

THE WORLD BANK GROUP STAFF ASSOCIATION

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Transcript of interview with

DAMIAN VON STAUFFENBERG

**February 29, 1988
Washington, D.C.**

Interview by: Charles Ziegler

[Begin Tape 1, Side A]

ZIEGLER: Today is February 29, 1988. My name is Charles Ziegler and I have with me--here at the headquarters of the World Bank--Mr. Damian Von Stauffenberg, who joined the Bank in 1970 in the Development Finance Companies Department. He later was a lecturer at EDI [Economic Development Institute] and subsequently became a loan officer for Peru. He went on to become an investment officer in IFC [International Finance Corporation]. In 1984, he was elected Chairman of the Staff Association for the fiscal year 1984-1985. Since that time Mr. Von Stauffenberg has been the Special Assistant to the Executive Vice President of IFC. Mr. Von Stauffenberg is being interviewed for the Oral History Program of the World Bank and more particularly, for the Staff Association Oral History Project.

Damian, you were here in 1970, and the Staff Association came about a year or two afterwards. What, in your opinion, impelled the staff to create the Staff Association?

VON STAUFFENBERG: Chuck, I'm afraid I don't really know. I was an Alternate in the Delegate Assembly that drafted the Constitution. But an Alternate is not really one of the people who does the formative thinking behind the whole enterprise. I was certainly not one of the organizers. But upon reflection, the people back in, I believe it was 1972, must have realized that in an organization of our size--even in a very well managed organization which treats its employees well--there are imperfections.

Let me use an analogy. In a state with a centralized government—even one with the best of intentions--if the people have no way of expressing themselves and their grievances, they feel alienated. And the result will be disaffection and growing unrest. Something similar happens in turn in a large organization like ours, which you can compare to a fairly centralized state, certainly not a democratic state. There are grievance procedures. You can complain. There are all sorts of mechanisms, but these mechanisms don't always work. And probably more importantly, most people are reluctant to use the grievance mechanisms except in extreme situations. Under a normal but bothersome situation that doesn't threaten your life, so to speak, you would use them. But you would be unhappy and resentful. And that is where the Staff Association comes in. It's a representation of staff that can bypass the normal channels and tell top management that something works or doesn't work. That is probably the most important role of the Staff Association. And I believe something like that must have been on the minds of the founding fathers.

ZIEGLER: Yes. What initially induced you to become active in the Staff Association? I know that when it started out, virtually everybody became a member ipso facto because they were employees of the Bank, and if they objected they had to sign a statement saying they didn't want to be associated with the Staff Association. But presumably, since you ultimately became a Chairman of the Staff Association, you had a little more commitment or interest than most people.

*Damian Von Stauffenberg
February 29, 1988 – Final Edited*

VON STAUFFENBERG: I don't remember what induced me originally in 1972 to be active. I just don't remember. I remained a member, of course, but I rejoined the Delegates Assembly--I believe it was in 1980; it could have been 1979--as a delegate for IFC. And what induced me then was a feeling closely related to what I've just talked about.

By the late '70s, early '80s, we had gone through the Kafka exercise. The Bank had gone through very rapid growth in the [Robert S.] McNamara years, and it was quite clear that strain was showing in the organization. I felt that, through the Staff Association, I could probably make a difference--for how well this institution could run, for how good a place it could be.

ZIEGLER: Could you relate some of the issues surrounding the two salary increases of 1973, especially the issue of the differential? I know this goes back a long way. But I think you were active in the Staff Association at the time.

VON STAUFFENBERG: In 1973, no. No, I left the Delegate Assembly, I think in 1972, when I transferred to the EDI.

ZIEGLER: Would you want to say anything about the issue of discrimination in access to benefits? I know it was largely resolved by the time you became active again in 1980. But I think that it's an issue that is always at least potential in the Bank. Because what they can give they can also take away.

VON STAUFFENBERG: No, indeed it was resolved, I think, around 1974 or so. What I would say about that is only that now, discrimination is being reintroduced. I think that is a worrying sign.

ZIEGLER: How do you see that being reintroduced?

VON STAUFFENBERG: That certain categories of staff, support staff for instance, do not have access to the same benefits as the others. I'm now thinking of home leave. Expatriate support staff do not have access to home leave basically because the staff hires expatriates in the United States.

ZIEGLER: In 1985 during your term as Chairman of the Staff Association, you were instrumental in establishing the so-called April 1 Group, an ad hoc Staff Association task force, which had a mandate to look at the way in which the Bank does its work. It produced a short report which was sent to Mr. [Barber B.] Conable. Could you discuss some of the thinking which led to the establishment of this task force and the effects of this report, if any? For instance, might it have had an effect on the 1987 reorganization? God, we hope not.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Well, I'm afraid it might have had an impact. And we certainly, by now, don't want to be reminded of that. But the Staff Association by 1985 had become a fairly loud voice calling for reform inside the World Bank. Let's not

kid ourselves. The Staff Association by itself could not have brought about what happened later on. But that, added to other surely more important influences, led to the World Bank's or Mr. Conable's attempt to reorganize and reform the Bank. And, yes, I think we probably did have an influence on it. They did listen. They did read the introduction to the Chairman's report, which was quite a departure from the practice of previous presidents. I know that because Conable's office asked for it.

Of course, Mr. Conable came on a year after the report was produced. In the early months of his presidency, they did ask for a copy of it. And I sent them one. Of course, I've never had a reaction. I don't know what they thought about it.

But you asked what led the Staff Association into this. And that perhaps might be, more appropriately, the last question in the interview because it rather caps everything else the Staff Association does, or did at the time. It was the feeling that we can fight for salaries; we can fight for benefits; we can fight for improvements. We can fight against injustices being committed against individual staff members. But we were seeing an atmosphere where the administration was tightening by trying to squeeze pennies out of its budget. And that was a reaction to the call for greater efficiency.

The World Bank was being seen from the outside as a bloated, inefficient bureaucracy. And, of course, we vehemently denied that that was true. But all of us on the inside could see that we did not work the way we should. The Bank was not, is not, an ideal institution for its employees. Quite far from that.

And if you then have Mr. [Martijn J.W.M.] Paijmans, the Vice President of Administration, reacting to that inefficiency by trying to cut quite ridiculous items out of budgets . . . We've all seen that, a classic case of penny-wise and pound-foolish.

