequencing of operations can encourage ing for a large and complex program. However, the unique reforms that increase the overall impact of investments in later strength of the political group behind Bahia Azul allowed it phases. In Brazil, the conditions laid down for access to the to ignore the need to engage with municipal governments, relatively modest capital investment component of the PMSS civil society, and statutory citizen oversight institutions, and provided sufficient incentives for institutional upgrading by its political orientation influenced an approach to working EMBASA, which was then able to leverage much larger vol- with communities that privileged top-down and short-term umes of investment resources due to its enhanced credibility mobilization over sustained participation. Had the emphasis and increased absorptive capacity. on social capital been more long term, community engage- ment with system operation and maintenance might have Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis been more effective, and links might have been made to The timing of information flow is important. Even when other health and urban upgrading programs. In many areas, rigorous analysis is undertaken (as was the case with the Bahia however, both customer and service provider are now more Azul health impact study), dissemination of key findings can satisfied with an arrangement whereby the utility maintains get lost, sidetracked, or potentially misused or captured if the the system for a higher service fee. timing is wrong (for example, at the start of a new political 58 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries administration). Strategically important studies can benefit conclusions from a flexible timetable. Interim findings based on monitor- In Brazil, although the World Bank has accounted for a rela- ing data of the health impact study could have been used to tively modest share of total sector investment, it has helped steer the debate more actively. to drive innovation and improved performance by encourag- ing institutional upgrading in once-fragile state utilities and Realigning accountability by supporting the spread of Brazilian innovations such as It is not easy to decentralize decision making, resource al- the condominial approach. The analysis of the Bahia Azul location, service delivery, and regulation. Helping to clarify program showed that it was a broadly successful example of the roles and responsibilities (or at least the pros and cons of political economy management, which included technically different roles and responsibilities) at the federal, state, and competent and politically astute handling of relations with municipal levels and the capacity requirements at each level the numerous different sources of national and international is an important contribution. funding for a large and complex program. The program was quick to adopt the innovative condominial approach In Brazil, the political left strongly backs and the current to provide sewerage services to low-income neighborhoods, government favors new forms of social oversight. Linking making significant investments in social mobilization work them to regulatory agencies (promoted by the center-right alongside construction. However, the unique strength of the groups that dominated the previous government) can increase political group behind Bahia Azul allowed it to ignore the the legitimacy of different service delivery options (technolo- need to engage with municipal governments, civil society, gies, for example) and solutions around sensitive issues like and statutory citizen oversight institutions, and its political tariff-setting. It may also help to overcome perceptions of orientation influenced an approach to working with commu- World Bank biases toward particular approaches, such as nities that privileged top-down and short-term mobilization its perceived bias in Brazil toward enhancing the role of the over sustained participation. private sector. B.2 india Partnership strategy The World Bank is clearly a potential convener or broker Overview of unlikely marriages of convenience between seemingly The Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) was launched across disconnected technical, political, and financial interests. the rural areas of India in 1999 and presented an important The Bank is not perceived to be neutral but must remain shift away from earlier supply-driven sanitation programs. supportive of the exploration of various options to enhance service delivery. TSC has a set of defined components, which includes in- formation, education, and communication; community The perception of being aligned with one political grouping mobilization activities; construction of household toilets may reduce the World Bank's ability to leverage continuity and community complexes; and provision of toilets in go- between programs created by different political administra- vernment schools and anganwadis (child-care and mother- tions. On the other hand, in Brazil like in other countries, care centers). Most importantly, TSC differs from previous the World Bank brings to the table clear institutional memory campaigns in that, for most participants, there is no govern- in the sector. ment contribution to the capital cost of sanitation facilities. Designed as a demand-driven project, the TSC emphasizes Public debate and communication awareness creation for a cleaner environment and hygienic When it has achieved a strong partnership with a particular habits at the household and community levels. political grouping (as was the case in Bahia), the World Bank should make full use of its leverage with this grouping to push The TSC program failed to take off in most of the states until it toward greater openness to public debate and engagement 2004­5. The political economy of the program provides a with civil society. Such engagement can both enhance pro- number of significant reasons for this failure. Most of the gram quality during implementation and enhance sustain- states were reluctant to implement a low-subsidy program, ability by securing broader buy in to program aims. in particular a subsidy that was not extended to households www.wsp.org 59 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries above the poverty line. On the demand side there was a lack of relatively uncontested and open to influence for progressive a felt need among communities for several reasons, including sanitation investment. Respected leadership, a lack of partisan poverty, the ready availability of open space in rural areas, associations, and public recognition for local efforts all helped lack of information and knowledge, and above all, long years to advance the program. Effective use of limited government of habitually defecating in the open. funds was also integral to its success: since the bulk of state government funds were used for promotion and prizes awar- The government of India's MDG commitments have mo- ded on the basis of transparent criteria, opportunities for the tivated it to devise innovative ways to strengthen the TSC, diversion of funds were quite limited. Moreover, the use of including notably an incentive/award scheme designed to rewards and recognition leveraged considerable community speed up coverage. This scheme, the Nirmal Gram Puraskar investment on top of the funds available from the TSC. While (NGP, Clean Village Award), has become one of the key the private sector--rural marts and local masons--supported drivers of the TSC program. NGP was introduced in 2003 latrine construction, private sector participation and associa- by the government of India as a postproject reward to village, ted regulation were not part of the political economy story block and district panchayats (councils) that achieved the emerging from Maharashtra. In contrast to urban sanitation status of Open Defecation Free and fully sanitized unit. The contexts, there are no big contracts--households appoint NGP was inspired to a large extent by the Sant Gadge Baba their own masons--so competition with public services scheme adopted by the government of Maharashtra.17 does not arise. The progress of the TSC program as a whole has accelerated The sector process analysis confirms that civil society par- since 2005, and national coverage was reported to be around ticipation (meaning community participation rather than 57 percent by 2008, compared to just 21 percent in 2001 and NGO participation) has been crucial to the success of the 31 percent in 2005.18 A major contributor to this improve- government's demand-driven strategy for sanitation inves- ment in fortunes is the role that Maharashtra has played as tment in Maharashtra. Due to a sustained, government-led a laboratory of good policy and practice. campaign, a gradual shift is evident whereby toilet use is Diagnostic findings becoming institutionalized as the social norm in at least some parts of the state--people accept that the time has come to The study's analysis of the country context has confirmed make a change. Moreover, a very significant driving force that decentralization is firmly established in Maharashtra, behind this demand generation has been the role of sector and that some senior political leaders and officers have wor- champions. These included a minister and two officers who ked their way up though the hierarchy, bringing with them helped to ensure bureaucratic support for the program. They an understanding of and commitment to grassroots action. There is also a long history of social movements led by local believed in rural development and shared a passion for im- champions in Maharashtra, including B. R. Ambedkar, who proving sanitary conditions. External development agencies spearheaded the liberation of oppressed castes. Sant Gadge had a subtle but significant role at different institutional Baba was a revered pioneer of sanitation and hygiene in the levels. WSP helped by exposing state government and Gram state in the nineteenth century and an ideal figurehead for a Panchayat representatives to promotional approaches and state campaign that incorporated sanitation investment. low-cost sanitation technologies from other places. These inspired and informed the design of a program customized The sector arena discussion suggests that in rural sanitation, to the Maharashtra context. WSP and UNICEF both were with its relative lack of capital intensive hardware and greater able to provide flexible resources in a rapid, responsive way focus on process, the stakeholder interests and institutional to fill gaps in government funding and procedures, especially arrangements from the federal down to the local level are in the areas of learning and communications. 17 While the NGP award is given by the central government, the Sant Gadge Baba are disbursed by the government of Maharashtra and can be spent at the discretion of the respective panchayats. 