

TECHNICAL WORKING PAPER

CAMBODIA

RICE SECTOR REVIEW

A MORE DETAILED ROAD MAP FOR CAMBODIAN RICE EXPORTS



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Agriculture Global Practice

East Asia and Pacific Region

Acknowledgments

A More Detailed Roadmap for Cambodian Rice Exports was prepared by consultants Tom Slayton, who has followed the world rice market for 35 years, and Sok Muniroth, a close observer of the Cambodia's agriculture sector.

Overall direction and guidance for analyzes was provided by Alassane Saw (country manager, World Bank) and Paavo Eliste (senior agricultural economist, World Bank)

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Content

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ដោយសារតែការលើកលែងពន្ធដារ

ការនាំចេញអង្កររបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា

មាននិន្នាការកើនឡើងយ៉ាងខ្លាំង ដោយទទួលបាន

បុរេយោជន៍ពីការអនុវត្តចរន្តពន្ធសម្រាប់ការនាំចូល

និងការវិនិយោគថវិកាសេដ្ឋកិច្ចសង្គម និង រចនាសម្ព័ន្ធអង្ករ។

ការនាំចេញដោយមានបរិមាណតិចជាង ៦០០០ តោន ចន្លោះពីឆ្នាំ ២០០៤ និង ២០០៨។
នៃកំណត់ចំនួន ២០០៩ សហភាពអឺរ៉ុបបានលើកចំណុចសម្រាប់ការនាំចេញ
មិនជាប់ពន្ធ និងមិនជាប់កូតា ពីប្រទេសកម្ពុជា ដោយប្រើប្រាស់កិច្ចព្រមព្រៀង
“ទំនិញគ្រប់បែបយ៉ាង លើកលែងតែអន្តរជាតិ (EBA) ”។ ជាលទ្ធផល

ការនាំចេញរបស់ប្រទេសនេះបានលើកឡើងដល់ ជាង ៥១០០០ តោន នៃកំណត់ចំនួន ២០១០។
ចាប់តាំងពីពេលនោះមក ការនាំចេញអង្ករទៅកាន់ សហភាព

អឺរ៉ុបបានកើនឡើងខ្លាំងគួរឱ្យកត់សម្គាល់ និងត្រូវបានប៉ាន់ប្រមាណថានឹងកើនដល់ ១៧៥០០០
តោន នៃកំណត់ចំនួន ២០១១។ ការនាំចេញរបស់សហភាពអឺរ៉ុប រួមមានអង្ករក្រអូប

និងអង្ករមិនក្រអូប កំណត់បរិមាណសរុបចំនួន ១% អង្ករដលៃនាំចេញភាគច្រើន (៩០%)
ពីប្រទេសកម្ពុជា ត្រូវបានដឹកទៅកាន់ សហភាពអឺរ៉ុប និងរុស្ស៊ី ដលៃជាទីផ្សារមួយទៀត

ដលៃផ្តល់ភាពអនុវត្តចរន្តពន្ធសម្រាប់ការនាំចូលដោយមិន

ជាប់ពន្ធដល់អង្កររបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា។

ប្រទេសរុស្ស៊ីជាអនុកិច្ចព្រមព្រៀងអង្ករមិនក្រអូបភាគច្រើន។

គួបក្តីតប្រជែងកំណត់ការនាំចេញជ័យរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា រួមមាន

ប្រទេសថៃ និងប្រទេស វៀតណាម។ ប្រទេសថៃ

គឺជាគូប្រកួតប្រជែងធំមួយខាងអង្ករក្រអូប ដោយបាននាំចេញអង្ករក្រអូប ២,៦៥ លានតោន
(រួមទាំងអង្ករកែច្នៃផង) នៃកំណត់ចំនួន ២០១០/២០១១។ ប្រទេសវៀតណាម គឺ ជា

គូប្រកួតប្រជែងធំជាងគេ នៃកំណត់ចំនួនអង្ករមិនក្រអូប ដូចជា ប្រទេសហ្វីលីពីន
និងឥណ្ឌូនេស៊ី ជាដើម។ ប្រទេសប៉ាគីស្ថាន និងមីយ៉ាន់ម៉ា

កំពុងប្រកួតប្រជែងជាមួយប្រទេសកម្ពុជា នៃកំណត់ចំនួនអង្ករមិនក្រអូប ភាគច្រើន
នៃអាហ្វ្រិក។

អប្បសិទ្ធភាពខាងកសិកម្ម
ធុរ្យវិធីឱ្យតម្លៃអង្ករឡើងខ្ពស់ខ្ពស់
ទីផ្សារសម្រាប់នាំចេញថ្មីឱ្យនាំចេញ

និងនីតិវិធីនាំចេញ
ដើម្បីបង្កើនទំនាក់ទំនង

តម្លៃអង្ករក្នុងប្រទេសកម្ពុជា

កាន់តែលើកកម្ពស់ប្រាក់ចំណូលរបស់ប្រជាជន និងគ្រួសាររបស់ខ្លួន។

ខណៈពេលដែលប្រាក់ចំណូលរបស់ប្រជាជនមានចំណាយផលិតកម្មម្តងទៀតជាងប្រាក់ចំណូល
និងប្រាក់ចំណូលរបស់ប្រជាជន ចំណាយកាន់តែខ្ពស់ និងកម្រិតចំណាយសម្រាប់ការកិនស្រូវ
ធុរ្យវិធីឱ្យតម្លៃស្រូវ មុនកិនឡើងខ្ពស់ ក្នុងកម្រិតមិនអាចប្រកួតប្រជែងជាមួយប្រាក់
បញ្ចូលបាននឹងតម្លៃផ្សេងទៀត

ដោយសារតែចំណាយលើការដឹកជញ្ជូនក្នុងស្រុកខ្ពស់ (ទាំងចំណាយផ្តល់ការ
ទាំងចំណាយក្នុងស្រុក) នីតិវិធីនាំចេញអស់ចំណាយអស់ចំណូល និងចំណាយពេលវេលា
ចំណាយលើសវាកំពុងខ្ពស់ និង
ចំណាយដឹកជញ្ជូនទៅក្រៅប្រទេសមិនសូវប្រកួតប្រជែង ជាលទ្ធផល
ប្រាក់ចំណូលរបស់ប្រជាជនមានភាពទាក់ទាញ ចំពោះអ្នកទិញនាំចេញប្រាក់ចំណូលឡើយ
ដោយសារតែប្រាក់ចំណូលរបស់ប្រជាជនមានទាន់ខ្លួនខ្លួនឯង
ក្នុងការដឹកជញ្ជូនផ្នែកផ្តល់សេវាដល់ប្រជាជនទៅឡើយ។

អង្ករក្នុងប្រទេសកម្ពុជា (បាក់ ៥%) ត្រូវបានគេដាក់តម្លៃ ៩៥០
ដុល្លារ បើគិតត្រឹមខែ មិថុនា ឆ្នាំ ២០១១

ខណៈពេលដែលអង្ករក្នុងប្រទេសកម្ពុជាមានតម្លៃ ៦០០ ដុល្លារ។
អង្ករនាំចេញ ប្រាក់ចំណូលរបស់ប្រជាជន មានតម្លៃថែទាំជាង ដោយសារតែចំណាយលើការកិន
និងការដឹកជញ្ជូន ទាបជាង ចំណាយនាំចេញប្រាក់ចំណូលរបស់ប្រជាជន។
នេះនាំឱ្យសក្តានុពលរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា ក្នុងការនាំ
ចេញអង្ករក្នុងប្រទេសកម្ពុជាកាន់ទីផ្សារអាស៊ី ដូចជា ប្រទេសឥណ្ឌូឌូនេស៊ី ហ្វីលីពីន
ឬចិនជាដើម មានការថយចុះ។ បើទោះបីជាអ្នកបញ្ជូនទិញជារដ្ឋាភិបាល
ទាំងទីក្រុងចាកការតា ទាំងទីក្រុងម៉ានីល ចាប់អារម្មណ៍
ក្នុងការធុរ្យវិធីពិធីកម្មការទិញរបស់ពួកគេ និងបញ្ជូនចូលអង្ករពីប្រទេសកម្ពុជាក៏ដោយ
ប្រទេសទាំងពីរនេះនឹងមិនទិញពីប្រទេសកម្ពុជាឡើយ រហូតដល់ពេលដែលតម្លៃ និងគុណភាព
មានកម្រិតប្រហាក់ប្រហែលនឹងអង្ករពីប្រទេសកម្ពុជា ឬថៃ។ អ្នកផលិតអង្ករថៃ Hom
Mali ដាក់តម្លៃខ្ពស់ជាងអង្ករកម្ពុជាគិតត្រឹម
ប៉ុន្តែអ្នកផលិតនេះមានការទទួលស្គាល់សុទ្ធតែលើខ្លួនខ្លួន និងមានចំណែកទីផ្សារថៃ
បើទោះបីជាតម្លៃខ្ពស់ជាងក៏ដោយ។

ចាំបាច់ត្រូវមានការវិនិយោគបន្ថែមទៀតលើសំយ៉ាស៊ីនកិនស្រួល ដឹកជញ្ជូន និង
នាំចេញ

ដើម្បីបង្កើនសមត្ថភាពប្រកួតប្រជែងនៃការនាំចេញអង្កររបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា

ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា មានកាត់បន្ថយថ្លៃថ្នាំសម្រាប់ការកិនស្រួលរបស់ខ្លួន
ប៉ុន្តែដំណើរការងារជា ច្រើនទៀត ដលៃត្រូវធ្វើ
ដើម្បីបង្កើនសមត្ថភាពប្រកួតប្រជែងនៃការនាំចេញអង្កររបស់ខ្លួន។

ថ្លៃថ្នាំសម្រាប់ការកិនស្រួលកំពុងត្រូវបានកាត់បន្ថយ
នៃតាមរយៈការកាត់បន្ថយថ្លៃថ្នាំសម្រាប់ការកិនស្រួលស្របតាមកម្រិត អង្ករកាម ដលៃបម្រុងអង្ករកាម
ជាតិផ្ទុះ និងអាចកាត់បន្ថយថ្លៃថ្នាំសម្រាប់ការកិនស្រួលសរុបបាន ៧៥% ឬ សន្ទុះសំបែកប្រើបាន
១៥ ដុល្លារ/តោន។ ប្រទេសកម្ពុជាក៏ចាំបាច់ត្រូវលើកទឹកចិត្តឱ្យមានការប្រើប្រាស់
បច្ចេកវិទ្យាកាត់ថ្លៃថ្នាំសម្រាប់ការកិនស្រួលផងដែរ តាមរយៈការផ្តល់ឥណទានដល់រោងម៉ាស៊ីនកិនស្រួល
និង

ជម្រុញឱ្យមានការវិនិយោគរបស់វិស័យឯកជនលើហេដ្ឋារចនាសម្ព័ន្ធសម្រាប់ស្តុកអង្ករ
របស់ប្រទេស ដលៃ អាចជាមូលដ្ឋានយ៉ាងល្អ សម្រាប់ការផ្តល់កម្មវិធី
ដោយមានដាក់តម្លៃបញ្ចុះ។

ចាំបាច់ត្រូវមានរោងម៉ាស៊ីនកិនស្រួល និងរោងចក្រស្រិតអង្ករជ័ង
ដើម្បីបង្កើនសមត្ថភាពការដឹកជញ្ជូនក្នុងបរិមាណច្រើន
ដោយបំបែកជាដុំតូចៗ។ ខណៈពេលដលៃសមត្ថភាពកិន

ស្រួលរបស់រោងម៉ាស៊ីនកិនស្រួលទំនើបជំងឺកើនឡើងទុំដេង
នៃក្រុមហ៊ុនរយៈពេលពីរឆ្នាំចុងក្រោយនេះ ចាំបាច់ត្រូវមានការវិនិយោគបន្ថែមទៀត
ដើម្បីបង្កើនគុណភាព និងសមត្ថភាពរបស់រោងម៉ាស៊ីនកិន ស្រួល។
ដើម្បីលើកទឹកចិត្តឱ្យមានការវិនិយោគបន្ថែមនេះ
រដ្ឋាភិបាលគួរផ្តល់រយៈពេលលើកលែងពន្ធ ១ល។ សម្រាប់ការវិនិយោគ
ដលៃអាចបំពេញប្រទេសទៅតាមលក្ខណៈវិនិច្ឆ័យ។

អនុកន្តរំចេញនឹងទទួលបានប្រយោជន៍ពីនីតិវិធីនាំចេញ
ដលៃមានលុបចោលជាងមុន និងថ្លៃថ្នាំ អស់តិចជាងមុន។

បើទោះបីជាមានការកែលម្អច្រើនជាងមុនក៏ដោយ ការកាត់ឯកសារនាំចេញរបស់ ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា
នៃតម្លៃភាពស្មុគស្មាញ ហើយថ្លៃថ្នាំក្នុងការដំឡើងការមានកម្មវិធីខុសពីមុនអាចទទួល
យកបាន។ រដ្ឋាភិបាលចាំបាច់ត្រូវលុបបំបាត់ឧបសគ្គការិយាធិបតេយ្យទាំងនេះ
និងកាត់បន្ថយថ្លៃថ្នាំផ្សេងៗ តាមរយៈការបង្កើតការិយាល័យ “ច្រកចេញចូលតម្លៃ”។

រដ្ឋបាលក្រុងបាឋាន ត្រូវបានបង្កើតឡើងក្នុងឆ្នាំ ២០១៥ ដើម្បីបង្កើនប្រសិទ្ធភាពនៃការងារ និងការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។ ការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន ត្រូវបានបង្កើតឡើង ដើម្បីបង្កើនប្រសិទ្ធភាពនៃការងារ និងការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

ប្រព័ន្ធសេវាសាធារណៈក្រុងបាឋាន និងមិនក្រុងបាឋានសម្រាប់ ដើម្បីសម្រេច គោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ

ប្រព័ន្ធសេវាសាធារណៈក្រុងបាឋាន គឺជាគោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ១ លានគោលដៅ ក្នុងឆ្នាំ ២០១៥ ដើម្បីបង្កើនប្រសិទ្ធភាពនៃការងារ និងការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

សក្តានុពលសេវាសាធារណៈក្រុងបាឋាន គឺជាគោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។ ខ្ពស់បំផុត ប្រព័ន្ធសេវាសាធារណៈក្រុងបាឋាន គឺជាគោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

គោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ១ លាន គោលដៅ គឺជាគោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

សមាជិករបស់ក្រុមការងារបច្ចេកទេសសេវាសាធារណៈ ដើម្បីបង្កើនប្រសិទ្ធភាពនៃការងារ និងការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

ក្រុមការងារសេវាសាធារណៈក្រុងបាឋាន គឺជាគោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

និងប្រព័ន្ធសេវាសាធារណៈក្រុងបាឋាន គឺជាគោលដៅនៃការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

