Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 19789 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (CREDIT 2530-MOZ) (October 12, 1999) Water and Urban 1 Africa Region Tfhis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of| their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. | CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Metical (pl. Meticais) US$1 = 2,910 Meticais (attime of appraisal, January 1993) US$1 = 12,475 Meticais (at time of ICR, June 1999) US$1= SDR 0.747 (at time of ICR, June 1999) FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER Calendar year ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CG Inter-ministerial Coordinating Group CIUEM Information Technology Center Edoardo Mondlane University (Portuguese acronym) CNA Commission on the Environment (Portuguese acronym) COM Council of Ministers DNAL Directorate of Local Administration (Portuguese acronym) IDA International Development Association GDP Gross domestic product GTL Local Technical Support Ufnits (Portuguese acronym) HABITAR Agency to manage urban rehabilitation contracts for MOPH IMC Inter-ministerial Conmnittee INPF Institute for Physical Planning (Portuguese acronymn) MAE Ministry of State Administration (Portuguese acronym) MICOA Ministry of Environment (Portuguese acronym) MOP Memorandum of the President (PROL project document) MOPH Ministry of Public Works and Housing (Portuguese acronym) MOL Ministry of Labor MPF Ministry of Planning and Finance (Portuguese acronym) NGO Non-Govermnental Organization PIU Project Implementation Unit PROL Local Government Reform and Engineering Project (Portuguese acronym) PRU Urban Rehabilitation Project (Portuguese acronym) SISGEF Municipal Finances Management System (Portuguese acronym) TSU Technical Support Unit WG Working Group Vice President: Callisto Madavo Country Director: Phyllis Pomerantz Sector Manager: Jeffrey Racki Team Leader: Alan Carroll ICR prepared by: Jocelyn Mason FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY Preface ..........................................................i Project Objectives ..........................................................i Implementation Experience and Results ................................................ii Summary of findings, future operations, and key lessons learnt .....................iii PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Background 1 B. Project Objectives and Components .. 2 C. Achievement of Objectives.. 4 D. Implementation Experience.. 6 E. Project Sustainability.. 9 F. Bank Performance ..10 G. Borrower Perfonnance ..11 H. Assessment of Outcome ..12 I. Key Lessons Leamt ..12 PART II STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments Table 2: Related Bank Credits and Loans Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Estimated and Actual Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operations Table 7: Studies Included in project Table 8A: Project Costs Table 8B: Project Financing Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Table 13: Bank Resources Missions APPENDICES: A. MISSION'S AIDE-MEMOIRE B. BORROWER EVALUATION REPORT C. PROL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT MOZAMBIQUE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (CREDIT 2530-MOZ) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Local Govemnment Reform and Engineering Project in Mozambique, for which Credit 2530-MZ in the amount of SDR 16.4 million was approved in May 1993, and made effective in July 1994. The credit was closed on March 31, 1999, one year after the original closing date. At the time of the extension SDR 3.6 million was cancelled. The final disbursement took place on August 17, 1999, and a balance of SDR 3.3 million is to be canceled. The ICR was prepared by Jocelyn Mason (Consultant) under the guidance of Alan Cairoll (Principal Urban Development Specialist) of the Urban and Water Group (AFT Ul), Africa Region, and reviewed by Phyllis Pomerantz, Country Director, and Jeffrey Racki, Sector Manager. The borrower provided comments that are included as appendixes to the ICR. Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's final supervision/completion mission in February 1999. It is based on material in the project file and interviews with officials of the borrower and Bank staff. The borrower contributed to preparation of the ICR by inviting the Bank mission to a project evaluation seminar, and by contributing its own evaluation report. The Government's evaluation report on the project, attached as Appendix B, basically concludes that the project's principal objective was achieved. A draft of this ICR was sent to the Government for conuments, but none were received. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (Credit No. 2530-MZ) EVALUATION SUMMARY BACKGROUND 1. In 1992 Mozambique was emerging from a 17 year civil war. While worse in rural areas, the effects of the war were nevertheless acute in urban areas where crumbling infrastructure and housing stock and weak institutions were unable to accommodate the large inflow of refugees. Since 1989, IDA had been supporting the Government to address these problems with an Urban Rehabilitation Project (PRU, Cr. 1949) to rehabilitate basic infrastructure and build capacity among public authorities. IDA lending to Mozambique had begun with support to the country's economic reform program with the Rehabilitation Program (Cr. 1610) in 1985 and the Second Rehabilitation Program (Cr. 1841) in 1987. The adjustment process was accompanied by a series of investment projects, of which PRU was one, aimed at mitigating the social effects of adjustment and the effects of the civil war. At the same time as it was undertaking economic reform, the Government was entering on a major program of strengthening its public administration which included decentralization as a cornerstone. The Local Government Reform and Engineering Project, known by its Portuguese acronym PROL, therefore emerged from two separate themes, the first relating to urban rehabilitation and management, the second relating to supporting Mozambique's decentralization program through legal and policy reforms. These two themes converged with the preparation of the PROL project. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 2. According to the Memorandum of the President, the overall objective of the project was to support the Government of Mozambique's decentralization program by assisting with its municipal reform and capacity building initiatives. The reforms were to focus on the legal, institutional and fiscal framework of local government in order to create a suitable structure for self-sufficient and accountable local authorities, and to include support for municipal development programs and pilot projects in five urban areas. The project comprised four components, under the direction of the Ministry of State Administration's National Directorate for Local Administration. Two, Legal and Institutional Reform and Fiscal, Financial and Organizational Reform, covered legal, policy, and institutional reform. The third, Urban/Environmental Management, covered local planning and public investments, including municipal development plans in each city and physical pilot projects. The fourth was Capacity Building, Institutional Support, and Project Management. - ii - IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 3. The project, approved in June 1993, became effective in July 1994 and closed on March 31, 1999 after one twelve month extension. Of the credit amount of SDR 16.4 million, SDR 3.5 million was cancelled in December 1997. Total project costs were $13.9 million as compared to $24.5 million. By category, the most significant deviation from appraisal estimates concerned the provision for consulting services, estimated at appraisal at about $6.7 million as compared to about $9.5 million eventually disbursed. 4. The PROL project achieved its main stated objectives. It supported the drafting of the legislation, known collectively as the Pacote Autdrquico, enabling the 33 provincial capitals, cities and towns to be governed independently by elected Assemblies and Presidents. Work under the PROL involved reviewing the legal, functional and administrative framework for local government, evaluating the fiscal, financial and organizational framework, and formulating and implementing the institutional reform program embodied in the new legislation. Some of the necessary regulations to make the laws functional, as well as legal follow-up work were also drafted under PROL. Finally, PROL was responsible for developing a new computerized financial management system for municipal finances. Key regulations to implement the legislation remain to be drafted or are incomplete. In addition to the reforms under the first two components, the main achievement under the third component was the production of structure plans for each of the five cities, but none of the physical pilot projects under the third component were implemented. 5. The project achieved its objectives despite problems which included exogenous events, flawed project design, deficient performance on the part of the Bank, and weak management on the part of the borrower. The project overcame these obstacles largely because decentralization had acquired its own political momentum, grounding the project in an environment of high Borrower commitment to its basic objectives. The project also benefited from an atmosphere of general donor community support for decentralization in the country. 6. Several factors limited the quality and quantity of some outputs. First, the constitutionality of the original 1994 legislation creating autonomous local governments was challenged, leading to a two year delay in the municipal elections. In the event, these elections were held in June, 1998, eight months before the (extended) close of the project. Second, the third component, involving local pilot studies and investments nominally under the Ministry of Works and Housing, proved too difficult to implement effectively, although much important preparatory work was done and structure plans for each city were completed. Third, the project's management structure was fragmented and not properly coordinated. Fourth, despite an effort to design the project flexibly to allow for a better reflection of the borrower's evolving needs, the project did not adequately take account of the political risks that would affect the timetables for a majority of the outputs. Fifth, difficulties in the relationship between the borrower and the Bank had a negative effect on implementation performance during the project's entire life span. Borrower performance was inhibited by a rapid turnover of task managers during design and by what it perceived to be the Bank's bureaucratic and unconstructive approach to supervision. The Bank's ability to provide positive and substantive input - ii- was hampered by weaknesses on the part of the borrower that caused process issues to absorb supervision resources, and a major Bank reorganization during 1996-97 which played a role in diverting management's attention from the problems in the borrower- Bank relationship. The mid-term review did lead to some minor changes to the design of the project, but both the Bank and the Government missed the opportunity to fundamentally restructure the project to accommodate for the delays in the political arena and the evident weaknesses in the third component. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS, AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED 7. The objective of supporting the Government's decentralization program was appropriate and was largely achieved. However, it represents only the first practical steps in Mozambique's long term decentralization program. Additional support will be needed to complete the legal and regulatory framework, to build the capacity within the municipal governments to meet their new challenges, and to expand the scope of municipal government authority. The Government, supported by the Bank, is preparing a Municipal Development Program to address these issues over the long term. Key lessons leamt from the PROL are the following: * The project was successful in achieving its stated objectives and outcomes, despite problems in the performance of both the Bank and the Borrower and the political diffTiculties of the process. The PROL project demonstrates that such obstacles can be overcome if commitment on the part of the client at the policy- making level is high. * The project's design was limited by a more restricted array of instruments for bank support than is currently available. The use of the Engineering Credit instrument, which is intended to be used as a precursor for large investment projects, did not provide the flexibility (in light of political changes, for example) needed in the PROL or allow for the sort of learning and long-term support that the LL or APL instruments could provide today. * The risks of the PROL were inadequately assessed and managed. The political risks and uncertainties of such a fundamental governance reform (decentralization) should have been taken into account through a more flexible project design. The implementation risks of Component 3 were not properly handled. The Bank and the Government should have undertaken a fundamental restructuring of the project after the postponement of the municipal elections. * The success of such projects (geared toward political and governance reforms) are especially dependent on a high level of trust between the Bank and the borrower. The Bank should be more careful to monitor and promptly address any problems in the relationship. * Projects that include several components coordinated by more than one ministry face difficulties in a capacity-constrained environment, both in terms of borrower coordination and Bank supervision. More streamlined - iv - management structures, preferably with one clearly defined responsible ministry, are essential. * Where implementation capacity is especially scarce, projects should ensure that local staff have the necessary skills, perhaps developed through an initial period devoted to training those responsible for the management of the project. In addition, Bank supported projects should take better note of the risks associated with the availability of counterpart funds, and should be designed to include more effective mechanisms for the prompt provision of counterpart funds. REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (Credit No. 2530-MZ) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT PART 1 - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. BACKGROUND 1. The Local Government Reform and Engineering Project, known by its Portuguese acronym PROL, emerged from two separate themes of Bank support for Mozambique's development. The first relates to the rehabilitation of Mozambique's badly deteriorated cities. Mozambique was and remains one of the poorest countries in the world, the results of a seventeen year civil war and misguided economic policies. The impact of the civil war was severe in urban areas, where under-funded and crumbling infrastructure had to meet the demands of a rapidly growing population of refugees from the countryside. In 1987, the Government with IDA assistance, introduced reform efforts to reverse the decline in GDP through macroeconomic and fiscal stabilization, growth incentives, and a specific focus on poverty alleviation. The adjustment process was supported by a series of investment projects that, although not classified technically as emergency projects, contained the elements of such projects, including simplified and shortened implementation schedules under defined action plans aimed at mitigating the social effects of adjustment and the effects of the civil war. Among these was the Urban Rehabilitation Project (PRU, Cr. 1949) to rehabilitate basic urban infrastructure and build capacity among Mozambican public authorities. PRU became effective in February 1989 and closed in October 1996. 1 2. The second theme relates to reforning the governance of a country emerging from civil war and a command economy. Mozambique, both under-Portuguese colonial rule and since independence, had been, fonnally, highly centralized, but the practical reality of the country had defied effective centralized control. Colonial rule had to constantly contend with strong centrifugal forces, and during the civil war the central government exerted only weak control over large portions of the country. With peace in 1992, the central government in Maputo was able, almost for the first time, to extend its reach over the entire country. Nevertheless, decentralization became a central tenet of Government policy to deal with the practical reality of providing services, particularly in remote areas, as a way of strengthening national unity and exercising effective control over the country. 3. The principles of decentralization were introduced into law in 1994, but municipal elections were delayed until June 1998. In the intervening period, the Government reduced the scope of decentralization, adopting an incremental approach in which, initially, elected, self-governing municipalities were created for a limited number of cities 1 See the Implementation Completion Report for this project, Report No. 16747 dated June 20, 1997. - 2 - and towns, and the central government remains responsible for the provincial and district administrations. The process adopted over this period was "gradualism", introducing an open-ended schedule for transferring authority to subnational levels. The municipal elections of June 1998, in 33 cities, towns and vilas, were boycotted by the leading opposition Renamo party and a majority of the minor parties, and the abstention rate was almost 86 percent for reasons that are not yet fully understood. However, the newly elected municipal assemblies and presidents were sworn in in August 1998 and have continued functioning. B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS 4. The two themes of previous Bank support to Mozambique described above, urban rehabilitation and decentralization, converged with the preparation of the PROL project, and are reflected in the project objectives. According to the Memorandum of the President (MOP), the overall objective of the project was to support the Government of Mozambique's decentralization program by assisting with its municipal reform and capacity building initiatives. The reforms were to focus on the legal, institutional and fiscal framework of local government in order to create a suitable structure for self- sufficient and accountable local authorities, and were to be implemented on a pilot basis in five urban areas designated as project cities. Secondary objectives were to: (i) assist the Government to create an appropriate policy framework for investment in the urban sector; (ii) prepare urban investment plans for the five project cities, including plans for the efficient management, rehabilitation, and financing of essential urban infrastructure and services; (iii) test specific, replicable approaches to solving entrenched urban problems (including absorption of rural migrants, environmental degradation, and low cost transportation); and (iv) coordinate the work of donor agencies, multilaterals and NGOs in the urban and local government sectors. 5. The project had four components: a. Legal and institutional reform, which included: (i) transforming the existing legal, functional and administrative framework of local government; and (ii) formulating and implementing an efficient institutional reform program to improve the capacity of municipalities to plan, manage and maintain efficient urban infrastructure and services. b. Fiscal, financial and organizational reform which included: (i) evaluating the present fiscal, financial and organizational performance of local government in such areas as intergovernmental responsibilities' for financial management, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, existing and potential sources of revenue and the equity and effectiveness of revenue generating instruments, and the effectiveness of existing organizational and staffing arrangements; (ii) designing an action plan for effective implementation of recommended financial and organizational reforms; and (iii) ensuring coordination of these reforms with those proposed for the legal and institutional aspects of local government. -3 - c. Urban/environmental management, which included: (i) formulating municipal development programs for each of the five cities; and (ii) carrying out pilot projects in the five cities, specifically land mapping in all five urban areas, land information systems in Maputo, non-motorized transport in Beira, environmental rehabilitation in Nampula, and neighborhood upgrading in Pemba. d. Capacity building, institutional support and project management, which included operating costs, vehicles, equipment, and technical assistance to the Ministry of State Administration (MAE), to the project cities, and to the former Ministry of Construction and Water (now Ministry of Public Works and Housing, MOPH). 6. MAE had overall responsibility for implementation, assisted by three Working Groups (WGs): WGI for Legal and Institutional Reform, WGII for Fiscal and Financial Reform, and WGIII for Urban and Environmental Management. Overall policy guidance and coordination was to be provided by an Inter-ministerial Committee (IMC). Links between the WGs was to be provided by the Inter-ministerial Coordinating Group (CG), which included representatives from the Ministries of Planning and Finance (MPF), Justice, Public Works and Housing (MOPH), National Commission for the Environment (CNA, which during the course of the project would become the Ministry of the Environment, MICOA), the Institute for Physical Planning (INPF) within MPF, and the Executive Councils of the five cities. The CG was chaired by the Director for the Directorate for Local Administration (DNAL) in MAE. Day to day operations were to be facilitated by a Technical Support Unit (TSU), under the leadership of a Project Director in DNAL, while the structure plans and pilot sub-projects were to be assisted by HABITAR (the agency that managed urban rehabilitation contracts under MOPH). (See Appendix C for a diagram of the management structures.) 7. Some saw PROL as the heir to PRU and part of the urban rehabilitation theme of Bank support, with policy and capacity building components as complements to enable better local management. However, most saw it as a technical assistance project supporting a fundamental reform in the country's governance structures. It is useful to remember that the decentralization process until early 1997 was meant to encompass not just a limited number of urban areas, but most of the country including the rural areas. 8. Support for decentralization was clearly relevant in the context of Mozambique at the time. While some have questioned the wisdom of a rapid shift towards autonomous local governments in a country lacking the basic building blocks of local administration (such as the minimum institutional infrastructure in terms of public expenditure management), there is no doubt that the government had committed itself irreversibly to this course, and external technical and financial support was essential. 2 While demanding in terms of local capacity and risky because it required substantial political intervention, components 2 See Vito Tanzi, Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects, paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1995; and Jennie Litvack, Junaid Ahmad and Richard Bird, Rethinking Decentralization inDeveloping Countries, PREM Sector Studies Series, The World Bank, 1998. - 4 - 1 and 2 were appropriate (although the separation between the legal/institutional and fiscal/organizational components turned out to be unnecessary and impractical). The objectives of components 1 and 2 are one step along the way towards improving the capacity of municipalities "to plan, manage and maintain efficient urban infrastructure and services". 3 To achieve these broader goals falls outside the scope of any one project, but PROL laid a solid foundation towards reaching them. Improving urban management was also a legitimate priority, and support for pilot urban investment projects, as in component 3, also was appropriate to bring the activities of Working Groups I and II "down to earth". The problem lay in neither the Bank nor the Government having clearly understood the additional complexity and risk, in terms of implementation, that the inclusion of component 3 would pose. C. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 9. The project was largely successful. in achieving its main stated objectives. Consistent with the MOP, WGs I and II elaborated a new set of laws known collectively as the Pacote Autcirquico, which comprised the legislation enabling the 33 provincial capitals, cities and towns to be governed by elected, autonomous governments. This involved reviewing the current legal, functional and administrative framework for local government, as well as evaluating the fiscal, financial and organizational framework, and formulating and implementing the institutional reform program embodied in the new legislation. The new laws include: the law regulating the functions and organization of local governments (Lei clas Autarquias Locais) passed in February 1997; three laws governing elections, passed in March, April and May 1997; the law governing administrative oversight by the central government of local governments (Lei da Tutela Administrativa do Estado sobre as Autaquias Locais) passed in July 1997; the law creating the local municipalities (Lei da Criaqdo de Autarquias Locais) passed in October 1997; and the law regulating local finances (Lei das Finan as e Patrimonio Locais) passed in November 1997. In addition, WGI elaborated some of the necessary regulations to make the laws functional, as well as undertook legal follow-up work (such as promulgating relevant legal opinions and drafting example modalities for the key municipal activities.) Finally, WGI was also responsible for developing a new computerized management system for municipal finances, the Sistema de Gestdo Financiera AIunicipal (SISGEF), which was developed jointly with the Centro de Informatica Universidade Edoardo Mondlane (CIUEM), the information technology center at Edoardo Mondlane University. Thus, the basic legal and fiscal framework for autonomous local government in the 33 municipalities was put in place. While a number of regulations to implement the above laws remain to be drafted or are incomplete (specifically, the code governing municipal taxes and the rules governing the transfer, mobility, and management of municipal employees were drafted but not acted on, and the rules governing competitive bidding for contracts for municipal works were not drafted), the project's achievement under these two components is especially notable, particularly given Mozambique's capacity constraints and the setbacks that these reforms faced 3 This is actually part of the description of the second sub-component of the Legal and Institutional Reform component on page 3 of the MOP, but clearly speaks to the broader objectives of the project. during the life of the project (including having the first decentralization law declared unconstitutional, postponement of the local elections, and difficulties in coordination.) 