18 See Government of India, Department of Drinking Water Supply, http://ddws.nic.in. 60 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries Operational implications context. The sector process may not be characterized by the Based on the diagnostic discussion a number of significant ope- kinds of vertical accountability relations central to much rational lessons can be drawn from the India case study in order lender/donor thinking. In the case of Maharashtra, the go- to help to inform future World Bank/WSP interventions. vernment has encouraged a different type of relationship, in which the emphasis is on encouraging private investment and Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations private behavior change. In this way government accountabi- Effective support can be built by recognizing and suppor- lity shifts from delivery to outcomes. This has been achieved ting government commitment and local leadership. This by the state focusing on creating a demand-driven approach involves understanding the importance of sector champions to sanitation investment, facilitated by the state using a mix of and tailoring support to help them succeed and scale up consciousness raising, subsidies, collective financial rewards, their impact. A striking feature of sanitation investment "soft" conditionality, and enforcement. in Maharashtra has been its success in translating political commitment into bureaucratic action. This translation was Partnership strategy achieved largely through dynamic and committed political The study highlights the utility of ensuring that partnership and bureaucratic leaders, many of whom worked their way strategies are based on sustained, flexible engagement with up from the grassroots. This bureaucratic commitment has government partners. The Maharashtra sanitation program been bolstered by political incentivizing. Senior officials is strongly government led. Nevertheless, technical and committed to sanitation in the early years in Maharashtra policy support from WSP has been strategically important, have been promoted, albeit sometimes to unrelated sectors, especially in exposing government officials and community and the government recognizes and rewards officers who leaders to new ideas and in helping to strengthen program perform well in the sanitation program. This form of political effectiveness. incentivizing has now started to be adopted in other states. Through sensitive and sustained engagement the WSP was Public debate and communication able to tailor its support to this locally owned process. Finally, lenders and donors can support policy makers and bu- reaucrats to secure and sustain public support for institutional Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis change. The state government and district administrations Lenders and donors can use analysis of comparative advantage in Maharashtra have sought to ensure that the sanitation in global practice to support local policy makers and admi- program is well known across the state, and to this end have nistrations to learn lessons from elsewhere and refine their made extensive use of local mass media, with awards repor- operational framework. This involves identifying how and ted widely and given a high profile. This has been critical to when they can add value to an ongoing process of change in the program's success and is reflected in the program budget investment strategies. The kind of support provided by WSP allocation for communication. in Maharashtra was geared toward lesson learning through exposure to CLTS and scaling up of good practice. This, conclusions rather than capital investment or strong steering, was exactly In Maharashtra, external development agencies had a subtle what was required from external partners in this context. but significant role at different institutional levels. WSP hel- ped by exposing state- and village-level government represen- This type of support can be tied to the promotion of more tatives to promotional approaches and low-cost sanitation te- inclusive policy debates. Lenders and donors can look to chnologies from other places within and outside India. These encourage, where appropriate, analysis conducted with a inspired and informed the design of a program customized to broad group of stakeholders to ensure greater inclusion, the Maharashtra context. WSP and UNICEF both were able and can link this process to strengthened public debate and to provide flexible resources in a rapid, responsive way to fill communication. gaps in government funding and procedures, especially in the areas of learning and communications. WSP used the evident Realigning accountability success of the Maharashtra program in advocacy at national There is scope for lenders and donors to adapt and support level for a shift in emphasis in the Total Sanitation Campaign models of accountability in the sanitation sector based on from household inputs (toilet construction) to collective www.wsp.org 61 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries outcomes (an end to open defecation). This national level ad- natural drainage channels, and this has meant that household vocacy helped to influence changes in the TSC guidelines and waste of all types has been easily disposed of, literally washed a strengthened government approach to rewarding outcomes away in rivers and water courses, taking the problem of dea- with the introduction of the Nirmal Gram Puruskar scheme, ling with waste both out of view and out of mind. However, which provides financial rewards for Gram Panchayats and open defecation is seen as uncivilized behavior, and latrines larger units of local government that achieve Open Defeca- and bathrooms within homes can also be valued as status tion Free status. The World Bank­funded Jalswaraj project symbols or physical demonstrations of wealth in some cases, has actively supported the sanitation program, in particular even though they might not lead to improved disposal or by strengthening village water and sanitation committees.19 treatment of wastewater (for example, they are not connected The project built institutional within communities, but was to a proper and safe facility). less successful at integrating with district administration sanitation institutions and investments. At the macro level, a long history of authoritarian rule makes advocacy (for sanitation and other topics) difficult, B.3 indonesia and there is the perception that government is not interes- ted in opinions voiced by the media or civil society. Also, Overview the public expects little from government, and this coupled Indonesia was initially selected as a case study so that synthe- with a blurred boundary between public and private service sized lessons from other case studies--namely, India (rural), provision means sanitation is mainly perceived as a private Brazil (urban), and Senegal (urban)--could potentially responsibility. This has been reinforced by a lack of interest contribute to addressing political economy challenges in from the more politically powerful middle classes, who are influencing sanitation sector reform and decision making. usually able to provide privately for their general infrastruc- However, given recent positive developments in the sector ture needs. (where national commitment to sanitation investment has increased significantly), the focus was revised to explore how The institutional landscape has undergone significant change and why government commitment to sanitation has increased through the initiation of the decentralization process. De- recently compared to just a few years ago. While the level centralization was rapid, if not instant, and not only gave of investments actually needed to address the significant greater administrative independence to local governments sanitation problems in Indonesia is still not sufficient, the but also moved financial resources and responsibility for the increasing government interest in investment is a major shift provision of many public services directly to district level. from viewing sanitation as a private matter for households. The sanitation sector has in consequence seen multiple ac- Interest continues to increase at a rate unexpected by some tors, with sometimes confusing and overlapping mandates. (particularly external) stakeholders. The challenge of aligning, coordinating, and simplifying the institutional set up is particularly important as ambiguity in Diagnostic findings mandates means reduced scope for accountability. A further Country context key issue faced due to decentralization is redistricting, where Historically, interest in sanitation has been extremely low in local politicians can petition for districts to be split into Indonesia. Awareness among all socioeconomic groups and smaller administrative units through a mechanism called even among the media is limited, and the disposal of feces pemekaran. With more money being raised locally through is not discussed in households or communities. The formal taxation, a key motivation for splitting districts has often language lacks a word for defecation, and it is culturally not been control over resources and rent-seeking opportunities accepted to discuss sanitasi in public. Moreover, many parts for local elites. While revenues have increased, local budget of Indonesia are geographically well endowed with rivers and priorities are generally go toward free education, (curative) 19 The World Bank-funded Jalswaraj project in Maharashtra supports community-led water supply improvements through a grant-making subproject mechanism in some 3,000 villages (out of some 26,000 in the state as a whole). A recent intermediate impact evaluation of the Jalswaraj project concluded that the institutional strengthening of village water and sanitation committees is the most significant contribution of the project to sanitation investment and sustainability. 62 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries health services, and the construction of new government start of 2009 it has become increasingly owned and driven offices to house newly formed local administrations, which by national government stakeholders. There is increasing easily crowd out sanitation and other public health promo- high-level ownership within government (in contrast to some tion issues. past donor/lender-funded projects, which had tended to be supply driven), and very recent developments suggest that Sector arena the national budget for sanitation infrastructure is likely to A detailed stakeholder mapping exercise showed that the be quadrupled in 2010 and will have a separate budget line sanitation sector is characterized by an array of stakehol- from water. ders--with no single national level ministry responsible for sanitation policy, and responsibilities shared among at least The Strategi Sanitasi Kota (City Sanitation Strategy, or five ministries. This institutional complexity and confusion SSK) approach, which was first tested in the Indonesia Sa- has not only resulted in a reduction of accountability to the nitation Sector Development Project (ISSDP) in 2006, is public for sanitation service delivery but had also a negative an evidence-based, strategic development approach led by impact on international lenders' and donors' willingness to city governments. Based on expressed local demand, with risk funding sanitation investments. external consultants acting as facilitators, the SSK approach is a bottom-up process, with participatory room for local Given the decentralized nature of service provision, it is not government. While this approach was rejected by most surprising that local-level government stakeholders and actors ministry stakeholders initially, several factors contributed have clear influence over budget allocations. This does not to its increased acceptance. First, a newly appointed ISSDP work to the advantage of sanitation, as local governments staff member, who had good personal ties and the effective in most cases prefer to allocate resources to high-visibility relationships, successfully became a facilitator in building investments (for example, roads, irrigation, and buildings). relationships within government and increasing interest. Moreover, despite certain formal processes being in place, A change of the director general within Cipta Karya (the informal patron-client relationships play a key role in de- Directorate General of Housing, Building, Planning & termining investment priorities and funding from central Urban Development, Ministry of Public Works) increased to local governments. Without having any clear guidance, institutional buy-in. Finally, decentralization increasingly criteria, or mechanisms for deciding on funding allocations, challenged the traditional centralized approach. there is space for political considerations or rent-seeking opportunities to influence investments at local level. Another interesting insight from the Indonesian sanitation- process discussion is defining "sanitation" as solid waste This study is concerned with "pro-poor" investments, but management, urban drainage, and sewerage. Linking these that term is not used often in Indonesia's sector arena discus- three elements has created important momentum, increasing sions. There has been an almost complete lack of investment political commitments to sanitation. Urban flooding has be- and infrastructure for either rich or poor, who often live at come an increasing problem in many cities, with high levels very close proximity in mixed neighborhoods (in contrast to of public concern and complaints when it occurs. Sewerage the more segregated nature of urban centers in Latin America and wastewater would not become topics for discussion at or Africa). The problem is therefore not one of investments the local government on their own, by including them under being focused on well-off areas or elites at the expense of the a wider definition of sanitation, backed-up with information poor. The focus needs to be on ensuring an adequate sanita- on the negative effects of poor sewerage, local governments tion minimum service package for all households. The term had to start thinking about the issue, and some of the ma- "poor-inclusive" is therefore seen as more appropriate for yors, supported by ISSDP, have promoted the benefits of Indonesia and more easily accepted among policy makers. sanitation investment. Sector process Operational implications This increased interest in and commitment to sanitation Based on the diagnostic discussion, a number of significant has developed over the last two to three years, but since the operational lessons can be drawn from the Indonesia case www.wsp.org 63 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries study in order to help to inform future World Bank/WSP of lack of sanitation. Understanding these government prio- interventions. rities and targeting research at them have proven successful in the Indonesia case. Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations Aligning and sequencing operations and support with natio- Realigning accountability nal planning and policy cycles can increase their influence Increasing clarity over institutional responsibilities can help on policy and planning. In early 2009 there was government increase accountability from both the supply-side (institu- agreement that the City Sanitation Strategy approach could tions know what they are responsible for) and the demand- be replicated and scaled up, and the timing of this agreement side (citizens know which institutions are responsible and fits in with the next five-year planning cycle. Sequencing who they should complain to). different interventions over different timescales (for example, awareness raising and improving local planning capacity) has Traditional top-down supply-driven approaches to sanitation been a necessary first step before making local investments investments have often been unsuccessful or unsustainable, for physical infrastructure. This helps to ensure that they are but combining them with social investments in bottom-up appropriate, effective, and efficient. processes can help increase accountability and the sustainabi- lity of investments even when there is low initial demand. The Understanding the political economy of lending--and City Sanitation Strategy approach recognizes the difference responding appropriately--can increase the acceptability of between perceived demands, which often form the basis of funding mechanisms and ease negotiations. For example, top-down approaches, and actual demands. the association of previous loans with corruption and debt increased subsequent public and government wariness of Partnership strategy loans from international lenders. Also, past loan negotiations Strong longer term support and collaboration with gover- have been delayed partly as a result of requests by lenders (for nment on planning and policy issues, with government example, for information on internal arrangements between viewed as a partner, can strengthen the capacity of govern- local and national government) that were perceived to be ment (central and local) to scale up sanitation planning and unacceptable by the government. ensure high levels of national ownership of the process. In Indonesia, this has been pursued through identifying and Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis supporting appropriate champions. These are trusted faci- Using the resources and comparative advantage of an inter- litators and negotiators who can help build and strengthen national institution can result in research and analysis that partnerships and relationships among key stakeholders in the is tailored for specific audiences and can inform sanitation urban sanitation sector. policy and investment decisions. A comparative study on the economic impacts of sanitation was undertaken by WSP-EAP Public debate and communication in four Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia. This Although the media in Indonesia are generally no more aware study was cited by key informants (government, internatio- of sanitation issues than the general public and coverage is nal lenders, and donors) as having been a powerful tool in limited, there is potential to develop partnerships that enable motivating central government stakeholders into action. Two sanitation messages to be conveyed effectively. The ISSDP has related factors can explain this. As a middle-income country recognized this potential in the design of its second phase, maintaining high levels of economic growth, Indonesia sees which will have components on advocacy, campaigning, itself as a leader within the ASEAN region; when attainment communications, and promotion. levels for some MDG targets have been worse than in other, much poorer Southeast Asian countries, it has caused some conclusions government stakeholders to feel they can, and should, be In Indonesia a "process approach to engagement" has started performing better. Second, the government is becoming to pay dividends by increasing pressure for top-down sector increasingly interested in economic evidence for its policy investment from the center of government and bottom-up decisions, for example, the cost of health care in consequence from local government upward. There is increasing high-level 64 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries ownership within government (in contrast to some past government investment levels in some of these cities have donor/lender-funded projects, which have tended to have increased from less than 1 percent of budget to between 3 been supply driven) and very recent developments suggest and 6 percent, a significant increase given the low starting that the national budget for sanitation infrastructure is likely point and other priorities. to be quadrupled in 2010 and will have a separate budget line from water. While the importance of process has long B.4 Senegal been recognized, the Indonesia case study highlights again the importance and effectiveness of development partners Overview understanding the national and country context, and ensu- In the 1990s, the Government of Senegal undertook major ring the approaches fit this context. reforms of its urban water supply and sanitation sector. The government's strong commitment to reforms has resulted in The Indonesia cases study clearly illustrates the appropriate- Senegal's water sector being regarded as a model of public- ness and effectiveness of intensive informal approaches built private partnership in sub-Saharan Africa. Following these on good personal ties and relationships. ISSDP key staff reforms, observers have pointed to a significant higher profile met with counterparts from the Ministry of Public Works of sanitation since 2000, with increasing investment levels (MoPW) many times to convince them of the potential of and a larger number of people gaining access to sanitation the SSK approach, but during the first year, advocacy efforts in urban areas. toward MoPW were unsuccessful. The breakthrough came when an additional person was recruited within the ISSDP Donor investments play a crucial role in sustaining inves- team who was a formerly a very senior government official tments in Senegal's urban sanitation sector. While govern- within the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and had many ment data is likely to underestimate considerably the pro- relations both in MoHA and in other ministries, including portion of donor contributions, estimates by independent MoPW. He was also a former lecturer in a prestigious univer- observers point toward 90 percent. Both, World Bank and sity from which many MoPW staff had graduated. Through WSP are key external actors supporting Senegal's urban sa- intensive informal approaches (for example, breakfast and nitation sector. The Bank's engagement in the wide-ranging dinner meetings, coffee meetings, and informal gatherings) water and sanitation reforms in Senegal began with a decade- he led the advocacy activities and was successful in getting the long Water Sector Project--a US$100 million IDA credit attention and commitment of MoPW, at least up to director was provided in 1995--followed by the Project Eau Long general level, and other government agencies and ministries. Terme. The latter includes the Sanitation Program for Peri- In some instances there were clashes between two director urban Communities of Dakar (Programme d'Assainissement generals, but through a series of additional informal mee- des Quartiers Péri-Urbains de Dakar, PAQPUD), which tings these were overcome. The year-long process was slow aims to bring onsite sanitation to poor peri-urban areas of but eventually led to the establishment of the Tim Teknik Dakar. Relying on an output-based approach, PAQPUD has Pembangunan Sanitasi (Technical Team for Sanitation De- supported the construction of 63,000 household sanitation velopment, or TTPS) in November 2007 through a ministry facilities by 2004, therefore surpassing its initial target of decree from Bappenas. Through the TTPS, interministerial 60,000 (by 2006) two years earlier than planned. Building relationships among MoPW, MoH, Bappenas, MoHA, and on experience and mechanisms developed under the PAQ- MoF became more formalized. PUD, a new World Bank/WSP-administered project was agreed to in 2007: the Global Partnership on Output-based In addition to the shifting priorities at national level, there Aid (GPOBA), which would help poor households in poor have also been significant shifts within some local govern- areas of Dakar to install onsite sanitation. The outputs in this ments. The six cities involved in the first phase of the ISSDP GPOBA-funded sanitation project include not only the hard- project have started some initiatives without continued ware of sanitation facilities but, importantly, the "software" prompting from external stakeholders, creating a dynamic of support, education, and monitoring from independent of their own and proving effective at putting pressure on agents, nongovernmental agencies, and community-based the national government from a subnational level. Local organizations. www.wsp.org 65 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries Diagnostic findings onsite facilities, network maintenance, and financial ma- The analysis of the country context for urban sanitation in nagement. Senegal has resulted in a strong case for the complex relation- ship between water and sanitation working to the advantage The sector process analysis has shown that the World Bank of both sectors. While often competing for resources, Dakar played a crucial facilitation role during the WSS reform in the policy makers were convinced that one sector could not deve- 1990s. Using the window of opportunity emerging through lop without the other. The wide-ranging institutional reforms the urgent need to solve the water supply problems in Dakar, in the mid-1990s were characterized by well-developed and the World Bank team played a pivotal role in translating a innovative performance contracts for the water sector but the general will for reform into a vision for the sector. The team exclusion of the underdeveloped sanitation sector from those also carefully managed initial skepticism about reform and contracts. In hindsight, some observers justified the decision private-public partnerships. The process discussion also to separate water from sanitation on the grounds that it gave highlights the potential of civil society and community-based greater visibility to the traditionally neglected sanitation sec- organizations in successfully creating demand for sanitation tor. However, the real driver for the institutional separation services in poor communities, for example, by using entry was that, in order to make the water sector attractive for points around solid waste collection, wastewater, and draina- private investment, it needed to be separated from the far ge--known to be bigger concerns in peri-urban communities less attractive sanitation sector. These reforms provided the than sanitation provision. Moreover, launched in 2005, the sanitation sector with the opportunity to develop institutions Millennium Drinking Water and Sanitation Program (PE- separately, enabling it to benefit from experiences in the water PAM) has successfully attracted investments--in particular sector, such as private sector participation, carefully designed from donors. While observers say that the PEPAM is biased contracts, and active community involvement in extending in favor of the water sector at the expense of sanitation, and improving services. In a climate of strong support by the there is agreement that PEPAM meetings and reviews and new political leadership since 2000 (President Wade stated provide a platform for discussion among a range of actors repeatedly that "sanitation is a matter of dignity"), PAQPUD from government, the donor community, civil society, and was started in 2002, and sanitation services for the first time private-sector organizations. were targeted at poor areas of Dakar outside of the reach of the existing sewerage network. Operational implications The analysis of the political economy in terms of stakeholder Based on the diagnostic discussion, a number of