ZIEGLER: My wife told me today her unit can't get stationery because apparently the Bank has run out of money for stationery.

VON STAUFFENBERG: That describes the situation very well. You cut down on the newspaper budget, and the divisions can no longer have the New York Times: only the departments get it. Ridiculous things like that. Then you start going into a downward spiral. You tighten the travel budget, for instance. That's always a favorite. That's more serious. You then start saying, "Well, hell. What's going on?" You affect morale. Then you say, "Well, why should I kill myself if the Bank is trying to chisel away at quite ridiculous odds and ends?" And we could see at the time that all these fights against little cuts and economies and the larger battles for salary increases, which were part of that same war really, wouldn't lead us very far unless we could do something about the underlying problem--which we felt was the perception, but unfortunately also the reality, of the Bank.

And therefore, we decided to look at how the Bank could become more effective. The question that immediately came up in the Executive Committee and was raised by

management vociferously was why the Staff Association? What's the Staff Association got to do with effectiveness of the Bank?

ZIEGLER: I think there was some of the same type of reaction among the membership of the Staff Association also.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes.

ZIEGLER: I clearly remember some people saying that this was none of our business.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, very clearly. And we argued about that. The answer we found was that there had been quite a large number of attempts at reform inside the Bank. There had been some very promising groups formed, task forces had come up with very interesting work. The pattern was always to put the best brains the Bank had into a task force and give it the task of finding out how we could work better. And it would come up with, as you would expect, very interesting and provocative recommendations. And then those recommendations would get watered down as they made their way through the hierarchy: as vested interests had to go at those recommendations, what would come out in the end was either nothing at all--a number of times the paper just quietly disappeared, fell between the cracks--or more often what emerged had very little resemblance to the original proposal. It would be a totally bland, defanged, over-edited piece of paper.

And we had seen that happen quite often. I can give you examples. The year before we started this effort, there was the Sandstrom Report. There was also a report by Bo Cutter, an outside consultant—a report which anticipated the Country Assistance Management, the CAM process. Both of these were shot down. And we could see that management did not have the will to change.

Sometimes parts of management felt that something had to be done and took the initiative. But they would not be strong enough to carry the proposal through because other parts of management, ultimately top management, would find a way of taking the sting out of the recommendations, of making them ineffective. That's very dangerous for an institution: if an institution loses the ability to reform itself from the inside, it is on a dangerous, downhill path. The Bank definitely was on that path.

And we had the feeling that the Staff Association should take advantage of its independent position--where nobody in management could really tell it what to do or not to do--and try to become an agent for change. So much hinges on the outcome for staff! We could see that only if the Bank took a serious attempt at reform could these underlying problems, which were leading to more and more staff dissatisfaction, be removed. We found, yes, the Staff Association had a role, and the way we set it up, assumed that role, was to keep it semi-autonomous from the Staff Association. We did not want it to be clearly a Staff Association initiative, to exclude staff management. We did not want that the initiative would be, from the outset, pooh-poohed by top management. So we set up a group and called it the April 1 Group for no other reason than that we couldn't think of a better name.

ZIEGLER: You started on April 1st.

VON STAUFFENBERG: We happened to start on April 1st. And besides, we felt anybody who even thought about trying to reform the Bank must be totally mad. This must be an April Fool's joke. So we called it the April 1 Group. The April 1 Group was really a task force set up by the Staff Association Executive Committee (EC), but it was composed mostly of people from outside the Staff Association. Not all of them were even members of the Staff Association, as far as we know. And they were from all levels: there were managers, directors, deputy directors, divisional managers, and division chiefs.

ZIEGLER: So you did get some fairly senior people involved in all this?

VON STAUFFENBERG: Oh, yes. [William J.] Cosgrove was in the group--I'll come to that in a moment, because his involvement had ironic consequences. But again, many members of management shared our concern. This was not only a Staff Association concern, but also a concern of staff in the World Bank. And since we kept a dotted line relationship with the Staff Association, members of management felt that they could--and wanted to--participate. So that's a long-winded answer to your question. Do you want to stay on this topic, Chuck, and pursue it, do you want to talk about what went on, what came out of it, how it fared?

ZIEGLER: I think so.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Since we started on it, we might as well pursue it. In April 1985, our Executive Committee still had three months to serve before Staff Association elections in June. And by that time, we hoped to have some results. So we in the April 1 Group started with a series of brainstorming sessions where everybody was encouraged to toss out ideas. First, we defined the ills; we tried to get a handle on what was wrong. As often happens with brainstorming, what started out quite chaotically ended up very interesting. We got an immense list, of course, of things people complained about. But after about three or four of these brainstorming sessions, the complaints seemed to fall into certain categories.

ZIEGLER: I attended a couple of those. I remember them.

VON STAUFFENBERG: But we were overtaken by the end of our term. We had finished the brainstorming, and we had started defining those areas which we needed to look at more seriously and where we thought we could come up with recommendations, when the leadership of the Staff Association changed. And I don't want to imply that my successor ended this effort. In fact, as I remember, she supported it.

ZIEGLER: Yes.

VON STAUFFENBERG: It was more, I guess, that somebody had to take the initiative. And I suppose I had taken the initiative while I was the Chairman of the Staff

Association, but I then went on to do something else, as I was in an awkward position to continue with this activity. And so, I withdrew from it. And the April 1 Group then, I'm afraid, sort of fell apart because nobody held it together and carried on.

ZIEGLER: But it did produce a short report which ultimately went to Mr. Conable, as the new President of the World Bank.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, that was a bit different. What it produced first--its only published piece of paper--was the introduction to the Annual Report of the 1984-1985 Executive Committee. It was a letter I wrote. It carried my signature. Those two pages contained the findings of the April 1 Group and presented the theme of the two realities--probably the strongest message we got out of the brainstorming. The one reality is out in the field where we deal with development, where staff members carry very wide responsibility. That contrasts with the other, internal reality of the Bank: the many clearances, of bureaucratic superstructure. As a result, the same staff member who, maybe a week before, has sat with a minister and advised him on how to frame his country's policies is, once he comes back to Headquarters, not even allowed to sign a letter acknowledging receipt of another letter. It's as extreme as that. And with it is the phenomenon that missions quite often know fairly precisely what they're going to recommend by the time they come back from the field, will spend many, many months--nine months, one year on average--in pushing their ideas through the internal bureaucracy where their proposals usually do not get changed much. Quite often they don't get changed at all. What gets done in the end is exactly what had been proposed by the mission. But nonetheless, it takes months and months of discussions of covers, of writing. And much of that effort, it seemed to the members of our group, had not to do with improving the idea, improving the substance of what they came back with, but was rather dedicated to improving the wording of the report that went to the Board, to deciding exactly how to present the proposal to the Board so that they didn't touch on a sensitivity? This was the kind of concern being addressed by this long drafting process.

