Study on Marginalized Groups in the Context of ID in Nigeria National Identification for Development (ID4D) Project

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Contents

List of Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 5
Internally Displaced Persons ................................................................................................. 12
Slum Dwellers and Informal Housing Residents................................................................. 22
Women.................................................................................................................................. 25
Persons with Disabilities........................................................................................................ 31
Religious Minorities ............................................................................................................. 34
Migrant and Border Communities.......................................................................................... 38
Minority Groups and Geographic Marginalization in the Niger Delta................................. 56
Recommendations to Minimize Risk and Optimize Participation........................................ 64
**List of Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Action on Disability and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCEND</td>
<td>Association for Comprehensive Empowerment of Nigerians with Disabilities</td>
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<td>CAN</td>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria</td>
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<td>CGD</td>
<td>Connecting Gender for Development CMA – Christian Mothers Association</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Civilian Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>DWIN</td>
<td>Deaf Women in Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM/C</td>
<td>female genital mutilation or cutting</td>
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<td>FIDA</td>
<td>International Federation of Women Lawyers</td>
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<td>FOMWAN</td>
<td>Federation of Muslim Women</td>
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<td>GADA</td>
<td>Gender and Development Advocacy</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Identification</td>
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<td>ID4D</td>
<td>Identification for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Integration, Dignity &amp; Economic Advancement of People Affected by Leprosy</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>JEI</td>
<td>Justice Empowerment Initiative</td>
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<td>JNI</td>
<td>Jama’atul Nasril Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>JONAWPA</td>
<td>Joint National Association of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<td>KIND</td>
<td>Kudirat Initiative for Democracy</td>
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<td>LANW</td>
<td>Legal Awareness for Nigeria Women</td>
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<td>MOSOP</td>
<td>Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People</td>
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<td>NDDC</td>
<td>Niger Delta and Niger Delta Development Commission</td>
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<td>MWD</td>
<td>Men with Disabilities</td>
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<td>NDRBDA</td>
<td>Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority</td>
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<td>NHIS</td>
<td>National Health Insurance Scheme</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>Nigerian Immigration Service</td>
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<td>NIMC</td>
<td>Nigerian Identity Management Commission</td>
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<td>NCFRMI</td>
<td>National Commission for Refugees, Migrants, and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>NECSOB</td>
<td>Network for Civil Society Organization Borno State</td>
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<td>NEMA</td>
<td>National Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NNAD</td>
<td>Nigerian National Association of the Deaf NPS – Nigeria Prisons Service</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)</td>
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<td>OMPADEC</td>
<td>Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission</td>
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<td>PCNI</td>
<td>Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative</td>
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<td>PFN</td>
<td>Prison Fellowship of Nigeria</td>
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<td>PRAWA</td>
<td>Prisoners’ Rehabilitation and Welfare Action</td>
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<td>SCIAN</td>
<td>Spinal Cord Association of Nigeria</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Slum Dwellers International</td>
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<td>SEMA</td>
<td>State Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERI</td>
<td>Socio Economic Rights Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPDC</td>
<td>Shell Petroleum Development Corporation</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Develop</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARDC</td>
<td>Women Advocacy Research and Documentation Centre</td>
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<td>WEP</td>
<td>Women Environmental Programme</td>
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Introduction

Authentication of identity has become inextricably associated with individual access to government services and the assertion of rights that enhance participation, inclusion and protection from discrimination. Governments in the developing world increasingly acknowledge the role of official identification (ID) in promoting development, providing data for national planning, and facilitating social integration. Many African countries in particular have embraced identification as a critical tool for achieving these goals and begun establishing new ID systems, taking advantage of new technologies and a conducive donor environment.¹

The World Bank Group’s Identification for Development (ID4D) initiative reflects this growing consensus. Collaborating with country partners around the world, it has sought to identify opportunities and challenges in different contexts. For example, digital identity can hasten the pace of progress by improving delivery of safety net services to the poor, advance financial inclusion, support agriculture development, and strengthen electoral voting.² But according to a recent ID4D Annual Report, about 1.1 billion people live without official identities globally. The populations who could benefit the most from an ID are often those most likely to lack one. This can entrench the marginalization of women, the disabled, identity-based minorities, displaced persons, rural communities and other populations. Lack of ID makes it difficult for these individuals to access social protection, education, health care, or financial services. They may be unable to vote in elections or cross borders legally. This results in systematic economic, political, and social exclusion. It also exacerbates ongoing governance challenges such as corruption, ineffective program targeting, and the evaluation of developmental progress due to unreliable data.

The Government of Nigeria has requested World Bank support to improve the national ID system and ensure it reaches all persons in Nigeria. This is a gargantuan task which will necessitate a new approach to ID enrollment. This is laid out in A Strategic Roadmap for Developing Digital Identification in Nigeria. The Roadmap proposes an ecosystem approach which would count on a number of public and private sector partners to support NIMC in conducting enrollments for the national ID. With inclusion primarily in mind, this paper seeks to articulate a framework for vulnerability in the context of ID in Nigeria, and identifies some key populations who are at risk of exclusion from Nigeria’s national ID.

Overview of the Nigerian ID System

The national ID system in Nigeria is managed by the National Identity Management commission (NIMC), which issues national ID numbers (NINs) and national ID cards to citizens and legal residents of. The NIMC Act No.23 of 2007 created the agency to establish, own, operate, register, maintain and manage the national identity database of Nigerians. The national identity management system is meant to enable secure, reliable and authentic verification of an individual’s identity anywhere in the country. NIMC’s operations effectively commenced in 2012 with the enrollment of citizens, issuance of NINs, and an ID card based on biometric checks.

Nigeria constitutes an important case for efforts to establish national IDs for several reasons. Not only is it Africa’s most populous country, it is the continent’s most diverse. Linguists estimate that five percent of the world’s languages are spoken in Nigeria, multiplying the practical challenges of any registration program.

Notwithstanding, Nigeria has a very fragmented ID landscape with over 13 government agencies and at least 3 state agencies offering ID services. Many of these capture biometrics and issue ID cards independently without establishing links with other systems, resulting in duplication and waste of resources. As a result, Nigeria’s key foundational identification systems – the national ID issued by NIMC and the civil registration system managed by NPopC -- suffer from low coverage across the population. Birth registration coverage is only 30 percent, and this figure drops to 19 percent in rural areas and to 7 percent within the poorest quintile of the population. Less than 50 percent of residents have any ID card issued by NIMC, while only 9 percent of individuals have a national ID number (NIN). Based on the Global Findex Survey results of 2018, 33 percent of those who do not have ID cite that it is too difficult to obtain, and approximately 20 percent cite a lack of supporting documentation as the primary barrier to accessing the national ID.

Presently, one must enroll in person with enrollment centers located in 600 or 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs), located largely in LGA headquarters and State capitols. Enrollment entails completing a lengthy application form and sitting for a photograph and collection of biometrics (fingerprints). To substantiate their application, a person must bring along a number of “breeder” documents which are required to verify information such as the person’s name, date of birth, citizenship/residency status, etc. Due to the volume of enrollments and a lack of connectivity to all offices, NIN numbers are not issued instantaneously. Applicants must come back to the NIMC office to receive their NIN slip (a paper receipt showing their basic information, photo, and NIN), and they must return again to collect their national ID card once it is ready. At present, applicants wait years to receive the national ID card -- NIMC has only recently finished printing cards for applicants from 2014. SMS-based systems which are meant to allow enrollees to check the status of their application are not always operable and are unable to explain why a NIN or ID card has not been issued, requiring people to return to enrollment centers to understand the cause of the delay, which may vary from a backlog of card printing to an issue with their application which has prevented the issuance of their NIN.

Output from the current ID system testifies to the substantial obstacles to enrollment, despite a significant government commitment. As of March 2019, only 34.6 million people – about 18 percent of the population – had a national identification number (NIN). However, the majority of these NINs were generated as a result of harmonization of the banking database with the national ID database, therefore many people who technically have a national ID number are unaware that they have one. The country possesses neither a coordinated database nor an identity management system that links the public and private sectors even though some of these institutions utilize smart card technology that should facilitate data transfer. A reliable national system for verification and secure authentication of an individual’s identity has thus not been established.\(^3\)

Biometric technology and simplified administrative requirements promise to overcome many of these challenges. Optimizing the national benefits of an ID card requires maximizing participation. However, even with a strong government commitment to eventual universal

enrollment, many Nigerians could be excluded from the NID if existing requirements for breeder documents or the stationary enrollment model persist. This paper presents a framework for assessing vulnerability to exclusion, identifies some key groups who are most at risk of exclusion, and suggest entry points for stakeholder engagement.

Scope of the Study
This paper is meant to inform the larger NID roll-out in Nigeria, which is still in its early stages. Several other aspects critical to the success of Nigeria’s national ID program, such as the hardware and technical elements of enrollment, are outside the scope of this paper. Similarly, researchers did not offer a full inventory or critique of the government agencies presently providing identification. However, the paper does note how trust in government varies significantly across agencies. This variation needs to be integrated into the ecosystem approach that plans to leverage existing agencies and expertise for enrollment. Finally, several important populations considered are intertwined with violence or tensions. The vulnerability assessments thus focus narrowly on the factors that could impact participation in the ID program, and do not recommend solutions to conflicts or evaluate the claims of victims or perpetrators.

Some populations receive only brief treatment because little reliable information is available, or because other populations warranted additional attention due to either the scale of marginalization or contemporary contexts that exacerbate the risks of exclusion. Other populations proposed were omitted from the final analysis because those profiled here offer analogous lessons for outreach and inclusion in the ID system.4

Methodology and Analytical Framework
The World Bank commissioned this desk study to explore where, how, and among whom such marginalization could take place. This study is not meant to be a comprehensive list of all potentially marginalized groups, but rather seeks to present a typology of vulnerabilities and an initial identification of key groups who are vulnerable to exclusion as the ID system continues to expand.

The Bank tasked seven researchers, representing a range of expertise and diverse academic and professional backgrounds, with identifying marginalized populations in Nigeria at risk of exclusion from the NID. Each researcher carried out a literature review and desk study of up to three population groups.5 These were discussed during a review workshop that included additional academics and members of civil society with expertise on the proposed populations or with registration initiatives such as INEC’s voter registration. The workshop provide ample feedback to the researchers and enabled the identification of five types of vulnerabilities:

1. Socio-cultural factors that stem from value systems or historically embedded perceptions of the population could discourage enrolment. Many small populations in this regard see

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4 For example, the team considered “ex-convicts”, a category that in Nigeria would likely include people who spent time in prison yet never appeared before a court, in addition to those convicted. As of March 2018, there were 71,522 people in prison, with 68.2 percent of them in pre-trial detention. These persons awaiting trial, especially those facing prolonged or wrongful detention, develop an overwhelming mistrust in the government according to groups such as Justice Empowerment Initiative (JEI), which could prevent them for engaging with the national ID system.

5 The choice of the term “population” is deliberate and inclusive, in order to underscore the possibility that identities can exist at individual and group levels, and be acquired, ascribed, or immutable.
participation in formal state processes (including registration) as coercive or unnecessarily interfering in their social or economic livelihoods. Certain groups, such as women in some parts of the country, can also be prevented from enrolling due to socio-cultural and religious factors;

(2) Structural conditions such as poor infrastructure, low levels of literacy, and limited access to social services can actively hinder access to enrollment points and can reinforce a view of the government as negligent. While issues like distance, cost, and lack of awareness can prevent the population at large from accessing ID enrollment points, they also increase the costs of persuading some populations who are already skeptical of government participation in the national ID system would actually advance their interests;

(3) Environmental characteristics, including migratory lifestyles, geographic isolation and variable climate conditions restricting movement increase the logistical challenges of reaching marginal populations and decrease the known information about them;

(4) Administrative and institutional bottlenecks most prominently include complications such as the documents currently required by the Nigerian Identity Management Commission (NIMC) for enrolment. But it also includes corruption during the registration process, confusion about where to enroll, inadequate cross-cultural communication, inappropriate means of communication for certain populations, and the current system’s fragmented approach to registration;

(5) Political factors contribute to marginalization when politicians see communities as affiliated with the political opposition, sympathetic to anti-state rebellions, or associated with communal violence. Recognizing minority grievances can alter the balance of power in the country’s federalism, just as information that alters population estimates is highly sensitive because of its implications for national oil revenue allocations to states and local governments.

The team’s goal was not to provide a comprehensive risk assessment of Nigeria’s many vulnerable populations. Rather, the team took into consideration variation across the above typology in order to capture a broad range of geographic, ethnic, religious, economic and other identities. Research covered both large populations at risk of exclusion as well as small, lesser-known communities. Based on these criteria, this paper assesses the vulnerability of internally displaced persons (IDPs), slum dwellers in major cities, religious minorities, border communities, minorities in the Niger Delta and the Middle Belt, communities lacking indigenous legal status, women, persons with disabilities, rural farmers in the Middle Belt, and finally pastoralists and various populations with migrant economies.
This paper assesses the vulnerability of each population on the bases of four questions. First, what defines membership in the population and what makes it vulnerable? This considers norms, societal practices, or other barriers that could impede full participation in the ID system and its benefits. Second, what is population’s capacity to address its concerns? This is an important question because some groups are marginalized but able to raise their grievances effectively. Other populations reduce their visibility as a survival strategy, thereby reducing their capacity. Third, could the population’s vulnerability change as a result of the planned roll out of the NID system? Vulnerability dynamics consider potential unintended consequences and the need for risk mitigation strategies. While the most obvious expression of this would be a backlash from existing social structures that feel threatened, researchers agreed that the ID project could – under some scenarios – formalize exclusion from state resources where officials have opportunities for selective or nepotistic behavior. Similarly, since several marginalized populations here are already subjected to government coercion or harassment, researchers considered how different populations would worry about data privacy.

