Violence and Conflict Resolution in Non-Conflict Regions: The Case of Lampung, Indonesia

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Violence & Conflict Resolution in “Non-Conflict” Regions:

The Case of Lampung, Indonesia

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The Burning Houses

Shortly after 6pm a scream pierced the quiet evening air. It was not the first scream that would be heard that night. Before dawn the air would be full of the sounds of fear and fury. A woman had been robbed and her family and friends wanted justice.

It was not the first time that the Javanese in the village had been victims of a violent crime. Indeed for many transmigrants throughout the area it was an all too familiar story. The thieves had not been caught, and this had happened once too often. The mob began burning the houses of the people they suspected were harboring the thieves.

As word of the confrontation spread, hundreds of people from the neighboring villages – mostly transmigrants – descended on the village. Outnumbered and scared the police beat a hasty retreat. The burning continued throughout the night. By the time more police and soldiers arrived the following day, the remains of 63 houses lay smoldering in the morning light and hundreds of people lay cowering in a nearby forest.
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Executive Summary

Lampung is not a province associated with violent conflict. The attention of the Indonesian Government and most human rights and humanitarian aid organizations is largely focused on “high-conflict” regions such as Aceh, Papua, and the Malukus.

However there is a significant level of violent conflict in Lampung. This report identifies three types of violence: spontaneous, armed robbery, and vigilantism. The extremely high level of armed robbery and violent crime is significant. This form of violence alone results in hundreds of deaths every year in Lampung. Of even greater concern is Lampung’s culture of vigilantism. The people of Lampung have no confidence in their legal system; if they want justice they administer it themselves. Hundreds of thieves are caught and burnt alive or beaten to death each year.

Sometimes vigilantism provokes revenge, initiating a dangerous cycle of vigilantism. Other times vigilantism escalates and entire villages are burnt to the ground. Institutions are also targets of community anger, with communities burning down police stations and company offices. Long-standing tensions between the minority local people and Javanese, Sumatran and Balinese transmigrants are compounded and exacerbated by inequitable economic conditions and conflict over land. In the absence of effective conflict-managing institutions, the outcome is a society in which insecurity, danger, and fear is all pervasive.

The tragic impact of the culture of violence – as explained in the words of the people of Lampung – is but one part of this report. The report also prompts the critical question: how much is really known about the extent of violence in Indonesia? If a province like Lampung has serious levels of conflict, then just how widespread and serious is violence in the archipelago? There is an urgent need to examine human security issues in the “non-conflict” provinces of Indonesia.

This report takes a new approach to analyzing violent conflict in Indonesia. Despite the explanatory power of typologies and theories of conflict, very little serious analytical work of this kind has been done in Indonesia. Little effort has been made to meaningfully differentiate between types of violence and to systematically examine their various causes and manifestations. This report presents a detailed typology of violence in Lampung and explores the psycho-cultural and structural aspects of the conflicts. Such an approach is essential to understanding violence and to intervening constructively.
Finally, this report challenges the way in which violence is conceptualized. It argues that there is a tendency to create artificial distinctions and barriers that abrogate responsibility for confronting violence and its tragic implications. Conflict is generally seen either as a human rights or a humanitarian aid issue. The majority of organizations working on violence in Indonesia are either human rights or emergency aid focused. Yet violence is at its very core a development issue. As this report details, violence not only critically affects the conditions for economic growth – it constitutes ‘un-development’ in itself. Violence, as the people of Lampung explain themselves, is a form of poverty. People in Lampung see themselves as poor, not because they lack food or money, but because they lack security – they are “security poor”.

How violence is conceptualized determines the ways in which we seek to address it. This report highlights the extent to which underlying institutional failings – failings that exist not only in the “high-conflict” provinces – allow for violent conflict to manifest and escalate. The underlying dynamics behind violence in Lampung, and in much of Indonesia, have more to do with the challenges of democratic transition than intrinsic hatreds or rigid identities. Furthermore, the causal factors driving violence in Lampung are much the same as those determining and defining many of the higher level Indonesian conflicts such as those taking place in the Malukus and Sulawesi.

This report suggests that approaches to limiting violence and managing conflict in Indonesia should focus on building and supporting just and democratic institutions that are inclusive and responsive. Managing social change in ways that enhances economic and social development, while preventing conflict from taking destructive violent forms, is the big challenge for those interested in a peaceful and prosperous Indonesia. Given the nature of conflict in Indonesia, the tools of development, when used well, have much potential for reducing levels of violent conflict. Tradition resolution mechanisms such as peace treaties and reconciliation commissions are not enough. In large part, the real work to be done is at the community level.
Introduction

Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998 there has been a dramatic increase in violence in Indonesia. Civil unrest, crime, separatism, and inter-communal violence have become significant features of Indonesian life. The extent of the violence is such that there are now 1.3 million internally displaced people (IDPs) spread throughout the archipelago.¹

The most serious conflict is in or has taken place in the regions of Aceh, Papua, the Malukus, Central Sulawesi, and Central and West Kalimantan. Most discussions and studies of violence and conflict in Indonesia focus on the “high-conflict” provinces in these areas. A consequence of this however is that very little attention is paid to the human security issues facing villagers living outside these provinces.² The perception that the aforementioned regions are the only ones in which Indonesians face serious security issues is common. At a gathering with local and international journalists in Jakarta, prior to our departure, people found it laughable that Lampung - an unremarkable province best known for the elephants at the Way Kambas National Park - should be the location for a social conflict study.³ As one witty journalist asked us, “Are you going to document the incidents of elephants knocking people over?”

Yet violence is taking place in provinces throughout Indonesia including those considered to be “non-conflict.” This study shows the extent to which conflict is evident in at least one area where no attention has been paid to issues of human security. As this report reveals, the violence occurring is having a major impact on the functioning and development of Lampung society.

There is an increasing recognition of the need for conflict mapping and other forms of research and analysis to identify the origins of conflict in Indonesia and to shape interventions to prevent it.⁴ This study is an attempt to provide such a mapping and analysis in order to gain some insight into the nature and impact of violence in a “non-conflict” province. The report aims to:

- paint a picture of the types and scale of violence in rural Lampung;
- present frameworks to interpret and understand the nature of violence in Lampung;
- document the impacts of violence; and

² Human security issues include the rule of law, basic services, a predictable commercial environment, and personal security and well being. See, World Bank Operational Policy on Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, available online at <http://www.worldbank.org>, through development topics “Social Development”, topics and regions “Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction”.
³ A detailed explanation of the methodology used is contained in Appendix A. Background information on Lampung, which is the southernmost province on the island of Sumatra, is contained in Appendix B.
⁴ See, for example, Leksono and Dagg’s (2001, p. 26) Ford Foundation report.
• recommend ways in which the World Bank can contribute to the prevention and resolution of rural violence in Lampung.

The report shows that addressing violence is integral to development work. Intervention is important not just for instrumental reasons (because violence retards development as it is traditionally conceived), but because ensuring a life free from violence is a development end in itself.

The report is divided into four chapters:
• Chapter 1 examines the nature of violence in Lampung. It presents a typology of violence and examines in depth the features of each type using a range of case studies and examples with a view to better understanding the causes, triggers, and manifestations of each violence type;
• Chapter 2 examines the costs and impacts of violence and shows the need for intervention;
• Any intervention will need to take account of existing practices. Chapter 3 looks at the reconciliation and conflict resolution practices that are currently in use in Lampung; and
• Chapter 4 summarizes some of the important lessons on how we can usefully conceptualize violent conflict in Lampung, and throughout Indonesia. The ways in which we understand conflict necessitate changes in existing policy approaches. The report concludes by presenting recommendations on how to address violent conflict in Indonesia.

This report was prepared for the World Bank. It is part of a larger effort to understand conflict in Lampung and, more broadly, in Indonesia. It is also one element of a broader intellectual project being undertaken by the Social Development Unit at the World Bank Office Jakarta exploring the changing role of local institutions as Indonesia undergoes a major economic, political, and sociological transition in the post-Soeharto era. Flaws in institutional incentives and accountabilities define and, in large part, account for Indonesia’s current crisis. Research activities that seek to better understand these dynamics include the two Local Level Institutions (LLI) studies,5 the ongoing evaluation of the Bank’s major community-driven development program in Indonesia (KDP),6 and an examination of the effects of globalization on women who are leaving their villages to work as migrant workers outside Indonesia.

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5 The LLI studies were undertaken in 1996 and again in 2000-2001 and examined the linkages between formal and informal institutions and welfare and good governance. See, Chandrakirana (1999), Evers (1999), Grootaert (1999); Alatas et. al. (2002), Wetterberg (2002).
6 KDP is a World Bank funded, Government of Indonesia sponsored, project to alleviate poverty in rural areas and to improve local governance. KDP provides block grants directly to kecamatan (sub-districts) and villages. (For more information, see Kecamatan Development Program Phase One: Final Report, 1998-2002).
One aspect of the role of local institutions concerns the part these associations play in preventing, resolving, or even triggering violent conflict. This study examines in detail the nature, causes, and impacts of violence in Lampung. Other research on how local institutions, and KDP, address, and could better address, violent conflict has taken place and is ongoing.\textsuperscript{7} The outputs of these studies will feed into the design of a new Bank project aiming to assist recovery and enhance conflict resolution and service provision in eight conflict-affected provinces.\textsuperscript{8}

This study provides an analytical framework to help understand the interaction between local institutions and conflict in Lampung. While the findings of this report are particular to Lampung it is, nonetheless, likely that the issues identified will be relevant to other regions of Indonesia. It is hoped that this report will be used by other organizations to inform future work on violence and conflict in the archipelago.

\textsuperscript{7} See, Smith’s (2003) and Onishi’s (2002) reports on Lampung. A major research project – led in-part by the authors of this report – is looking more systematically at the relationship between KDP and local level conflict in two other Indonesian provinces.

\textsuperscript{8} The Support for Conflict Ridden Areas Project (SCRAP) is currently in the design stage. Lampung is one of the eight provinces chosen for the project.
1. The Nature & Causes of Violence in Lampung

The most important finding of this report may also be the most surprising: violence is a major problem in Lampung. Violence is pervasive and its impact is enormous. On the day we arrived, the provincial newspaper, The Lampung Post, ran stories of violence and gambling, of conflicts between communities and companies, and of police saving two nine year old boys who were being burnt alive for stealing. Crime is common and violent and it is met with equal violence from communities. Seven thieves were burnt alive in one kabupaten (district) alone in the three weeks surrounding our fieldwork. Despite the incredulity of Jakarta journalists, Lampung is a violent province.

This chapter examines the nature and causes of violence in Lampung. It does so by developing a detailed typology of violence in Lampung. Typologies are powerful analytical tools. A first step towards finding ways of resolving violent conflict is to understand its characteristics. Typologies enable meaningful distinctions to be made between the characteristics of different types of violence. Distinguishing between types of violence is important in order to understand the variety of causes and manifestations of violence. Typologies, in showing the differences between types, help to provide an analytical base for a deeper exploration of how violence unfolds and is resolved. Until these distinctions are made, it is difficult to intervene constructively in a conflict situation.¹

Despite the value of typologies, little attempt has been made to develop meaningful typologies of violence in Indonesia. Violence in Indonesia is usually categorized as either separatist, ethnic or religious. While the problematic nature of these categories is sometimes acknowledged, rarely are they refined or analyzed in such a way as to deepen an understanding of the conflicts they describe. Typologies developed for other conflict regions around the world provide little assistance, either because the categories are not relevant or because the categories are not analytically useful.² The limited value of existing categorizations of violence in Indonesia is highlighted by the fact that none of the types of violence commonly cited in Indonesia accurately describes any of the violence in Lampung.

¹ As Moser and Shrader (1999, p. 2) write: “Categorizing violence is a critical first step towards systematically understanding violence and developing sustainable violence reduction and peace initiatives.”
² The majority of analytical work on violence and conflict has concerned the Caribbean and Latin America. While the methodologies that Moser among others employ have some potential applicability to Indonesia, the actual types identified are less helpful, in part because most studies have been urban in focus.
1.1 Typology of Violence in Lampung

The three types of violence identified in Lampung are shown below (Table 1.1). This is not an exhaustive list of all violence in Lampung, nor is it a comprehensive typology of violence in Indonesia; it is a typology of the major types of violence documented by us in Lampung in January 2002.\(^3\) The types are categorized by characteristics rather than causes. Categorizing violence descriptively enables violence to be identified in a way that can be commonly understood without needing to know or make judgments about the underlying causes. As there are often multiple causes of any one incident of violence, a causal classification is rarely useful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type of Violence</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Triggers/Proximate Causes</th>
<th>Perpetrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Spontaneous</td>
<td>Unpremeditated violence which arises from the consumption of alcohol or drugs</td>
<td>Various including: demonstration of masculinity, conflict over girls, misinterpretation of events</td>
<td>“Naughty young men”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Armed Robbery</td>
<td>Violence perpetrated during an act of larceny</td>
<td>Various including but not limited to: opportunity, economic need</td>
<td>“Naughty young men”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Vigilantism (a) Individual Level</td>
<td>Spontaneous</td>
<td>The use of force to summarily punish a crime</td>
<td>Community members proximate to apprehension of thief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Premeditated</td>
<td>(1) Thief(ves) caught in the act of stealing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Recent theft that exceeds community’s tolerance</td>
<td>Aggrieved community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Vigilantism (b) Wider-scale Level</td>
<td>Against Communities</td>
<td>Escalated form of vigilantism, where individuals or groups take justice into their own hands (against communities)</td>
<td>Aggrieved community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against Institutions</td>
<td>Individuals or groups taking justice into their own hands (against institutions)</td>
<td>The inequitable or illegitimate use of power by an institution combined with inadequate response by the institution to the community’s grievance</td>
<td>Aggrieved community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) It is likely that there are other types of violence in Lampung, although we did not document any other types. It should be noted that the study did not focus on forms of violence within the home, such as domestic violence.
1.2 Type I: Spontaneous Violence

Spontaneous violence is common in Lampung. The term ‘spontaneous violence’ describes violence that is not premeditated and that arises from the consumption of alcohol and/or drugs. Spontaneous violence is not unique to Lampung – throughout the world young people get drunk, vent their anger and start fighting. However, in some parts of Lampung the problem is serious enough to have prompted a ban on the sale of alcohol. Spontaneous violence therefore necessitates more than just a cursory examination.

Spontaneous violence generally occurs at ceremonies or parties. Young men (aged 12-25 years old) get into fights after consuming large amounts of alcohol. The fighting can be between individuals (most common), between individuals and a small group, or between two groups (least common). Groups normally consist of people from the same village, who are usually – but not always – of the same ethnicity. These groups may form spontaneously, as friends rally around someone involved in a fight, for example, or they may be more organized. Gangs of preman are evident in many villages. In contrast to Jakarta, preman in Lampung are relatively loose groupings with no chain of command, no set membership, and little internal coercion. They can be ethnically mixed but are usually associated with a particular village. Thus, ceremonies may be staging grounds for fights between different preman groups. Fighting involves the use of fists but may also involve other weapons: knives; bottles; or pieces of wood.

“At parties most people are about 20-25 years old. People come from outside the village, from other villages. There is often fighting between people from this village and from other villages. There are fights because of girls. People drink a lot. There is always fighting at every party. They fight with bottles.”

16 year old boy, Braja Caka

The Causes of Spontaneous Violence

The seriousness of the spontaneous violence problem in Lampung prompts two questions: What causes young men in Lampung to drink so much? And what then triggers violent acts?

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4 It is this second part of this definition that distinguishes spontaneous violence from other types of unplanned violence such as the lynching of a thief who is caught in the act.

5 The most popular types of alcohol include vodka, whisky, aneka, topi miring (sticky rice wine spirit) and beer.
Young men attributed their drinking primarily to unemployment. Since *krismon* (the monetary crisis) most villagers report that unemployment has gone up. It was claimed in Jepara village that almost all young men were unemployed. While this is not literally the case – young men can be seen working in the fields and often work as laborers – it does paint an accurate picture of a society with a lot of young people with time on their hands. This, alongside the sense of hopelessness that goes with being unemployed, and the relative cheapness of alcohol, has made the drinking of alcohol one of the most favored forms of escape.

“You might be stressed, like with a girlfriend. Normally you would speak to friends, but if your friends weren't there ... And also because of other frustrations, then you might think 'I'm going to drink'.”

Young man, Jepara

People in Jepara claim that 90 per cent of young men drink. Women also drink, but in lesser numbers. Both drink to get drunk. Drinking can be a solitary activity or a communal one. Drinking gives young men *mengsi* (prestige) among their peers; other young men see those who drink as “real men”.

While the context may be an economic one, it does not seem that economic motives play a direct role in triggering spontaneous incidents of violence. Fights commonly occur over relatively minor incidents: people bumping into each other, dancing with another man’s girlfriend, misinterpreted comments, and the like.

January 2nd 2002: “A group of young men saw another group of young men sitting outside drinking alcohol. ‘Can we have some?’ they asked. They were given some alcohol, but they were not used to drinking and demanded more. The original group got emotional and irritated. They started beating the newcomers. The second group did not fight back, but were upset and reported the incident to one of their fathers.”

Village Head, Braja Caka

The extent to which ethnic or cultural differences are responsible for triggering violence is difficult to judge. However, it seems that fights are more likely to break out between locals and transmigrants than within an ethnic group. Certainly, villagers are more likely to fight people from other villages than from their own. While cultural differences do not alone trigger the violence, the prejudices and preconceived conceptions that groups have about each other helps provide the psychological context
in which simple incidents can spark violent confrontation. This, in turn, can strengthen hostilities between communities, leading to mistrust between individuals and groups, and, ultimately, can make misunderstandings and violent incidents more likely in the future.

### 1.3 Type II: Armed Robbery

A second type of violence is armed robbery – violence perpetrated during an act of larceny. Weapons used include large knives, homemade pistols and *pentung*.\(^6\) Despite it being illegal to possess a gun under Indonesian law, locally made guns are carried by most thieves. Items commonly stolen include motorcycles, chickens, money, agricultural produce, and televisions.

> “Almost every village has robbers. This village has 50 robbers. It’s the same in other villages. They [other villages] have a minimum of 50 robbers. Stealing motorbikes, using force to get money. Mostly stealing motorbikes. More than 50 motorcycles a year get stolen.”
> Young man, Nibung

Armed robbery is by far the most widespread form of violence in Lampung. It was prevalent in almost all *desa* (villages) and all *kecamatan* (sub-districts) visited.\(^7\) When villagers were asked about what issues their villages faced, “security” ranked highest alongside economic problems. By absence of “security” people are referring to crime, specifically armed robbery.

Most common is the stealing of motorcycles when the victim is riding in the late evening or night. Motorcycle theft can be extremely violent resulting in a large number of injuries and deaths (see Section 2.1). Victims are knocked from their motorcycles and beaten, stabbed or shot before the thieves take their bikes. In Bahuga sub-district, thieves often use guns and people are frequently shot. In Jepara, a motorcycle was stolen almost every two days in the lead up to the house burning (see Preface). Other villages have several bikes stolen every week.

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\(^6\) A *pentung* is a large piece of wood, somewhat like a baseball bat. Most households seem to own a *pentung*, primarily for protective purposes.

\(^7\) Indonesia is divided into provinces (states). Provinces are divided into *kabupaten* (districts) and are administered by a *Bupati* or Chief of the District. *Kabupaten* consist of *kecamatan* (sub-districts) that are administered by *Camat* (Chief of the Sub-District). *Kecamatan* are made up of *desa* (villages), each of which is administered by a *Kepala Desa* (Village Head). *Desa* normally consist of several *dusun* (sub-villages or hamlets), each of which has a *Kepala Dusun* (Sub-Village Head).
Box 1.1 A Costly Wedding

January 8th 2002: “Around 1.30 a.m. Deni was riding home from Tanjun Agin after going to a wedding party. Suddenly someone leapt out of the dark and hit him on the head with a big bit of wood (1.5 feet long). When Deni’s friends realized they could not see the light of his motorcycle they raced back down the road. Deni was on the ground and his motorcycle was gone. His friends took him to the health care center where he received emergency treatment. His skull was fractured. He was then taken to the hospital in Bandar Lampung. It cost more than 5 million rupiah for surgery.8 He is still in the hospital. I think he has brain damage. I have not been able to see him yet. If I catch the robber I will kill him.”