significant interests, influence, and incentives as well as the institutional operational lessons can be drawn from the Senegal case framework (sector arena) suggests that there is no powerful study in order to help to inform future World Bank/WSP opposition to increasing sanitation sector investments or interventions. conflicts between different levels of government, which of- ten characterize political economy factors in decentralized Timing, tailoring, and location of investment and operations settings. Several factors contributed to the successful mana- The research has found evidence that it is crucial to recognize gement of the political economy, the most important being political support and use windows of opportunity to push support by the political elite and performance contracts that for reform. Both the institutional reform in the water and have shaped stakeholders' incentives and protected inves- sanitation sector and the later PAQPUD occurred in a clima- tments from adverse political economy impacts. Recently, te of political support, initially to solve the problem around the sanitation sector has followed the example by the water water supply and later to stress the importance of sanitation sector, and a performance contract was signed by the National provision. Moreover, well-linked World Bank staff based Sanitation Office (ONAS) and the Government of Senegal. in Senegal was able to identify champions of change and The contract obliges the state to cover the financing gap if engage with them on a continuous basis. Formal and, more ONAS achieves certain performance indicators, including importantly, informal meetings built mutual understanding those for wastewater treatment, investment in the network and trust and successfully prepared important decisions (extension and rehabilitation), new connections and new and obtained government support for initially controversial 66 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries reform aspects, such as the privatization of the state-owned demands are made, they generally focus on waste collection water utility (SONEES) prior to 1996. or rainwater drainage rather than sanitation in the narrow sense of the definition. Driven by the World Bank, PAQPUD (and subsequently the WSP/World Bank­managed GPOBA) for the first time Partnership strategy brought onsite sanitation and condominial systems to Dakar's Evidence from the Senegal case study has shown that donors urban poor, which had until then been excluded for the most can successfully facilitate reform if they have invested in part from the network-based service provision in the capital's long-term and continuous engagement in order to build trust center. Inspired by the success of the pilot, many engineers among key stakeholders. Well-connected national donor staff have acknowledged the merit of alternative means of sani- can play a crucial role in understanding the Government's tation provision and became advocates of onsite sanitation. position and carefully negotiating with the main stakehol- This shows that successful interventions can have a powerful ders--both supporters and opponents of reform. demonstration effect; this may be particular important in an environment where the default for urban sanitation provision While partnerships are built not solely through formal remains the sewerage. meetings, carefully organized and facilitated workshops have provided a vehicle for presenting evidence on policy choices Understanding the sector through rigorous analysis and managing potential resistance to reform in order to Donors and lenders have a comparative advantage in provi- generate continuous engagement. ding rigorous analysis to inform reform and sector choices. While in Senegal no explicit political economy assessment Public debate and communication was undertaken, donors have successfully contributed to PAQPUD and GPOBA have rightly acknowledged that evidence and, subsequently, an informed sector debate. investment in communication is key to generating effective Studies--using national and international expertise--have demand (and advocacy) for sanitation within low-income offered policy choices to government stakeholders and con- communities. Discussions around wastewater and water tributed to the evidence base used during workshops to supply--usually more popular than sanitation--have been undertake institutional sector reform. See, for example, the shown to arouse household interest and can provide the tariff study by ONAS/Banque Européenne d'Investissement platform for discussions around improving sanitation pro- (2008). vision with local communities and consumers. Champions of change and self-declared advocates often emerge from Realigning accountability within the communities and could further be targeted more As outlined above, the carefully designed and contextually formally through donor-supported projects. specific contracts in the water and the sanitation sector pro- vide the right incentives and strengthen accountability by conclusions unbundling the functions supporting investment decisions In Senegal, the World Bank played a crucial facilitation and policy implementation. At the same time, performance role during the WSS reform in the 1990s. Using the op- contracts, if designed well, have been shown to protect the portunity emerging through the urgent need to solve water sector from adverse political influence and vested interests. supply problems in Dakar, the World Bank team helped to translate a general will for reform into a vision for the In order to strengthen accountability initiatives from the pri- sector while successfully managing initial skepticism about vate sector and from civil society more broadly (the demand private-public partnerships and opposition from the state- side of accountability), PAQPUD and GPOBA have combi- owned water utility, SONEES. This role was most visible ned technological choices around the hardware of sanitation through the organization of a range of workshops that helped facilities with targeted information campaigns. While CSOs to facilitate and provide clarification on various issues in and the private sector are successful in creating demand order to find agreement on the nature of contracts. While for sanitation investments, there are still few examples of the workshop was acknowledged by all stakeholders as the citizens actively demanding better service provision. And if formal vehicle for the process, many discussions were held www.wsp.org 67 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex B - case study summaries in between sessions and behind closed doors to discuss and reach agreements. In addition to the World Bank team in Washington, D.C., a national resident advisor, who was a former a member of the Ministry of Water and Sanitation and had access to government stakeholders, drove these more informal consultations. Using its role as credible partner, the World Bank in colla- boration with the WSP successfully built on the existing institutions and increased their focus on sanitation sector initiatives. Through its support of PAQPUD, the World Bank/WSP partnership for the first time brought onsite sanitation and condominial systems to Dakar's urban poor, which until then had been excluded for the most part from the network-based service provision in the capital's center. Inspired by the success of the pilot, many engineers have acknowledged the merit of "alternative" means of sanitation provision. While nobody doubts the demonstration effect, sustainability is still at risk once the program's successor comes to an end. 68 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference annex C - terms of reference Global economic and Sector Work (eSW) on the poli- powerful interests that may support or oppose those interven- tical economy of sanitation in four countries tions or capture related benefits. These are political economy issues. Hence, this work is able to draw on the PSIA approach 1. Background and rationale with its Conceptual Framework for the Political Economy Currently, 2.6 billion people worldwide live without access to of Reform, developed by SDV (see details in box C.1).22 basic, "improved" sanitation.20 A more systematic assessment This lack has been identified as a component of poverty that is needed to identify and address these political constraints contributes to 2 million child deaths a year, reduced school to improved sanitation for the poor. attendance, and a fundamental deprivation of human dignity. According to the study Sanitation and Hygiene at the World For this purpose, the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP, Bank (Kolsky, Perez, Vandersypen, and Jensen 2005), global administered by the World Bank, in collaboration with investment will have to increase to at least US$2 billion to various governments and other public and private partners) meet the MDG target. However, there is ongoing concern and the World Bank are conducting a Global Economic that governments, at many levels, are not devoting enough and Sector Work (ESW) Study on the Political Economy attention and resources to sanitation services. While there are of Sanitation in Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Senegal. The no general figures showing on- and off-budget expenditures purpose of the study is to help WSP and the World Bank-- in the sector at regional levels, evidence at the country level through a better understanding of the political economy of illustrates that investments and expenditures in sanitation sanitation--in their efforts to support partner countries and are very low compared to those for water supply and other development practitioners in the design, implementation, infrastructure services. and effectiveness of operations that aim to provide pro-poor sanitation investments and services to improve health and Not only is there a lack of focus on sanitation generally, but hygiene outcomes. existing sanitation investments and service provision are not always pro-poor. They often do not consider sociocultural Definition of terms: What do we mean by political factors that play a role in sanitation, especially in remote rural economy of sanitation? areas. Also, the role that private sector sanitation supply or The term political economy is subject to multiple unders- demand plays in people's decision making about sanitation is tandings and definitions. In its original use in academic often not recognized adequately. Efforts to increase access to literature, it referred simply to the application of economic service can benefit better-off urban residents at the expense principles to the practice of public policy of nation-states.21 of urban poor, slum dwellers, or the rural population. On tested over the past six years, offers concepts, methods, and the other hand, there is a general consensus and evidence tools to analyze both the "winners and losers" in the provision on the economic and health benefits of adequate sanitation of sanitation services: Is there equity in the distribution of services. Many documents suggest that governments' limited the impacts of development interventions, and what are the sanitation expenditures are determined largely by political 20 By sanitation we mean the infrastructure and service provision required for the safe management of human excreta, for example, latrines, sewers, and wastewater treatment. Hygiene is the set of human behaviors related to safe management of excreta, for example, washing hands with soap or safe disposal of children's feces. 21 World Bank, 2006. World Bank's Increased Focus on Basic Sanitation and Hygiene, Water Supply and Sanitation Feature Story #3. World Bank, 2005. Sanitation and Hygiene at the World Bank: An Analysis of current activities, Pete Kolsky, Eddy Perez, Wouter Vandersypen, Lene Odum Jensen. UNDP, 2006. Human Development Report 2006 - Overview of the Global Sanitation Problem, David Satterthwaite and Gordon McGranahan. 