The final question asks about the strengths and weaknesses of different access points to the population group. Which ones are likely foster trust and cooperation? What types of outreach could discourage participation? The analysis of each vulnerable population then concludes with a table providing a stakeholder assessment in order to help inform future outreach. The table summarizes the influence and perceived legitimacy of stakeholders and representatives. It also considers the population’s level of interest, listing benefits it could gain from participation in the ID system. Finally, the assessment considers potential ways that stakeholders could specifically be involved, for example by raising visibility, incorporating ID access in existing programs, or facilitating contacts that promote inclusive community participation. Although the table lists specific stakeholders, this summary identifying all of the potential relevant partners was beyond the scope of the paper.

How Intersectionality Compounds Population Vulnerability

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6 According to the Red Cross, a population is categorised as being vulnerable when they have diminished capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made hazard (www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster/what-is-vulnerability/). A population can also be categorised as vulnerable if it is unable to access formal or government services, included in interventions etc., by virtue of the fact that they are located in hard to reach areas, do not have the appropriate information, network, skills, competence etc., to enable them engage in a constructive manner with the existing system or platforms.
During the research and drafting stage, researchers arrived at a deeply shared understanding that overlapping population vulnerabilities increase the risks of exclusion from the national ID system. For example, gender compounds vulnerabilities, adding to the marginalization that women and girls already experience in patriarchal cultures where their economic and educational opportunities are limited. Prisoners and ex-convicts often endure mental health, struggle with substance addiction, or carry communicable diseases that add to their isolation from mainstream society.\(^7\) Former (or suspected) members of Boko Haram offer another example. Facing social alienation from their families and communities, they might opt to live in slums – informal housing arrangements with their own risks and uncertainties. Similarly, millions of migrants who fled Boko Haram’s violence and settled in “host communities;” many of these IDPs fled their state of origin and fear for their lives if they return home. However, staying where they are means embracing a precarious legal limbo where they lack “indigenous” status that protects them from discrimination, improves their access to land, and generates employment opportunities. Questions of indigeneity similarly contribute to drivers of conflict in Nigeria’s religiously mixed “Middle Belt” states and exacerbate feelings of alienation among Niger Delta’s minority groups. In sum, intersectionality means that an individual can simultaneously be associated with multiple and overlapping categories of vulnerability, thus exacerbating the risks of exclusion.

**Indigeneity as an Exclusionary Device**

A person’s lack of indigenous status frequently overlaps with other sources of marginalization. But unlike other common intersectional vulnerabilities such as gender, which has been the subject of efforts to “mainstream” it, indigeneity remains under-appreciated as a cause of exclusion.\(^8\) In Nigeria, indigeneity assigns legal privileges to individuals officially recognized as the first settlers of an area. In practice, long histories of migration, recent demographic trends of urbanization, and increasing pressures for involuntary migration often make it difficult to objectively assign such status. Not only does this open up opportunities for legally-sanctioned discrimination against “settlers,” it conflicts with constitutionalism which applies equal rights of citizenship, thereby promoting national integration. The Land Use Act, decreed by an outgoing military government in 1978 and still in force, further complicates matters by vesting all urban land within a state in the state governor, and all non-urban land under the authorities of the respective local government. This makes one’s access to land title contingent upon their indigenous status, and thus at the mercy of local or state government officials who have broad powers to assign “certificates of indigeneity.”

The elevation of indigeneity to a primary identity began during the colonial era, with the organization along communal lines by migrants and their “hosts” who competed for social and economic opportunities.\(^9\) The aftermath of Nigeria’s civil war (1967-70), when ethnic Igbos in the then-Eastern Region attempted to secede, further advanced the concept of indigeneity. As part of its post-war reconciliation efforts, and to remedy educational qualifications that rendered most northerners ineligible for the civil service, the government adopted an ethnic quota system to reintegrate the military and then implemented the “federal character principle.” Though this principle is meant to promote inclusiveness by ensuring different ethnic groups are represented


in government and have access to goods, in practice it results in legal discrimination. Nigerians who permanently reside in a particular states or local government can be denied access to government programs, public education, land, or title if those territories differ from their paternally determined place of origin.

By relying on this arbitrary understanding of territory or homeland, the government affirms that the administrative space belongs to people called indigenes. Consequently, those regarded as non-indigenes become vulnerable populations in their places of permanent residence even though they are legally Nigerian citizens. Indigeneity exacts a large toll on national integration because of an “essentialist” view of membership. This view presumes that members of the indigenous group highly value a pure identity and do not desire membership of other groups. Over time, indigeneity has thus been elevated to primary social good, being the foremost identity for access to other goods. It is attractive to those who benefit from it because it allows dominant groups to seek advantage, and minor groups to create privilege. It has gained traction over citizenship because of its role in Nigeria’s distributive politics based on federal character, and because of the power it grants subnational officials.

In sum, there are strong institutional structures and social incentives reinforcing the concept of indigeneity, even though it legally enables discrimination. Through a flexible policy of group identity definition, the government can support an individual’s disposition to a new group identity. Doing so effectively reduces the salience of exclusive indigeneity and allows residents access to government jobs and scholarships in the state where they actually live. Left unaddressed, this disenfranchisement of non-indigenes is problematic for the ID program, especially if certificates of indigeneity are necessary for enrollment or retain important legal status at the subnational level. IDPs who fled violence, citizens living in slums seeking economic opportunities in Nigeria’s growing urban centers, and populations whose economic livelihood depend upon regular migration would all face significant barriers to participation if enrolment requires proof of indigenous status. As such, it is recommended that the national ID be delinked from indigeneity—and even citizenship—to enable the widest possible reach and to remove one of the key barriers currently arising from the required breeder documents.

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Internally Displaced Persons

Internally displaced persons are a key group that the ID system must seek to reach as they represent a sizable vulnerable population in Nigeria who is also most in need of access to services which could be facilitated by IDs. They are also highly vulnerable to exclusion from the ID system both because they lack breeder documents, but also as a choice based on existing mistrust of Government and “enrollment fatigue” arising from the substantial number of actors and programs undertaking different types of enrollments. In addition, IDPs also suffer exclusion in host communities who fear that giving IDPs access to IDs will give them access to benefits and scarce community resources at the expense of indigenes.

Vulnerability Profile

In recent years, forced displacement due to violent conflict, civil unrest, and territorial transfer has been a significant cause of social exclusion in Nigeria. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) currently estimates that there are over 1.88 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria. However, the real number is likely much larger, as IOM only tabulates numbers for the country’s northeast, and they do not account for the large number of people living outside of formally registered sites.\(^{11}\) For example, a recent study estimated that 930,000 individuals in need of assistance remain stranded, out of reach by humanitarian actors due to a combination of military policy restricting unescorted movement and security concerns.\(^{12}\)

By definition, IDPs are persons or groups who have been forced or been obliged to leave their places of residence as a result of – or in order to avoid – armed conflict, credible fear of violence, human rights violations, or natural or human made disasters. Unlike refugees, they have not crossed any internationally recognized border. While Nigeria is prone to natural disasters such as floods, erosion, and drought, the principal cause of the current displacement crisis is Boko Haram, an Islamic insurgency concentrated in the three northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. In the broader Lake Chad region, which borders Cameroon, Niger and Chad, ongoing militant activity and clashes with state security forces have displaced additional populations. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that by the end of 2018, an additional 115,000 IDPs will be displaced by an intensification of hostilities.\(^{13}\)

IDPs face a host of intersectional challenges that multiply the risk of exclusion from the national ID system, even though these populations realize they would benefit from participation. Challenges include continued targeting by Boko Haram, food shortages, unemployment, congested housing settlements, poor sanitation, and de facto and de jure barriers to education and healthcare. Women, children, unaccompanied minors, and orphans are particularly vulnerable subsets of the IDP population and are sometimes victims of abuse by authorities. The majority of IDPs lack any form of documentation, having lost it while fleeing. Without a certificate of indigeneity or other documents, IDPs can become “stateless.” Without an established permanent


\(^{13}\) United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *North-East Nigeria Situation Update, June 2018*. 

12
legal residency, IDPs’ struggle to participate in elections, find work, occupy housing, or access government services.¹⁴

Compounding the daily challenges facing IDPs is the government’s response. Nearly a decade after the insurgency began, Nigeria still does not have a guiding principle or policy on displacement. In addition, the lack of properly defined institutional spheres of responsibility is a significant challenge for the management of IDPs. For instance, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants, and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) is currently responsible for the management of displacement-related issues, especially profiling and registration.¹⁵ At the same time, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMs), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are all actively working with IDP populations. These actors help alleviate the strain on resources, but they also often create confusion as to who does what, who gets what allocation, and who has what responsibility. Each one of these actors had its own system of registration and identification. Past efforts to reduce duplication and increase coordination suggest that such administrative barriers to inclusion could replicate themselves in the national ID program. For example, in 2016 the Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI) established a standardized registration system using biometric data to ensure that all IDPs would have access to all interventions.¹⁶ To date, this program has made little headway, apart from piecemeal registration efforts limited to formal IDP camps.¹⁷

Importantly, IDPs in formal camps constitute a minority of IDPs overall. Most live in informal camps (or “camp-like” settings) either in isolation or on the outskirts of established towns, or in “host communities” that welcomed them but that now facing increasing strain. Unlike formal camps, which are easy to identify due to their official government status, the other types of settlements are more difficult to categorize and identify. According to the IOM, 61 percent of IDPs in the northeast live in host communities. The vast majority of IDPs (between 87% and 100%) in Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi, and Taraba all live outside camps or camp-like settings. Only in Borno State do a significant number of IDPs, estimated at 49 percent, actually reside in formal or informal camps.¹⁸

In 2017, REACH assessed two camps in Borno State. An informal camp known as “Abachari” on the outskirts of Maiduguri encompassed 12 families from the same village of origin, all living in the same courtyard of a mutual acquaintance. Another REACH analysis differentiates between the informal Fulatari IDP Camp in Monguno and its namesake host community, Fulatari. Satellite imagery of Fulatari shows that the camp is distinct but surrounded by the community and bleeds into it. Should Abachari be classified as a settlement or a host community? And how should the areas around the Fulatari Camp be classified? Such decisions have major implications for resource allocation, access to government services, and IDP counts.

¹⁴ Lamarche and Yarnell, *Political Pressure to Return*.
¹⁵ See https://ncfrmi-gov.ng/. The organization’s original mandate (as the NCFR) was to support refugees only, but has since been extended to IDPs as well.
Borno has received the largess of attention from the government, donors, and NGOs, meaning that millions of people in other states are at risk of exclusion.

Because the social and physical risks, likelihood of exclusion, and vulnerability dynamics vary significantly across formal, informal and host communities, the analysis that follows is organized along those categories, giving special treatment to Borno State. In order to compare the experience of Boko Haram-related IDPs with other types of displaced persons, the analysis also briefly considers communities on the Bakassi peninsula at risk of exclusion.

**IDPs in Formal Camps**

IDPs living in formal camps – those administered by the state or federal government – are normally registered, and thus have more direct access to government and NGO services. Additionally, as recognized sites for displaced people, formal camps often have greater concentrations of humanitarian aid and assistance than informal camps or host communities. These IDPs report greater access to cash (and employment) than IDPs in informal settings. They also enjoy greater physical security from militant attacks and generalized crime, compared to IDPs in host communities and informal camps. The military, the police, a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and other formal and informal security actors guard the camp, conduct internal patrols, and screen entering and exiting residents.

The bulk of Nigeria’s IDPs living in formal camps reside in Borno State, which in 2016 had estimated total population of 5.8 million people. As of February 2018, Borno had at least 1.3 million IDPs – a number that actually represents a decline from peak periods in 2014-16. Figures reporting the number of IDPs, the number of camps and classification of camps in Borno differ widely depending on the source. That said, an estimated 26 percent reside in one of the 33 formal or informal camps across the state. The government planned for only a few of these camps. Within Maiduguri, the largest camps are Arabic Teachers College, Teachers Village, National Youth Service Scheme Camp, Dalori, Bakassi and Gubio. There are also 14 sites commonly known as “satellite camps” run by the military and established in towns recaptured from Boko Haram.

Beyond the benefits of improved protection from external threats and better access to cash, life in formal IDP camps is very harsh. A REACH survey in the northeast found that IDPs in formal camps tended to rate their living conditions as inferior to those residing in host communities or informal camps. Moreover, formal camp residents were the least likely to consider settling in their current locations. Freedom of movement into and out of the camps is also severely restricted, preventing residents from conducting various economic and social activities.

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20 Mohammed, “The Causes and Consequences of Internal Displacement.”


22 Ibid. 29; International Committee of the Red Cross, “Internal Displacement in North East Nigeria: Operationalising the Kampala Convention in Borno, Adamawa, and Borno States,” (December, 31 2017), 33.