និងដើម្បីបង្កើនប្រសិទ្ធភាពនៃការងារ និងការងារសេវាសាធារណៈ ដល់ក្រុងបាឋាន។

ចេញកាលពីពេលថ្ងៃនេះ
ប្រកួតនាយកដ្ឋានគយ និងដំបូករ។

ដូចដលៃត្រូវបានកត់ត្រាដោយកាំកុងត្រូល

លទ្ធផលរកឃើញសំខាន់ៗ

- ១. ដោយសារតែទំហំនៃចំណែកផ្សេងៗរបស់ទីផ្សារអង្ករពិភពលោក
ប្រទេសកម្ពុជាមិនអាច សម្រេចតាមគោលដៅនាំចេញ ១០
លានតោនរបស់ខ្លួនឡើយ ប្រសិនបើមិននាំចេញអង្ករក្រអូបផង
និងមិនក្រអូបផងនោះទេ។
- ២. ប្រទេសថៃ គឺជាគូប្រកួតប្រជែងធំជាងគេរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា ខាងអង្ករក្រអូប
ខណៈពេល ដលៃប្រទេសសៀតណាម គឺជាគូប្រកួតប្រជែងធំខាងអង្ករមិនក្រអូប។
- ៣. ប្រទេសកម្ពុជាមានចំណាយផលិតកម្មតិចតួចជាងប្រទេសថៃ
និងប្រទេសសៀតណាម ប៉ុន្តែ
តម្លៃអង្ករមិនក្រអូបកាន់តែថ្លៃទៅៗក្នុងកម្រិតមិនអាចប្រកួតប្រជែងជាមួយគេ
បាន នៅមុន ឆ្នាំ២០១៥ ក៏ដូចជា តម្លៃ FOB ដឹកដល់កំពង់ផែ
និងដឹកទៅកាន់គោលដៅនាំចេញក្រៅប្រទេស។
- ៤. កំណើនយ៉ាងឆាប់រហ័សនៃការនាំចេញ ចាប់តាំងពីឆ្នាំ ២០០៩ មក គឺដោយសារតែការ
អនុគ្រោះពន្ធផ្តល់ដលៃដោយសហគមន៍អឺរ៉ុប និងភាពអនុគ្រោះ
ដលៃផ្តល់ដោយ ប្រទេសស្រុស្រី
ក្នុងកម្រិតទាបមួយទាបជាងកម្រិតដលៃផ្តល់ដោយសហភាពអឺរ៉ុប។ ចាំបាច់ត្រូវ
មានការបន្ថែមទ្រព្យសម្បត្តិ ដើម្បីជ្រៀតជ្រួតទៅក្នុងទីផ្សារសំខាន់ៗផ្សេងទៀត
ដូចជា ឥណ្ឌូឌីនីស៊ី និងចិន ជាដើម។
- ៥. ខណៈពេលដលៃមានការកើនឡើងខ្លះៗក្នុងសម័យកាល នៃក្រុងឆ្នាំ ២០១១
ខាងរយៈពេល ដើម្បីទទួលបានការឯកភាពលើឯកសារ
នីតិវិធីនាំចេញរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា នៅតែមិនទាន់បានការយល់ព្រមយល់ព្រម
និងមានចំណាយក្រៅផ្តល់ការ ដលៃខ្ពស់ ក្នុងកម្រិតដលៃមិនអាចទទួលយកបាន។
ចំណាយផ្តល់ការ និងក្រៅផ្តល់ការ ធ្វើឱ្យតម្លៃ FOB កើនឡើង ១៧
ដុល្លារ/តោន។
- ៦.
រដ្ឋាភិបាលគួរជម្រុញឱ្យមានការប្រើប្រាស់ឧបករណ៍ដុតអង្ករក្រអូបឱ្យបានកាន់តែទ្រុ

លំទូលាយ បន្ថែមទៀត ដល់អាចកាត់បន្ថយចំណាយកិនស្ករ ៧០% ពេលគឺជិត ១៥ ដុល្លារ/តោន។

៧. ចំណាយខ្ពស់មិនអាចប្រកួតប្រជែងជាមួយគោលនយោបាយនៃការដឹកជញ្ជូនក្នុងស្រុក និងអន្តរជាតិ និង តម្លៃសេវាកំពុងខ្ពស់ អាច “ដោះស្រាយចេញ” តាមរយៈការចរចាឱ្យមានកិច្ចព្រមព្រៀងរវាងកាត់ ជាមួយនឹងប្រទេសរៀនណាម និងប្រទេសថៃ។ កិច្ចព្រមព្រៀងដល់មានស្រាប់ ជាមួយនឹងប្រទេសរៀនណាម បង្កើតនូវក្រុមខ្នាតមួយ សម្រាប់ដឹកអង្ករមិនដាក់ក្នុងកុងតឺន័រតាមទូក តាមដងទន្លេមេគង្គ ដើម្បីរងចាំកំប៉ាល់ ដល់ដឹកក្នុងបរិមាណច្រើន។ គេអាច ចម្លង តាមកិច្ចព្រមព្រៀង រវាងប្រទេសថៃ និងប្រទេសឡាវ ដល់អនុញ្ញាតឱ្យប្រទេសឡាវ ប្រើប្រាស់កំពុងថៃហាន។

៨. ដោយសារតែទំហំរបស់រោងចក្រកិនស្ករនីមួយៗ ប្រទេសកម្ពុជាធុរការនាំចេញអង្ករ តែ តាមកុងតឺន័រមួយចំនួន។ ការពឹងអាស្រ័យដល់ដាច់មុខលើកុងតឺន័រនេះ អាចនាំឱ្យការនាំចេញ ជាប់គាំងតិច ២ សន្លឹក ៥ មីនតោន ក្នុងមួយឆ្នាំ។ នេះកើតឡើង ដោយសារតែបញ្ហាខាង កំសុជុំការ និងដោយសារតែអ្នកនាំចូលធំៗ នៅអាហ្វ្រិកខាងលិច ហ្សឺណីប៊ែរ និងឥណ្ឌូឌីនេស៊ី នាំចូលអង្ករតាមរយៈកំប៉ាល់ធំៗ ដល់ដឹកក្នុងបរិមាណច្រើន។ កិច្ចព្រមព្រៀងរវាងកាត់ទុរភោគី ដល់សុន្ទើរឡើងនេះ គឺជា “ដំណោះស្រាយ” ចំពោះឧបសគ្គទាំងពីរនេះ។

៩. ភាពកំហិតខាងដំបូងទៅសម្រុះ រារាំងមិនឱ្យកំប៉ាល់ធំៗចូលមកដឹកទំនិញ នៅក្នុងកុងតឺន័រ ព្រះសីហនុ។

អនុសាសន៍ ៖ ពលរដ្ឋលោកសារៈសំខាន់យ៉ាងខ្ពស់

១. ផ្នែកទីបង្ហាញផ្តល់មួយ ដើម្បីបង្កើនការនាំចេញរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា គួរពិចារណាលើតថវិកាដាក់សុដង់អំពីកន្លែងដល់មានអតិរេក សមាសភាគរបស់វាបង្កើតទៅតាមប្រភេទអង្ករ និងសមត្ថភាព ប្រកួតប្រជែងនៃអង្ករផ្តល់ឱ្យ។

- អតិរេកដល់អាចនាំចេញបានរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា អាចបង្កើតជាពូជអង្ករក្រអូប ពូជមិន ក្រអូប និងពូជ **IRRI** ផលិតកម្មអង្ករក្រអូបប្រមូលផ្តុំនៃបណ្តាខេត្តភាគពាយ័ព្យ ជាប់ ព្រំដែនជាមួយប្រទេសថៃ ខណៈពេលដល់ពូជ **IRRI**

ត្រូវបានដាំនៅរដូវវស្សា នៅភាគ អាគ្នេយ៍នៃប្រទេសកម្ពុជា
នៃតាមបណ្តាខេត្តដាច់នឹងប្រទេសវៀតណាម។

- នៅក្នុងរយៈពេល ១០ ខែ
ចាប់តាំងពីគោលដៅនៃការនាំចេញអង្ករក្របីដោយមហិច្ឆតា ១
លានតោន ត្រូវបានដាក់ចេញ
មានការសម្រេចបាននូវវឌ្ឍនភាពតិចតួចប៉ុណ្ណោះ នៅក្នុងការ
ដោះស្រាយបញ្ហាសម្បត្តិសម្រាប់ ដលៃពាក់ព័ន្ធជាមួយតុលាការ
ដលៃធុរ្យវិធានសុទ្ធដល់សមតុល្យភាព
ប្រកួតប្រជែងរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា នៅក្នុងការនាំចេញអង្ករ។
- ប្រសិនបើប្រជាជនមានបំណងយកស្បៀងដលៃលេចចេញក្នុងវិស័យកសិកម្ម
មួយភាគធំ ទៅប្រទេស ថៃ និងប្រទេសវៀតណាមក្នុងវិស័យកសិកម្ម
មកបម្រុងឱ្យមានលទ្ធផលជាការនាំចេញអង្ករជាផ្លូវការ វិញ
វិធានការដលៃសុទ្ធជឺឡើយនេះ គួរយកមកពិចារណាជាកញ្ញូចប់។
- គម្រោងសុទ្ធជឺឡើយ និងទំនើបកម្មកំពុងដកខ្លួនចេញ
និងក្នុងព្រះសីហនុ គឺជាដំណោះស្រាយ រយៈពេលមធ្យម
ដលៃអាចជួយកាត់បន្ថយចំណាយសុទ្ធជឺឡើយដលៃកំពុងតម្រូវឱ្យខ្ពស់
និងចំណុចរាំងស្ងួតមួយចំនួនរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា។
បើតាមអ្នកនាំចេញសំខាន់ៗជាច្រើន
ចំណុចរាំងស្ងួតទាំងនេះអាចនាំឱ្យការនាំចេញរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា
ត្រូវដាច់គាំងត្រឹមតិចជាង ២ សែន ៥ ម៉ឺនតោន។
សូមប្រឹក្សាដោយនឹងការពិគ្រោះប្រចាំប្រទេសកម្ពុជាបន្តទៀតក៏ដោយ ការនាំ
ចេញ
អាចកើនឡើងដល់ត្រឹមតិចពាក់កណ្តាលនៃគោលដៅនាំចេញប៉ុណ្ណោះ
នោះ នៅឆ្នាំ ២០១៥ បើទោះបីជាប្រទេសនេះក៏ដោយ
នេះនៅតែជាសមិទ្ធផលគួរឱ្យយកចិត្តទុកដាក់។

២.

រដ្ឋាភិបាលកម្ពុជាគួរដល់អាទិភាពខ្ពស់ដល់ការបង្កើតឱ្យមានកិច្ចព្រមព្រៀង
មធ្យមរវាងប្រទេស និងប្រទេស វៀតណាម
ដើម្បីអនុញ្ញាតឱ្យមានការដឹកអង្ករមិនដាក់ក្នុងកុងតឺន័រតាមទូក
តាមទន្លេមេគង្គ ជាទំនិញ រំលងកាត់ ដើម្បីបង្កើនចំណូលមកដឹក
នៃកំពុងផលិតសេវា។

- នេះនឹងជួយដល់បញ្ហាបច្ចុប្បន្ន
ដលៃសូម្បីតែរដ្ឋាភិបាលក៏ដោយ ក៏នៅមានទំហំតូចពេក

ដើម្បីបង្កើនផលិតផលក្នុងវិស័យកសិកម្ម កសិករខ្ញុំយកប៉ាល់សម្រាប់ កន្លែងបរិមាណ ៥០០០ តោន ខ្ញុំយកទិញទាត់ពេលវេលា។

- ការដឹកដំបូង អាចធ្វើឡើង តាមទូក ដល់ដីកពី ២៥០ តោន ទៅ ១០០០ តោន ហើយយក ទៅ បញ្ជូនចូលក្នុងកន្លែងរក្សាទុកដើម្បីកែច្នៃជាការនាំចេញនានាជាដាច់ខាត។
- ដោយសារតែទំហំ និងកម្រិតទំនើបនៃវិស័យកសិកម្ម កម្រិតនៃ និងនាំចេញស្រូវអង្កររបស់ប្រទេស កម្រិតនៃការនាំចេញឡើង ទំហំនៃការលក់ពីការនាំចេញ អាចមានការកើនឡើងបន្តិចម្តងៗ រហូតដល់ចំណុចមួយ ដលៃកប៉ាល់ដំបូងអាចចូលមកដឹកអង្ករពីកម្រិតជាតិមួយ “ដំណោះ-សុភាយ” នេះ កាត់បន្ថយចំណាយដឹកជញ្ជូន និងនាំចេញផង របស់ប្រទេសកម្រិត មិនត្រឹមតែសម្រាប់ទំនិញអង្ករប៉ុណ្ណោះទេ ប៉ុន្តែថែមទាំងសម្រាប់ទំនិញនាំចេញផ្សេងទៀតរបស់ ប្រទេសកម្រិតជាទូទៅផង។
- លើសពីនេះ ដំណោះស្រាយនេះធានាថា តម្លៃ FOB របស់អង្ករពីកម្រិត នៅតែអាចប្រកួត ប្រជែងបាន ផ្នែកទៅតាមមូលដ្ឋាន CNF។

៣. លើកទឹកចិត្ត ខ្ញុំយកមានការវិនិយោគឯកជនលើវិស័យកសិកម្ម និងវិស័យកសិកម្មស្រូវសីតិស្រូវ ដលៃ មានសមត្ថភាពយ៉ាងហោចណាស់ ៣០ តោន/ម៉ោង តាមរយៈការផ្តល់រយៈពេលលើកលែងពន្ធដាររហូត ដល់រយៈពេល ៥ ឆ្នាំ សម្រាប់កម្រិតបរិមាណ និងកន្លែងស្តុក ដលៃបំពេញតាមលក្ខខណៈវិនិច្ឆ័យ

- រោងចក្រទាំងនេះផ្តល់នូវឱកាសល្អបំផុត ដើម្បីបង្កើនការនាំចេញអង្ករ នាពេលអនាគតដ៏ខ្ពស់ ខាងមុខនេះ។
- រដ្ឋាភិបាលអាចប្តូរវិធានការលើកទឹកចិត្តផ្តល់ពន្ធដារ ដើម្បីលើកទឹកចិត្តខ្ញុំយកមានការវិនិយោគ ក្នុងវិស័យកសិកម្ម ឬក្នុងវិស័យ លើវិស័យកសិកម្មស្រូវ ដលៃអាចបំពេញទៅតាមតម្រូវការនៃការនាំចេញបាន។

៤. រដ្ឋាភិបាលចាំបាច់ត្រូវតែបន្តផ្តល់លទ្ធភាពសេរីក្នុងការវិនិយោគលើវិស័យ និងកាត់បន្ថយចំណាយ សម្រាប់ដំណើរការការនាំចេញ បើទោះបីជាមានការសម្រេចបាននូវខុណភាពយ៉ាងច្រើន កាលពីឆ្នាំ កន្លងទៅនេះ ក្នុងការកាត់បន្ថយរយៈពេលសម្រាប់ចេញលិខិតបញ្ជាក់កំរិតតម្លៃ លិខិតបញ្ជាក់ អនាម័យ និងភូតកាមអនាម័យ និងលិខិតបញ្ជាក់គយក៏ដោយ។

- ចំណុចនេះអាចសម្រេចទៅបាន តាមរយៈការពង្រីក “សវ័យចេញចូលតម្លៃ” សម្រាប់ ផ្តល់ការអនុញ្ញាតដល់ការនាំចេញ ដើម្បីកាត់បន្ថយរយៈពេល ដលៃតម្លៃចំណាយបច្ចុប្បន្ន ដើម្បីទទួលបានការអនុញ្ញាតលើឯកសារនានា។