22 Works by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx were all presented under the rubric of «political economy.» www.wsp.org 69 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference rather than technical or economic constraints; there are methodology,24 This approach will support evidence-based competing demands for resources.23 We follow the current decision-making and policy dialogue on sanitation inves- common understanding of political economy, as referring to in- tment and service provision. terdisciplinary studies that draw upon social and political theory in addition to economic principles in order to understand how The PSIA perspective views the social, economic, health, political actors, institutions, and economic processes influence institutional, political, cultural, and historical context of sa- each other. The political economy of sanitation, therefore, nitation as part of one system. A system consists of elements, refers to the political and economic processes and players processes, and positive or negative feedback mechanisms. that determine the extent and nature of sanitation inves- When those are altered, they have direct and indirect, short- tment and service provision. Understanding and addressing and long-term effects on the entire system. This ESW work in- the political economy of sanitation consists of identifying corporates the understanding of sanitation access, collection, and and addressing impacts, risks, opportunities, participating treatment as part of a whole system. The work further accounts institutions, various stakeholder interests that support or for the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of sanitation oppose the investment in sanitation services for poor and investment and service provision. Finally, decentralization vulnerable groups, and the level of policy debate on sanitation and private sector and community participation are often investment and service provision. seen to increase the complexity of designing and implementing sustainable operations, as multiple stakeholders, institutions, Focus of work: Poverty and Social impact analysis and competing interests need to be addressed. To assess and (PSia) to assess equity and powerful interests address this complexity, this work considers upstream dialogue This work is a unique, innovative way of looking at sanita- and engagement with local governments, the private sector, tion investments and service provision. It combines multiple and civil society as entry points to the design of sustainable disciplines to understand and manage the political economy sanitation operations. (See, for example, experience with the of sanitation. The Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) total sanitation approach in South Asia). 23 World Bank, 2003. PSIA User's Guide; World Bank, 2005. TIPS; World Bank/OPM, 2008. The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations. Report no. 44288-GLB. Washington, DC: World Bank. 24 See World Bank 2003, A User's Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis. In 2004, the framework of «Tools for Institutional, Political and Social Analysis» was added to the PSIA approach. See World Bank/OPM 2008, The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for Policy Dialogue and Development Operations. 70 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference Specifically, the work focuses on the Box c.1 poverty anD Social impact analySiS (pSia): one approach to help Better unDerStanD anD aDDreSS the political economy of Sa- analysis and understanding of country nitation context, sector arena, and sector pro- cess, as well as on developing Actions PSIAistheanalysisofthedistributionalimpactofpolicyreformsonthewelfareof differentsocialgroups,withaparticularfocusonpoorandvulnerablegroups.Itis and recommendations.25 an approach to (i) understanding the impact of policy choices and public actions on povertyandsocialoutcomes;(ii)analyzingintendedandunintendedconsequences Country context comprises the his- of policy interventions; (iii) considering tradeoffs between social costs and benefits of policy change by assessing opportunities, constraints, and social risks; and (iv) torical and sociocultural context; the designing appropriate mitigating measures and risk-management strategies when policy, political, legal, and institutional adverseimpactsareunavoidable.Itfurtheranalyzesthepoliticaleconomyofreform-- frameworks; and the power relations. reform support and opposition--and the capture of benefits. PSIArecognizestheneedtounderstandthelikelyimpactsofpolicyadjustments Sector arena comprises institutions onpoorandnon-poorgroups.Itidentifiesstakeholdergroupsthathavesignificant influence to (i) support or oppose policy change toward improved outcomes in and organizations, stakeholders and sanitation service provision and/or (ii) capture benefits of sanitation investments their economic and political interests orserviceprovision.Italsoanalyzesinstitutions,impacts,risks,andopportunities. and perceptions, incentives, impacts, Finally, PSIA develops concrete policy measures to enhance opportunities and address risks and opposition. risks, and opportunities. APSIAapproachallowsonetocombinesanitationsectorexpertisewitheconomic Sector process comprises the buil- and social analysis, drawing specifically on (i) institutional analysis--defined as the "rules of the game" that people develop to govern group behavior and interaction ding of coalitions for change through in political, economic, and social spheres of life; (ii) political analysis--defined as dialogue, partnership, participation, the structure of power relations and the often-entrenched interests of different communication, and leadership; the stakeholders that affect decision making and distributional outcomes--and (iii) social analysis-- defined as social relationships that govern interaction at different interactions between players in the re- organizational levels, including households, communities, and social groups. form arena over time; and the leverage of WB/WSP operations. The PSIA approach also allows one to combine analytical evidence with policy dialogue to build coalitions for change toward increased public debate and policy making that lead to pro-poor sanitation investment and service provision. Actions include concrete recommen- Key elements of PSia: dations and tools for development practitioners to enhance the design, · Askingtherightquestions(assessingthecontext) implementation, and effectiveness of · Analyzingstakeholders(interests,influence),incentives,institutions(formal,infor- sanitation operations, portfolios, and mal), impacts, risks (including political economy ), opportunities, processes, and outcomes. policy debates · Understandingtransmissionchannels(price,accesstogoodsandservices,assets, The unit of analysis is concrete WSP/ employment, transfers and taxes, authority (e.g., decision-making power) WB sanitation operations in Brazil, · Gatheringdataandinformationtofillgaps India, Indonesia, and Senegal. The approach is to use the PSIA methodology · Enhancingpositiveandaddressingnegativeimpacts to combine multiple disciplines to look · Establishingmonitoringandevaluationsystems at sanitation service provision from both the supply and demand side for · Fosteringaparticipatoryprocess,policydebate,partnership,andcoalitionsfor change the following reasons. First, sanitation interventions are often add-ons to · Integratingrisksintointerventions(internalizingexternalities)andpromotingfee- dback for policy adjustment water supply projects and often focus Adapted from User's Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (World Bank 2003); Tools for Institutional, Poli- tical and Social Analysis (TIPS) for Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) (Holland 2007); and The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Issues and Implications for World Bank (World Bank 2008). 25 See annex 3 for a visual illustration. www.wsp.org 71 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference on sound engineering, technical feasibility, and economic and service provision that are based on empirical evidence viability.26 Third, some demand-driven interventions have and that take a comprehensive sanitation perspective. Fur- failed as institutional barriers prevent scaling-up and sus- ther, this work promotes the economic impact argument, tainability. where the lack of sanitation facilities is both a health and an economic concern. This work examines the influence of vested interests on sani- tation investment and service provision, both as opponents The ESW work promotes multidisciplinary analysis, meth- and supporters for improved, pro-poor sanitation. Powerful ods, and tools. Findings will inform the policy dialogue with interests may make investment decisions that sustain rents a wide range of stakeholders, including communities and and/or capture respective benefits from sanitation inves- households receiving the sanitation services. Hence, the work tment decisions. Influential stakeholders, however, can also combines social analysis, economic analysis, and operational be proponents for more and better sanitation, as is seen, for and KSL experience from the sanitation sector. The primary instance, in the "total sanitation" experience in Bangladesh. audience of this work will be development practitioners The work also includes analysis of and recommendations engaged in sanitation operations and policy debates. The for incentives, impacts, risks, opportunities, processes, and ESW will inform the work of partner countries, Country policy debates. Management Units, and Bank task teams of sanitation projects, programs, and nonlending activities. By combining The ESW work acknowledges (in line with existing sector applied analysis and operational experiences, the work will thinking) that it is crucial to tailor efforts to focus attention inform the design, implementation, and assessment of such on sanitation provision and investment to the local context.27 lending and nonlending activities as investment projects, as well as upon those other interests that influence decisions technical assistance activities, SWAPs, Development Policy about the process. The ESW resonates with the WSP 2006 Loans / PRSCs, and Economic and Sector Works, including Sanitation-Global Practice Team retreat.28 Comparatively Sanitation Road Map papers, Country Assistance Strategies less focus is placed on the following: the special features (CAS), and Country Economic Memoranda. The work will and delivery aspects of sanitation; the influence of political, inform WB portfolio management and aims to enhance the social, and cultural aspects on the design, implementation, focus on sanitation during the CAS development process. or sustainability of sanitation interventions; or the political, social, and economic impacts that sanitation operations 2. Objective of this work have on different social groups, which can affect their sup- The overall objective of the consultancy is to deliver the port of or opposition to decisions on sanitation investment ESW, which includes design, primary and secondary data and service provision. Second, supply-driven, project-based collection and analysis, and report writing and dissemination interventions have often been unsustainable, as they stalled in the four case study countries: Brazil, India, Indonesia, or even reversed when the project support ended.29 The and Senegal. Specifically, the consultant firm is expected to work argues that "a central feature of most efforts must be conduct the work with a multidisciplinary consultant team to engage with the people that lack adequate sanitation, and that integrates both (i) in-depth local country knowledge to build on, or respond to their concerns and initiatives" with (ii) expertise in social analysis and political economy (UNDP 2006, 30).30 Respective discussions focused on the of sanitation investment and provision in order to address need to make informed decisions on sanitation investment key questions, such as the following: 26 For instance, Water Aid (2003) highlights that sanitation is devalued by most governments and donors; sanitation solutions are generally not known or poorly understood; communities are rarely involved in policy, programming and innovation; sanitation impact on health and development is not clearly understood; institutional roles and responsibilities remain confused at the country level; coordination within the sector and between sectors related to sanitation (water supply, public works, health, agriculture, education, etc.) remains weak and undermines sanitation development. 27 Globally, sanitation projects have moved from supply- to demand-led approaches. 28 OED report on Development Effectiveness (2005: vii) states that effectiveness can be improved by tailoring operations to the circumstances of each country and adapting strategies to the local political economy. 29 UNDP, 2006. Human Development, 30. 30 World Bank, 2006. Sanitation, Wastewater and Hygiene Practice Retreat, 16 November. 