23 International Committee of the Red Cross “Internal Displacement in North East Nigeria”


activities. Most importantly, IDPs in formal camps are highly susceptible to abuse by security officials and government authorities. Camp dwellers may be subject to harassment or detention on suspicion (warranted or not) of Boko Haram connections. Women and children are particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence, sometimes at the hands of camp officials and security force members. Though sexual violence is a risk for all IDPs, the problem is more acute in formal camps; a September 2016 poll of IDPs indicated that 66% of sexual violence perpetrators were camp officials, whereas in host communities members account for 28 percent of perpetrators. This one of many reasons why many female IDPs often choose to live in host communities rather than formal camps, as local households provide better protection from such personal violence.

**IDPs in Host Communities**

The advantages of living in host communities account for the large share of IDPs who choose not to live in government run camps. IDPs in host communities are often well-integrated with the local population and considerably less vulnerable than other categories of IDPs. Survey findings support this: IDPs in host communities are less willing than camp-dwellers to actively consider returning home (9% compared to 15%), and they are more willing to consider permanently settling in their current location (26% compared to 25% in informal camps, and 18% in formal camps). Some IDPs also report that they prefer life in host communities because of easier access to employment, more freedom of movement, and greater social and psychological security. They may have relatives or other connections that provide housing or financial assistance. In some cases, wealthy benefactors, NGOs, and community leaders provide displaced families with land, housing, food assistance, and access to water. These findings indicate that many IDPs actively choose to live in host communities, though it must also be noted that lack of space in formal camps also drives some IDPs into host communities. However, IDPs living in host communities also face their own set of challenges. Those without local connections or friendly neighbors faced increased vulnerability. IDPs living in host communities often lack access to NGO or governmental services. For example, they may seek out employment in temporary jobs, but due to the flooded labor market, they are often forced to resort to begging or theft to meet food needs. Some communities lack primary or secondary schools, and even when schools are present, few IDPs can afford the fees and uniforms necessary.

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34 REACH, “Informal IDP Camp Profiles: Kushari Community;” See also Erong.
for attendance. When land or housing is not granted freely by locals or community leaders, IDPs struggle to pay rent. If the IDPs migrated from a different state, their lack of a certificate of indigeneity and other documentation increases the sense of uncertainty.

By and large, host communities have been welcoming and extremely generous to the IDPs they receive. However, the difficulties engendered by living in close proximity to local populations in a stressed economic environment often spawn competition and conflict. Many host communities were vulnerable and impoverished prior to the conflict, and they too have suffered from the insurgency’s fallout through the destruction or closing of schools and health facilities, among other effects. The large influx of displaced persons has put severe strains on local resources and services, serving to increase the cost of healthcare, housing, and education. IDPs’ desperate search for employment has put them in direct competition with locals. Access to water, which is often shared by IDPs and host populations, is another potential source of tension. In fact, the negative impact of IDP influxes on host communities is so great that OCHA estimates that almost 310,000 “vulnerable and non-displaced people from towns” will need humanitarian assistance in 2018.

Relationships between host communities and IDPs may be cordial at the beginning, but tensions emerge over time for a variety of reasons. Resource depletion and competition for scarce employment opportunities are one source of tension. Hosting IDPs in personal homes also engenders friction due to close living and shared space. IDPs may also face discrimination and exploitation at the hands of host communities. For example, they are often singled out for abuse or paid poorly for labor or community service. Newly arriving IDPs may face unfair treatment or suspicion from host communities, out of fear that Boko Haram may be attempting to infiltrate communities disguised as IDPs. Finally, an increasingly important vulnerability dynamic stems from community resentment of government assistance or NGO aid available to IDPs but not for the hosts; aid interventions less frequently target the local residents themselves.

**IDPs in Informal Camps and Settlements**

IDPs inhabiting informal settlements and camps (which, as noted, may occasionally be classified as “host communities”) are perhaps the most vulnerable displaced persons grouping. They often share the negative aspects of both formal camps and host communities, without enjoying the benefits of either. IDPs in informal camps have less direct access to government or NGO services, often remain unregistered by state and federal authorities, have lower reported physical security than IDPs in formal camps or host communities, and tend to suffer from the same sorts of community conflict and tension as IDPs in host communities. At the same time, informal camps can have similar overcrowding issues, endemic poverty, and susceptibility to abuse.

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38 See the REACH assessments for Maiduguri informal camps and host communities.
43 Ibid. 28.
46 ICRC, *Internal Displacement in North East Nigeria*.
49 Ibid. 24.
characteristic of the formal camps.\textsuperscript{51} Informal settlements do, however, offer one advantage: better access to land, and hence increased capacity to cultivate and improve food security.\textsuperscript{52} This may account for informal settlement IDPs’ greater willingness to settle in displacement sites than those in formal camps.

Some of these informal camps are found outside of the northeast, notably in the FCT around Abuja, where 21 to 40 different sites have been identified.\textsuperscript{53} In addition to IDPs from the conflict in the Lake Chad area, IDP settlements in the FCT also house displaced groups from the north-central region who have fled communal clashes and sectarian fighting.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Bakassi IDPs}

Another particularly vulnerable subset of IDPs in Nigeria consists of exiles from the Bakassi peninsula. Following adjudication by the International Court of Justice in 2002, Cameroon was accorded sovereign control of this oil-rich territory on the Atlantic coastline, which was formerly controlled by Nigeria.\textsuperscript{55} Although Bakassi residents were given judicial and treaty assurances of protection and the offer of Cameroonian citizenship, many instead chose to flee to Nigeria out of fear of Cameroonian abuse – an apprehension that was not unreasonable, given the history of violence on the peninsula. Upon the completion of the territorial transfer in 2008, some 76,000 Bakassi returnees were registered in Cross River and Akwa Ibom states. They took up residence in both formal and informal camps throughout Southeastern Nigeria, anticipating governmental assistance in procuring a permanent home.\textsuperscript{56} Ten years on, many still await resettlement and live in deplorable conditions, alleging neglect on the part of the federal government. Bakassi IDPs report extreme rates of unemployment, inadequate shelter, a lack of capital for rebuilding their lives, and difficulty accessing education.\textsuperscript{57} Others cite food insecurity and a growing crime wave among IDP communities.\textsuperscript{58} Some Bakassi describe themselves as “political orphans,” abandoned by government and left to fend themselves.\textsuperscript{59} As most displaced Bakassi had been fishermen on the peninsula, their current inland locations deprive them of their primary livelihood.\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{Capacity Assessment}

Based on the preceding analysis of marginal Nigerian groups and their vulnerability, we can draw out a few conclusions regarding the relative capacity of different populations. Host community IDPs may have stronger social networks and greater financial independence, better protection from security force abuses, more freedom of movement and greater access to employment. However, they have less access to official interventions. This is sometimes a calculated decision to avoid mistreatment by camp authorities or security officials. Informal camp dwellers suffer from lower capacity in general, although their improved access to land for

\textsuperscript{51} ICRC, \textit{Internal Displacement in North East Nigeria}, 33.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid. 28.
\textsuperscript{53} Mohammed, “The Causes and Consequences of Internal Displacement,” 29.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ingiabuna, “Migration and Resettlement Challenges of Bakassi Returnees in Yenagoa,” 213.
cultivation provides them with a unique opportunity to lessen food insecurity. While the Bakassi IDPs are landless and isolated, they are a vocal group, with the ear of the Nigerian press and the sympathy of the Cross River State government (among others).

In general, the direct capacity of the IDPs living in formal camps to address their political and structural grievances is low. The ability of civil society in Borno State and in the northeast in general to engage socio-political issues is low.\(^{61}\) This limits IDPs’ ability to articulate and devise a strategy to address their marginalization. Moreover, discriminatory practices and subtle segregation weakens the capacity of IDPs. For example, IDPs sort themselves based on their origin northern or southern Borno, or according to religion, gender or association. Notably, camp members openly discriminate against women who were married to Boko Haram fighters.\(^{62}\)

However, several factors positively affect IDP capacity in Borno’s camps. An indirect factor possibly improving capacity is increased freedom of movement in and out of camps. This increases opportunities for pursuing economic livelihoods. For better or for worse, though freedom of movement simultaneously generates feelings that the camps are permanent places of abode. Formal camp IDPs have better access to government and NGO interventions. CSOs such as Jire Dole and Knifar Women Networks are helping to organize IDPs so they can articulate their grievances. Importantly, these camps also have community organizations that resolve disputes and allocate resources. Community leadership structures in the camps are organized around local governments and sometimes “cluster” around original settlements. The formal structures are made up of elected positions, and there are allegations that camp officials influence the elections because those officials prefer leaders they can easily work with. Informal leadership can be based on personal characteristics such as gender, religion or tradition. The fact that official leadership sometimes relies on informal structures to resolve problems speaks to the legitimacy and influence of the latter. This is further evidenced by data citing friends/neighbors as the most trusted source of information, local/community leaders as second most trusted, and religious leaders ranking third.\(^{63}\)

\textit{In sum, any outreach strategy for the ID program will need to carefully assess de jure leadership that might be a source of resentment alongside de facto leadership that enjoys influence and legitimacy.}

**Vulnerability Dynamics associated with Project Implementation**

A comprehensive identification system would have a largely positive effect on IDP populations by facilitating official registration of their displacement status and increasing their access to


\(^{63}\) IOM Displacement Matrix Report for February 2018.
government and NGO interventions. IDs could help IDPs in formal camps gain more freedom of movement, thus reducing some of the friction with camp officials and security forces. For IDPs in informal camps and settlements, IDs would increase their visibility to agencies seeking to help them. However, it is important to reiterate that many IDPs are hostile to the government and bitter about the lack of justice for abuses at the hands of authorities. Along with the attendant corruption that may be expected during the registration process, and the plausible likelihood that authorities might use access or possession of IDs as another form of discrimination, IDPs may fear that their data may be used by the government or community leaders for nefarious or political purposes. Distrust is not limited to the government either. NGOs have been accused of siphoning aid and even helping Boko Haram; IDPs may be hesitant to provide biodata to these actors. Furthermore, recent research indicates that local, traditional leadership has been implicated in various abuses throughout the insurgency\(^6^4\) – IDPs may fear that their information can be used by these individuals in local disputes or conflicts.

It is noteworthy that the relationship between civil society and IDPs in Borno State has become substantially transactional. This is generating animosity toward CSOs and INGOs as they are seen as increasingly self-interested. This resonates with statements and some steps taken by Governor Kashim Shettima to periodically vet, register and re-register international / CSOs working in Borno. Finally, it is important to mention that some IDPs already have NIMC-issued IDs. However the existing program has had limited coverage and sown confusion, particularly given the density of government and non-governmental actors present in registered camps. Similarly, the Nigeria Immigration Service requires registration of non-Nigerians at the airport in Maiduguri – the result of changing attitudes toward INGOs and the resources they bring to the state. In this context, partnerships for rolling out the NID system could be viewed with suspicion, or target populations might feel a sense of “enrollment fatigue.”

**Stakeholder Identification**

As in most of the north, radio continues to feature as the most preferred and accessible platform for communicating with all types of IDPs. The number of actors involved their overlapping internal governance structures, and the role of the security services in controlling access to the camps all complicate identification of stakeholders and outreach to formal camps. Outreach to other types of camps will involve overcoming low visibility and rapidly shifting vulnerability dynamics, especially in host communities. Low levels of trust nationwide in the security agencies, which play a domineering role in the formal camps and regions with settlements, present another challenge by conditioning overall attitudes about the government. A survey carried out by CLEEN Foundation in 2012 found that only 7.7% of respondents trusted the police while 41.2% said they did not. Security agencies are perceived as instruments of the state that deepen Nigeria’s significant structural inequalities.\(^6^5\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Key characteristics</th>
<th>Nature and extent of influence</th>
<th>Nature and extent of interest</th>
<th>Potential role in the program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\(^{6^4}\) Centre for Democracy and Development (forthcoming 2018).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Interest Level</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)</td>
<td>Established to cater for the needs of displaced persons across the country.</td>
<td>High interest</td>
<td>Management and response to disaster and support to victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)</td>
<td>SEMA assists NEMA with delivery of relief. In cooperation with the military, it creates humanitarian cells that deliver basic supplies, provide essentials such as food and shelter, and assists with registering IDPs in camps.</td>
<td>Medium level of interest</td>
<td>As a stakeholder with the responsibility of delivering relief to the IDP camps, SEMA would be a valuable partner for collection and documentation of data in the various camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Commission for Refugees</td>
<td>Established to handle displacement related issues in the country.</td>
<td>High interest</td>
<td>Musterling IDPs in camp locations for ID processing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
<td>Monitors flows of IDPs/Refugees in the region; helps administer camps.</td>
<td>High interest</td>
<td>Locating and prepping IDP populations for processing. The Displacement Matrix could be a useful data tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Committee on the North East initiative</td>
<td>Responsible for policy formation and implementation for Lake Chad crisis.</td>
<td>High-level planning and coordination, little ground presence.</td>
<td>Planning level only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity Management Commission</td>
<td>Main federal party contact for identification programming</td>
<td>High interest.</td>
<td>Every type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network for Civil Society Organization Borno State (NECSOB)</td>
<td>Coordinating activities related to IDPs within the state</td>
<td>High interest – IDs useful for coordinating humanitarian activities in Borno.</td>
<td>Coordinating and mustering IDPs in formal camps for registration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa Peace Initiative – American University, Yola</td>
<td>Focuses on peace building, humanitarian relief, and raising awareness in conjunction with local leaders</td>
<td>Medium interest – could use ID program for peacebuilding initiatives</td>
<td>Coordinating and mustering IDPs in formal camps for registration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>Coordinates aid delivery to refugee camps, IDP camps</td>
<td>High interest – registering IDPs and refugees.</td>
<td>Coordinating and mustering IDPs in formal camps for registration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEEM Foundation</strong></td>
<td>Works with women and girls who were married to Boko Haram members. They focus on psychosocial, de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KINAF Foundation</strong></td>
<td>NGO of women survivors of BH</td>
<td>Medium/High</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Slum Dwellers and Informal Housing Residents

Slum dwellers represent a particularly marginalized population in Nigeria that is substantial in size, yet often missed by Government in programming and which bears significant mistrust and grievances against Government. This is a population likely to lack breeder documents entirely, who may in addition prefer to remain un-identified for various reasons. Understanding their unique circumstances and potential entry points for building trust and conducting outreach will be critical for ensuring coverage of the NID system includes this population.