This introduction to the Annual Report was not, by the way, sanctioned by the April 1 Group. I put my name on it because I felt it was unfair to expose members of management, oblige them to say that they had produced these ideas. We felt that one man had to take the responsibility and that the Chairman of the Staff Association was in the best position to do so.

ZIEGLER: It didn't necessarily make you terribly popular in all quarters, did it?

VON STAUFFENBERG: No, it came at an awkward moment. The Annual Report, the draft of the Annual Report, appeared in early September 1985. And we had, of course, the agreement to show everything to management that goes to all staff, not for clearance but for information. And management had the same agreement with the Staff Association. Anything they sent to all staff of an administrative sort or personnel nature was shown to the Staff Association beforehand.

And when we showed our Annual Report to management, there was an instant and fairly wild reaction. I remember being hauled into Mr. [Moeen A.] Qureshi's office. He was then the acting President--Mr. Clausen was out of town--and there were two long sessions with Mr. Qureshi where he tried to prevail on us to withdraw the letter. I think this was preceded by our session with Mr. Paijmans, who had passed us on to Mr. Qureshi.

ZIEGLER: When you say "us," you mean not only you.

VON STAUFFENBERG: No, in all these cases I was accompanied either by Donneve Rae, who was my successor, or by Shigeo Katsu who was the Vice Chairman of the Staff Association under my Administration. And there was strong pressure from the acting President, who was very concerned that the gist of what we had written in this introduction would be on the front page of the New York Times the next day. We didn't share his concern. We felt that if it were on the front page of the New York Times it would not be disastrous; there was nothing terribly damaging. But mainly, we felt it was highly unlikely. We didn't think that anybody on the outside would care all that much about our internal travails.

The conflict then escalated further a few days later when Mr. Clausen came back. Shigeo and I were hauled into Mr. Clausen's office, and again, the same thing happened. Mr. Clausen was quite worried. In fact, he was more blunt than Mr. Qureshi had been in his demands that we withdraw this letter. And he questioned our authority; his implication was that this was really none of our business. I believe what was behind his objection was that this was happening on the eve of the Seoul Annual Meetings at which the successor to Mr. Clausen, whose term was coming to an end, was expected to be chosen.

ZIEGLER: And he wasn't.

VON STAUFFENBERG: No. I guess Mr. Clausen, at that time, still hoped to run for a second term. And, of course, he didn't want this kind of publicity. But we stuck to our guns. We felt that we couldn't keep quiet, that we were right. And so we published it. It came out during the Annual Meetings at the end of September. The impact was minimal because I think very few people actually read the Annual Report of the Staff Association. Management was much more excited about it than anybody else, I'll bet.

ZIEGLER: This leads me to one question we haven't discussed. As I said before, you didn't necessarily make yourself terribly popular among management. And yet, retrospectively, it wouldn't appear that your career has suffered. What I'm trying to get at is not so much a personal thing, but is there scope for a Chairman or anybody who's active in the Staff Association to be principled and independent and not suffer professional suicide, so to speak.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, I think the answer very clearly is yes. And not only my case demonstrates that. There are quite a few cases of Chairmen of the Staff Association not making themselves popular with management during their tenure with the Staff

Association, but whose careers did not seem to have suffered, who went on to be promoted and to make careers at the Bank. In that sense, the Bank is not vindictive. I think the Bank realizes that a person must do his job. And that being the Chairman of the Staff Association includes fighting with management. That's inevitable. And if you don't do it as Chairman you're not doing your job. In management's favor, I must say that they are enlightened in that sense. I've never had any indication that anybody was holding a grudge against me.

ZIEGLER: That's encouraging anyway. We can move to another topic, one of our favorites. Job grading was a contentious issue during your term as Chairman. Could you discuss some of the basic issues from the Staff Association's point of view?

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, job grading was one of those cases where you have a technically complicated subject, which the public and staff and management at large don't really understand. Only very few people understand the sort of intricacies, the deeper problems of job grading. The issue of job grading had been simmering along for over a year by the time our Executive Committee was elected in June of 1984. And there was an active Job Grading Working Group. And when we took over I, quite frankly, was not aware of the dangers lurking in job grading. On the contrary, I felt that it was a rather reasonable proposition when it was explained to me, the idea that you evaluate the content of the job and then try to design a grade structure where equal things are treated equally. It seemed basic justice that somebody who carries more responsibilities or does a more difficult job should be better rewarded than somebody who does an easier job or one with lesser responsibilities. So the concept seemed close to motherhood and apple pie. It seemed unassailable. And I think, because of the plausibility of the concept, it went as far as it did without being attacked.

It took me personally a few months to get deep enough into job grading to see that, under this very plausible surface, there was--it would not be exaggerated to say--a nightmare of complications and inconsistencies and outright injustices. The people who converted me were members of that Job Grading Working Group, but maybe Shigeo Katsu and Ann Hammond were the first ones to really see through it.

In the early fall of 1984 the Executive Committee of the Staff Association--after quite heated discussions and meetings with Reg [Reginald A.] Clarke, the Director of Compensation, and nearly constant meetings with Dan [Daniel G.] Ritchie, who had been put in charge of job grading and was a very reasonable man, somebody who inspires confidence--finally reached the conclusion that the Staff Association could not go along with job grading. It was going to do serious harm to staff, and we would have to attack it.

And I believe it was in October or November of 1984 that we sent out three newsletters in which the Staff Association took a quite uncompromising position against job grading. In fact, one of them was headed something like: This Exercise Must Stop.