10. Achievements under the third component of the project-Urban/Environmental Management-were fewer. The most notable were the structure plans for each of the five cities. The structure plans were largely completed just up to the project's closing date, having been considerably delayed due to the lack of an institutional "home" for component 3 (see below), coordination and procurement problems, and some problems with inadequate performance by consultants. They appear to be of generally good quality and to have benefited from reasonable consultation with stakeholders in the community. Component 3 also produced an important study on reforming regulations and processes for urban planning (for which there has been no follow-up) and a study of cadastral management in Maputo (which also is awaiting follow-up). Aside from the structure plans, the most tangible achievements of this component were those funded by other donors: rapid mapping in the five cities (which produced aerial photos, photo maps, and digitized maps) funded by the Norwegian government (NORAD) and the adressage project in Maputo funded by the French government, plus a few pilot environmental rehabilitation activities in Nampula funded by the Dutch government. Although much useful preparatory work was undertaken, none of the Bank funded pilot projects were implemented (these were urban upgrading in the Natite area of Pemba; urban environmental improvements in Nampula; non-motorized transport in Beira; and the construction of a building for cadastral archives in Maputo). These pilot projects were all cancelled as a result of (a) severe delays due to procurement problems and inadequate communication between the Bank and the borrower and (b) poor performance by consultants. The failings of this component, while disappointing, should not detract from the overall achievement of the project, whose main objective was governance reform. D. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE 11. The PROL project experienced implementation problems which limited the scope of some of the outputs of Components I and 2, resulted in the cancellation of several pilot sub-projects under Component 3, and allowed only a small amount of training to be carried out. Implementation was hindered by factors outside the Government's control (notably the deficient performance of the Bank; see below); by factors within the Government's control (i.e., flaws in the design of the project); and by factors within the implementing agency's control. 12. The success of the project in achieving its objectives, despite these problems, is explained by two factors. First, it was possible for a committed group of senior officials to persevere with the establishment of the policy and legal framework for municipal devolution. Second, this effort was carried along by a political momentum for decentralization that grounded the project in an environment highly supportive of its main objectives. In Mozambique, support for decentralization came from a number of sources, including a recognition of the practical need to deliver services more effectively, the political imperative to complete the unfinished agenda of the peace process, and a strong belief in the importance of decentralization on the part of almost all of Mozambique's donor partners. - 6 - 13. A key factor outside the project's control was the delay in the municipal elections, originally scheduled for late 1996 but which only took place in June 1998, eight months before the (extended) close of the project. A major cause of this delay was that the original 1994 decentralization law was found to be unconstitutional, and the Government had to draft and pass a new law, along with a change in the constitution. The project was designed essentially to help create and to support the new municipal govemments, so this inevitably inhibited the achievement of the project's secondary objectives of building capacity at the local level and piloting locally-driven public investment programs. 14. The Bank and the Government can take considerable credit for leadership in designing a decentralization reform package that proved central to the Government's overall reform program. However, several drawbacks in the project's design emerged. One was the underestimation of the risks and problems of implementing a project combining policy and governance reforms with urban management and pilot civil works activities. The third component, while arguably sound in theory to provide a practical grounding for the project's main focus on policy reform, did not in practice fit well institutionally into the project and proved unwieldy to implement. 15. Weak coordination between MAE and MOPH, MICOA, and INPF hampered implementation of WGIII's activities, which were due in large part to the absence of an institution responsible for them. The original project design called for HABITAR, a project management entity established under the previous PRU project, to manage Working Group III. Institutional strengthening of HABITAR with, among other things, the appointment of a senior urban planner, was a condition of project effectiveness. However, HABITAR was disbanded almost immediately after effectiveness. As a result, this component of PROL became by default the nominal concern of the Department of Civil Construction in MOPH. However, in practice, neither MOPH, nor the newly created MICOA took an active role in managing it. Moreover, the INPF, which might have been considered to play a role, was slated to be disbanded and was not included in project design. In fact, NPF was not disbanded, but neither was it given formal responsibility within PROL. 16. A second design problem was the project's complex internal structure. Responsibility for the three Working Groups, each headed by a separate individual, was fragmented and not well coordinated. The roles of the Interministerial Committee (IMC), the Coordinating Group (CG), and the Working Groups (WGs) were not well defined. The separation of WGI and WGII was unnecessary and caused coordination problems. At the political level, the IMC met rarely and failed to provide any link to the Council of Ministers. At the implementation level, the CG also met rarely. The WGs, which were intended to comprise senior officers from each of the relevant ministries supported by consultants, in fact comprised only consultants. Not only was coordination between the WGs inadequate, coordination even within the WGs was in some cases a problem. WGI was staffed by two successive groups of consultants, but the second group seems to have had no contact with the first. The TSU, while designed to be a coordinating unit at the implementation level, was not supplied with the authority or staff to act as a traditional project implementation unit (PIU). According to Bank staff involved in the design of the project, this was an intentional attempt to avoid the pitfalls of a PUJ. However, the TSU -7- was unable to fulfill its coordination role, notably in the case of training, and lacked the necessary authority, capacity and skills to act effectively as a "secretariat' for the project. This was exacerbated by the fact that the TSU was never provided with an Organizational and Administrative Manager, as called for in the original project design, leaving that role to be fulfilled by the CG chairman (the Director of MAE's Directorate of Local Administration), who had many other responsibilities, making it difficult for him to devote adequate time to the project. 17. In lieu of formal coordination and leadership within the project structure, these were provided ad hoc by a small cadre of committed individuals in DNAL, WGII, and WGIIIt who can be largely credited with the success of the project, but whose efforts could not substitute for the inadequate inter-institutional linkages. Slowness in coordination between MAE and the Ministry of Planning and Finance hindered work on key fiscal and financial issues. Resolution is pending of issues concerning the transfer of future responsibilities and resources to municipal governments, mechanisms for coordinating financial reporting, and measures to tackle compensation for former state employees severed from municipal service. 18. Although the project was intended to be implemented flexibly, in recognition of the uncertainties of the political reform process, in practice the project was flawed by the treatment of political decisions as controllable project outputs. The use of the Engineering Project instrument may have suited the types of activities in the third component of PROL, but it seems to have not been well adapted to the design and implementation of the main political, legal, and regulatory reform components of the project. For example, in the MOP, Appendix B, laws passed are listed as monitoring indicators, or are assumed to have been passed once they have been drafted. As a result, the Bank tended to confuse delays in political decision-making with delays in project implementation. This could have been corrected through a project restructuring. 19. At the project level, very little of the expected training was carried out, despite constant urging by the Bank for a comprehensive training program and plan. What was provided was linked to specific activities, such as seminars on the new legal framework, training in the new financial management systems, and a few technically oriented seminars on topics like land registration. The training assessments planned in Appendix E of the MOP were not carried out, nor was any long-term coherent training program developed. The reasons include the project's awkward management structure, the absence of an Organizational and Administrative Manager, and the view that training should be postponed until the new municipal governments were installed. 20. Second, Appendix E of the MOP outlined a process of consultations to be linked with specific stages of the development of the decentralization reforms, e.g., after the principles of reform had been outlined but before the drafting of legislation, after the draft legislation had been prepared, on the completion of analytical studies, and prior to the implementation of reforms. Except for those held in connection with the structure plans, none of these consultation took place. One reason was simply that project management was over-extended. Another was that the uncertainties and sensitivities of the political process made organizing formal consultations difficult. -8 - 21. The project experienced serious and recurrent procurement delays. Misunderstandings occurred over the specifications and awarding of bids for goods and the tenns of reference and selection of consultants. On the Government side, officials complained that the Bank was overly rigid and bureaucratic, delaying the provision of no objections for reasons that failed to recognize the real difficulties that MAE faced. On the Bank side, staff complained that MAE's response time was often slow, that Bank procurement procedures and fiduciary responsibilities were misunderstood or even ignored, and that a lack of counterpart funds was frequently the cause of extended delays. Documentary evidence suggests that on some occasions the Bank took a bureaucratic rather than facilitating role. These occasions created the perception, on the part of the client, that this approach characterized all the Bank's dealings with this project. However exaggerated, this perception worsened an already strained relationship between the Bank and the borrower (see Section F below). 22. MAE and Bank staff agree that counterpart funds were often unreliable, and that MPF's approval of contracts was often seriously delayed. The problem of counterpart funds seems to be particularly acute in the case of MAE, as compared to some other Ministries, which typically can draw from a pool of counterpart funds generated by a number of projects. 23. The implementing agency had difficulties managing, commenting on, and evaluating the work of the consultants in the WGs. This situation was exacerbated by the absence of senior government officials on the WGs and the difficulties of inter-ministerial coordination. Slow or inadequate review by MPF and MOPH delayed or left incomplete some regulations and studies. E. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 24. Since the legislative framework is in place, municipal elections have occurred, and new municipal governments have taken office, the main accomplishments of the project are likely to be sustainable. This project, however, is only a first step in a much longer program of decentralization. Next steps would need to include, among others, strengthening of the new autonomous municipalities, the completion of the legal framework particularly critical regulations covering taxation, inter-governmental financial management, and staffing, as well as the extension of municipal authority over the full range of sector activities devolving to the municipal level under the new legislation. These next steps will be necessary to ensure the achievement of the promised improvements in planning, managing, and maintaining municipal infrastructure and services, and thus to ensure the long-term success of the decentralization program. As long as Mozambique remains politically stable and its economy continues to improve, there seems to be no reason to doubt that decentralization will move forward and begin to deliver the hoped-for benefits. 25. The sustainability of some of the project's other outputs, on the other hand, is more uncertain. What little capacity building of non-elected officials that has taken place, in the form of training, is likely to be short-lived unless changes in pay and working conditions improve to encourage qualified people to stay in the municipal civil services. - 9 - Similarly, maintenance of equipment purchased under the project is likely to be a problem unless the municipalities improve their revenue collection and management systems. Finally, the municipalities will need substantial financial and technical support to implement the structure plans produced under WGIII. F. BANK PERFORMANCE 26. The Bank took a leading role in project design and should be given credit for taking the initiative in encouraging the Government to pursue an ambitious decentralization program. This is particularly notable in that this took place at an early stage in the Bank's relationship with the Government and at a point when Mozambique had just emerged from civil war and was still in transition towards a peacetime economy and democracy. It represents a major investment of confidence in the Government at a very difficult time. Apart from this, however, the Bank's performance on this project was problematic throughout, and it is rated deficient overall. The Bank must bear a majority of the responsibility for the design problems already discussed. The Bank underestimated the inherent difficulty and political sensitivity of the project's objectives and components, and it overestimated the capacity of the borrower to implement the project. 27. The project had three World Bank task managers between identification and effectiveness. A fourth took over after effectiveness and remained with the project until about one year before closing. This rapid turnover of task managers caused a number of problems, including changes in project design which were not always fully "owned" by the Mozambican authorities and a shift in approach, from more to less flexible application of Bank rules. This created confusion among the Mozambican authorities, many -of whom were not yet very familiar with Bank practices, and a sense that they had been misled. By the time of effectiveness, Mozambican officials and staff had already started to view the Bank's procedures as an obstacle to be overcome rather than an aid towards a better outcome, and the relationship between the Bank and the Government at the working level had been seriously strained. 28. The relationship was further strained during implementation as the Bank was increasingly seen by the borrower as tending to be critical on issues of procedure and compliance with guidelines, rather than helpful in solving problems collaboratively. Not only did the difficult relations between the Bank and the borrower impede the smooth implementation of the proj ectper se, but it led to the Bank being largely excluded from providing advice at the technical level on the substance of the reforms. In fact, according to Bank staff, technical advice on the substance of the reforms was offered informally throughout the process, but lack of trust and the chronic procedural problems impeded most constructive dialogue on these matters. 29. The mid-term review was a missed opportunity to restructure the project in light of the delayed municipal elections and the slow progress on the pilot projects. Some minor changes were made, for example, to focus more on intergovernmental fiscal transfers and strengthen the capacity building and training activities. The mid-term review failed to come to grips with the fact that many of the project's activities were being affected by the - 10- postponement of the municipal elections, that the new municipal governments would, once elected, require substantial support including training, or that the pilot proj ects were unlikely to be implemented under current structures. The project was later extended by one year (from the original closing date of March 31, 1998) in conjunction with minor adjustments and a cancellation of SDR 3,550,000, but, again, nothing was done to address the root problems facing the project. The extension was granted simply to allow time to complete some of the ongoing tasks, including preparation of decrees, establishment of mechanisms for the transfer of competencies, development of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, strengthening of dissemination and locally-based technical assistance, and implementation of the pilot projects. 30. The Bank's reorganization during 1996-97 played a role in diverting management's attention from the project's problems. Insufficient management guidance inhibited the development of needed restructuring of the project and left the troubled relationship unaddressed. By the time of the mid-term review in October 1996, both the Mozambican authorities and Bank staff recognized that the relationship at the working level had deteriorated badly, but no moves were made to remedy the situation. 31. The final blow to the relationship was the Bank's refusal to consider the Government's request for an additional year's extension to allow the project to start building capacity in the new municipal governments elected in June 1998. Delays and confusion lasting several months characterized the transfer of the project to the last task manager in October 1998, which contributed to this lapse. In retrospect, uncommitted funds could have been productively used to provide training and technical assistance to the new municipal governments, thus laying a foundation of both better relations and improved capacity. G. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 32. Despite the difficulties in implementation and the Bank's unsatisfactory performance, the main objectives of the project were achieved. 4 The borrower's performance had very significant shortcomings, but it is rated satisfactory taking into account the factors discussed under sections D and F above. A major reason for the project's success is that it was driven by a high level of Government commitment: not only was decentralization part of the Government's five year plan (and therefore of its political platform), but it constituted an important part of the peace process, and became a condition of bilateral donor support. Nevertheless, the challenge of decentralization, especially given the time frame, the limited capacity of the Government in general and of the implementing ministry in particular, makes the achievements of the project particularly notable. 33. Weaknesses in the borrower's performance during implementation of the project included: lack of coordination, within the project implementation structure and inter- institutionally; lack of initiative to restructure the project in light of changed circumstances; inadequate management of consultant contracts; faulty administration of procurement procedures, and inadequate provision of counterpart funds. Moreover, the 4During the ICR mission, a top-level Government official stated that the Bank had not been a good partner and that the project had been a success "in spite of the Bank." - 11 - Borrower was slow in meeting a majority of the conditions of effectiveness, causing a delay of almost a year before the project became effective. In large part this was due to capacity constraints, and to unfamiliarity with Bank procedures in engaging consultant services, for example. H. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES 34. The PROL project was responsible for legislation that has had a profound effect on governance and public administration in Mozambique. Under the project, the Government enacted the framework legislation for autonomous governments in 33 municipalities, as well as the legislation for municipal elections and municipal finance. These elections took place, and the new municipal governments have been installed. The first practical steps in Mozambique's decentralization program have therefore been taken. There is still a long way to go, however, to complete the legislative framework, to build the capacity within the municipal governments to meet their new challenges, and to expand the scope of municipal government authority. The project had two main failures. One was its inability to build capacity in the new municipal governments, mainly because of the long postponement of the local elections, but secondarily because the project could have been restructured and/or extended but was not. The other was the failure to implement any of the physical pilot projects, thereby leaving the municipal councils with a sense of having been left out and depriving them of tangible outputs "on the ground", however small. While disappointing, these failures did not significantly compromise the achievement of the project's main contributions to the Government's decentralization program. 1. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 35. A number of lessons can be learned from the PROL project: * The project was successful in achieving its stated objectives and outcomes, despite problems in the performance of both the Bank and the Borrower and the political difficulties of the process. The PROL project demonstrates that such obstacles can be overcome if commitment on the part of the client at the policy- making level is high. * The project's design was limited by a more restricted array of instruments for bank support than is currently available. The use of the Engineering Credit instrument, which is intended to be used as a precursor for large investment projects, did not provide the flexibility (in light of political changes, for example) needed in the PROL or allow for the sort of learning and long-term support that the LIL or APL instruments could provide today. * The risks of the PROL were inadequately assessed and managed. The political risks and uncertainties of such a fundamental governance reform (decentralization) should have been taken into account through a more flexible project design. The implementation risks of Component 3 were not properly - 12 - handled. The Bank and the Government should have undertaken a fundamental restructuring of the project after the postponement of the municipal elections. * The success of such projects (geared toward political and governance reforms) are especially dependent on a high level of trust between the Bank and the borrower. The Bank should be more careful to monitor and promptly address any problems in the relationship. * Projects that include several components coordinated by more than one ministry face difficulties in a capacity-constrained environment, both in terms of borrower coordination and Bank supervision. More streamlined management structures, preferably with one clearly defined responsible ministry, are essential. * Where implementation capacity is especially scarce, projects should ensure that local staff have the necessary skills, perhaps developed through an initial period devoted to training those responsible for the management of the project. In addition, Bank supported projects should take better note of the risks associated with the availability of counterpart funds, and should be designed to include more effective mechanisms for the prompt provision of counterpart funds. Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Project Objectives Assessment Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Categories J Macroeconomic Policies X Sector Policies X Financial Objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives X Gender concerns X Other social objectives X Environmental objectives _ _ _ __ _ X___ Public sector management X Private sector development X Other X B. Project Sustainability Likely Uncertain | Unlikely x C. Bank Performance Stage of Project Cycle Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification X Preparation x Appraisal X Supervision x D. Borrower Performance Stage of Project Cycle Highly satisfactory | Satisfactory Deficient Preparation x Implementation Covenant Compliance X E. Assessment of Outcome Highly Satisfactory Marginally Unsatisfactory Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory x Table 2: Related Bank Credits and Loans Preceding Operations Title Urban Rehabilitation Project Loan no. 1949-MOZ Year of approval 1988 Amount SDR 44.0 million Purpose : To assist in stemming deterioration in basic urban infrastructure and services, and to mitigate the social costs of structural adjustment through the implementation of a program of urban rehabilitation and employment generation. Status Closed October 1996 Title Legal and Public Sector Capacity Building Credit no. : 2437-MOZ Year of approval : 1992 Amount SDR 10.9 million Purpose : Civil service reform and capacity building in the Ministiy of State Administration and legal institutions. Status : ongoing Following Operations Title Municipal Development Project Credit no. Year of approval : 2001 Amount : To be determined Purpose : Continuation of policy reform, municipal capacity building, and introduction of municipal infrastructure grants Status In preparation Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in project cycle Date planned [ Date actual Identification Not Available 11/91 Preparation Not Available Not Available Appraisal Not Available 06/92 Negotiations 514/93 04/04/93 Letter of development policy Not Available Not Available Board presentation Not Available 6/29/93 Signing Not Available 9/17/93 Effectiveness 10/1/93 7/30/94 Credit closing 3/31/98 3/31/99 Source: Project Files and Bank staff estimates. PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual | FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FYOO Appraisal estimate 1.7 2.9 5.2 9.9 3.5 0.0 0.0 Actual 0.0 3.6 1.6 1.9_ 1.7 4.4 0.4 Actual as % of estimate 0 124 31 19 49 - Cumulative 0 3.6 5.2 7.1 8.8 13.2 13.6 Date of Final disbursement Source: Bank MIS, Bank Loan Administration System and staff estimates. Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Key implementation indicators in the SAR/President's [ Estimated Actual Completion Dates Report Completion Dates Enactment of key decentralization laws First law passed in March 1994; final law passed in November 1997 Elaboration and approval of an urban services delivery and Not completed management policy Broad consultation process with Municipalities in the Too soon for consultation conduct of the decentralization process, and agreement on yet with the municipalities; the transfer of competence and associate funding resources no agreement on transfer of competencies other than those transferred to new local governments taking office. Completion of structure plans in the five pilot cities, and the Structure plans completed adoption of urban planning regulations and procedures in March 1999, and under review by INPF after close of project Implementation of pilot projects None implemented Source: Project files and Bank staff estimates. Note: This project was prepared before the formal requirement for key indicators of project implementation. The project was retrofitted with the above indicators, but no completion dates were provided. Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation Not applicable . The preparation of the project's SAR took place before the development of these indicators had become part of the appraisal process. Table 7: Studies Included in the Project Study Purpose Status and impact 1. Legal and Institutional Component Ante-projecto da Lei Quadro das Draft of general local Law approved 1997 Autarquias Locais government law Ante-projecto da Lei da Tutela Draft of law on government Law approved 1997 Administrativa do Estado sobre as oversight of municipalities Autarquias Locais Ante-projecto da Lei do Estatuto Especial Draft of special statute for City of Law approved 1997 da Cidade de Maputo Maputo Ante-projecto da Lei sobre o Estatuto dos Draft of law on members and Law approved 1997 Titulares e Membros dos Orgaos appointees of municipal bodies Autarquicas Ante-projecto da Lei das Financas e Draft of local government finance Law approved 1997 Patrimonio Locais law Ante-projecto da Lei do Recenseamento Draft of law on census for voter Law approved 1997 Eleitoral Sistematico para as Eleicoes e registration Referendos Ante-projecto da Lei da Criacao da Draft of law establishing national Law approved 1997 Comissao NVacional das Eleicoes election commission Ante-projecto da Lei Eleitoral para os Draft of electoral law for Law approved 1997 Orgaos das Autarquias Locais autarchies Ante-projecto do Lei da Criacao das Draft of law for creation of new Law approved 1997 Autarquias de Cidade e Vila autarchies Ante-projecto de lei sobre mobilidade de Draft of law on mobility of public Completed and submitted to funcionarios entre quadros da servants between central and local government Administracao do Estado e dasAutarquias government Locais Anteprojecto de Decreto sobre os Draft decree on basic contents of Completed and submitted to Principios Fundamentais a constarem nos internal regulations of Municipal government Regimentos das Assenibleias Municipais Assemblies and model regulations and Aodelo de Regimento dasAssembleias Municipais Anteprojecto de Decreto sobre os Draft decree on basic contents of Completed and submitted to Principios Fundamentais a constarem nos internal regulations of Municipal government Regulamentos Internos do Conselhos Councils and model regulations Municipais and Modelo de Regimento dos Conselhos Municipais Proposals for municipal regulations and Completed and submitted to laws on cemeteries, markets, ambulant government traders, vehicles of hire. Training Manuals on local government Completed legislation Glossary of local government legislation (2 Completed volumes) Study Purpose Status and impact 2. Financial and Fiscal Component Contribuicao aos EstudosRelativos aos Comparative analysis of budget Completed, February 1995 Sistemas de Transferencias Orcamentais transfer systems in Brazil, Peru and Columbia, to provide basis for legislation Methodology for collection of data on To define working methodology Completed, December 1995 municipal fmances and financial administration Relatorio de Pre-politicas de transferencias Presentation of budget scenarios Completed, September 1995 orcamentais e mobilizacao de recursos and proposals for municipalities' locais own revenues and budget transfers, to provide basis for legislation. Bases teenicas de capacitacao de recuirsos To provide basis for training in Completed, October 1995 humanos dos Conselhos no uso do sistema computer use and fmancial de gestao de financas locais management J. Relatorio da Area de Design of financial management Completed, August 1995 Sistemas system and method of implementation Final Report of initial contract of Includes conclusions and policy Completed, May 1996 KPMG/IBAM, covering studies of recommendations made by the municipal fmancial management, capacity Consultant. building, urban services and organizational structure. Manuals on accounting, treasury e others 6 user manuals on procedures and Completed, December 1996 standards for financial management. Situacao financeira dos Municipios e To provide basis for legislation Completed, July 1997 investimento municipal Management instruments for SISGEF Manual for senior managers of Completed, October 1997 (Financial management system) SISGEF (Finance Directors and Presidents of Municipal Councils) explaining management tools provided by SISGEF. Manual de Rerefencia Operacional do Short version of user manuals Completed, November 1997 SISGEF Relatorio de Politicas de Servicos Urbanos Policy proposals for provision of Completed, November 1997 de Utilidade Pub lica (English and waste collection, water, sanitation Portuguese) and public transport. Implantacao do Sistema de Financas Draft legislation covering the Completed January, 1998. Autarquicas - dispositivos transitorios period of transition from central to Submitted to Ministry of Planning local government financial and Finance management Study Purpose Status and impact K. Propostas de organizacao 6 volumes of proposals for the Completed, March 1998 administrativa structure and staffing requirements for the 5 PROL cities L. Codigo de Posturas Model proposal for municipal laws Completed March 1998. Submitted Autarquicas to Ministry of Planning and Finance, no decision yet Codigo Tributario Autarquico Draft regulations for municipal Completed May 1998. Submitted to taxes Council of Ministers, no decision yet Proposta de decreto sobre transferencia de Draft decree on transfer of Completed May 1998. Submitted competencias responsibilities from central to to Ministry of Planning and local government Finance, no decision yet 3. Urban and Environmental Management Component Planeamento e Gestao Urbana em Basis for the definition of Submitted to National Institute of Mo,cambique legislation, regulations and Physical Planning, June 1997 procedures on urban development planning Stiicture Plan for Greater Maputo Completed, March 1999 Structure Plan and Priority Action Plan for Completed, March 1999 the city of Quelimane Structure Plan and Priority Action Plan for Completed, March 1999 the city of Pemba Structure Plan and Priority Action Plan for Completed, March 1999 the cities of Beira and Dondo Structure Plan for the city of Nampula Completed, March 1999 and approved by the Municipal Assembly in April 1999 Comparative Study of Real and Completed, March 1999 Documented Land Use in the City of Maputo and Legal Support to Urban Land Management - Vol. 1: Analysis of existing conditions and Vol. 2: Proposals for anew system of land administration Construction of a new building for the land Completed March 1998, tender administration archive, Maputo: detailed documents reviewed by Bank design and tender documents Nampula Urban and Enviromuental Management Pilot Project: Manual on erosion control, Nampula Guidelines for actions by Completed 1997 community groups Master plan for municipal nursery, Completed 1997 Nampula Market and Health Post, Muhala Completed March 1999, tender neighbourhood, Nampula, including documents not reviewed by Bank water supply: detailed design and tender documents Study Purpose Status and impact Rehabilitation of public lavatories, Completed March 1999, tender Murrapaniwa Market, Nampula: documents not reviewed by Bank detailed design and tender documents Construction of public lavatories, Completed March 1999, tender FAINA market, Nampula: detailed documents not reviewed by Bank design and tender documents Rehabilitation of municipal nursery, Completed March 1999, tender Nampula: detailed design and tender documents not reviewed by Bank documents Water supply and sanitation, Namwatu Completed March 1999, tender School, Nampula: detailed design and documents not reviewed by Bank tender documents Rehabilitation of roads, construction of Completed March 1999, tender public water posts and control of documents not reviewed by Bank ravines, Muhala neighborhood, Nampula: detailed design and tender documents Pilot project for integrated infrastructure improvements, Natite, Pemba: Report on consultation process Completed, 1998 Analysis of existing conditions Completed, 1998 Financial analysis Completed December 1998 Resettlement Plan Completed, December 1998 Construction of market and recreation1998, t center: detailed design and tender documents not reviewed by Bank documents Rehabilitation and expansion of Completed December 1998, tender primary school: detailed design and documents not reewed by Bank tender documents Drainage and roads: detailed design and Completed December 1998, tender tender documents documents not reviewed by Bank Proposal for maintenance program for Completed improved infrastructures using local labor Proposal for solid waste collection Completed December 1998 Layout plan for Wimbe expansion area Completed December 1998 Source: Project Files and Bank staff estimates. Table 8A: Project Costs Item Appraisal Estimate (US$mm) E Estimated Actual Costs (US$mm) 9/ Local Foreign costs Total Local Foreign Total costs costs costs costs Costs Legal and Institutional Refonns 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 Fiscal and Financial Reforms 0.2 1.7 1.9 0.3 3.4 3.7 Urban Environmental Management * Preparation of 0.0 1.8 1.8 0.7 0.4 1.1 Municipal Development Plans * Preparation and 2.3 2.4 4.7 0.5 3.4 3.9 Implementation of Pilot Sub-projects Capacity Building, Institutional Support and Project Management Support for MAE * Technical Advice 1.0 1.1 2.1 0.02 0.2 0.2 and Support * Training 0.9 0.2 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 * Staff (TSU) 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 * Project 2.1 0.5 2.6 Administration (TSU) Support for MCA (HABITAR) & CNA * Staff 0.6 1.3 1.9 (HABITAR/CAN) * Project 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.7 Administration Vehicles and Equipment 0.2 1.9 2.1 0.3 0.9 1.2 Base Cost: 8.6 11.8 20.4 3.9 9.0 12.9 Contingencies 0.9 Physical Contingencies 0.8 1.2 2.0 Price Contingencies 0.9 1.2 2.1 Total Project Cost: 10.3 14.2 24.5 3.9 9.9 13.9 Source: Bank MIS and staff estimates. Table 8B: Project Financing Source Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimate Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total costs costs Costs costs costs costs IDA 9.0 14.2 23.2 3.4 9.9 13.3 Government 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.6 0.0 0.6 10.3 14.2 24.5 4.0 9.9 13.9 Table 9A Economic Costs and Benefits Not applicable. Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Agreement!l Covenant Status | Covenant Description Comments Section Type 3.01 (c) 12 NC Borrower to cause MAE to enter into Failure to implement pilot projects Implementation Agreements with all and delays in preparing structure of the Project Cities. plans led this to be unnecessary. 3.03 (a) 10 CD Borrower to conduct with the IDA Reviews conducted but generally project implementation reviews by delayed. not later than September 30 of each year, including mid-term review by not later than September 30, 1995. 3.03 (b) 10 C Submit to IDA for its review and comments, annual and mid-term reviews, progress reports and a draft action program including training plans to be carried out during the upcoming year. 3.03 (c) 10 CP Carry out recommendations arising Most actions implemented, but out of annual and mid-tern reviews often with delays. 