Vulnerability Profile
Informal settlements or slums are fast emerging in urban areas, providing home to an estimated 60-70% of residents in Nigerian cities.\(^66\) Although many attribute the growth of informal settlements to rural-to-urban migration, population studies show that expansion of most Nigerian cities is driven by natural population growth through childbirth. Slums are characterised by poor quality housing, lack of adequate space and public services such as water and sanitation, and a lack of security of tenure. Although slums are plagued with social and economic deprivation, driven by physical and social exclusion, these communities are actually solutions to inadequate housing supply and socio-economic exclusion. The growth of slums is driven primarily by failed urban planning and governance that excludes the massive urban poor populations who comprise the majorities in Nigerian cities.

Slums and informal settlements are incredibly diverse – both in terms of who inhabits them and also their genesis. Some originated as rural communities that were encircled by urban development as Nigerian cities grew up around them. Others can be found adjacent to particular industries that provide low wage or informal employment. Additionally, in Northern Nigeria, the growth of informal settlements is also driven by internal displacement – namely IDPs fleeing the Northeast. For example, Kuchigoro (old and new) community in Abuja is a slum area that is inhabited by many IDPs from Borno State as well as a variety of other urban poor migrant communities.

Many Nigerians living in urban areas lack secure terms of tenure, making them vulnerable to eviction at the hands of landlords or government demolitions.\(^67\) One NGO for example estimates that as many as 1.2 million people were rendered homeless due to government demolitions of informal housing between 2003 and 2007.\(^68\) Intersectionality of vulnerability amplifies the challenges of daily life in Nigeria’s slums. Scarcity of clean water, poor environmental conditions, inadequate sanitation, lack of waste disposal facilities, and poor air quality and generate health problems, while high population density facilitates the spread of communicable diseases. Many urban poor families cannot afford education, despite laws guaranteeing free basic education for all Nigerians. Residents who arrive in search of new economic opportunities encounter high unemployment, and economic and social exclusion. In addition to facing numerous de facto obstacles, migrants with non-indigene status in some large cities are legally unable to obtain a Certificate of Occupancy for secure housing, and face limited


\(^68\) Women Environmental Programme. Beyond the Tears and Rubble. (Abuja: Women Environmental Programme, 2009).
job prospects without a local Certificate of Origin (one of the documents mentioned by NIMC for ID enrollment).

In short, slum residents suffer from overlapping vulnerabilities including health problems, legalized discrimination, and insecure tenure that increases risks of sudden displacement. Demolitions cast officials as unsympathetic, while local self-help mechanisms that address intersectional vulnerabilities indirectly reinforce feelings that residents do not need the government.

**Capacity Assessment of Slum Dwellers**

Without perceived security of tenure, access to some means of generating livelihoods, and the necessary capacity to manage threats such as environmental hazards, the majority of slum dwellers are unlikely to make incremental improvements to their own housing and living conditions. For residents in slum areas to be motivated to develop their communities, they need guarantees from the government that their homes will not be demolished, i.e. security of tenure. There are some instances where residents are temporary, pay little rent, do not feel part of a community and where the buildings are owned by absentee landlords, the residents have little or no reason to invest in order to improve their living environments. Most landlords want to be able to offer security of tenure to their tenants because it stabilizes their rental income. Landlords and tenants in cities such as Abuja, Lagos and Port Harcourt therefore have some overlapping interests in opposing government demolitions.

**Stakeholder Identification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th>Key Characteristics</th>
<th>Nature and Extent of Influence</th>
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<th>Potential Role in the Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States Ministries of Housing, Land and Survey and Urban Development</td>
<td>Responsible for the building and distribution of public houses being built in some states, e.g. Rivers state.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Government agency can make information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Empowerment Initiatives, which supports various local and national CSO partners</td>
<td>They promote the non-exclusion of urban poor by dismantling barriers that prevent the poor from accessing justice, benefiting from development efforts, or participating in urban planning and governance</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Supporting access/outreach to urban poor communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Slum / Informal Settlement Federation is a movement of the urban poor</td>
<td>The Federation is a local affiliate of Slum Dwellers International (SDI). It profiles, maps and assists with community enumeration for better urban planning. Such data identify needs for</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Supporting access/outreach to urban poor communities, participating directly in ID enrolment and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Level of Engagement</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>Promotes socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements development</td>
<td>Medium/High</td>
<td>Facilitating multi-stakeholder engagements, ensuring CSO participation where there is limited trust of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>Partnered with the African Development Bank and the Federal Government to design a program to supply water and improve sanitation conditions. The city of Jos has served as a pilot project.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Through litigation, SERI stopped the Lagos State Government from demolishing the Ajegunle slum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio Economic Rights Initiative (SERI) formerly called Shelter Rights Initiative</td>
<td>Promotes universal rights to health, housing, education and other necessities</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Advocacy around rights of slum dwellers. Could inform slum dwellers how NID would assist slum dwellers in advancing claims on rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Women

Women are often disproportionately affected by formal and informal barriers to accessing identification. Informal barriers include the inability to leave home, lack of funds for costs associated with registering for an ID, lack of safe transport to enrollment centers, and lack of breeder documents, among others. Cultural or religious beliefs may also limit women’s ability to access identification.

Better access to identification documents can have positive impacts on women’s economic empowerment. As more women start requiring bank or mobile money accounts to be paid, save, or access credit, IDs will become critical. There is a sizeable gender gap between men’s and women’s access to bank accounts -- 51% of men over 15 have bank accounts compared to only 27% of women over 15. Easier access to national ID can also support women entrepreneurs. Many women play an important role as small traders and IDs can make them more profitable by enabling them to cross borders more easily and buy goods and services (e.g. through accessing to finance and SIM cards).

Vulnerability Profile
Nigeria’s gender value system confers more value and recognition to men through the attachment of social roles. This entrenches male superiority that perpetuates numerous forms of inequality and female subordination. Gender also interacts with structural factors such as education, social identities, and disabilities to further marginalize women. This vulnerability assessment thus documents multiple manifestations of gender inequality and explores how women’s marginalization is compounded by intersection with factors such as ethnicity, religious norms, class, cultural expectations, demographic factors (such as age), and conflict.

The majority of Nigerian women live in chronic poverty. Sub-populations include rural, uneducated women, women from ethnic and religious minorities, uneducated girls forced into

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The overview provided in this note is a precursor to a gender deep dive study to be undertaken by the World Bank’s ID4D in 2019. The qualitative study will see to identify barriers to women’s access to identification across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, and will provide detailed and concrete recommendations to inform implementation of the ID system.
early marriages, or women secluded from public view for cultural reasons. Norms and stereotypes restrict the kinds of jobs women can do, often limiting women to low-paying, informal jobs that trap women in cycles of poverty. Poor women undertake unpaid work in family businesses, incur opportunity costs in lost wages while carrying out roles such as caring for the sick and disabled. An additional component of women’s economic disempowerment is gender norms that limit women’s property rights through male inheritance traditions. Without such collateral, women cannot obtain bank loans or other financial services to engage in entrepreneurial activities. In this way, social norms effectively become de jure discrimination against women. These disadvantages create disparity in financial earnings between men and women, with women becoming disproportionately poorer than men. World Bank data show that while men’s share of wage and salaried work increased by about 4 percent between in the past three decades, women’s share have remained stagnant at 12.2 percent. Similarly, women’s share of vulnerable employment stagnated at 87 percent while men’s share of vulnerable employment decreased from 80 to 75 percent within the same time period. Between 2010 and 2016, gender gaps in unemployment have widened in relative terms in recent years, from 4.7 in 2010 to 15.3.\

Entrenched gender and cultural norms make accessing formal education difficult for girls, who often have to contend with early marriage, safety concerns going to and from school, and the unwillingness of families to invest in girls’ education as a result of gender role expectations. Girls are expected to collect firewood for cooking, fetch water, and take care of younger siblings and the elderly – tasks that currently prevent them from going to school. UNICEF reports that out of the 57 million out-of-school children in the world in 2015, 10.5 million are from Nigeria, mostly girls and mostly in the north, which makes Nigeria the country furthest away from the UN Millennium goal of universal primary education. This number has increased with the continuing conflict with the Nigerian government recently estimating that over 11 million children are out of school. Attendance rates are also low. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), primary level attendance is only 43% for girls and 46% for boys compared to 85% attendance rate for girls and boys in South-South region of the country as of 2015. These disparities and social expectations would interfere with girls’ ability to go register for an ID.

The education gap is just one manifestation of a patriarchal and patrilineal preference for boys, alongside social expectations that exacerbate gender inequality. Early marriage is practiced across much of the north, in some parts of the southeast (such as rural Enugu State) and in the Niger Delta (rural Cross River State) with similar consequences. A woman will have an average

| **According to the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Gender Gap Report, Nigeria ranks 122 out of 144 countries globally, and 26th out of 30 countries regionally. Women’s inequality is also reflected in politics, according to statistics gathered by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics: between 1999 and 2005, women constituted only 5.76 percent of the National Assembly members, 29.38 percent of judges in federal courts, 5.29 percent of State Assembly legislators, and only 5.9 percent of local government councilors.** |

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of 5.8 childbirths throughout her lifetime. According to the World Health Organization, 21.9 percent of all Nigerian women report an unmet demand for modern contraception, suggesting a causal relationship between gender inequality and Nigeria’s extraordinarily high fertility rates. Field research describes a related, contributing cause in the north: women have more children because they fear divorce and want to dissuade their husbands from plural marriage arrangements.74

Level of education has important ripple effects. Women with higher levels of education are less likely to experience domestic violence, contract HIV/AIDS, and experience female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C). FGM/C leaves psychological scars, traumatic childbirths and in some cases, life-threatening infections and disabilities. The most recent figures report that 12.3 percent of women aged 15-19 had some variety of the procedure performed on them, while 27.6 percent of women aged 45-49 had.75 These data suggests that the practice may be fading, since it is typically performed on girls when they are younger. But the rates are still high overall, and since the government of Nigeria considers FGM/C violence against women, the continuing practice speaks to the de facto power of men in society. Regarding HIV, Nigeria has the second largest HIV epidemic in the world and one of the highest new infection rates in sub-Saharan Africa.76 A widening gender gap is an important part of the HIV experience in Nigeria: between 2013 and 2016, the percentage of women living with HIV increased slightly from 51.7 to 53.1 percent, while the share of infected men decreased slightly from 48.3 to 46.9 percent.77 Once women are victims of disabilities from FGM/C, survivors of sexual violence, or are infected with HIV, they face stigmatization and discrimination.

Finally, less educated women marry at younger ages. Marriage then constrains women’s voice and agency, not just for child brides but also for women of marriageable age who live in seclusion (Mata Kule) in the north, or elsewhere who live under disempowering male control. The norms of male physical domination are pervasive: a nationwide survey in 2012 reported that nearly 12 percent of Nigerians aged 15-24 agreed that “wife beating is completely justified” (with over 21 percent saying so in the northeast).78 Sex workers (male/female), transgender persons, and crossdressers as well as others who engage in activities not sanctioned by religion and state are also key populations with heightened vulnerability to marginalization and violence.

In sum, street hawking, early marriage, and multiple childbirths at an early age locks the girl into a life of abject poverty, domination, and a high risk of sexual violence. Men deterring their wives or daughters from enrolling in the national ID is a plausible expression of this this “matrix of oppression.” Women who are poor, without formal education either in rural areas or in slums, face huge obstacles to ID enrollment including from unaffordable transaction or opportunity costs to barriers mounted by gender norm expectations within social structures. This population, which accounts for a significant percentage of those who presently lack ID, may be unable to provide the required documents, afford the real and opportunity costs, and scale the physical barriers to enrollment. Where this population experiences multiple marginalizations such as single mothers, women with disabilities, or survivors of domestic and sexual violence,
they will be even more difficult to reach for ID enrollment and will face multiple avenues of exclusion.