ZIEGLER: This ties into a specific question I have. What were some of the considerations which led to that sort of decision? It seems to me that it's almost as if you

closed the door on something, whereas, traditionally, the Staff Association has tried to co-operate, and you personally, I think . .

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes.

ZIEGLER: . . have tried to at least keep the door open, so to speak. And from what I remember from reading those statements, the Staff Association essentially just slammed the door and said no.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes.

ZIEGLER: Essentially it almost closed itself out of the process.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Almost. Not quite. We closed ourselves out of the process on the surface. We refused to cooperate. And we refused to consult with management. There were consultations, of course, under the surface. Those went on all the time. But we came to see by the fall of 1984 that we were probably too late, that we had reached our conclusion probably a year too late. By then, job grading was about to be implemented. Management thought they would implement it by the end of the year. It actually took much longer, but it was to be done. We didn't rate our chances of putting a stop to it very high, but we were convinced that this job grading was going to be bad for staff. The Staff Association had to be on record as against it, and we felt: better late than never.

ZIEGLER: I certainly would not put myself up as a job grading expert. But since that time, I've had to do a little reading on the subject for my own Staff Association work. And it strikes me that even systems such as the Hay System are often attacked by those advocating other job grading methods and that, in almost any sort of job grading, you have a considerable number of subjective factors. It strikes me as all very insidious. As you said, from what you hear at the beginning the concept is like motherhood and apple pie: it would be almost insane to go against it. But the closer you look, there's a lot more subjectivity involved than you are led to believe. Do you get the impression that management was aware of these necessarily subjective factors? Or did they seem to think that they had an objective tool by which they could actually do a successful job-grading exercise? In other words, were there any predispositions? There can even be built-in biases in the job grading. The consultant can almost tailor it to what the management, or the client even, wants to come out of it.

VON STAUFFENBERG: We heard from quite a number of managers, usually indirectly through others who got word to us, saying that we were on the right track, that they thought this job grading was nonsense. But Mr. Paijmans, who was our counterpart really, our top counterpart, sounded to us like a very convinced advocate of job grading. I'm not sure that deep down in his heart, he really believed what he was doing, but he certainly sounded as if he did believe it.

ZIEGLER: I'm interviewing him. At least I'm scheduled to.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Maybe now that he has left the Bank, he will be prepared to reveal that he wasn't a wholehearted supporter. But I remember having very bitter discussions with Martijn before the first of the three newsletters hit the public--bitter in the sense that Pajmans saw that it would not help at all, to put it mildly, to have the Staff Association go on full attack. And it seemed to me at the time that he was convinced that he was doing the right thing.

His protest had very much the air of: "Look here, we're trying to do something sensible for the staff. And you fellows in the Staff Association are being irresponsible. You're really hurting staff by going against it." That was the line taken by Pajmans at the time.

ZIEGLER: My impression--and my impression comes in somewhat later than yours because I served on the EC after your term had ended--but it struck me in the discussions I attended with him just as a member of a group that he was trying to protect the staff from the Board. I always felt he was a decent sort, that he had his eye very clearly on the Board and was using job grading to protect the staff from further depredations by the Board. I mean, the idea that job grading might be bad, but, hey, you guys watch what the Board is going to do to you if we don't have it. That's the sense I got, but it's no more than that.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Since you mention it, yes, that was an argument he used quite frequently, that it was something mandated by the Board. I doubt that the Board itself took the initiative. Since then I've worked quite a lot with the Board, and I doubt that it was "mandated," in quotation marks. The Board does not mandate these sorts of things. The Board usually reacts to something management suggests. I don't know what the facts are in the case. But it might have come in handy at some stage to deflect some criticism in the Board.

ZIEGLER: What effect did this call to stop job grading have on relations with management during the rest of your term? You said relations went on sort of under the surface with regard to job grading. But this is, at least potentially, a very bitter controversy. What about your other relations with management? There are more things than job grading in any term.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Again, management is very pragmatic. I did not feel that my stand hurt our relations with management. Okay, there were bitter clashes. I remember feeling deeply dejected when leaving Mr. Pajmans' office after that one session before our newsletter went out. Because there was not a shred of agreement anywhere. It seemed that this was a bitter, nearly personal fight. And usually, when these fights got very bitter, we were reminded that the Staff Association really received considerable financial support from management: that we had a rent-free office and two staff years of time paid by management. And, of course, in a time of budgetary constraints, that could not be taken for granted. So there was quite a lot of pressure, but frankly, it did not impair our ability to talk to management and to deal with it. There was no break all across the land: in other areas, it was business as usual.

ZIEGLER: I have another question. But I'll keep this simple.

[End Tape 1, Side A]

[Begin Tape 1, Side B]

ZIEGLER: What sort of role did the many working groups that the Staff Association sponsored play during your term as Chairman of the Staff Association?

VON STAUFFENBERG: Well, there was a very wide variety of working groups, as is always the case. There were some very active working groups, some very productive working groups, some very unproductive ones. The active ones were not necessarily the productive ones, by the way. They don't necessarily go hand in hand.

On the whole, the working group structure was fairly weak, as was the Staff Association itself. I always felt it was a bit of a shoestring operation. We certainly did not have the resources of management. It was very much a David-against-Goliath kind of relationship, except that Goliath was genuinely afraid, I think, to be hit by David's stone. So that gave David a certain power.

Of the working groups, probably the Job Grading Working Group was strongest. But even it, I think, had dug itself into detail, by going very deeply into and working very hard on intricate, sort of technical problems of job grading. By staring intently at individual trees, it was in danger of not seeing the woods. The working group as a group had not really told the Executive Committee, "Look, this is real trouble, be careful." It had not really enabled the Executive Committee to make the political judgment. It was more the individual members who, in the end, pulled together all these trees.

ZIEGLER: Individual members of the working group.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Well, there was one member of the working group who did. That was Ann Hammond, who is Staff Association Chairman now. And then Shigeo Katsu, who was the EC liaison to that working group, who then pulled together those threads and reached a conclusion. I think that probably a generic problem with working groups is their tendency to get bogged down in detail so that they no longer see the whole on which the Staff Association has to act.

