Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 31690 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (SCL-39520 SCL-39530) ON TWO LOANS IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 88.0 AND US$ 57.0 MILLION TO THE EMPRESA DE ACUEDUCTO Y ALCANTARILLADO DE BOGOTA FOR THE SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT May 11, 2005 Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Country Management Unit 1 Colombia and Mexido Latin America and the Caribbean Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2004) Currency Unit = peso Col $ 1.00 = US$ 0.0004 US$ 1.00 = Col$ 2390 FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS EAAB Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá Bogota Water and Sewerage Company CRA Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico Water Supply and Sanitation Regulatory Commission DAMA Departamento Técnico Administrativo de Medio Ambiente Environmental Technical Department ERR Economic Rate of Return FRR Financial Rate of Return IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICR Implementation Completion Report NBF Not Bank Financed NPV Net Present Value OED Operations Evaluation Department PCR Project Completion Report QAG Quality Assurance Group SAR Staff Appraisal Report UFW Unaccounted-for-Water Vice President: Pamela Cox Country Director: Isabel Guerrero Sector Manager: John Henry Stein Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Menahem Libhaber COLOMBIA SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 12 6. Sustainability 14 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 15 8. Lessons Learned 18 9. Partner Comments 19 10. Additional Information 20 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 21 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 24 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 27 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 28 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 30 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 31 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 32 Annex 8. Borrower's ICR 33 Annex 9. Maps IBRD 26608, 25737, 25738, 25739, 25740, 25741, 25742, 25743 45 Project ID: P006894 Project Name: Santafe I Water Supply and Sewerage Rehabilitation Project Team Leader: Menahem Libhaber TL Unit: LCSFW ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: May 11, 2005 1. Project Data Name: Santafe I Water Supply and Sewerage L/C/TF Number: SCL-39520; SCL-39530 Rehabilitation Project Country/Department: COLOMBIA Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: Sewerage (41%); Sanitation (30%); Water supply (27%); Other social services (2%) Theme: Access to urban services and housing (P); Other urban development (P); Other financial and private sector development (P); Pollution management and environmental health (P) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 07/07/1993 Effective: 03/18/1996 03/18/1996 Appraisal: 11/29/1993 MTR: 10/10/1997 Approval: 11/16/1995 Closing: 06/30/2003 12/31/2003 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/EAAB Other Partners: None STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Pamela Cox Shahid Javed Burki Country Director: Isabel M. Guerrero Paul Isenman Sector Manager: John Henry Stein Eugene D. McCarthy Team Leader at ICR: Menahem Libhaber R. Venkateswaran ICR Primary Author: Bernardo Gomez 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: According to the Loan Agreements, the project objectives were to: (i) support and consolidate the transition of Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá (EAAB) from a public service agency to a commercially-run public utility company; (ii) support a revamped economic and tariff framework; (iii) expand water distribution and sewerage services to the poor; (iv) address major environmental concerns of the heavily polluted Bogota River; and (v) reduce the vulnerability of the Bogota water supply and sewerage system. The above objectives were highly relevant in helping the national and Bogota District governments in achieving their priorities within the context of the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy. In fact, the project objectives, with their emphasis on institutional strengthening, environmental improvement, and poverty alleviation were designed to help the national and Bogota District governments in consolidating and deepening the ongoing structural reform program, improving the delivery of basic services to the poor, and addressing the degradation of the natural resource base through the implementation of environmental protection programs and policies. In assessing the viability of the project objectives, it is also necessary to look at the Bank's prior experience with EAAB, as well as the project framework for evaluating progress in achieving its objectives. The Santafe I was the fifth Bank-financed project for EAAB. The fourth project (Fourth Bogota Project - Loan 2512 ­ CO) was closed two-and-half years before Board approval of the Santafe I. The objectives of both projects were similar, as both aimed basically at strengthening EAAB's institutional capability, expanding water and sewer services to the poor, and reducing the vulnerability of the Bogota water supply system. The Project Implementation Report (PCR) of the Fourth Bogota Project rated the project as marginally satisfactory, of uncertain sustainability, and of negligible institutional impact. The less than fully satisfactory experience with the Fourth Bogota Project suggests the need for the Bank to put special emphasis in sharply defining the Santafe I project objectives and the corresponding impact indicators. This Project Implementation Report (ICR) found, however, that this is not the case, as the SAR includes impact indicators and targets only for the vulnerability objective (the completion of two major works: the Tibito Water Supply System and the Back-up Usaquen Tunnel), and impact indicators but no targets for the poverty alleviation objective (number of new water and sewerage connections in low-income areas). Other impact indicators in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) are, at best, indirectly related to the project objectives and do not include specific targets. These indicators are: flood control, which is to be evaluated by the number of hectares and population benefited by the project; environmental improvement to be evaluated by the number of hectares of wetland protected; and efficiency improvements to be evaluated by the cost per m3 of water produced and billed. The lack of a clear definition of the project objectives was particularly unfortunate in the case of the institutional objective [objective (i) in the Loan Agreements], as it contributed to misunderstandings and tensions between EAAB and the Bank during project implementation. - 2 - The misunderstandings and tensions emerged from the different interpretations of EAAB and the Bank of the extent and form of private sector participation in the provision of services and operation of Bogota's water and sewerage systems. This issue is discussed later in this ICR. 3.2 Revised Objective: The original project development objectives remained unchanged throughout project implementation. 3.3 Original Components: The project consists of eight main components, which, at the Bank's request, were split in two phases, whereby each phase included only part of each one of the original project components included in the single-phase project. Both phases were expected to include Bank financing through consecutive lending operations. The Bank's request to split the project in two phases resulted from the recognition of the uncertainties surrounding the ongoing sector reform and its impact on EAAB's operations and financial performance. The Bank's participation in the second phase was contingent on EAAB's performance in the first phase. The Bank's decision to implement the project in two phases was taken after appraisal and shortly after negotiations, and therefore drew some criticism by the borrower. The project components are outlined below and detailed in Annex 1c: A. Vulnerability control B. Primary sanitary and storm water drainage and pollution control C. Primary water distribution system D. Secondary water, sewerage and drainage networks and service connections E. Rehabilitation of secondary networks F. Institutional strengthening of EAAB G. Technical assistance for institutional reform, engineering, design and supervision of works H. Environmental protection and improvement The project components are closely linked to the project objectives. The objectives of strengthening EAAB's institutional capability and revamping EAAB's economic and tariff framework are addressed by the project through investment in the technical assistance program (Components F and G). The objective of poverty reduction is addressed by the project through the expansion and rehabilitation of primary and secondary water, sewerage and drainage networks, and installation of service connections (Components B, C, D and E). Provision of water connections reduce the high expenses paid by the poor for purchase of water from private providers prior to getting connected, reduce the risk of contamination by polluted water and improve the standard of living of the newly connected poor. The objective of addressing environmental concerns of the polluted Bogota River is addressed by the project through the investments in primary sanitary and storm water drainage systems, in the rehabilitation of dikes on the left bank of the river, and in the protection of the wetlands (Component B). - 3 - The objective of reducing the risk of EAAB being unable to meet water demand is addressed through the rehabilitation of the Tibito System, including the water treatment plant and the 2m diameter conveyance pipe which was undergoing a corrosion process, and through the construction of the backup tunnel for conveying treated water from the Wiesner Water Treatment plant to the city (Component A). 3.4 Revised Components: The eight components of the original project remained unchanged during project implementation, but the concept of implementing the project in two phases was dropped, and some works planned for the second phase were advanced and carried out as part of the single-phase project. The end result is that EAAB completed investments amounting to 84% of the total cost of the original two phases. The above changes are outlined below and presented in detail in Annex 1c. First, the works under the first phase of the vulnerability control program were carried out but they were not financed by the Bank loan, as EAAB entered into a Built Operate Transfer (BOT) contract with a private firm for rehabilitating and operating the Tibito System, which includes the water treatment plant and the pipeline to convey water to the city. The second element of the vulnerability reduction program, the construction of the Usaquen back-up tunnel and the associated 12 MW hydropower plant was advanced from the original second phase, and financed by the Bank loan. In advancing this component, EAAB decided, with Bank's concurrence, to directly contract the construction of the tunnel and the hydropower plant without carrying out studies of alternatives for private sector participation in the construction and operation of the tunnel and the plant. Second, the number of Bank-financed water and sewerage connections, as well as the number of installed domestic meters were below the target, but the shortfall was more than compensated by the new connections installed through the municipal Community Participation Program (Gestion Comunitaria), and through the contracts with the three private firms hired by EAAB to provide commercial services and operate small-diameter water networks in the EAAB's service area. Third, the project exceeded the physical targets under most project components by advancing to the first phase works which were originally planned for the second phase. These additional works were financed by funds released from the Tibito system and by additional contributions from EAAB's internal cash generation. 3.5 Quality at Entry: The quality at entry is rated as satisfactory because of the relevance of the project objectives and the consistency between objectives and components. The project was not rated as highly satisfactory because of weaknesses in the framework for project evaluation, as discussed in Section 3.1, and because of the poor timing of the Bank's decision to split the original project in two phases. The following paragraphs elaborate on these points, except private sector participation, which is discussed in the supervision section (Section 7.2). The relevance of the project objectives and design is illustrated by two main observations. First, the project recognized the importance assigned by the Colombian authorities to strong institutions and organizations, as reflected in the broad public sector reform launched by the Gaviria - 4 - Administration on taking office in mid-1990s. This reform rests on a solid legal framework, as it is rooted in the 1991 Constitution. Second, the water and sanitation sector reform, which was underway at the time of project preparation and appraisal, constituted a strong basis for project design, as the reform included the establishment of a regulatory water agency, a consumer's rights protection superintendence, and up-to-date pricing and subsidies policies. The project was also part of a plan agreed by the national and District governments to rescue EAAB from the deep financial crisis it was facing since the early 1990s. This plan included the government refinancing almost the entire EAAB's foreign debt service coming due in the second half of 1993, and in the years 1994 to 1997. The plan was part of a legally binding performance plan. The project was also part of the District's economic and social priorities as outlined in the development plan for the 1995-1998 period (Decree No. 295 of June 1, 1995). These priorities include: improving the quality of life for the poor; increasing public space; rationalizing urban growth; promoting community development; and promoting institutional strengthening. The project fully complied with the Bank's environmental and social safeguard policies. Detailed resettlement guidelines were agreed between the Bank and EAAB during loan negotiations. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The overall outcome of the project is rated as satisfactory. This rating requires, however, an explanation. Given that the loan documentation does not include adequate indicators for project outcomes, the ICR takes, when appropriate, project outputs as proxies for the achievement of project objectives. This approach is justified because the outcomes (benefits) of the project are closely related to the completion of the works and to the satisfactory operation of the resulting assets. Accordingly, the fact that EAAB significantly exceeded the physical targets (outputs) under the project is taken as evidence that the objectives were met. EAAB's progress toward achieving the five specific objectives stated in the Loan Agreements is outlined below. The output indicators included in the SAR are summarized in Table 1a of Annex 1. Objective 1: Supporting and consolidating the transition of the borrower from a public service agency to a commercially run public utility company EAAB made substantial progress toward the key project objective of transforming itself into a utility sensitive to the demands of the market, and with a corporate culture based on professional responsibility and accountability. One remarkable aspect of this progress is that it was achieved without EAAB changing its status of public utility subject to political interference, as the District's mayor continues having almost total control of EAAB. This accomplishment can, in turn, be attributed to the responsible behavior of the District administrations which were in office during the project implementation period. One important indicator of EAAB's sensitivity to the demands of the market was the utility's decision to improve customer's services through the hiring of private firms to provide customer's - 5 - services, including billing and collection, and operation and maintenance of small diameter water networks. The five contracts with three private firms were signed and became effective in 2003, and have resulted in significant improvements in service quality, as reflected in the easy access by the customers to the five customer service centers located in different parts of the city (as opposed to only one before the contracts), the prompt attention to customers inquiries and complaints, and the reduction in the number of complaints. EAAB has also established a sophisticated planning department and modern management information systems trough the implementation of the SAP software. EAAB also promoted the participation of private sector capital and expertise in the provision of services through the 20-year BOT contract signed and implemented with a private operator for the rehabilitation, and operation and maintenance of the Tibito Water Supply System. EAAB has been less successful in increasing efficiency as measured by the SAR indicators (cost per m3 produced and sold). In fact, unitary costs more than double in real terms during the project implementation period (from Col$ 314 per m3 produced in 1996 to Col$ 833 in 2003; and from Col$ 465 to Col$ 1,343 per m3 sold in 2003, all at 1996 prices). The above indicators are, however, of limited relevance for evaluating EAAB's management's performance, as they do not discriminate between cost and expenses controllable and non controllable by EAAB's management in the short- to medium-term. The depreciation charges provide a good illustration of the above point, as they increased from Col$ 23 per m3 sold in 1996 to Col$ 187 in 2003 (both at 1996 prices) or from 5% to 15% of total cost per m3 sold. This substantial increase was due to EAAB's updating and revaluation of its fixed assets, and to the investments carried out in the 1996-2003 period. It was also due in a smaller part to the reduction in the volume of water sales (from 375 million m3 in 1996 to 283 million m3 in 2003). The unitary cost increase is also due to EAAB's political and legal restrictions to reduce personnel costs in the short-term. An example of this point is provided by EAAB's actions to reduce personnel to compensate for the reduction of the workload for its staff resulting from the hiring of the private firms to provide customer services. The reductions achieved were through staff voluntary retirement, which in the end was less than expected by EAAB's management. The efficiency changes may be evaluated also using the operational, financial and commercial indicators proposed in the SAR to monitor EAAB's performance. See comments below and further details in Annex 1b. The unaccounted-for-water indicator was on target during the first four years (1996-1999) of project implementation, but deteriorated in the following years. This apparent deterioration is due to the use of an indicator, which, since the time of appraisal, has become outdated in the specialized literature. One of the problems with the indicator used is that, in an environment of contracting water demand and production, it is most likely that the unaccounted-for-water or non-revenue-water as a percentage of total production increases even though the losses in absolute terms decrease, as was the case in EAAB. In fact, EAAB's unaccounted-for water decreased from 184 million m3 in 1996 to 167 million m3 in 2003, which is the same as estimated - 6 - at appraisal, or from 14 m3 per connection month in 1996 to 10 m3 per connection month in 2003 (9 m3 estimated at appraisal ­ see graph in Annex 1b). EAAB has improved its working ratio but not enough to achieve the SAR targets. EAAB's liquidity has been highly satisfactory and above expectations as a consequence of the high revenues resulting from the higher than expected tariff levels. EAAB's bill collection ratio exceeded appraisal expectations with the exception of the early stages of the SAP implementation. Although the SAR target of working ratio was not achieved, it had no impact on the financial performance of EAAB since the SAR target was probably too stringent. Objective 2: Supporting a revamped economic and tariff framework EAAB made substantial progress toward this objective. It was able to transform itself into a financially viable utility able to provide first-class services to its customers, and also able to attract private capital and managerial skills to the provision of water and sewerage services. First, EAAB recovered itself from the deep financial crisis, which led to the government rescue of the entity in the early 1990s, as part of the recovery package which included the Bank Loan. Second, EAAB has been able to access the capital markets in favorable terms based on the AA+ credit rating by Duff and Phelps of Colombia. Third, as an outcome of its financial strengthening, EAAB was able to implement an investment program between 1996 and 2003 amounting to about one billion dollars, with limited Bank financing (US$ 144 million or 14% of total investments). All the above was made possible by the substantive average tariff increases in real terms during the project implementation period. The cross subsidies implicit in the tariff structure remain in effect. Objective 3: Expanding water distribution and sewerage services to the urban poor This objective was fully achieved, as EAAB has been able to satisfy the demand for water and sanitation services to 100% and 90% respectively, of the population living in formal settlements of the city. This accomplishment was the result of a substantial effort by EAAB, as it provided water and sewerage services to about 2.0 million additional inhabitants in the period 1996-2003. Most of the additional population served was in the income strata 1 to 3, defined as poor in the SAR (the domestic customers in Colombia are classified in six categories according to income levels, with 1 corresponding to the lowest income level and 6 to the highest): 1.8 million additional inhabitants in strata 1 to 3 were provided with water services and 1.7 million were provided with sewerage services. An estimated 600,000 inhabitants living in informal settlements have yet to be serviced by EAAB and, thus, they currently meet their water and sanitation needs with ad-hoc solutions. EAAB's accomplishments in service coverage were facilitated by the project investments in water and sewerage networks and service connections. The number of connections installed by EAAB under the project was, however, relatively small (24,000 water connections out of a total of 348,000, and 46,000 sewerage connections out of a total of 393,000), as EAAB decided to carry out this task through the Community Participation Program and through the contracts with the private firms providing commercial services and operating small-diameter water networks. - 7 - Objective 4: Addressing major environmental concerns of the heavily polluted Bogota River EAAB made progress toward achieving this objective, as it was able to protect a significant area of wetlands, which was one of the main project objectives, and to mainstream modern and effective environmental and resettlement practices. Progress in protecting wetlands was achieved through the construction of primary sanitary drainage systems which divert wastewater from Torca, Guaymaral, Salitre, La Conejera, Jaboque y Chucua La Vaca wetlands (542 hectares). Furthermore, EAAB carried out inventory and diagnostic studies of an additional 260 hectares of wetland in its service area. Progress in mainstreaming innovative environmental and resettlement practices has been achieved through a series of actions taken by EAAB, including the following: first, establishing an environmental unit. Second, issuing a manual of environmental management practices to be applied by EAAB and its contractors. Third, carrying out public events to raise the profile of environmental issues. These events included visits by environmental groups, students, communities, and national and local authorities to the wetlands and other environmentally related projects. The events included also the organization by EAAB of an international conference on wetlands (May 2003), and the participation of EAAB's staff in international conferences like the Eighth Conference of the Ramsar Convention (November 2002). In addition, EAAB published under the project a book on the wetlands in Bogota, which is being widely distributed to schools and universities. The high quality of the work carried out by EAAB in environmental and resettlement matters has been widely recognized. Two important recognitions are: first, the "Green Award" conferred to EAAB by the Bank because of the entity's innovative and sound environmental and resettlement practices and, second, the award conferred to EAAB by the Colombian Society of Engineers in recognition of the work done to protect Bogota's hydraulic systems through the wetlands protection. Objective 5: Reducing the vulnerability of the Bogota water supply and sewerage systems This objective was fully achieved through the construction of the Usaquen back-up tunnel for conveying treated water from the Bogota's main treatment plant (Wiesner plant) to the city, and through the rehabilitation of the second largest water treatment plant (Tibito Water Supply System). The Usaquen back-up tunnel together with the Suba Storage Tank (90,000 m3) and the 2.2 m water main, all built under the project, make the water supply system highly safe, as through this system EAAB will be able to distribute 100% of the current water demand. The Tibito Water Supply System was part of the first phase of the project, while the back-up tunnel was part of the second phase. EAAB was able to advance the construction of the back-up tunnel because of the availability of funds released by the BOT contract for the Tibito System. 4.2 Outputs by components: EAAB exceeded the physical targets under the project, and they were accomplished with high standards of quality, with due regard to environmental and social considerations. Following is a brief outline of the outputs by project component. Further details, including physical targets and - 8 - accomplishments are included in Annex 1c. Component A ­ Vulnerability Control ­ (US$ 106.6 million or 111 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 146 percent of first phase). The physical targets were achieved, as indicated in Section 4.1, Objective 5. The 12 MW hydroelectric power plant built at the end of the Usaquen back-up tunnel has been connected to the national energy interconnection system and it generates a positive cash flow for EAAB. Component B ­ Primary sanitary and storm water drainage and pollution control ­ (US$ 163.5 million or 99 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 156 percent of first phase). The physical targets were exceeded in the case of sewage interceptors, trunk sewers and storm water drainage systems. The targets were achieved in the case of sewage pumping stations, storm water peak attenuation reservoirs, rehabilitation of dikes on the left bank of the Bogotá River, and the first section of the Bogotá River Interceptor (Torca-Salitre stretch). Component C ­ Primary water distribution systems ­ (US$ 68.5 million or 67 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 208 percent of first phase). The physical targets were exceeded in the case of primary distribution mains. The targets were achieved in the case of storage tanks, pumping stations, and storage reservoirs. All the water distribution systems built under the project are operated electronically. In addition, EAAB, without Bank assistance, is preparing bidding documents for the purchase and installation of an electronic control center for the whole water distribution system. Component D ­ Secondary water, sewerage and drainage networks, and service connections (US$ 100.0 million or 61 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 140 percent of first phase). The physical targets were exceeded in the case of secondary water distribution mains, sewage collectors and storm water drains. The service water and sewer connections financed out of the loan proceeds were substantially below appraisal estimates: 24,000 water connections out of 70,000 estimated at appraisal, and 46,000 sewerage connections out of 100,000 estimated at appraisal. The total number of service connections constructed by EAAB during the project implementation period was, however, much higher than that financed under the project: 348,000 water connections, and 393,000 sewer connections. Component E ­ Rehabilitation works of secondary networks (US$ 27.4 million or 61 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 147 percent of first phase). The physical targets were exceeded in the case of both sewerage works and water distribution pipes. - 9 - Component F ­ Institutional strengthening (US$ 31.5 million or 60 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 60 percent of first phase). The number of domestic meters purchased and installed under the project was substantially below appraisal estimates: 425,000 out of 780,000 estimated at appraisal. The difference was made up by meters purchased and installed by EAAB's contractors for commercial services and operation and maintenance of small diameter networks. It was EAAB's management decision not to use Bank funds for purchasing the agreed number of domestic meters. The following activities were also carried out under the institutional strengthening component of the project: (i) development of a water conservation program focused on researching and formulating alternatives for managing water demand; (ii) development and implementation of a training program for staff; (iii) purchase of laboratory equipment and radio communication; (iv) formulation of a strategy for developing information systems, specifically a financial information system, and purchase of software and hardware; (v) creation of a committee within EAAB for environmental protection and development of institutional capacity for undertaking environmental audits. Component G ­ Technical assistance (US$ 73.3 million or 82 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 148 percent of first phase). EAAB contracted consultants for a number of activities, including meters cadastre, sectoring the water distribution system, project design and supervision, and institutional strengthening. Component H ­ Environmental protection and improvement (US$ 31.1 or 275 percent of appraisal estimate for the two original phases ­ 275 percent of first phase). EAAB carried out diagnostic studies of 766 hectares of wetlands, and improved 542 hectares through the construction of the Salitre, Rio Bogotá, Torca and Jaboche interceptors. EAAB also constructed 40 kms of parks along the drainage channels financed under the project; participated in educational programs; and mainstreamed environmental protection measures during the construction of infrastructure works. These activities had a positive impact on watershed management as the project contributed to recuperate flora and fauna and reclaimed these areas as public space. EAAB adopted a resettlement policy that was successfully implemented and created two units to support it: (i) the Real Estate Unit, which is responsible for land acquisition and resettlement; and (ii) the Community Outreach Unit, which is responsible for social communication programs. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: The economic rate of return of the net benefit stream is re-estimated at a satisfactory rate of 12%, though below appraisal estimate (17%). Both the appraisal and the re-estimated rates of return are conservative, as they do not include a number of non-readily quantifiable benefits which include health improvements, reduction of the contamination of the main water courses and the preservation of wetlands; the cost savings from postponed investments, which are significant in the case of EAAB as a result of the reduction in per capita water consumption; increased property values in previously flood prone areas; and benefits associated with the institutional strengthening of EAAB's capacity to plan and manage its resources. - 10 - An indication of the environmental benefits not captured by the re-estimated rate of return of the project is provided by the economic evaluation of investments in two wetlands under the project (Juan Amarillo and Cordoba), which was carried out by EAAB in cooperation with a local university. In accordance with this evaluation, which was carried out applying the "contingency evaluation" methodology, the benefit-cost ratio of the Juan Amarillo wetland was 1.8, while the one for Cordoba was 9.6. The rate of return was calculated on the basis of incremental costs and incremental benefits during the period 1996-2025. Incremental costs are taken as those of EAAB's total investments during the project implementation period, 1996-2003, at 1996 prices (excluding import duties and VAT), plus the incremental operations and maintenance costs of the water and sewerage services provided during the period 1996-2025, also at 1996 prices (excluding taxes and depreciation charges). These incremental operations and maintenance cost of services provided is defined as the operation and maintenance costs per year, less the operation and maintenance costs for the year before project implementation (1995). Incremental benefits are the incremental revenues during the project implementation period obtained from sales over and above the 1995 level. The costs and benefits from project-related investments and from other investments carried out by EAAB were not separated because of a number of reasons. First, during project implementation period EAAB implemented investments other than the ones under the project, but of a similar nature to the ones under the project, for an amount equivalent to about 65% of the project investments (US$ 1 billion total investments vis-à-vis US$ 602 million under the project). It was difficult to quantify separately the benefits from the works financed under the project and from works carries out by other investments of EAAB. Second, the investments in water and sewerage connections, which are the ones that, in the end, generate revenue to EAAB, were financed mainly outside the project, but they were feasible only because of the project investments in water and sewerage networks and, thus, it is not practical to try to separate the benefits. And, third, there were many changes in EAAB's external environment, which make it difficult to separate the benefits attributable to the project, from the changes resulting from the external environment, including the establishment of the regulatory agency, the consumer's rights superintendence, and the new tariff policy at the national level. 4.4 Financial rate of return: No financial rate of return has been calculated because none was calculated at appraisal. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The project institutional development impact is rated as substantial because of progress made by EAAB in several areas of its operations during the project implementation period. It is not rated as high, despite this progress, because the project did not achieve any significant change in the political nature of EAAB's management, as the District's Mayor continues to have nearly total control of EAAB's operations. That is, EAAB continues with a governance system lacking adequate checks and balances that could provide the entity with a more appropriate degree of managerial autonomy. The SAR considered EAAB's lack of autonomy as one of the issues to be - 11 - addressed by the project. Progress made by EAAB during the project implementation period in specific organizational areas is reflected in items like the ones below: · EAAB's capability to provide first-class water and sewer services to the population (100% with water and 90% with sewerage) · EAAB entering into and implementing a BOT contract with a private firm for the rehabilitation and operation of the Tibito Water Supply System · EAAB hiring private firms to provide customer services, management of commercial operations, and operation and maintenance of small diameters water supply networks in all the service area. This decision has resulted in major improvements in customer service quality · EAAB's ability to access private capital markets, made possible by the AA+ rating of its bonds · The experience gained in recovering wetlands, and in requiring its contractors to observe sound environmental standards included in the company's environmental manual · The ISO certification for several EAAB's processes, including water intake, transport and treatment (ISO 9001-2000), water quality (ISO 9000), and construction supervision (ISO 9002/94). 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: Two factors can be cited. First, the economic recession that affected Colombia during most of the project implementation period translated into lower than expected prices for construction and material contracts, and this helped EAAB to exceed the physical targets under the project. Some contracts were awarded at prices 20 % lower than EAAB's estimates prior to bid. Second, the collapse of the Chingaza Tunnel (the conveyance system of the main source of water for Bogota), which had serious implications for EAAB, its customers and the project: water rationing during 7 months in 1997; lower revenues than expected in the year of the collapse; and absorption of a substantial portion of EAAB's managerial and technical resources. The water rationing was also a factor in the sustained reduction in per-capita water consumption, as the effects of this event reinforced the decline in consumption observed during the fifteen-year-period prior to appraisal and the effect of substantial tariff increases in real terms during the project implementation period (the price elasticity of water demand was estimated at ­0.28 at appraisal). 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: - 12 - Project implementation was favored by substantial indirect and direct support provided by the national government. The main indirect support was the enactment of the sector framework law (Law 142 of 1994), which is rooted in the 1991 Constitution. Law 142 provides the basis for the creation of the water regulatory commission and of the superintendence of public services; and the implementation of prices approaching full cost recovery. The direct support from the government was provided through the refinancing of almost the entire foreign debt service becoming due in the second half of 1993, and in the years 1994 to 1997. Project implementation was also favored by the strong commitment of a series of District government administrations, which are widely recognized as catalysts of major improvements in the quality of life in Bogota, particularly for the poor. The project was part of the District's economic and social development plans of the three successive administrations (1995-2004) responsible for project implementation. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: The project suffered initial delays because of a number of reasons such as EAAB's delays in setting up an effective project management unit, and long procurement processes. Loan disbursements were also slow because of EAAB's decision to finance a number of investments with internal cash generation. This decision was motivated by two main factors: first, EAAB's high liquidity as a result of the high tariff levels implemented during the project implementation period and, second, EAAB's policy of reducing the foreign currency risk in its balance sheet through the repayment of loans in foreign exchange, rolling them over into local currency debt, and the postponement of disbursements of the Bank loans. 5.4 Costs and financing: The total estimated cost of the two phases of the project was US$ 718 million (US$ 414 million for the first phase and US$ 304 for the second phase). The two initial Bank loans amounting to US$ 145 would finance 35% of the cost of the first phase of the project. As a result of the dropping of the concept of a two-phases project and of the corresponding changes in the timing of some investments, the actual cost of the project, including taxes, and its financing plan were as follows: Source of Funds Amount % (US$ million) EAAB 292 49 World Bank 144 24 District 91 15 Private Sector 75 12 Total 602 100 There were no cost overruns, deficient cost estimates or major project implementation delays. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Project sustainability is rated likely. This rating takes into account a number of factors, including the ones below: first, the sector-wide policy and institutional environment emerging from the early 1990s sector reform that has proven to be an important element in improving sector performance, - 13 - including enhancing the financial viability of the service providers. The substantial consensus in the country about these reforms and the fact that they are rooted in the 1991 Constitution are likely to give them continuity and stability. Second, EAAB's highly developed organizational capability and the highly qualified technical personnel. Third, the high technical standards applied by EAAB to the works under the project, and EAAB's proven capability to operate and maintain them competently. Notwithstanding the above, a utility like EAAB is inherently at risk of ups and downs in performance for a number of reasons. Some of the risks arise from EAAB's institutional setup and others from the nature and dimension of EAAB's task. The main risks related to EAAB's institutional setup are discussed below: first, changes in District's administrations may result in substantial changes in EAAB's policies and programs in accordance with the Mayor's preferences, not necessarily based on sound economic and financial principles. This risk is a direct consequence of the Mayor's authority to appoint EAAB's Board and general manager, and of his position as Chairperson of the Board. That means that EAAB is very dependent on political cycles and runs a high risk of overturning progress and adequate policies by future Mayors that might have different opinions. Another risk is the potential disruption in EAAB's activities resulting from changes of general manager and second level positions every time a new administration comes in office. In fact, every time that a new Mayor takes office, the general manager of EAAB and consequently all the senior management, are replaced. Usually, each new general manager is a confidant of the new Mayor, and is not always qualified to serve as a general manager. The regulatory structure is unlikely to be able to prevent these contingencies. The second risk is that the Mayor and EAAB's management may decide not to continue with the practice of contracting with private firms the provision of customer services, and operation and maintenance of small diameter networks. This is a risk which could materialize in the short-term, as the current contracts expire in 2007, and there are members of EAAB staff favoring the option of returning to EAAB the responsibility for directly providing the services. Third, the uncertainties regarding EAAB's role in wastewater treatment, as the municipal government recently transferred to the entity the plant built by Departamento Técnico Administrativo de Medio Ambiente (DAMA) and Corporación Autónoma Regional (CAR) through a BOT contract, which was rescinded by the government. Involvement of EAAB in the wastewater treatment program may incur huge expenses which might shake the financial stability of the utility. Fourth, the "modernization program" currently under way in EAAB is being strongly criticized, and one of the major contracts under this program (the establishment of a SAP information system) is under investigation, because of high cost overruns and it is then likely to have implications future development of the program. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: All assets added by the project are already fully operational without special transition arrangements, particularly in areas related to water and sanitation, as this operation fits naturally within EAAB's organizational structure. Furthermore, the recently created environmental unit has been adequately staffed and provided with the necessary resources to make it likely that it will - 14 - continue functioning properly. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: The Bank's performance in project identification, preparation and appraisal is rated as satisfactory . Of particular note are the items below. First, the Bank's explicit recognition of the uncertainties surrounding the ongoing sector reform and its impact on EAAB's operations and financial performance, which, in turn, led to the sound decision to split the project in two phases, making the Bank's participation in the second phase contingent to EAAB's performance. The timing of this decision suggests, however, a flaw in the loan processing, as the decision was taken after appraisal and shortly after negotiations, negatively affecting the Bank's reputation with the borrower. Second, the Bank made good use of its extensive knowledge of EAAB's operations, gained through the first four loans. In this respect, it is important to mention the Bank's opposition to the District administration's approach to alleviating the Bogota River pollution problems. The District adopted a strategy based on constructing three activated sludge treatment plants within the city limits, at the confluences of the tributaries Salitre, Fucha snd Tunjuelo with Bogota River. The Bank's proposed strategy was to construct first the Bogota River Interceptor (BRI), which is a large diameter sewage collector along the river, which would collect the entire city's raw wastewater and convey it downstream the city limits, where it will be treated. The development of the treatment plant will be carried out in stages, in accordance with the financial capacity of the District. The Bank's proposed strategy has many advantages, since with a relatively small investment of constructing the BRI the section of the Bogota River within the city limits can be cleaned up, removing within a short time (i.e. the construction time of the BRI) the public health risk imposed by discharging raw wastewater to the river. The District's three plant strategy was extremely expensive, could be completed only after many years due to financial restrictions, and would not have resolved the public health risk since the effluents of the three plants contain almost the same amount of pathogens as raw sewage. The value added by the Bank's opposition was that it was instrumental in preventing that EAAB be involved in the implementation of the BOT for the Salitre wastewater treatment plant. This was an important accomplishment, as it prevented EAAB from being involved in financing the Salitre plant and from entering into serious financial problems. The Bank was not, however, in a position to prevent the District administration in going ahead with the Salitre BOT. The District continued with its program by transferring the responsibility of wastewater management to DAMA, which is an entity with no relationship with the Bank under this project. During the past two years the District authorities recognized that the three plants strategy was not sustainable. A few months ago it terminated the Salitre BOT contract, and is practically adopting the Bank's strategy, while adjusting it to the fact that the Salitre plant has already been constructed. Third, the Bank's emphasis on the early preparation of studies and designs for the works included in the project, and on ensuring compliance with the Bank's safeguard policies with emphasis on environmental policies, as well as on compliance with sound financial management and procurement procedures. - 15 - The Bank's performance is not rated as highly satisfactory because of the untimely decision to split the project in two phases, the lack of clarity on the "key" project objective of transforming EAAB in a commercially-run public utility, and the absence of a satisfactory framework to evaluate progress toward the achievement of other project outcomes. The risk involved in the Bank's approach to EAAB's institutional strengthening is encapsulated in the statement of one of the Bank's Executive Directors who indicated that the proposed study on institutional alternatives for EAAB might "merely" defer decisions on institutional issues. This concern proved to be relevant for the success of the project, as the lack of agreement between EAAB and the Bank on institutional issues contributed to unproductive tensions and disagreement between the Bank and EAAB during project implementation and, eventually, prevented the Bank in participating in the financing of the original second phase of the project. 7.2 Supervision: This ICR rates Bank's overall performance during supervision as satisfactory. This rating agrees with the Quality Supervision Assessment's (QSA 5) rating and with the rationale behind it, mainly: (i) the satisfactory supervision of fiduciary aspects, particularly environmental issues, resettlement, financial management, and procurement; (ii) the quality of the staff responsible for supervision, as well as the amount of inputs allocated to supervision; and (iii) the realism of the ratings. The high quality of the staff was highlighted by EAAB's personnel who mentioned a number of Bank's contributions to the entity's operations, including: the strategic approach to project design, the emphasis on training, the recommendations on innovative technical matters like the use of "trenchless" technology for underground works in densely populated areas of the city, and the recommendations on the use of "Panels of Expert" for large and controversial projects. This was the case of design of the Regadera dam and the Fucha-Tunjuelo interceptor (Interceptor Rio Bogota). On the negative side, it is relevant to mention the view of the QS5, which considers that the Mid-term Review, which was scheduled to take place in September 1997, was conducted in an informal manner as part of a normal supervision mission, with little evidence of any involvement of country and sector management. A second supervision issue is the extension of the loan closing date at a time when there were no specific plans for the application of the loan amount yet to be disbursed, and the project implementation unit had been disbanded, without consultation with the Bank, and without putting in place a satisfactory alternative. No additional work or project activities were carried out during the extension period. The disbursements after the original closing date (US$ 23 million) were made only shortly before the extended closing date, by increasing to 94% the financing of a number of contracts. Total loan disbursements amounted to US$ 144 million, i.e., about 99% of the amount approved (US$ 145 million). Bank's independent consultants carried out an audit of procurement under the project during the first two and half years of project implementation and concluded that EAAB did follow the established procedures in all of the procurement actions reviewed. The auditor's report highlights, however, that the Bank should improve the timeliness of Bank's review and no objections. - 16 - 7.3 Overall Bank performance: The Bank's overall performance is rated as satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The Borrower's performance during project preparation is rated as satisfactory. 7.5 Government implementation performance: The District's administration implementation is rated as satisfactory. First, the District delivered on its commitment to transfer to EAAB funds received from the National Government under Law 60 of 1993. Second, it fully integrated EAAB's investment plans and operations within its Development Plans. The District administration's reluctance to enter into, at least, a lease contract with a private operator for the provision of services was considered by the Bank as a negative factor for the successful project implementation, as shown by the Bank's reluctance to participate in the financing of the original second phase of the project. In hindsight, the actions taken by EAAB in hiring private firms for the rehabilitation and operation of the Tibito Water Supply System and for customer services were successful and constitute important steps toward further improvement of EAAB's operations, although the Tibito BOT is of a lower degree of importance since EAAB was capable of doing all the Tibito system works since it has a lot of experience in design and operation of water treatment plant. The commercial operation contract is of higher importance since it refers to operations that EAAB had difficulties in complying successfully. The hiring of the mentioned private operators need not be considered in isolation but as part of a gradual institutional development process, which takes into account the District administration and EAAB's political constraints. A factor under the control of the District administration which created delays in project implementation was the frequent changes in EAAB's management, as there were four general managers during the project implementation period. Each change of general manager was accompanied by changes of deputy general managers and other top-level staff. 7.6 Implementing Agency: EAAB's overall performance is rated as satisfactory. It advanced the institutional and organizational reform through a series of actions, including the BOT contract for the Tibito Water Supply System, the hiring of private firms for providing customer services, and strengthened its managerial capability through the implementation of SAP. It strengthened its financial performance through substantial tariff increases, and also strengthened and mainstreamed the environmental management function. The works carried out under the project are of high quality and high technical standards. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: EAAB's overall performance in implementation is rated satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned The following are key lessons learned from this project: - 17 - Institutional and organizational reform: Poorly defined expectations at appraisal regarding institutional and organizational reform leads to tensions and misunderstandings between the Bank and the borrower. Active support by the government authorities and by the utility is necessary for effective and sustainable reform. The Bank would do well in ensuring that project appraisal and negotiations include explicit agreement on the objectives and scope of proposed utility's restructuring and privatization. The Bank would do well also in recognizing that the inertia and political opposition to reform can be overcome through a strategy of gradual but sequential reform. Knowledge Bank: Sophisticated borrowers like EAAB seek and value expert advice of the highest quality. This point is illustrated by EAAB's staff recognition of the Bank's contribution to the identification and implementation of up-to date engineering technologies and environmental protection practices. It is also illustrated by the Bank's contribution to the shaping of utilities' major development plans and resource allocation priorities ­ system expansion versus rehabilitation and increased efficiency, least-cost solution approaches to water pollution problems, and affordability and cost recovery. The Bank should take into account the level of sophistication of Borrowers and ensure that teams are composed of highly specialized staff to formulate project concepts and to supervision. It is not sufficient to assemble Bank teams consisting of only generalists with experience in Bank procedures but not in the issues. Institutional climate: The institutional climate surrounding the project implementation agency plays a major role in the project's outcome. A sound external climate allows for the implementation of adequate cost recovery policies and for synergies with projects and activities carried out by other economic agencies. An unsound climate has negative impacts. The Santa Fe project illustrates well this point, as the sound and supportive external climate helped in achieving the project goals. The Bank should play a role of partner in reforms and try to create the appropriate external climate, or, alternatively, reconsider participation in projects when a sound external climate cannot be achieved. Project monitoring and evaluation: The lack of a clear framework and indicators for monitoring and evaluating project outcomes limits the effectiveness of the Bank's supervision and the scope of the lessons to be learned from the project. The Bank would do well then in ensuring that project appraisal contains an adequate project evaluation framework. Extension of closing dates: Extending loan closing dates without specific plans and implementation capability are likely to do more harm than good, as it increases commitment costs for the borrower and supervision cost for the Bank. The Bank would do well in being selective in extending closing dates. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: - 18 - (b) Cofinanciers: Not applicable - 19 - (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): Not applicable 10. Additional Information - 20 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Annex 1a: Outcome/Impact Indicators Indicator Projected in Actual/lates SAR End of t estimate project Poverty alleviation 1. New water connections in low-income strata (strata 1 to 3) (000) 70 24 2. New sewer connections in low-income strata (strata 1 to 3) (000) 100 46 Flood control ­ Neighborhoods drained 3. Extension drained (hectares) NA 542 4. Population in drained areas (000) NA NA Environmental ­ Wetland protection 5. Hectares protected (No) NA 1/ Vulnerability ­ Vulnerable components rehabilitated or built 6. Tibito water treatment plant and pipeline rehabilitated End 1998 End 2001 7. Back-up Usaquen Tunnel constructed 2/ End 2000 Early 2003 Efficiency 8. Cost per m3 produced (Col $ at 1996 prices) NA 833 9. Cost per m3 billed (Col $ at 1996 prices) NA 1,343 NA: Not available. 1/ Included in the hectares drained. 2/ The back-up Usaquen Tunnel was part of the second phase of the project. Annex 1b: Operational, Financial and Commercial Indicators Year UFW 1/ Working Ratio 2/ Quick Ratio 3/ Collection Ratio 4/ SAR Actual SAR ActualSAR ActualSAR Actual 1994 40 40 44 521.22.06079 1995 39 37 45 601.42.166115 1996 37 33 45 661.02.67383 1997 36 32 45 861.02.18076 1998 34 34 45 841.11.68893 1999 32 32 45 1021.11.59295 2000 31 34 40 931.10.69287 2001 29 36 40 631.10.89291 2002 29 35 40 731.11.49295 2003 29 37 40 721.11.69296 - 21 - 1/ Unaccounted-for Water defined as the percentage of non-revenue generating water over total water production. 