3.04 (a,b) 05 CP Maintain institutional arrangements Mostly complied with, with some and staff as specified under part A of gaps. Schedule 4 of DCA; and appoint qualified local counterpart to closely work with and receive training from the consultants contracted under the project. 3.05 12 NC Borrower shall ensure the timely Failure to implement pilot projects implementation of the implementation and delays in preparing structure Agreement/ Covenant Status Covenant Description | Comments Section Type agreements entered into between plans led this to be unnecessary. MAE and the Project Cities and the Municipal Development Programs prepared by each such city. 3.06 07 NC Borrower shall take all necessary No resettlement necessary due to measures to prepare and implement failure to implement pilot projects. resettlement plans referred to under Part C.3 of the Project, in accordance with the terms, criteria and a timetable agreed upon between the Borrower and IDA, and with the objective of restoring the incomes of displaced people to allow them to maintain or improve their standard of living. 3.07 01 CP Borrower shall (a) open and maintain Replenishment irregular and notto a project account in local currency, in the full amount. a commercial bank on terms and conditions satisfactory to IDA; (b) make an initial deposit into such an account of $60,000; and (c) deposit every four months such an amount as shall be required to replenish such account. 4.01 01 C Borrower shall (a) maintain financial Audits received and unqualified. records and account; (b)perform independent annual audits of project accounts and furnish certified copy to IDA within 9 months; and (c) maintain records and accounts reflecting expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made. C = complied with; CD = comp ied with after delay; CP = complied with partially; NC = not complied with Source: Project Files and Bank staff estimates. Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Statement number and title Describe and comment on lack of compliance 1. None 2. 3. Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Planned Revised Actual Stage of Weeks US$ Weeks $ Weeks US$ project cycle I W_k _ Wek (000) Preparation NA NA NA NA 44 80.4 to appraisal Appraisal NA NA NA NA 66 131.8 Negotiations NA NA NA NA 4.9 11.8 through Board approval Supervision 110 NA NA NA 97.8 241.1 Source: Project Files and Bank staff estimates. Not Available Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Stage of project Month Number Days Specialized Performance Types of cycle /Year of in field staff skills rating problems/ _ persons represented Notes Through appraisal r__l-___---_ _ Identification 9/91 3 20 d, Not applicable Preparation 12/91 6 18 a, d, h, n, Not applicable Pre-appraisal 4/92 7 13 a, d, e, f, n, Not applicable Appraisal through Board approval Supervision Preparation for 3/94 2 10 a, d, Not appl. Slow progress implementation towards effect. Supervision 1 11/94 2 3 d, e, S Slow progress Supervision 2 3/95 2 6 a, d S Need to establish SA Supervision 3 7/95 1 5 a, S Launch workshop Supervision 4 11/95 4 10 a, d, g S Election law package withdrawn Supervision 5 3/96 3 4 a, d, S dNelayews Supervision 6 11/96 5 3 d, i, m SMid-term review Supervision 7 4/97 1 2 d, SSlow progress on Supervision 8 6/97 2 15 a, j S taning Slow progress Supervision 9 10/97 2 4 a, d SExtension and I restructuing Supervision 10 4/98 1 1 | 3 | d, I S I Completion 2/99 3 10 d, e,i S ICR Source: Project files and Bank staff estimates. APPENDIX A AIDE MEMOIRE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (PROL) (Project MZ-PE-1791, Credit 253000 - MOZ) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION MISSION 1. A World Bank mission visited Mozambique from February 22 to March 12, 1999 during which they undertook the Implementation Completion Mission of the above project. The mission team consisted of Mr. Alan Carroll (Team Leader/Senior Urban Development Specialist), Mr. Jocelyn Mason (Consultant/Public Administration Specialist), and Mr. Luis Carvalho (Consultant/Civil Engineer). The mission is grateful for the valuable assistance provided by his Excellency the Minister of State Administration, the officials and staff of the Ministry of State Administration/National Directorate of Local Administration (MAE/DNAL), and the Presidents and staff of the Municipal Councils of Beira, Nampula, Quelimane, and Pemba. A list of people met is attached as annex 1. The mission would especially like to thank the officials of Municipal Governments of Beira and Nampula for the courtesies shown Mr. Mason and Mr. Carvalho during their visit to those cities. This Aide Memoire will be included in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) as an annex. 2. Special Account. The mission noted the customary grace period for Bank projects is four months, and the mission hereby informs the Government that it will honor requests for payments up to June 30, 1999 for goods and services delivered prior to the closing date. 3. A project evaluation workshop was held on Tuesday, March 9th, (a list of attendees is attached as annex 2). The Government and the Bank agree that, while the project suffered from a number of problems in design and implementation, which will be dealt with in detail in the ICR, the project did achieve its development objectives. The following main points were made. (a) Component 1 of the project, Legal and Institutional Reform, implemented by Working Group 1, was also largely completed and successful, although gaps in the legislation remain. The activities of this component can be described as the legal dimensions of Component 2, but the coordination between the two Working Groups was poor. (b) Component 2 of the project, Fiscal, Financial and Organizational Reform, implemented by Working Group 2, was largely completed and was successful. The legislation enabling the 33 provincial capitals, cities and towns to be administered independently by an elected government is now in place. The first stages of decentralization to the municipalities has taken place: local elections took place in July 1998, the new municipal governments were installed in August 1998, and the first steps towards making local government effective have been taken. However, gaps in the legislation remain, and although a first successful seminar was held in October 1998, little of the training of the new elected officials and their administrations took place as APPENDIX A planned. (c) Component 3 of the project, Urban/Environmental Management, implemented by Working Group 3, consisted primarily of rapid mapping exercises and developing structure plans for each of the five cities, as well as pilot civil works projects. While the rapid mapping and the structure plans, as well as the installation of the technical support groups (GTLs) for the five municipalities were notable successes, although considerably delayed, none of the pilot projects was begun. 4. The mission took note of the view, expressed broadly by all Government counterparts, that Bank implementation performance was unsatisfactory, because of the unusually large number of task managers involved in the project, and because the Bank failed to perform an adequately facilitating role during project implementation. 5. Before the workshop, the mission also met separately and extensively with Working Groups I, II and Im, as well as the TSU. These meetings provided important information and insights relating to the management of the project which will form part of the ICR analysis. 6. In addition, Mr. Carvalho and Mr. Mason visited the cities of Beira and Nampula, where they met with the PROL project units as well as the new Municipal Council Presidents, members of the Municipal Council, the Assembly Presidents, and directors of municipal departments. These trips were highly informative, providing additional insights for the PROL evaluation. 7. Next Steps. The mission that the Bank's Disbursement Department has agreed that the Special Account would be replenished to the amount of $50,000 until the closing date of the project in order to provide for the volume of end-of-project expenditures. The mission also committed the Bank to do all it could to expedite the processing of replenishment requests. 8. The mission discussed the following steps that would need to take place as part of the Bank's ICR process: (a) On project completion, Government staff will provide the Bank with the data for the ICR tables as discussed during the mission; these tables may be prepared as soon as the closing date is over, and any changes to the tables resulting from payments during the grace period can be included in the final version of the ICR as detailed below- due April 15; (b) Government staff will prepare an evaluation report which it will send to Bank staff to be included as an annex to the ICR (the mission also understands that the "Avaliacao Final do Proj eto" document presented during the evaluation workshop is not the Government's final evaluation report) - due April 15; (c) Bank staff will prepare a draft of the ICR which it will clear with Bank management - June I APPENDIX A (d) Bank staff to send the cleared draft ICR to the Government - June 15; (e) Government to provide Bank staff with written comments on the draft ICR if they wish, which will be included as an annex to the ICR, and any changes to the ICR tables - June 30; (f) The ICR will be delivered to the Bank's Board - June 30. March 10, 1999 APPENDIX A Annex 1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (PROL) (Project MZ-PE-1791, Credit 253000 - MOZ) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION MISSION List of People Met Ministry of State Administration H.E. Alfredo Gamito, Minister MAE/National Directorate of Local Administration (DNAL) Jose Guambe, Director Ministry of Works and Housing Jorge Pedro de Eusebio Working Group I Fernando Loureiro Bastos Rui Pinto Emidio R. Nhamissitane Working Group II Lourenco Pinhal, Head Milton Rocha Manuel Macomba Working Group Im Joaquim Almeida Femandes Charlotte Allen Artindo Dgedge Antonio Tovela Technical Support Unit Mr. Guiliche Rosinda Nunes Esmeraldo Pardal City of Nampula H.E. Dionisio Chereua, President of the Municipal Council H.E. Cassamo D. Mussage, President of the Municipal Assembly Felix Socre, Head of Urban Services Emesto, Municipal Urban Services Gaspar, Municipal Urban Services Mr. Patua, Head of the Human resources Department Mr. Aboo, Head of Financial Department Dr. Jaime, Director, DPAC Mr. Equasune, Environment Department (PROL) Mr. Marques, Environment Department (PROL) APPENDIX A Polcarpio Napica, Head of the Centro de Desenvolvimento Sustentavel (CDS) Jorge Tinga, PROL Coordinator and Assesor de Administracao e Financas Mikko Mansikka, PLANCENTER Timo Ripatti, PLANCENTER Tapio Toropainen, PLANCENTER Erik Sj6berg, Suomen Ymparistokeskus Adolphus Arno, First Secretary, Embassy of the Netherlands Province of Nampula Mr. Remo, DPAC City of Beira H.E. Joao Azinheira Filipe, Council Member, Alternate President of the Council H.E. Luis Neves, Council Member H.E. Louran,o Ferreira Bulha, President of the Assembly H.E. Paulo Lourenco, Council Member H.E. Nhacutsane R. Muianga, Council Member Mr. Mussengue, Director for Construction and Urbanization Ross Palmer, Palmer Associates Projecta Scott Wilson Joint Venture Caroline Pitt, Palmer Associates Projecta Scott Wilson Joint Venture Francisco Perreira, Palmer Associates Projecta Scott Wilson Joint Venture Province of Sofala Mr. Jaime, DPAC International Development Association FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IDA/SecM99-6 13/1 FROM: Vice President and Secretary October 29, 1999 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (Credit No. 2530-MOZ) Corrigendum Attached is a copy of Appendix B, Borrower's Evaluation Report, which was omitted inadvertently. The original report entitled "Implementation Completion Report: Republic of Mozambique: Local Government Reform and Engineering Project (Credit No. 2530-MOZ)," dated October 12, 1999 (Report No. 19789) prepared by the Africa Regional Office, was distributed on October 25, 1999 under IDA/SecM99-613. Distribution: Executive Directors and Alternates President Bank Group Senior Management Vice Presidents, Bank, IFC and MIGA Directors and Department Heads, Bank, IFC and MIGA This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perform,ance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ APPENDIX B Government Evaluation of the Local Government Reform and Engineering Project (Credit 2530-MOZ) I REPUBLICA DE MO(AMBIQUE MINISTEtIO DA ADMINISTRACAO ESTATAL DIRECCAO NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRA(AO LOCAL AVALIACAO FINAL DOS OBJECTIVOS DO PROJECTO DE REFORMA DOS ORGAOS LOCAIS E ENGENHARIA (PROL) (Efectividade de 14 de Jillho de 1994 a 31 de Marco de 1999) I REPUBLICA DE MOI;AMBIQUE M1NISTERIO DA ADMINISTRA4:AO ESTATAL DIREC4:AO NACIONAL DE ADMNISTRACAO LOCAL AVALIA(A0 FINAL DO PROJECTO DE REFORMA DOS ORGAOS LOCAIS E ENGENHARIA 1, INTRODU(4CO O Programa de Reforma dos Orgaos Locais(PROL) e um conjunto de medidas de politica em que genese remonta a meados dos anos 80 e cujo impulso advem da op,co pela abertura a democracia politica e ao multipartidarismo consubstanciado na Constitui,co de 1990. O diagn6stico e respectiva estrategia resultou do Seminario "Descentralizac,o e Autonomia dos Orgaos Locais" efectuado em Maputo em Novembro de 1991, do qua] se destacou a clara recomenda,ao no sentido da Descentraliza,co, como forma de aprofundamento da pratica democratica no sentido pluralista e como rem6dio para alguns problemas que constituem obstaculo para o desenvolvimento econ6mico e social e da atribui,co de autonomia administrativa, financeira e patrimonial a entidades locais, com personalidade juridica pr6pria, dirigidas por quadros eleitos pelas populagoes atraves de actos eleitorais livres e amplamente praticados. O segundo Seminario sobre o PROL, enquanto programa, que decorreu em Maputo no mes de Abril de 1993, organizado pelo Ministerio da Administra,co Estatal(MAE), constituiu sequencia l6gica e necessaria do 1°. Debru,ou-se tambem sobre o processo de descentralizac,o, nas suas varias vertentes, desde a administrativa ate a financeira. Enunciou-se os riscos do processo de descentraliza,co. Analisou-se ainda o contexto sociol6gico, antropol6gico, cultural e juridico da autoridade tradicional nc Pais. Com base nas conclusoes do I Semindrio, o Conselho de Ministros decidiu aprovar, em linhas gerais, o principio da descentralizacao, a quat deveria processar-se gradualmente, devendo iniciar-se em algumas cidades e distritos, a come,ar pelas cinco entao definidas: Maputo, Beira, Nampula, Quelimane e Pemba, um plano de trabalho e ratificaram-se os contactos ja em curso com institui,ces financiadoras, nomeadamente Banco Mundial e ASDI. Concomitantemente, foi criada uma Comissao Interministerial composta por varios Ministros (Ministros da Administraqao Estatal, das Finan,as, da Construc,o e Aguas, do Trabalho, da Justi,a e o entao Vice- iMinistro do Plano), a qual acompanharia a reforma institucional dos 6rgaos locais. Para alem disso, seria criado um grupo coordenador, composto por Directores Nacionais de v6rios Ministerios, que acompanharia os trabalhos dos varios grupos tecnicos. 