ZIEGLER: I think one of the solutions there would be to make sure that the working group reports regularly to the EC, which needs to keep the wider picture.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes. But, in this case, this was not a problem. Everybody recognized that job grading was an important topic. That EC was in constant touch with that working group. But the topic was so complicated that a layman could not really see--at least I couldn't, and my colleagues on the EC couldn't--what we should have seen. A picture didn't emerge from what the working group was telling us. That was the problem. And that was probably why we were so late.

ZIEGLER: As you said, it was complicated and subtle. And it's easy to be seduced by some of the promises of job grading. You have to be very careful of the biases and assumptions being made in the course of the exercise.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, absolutely. Now, another working group was the Status of Women--well, you know that was not terribly active. Let me think. They did a survey, and they did some good work on that. And--there was the support--how was it called? The support staff . . .

ZIEGLER: Professional Support Staff Working Group.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Right. That started out as a very active working group because of the differential in the 1984 salary increase. And I remember, close to the beginning of my tenure as Chairman, there was an assembly in the Eugene Black Auditorium to protest this differential salary increase, which had just been announced. And I had to field that roomful of mostly very upset support staff. By roomful, I mean a few hundred. They demanded to hear from management.

I then arranged for a second session a few days later in the Black Auditorium where Pajmans and Clarke were present to answer questions. That was a difficult session, too, because the level of emotion was rather high. But because of that session, we decided to create a group that would put together a black book to document the grievances of support level staff. It was quite clear that there were deep grievances, that this was not just disappointment at getting 1 or 2 percent less salary increase than the rest of the staff. That had been the spark which set off a powder keg of dissatisfaction and frustration that was not so much money related, I suspect.

And a very good group started working. But, as far as I know, it never produced anything in the end.

ZIEGLER: Well, finally in October 1987 there might have been a break.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes.

ZIEGLER: In 1987 a report was produced. In fact, at the next meeting of the Delegate Assembly, it's going to be discussed.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Oh, I see.

ZIEGLER: But many of us view it, unfortunately, as deeply flawed, even though many of the grievances it documents are quite real.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes.

ZIEGLER: The manner of presentation leaves a lot to be desired.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes. Well, that's unfortunate. The situation was defused at the time by pushing it into committee. That's a time-honored way of doing it. That sounds a bit callous, but I was, throughout my term as Chairman, quite keenly aware of this danger to the Staff Association.

In fact, I saw it as the chief danger to the Staff Association, this rift among its members due to different interests among support staff and higher level staff. It also acquired a dimension of male-female dissension because most of the support staff are women and most of the higher level staff are men. So that kind of tension was coming in as well. Are we treating women badly because they are women, or because they are secretaries?

ZIEGLER: Well, what would you say to this: that the chief danger is perhaps not so much that the Staff Association will not be sympathetic to, or conscious of, some of these very real grievances on the part of support staff, or women, or whatever group you choose to pick, but rather that the Staff Association will be seen to be ineffective in addressing these concerns. And to an extent, it's not the Staff Association's fault: it's an advisory group, and management can tell it to forget it.

VON STAUFFENBERG: What I was afraid of was a split in the Staff Association. I think we were not terribly far away from that at the time, since the support staff felt that the Staff Association was dominated by a bunch of professionals who didn't really care what happened to it.

ZIEGLER: And the perception, as opposed to the reality, would have been, on the part of the support staff, that the Staff Association was not taking their grievances seriously.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes.

ZIEGLER: And addressing them.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Well, not only perception. The Staff Association had made a proposal in that 1984 salary round. When I came in as Chairman, I got the wrath of many of the support staff members in the Eugene Black Auditorium, because the Staff Association had, in fact, recommended a differential salary increase. The Staff Association had recommended a higher percentage increase for both, but it had accepted the principle of a differential salary increase. So the Staff Association was seen as partly responsible for what had happened. We had ceded the principle of equal salary increase.

ZIEGLER: In general, what negotiating tactics and strategy did you use with management during your term as Chairman? Not necessarily just you personally, but the EC more collectively.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Let me try to think. There was not a very worked-out negotiating tactic. One thing we believed in was pragmatism. We didn't want to be too dogmatic, even though our stand on job grading may sound dogmatic. But that was an extreme case. In the end we had to come up with solutions, because we wanted to have a

better-functioning bank. That does not mean we couldn't have a few fights, even public fights. Excessive pragmatism would probably have led us to finding solutions without making many waves.

But the greatest threat to the Staff Association is apathy from staff. The Staff Association on paper represents most staff members. In reality, the overwhelming majority, I would say way over 90 percent, don't think about the Staff Association. They're barely aware it exists. It's sort of a very distant thing. And that is a great danger for the Staff Association. Management isn't aware of it, most of the time. What the Staff Association has to do is remind staff every now and then what it's doing. It's not good enough for the Staff Association to do very useful work behind the scenes because the apathy will only increase. It has to show staff that it really can represent staff's interests effectively, and that necessitates a good fight with management every now and then.

ZIEGLER: Just for show, if nothing else.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Really just for show. The public part is for show. The substance of the fight might be for real, but you have a choice: Do you want to make it public, or do you want to deal with it in private? It may even, in some cases, be more effective to deal with it in private, but you choose to make it public. And that is part of a tactic in dealing with management. It is also a good way of reminding management that it needs to consult with you. That's easier to do if management hasn't consulted. Then you can hit them in public, and the implication is that if they had consulted with you, this wouldn't have happened.

Otherwise, we had no strategy, no very thought-out way of dealing with management. We could very rarely see from one day to the next what was going to happen. Most of the crises erupted quite unexpectedly. But you did not jeopardize your working relationship because, in the end, you had to work with each other. Both sides knew that. But you also could not shrink away from a good fight. I would sum it up in those terms.

ZIEGLER: Who were some of the managers with whom you dealt? And what sort of a working relationship did you have with them? From what I know, it was kind of a colorful crew.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Well, yes. The main, well, the highest level relationship was with Pajmans. Not that he was the man we saw most. We saw more of Reg Clarke and Mel Ray, who was the head of the IRMD [Information Resources Management Department] at the time.

ZIEGLER: Did you have a lot to do with Mel Ray at that time?

VON STAUFFENBERG: We had quite a lot to do with him really. He insisted on having at least a monthly meeting just to brief us on what he was doing.

ZIEGLER: That's interesting.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Because they were, at the time, working on a fairly sweeping proposal for our office technology. And they were aware that they needed support of the staff to get it accepted.