- មានការលើកជាសំណូមពរឱ្យមានការបើកការិយាល័យ “ចុះកម្រិតចូលតម្លៃ” នៅតាម តំបន់ផ្សេងទៀត បន្ថែមលើវិធានការណ៍នៃការបញ្ជា និងនៅតាមតំបន់ដែលមានរោងម៉ាស៊ីនកិនស្រូវ ដំបូង នៅក្នុងប្រទេសនេះ។
- ចំណុចមួយដែលមិនពាក់ព័ន្ធជាមួយនឹងកិច្ចខិតខំប្រឹងប្រែងនេះគឺ មានការលើកជា សំណូមពរ ឱ្យយកកុងតឺន័រលើកការិយាល័យនៅក្នុងខេត្តដំបូង និងតំបន់ដែលមានរោងម៉ាស៊ីនកិនស្រូវដំបូងផ្សេងទៀត ដោយមានបុគ្គលិកជាមនុស្សធម៌តិរិយាអង្គការ ដើម្បីសម្រួលការ ត្រួតពិនិត្យតាមតំបន់ទាំងនេះ។ លើសពីនេះ គួរមានការបង្កើនចំនួនមនុស្សធម៌តិរិយាអង្គការទាំងនេះ ដើម្បីឱ្យពួកគេ អាចចេញទៅជួរការងារក្នុងតំបន់ដើម្បីការធម្មតាបានជាប្រចាំ។
- ដើម្បីបន្ថែមសម្រួលមុខងារដំណើរការនៃការបញ្ជា មានការលើកជាសំណូមពរឱ្យយកកុងតឺន័រលើកការិយាល័យមុខងារត្រួតពិនិត្យ ពីអគ្គនាយកដ្ឋានគយ និងរដ្ឋប្រចុះបន្ត និងមុខងារចេញ វិញ្ញាបនបត្រអនាម័យ និងភូតគាមអនាម័យសម្រាប់ផលិតផលអង្ករ ពីក្រសួងកសិកម្ម រុក្ខាប្រមាញ់ និងនេសាទ។
- រដ្ឋាភិបាលអាចកាត់បន្ថយចំណាយសម្រាប់ការនាំចេញ តាមរយៈការកាត់បន្ថយថ្លៃសេវា ដែលគិតលើឯកសារនាំចេញ (ជាជាងបង្កើនថ្លៃសេវាផ្តល់ការសម្រាប់ការចេញវិញ្ញាបនបត្រអនាម័យ និងភូតគាមអនាម័យ និងលិខិតបញ្ជាក់គយ) និងអង្គការដែលមានសារៈសំខាន់ដូចគ្នានេះ គឺត្រូវបន្ថែមកាត់បន្ថយថ្លៃកែតម្រូវ។

៥. ដើម្បីជួយដល់រដ្ឋាភិបាល នៅក្នុងការកំណត់ពីឧបសគ្គនានាដែលកំពុងតម្រូវ ទាន និងជំនះបញ្ចុះហាននានា នៅពេលដែលវាកើតមានឡើង សមាជិករបស់ក្រុមការងារបច្ចេកទេសស្រូវអង្ករ មកពីវិស័យឯកជន គួរជាអនុកម្មក្នុងការបញ្ជាក់នូវការងារដំបូងទាំង ៥ ហើយគួរមានការរៀបចំកិច្ចប្រជុំប្រចាំឆ្នាំ ដើម្បីផ្តល់ដំបូន្មានដល់រដ្ឋាភិបាល។

- សមាជិករបស់ក្រុមនេះអាចជួរសេវាផ្តល់ការងារនៅតាមបរិមាណនាំចេញ កាលពីពេលថ្មីៗនេះ ទៅតាមការកត់ត្រាដោយយកកុងតឺន័រ ឬអគ្គនាយកដ្ឋានគយ និងរដ្ឋប្រចុះ ក្រុមការងារបច្ចេកទេសស្រូវអង្ករនេះ និងផ្តល់ឱកាសឱ្យមានការចូលរួមពីអ្នកពាក់ព័ន្ធចម្រុះនិស្សិតស្រូវអង្ករ របស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា ដូចជា រោងម៉ាស៊ីនកិនស្រូវ រោងចក្រស្រិត និងអ្នកនាំចេញ ដែលមិន មានរោងចក្រដោយខ្លួនឯង។

- រៀងរាល់ ២ ឆ្នាំម្តង សមាជិកមកពីសំណងកងកម្មវិធីស្រាវជ្រាវស្រែកស្រែកដំណើរការស្រាវជ្រាវស្រែកស្រែក
ទៅតាមឯកសារបញ្ជាក់ពី បរិមាណនាំចេញចុងក្រោយ។

៦. មានការលើកដាស់ណូមពរថា ក្នុងស្ថានភាពសិកម្ម រុក្ខាបុរាណ និងសេវា
ត្រូវបានរៀបចំការសិក្សាស្រាវជ្រាវ វិទ្យាសាស្ត្រដុះដុះមួយចំនួន
ដើម្បីបង្កើនប្រសិទ្ធភាពផលិតផលក្នុងតំបន់រដ្ឋាភិបាលកម្ពុជា ពុំមានសត្វចង្រៃ
និងពុំមាន សារធាតុ GMO។
បន្ទាប់ពីការសិក្សាស្រាវជ្រាវនេះត្រូវបានគេពិនិត្យឡើងវិញ
និងយល់ដឹងដាក់ក្នុងឯកសារ បោះពុម្ពផ្សាយវិទ្យាសាស្ត្រដុះដុះ
ដែលមានការទទួលស្គាល់ហើយ ក្នុងស្ថានភាពសិកម្ម រុក្ខាបុរាណ និងសេវា
អាចចេញវិញ្ញាបនបត្រមួយ ដើម្បីបញ្ជាក់ថា
អង្គការរបស់កម្ពុជាពុំមានសត្វចង្រៃ និងពុំមានសារធាតុ GMO
ដែលអាចលុបចោលនូវកូឡេនដុលស្តិកម្មឱ្យមានការផ្តល់សេវាដល់ប្រជាជន
រាប់អាននាំចេញ បើទោះ
បីជាចាំបាច់ត្រូវតែមានការបន្តពិនិត្យតាមដានលើបញ្ហានេះក៏ដោយ។
មានការលើកដាស់ណូមពរ ឱ្យក្នុងស្ថានភាពសិកម្ម រុក្ខាបុរាណ និងសេវា
ខិតខំបង្កើនប្រសិទ្ធភាពផលិតផលក្នុងតំបន់រដ្ឋាភិបាល ដើម្បីផ្តល់ការលុបបំបាត់ សត្វលុត
និងរុក្ខាបុរាណចង្រៃ
ដែលជាករណីប្រឈមរបស់ប្រទេសជាតិទាំងនាំចេញមួយចំនួន ដូចជា ប្រទេស
ចិន ជាដើម។

- បញ្ហាអនាម័យ និងភូតកាមអនាម័យ កាន់តែក្តៅក្តាយជាខ្ពស់ក្នុងមួយឆ្នាំ ឧទាហរណ៍
ប្រទេសចិន នឹងមិនអនុញ្ញាតឱ្យនាំចូលអង្ករកម្ពុជាឡើយ
លុះត្រាតែដំណើរការអាចបញ្ជាក់ថា អង្ករដែលនាំ
ចេញទៅប្រទេសចិនពុំមានសត្វចង្រៃដូចតទៅ ដែលជាករណីប្រឈមរបស់ប្រទេសចិន ៖
Leptochloa chinensis, Striga asiatica, Apenlenchoides besseyi, Ditylenchus angustus។
- កញ្ចប់នីមួយៗ ដែលឆ្លងកាត់ការត្រួតពិនិត្យ
នឹងមានចេញវិញ្ញាបនបត្រភូតកាមអនាម័យ ដែលបង្កាញថា
កញ្ចប់នេះមានបំពេញទៅតាមលក្ខខណ្ឌឧត្តមរបស់ប្រទេសចិន និងមានការ
បញ្ជាក់ពីប្រភពដើមផលិតកម្ម។¹
- សហភាពអឺរ៉ុប ដែលជាទីផ្សារនាំចេញធំជាងគេរបស់ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា
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ហើយពុំមានមនុស្សពិសោធន៍ណា នៅក្នុងបុរេសកម្មពុទ្ធសាសនា ដើម្បី
ធុរកិច្ចសេដ្ឋកិច្ចទំនើបទាំងនេះឡើយ។

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ថ្នាក់ដឹកនាំបច្ចុប្បន្ន។

Executive Summary

Cambodia's rice export highly dependent on the European Union due to tax exemption

Cambodia's rice exports are on a steep upward trajectory, benefiting from import duty preferences and new investments in rice mills and polishing factories. Exports averaged less than 6,000 tons between 2004 and 2008. In 2009, the European Union opened its market to duty-free and quota-free rice exports from Cambodia with the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) trade agreement. As a result, the country's exports jumped to over 51,000 tons in 2010. Since then, the rice exports to the EU have grown significantly, and are estimated to reach 175,000 tons in 2011. The EU exports are evenly split between fragrant and non-fragrant rice. A vast majority (90%) of Cambodia's rice exports is shipped to the EU and Russia, which is another market providing duty free access to Cambodia's rice. Russia is buying mostly non-fragrant rice.

Cambodia's major export competitors are Thailand and Vietnam. Thailand is a main competitor for fragrant rice, exporting itself *ca* 2.65 million tons of aromatic rice (including broken) in 2010/2011. Vietnam is the principal competitor for the non-aromatic white rice markets such as the Philippines and Indonesia. Pakistan and Burma are competing with Cambodia for low-grade white rice markets mainly in Africa.

Inefficiencies in logistics and export procedures keep rice prices too high to enter new export markets in Asia

Cambodia's prices for non-aromatic milled rice are increasingly out of competition with its neighbors. While Cambodia has significantly cheaper production costs than Thailand and Vietnam,² higher milling costs and margins render its ex-mill prices uncompetitive. This is further exacerbated by high domestic transport costs (both formal and informal), expensive and time consuming export procedures and port charges, and less competitive overseas freight costs. As a result, Cambodian rice is unattractive to overseas buyers given that Cambodia has not established itself as a reliable supplier yet.

² Wholesale harvest prices for fragrant paddy in northwest Cambodia were \$305/ton in December 2010 (Riels 1,250/kg), while they averaged almost \$445 in N.E. Thailand. Similarly, wholesale prices for IR paddy in the eastern provinces averaged \$237/ton in March 2011 (Riels 970/kg) compared to \$263/ton (VD 5,490/kg) in Vietnam's Mekong River Delta. Cambodian prices from provincial rice millers in Battambang and Prey Veng, Thai values from USDA/Bangkok, and Vietnamese prices from Viet Food Cambodia needs to export both fragrant and non-fragrant rice to achieve its export goals. Association.

Cambodian fragrant rice (5% broken) is quoted at \$950 as of June 2011 while the fragrant rice from Vietnam is available at \$600. Rice in Vietnam is cheaper primarily because their milling and transportation costs are nearly half of those in Cambodia. This dims down Cambodia's potential to sell its non-fragrant rice to Asian markets like Indonesia, the Philippines or China. Although the government buyers in both Jakarta and Manila are interested in diversifying their purchases and include rice from Cambodia, they won't buy until the prices and quality are comparable to those in Vietnam or Thailand. Thai producers' *Hom Mali* is quoted slightly higher than Cambodian rice, but it has very high brand recognition and stable market share regardless higher price.

More investments are needed in milling, transport and export sectors to increase competitiveness of Cambodia's rice export

Cambodia has reduced its milling costs but more needs to be done to improve competitiveness of its rice export. Milling costs are being reduced at factories that are installing rice husk gasifiers which convert the rice husks to fuel and slash diesel costs by up to 75% or save almost \$15/ton. Cambodia also needs to encourage the adoption of this cost-cutting technology by extending credit to rice mills and promoting private sector investments in new storage infrastructure, which would be a good bases for collateral based financing.

Larger rice mills and polishing factories are needed to facilitate break bulk shipments. While there has been a doubling in the milling capacity of relatively large modern rice mills in the last two years, more investments are needed to improve the quality and capacity of mills. To encourage such investments, the government should provide tax holidays etc for qualifying investments.

Exporters would benefit from quicker and cheaper export procedures. Although there have been significant improvements, the Cambodia's export documentation process remains complicated and informal costs unacceptably high. The government needs to further remove bureaucratic hurdles and lower expenses by *inter alia* setting up "single stop service" offices.

The government needs to intensify its export facilitation efforts to increase its rice exports. The capacity of Cambodia's logistics system from mills to ports is inadequate to accommodate large-scale volumes. All of Cambodia's rice exports are shipped in containers from Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville ports. Unless the government obtains a transit access to Saigon Port via the Mekong River for uncontainerized milled rice, it is unlikely that Cambodia will export even 500,000 tons by 2015.

Cambodia needs to export both fragrant and non-fragrant rice at lower prices to achieve its export goals

Cambodia has set a rice export goal of 1 million tons of milled rice in 2015, which will require exporting both aromatic and non -fragrant rice. Outside of the E.U. and Russia, the brightest export prospects in the near term are for the fragrant rice. The Philippines, for example, is the world' largest buyer of 25% broken rice, a quality that Cambodia can produce. Therefore increasing export of aromatic rice should be the first focus of the government of Cambodia. The export target of 1 million tons cannot be reached by exporting only fragrant rice given the finite size of that market (less than 3 million tons) and popularity of Thai *Hom Mali*.

Private sector members of the Rice Technical Working Group should form a advisory group for the government. The working groups should gather representatives of the five largest rice exporters and meet every quarter to advise the government in identifying ongoing hurdles and overcoming problems as they arise. Membership of the group should be selected from companies based on their recent export volumes as recorded by either Camcontrol or GDCE.

Key Findings

1. Given the size of the different segments of the world rice market, Cambodia cannot reach its 1.0 million ton export goal without exporting both fragrant and non-fragrant rice.
2. Thailand is Cambodia's principal competitor for fragrant rice, while Vietnam is the key competitor for non-fragrant rice.
3. Cambodia has significantly cheaper production costs than Thailand and Vietnam, but its prices for non-aromatic milled rice become increasingly uncompetitive ex-mill, FOB the port, and delivered to the overseas destination.
4. The rapid growth in exports since 2009 is due to import duty preferences granted by the E.U. and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Lower prices will be needed to penetrate other key markets such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and China.
5. While there has been a significant improvement during 2011 in the turn-around time involved in getting documents approved, Cambodian export procedures remain highly bureaucratic and informal costs unacceptably high. Combined formal and informal costs add \$17/ton to FOB prices.
6. The government should promote wider adoption of rice husk burning equipment that can reduce milling costs by 70%, almost \$15/ton.

7. Uncompetitive local and international freight costs and high port charges can be "solved" by negotiating transit agreements with Vietnam and Thailand. An existing pact with Vietnam provides a framework for the barging of uncontainerized milled rice down the Mekong River to waiting break bulk vessels. A bilateral agreement between Thailand and Laos, which allows the latter to use Thai ports, could be copied.
8. Because of the size of the individual mills, Cambodia only exports rice via containers. The exclusive reliance on containers could result in exports stalling at about 250,000 tons per year. This is due to domestic logistical constraints and because major importers in West Africa, the Philippines, and Indonesia primarily import rice carried on break bulk vessels. The proposed bilateral transit accords provide a "work around" to these twin hurdles.
9. Depth limitations currently preclude larger vessels from loading in Sihanoukville.

Recommendations: Time is of the Essence

1.A viable road map to increase Cambodia's exports should take into account the realities of where the surplus is located, its composition by type of rice, and the competitiveness of the different varieties.³

- Cambodia's exportable surplus can be divided into aromatic, native non-aromatic, and IRRI varieties. The aromatic production is centered in the northwestern provinces that border Thailand, while the IRRI varieties are grown during the dry season in southeastern Cambodia in the provinces bordering Vietnam.
- In the ten months since the ambitious 1 million ton export target was established, only limited progress has been made in grappling with the complex, inter-related issues, which hamper Cambodia's competitiveness of rice exports.
- If the government desires to quickly replace a significant share of the paddy leaking into Thailand and Vietnam with formal exports of milled rice, it is suggested that proposed measures are considered as a package.
- The planned rehabilitation of the railroads and the modernization of Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville ports are medium-term remedies, which will only partially alleviate the Kingdom's high logistics costs and bottlenecks. According to several key exporters, these hurdles could result in Cambodia's exports stalling at less than 250,000 tons. Even with urgent and concerted efforts, exports may only reach half of the export target by 2015 – albeit still a significant achievement.

³ This makes it imperative that MAFF begin to monitor the breakdown of the rice crop area and production by type.

2. The Cambodian government should give its highest priority to getting Vietnam’s agreement to allow the barging of uncontainerized milled rice down the Mekong River as a transit good to waiting conventional vessels in Saigon Port.