**Capacity Assessment**

Some of the marginalized, hard to reach women characterized and identified above have built capacities created around collective action to address their concerns by themselves. Women cut across and constitutes a significant percentage of the different regional populations in the country. They develop collective action institutions to organize themselves, identify local solutions to their problems and demand community-wide changes to address economic inequality for their members, promote access to education for their children, demand access to healthcare, participate in local politics and seek positive changes for harmful practices that hinder their opportunity and capacity to earn a living, like domestic violence and harmful widowhood practices including property dispossession and levirate marriage. For example, across the different regions, women operate rotating credit groups, establish group farm work groups, and seed sharing groups.\(^9\) One of the most influential grass roots women’s organization across the East Central region is the (women’s) August Meeting. Across the Igbo states of Anambra, Imo, Abia and Ebonyi, women travel en-mass back to their villages/towns to participate in the August Meeting, a forum that provides women with the capacity to discuss their issues and concerns and arrive at collective decisions on solutions.

Some sub-groups are much less capable of addressing their concern and do not organize collective action against the majority population that has marginalized them. As a result of the nature of the vulnerabilities that inform their exclusion, these sub-groups choose reduced social visibility or complete isolation as a strategy of self-protection from community hostilities including discrimination, stigmatization, threats of violence and actual violence. For example, women living with HIV/AIDS, fistulas, and sexual violence might create a support group that meets in secret to provide emotional support for members but rarely seek to engage the community in any way. They depend on interventions by external organizations for accessing the resources and services they need for development.

**Vulnerability Dynamics associated with Project Implementation**

Expanding inclusion and maximizing coverage for ID registration requires an understanding of gender, its resultant vulnerabilities for groups impacted, and the various ways it intersects other sites of marginalization to compound constraints and limit opportunities. Gendered marginalization is pervasive given endemic patriarchy and cultural conservatism in Nigeria. The latter also has exclusionary consequences for individuals with alternative lifestyle and socially sanctioned socio-economic activities including sex work.

There are likely communities where women’s autonomy is curtailed such that they are unable to engage in the public sphere to reach an enrollment center to gain access to an ID. Similarly, the most likely unintended effect of ID enrollment is the possibility of a backlash from husbands and male members of the community. Communities with high rates of oppressive practices such as FGM/C or child marriage could view the ID as an expression of women’s autonomy and therefore a threat to male domination and social control.

**Stakeholder identification**

Many groups and organizations have established access and built a relationship of trust with the diverse sub-groups that constitute rural, poor women across Nigeria. These include faith-based civil society organizations like Federation of Muslim Women (FOMWAM), the Christian Mothers Association (CMA), and the women’s wing of CAN. Faith is a critical component of social identity in Nigeria and has been salient since religious revivalism in the 1980s. Faith-based CSOs wield significant influence within these populations as they command moral authority and women repose complete trust in them. For example, interventions that consider opportunity costs like scheduling registration in church buildings on Sundays for the southeastern region, or on Fridays after salah in the predominantly Muslim north might maximize coverage for women.

It will also be important to complement outreach to the large national networks and coalitions with careful outreach to regional and community level organizations. For example, in the southwest, Women Advocacy Research and Documentation Centre (WARDC), the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), and the Kudirat Initiative for Democracy (KIND) are influential in the southwest. Groups such as Gender and Development Advocacy (GADA) have grassroots legitimacy in the Niger Delta. In the north central region, CSOs such as Women Environmental Programme (WEP), Legal Awareness for Nigeria Women and Connecting Gender for Development (CGD) would likely be important partners. Activists in these organizations are perceived as responsible (and often more educated) and therefore trusted. Their presence may help assure male members of the community that the national ID is not meant to disrupt the social fabric. Similarly, women’s councils are appointed (or elected) based on their perception as knowledgeable, brave and educated, with the skills and capacity to advocate for women.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Key Characteristics</th>
<th>Nature and Extent of Influence</th>
<th>Nature and Extent of Interest</th>
<th>Potential role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based civil society eg. FOMWAM, Christian Mothers Association of Nigeria</td>
<td>High degree of expertise in organizing against women’s gendered marginalization and promoting women’s development. Fully trusted by members of the target population.</td>
<td>Highly influential with dense and expansive networks. Access to traditional rulers, religious leaders, political elites, law officials, state agents and local women leaders.</td>
<td>Have local branches all across the country, so has local stake wherever they operate.</td>
<td>Organizing information campaigns and workshops. Serving as interpreters, enumerators to minimize errors and illicit acts. Has unrestricted access to the target population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs: Society for Family Health; Gender and Development Action, Women Advocacy Research and Documentation Centre, and others</td>
<td>High degree of expertise in organizing against women's gendered marginalization and promoting women’s development. Issue-based, a high degree of expertise in education advocacy, counseling and rehabilitation for survivors of sexual and domestic violence and support for people living with HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Mid-level influence and contingent. Needs an intermediary for an audience with religious leaders, political elites, and traditional rulers.</td>
<td>Contingent on issue mandate of NGO.</td>
<td>Information dissemination, awareness campaigns, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based coalitions, women’s councils EXCOS of women’s August meeting</td>
<td>Low-level expertise. Fully trusted by members of the target population.</td>
<td>Low influence with higher level authority like political elites and state agents. High influence with the target population.</td>
<td>Local ownership of the project. Deeply Involved in ensuring success</td>
<td>Organizing information campaigns and workshops. Serving as interpreters, enumerators to minimize errors and illicit acts. Has unrestricted access to the target population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government/Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development</td>
<td>Deep knowledge of grievances and demands of Ethnic and Islamic militias.</td>
<td>Significant influence with national and local women’s organizations, NGOs and INGOs.</td>
<td>Avoidance of instability and violence within the state.</td>
<td>Information and awareness outreach through militia leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Persons with Disabilities

Persons with disabilities (PWDs) represent a critical group for outreach in the context of identification. Across the world they face similar barriers to accessing identification and represent a significant portion of the population. In addition to the brief overview provided in this note, the World Bank organized consultations with PWDs in the context of the ID project in Nigeria in the fall of 2018. These reached both national umbrella organizations and CSOs, as well as PWDs from rural areas and all parts of Nigeria. The outcomes of these consultations and similar work in Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea will feed into a global Guidance Note on Disability in ID.

Vulnerability Profile

Persons with disabilities do not belong to a homogenous group, but come from diverse backgrounds with differing impairments that can be physical, sensory, mental or intellectual. They experience both environmental and attitudinal barriers to participation in society and access to services. Persons with disabilities represent 15% of the global population. Of these, no less than 80% reside in developing countries. Disabled Peoples Organizations (DPOs) in Nigeria— the Association for Comprehensive Empowerment of Nigerians with Disabilities (ASCEND) and Joint National Association of Persons with Disabilities (JONAPWD) – report that persons with disabilities are the largest minority group in Nigeria next to poor women and uneducated girls. Preparations for the 2019 elections, which sought to increase access for persons with disabilities, suggest that the projected number of disabled voters (e.g. adults) is about 20 million. While the World Health Organization’s 2011 World Disability Report estimates that about 15 percent of Nigeria’s population (or at least 25 million people) have a disability. Given the limited scope of social security and the increasing decentering of the extended family welfare system with the likelihood of developing a disability as age increases, this population will continue to grow.

Perceptions and treatment of persons with disabilities are complex, context-specific and evolving across Nigeria with material consequences. There are slight regional variations in the way people treat persons with disabilities. For example, families may hide away individuals with disabilities because of the stigma attached to disability in most parts of the southeast. Persons suffering from leprosy and survivors of leprosy in the North are no longer compelled to live in leper colonies, as is the case in Bauchi State and Abuja (DFID, 2008). They live among their communities while facing all the vulnerabilities resulting from their condition. In contrast, populations suffering from leprosy in the Southeast remain ostracized in camps. These groups tend to consider the state as nonchalant at best, and predatorial at worst.

In January 2019, Nigeria signed into law the Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (Prohibition) Act, 2018, following 9 years of advocacy by disability rights groups and activists. The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and imposes sanctions such as fines and prison sentences. Most importantly, it stipulates a five-year transitional period for modifying public buildings, structures, and automobiles to make them accessible for PWDs.

Capacity Assessment

There are numerous well-established national groups capable of pressuring the government or interfacing with the relevant agencies. However, this network is weak among the rural poor.
Also, poverty-gendered subgroups possess weaker capacity. They often rely on the local church, mosque, or civil society organizations who occasionally partner with the private sector. The physical limitations, ostracization, marginalization and abject poverty that attends disability makes it difficult and time-consuming to reach populations living with various disabilities.

**Vulnerability Dynamics associated with Project Implementation**

Persons with disabilities face structural, economic, and attitudinal barriers to accessing identification in Nigeria. The distance to enrollment centers, cost of transportation, and the buildings themselves make access difficult for persons with disabilities. Enrollment centers are often centrally located in LGAs or States requiring PWDs to hire expensive transportation to get to them. Once there, they usually find that enrollment centers are not accessible, often located on upper floors, and lacking in ramps or elevators. PWDs also face long queues but do not receive preferential treatment which can lead to serious issues for those who have albinism, for example, who cannot be outdoors in the sun for even short periods of time. At the point of enrollment, PWDs who might need assistance are required to bring someone along to help them, whether it is to read and fill the application form for someone who is blind or to translate into sign language for someone who is deaf. Others find they are unable to register because their fingerprints or photographs cannot be captured, this includes survivors of leprosy, amputees, or persons with visual impairments that make it hard to capture their eyes clearly in a photograph. Faced with such issues, enrollment officers often fail to put in place exception handling procedures to complete enrollments for PWDs without the required biometrics, thereby denying the person access to identification. Across the board all categories of PWDs find attitudinal barriers—they are stigmatized, treated as beggars, and enrollment officers do not feel it is their duty to help PWDs to apply for an ID.

Given their history of exclusion from services and amenities for development, exposure to carefully designed awareness and information campaign to engage them is crucial. Preparation for national elections in 2019 may generate important lessons for outreach to persons with disabilities, and could potentially reduce overall stigma.

**Stakeholder Identification**

PWDs networks in Nigeria are strong and well organized. The table below identifies key entry points into these networks, which are present in all States of the Federation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Key Characteristics</th>
<th>Nature and Extent of Influence</th>
<th>Nature and Extent of Interest</th>
<th>Potential role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disabled People’s Umbrella Organizations like ASCEND and JONAPWD.</td>
<td>Has generalized knowledge of issues and concerns of people with disabilities</td>
<td>High influence with state actors/agencies and international actors/funders. However, critics say is focused on elite organizing. This weakens its influence and coverage with local and specific disability groups</td>
<td>Has high interest on the national scene, which at times becomes politicized.</td>
<td>Information dissemination, awareness campaigns, technical advice on intervention models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific disabilities group organizations:</td>
<td>High expertise and knowledge of issues and concerns of local and specific groups. High degree of expertise in education advocacy, counseling, rehabilitation and long-term care and development for members of target population</td>
<td>Low influence with state actors and with higher level community leaders and elites. Has very high influence with members of the target population.</td>
<td>Very high interest due to local links and group embeddedness. Local ownership and deeply focused on members well-being and development.</td>
<td>Information dissemination, awareness campaigns, technical advice on intervention models. Serving as interpreters, enumerators to minimize errors and illicit acts. Has unrestricted access to the target population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration, Dignity &amp; Economic Advancement of People Affected by Leprosy (IDEA); Action on Disability and Development (ADD); Community Based Rehabilitation, Men with Disabilities (MWD), Deaf Women in Nigeria (DWIN); Nigerian National Association of the Deaf (NNAD), Christian Blind Mission, Spinal Cord Association of Nigeria (SCIAN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Religious Minorities

In order to reach full coverage of the national ID system, it is important to consider the experiences and perceptions of various minority groups throughout Nigeria who may experience marginalization from the ID system or who may themselves choose not to engage. Religious minorities represent a critical sub-group of marginalized groups in Nigeria who will need to be reached through appropriate means to encourage them to engage with the ID system.

Vulnerability Profile

Religious minorities suffer from social, political, and economic vulnerability throughout Nigeria. Such minorities may be defined in both ethnic and religious terms, and they often perceive themselves as victims of exclusion or marginalization. In most of the south, Muslims are minorities, while in most of the north Christians are in the minority. On top of this regional variation are minority sects, offshoots of global religions, and practitioners of traditional religions. Regional minority groups report varying degrees of social and political marginalization throughout the country. Northern Christians complain about discrimination by Muslim communities and a lack of government support in circumstances as varied as obtaining permits to build churches or gaining admission to universities. Similarly, southern Muslims report discrimination over practices like wearing the hijab. Increasingly, religious marginalization has been drawn into the unresolved conflicts around indigeneship. As mentioned in the introduction, indigeneship is a byproduct of unresolved legal and social constructs of Nigerian national citizenship. Despite constitutional safeguards against discrimination, subnational governments practice and reify categorical exclusion by issuing certificates of indigeneship. These conflicts very often acquire religious, sectarian overtones.