72 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference · Whyaresanitationinvestmentsandserviceprovision which may be detrimental to the provision of sanita- not given adequate priority in lending and nonlending tion services to the poor. work? 4. Contribute to raising awareness for sanitation and its · Whensucheffortsare undertaken, why are they not policy debate through this work's analysis and disse- strategically targeted toward increasing access to sa- mination. nitation for the poor? 5. Prepare the final documents (including the Synthesis Report) as enhancements to the global policy debate Specifically, it is expected that the consultant firm will meet and the design and implementation of sanitation the following five objectives: operations through an operationally tested approach to the analysis of the political economy of sanitation. 1. Apply and refine the Conceptual Framework on the Such analysis and understanding will help to promote Political Economy of Reform, developed by the World a stronger pro-poor focus and ultimately improve Bank, based on the approach of PSIA, to the sanitation health and hygiene outcomes on the ground. sector. 2. Analyze the political economy of sanitation of the 3. Scope of work selected WSP and WB projects in Senegal, India It is expected that this ESW will be carried out by a consultant (Maharashtra), Brazil, and Indonesia by working with firm having experts with both in-depth country knowledge of respective project leaders to the four case studies and sanitation and sociopolitical skills. a. Identify--through a social analysis perspective-- Responsible for team management and supervision of ESW which stakeholders (including vested interests), implementation, the firm's project leader will supervise and incentives, institutions, impacts, risks, opportu- guide its case study teams throughout the case study prepa- nities, processes, and policy debates support or rations, implementation, and reporting in order to deliver oppose sanitation investments and improved ser- the Synthesis Report. The firm is expected to conduct the vice provision and why. The study should examine work in close collaboration with WSP and World Bank staff what drives these factors and what could be done throughout the four phases of (1) desk review, (2) prepara- to increase support for pro-poor sanitation inves- tion, (3) applied research, and (4) Synthesis Report writing. tments and service provision. The study should be Separately, the World Bank will hire an econometrician, sensitive to the ways in which benefits of sanitation and the consultant firm is expected to cooperate with this investments are, or could be, captured by various consultant.31 stakeholders. b. analyze the historical context of the policy, legal, The work, excluding the economist's work, will begin with and institutional frameworks for and the sociocul- an initial kick-off meeting with the firm's project leader firm tural aspects of sanitation, in terms of constraints and the World Bank project leaders. This will help to develop and opportunities for pro-poor sanitation inves- a common understanding of the project objectives, goals, tment and service provision. process, outputs, and final deliverables. The meeting will also 3. Generate lessons from actual operational experiences help to agree upon a clear way forward on the implementation and produce recommendations on how best to enhan- of this work. Output: meeting minutes ce support for evidence-based decisions in sanitation investment. These lessons and recommendations will Phase 1: Desk review, inception report address as appropriate how to overcome (i) opposition The consultant firm will conduct an overall desk review on (i) and resistance to sanitation improvement programs the key political economy literature in the sanitation sector and/or, (ii) the capture of benefits by powerful groups, in general; (ii) the main issues of the political economy of 31 The hiring of an econometrician is contingent on extra funding. After the desk review, the firm's economist and the econometrician, hired separately by the World Bank, shall cooperate on a set of hypothesis to test. The econometrician will define an experiment, prepare a survey, collect the data, and prepare some estimation. However, the scope of the work of the econometrician should be an add-on to the project and does not replace the task developed by the firm's economist. www.wsp.org 73 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference sanitation in Senegal, Brazil, India, and Indonesia, based on the qualitative analysis of stakeholders, institutions, the collected country material; and (iii) overarching political impacts, risks, opportunities, processes, and policy economy issues regarding the WSP and WB projects in those debate via (i) key-informant interviews and (ii) focus four case study countries. This review includes economic, group discussions. A suggested methodology for the social, political, and sanitation data and perspectives. This research design can be found in TOR annex 3. secondary data analysis report will (a) document positive and Second, the consultant firm will tailor the standard negative experiences with the political economy of sanitation survey instrument to the case studies' context by in the literature and operations, (b) highlight challenges and adding case-study-specific sociopolitical and sanitation opportunities for a better understanding and management information and stratification, tapping into the coun- of the political economy of sanitation, and (c) draw on and try context knowledge of its technical experts. This tailor the Conceptual Framework to the political economy will capture the country-specific political economy of sanitation. This desk report serves as background paper characteristics (stakeholders, institutions, impacts, for the firm's case study teams. risks, opportunities, processes, and policy debates) that will be assessed and addressed via The firm's project leader will deliver an inception report that a. key-informant interviews with central and local illustrates a refined study implementation plan. government, parliament, private sector, civil society organizations, media, associations, donors and Outputs: desk literature report, inception report. lenders; and b. focus group discussions with households and bu- Phase 2: Preparation of applied research: design sinesses. of hypotheses, survey instruments, research 3 Applied research stratification and fieldwork logistics: stratification, logistics With support from its case study teams, the firm's The consultant firm will draw on the Conceptual Framework project leader will prepare the fieldwork logistics in (based on the PSIA approach and tools) and the desk review the four countries and determine the exact stratifica- to refine the overall study design that will guide its multi- tion for in-country data collection, tapping into the disciplinary teams in the applied research phase. This work country context knowledge of the case study teams, involves the following: each of which will include at least one sanitation 1. Identification of case study specific hypotheses: The firm's expert and one sociopolitical expert. The consultant project leader will develop case-study specific hypothe- firm will select case-study-specific field sites in urban, ses, based on the desk review and the in-depth local peri-urban, and rural areas, as relevant, and prepare expertise of its sociopolitical, sanitation, and economic the case study fieldwork logistics to assess a sample of experts, regarding the political economy of the case the WSP/WB project sites and a few nonproject sites study countries in general and of the sanitation sector for comparison and ensure that these and the WSP/WB operations in particular. a. adequately reflect (i) the different types of sanita- 2. Development of the overall survey instrument and subse- tion investment and service provision and (ii) the quent tailoring to the case study context: First, the firm's full socioeconomic spectrum of different social project leader will draw on the Conceptual Framework groups, including poverty and exclusion of certain and the sample research design questions (see TOR groups, ethnicity, religion, gender, geopolitical annex 3) to develop the overall survey instrument, issues; and in close collaboration with the WB/WSP team. This b. are adequately stratified to capture the perceptions overall instrument will ensure comparability across of the different stakeholders and incentives, the all case studies for the later cross-country analysis and institutions and organizations, a wider range of the development of transferable lessons for operatio- distributional impacts and equity considerations, nal design, which the synthesis report will present. a variety of risks and opportunities, processes, and Specifically, the standard survey instrument includes the policy debate. 74 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference Outputs: Case-study-specific hypotheses; overall survey ins- c. illustrate the analysis of stakeholders, institutions, trument; case-study-tailored survey instruments; detailed impacts, risks ,and opportunities, as well as the stratification of data collection and field sites (reflecting the processes and policy dialogue, which the WSP/ spectrum of different socioeconomic groups and types of WB projects have used to (i) better understand and sanitation investments and service provision); overall and manage the political economy of sanitation and (ii) case study specific logistics. have a more equitable and sustainable operational design and implementation; and Phase 3: applied research (hypotheses testing) in four d. provide respective lessons and recommendations case study reports for development practitioners. The consultant firm will conduct the applied research through its multidisciplinary case study teams, which comprise at least Outputs: applied research and three detailed case study one sanitation and one sociopolitical expert per case study in reports with project lessons and recommendations for Senegal, Brazil, India, and Indonesia, and deliver four case development practitioners; and in-country dissemina- study reports. Specifically, the consultant firm will draw on tion measures. the Conceptual Framework to carry out the field research, ensuring that its multidisciplinary teams 2. For projects requesting assistance (Indonesia), the case study team will assess the political economy of · applythecasestudysurveyinstrumenttocollectthe sanitation qualitative data, using social analysis techniques for key- a. to learn which factors constrain the project design informant interviews and focus group discussions; or implementation (as relevant) and · analyzethequalitativeandquantitativedata;and b. develop operational recommendations for both, · deliverthefourcasestudyreportsthatreflectdistinct the project and the policy level to overcome current social, political economy and sanitation perspectives. operational constraints and improve effective- ness. The consultant firm is expected to conduct this fieldwork in two types of study cases: (i) WB and/or WSP sanitation The study team will collect and analyze data and pro- projects that have positive experiences with understanding and duce a detailed case study report. It is expected that managing the political economy of sanitation, and (b) WB this report will and/or WSP sanitation projects that request assistance for a c. illustrate which stakeholders, incentives, institutio- better understanding and managing the political economy of nal barriers, risks, and processes exist that hamper sanitation in order to move the operation forward. project design/ implementation (as relevant) and which powerful interests may sit on rents or cap- 1. For projects with positive experience (Brazil, Senegal, ture benefits, and India), the case study teams will assess the political d. provide recommendations on concrete measures economy of sanitation to learn how the projects that need to be put in place to overcome opposition a. had identified the support and opposition to sa- and/or capture of benefits, as well as improve the nitation investment and service provision, capture policy dialogue to enhance project performance of benefits, and and effectiveness. b. have managed to overcome opposition and/or capture of benefits in their project design and Outputs: applied research and a detailed case study report implementation (as relevant). with recommendations for (i) project improvement in design or mid-course corrections for project implementa- The case study teams will collect and analyze data and tion (as relevant), (ii) enhanced policy dialogue, and (iii) produce three detailed case study reports. It is expected recommendations for development practitioners; in-country that these reports will dissemination measures. www.wsp.org 75 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference Phase 4: Synthesis report, dissemination 4. expected level of effort The firm's project leader is responsible for producing, delive- The expected level of effort is a total