ZIEGLER: So that was the basis for his felt need for consultation?

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, from our side we saw that need, and we tried to respond to it through our Office Technology Working Group, which was not very active, I'm afraid. So we were not really able to interact with him on substance very much. But as it happened, IRMD was also fairly rife with dissent and dissatisfaction, and there were jobs being cut there. So that gave plenty to talk about. But others, well, I had quite a lot of dealing with Reg Clarke, because that's the bread and business of the Staff Association: the benefits, the staff rules, the compensation.

ZIEGLER: How did you find him to deal with across the table?

VON STAUFFENBERG: Oh, very good. Reg Clarke was accomplished in his way of doing things—I don't mean he was accomplished in the technical sense, although he was probably accomplished in that way as well. But he had elevated to an art form the way of playing the politics of getting what he wanted on the compensation side. He was squeezed between the Board; his superiors, Paijmans and Clausen; and the Staff Association. So he was playing at least a three-way game—there may have been other dimensions I wasn't aware of. And he did that like a true artist, I must say. His initial attempt, which was quite the right one, was to get the confidence of the Staff Association and to get as close to it as he possibly could. Fairly soon, we hit areas where we just couldn't agree, where this closeness didn't work. And then the tone changed a bit and became sometimes friendly, sometimes not so friendly. We sometimes had real battles with him.

ZIEGLER: And Martijn Paijmans, too, you would have met with him a number of times. I always thought of him as a fairly candid and straight-forward sort, basically speaking. Did that come through to you, also?

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes. I had high regard for Martijn. How candid he is I'm not quite sure, but I don't think you can be totally candid in that job. There's just too much politics involved. But I had high regard for Martijn's dedication. I think he really took seriously what he was doing. Very, very seriously in fact. And what I felt spoke for him was particularly in his dealing with individual hardship cases, which land in the lap of the Staff Association. There was always a steady flow of people who had been wronged, who couldn't get justice through the normal grievance procedures, and who then came and knocked on the Staff Association's door. And some of these cases were really quite bad, quite horrible. The Bank's systems had failed. And quite often the solution was to go to Martijn and point out to him that somebody had fouled up, that somebody was being treated very shabbily and probably contrary to the Bank's own rules.

And in all those cases Martijn would respond very quickly. Martijn was extremely busy; he had a very full schedule. But he would respond within a matter of a day or two and give real time. He would sit down with someone for an hour or even two and listen to the story to get the details of what happened. And that, I thought, showed that he was dedicated. I thought that was very good of him.

Otherwise, he was very pragmatic. He had a sense of humor and recognized a fight for what it was. I mean, he can fight with you on one level, and you can deal with him on another level. So he was quite good to work with.

While we're on the topic of Martijn, I think he also recognized, had that wisdom that made him see, that having a Staff Association, uncomfortable as it is—and it's terribly uncomfortable, I'm sure, for someone in his position--in the end is a good thing. And he very much insisted that his managers consult with the Staff Association, and he insisted that the Staff Association be brought into the formulation of personnel policies and of compensation policies at an early stage because he generally felt that out of the tension between management's point of view and Staff Association's point of view, you get a better product. I'm not sure whether his successors have quite seen it that well yet.

ZIEGLER: I don't think so. It's interesting that you say that because at least twice I have personally heard him stress the importance of the Staff Association and how a viable, strong Staff Association is important to the Bank. In a sense, what I heard him say and what I interpreted was that it was almost a counterpoise to the Board's pressure on management. I mean, the management and Board can fight it out, but management should at least point and say, "Well, the Staff Association is concerned about these points also." And if we're a coherent, responsive organization, there are advantages for management.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, that's exactly right. Let me add an anecdote here that concerns Cosgrove. When I had the session with Clausen in September or October 1985, where Clausen was very upset about the Staff Association's Annual Report and applied hard pressure to have it withdrawn, Pajmans was out of town and Cosgrove was the acting Vice President of Administration. So he was in on that meeting. And it was quite embarrassing because Cosgrove, of course, had been a member of the April 1 Group and was, to a good part, responsible for the ideas. He had not seen the text, he had had no hand in drafting it, and I'd not asked him when I drafted it. But he was responsible and he had to admit it. At one stage--I don't remember how it came up, but it came up--Cosgrove had to say, yes, he was part of this effort.

ZIEGLER: Earlier on, you alluded to the question of staff apathy, which, by the way, I gather from other interviews I've conducted, is not a new thing. You can take this back to 1974, 1973 even. But one of the things you would have had to have done is mobilized staff support, at least to some extent. How did you try to get the staff more involved or try to mobilize support for the Staff Association?

VON STAUFFENBERG: For one thing, we tried to enliven the Delegate Assembly, tried to make it interesting and worth the while of those going there. That was not always

easy. One way of doing that was to keep the meetings down to an hour and try to cut down on the endless debates, which were interesting for a few but deadly for everybody else. Another was to introduce a written Chairman's report for every Delegate Assembly meeting so that the Chairman didn't have to sit up there and give a monologue. The hope was that the Delegates would pass the report around, so that it would circulate around the Bank. I don't think that that really happened, but that was the thought behind it.

ZIEGLER: It's still a good thought. I mean, if the Delegates don't pass the report around, it's their fault, not the fault of the Staff Association as such.

VON STAUFFENBERG: I also thought that Staff Matters, the Staff Association publication, would have been an excellent thing, potentially very powerful tool to keep staff interested and knowing what's going on in the Staff Association, if it is done right. It's ironic that Staff Matters folded when I was Chairman. In fact, I let it fold in its original form at the time the editor, Martin King, either withdrew or left the Bank, I forget which.

ZIEGLER: I think he left the Bank.

VON STAUFFENBERG: And we then needed a new editor, and I felt that Staff Matters as it had existed was just too tame, too bland. We needed something more hard-hitting. Staff was overfed with written communication. You could not just send another written piece of paper to them: it had to be something that would grab their attention. We had various attempts to launch something, and we never were successful. But that potentially would be something very powerful for the Staff Association to use. I think an indication of its potential power was how much concerned management was about it. When Staff Matters was launched, there was very strong management opposition to it.