The religious and ethnically diverse “Middle Belt” states provide important examples of intersectionality and the broader risks of minority exclusion through indigeneity questions. Bordering Nigeria’s culturally and historically distinct northern and southern regions, this geographical zone typically includes the states of Kwara, Kogi, Benue, Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa, Niger, and Adamawa, plus and Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). In Plateau State, the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani population define themselves as minorities who suffer discrimination. Largely Christian ethnic groups such as the Afiizere, Anaguta and Berom leverage their historical ties to Jos North Local Government Area to claim indigeneous status and access state and local political power. This status in turn helps compensate for their status as minorities at the national level, where the Hausa-Fulani dominated politics for decades. Non-indigeneship overlapping with religious cleavages has also stoked conflict between Tivs and Fulanis in Benue State, between Tivs and Jukun in Taraba State, between Fulanis and Mambilas in Taraba State, and between Kataf and Hausas in Kaduna State. In particular, Jos North and Zangon Kataf LGAs of Plateau and Kaduna States, have been the hot-bed of conflicts over indigeneship for several decades. In several Middle Belt states, notably Benue and Taraba at present, violent conflicts have strong religious colorations as Muslim pastoralists are seen as

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migrants or “strangers” while largely Christian farmers claim status as indigenes or “settlers.”

(These tensions and their complex causes are discussed in greater detail later this report.)

The Eggon ethnic group in north-central Nasarawa state provides an example of a different type of religious discrimination and conflict. The Eggon have complained of marginalization by the Hausa and Fulani Muslim majority populations for nearly two decades. In recent years, the foment of this discontent coalesced around the Ombatse traditionalist religious movement, which was accused of various crimes and atrocities (including armed revolt and forced conversion of Christians and Muslims) in 2013. Clashes between the movement and security forces led to over thirty deaths in May of that year. The Ombatse movement has largely remained out of headlines since then, although occasional Eggon-involved clashes in Nasarawa inevitably provoke speculation of Ombatse activity. As a result of the stigma associated with Ombatse, members of the Eggon minority may face discrimination or abuse from the state and federal government.

Finally, Nigeria’s adherents of Shia Islam generally, and members of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) in particular, have been subject to significant discrimination and abuse by the government. The growth of Shia Islam in Nigeria is generally associated with the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9, and the preaching of Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, who founded the IMN with the support of Iran. El-Zakzaky and the IMN have called for the purification of Nigerian Islam and the creation of an Islamic state. Similarly, the IMN has criticized the corruption of Nigeria’s political elite, dismissed the authority of the Nigerian state, and acts as a “state within a state,” helping members with access to school and medical attention. In these regards, the IMN resembles Boko Haram under Muhammad Yusuf; however, el-Zakzaky and the IMN have never publicly advocated violence. Nonetheless, violent clashes between IMN and state security forces since 2007 have created a toxic dynamic. Following an alleged assassination attempt in Zaria in 2015, the military raided IMN compounds, killing hundreds of Shiites or IMN members, and arresting el-Zakzaky. The attack was widely condemned as state overreaction and abuse of force. The Kaduna State evaluation of the Zaria episode in the following year failed to hold the Nigerian military responsible for the killings (despite acknowledging 347 civilians were buried

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84 S.O. Alozieuwa, “The Ombatse Crisis in Nigeria: Background, Recent Developments and Possible Solutions,” Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science, 2, no. 2 (2016), 7-10.
85 Ibid. 9-10.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
in a mass grave) and branded the IMN an insurgent group.\textsuperscript{93} To this day, el-Zakzaky remains in federal custody, held on murder charges, with IMN protests on a weekly basis.\textsuperscript{94}

**Capacity Assessment**

Christian and Muslim minorities seem to have relatively high capacity, despite regular accounts of minor forms of discrimination. Middle Belt Christians regularly testify before the U.S. Congress about their situation, and have persuaded some state governments to ban open cattle grazing in order to limit Fulani pastoralist encroachment. Hausa and Fulani, for their part, retain a large presence in the federal government due to their population size and a political history that dates back to British favoritism. While the Ombatse are marginalized to an extent by the Hausa and Fulani in Nasarawa state, they constitute a substantial portion of the overall population, have a well-educated populace, and are not entirely absent from the seats of power.\textsuperscript{95}

Similarly, the IMN is well connected to elites, despite their clear victimization at the hands of the Nigerian state, and its members are highly educated.

**Vulnerability Dynamics of Project Implementation**

A critical change needed in the ID system is to stop collecting any information which might be tied to religion or minority status, such as religion, state of origin, proof of indigeneship, etc. Minority Christians and Muslims would likely not have their vulnerability affected by the ID program – either in perception or reality – but their negative experiences as minority groups may affect their willingness to engage with the system. As members of religious groups in conflict with the government, Ombatse and IMN members might for example be more reticent to provide biometric information to the Government.

IMN members in particular would be reluctant to participate in the ID program for a variety of reasons. They might fear being “blacklisted” by the government. Following the extrajudicial killing of its members, which included Kaduna State’s public agreement to bury 347 victims, feelings of victimhood are pervasive. Moreover, the group’s proscription in several northern states and Kaduna State’s officially declaring the group a terrorist organization (a view that remains widely contested by neutral observers) constitutes an obvious deterrent to participation. Finally, IMN’s interpretation of the Qu’aran may prevent them from registering for an ID, as this could be construed as an act of idolatry. Supporting this speculation is the fact that the group never formally registered as an organization under Nigerian law. Through the group’s “Funtua Declaration,” Zakzaky declared allegiance to only the holy books. In this spirit, some Islamic scholars argue that passports and other identity documents are not permitted under Islam except to undertake Hajj or engage in jihad.

While these minority groups represent a small portion of the population, it will be important that communications around enrollment and the benefits of IDs remain cognizant of different believe systems across Nigeria. The existance of significant religious conflict in the country strongly suggests that the ID system should make extra effort to ensure that the information collected, the methods used for collection, and the outreach done to encourage enrollment are culturally and religiously aware. Data protection and privacy regulations will be needed to encourage enrollment by those who are hesitant to engage with Government out of fear of blacklisting or misuse of their data by Government.

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\textsuperscript{94} Campbell, “Nigeria’s Treatment of Shia Minority Recalls That of Boko Haram.”

\textsuperscript{95} Onyemachi, “The Ombatse Crisis in Nigeria”
Stakeholder Assessment

Due to the nature of their relationships with larger religious communities in Nigeria or mainline world religions, as well as the self-selected isolation of many religious minorities, stakeholder identification will be a challenge. That said, the best form of outreach would be to directly contact the group and use its existing structure to encourage participation and enrolment. Utilization of national umbrella organizations such as Jama’atul Nasril Islam (JNI) and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) could very likely result in a backlash that would be difficult to correct. Outreach through CAN would also be problematic because it has largely lost its reputation for political neutrality. The divide between Pentecostal Christians and a youthful population also complicates CAN’s ability to serve as an umbrella body to promote buy-in across Christian denominations.

Pan-Islamic organizations such as the Da’wah Institute could similarly trigger backlash that would be difficult to correct. For instance, with regard to IMN, Da’wah is a Sunni foundation with no common interest with Shiite groups. Yet in other ways, Da’wah may help reach out to members familiar with the chain of command.
Migrant and Border Communities

Migrant and border communities are critical for achieving universal coverage in ID systems, yet they are often excluded due to their lifestyle, as well as others’ perceptions of the legitimacy of these communities. In Nigeria, the issue of internal migration and immigration interacts negatively with the issue of indigeneity in the context of ID, particularly because the ID system is presently liked to nationality. Indigenes discriminate against and at times actively prevent those they perceive as “migrants” from registering for national IDs, claiming that they are foreigners and are not entitled to a Nigerian ID. This compounds existing mistrust that migrant communities often have for Government and its programs.

Vulnerability Profile

Migration, conventionally defined, involves a shift in permanent residence from one place to another. It involves an ongoing interchange of people between points of origin and destinations, such as villages and towns, as individuals and in groups of varying sizes. Migrations differ both in geographical scale and permanence, which provide basis for varying classifications of migration. For example, daily commuting differs in important ways from seasonal migration, which involves movement from one place to another during specific seasons in search of jobs, food, or more favorable environments. In Nigeria, this can occur as rural – rural migration such as in the cocoa belt of the southwest, among transhumance pastoralists, the ci-rani in the irrigated areas of the north, or mining of minerals as in the Jos Plateau. Periodic migration describes migration by tourists, pilgrims and students over short time periods but are associated with predictable periods (such as holidays). Finally, permanent migration is traditionally associated with ancient societies and to “discoveries” of land opportunities in the late 18th to the 19th centuries. In these cases, people have migrated permanently from one location to other distant locations without returning back – such as the tracing of the histories of different ethnic groups from the Far and Middle East.

Nigeria’s history also involves significant histories of involuntary migration through the Atlantic trade. Contemporary examples of involuntary migration include the IDP crisis examined earlier, displacement of an estimated 480,000 persons between 2006 and 2008 due to clashes in the Niger Delta, and floods in Yobe, Jigawa, Kebbi and Gobe states that displaced about 450,000 people in 2007. This section however focuses on distinguishable groups who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods and survival. This migration could be considered voluntary due to their efforts to preserve cultural traditions, but numerous exogenous factors highlight the groups’ vulnerabilities. The most important of these groups are pastoralists, migrant farmers and migrant fisherfolk. All of these populations live and earn livelihoods in remote environments with very little attention from government. The analysis also identifies several neglected border communities that are very far from centers of governance and administration. In terms of this report’s typology, the populations considered here reflect a combination of socio-cultural factors, structural conditions, and environmental characteristics. Political factors are becoming increasingly relevant for pastoralists (sometimes rhetorically referred to as “herdsmen”) as well.

Pastoralists, migrant farmers and fisherfolk, and border communities generally have little access to government services and benefits. They suffer from very low levels of education and very

limited access to other essential services such as healthcare. Moreover, their future livelihoods are severely threatened by Nigeria’s rapid environmental, political and economic transformations. For example, climate change, population growth and increasing land aggregation are threatening pastoralists and migrant farmers. Environmental pollution, construction of dams and increasing decline in flash floods are threatening the livelihoods of the migrant fisherfolk.

Pastoralists, migrant farmers and migrant fisherfolk pursue different livelihoods but share common socio-economic characteristics are discussed together because of the common denominator of being migratory and leaving in remote, difficult to access areas. This makes the alienable in an equal proportion to exclusion in national identification processes. A separate discussion of border communities, who share a number of characteristics with the migrant populations, then follows.

**Pastoralists**

Pastoralists, people who use rangelands for livestock production, are found in about 25 African countries with the highest concentration in sub-Saharan Africa. The African Union estimates that pastoral areas occupy about 40 percent of Africa’s land mass (with significant differences across countries). There are no reliable statistics on Nigeria’s total pastoralist population, but recent estimates range from 10 million to 18 million people sparsely distributed across 32 of the country’s 36 states. Tahir and Umar estimate there are about 6.5 million pastoralists of the nomadic and transhumance variety. The ethnic groups who practice pastoralism include the Fulani (Fulbe, Fullah, or Puel), Shuwa-Arabs, Koyam and Baduwe, with the Fulani constituting over 90 percent of Nigeria’s pastoral population. The population of the Koyam, Badawi and Baduma was estimated at some 32,000, 20,000 and 15,000 people respectively. Pastoralists are arguably the most diffuse ethno-cultural group in rural Nigeria.

Generally, pastoral populations inhabit rural areas with low population densities that are underserved in terms of infrastructure and social services. Historically, they are more concentrated in the drier savannah regions of Nigeria and other sub-Saharan countries, but in recent years, substantial populations have moved to the sub-humid and forest zones of Nigeria and other West African countries. The social, economic and political development of the pastoral people has largely been neglected, rendering the group among the most vulnerable in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on the nature of movement and production system, four groups of pastoralists can be identified:

1. Nomadic pastoralists are livestock producers with no place of permanent or semi-permanent residence and therefore migrate with their families. Camps are established in wet and dry season grazing areas for short periods, ranging from two to five months in a year. During the remaining period of the year, entire family members and their herds engage in continuous migration in search of feeds and water.

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2. Transhumance pastoralists engage in seasonal migration between regions with different ecological conditions. In this production system, there are well-established patterns of movement, mostly between wet and dry season grazing areas. This migration can cover short or long distances depending on the peculiarities of the ecological conditions and the adaptation of the pastoral groups to these variations over decades and centuries. Typical examples are transhumance pastoralists between: the Bauchi Plains and the Jama’a plains; the Shendam, Awe, Doma lowlands and the River Benue valley; and Girei, Song and Mubi uplands and the River Benue valley around Demsa, Numun adjoining floodplains of the Gongola River; the Sokoto plains and the Rima River basin; among many other transhumance areas.

3. Semi-Sedentary pastoralists are culturally or economically in transition from transhumance towards sedentarisation (i.e. establishment of permanent settlements). The live in semi-permanent households, with animals migrating in response to seasonal variability.

4. Sedentary pastoralists (also known as agro-pastoralists) are groups who have established permanent settlements. In addition to livestock production, they also engage in the cultivation of different crops. They practice “split” migration where a small proportion of household members participate, mainly male youths of animal grazing age (from about 12 years to 30 years), while others stay home.