- This would help to overcome the current problem that even Cambodia’s largest mills are too small to individually supply coastal vessels carrying 5,000 tons on a timely basis.
- Initial shipments could be made on barges carrying 250 tons to 1,000 tons where they could be combined on the waiting ships with much larger tonnages of Vietnamese rice.
- As the size and sophistication of Cambodia’s rice milling, processing, and exporting sector grows, the size of the export sales could be gradually increased until it reaches the point where entire vessels of Cambodian rice are loaded. This “solution” lowers both Cambodian transport and export costs not only for rice, but also for other Cambodian exports.
- Also, it ensures that competitive FOB mill milled rice prices remain that way on a CNF basis.

3. Encourage private investments in larger mills and rice polishing factories with capacities of at least 30 tons/hr⁴ by providing up a tax holiday up to five years for qualifying foreign and domestic firms.

- These facilities offer the best opportunity for increasing rice exports in the near-term.
- The government could use its tax incentives to encourage overseas or domestic investments in the milling sector, which are able to meet export requirements.

4. The government would need to further remove bureaucratic hurdles and lower export processing expenses although considerable progress has been made in the last year in reducing the turnaround times for issuing Camcontrol, SPS, and customs certificates.

- This could be achieved through expansion of the “single stop service” for export approvals in order to minimize the time currently spent getting documents approved.
- It is suggested that centralized “single stop service” offices be opened in addition to Phnom Penh, also in major milling centers of the country.
- Independent of this effort, it is suggested that Camcontrol staff its office in Battambang and in the other major milling centers with rice inspectors to facilitate the inspections upcountry. Further, its inspectors should be increased so that they are routinely available outside of regular office hours.

⁴ As indicated in the appendix, the construction of rice polishing factories played a key role in Vietnam’s relatively rapid advance from primarily an exporter of low quality rice to an origin that last year exported 2.5 million tons of high quality rice.

- In order to further streamline and simplify export processing functions, it is suggested that Camcontrol take over the inspection duties currently performed by the General Department of Customs and Excise and the issuance of SPS certificates for rice from MAFF.
- The government has a scope to reduce export costs by reducing fees charged for export documentation (rather than increasing official fees for SPS and customs certificates), and equally important, further slash port costs.

5. To assist the government in identifying on going hurdles and overcoming problems as they arise, it is recommended that the private sector membership of the Rice Technical Working Group (RTWG) be reconstituted to consist of the five largest rice exporters and that regular quarterly meetings be held to advise the government.

- Membership of the group could be based on recent export volumes as recorded by either Camcontrol or GDCE. This RTWG would provide a cross section of the Cambodian rice sector – millers, polishers, and exporters without factories.
- Every two years the private sector membership could be changed based on the most recent export performance records.

6. It is suggested that MAFF urgently undertake a series of scientific studies to prove that rice in the Kingdom is pests and GMO free. After these studies are reviewed and referenced in a recognized scientific publication, MAFF can issue a blanket certification that the Cambodian rice crop is pest and GMO free, eliminating additional testing requirements for exporters, although continuous surveillance may need to be continued. It is suggested that MAFF also redouble its efforts to eliminate insects and noxious weeds that are of concern to targeted export destinations such as China.

- SPS issues are increasingly likely to become a major constraint. China, for example, will not allow Cambodian rice to be imported unless the government can certify that the milled rice exported to China are free from the following quarantine pests of Chinese concern: *Leptochloa chinensis*, *Striga asiatica*, *Apelenchoides besseyi*, *Ditylenchus angustus*.
- Each batch passing inspection will be issued an official Phytosanitary Certificate demonstrating that it has fulfilled the Chinese requirements and specifying the origin of production.⁵
- The EU, Cambodia's largest export market is very sensitive about importing GMO-free food and there are no labs in Cambodia to test the goods.
- Presently, the exporters must ship a sample to Vietnam for testing, which costs \$150 per test and takes several days to perform.

⁵ “The Protocol Between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China on Phytosanitary Requirements for Cambodia Milled Rice Export to China,” October 2010

1. Targeted Overseas Markets & Competition

1. Cambodia's rice harvests have been rising significantly since 2005, powered by improved and expanded irrigation and attractive farmgate prices. This year's production is officially estimated at 8.25 million tons, including the recently harvested dry season crop of 1.7 million tons. Cambodia's rice production is primarily comprised of three types of rice: traditional non-aromatic varieties, fragrant rice, and IRRI HYV's. While official statistics are lacking, the traditional non-aromatic varieties make up by far the largest share of the production, accounting for roughly half of the total harvest.⁶ The IRRI varieties account for about one-fourth to one-third of the output,⁷ while fragrant rice production, which recently has been expanding rapidly, is about 1.65 million tons or 20% of the crop.⁸

2. The production gains have fueled a burgeoning exportable surplus which is informally shipped to Thailand and Vietnam by well-financed traders which swoop in to buy the freshly harvested paddy. The relative volumes and the mix by variety depend on the price differentials in the neighboring markets in a given year. Typically, though, about one-third of the surplus flows west to Thailand and the balance east to Vietnam. A mix of varieties are shipped in each direction, but most of the surplus fragrant rice is sold ultimately to Thai rice millers located in the border areas, while IRRI varieties are predominantly traded to Vietnam.

3. While Cambodia has significantly cheaper production costs than Thailand and Vietnam,⁹ its prices for non-aromatic milled rice become increasingly uncompetitive ex-rice mill, FOB the port, and delivered to the overseas destination.

⁶ The non-fragrant traditional varieties include Phkar Khney, Neang Minh, and Neang Khon. These are medium- and long-duration cultivars with growing periods of up to 210 days which are photoperiod sensitive, i.e. they must be grown in the rainy season.

⁷ IR 66 and IR 50404, which are non-photoperiod sensitive, are the predominant IRRI varieties grown. While IR 66 has excellent grain quality and can be milled into rice with 5% brokens, IR 50404 typically can only be milled with difficulty into 15% brokens. Except for the very poor consumers, the IRRI varieties are grown for export.

⁸ The most well known fragrant varieties are Somaly, Neang Malis, Phka Romdul, and Domaly. They are photoperiod sensitive. Recently, two non-photo period varieties have been introduced, Sen Pidao and Sen Kra-ob. Production of fragrant rice has expanded sharply in the last several years as farmers switch out of non-fragrant varieties during the rainy season and increasing acreage is being devoted to Sen Kra-ob during the dry season.

⁹ Wholesale harvest prices for fragrant paddy in northwest Cambodia were \$305/ton in December 2010 (Riels 1,250/kg), while they averaged almost \$445 in N.E. Thailand. Similarly, wholesale prices for IR paddy in the eastern provinces averaged \$237/ton in March 2011 (Riels 970/kg) compared to \$263/ton (VD 5,490/kg) in Vietnam's Mekong River Delta. Cambodian prices from provincial rice millers in Battambang and Prey Veng, Thai values from USDA/Bangkok, and Vietnamese prices from Viet Food Association.

This is due to the combination of improper drying of the paddy, mixing of the varieties by paddy traders, out-of-date milling technology, high power costs to operate the rice mills, inefficient milling technology, expensive transport costs, informal payments, high costs for processing export documents, expensive port charges, and uncompetitive ocean freight. “In Cambodia, the cost of rice milling is about \$30-50/ton, compared to \$20-30/ton in Thailand and Vietnam. The cost of transporting rice to the harbor in Cambodia is about \$50-60/ton, which is double the internal transport costs in Thailand (\$20-30).”¹⁰

1.1 Rice is not rice, is not rice

4. The world rice market is a thin, segmented, and imperfect market in which governments are key actors. World trade has averaged just over 30 million tons during the last three years. Most of the rice moving in world commerce is fully milled and shipped as bagged cargo on break bulk vessels, while Cambodia is only using containers. There are very distinct markets based on different rice types, qualities, and methods of processing which preclude perfect substitution.

5. In the world market, considerable emphasis is placed on grain length and on the percentage of brokens as criteria of quality. In addition, the kernel shape (length/breadth), the chalkiness, and translucency are considered. The absence of chalkiness and high translucency in the rice endosperm are quality characteristics associated with good grain appearance. Uniformity of quality is also important to rice buyers.

6. There are basically four types of rice: glutinous, aromatic, Japonica, and Indica. The tenderness and stickiness of cooked rice are inversely correlated with the amylase content of the starch. Glutinous or sticky rice (a very low amylose rice) is typically used in desserts and only about 300,000 tons is traded each year in the world market. As described in further detail below, 5.7 million tons of aromatic rice were traded internationally last year. Japonica type rice, having fairly low amylose content, is semi-sticky and moist when cooked. Japonica is a round-shaped grain. The amount of Japonica rice traded internationally varies widely. Usually, however, about 1.5 million tons of Japonica is traded annually.

7. With an intermediate to high amylose content, Indica or long grain rice cooks fluffy and shows high volume expansion as well as grain separation. Indica accounts for all but about 6.5 million tons of the 30 million tons that enters international trade channels. About 2.3 million tons of the 23.5 million tons of Indica rice traded is shipped as rough rice or paddy. Broadly speaking, the world market for milled long grain can be divided into parboiled (a process where the rough rice is soaked and steamed before milling) and regular milled or white rice. Just as there is only limited substitution between

¹⁰ Draft “IFC Gasifiers Study” by Rogier van Mansvelt, February 2011.

Japonica and Indica rice, there is also very limited substitution between regular milled and parboiled rice.

World trade in parboiled rice is typically about 5.5 million tons. The market for regular milled rice is annually approximately 15 million tons. It can be sub-divided further into high (less than 10% broken), medium (10-20% broken), and low (more than 20% broken) quality based on the broken content. The volumes moving in each class can vary dramatically from year to year depending on which countries have major crop shortfalls and the relative price spreads between qualities.¹¹

1.2 The competition

8. Cambodia's competitors vary based on the type of rice. For fragrant rice, Thailand is its major competitor, followed by Vietnam. Thailand exported 2.65 million tons of aromatic rice last year (including broken). This was more than ten times the volume shipped overseas by Vietnam. For the non-aromatic white rice markets such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Africa, Vietnam is the principal competitor. Pakistan and Burma also export major quantities of low grade white rice.

9. After averaging less than 6,000 tons annually during the five years ending in 2008, Cambodia's formal exports have grown rapidly primarily due to duty preferences, but also because of investments in modern rice mills and polishing factories. Both the E.U. and Russia permit duty-free imports from Cambodia, but not from its primary competitors. With the Everything But Arms import policy going into effect for rice in late 2009, Cambodia's recorded exports jumped to 16,000 tons and rose three-fold last year to over 51,000 tons. Over 90% of last year's recorded exports went to the E.U. and Russia. With almost 61,000 tons shipped through June 12, this year's overseas sales appear destined to reach at least 175,000 tons. The rice exported to the E.U. in 2011 is estimated to be evenly split between fragrant and non-fragrant white rice, while virtually all of the material destined for Russia is non-fragrant. As indicated earlier, all of Cambodia's rice exports are via containers which are shipped from Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville ports.

10. The importance of the E.U. and Russia are primarily explained by the duty preferences extended to Cambodian rice vis-à-vis its competitors.¹² While Cambodia's cost of paddy production is significantly below both Thailand and Vietnam, higher milling costs and margins render its ex-mill prices – especially for IRRI rice – uncompetitive. This is further exacerbated by high domestic transport costs (both formal

¹¹ This section is excerpted from "A Primer on the World Rice Market" which is contained in Slayton, "A Road Map for Cambodian Rice Exports," a report prepared for the World Bank in June 2009. The primer describes how the world rice market works, pricing relationships of the various types of rice, and the key origins and destinations for the various rice.

¹² Imports of Cambodian rice into the E.U. currently enjoy a duty preference of \$250 vis-à-vis Thai and Vietnamese rice, while the duty preference is worth \$129/ton in Russia.

and informal), expensive and time consuming export procedures and port charges (again including informal costs), and less competitive overseas freight costs. As a result, Cambodian rice is generally unattractive to overseas buyers facing higher prices for a rice with which they are unfamiliar and potentially suppliers of uncertain reliability.

Table 1. Cambodia rice exports (TMT)

Market	2009	2010	2011
U.S.	*	0.8	0.6
E.U. 1/	11.9	45.1	37.3
Russia	0	1.8	2.5
Africa	0.5	0.4	0
Asia	3.6	3.1	2.1
Total	16.0	51.2	42.7
1/ Includes shipments declared to Reunion.			
* = Less than 500 tons			
Source: GDCE, 2011 through April			

1.3 Export procedures and costs

11. Exporters report a significant improvement during the last year in the turn-around time involved in getting documents approved, but the exporters interviewed all agreed that Cambodian export procedures remain highly bureaucratic and informal costs unacceptably high. They also note that the locations of the competent authorities are distant from each other and contribute to difficulties in easily completing the procedures. The informal fees are negotiable and the increase in export volumes has apparently allowed the unit costs incurred to decline. Combined official and unofficial costs are reported to have to currently total about \$17/ton on the larger shipments.

12. In addition to having either the provincial governor's office or the Phnom Penh municipal office certify the company's location, an exporter must annually register with the Ministry of Commerce's GFP office.¹³ When an exporter receives an overseas order, it must be registered with MEF's GDCE to obtain an ASYCUDA number (which takes three visits) and an export license (a fourth trip).

In addition to GDCE's export license, the following certificates must be obtained:

¹³ Ostensibly the location certification is a "one time" event, but exporters indicate that they find it advisable to annually make "sentimental" payment to stay in good graces with the local officials.

- SPS certificate (MAFF)
- Camcontrol certificate (quality inspection)
- Certificate of Origin (MoC/GFP office, if destined to the EU or Russia)
- Fumigation Certificate
- GMO Certificate (if destined the EU)

Table 2: Cambodia: Exports by leading firms (TMT)

	2009	2010	2011
Mega Green Imex 1/	3.7	13.6	8.3
Golden Rice	3.0	10.1	4.7
Khmer Foods	1.0	7.7	6.6
International Rice Tdg 2/	0	3.3	5.0
Angkor Rice	0.5	3.0	0.9
Anduriz SARL	2.0	2.6	0.2
Loran Import-Export 3/	0.1	1.8	1.1
Amru/Amret RRG	0.3	1.5	6.2
Indochina Rice Mill	0	0.1	2.2
QC Rice	1.2	0.1	1.4
Top Five Firms 4/	10.9	37.7	30.8
(as % of Total)	68.1	73.6	72.1
Top Ten Firms	11.8	43.8	36.6
(as % of Total)	74	86	86
Total Exports	16.0	51.2	42.7
1/ Includes Khy Thay & Mekong Crown			
2/ Includes Gold Rice Mill & Im Eang Kry Rice Reprocessing Factory			
3/ Includes Lim Bun Heng Trading			
4/ In the given year.			
Source: GDCE, 2011 through April.			

1.4 The players

13. A small number of firms have capitalized on the export opportunities emerging during the last couple of years. The ten most active exporters have accounted for 86% of all shipments since the end of 2009 and the largest five shipped three out of every five tons sent overseas. It is a very dynamic market with the current top players experiencing dissimilar growth rates and having different business models. As such, the relative rankings of the exporters are fluid. At the end of April, Mega Green Imex Camodia was the largest exporter, followed by Khmer Foods, and Amru Rice. Of note, both Mega Green and Amru do not own their own rice mills or polishing factories. Amru relies on a small number of large modern rice mills for which it provides financing for paddy. Its rice sales to the E.U. are primarily through Schepens, a Belgian-based international broker which has spent many years helping to shepherd Cambodian rice exports into the world market. Mega Green (and its affiliates) sources its rice from a much larger pool millers which, by and larger, are smaller than those supporting Amru. It, too, primarily relies on Schepens, but does not pre-finance the paddy purchases of its suppliers.

14. Khmer Foods owns a rice polishing factory from which it sources its exports. Unlike Amru and Mega Green, it also is a major seller into the domestic rice market which accounts for about 75% of its volume. Golden Rice, a JV with principals from Reunion, is the only actual miller in the top five and it sells primarily fragrant rice directly to its overseas clients. International Rice Trading is a rice polisher. Like Khmer foods, it has both domestic and overseas customers. It exclusively is a seller of fragrant rice and does not rely on brokers.