of 31 staff weeks. ring and disseminating the Synthesis Report. The report will be based on the applied and refined Conceptual Framework, 5. Time frame for implementation the case study reports, inputs from the firm's technical experts, It is expected that the contract will be signed by June 2008 and the cooperation with the separately hired econometrician and implemented through April 2009. consultant. The project leader will deliver a draft report for review by the World Bank, and incorporate all comments 6. Outputs and delivery schedule and feedback into the final report. Specifically, it is expected milestones Description that the Synthesis Report will Upon signature of contract 10% of total allocation · consolidatethefourcasestudyexperiencesandreports Inceptionreportsanddeskreview 10% through a cross-country case study analysis, Designofhypotheses,survey 15% · generatecommonlessonsfromtheoperationalcase instruments, applied research experiences on how to better understand and manage material, and logistics the political economy of sanitation by refining the Appliedresearchimplementation 35% Conceptual Framework to the political economy of and case study reports sanitation, and DraftSynthesisReport 10% · translatethegeneratedbodyofanalyticalandoperatio- Final Synthesis Report 20% nal knowledge into concrete operational recommen- dations and guidance that development practitioners can apply to their sanitation work (including inputs to 7. Payment terms PADs, CASs, etc). The purpose is to help them enhan- The consulting firm will be hired on a lump sum basis. Pay- ce the policy dialogue and the design, implementation ments will be made in six installments as follows. and performance of sanitation operations that (i) outputs Delivery schedule (# of emerge from evidence-based decisions for sanitation weeks after signing of investment and service provision, (b) have a stronger contract pro-poor focus, and (c) contribute to improved health Minutesofkick-offmeeting 1 week and hygiene outcomes on the ground. This will directly Inceptionreportanddesk 3weeks inform operational design. literature report Case study specific 7 weeks The project leader will submit an annotated outline of the hypotheses Synthesis Report for comments and agreement to the World Overall survey instrument and 10 weeks Bank. He/she will then write the draft Synthesis Report, case-study-tailored survey and after incorporating all World Bank comments, finalize instruments the Synthesis Report and submit it to the World Bank for Detailedstratificationofdata 12 weeks approval. Upon finalization, the Synthesis Report will be collection and field sites; overall and case-study-specific distributed among the respective stakeholders and results logistics disseminated in case study countries. The firm's project leader Four detailed case study 28 weeks will work closely with WB/WSP staff throughout the drafting reports as a result of applied of the report, and dissemination. research DraftSynthesisReport 32weeks Outputs: draft reports, and final Synthesis Report; in-country Final Synthesis Report, 37weeks dissemination in-country dissemination 76 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference 8. Qualification and experience requirements · Track record of project and team management The consultancy requires the following qualifications and skills. experiences. Further details can be found in TOR annex 2. · Abilitytocontractandmanageconsultantswithso- ciopolitical and sanitation expertise in Senegal, India, Essential Skills and experience Brazil, and Indonesia. · Mastersdegreeorbetterinsocialsciences(sociology, · AbilitytoworkinEnglish,French,Portuguese,and political science, economics) and sanitary, environ- Indonesian, or the ability to contract and manage mental or civil engineering, public administration, consultants who can. etc. · Atrackrecord(minimumeightyears)ofappliedre- Desirable Skills and experience search and operational experience with the political, · ExperienceinworkinginSenegal,India,Brazil,and social, economical, and institutional aspects of sani- Indonesia tation in developing countries, particularly Senegal, · Capacity to work in several countries simulta- India, Brazil, and/or Indonesia. Previous experience neously. in at least two of these countries is essential. · Previous experience with the Water and Sanitation · Proven track record on political economy work in Program. developing countries from a sociopolitical as well as · PreviousexperiencewithWorldBankoperations. operational perspective. · Experience with understanding and managing the 9. Working linkages with the World Bank political economy of sanitation investment and service provision at the policy and operational level, The team will report to Eduardo Perez eperez1@worldbank. combining political, social, economic, and sanitation org, Sabine Beddies sbeddies@worldbank.org, Peter Kolsky perspectives. pkolsky@worldbank.org, and Daniel Benitez dbenitez@worl- · Demonstrated track record in collecting primary dbank.org, who oversee and supervise the consultancy. The sociopolitical, institutional, economic, and sanitation firm's project leader will report regularly on progress of the data through fieldwork, as well as in processing and work by submitting drafts of the survey instruments, applied analyzing multidisciplinary primary and secondary so- research material and case study progress, and reports to the ciopolitical information and data using cross-country World Bank for review. For the case study progress reports, comparative case study methods. the firm's project leader will mention any problems identi- · Proventrackrecordintranslatinganalyticalfindings fied and solutions developed to address them. The team will into recommendations for operations and policies. submit all outputs to the World Bank for review, comments, · Excellent report skills, as well as excellent English and approval in English in electronic version available in MS language skills (both speaking and writing). Word format and as PDF files. www.wsp.org 77 AnnEx 1: ovErviEw of AcTiviTiES, rolES, And ouTPuTS Involvement of/in firm's project firm' Sanitation firm's Sociopolitical firm's economist Outputs leader Specialist(s) Specialist(s) Kick-off Phase TeamMeeting Discussandagreeuponconsultancyobjectives,focusandscopeof MeetingMinutes work, interim outputs, and deliverable Teamrole Teammanagementand Teammembershiptodeliverthecountrycasestudies 5.23 supervision of study implementation PhaSe 1: DeSK reVieW anD incePTiOn rePOrT Compile and deliver Compile country-specific background information DeskLiteratureReport desk review report 5.25 InceptionReport PhaSe 2: PeParaTiOn OF aPPlieD reSearch: DeSiGn OF hYPOTheSeS, SUrVeY inSTrUMenTS, reSearch STraTiFicaTiOn, anD lOGiSTicS Designcase- - Basedondesk Deliverideasforpotentialhypotheses Case-study-specific study-specific review, generate hypotheses hypotheses testable hypothesis - Decideonthe methods used for testing hypotheses Develop - Designofoverall Tailoroverall,standardsurveyinstrumentandmaterialto Standard survey overall survey study framework and country cases instrument instrument material 5.26 Case-study-tailored Tailor - Tailoroverallsurvey survey instruments instrument to instrument and case study material to country context cases Detailed - Detailedstratification Provide country and technical expertise to help develop Detailedstratification stratification of of data collection the detailed stratification of data collection and field sites of data collection and data collection and field sites field sites (different and field sites Provide country expertise to help develop the case study socioeconomic - Preparation of overall specific fieldwork logistics groups & sanitation Overall and and case-study- investments/services) case-study- specific fieldwork 5.27 specific logistics logistics Overall fieldwork logistics, case study specific logistics 5.28 5.29 5.30 5.31 5.32 Continued 78 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference AnnEx 1: ovErviEw of AcTiviTiES, rolES, And ouTPuTS conTinuEd Involvement of/in firm's project firm' Sanitation firm's Sociopolitical firm's economist Outputs leader Specialist(s) Specialist(s) PhaSe 3: aPPlieD FielD reSearch (hYPOTheSiS TeSTinG) in FOUr cOUnTrieS anD rePOrTS Appliedresearch Manageits Carry out fieldwork (applying survey no fieldwork Datacollectionand ofWB/WSP multidisciplinary instruments) to analysis sanitation teams to implement - collectthequalitativedata,using projects (a) the applied research socialanalysistechniquesfor Four detailed case with positive and deliver four case key-informant interviews and focus study reports experiences study reports group discussions, of and (b) requesting - analyze data, assistance for understanding - deliver the four case study and managing reports that reflect distinct social, the political political economy, and sanitation economy of perspectives sanitation in Senegal,Brazil, India,and Indonesia PhaSe 4: SYnTheSiS rePOrT anD DiSSeMinaTiOn DraftReport, - Produce and deliver Deliverinputstoprojectleaderupon DraftSynthesisReport Final Synthesis draftreporttoWorld request Final Synthesis report Report Bankteamforreview and comments In-country - Revise and finalize Organize and hold dissemination in- In-country dissemination report country dissemination - dissemination supervision among relevant stakeholders in-country www.wsp.org 79 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference AnnEx 2: rEquirEd TEAm SkillS And ExPErTiSE firm's project firm' Sanitations firm's Sociopolitical firm's economist leader Specialist(s) Specialist(s) required Qualifications (education and experience) (Post)Graduatedegree Masters'degreeincivil (Post)Graduate (Post)Graduate in social sciences, engineering, preferably degree in sociology or degree in preferably sociology, sanitary or environmental political science, with economics, with a political science with specialty, with a minimum a minimum of eight minimum of eight a minimum of eight of eight years operational years of operational years of operational years operational experience with a focus on experience, preferably in experience, experience, preferably tailoring sanitation services sociopolitical, institutional preferably in in sociopolitical work to the needs of the poor, work, applied research socioeconomic, (research, projects), and with familiarity with political, and international institutions, the associated institutional institutional work, applied research issues applied research required expertise Job - Responsibility for - Contributes (i) in-depth - Contributes (i) in-depth - Contributes (i) purpose managing the project, country knowledge and (ii) country knowledge, in-depth country including supervision of strong technical expertise (ii) political economy knowledge, (ii) process and guidance to the multidisciplinary expertise, and (iii) political economy to multidisciplinary team throughout study strong technical expertise and (iii) teams design, implementation, expertise to the strong technical - Responsibility for analysis, and report writing multidisciplinary expertise to the delivering final report - Carries out responsibilities team throughout multidisciplinary and disseminating it of fieldwork, analysis, study design, team throughout - ReportsbacktoWorld and report writing implementation, study design, Bankteam independently but as part analysis, and report implementation, - Managesproject of a team, and delivers writing analysis, and budget inputs and outputs to - Carries out report writing the work of the project responsibilities of - Analyzesfieldwork leader (including Synthesis fieldwork, analysis, data collected Report) and report writing by sanitation and independently but as sociopolitical part of a team, and experts and delivers inputs and delivers inputs outputs to the work and outputs to the of the project leader work of the project (including Synthesis leader (including Report) Synthesis Report) Requires WorldBankstaffand CounterpartsinWSP/ CounterpartsinWSP/ Counterparts interaction country officials WBsanitationprojects, WBsanitationprojects, inWSP/WB with government, private sector, government, private sanitation projects, civilsociety,andWBteam sector, civil society; and government, private WBteam sector, civil society, andWBteam Continued 80 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference AnnEx 2: rEquirEd TEAm SkillS And ExPErTiSE firm's project firm' Sanitations firm's Sociopolitical firm's economist leader Specialist(s) Specialist(s) Essential - Proven knowledge - Understanding of the - Proven expertise - Proven expertise specialized of political economy political economy of in assessing and in assessing and