The groups of pastoralists that are most susceptible to exclusion and marginalization from national identification processes are the nomadic and transhumance pastoralists. Sedentary and semi-sedentary are more likely to be registered with little effort from the national identification registration bodies. The seasonal calendar of pastoral groups will be essential for effective outreach, and can be divided into the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season of the Year</th>
<th>Characteristics of the period</th>
<th>Suitability for Engaging with Pastoralists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early wet season</td>
<td>Rains begin. There is high mobility of people and livestock in search of fresh pastures</td>
<td>Period not suitable for engaging pastoralists because groups are engaged in migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April/Mid-May to June)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wet season (June to September)</td>
<td>Less mobility. Groups are generally relaxed at the wet season grazing areas.</td>
<td>Period is suitable for engaging pastoralists. However, heavy rains and often very poor roads are a key constraint. Youths remain at base camps for the longest hours during the morning period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late wet season</td>
<td>Less mobility. Groups are generally relaxed, but preparing for dry season movements</td>
<td>Period is suitable for engaging groups. However, some groups begin to move by this period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(September to October)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early dry season</td>
<td>Dry season begins. There is high mobility from wet season grazing areas to dry season grazing areas. Lots of competition over access to crops residue.</td>
<td>Period not suitable for engaging pastoralists because they are migrating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(November to January)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry season (February to March)</td>
<td>Groups are at dry season grazing areas. Generally more relaxed.</td>
<td>Period is suitable for engaging groups. However, some groups do engage in short</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
distance oscillatory movements in search of better feeds.

| Late dry season (March to Mid-May) | Acute scarcity of cattle feed. Groups are constantly searching for grassland and competing for access to irrigated crop residue or browse trees. | Period is not very suitable for engaging groups as they devote much attention to searching for cattle feed. |

The pastoral Fulani are among the most dispersed populations in Nigeria. Nevertheless, there are densely populated areas, especially during the cropping season. But these areas are geographically remote, which increases the potential for exclusion of the pastoralists in national identification and registration processes. The Shuwa-Arabs, another pastoral population, settled around the shores of the Lake Chad as early as the 16th century. Gradually, they occupied many parts of the Lake Chad Basin, extending southwards to places around the present day Jere town (at the outskirts of Maiduguri) and Benisheikh in Borno State. Unlike the Fulani, the Shuwa-Arabs pastoralists have mainly livestock remained within the Lake Chad Basin and have not migrated widely to other parts of the country. The major areas of pastoralists’ concentrations are listed below and shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the current areas of high concentrations while Figure 2 describes the areas indicating some of the key settlements and towns in the areas.

Figure 1: Areas of Pastoralists Concentration in Nigeria
Different types of conflict adversely impact pastoralism. Cattle rustling, involving theft of cattle by bandits, is widespread in states such as Zamfara and Kaduna, putting pastoralists on the defensive.\textsuperscript{100} Even before the IDP crisis discussed earlier and Boko Haram’s insurgency, pastoral migration patterns were already straying into areas across the south outside of traditional routes. Democratization after 1999 reopened tensions over indigeneity in the middle belt, where pastoralists and settled agriculturalists have engaged in serious violence. Examples of these conflicts are displayed below in Table 1. Both pastoralists and farmers are displaced in the aftermath of violent conflicts, altering the level of trust in the government, the places they are likely to congregate, and possibly the stakeholders with the most legitimacy to assist with outreach.

Table 1: Confrontations between Farmers and Pastoralists in the Middle Belt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>Demsa, Numan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{100} Kuna and Ibrahim, \textit{Rural Banditry and Social Conflicts}. 

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Figure 2: Details of the Areas of Pastoralists Concentration in Nigeria
**Migrant Farmers**

Migrant farmers rely on subsistence crop production and wild plants, meaning their food security is sensitive to exogenous shocks. Most migrant farmers have some form of permanent settlements, but remain in such locations for only few months of the year. These locations are mostly remote, found in Nigeria’s sparsely populated belts; they are scattered and difficult to reach. Migrant farmers reside in their permanent settlements during the off-farm season, mostly from the months of January to March/April. As the rainy season approaches, they migrate back to their farm camps, preparing the land and subsequently planting crops as the rainy season sets in. They mostly remain at the farm camps until after harvest and processing of crops that ends in December or January. The seasonal movement, as well as “split migration” in which the youngest (under age 7) and the oldest members of a family stay home, make successful national ID enrollment contingent upon the timing of outreach.

Although they are food sufficient, this population lacks access to basic infrastructure and social services. They rarely visit hospitals and cities, and remain localized within their environments. They are rarely enrolled in education and therefore have very low literacy levels. Like pastoralists, migrant farmers have little access to government development programs and participate in national elections at low rates. This provides a reasonable basis to expect high rates of exclusion from national identification processes without appropriate interventions.

Unlike the pastoralists and migrant fisherfolk, there is very little research on these groups. For this reason, there is inadequate literature on their ways of life, as they are often considered part of larger farming populations. The only groups of migrant farmers that have been studied are the migrant farm laborers of the cocoa plantations in southwestern Nigeria and the ci-rani (dry season) irrigation farmers of the north. However, these two group of farmers share different characteristics with the rural base migrant farmers that have the highest potential for exclusion from Nigeria’s identification processes.

The migrant farm laborers of the cocoa plantations have disappeared with the decline in cocoa production in Nigeria. In the part of the ci-rani irrigation farmers, they normally migrate from well established rural and semi-urban settlements to more rural riverine areas for dry season cultivation. Most of these farmers are well enlightened, and they are generally not excluded from national identification processes especially in their source regions. The population of migrant farmers is continuously reducing in the country as a result of expanding populations and rapid encroachments on many of Nigeria’s forest reserves. The rate of deforestation due to logging, urbanization, and commercial agriculture is mind boggling: between 1990 and 2010, lost 47.5 percent of its forest cover.\(^{101}\) Some of the locations with known concentrations of migrant farmers are shown in Figure 3.

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\(^{101}\) Watts, “Ecologies of Rule.”
Migrant Fisherfolk

Migrant fishermen are widely distributed along the riverine and coastal areas of Nigeria. They are located in low-lying floodplains of Nigeria’s major rivers, the most important being the Rivers Niger, Benue, Komadugu-Yobe and Sokoto-Rima. Within the coastal areas are large concentrations along the shores of the Atlantic, extending from the Nigeria – Benin Republic borders (Lagos State) in the West to the Bakassi Peninsula (Cross Rivers State) at the Nigeria – Cameroon border to the East. In 2000, scholars estimated that population of migrant fisherfolk at 2.8 million people.¹⁰²

They are sparsely distributed in harsh aqua-marine ecological conditions. The coastal states with substantial populations of migrant fisherfolk are Rivers, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Edo, Ondo, Ogun and Lagos. Riverine States with populations of migrant fisherfolk include Niger, Kogi and Benue States. There are also few migratory fisherfolk along the inland waterways in states such as Sokoto, Kebbi, Kwara, Jigawa, Yobe and Borno. These communities move along the major rivers of Niger, Benue, Komadugu-Yobe and the shores of the Lake Chad. Fisherfolk in the interior parts of country are found along the major waterways (Figure 4). The proportion of migrant fisherfolk along these river systems has significantly declined in recent years. Preliminary information research by the authors indicate that the remnants of these populations are found along the Niger River, especially around Lake Kainji in Niger State, the floodplains of the Sokoto-Rima, around Argungu and Augie in Kebbi State, and floodplains of the Benue River around Ibbi in Taraba State.

¹⁰² Tahir and Umar, 40 – 47,
Migrant fisherfolk mainly fish in the marine or inland waters where the groups are totally dependent on natural supplies of fishes. In each fishing village or camp, semi-permanent huts are erected to house the fisherfolk during their stay in such areas. These villages or camps are managed by the Chief of the Fishing Village who permanently resides in the camp and takes responsibility for the management of the fishing huts and other essential administrative duties. Members of the fishing families, males and females, young and old migrate from one fishing village to another during the fishing periods. There is segregation of responsibilities where adult men and boys engage in active catching of fish, the women and girls engage in processing the catch and marketing the products while the aged provide supportive roles in the processing of the catch.

Fishing villages and camps are located in remote and inaccessible areas with very poor communication networks. These areas lack social services such as motorable roads, health facilities and quality educational infrastructure, even where such camps exist at the vicinity of cities and towns. There were efforts to provide education to the migrant fisherfolk through the Nomadic Education Programme, but inadequate funding at all levels has impeded the program’s impact on education. Educational attainment among the fishing communities is therefore very low. They are also underserved in terms of access to, and availability of social amenities. They are generally neglected in development programs initiated by all tiers of governments.

Although the communities may belong to the Christian or Islamic religions, they are more bounded by their culture which significantly varies from one fishing community to another. However, they share the common belief in the sanctity of the waters, uphold a number of rituals and enshrine taboos to guide group and individual behaviors. Generally, they tend to resist external influences and would prefer to maintain their beliefs and value systems, hence their resistance to social changes. For example, just as the pastoralists, they reject the formal educational system and view it as alien and disruptive to the norms of their societies.¹⁰³

There are several different patterns of migration among fishing population, depending on their environment. For communities along inland waterways, the direction of movement is defined by the direction of flow of the rivers. In coastal areas, the movement is in two directions: north to south along the inland water courses of coastal rivers and east to west along the Atlantic coast. In coastal areas, the fisherfolk move from their northern camps and settlements towards the Atlantic coastline in the beginning of the dry season. As the volume and level of water flow retreats in the dry season, the fishing communities follow the water until they are at the Atlantic coast. Upon reaching the Atlantic coast by the middle of the dry season, the direction of movement changes, either to the east or west depending on the preferences of the group. This movement continues until the wet season sets-in, and the water levels began to rise again. During this period, migration towards the north begins, moving gradually as the water level rises until they reach their northern camps/settlements. Yet another form of migration is to follow the fish tide, as the community retreats to the ocean. They camp for weeks along the coast, following the rise and fall of the tides, putting nets in the water as they advance forward and then retreat with the tides.

There are also periodic journeys to the markets, mostly in the more densely settled villages or adjoining towns. This form of travel is mostly done by women and children for up to four days at a time, depending on the distances covered. At these markets, fish products are sold.

and commodities such as fishing materials, foods, clothing and other domestic and family needs are purchased.

Figure 4: Major Rivers and Coastal Areas in Nigeria

Source: Fragene, B.T., Profile of Fishermen Migration in Nigeria

Fishing communities face a number of challenges. In recent years, the use of advanced fishing trawlers in the coastal areas deplete the fish resources available to the migrant fisherfolk. Another problem of significance is marine erosion, leading to incursion of the oceans on the coastlines thus making the use of local fishing nets more difficult. Within the Niger Delta region (discussed below), oil spills has significantly devastated the livelihoods of several migrant fishing communities. Oil spills destroy fish resources, which rarely recover even in the aftermath of environmental remediation. Along the Inland waterways, construction of dams has affected the normal flow of rivers, which has tremendous impact on availability of fish resources. Dams such as the Tiga, Challawa, Kafin Zaki, Goronyo, Kainji and Shiroro have significantly affected fishing activities downstream. Even though these dams provided new “fishing opportunities,” migrant fisherfolk rarely benefit from these opportunities as sedentary populations and government tend to take advantage of the opportunity at the expense of marginalized migrant fishing groups.
As a consequence, many communities have abandoned fishing, with the young moving to towns and cities in search of alternative means of livelihoods mostly serving as menial labourers. Some others had to migrate to fishing camps outside the Niger Delta, moving eastwards into the coastal waters of Cameroon as well as westwards to as the coastal areas of Ondo and Lagos States, thereby increasing the density and population of fisherfolk leading to overexploitation of available fish stocks.

Overall, the population of migrant fisherfolk is on the decline. With poor education, few other skills, and limited exposure to alternative livelihoods, these groups are poor, isolated and impoverished. Additionally, there are limited opportunities as well as focused interventions that would help them overcome current challenges and adopt improved and modern fish production activities.

**Border Communities**

A related, or special category of migrant populations are border communities. Nigerians living in border communities regularly face social exclusion and extraordinary vulnerability. As populations on the literal, physical margins of the state, these groups experience social or political marginalization due to geographic remoteness, absence of public services and low levels of education among other factors. One obvious source of their vulnerability is physical distance from political and administrative leadership. Though there are cities, several local government headquarters, towns and commercial centers near border areas (which could reduce the costs of national ID enrollment), many border communities are very isolated. Another source of vulnerability is the poor state of local infrastructure, especially roads and transportation. In one study of communities near Benin in Oyo state, 94 percent of villagers reported traveling primarily by foot due poor roads. In the rare cases where vehicle owners were capable and willing to pass through the area, the transport costs were exorbitantly high, due to the low supply and high demand.\(^{104}\) The local economy and households’ livelihoods suffer as a result. Figure 5 shows some of Nigeria’s border communities. They are referred to as “neglected” here due their risk of exclusion from the national identification process.