Fragrant Rice Markets

15. Aromatic rice (also known as perfume or scented rice) typically accounts for 15% of total world trade, but exceeded 5.7 million tons last year. The three leading exporters of aromatic rice are Thailand, Pakistan, and India. Basmati shipments out of the Indian subcontinent totaled 2.85 million tons in 2010. It is overwhelmingly destined for consumers in the Middle East and the overseas Indian and Pakistani communities. It does not compete directly with the aromatic rice shipped by Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Thailand exported over 2.65 million tons of perfumed rice last year - 1.8 million tons of Jasmine rice,¹⁴ almost 160,000 tons of Patum Thani 1,¹⁵ and nearly 700,000 tons of fragrant broken. Vietnam is an up and coming rival, selling last year over 220,000 tons of fragrant rice and 17,000 tons of aromatic broken. Container shipments account for two-thirds of the Jasmine shipments. The balance moves on break bulk vessels, primarily to Africa.

¹⁴ Kao Dawk Mali 105, which is photo-period sensitive, is the most prominent fragrant variety grown. RD 15 is also classified as Thai Jasmine rice. In the Thai language, "jasmine" is "*Hom Mali*."

¹⁵ Patum Thani 1 is a non-photoperiod sensitive fragrant HYV.

Thailand

16. Increasing quantities of scented rice are being grown in Thailand. There are a number of aromatic varieties grown, but official production efforts are focused on Khao Dawk Mali or Jasmine rice. In recent years, about 5.0-5.5 million tons of Jasmine is produced with 85% of the harvest originating in Thailand's rain-fed Northeast. Thai farmers in the Central Plains and lower North started cultivating Patum Thani 1 beginning in 2001. While no reliable official estimates exist as to the size of the crop, industry estimates indicate that output approaches the size of the Jasmine harvest as several harvests can be grown in a single year and field yields are very high compared to Jasmine rice.¹⁶

17. Thai fragrant rice is sold primarily to Asian markets. Jasmine exports averaged nearly 1.8 million tons of in 2008-10, of which 1.6 million tons was Jasmine 100% (which has fewer than 5% broken). Almost 40% of the Jasmine 100% is shipped to Asian markets. See Annex Table 1. Up until 2006, China was the largest market. From a peak of 467,000 tons, Thai exports of Jasmine 100% to China declined to only 125,000 tons each in 2009 and 2010 as high Thai price supports had prompted many buyers to switch initially to Patum Thani and increasingly to local aromatic rice. Other major markets include Hong Kong, Singapore, and, Malaysia. The U.S. is also a growing market for Jasmine rice with the product starting to enjoy consumer acceptance outside of the Southeast Asian immigrant community. Over 300,000 tons is annually exported to Africa with the Ivory Coast and Ghana the leading markets - accounting for two out of every three tons exported to the continent. Only about 5% of the Jasmine is marketed in the Middle East.

18. According to official Thai grade standards, rice exported as Jasmine is to be 92% purity, but mixing with other varieties is very common. Some of this mixing is done with the knowledge of the buyer to make the rice more affordable to the end consumers. Each of the major international traders has its "own recipe" for Jasmine purity, which can vary by market. According to the Thai Rice Exporters' Association (REA), current crop Jasmine 100% A is presently valued at \$991/ton (and old crop at \$1,129).¹⁷

¹⁶ The quality of the crop grown during the dry season is reported to be of better quality than that grown during the wet season.

¹⁷ Prices as of June 1, 2011, see <http://www.thairiceexporters.or.th/price.htm>. REA export prices are almost always substantially higher than commercial quotations. According to the trade, African quality Jasmine currently sells at a discount of almost \$160.

Table 3: Thailand: Exports of Jasmine by grade (TMT)

Year	High Quality	Medium Quality	Brokens	Brown	TOTAL
Avg					
'05-09	1,649	17	839	46	2,574
2005	1,425	3	800	52	2,268
2006	1,625	14	882	48	2,572
2007	1,758	28	1,038	49	2,904
2008	1,732	17	694	47	2,499
2009	1,794	21	781	33	2,626
2010	1,741	17	694	47	2,499

Note: High quality refers to less than 10% brokens.

Source: Thailand Board of Trade

19. Patum Thani exports typically are not separately reported, but reached a peak of almost 350,000 tons in 2007, before tumbling to a little more than 160,000 tons in 2010.¹⁸ Historically, China was the largest market, by far, but last year exports to that destination contracted to only 22,000 tons. Asian buyers accounted for three out of every five tons of Patum exported last year with Hong Kong the single largest market, taking just under 40,000 tons. While Asian demand for Thai Patum is declining, shipments to the E.U. are on the upswing - topping 33,000 tons in 2010. (See Annex Table 2 for full details.) According to the Thai REA, Patum Thani as of June 1, 2011 traded at a discount of almost \$300/ton to Jasmine 100% A.

20. Here, too, high prices have taken a toll on consumer demand. Thai Jasmine brokens averaged almost 725,000 tons during the three year period ending last year, well under the record of more than 1.0 million tons shipped in 2007. About 85% of the shipments are destined for Africa, while the balance is almost evenly split between Asian and European markets. Senegal and the Ivory Coast are the leading markets for Thai Jasmine brokens, each taking almost 225,000 tons in 2010. See Annex Table 3. According to the Thai REA, fragrant brokens are currently valued at \$480/ton FOB.

¹⁸ One leading Thai exporter attributes the decline in Patum exports to increased mixing with Jasmine on rice destined for Africa. A more persuasive argument is that increasing quantities of Patum are being consumed in the domestic Thai market.

Table 4: Thailand: Exports of Patum Thani by grade (TMT)

Year	High Quality	Medium Quality	Brokens	Brown	TOTAL
2005	275	-	-	3	278
2006	322	1	1	5	328
2007	337	2	6	3	348
2008	226	1	5	5	236
2009	179	1	3	6	190
2010	134	7	2	19	161

Source: Thailand Board of Trade

Vietnam

21. While Thailand pioneered the Jasmine export market, Vietnam only began exporting fragrant rice in 2000 and the first observed shipments of fragrant brokens occurred in 2005. Initial shipments were limited (with observed sailings averaging only 13,000 tons in 2000-04), but have mushroomed during the last three years. After averaging 80,000 tons during 2005-09, exports last year exceeded 160,000 tons.¹⁹ One-fourth of this rice was sold to buyers in Africa, while Asian customers purchased 65% of all Viet fragrant exported in 2010. See Annex Table 6. Exports of Vietnamese fragrant brokens, which are primarily shipped to Africa, averaged 21,000 tons during 2005-09. After peaking at just under 55,000 tons in 2008, exports tumbled to less than 12,000 tons last year. See Annex Table 7. As of June 1, Viet fragrant rice is being commercially quoted at \$350/ton discount to *Hom Mali*, while fragrant brokens are nominally trading at a \$40/ton discount to Thai values.

Table 5: Vietnam: Fragrant exports (TMT)

Year	Rice	Brokens
2008	164	11
2009	162	47
2010	222	17

Source: Vietnam Food Association

¹⁹ Vietnam does not publish its detailed rice export data by grade/and destination. As such, there can be significant variations between observed sailings and "official" data. The following text is based on identified shipments and varies from the data presented in the table to the right.

Specific Markets

The EU

22. The E.U. annually imports over 1.5 million tons, primarily brown regular milled and parboiled rice (because of the progressive duty structure).²⁰

Approximately one-fourth of its imports are Basmati rice. European purchases of Thai Jasmine 100% averaged 155,000 tons during 2008-10, plus nearly 75,000 tons of fragrant broken and significant quantities of brown Jasmine (approximately 25-30,000 tons, including that shipped via Reunion). Benefiting from a zero import duty under the EBA policy instituted in September 2009, imports from Cambodia climbed last year to just under 39,000 tons - far above the 3,000 tons. averaged in the years leading up to the policy change. Notwithstanding these gains, there remains considerable scope for expanded Cambodian sales to the E.U. as recent sales include both fragrant and non-fragrant rice as the import duty for milled rice, which is waived for Cambodia is € 175/ton (\$250 at current exchange rates). It should be noted, however, that there is a special safeguard that may be triggered when the imports under EBA exceed by 25% the volume imported in the previous year under the scheme.²¹ Based on exports during the first four months of 2011, E.U. imports will increase by more than 100% this year and possibly by 200%. According to a USDA medium-term projection, E.U. imports are expected to gradually increase between 2011 and 2015 – see Annex Table 10.²²

Russia

23. Faced with an increase in the import duty to € 120/ton (\$172/ton), Russia's rice imports declined in 2010 to 240,000 tons, 14% below the nearly 280,000 tons averaged in the five years ending in 2009 and less than half of the record 500,000 tons achieved in 1999. USDA is forecasting a continuing decline in Russian imports to 200,000 tons in 2011. USDA's medium term project for 2015 is for imports to be flat, near recent historical levels. Rice imports from Thailand and Vietnam receive a duty preference of 25%, thereby subject to an import tariff of € 90/ton (\$129/ton). Imports of Cambodian rice are duty free.

²⁰ Brown rice is a partially milled rice where the pericarp or hull has been removed, but the bran remains.

²¹ Personal communications between authors and FAO.

²² USDA's forecasts for 2011 are found in its Production, Supply, Distribution data base, March 2011. <http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdHome.aspx>. Projections for 2015 and 2021 are found in USDA Long-Term Agricultural Projections, February 2011

<http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewStaticPage.do?url=http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers/94005/.2011/index.html>

China

24. **During the last decade, China experienced two years of unusually heavy imports - recorded arrivals were over 760,000 tons in 2004 and reached nearly 720,000 tons in 2006.** More typically, China has been a market for about 250-350,000 tons. After importing 366,000 tons in 2010, USDA is projecting this year's arrivals will increase to 400,000 tons. This rice is primarily destined for urban markets in southern China. Official trade numbers in both 2010 and 2011, however, do not appear to be capturing a significant amount of border trade with Vietnam and Burma. According to a leading importer, last year's imports of Vietnamese rice totaled approximately 150,000 tons or almost three times what is officially showing in the trade books. USDA's medium-term forecast is for Chinese imports to gradually increase to 450,000 tons in 2015, before accelerating to 620,000 tons in 2021.

Table 6: China: Rice imports (TMT)

	Avg 00-04	Avg 05-09	2007	2008	2009	2010	% CHG
TOTAL	353	468	472	296	338	366	8
of which:							
Laos	*	6	4	4	17	7	-60
Thailand	345	439	440	286	317	299	-6
Vietnam	6	22	27	1	3	56	**
* = Less than 500 tons			** = More than 100%				
Source: World Trade Atlas							

25. **Despite many Thai exporters hiring local agents and spending considerable sums on marketing their brands (primarily in the southern coastal cities), Chinese imports of Thai Jasmine rice peaked in 2006 and have since been in serious decline.** Sales of the much cheaper Patum initially cannibalized the Jasmine market, but the combined volumes have been collapsing. In 2007 Thailand exported over 420,000 tons of both Jasmine and Patum milled rice, but the volume had declined to less than 150,000 tons by 2010.

26. **Thanks to rising local prices in China, private importers (and, to a lesser extent, COFCo, the central government's food agency) have been buying increasing quantities of mostly high quality white rice in both Vietnam and Thailand during the last twelve months.** With their existing connections with local importers, Thai exporters and Singapore-based traders have played a significant role selling the Vietnamese rice (primarily 5% broken) to China. Reportedly some of the white rice is being blended for industrial usage. According to the trade, import parities

in early May were \$475 CIF for Viet 5% or \$465 FOB. Allowing margins and costings for the traders, prices above \$450 were unattractive.

Indonesia

27. With domestic prices that are increasingly diverging from world price levels,²³ Indonesia seeks to tightly limit overall rice import volumes and timing. This endeavor, however, is complicated by its nearly 55,000 km of coastline spread over more than 17,500 islands in the archipelago. Rice imports require permits and are subject to an import duty of \$53/ton (Rp 450/kg). Food processors are granted a limited number of import licenses for "specialty rice," e.g. glutinous rice, glutinous broken, and white broken. Imports of ordinary rice are restricted to Bulog, a state-owned enterprise (S.O.E.). As a matter of policy, Bulog is generally not allowed to import rice during the period one month prior to the main harvest in March and April and in the two months after the harvest. Bulog normally buys 15% broken.

28. Once consistently the world's largest importer, Indonesia's purchases neared 6.1 million tons in 1998. Reflecting more restrictive policies, average imports declined to 2.0 million tons during 2000-04 and further fell to some 690,000 tons of average annual arrivals in the following five-year period. With subpar carryover stocks and a poor harvest, imports rebounded to over 885,000 tons in 2010. (One of the food agency's primary tasks is to source rice for the country's *Raskin* program where subsidized rice is provided for the poor.) USDA's medium-term forecast is for Indonesia to import over 1.1 million tons in 2015 and almost 1.6 million tons in 2021.

Table 7: Indonesia: Rice imports (million tons)

	BULOG	OTHER	TOTAL
Avg '00-04	0.49	1.43	2.01
Avg '05-09	0.34	0.33	0.69
2007	1.29	0.41	1.71
2008	0.04	0.30	0.34
2009	0.00	0.31	0.31
2010	0.46	0.42	0.89

Source: Slayton & Associates

²³ Jakarta wholesale prices for IR 64 3rd Grade were \$644/ton in early May, while FOB values for Viet 15% were almost \$200/ton cheaper.

29. Bulog purchased 2.0 million tons under a Cabinet authorization issued in October 2010. Import duties were waived, but arrivals needed to be made by April 1. While Bulog typically buys 15%, this time it purchased both 5% and 15%. Its purchases of Vietnamese rice were made via Government to Government negotiations, while it tendered for its Thai rice - although it limited participation to Bangkok-based firms. Because the imports needed to arrive before the end of March, only 1.85 million tons were executed. This included 1.4 million tons which arrived during the first three months of 2011. Because of a poor crop due to adverse weather, Indonesian imports are forecast at 2.25-2.5 million tons in 2011.

30. Notwithstanding the announced policy concerning the timing of imports, Bulog's imports during periods of large imports are spread throughout the year. Generally, though, imports primarily occur during the fourth quarter (33% of all imports during the five-year period ending in 2009) and the first quarter (26%).

Philippines

31. Like Indonesia, domestic rice prices in the Philippines are far above world levels,²⁴ imports are restricted and smuggling is a problem. With consumption fueled by subsidized prices vis-à-vis corn and a burgeoning population, the Philippines in 2008 emerged as the world's largest importer, taking delivery of 2.6 million tons. The National Food Authority (NFA), the Filipino food authority, is the primary importer. While its overall import totals are decided by an inter-agency committee, NFA's decisions to buy via tender or through G-to-G negotiations are subject to the approval by secretary (minister) of agriculture. Typically it buys 25% broken, but during some campaigns it also buys 5% and 15%. To avoid criticism for the seasonal decline in domestic prices, rice imports typically occur during the first six months of the calendar year.

32. The Philippines and Vietnam have a multi-year MOU whereby Hanoi agrees to supply up to 1.5 million tons annually through 2013 and Vietnam is by far the largest supplier to this market. (Manila is reported to be exploring an MOU with Bangkok for 1 million tons.)

33. Private sector imports are subject to a 40% tariff, but in recent years the licenses have been awarded by NFA subject to the payment of a "service fee." Under the Arroyo regime, the quantity of licensed imports by private firms was limited, but the new Aquino administration has a 2011 policy of limiting NFA's import share to 200,000 tons out of a planned 860,000 tons. The reduction in NFA's volume reflects the combination of very heavy carryover stocks and huge debts resulting from recent heavy imports at very high prices and sales domestically at heavily subsidized levels. "The Philippines operates two tiers of rice prices: Commercial (free market) and NFA (subsidized). Commercial rice is more expensive than NFA rice and typically sells for P 30-45 (\$0.68-1.02) per kilo retail, depending on quality... On December 2010, the NFA increased its retail selling price from P 25 (\$0.57) to P 27 (\$0.61).²⁵

²⁴ Retail prices for regular milled rice (25%) were \$724/ton in March.