Father of 19 year old victim of violent robbery, Wana

Box 1.2 Sticks & Stones

“Recently a thief killed someone with a bit of wood. This last happened two months ago. The victim did not directly pass away. The victim told the story on the way to hospital. The victim was a pepper farmer. In the morning he left from his house. He was going to bring his product to the wholesalers. All of a sudden he was stopped in the middle of the street by a group of three robbers. One of the robbers hit him with the wood. After the victim fell down they took his motorbike by force. After that, someone found him and brought him to the health care center. The doctor was unable to give him adequate treatment. The victim had very serious injuries. The doctor sent him to the district hospital in Bandar Lampung. Several hours after this the victim passed away.”

Villager, Wana

Crime also occurs where the victims are not present. Theft of this sort normally occurs late at night while the village sleeps. This type of crime is not always violent because there is normally no confrontation between the thief and the victim. However, it can lead to violence; thieves appear to normally carry weapons and may use them if they are apprehended. Moreover, even if there is no violence at the time of the crime, these acts can lead to future violence in the form of vigilantism (see Section 1.4). In Wana village there have been a number of cases where thieves have attempted to steal goods, but had been apprehended and killed by victims with knives. If the thief is killed in the act no report is made to the police. People may also go looking for the items that have been stolen. If they find the goods, and the person who has stolen them, a violent confrontation can ensue.

“About two days ago, a cow was stolen around 12.30 a.m. All the men in our sub-village split into four groups and went searching for the cow – north, south, east and west. We found it 15km away in South Sumatra. The thief ran away. If we had found the thief we would have killed him.”

Villager, Way Tuba

8 5 million rupiah is an extremely large sum of money – around $US500 – which is considerably more than the average yearly income of a family in Lampung (see Appendix B).
The Naughty Young Men

Most crime is attributed to what villagers refer to as “naughty young men”. While most criminals do fall within this category – that is, they are young and male – some criminals are older, in their 30s or 40s. People are either thieves or they are not; the middle ground of the ‘petty thief’ does not seem to exist. Villagers cited a set number of thieves operating in each village. There is evidence that the stealing is to some extent organized. Stolen motorcycles are sold on outside the sub-district, for a price of 3-3.5 million rupiah,\(^9\) and the bikes are ordered before they are stolen. Victims were men and women of all ages.

The Causes of Armed Robbery: Economic, Cultural & Institutional Explanations

Why is there so much armed robbery in Lampung? Explanations of conflict are most often either economic, cultural, or institutional in focus.\(^{10}\) Economic explanations are most commonly given. These structural theories point out that rising unemployment since the monetary crisis has increased poverty resulting in an increased struggle over resources. Armed robbery is a result of this struggle. Cultural theories point to cultural differences (and associated ethnic tensions) as driving violent crime. Transmigrants implicitly argued such a line, identifying laziness among locals as a root cause of armed robbery. The fact that stealing occurs primarily between different ethnic groups rather than within a group seems to support this view. Institutional failure approaches emphasize the way in which the absence of effective policing and legal institutions allow crime such as armed robbery to flourish.\(^{11}\)

\[\text{“The sub-district military now have no power to make the area secure. Criminals used to be afraid of the army, but are not scared of the police.”}\]

\[\text{Village Head, Sumur Bandung, village neighboring Jepara}\]

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\(^9\) Approximately $US300-350.

\(^{10}\) This section looks at social and cultural explanations. Section 1.4 on vigilantism will examine more closely the role of legal institutions.

\(^{11}\) These explanations correspond somewhat to Moser and Shrader’s (1999) categorization of violence as being economic, social, and political. However, whereas they identify types of violence in terms of the type of power that the violence is used to gain or maintain, it is more useful to think of the labels in terms of causes. Economic and social causes relate broadly to the structural and psycho-cultural factors identified later in this section. By pointing also to a political (institutional) cause, not only are the proactive motivations of those partaking in violence highlighted, but also the systemic deficiencies that promote or allow violence to occur. This is important because, as a simple incentives model indicates, people take into account the risks of being caught and the level of punishment as well as the potential benefit of a possible action when determining whether or not they will act. It is important to note that while Moser and Shrader’s categorization may be useful in Latin America, in almost all cases in Lampung causes (or the ends of the power used) are a mixture of the three types they identify.
Attempting to understand the causes of violent crime in Lampung requires a more refined approach. None of the views mentioned above fully or accurately explains why armed robbery occurs. Instead, two key points need to be made:

- Armed robbery does have an economic driver, but it tends to be that of income inequality rather than absolute need;
- Cultures and ethnic difference play a role only in so much that other factors – and particularly economic ones – help redefine and recreate them.

**Economic Inequality**

It is clear that there is some economic basis to armed robbery in Lampung. However, people are not stealing because of absolute economic need. The economic driver behind crime appears to be one of inequality. Crime tends to be driven by relative rather than absolute poverty. A number of pieces of evidence point to this conclusion. First, we did not see much extreme below-the-breadline poverty. While there was some economic hardship, everyone seemed to have enough to eat and survive. Second, and significantly, crime was not higher in the poorest villages. In fact Giri Hajo, the least wealthy village in Lampung according to its Village Head, had the least crime of any villages we visited. While people were poor in Giri Hajo, the poverty was similar for everyone with little wealth gap between the richest and poorest.

**The Construction of Cultures**

Insomuch as cultural and ethnic differences lead to armed robbery, these differences are not intrinsic to the different groups but are created – and are constantly being recreated – by exogenous factors such as the distribution of resources between groups and previous violent incidents. It is only through the effect of other variables that cultural differences come into play. This means that ethnic difference does not necessarily or directly mean conflict. Giri Hajo is illustrative of this point. Despite being one of the most ethnically diverse of all the villages visited, crime rates were low and there seemed to be little animosity between transmigrants and locals. Ethnic differences do play a role in driving armed robberies, because people chose to target ethnic groups that are ‘different’ to their own. Yet the fact that a person sees him or herself as ‘different’, and chooses to emphasize this difference, is a process that occurs through perceptions of previous events.

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12 This seems to be true across countries. Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza (1998, p. 30) find that increases in income inequality raises crime rates, and, particularly, robberies: “Larger income inequality (high Gini index) induces an increased in the incidence of robberies.”

13 This is a *cognitivist* view of conflict, which emphasizes that perception is as important as objective reality in determining action. Cultures are determined through perceptions of the self and of the other, and these interpretations stem from derived experience, either personal, of those around them, or of previous generations. Cultural conflict is thus socially
Concretely, a local Lampung person may steal from a transmigrant (there seems to be significantly less theft within ethnic communities) because of his interpretation of past events that has hardened his conception of ethnic difference as being important. This perception seems to be created and strengthened by a perceived unjust reallocation of wealth in the past through land distribution. Some local people see stealing as a way of transferring resources from a “wealthy” group (the transmigrants) to a “worthy” one (local Lampung people). Stealing crops is often justified by a perceived injustice over land. The thief is seen by some as an agent of redistributive justice. From the perspective of the transmigrant, the interpretation that robbers are always Lampung people transmutes into a broader claim about the inferiority of Lampung culture – the first step towards calling local people “lazy” or “troublemakers”.

“\textit{The (Lampung) community has been disappointed for a long, long time. It is always people from the other group (transmigrants) who get the benefit. So Lampung people steal the benefit from the transmigrants.}”

Transmigrant, Way Jepara sub-district

In short, violence is driven by a complex interaction between structural (economic) and psycho-cultural factors. This, along with the opportunities that an ineffective legal system affords, has led to high levels of violent crime between communities in Lampung.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Violence & Robberies}

The level of violence that occurs when theft takes place is often higher than is instrumentally necessary. Three elements of violence are sometimes observable when a motorcycle is stolen. The first two are instrumental: the initial violence to get the person off the bike; and a continuance of violence to keep the person immobile while the thieves escape. However, the evidence points towards the violence continuing beyond the level that is instrumentally necessary. The extent of the injuries of many victims suggests a gratuitous level of violence is often applied.
This finding is significant and raises a number of interesting issues. When, and why, does gratuitous violence take place? What specifically triggers it? More research needs to be done to answer these questions. However, that the level of violence goes beyond that needed to steal the motorbike points to a motive beyond a purely economic one. It also shows the extent to which armed robbery is another means upon which to impose pain – both in the form of lost property and physical injury – on an individual of another group.

1.4 Type III: Vigilantism

Of the three major types of violence in Lampung, vigilantism, or the practice of an individual or a group taking justice into his/her or their own hands, is of the greatest concern. The prevalence and extreme nature of vigilantism is profoundly disturbing. A culture of vigilantism is a damming indictment upon the state. Vigilantism is the antithesis of the rule of law. The almost universal community acceptance of vigilantism shows the contempt in which the state – and particularly its legal institutions – is held in Lampung.

This section examines the various types of vigilantism, their causes, and their targets. It is divided into two sections that correspond to the two levels at which vigilantism takes place in Lampung. These are vigilantism against individuals (Individual Level Vigilantism) and vigilantism against communities and institutions (Wider-scale Vigilantism).

a. Individual Level Vigilantism

Individual level vigilantism is the use of force to summarily punish an individual or a group of individuals who are perceived to be guilty of a crime. This type of vigilantism is extremely common in Lampung. Almost every village we visited could relate a story of a thief being killed in their area.
In one sub-district, the resident doctor estimated that in the preceding twelve months some 60 thieves had been killed in the surrounding eleven villages alone.15

Individual level vigilantism can be either spontaneous or premeditated. Spontaneous vigilantism occurs when a person or group of people are caught in the act of committing a crime, normally stealing. It is at this moment that the community’s emotions – particularly their sense of anger and indignation – are at their height. Those who apprehend the thief usually administer punishment immediately.16 Premeditated vigilantism occurs when an individual is either suspected or known to be a criminal – again, normally a thief. No distinction is made between whether one actually is, or is merely suspected of being, a thief; suspicion is sufficient. When the aggrieved community, or particular community members, decide to take action, the alleged thief is found and killed.

In cases of both spontaneous and premeditated vigilantism, the punishment is usually death. Thieves are killed most commonly by being burnt alive or beaten to death with a penjat.17 It is not only the aggrieved individual who administers justice; instead, many community members participate in the killing.

"If the thief is caught they beat the thief, for maybe 30 minutes to one hour. They beat with fists and penjat. Many people beat the thief, all men, all ages, probably every man. It is safer after because the suspected person is in jail or is killed."

Woman at mosque, Braja Caka

The Causes of Individual Level Vigilantism

Vigilantism is a response to the high level of crime in Lampung. Yet, it is integrally related to the failure of legal institutions and in particular the police.17 Among both local and transmigrant communities, the police are very poorly perceived. At best, they are seen as being understaffed, under resourced, and unresponsive. More commonly, the police are just seen as another group of corrupt government officials. According to the first view, the police are underpaid, overloaded, and

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15 Two weeks before we arrived in East Lampung, three thieves were burnt alive in Jabung sub-district. Two days after we left the district, four thieves were burnt alive in Labuhan Maringgai sub-district. Chapter 2 details the impact of vigilantism.

16 An incident in Tulang Bawang in July 2001 illustrates the nature of spontaneous vigilantism. Two thieves were stealing a cow when they ran into a number of villagers around dawn. The thieves were promptly burnt to death.

17 While economic and psycho-cultural factors tend to drive crime such as armed robbery, it seems that institutional failures are primarily responsible for vigilantism, although structural factors and psycho-cultural dispositions still play a role (albeit less important).
unable to investigate the multitude of cases they face.\textsuperscript{18} Taking the second, if they do pursue a case they are more likely to accept a payment from the thief or his family than to make an arrest or push for prosecution.\textsuperscript{19} Both perceptions appear to be grounded in truth. For a combination of both reasons criminals are rarely apprehended and there is little incentive to report crime.

\begin{quote}
“Because people think the police don’t act seriously they don’t tell them about things. If they give the robber to the police, the police will release them.”
Villager, Wana
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
“This sub-district is vulnerable to criminal cases. [Why?] Because of lack of policemen action. Many cases are unsolved. The police do not act seriously towards the problem of stealing and killing. [Why not?] Because the police are powerless. And people don’t trust them because they never respond positively when villagers make a report. The villagers get bored of going to them.”
Villager, Wana
\end{quote}

The Culture of Vigilantism

A culture of vigilantism has developed in Lampung. The failure of policing means that villagers feel that if they want justice, they must administer it themselves. Vigilantism is widely accepted and socially approved. Although a few people expressed sadness at the death of thieves as human beings, even those people felt that those who steal deserve to die. Retributive values are inculcated from an early age. Teachers use the killing of thieves as an example to their students of what happens “if you have a bad attitude like the thief.”\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{quote}
“I agree that people should sentence the thief themselves. If the community captures the thief then they hit the thief until he dies. It should be done this way. It happens in most villages here.”
Villager, Wana
\end{quote}

Worryingly, vigilante action seems to be authorized in some cases by authority figures within villages.\textsuperscript{21} A case in Way Tuba (below) highlights the extent to which – at least in some circumstances – village heads explicitly authorize or even organize vigilantism.

\begin{quote}
“During the New Order period, the police were part of the armed forces. They are now a separate entity but are weak and are not well respected. See International Crisis Group’s (2001) report on the problems of the police in Indonesia and recommendations for reform.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
“The size of the bribe depends on the nature of the crime. Two million rupiah ($US200) is apparently the standard payment for someone who has stolen a motorcycle.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
“In this report many people who would normally be called “leaders” – such as Kepala Desa (village heads) – are referred to as “authority figures”. The term “authority figures” more accurately reflects the nature of the role these people play in village life. This report uses “leadership” in the Heifetzian sense (Heifetz, 1994). That is, a leader is someone who
\end{quote}
Case Study: “Kill the Pig! Spill His Blood!” - A Lynching in Way Tuba

November 1st 2001: The Village Head in Way Tuba has called a meeting of all the community. He wants to discuss what to do with a suspected thief. The suspect has never been caught stealing – no-one knows for sure that he has actually done anything – but everyone is pretty sure that he means trouble. He is not from this area and he gets on well with other suspected thieves.

There seems to be a consensus: catch him before he can do anything. As the meeting draws to a close it is decided that it is best to kill him. Everyone agrees including the Village Head. There have been too many thieves in the village – motorbikes, cows and TVs are often stolen – and all the police do when they catch them is keep them until they pay a bribe to get out.

Shortly after the meeting ends a group of community members go searching for the man. About 1 a.m. they find him sleeping in a chair. “Kill the pig! Spill his blood,” they shout. First they tie his hands, then his feet, and they carry him away, like a chicken about to be roasted, to the cemetery. Slowly people hear what is happening and soon there are more than 100 villagers at the cemetery despite the late hour. There they hit him until he dies. People take turns with their pentung and fists and soon the suspect is dead. Some people rub his limp body with white cloths to get the blood off. A small boy, a son of a local teacher, sees him as he lies there, his body clean but his head broken and his brains seeping out.

When the police arrive about 2 a.m. the man has been dead a short while. They do not know who has killed the man so they leave. The community buries the body. The stealing goes on.

Regardless of the role of village officials it is clear that vigilantism is accepted as a legitimate action. The fact that vigilantes can act without fear of reprimand shows the acceptance from authority figures and ordinary villagers of the culture of vigilantism. Similarly, as the story below shows, police simply accept vigilantism as a form of law enforcement. Despite the numerous tales of vigilante action, not once did we hear of action being taken against anyone responsible for the retribution.

Box 1.3 Throat Slitting

“In February or March 2001 people in this village killed a robber who had stolen a motorbike. Many people from this village, including me, went out and found the thief. We also hit him with our fists and with pentung. After he was dead we put him in a plastic bag all chopped up. When the policemen arrived they asked who he was. He was so chopped up that they couldn’t identify him. The police asked, ‘Is he the thief?’ We answered that he was. The police went away carrying the body. They did not try to arrest us because the person who was killed often commits crime.”

Villager, Wana
b. Wider-scale Vigilantism

Individual level vigilantism is of serious concern. Yet more worrying still are acts of wider-scale vigilantism. The culture of vigilantism in Lampung is such that a violent act or a perceived injustice can sometimes provoke vigilantism on a wider-scale than that of individual level vigilantism. Institutions can become targets of vigilantism and vigilantism may also escalate to target communities.

(i) Vigilantism Against Communities

Lampung's culture of vigilantism means that a community can become the target of vigilantism if, following an act of violence, the perpetrators of an injustice cannot be readily identified. Wider-scale vigilantism against communities is therefore best understood as an escalated form of vigilantism. In the absence of a responsible party, vigilantism escalates and the burden of blame is borne by the community as a whole. There are at least two distinguishable circumstances under which vigilantism can escalate to target a community: where the perpetrators of a crime cannot be found; where an act of individual level vigilantism provokes a violent response.

Where the perpetrators of a crime cannot be found

A community can become a target of vigilantism when the perpetrators of a crime cannot be found. Under such circumstances those seeking to punish the criminal may treat the village as a proxy for the thief. The burning of Jepara is best understood in such terms.

Case Study: The Burning of Jepara

Shortly after 6 P.M., 14 October 2000. Just off the main street of Jepara a young woman of transmigrant origins, Sothia, had been robbed. Armed with pentung, four men had threatened to kill her and had stolen her motorcycle. Although the police responded quickly, it was not long before a large number of transmigrants from Jepara were demanding action. They wanted to search the village for the culprits. The local LKMD Chief, 23 Marhusin, suggested they should first report the matter to the Village Head.

At this time the Village Head was very ill. Unable to accompany the villagers he apparently approved their search nevertheless. Dividing into two teams, each accompanied by a police officer, the transmigrants went door-to-door looking for the suspects. After an unsuccessful

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23 The LKMD is the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Resilience Council). It is not a formal part of the village government, but assists the village head with village development planning. The LKMD Chief (or 'First Deputy') is the main executive in the village development effort. However the position has no formal power or remuneration. See, Evers (2000, p. 13).
The burning of Jepara illustrates how easily anger at an act of violence can escalate into wider-scale vigilantism against an entire community. The speed with which this conflict escalated and the extent of the destruction may seem surprising. However, this case must be viewed against a structural backdrop of pervasive crime. It must also take into account the psycho-cultural disposition of transmigrants in Lampung. As detailed in Section 1.3, above, there is an assumption among transmigrants that whereas transmigrants work hard, local people are lazy and seek to gain through illegitimate means such as stealing. The perception that the Village Head of Jepara was a palingdun – roughly translated as “godfather” or “protector of young people” – led transmigrants to conclude that the thieves were being protected by the local people.

24 During the robbery, as one of the thieves was about to hit Sothia, another thief had said, “Don’t hit her Rizal”. (Note: not suspect’s real name).
25 Not the suspect’s real name.
26 See footnote 22.
In the context of such community tensions, the absence of an individual upon whom to target retributive justice leads to a wider-scale response where the community is punished, not just for the present crime committed but for all the perceived wrongs of the past. Thus the issue of a stolen motorcycle can escalate to the burning of a whole sub-village.

It is also important to note the ineffectiveness of the police and their lack of standing among the people. Police inadequacy helped to foster the culture of vigilantism. This culture, when placed on top of a climate of immense mistrust and anger between communities, allowed for a violent act to escalate into a serious act of vigilantism. If the police had caught the original thieves the wider-scale vigilantism could have been avoided, at least temporarily. Broader measures of conflict resolution may be necessary, however, to change the underlying conditions that allowed the escalation to happen.

**Where an act of individual level vigilantism provokes a violent response**

Vigilantism can also escalate to target a community as a result of an earlier act of vigilantism. If an individual or a group punishes someone from another community, members of the thief’s community may retaliate. As the vigilantes are unlikely to be known to the aggrieved community, the vigilantes’ entire community can be targeted, initiating a cycle of vigilantism.