2. OBJECTIVOS DO PROJECTO 2.1 Objectivos Gerais * Descentralizacao administrativa das cidades de Maputo, Beira, Quelimanrie, Nampula e Pemba na fase piloto; * Melhorar as condi,ces de vida das comunidades locais. 2.2 Objectivos Por Componentes 2.2.1 Componente I - InstitucionaltLegal * Elabora,co de projectos de reforma institucional e legislativa; * Realiza9co da formagao profissional dos funcionarios e dos elementos integrantes dos 6rgaos eleitos. 2.2.2 Componente II - Finangas Locais * Refor,ar o sistema de transferencias or,amentais; • Mobilizar recursos locais; * Melhorar o sistema de fiuncionamento dos servicos urbanos; • Refor9ar a contabilidade, or,amento, gestao financeira e sistema de dados; * Refor,ar as funq6es dos Governos Locais, as condi,ces para recrutamento e, os programas de forrnaao. 2.2.3ifa - Infra-estruturas e Meio Ambiente * Realizar programas de desenvolvimento Municipal nas cinco cidades; * Preparar e implementar projectos-piloto incluindo a participa,co de entidades do sector privado; * Projectar e realizar pIanos de assentamento necessarios para realocar pessoas deslocadas devido a implementa,co dos projectos-piloto. 2.2.4. IV - Reforco Da Capacidade Institucional Da GestAo Do Projecto * Dotar as cinco cidades de capacidade institucional para a aplica,co do quadro legal municipal, da regulamenta,co financeira e administrativa; * Estabelecer e operacionalizar uma Unidade de Apoio T6cnico(UAT); 2 * Refor,ar o HABITAR(actual Departamento de Habita,co- INAHU); * Reforcar a CNA(actual MICOA). 3. PERIODO DO ADIANTAMENTO PARA A PREPARA(4AO DO PROJECTO (PROJECT PREPARATION-PPF) O PPF iniciou em 1992 e durante a sua vigencia foram realizadas as seguintes tarefas: a) Delineamento do escopo e do universo do Projecto de Reforma dos Orgaos Locais e Engenharia; b) Elabora,co dos TORs das tres componentes do Projecto e do TSU (Unidade de Apoio Tecnico); c) Prepara,co dos documentos preliminares para as negocia,oes do Acordo de Credito corm a Associacao Internacional de Desenvolvimento (International Development Association-IDA) do Banco Mundial; d) Entre a data da assinatura do acordo(Development Credit Agreement- DCA)realizado em 17 de Setembro de 1993 e a efectividade do mesmo foram satisfeitas as seguintes condi,ces indispensaveis para que ela tivesse lugar: (i) Concep,ao e entrada em funcionamento da Unidade Tecnica de Apoio(TSU com a sua subdivisao "HABITAR de apoio do Grupo III): (ii) Elaboracao dos terrnos de referencia, respectivo concurso e contrata9ao de um planificador urbano senior, Auditor independente(Price Waterhouse), Gestor para o Grupo III; (iii) Idem de uma Empresa afim de realizar estudos nas areas organizativa, financeira e de recursos Humanos(KPMG PIET Marwick- Instituto Brasileiro para a Administra,co Municipal- Cons6rcio KPMG/IBAM); (iv) Assinatura de acordos entre o MAE e os Conselho Executivos das cinco cidades; (v) Abertura de uma conta para o projecto, em meticais num montante equivalente a 60.000 d6lares Americanos; (vi) Actualiza,co dos TORs dos projectos de Nampula(Piloto), transporte nao motorizado (Beira) mapeamento rapido das cinco cidades e dos consultores individuais; (vii) Elaboracao de draft para lanaramento de um concurso para qualifica,co de Empresas para os concursos de plano de estrutura. Durante este periodo o PPF teve o concurso dos seguintes Task-Managers: ; Robert Chavez, Kingsley O.Robotham, Richard Beardmore. Paralelamente foram levadas a cabo as seguintes acgoes: a) Compila,co e estudo da legisla,co vigente sobre os servi,os publicos; b) Primeiros estudos de natureza organizativa financeira e patrimonial para delineamento das linhas gerais; c) Execu,co financeira e material do PPF. Os estudos referidos nas alineas a) e b) deram lugar a um anteprojecto de Lei QUADRO sobre Distritos urbanos e Rurais, o qual viria a ser aprovado pela Assembleia da Repuiblica (A. R.) em Setembro de 1 994(Lei 3/94). 4. EXECUfJAO DO ACORDO DE CREDITO 4.1 0 acordo de credito teve a sua vigencia de 20 de Julho de 1994 a 31 de Margo de 1999, nele incluido o beneficio da extensao de urn ano aprovado pelo IDA. Durante esse percurso formalizou-se a estrutura organizativa do PROL e procederam-se As ac,6es e demais tarefas a ele cometidas. Verificada que foi a ultima,ao do anteprojecto da Lei sobre o Quadro Legal Autarquico, o qual, como anteriormente se mencionou, foi aprovado pela A. R., passando a ser designado por Lei n° 3/94, de 13 de Setembro. Com base nele procedeu-se a sua dessiminagao atraves de seminarios realizados nas cinco cidades, os quais tiveram a participacao da sociedade civil, das associag5es econ6micas e sindicais, da comunidade religiosa, para alem de elementos pertencentes a Administragao Puiblica, quer de nivel central ou provincial, quer de nivel local. Neste lan,amento procedeu-se tamb6m a analise pormenorizada das normas contidas na Lei Quadro. A arguic,o da sua inconstitucionalidade levaram a novos estudos e debates que culminaram com a alterac,o pontual da Constitui,co verificada em 1996, com a consequente modificagao da filosofia que enformara o ante- projecto acima referido, o que levou ao refazemento de novos estudos tendentes ao delineamento do universo da descentralizacao, dentro dos principios saos da democracia e do multipartidarismo. A nova Lei Quadro foi aprovada pela A. R. cabendo-lhe o n° 2/97 de 18 de Fevereiro e com ela iniciou-se o processo de elabora,co das restantes leis que iriam constituir o pacote legislativo da descentralizagao, a saber: 4 Lei no 6/97- que criou o quadro Juridico e Legal para a realiza,co das eleigces dos 6rgaos municipais; Lei n° 4/97- que cria a Comissao Nacional de elei,ces; Lei n° 4/94- que institucionaliza o recenseamento eleitoral sistematico; Lei n° 7/97- que estabelece a tutela administrativa; Lei no 8/97- Estatuto especifico de Maputo; Lei n° 9/97- que define o estatuto dos titulares e dos membros dos orgaos autarquicos; Lei no- 10/97 que cria o municipio em 12 cidades e 10 vilas, para alem das 11 anteriormente criadas; Lei no- 11/97 que estabelece o regime Juridico das finan,as e patrirn6nio autarquicos. 4.2. Na execu,co do PROL houve o concurso de: Grupo I: n Seis Juristas seniores, dos quais quatro de curta dura,co e dois de dura9ao media, a Dois Juristas de curta dura,co e tres de curtissima dura9co, todos juniores Com este grupo foi feita a formula,co das Leis ja referidas, consubstanciado nas bases t6cnicas apresentadas. Coube-lhes tambem a analise e aprecia,co de diplomas regulamentares celebrados pelo G-II; Grupo II: Este grupo teve desde o inicio um consultor coadjuvado por tres tecnicos do MAE e foi assistido pelo Cons6rcio KPMG/IBAM. A sua actuagao centrou-se nos estudos das areas econ6mico- financeiras quer do Estado quer das cidades objecto do projecto e nao s6, e, bem assim, na parte organizativa e de recursos humanos das cidades com vista as estruturas municipais. Teve posteriormente ap6s o termo do contrato com o Cons6rcio o concurso de dois consultores seniores um para a area financeira e outro para a Administra,co Municipal e de mais cinco consultores juniores que vieram a constituir os grupos tecnicos locais das cinco cidades. Este grupo de consultores deu a sua colabora,ao atraves de contratos de curta dura,cao. Para a prossecu,co de alguns dos diplomas acima referidos foram efectuados estudos de natureza financeira, econ6mica, organizativa, de 5 recursos humanos, dos quais resultaram em 67 produtos, intermediarios e finais. Grupo III Este grupo foi constituido por consultores individuais e por Empresas e "Joint Ventures"e tinha a seu cargo a realizagao dos seguintes projectos: • Planos de estrutura para as cinco cidades, * Planos de acq6es para as cinco cidades, • Recupera ao de infra-estruturas integradas de Natite em Pemba, * Planeamento e gestao ambiental urbana da cidade de Nampula, • Transporte nao motorizado para a cidade da Beira, • Mapeamento rapido das cinco cidades e • Enderecamento da cidade de Maputo. 5. RESULTADOS DA EXECU(.&O DO CREDITO Nao obstante algumas limita,ces ocasionadas quer pela argui,ao de inconstitucionalidade da Lei nuimero 3/94, o que levou a repensar todo o processo situagao amplamente circunstanciada no relat6rio final do PROL- o principal obiectivo deste projecto foi alcancado. Trata-se do culminar de um processo de descentraliza,co gradual com a instituiqao de entidades com autonomia administrativa, financeira e patrimonial, com personalidade Juridica pr6pria distinta da do Estado: Estamos a referir a realiza,co das eleigoes autarquicas efectivadas em Junho de 1998 nos 33 municipios existentes, com o conferimento da posse em Agosto do mesmo ano e com ela o inicio do exercicio "de facto" da actividade municipal em Mo,ambique. Estao ja decorridos 9 meses desse mesmo exercicio e tudo concorre e assegura o seu sucesso. 6. RESULTADOS POR ALCAN(CAR As dilac6es verificadas no processo quer motivadas pela inconstitucionalidade de Lei 3/94 quer pela reformnulacao dos termos de referencia dos sub-proj ectos do Grupo III quer ainda na demora da aprovagao da extensao do contrato do Cons6rcio KPMG/IBAM, ocasionaram um deslocamento das fases sequenciadas do projecto o que, como nao poderia deixar de ser, resultou no nao cumprimento do m6dulo dos desembolsos, o que necessariamente obrigou a uma projecgao que excedia o limite temporal contido no Acordo de Credito, ou seja, 31 de Margo de 1998. 6 Frisa-se, contudo, que tal facto nao obstou, como ja se mencionou, a que se alcangasse o objectivo principal do projecto: 0 estabelecimento real e concreto dos Municipios. Foi precisamente por isso que se fizeram duas solicita,ces de extensao do termo do projecto por mais um ano. Contudo, s6 a primeira mereceu a aprova,ao, nao obstante existir um saldo de 10.478.895,31, nele incluso o montante de 5.021.951,22 cuja redu,co fora efectuada por nao ter sido cumprido os parametros do m6dulo de desembolsos. Esse facto nao veio permitir a implementacao das experiencias- piloto que deveriam ter sido efectuadas na base do quadro juridico- legal aprovados e do inicio da autarciza,ao, pelo periodo de um ano, como constava constava do cronograma do projecto PROL. Este exercicio teria sido de primordial importancia na edifica,co do edificio municipal uma vez que teria sido o laborat6rio na qual haveria a oportunidade de se rectificar quaisquer imperfeic6es, corrigir desvios e sanar lacunas. 