²⁵ "Philippines: Grain and Feed Annual" USDA, March 1, 2011

34. According to USDA, the Philippines will be forced to import increasing quantities of rice during the medium- and long-term. The Philippines is projected to import 3.3 million tons in 2015 and over 4.2 million tons in 2021.

Table 8: Philippines: Rice import (TMT)

	NFA	Privates		Total
		Official	Unofficial	
2008	2,458	75	75	2,608
2009	1,643	200	110	1,953
2010	2,169	200	105	2,474
1/ Includes 20 TMT via PITC, another S.O.E.				
Source: NFA and licensed imports by privates for 2006-10 based on official data, balance Slayton & Associates.				

Take Away Points

1. Given the size of the different segments of the world rice market, Cambodia cannot reach its 1.0 million ton export goal without exporting both fragrant and non-fragrant rice.
2. Thailand is Cambodia's principal competitor for fragrant rice, while Vietnam is the key competitor for non-fragrant rice.
3. Cambodia has significantly cheaper production costs than Thailand and Vietnam, but its prices for non-aromatic milled rice become increasingly uncompetitive ex-mill, FOB the port, and delivered to the overseas destination.
4. The rapid growth in exports since 2009 is due to import duty preferences granted by the E.U. and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Lower prices will be needed to penetrate other key markets such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and China.
5. While there has been a significant improvement during the last year in the turn-around time involved in getting documents approved, Cambodian export procedures remain highly bureaucratic and informal costs unacceptably high. Combined formal and informal costs add \$17/ton to FOB prices.

2. New Investments

35. Due to attractive milling margins for modern, export-oriented rice mills, Cambodia's antiquated milling industry has been undergoing a renaissance during the last three years. This has included the upgrading and expansion of existing mills, but also investments in new large(er) rice mills. As summarized below, the number of milling companies capable of processing at least 8 tons/hour of paddy has increased by seven, adding 106 tons/hr of installed capacity or more than double that existing in 2009. Equally important, at least four new rice polishing factories have been built with capacity to upgrade at least 10 tons/hour. These factories can upgrade the quality of milled rice produced by the older, smaller rice mills.²⁶

36. Based on interviews with market participants, it would not be surprising if an additional 100 tons/hour of milling capacity were to occur within the next 12-15 months and possibly another doubling of the installed capacity in the next two years. New medium-sized mills, too, are being built and existing facilities upgraded. While new interest in bank lending to rice mills is reported, most of the existing expansion is self-financed.²⁷

37. Assuming the new rice mills coming on stream in the last two years are working 12 hours/day, six days per week, and allowing for the equivalent of two weeks of holidays, the new factories would be process a total of 380,000 tons per year. This represents less than one-fourth of the estimated paddy exports occurring in 2009.²⁸

²⁶ Ying & Yang Rice Head Quarterz is an upgrading factory with de-stoners and machinery to separate the brokens. Unlike the rice polishing factories, it does not have whiteners and color sorters.

²⁷ The new mills, while large by local standards, are modest compared with mills in Thailand's Central Plains which are typically twice as large.

²⁸ Slayton, "A Road Map for Cambodian Rice Exports," World Bank working paper, June 2009.

Table 9: Cambodia: Large rice mills (tons paddy/hr)

Mill	Capacit	Location	Comment
<u>Existing 2009</u>			
Angkor Rice	10	Near PP	Built 2001
Golden Rice	20	Near PP	Operational 2009. JV Reunion
Green Trade	10	Various, 4 of 6 in PP	partner in Cavifood with plans of 24 ton mill to begin construction in June
Lor Ngor Peng	8	K. Cham	
Loran Import-Export	12.5	Battambang	Built 1994 & expanded; plans to add 30 tons/hr by mid 2012
Men Sarun	24	PP	Built 2003, also polishes rice from its other mills; also has 39 other mills elsewhere
Phou Poy Rice Mill	9	Battambang	At two mills
<u>New Mills</u>			
Baitang	20	Battambang	Built 2009, operational 2010
BVB	30	K. Thom	Operational June 2011
Chhun Thom	10	Prev Veng	Operational 2011
OO Rice	12	Pursat	Malavsian JV
Sour Keang QC Rice	12	K. Cham	Built 2010
Yam Leoung	10	Battambang	Mill expansion, operational June 2011
Vinh Cheang	12	K. Cham	Under construction
<u>Rice Polishing</u>			
Baitang	30	Battambang	Built 2009, operational 2010
International Rice Trdg	10	PP	Built 2010
Khmer Foods	10	PP	Built 2009
Loran Import-Export	30	Battambang	Operational June 2011; this in addition to 5 tons/hr existing capacity
<u>Rice Upgrading</u>			
Ying & Yang Rice	10	Sih'ville Port	Built 2009, foreign company
Source: Interviews by authors			

3. Issues and Constraints

38. Until very recently, rice market participants from the farmer through the retailers have not been rewarded for quality. As a result, farmers have cared little about the seed they used and properly drying the harvest, while the paddy traders failed to keep different varieties that they purchased separate, contributing to uneven appearance of the rice produced. Similarly, rice millers often do not take care about their storage conditions and were not rewarded for careful milling and separating the head rice from the brokens. This, however, is beginning to rapidly change in response to the rising export opportunities and the demanding specifications of the overseas buyers.

3.1 Recognizing economics and geographic reality

39. While the recent growth in exports is very impressive, this represents the “low-hanging fruit” afforded by duty preferences in the E.U. and, to a lesser extent, Russia. In order to have a chance of even reaching 500,000 tons of exports by 2015 or half of the announced target, the government must not only significantly intensify its near-term efforts to reduce milling costs, simplify export procedures and cut port costs, but it must afford itself of the cheaper shipping alternatives afforded by Vietnam’s deep water port in Saigon and, eventually, Thailand’s container port in Laem Chabang.²⁹ High electricity costs and limited availability have traditionally prompted Cambodia's rice mills to depend on diesel for their power needs. Diesel, however, is not inexpensive. Investments in rice hull burning equipment, however, can reduce diesel expenses by 75%³⁰ or almost \$15/ton, but this in itself is not be enough in short run to achieve the needed cost reductions to allow Cambodia to successfully compete in the much larger world market. It, however, represents a major improvement. What are also needed *inter alia* are bilateral transportation agreements to allow uncontainerized Cambodian milled rice to be barged down the Mekong River to be loaded on conventional break bulk vessels and/or trucked to Thai container ports.

40. Where Cambodian exporters are facing costs of over \$18/ton to stuff containers and transport milled rice from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville, barging costs of uncontainerized rice from the Cambodian border to Saigon, which vary by season, are currently \$6-7/ton.³¹ Opening up transport of milled rice down the Mekong River should spark new investments (both private and foreign) in large modern rice mills in the provinces bordering Vietnam. This would also produce additional

²⁹ Prior to the global recession, Laem Chabang handled 5.2 million teu in 2008, when it was operating at about half of its installed capacity. That same year, the combined container throughput at Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville ports was 306,000 teu. For a description of Laem Chabang Port, see http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/THA_Port_of_Laem_Chabang_3449.php.

³⁰ Draft “IFC Gasifier Study”.

³¹ Personal communication with a Vietnamese rice exporter.

transport savings between the farmgate and the mills. With limited milling capacity in the eastern provinces where most of the IRRI rice is grown, millers face added transport costs to move the paddy to the Phnom Phen environs where it is milled. These costs would be minimized by the building of rice mills in the rice production areas bordering Vietnam.

41. Effective June 2010, a bilateral accord between Cambodia and Vietnam came into effect which provides a framework where Cambodian milled rice could gain duty-free access to Vietnam's downriver ports.³² The Vietnamese authorities would need to agree to treat uncontainerized Cambodian milled rice as a "transit good." As there are significant vested interests in Vietnam to continue the current trade relationship which largely relegates Cambodia as a raw material supplier to rice mills in Vietnam (and Thailand), it is likely that Hanoi would only make such an agreement if the issue was personally taken up as a priority issue at the highest level.

42. Diplomatic relations with Thailand are presently very poor, but presumably this will ameliorate after Bangkok's July elections. Under the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), Thailand is obliged to allow duty free imports of Cambodian rice. Its policy, however, is to limit imports to brokens destined for industrial use. These imports are to be restricted to only certain months and by approved importers. Thailand's trade posture is defensive in nature, but ignores the reality that massive tonnages of Cambodian paddy already are informally imported. The Thai rice industry at a recent meeting of exporters, millers, brokers, and farmers agreed to pursue "free trade" in rice, or at least in paddy, but the outlook for this proposed policy change is uncertain. More politically palatable to the general Thai public would be a transport corridor agreement similar to one that Laos and Thailand have in place which would obviate any political fallout that rice imports would depress Thai paddy and milled rice prices.³³ What is important to recognize is that there are influential domestic interests in Thailand which want to promote Cambodian milled rice exports either by purchasing this rice and shipping it to its overseas customers and/or investing in the Cambodian rice milling sector.

³² "Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Royal Government of Cambodia on Waterway Transportation," signed December 2009. Also, Vietnam has a TRQ which permits duty-free annual imports of 250,000 tons of Cambodian milled rice, but precludes this rice from being re-exported. Source: personal communications with USDA/HCMC.

³³ "Agreement Between the Government of Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on Road Transport," signed March 5, 1999.

Thai imports of Cambodian paddy provide a sorely needed source of raw material for the grossly overbuilt Thai rice milling industry. While this political support would presumably be lacking for a "transit corridor" agreement, Thai rice exporters, which have recently started to trade Cambodian milled rice, would be still benefit from the transit accord. Beginning in 2010, at least three Thai rice exporters have started to buy containers of Cambodian milled rice to ship to their overseas customers as products of Cambodia. Additionally, one of these three firms and two others have expressed interest in joint ventures in the Cambodian rice sector along with partners from Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

3.2 Logistics – containers are not the final solution

43. According to USDA, the world trade in rice has recently averaged almost 30.25 million tons. There are, however, no reliable estimates of the share of world trade that moves via containers, but the vast majority of the international trade in rice is in conventional vessels. While paddy and brown rice are typically moved in bulk, the vast majority of the milled rice is shipped in bagged form in break bulk vessels.³⁴ Data from Thailand, for example, indicates that 38% of last year’s exports were shipped via containers and the balance as bagged cargo on conventional vessels. Outside of Africa, containers are the predominant mode for shipping *Hom Mali*.

44. Like any other market, freight prices are set by supply and demand. At times, container freight costs, including handling charges, to a specific destination can be especially competitive *vis-à-vis* break bulk charges as the container shipping lines attempt to distribute excess containers from one region or destination to another without having to physically ship empty unwanted containers. Generally speaking, however, it is not a convenient means for shipping large quantities of a commodity such as rice because of the extra paper work and physical handling of the rice bags.

45. Further complicating this mode of transport, not every container is suitable for shipping rice. Containers come in two sizes – twenty and forty foot long boxes. Because of its weight, rice can only be shipped in the smaller containers³⁵ which can accommodate 24 tons of rice. Also limiting which containers are suitable for rice, they must be of “food quality,” i.e. suitable to ship rice or other food items. Depending on what was last shipped in the box, it may be too dirty or have lingering odors which would contaminate the rice.

³⁴ There are, of course, exceptions. Brown rice shipments to Japan, for example, are in bags, while milled rice exports out of Mercosur are typically in bulk. Nonetheless, there is no overwhelming reason why Cambodia should convert its rice logistics system to handle rice in bulk. Break bulk is non-containerized cargo.

³⁵ The common measurement of containers is in twenty foot equivalent units or teu.

Table 10: Container traffic by port ('000TEU)

Year	Phnom Penh	Sihanoukville
2008	47.5	258.8
2009	43.3	207.9
2010	62.3	222.9
Jan-April		
2010	16.1	65.6
2011	21.7	72.9

Source: Interviews with ports

46. **Of the incoming laden containers last year, only 38% of the movement by weight was in 20 ft containers.** Exporters report that as the volume of rice shipments has risen, there is an increasing problem in finding suitable containers. One of the largest exporters, for example, advised that in April he could locate only one container out of 50, which was food quality, resulting in his having to delay the shipment. Due to the lack of suitable containers, he reports he must reduce his exports in June by over 35% from planned levels.³⁶ The lack of containers is prompting the shipping lines to bring in increasing quantities of empty containers. Sihanoukville Port indicates that the number of empty containers brought into the Kingdom during the first four months of this year more than doubled to 10,582 teus. (Phnom Penh port also reports a significant increase in empty boxes being imported.) This shortage not only is leading to delays, but results in higher costs to the shipping lines which are ultimately reflected when freight tariffs are reviewed.

Table 11: Rice container traffic share (as %)

Port	2010	2011
Sihanoukville	67	78
Phnom Penh	2	12
Dry Port	27	9
Other	4	1

Source: Camcontrol, 2011 through June 12

³⁶ Port Authority of Sihanoukville officials indicate that they do not allow dirty containers to be off loaded into their container yard. This problem is apparently occurring in Phnom Penh where virtually all of the containers of rice are stuffed.

47. As a small developing economy, the number of incoming containers in Cambodia is relatively limited compared to Thailand and Vietnam. This has several implications. First, Cambodia’s outgoing container freight rates will always tend to be higher than its neighbors. Second, finding enough food quality containers in this smaller national universe is increasingly a constraint.³⁷ Finally, this results in a reluctance on the part of shipping companies to allow empty containers to be transported upcountry where most of the rice is produced and milled. As a result, virtually all bagged rice intended for formal export is trucked to Phnom Penh where it is loaded (“stuffed”) into containers and then shipped out of the country through the container ports located in Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville. Notwithstanding the additional transport costs of \$15/ton to truck to Sihanoukville, most of the rice exports are shipped via this port and the trend is accelerating. Container freight rates and sailing times to Europe are more favorable via Sihanoukville. Traders also report export clearance times are shorter in Sihanoukville as customs and Camcontrol officials in Phnom Penh port are reportedly more difficult to deal with, and buyer and seller can constantly monitor the status of the shipment which have departed via Sihanoukville, but cannot do the same ex-Phnom Penh. According to Camcontrol data, 78% of this year’s containers of rice were shipped via Sihanoukville, up from 67% last year.

48. The sole reliance on containers will preclude reaching the 1 million ton export target for 2015 for both logistics and marketing considerations. Because of the entrenched trucking “network” in Phnom Penh, the large provincial trucks carrying bagged rice from upcountry do not usually proceed directly to Sihanoukville to deliver the rice for stuffing. First, there are insufficient warehouses in Sihanoukville where the containers can be stuffed. Second, the freight forwarders in Sihanoukville are unlikely to deal with provincial truckers that they do not know, resulting in a lack of cargo to be transported from Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh and elsewhere. Some market participants indicate that, if they directly ship the rice from Battambang, they will also be denied backhaul cargo in Phnom Penh as their direct deliveries have harmed the business interests of the shipping companies based in the capital. The denial of backhaul cargo would raise the transport costs of those that ship direct to the port. This creates a logistical constraint of insufficient semi-trailer trucks (vehicles which pull the trailers that carry the containers). Exporting 1 million tons of rice via containers would involve almost 42,000 teu or almost 3,475 teu/month. This is more than five times the record April 2011 performance of 671 teu. It would also require roughly 375 additional semi-trailer trucks or nearly doubling the reported current national fleet of about 400.³⁸

49. While the vast majority of the world trade in fragrant rice is shipped via containers, the reverse is true for ordinary rice and fragrant broken. This rice is overwhelmingly transported as bagged cargo in conventional vessels. With the size of

³⁷ Surveying companies in Thailand indicate that approximately 80% of the twenty-foot containers in that market are of “food quality.” Market participants in Cambodia indicated that it is generally significantly lower (perhaps 20%).