**Box 1.4 The Evacuation of Wana**

February or March 2001: “[Following the killing of the thief (Box 1.3)] someone from a gang in Tanjung Aji village, the village where the thief came from, came here looking for revenge. He wanted revenge because people here had killed a man from his village.

About 11 at night all of the men from here woke up their wives and told them to run away from the village because people from Tanjung Aji were threatening to burn our houses. The people were the thief’s friends. The women and children ran away but nothing happened. But there are rumors about threats from other villages and other groups. Another time people here ran away after threats. Nothing has happened so far.”

Villager, Wana

The precise reason for retaliation is not clear. It may be that the vigilante action is seen as being unjust. The nature of community relations in Lampung is such that it is possible that what one community portrays as a legitimate lynching is always thought to be illegitimate by the victim’s community. However, generally stealing seems to be condemned in both local and transmigrant communities and there is a strong sense that criminals who are lynched are getting what they deserve.
As the two cases reveal, where vigilante action did provoke attempts at revenge it appears that these attempts came from people who were close to the thief and who were angered by his death. That said, it seems evident that villagers who later support those who initiate retaliatory action may be motivated by broader conceptions of justice.

It is also unclear how often vigilante action provokes revenge. Although we heard a lot of lynching stories, we rarely heard of negative consequences associated with vigilante action. It may be that there are few attempts at revenge or that interviewees generally omitted that part of the story. Nevertheless, the incidents documented here demonstrate that when vigilante action provokes revenge the consequences are potentially very grave. In the Wana case (see Box 1.4 above) the threat of violence was serious enough to twice justify the evacuation of all the women and children from the village. In another case, further violence was only prevented by the payment of a large sum of money to those seeking revenge.

**Box 1.5 Stolen Chickens & Revenge in Braja Caka**

“About one year ago, a suspected person stole a chicken. This often happens. It was the third time he had stolen a chicken. The villagers killed him because he had done it too often. They tied him to a bamboo tree and hit him until he died. They used a pentung. Lots of people came to hit him (all the people from this sub-village). The thief was from a different village. He was a Lampung person from Jepara. I felt sorry for the thief because the thief had no money [respondent laughing strongly at this point].

After he was killed some people came from Jepara to get revenge. They asked for money from the village for security. The people in the village gave the money (6 million rupiah). They collected round the village. People were not happy, but they had to do it. They were not happy, but not really angry. The case was finished. The Chief of Police here just tries to be patient to prevent anything bigger happening.”

Villager, Braja Caka

The clearest illustration of the dangerous potential of vigilantism comes from the Jepara case (above). The morning after the burning, a large number of local Lampung people gathered in Jepara. Locals claim they were just protecting (what was left of) the village. However, transmigrants believed they had amassed to take revenge. The actions of the police – who used their trucks to return the transmigrants to their villages – suggest that a retaliatory attack by local people was a distinct possibility. Certainly neighboring villages anticipated a response. In Braja Caka there was genuine

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27 Approximately $US600.

28 Respondents suggested that there were as many as 1,000 people.
fear that they would be attacked. While many villagers were at Jepara for the burning, many stayed behind to guard the houses in the village.29

The Threat of Escalated Vigilantism

While we documented relatively few cases of actual or threatened escalated wider-scale vigilantism, the significance of this type of violence is that once it has occurred there is a high probability that it will recur. Although our fieldwork took place 15 months after the burning of Jepara, tensions were still high and further violence seemed imminent.

“There is still conflict. The building of the houses is finished but there is still conflict. At the moment there is just tension, no violence. It is getting better. But people are still worried that there may be violence.”

LKMD Chief, Jepara

In the months following the burning of Jepara, other villages were evacuated following threats of vigilant attacks. Moreover, despite the passage of time, authority figures in other villages expressed real concern that something similar could happen in their village.30 Acts of wider-scale vigilantism reinforce mistrust and tensions within and between communities. With such acts effectively going unchecked by the police or legal institutions they create a dangerously unstable environment whereby small acts can escalate into wider-scale community battles.

“East Lampung is like a jungle...It is like a time bomb. It is like a war. There is no law here.”

Doctor, Way Jepara sub-district

(ii) Vigilantism Against Institutions

Institutions can also be the targets of wider-scale vigilantism.31 Institutions can become the targets of vigilantism if they are perceived to have perpetrated some form of injustice on a community. Vigilantism against institutions generally takes the form of violence against the physical property of

29 There seemed to be real fear. Those who stayed behind gathered together beside the dam to protect themselves, perhaps sending patrols to check on the houses.
30 One Village Head, in noting the risk to his own villages, pointed out, “our village has the same characteristics [as Jepara]: a mixed community and high crime rates.”
31 We define institutions broadly to include public and private companies, as well as government-owned or controlled bodies. Institutions are defined broadly because the boundaries between different actors in Indonesia are often blurred. What looks like a private plantation may only exist because the government appropriated the land and then sold it cheaply to the company. Collusion between the public and private sectors often makes the actions of the state indistinguishable from those of private actors.
these institutions rather than violence against those people who constitute the institutions. Thus it
normally involves torching an institution’s buildings.

It is important to distinguish the causes of vigilantism against institutions from the causes of
vigilantism against communities. As we have described, vigilantism against communities flows from
an earlier act of violence. Communities usually become targets of vigilantism either in response to an
armed robbery or to an earlier act of vigilantism. As such, it is an escalated form of violence. In
contrast, vigilantism against institutions is not provoked by any of the types of violence already
discussed. Instead this type of vigilantism is a response to the inequitable or illegitimate use of
institutional power.32 This happens when a government body or a private company (or both working
together) uses their disproportionate power against a community in an unjust, unfair, or illegal way
that leaves a community aggrieved.

In Lampung this type of action against institutions is often related to land. The army, for example,
seizes land and either under-compensates or does not compensate the community. The prevalence
of land conflict in Lampung is so widespread that it will be the focus of this section. However, land
is not the only cause of vigilantism against institutions. If an institution has acted beyond its powers,
or breached its responsibilities to the people, it may also incur the anger of a community.

This was the case in October 2001 in Jabung, East Lampung. A thief had been operating in Jabung,
but when the police arrested the wrong person the ire of the community led to the local people
burning the police station to the ground.33 The animosity between the local people and the police in
Jabung is so severe that the police station has not been rebuilt and Jabung is currently without a
police force.34

32 It should be noted that some authors define the use of such power as violence in itself. Galtung (1969) coins the term
’sstructural violence’ to describe repressive state power. There is an argument to be made that the illegitimate or unjust
actions of the state constitute a violence type. We would argue however that such a use diminishes the meaningfulness and
utility of the word violence.
33 The thief had been stealing shoes and clothes from villagers in Jabung. The police learned that the thief’s name was Udin
and promptly arrested a local person whose name was Udin. However, the local people asserted that the police had
arrested the wrong man.
34 Many people we spoke to said that Jabung would not be not a safe place to conduct fieldwork. Initially we thought this
was because it was more dangerous than other parts of East Lampung. However, later we learnt that criminal gangs had
been paid off to ensure our safety in the villages that we visited. The reason we could not visit Jabung was not just because
of the level of violence – the parts of East Lampung that we visited were also extremely violent – but because our hosts
were unable to secure a criminal gang to protect us.
Conflicts over Land

Land lies at the heart of life in rural Lampung; most people are small-holding farmers. However, the way in which land has been and is being managed and distributed is a major source of conflict, both between individuals and communities and between communities and institutions.35

Conflict between individuals and communities can be traced primarily to the transmigration program. Land that had been traditionally used by locals — although they had no legal certification — was either given to transmigrants or sold on by locals to them. This soon created a system whereby the transmigrants were predominantly the landed class. Bitterness over this situation has played into tensions between the communities.36 The land certification system in Lampung is very rudimentary. However, there is little evidence to suggest that greater certainty of title would reduce the conflict over land. Systems of land certification are dependent upon having an enforceable institutional system.37

Conflict between communities and institutions is also rife. The main reason for conflict between institutions and communities over land seems to be the issue of compensation. Communities are either not compensated, or do not receive adequate compensation for their land. Institutions use their power and their superior bargaining position to acquire land, irrespective of the position of the community.

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35 Land conflict in Lampung is not a recent phenomenon. In 1989, the army killed an estimated one hundred villagers in Labuhan Ratu sub-district in East Lampung. Adam Schwartz (2000, p. 173) writes, “the army initially accused the villagers of being Muslim fundamentalists but later backed down when it became clear that land rights were at the heart of the matter.”

36 See Section 1.3 on structural and psycho-cultural factors.

37 Despite programs of land certification, land conflict did not seem to be subsiding. Individuals seem to place more importance on what they see as ‘naturally just’ than what the law says.
In 1991, a decree was released from the Governor of Lampung ordering the community of Way Tuba village to give up some of their land to be used by the army. Compensation was given – 100,000 rupiah for each hectare and 1,500 rupiah for each rambutan tree already planted. The land, already cultivated, was cleared by the army. People were unhappy but did not complain. The land was going to be used for state purposes. And besides, this was the army so complaining was not an option. But the army never used the land. A foundation, established by an army general, sold the land on at profit to a private company, PT Karisma. The company set up a palm oil plantation. The community in Way Tuba lost their land.

Around the same time as the PT Karisma incident another decree was issued. An area of land was to be cleared for an army airport to be built – 385 hectares in all, 214 of it owned by the community. The decree said that people had to give up their land but that compensation would be paid by the army. Without permission from the community, the army measured the land they needed and took it over by force. Many plantations that had been cultivated by the community were flattened by force. The community kept silent because they were scared of the army. But when it was clear that compensation was not forthcoming they complained to the Governor and then, in 1997, to the army. A series of meetings has taken place, but the community have still to see a single rupiah.

In the cases above the Indonesian army (TNI) used its dominant position in society to take over land owned by the community of Way Tuba. The first case shows the importance of a broad definition of institutions. Although this became a conflict between a company and a community, this was because the land had been acquired cheaply by the army and then promptly sold to PT Karisma. In the second case, the army acquired the land for its own use, but this time they paid no compensation at all. Although neither of these land conflict cases became violent, this was largely because of power of the TNI in Indonesia (see Section 3.1).

Private companies also use their institutional power to buy land cheaply. Utilizing close ties to government and cheap lines of credit, companies exploit the structural barriers that prevent communities from recognizing or realizing the value of their land. The lack of knowledge and financial resources of communities and the endemic corruption of Indonesia’s legal system combine to severely limit the capacity of communities to respond peacefully to this injustice. If the adversary is not the army, force may seem like one of the few options available to an aggrieved community.

38 Approximately $US10 for each hectare and $US0.15 per rambutan tree.
39 Most of the details in the story are from an interview with a representative from Land Advocacy Institute, a local NGO.
Case Study: “Razed to the Ground” - The Burning of PT PLP

The brown river was the muddy divide that kept the wooden houses of Karangan from the seemingly study buildings of PLP, the local palm oil factory. An early morning in March 2001 and two hundred or so people were boarding boats, floating across the swollen river to the town of Giri Hajo where the company’s offices stood.

This was the third time in three months that they had crossed the river to demonstrate outside PLP’s buildings. Five years earlier they had sold their land, just under 400 hectares in all, to a broker. The broker had sold it on to the company – a vast enterprise employing thousands in the local community – and the land, previously a source of wood used to build offices in Bandar Lampung, now played home to offices of its own.

The villagers were upset about the compensation they had received. The land was sold for 335,000 rupiah/hectare, but soon after access roads had been built into the wild jungle and the land value had risen exponentially. Now the market value of the land was almost 5 million rupiah/hectare. And the local community – poor and getting poorer as government food production subsidies disappeared – wanted their cut.

The demonstration started peacefully. Representatives from Karangan, leaders from the village, had been negotiating with the company. But as their ninth meeting finished, and the company still would not budge, the community got angry. The security guards tried to calm them down but they were vastly outnumbered and the villagers ignored them. Now was the right time to attack. The police who protected the factory had just gone back to Bandar Lampung and their replacements would not arrive until the next day. The community knew this because some of them had been in the factory in their usual job as waged laborers (6,500 rupiah for a 7am-2pm shift) just the day before.

Some people had brought with them matches. There was plentiful gas at the factory, gas that when ignited would fuel the flames that would eventually burn down all the property the company owned. The fire spread: through the offices of the company, through the village level cooperative building, engulfing the storage buildings and twenty-five houses where company employees lived. When police reinforcements arrived six hours later, a scorched tractor and some charred foundations were all that remained.

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40 Approximately $US33.50 per hectare.
41 Approximately $US500 per hectare.
The PT PLP case is but one example of how companies take advantage of communities. Located in a remote part of the district surrounded by forest, the community had no way of realizing the value of their land. PT PLP capitalized on the community’s ignorance and used a broker to buy the land cheaply. Whilst not illegal, such conduct could arguably be described as fast practice.

The burning of PT PLP also shows that communities do not immediately resort to violence. In this case the community only became violent when they had exhausted all the other options they saw available to them. The local people of Karangan had been negotiating with the company for over two years during which time they had not even been able to meet the owner of the company. Their response was clearly one of frustration and desperation.

**The Threat of Further Vigilantism**

PT PLP is just one of many companies that have acquired large amounts of land in Lampung in the last decade. The strength of resentment among some communities at the way in which many of these companies came to occupy their land should be of great concern. As has been seen, under-compensation can be enough to provoke vigilant action by aggrieved communities.

In addition to this, however, the hostility that the operating methods of these companies are generating is palpable. Many of these companies use a system of *plasma* farming, where small landholders agree to allow a company to work their land in return for a percentage of the profits. It is not clear how willingly communities enter into plasma programs. Moreover, villagers are often critical of the length of time it takes to receive any income and the paltry size of the payments. It is argued that one of the advantages of this system of farming is that it creates employment for local villagers who are needed to work the new palm oil plantations. However the low wages that are paid to these workers is also a source of resentment. In one village, the Village Head had just organized a week long strike in an attempt to get a pay rise.

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42 Approximately $US0.65 per day.

43 Evidence suggests that this was not an isolated case. Disputes between companies and communities over land seem to take place throughout Lampung.

44 A common revenue sharing model for palm oil companies is: 60 per cent to the landholder, 35 per cent to the company, and five per cent for compulsory savings for the landholder. It appears that companies use the villagers’ land as a way of securing credit to finance their operations.

45 As one villager who did not want to take part in the plasma program explained, although the company said it did not want to “force the community to take part”, after being spoken to by the key village authority figures, “I don’t feel like I belong to the community if I don’t take part in this plasma program.” Ultimately only ten families in the village refused to take part in the program. This villager did not want to participate in the plasma program because he had already had a “bad experience” with the implementation of the program in Sumatra.” He had only “received a very small income from the company.” Eventually he had “run away from the program.” He also had environmental concerns, arguing that “land that is cultivated with palm oil does not become fertile anymore.”

46 A laborer on the PT PLP plantation receives 6,500 rupiah per day ($US0.65), while those working at a nearby pineapple company are paid 11,000 rupiah per day ($US1.10). Laborers at PT Karisma receive 8,500 rupiah per day ($US0.85).
It is clear that the nature of many company-community relations is such that there is great potential for further wider-scale vigilantism against institutions.

1.5 Lampung’s Culture of Violence

As this chapter has shown, there is a culture of violence in Lampung. We have identified three types of violence in Lampung: spontaneous, armed robbery, and vigilantism. Each type of violence has its own distinctive characteristics but the violence types are also linked. Armed robbery may provoke a response of vigilantism. An act of individual-level vigilantism can initiate a cycle of vigilantism. And each act of violence creates the conditions in which more violence (including spontaneous violence) becomes likely. Figure 1.1 below shows the linkages between the types of violence. The seriousness of an act of violence lies not only in the negative impacts of the individual incident. Of even more concern is the fact that a violent act often provokes more violence. This multiplication effect, as the next chapter will show, has led to a situation of grave concern in Lampung.
Figure 1.1 The Culture of Violence in Lampung

**Primary trigger:** consumption of alcohol at parties combines with some form of provoking action

Other forms of violence can help create conditions where spontaneous violence is more likely, but are not direct triggers

### Type I: Spontaneous

- **Can lead to individual vigilantism if**
  - (a) Thief caught in the act, or
  - (b) Police failure

- **Can initiate a ‘Cycle of Vigilantism’ against communities if**
  - Lynchings not seen as justified

- Can escalate to vigilantism against communities if
  - (a) Thief not caught, and
  - (b) Community deemed responsible

- Numerous cases e.g. ‘Kill the thief, Spill his Blood’

- institutional failing

- e.g. burning of Jepara

### Type II: Armed Robbery

- Numerous cases e.g. ‘Kill the thief, Spill his Blood’

- Can lead to individual vigilantism if
  - (a) Thief caught in the act, or
  - (b) Police failure

- Can escalate to vigilantism against communities if
  - (a) Thief not caught, and
  - (b) Community deemed responsible

- e.g. burning of police station in Jabung

### Type IIIa: Individual-level Vigilantism

- Can initiate a ‘Cycle of Vigilantism’ against communities if
  - Lynchings not seen as justified

- Can provoke vigilantism against institutions if
  - (a) Inequitable or illegitimate use of institutional power, and/or
  - (b) Unresponsive institutions

- e.g. burning of PT PLP

### Type IIIb: Wider-level Vigilantism

- Can lead to individual vigilantism if
  - (a) Thief caught in the act, or
  - (b) Police failure

- Can initiate a ‘Cycle of Vigilantism’ against communities if
  - Lynchings not seen as justified

- Can escalate to vigilantism against communities if
  - (a) Thief not caught, and
  - (b) Community deemed responsible

- Numerous cases e.g. ‘Kill the thief, Spill his Blood’

- Institutional failing

- e.g. the burning of Jepara

### Numberous cases

- e.g. burning of PT PLP
- e.g. threatened revenge in Wana
- e.g. drinking in Braja Caka
2. The Impact of Violence in Lampung

Violence is having a significant impact in Lampung. Almost everyone we spoke to had been affected in some way. Whether it is having a family member or a friend killed, or the way in which fear restricts one’s freedom of movement, the impact of violence is real and serious. Little wonder then that in every village we visited, villagers consistently named the lack of security caused by violence as one of the primary, if not the major, problem facing their community.

The negative effects of violence are well known. Studies show that violence can be a major public health problem,¹ a constraint on economic growth and development,² a destroyer of social capital,³ and can have serious psychological impacts.⁴ All of these findings are borne out in Lampung. In the absence of detailed statistics it is difficult to precisely quantify the impact of violence.⁵ Nevertheless, the consequences of violence can be clearly seen by systematically documenting the variety of ways in which violence affects people's lives.

Violence has both direct and broader effects. In addition to the direct impact that violence has on its victims, the level and scale of violence also has broader societal consequences. This chapter examines the specific effects and costs – direct and indirect – that violence is having in Lampung.

2.1 The Direct Effects of Violence

The direct effects of violence can be seen immediately after an act of violence. They include injury and loss of life, loss of goods and money, and loss of, or damage to, physical assets and infrastructure.

Injury & Loss of Life

The number of injuries and lost lives – arguably the most serious consequence of violence – is alone enough to justify action on the issue of violence in Lampung. Although accurate figures do not exist, the evidence that we gathered indicates that every year hundreds of people are dying as a result of

¹ See, for example: the forthcoming WHO World Report on Violence and Health; Rosenberg (1999).
³ See, Moser and Holland (1997).
⁴ See, Kakar (1996).
⁵ Even if it was possible to obtain detailed statistics, as doctors and other village officials candidly observed, there is a large degree of underreporting of violence: “Most victims don’t report to the police or the health service.”
violence in Lampung province. By way of contrast, in the four years between 1995 and 1999 (the most recent years for which data is available) 101 people were killed in the troubles in “high-conflict” Northern Ireland.