skills, know- issues of sanitation in sanitation investment addressing political addressing political ledge, and developing countries and service provision at economy issues at economy issues at compe- - Trackrecordofproject operational level (preferably both the policy and both the policy and tencies and team management also at policy level) operational levels. operational levels. skills - Demonstratedtrackrecord Experiencewith Experiencewith - Excellentskillsin in collecting, processing, sanitation sector is a sanitation sector is sociopolitical analysis and analyzing primary and plus a plus and cross-country secondary sanitation and - Demonstratedtrack - Demonstratedtrack comparative case economic data through record in collecting, record in collecting, study analysis fieldwork processing, and processing, and - Proven track record - In-depthknowledgeoflocal analyzing primary analyzing primary in translating conditions in sanitation and secondary and secondary analytical findings into and hygiene sector, with sociopolitical, social, political, recommendations for operational experience in institutional, and institutional, and operations and policies case study country(ies) economic data through economic data - ExcellentEnglishreport - Proven ability to integrate fieldwork through fieldwork preparation skills technical sanitation skills - In-depthknowledge - In-depthknowledge - Abilitytocontractand into multidisciplinary of local political, of local political and manage consultants team work, and cross- institutional, social, economic context with sociopolitical and country comparative case cultural, and with operational sanitation expertise in study analysis, including historical context with experience in case Senegal,India,Brazil, translating analytical findings operational experience study country(ies) andIndonesia into recommendations for in case study - Proven ability - Abilitytoworkin operations and policies country(ies) to integrate English,French, - ExcellentEnglishreport - Proven ability to economic skills into Portuguese, and preparation skills integrate technical multidisciplinary Indonesianorabilityto - Knowledgeofofficial skills sociopolitical team work, and contract and manage country language is highly skills into cross-country consultants who can desirable multidisciplinary team comparative work and cross- case study country comparative analysis, including case study analysis, translating analytical including translating findings into analytical findings into recommendations recommendations for for operations and operations and policies policies - ExcellentEnglishreport - ExcellentEnglish preparation skills report preparation - Knowledgeofofficial skills country language is - Knowledgeof highly desirable official country language is highly desirable General - Abilitytomanage - Strong verbal and written - Effectiveverbaland - Effectiveverbal compe- multicultural teams and Englishcommunicationskills written communication and written tencies projects and strong verbal skills in skills communication - Effectiveverbaland the languages in which the - Workseffectivelyin skills written communication consultant will be working multidisciplinary and - Workseffectively skills - Workseffectivelyin multicultural team(s) in multidisciplinary, multidisciplinary and and multicultural multicultural team(s) team(s) www.wsp.org 81 The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference AnnEx 3: rESEArch dESign As highlighted in section of annex C ("Background and countries invest so much money in treatment wor- rationale"), this ESW is a unique, innovative way of looking ks when so few people in the area have basic access at sanitation investments and service provision. It combines or a connection to the sewer? Why do IFIs subsidi- multiple disciplines to understand and manage the political ze sewerage at 100 percent, but onsite sanitation is economy of sanitation. As the PSIA methodology (Kolsky, assumed to be at the cost of the household? What Perez, Vandersypen, and Jensen 2005; World Bank 2003, really determines which urban and/or rural areas 2007),32 tested over the past six years, offers concepts, get selected for sanitation improvements? How is methods, and tools to assess both, the equity and politi- investment in sanitation perceived by households, cal economy of reforms, this work is able to draw on that central government, local government, private experienced approach to apply and refine the Conceptual sector, civil society, and international donors and Framework for the Political Economy of Reform to the lenders? What are the processes that determine the sanitation context in order to assess and address "winners answers to these questions? Who decides what, and and losers," supporters and opponents, and the capture of how can we inform/influence the process most the benefits of sanitation operations (investment and service effectively?33 provision). Below are some suggested sample questions that 2. Institutions: What are the institutional structural and the firm's project leader may use as research design to develop systemic constraints to (i) increasing allocations to sani- the standard and case-study-specific survey instruments. tation in the national budget (of the case study country); (ii) planning sanitation infrastructure; or (iii) construc- 1. Country context (historical, policy, political, legal, ting and maintaining sanitation infrastructure? institutional, sociocultural), and power relations: 3. Stakeholders: Which stakeholders have power over What is the cultural and historical background to (i) decision-making about access, collection, treatment sanitation? What is considered "adequate sanitation" (including type of sanitation service provision--wet, in each country? What are the sociocultural drivers for dry), investment (central government, local govern- or constraints to improved sanitation? Which policy ment, private sector, civil society, international donors level and which entity makes decisions on sanitation and lenders); (ii) regulation; (iii) implementation, investment and service improvement? investment, and maintenance? What common gover- a. Why do some countries not invest in sanitation at nance problems to planning and implementation does local, regional, and national levels? What are the sanitation share with other infrastructure provisioning, reasons argued in each country? How is sanitation for example, water supply? How does decentralization covered in national policy (for example, WSS, ur- affect sanitation? ban/rural development, health policy, etc)? What 4. Access: How do households manage and treat their political economy factors can be determined to sewage (pit latrines, septic network, etc.)? Do house- influence the level of sanitation investment. For holds have choices regarding different sanitation op- example, do projects yielding instantaneous payoffs tions? What incentives exist for households to connect dominate the sanitation agenda? Are national deci- to sanitation networks (if this option exists)? How sions on sanitation investment affected by electoral are these incentives perceived by households, central cycles? What are the politics of the policy making government, local government, private sector, civil process? society, and international donors and lenders? What b. How do countries that do invest, make decisions on are the real and/or perceived benefits to households, where, when, and what to invest in? Why do some local government, central government, private sector, 32 World Bank (2003, 2005, 2007). 33 Some experience shows that the Ministry of Finance rather than line ministries make sanitation decisions. 82 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Annex c - Terms of reference civil society, and international figurE c.2 PoliTicAl Economy frAmEwork donors and lenders? 5. Price and subsidies: What DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK ACTION FRAMEWORK is the willingness to pay for sanitation and how affordable REFORM CONTEXT Timing, Tailoring, is it? Who pays to meet costs/ - Economic, social, political and institutional Sequencing of reforms/operations recovery? Subsidies, taxes for context, at the sector and national level. Lending Instruments households, service providers, - Scope of proposed policy reform (reform agenda). local government, private sector, Analysis communities Rigor, M&E REFORM REFORM Transparency 6. Assets: Who owns/maintains ARENA PROCESS (Dissemination) what assets (land, wastewater treatment plant, network, etc.)? Stakeholders Dialogue & Realing How are networks established & Decision-Making Accountability Institutions Demand & Supply-Side and expanded, and what are the processes for connecting new Partnership Strategy Households? Champions & - Decision Makers Opponents - Allies 7. Employment: Are there emplo- Economic Political yment issues to consider (gain/ Interest Interest Public Debate & loss)? (rents, asset (authority, Communication capture, clientelism, Development 8. Policy dialogue: What is the etc.) etc.) Partner In uence Strategy Desig & level of debate on sanitation Implementation investment and service im- provements (access, collec- tion, treatment)? Is this debate public--where is it conducted? Source: World Bank/OPM 2008. What are the reasons for a de- bate that is not public? www.wsp.org 83 The Political Economy of Sanitation Abbreviations abbreviations BcOn Associação Brasileira das Concessiónarias Privadas dos Serviços Públicos de Água e Esgoto (Brazilian As- sociation of Private Water and Sanitation Operators) aBDiB Associação Brasileira de Infra-Estrutura e Indústrias de Base (Brazilian Infrastructure and Heavy Industry Association) aeSBe Associação das Empresas de Saneamento Básico Estaduais (Association of State Sanitation Companies, Brazil) aSean Association of Southeast Asian Nations aSSeMae Associação Nacional dos Serviços Municipais de Saneamento (National Association of Municipal Sanitation Services, Brazil) BnDeS Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (National Bank for Economic and Social Develop- ment, Brazil) caeSB Companhia de Saneamento Ambiental do Distrito Federal (Environmental Sanitation Company of the Federal District, Brazil) caiXa Caixa Econômica Federal (Federal Savings Bank, Brazil) cBO Community-based organization clTS Community-led Total Sanitation cSO Civil society organization DFiD Department for International Development (UK) eMBaSa Empresa Bahiana de Águas e Saneamento (Water and Sanitation Company of Bahia, Brazil) eSW Economic and Sector Work FUnaSa Fundação Nacional de Saúde (National Health Foundation, Brazil) GPOBa Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid iFi International financial institution iSSDP Indonesian Sanitation Sector Development Program M&e Monitoring and evaluation MDG Millennium Development Goal nGO Nongovernmental organization nPG Nirmal Gram Puraskar (Clean Village Award, India) 84 Global Practice Team of Sanitation The Political Economy of Sanitation Abbreviations OnaS Office National de l'Assainissement du Sénégal (National Sanitation Office, Senegal) OPM Oxford Policy Management Pac Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program, Brazil) PaQPUD Programme d'Assainissement des Quartiers Péri-Urbains de Dakar (Sanitation Program for Peri-urban Com- munities of Dakar, Senegal) PePaM Programme d'Eau Potable et d'Assainissement du Millénaire (Millennium Drinking Water and Sanitation Program, Senegal) PFl Partido da Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party, Brazil) PlanaSa Plano Nacional de Saneamento (National Water Supply and Sanitation Plan, Brazil) PMDB Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) PMMS Programa de Modernização do Setor Saneamento (Water Sector Modernization Project, Brazil) PrOSanear Programa de Saneamento para Populações em Áreas de Baixa Renda (Sanitation Program for Low Income Areas) PSDB Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) PSia Poverty and Social Impact Analysis PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, Brazil) SnSa Secretaria Nacional de Saneamento Ambiental (National Secretariat for Environmental Sanitation, Brazil) SOneeS Société Nationale d'Exploitation des Eaux du Sénégal (state-owned water utility prior to 1996) SOneS Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal (state asset-holding company, Senegal) UnDP United Nations Development Program UniceF United Nations Children's Fund WB World Bank WhO World Health Organization WSP Water and Sanitation Program WSP-eaP Water and Sanitation Program--East Asia and the Pacific WSS Water supply and sanitation www.wsp.org 85 86 Global Practice Team of Sanitation www.wsp.org 87 88 Global Practice Team of Sanitation