2/ Working Ratio defined as the ratio of working expenses, prior to depreciation and interest charges, and including annual payments to existing pensioners, payments into the EAAB Pension Fund, and annual transfers to external pension funds under Law 100 to operating revenues prior to subsidy transfers and extraordinary income (including income from excess liquidity balances). 3/ Quick Ratio defined as the ratio of liquid assets (cash and bank balances and short-term investments readily convertible to cash in three months) and 30% of accounts receivable to current liabilities due and payable within one year, including loan amortizations due and payable. 4/ Collection Ratio is the ratio of amounts collected in the current year to the amount of billings during the year. The ratio excluding collection of receivables from previous years was not used because that information is not readily available in EAAB. Alternative Indicator for Unaccounted-for Water Unaccounted-for Water per Connection 20 15 10 5 m3/connection/month 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Years Appraisal Actual Annex 1c: Output indicators A. Vulnerability Control Appraisal Actual 1. Rehabilitating a section of the pipeline from Tibito to Casablanca Treated Water Tank * 31 km 31 Km 2. Rehabilitating the Tibito water treatment plant * 11m3/s 11m3/s 3. Constructing the Usaquen back-up tunnel ** 2.7 km 2.5 km B. Primary sanitary and storm water drainage and pollution control 1. Constructing sewage interceptors, trunk sewers and storm water drainage systems 35 km 72 km 2. Constructing drainage canals in the Salitre, Jaboque, Fucha Tintal and Tunjuelo 17 km 25 km drainage canals 3. Constructing two main sewage pumping stations and expanding 2 smaller sewage 2 main 2 main pumping stations in the Tintal and Salitre drainage basins 2 smaller 2 smaller 4. Constructing a storm water peak attenuation lagoon at Fontibon 1 1 - 22 - 5. Rehabilitating dikes on the left bank of the Bogotá River at Fontibon and Tintal 11 km 11 km 6. Constructing the first section of the Bogota River Interceptor (Torca-Salitre stretch) ** 12 km 11 km 7. Constructing sewage pumping station ** 1 1 8. Constructing a storm water peak attenuation lagoon at Tintal ** 1 1 C. Primary water distribution system 1. Installing primary distribution mains *** 54 km 110 km 2. Constructing storage tanks in the southwestern sector of the city 4 tanks 4 tanks 10,800 m3 10,800 m3 3. Constructing pumping stations in the southeastern and southwestern parts of the city 2 2 4. Constructing main storage and compensation tanks ** 3 tanks 3 tanks 94,000 m3 94,000 m3 5. Rehabilitating and increasing the volume of storage tanks in the Northern part of the6 tanks 6 tanks city ** 3,400 m3 3,400 m3 D. Secondary water, sewerage and drainage networks, service connections 1. Constructing secondary water distribution mains 125 km 167 km 2. Constructing secondary sewage collectors 265 km 299 km 3. Constructing storm water drains 225 km 266 km 4. Installing 70,000 water service connections 70,000 24.000 5. Installing sewerage service connections 100,000 46.000 E. Rehabilitation works 1. Replacing or repairing sewage collectors, constructing alleviation sewers and 19 km 25 km rehabilitating sewer appurtenances, and repairing erroneous connections between sewage and storm water collectors 2. Replacing or repairing older water distribution pipes 150 km 600 km F. Institutional strengthening 1.Purchasing and installing bulk meters and domestic meters 780,000 425,000 * BOT contract. ** Originally part of the second phase of the project. ***Includes first and second phase works. - 23 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million A. Vulnerability Control 73.00 106.60 111 B. Primary Sewerage and Drainage 104.40 163.50 99 C. Primary Water Distribution 32.90 68.50 67 D. Expansion Secondary Networks 71.60 100.00 61 E. Rehabilitation Secondary Networks 18.70 27.40 75 F. Institutional Strenghtening 52.80 31.50 60 G. Technical Assistance 49.60 73.30 82 H. Environmental Improvement 11.30 31.10 275 Total Baseline Cost 414.30 601.90 Total Project Costs 414.30 601.90 Total Financing Required 414.30 601.90 Appraisal Actual 1/ Project Component Phase 1 Phase 2 Total (US$ million current) (US$ million) % A. Vulnerability Control 73.0 22.8 95.9 106.6 111 B. Primary Sewerage and Drainage 104.4 61.1 165.5 163.5 99 C. Primary Water Distribution 32.9 69.1 102.0 68.5 67 D. Expansion Secondary Networks 71.6 92.4 164.0 100.0 61 E. Rehabilitation Secondary Networks 18.7 17.9 36.5 27.4 75 F. Institutional Strengthening 52.8 0.0 52.8 31.5 60 G. Technical Assistance 49.6 40.3 89.9 73.3 82 H. Environmental Improvement 11.3 0.0 11.3 31.1 275 Total Investment Cost 2/ 414.2 303.6 717.8 602.0 84 Note: Physical and price contingencies in the appraisal estimates are allocated to each component in proportion to its estimated cost. 1/ The percentage is in relation to the estimated cost of the original two phases. 2/ Including taxes. Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 192.00 90.00 0.00 0.00 282.00 (37.40) (22.30) (0.00) (0.00) (59.70) 2. Goods 91.80 90.00 15.00 40.00 236.80 (31.50) (22.30) (4.30) (0.00) (58.10) - 24 - 3. Services 0.00 0.00 78.60 0.00 78.60 (0.00) (0.00) (27.20) (0.00) (27.20) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.40 33.40 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 283.80 180.00 93.60 73.40 630.80 (68.90) (44.60) (31.50) (0.00) (145.00) Notes: Figures in brackets correspoond to the amounts financed by the Bank. 1/ Includes only the estimates for the first phase of the project. Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 213.80 154.30 0.00 71.70 439.80 (50.60) (58.30) (0.00) (0.00) (108.90) 2. Goods 2.20 11.10 0.00 6.40 19.70 (0.90) (3.90) (0.00) (0.00) (4.80) 3. Services 0.00 56.90 0.00 41.50 98.40 (0.00) (30.00) (0.00) (0.00) (30.00) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 44.10 0.00 44.10 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 216.00 222.30 44.10 119.60 602.00 (51.50) (92.20) (0.00) (0.00) (143.70) Figures in brackets correspond to the amounts financed by the Bank. 1/ Includes only the estimates for the first phase of the project. 1/Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2/Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. A. Vulnerability control 16.20 26.80 30.00 16.20 15.40 75.00 100.0 57.5 250.0 B. Primary 39.40 65.00 39.40 124.10 100.0 190.9 sewerave/drainage C. Primary water 12.40 20.50 12.40 56.10 100.0 273.7 distribution - 25 - D. Expansion secondary 27.00 44.60 27.00 73.00 100.0 163.7 networks E. Rehabilitation 7.10 11.60 7.10 20.30 100.0 175.0 secondary networks F. Insstitutional 19.90 32.90 19.90 11.60 100.0 35.3 strengthening G. Technical assistance 18.70 30.90 18.70 54.60 100.0 176.7 H. Environmental 4.30 7.00 4.30 26.80 100.0 382.9 improvement Total 145.00 239.20 30.00 144.00 383.00 75.00 99.3 160.1 250.0 Nota: Govt. means EAAB CoF. means Private Sector - 26 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits Santafe I Water Supply and Sewerage Rehabilitation Project Economic Internal Rate of Return (Million Col $ at 1996 prices) Year Investments O and M Increm. Cost Increm. Net Benefit Revenue 1996 88,851 1,789 90,641 54,163 -36,478 1997 114,097 40,953 155,050 43,569 -111,481 1998 111,623 63,414 175,037 93,027 -82,010 1999 132,914 72,971 205,885 118,660 -87,225 2000 166,227 132,676 298,903 189,573 -109,330 2001 188,276 118,565 306,841 253,339 -53,502 2002 115,087 140,365 255,453 264,924 9,471 2003 113,090 166,359 279,450 329,951 50,501 2004 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2005 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2006 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2007 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2008 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2009 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2010 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2011 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2012 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2013 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2014 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2015 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2016 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2017 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2018 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2019 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2020 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2021 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2022 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2023 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2024 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 2025 202,854 202,854 302,869 100,015 IERR: 12% - 27 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 05/93 4 TASK MANAGER; FINANCIAL ANALYST; ENGINEER 09/93 3 TASK MANAGER; FINANCIAL ANALYST; ENGINEER 10/93 3 ENGINEERS 12/93 7 TASK MANAGER; ENGINEER; FINANCIAL ANALYST Appraisal/Negotiation 12/93 4 TASK MANAGER; ECONOMIST; FINANCIAL ANALYST; ENGINEER 05/93 4 TASK MANAGER; FINANCIAL ANALYST; ENGINEER 01/94 5 TASK MANAGER; ENGINEER; FINANCIAL ANALYST 04/94 7 TASK MANAGER; ECONOMIST; ENGINEER; FINANCIAL ANALYST 05/95 7 TASK MANAGER; ENGINEER; ECONOMIST Supervision 03/23/1996 2 ENGINEER (1); S S PROCUREMENT (RM) (1) 11/27/1996 4 SR. ENGINEER (1); SR. S S FINANCIAL ANAL. (1); ENV. SPECIALIST (1); PROCUREMENT (RM) (1) 07/04/1997 4 SR. FINANCIAL ANALYST S S (1); SR. WATER ENGINEER (1); CONSULTANT (2) 02/24/1998 4 SR. FINANCIAL ANALYST S S (1); TEAM LEADER (1); CONSULTANT (1); SR. PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1) 05/21/1999 3 TM INSTITUTIONAL (1); S S ENGINEERING (1); FINANCIAL (1) 10/08/1999 3 TTL, ENGINEER (1); S S - 28 - ENGINEER (1); FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1) 05/24/2000 3 TEAM LEADER (1); S S ENGINEER (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1) 04/17/2001 2 SOCIAL SPECIALIST (1); S S ENVIRONMENTAL SPEC. (1) 10/27/2001 2 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); S S ENGINEER (1) 05/24/2002 1 FINANCIAL EXPERT (1) S S 02/16/2003 2 TTL (1); FINANCIAL S S SPECIALIST (1) 02/16/2003 1 FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1) S S 10/22/2003 2 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); S S WATER MANAGEMENT (1) S ICR S 01/19/2004 2 TM (1); HIDROLOGIST (1) S S (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 33.2 104.8 Appraisal/Negotiation 126.9 374.8 Supervision 173.4 639.2 ICR 30.0 20.0 Total 363.5 1,138.8 - 29 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA - 30 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 31 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Bank's November 1993 CAS for Colombia (Included in the Staff Appraisal Report No. P-6070-CO). 2. Project Completion Report for the Fourth Bogota Water Supply and Sewerage Project (Loan 2512-CO), Report No. 13473. 3. Colombia: Recent Economic Developments in Infrastructure (REDI) ­ Balancing Social and Productive Needs for Infrastructure. The World Bank, Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean, September, 2004. 4. Bogotá, D.C. Plan de Desarrollo Económico, Social y de Obras Públicas para Santa fe de Bogotá D.C. 1995 ­ 1998, Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital. 5. Bogotá, D.C. Plan de Desarrollo Económico, Social y de Obras Públicas 1998 - 2001, Acuerdo No. 06 de Junio de 1998. 6. Bogotá, D.C. Plan de Desarrollo Económico, Social y de Obras Públicas 2001 - 2004, Decreto 440 de 2001. 7. Garzón Luis, Alcalde Mayor de Bogotá 2004 2007. Por un Compromiso Social Contra la Pobreza en Bogotá, December 31, 2003. 8. EAAB, Conservación Internacional, Banco Mundial. Los Humedales de Bogotá y la Sabana, Bogotá, Colombia, 2003. 9. The World Bank. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$100 Million to the Capital District of Bogota for the Bogota Urban Services Project. Report No. 24941-CO, February 14, 2003. - 32 - Additional Annex 8. Borrower's ICR IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR) Comentarios del Prestatario Préstamos 3952 y 3953 8.1 Comentarios en relación con los objetivos del proyecto El Programa Santa Fe I constituyó el Plan de Inversiones más ambicioso emprendido por la Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá - ESP. Fue un programa global, que tuvo como objetivos principales: fortalecer institucionalmente a la Empresa, disminuir la vulnerabilidad de los sistemas de abastecimiento de agua y alcantarillado de la ciudad y expandir los servicios de acueducto y alcantarillado, primordialmente a las clases urbanas menos favorecidas. El proyecto fue concebido para apoyar y consolidar la transición de la EAAB de una empresa de servicios públicos con capacidad técnica pero con deficiencia operativa, a una empresa de servicios públicos manejada comercialmente, sensible a las exigencias del mercado, y con una cultura corporativa basada en la responsabilidad profesional. El proyecto se desarrolló en el marco de la Ley de Servicios Públicos que permitió reforzar la eficacia operacional, proporcionó autonomía directiva y mayor responsabilidad gerencial, redujo la interferencia política y aumentó la responsabilidad pública de los servicios municipales. El proyecto también soportó a la EAAB en definir la estructura de largo-plazo de cambios institucionales y las estructuras de tarifas económicas que se necesitarían para financiar adecuadamente las nuevas e importantes inversiones para el suministro de agua, alcantarillados y sobre todo en el tratamiento de aguas residuales en el Distrito Capital y sus municipalidades circundantes durante los próximos 20-30 años, para cuando se espera que la población doble su tamaño actual que sobrepasa los 6.5 millones de habitantes. En adición a este importante objetivo institucional, el proyecto tuvo varios objetivos específicos que incluyeron, (a) Expandir la distribución de los servicios a las zonas marginales urbanas, en particular, enfocando los recursos a los grupos de personas de menores ingresos en el área metropolitana; (b) direccionando lo concerniente ambientalmente al altamente polucionado Rió Bogotá; (c) reduciendo la vulnerabilidad del sistema de suministro de agua para Bogotá; y, (d) apoyando una renovada y económica estructura tarifaría que le permita a la EAAB reflejar el costo pleno para proporcionar sus servicios. De acuerdo con los objetivos anteriores, el proyecto se centró específicamente en las siguientes acciones: · Perfeccionar los servicios de suministro de agua potable y alcantarillados pluviales y residuales en Bogotá, con énfasis especial, en zonas de servicio sub-normales habitadas por población de bajos ingresos, a través de la optimización de la operación del sistema - 33 - de acueducto existente y la expansión y rehabilitación de las redes de alcantarillado. · Mejorar la confiabilidad del sistema de suministro de agua reduciendo los riesgos de racionamiento. · Soportar a la EAAB reestructurando