ZIEGLER: Reflecting back, what would you summarize as your successes as Chairman of the Staff Association? Obviously, we touched on some of this in the course of this discussion, but perhaps you could summarize here a little bit. What was good? And what would you have liked to have done better?

VON STAUFFENBERG: I would have liked to have realized earlier that job grading was going to be a disaster. I think I started in early July as Chairman, and it took me some four months or so to see the light. And these were four very precious months. We might have accomplished much more if we had reacted immediately.

I would have liked to have changed the Constitution, which was then subsequently done. I felt it was very unfortunate that the Constitution mandated elections in June, in the heat of the compensation problem. My own example where I took over, I think one or two days after the compensation decisions were announced and had to really live with the heat of the moment and with the situation that had been created by others left an impression.

What other things done better . . . I did not really succeed in making the Delegate Assembly much more lively. And more serious than that, I did not succeed in making the Delegate Assembly really representative. It is still not representative.

ZIEGLER: In what sense, Damian?

VON STAUFFENBERG: I think few Delegates really see themselves, and are seen by their constituents, as representatives of their constituents. They go there because of personal interest, not because they represent concerns of others. That is a big weakness, a big structural weakness. In the old wisdom, the Staff Association is only as strong as its members make it. If 90 percent of the members are totally unconcerned, that's not a strong position.

The Staff Association was really a shoestring operation. And I'm afraid it has remained a shoestring operation. I was not able to change a lot. Some of the public confrontations with management, I think, strengthened the Staff Association by giving it a higher profile, but that is a fleeting sort of strength. That's an impression that might last a few weeks, months if you're lucky, but it's not a lasting improvement.

Other weaknesses? Oh, I'm sure there are very many. We did not really deal effectively with the problem of the rift between support staff and higher level staff. Rather, we relied upon the working group to work on the problem. We should have recognized a rift that could have threatened the existence of the Association; it probably deserved more attention and more active addressing than we gave it.

ZIEGLER: In your defense, though, if I can put it that way, I've come to recognize how difficult it is, the position of Chairman, because you're dealing with a volunteer organization. If you take a look at the other side of the table, look at some of the difficulties management has, and they have sanctions that they can apply and far more resources. And yet, their problems go on and on--in any organization, not only just at the Bank. And to be Chairman of an organization that's almost totally volunteer is a very difficult position to be in under the best of circumstances.

VON STAUFFENBERG: All right. Yes, but then you have to deal with the fundamental problem--to somehow make yourself more representative of staff--and that we were not able to do. I think that's going to be the challenge for all the Staff Associations and for all the Executive Committees.

ZIEGLER: And it's something you have to keep doing.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes.

ZIEGLER: You can't say, "Oh, we have done it," and it's done. It's a continuing process.

VON STAUFFENBERG: That's quite right. There's no one solution to the problem. It's a continuous fight. If you slack off on that fight, then you go downhill. Now, before I talk

about things that worked well, let me say that one solution we had to this problem of getting really technically competent and hard-working working groups was to hire experts in the salary field. We felt being technically competent on specific issues was very critical. Remember that during my tenure the Joint Committee on Compensation was formed. It started to devise the so-called Kafka II formula. Everyone thought that by the end of fiscal 1984, the Kafka II results would be in. And so we felt we had to deal with this issue.

ZIEGLER: For the record, it's now February 1988 and the Committee's still going on.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, we certainly did not foresee that, nor did anybody else, quite frankly. So we probably started a trend that has become stronger and stronger: you substitute money for staff commitment for volunteer work. I make it sound worse than it is; it may be the right thing to do if you do it well. We hired consultants. We hired a compensation consultant and had him do the technical work of writing working papers. We felt that the Staff Association had to be an equal partner with that joint committee, equal in that the Staff Association had to be a resource that the joint committee could draw on as much as it drew on management. So to establish the credentials of the Staff Association as a body that knows something about the topic of compensation, we commissioned those working papers, which were done by a consultant.

The other area in which the Staff Association substituted money and consultants' services for staff volunteer work was in the salary field. We went to court, to the Administrative Tribunal--that had been done before, by the way--to protest against the salary decision in 1984 and spent very considerable amounts of money on legal fees. I think that hiring consultants outside the Bank has been a trend which is becoming stronger and stronger. Fortunately, the Staff Association has money, so it can afford the cost.

ZIEGLER: What, in your view, should be the role of the Staff Association in the Bank? Again, this is more a summing up question because we have touched on the Staff Association's role at several points here.

VON STAUFFENBERG: I haven't gotten around to the successes of the Staff Association. Let me brag a bit as well. I've only talked about the things that went wrong. The successes are not quite as easy: not that many that come to mind.

I think the April 1 Group was a success even though, in view of the Bank's reorganization, I mean for you to take that with a grain of salt. If we contributed to the reorganization in some small way, that is nothing to be proud of right now. But the underlying concern is still very valid. In that sense we did the right thing. And it was quite good to be able to rally the staff at so many levels--up to higher management levels from an effort sponsored by the Staff Association. That's not bad. I think that's an achievement. I think, on the whole, the Staff Association was alive during that year. Staff awareness of the Staff Association, I would guess, was certainly not lower in June 1985 than it had been in June 1984. That's not bad. And a tangible achievement was the childcare center which management, for years and years, had opposed, had just refused to

consider. And for some reason, I don't know what, we managed to get agreement from Pajmans that we could go ahead and set up a childcare center.

ZIEGLER: Not without its controversies, however. I remember that as one of the first major issues that came up when I was in my first term on the Executive Committee. We took a good look at the costs, and we found, I guess to our dismay, or at least certainly to the dismay of some people, that the actual costs were going to be far greater than had been anticipated. Not that the Staff Association should not have supported it or that it wasn't a success. But it did, in and of itself, become an area of controversy because the costs had risen tremendously over 13 years. I checked that out. It took 13 years from the initial suggestion to the final implementation.

VON STAUFFENBERG: That final implementation was some time in late 1984, as I remember. Management gave in. We made it a priority because we felt it was right and reasonable. And management, to our surprise quite frankly, went along. We did not focus all that much on how it was going to be done, but more on that it should be done. We certainly didn't see the Staff Association as financing it. That was quite clear. The childcare center had a very active grassroots support group, but the group lacked the political clout to carry it through alone. That's where they needed the Staff Association. So that's another one.