Each form of violence we identified has, or potentially could, lead to loss of life and/or injury. Although we did not hear of any cases of spontaneous violence leading to the loss of life, the frequency of this type of violence, and the seriousness of the injuries arising from it, suggests that people do die from spontaneous fighting. The use of bottles and knives causes severe injuries and victims are often hospitalized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Healthcare Centre</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Sub-District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wana</td>
<td>Melinting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way Tuba</td>
<td>Way Tuba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost everyone interviewed knew of someone who had been seriously injured or who had died as a result of a violent armed robbery. Deni’s hospitalization with a fractured skull (see Box 1.1) is not atypical. Although Table 2.1 below only has figures from two health centers, it provides some indication of the number of people being killed or injured by armed robbers.

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6 Our estimates of fatalities and injuries are based primarily on figures given informally when visiting health centers. Examples of incidents given by interviewees, as well as those mentioned in local media reports, help to confirm our assertion that death rates from violence in Lampung are extremely high.

7 Sutton (1999).

8 According to a doctor at the health clinic of in Wana, around half of those injured from fighting at parties go to hospital. While in Wana there have been no reported deaths from spontaneous violence of this type, the injuries that occur can often be serious. One recent case involved a victim being stabbed in the back with the knife almost reaching his lung. Many victims are hospitalized.

9 It should be noted that policemen can also be victims of armed robbers. In Way Jepara sub-district, policemen have been shot by robbers on at least three occasions.

10 Figures given in interviews at health centers in Wana and Way Tuba. In recognition of the frequency with which doctors are faced with injuries arising from violence and the fact that they have no training in how to deal with them, the Ministry of Health recently established a Forum to assist doctors in dealing with these problems. The Forum, which was established in January 2002, suggests that the Ministry of Health may at least recognize the extent of this problem.
Box 2.1 A Thief in the Night - Injury from Armed Robbery

Around midnight on 18th December 2000, Sri Suciats was woken by a knock at his door. A young man explained that the tire on his motorcycle was flat and asked him if he could borrow a pump. Sri Suciats gave the man his pump, but as he did the man suddenly put a pistol to his head. “Don’t move,” he ordered. “Where is your motorcycle?” As the thief moved to the back of the house, three more men suddenly appeared carrying golok (a large knife with a 30-40cm blade). Knocking Sri Suciats to the ground they slashed his back and arm. Standing on his back, Sri Suciats’s assailants tried to put a handkerchief in his month. But when Sri Suciats fought back crying ‘Allah Hu Akbar’ the thieves ran away.

Sri Suciats’ neighbours rushed him to the Village Head’s house. His wounds were very deep and he was losing a lot of blood. The Village Head instructed some villagers to take his car and drive Sri Suciats the three hours to the hospital in South Sumatra. When he arrived in the early hours of the morning, Sri Suciats received 108 stitches in his back and arm.

Sri Suciats spent three days in hospital and needed a month off work to recover. Following the attack he no longer felt safe in Giri Hajo. He asked the government to move him out of the district, but the Bupati (Head of the District) refused. “Be patient,” he said. In the end Sri Suciats gave up. He is still living in Giri Hajo.

Individual level vigilantism results in the death of many thieves. Significantly, we did not hear of vigilantes inflicting injuries; generally if thieves are caught they are killed. Again, statistics are unavailable, partly due to the fact that few vigilante killings are reported to the police, and even those that are reported do not seem to be officially recorded. Yet the testimony of villagers, and reports in the Lampung media, indicate that the number of “thieves” killed by vigilantes is significant, perhaps hundreds per year.

Although there were few injuries and no deaths in the cases of wider-scale vigilantism considered in the report, there remains a strong possibility of such an eventuality. It is less likely in the case of vigilantism against institutions; it seems that it is usually the physical structures that embody the

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11 Given, as we noted earlier, that people do not make a distinction between thieves and those suspected of being thieves, individual level vigilantism could also result in the deaths of some who have not committed crime.
12 Two weeks before our arrival in Lampung three thieves were burnt alive Jabung sub-district. Just two days after we left East Lampung, another four thieves were burnt to death in Jabung. A villager in Jepara mentioned that two thieves had been burnt and killed there in July 2001. There were numerous other accounts of vigilante justice resulting in death. Of the villages visited, only one village (Giri Hajo) did not have a story of a thief being killed in act of individual level vigilantism. Most people we spoke to could recount at least one example of a thief being caught and killed. In Melinting sub-district alone, according to the doctor who does post-mortems on the dead bodies, 60 thieves were lynched and killed in the previous twelve months.
institution that are attacked rather than their employees. However, injuries or death are quite possible in acts of vigilantism against communities. A number of people were injured in the burning of Jepara and the evidence suggests that if the violence had been allowed to escalate further, there could have been serious inter-community violence. Similar near misses in Wana and Braja Caka (Boxes 1.4 and 1.5) are ominous signs.

**Loss of Goods & Money**

A second problem, the loss of goods from armed robbery, occurs throughout Lampung. Stolen goods include: motorcycles, agricultural produce, chickens, televisions, and money. These losses can have a devastating effect on victims.

> “The thieves stole the motorcycle and left. As I returned home I cried. The motorcycle had been borrowed from a neighbor. I had to give him two million rupiah. This is two years’ salary.”
> Villager, Braja Caka

The theft of agricultural produce is especially difficult for farmers who often operate on very tight budgets, especially given increasing prices for fertilizer and reduced market prices for the goods they produce. Farmers spoke despairingly of having significant amounts of their harvest stolen. Sometimes money itself is stolen. The escalated vigilantism in Braja Caka (Box 1.5) led to the loss in that village of six million rupiah – a significant sum of money even shared across the whole village.

> “A problem here is people stealing crops. This happens every harvest. Maybe a farmer has 100 pepper plants. Thieves steal 15-20 of them. The farmers are very, very sad when they have crops stolen because it takes years to grow the plants. They feel upset and angry.”
> Villager, Wana

**Loss of/damage to Physical Assets & Infrastructure**

A third direct effect of violent conflict is the damage to, and loss of, physical assets and infrastructure. Wider-scale vigilantism in particular can have a severe effect of this kind. The cases examined below give an indication of the effect vigilantism against communities and against institutions on physical assets, along with other effects.

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13 There were no reported injuries or deaths in the burning of PT PLP or of the police station in Jabung.
14 Approximately $US200.
15 As one villager explained “I am one of the victims. I have lost agriculture. [Some time ago] I only got 75 per cent of my production [harvest]. The rest somebody stole. Before the houses burning [in Jepara – see earlier case] nearly 50 per cent of my harvest was lost. After the burning I was scared to replant.”
16 Approximately $US600.
Case Studies: The Direct Impacts of Wider-scale Vigilantism

The Burning of Jepara

**Loss of/Damage to Physical Assets & Infrastructure:** 63 houses and their contents were burnt to the ground. Furniture, food stocks, and clothing were all lost to the flames. Tools used to make brown sugar, a popular livelihood, were also burnt.

**Injuries:** The opportunity afforded household residents to leave their houses meant that only two people were injured. However, the possibility of further injuries or death was high, especially if the violence had escalated further.

**Financial Costs:** Following the burning of Jepara, the houses were rebuilt using funds from the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) and PPM. Jepara received 250 million rupiah with which to rebuild the 63 houses. The government also provided food supplies and a committee was established to collect money and goods in kind from other community members, including rice, clothes, dried fish, plates, and carpets for praying.

The Burning of PT PLP

**Loss of/Damage to Physical Assets & Infrastructure:** When PT PLP was attacked the entire company headquarters was razed to the ground. Three office buildings, ten residential houses, storage facilities and their contents, including equipment (such as tractors) and supplies (such as fertilizer), were burnt.

**Loss of investment:** PT PLP intended to expand its operations in Giri Hajo by building a factory. However, after the headquarters were burnt down the bank was “afraid to give them money”. The bank is monitoring the situation and “if conditions are still vulnerable then it will not give them credit.” If nothing had happened then the construction of the factory would now be complete.

**Costs:** The Headquarters were subsequently rebuilt at a new location at an undisclosed cost.

Table 2.2 summarizes the direct effects of each type of violence and indicates possible (although undocumented) direct effects.

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17 PPM is a fund of government money from oil and gas revenues. For an explanation of KDP see footnote 6 in Introduction.

18 Approximately $US25,000.
### Table 2.2 The Direct Impacts of Violence in Lampung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence Type</th>
<th>Direct Impact/Consequence</th>
<th>Loss of goods</th>
<th>Loss of/Damage to Physical Assets/Infrastructure</th>
<th>Injury</th>
<th>Loss of Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Spontaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Armed Robbery</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Vigilantism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Individual Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Wider-scale Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* X = observed incident
* P = potential incident

### 2.2 The Broader Effects of Violence

The complete impact of violence cannot be understood by looking simply at individual acts of violence. Violence has broader effects beyond those immediately identifiable after a particular act of violence. Many of the effects of violence are not attributable to a single act of violence; rather they are the product of a culture of violence. Through its effect on attitudes and behavior violence increases human insecurity, slows economic growth, and, ultimately, restricts human agency. This section identifies and examines a number of broader effects: adverse psychological effects; effects on social capital and community relations; the reduction in the provision of government services; lower investment, higher unemployment, and reduced productivity; and a decline in tourism.

### Adverse Psychological Effects

Violence affects people mentally as well as physically. Although the psychological impact of violence may not always be immediately apparent, it is very real. Violence can have a profoundly disturbing effect on people, especially for those who experience it directly. The testimony of a man in Jepara who had his house burned down is a clear example. In response to government questioning about compensation, he answered: “If I could count the hurt of my feeling, no-one could pay. I have a
three-month-old baby but have to stay in the forest. Because the transmigrants threaten, not just to burn the houses but also to kill us.”\textsuperscript{19} Violence can also have psychological effects on the community as whole. As we have seen, the prevalence of violence in Lampung has created fear and insecurity within the minds of entire communities. It is clear that even 15 months after the burning of Jepara the community is still nervous and on edge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Because everyone is still irritated after the accident happened everyone is more careful towards each other so they don’t irritate other people. Everyone tries but the conflict is still there.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young man, Jepara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Effect on Social Capital**

The negative effects of violence on an individual’s cognitive reasoning are not only seen in the psychological problems and increased insecurity that victims of violence suffer. Violence, in changing people’s attitudes and behavior, also affects relations between individuals. Violence helps shape the dispositions and attitudes of individuals to others and thus impacts on social relations. Trust and social solidarity decrease as violence creates fear and insecurity – both for the victim and for the rest of the community who feel increasingly threatened and vulnerable. This, in turn, impacts upon a society’s social capital.

Much of the literature on social capital identifies it as a good. Social ties in the form of networks and civic associations, both formal and informal, allow communities to combat poverty and insecurity. Social capital is a development input just as physical capital and human capital are. As such, social capital is an asset that can help people survive and prosper. It has been argued that violent conflict has a negative effect on social capital and that social capital can help reduce violence within communities.\textsuperscript{20} However, this is an incomplete explanation of the effect of violence on community relations, norms and networks. Violence in Lampung seems to have both positive and negative effects on social capital. It can lead to an increase in bonding social capital (the relations within groups), but it decreases bridging social capital (the relations between groups).\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} Although we did not gather any evidence that being a victim of violence was causing psychiatric problems, the evidence from studies conducted elsewhere would seem to suggest that this is a real possibility. The Dutch Centrum ’45 group, for example, has extensively researched these links. See <http://www.centrum45.nl/ukintro.htm>

\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, Moser and Holland (1997).

\textsuperscript{21} Clearly the unit of analysis is of importance here. By “group” or “community” we primarily mean people of the same ethnic identity – i.e., transmigrant or local – rather than people from the same village. In other words, the cleavage is an ascriptive ethnic rather than a prescriptive geographic one.
Most violent conflict in Lampung is between ethnic groups. Spontaneous violence, armed robberies and acts of vigilantism occur largely between locals and transmigrants. In the aftermath of a violent incident, there appears to be a strengthening of ties within their individual communities – both within the dusun (sub-village) and with others of the same ethnic identity in other dusun. These ties provide help and support in kind for those who have suffered loss or injury as a result of violence.

“After my house was burnt I went to live in my children’s friend’s house for two nights. Then I stayed in Labuhan Taruan for one week in the house of some family. I then found a house for rent in Way Jepara.”

Community Leader, Jepara

However, violence also leads to a reduction in bridging social capital – the ties and relations between people of different (ethnic) groups. It is this negative impact of violence on social capital that many have highlighted. Yet it is important to point out that the mechanism through which this takes place is the creation of bonding social capital. Too little attention has been paid in the literature to the negative effects of social capital. Positive bonding social capital can actually negatively impact upon bridging social capital. Although increased social capital within groups allows individuals to cope in times of hardship, it is exclusionary in nature; in strengthening the bonds and fostering a stronger intra-community identity this, in turn, can have the effect of worsening relations between communities and increasing inter-group tensions.22 And this can help lead to a continuation and escalation of violent conflict.

The aftermath of the burning of Jepara provides a clear example of these processes at work. Following the burning, key Javanese authority figures got together and made a pact: if a transmigrant was killed by a local in an act of revenge for the burning, the Javanese would band together to kill the perpetrator and to “attack more seriously.” Although the conflict solidified relations between Javanese, it detrimentally affected relations across ethnic groups. This is particularly harmful given the weak state of cross-cutting ties.

The solidifying of group identity, and the breakdown of ties between groups, increases the likelihood of escalated violence. As people rely more, both materially and psychologically, on people within their own ethnic group (normally those in their sub-village), they become less dependent on those from other ethnic groups (in other sub-village). This reduces bridging social capital and can

22 Woolcock and Narayan (2000, pp. 231-233) identify the networks perspective on social capital and economic development. They write: “social capital is a double-edged sword ... groups can both help and hinder economic development.”
potentially increase tensions as perceptions of the motivations of the “other” group are altered. In strengthening intra-ethnic group ties and weakening inter-ethnic ones, this can lead to an escalation of conflict.  

**Reduction in Services**

Conflict can affect the willingness and the ability of organizations to deliver services. This was particularly evident in East Lampung. The following examples reveal the effect that violence is having on government services:

- In Jabung sub-district, the local people burnt down the police station. The sub-district has been without police ever since.
- The postman no longer delivers mail to Wana; instead he leaves the letters in a neighboring sub-district. “That’s why the letters are always late.”
- Some children are not being immunized in Melinting sub-district because healthcare staff are scared to go to the remote parts of the sub-district after a nurse was assaulted.
- The healthcare center in Melinting sub-district needs more personnel but no one will accept a position there. According to the doctor, “every time I ask the Government approves, but no one will move to work here.”

**Reduced Investment, Increased Unemployment & Lower Productivity**

Lampung’s culture of violence is having a critical impact on economic conditions in the province. The high levels of violence provide a strong disincentive to invest in the area. It also makes investment difficult for those already operating in Lampung. As the burning of PT PLP illustrates, banks are reluctant to provide credit to companies threatened by violence. If PT PLP had been able

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23 Varshney (2001, p. 1) is one of the few scholars who has distinguished between inter-ethnic networks and intra-ethnic networks. He writes: “Because they build bridges and manage tensions, inter-ethnic networks are agents of peace, but if communities are organized only on intra-ethnic lines and interconnections with other communities are very weak (or do not exist), ethnic violence is quite likely.”

24 Designing demand-responsive systems of service delivery in conflict-afflicted areas is a key part of the World Bank’s Support for Conflict-Ridden Areas Project (SCRAP).
to get the loan they needed, the factory would now be operational and would be providing hundreds of jobs to those in surrounding villages.

Reduced investment means fewer jobs and more unemployment in Lampung. The lack of opportunities are such that it is very common for young women to leave the province to work in countries such as Saudi Arabia as migrant laborers. Negative perceptions about the young men who are living in violent areas can make it difficult for them to obtain employment, even when there are at least theoretical opportunities. In Nibung village, the young men complained that there was no work to do. There is a textiles factory nearby, but it refuses to employ young men: “The company doesn’t want to take men. The company claims all men from Lampung commit crime, so they don’t employ them anymore.”

Violence is also reducing productivity. Whether it is time lost through injuries, or the difficulty in working after staying up all night to provide security to one’s village, or the additional time required to get to the market by the more secure but less convenient public transport, Lampung’s culture of violence is resulting in the sub-optimal use of time and decreased economic efficiency.

Violence can create a dangerous cycle. As we have already documented, poor and inequitable economic conditions help to create an environment where violence flourishes. Violence also critically affects the business climate through lower investment and increased unemployment and this creates the conditions for further violence.

**Decline in Tourism**

It is common for outsiders to note the significant opportunities for tourism in many places in Indonesia, and Lampung residents also identify this opportunity – and recognize the effect that violence is having on tourism. Violence affects tourism in at least two ways: it hinders investment in tourist infrastructure, and it leads to security concerns amongst travelers. In Wana village, tourists

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25 Quote from young man in Nibung.
26 As detailed above (Box 2.1) the schoolteacher stabbed in Giri Hajo spent three days in hospital and had to take one month off school. The absence of social safety nets means that time off work can lead to severe hardship, particularly for those in non-waged occupations such as farming.
27 The failure of the state to provide security in Lampung has compelled most villages to operate their own form of security (siskamling), with groups of five to seven men taking it in turns stay up until 4am patrolling their area. Siskamling will be examined further in Section 3.1.
28 In some villages women did not ride their motorcycles for fear of being held up and robbed by a thief. As distances to the market can be very long, especially for those living in more remote sub-villages, this can take up a lot of time.
29 Like much of Indonesia, Lampung has beautiful coastlines, spectacular mountain ranges and abundant wild life. It also has the advantage of being easily accessible from Jakarta.
used to come to look at the original houses and traditional music and dancing would be performed. This no longer happens. Other tourist attractions, such as the elephant sanctuary at Way Kambas, also seem to be suffering. The wife of East Lampung’s Bupati, who had studied tourism at a university in England, was keenly aware that the tourism industry would not develop until the issue of violence has been addressed in Lampung.

2.3 Violence, Growth & Development

The scale and nature of violence in high-conflict areas such as Aceh and the Malukus has resulted in violence in Indonesia being conceptualized primarily in human rights terms. However, the prevalence and impact of violence in a “non-conflict” province like Lampung shows that violence is not solely a human rights issue; it is also a significant development issue. There is a two-way link between violence and development. Chapter 1 showed how inequitable patterns of economic growth helped create a culture of violence. This chapter has shown that violence is having major social and economic effects on life in Lampung. Violence and development are integrally interlinked. Uneven development can lead to violence. And violence, in turn, is arguably the major barrier to development in Lampung.

There are clear instrumental reasons why violence should be re-conceptualized as a development issue. Economic growth has traditionally been regarded as an integral component of development and it is evident that violence retards economic growth. All of the effects discussed in this chapter combine to undermine the necessary conditions for growth. The ongoing consequences of violence and the ever-present threat that simmering tensions and conflicts will escalate provide a strong
disincentive for much needed savings and investment. Lampung desperately needs new industries and the opportunities that they bring. The 1997 Asian economic crisis revealed the uncompetitiveness of traditional agricultural methods in the absence of state price supports. Significant economic growth in Lampung is dependent upon the attraction of new industries. Yet Lampung’s culture of violence is preventing the realization of this.

Violence has a particularly damaging effect on social factors such as social cohesion, which are vital inputs into economic growth. The positive elements of social capital, the “features of social organization, such as trusts, norms, and networks, that improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions,”\(^{30}\) are a prerequisite for growth. As the Voices of the Poor study found, “cohesive societies are likely to be more efficient and capital-rich, and hence more productive than fragmented societies.”\(^{31}\) Violence impedes cohesion and prevents the cooperation and relations necessary for growth. Re-conceptualizing violence as a development issue highlights the links between the two. Inequitable economic growth may provide fertile ground for violence. But, equally important, violence stops ‘good’, non-conflict creating, economic growth from taking place.