el programa de fortalecimiento institucional y financiero incrementando la eficiencia operacional para lograr y consolidar la viabilidad financiera. · Fortalecer el manejo de protección ambiental de los humedales y aumentar la sensibilidad de la EAAB en los aspectos ambientales. · Proveer los servicios de asistencia técnica y consultoría para soportar la implementación del proyecto y preparar futuros programas de inversión. · Apoyar a la EAAB en llevar a cabo estudios coherentes para explorar alternativas institucionales promisorias para la compañía enfocadas a estrechar su autonomía y eficiencia. Situación previa a la ejecución del proyecto Generalidades A comienzos de la década de los 70, la EAAB creció rápidamente y extendió el cubrimiento de su servicio, desde un 60% de la población en 1970 (estimado), hasta más del 85% en 1993. Gracias, en parte, a la ejecución de los primeros cuatro proyectos financiados por el Banco Mundial, así, la calidad del agua alcanzó los niveles internacionales y el alcantarillado llegó a casi el 89% de la población. Sin embargo, durante el curso de la ejecución del proyecto Bogotá IV, aumentó la interferencia política y, a pesar de las nuevas inversiones en el sistema de acueducto y alcantarillado, las operaciones de la EAAB comenzaron a acusar grandes deficiencias, se dispararon los niveles de personal contratado y se redujo el mantenimiento, en la medida que los ingresos de operación no lograban mantenerse al ritmo de los costos crecientes. Desempeño Financiero La situación financiera de la EAAB se deterioró constantemente durante el periodo 1988-1992, principalmente como resultado de sobrecostos en el programa de construcción, que fueron financiados con deudas a corto plazo, el vencimiento de la deuda a largo plazo y los elevados e incrementales costos laborales, que iban en aumento. Así, en 1990, el servicio de la deuda era el doble de la registrada en 1989, y se duplicó una vez más en 1991. Hasta 1992 los costos laborales habían aumentado al 67% de los gastos operativos, cifra que era del 55% en 1959. Los ingresos netos siguieron cayendo durante este periodo y cada vez la generación de efectivo era más insuficiente para cubrir el pesado programa de gastos de capital de la EAAB, así como el incremento de sus obligaciones de servicio de la deuda. - 34 - Durante varios años, bajo el proyecto Bogotá IV, el Banco señaló la urgencia de tomar acciones correctivas y trató de garantizar el cumplimiento de las condiciones pactadas, con respecto al desempeño financiero. En 1991, la EAAB dio inicio a un ejercicio de reestructuración financiera, que hacía parte de un amplio Plan de Acción, Las tarifas de agua se incrementaron en términos reales en 1991 y 1992 y la EAAB disminuyó sus costos de personal y sus gastos de operación, además de obtener un crédito a largo plazo en términos de concesión, para terminar el proyecto Bogotá IV. Sin embargo, estas medidas fueron insuficientes para detener el deterioro de la situación financiera. El déficit interno se amplió en 1992 y, hacia fines de 1992, la EAAB había acumulado deudas atrasadas, con los proveedores y contratistas, que se estimaban en unos Col$22000 millones (cerca de US $30 millones). También estaba incapacitada para costear su programa de construcciones y experimentó dificultades para cumplir sus obligaciones de servicio de la deuda. Durante este periodo, la EAAB operó con malos márgenes de liquidez, como lo evidencia la Relación entre Activo Disponible y Pasivo Corriente mucho menor de 1. Esta difícil situación financiera fue enfrentada por el Gobierno Nacional en 1993, cuando decidió rescatar a la EAAB y refinanciar la casi totalidad del servicio de la deuda externa que se vencía en la segunda mitad de 1993, así como en los años 1994 a 1997, como parte de un acuerdo más amplio para reestructurar a la EAAB con el fin de que lograse mayor eficiencia y responsabilidad, utilizando un Plan de Desempeño con obligatoriedad legal. En 1993, como consecuencia de este acuerdo con el Gobierno Nacional, que cubrió efectivamente más del 25% del servicio total de la deuda para ese año, la EAAB pudo generar fondos internos netos, después de servir una deuda equivalente a cerca del 73% de sus inversiones. A fines del año 1994, la EAAB presentó un nivel sustancial de superávit de liquidez, disponible para dar inicio a un plan significativo de inversiones. Otras elementos que contribuyeron a la recuperación financiera de la EAAB durante 1994, fueron: el pago hecho a la EAAB por parte de los Gobiernos Nacional y Distrital, de sus deudas por servicio de agua, y las campañas para aumentar el nivel de dinero recaudado de los clientes y eliminar las conexiones ilegales, todo lo cual hacía parte del Plan de Desempeño. Cambios Institucionales El Gobierno Nacional y el Alcalde de Bogotá también dieron pasos positivos para resolver la crisis de la EAAB, en los aspectos estructural, institucional y financiero, que la llevó a su crisis financiera de 1989-1992. En Julio 21 de 1993, el Gobierno expidió el Decreto-Ley 142, que redefinió la organización y estatutos del Distrito Capital y sus empresas de servidos públicos. Un punto destacado de este Decreto-Ley es que aumentó notoriamente la responsabilidad del Alcalde Mayor y los Gerentes Generales de las empresas públicas. Esta Ley de Servicios Públicos, fortaleció aún más la autonomía de la EAAB en estos aspectos cruciales, y ordenó que se reorganizaran todas las empresas de servicios públicos como empresas municipales, comerciales e industriales, transformándolas en compañías accionarías, con ingreso significativo de capital privado. Como consecuencia, aunque el Alcalde aprueba el presupuesto de la EAAB (a través del Consejo Social y Económico del Distrito Capital-CONFIS), y nombra al Gerente General y los miembros de la junta, dicho - 35 - Gerente General tiene ahora, por vez primera, la plena responsabilidad del manejo de la empresa en conformidad con las políticas formuladas por su Junta Directiva, lo cual no solamente representa los intereses del consejo municipal, como propietario, sino además los del público en general. La reestructuración institucional de la EAAB ayudó a restaurar la viabilidad básica de una gran empresa pública de la Capital, fortaleciendo su capacidad para responder adecuadamente a las necesidades no satisfechas de rehabilitación y modesta expansión de la red de distribución de agua y alcantarillado, y también a las complejas demandas a mediano plazo para el control y tratamiento de la contaminación. Adicionalmente, mejorando la eficiencia especialmente por la reducción del agua no contabilizada y previendo y solucionando los problemas de liquidez a largo plazo incrementando su capacidad institucional y financiera para emprender las inversiones que son necesarias para la expansión de su capacidad a largo plazo. Sin embargo, la alta rotación de directivos fue un problema grave para la EAAB. La Ley de Servicios Públicos no va a remediar esta situación hasta que las autoridades municipales no reconstituyan las entidades públicas para convenirlas en compañías accionarias. El estudio propuesto para las alternativas institucionales de la EAAB examinó los medios para estabilizar a largo plazo la estructura institucional y la autoridad de la EAAB, para que le permita cumplir con sus retos principales en el futuro; en especial, la necesidad de emprender inversiones a gran escala, que llegarán hasta bien entrada la siguiente década, y obtener capital a largo plazo. En la medida que se implanten las previsiones de la nueva Ley de Servicios Públicos, las prácticas de trabajo de la EAAB en varias áreas operacionales y estratégicas claves, tendrán que ser modificadas, sea por medio de la reorganización interna o, más probablemente, a través de la separación de muchas de las funciones que ahora desarrolla por si misma. Un comienzo hacía esta delegación y la introducción del sector privado en las operaciones, se pretendió hacer con el proyecto Santa Fe I. Situación posterior a la ejecución del proyecto. Generalidades El proyecto fue ejecutado a lo largo de un período de siete años, entre mediados de 1995 y el 2002, incluyó ocho componentes básicos, donde todas las obras principales correspondieron a la solución de mínimo costo. A continuación se da una descripción de los componentes del proyecto y su ejecución. Componente A: Control de Vulnerabilidad. Estas obras son: a. Rehabilitación Planta Tibitoc, b. Rehabilitación Tubería de 2.0 m Tibitoc-Casablanca, c. Construcción de dos líneas de distribución nuevas en la Calle 170 y d. construcción de dos líneas de distribución nuevas en la Autopista Norte. La rehabilitación del sistema Tibitoc se contrató a través de una concesión y en consecuencia, - 36 - dejó de ser objeto de financiación por parte del BIRF. Teniendo en cuenta esta situación y el desfase en la ejecución que se estaba presentando respecto a la programación original, se decidió incorporar en la Fase 1 algunas obras que en el SAR aparecen como componentes de la Fase 2. Para determinar cuales obras se pasarían de Fase 2 a Fase 1 se tuvo en cuenta en primer lugar la urgencia de las mismas y en segundo lugar que el valor del Programa a precios base se mantuviera (es decir, que la disminución de costos a financiar ocasionada por la exclusión de las obras de Tibitoc se compensara con los costos de las obras traídas de la Fase 2 a la Fase 1). Las obras que debía realizar la concesión se encuentran terminadas y operando en buena forma. El Túnel Alterno de Usaquén y estación generadora de 12 MW. Se encuentra 100% ejecutado. Conforma un sistema denominado "Sistema Wiesner Suba" y conjuntamente con las "líneas de Red matriz de acueducto de diámetro 2,20 m y el Tanque de Suba con capacidad de 90,000 m3 también desarrollados por el proyecto, minimizan los riesgos de insuficiencia de suministro de agua para la ciudad, prácticamente por este sistema se puede distribuir el 100% de la demanda actual. Se aprovecha la diferencia de altura entre la planta Wiesner de suministro de agua potable con el Tanque de Santa Ana para generar hasta 12 MW. La energía producida se conecta al sistema de interconexión nacional y producirá recursos adicionales para la EAAB. La implementación de estos trabajos y su funcionamiento son satisfactorios. Componente B: Redes troncales de drenaje Sanitario y Pluvial Comprendió la ejecución de varios sistemas que aliviaron los vertimientos directos de aguas residuales a las cuencas de los humedales: Torca, Guaymaral, Salitre, La Conejera, Jaboque y Chucua La Vaca. Se construyó "llave en mano" por sistema Pipe Jacking la primera etapa del interceptor río Bogotá, 10 km de túnel en suelos blandos, primera obra de éste género construida en Colombia, con resultados sorprendentes en mitigación ambiental y en rendimientos de avance. Se construyó el box culvert y el canal revestido del Salitre de 4 km de longitud lo que permitió hacer la recuperación ambiental del sector. Los compromisos fueron cumplidos en su mayor parte. Está pendiente la terminación del canal Cundinamarca tramo 6, por problemas en la adquisición de unos predios y el Interceptor Cundinamarca sur tramo 1, por cambio en la concepción de drenaje de la zona, esta modificación está relacionada directamente con el futuro tratamiento de aguas residuales que se hará en la margen izquierda del río Tunjuelo y verterá sus aguas al interceptor Fucha Tunjuelo y no a la estación elevadora de aguas residuales del Tunjuelo como estaba contemplado inicialmente con el proyecto Santa Fe I. Se espera terminar éstas actividades con algún retraso respecto a la fecha de cierre. Sus resultados van mas allá de lo inicialmente concebido para la fase I del proyecto, se considera altamente satisfactorio, se cumplieron los compromisos ambientales y sociales involucrando a - 37 - las personas de los diferentes sectores a ser partícipes de los trabajos. Para obras futuras en este campo se ha abierto un nuevo panorama, puesto que se pueden emplear tecnologías de punta que permiten la construcción de estas redes por medio de túneles en suelos blandos, disminuyendo el impacto ambiental y los costos derivados de interrupciones de tráfico y posibles averías en las edificaciones y en las vías, producidas por las excavaciones por métodos tradicionales, elaborados con zanjas abiertas desde superficie. Se han diseñado proyectos que desde el punto de vista hidráulico disminuyen el diámetro de los conductos al considerar que los aportes de las conexiones erradas y los caudales de infiltración para alcantarillados de aguas residuales, pueden ser retenidos por embalses de amortiguación. Componente C: Red matriz de Acueducto Sus obras se encuentran terminadas siendo las más representativas las líneas de Acueducto Wiesner Suba, las líneas Nororientales, la línea Vitelma Jalisco, los Tanques Jalisco, Volador, Quiba, los Alpes, Castillo y Tanque de Suba; todos ellos cuentan con los sistemas electrónicos para hacer manejo y control no asistido, para que pueden ser operados remotamente desde el centro de control del acueducto, se pueden también monitorear sus diferentes variables. La EAAB está ejecutando un contrato para hacer el centro de control en donde se pueda operar el sistema integralmente. Los resultados son altamente satisfactorios. Componente D: Redes secundarias de aguas potables, residuales y pluviales Se ha trabajado intensamente en ampliar la cobertura de estos servicios a los barrios más pobres de la ciudad. Las metas para la Fase 1 del proyecto se han superado. En la actualidad se presenta una cobertura de Alcantarillado de aguas residuales del 90.1%. Se debe seguir trabajando para determinar las conexiones erradas en la medida que la independización de alcantarillado incide en la calidad de agua que se vierte al Río Bogotá, altamente contaminado aún por los vertimientos de aguas lluvias. Se ha pensado implementar unos vertederos de excesos en las redes de aguas negras, combinando los dos sistemas para que cuando no haya lluvias que superen la capacidad de los dos conductos se lleven estos residuos a las plantas de tratamiento. La implementación de este componente se considera satisfactoria. Componente E: Rehabilitación redes de acueducto y alcantarillado Se rehabilitaron 607.6 Km de redes de acueducto y 24.5 Km de redes de alcantarillado. Las metas para la Fase 1 del proyecto se han superado. En la actualidad se presenta una cobertura del 100% de agua potable. La implementación de este componente se considera satisfactoria. Componente F: Fortalecimiento Institucional Se desarrollaron los estudios de catastro de medidores, sectorización, uso racional del agua, entrenamientos para personal responsable de la gestión técnica, conjuntamente con los estudios para reestructurar la empresa a una compañía enfocada comercialmente que - 38 - permitiera la participación del sector privado; se dividió la ciudad para su