³⁸ This is a “back of the envelope” calculation that assumes that Sihanoukville’s share of the rice container traffic remains the same as in early 2011 and that none of the rice moves by rail from Phnom Penh – an admittedly conservative assumption. Transport via rail, however, is unlikely to be available before 2014.

the Cambodian container market, prospects are dim that container freight out from this origin will generally be competitive with conventional freight out of competing origins. Indeed, some buyers such as NFA are generally unwilling to import rice via containers.

3.3 Logistics – break bulk shipping is not yet ready for prime time

50. As indicated above, all of Cambodia’s formal rice exports up to this point have been via containers. Due to rocky outcrops in the channel, the entrance to Sihanoukville is restricted to vessels with a draft (depth of water a ship draws when loaded) of less than 8.0-8.5 meters. In practice, boats of up to about 10,000 dwt can use the port – limiting break bulk cargoes carrying rice to Asia and East Africa.³⁹ The current lack of a deep water port precludes Cambodia from competing in the 5 million ton West African market for fragrant and white rice even once its FOB costs have been lowered to competitive levels unless transit access is obtained to Saigon Port. Saigon Port, in contrast, can accommodate 32,000 dwt vessels alongside and 60,000 dwt at the lighterage area, Thieng Lieng buoy berths.⁴⁰

51. With Japanese financing, there are plans to deepen the channel for Sihanoukville port to 13.5 meters by 2014, which will permit the loading of vessels carrying 20,000 tons.⁴¹ In the interim, Cambodian exporters have thus far avoided break bulk shipments via Sihanoukville for the following reasons:

- The size of the individual rice mills and their storage capacities;
- Lack of all-weather loading facilities for uncontainerized goods; and,
- Lack of affordable storage at the port.

52. Given the current size of even the larger mills and rice polishers, it could take months for a single exporter to assemble the necessary cargo to load even a small vessel carrying 5,000 tons – assuming that the company has no other domestic (or overseas) market obligations, and the financial resources. For a rice polishing factory with 10 tons/hour processing capacity and dedicated only to export, it would take about approximately two months to produce enough rice to fill a vessel carrying 5,000 tons of 15% assuming a minimal number of holidays, working 12 hours/day, no power outages, and upgrading 25% broken to 15% broken. The largest exporters, of course, can avoid this problem by working with a number of mills. The uniformity of the cargo, however, can suffer if the number of sourcing mills becomes too large. At present, the largest exporters are only shipping 1,000 to 1,500 tons/month.

³⁹ http://www.business-in-asia.com/cambodia/cambodia_ports.html

⁴⁰ http://www.vpa.org.vn/english/information/info_capa.htm

⁴¹ <http://sideth.com/sihanoukville-port%E2%80%99s-low-capacity-seen-as-trade-obstacle/> It is unclear at this time whether the port modernization plans will include additional warehouse capacity.

53. Aside from Sihanoukville, there are several private ports on the Gulf of Siam. The deepest and largest is Oknha Mong Port (OMP). It has a depth of only 4.5 meters, limiting the vessels that can call to those lifting no more than 5,000 tons. While there are no known natural deepwater port locations in Cambodia, one might lighter milled rice to waiting vessels offshore. For this to be economically feasible, however, a very large rice mill(s) would need to be constructed in the eastern provinces neighboring Vietnam.

Take Away Points

1. Rice husk burning equipment can reduce milling costs by almost \$15/ton.
2. Uncompetitive local and international freight costs and high port charges can be "solved" by negotiating transit agreements with Vietnam and Thailand. An existing accord with Vietnam provides a framework for the barging of uncontainerized milled rice down the Mekong River to waiting break bulk vessels. A bilateral agreement between Thailand and Laos, which allows the latter to use Thai ports, could be copied.
3. Because of the size of the individual mills, Cambodia only exports rice via containers. The exclusive reliance on containers could result in exports stalling at about 250,000 tons per year. This is due to domestic logistical constraints and because major importers - in West Africa, the Philippines, and Indonesia - primarily import rice carried on break bulk vessels. The proposed bilateral transit accords provide a "work around" to these twin hurdles.
4. Depth limitations currently preclude larger vessels from loading in Sihanoukville.

5. Recommendations

54. A viable road map to increase Cambodia's exports should take into account the realities of where the surplus is located, its composition by type of rice, and the competitiveness of the different varieties.⁴² Cambodia's exportable surplus can be divided into aromatic, native non-aromatic, and IRRI varieties. Broadly speaking, the aromatic production is centered in the northwestern provinces that border Thailand, while the IRRI varieties are grown during the dry season in southeastern Cambodia in the provinces bordering Vietnam. Outside of the E.U. and Russia, the brightest export prospects in the near term are for the fragrant rice and - once milling, transport, and export costs are lowered - for IRRI rice. The export target, however, cannot be reached by exporting only fragrant rice given the finite size of that market (less than 3 million tons) and Thai *Hom Mali's* brand strength.⁴³

55. In the ten months since the ambitious 1 million ton export target was established, only limited progress has been made in grappling with the complex, inter-related issues which hamper Cambodia's competitiveness of rice exports. It is suggested that the following proposed measures be considered as a package if the government desires to quickly replace a significant share of the paddy leaking into Thailand and Vietnam with formal exports of milled rice. The planned rehabilitation of the railroads and the modernization of Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville ports are medium-term remedies which will only partially alleviate the Kingdom's high logistics costs and bottlenecks. According to several key exporters, these hurdles could result in Cambodia's exports stalling at less than 250,000 tons. Even with urgent and concerted efforts, exports may only reach half of the export target by 2015 – albeit still a significant achievement.

55. The Cambodian government should give its highest priority to getting Vietnam's agreement to allow the barging of uncontainerized milled rice down the Mekong River as a transit good to waiting conventional vessels in Saigon Port to overcome the current problem that even Cambodia's largest mills are too small to individually supply coastal vessels carrying 5,000 tons on a timely basis. Initial shipments could be made on barges carrying 250 tons to 1,000 tons where they could be combined on the waiting ships with much larger tonnages of Vietnamese rice. As the size and sophistication of Cambodia's rice milling, processing, and exporting sector

⁴² This makes it imperative that MAFF begin to monitor the breakdown of the rice crop area and production by type.

⁴³ Some observers offer the view that exports of organic rice may offer an important outlet for Cambodia's rice surplus. This notion, however, is incorrect. According to the leading exporter of organic Thai rice, Thailand - the world's largest rice exporter - annually exports no more than 4,000 tons of organic rice. No formal studies of the size of world trade in organic rice are available, but he estimates that only about 20-30,000 tons of organic rice are traded globally.

grows, the size of the export sales could be gradually increased until it reaches the point where entire vessels of Cambodian rice are loaded. This “solution” lowers both Cambodian transport and export costs not only for rice, but also for other Cambodian exports. Also, it ensures that competitive FOB mill milled rice prices remain that way on a CNF basis.

56. Give priority to encourage private investments in larger mills and rice polishing factories with capacities of at least 30 tons/hr.⁴⁴ These facilities offer the best opportunity for increasing rice exports in the near-term. The government could use its tax incentives to encourage overseas or domestic investments in the milling sector, which are able to meet export requirements. This could include a tax holiday of up to five years for qualifying foreign and domestic firms.

57. In order to continue to improve the competitiveness of Cambodian milled rice the government would need to further remove bureaucratic hurdles and lower export processing expenses. Exporters confirm that considerable progress has been made in the last year in reducing the turnaround times for issuing Camcontrol, SPS, and customs certificates. However, there is a scope for additional efficiency gains in this area. This could be achieved through expansion of the “single stop service” for export approvals in order to minimize the time currently spent getting documents approved. It is suggested that centralized “single stop service” offices be opened in addition to Phnom Penh, also in major milling centers of the country. Independent of this effort, it is suggested that Camcontrol staff its office in Battambang and in the other major milling centers with rice inspectors to facilitate the inspections upcountry. Further, its inspectors should be increased so that they are routinely available outside of regular office hours. In order to further streamline and simplify export processing functions, it is suggested that Camcontrol take over the inspection duties currently performed by the General Department of Customs and Excise and the issuance of SPS certificates for rice from MAFF. The government has a scope to reduce export costs by reducing fees charged for export documentation (rather than increasing official fees for SPS and customs certificates), and equally important, further slash port costs.

58. Rice Technical Working Group (RTWG) be reconstituted to consist of the five largest rice exporters and that regular quarterly meetings be held to advise the government to assist the government in identifying on going hurdles and overcoming problems as they arise, it is recommended that the private sector membership of the Membership of the group could be based on recent export volumes as recorded by either Camcontrol or GDCE. This RTWG would provide a cross section of the Cambodian rice sector – millers, polishers, and exporters without factories. Every two years the private sector membership could be changed based on the most recent export performance records. SPS issues are increasingly likely to become a major constraint. China, for example, will not allow Cambodian rice to be imported unless the

⁴⁴ As indicated in the appendix, the construction of rice polishing factories played a key role in Vietnam’s relatively rapid advance from primarily an exporter of low quality rice to an origin that last year exported 2.5 million tons of high quality rice.

government can certify that the milled rice exported to China are free from the following quarantine pests of Chinese concern: *Leptochloa chinensis*, *Striga asiatica*, *Apenlenchoides besseyi*, *Ditylenchus angustus*. Each batch passing inspection will be issued an official Phytosanitary Certificate demonstrating that it has fulfilled the Chinese requirements and specifying the origin of production.⁴⁵ The E.U., Cambodia's largest export market is very sensitive about importing GMO-free food and there are no labs in Cambodia to test the goods. Presently, the exporters must ship a sample to Vietnam for testing which costs \$150 per test and takes several days to perform.

59. **It is suggested that MAFF urgently undertake a series of scientific studies, which prove the absence of above mentioned pests and GMO rice in the Kingdom.** After the these studies are reviewed and referenced in a recognized scientific publications, MAFF can issue a blanket certification that the Cambodian rice crop is pest and GMO free, eliminating additional testing requirements for exporters, although continuous surveillance may need to be continued. It is suggested that MAFF also redouble its efforts to eliminate insects and noxious weeds, which are of concern to targeted export destinations such as China.

⁴⁵ "The Protocol Between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of the Kingdome of Cambodia and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People's Republic of China on Phytosanitary Requirements for Cambodia Milled Rice Export to China," October 2010

6. Appendixes

Appendix 1: The Vietnamese Export "Model"

In the aftermath of economic reform efforts ("doi moi"), Vietnam resumed being a net rice exporter in 1987 after a quarter of a century's absence. Its exports that year totaled only 153,000 tons, while it also imported nearly the same volume into the north - 150,000 tons. The following year imports improved to almost 100,000 tons, but the quantity exported declined by over one-third. In 1989, Vietnam's exports surged to over 1.7 million tons as it began to export mostly low quality rice to Africa and selected Asian destinations (especially China, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka).

Evolution of Exports. Virtually all of Vietnam's exports originate out of the Mekong River Delta (MRD) where rice from the country's rice mills and polishing factories is mostly barged to the ports. While small vessels sail from provincial ports such as Cantho and My Thoi, the over whelming volume departs from HCMC.

During its first five years of large scale exports ending in 1993, Vietnam's exports averaged just under 1.8 million tons, with low quality rice (mostly 25% and 35% broken) accounting for at least 47% and possibly as much as 60% of all shipments.⁴⁶ Observed shipments of high quality rice (less than 10% broken) averaged only 176,000 tons, while the identified medium grades (10-20% broken) averaged 281,000 tons. (Average observed shipments of 100% broken were 41,000 tons.)

With additional investments in improving existing rice mills, and later investments in new rice mills and polishing factories, Vietnam stepped up its overall exports and also sold increasing quantities of high quality rice. Vietnam's exports averaged almost 3.6 million tons during the second half of the 1990s with over half of the sales made to other Asian markets. Indonesia was the single largest importer, taking on average 925,000 tons, while the Philippines was annually lifting over 400,000 tons.

Exports largely stabilized at that level during 2000-04, increasing only 2% to average over 3.6 million tons. The composition of the exports, however, changed with identified exports of high quality rice topping 1 million tons, an increase of over 150,00 tons. This, of course, resulted in the generation of additional surplus broken. Observed annual exports of broken averaged almost 170,000 tons, up over 45,000 tons from the preceding five-year period. Helping to fuel this change was the increase in sales to Iraq (a buyer of 5% broken) which rose by almost a quarter of a million tons to average

⁴⁶ This is based on author's contemporaneous estimates. Identified low grade exports averaged 841,000 tons, but there was also on average 230,000 tons of shipments for which the rice quality was not identified.

more than 540,000 tons p.a. Also noteworthy were the increasing sales of low quality rice to Cuba (part of which was provided as debt repayment) and the Philippines. Shipments to Cuba averaged over 290,000 tons, an increase of more than 110,000 tons over that averaged during the late 1990s and more than 200,000 tons higher than the 88,000 shipped annually during 1990-94.

During the following five-year period, Vietnam annually exported over 5.0 million tons. The sharp increase reflected higher sales to the Philippines, as well as a steep gain in sales of high quality rice, which included rising quantities of fragrant rice.⁴⁷ This increase in high quality exports occurred despite reduced sales to Iraq where the buyer became unhappy with the Vietnamese quality. More than taking up this slack were larger sales of high quality rice to Africa resulting in part from uncompetitive price supports in Thailand. Exports of Vietnamese high quality rice to Africa averaged over 875,000 tons annually or nearly three times that shipped during 2000-04.

While observed shipments out of Vietnam exceeded 6.4 million tons in 2010 (including 2.3 million tons of high quality white and fragrant rice), the Vietnamese Food Association (VFA) reports that exports exceeded 6.75 million tons. Sales through the two state-owned Vinafoods accounted for 80% of all exports, but only 3.2 million tons were physically executed by these two entities. (The balance was shared with other exporters.)

According to VFA, high quality shipments represent over one-third of last year's record movement. Container shipments, which were primarily to Asian destinations,⁴⁸ accounted for an estimated 20-30% of all exports, but demand can vary from year to year.

Table 12: Vietnam: Rice exports by grade (TMT)

	HIGH		MEDIUM	LOW	BROKENS		OTHER/ NA	TOTAL
	Frgt	Non-Frgt			Frgt	Non-Frgt		
2008	164	1,585	1,089	1,525	11	161	144	4,679
2009	162	2,376	1,301	1,652	47	413	102	6,053
2010	222	2,270	1,561	2,232	17	251	201	6,754

Source: Vietnam Food Association

⁴⁷ The first observed shipments of Vietnamese fragrant rice were in 2000. Exports of fragrant rice exploded in 2004 with over 55,000 tons observed. During 2005-09, identified shipments of fragrant rice averaged 80,000 tons or five times that shipped in the preceding period.

⁴⁸ Vietnam's shipments to NFA and Bulog, however, are exclusively in break bulk vessels.

Market Manipulation Is SOP. The rice market in Vietnam is both an opaque and “directed” economy. With a goal of ensuring adequate local stocks, policy makers often regulate the exports by setting export sales quotas and attempt to enforce minimum export prices (MEP). In a typical year, the export sales quota has been reached by late summer and a new quota is not issued until the eve of the harvest of the winter-spring crop in the MRD, which typically begins in late February. During the intervening months, the execution of previously approved contracts is allowed, but new sales are not. The government further intervenes in the market by “reserving” certain export markets for the two Vinafoods.

Policy makers in Hanoi attempt to control Vietnam’s rice economy via the VFA – helping to partially shield the government from any unpopular decisions. VFA is an "association" in name only. The VFA is actually an extended arm of Government administering the rice export management regime (export quantities, MEPs, etc.) on instructions received from the Rice Export Administration Committee. (The committee includes the prime minister, the ministers of agriculture and trade, and the VFA.) The head of Vinafood 2 is the chairman of the association and because of his power in distributing contracts and because Vinafood 2 owns controlling interest in a number of what were previously provincially-owned food companies (under the so called "mother-daughter" system), it is a rare occurrence when he is over-ruled. Both Vinafood 1 and Vinafood 2, though, are exempt from the administration of both the quotas and MEPs. Thus, the Vinafoods are able to exploit the export quotas to garner a major share of the sales in any one year. This year's recent sale to the Philippines, for example, was concluded in March at \$480 CNF (including 270 days credit) at a time when the MEP for 25% was \$480 FOB (basis sight).