Instrumental reasons alone justify violence being re-conceptualized as a development issue. However, more importantly, violence is a development issue because a life free from violence is a development end in itself. Increased GDP is but one measure of development. Development, as Amartya Sen has convincingly argued, is about freedom. Development is about increasing human agency to enable people to live the lives they choose.\(^{32}\) This undoubtedly includes having an adequate material base and economic opportunities. But it also means freedom from other threats including that of violence. Poverty is not just about lack of money; it is also about the lack of a broader range of basic rights including security. In the absence of security, people are not free to live life in the way that they want. Again and again security issues were identified as the number one concern of villagers in Lampung. When asked about life in the village, people consistently talked about the fear they felt, the ways in which the violence created insecurity, and the detrimental impact that it had on their lives. People in Lampung may have food to eat and brick walls supporting tiled roofs, but they see themselves as poor. They are poor because they lack – not food or money – but security and all it entails. As such, there is a broader and a stronger argument to be made: for development, both narrowly and more widely conceived, to take place, the violence has got to stop.

\(^{30}\) Putnam (1993, p. 167). For empirical cross-country evidence on the effect of social capital on economic growth, see Knack and Keefer (1997). The LLI studies also highlighted the links between social capital and economic efficiency.

\(^{31}\) Narayan et. al. (2000, p. 175).

\(^{32}\) Sen most famously made this argument in 1999's *Development as Freedom.*
3. Conflict Resolution in Lampung

The level and seriousness of violence in Lampung highlights the need for effective conflict resolution. This much is clear. Yet determining what form such resolution should take is more complicated. As the last two chapters have shown, the causes of social conflict in Lampung are multifarious. There are no simple remedies when there is a culture of violence. So, where do we start from when trying to work out how to build peace in Lampung?

In considering how conflict can be resolved in Lampung it is essential to examine the ways in which the people of Lampung themselves address their problems. The litany of failed development projects in Indonesia and other transitional countries shows the problematic nature of a prescriptive approach where Western “solutions” are uniformly imposed upon a country. Similarly, conflict resolution that simply applies “expert” techniques is unlikely to succeed. Conflict is complex and contextual; addressing conflict is not simply a matter of emulating those who have made more “progress”.

It is important to use an elicitive approach that sees culture and cultural practices as resources that form the foundation for any intervention. To this end, this chapter examines how the people of Lampung deal with conflict and violence. It endeavors to identify existing ideas, practices, and mechanisms that could be supported or strengthened to resolve conflict. This chapter highlights what is working and what is not. The recommendations in Chapter 4 are largely built upon successful or potentially successful methods that are being used today in Lampung.

This chapter is divided into three sections – violence prevention, violence intervention, and post-violence reconciliation – which correspond with the continuum of conflict resolution. The first section examines action that has been taken or is being taken to stop conflict from occurring or from

1 The importance of considering culture when attempting to resolve conflict has been highlighted by a burgeoning school of theorists and practitioners. Cultural understandings help drive conflict (see Chapter 1). Likewise, resolution methods must take account of the role of culture in conflict situations.
2 See Lederach (1995) for an examination of the elicitive model.
3 The list of local conflict resolution methods is by not exhaustive. For more on other resolution methods, see Smith (2003).
4 The approach of building upon existing strategies is not universally accepted. An influential school of largely neo-modernists have – in reaction to the increasing influence of epistemological relativism – argued that there is a need to change, rather than build upon, existing values in order to ensure “progress” (see, Harrison and Huntingdon, eds., 2000). This argument is most typically used to justify the imposition of western economic models onto undeveloped economies. However, it has also been extended to the realm of social relations. For an extreme example, see Edgerton’s chapter in the Harrison-Huntingdon volume (2000, pp. 134-135): “humans, especially those who live in folk societies, make their decisions using heuristics that encourage them to develop fixed opinions, even though these opinions are based on inadequate or false information ... it is unreasonable to expect people’s whose cultures are even less secular than ours to be more efficient problem solvers than we are.” For a rebuttal of such arguments, see Barron and Madden (2002).
becoming violent. The second explores what is done when tensions are high and violence is imminent or is in progress. The third section is concerned with what happens after an act or acts of violence. It focuses on what is done to stop violence from recurring. The chapter concludes with consideration of the ways in which conflict resolution is perceived in Lampung.

3.1 Violence Prevention

Violence prevention aims to stop violence before it starts. It involves measures being taken so that potential conflict situations do not occur, or to prevent conflict from escalating into violence. Violence prevention is preemptive in that it works towards creating conditions that make violent conflict less likely. It may involve changing the structural or psycho-cultural factors that lead to violent conflict.5

Musyawarah

One important way in which villagers in rural Indonesia try to resolve conflict is through musyawarah, a process of discussion and consensus building that is used to address a wide variety of problems. It can take place from the village to the inter-village level. In one village we visited there had already been four musyawarah that week on issues as diverse as trouble with the water supply to difficulties updating the local government database.

In the village of Braja Caka a musyawarah was used to try to address spontaneous violence. As detailed earlier, alcohol or drug-induced fighting amongst young men is a serious problem in Lampung. In Braja Caka there were a number of incidents of spontaneous violence involving alcohol before and after New Year’s Eve. When we arrived in the second week of January, a musyawarah had decided that kiosks would be prohibited from selling alcohol and young men would receive further guidance through religion to eliminate drinking.6

One of the major causes of concern about violence in Lampung is its potential to escalate to target communities and institutions. Identifying mechanisms that can prevent this escalation is therefore

5 See Section 1.3 for a more detailed explanation of the role of structural and psycho-cultural factors in causing violence between communities.

6 A number of villages have banned the sale of alcohol. It is too early to ascertain whether this strategy has been effective in preventing spontaneous violence. Some villagers feel that the ban is working, although there is ample evidence from around the world to suggest that prohibition has never eradicated the consumption of alcohol. Illegal distillation and black markets for alcohol mean it is difficult to prevent people from drinking. Other (forthcoming) WBOJ research conducted in Lampung found more positive evidence as to the efficacy of banning alcohol, at least in the short term (Smith, 2003).
critical. There is evidence to suggest that *musyawarah* may be useful to this end. Authority figures in villages neighboring Jepara, where a whole *dusun* (sub-village) was burnt down (see earlier case), believed that the violence could have been averted had there been a *musyawarah*.7

> "Normally when there is conflict a deal would be done through *musyawarah*. But the Village Head in Jepara refused to have these meetings, even though the Javanese transmigrants in Jepara had requested one. The migrants got more and more angry."

Village Head, Labuhan Ratu Satu, Way Jepara sub-district

In theory, *musyawarah* are a way in which all voices can be heard. It appears that when all parties are given an opportunity to speak the outcome is respected because the process is seen as being fair and just. Under these circumstances, even if a *musyawarah* does not lead to one group’s preferred outcome, the outcome nevertheless appears to be respected by virtue of the process used to reach that result.8

![A musyawarah in progress in Braja Caka](image)

However, the nature of power structures in rural Indonesia is such that the decision-making process is often not genuinely consensual. The culture of deference and fear that characterized the hierarchical political culture of rural villages during the New Order period is still present in many villages in Lampung.9 Consensus reached in *musyawarah* may be more an imposed consensus than a

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7 Although the specific type of *musyawarah* may be important. One *Kepala Dusun* believed that a *pembinahan* (religious meeting) was required. It was the failure to have a *pembinahan* that meant that the community was “not close and unified”.

8 In one village in Way Jepara sub-district, the Village Head said “I regret that I couldn’t get enough money from KDP and PPM. Instead 250 million rupiah went to Jepara. Our village only got 86 million. I felt like I couldn’t ask for more, but the process was fair because they had had a *musyawarah* process with talking and discussion.”

real meeting of minds.\textsuperscript{10} In villages where the Village Head continues to operate in the “New Order style”, the effectiveness of \textit{musyawarah} can be severely limited. Further, while a number of authority figures in Way Jepara sub-district stressed the need to have a \textit{musyawarah} in circumstances similar to those in Jepara, they were not all confident that the process would be successful. One official said, “If we ever had a problem like that in Jepara, we are sure we couldn’t handle it. I don’t know what we’d do.”\textsuperscript{11}

Nevertheless, it is clear that the \textit{musyawarah} provides a model that could be developed and strengthened to help resolve conflict in Lampung.

\textsuperscript{10} When the local community leader of Jepara was asked what should be done about the problems in Jepara he said he would “ask the Village Head to invite all of the community to come together and then tell the community how to handle the situation. Discuss with them, give advice to them.” This response reveals a lot about the contradictory tensions in some \textit{musyawarah}. It is not clear whether the process here is one of the Village Head telling the community what to do, or one of the whole community engaging in joint problem-solving.

\textsuperscript{11} Village Head, Sumur Bandung.
Case Study: A Big Meeting to Confront Violence in East Lampung

The burning of Jepara was just one of many violent conflicts in East Lampung in 2000 and 2001. The situation was so bad that in May 2001 the newly inaugurated Bupati (District Head) called a Rembuk Akbar (big meeting). A meeting on an unprecedented scale, Rembuk Akbar brought together 1,000 representatives from district and village government, as well as police, businesses, civil society, and the media. The purpose was to address key issues facing villagers: security, the “togetherness” and unity of ethnic and religious groups, development, and ways to improve the community's standard of life. The Bupati's report reveals, the meeting was grounded in a theory of community participation. Community involvement was meant to enhance the sense of public responsibility for public affairs and to improve problem-solving. Solutions agreed upon by all stakeholders would be sustainable over the longer term.

In the lead up to Rembuk Akbar (February–March 2001) there were discussions at the sub-district level about “security and social conditions”. Ten people from each of the 23 sub-districts then brought their resolutions and solutions to the Rembuk Akbar. It is not clear how the meeting operated, but it culminated with a Declaration and an Action Plan to Improve Stability, Security and Community Orderliness in East Lampung. (See Appendix C for translations).

The Bupati was very positive about Rembuk Akbar and other government officials spoke of the meeting “accommodating many people's interests” and reflecting “one vision”. Violence was reduced in the meeting's aftermath, but only briefly. Within a few months it was as prevalent as before. This is not surprising. Despite the participatory rhetoric the meeting was a top-down initiative with most participants traditional authority figures. Although there seemed to be some new ideas and – at least implicitly – acknowledgement of some institutional shortcomings, there did not appear to be a sustained effort to address the root causes of the security problem. Moreover the Declaration and Action Plan are very responsibility focused. The fact that no one at the village level – not even the village officials – ever mentioned Rembuk Akbar is suggestive of its small significance at the level it was primarily concerned with.

Young Men's Forum

A recent initiative to help combat crime in East Lampung is the Young Men's Forum. An idea of the district head, each sub-district has been allocated 1 million rupiah to fund a forum consisting of 30 young men nominated by the village heads within each sub-district. The interesting feature of the Forum is that its members are predominantly the “naughty young men” – that is, those who are suspected of stealing and other crimes.

The Forum is a very new idea – in some sub-districts there have only been one or two initial meetings, in others it has yet to meet – and its exact role is not yet clear. People seem to have different perceptions of its role and how it will work. In Nibung, the Village Secretary saw the Forum's role as helping to investigate crime committed by young people, as well as providing outlets for the aspirations of other young men, particularly through the organization of sport. In Way Jepara
sub-district, the Chief of Police saw the Forum as more of a means of reconciliation that would only indirectly prevent crime.12

Disconcertingly, members of the Forum in Nibung seemed to view their role as being that of a para-police force. Describing themselves as “the enemy of the robbers” they proposed buying motorcycles and communications equipment to enable them to patrol the “vulnerable areas” to prevent “violent activity”. In the event of a crime they would “hunt the robber until they find him” and then “give him to the police.”13

“They [the Government] have no idea how to solve the [security] problem.”
Member of a Young Men’s Forum, Nibung

While the role of the Forum is not clearly defined, it appears that its purpose is to actively engage some of the more problematic members of the community in addressing sub-district security issues – a “poacher turned gamekeeper” scenario. There is value in involving young men in decision-making processes but there is also an obvious danger that the men become officially sanctioned vigilantes. The Forum offers potential as a means of prevention, but caution must be paid regarding the exact role it plays.

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12 Although the police chief was not entirely sure of the Forum’s activities as it apparently falls under the responsibility of the Sub-District Head.
13 Young men from Nibung.
Sport & Organized Community Activities

Sport and other such activities can help prevent violent conflict by providing alternative avenues for conflict and through giving young people constructive things to do with their time. The Young Men’s Forums aim to “counter the aggression of young men” and a perceived means of doing this is through sport. Sport is an important part of rural village life in Lampung; most villages have a soccer field and almost all sub-villages have volleyball courts. The value of sport was recognized in number of sub-districts we visited.

“We created a sports program to make sure that young men don’t do negative things. I created the program last year. Every sub-village has a group and then there is an organized championship between sub-villages. This activity will help create the togetherness feeling.”

Village Head, Way Tuba

Sport brings communities together and increases their level of interaction. It provides an alternative way of fighting or doing battle. It is an outlet for aggression and, as such, sport can be conceptualized as the transference of actual violence into a form of stylized violence.\textsuperscript{14} Ideally, sport would be conducted on a campur or mixed-ethnic basis rather than along ethnic lines. Given the ethnic divisions within villages in Lampung there is a risk that two sub-villages competing against each other could become a competition between local Lampung people and transmigrants. That said, we found no evidence of sport provoking conflict.

Other organized community activities could also be of value in preventing violence, particularly those that explicitly involve young people. The Village Head in Way Tuba also wants to create an “arts activity” in which young people could be involved in creative activities such as music. Unfortunately a lack of money has proved to be a barrier to this initiative.\textsuperscript{15}

Siskambling

Most villages in Lampung operate their own security system, known as Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan (or Siskambling), to try to prevent robberies. Soeharto initiated Siskambling in 1987 in preparation for the upcoming general election. Although the system came and went, the present security situation is

\textsuperscript{14} In his seminal work, \textit{The Colors of Violence}, Sudhir Kakar (1996) explores the significance of the culture of wrestling in relations between Hindus and Muslims in India. Others have pointed out the value of stylizing and ritualizing conflict, with sport being one such way to do this.

\textsuperscript{15} The Village Head told us, “I want to buy more instruments, but don’t have enough money. If I could buy more instruments, maybe the arts activity would develop.”
so poor that most Village Heads have reactivated it. Villages are divided into household groups of about 40 families. In each group five or six men take turns to patrol their part of the village throughout the night (10 p.m. – 4 a.m.).

*Siskambling* clearly does not address the underlying causes of robbery. It prevents armed robbery only in so far as it acts as a deterrent against crime and there is little evidence that it has any deterrence effect. Despite the presence of security guards, theft (primarily of agricultural products) has not reduced and continues at high levels. Moreover, in at least one village, it seems that the *Siskambling* was actually seen as a resource for robbers. Masked men in trucks and armed with guns forced the *Siskambling* to open the doors of a target house, enabling them to steal two motorcycles.16

**Vigilantism**

In addition to fulfilling a retributive function, vigilantism is seen by people in Lampung as also being a form of deterrence. It should therefore be conceptualized, at least in part, as a form of violence prevention. It is unclear how effective vigilantism as a deterrent is. In Way Tuba villagers thought the killing of a suspected thief (Section 1.4) was good because apparently all the other robbers in the area then left because they were “scared the same thing would happen to them.” Similarly, transmigrants in Way Jepara sub-district believed that there was no more stealing after the burning of the houses because all the thieves had moved to Jakarta, although the cessation proved to just be a two-month lull. The large number alone of thieves who have been lynched indicates the importance Lampung people place on vigilantism as a deterrent while, perversely, the fact that crime continues shows its ineffectiveness as a prevention method. Vigilantism reinforces the culture of violence. In addition to sparking larger-scale retaliatory vigilantism against communities, it legitimizes the use of violence as a means of problem-solving. As such, vigilantism has not proven to be successful as a prevention method.

**Case Study: Prevention of Violence over Land - Comparing the PT PLP, PT Karisma & Army Airport Cases**

As in much of Indonesia, land conflict is common in Lampung. Chapter 1 explored situations where conflict over land led to wider-scale vigilantism. This section will look at three land conflicts between communities and institutions. In one case (PT PLP) preventative resolution measures failed and the situation became violent; in a second (the Army Airport) the measures were partially successful in that there has been no violence, but the issue is not yet resolved; in the third (PT

16 This incident happened in Way Tuba in November 2001. Following that incident the men were too scared to be guards and the system’s operation was suspended. It has only just been restarted.
Karisma) violence was prevented and the issue, in the eyes of the community has been resolved. Examining the preventative measures taken, as well as contextual factors, helps in part to explain why one case became violent and two did not.

**Box 3.1 Before the Burning - Initial Attempts to Resolve the Conflict between Karangan & PT PLP**

“The burning happened because the company did not solve the conflict. The conflict has been going on since 1996. Villagers from here [this sub-village] complained. The company was cheating because they sold 500 hectares of land but the company said it was 335 hectares. The BPK Chief 17 asked to go to Bandar Lampung to meet the company. But when he arrived the company was not willing to solve the problem. The Director (Mr Borhan) met with him, but Mr Borhan is not the owner of the company, just a representative.

He was lying. He often promised things but did not deliver. In the first meeting he said the company would build a mosque and a village meeting place. In the second meeting he cancelled his promises. 18 I don’t know why the promises were cancelled. Mr Borhan said “why did you not ask for that price [the price they now want] when you sold the land.” After that the community got angry and went to his office [they demonstrated at the company offices in Giri Hajo].

There were other negotiations. The community formed a team to negotiate with the company. There were eleven [community representatives] in the team. There were two negotiations in Bandar Lampung and seven in the offices, but no solution. The negotiations went on for over two years. The last negotiation was just before the incident happened. After the last negotiation the community got angry and the incident happened. We never met with the company owner – just with the representative of the company, Mr Borhan – so we were angry.

After the negotiation happened there was no action from the company. The community occupied the inti [company-owned] land so the company could not do its business. 19 After the community heard there was no action they got out of control and burned the offices. We used matches and gas owned by the company.”20

Local Men, Karangan

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17 The BPK, known is some villages as the BPD, is the elected village council. It replaced the LMD as a result of Law 22/1999 and was meant to be an attempt to strengthen democracy at the village level. It is unclear as of yet how much effect this change has had. See, Antlov (2001).

18 The meetings both took place in March 2001.

19 Most of the plantations in Lampung seems to consist of plasma land – land owned by villagers but worked by the company and inti or “core” land which is owned by the company.

20 See the case study in Section 1.4 for more details.
In 1991 the Army claimed 214 hectares of land from people in Way Tuba for the construction of an airport. However the people did not receive any compensation (see Box 1.6). The story continues post-reformasi…

"The community kept silent at first because they were scared of the army. But in 1997 the community complained to the army. There was no response. [In 1998] they complained to the Governor of Lampung who had released the decree in 1991. The Governor said that the government would be a mediator in this case. In 1999 they had several meetings with the Assistant Governor. The participants agreed immediately to solve the problem, [but] they did not agree how – it was up to the army. In September 2000 the new autonomy law was released. The local government has to solve the problem. It met the Bupati (District Head) three times and the Bupati asked the army to immediately solve the problem. The Bupati and the army made an agreement to solve the problem.

But the problem is not yet solved. Later (September 2000) another problem was raised, related to adat. The culture community (adat) claims this same area. The Bupati only wanted to solve the problem between the army and the community; if there is a conflict between adat and the community they have to solve the problem themselves. The army has not yet measured the area or given compensation. They don’t want to do this until the conflict between the community and the adat is solved. So far the community and the adat have not tried to solve the problem because they are still thinking of the best way."

Pak Agus Makiti, Land Advocacy Institute, Way Kanan sub-district

In 1996/7 the community in Way Tuba was under-compensated for land that they were led to believe would be used by the army, but was in fact sold on to a palm oil company. (See Box 1.6). The story continues in 1999….