operación comercial en 5 sectores. Como parte de los esfuerzos de fortalecimiento institucional, la EAAB decidió contratar, a operadores especializados mediante acuerdos de gestión. Estos procesos fueron estructurados por consultarías especializadas en conjunción con miembros de la Banca de Inversión. Después de llevar a cabo el análisis y diagnóstico de la situación de la EAAB, las consultorías concluyeron que el mejor esquema, desde el punto de vista financiero y de impacto, sería un esquema de contratos integrales (comercial y operativos de redes secundarias de acueducto y alcantarillado) para cada una de las cinco zonas - la Tabla 5 presenta las características de cada zona. No obstante, debido a la rigidez de las condiciones laborales actuales, la Empresa continuó manejando los sistemas de alcantarillado de todas las zonas. Se hicieron los siguientes acuerdos: a) dos contratos exclusivamente comerciales y b) tres contratos integrales (comercial y operación de redes secundarias de acueducto los cuales fueron firmados con tres operadores especializados. El personal de operación y mantenimiento de redes menores de acueducto fue trasladado al grupo de mantenimiento de alcantarillado y de redes matrices de acueducto. Los tres Gestores fueron seleccionados entre cinco que participaron en la licitación pública abierta el 9 de Septiembre del 2002. Los Gestores contratados empezaron a trabajar el 2 de Enero del 2003 y la responsabilidad por las cinco zonas fue distribuida de la siguiente manera: · zona 1 (la de mayor número de usuarios con gestión integral) al Consorcio Aguas Capital conformado por Técnica Hidráulica Sucursal Colombia, Ponce De León y Asociados S.A Información Y Tecnología S.A, Miguel E. Nulle, y Gas Kpital GR Ltda. · zonas 2 y 5 (la zona 2 con un componente de facturación importante y solo gestión comercial y la zona 5 con gestión integral) a la Unión Temporal Aguazul conformada por Acea SpA, Ingeniería E Hidrosistemas Grupo De Consultoría Ltda., Prestadora de Servicios de Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo S.A. E.S.P. ­ PRESEA S.A. ESP, Estudios Técnicos S.A., Boada Sáenz & Cia. Ltda., y Gestaguas S.A. · zonas 3 y 4 (la zona 3 con un componente de facturación importante y solo gestión comercial y la zona 4 con gestión integral) a la Unión Temporal EPM Bogotá Aguas conformada por EPM ESP, Aguas del Oriente Antioqueño S.A. E.S.P, EPM Bogotá S.A., EMTELCO S.A., y Fondo de Empleados Empresas Publicas de Medellín. - 39 - Características de las Zonas Comerciales Zona 1 Zona 2 Zona 3 Zona 4 Zona 5 Total Cuentas 326.086 261.762 241.449 238.694 225.187 1.310.396 E. 1, 2 y 3 44,23% 60,06% 72,09% 93,79% 93,52% 69,44% E. 4, 5 y 6 47,34% 27,86% 11,07% 0,04% 0,56% 19,59% No residenciales 8,42% 12,08% 16,84% 6,17% 5,92% 9,86% Facturación 17.245 14.273 17.982 7.643 7.335 64.478 (miles USD) Consumo (miles 10.250 9.230 10.233 7.703 6.870 44.286 m3) Área (Ha) 8.857 7.432 7.569 7.531 5.091 36.479 Red sec ac. 1.218 1.266 1.426 1.279 898 6.086 (miles m) Red sec alc. 1.580 1.445 1.497 1.164 827 6.513 (miles m) Fuente: La EAAB y Menahem Libhaber Componente G: Asistencia Técnica y Consultoría Se contrataron los estudios para los diseños y las interventorías descritos en el SAR para la ejecución de las obras. Se implementaron las prácticas de control y aseguramiento de la calidad basados en las normas ISO 9000, se pusieron en práctica entre otras en la obra del Interceptor Río Bogotá, en donde se disminuyeron los costos de las interventorías tradicionales en magnitudes sustanciales. Los contratos se hicieron inicialmente siguiendo los procedimientos y normas interpuestas por el Banco en los convenios hasta que se copó la capacidad de este componente en cuanto a su cantidad descrita en las categorías, a partir de ese momento se siguieron los procesos por contratación nacional, no elegibles para solicitud de desembolsos pero si haciendo parte integral del Programa Santa Fe como contrapartida. Componente H: Componente Ambiental, Reasentamientos Este fue uno de los componentes del programa que se desarrolló especialmente en donde se ha ido mas allá del alcance original, la última misión del Banco que visitó la ciudad observó que el proyecto Santafé I es un ejemplo donde se realizó una de las buenas prácticas para el manejo de asuntos sociales y ambientales dentro de desarrollos de infraestructura. En particular, el proyecto y la participación de otros programas de la EAAB han: (i) terminado los diagnósticos de las 766 hectáreas de humedales dentro del perímetro de Bogotá y mejorado 542 hectáreas, mediante la construcción de interceptores de aguas residuales en las cuencas de los ríos o canales Salitre, Bogotá, Torca y Jaboque; (ii) construido 40 Km de parques a lo largo de canales de drenaje; (iii) ha participado activamente en el desarrollo de programas educacionales sobre la protección de humedales; e (iv) incorporado medidas de protección ambiental durante la construcción de obras de infraestructura. Adicionalmente, el proyecto es responsable por la creación de una Gerencia Ambiental que hoy en día internaliza aspectos ambientales en todos los proyectos llevados a cabo por la EAAB. Esta Gerencia Ambiental empezó como una unidad de bajo nivel dentro de la jerarquía de la organización y hoy en día funciona a nivel directivo. La Gerencia está trabajando para obtener la certificación ISO 14000. Por todo lo anterior, el proyecto se nominó para el - 40 - "Green Award" interno del Banco Mundial y fue reconocida su ejecución. Se llevaron a cabo estudios de caso sobre la rehabilitación de los humedales Juan Amarillo y Córdoba por la Universidad de los Andes. El objetivo de estos estudios fue la valoración económica de las mejoras ambientales desarrolladas mediante la estimación de la disponibilidad a pagar de los habitantes dada su situación socioeconómica. En el caso del Humedal Juan Amarillo, los beneficios brutos estimados fueron de cerca de CO$575 billones. Al asociar esta cifra con el costo total del proyecto que es de CO$207 billones, se obtuvo que la relación beneficio/costo del proyecto fue de 1,79, lo cual indica la alta rentabilidad social de la recuperación del Humedal Juan Amarillo. En el caso del Humedal Córdoba, el valor presente neto de los beneficios económicos derivados del proyecto de recuperación ascendió a la suma de CO$332 billones aproximadamente. Al comparar estos beneficios con los costos totales de proyecto se obtiene un indicador beneficio ­ costo de 9,64, lo cual evidencia la generación de bienestar económico para la sociedad bogotana. Otro estudio valoró el entorno del Humedal Córdoba antes de su regeneración y concluyó que la proximidad colindante (menos de 250 m) al Humedal, en su estado actual, tiene un efecto negativo sobre el valor de la vivienda. Esto indicaría que una política de recuperación de zonas verdes, así como la continuación de los proyectos de cicloruta, trae consigo importantes beneficios para la sociedad, ya que la mayor presencia de zonas verdes y ciclorutas en áreas de recreación están asociadas a una mayor disponibilidad a pagar marginal de los habitantes. Este proyecto específico ha tenido una fuerte oposición por parte de algunos habitantes del sector que han interpuesto tutelas para frenar el normal desarrollo de los trabajos aduciendo que el programa de recuperación del humedal atraerá una recreación activa y problemas de seguridad al sector, escudándose en manejos ambientales de la conservación de la flora y fauna. Las autoridades locales han hecho caso a las reclamaciones y las obras del humedal Córdoba se encuentran paralizadas. La misión del Banco Mundial de febrero de 2003 consignó recomendaciones especialmente dirigidas a: (i) la sostenibilidad a largo plazo de las obras terminadas; (ii) la implementación de planes de restauración a largo plazo mediante esquemas de concesión a empresas privadas u ONGs; (iii) la maximización de los resultados obtenidos mediante la detección y control de conexiones ilegales; y (iv) el monitoreo y difusión de los resultados obtenidos. En particular, en lo que concierne a la sostenibilidad a largo plazo de las obras terminadas, la misión recomendó que la EAAB continuar buscando otras fuentes de financiación para así limitar la carga financiera impuesta a los consumidores, quienes se prevé pagarán por estos costos de rehabilitación. El programa de inversiones en recuperación de humedales requiere una inversión total de CO$633 billones de los cuales faltan CO$287 billones por ejecutar. Igualmente, la misión resaltó la falta de un programa de monitoreo a largo plazo y recomendó que la EAAB desarrollara este plan y continuará como ente responsable de los humedales hasta tanto el DAMA tuviera la capacidad y los fondos necesarios para llevar a cabo esta labor. La implementación de este componente y los logros son considerados altamente satisfactorios pues se ha dejado una semilla que muy seguramente seguirá proliferando. - 41 - 8.2 Comentarios en relación con el desempeño de la EAAB Financieros El programa siempre contó con los recursos necesarios para la ejecución de todas sus obras y los pagos hechos a sus diferentes contratistas fueron siempre oportunos. La EAAB en los 3 últimos años ha obtenido en sus ejercicios utilidades que han permitido tener un flujo de caja muy sano. Los desembolsos solicitados al Banco no se realizaron conforme a lo proyectado debido a la misma situación de liquidez que la EAAB maneja y más aún ha hecho prepagos de deuda. Contratación Se siguieron las normas de contratación exigidas por el Banco como también los requisitos para solicitud de adiciones que requirieran de "no objeción". Algunas normas del Banco dan la posibilidad de interpretación que permite a los contratistas variar los precios unitarios. Las apelaciones a adjudicaciones fue un aspecto que retrasó la ejecución de algunas obras. La adjudicación a las ofertas con el criterio de menor costo evaluado, permite que contratistas con precios bajos entren a competir permitiendo que manipulen las especificaciones tratando de variarlas para lograr precios unitarios nuevos que balanceen la obra durante su ejecución. Es muy difícil rechazar estas ofertas por las mismas condiciones de un mercado en crisis donde los contratistas aportan a sus proyectos sus equipos sin considerar su costo. De allí surgen precios irrealmente bajos. La EAAB ha cambiado las formas de adjudicación nacional y está trabajando con adjudicaciones por "medias" de los valores de las ofertas. Algunos procedimientos de contratación cuando tienen precalificación pueden demorarse hasta 2 años, caso del túnel alterno de Usaquén. Cuando se requiere de algún perito extranjero se hace muy compleja su contratación y los procesos se demoran más que el mismo estudio. No se han presentaron inconvenientes y reclamaciones que alteraran el normal funcionamiento del programa. Existió una magnífica colaboración con el personal del área de contratación. Administración El proyecto fue apoyado por el personal directivo de la EAAB aunque no compartió con los asesores del Banco la totalidad de las sugerencias en cuanto a la participación del sector privado. Aun se continúa por medio de la Administración con decisiones que modifican la buena - 42 - marcha de los proyectos puesto que se retiran personas idóneas con conocimientos del programa y de sus obras sin ninguna razón, por consiguiente no se capitalizan las experiencias adquiridas a través del mismo. La unidad ejecutora se vio disminuida en la totalidad de sus integrantes y sus funciones se desplazaron a otras áreas. Técnicos La EAAB ha demostrado con la ejecución de grandes obras su conocimiento específico y su capacidad para diseñarlas y realizarlas lo que ha redundado en una alta credibilidad dentro del sector. En el área de la nueva Gerencia de Tecnología se determinan las Normalizaciones Técnicas requeridas para la ejecución y adquisiciones. Durante la mayor parte del período de ejecución del proyecto, la relación entre los funcionarios del Banco y de la EAAB fue la mejor. Las misiones del Banco se realizaron con la mayor diligencia y confianza. 7.3 Comentarios en relación con el desempeño del Banco En 1993 comenzaron los preparativos para dimensionar el proyecto de préstamo Santa Fe, en un momento en el cual la EAAB estaba en un estado financiero bastante deteriorado, el apoyo del Banco con la estructuración del SAR fue de gran ayuda para objetivamente atacar integralmente las dolencias económicas por las que se atravesaba, el resultado de estos trabajos se pueden palpar hoy en día con la situación financiera, que presenta gran estabilidad y con la culminación de un proyecto que permitió a la EAAB consolidarse aún mas. La participación del Banco, las relaciones entre el Banco y el Organismo Ejecutor, en esta fase del proyecto, fueron altamente satisfactorias. La partición del proyecto en dos fases dificultó la evaluación del mismo, en donde no existió una correlación alta entre el SAR y los contratos de acuerdos del préstamo. En los primeros años de ejecución del proyecto, las relaciones entre los funcionarios del Banco y del EAAB se consideran satisfactorias. En los años cercanos a la revisión de medio período las relaciones pueden calificarse como satisfactorias básicamente por los enfoques con respecto a la PSP de ambas partes. En el últimos años de ejecución las relaciones pueden considerarse un poco distantes en lo que se refiere a futuras políticas de la EAAB para el tratamiento de aguas residuales en donde se ha manifestado que por el momento no está interesada en el manejo de este tema con el Banco, sin embargo se estableció un diálogo fluido entre el Banco y la EAAB. La calificación es de altamente satisfactoria. No obstante las diferencias de criterio en este tema. 8.4 Comentarios Generales. La participación de la EAAB y del Banco en la preparación del proyecto fue muy activa y - 43 - estaban concientes de la necesidad de estudiar el sector del agua y reformarlo, para lo cual se comprometieron con este propósito. Las personas que participaron en su ejecución estaban enfocadas en la dirección correcta. El Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) ayudo a desarrollar el proyecto en una forma ordenada y coherente y se constituyo en la "Carta de Navegación" para realizar el programa Santa Fe I con éxito. Los costos proyectados fueron bien estimados y los costos reales no sobrepasaron lo esperado. Para la EAAB el proyecto en general fue más que satisfactorio puesto que a pesar de no recibir el correspondiente préstamo para realizar la Fase 2 del programa, desarrolló el 100% de Fase 1 y un alto porcentaje de la Fase 2 para lograr el 84% del alcance del proyecto conjunto. Con el préstamo de US$145 ejecutó un proyecto de US$602, representando el préstamo solamente el 24% del valor total. - 44 - Additional Annex 9. Maps - 45 - IBRD 26608 To To Guachala To Fomeque Choachi To Tunja GUATAVITA Untreated Water COLOMBIA from Chingaza CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA Guatavita SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND Reservoir Tominé River SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT San Rafael Wiesner GENERAL LAYOUT AND Reservoir Treatment Plant VULNERABILITY CONTROL COMPONENT WORKS Usaquen Tunnel To Tunja Tuesaca River New Back-up Usaquen Tunnel San Diego Vitelma Santa Ana Tank Treatment Plant Treatment Plant Usaquen Pumping Station Untreated Water from Regadera Reservoir Bogotá River TOCANCIPA Parque Nacional Tank To Girardot S A N T A F E D E B O G O T A Plant River Tibito fromTibito Treatment Main Salitre Pumping and Treatment TreatedWater 78"Tibito Transmission Plant 78" Tibito SUBA Transmission Main Bajo Teusaca To La Caro CHIA Casablanca Scheme Tank Bogotá River Airport ZIPAQUIRA COTA BOSA SOACHA 80° 75° 70° 65° REHABILITATION EXISTING ATLANTIC OCEAN WATER MAINS: Bogotá 54"O AND LARGER To Sibaté 10° Muna 30"O TO 48"O River 10° Reservoir 24"O AND SMALLER PANAMA VENEZUELA TUNNELS COLOMBIA 5° STORAGE TANKS SANTAFE DE BOGOTA 5° WATER TREATMENT PLANTS To Fusagasuga PACIFIC OCEAN Map Area WATER INTAKES PUMPING STATIONS FLOOD PRONE AREA To Medellin 0° The boundaries, colors, 0 1 2 3 4 5 Kilometers denominations and any 0° BRAZIL URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE other information shown ECUADOR on this map do not imply, on the part of National Capital ROADS OUTSIDE BUILT-UP AREAS 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal PERU International RIVERS Boundaries status of any territory, or any endorsement 5° or acceptance of such boundaries. 