The role of the MEP is both long-standing and dynamic. At times the MEP is indicative, but periodically the authorities tighten the screws and in some period the screws are tighter than others. In 2008, for example, VFA generally would not approve contracts with prices below the MEP. (Reportedly, though, there were instances where firms that were close to Vinafood 2 were allowed to execute contracts at prices below those posted.) Sometimes decisions by VFA are made on an *ad hoc* basis and there are periods (in 2008) when it was not clear what the MEP levels were and others when MEPs were issued for only one or two grades of rice. Finally, there is no fixed schedule of when new MEPs will be announced.⁴⁹

A Look At The #3 Exporter. Kigitraco, which is owned by the People's Committee of Kien Giang province, was the country's third largest exporter in 2010, exporting 166,000 tons. This provincial exporter has production capacity of 183,000 tons p.a., sourced from five factories. Only one of the facilities is a rice mill, the others are polishing facilities.⁵⁰ During the last three years, it covered 69% of its average annual sales of nearly 150,000 tons from outsourcing to other millers and trading companies. It reported last year that its inventory turnover was just under 49%.⁵¹

⁴⁹ VFA only episodically posts its MEPs on the internet and then in Vietnamese – <http://www.vietfood.org.vn/vn/default.aspx?c=74>

⁵⁰ The mill can annually produce 15,000 tons of milled rice and polish 48,000 tons of semi-milled rice.

⁵¹ This is taken from "Strategic Business Plan for Exporting Rice of Kigitraco (2010-2015," a MBA thesis at Griggs University by Huynh Truc, Mac Kinh Hung, Le Vinh, Dong Thi Y Nhi, and Bui Hong Thac. March 2011.

Rice Polishing Factories. When Vietnam began large-scale exports in the late 1980s, virtually all of its rice mills were small, had antiquated machinery, and were S.O.E.s. As a result, Vietnam was exporting mostly low quality rice. While many of the provincial food companies invested in upgrading their existing mills and exporting was generally reserved for the state-owned firms, a number of private businessmen invested in rice polishing factories which were typically sited on the banks of the Mekong River and its tributaries.⁵² Rice polishing factories did not require the extensive supply networks necessary for rice mills, the rice could be stored longer, and the margins were better because they could mix good and poorer quality rice. These facilities, which usually have color sorting machines (and some have specialized packaging equipment), played a key role in meeting the specifications of overseas buyers and facilitated the rapid upgrading the quality of rice exported by Vietnam. Initially the factory owners sold to the various S.O.E., but eventually some of them have begun to act as exporters. This rice is shipped down the Mekong River on barges carrying up to 1,000 tons.

While accurate, detailed information of the rice polishing sector is limited and new investments are booming,⁵³ it is reported that the current capacity in the MRD is around 150-200,000 tons per day. Many of the rice polishing factories in the MRD are clustered in three locations which form a "rice triangle" formed by the intersection of the Song Tien and Song Hau branches of the Mekong River. The largest cluster is in Sadec-Lapvo (Dong Thap province), followed by Long Xuyen-Phu Chau (two towns on opposite river banks in An Giang province), and Thot Not (Cantho). In Thot Not, the smallest of the three clusters, it is reported that there are some twenty large rice polishers and another 10-20 smaller factories.⁵⁴ (Room for expansion is said to be limited in Thot Not, prompting construction across the Song Hau River in Dong Thap and elsewhere.)

Hiep Thanh, established in 1989, is one of the larger polishing factories located in Thot Not. The firm has been successively expanding and now claims to have a processing capacity of 1 million tons/year, but annual production is reported at 300-350,000 tons. Its output can be packaged in 10 kg, 25 kg, 30 kg, 45 kg, 50 kg, 25 lb, 50 lb, and 1 ton jumbo bags.⁵⁵ Hiep Thanh both sells to Vietnamese rice exporters, but it also is an exporter in its own right. In 2010, for example, it is credited with exporting over 34,000 tons.

⁵² Reflecting the poorly developed roads and the extensive river and canal networks in the MRD, most rice mills, rice polishers, and traders' warehouses are located along the waterways.

⁵³ Under decree 119, licensed exporters will be required to have domestic processing facilities. According to the trade, a single leading rice processing plant manufacturer has orders to build over 60 mills this year.

⁵⁴ This discussion of the rice polishing industry is based on interviews with two long-time Vietnamese rice traders and USDA's office in HCMC.

⁵⁵ <http://www.hiepthanhgroup.com>. These corporate claims (like those in Cambodia) should be treated with caution. One rice trader advised that these figures are inflated and estimated actual production was closer to half of that indicated.

Another major rice polisher is Khiem Thanh, which has factories in An Giang and Kien Giang provinces.⁵⁶ The owner of Khiem Thanh is understood to be a relative of the managing director of Vinafood 2. According to the VFA, Khiem Thanh exported 55,000 tons last year. A direct exporter of 45,000 tons, Hiep Loi is another leading rice polisher with factories in Thot Not, Sadec, Hau Giang, and An Giang. Others report that Vinafood 1 has the largest rice polisher with a capacity of 1,000 t.p.d, followed by Hai Thanh at 500 t.p.d.

⁵⁶ One trader, for example, estimated that its capacity was three times that of Hiep Thanh, but the other claimed that it was one-third smaller.

Appendix 2: Tables

Table 1: Thailand: Jasmine 100% exports (TMT)

COUNTRY	Avg	Avg	Avg	Avg	2008	2009	2010		
	'90-94	'95-99	'00-04	'05-09			Qty	% CHG	Share
								vs '05-09	
AMERICAS	182	242	298	410	440	445	425	4	27
of which:									
Canada	30	43	50	66	69	74	80	20	5
U.S.	151	198	246	342	368	368	343	0	22
E.U	36	44	71	133	152	159	155	17	10
MIDDLE EAST	131	90	60	108	114	135	112	3	7
of which:									
Israel	15	24	23	25	22	31	33	30	2
Saudi Arabia	34	29	26	29	31	33	27	-9	2
U.A.E.	48	3	4	25	29	22	22	-10	1
AFRICA	32	37	57	242	282	350	309	28	19
of which:									
Gabon	1	4	9	21	27	26	31	50	2
Ghana	3	8	10	62	88	80	80	28	5
Ivory Coast	9	6	12	95	85	166	130	38	8
ASIA	565	815	772	826	639	638	561	-32	35
of which:									
Australia	21	23	32	55	61	62	60	9	4
Brunei	15	24	17	26	26	27	21	-20	1
China	92	272	247	280	170	125	125	-55	8
Hong Kong	219	211	215	220	190	184	160	-27	10
Malaysia	53	106	87	100	108	105	62	-38	4
Singapore	160	170	139	122	111	102	99	-19	6
TOTAL	967	1,239	1,275	1,717	1,531	1,746	1,584	-8	100

Source: Thailand Board of Trade, as adjusted by Slayton & Associates

Table 2: Thailand: Patum 100% exports (TMT)

COUNTRY	Avg '05-09	2008	2009	2010		Share
				Qty	% CHG vs '05-09	
AMERICAS	4	3	4	6	43	3
of which:						
U.S.	3	3	4	5	50	3
E.U	12	14	27	33	**	20
MIDDLE EAST	5	11	9	12	**	7
of which:						
Saudi Arabia	1	3	3	5	**	3
AFRICA	11	13	15	14	21	9
of which:						
Gabon	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	2	3	4	0	-100	0
Ivory Coast	4	1	5	8	**	5
ASIA	242	192	135	96	-60	59
of which:						
China	141	56	33	22	-84	14
Hong Kong	57	76	57	39	-31	24
Singapore	26	40	25	17	-32	11
TOTAL	276	236	190	161	-42	100
** = More than 100%						
Source: Thailand Board of Trade						

Table 3: Thailand: Jasmine brokens exports (TMT)

COUNTRY	Avg '05-09	2008	2009	Qty	2010 % CHG vs '05-09	Share
AMERICAS	5	4	5	5	7	1
of which:						
U.S.	4	4	4	4	-2	1
E.U	67	116	58	44	-34	6
AFRICA	721	547	701	619	-14	90
of which:						
Ghana	57	28	57	20	-65	3
Guinea Bissau	16	2	19	7	-58	1
Ivory Coast	186	183	208	223	20	32
Mauritania	40	39	101	84	**	12
Senegal	367	251	268	223	-39	32
Sierra Leone	13	8	17	8	-39	1
ASIA	46	24	23	20	-57	3
of which:						
China	14	5	5	8	-41	1
Malaysia	16	5	0	0	-100	0
TOTAL	829	648	787	688	-17	100
** = More than 100%						
Source: Thailand Board of Trade, as adjusted by Slayton & Associates						

Table 4: Vietnam: Rice exports by grade (TMT)

YEAR	HIGH	MEDIU M	LOW	BROKE NS	OTHER/ UNKNOWN	TOTAL
			Total			
Avg '95-99	854	1,151	1,200	123	227	3,556
Avg '00-04	1,007	1,144	927	169	359	3,633
Avg '05-09	1,717	1,419	1,540	199	161	5,036
2008	1,821	1,125	1,714	226	172	5,058
2009	2,541	1,127	1,613	427	135	5,843
2010	2,322	1,433	2,118	215	346	6,435
			Africa			
Avg '95-99	115	199	400	109	13	806
Avg '00-04	265	199	127	158	11	785
Avg '05-09	876	163	131	157	12	1,337
2008	816	91	162	200	27	1,292
2009	1,193	156	144	325	21	1,838
2010	788	139	245	182	45	1,398

Source: Slayton & Associates

Table 5: Vietnam: Exports, 1990 to present (TMT)

DESTINATION	Avg '95-99	Avg '00- 04	Avg '05-09	2008	2009	2010		
						Qty	% CHG vs '05-09	Share
AMERICAS	307	306	502	598	475	527	5	8
Of which:								
Cuba	181	293	486	573	432	462	**	7
MIDDLE EAST	481	600	248	302	311	302	22	5
Of which:								
Iraq	297	541	116	209	230	243	**	4
AFRICA	806	785	1,337	1,292	1,838	1,398	5	22
Of which:								
Angola	34	76	146	175	104	194	32	3
Ghana	51	69	137	110	173	175	28	3
Ivory Coast	112	102	222	163	290	222	0	3
Senegal	102	151	119	139	221	145	21	2
ASIA	1,863	1,755	2,795	2,626	2,967	4,018	44	62
Of which:								
Indonesia	925	763	463	164	51	728	57	11
Philippines	404	653	1,609	1,835	1,766	1,579	-2	25
TOTAL	3,555	3,633	5,036	5,058	5,843	6,435	28	100
** = More than 100%								
Source: Slayton & Associates								

Table 6: Vietnam: Fragrant exports (TMT)

DESTINATION	Avg '05-09	2008	2009	2010		Share
				Qty	% CHG vs '05-09	
AMERICAS	1	1	2	5	**	3
Of which:						
U.S.	1	*	1	5	**	3
E.U.	34	7	4	6	-82	4
MIDDLE EAST	3	6	4	3	0	2
Of which:						
Israel	2	3	2	1	-50	1
AFRICA	40	51	67	40	0	25
Of which:						
Ghana	7	7	18	25	**	16
Ivorv Coast	17	14	28	12	-33	7
ASIA	26	29	53	104	**	65
Of which:						
China	1	0	1	13	**	8
Hong Kong	4	1	18	58	**	36
Malavsia	5	9	1	6	9	4
Singapore	7	10	13	14	100	9
Taiwan	3	4	9	4	53	2
TOTAL	80	103	131	161	**	100
* = Less than 500 tons		** = More than 100%				
Source: Slayton & Associates						

Table 7: Vietnam: Fragrant broken export (TMT)

DESTINATION	Avg '05-09	2008	2009	Qty	2010 % CHG vs '05-09	Share
AFRICA	19	52	35	12	-40	100
Of which:						
Ghana	1	1	6	1	-61	8
Guinea Bissau	2	8	*	0	-100	0
Ivory Coast	10	19	26	9	-7	75
Senegal	6	23	2	0	-100	0
ASIA	1	2	4	0	-100	0
TOTAL	22	54	44	12	-47	100
* = Less than 500 tons		** = More than 100%				
Source: Slavton & Associates						

Table 8: Vietnam: Exports of low quality white rice (TMT)

DESTINATION	Avg '00-04	Avg '05-09	2008	2009	2010		
					Qty	% CHG vs '05-09	Share
AMERICAS	241	44	0	8	30	-33	1
Of which:							
Cuba	241	43	0	3	0	-100	0
AFRICA	127	129	158	143	245	90	12
Of which:							
Guinea	15	17	25	37	59	**	3
Ivory Coast	35	44	40	32	73	67	3
ASIA	558	1,360	1,547	1,445	1,837	35	87
Of which:							
Indonesia	94	11	2	22	41	**	2
Philippines	433	1,328	1,536	1,391	1,526	15	72
TOTAL	927	1,540	1,714	1,613	2,118	38	100
** = More than 100%							
Source: Slayton & Associates							

Table 9: EU 25: Rice imports by origin (TMT)

	Avg '05-09	2008	2009	Qty	2010 % CHG vs '05-09	Share
AMERICAS	438	484	461	357	-18	23
of which:						
Guyana	119	120	146	145	21	9
Uruguay	94	125	139	65	-31	4
U.S.	155	133	82	90	-42	6
AFRICA	78	71	47	85	10	5
of which:						
Egypt	58	48	33	75	28	5
ASIA	870	1,074	967	874	--	55
of which:						
Cambodia	5	3	11	39	**	2
India	293	305	253	246	-16	16
Pakistan	135	202	140	191	42	12
Thailand	396	504	480	364	-8	29
Vietnam	27	44	66	21	-22	1
TOTAL	1,537	1,816	1,648	1,585	3	100
** = More than 100%						
Source: World Trade Atlas						

Table 10: World Rice Trade: Medium term projections (million tons)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2015	2021
Importers						
E.U. 1/	1.52	1.38	1.20	1.35	1.37	1.49
Indonesia	0.35	0.25	1.15	1.75	1.11	1.57
Iran	1.55	1.47	1.15	1.20	1.36	1.36
Iraq	0.98	1.09	1.14	1.15	1.25	1.37
Malaysia	1.04	1.09	0.91	1.04	1.24	1.37
Philippines	2.50	2.00	2.40	1.00	3.30	4.22
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.57	7.99	8.04	8.18	9.48	10.61
U.S.	0.65	0.68	0.56	0.62	0.69	0.80
Other	13.56	13.30	14.71	13.85	15.93	18.19
World Trade	29.72	29.25	31.26	30.14	35.72	41.00
Exporters						
China	0.97	0.78	0.62	0.60	0.99	1.07
India	3.38	2.12	0.20	2.40	5.42	5.59
Pakistan	3.05	3.19	4.00	2.65	3.31	4.38
S. America	2.04	2.64	2.26	2.58	2.42	3.24
Thailand	10.01	8.57	9.05	10.00	10.83	12.43
U.S.	3.22	2.98	3.82	3.42	3.94	4.21
Vietnam	4.65	5.95	6.73	6.00	5.71	6.40
Other	2.40	3.02	4.59	2.49	3.11	3.69
1/ Excludes intra-trade.						
Source: 2008-2011 - USDA Production, Supply & Distribution Database (April 2011) at http://www.fas.usda.gov/fassearch.asp 2015 & 2021 - USDA Long term Agricultural Projections (February 2011) at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewStaticPage.do?url=http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usdaers/94005/./2011/index.htm						