"The community protested to the company about their right. The community conveyed their aspirations to the local parliament. The Parliament responded and acted as a mediator between the community and company (September 1999). It organized a company/community meeting to find a solution. In the mean time, we asked for compensation (5 million rupiah per hectare), but the company did not accept our proposal. The Parliament invited the owner of the company to a meeting with the community. The owner of the company gave the community three choices: buy the land back from the company; cooperate together [with the company]; or participate in the Plasma program."

21 In Lampung, adat (customary law) has traditionally regulated land use and ownership, and adat elders have acted as quasi-landlords, holding the land for the benefit of the people (the ethnic Lampungese). In Lampung, as in much of Indonesia, as areas have become increasingly ethnically heterogeneous, and as state repression of ‘non-modern’ institutions has declined post-Soeharto, adat leaders have reasserted traditional claims. These claims often contradict positive state-endorsed property rights.
22 The Dewan Peswaklan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD), Way Kanan.
23 Approximately $US500.
24 For further information on plasma programs refer to Section 1.4.b(ii) above.
In each of the three cases above a community appears to have a legitimate claim that their land has been appropriated inequitably or unjustly. In each case the communities did not act upon their grievances until after reformasi. This shows again the extent to which the authoritarian New Order regime prevented conflict from becoming overt, primarily through state repression and fear. However, given the fact that all the communities acted upon their grievances post-reformasi, it is useful to consider what it was that led to two of the cases becoming violent and one not.

It is tempting to look at the fact that the only case that became violent was the case where the army was not involved and to conclude that it was easier to resolve a community’s problems with the army than with a private company. However, this misses a key point: the primary reason the two cases in Way Tuba did not become violent was that when the army was involved violence was not an option. Despite reformasi, Indonesians are still scared of the army. In the case of the Army Airport, fear led the community to petition the district government, rather than the army directly. Although the two disputes in Way Tuba were resolved, at least to some extent, it seems that the final outcome was perhaps less than satisfactory to the community. Certainly, it is unlikely that the community in Karangan would have settled for a plasma program or for a ‘solution’ which has still resulted in no compensation.

However, while it is true that fear of the army prevented any violence occurring in Way Tuba, prevention is still possible when the army or the state is not a party to the conflict. The two Way Tuba cases offer valuable lessons that if enacted in the PT PLP case could arguably have resolved the matter before it became violent. The extent to which local institutions support a claim from a

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25 This raises the question of the extent to which repression can act effectively (and legitimately) as a conflict prevention method. ‘Lifting the lid’ on the tensions that were hidden during the Soeharto era has led to increases in violent conflict in Indonesia. However, as Nader (1991) forcefully points out, absence of overt conflict is not necessarily good. Harmony is the forced veneer of peace and can be repressive in itself.

26 This is illustrated by the fact that upon learning that the army was involved in the conflict in Way Tuba our driver refused to take us any further. Instead we had to pay a relatively large sum of money to hire another vehicle and driver to take us to Way Tuba.

27 In the Army Airport case there are still ongoing disputes between the community and the culture. However, the principal actors – the army and the community – have dealt with the issue.
community, and the extent to which a community does not have to directly pursue the claim without outside institutional support, does seem to effect whether or not it can be successfully resolved.

Although it was the BPK Chief who initially took the issue to PT PLP, at no time did the claim enjoy the broad support of all Karangan villagers. The disputed land had originally belonged to the local people and it was the local people alone – a minority in Karangan – who were aggrieved. Ultimately, it was the Karangan people themselves who represented their case. In the other two cases, where both local and transmigrant people were aggrieved, and where the local parliament genuinely pursued the case, negotiated resolution was more likely. In the Army Airport case the local government negotiated with the Bupati on behalf of the community and pursued the matter with the army. In the PT Karisma case, the local parliament mediated between the company and community. In cases where the local government supported a community’s claim, there was a greater likelihood that it would be peacefully resolved.

This shows the extent to which a third party is necessary where there is a power imbalance. The third party can either be a government institution or another trusted outside party such as an NGO. Third parties help address power inequalities and also help moderate claims from each side. In both the Karangan and the PT Karisma cases the community demanded 5 million rupiah per hectare compensation. However, in Way Tuba when the demands were not met, the local parliament was able to salvage the negotiations. The Karangan community had no such third party to assist it. Further, in both the Way Tuba cases a community-based NGO, the Land Advocacy Institute, played a key role. In contrast, the people of Karangan did not have the benefit of NGO assistance until after the conflict had become violent, when KOAK (a local anti-corruption NGO) started to help them. The Way Tuba cases highlight the value of grassroots NGO activism as a preventative measure.

**3.2 Violence Intervention**

The tendency for conflict to escalate in Lampung underscores the importance of examining who or what is effective at preventing violence when it is about to erupt. Intervention when violence seems imminent or is actually taking place can be critical. Interventions can come from individuals or from organizations. This section examines the way in which intervention in the heat of the moment can prevent violence from occurring.

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28 Approximately $US500.
Individual Actors

Case Study: Trying to Prevent the Burning of Jepara

The Jepara case illustrates the difficulty of intervening when tensions are high. With the Village Head of Jepara incapacitated, the story of the LKMD Chief’s attempts to resolve the conflict provides rich material for analyzing violence intervention by individuals.

Box 3.4 Trying to Prevent the Burning of Jepara

“I went to the thief’s house and asked him to give back the motorbike. He said they would give back the motorbike if I prevented the people from outside the village who were going to burn his house down from coming in. So I went to the groups of people who were going to enter and asked them not to enter. I told them they would get the motorbike back. I asked four of the people outside [from another village] to help me make a better solution. But the people outside refused. They didn't just want four people but all of the people [from the other villages] to come here. I said it was prohibited for everyone to come in because it would not solve the problem.

Some people from outside provoked others to burn the houses. I said ‘Don’t burn all the houses because not all the houses are owned by the robbers.’ But they said to me, ‘It’s not your business.’ I asked, ‘Whose house are you going to burn?’ They answered, ‘Just five houses.’ The houses they were going to burn were [gives names]. The people said they were guilty and that they had to take action.

I told them that the houses were owned by their parents. They said that I was trying to cover the thieves. I just wanted to stop them from burning [the houses]. They were very mad and asked me to go. They wanted the Village Head to meet them. I told them that the Village Head was in very bad health. They answered, ‘Why then is he the Village Head?’

I was getting scared. People were standing in a circle around me. I knew one of the people, Agus Santoso. I asked Agus to help me handle the question. Agus whispered to me that it was hard to handle this situation and told me to run away. So I took my motorbike and my family, and also Agus, to go to Way Jepara sub-district. When we arrived at the border of the village there were many people there to attack the village. I asked Agus to go back into the village to prevent them from attacking while I went to the police office. I asked the policemen to come.”

Pak Marhusin, LKMD Chief, Jepara

Marhusin made a number of attempts to intervene to stop the situation in Jepara from becoming violent. First, he tried to address the proximate cause of the conflict by retrieving the stolen
motorcycle. Second, he attempted to act as an intermediary between one of the thieves and the angry mob of transmigrants. Third, he tried to act as a neutral voice of reason, trying to explain the problems associated with the conflict escalating, and then appealing to the group’s sense of justice. Finally, he attempted to intervene by reaching out to someone in the group whom he knew.

Why were these attempts unsuccessful? The attempt to address the proximate cause was insufficient because the transmigrants saw the issue in broader terms; the issue was that the sub-village was perceived to be complicit in the protection of the thieves. This also reduced his trustworthyness in the eyes of the transmigrant community. His actions were interpreted, not as an attempt to prevent violence, but as an attempt to frustrate the transmigrants in their quest for justice. By the time he made his final attempt at intervention, any opportunity for mediation or negotiation by Marhusin had passed.

It is not clear who might have successfully intervened in this situation. Locals from Jepara cite the incapacity of the Village Head as an important explanatory factor as to why this situation spiraled out of control. It is possible that his formal authority might have been enough to prevent the violence, although the transmigrants’ lack of respect (and perhaps even their contempt) for the sickly Village Head was palpable. The Camat (Sub-District Head), or some other higher governmental authority figure, may have been more successful. Or the police might have been able to keep the parties apart through the threat of force.

There is evidence in Lampung to suggest that interventions from individuals can be effective. After villagers in Wana lynched a thief from Tanjung Aji, the threats of a retaliatory attack never materialized. This in part was due to an old man in Wana who, despite not holding any formal authority, apparently had family in Tanjung Aji, which motivated him to prevent the violence from escalating into a cycle of vigilantism. It is hard to identify a clear set of principles governing when intervention by an individual is effective. It seems that trust from both sides, perhaps stemming from some kind of authority, is central.

**NGOs**

**Case Study: Intervening to Prevent Further Burning**

As was shown in the Way Tuba land cases (Boxes 3.2 and 3.3), NGOs can play an important role in preventing conflict. They can also play a role in intervening when violence is about to erupt. The anti-corruption NGO KOAK helped prevent the violence from escalating further after the burning
of PT PLP. Following the burning, the police arrested seven “provocateurs” from Karangan. Greatly upset by this, the locals in Karangan staged a demonstration outside the police station in Kotabumi and demanded the release of the men. With emotions running high, this protest could easily have turned violent. However, after intervention from KOAK, the police agreed to re-examine the matter and the situation was defused. KOAK’s role was vital. Villagers from Karangan claimed that KOAK organized the demonstration, while the secretary of the Blangbangumpu branch of KOAK said that they simply acted as “facilitators” and “spoke to the police on behalf of the community.” In any event, KOAK’s involvement appears to have been helpful in preventing violence.

**The Police**

There is certainly a clear role for police intervention when tensions run high and violence seems imminent. It was the police who eventually defused the situation in Jepara after the houses were burnt down. As local Lampung people began descending in large numbers, angry at the actions of transmigrants the night before, police from Bandar Lampung used their trucks to take the transmigrants back to their villages. This was critical in preventing further escalation.

“*If the government did not come in time, big war would happen.*”

Community Leader, Dusun I, Jepara

It is not clear what prevented the threat of violence from materializing when Wana was threatened for a second time (again prompting the evacuation of the women and children), although villagers
noted that the police did come to Wana on this occasion. Similarly, in Karangan the extent to which intervention from the police as the conflict began to escalate was beneficial is unclear.

Box 3.5 The Burning of PT PLP - The Role of the Police

“The police helped when the community had difficulty meeting with the company. The police came here, got community representatives, and then took them to Bandar Lampung to meet the company. The police offered [to do this]. But really the police have been no benefit. Now the police have given up. They don’t want to be involved anymore. Why? Because the company keeps telling the police that they are the right side.”

Local men, Karangan

The Jepara case also highlights the limitations of the police in preventing violence in the heat of the moment. Faced with a large group of angry transmigrants looking for revenge the police failed to intervene in any adequate way. Although the police were aware of the precariousness of peace in Jepara, no measures – not even the temporary posting of policemen to the village – were taken to ensure that the conflict did not escalate into violence. The police were not there when the burning started and when they arrived they took no action. Transmigrants claim that the situation was beyond police control: they “tried to stop the action, but could not do anything.” However, local people claim that the police had been told by their superiors not to intervene. Some even suspect that some of the police provoked the vigilantes.

**Perpetrators**

Sometimes it is the potential perpetrators of violence themselves who intervene to prevent violence from transpiring. In the motorcycle theft that led to the burning of Jepara, one of the thieves prevented his companion from physically assaulting the female victim: “Al don’t kill her – she is my neighbor!” Similarly, shortly after the same burning there was an incident in which a transmigrant riding down the main street was stopped by some local people. With emotions still raw, the locals set the motorcycle on fire and then threw gasoline on the transmigrant. Fortunately one of those involved in the attack intervened shouting, “Don’t do that - don’t burn him - I know him.” These incidents highlight the very real preventative value of cross-cutting social ties. It is important to emphasize that violence is more easily perpetrated on people whom one does not know. Being known can be the difference between life and death.

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29 In contrast, note that in the case of threatened escalated vigilantism in Braja Caka (see Box 1.5), it appears that further violence was only averted through the community acquiescing to the vigilantes’ demands. The community pooled its resources and paid the vigilantes the 6 million rupiah ($US600) that they were demanding.

30 Quotes in this section from interview with Pak Marhusin, LKMD Chief, Jepara.
The importance of understanding who and what can dampen a tense situation and prevent it from becoming violent cannot be overstated. Preventing the establishment of a cycle of violence, or breaking the cycle once it has started, is clearly very important and both individuals and organizations can play key roles. However, in practice, obtaining stories on violence that “did not happen” or that was narrowly averted is not easy. More in-depth qualitative research is required on this subject.

3.3 Post-Violence Reconciliation

The preceding analysis has focused on initiatives and procedures to prevent violence and to intervene when violence is imminent. Whilst violence prevention at an early stage is clearly preferable, it is also important to understand how communities deal with violence once it has occurred. What – if anything – do parties to violence and the communities around them do to achieve post-violence reconciliation? Reconciliation is important because it helps strengthen ties that have been weakened by violent conflict. Without reconciliation, violence will continue or worsen.

Unfortunately our information is limited on this subject. It appears that very little work is done to reconcile individuals and groups after spontaneous violence or individual-level vigilantism. We have already seen that it is common for communities to respond to violence with more violence. This is particularly likely following violent crime. The application of vigilante justice, rather than any attempts at constructive post-incident problem-solving leads to further violence. There appear to be no real attempts at reconciliation. The two case studies of Jepara and PT PLP do, however, provide some information on reconciliation after wider-level vigilantism.

Case Study: Reconciliation after Burning - Jepara & PT PLP

Following the burning of Jepara, key authority figures tried to resolve the conflict. The Camat (Sub-District Head), and then later the local legislature, acted as facilitators for discussions between transmigrants and locals. The Bupati (District Head) also rushed to the sub-district to facilitate reconciliation (Box 3.6 below). He appealed for calm and promised compensation for the victims. The victims received food and clothing and some basic household equipment and utensils. Government officials bluntly asked each community leader what would be sufficient compensation to prevent them from initiating revenge: “if you are not going to take revenge, what are your
requirements?” The transmigrants wanted the four thieves caught; the locals from Jepara wanted their houses rebuilt.

**Box 3.6 After the Burning - Reconciliation in Jepara?**

“After this incident the Bupati went to the village [Jepara] with the Vice-Chief. They tried to ask the two groups [the victims and the vigilantes] to meet each other. The two sides had a meeting with the Bupati in another sub-district – Pesanggrahan Way Curup in Labuhan Maringga sub-district. The meeting happened on 16-17th October 2000. [The original incident happened on 14th October 2000].

The Bupati said everyone who had his house burnt would get funds for it to be rebuilt. The houses would be rebuilt and the people would get furniture. He asked the migrants in Jepara to help the people who had their houses burnt. They were ready but the Bupati did not mention how much money they had to provide. The Bupati immediately formed a committee for the incident and a secretariat. The committee collected funds from everyone who wanted to give money and also rice, clothes, dried fish, glasses and plates, and carpets for praying. The government also gave money. I made a report to the Bupati who immediately took action. They arrested one of the robbers. The rest had run away. The robber went to jail.”

**LKMD Chief, Jepara**

The reconstruction of the houses was funded by the Government and the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP). Interestingly, KDP was the mechanism for the distribution of the money. At the KDP meeting it was noted that KDP money should not be used to fund infrastructure projects for personal benefit. However because of *kemanusian* (a sense of humanity) all ten villages agreed to use the money to rebuild houses. While this breaks the rules, everyone decided it was a special case for *rekonsiliasi* (reconciliation). One Javanese village official in the sub-district noted that “actually it was not reconciliation because the problem was only in one village.” He nevertheless acknowledged that the money had helped reconciliation in that village. He believed that the sub-district level should always help villages to reconcile and the fact that there was reconciliation in Jepara made the other villages feel more secure.

After PT PLP’s offices were burnt down, the Karangan villagers sought help from KOAK. After sending a team to Karangan to investigate the matter, KOAK arranged mediation between the community and the company in Bandar Lampung. The three-person mediation team included a lawyer from Bandar Lampung and a lecturer from the law faculty at UNILA (University of Lampung). They first met in August 2001 and the mediation is ongoing. While local people are

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31 The members of the committee were: the Vice-Bupati, the Vice-Bupati’s assistant, representatives of the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Village Secretary, representative from the Public Works department at the district level, the Chief of LKMD (Marhusin), the Camat (Chief of the Sub-District), the Village Head. Most of these people were local Lampung men.

32 Apparently some transmigrants provided the sand for the reconstruction of the houses.
hopeful that the mediation team will be able to solve the problem, they admit that there is no sign that the company will acquiesce to their demands. The company describes the negotiations as “deadlocked.”

In both of these cases the violence was serious enough to prompt some form of post-violence action. In both Jepara and Karangan a third party brought together those involved in the violence. In Jepara the government took the initiative, while in Karangan it was a NGO. Mediation was used in both cases, although whether this was at the request of the parties themselves is unclear. Although mediation is reputedly still in progress in one case, neither appears likely to successfully resolve the conflict. This is due in no small part to the way in which resolution is understood.

### 3.4 Concepts of Resolution

As is evident above, there is little emphasis placed on post-conflict reconciliation in Lampung. Reconciliation is important because it attempts to rebuild ties that have been broken in the process of violent conflict. As discussed earlier, individual and group perceptions change after incidents of violence and this can affect cross-cutting ties and bridging social capital. In large part the neglect of reconciliation stems from the view of conflict resolution that is dominant in Lampung. A conflict is seen as resolved if people’s immediate desires are satisfied. The concentration of resolution in Lampung is on reparations. This focus leads to a lack of willingness to compromise in any way. As the locals from Karangan explain, “If the company gives the community 1 billion rupiah\(^{33}\) there will be no problems. If the company accepts this proposal the conflict will end.” The implicit message is if PT PLP does not provide the money, the conflict will not end. Concern is entirely focused on getting compensation, rather than addressing the deeper issues that are the causes of the conflict.

Likewise, in Jepara the transmigrants wanted the thieves caught while the locals wanted their houses rebuilt. No attempt was made to address the problems underlying the recurring violence. Most of the anger and bitterness of Marhusin, the community leader in Jepara, stemmed not from the disheartening state of local-transmigrant relations but from the fact that the government had only replaced his house and not his furniture as promised. Even the third party (the government) defined the problem narrowly, focusing simply on actions that would prevent the conflict from further escalation rather than the deeper issues.\(^{34}\)

\(^{33}\) Approximately $US100,000.

\(^{34}\) The confrontation between the locals of Karangan and the police at Kotabumi (above) is another case in point. It seems that it was solely the outcome (the release of the men) that appeased the mob. Despite the involvement of KOAK there is
Conflict resolution involves addressing the root causes of conflict as well as its episodic manifestations. While this chapter has highlighted local methods and processes that do offer potential in helping to prevent conflict, the way in which conflict resolution is understood in Lampung is itself a barrier to an improvement in conditions. Given the absence of genuine concern to achieve a deeper sense of resolution, it is no surprise that the PT PLP case goes on and that post-Jepara tensions are still high.

While more research is needed to better understand community attitudes to violence and conflict resolution, it is likely that the nature of the New Order regime, and the impact it had on the way in which social interactions are understood, would figure prominently in any explanation. Given the little opportunity that villagers had to express themselves and resolve their own conflicts, it is no surprise that villagers also have few effective conflict resolution skills.

Yet, as this chapter has shown, some practices do work, or have the potential to work. Effective conflict resolution must build upon existing practices that work. But there is also a need to build the conflict resolving skills of people in Lampung and to change perceptions of what addressing conflict really means. Our recommendations will address some of these concerns.

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strong reason to believe that if the community had not achieved the outcome they desired the situation would not have been resolved peacefully. No attempts were made to address underlying issues.
4. Conclusions & Recommendations

“I want you to come up with a better solution so the young criminal people can have a better life.”
Villager, Jepara

This report has shown that there is an urgent need to address violent conflict in Lampung. It has also outlined some of the key dynamics and processes that allow conflict to take a violent form and to escalate. This chapter builds on the way in which we have conceptualized conflict and its causes to provide recommendations about how to move forward in preventing, managing, and resolving violent conflict in Lampung.