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° To Facatativa To San Antonio JANUARY 1995 IBRD 25737 NT. 127 DELCEDRO INT. HTIGIR STREET 7 SE AVENUE RIGHT CEDRO INT. LL STREET CA INT. CEDRO INT. 100 TORCA LEFT RIGHT AL CANTUZ COMUNEROS NORTHERN HIGHWAY GUAYMARAL LA URIBE INT. INT. RIO NEGRO AVENUE RIGHT INT. RIO NEGRO Torca PUMPING AVE. YOMASA STATION 30 AVE. STREET BRITALIA INT. SALITRE LEFT INT O AD LAS River INT. 170 SALITRE PUMPING River Salitre 68 AME Fucha FIRST STRETCH AVENUE D OR EL . . RICAS Tu njuelo OFTHE BOYACA INT. HT INT AVE ALBINA LEFT INT. BOGO SalitreRE INT. LEFT LIT ENEZ INT. INT. ALBINA RIGHT INT. TA SA AVENUE RIG N O CA CISC JIM AVE. COMUNEROS COMUNEROS RIGHT LEFT RIO SECO RIGHT INT. ARRAYANES RIVERINT. AVENUE LOS LOS RIO SECO LEFT INT. SAN FRAN SAN INT. M ARCOS CO LLECTOR TIBABUYES EASTERN INT. NEGRAS EASTERN JABOQUE CANAL MEDELLIN INT. LIM ASINT. TIBABUYES AGUAS FUCHA WESTERN INT. Villa RIGHT KEN INT. Gladys NEDY ALSACIA INT. INT. SO WESTERN Fontibon Final RIGHT JABOQUE Outfall TUNJUELO INT. BAJO UTHER INT. N ST. INT. INT. 38 TINTALITO Gran Britalia HIGH W Class AY BRITALIA INT. COLOMBIA IIIINT. CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA Saucedal II 80° 75° 70° 65° Saucedal I CIN TINTAL Grancolombiano Patio Bonnito II ISABEL ATLANTIC OCEAN SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND Tintalito II DINAMAR STA. INT. IV IV TUNJ SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT Patio Bonnito I CA TINTALINT.TINTAL LEFT Gibraltar INT RIGHT INT. UELO 10° . Tintalito I BAJ BERNARDINO T. 10° PROPOSED PRIMARY SEWERAGE NETWORK INT. SAN IN LA SE A .TNIO MUNA PANAMA VENEZUELA RESERVOIR EXISTING COLLECTORS COLOMBIA 5° PROPOSED SANTAFE I COLLECTORS Wastewater SANTAFE DE BOGOTA 5° COLLECTORS BY PRIVATE DEVELOPERS Treatment PACIFIC Plant OCEAN Project Area FUTURE COLLECTORS EXISTING PUMPING STATIONS PUMPING STATIONS TO BE EXTENDED The boundaries, colors, 0° denominations and any PROPOSED SANTA FE I PUMPING STATIONS other information shown 0° BRAZIL on this map do not ECUADOR FUTURE PUMPING STATIONS imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, National Capital 0 1 2 3 LAGOONS OR RESERVOIRS 4 5 any judgment on the legal PERU International status of any territory, Boundaries RIVERS KILOMETERS or any endorsement 5° or acceptance of such URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE boundaries. 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° SEPTEMBER 1995 IBRD 25738 LOS MOLINAS COLLECTOR LANAC CHICO ORIENTAL BAL ALEUZERRES NAL LA VIEJA CRISTO CA LANAC CEDRO SAJELLAC COLLECTOR LOS ROSALES COLLECTOR COLLECTOR DEL NORTE LA PERSEVERANCIA SAN EL CANAL COLLECTOR COLLECTOR LAS DELICIAS COLLECTOR Arzobispo SAN FRANCISCO DEL NORTE RIONEGROCANAL Reservoir COLLECTOR CASTELLANA TORCA CANAL CANAL C LANAC DATNO CANAL DELICIAS SAN AGUSTIN CANAL COLLECTOR SAN BLAS LAS CANAL RO VIEJA RS ARZOBISPO CANAL GUAYMARAL CANAL CORDOBA CANAL NAL LA CANAL SEA CA Cordoba Reservoir RIO NUEVO L River NIZA SALITRE CANAL CANAL SCANA CANAL L CORDOBA Tu nju elo ABAJO ANALC ERCEDE CANA M ES LAN CANAL BOYACA CANAL S LAS ARAYAN CA ERO TA SAN CARLOS CO COMUN RIOS ECOCANAL Juan Amarillo CANAL L Lagoon CANA ORIENTAL QUE SAN FONTIBON SAN VICENTE I CANAL VICENTE II CANAL BO CANAL Reservoir BOGOTA CANEJERA JA CANAL DE No. 1 RIVER COLLECTOR CRA COFONTIBON 94 LLECTOR Jaboque ALSACIAAL Reservoir Lagoon CAN No. 2 37 COLLECTOR CRA CLL 102 Reservoir Fontibon COLLECTOR No. 3 F Pumping ERICAS AVE. Station AM AL COLLECTOR Fontibon LASCAN Lagoon AVE. AL DIAGONAL 38ST.CAN AL IICAN 38 AVE. A CANAL TINTAL NADAL GRACAN Gibraltar 80° 75° 70° 65° COLOMBIA Pumping III ATLANTIC OCEAN CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA Station CUN TAL AL ISABAL EL SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND DINAM TINCAN . 10° STACAN TALIVL 10° SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT ARCA CANA TINCANA L PANAMA VENEZUELA PROPOSED STORMWATER DRAINAGE SYSTEM Rio Bogota Flood Control MUNA COLOMBIA RESERVOIR 5° SANTAFE DE BOGOTA 5°PACIFIC EXISTING PUMPING STATION LAGOONS OR RESERVOIRS OCEAN Project Area PROPOSED PUMPING STATION EMBANKMENTS EXISTING CANALS RIVERS 0° EXISTING COLLECTORS HYDRAULIC REHABILITATION OF THE BOGOTA RIVER The boundaries, colors, denominations and any 0° BRAZIL PROPOSED SANTAFE I COLLECTORS FLOOD CONTROL OF THE TUNJUELO RIVER other information shown ECUADOR on this map do not FUTURE COLLECTORS 0 1 2 3 4 5 National Capital URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, COLLECTORS BY PRIVATE DEVELOPERS PERU International any judgment on the legal Boundaries KILOMETERS status of any territory, 5° or any endorsement or acceptance of such 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° boundaries. SEPTEMBER 1995 IBRD 25739 Extension of Northeast From Weismer Plant Network and Tanks Total Volume 2.300 m3 Santa Ana Tank Vol. Vol. 30.000 m3 500 m3 Vol. ø Horizonte Tank Vol. 1.500 m3 280" Vol. 1.000 m3 1.000 m3 20" ø 16" ø 16" ø 60" ø Los ø Rosales Tunnel Codito Tank ø ø 42" 24" ø 24" ø 60" 42" Vol. 1.000 m3 ø 12" ø24" ø Silencio Tank ø 16" ø 12" Vol. 30.000 m3 Paso Tank ø ø 60" 42" ø 42" Vitelma Plant and Tank 12" 60" 60" Vol. 2.000 m3 ø 12" ø 24" Vol. 36.000 m3 ø 16" ø ø 12" ø ø 36" ø 12" ø 12" 12" ø ø 60" ø 60" ø ø42" 24" " ø 36" ø ø 36" Dorado Tank ø 24" ø 60" ø 24" ø 30" 42" ø20 ø ø36" 24" Vol. 2.000 m3 From Regadera ø ø 24" ø 24" ø ø12"ø 24" ø 42" ø ø 78" 78" 48" 12" ø 36" Piedra Herrada Tank 16" 16" 24" 12" ø ø ø ø ø ø ø ø 36" Vol. 10.000 m3 Future 16" 30 Avenue Line ø Monteblanco Tank ø 36" 30" ø16"ø 24" ø ø 20" 24" La Fiscala Tank 36" Vol. 5.000 m3 Buena Vista Boyaca ø 16" 30" Vol. 5.000 m3 Suba Tank ø Vitelma Plant Ave nu e Line 42" ø 2 0" Suba M. ø 78" Vol. Salitre ø 42" ø ø16" Ja 36" ø16" Uval Tank Suba M. Norte Tank Sur Tank 90.000 m3 42" ø ø ø16" ø Vol. 3.000 m3 Laguna Vol. 6.000 m3 ø Vol. 2.000 m3 42" ø ø 42" 48" 30" ø lisco 24" ø 16" ø 42" ø ø 36" ø 24" 24" River Plant Suba Alto Tank ø 24" Line ø 12" ø 24" ø 78" 42" ø 30" ø 24" øMonteblanco 24" Line Tunjuelo Mochuelo Tank Vol. 2.000 m3 "42 ø ø ø 12" ø 36" 12" Vol. 1.000 m3 ø 48" ø 30" Juana Tank eniL C. Cali Ave. Line Line ø16" 16" Vitelma ø ø 42" ø ø 30" Vol. 3.000 m3 ø 60" ø24"ø ø 12" 12" ø 24" 16" ø ø ø Tibabuyes Ave. Line ø 16"ø16" 12" 24" Ave. 24" Ave.ø 48" Vol. 4.000 m3 ose ø ø 16" 16" "61 ø 24" ø ø 24" ø ø ø 16" 78" 16" 42" ø El Rincon Tank risca 24" 12" ø ø ø 16" ø ø S.J ø 12" Line ø 12" 24" 24" Vol. 3.000 m3 Vol. BOGOTA Cundinamarca Ave Mo ø 24" ø24" ø ø Vol. 4.000 m3 El Cielo Tank 48" 78" ø 78" 4.000 m3 RIVER ø 16" Ave.Line 24" ø ø ø 16" ø ø 12" ø 16" 24" ø "61 Vol. 2.000 m3 63 ø 42" ø24" ø 24" 24" Quiba Tank ø ø Vol. 1.000 m3 12" 12" ø 42" Villavice48" ncio ø 78" Casablanca Tank Jalisco, Castillo and Volador ø12" ø ø ø 16" Agobe ø So Vol. 140.000 m3 Tanks Extension COLOMBIA ø 16" 48" 12" ø 24" uth ø 12" rto Mej CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA ø 30" ia ø 16" 48" High way Line 80° 75° 70° 65° SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND ø Ave. ø 16" Los Line ATLANTIC OCEAN SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT PROPOSED PRIMARY WATER Tintal ø A 10° 16" ve. 10° DISTRIBUTION NETWORK South eniLseleruaL PANAMA VENEZUELA EXISTING NETWORK Line MUNA COLOMBIA PROPOSED SANTAFE I NETWORK RESERVOIR 5° SANTAFE DE BOGOTA FUTURE WORKS 5°PACIFIC WORKS BY PRIVATE DEVELOPERS OCEAN Project Area PROPOSED PUMPING STATIONS EXISTING WATER TANKS 0° PROPOSED WATER TANKS The boundaries, colors, denominations and any 0° BRAZIL FUTURE WATER TANKS other information shown ECUADOR on this map do not LAGOONS OR RESERVOIRS 0 1 2 3 4 5 imply, on the part of National Capital The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal PERU International RIVERS KILOMETERS Boundaries status of any territory, 5° URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE or any endorsement or acceptance of such 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° boundaries. SEPTEMBER 1995 IBRD 25740 127 170 STREET 7 AVENUE STREET STREET 100 NORTHERN HIGHWAY 30 STREET E AVENU 68 AVENUE DO River Tu njuelo AVENUE GUAYMARAL Salitre BOYACA ELDORA AVENUE AVENUE MEDELLIN 80° 75° 70° 65° ATLANTIC OCEAN COLOMBIA 10° CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA 10° SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND PANAMA VENEZUELA SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT MUNA COLOMBIA RESERVOIR 5° SANTAFE DE BOGOTA PROPOSED SECONDARY WATER AND SEWERAGE NETWORKS 5°PACIFIC OCEAN Project Area PROPOSED SECONDARY WATER AND SEWERAGE NETWORKS 0° The boundaries, colors, LAGOONS OR RESERVOIRS denominations and any 0° BRAZIL other information shown ECUADOR RIVERS on this map do not imply, on the part of National Capital URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE 0 1 2 3 4 5 The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal PERU International status of any territory, Boundaries KILOMETERS or any endorsement 5° or acceptance of such boundaries. 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° SEPTEMBER 1995 IBRD 25741 170 127 STREET STREET 7 AVENUE 1 STREET 4 100 NORTHERN HIGHWAY 2 8 10 5 6 E 30STREET 7 AVENU 9 68 River AVENUE DO 11 Tu njuelo AVENUE GUAYMARAL Salitre BOYACA ELDORA AVE. Z 12 3 AVENUE JIMENE AVENUE MEDELLIN COLOMBIA 80° 75° 70° 65° CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA ATLANTIC OCEAN SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT 10° 10° PROPOSED SEWERAGE REHABILITATION WORKS PANAMA VENEZUELA SECTOR NAME: 1 CEDRITOS ERRATIC CONNECTION MUNA COLOMBIA RESERVOIR 5° 2 LA URIBE INTERCEPTOR HYDRAULIC CAPACITY REHABILITATION SANTAFE DE BOGOTA 5° 3 SUBA PACIFIC STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES REPAIRS 4 LA CAROLINA AND CANAL CALLEJAS OCEAN Project Area LAGOONS OR RESERVOIRS 5 CORDOBA RESERVOIR 6 SALITRE ALLEVIATION COLLECTORS RIVERS URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE 0° 7 WEST SALITRE CANAL The boundaries, colors, 8 SEARS COLLECTORS denominations and any 0° BRAZIL other information shown ECUADOR 9 22 STREET COLLECTORS on this map do not National Capital 10 CITY CENTER NETWORKS 0 1 2 3 4 5 imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal PERU International 11 CHIGUAZA CREEK Boundaries KILOMETERS status of any territory, 12 ALBINA CANAL 5° or any endorsement or acceptance of such 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° boundaries. SEPTEMBER 1995 IBRD 25742 170 7 AVENUE STREET STREET 127 100 NORTHERNHIGHWAY STREET 30STREET E AVENU 68 DO River River Tu njuelo AVENUE GUAYMARAL Salitre BOYACA AVENUE ELDORA LAS Fucha AVENUE AVENUE AMERICAS AVENUE MEDELLIN 80° 75° 70° 65° ATLANTIC OCEAN COLOMBIA 10° CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA 10° PANAMA VENEZUELA SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT MUNA COLOMBIA RESERVOIR 5° SANTAFE DE BOGOTA PROPOSED WATER SUPPLY REHABILITATION WORKS 5°PACIFIC OCEAN Project Area RENOVATION OF DAMAGED NETWORKS RENOVATION OF NETWORKS DUE TO 0° POPULATION DENSITY INCREASE The boundaries, colors, denominations and any 0° BRAZIL RENOVATION OF OLD NETWORKS other information shown ECUADOR LAGOONS OR RESERVOIRS on this map do not imply, on the part of National Capital RIVERS 0 1 2 3 4 5 The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal PERU International Boundaries URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE status of any territory, KILOMETERS 5° or any endorsement or acceptance of such 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° boundaries. SEPTEMBER 1995 IBRD 25743 5.56% 23.76% 18.12% 1.64% 1 2.26% 2 4.30% 3.99% 17 29.14% 3 29.73% 0.66% 0.00% 0.21% 4 0.00% 12 14 5 2.55% 37.90% 29.11% 10.86% 13 16.44% 12.19% 16.58% 0.32% 1.86% 15 0.46% 2.67% Salitre 24.90% 0.59% 11 16 18 0.25% 17.68% 8.28% 10 6 0.00% 19.22% 17.72% 9 0.00% 8 9.50% 10.21% 47.58% 19 7 1.28% 80° 75° 70° 65° COLOMBIA ATLANTIC OCEAN CITY OF SANTAFE DE BOGOTA SANTAFE I WATER SUPPLY AND 23.14% 10° 10° SEWERAGE REHABILITATION PROJECT PANAMA VENEZUELA POVERTY INDICATORS IN THE AREA OF PROPOSED SECONDARY WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE NETWORKS MUNA COLOMBIA RESERVOIR 5° SANTAFE DE BOGOTA SECTORS: 5°PACIFIC 1 USAQUEN´ 11 SUBA 0.46% OCEAN Project Area INADEQUATE SERVICES * (PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION) 2 CHAPINERO 12 BARRIOS UNIDOS 16.58% 3 SANTA FE POOR PERSONS* (PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION) 13 TEUSAQUILLO 4 SAN CRISTOBAL 14 LOS MARTIRES ´ PROPOSED AREAS OF SECONDARY WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE NETWORKS 0° The boundaries, colors, 5 USME 15 ANTONIO NARINO LAGOONS OR RESERVOIRS denominations and any 0° BRAZIL other information shown ECUADOR 6 TUNJUELITO 16 PUENTE ARANDA RIVERS 0 1 2 3 4 5 on this map do not imply, on the part of National Capital 7 BOSA 17 LA CANDELARIA URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE The World Bank Group, PERU International 8 KENNEDY 18 RAFAEL URIBE URIBE KILOMETERS any judgment on the legal Boundaries 9 FONTIBON ´ 19 CIUDAD BOLIVAR ´ status of any territory, 5° *Definitions based on the Unsatisfied Basic Nees (UBN) methodology of the Colombian Government. or any endorsement 10 ENGATIVA or acceptance of such 5° 80° 75° 70° 65° boundaries. SEPTEMBER 1995