7. CONCLUSAO O processo foi de merecimento pela realidade que hoje se verifica nas 23 cidades e 10 vilas, tendo valido a pena e ser de louvar todos os esforcos nele concentrados. Como nao poderia deixar de ser, trata-se do inicio, da arrancada, do municipalismo no Pais, pelo que ha ainda um longo caminho a trilhar para seu aprimoramento e solidificagao, devendo-se debruyar sobre Areas como: institucionaliza9ao dos 33 municipios, capacitacao quer em termos de forrnacao e treinamento do pessoal existente e o a recrutar quer de apetrechamento de equipamentos e espa,os, complementar com dispositivos legais de certos segmentos das Areas Administrativa, Financeira e de prestacao de servi9os, provenientes de lacunas ou dos ensinamentos apreendidos durante o processo, criagao de condi9oes com reabilita9ao de infra- estruturas existentes com vista a uma melhor prestacao de servi9os aos seus municipes e o melhoramento do meio- ambiente. Em anexo um mapa diagramatico de recolha e analise de ac,ces e objectivos do PROL e outro de execu,co de Credito que faz parte integrante desta avaliagao. Maputo, Junho de 1999 7 I AVALIA AO FNAL DOS OBJEC1TIVOS DO PROL NO AC:OES REALIZAjOES PRODUTOS AVALIA(hAO 1,- Refor5o Instituclonal e gest3o do Projecto 1.1 Assessoria tecnica ao MAE Prestada a assessoria t6cnica ao MAE em Bom varios dominlos 1.2 Forma,c5o aos t6cnicos do MAE Realizada a formag5o de todos os t6cnicos do Bom MAE em materias de legislag5o autirquica 1.3 Forma,co as autarqulas sobre: a) Quadro legal Fol realizado um curso para os Presidentes das Excelente Assemblelas e Conselhos Municipais e t6cnicos das 33 autarqulas b) Regime financeiro idem Regular c) Procedimentos adminlstrativos idem Insuficlento 1.4 InstItuclonalizag5o da Unidade de Apolo Felta TOR Tecnlco (UATtTSU) Operacionalidade da TSU nas varlas 6reas Preparar,ao de encontros, contactos com o WB, Regular, 1.4.1 Desenvolvlmento Administratlivo e Minist6flos do Plano e Flnan,as, das Obras contudo actuou Organizacinal Publicas e Habitav3o e para a Coordena,0o da nos Altimos dols Ac,cao Amblental, com o INPF e outras anos Institulc6es 1.4.2 Na rea do Aqulshco d e Feltas algumas aquisigoes de viaturas, _Deficlente, cor ("Procurement") equlpamento lnformatico, moblliario, aparelhos parte de culpas de ar condlclonado e consumivels do WB 1.4.3 Na Area de GestAo Financeira Pagamento de prestag6es de servlgos e Processos de contas Bom consultores semestrals e anuais Auditorlas anuals 1.4.4 Na Area de Coordenaio de FormarAo Elaborado piano de formarao para as 5 cidades Insuficlente, pols algumas acq6es foram canceladas 1.5 Fortalecimnento e operacionalidade do Devido h evolucdo politica do Pais delxou de HABITAR ser uma acgao relevante, o que levou a sua extIngao 1.6 Fortaleclmento da ComIss5o Nacional do A CAN transformou-se no Minist6rio para a suficlento Amblento (CAN) Coordenagao da Acsao Amblental, tornando-se beneficibrlo do PROL 2 Avallai5o da Refortna Instituclonal e legal 2.1 Levar a cabo uma reforma legislativa e legal, Incluindo: 2.1.1 RevIsao da legislavao e o quadro Elaboraiao da proposta de Lel Quadro das Aprovac5o da Lei Bom administraUvo dos governos locals Autarqulas Locals (Conselhos ExecuUvos) 21.2 Especificar o grau de autorldade e Elaborag5o da proposta de Lel da Tutela Aprovaiao da Lei Bom responsabilidade a serem conferidos aos Administrativa do Estado governos central, provincial e local ________ _ .______________________________ I_____________________ 2.1.3 Definilo de unidades tlcnicas a serem Felta Regular criadas ou reestruturadas 2.1.4 Elabora,co do quadro legal para permitir a Elabora5ao do pacote autarquico que Lois Bom Implanta,cao da reforma municipal (Quadro possibilltou a realizalizagao de eiel,6es Legal da descentraliza93o) a nivel nacional autarquicas que culminaram com a Institulgao de 33 autarqulas 2.1.5 Elaborag3o de leis especificas com a Foistas algumas propostas de regimentos e Insuficlentc, pols finalidade de facilitar a testagem da reforma posturas o processo n5o (descentralizagAo) nas cinco cidades do fol completo projecto 2.2 Fortalecimento da capacidade de Mogamblque na area de formaao e desenvolvimento de capacidades e habilidades , atraves de: 2.2.1 Desenhar e Implantar um programa de Realizardo de semin6rios sobre o Pacote Razoavel formacao para grupos chave a nivel central, AutArquico dirigidos a quadros dos nivels prov Inclal a local central, provincial e local 2.2.2 Revis3o da estrutura da Escola de Estado e Nao feila, por Direlto e do Centro de Formagao em Gestao estar sob a Publica Local alrada da DNFP 2.2.3 Desenvolver habilidades baslcas relaclonadas com as fung6es dos futuros municipios Avalla3io da Refonna Fiscal, Financeira e 3 Organlzaclonal 3.1 Fortaleclmento do sistema de transferenclas Aprovag5o da Lei 11/97 sobre Finangas Dlagnosticos e Politlcas Bom fiscals atrv6s da revisio do sistema de taxas Autarqulcas e do desenho e lmplementaigo de crit6rlos orlentadores da parUlha das receitas do Goerno central e das transferbnclas fiscals Estudos de impostos de nivel central, provincial e local 3.2 Mobillzag5o do recursos locals atrav6s de: 3.2.1 RevIs5o de fontes de receltas locals o Consagrado no documento Mobilizag5o de Dlagn6stlcos e Politicas Boom desenvolvimento de propostas de reforma Receltas Locals e transferenclas orcamentals 3.2.2 Estabelecimento de prlnciplos para a Taxas por llcengas concedidas, Tarifas c taxas Dlagn6sticos e Politicas Bom recupera,co de custos pela prestafAo de scrvltos, colmas e multas 3.3 Melhorar o sistema de financlamento dos servlgos urbanos atraves de: 3.3.1 RevIsao da estrutura financelra dos servios Elaborado o estudo para o dellneamento da Dlagnbsticos e Politicas Razoavel p6ibllcos urbanos e a actual polltica de prestagao de servlgos de utilidade puebllca estabelecimento das tarifas urbana 3.3.2 RevlsAo da parUclpag5o do sector privado Consagrado no Estudo de polltcas de servl9os Diagn6sticos e Politicas Razoavel na prestagfo de servlios urbanos a nivel urbanos de utilidade puiblica a prestag3o do local o determinac,o do potenclal para um servicos por empresas privadas sob varlas malor envolvimento formas 3.3.3 Determinar a relag30 entro nivels do tarifas e Consagrado no Estudo de politicas do servilos Dlagnosticos e Poilticas Razoavel correspondentes custos de opera,ao e urbanos de utilidade publica os mecanismos de manuteng5o para servi9os especificos fixagAo de custos 3.3.4 Examinar as pollticas do Invostimonto Consagrado no docurnento Mobilizarao de Dlagn6sticos e Politicas RazoAvel upiblico _ Receltas Locals e transferenclas orgamentals _ 3.4 Fortalecimento da gestao financeira, contabilidade, orcamento e sistema electr6nico de dados atraves de: 3.4.1 Melhorar a contabilidade, or9amentagao, Implanta,co do Sistema de Gestao das Manuals de: Bom planificac,ao financeira, gestao tributarla e Finangas Locals(SISGEF) nas 5 cidades piloto Elaborag5o do controlo Interno orc,amento, Execug5o das Depesas, Tesourarla Cobranga de receltas, Contabilidade e Controlo Interno e Auditoria 3.4.2 Incorporar as contas de capital nos Consagrado na Lel n°11/97 Bom orQamentos dos governos locals 3.4.3 Desenvolver o sistema de prestag5o de Contemplado no SISGEF Manuals do SISGEF Bom contas Incluindo a auditorla o outros mecanismos de controlo 3.4.4 Introduzlr sistemas de processamento Desenvolvimento c Impantag5o do Sistema Manual de utilizag5o do Bom electr6nlco de dados e do gestao de Informatico de Gestao das Flnancas Locals SISGEF Informag5o (SISGEF) nas 5 cidades piloto 3.5 Fortaleclmento das fungoes dos governos locals, quadros de pessoal e programas de forma,ao atraves de: 3.5.1 Deflnlr procedimentos administrativos Elaborada a proposta de estrutura e quadro de Razoavel relativamente a contabilidade, fung0es pessoal para cada um dos 5 Conselhos financelras e processamento de dados, Municipals, criados os Gabinetes TUcnlcos necessidades de pessoal e sua forma,co Locals representados a nivel local por assessores contratados 3.5.2 Desenvolver e lmplementar programas de Realizadas duas acq6es de treinamento no Bom formagao para o pessoal financelro a de PROL para o pessoal a trabalhar no sistema I____ contabilidade lnformalico SISGEF Realizadas varlas ac,ces_ do trelnamento "on the job" nas5 cidades para o pessoal da Area financeira dos Conselihos ______ _ _______________________________ M unicipals 4 Avalla5io da Refonna na Gestio Urbana e amblental 4.1 Levar a cabo programas de desenvolvimento Elaborados regulamentos de procedimentos Razoavel municipal nas cidades piloto atraves de para a plancamento e gestao do preparacao e Implementacao de um desenvolvimento urbano Elaborados pianos de Programa de Dosenvolvimnto Municipal estrutura para as cidades de Quolimanc, para cada Cidade do piloto Pemba, Nampula, Beira c Dondo c area metropoiltana de Maputo e Planos de Acq5o Prioritarlas para as cidades de Pemba, Quellmane e Belra 4.2 Prepara$so e implementag5o de subproJectos piloto Incluindo a participa,ao do sector privado, nomeadamente: 4.2.1 Melhoramento de Infraestruturas Integradas Inqueritos at populag5o, analise da situag5o Deficiente, as do Balrro de NaUto (Pemba) actual do Bairro, anaiise da situacAo financeira, obras nao foram elabora,cao de projectos executivos de: realizadas mercado, escola primarla, valas de drenagem, ruas e centro recreativo de Natite. 4.2.2 GestAo Amblental Urbana de Nampula Elaboragao de projectos executivos de Deficlente, as Mercado e Posto de Saude de Muhala, obras n3o foram Morcados de Murrapanlwa e da Faina, Escola realizadas de Namuhato, Vlveiros e canal de Irrigagao, vias e fontenArlos 4.2.3 Transporte Nao Motorizado na cidade da Elaboragao dos Termos do Refcrencla Mau, a compra Beira fol cancelada 4.2.4 Mapeamento RapIdo das 5 cidades Digitalizagao dos mapas, traingula ,ao a6rea, Fotografias aeres e Bom, fol anallse e planeamento da Rede Naclonal mapas fotogrametJcos financlado pela Geod6tica, Trelnamento de de pessoal e NORAD produrao de docurnentos 4.2.5 Slstemas do Informagao do Solo Urbano de a) Elabora,ao do projecto de construrAo do Deficlente, as Maputo edificto para o arqulvo do cadastro de Maputo e obras nao forarm langado o respectUvo concurso de obras realizadas b) Crlaq5o de um sistema simpilficado de Deficiente, as cadastro adequado aos varlos tipos de obras nao foram ocupagao realizadas c) Numera,co das ruas e afixag3o de placas, Cria,cao de uma celula de Bom, foi actualizagao da numera,co das portas de endereramento financlado pela entrada, edlqAo de um gula de endere,amento cooperagao da cidade, edliao de mapas de enderecramento francesa e organizac, o de um ficheiro informatisado 4.3 Desenho a reallza5ao de pianos de Realizadas dIscuss5es com as populac,es alvo Deficlente, as reassentamento das pesssoas afectadas e definidas zonas alternativas para a fixagao obras n3o foram pela Implementag3o dos subproJectos phioto realizadas 91ISTERIO DA AW ItlPlSTRAO lSTATAL PROL - CA. 2520/tZ CASTOS TOTA1S OCSOD 1994 ATt 41ABRIL DX 1999 POR CATCOORIAS Dr DCSEmBOLSOS tUNIDAPt - USD9 GASTOS ~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ t;0.9.210PlRD1CAO CO97 CA7tGORWAS VALOR ORCAHI NTADO $01 USD 1. 1994 199I 1996 1997 1999 116B I7TAIs DEL VO A. SALOS 91) 929 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~JAIl S 61ABRI 1'LLO "W94 (31 5.t.-.4 1 STUDIES AHID AUDITICS 3.140,000.00 4.441.931.22 42421,911 .2 2 CONSVLTAN?'S SRVICIES 4.100,000.00 4,949,300.49 951,243.00 2,227,494.94 1.409.210.91 1.293.9603.30 1.951,466 30 3,3331,46496 .1,9.3 312.0 3 TCO SULS N 1.040.000.00 2,402,926.63 124,500.36 7S 7172.95 136,340160 527,041,45 563076191 931,372.31 1,046.,21.77 2,111.921.19 4 CIVIL liORlt 1UECR pART 1,J01,46.1 C.2. or Tht PPOJECT 920,000.00 1.391,463.4. I VESOCLES Eg4JII'9E11 SPARE PARIS AND 9UPPLIti 1,S90,000.00 2,900,975.61 79,011.01 305,751.23 292,194.57 57,750.00 724,706491 1,981,463.41 5,957,732.21 * 19CRfli.9TAL OPERA94I9ZG COSTS 1,760,000.00 2,469.156.10 11,010,16 19,349,46 90,.9S660 1S,992.91 20,310.46 297,719.S7 2,09,656.564 4,205,626.07 7 SE6VICIES UIIDE0 PApT C.3 OF THE PROJECT 70,000.00 99,024.39 * iREltJrmi94o or PROJECT 22,57V07 PR2PARATIONl ADYANCE 90Q,000.00 1,213.110.13 990,591.66 .9,5244 .95'1.2 9 U94AL.OCATEO 1,090,000.00 1,541,951.22 TOTAL IS,400,000.00 23,200,000.00 1,99.1937.66 2,363,005.16 1,595,143.37 1,929,.31.91 2,924,605 13 1,261,601.55 12,721,104.69 5,021.951.22 10,47b.095.31 DOS: 0 valor total do cv.dlto, tol raduzido d. 10R 14.400.000,00 p... SD0 12.950.00,00 p.l dd....o d. v-rb.. . orl 3 - Tra1nin7: 5 - V.hic. Cqotp.l * 6 - Inc. Op. Co.tm, no v9lor global da JOR 3.550.000,00 .USD5.005.500,00ocorrld.a Da mbro da 1997. . S _ APPENDIX B Annex 2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND ENGINEERING PROJECT (PROL) (Project MZPE-1791, Credit 253000 - MOZ) IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION MISSION List of Attendees at the PROL Evaluation Workshop Institution/lnstituicao Name/Nome Position/Posicao Banco de Mocambique Francisco Mendes Tec. Coordenador de Projectos Banco Mundial Alan Carroll Chefe de Missao Banco Mundial Luis Carvalho Consuftor Eng. Civil Banco Mundial Jocelyn Mason Consultor CMB Edmundo Mussengue Arquitecto CMB Univanice Muchangage Presidente CMC Pemba Assubugy Mehgy President CMCP Jose de Jesus Avelino Tec. Florestal/ Director CMCP Nampula Jose Marques B. dos Santos Tecnico Florestal CMCP Nampula Dinonisio Cherewa Presidente DNHU - MOPH Domingos Mawamule Director GI - PROL Fernando Rostino Macamo D. N. Adjunto GTL - Gll - CM Pemba Alda Reis Consultor GTUGII - Maputo Severino Mateus Assessor GTUGII - Nampula Jorge Tinga Assessor MAE- DNAL Jose Manuel Guambe Director Nacional MAE/DNAL Holger Jonasson Assessor MOPH - IGOP Jorge Pedro de Eusebio Inspector Geral PROL - TSU Esmeraido Pardal Coord. Formacao PROL - TSU Rosinda Nunes Procurement PROL - Gill Arlindo Dgedge Arquitecto PROL - Glil Antonio Tovela Planificador PROL - Glil Joaquim Almeida Fernandes Coordenador GliI PROL - Gill Charlotte Allen Consultora PROL - Gil Lourenco Pinhai Coordenador PROL - GP Il - Quelimane Yasmin Camurdin Consultor PROL - Grupo I Jose Pedro Ramos Assuncao Consultor PROL Gill - Beira Manuel Armando Planificador Urbano Quelimane Rafael Adeus M. Eng. Tecnico Civil Quelimane Pio Matos Presidente APPENDIX C PROL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES rcoM Mi. MAE. IMIC E E 2 3 3 rM°81 11 E I i--- M --------- _--___~~~ -- / ~~~ 11 ~~~~~ DNAL Director|| - L\ / I F ~ ~ ---- ----- ---1 --1--- -- ----------------------- r- - -- -1- -- - -- --- WGI ~~~WGII WGIIROEC C C C : 1| ~~~~~~~~~~SECRETARIAT| R T ||Consult | Consult 1 |Cnut| N Municipalit o a Note: HABITAR was canicelled a month after effectiveness, and WGIII reported directly to TSU and DNAL.