Understanding the nature of conflict is a prerequisite to attempting to resolve it. Without an adequate understanding of the dynamics of conflict, attempts at prevention and resolution will prove fruitless and may even increase the level of conflict in the society. It has been an argument of this report that too often conflict is misunderstood in Indonesia. The fact that studies are concentrated in the “high-conflict” provinces – and the analytical inadequacy of much of the work that has been done – distorts our understanding of the factors driving and triggering violent conflict.

This report posits that violent conflict in Lampung, as in much of Indonesia, is, in large part, a result of institutional failings. Interventions that seek to strengthen the institutions of every day conflict management will do more to lower levels of violent conflict than more typically prescribed tools such as peace treaties or resource settlements.

Indonesia is currently undergoing a period of massive change. During the 30 years of New Order government, the institutions of the state penetrated every part of Indonesian society, down to the most remote village in the most remote province. This “vertical” institutional structure regulated conflict but at the tragic expense of the human rights of the Indonesian people. The fundamental weakness of this structure, which imposed solutions and a method of societal organization from the top, was exposed in the impact of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the student protests that followed the next year. The need for more integrative institutions and norms, which better reflect the diversity of Indonesian society, became clear. Recent decentralization and regional autonomy laws, accompanied by ongoing democratization, have set Indonesia on a path that has the potential to dramatically change the nature of Indonesian society.
Yet the vacuum created by the collapse of the New Order has yet to be filled. Authoritarian states do not become well functioning democracies overnight. Indeed, the types of violence this report identifies in Lampung – spontaneous, armed robbery, and vigilantism – are typical of a society wrestling with the challenges of democratic transition. They are symptomatic of a state where the institutions of democracy are still being built. Conflict becomes violent in Lampung because the institutions of deliberation and law enforcement – two vital prerequisites of effective conflict management – are not in place or, if they are, they do not function adequately.

What does this mean for how we seek to reduce levels of destructive violent conflict in Lampung and beyond? This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the ways in which adopting a paradigm that sees conflict through an institutional lens changes our responses to the problem. The second section looks more concretely at interventions that can be made to help strengthen conflict-managing institutions in Lampung. The third part of this chapter considers the potential role the World Bank can play in helping lower levels of violent conflict. The paper closes by reconsidering what the case of Lampung tells us about conflict in Indonesia, and the lessons that can be learned to help reduce violent conflict in Lampung and throughout Indonesia.

### 4.1 Building Institutions

As Chapter 1 of this paper documented, the failure of legal institutions is one of the most important factors explaining the violence in Lampung. Legal institutions help prevent conflict from becoming violent and help ensure that violence does not spiral out of control. In the absence of effective policing, armed robberies can lead to individual vigilantism, which in turn can escalate to wider-scale vigilantism and violent conflict between communities. Similarly, the absence of an independent and impartial legal system allows for state activities, such as the seizure of land, which can provoke violent community responses. As in the rest of Indonesia, an important way to help prevent violent conflict in Lampung is to create effective and impartial legal institutions.

Yet legal reform is neither a complete solution nor immediately realizable in the short-run. Fundamental tasks such as reshaping the Indonesian police force and changing legal norms are long-term projects. Trying to create new, or reform existing, national level institutions in a country with a complex bureaucracy characterized by endemic corruption, cronyism, and nepotism, is extremely difficult.
Further, this report has shown how localized factors are key elements in driving and triggering violent conflict in Lampung. Structural economic factors and psycho-cultural perceptions play out at the local level; they are the result of the interactions that take place within and between villages. In a place like Lampung, while national forces – including the role of the Indonesian army (the TNI), the decisions of central government, and the performance of the national economy – have an influence in shaping the environment which allows for conflict, often it is local level institutions that determine the ways in which the conflict plays out. Local level institutions – formal and informal – help dictate the relations between individuals and between groups. Intervening at the local level offers the potential for modifying the dynamics that drive violent conflict.

Building institutions at the sub-village, village, sub-district and district levels that help communities manage conflicts is a vital step towards lowering levels of violent conflict. In addition, in Lampung, as in much of Indonesia, part of what is required is to build institutions at the local level that build psycho-cultural trust between groups – institutions that alter in a positive way the perceptions groups have of each other. There is a need to fully understand the institutional environments that help define communities, and through which social relations are in part dictated. This is a vital first step towards intervening successfully to help communities manage conflict in more productive and less violent ways.

4.2 A Way Forward: Supporting Best Practice

Where should we start in seeking to build an institutional environment that makes peace possible? Another argument of this report has been that we need to build on the institutional foundations already in place. As noted in Chapter 3, strategies for managing conflict that are not rooted, at least in part, in traditional norms and practices are likely to fail. Interventions that do not take account of the existing climate and history can all too easily lead to increased violence.

Marc Ross’s claim that “effective conflict management strategies must be consistent with existing cultural norms and practices and cannot import methods that are successful in other settings without paying attention to their application in local contexts”\(^1\) is certainly true in Indonesia. Initiatives that fail to recognize existing norms and dynamics between different groups, and existing mechanisms of conflict management, will not successfully address violent conflict in Lampung. Take, for example, attempts to impose national regulations and law. In eroding traditional means of problem-solving,

\(^1\) Ross (1996, p. 96)
and forms of alternative dispute resolution, these efforts may in some cases have unintentionally exacerbated the problem. The challenge is to identify existing ideas, practices or mechanisms at the community level that can be strengthened or further developed to manage conflict.

Institutional mechanisms that improve social relations between groups and which build “bridging” social capital should be promoted. Some mechanisms that work to these ends are in place in Lampung. The recommendations below seek to build upon good practice and cultural understanding as a base for reform.

**Recommendation 1: Promote and strengthen existing mechanisms for joint problem-solving**

In Lampung, violent conflict was averted and more easily resolved when joint problem-solving took place. Involving all parties in the decision-making process gives disputants a sense of control over the process and ownership of the outcomes. It is also likely to lead to greater understanding from all sides of the other party’s position and motivations. Problem sharing potentially reduces misperceptions and this can help reduce the psycho-cultural barriers to finding a solution. Evidence from Lampung suggests that when meetings and processes involve both transmigrants and local people in a meaningful way they lead to more effective results.

Mechanisms of joint problem-solving already exist in Lampung. *Musyawarah* at either the village or inter-village levels can involve transmigrants and locals together trying to find solutions to their problems. Although these groups are sometimes captured by elite interests, when they do work in genuinely consensual ways they can help break down barriers between groups and build bridging social capital. Such cross-ethnic forums can help build lasting solutions.

The model of the working *musyawarah* should be used as a way of promoting joint problem-solving in communities. More thought and research on how to ensure these village meetings are genuinely consensual needs to be done but answers may include the use of neutral third party facilitators. Development organizations should consider the extent to which the programs they run and finance promote joint problem-solving. They should also seek to build this capacity into existing and future projects.
Recommendation 2: Support/fund organizations promoting community empowerment

In one village we visited the community was outraged when the police accepted a bribe from a known thief in return for his release. They demonstrated and pressured the police to deal with the thief in accordance with the law. Although this is unusual, the incident clearly shows the potential for villagers to make the state accountable for its actions. While legal reform is important, it is a long-term project. Another way of achieving a more responsive police force is harnessing communities’ increasing willingness to demand accountability.

For this to happen effectively communities must understand their rights, the role and the duties the police should fulfill, and they must be willing to express their expectations. Bottom-up accountability helps make institutions accountable and this helps prevent violent conflict. After 30 years of authoritarian New Order rule this requires civil empowerment.

A number of civil society organizations in Lampung are educating people about their rights and about the norms of democratic societies. They are also helping people articulate their interests. Support for grassroots NGOs, particularly those involved in legal and anti-corruption issues, may be one of the most effective ways of fostering the development of the rule of law in rural villages. A local NGO, KOAK, which played a major role in making the community of Karangan more aware of their rights, was funded by USAID. Donors should make the funding of NGOs that are effectively promoting community empowerment a priority.

Recommendation 3: Provide alternative avenues for conflict

“Conflict,” Kevin Avruch points out, “is a feature of all human societies and, potentially, an aspect of all human relations.” Likewise, cross-cultural studies have shown that anger is a universal human impulse. Yet while conflict and anger may be inevitable, the forms it takes are not necessarily violent. Social institutions can provide alternative avenues for conflict that allow for constructive competition rather than destructive violence.

Competitive activities such as sport are one way to channel aggression from potential violent conflict to more constructive pursuits. This was a lesson that had been learned in some Lampung villages.

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3 Bjorkevist (1997) cites Ekman and Friesen’s (1971) cross-cultural study on nonverbal expression as supporting this claim. Numerous others, including Coser (1956) and Levi-Strauss (1958) make similar arguments about the universality of conflict.
In particular, one Village Head had instituted an afternoon volleyball tournament and had great hopes that it would help foster a less violent culture within his village.

“Ritualizing” and “stylizing” conflict in non-harmful activities can prevent conflict from becoming violent. Perhaps perversely, relations between different communities can actually improve from this type of conflict. More creative thinking needs to be done about what alternative avenues of conflict are appropriate given local cultures, and how they can best be supported. However, providing such avenues is a potentially powerful tool currently under-utilized. Development organizations should fund infrastructure projects at a local level that allow villages to develop alternative avenues for conflict such as sports. These programs are both inexpensive and potentially large in impact.

**Recommendation 4: Promote and support initiatives that involve young people in the community**

In East Lampung there were attempts to actively involve young people in decision-making processes and in defining solutions to the problem of violence. While its absolute workings are not entirely clear, the philosophy behind the Young Men’s Forums of involving a marginalized element of the population in the prevention and resolution of violent conflict is good. Getting young people actively involved has a number of potential benefits. Linking the individual interests of young people with community interests helps integrate young people into the community. As young people become more embedded, and as the consequences of violent actions increase, they are less likely to take actions that are destructive to the community. Participation, in other words, fosters responsibility.

The Young Men’s Forums do offer potential but should not be given unconditional support. The idea of authorizing young people to act as a para-police force is problematic, especially if it has the effect of legitimizing current violent activity. Rather, development organizations should design their projects so as to substantively include young people in decision-making processes. Community development projects should ensure that young people have a voice and real opportunities to contribute. Young people involvement should be mainstreamed in both the construction and the implementation of development projects in Lampung.
Recommendation 5: “Good growth” and jobs for young men

The major argument of this report has been that conflict in Lampung and elsewhere in Indonesia is, in large part, a symptom of institutional failure. The natural policy response is thus to fix the institutions – to build accountable, just, and trusted institutions that prevent conflict from becoming violent and from escalating. However, while institutional weakness is a better explanatory variable than more traditional ‘ethnic’ or economic explanations of conflict in Lampung, it is also true that certain interventions can create a structural environment in which violent conflict is less likely.

In particular, the presence of what locals refer to as “naughty young men” is a key factor in understanding the culture of violence that exists in Lampung. A large percentage of young men in Lampung are unemployed or underemployed. Further, young men often – and quite understandably – see the prospect of finding well remunerated and meaningful work as slim. Absence of jobs in Lampung is compounded by real discrimination from employers against young men, who are often viewed as trouble-makers or “hooligans.”

While a detailed policy response to this problem is beyond the remit of this paper, a few pointers can be given. First, there is a need in Lampung for growth-promoting activities. The lack of jobs in Lampung is a symptom of the general economic malaise of the province. There is little evidence that low growth in itself causes conflict – poorer areas of Lampung and Indonesia are not more prone to violence than richer areas. Yet, the economic structure of Lampung is one of the reasons why violent conflict is so high. In particular, disparities in economic conditions between groups helps to explain the high levels of social tension. Given that categorical inequality – that is inequality between different identity groups – tends to explain conflict more than absolute deprivation, we cannot assume that all growth will lower levels of conflict. Indeed, and as this paper has shown, inequitable growth can actually lead to an increase in conflict. Growth-promoting activities must carefully consider distributional effects, as different benefits can accrue to different population groups. However, equitable and just growth – that is, growth where benefits are shared equally across groups – can help to create the conditions where violent conflict will be less likely.

Second, there may be a need to target economic interventions at problem groups such as young men. Subsidies to employers to hire men between the age of 15 and 30, say, may be as effective in dealing with the young men problem. This linked to a program of apprenticeships could have a significant impact.

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4 The SCRAP project is designing a private sector development strategy for conflict-ridden areas.
5 See Appendix B for information on the Lampung economy.
4.3 Supporting Transition: The Role for the World Bank

Despite the tragic levels of violence in Indonesia, the World Bank has in the past been reluctant to engage in conflict work. Seen by some as a “soft” topic, by others as too political, many have argued that the Bank should stay clear from projects that explicitly address violent conflict. This position has, in the past, created barriers to the realization of the World Bank’s goals.

In the last few years, this attitude has started to change. The World Bank in Indonesia currently has a $US55 million project in preparation to work in conflict-ridden areas, which aims to promote economic development, community-driven health care and education provision and to strengthen the formal and informal justice system in eight provinces across Indonesia.6

This is to be welcomed. This report has shown how a culture of violence undermines the conditions necessary for economic growth and critically affects government service delivery. Furthermore, and as we have detailed, the people of Lampung consistently explained their poverty in terms of the insecurity arising from the prevalence of violence in the region. They saw themselves as security poor. Vulnerability did not mean susceptibility to economic shocks; it meant vulnerability to crime and other forms of violence.7

Yet not only is it the case that reducing levels of violence is a development imperative. Given the nature of violent conflict in much of Indonesia, there are also tremendous opportunities for development organizations like the Bank to positively impact upon the situation. For if, as this report has argued, violent conflict in Indonesia is largely a symptom of state transition – a process playing out across Indonesia – the tools that development agencies possess can potentially be used to lower levels of violence.

Getting involved in conflict does not just mean providing emergency aid to high-conflict regions. It means addressing the underlying causes of conflict and helping to build local capacity to deal with

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6 Lampung is one of these provinces.
7 The overarching goal of the World Bank Group in Indonesia is to “support efforts to reduce poverty and vulnerability in a more democratic and decentralized environment” (World Bank, 2001, p. ii). However although the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) acknowledges that poverty does not just mean lack of money, it fails to recognize one of the most obvious and serious forms of poverty in Indonesia – the fear and vulnerability caused by widespread violence. It notes that lack of access to basic education and adequate nutrition, or of resource to medical services make people poor, as do inadequate or nonexistent basic infrastructure and exclusion from social community life or discrimination (ibid, p. 17). However, it makes no mention of insecurity as a form of poverty. It is to be hoped that the next CAS, currently in preparation, will improve upon this.
conflict across Indonesia. The Bank is thus in a strong position to contribute to efforts to prevent and resolve violence – both in a top down manner and from the bottom up.

**From the top down: governance reform and “good growth”**

It is clear that part of the Bank’s comparative advantage is working at the national governmental level on broad structural programs. Although this report has highlighted the difficulty and lengthy timeframe of enacting national institutional change in Indonesia, this does not diminish its importance. Top-down initiatives (as they are often characterized) can, over time, affect both the conditions that lead to conflict and the way in which it is resolved. Legal reform is an example of this. As has been noted, the creation of effective and impartial legal institutions is critical. The legal reform work that the World Bank is doing, in partnership with NGOs, is vital and needs to continue.

Promoting economic growth is a core component of the Bank’s strategy in Indonesia. Economic growth can play a role in averting conflict but the nature of growth is critical. The World Bank’s policy on working with conflict-afflicted countries highlights how growth-promoting activities can potentially have negative effects of stability and human security.\(^8\) The danger of economic growth is that it will be promoted without due regard to the ways in which the benefits of growth are shared or distributed. The policy of transmigration, supported and sped by the World Bank, stands as a cautionary tale.\(^9\) Although well intentioned, the consequences of inducing hundreds of thousands of Indonesians from particular ethnic groups to move to parts of the archipelago occupied by other ethnic groups, are evident not just in Lampung, but in other areas of conflict such as Kalimantan and the Malukus. The Bank’s growth-promoting policies inevitably alter the relations between communities and individuals at a local level – for good or for bad – and, as such, will change the underlying conditions that make violence more or less likely. The Bank, in developing its growth-promoting mechanisms, should continue to give thought to the distributional effects these policies have, the likely impact on relations between communities, and thus the likely effect in promoting or reducing violence.

**From the bottom up: community-driven solutions**

While there is a role for top down structural work, such programs are by themselves insufficient to address conflict when mistrust and suspicion between groups is such a significant dimension to the dynamics of the violence. At least as important are initiatives at the community level that provide an

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\(^8\) World Bank (1997).

\(^9\) As of 1993, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank had provided $US1.4 billion in support of the transmigration program (Szczechanski, 2002, p. 29).
opportunity for different groups such as transmigrants and local people to work together and build trust and mutual respect.

In this area that the World Bank has a valuable resource: the *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP). KDP is a large decentralized community development project operating in over 20,000 villages throughout Indonesia. Its purpose is to alleviate poverty in rural communities and improve local governance. It does this by providing *kecamatan* (sub-districts) and villages with block grants to use for small-scale infrastructure and economic activities. Through village councils and *kecamatan* development forums, and supported by teams of facilitators and consultants, communities determine the kinds of projects that they need and want.

By bringing communities together to determine their own development priorities, KDP provides a vehicle through which communities can develop bridging social capital and joint problem-solving skills. The process of peacefully negotiating priorities, resolving differences, and making choices develops critical skills and norms. Thirty years of imposed institutions and solutions have withered many of these basic skills. However, it is these skills that can play a valuable role in preventing violence and resolving conflict when it arises.

In other conflict-ridden places around the world, community-driven development (CDD) programs are being used specifically to address conflict. Indeed, SCRAP – the Bank’s conflict program in development – seeks, in large part, to use CDD as a mechanism for strengthening trust and bridging relations between different groups. It will help support initiatives such as sporting activities that aim to channel conflict in non-harmful ways while building bridges between different villages and ethnic groups. It will also seek to make the delivery of vital services more demand responsive, help encourage reform of the judicial and security sectors, and encourage equitable private investment at the local level. The development of these, and other initiatives, has the potential to lower levels of violent conflict.

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10 KDP, which commenced in 1998, in the largest community development project in Southeast Asia at over $US 1 billion.

11 A large-scale research study which is attempting to empirically test these claims is currently underway in two other provinces of Indonesia (East Java and East Nusa Tenggara). Both the authors of this report have been involved in the design and management of the study.

12 For example, Oxfam UK’s ‘imagined communities’ project in Rwanda.
4.4 Lampung and Violent Conflict in Indonesia

This report has focused on the province of Lampung. In so doing it has shown that an area that had been assumed to be a “non-conflict” province is in fact very violent. In closing, it is important to consider the implications of the case of Lampung and how it fits within the broader context of violence in Indonesia. To this end, it is useful to pose a number of questions, first in terms of Lampung and violence in other “non-conflict” provinces, and then with respect to violence in “high-conflict” provinces.

One of the central organizing questions must be: “Is Lampung a unique case?” The finding that there are high levels of violence in Lampung – despite the perception that it is a “non-conflict” province – prompts consideration of how little is known about the extent of violence in Indonesia. How many other “non-conflict” provinces are wracked by serious violent conflict? If there is violence in other “non-conflict” provinces, does it take the same form as the violence in Lampung?

From the available evidence it seems that Lampung is not unique. Jakarta newspaper reports suggest that at least some of the types of violence in Lampung are also occurring in other “non-conflict” provinces. Whether it is vigilantes storming a police station in Purbalinga in Central Java to burn to death an alleged rapist,13 or a group of Hindus torching the homes of Christians in Kintamani in Bali,14 it appears that – as in Lampung – villagers in other “non-conflict” parts of Indonesia are using violence to administer justice themselves. A recent map constructed by the Ministry of Planning found 26 of the 31 Indonesian provinces as being prone to violence.15 Similarly, the work of the Indonesian NGO Consortium for Agrarian Renewal (KPA) shows that in some 19 provinces conflict over land has provoked serious violence including death, torture and arson.16 And a survey of newspaper accounts of vigilante killings by Bridget Welsh (2003), found 1,264 vigilante incidents involving over 2,000 victims in West Java and Jakarta between 1997 and mid-2002.