There was another issue in very early 1985 when management changed expatriate benefits by introducing a point system for travel. We fought that one because we felt it was much too complicated and would lead to confusion. I think, in hindsight, events have borne us out. We were not able to prevent the change. Our success was our statement of protest to the Board, which I believe put the Staff Association on the map in the Board members' eyes. The timing was not bad because it was a few months before the salary discussions started. And we were told we were not allowed to participate in the discussion of that statement. We had to trot out after delivering the statement that . . .

ZIEGLER: Which is typical, of course.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Which is typical and which is bad.

ZIEGLER: Makes no sense.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, the Staff Association really should try and get that abolished. Because what then happens is the Staff Association makes a statement, and sympathetic directors pick up parts of the statement. And then management is free to take it apart because there's nobody to defend it. That happens regularly. In this case I understand that there was quite a lot of support for the Staff Association's position, so that was a success. But I guess that's probably . . .

Let me stop there as far as the achievements go.

ZIEGLER: It's a good record. We were going to discuss what the role of the Staff Association should be in the Bank which, of course, we've touched on throughout this discussion. But a good summary would be very helpful and enlightening.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Well, the Staff Association is not a union. That's always a good way of defining what something is: by finding out what it is not. It's not a union in that we have no bargaining powers. It's as simple as that. Of course, we can, and we do, sit down with management and discuss, and there is give and take and a compromise is reached. And the compromise is implemented. In that sense there is bargaining. But if the Staff Association were a union, management would have to go through this process. It would be legally or contractually required to do so. As it is now, it is not.

Management does it if it's enlightened. If it forgets, well, it has forgotten. The Staff Association can then yell and holler. But there's no contractual right to be consulted. That is the big difference from a union.

The Staff Association, or something like it, is absolutely necessary, I think, because the Bank just has grown to the size where so many things go wrong. If you're in the Staff Association as you were, Chuck, you see them go wrong. On the personal level, with individuals and also institutionally, things just go wrong. That's human nature. It's not that the Bank is a particularly bad employer. It's just going to happen. The more corrective channels you have and the more voices that yell when something goes wrong, the better your institution is going to be in the end, I believe. As long as these voices . . . All right, they could end up in chaos, they could be destructive, but I think that danger is quite remote in our case. The danger is more the opposite, that the voices will not be heard, that the organization will go like a steamroller in the direction it wants to go and overlook reality, overlook what doesn't work.

Again, job grading is a good case in point. I've since then witnessed the application of job grading—in IFC in my case, but I'm sure this does not only apply to IFC--and it is deplorable. It is really terrible. I've seen case after case where job descriptions were manufactured to bring about the desired result. The whole system for all its apparent beauty is really having mostly negative results, I would say, because it ties people into bureaucratic rigidity. I think here that the Bank would have been better off if it had listened to those warning voices.

There's a good illustration of why you need a Staff Association. Inside management, as I mentioned at the beginning, I believe, many people supported our opposition to job grading but were unable to say so. It was something that was mandated from the top. No dissent was tolerated.

ZIEGLER: You said support of Staff Association against job grading.

VON STAUFFENBERG: That's right. Yes, many managers shared the Staff Association's opposition to job grading, but could not say so. In the official organization there was no way of bringing up concerns about what the effects of job grading would be.

Only had the Staff Association was independent. Nobody could tell it to be quiet, or rather, we were told to be quiet, but nobody could shut us up. That I think demonstrates the use of the Staff Association.

ZIEGLER: Is there anything else you'd like to sum up? Or in summary is there I anything else you'd like to add to this interview?

VON STAUFFENBERG: At the very beginning when we talked about the April 1 effort, you had mentioned that the April 1 Group had prepared something for Conable. That is correct, but only in a sense. The April 1 Group had ceased to exist at that time. The April 1 Group had been a very large group of, I forget, 25 to 30 or maybe even 40 people. When Clausen decided that he was not going to seek a second term and when it became apparent that Conable would start in June of 1986 as President--this was half a year after I'd left the Staff Association--a few former members of that April 1 Group, less than a handful of people, got together to discuss how to make sure that the new President got the message that the April 1 Group had worked out. And we then guessed he would get huge briefing books, in which he would be told that everything was pretty good in the World Bank. We thought: how about us preparing a piece that would capture his attention by being brief, by being no longer than three pages or so, and that would succinctly summarize these concerns of the April 1 Group. And that was done.

[End Tape 1, Side B]

[Begin Tape 2, Side A]

VON STAUFFENBERG: And it was sent through the Staff Association with the knowledge of Chris [Christopher J.] Redfern, the Chairman of the Staff Association. And Chris then sent it as a brief . . .

ZIEGLER: Would that have been . . . I think the Chairman would have been Donneve?

VON STAUFFENBERG: No, I'm sorry. You're right. It was done with the knowledge of Donneve and Chris, who was the liaison man in the Executive Committee. And then, after Chris was elected Chairman, it was sent to Conable under the signature of Chris Redfern--as a briefing from the Staff Association. So there was that sequel to the April 1 Group, but it was really no longer done by the April 1 Group per se.

ZIEGLER: I think a useful sequel. I remember having a very small hand in it myself, a few very minor changes there.

Any particular advice you'd like to leave for your successors?

VON STAUFFENBERG: That the greatest danger you face as Chairman of the Staff Association is that so many things are thrown at you and fly at you that you have to deal with all at once that it seems to be a kind of a juggling act where you have to keep all the balls in the air at the same time, and you become totally overwhelmed. Some of these issues you're dealing with are very big issues that really will affect many people. So it's

quite easy to become overwhelmed. And in dealing with those issues the temptation is to forget that staff does not automatically see that what you're doing is very, very important. I think the Chairman and Executive Committee have to remind themselves constantly that they might be doing excellent work, but if staff don't know about it, it's going to not do very much good because the Staff Association is going to erode. That has happened to the Staff Association over the last decade, and I'm afraid it's going to continue to happen to it.

ZIEGLER: Well, if there's nothing else you'd like to add then, I want to thank you very much. I thought it was a most enlightening and entertaining interview. It was fun. I hope you had a good time.

VON STAUFFENBERG: Yes, I did. Thanks, Chuck.

ZIEGLER: Thank you, very much.

[End Tape 2, Side A]

[End of interview]