Yet, it is unclear exactly how widespread or common these incidents of violence are. Just as it is rare for stories about Lampung to make it into national newspapers such as Kompas or the The Jakarta Post, it is unlikely that these publications paint a representative picture of violence in other parts of the archipelago. The absence of comprehensive answers to these questions highlights the need for

15 Figure given in the Project Concept Document for the SCRAP project.
16 ‘Down to Earth’, International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia, Newsletter No.52, February 2002. See also the website of the Consortium for Agrarian Renewal <http://www.kpa.or.id>
further study of violence in “non-conflict” areas. The first step to ensuring human security throughout Indonesia is to properly recognize the extent of the violence.

How then does the violence in Lampung fit in with the violence in known high-conflict provinces? This question is also difficult to answer, not because of the lack of research but because of the nature of the analysis of conflict in places such as Kalimantan and the Malukus. As noted earlier, there is a tendency to simply categorize violence in the high-conflict provinces as either separatist, ethnic or religious. Unfortunately, this typology of violence obscures more than it illuminates. In particular it does not serve the valuable role of disaggregating the violence so the immediate triggers or proximate causes of the violence can be identified and so that connections can be made between the various different types of violence.

Nevertheless, it seems that again at least some of the types of violence identified in Lampung manifest themselves in the conflicts in some of the “high-conflict” provinces, albeit on a larger-scale than seen in Lampung. In the case of the Malukus, for example, the most recent period of violence erupted after a fight (spontaneous violence) between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger in Ambon City in January 1999. This violence then escalated to target communities as the groups sought revenge on the other. This initiated a cycle of vigilantism, with each attack prompting a retaliatory attack. As it was in Lampung, negative perceptions between each group played a critical role in furthering the violence.17

This suggests that the types of violence identified in Lampung are part of a broader spectrum of violence evident elsewhere in Indonesia. This would not be surprising, not least of all because of the similarities between Lampung and many other parts of Indonesia. The inadequacy of legal institutions and policing, ethnic diversity as a result of transmigration, economic inequality between groups, and long standing tensions over land are common features of many Indonesia provinces.

Nevertheless, more work is required to understand this spectrum of violence. In addition to examining non- and high-conflict provinces, future research must also be more analytical and thorough than previous work. Too many of the studies of conflict in Indonesia have made little effort to differentiate meaningfully between types of violence and to understand underlying causes, triggers, and manifestations. Labeling violence separatist, ethnic, or religious, without analysis that deepens understanding of the conflicts the labels describe, is unhelpful. Conflict mapping and the

construction of adequate typologies are tools that have extensive power in explaining conflict as a first step to designing constructive and effective interventions. Research must also be focused far more at the local level. As this report has argued, local level institutions – formal and informal – play a large part in defining the ability of communities to manage conflict. Only by understanding more fully the roles of actors at a local level can we truly understand the dynamics of conflict, and seek to productively address it. Moreover, this report has also argued that interventions need to be informed by more research on existing conflict resolution practices. Where they are working these practices form the basis for improved prevention and reconciliation. Funding and supporting such research in areas across Indonesia should be a priority.
Appendix A - Methodology

There has been a failure to examine violence in Indonesian provinces outside those that are normally thought of as high-conflict. Given the particular nature of conflicts in these areas, this has meant that there has been a bias against studying the forms of unrest that are observable throughout the archipelago; this, more significantly, has stymied the development and tailoring of appropriate responses to the conflict in these lower conflict areas. As such, there is a need to map conflict in provinces outside of those normally studied.

Lampung was chosen for a number of reasons:

First, Lampung may be more typical of most Indonesian provinces than those normally equated with violence. In contrast to the high-conflict regions of Aceh and Papua, most provinces are not seeking independence from Indonesia. As such, the types of violence identified in this report may well better reflect those prevalent throughout Indonesia than those found in the high-conflict regions.

Second, Lampung has a large transmigrant population. While the findings of this study clearly cannot be generalized across all other Indonesian provinces, many of the issues it presents, and the patterns it highlights, will apply – at least to some extent – to other regions with similarly high levels of transmigration. Indeed, it is likely that similar issues to those that this report have highlighted will be relevant to parts of Java and other “non-conflict” areas.

Third, Lampung has received comparatively little attention from the World Bank and from other organizations. As far as we can determine, there has been no single study of violence in Lampung (in English or in Bahasa Indonesia). Given the fact that local newspapers have been highlighting the large number of incidents of violence, this alone suggests that a more thorough study is long overdue.

Fourth, Lampung’s proximity to Jakarta offers the additional advantage that its relatively accessibility from Jakarta means that it provides a potential site for a short-term study.

Villages studied

The analysis presented in this report is based primarily on a field study conducted in Lampung from 9th–22nd January 2002. Eight villages were visited in five sub-districts in two districts (see Table A.1). In-depth interviews with a range of actors were conducted in each village. This section will outline the selection of villages within Lampung and will then talk about the sampling of respondents within
each village. It also identifies some of the methodological issues and lessons that can be taken into account – both by the World Bank and by other organizations – when undertaking future work of this sort.

The aims of the research dictated the ways in which the districts and villages were selected. In order to make possible the construction of a typology of kinds of violence, *villages were chosen with the primary purpose of maximizing the range of violence observed* rather than to act as a representative sample of villages in Lampung. In selecting villages we looked for villages that had high levels of violence or conflict and that varied along a number of lines:

- Proximity to urban centers (e.g. distance from the provincial capital, Bandar Lampung);
- Ethnic mix (i.e. the relative number of locals and of transmigrants);
- The major forms of employment (e.g. villages where most people were employed in company-owned plantations and villages where most people were self-employed farmers);
- The kinds of violence already reported in the area.

The villages were selected after consultation with a range of ‘experts’ and locals with knowledge of their area, both in Jakarta and in Lampung. These included discussions with National Management Consultants and KDP coordinators, representatives from NGOs and the local media, and Government officials. Throughout the fieldwork interviewees would suggest places where we should go; this local knowledge was also integrated into our decisions on which villages to visit.

**Table A.1 Villages Visited**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Lampung</td>
<td>Way Jepara</td>
<td>Braja Caka</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jepara</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Melinting</td>
<td>Wana</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labuhan Maringgai</td>
<td>Nibung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way Kanan</td>
<td>Bahuga</td>
<td>Giri Hajo</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Karangan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Wano Hajo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Way Tuba</td>
<td>Way Tuba</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Respondents**

An ethnographic qualitative fieldwork methodology was utilized in the preparation of this report. We conducted 76 interviews with approximately 200 people throughout the eight villages. In-depth

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1 National Management Consultants (NMC) are the government employees who administer the *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP).
interviews – both of individuals and in a focus group setting – provided rich stories, historical background and, most importantly, information on perceptions of violence in the villages. As far as possible the information gathered was “triangulated” by gathering multiple versions of each story to develop a more accurate picture of an event or story. The majority of the stories told throughout this report are the result of interviewing multiple persons. In most cases people’s real names are hidden. In places the multiple perspectives confirmed details about specific incidents; in others, the evident gap in the perceptions of different individuals and groups helped to explain why and how specific conflicts had been triggered or exacerbated.

Generally we aimed for a sample of representatives. Respondents were selected from two categories of key informants (in theory distinct, but often, in practice, inter-related):

- *Authority figures* and *experts* helped provide broad overviews of violence within an area, helped give generalized perspectives on what was going on, and often showed elite (authority) perceptions. Interviewees in this category included government officials, KDP staff, village authority figures, medical personnel, and the police.

- Interviews with a *cross-section of villagers* provided complementary information. These interviews provided individual testimony on incidents of violence and they acted as a counterbalance against a sampling bias in the direction of authority opinion and perception. Many of those interviewed were victims or perpetrators of violence (or both).

It should be noted that we had difficulties in speaking to a balanced number of men and women. We were conscious of the importance of getting opinions, perceptions and the stories of people across gender, age, and ethnicity boundaries, but gaining access to women was a problem. Generally if men were present they would take over conversations. We tried to speak to women at times in the day when their husbands were in the field, but often they felt that they did not have useful information for us and that we should wait until their husbands arrived home. In some cases, women felt they were not qualified to speak to us. On a number of occasions perceived inferiority amongst women was evident. For example, in Way Tuba two women said they could not talk to us because they were stupid:

> “We [women] are stupid, we know nothing.”

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2 See Weiss (1994, pp. 17-18) on samples of representatives.
“I feel very stupid. Because I am a woman I don’t know what is going on. I just stay in the house. My husband never tells me anything.”

Women, Way Tuba

Although we were able to speak to some women – and some women were frank, honest and confident in our presence – the methodological difficulties of getting female opinions in societies with such gender power imbalances need to be taken into account when designing participatory projects and research (both qualitative and quantitative). Use of female interviewers and time spent building relations may be the best immediate ways of eliciting responses from females.³ In the longer run, the need for gender empowerment programs cannot be understated.

Applicability of Findings

The information and findings presented here do not claim to convey a representative picture of violence in Indonesia. The violence types and patterns presented here are not necessarily the same as those throughout Indonesia. In any country as large and diverse as Indonesia patterns of social relations will vary greatly and this is certainly the case in Indonesia given the ethnic diversity, the relatively recent formation of the Indonesian nation, and the relative lack of communication and easy transportation between many of the islands. As such, the policy recommendations presented here are not necessarily fully applicable outside of Lampung.⁴

We hope, however, that this report will have some use outside of Lampung. Both the methodology it employs and some of the general patterns of violence it identifies will be applicable when studying violence throughout the archipelago. The report’s major finding – the unexpectedly high level of violence – may also be true for other supposed low conflict provinces in Indonesia. It is hoped that this report will prompt a greater investigation of social conflict and violence throughout Indonesia.

³ While we are both men, our two female translators were invaluable in helping women respondents to feel comfortable speaking.

⁴ It should also be noted that time and resource constraints limited the study to two districts within Lampung. Other districts may have different characteristics than the ones we visited, although evidence from the interviews suggest that the picture described in this report is generally consistent across Lampung.
Lampung, the southernmost province of the island of Sumatra, was given provincial status by the Indonesian government in 1964. Covering an area of 3,300 square kilometers, Lampung is the second smallest Sumatran province. Its population stood at 7.25 million in 2000 and is projected to grow to close to eight million by 2005, in part from natural growth and partly from inward migration.

It is this inward migration, formalized and quickened by the transmigration programs of the Indonesian government, that has determined the composition of Lampung today. In 1856 the Dutch wrested control of the region and fifty years later they initiated the first transmigration schemes. These schemes continued as people from Java and beyond were given land to farm in Sumatra. The early ‘colonization villages’, created about twenty kilometers west of the provincial capital Bandar Lampung (then Tandjungkarang), soon expanded and new unplanned settler villages sprang up.¹ Now less than ten per cent of Lampung’s population is indigenous and Lampung is one of the most densely populated areas of Indonesia.²

¹ For an interesting historical anthropological study of some of the early Javanese resettlements in the Lampung area, see Utomo (1967).
² According to the latest census (BPS, 2001), 62 per cent of the Lampung population are ethnic Javanese; another 9 per cent are Sundanese, from West Java.
The practical effects of this population change are numerous and this report deals in part with one of them. There has been conflict between transmigrants and locals. Economic jealousy has arisen from the fact that incomers have generally fared better than locals, and migrants now own most of the land. Transmigrants and locals have not tended to mix. Even though villages in Lampung may contain people from different ethnic groups, Lampung dusun (sub-villages) are generally characterized by their ethnic homogeneity. Thus, a typical village may have six dusun, five of which will be “transmigrant” and one of which will be “local.”

The population of Lampung is predominantly rural; in 1995 only 16 per cent of the population were classified as urban. Production activity is largely agricultural. Lampung is one of the biggest cassava growing areas in Indonesia. Other crops include: coffee, tropical fruits, rubber, palm oil (farmed in large plantations), peppers, and rice. Of the close to three million people in Lampung’s working population, just over two million (67 per cent) are involved in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishery. All but 580,000 of the working population are self-employed or acting as a non-reimbursed
employees (e.g. helping on the farm of a family member). The official unemployment rate for Lampung was 5.76 per cent in 1998, but the real figure is undoubtedly higher, in large part because of the impact of krismon (the monetary crisis) and the structural adjustments in the Indonesian economy that have ensued. Many of those working are underemployed, perhaps working part-time on the family farm or undertaking only informal odd-jobs such as giving people rides on their motorbike, or acting as short-term labor. While overall GDP growth has been relatively high by Indonesian standards, the province’s relatively large population increase has meant that its GDP per capita (US$573 in 1996) is only around half that of the Indonesian average.

Over the past few years, there has been significant change in the administrative boundaries and system of governance within Lampung. Kabupaten (districts) have been split into smaller administrative units, as have kecamatan (sub-districts). Indonesian Law 22/99, implemented in January 2001 and still not fully executed in every district, has modified structures of local governance and this has had an effect on Lampung as it has elsewhere in Indonesia. Villages are still adapting to the increased autonomy that the law affords them. This is a time of transition as democratic and decentralization forces start to change the power dynamics of rural villages, not just in Lampung but throughout Indonesia.

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3 Figures for 2001 (most recent available) from government statistics (BPS Indonesia) <http://www.bps.go.id>
4 Figure from Indonesia Government Lampung Brief (updated to February 2000) <http://www.lampung.go.id/index-old.htm> The GDP per capita in 2000 for Indonesia as a whole was $US721 (EIU Country Data). Assuming that Lampung per capita income is still approximately half that of the country’s per capita income (there is no current data available), the per capita income of Lampung has fallen to approximately $US360.
Appendix C - Documents from Rembuk Akbar

These documents were obtained from the Bupati of East Lampung. Previously unavailable in English, they have been translated by staff at the World Bank Office Jakarta.

Declaration of Rembuk Akbar

1. We, the community of East Lampung, consisting of various ethnic, religious, cultural groups, and professions, are a unity and cannot separate each other, and must respect each other, respecting complexity and diversity. We all agree make East Lampung perform well and to develop East Lampung, to increase the dignity and welfare of the East Lampung community. Our diversity does not hamper our unity but is a tool that makes us closer to one another, and as innovator and dynamizer and stabilizer in developing “Bumei Tuwhah Pepandan” that formed based on Act number 12, Year 1999.

2. We, the community of East Lampung, as a totality will participate as individuals and together in organization to keep life safe, peaceful, and secure for all the community of East Lampung.

3. We, the community of East Lampung, completely support the integrity and objectivity of the Law Apparatus in order to encourage law enforcement to defend justice and rightness. Therefore, we will support the Law Apparatus in doing their task through delivering information and the right news immediately, whether asked or not, and through involvement in patrolling, operation, and guarding. As part of this, in order to guarantee the creation of good security in East Lampung we ask the government to improve the performance of the services they provide as soon as possible, through the establishment of Polres (police station at kabupaten level), Polsek (police station at kecamatan level), Pos Polisi (police post), increasing the number of policeman staff, and staff assistance, and also the instruments necessary to make security activities more thorough and to handle cases faster and completely.

4. We, the community of East Lampung, condemn all forms of violence and 'main hakim sendiri' ('justice by himself'/vigilantism) to everyone or to the suspected person, because it is against the law and basic human rights.
5. We, the community of East Lampung, refuse all delivering, using or selling-buying of goods that we are suspicious of, or know, are the result of crime or are related to the criminal case and which contributed to the crime activity.

6. We, the community of East Lampung, refuse all forms of gambling, trading alcoholic drinks, and will avoid the senjata tajam and illegal guns that might be used for crime.

7. We, the community of Lampung, condemn and will totally eliminate all forms of provocation effort by all parties that can create tension and clashes in the community and activities that can destroy the life harmony of the groups in the community. We always hold high the life harmony and always put that before individual business, groups, or parties. Because of that, we ask the mass media to involve in creating a ‘fresh climate’ through developing the journalism that does not destroy community togetherness.

8. We, the community of East Lampung, will always improve in caring for community members in order to create security and orderliness and will always give advice to each other to avoid activities that can decrease security and community orderliness.

9. In our own actions, we, the community of East Lampung, agree to form a communication forum in each kecamatan and village that will have a role in encouraging efforts and commitment to create the secure feeling and community orderliness, together with the law apparatus.

10. All NGOs in East Lampung will take an active part in developing and empowering the community of East Lampung in a climate conducive of participation.
**Action Plan in Improving the Stability of Security and Community Orderliness in East Lampung**

According to the Rembuk Akbar Declaration, held on Tuesday May 29, 2001, as an agreement of the community of East Lampung in order to improve the stability of Security and Community Orderliness, the action plans are the following:

**(a) The Community as Supporters of the Law**

1. To be involved actively, spontaneously and self-supporting, in keeping the security in their area and their village, individually and collectively – for example *Siskambling* (local security guard, night patrol, etc.)

2. To form a communication forum in each kecamatan and village that has an active role in assisting the community and as the institution for solving problems and conflicts in order to create stability and security.

3. To campaign in order to prevent community members buying or receiving good that are the product of crime activities.

4. To make a report and take over the goods that are known as the product of crime activity to the law apparatus to process so that they can be given back to the owner.

5. To help the law apparatus in patrolling, operation, security, and to give information as clear as possible to the law apparatus to catch the suspected person in the crime case.

6. To stop carrying weapons and illegal guns and to combat gambling activity and the trading of alcoholic drinks/narcotics.

7. With the support of all parties, to assist young people through sport activities, job training, etc.

8. To never “act the justice by themselves” to anyone and to a suspected person in a crime case. If they successfully catch the suspected person who has done the crime, they have to bring him ASAP to the police station to process by the law.
9. To not initiate or be involved in any act of provocation that can destroy community harmony and community orderliness.

(b) Legal Institutions

1. To assist the apparatus internally to do their task in a professional way, straight and objective in defending rightness and justice, and free from corruption, collusion and nepotism. Also, to assist the apparatus in avoiding involvement in trading illegal goods, gambling, and other bad behavior.

2. To improve the number of personnel, as the state can fulfill, so the security task can be acted intensively and in an integrated way.

3. To form a Police Station of East Lampung, Justice Office of East Lampung, and to form a Police Station at the kecamatan level to encourage effective assistance and law enforcement.

4. To complete the facilities and infrastructure, the security services, and law enforcement needed in assisting the community.

5. To process the crime case as soon as possible, strictly, objectively based on the rules and to avoid the practice of justice out of the court, for example ‘on-road court’.

6. To investigate professionally (for example through acting in disguise) suspected persons who commit crime, receive stolen goods, and the illegal goods mafia.

7. To assist the community and extend law to the common people and the community.

8. Sweeping of alcoholic drinking, weapons, guns, narcotics, illegal vehicles, and to control the location of trading alcoholic drinks and narcotics.

(c) Kabupaten Government

1. To finish the process of conflict over village borders.
2. To mediate in the processing of land conflict in order to reach agreement between the parties involved in the conflict case.

3. To mediate in the processing of ethnic clashes and to take follow-up assisting action.

4. To develop the forest community in the Gunung Balak area in order to encourage the function of conservation of the area simultaneously through economic development of the community and through avoiding conflict between communities.

5. Together with the legislative institution, doing the analysis of local wisdom and culture law that can be considered as the source to complete the law that is needed to encourage law enforcement and community security.

6. To help in improving the law apparatus performance through improving the facilities and infrastructure, through adjusting the local budget and problem-solving.

7. To assist local security guards in increasing their skills in doing their task of providing local security.

8. To develop and improve the infrastructure of roads and bridges, to open potential area that, integrated with the people economic program, can create the job opportunity.

9. To handle elephant attacks in the vulnerable area, to avoid inflicting a loss upon the local community.


BPS Indonesia (Government Bureau of Statistics) <http://www.bps.go.id>


Consortium for Agrarian Renewal <http://www.kpa.or.id>


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