Border communities generally engage in subsistence farming and livestock production. In many areas, communities possess substantial economic and cultural ties with those across the border, little-affected by the “artificial” borders of colonialism and post-independence state-building.\(^{105}\) The Kanuri culture and economy of the Lake Chad basin is but one example. However, political violence, insurgency, and counter-insurgency threaten to tear such ties apart. The Boko Haram insurgency has led to the steady deterioration of local relationships between the community and the state, as militaries use brutal methods to suppress terrorism and punish

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\(^{105}\) Daniel Olisa Iweze, “Insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria and its Implications on Inter-State and Trans-Border Mobility,” unpublished manuscript, 8-9.
communities suspected of harboring militants. Border dwellers may be feared and stigmatized, and refugees are often distrusted.106

Armed non-state actors often target roads and bridges through border communities, resulting in increasingly dilapidated infrastructure.107 Insurgent activity tends to bring cross-border trade and commerce to a halt, further weakening already marginalized communities. The Damasak-Diffa crossing and the Maiduguri-Kousseri/Maroua routes were once major avenues of trade, but security concerns have severely hampered the passage of goods. Out of fear of the insurgents, some northern Cameroonian traders are willing to extend their routes of commerce all the way to Yaounde, in order to enter Nigeria from the south.108 Often, the government’s counter-insurgency measures depress trade and harm livelihoods. Chadian restrictions on livestock export due to conflict led to potential losses nearing 41% of the GDP.109 Along the Nigeria-Niger frontier near Diffa, bans on fishing and trade, the implementation of no-go zones, and quotas on fertilizer all served to hamper local livelihoods.110

Corrupt immigration officials and security personnel also multiply the challenges facing border communities. There are many reports of extortion from the NIS along the border of Niger near Damasak. According to complainants, NIS officials regularly ask individuals to display their identity cards when travelling to Niger, Chad, Maiduguri, or even their local farm. If they are unable to provide such identification – which they are often unable to do, having lost the cards during flight from insurgents – the officials ask for money (N100, N200). If people cannot pay (and many do not have money to do so), they are taken to an NIS office and kept for hours. People who have tried to show the NIS their student cards instead have had these torn up in front of them. In practice, this means that people without identity cards are unable cultivate, do business, or to visit relatives across the border. A national ID has the potential to reduce such corruption and protect border communities pursuing legitimate livelihoods.

Vulnerable border communities often utilize negative coping mechanisms to supplement their physical and economic security. Illegal trade of petroleum products (which is cheaper in Nigeria than surrounding countries) is widespread along the Nigerian border, particularly near Benin. In addition to the black market for normal goods, border communities often engage in (or are otherwise affected by) trade in illicit goods, such as illegal drugs or firearms.111

Figure 5: Locations of some neglected border communities in Nigeria

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107 Iweze, p. 6.
108 Ibid.
Capacity Assessment
Migrant and border communities have low capacity across the board. Conflict areas are worse because the social, political, and economic fabric of life has been torn apart. In addition to a lack of access to government or NGO services and poor infrastructure, these communities must deal with regular restrictions, abuse, and attacks on their lives and livelihoods – from insurgents and government actors alike.

Several types of issues affect border and migrant community capacity. Socio-cultural issues – value systems and perceptions of the migrant groups and border communities often make them resist identification and registration. For example, most pastoral groups, particularly the Fulbe and Shuwa-Arabs were historically averse to central control and administration. Resistance to any attempt to document their populations and assets of livestock signifies a survival strategy. They perceive registration processes as attempts by state institutions to coerce and unnecessarily interfere with their social and economic lives. These histories and cultural norms make it more difficult to convey the potential benefits of ID enrollment, and increase the possibilities for misinformation about the registration and identification processes. Many other border communities see little value in enrolment as there are few incentives associated with such exercises. It will be important to mobilize groups to recognize some of the benefits of the ID system. For example, it will accord the migrant and border populations’ opportunities to participate in several processes such as elections and access to finance for investment.

Relatively, low levels of literacy prompt individuals and communities to assign little value to formalized government processes. For example, literacy level among pastoral groups is just
about 2%, with lower levels for transhumance and nomadic pastoralists. There are no reliable statistics for migrant farmers. Among migrant fisherfolk, it is about 5%. Statistics for border communities are not available, but they are generally underserved with very low literacy level. For this reason, it is very difficult to convince migrant groups about the need for national identification and registration. Low literacy can contribute to prejudice by administrative officials of migrant groups and neglected communities. Many of the migrant groups often express the fear of discrimination or ill-treatment while attempting to get registered, and as such they opt not to participate. Therefore, the low capacity in terms of education and literacy creates great potentials for exclusion, unless specific and targeted interventions are deliberately pursued by relevant government agencies such as the National Identity Management Commission and the National Orientation Agency.

Geographical and environmental conditions further undermine capacity. The areas inhabited by pastoral populations, migrant farmers, fisherfolk and neglected border communities are often remote and undeserved in terms of social amenities like roads, telecommunications and health services. In addition, there are several limitations associated with the terrain in many areas such as rocky, sandy and muddy surfaces that restricts vehicular movements. Furthermore, some climatic conditions are restricting access such as high intensity rainfall, excessive atmospheric dusts and winds. This will increase the cost of staff and logistics support, especially due to the unpredictability of these factors. Environmental limitations therefore tend to limit the effectiveness of the identification and registration processes for populations living in the remote and isolated rural environments.

It is also important to note how administrative neglect in Nigeria’s planning processes rarely take into account the needs of specialized groups such as border communities. The government makes uniform provisions for all citizens with little consideration for special needs of the pastoral and other marginalized populations. People from rural communities may have to embark on so many repeated journeys pursuing the registration for national identity, which serves as deterrent to so many others who may not wish to embark on these repeated long travels or who lack the resources to pay for the travels. These journeys also mean that many migrants do not possess many of the documents required for ID enrolment. Since mechanisms to support these groups to access above documents have not been put in place by nearly all the institutions of government, they are likely going to remain neglected from the national identification registration exercise.

Finally, key political leaders and high-level bureaucrats are often driven by the needs of urban and more sedentary rural communities. Thus, they see few reasons for the identification and registration of pastoral groups, migrant farmers, migrant fisherfolk and the border communities. Political leaders often interfere with recruitment processes where urban based personnel are recruited to work in rural areas. Such personnel are not familiar with the rural environments, and the therefore commute daily from the cities to the villages, spending too much time in travelling and very little time in working and registering the communities. Such personnel are always have very limited time. This leads them to rush people, and reduces the likelihood of being available during rural communities’ non-working hours. For these reasons, many populations – such as youths who spend afternoon hours attending to livestock, crops, fish as well as women who are marketing products – are at high risk of exclusion.

Vulnerability Dynamics of Project Implementation
While these populations could benefit from gaining IDs, they may also be suspicious of the program. Having suffered government abuses and restrictions in unstable border areas, communities may fear that the ID program is another means of extortion for corrupt government agents, or a mode of control. The vulnerability dynamics that could affect the implementation of the national registration among these populations include appropriate sensitization of civil servants and ad-hoc personnel. Rural populations are often perceived as backwards and illiterate, and this triggers non-cooperative attitudes towards government programs. Working with literate children from migrant communities could enhance participation in the national identification processes wherever practicable, for example as interpreters. With carefully designed capacity building, children with minimal education can be supported to work within the communities. This approach has been used effectively by the nomadic education extension agents’ initiative of the National Commission for Nomadic Education (NCNE).

It is also important to consider that migrant groups and border communities have specific times when they are totally committed to their economic lifestyles. As livestock and crops must be cared for at all times, and fish are available only at certain times, the identification process need to target the periods when these groups are least engaged. For this reason, the rigid work hours assigned for the national registration exercises in towns and villages may not work for migrant groups, and the registration centres of course need to be accessible. Perhaps most importantly, the types of documents to be presented (if any) for registration need to be significantly simplified.

It is important to note that due to the previous insecurity in the Northeast of Nigeria, some pastoralists were actually incentivized to seek national ID cards in order to facilitate their movement through the region. This issue of security and mobility raises an important entry point for encouraging such communities to suspend their mistrust and engage with the future ID system.

**Stakeholder Identification**

Numerous formal and informal stakeholders and platforms are available for engaging migrant groups and border communities. First, migrant groups and border communities have well defined traditional leadership structure that regulate and coordinate activities. Among the pastoralists, the highest authority among each group lies with the Ardo, who is supported by title holders (like Madaki, Wakili, Chiroma, etc) and head of clans (known as Jauro’en or Ardiibe Saare/Ngure). Each family is headed by an elder who is often the oldest member of the family. Among the migrant fisherfolk, each fishing camp has a Chief who oversees the affairs of the camps. Migrant farmers move in groups, with each group headed by a Chief who is responsible for coordination the affairs of the farmers. It is these traditional leaders that interface with external communities and undertake liaison and diplomacy between the migrant groups and other Nigerians. The border communities also have well established traditional systems of administration.

Second, households and household heads can be reached through camp visit during periods of minimal movement. Migrant groups and border communities have well structured clan and household leadership systems. These leaders have high influence over the conduct of members and can be important mobilisers for the national identification. Migrant groups are generally relaxed and welcoming during periods of minimal movement and activities. When approached through their leadership, they can easily be enlightened especially if such visits are conducted at their camps or settlement areas. Again, it is important for such institutions to plan their visits to coincide with the daily schedules of the groups.
Third, leaders in rural markets are important because markets are social and economic centers for migrant groups and border communities. Markets are therefore centers of aggregation where the groups from different areas assemble. Within each market, there are clearly defined leaderships, each addressing specific communities or products. For pastoralists, leaders of milk marketing who are mainly women are very influential among the pastoralists’ women. Leaders of cattle markets are very influential among the men. For migrant fisherfolk, leaders of fish markets who are mainly women are likewise very influential. For migrant farmers and border communities, the leaders of the commodity markets with grains or tubers are influential among both men and women. For these reasons, the markets are important entry points where information can be communicated to the wide range of migrant and border populations.

Fourth, migrant groups and most rural communities respect festivals and ceremonies, cultural events that present opportunities for outreach. In these festivals and ceremonies, there are well defined leaders who take responsibility for organizing and directing the affairs of the events (such as leaders of women and youths associations, leaders of cultural troupes, etc). Linkages with such leaders to mobilize these communities for national identification registration will be useful for community enlightenment. For example, marriage ceremonies are mostly attended by women and important messages can be passed at such events. Music festivals are mostly attended by youths. Religious and harvest festivals are attended by adults, women and youths. Since festivals and ceremonies are attended by migrant and neglected groups from far and wide, they are important mediums for information dissemination and community mobilization once the leadership of these events are mobilized.

Fifth, religious leaders and religious events present opportunities. Pastoralists are mainly Muslims while migrant farmers and fisherfolk can be Christians or Muslims. Most of the migrant fisherfolk in the Niger Delta are Christians. Again, many of the migrant farmers and fishing communities also have some ancestral beliefs they strongly hold onto in addition to the orthodox religions. The border communities are a mix of the two religions. Religious leaders are highly respected by migrant groups and their messages are taken very seriously and largely complied with. Thus religious events such as Friday congregational mosques and the weekly Sunday Churches can be utilized to communicate with migrant and border groups.

Sixth, migrant and rural communities have little access to most forms of modern media, with exception of the radio. The radio is most popular with the pastoral groups than the migrant farmers and fisherfolk. It can therefore be deployed to communicate information to vast majority of pastoralists. In the north, the Federal Radio Corporation Hausa service is most popular. Also, the Hausa programs of the International Radio like BBC Hausa service, Voice of America Hausa Service are very popular. Many of the state and private radio stations are widely listened to within their areas of coverage as well.

Finally, there are several community based organizations such as tribal pressure groups, occupational organizations and civil society organizations that are highly influential among the diverse migratory groups and border communities. Leveraging these platforms will ease entry into the communities and creates greater acceptability of the national identification exercise. It is therefore important that in each local government, such platforms be identified to get them involved in awareness creation and mobilization of the migrant and border communities.

Although many of migrant groups and border communities have access to mobile telephones, its use is mostly for verbal communication via phone calls because of the low level of literacy. For this reason, the use of the social media via text messaging may not an effective means of communicating with the groups. Notwithstanding this challenge, audio and video
messaging through the social media can be an important means of communication. This is quite feasible as many young people in these communities have learnt the techniques of downloading video and audio music, films, and dramas posted on the social media. Thus important messages on the national identification and registration exercise can be excellently crafted in short audio and video formats and shared through appropriate social media platforms for enlightening and encouraging the populations to enrol for national identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Key characteristics (including degree of expertise on the issue)</th>
<th>Nature and extent of influence</th>
<th>Nature and extent of interest</th>
<th>Potential role in the program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Commission for Nomadic Education</td>
<td>Headquarters in Kaduna with six Zonal offices (Kano, Bauchi, Minna, Enugu, Port-Harcourt and Ibadan). Good knowledge of pastoralists and migrant fisherfolk</td>
<td>Influential among pastoralists and migrant fisherfolk especially in the Niger Delta. Little influence among migrant farmers</td>
<td>High interest in the affairs of migrant groups, although more focused on education</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its personnel who are familiar with the communities; staff can serve as facilitation agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Communities Development Commission</td>
<td>National headquarters at Abuja</td>
<td>Influence on border communities</td>
<td>Interest in affairs of neglected border communities</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its personnel who are familiar with the communities; staff can serve as facilitation agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres for Nomadic Education at the University of Jos, Port-Harcourt and Maiduguri</td>
<td>As above. In addition, can provide some valuable literature</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>High interest in the affairs of migrant groups, although more focused on education</td>
<td>Personnel can support research and outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States Ministries of Agriculture</td>
<td>Veterinary and Livestock Departments have information and records on pastoralists</td>
<td>Veterinary and animal health practitioners do have good working relationships with some pastoral groups</td>
<td>Good interest in working with pastoralists</td>
<td>Personnel can support community mobilization and sensitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States Ministries of Education</td>
<td>Nomadic education supervisors and teachers have good knowledge of pastoralists and migrant fisherfolk</td>
<td>Nomadic education supervisors and teachers have good working relationships with pastoralists and migrant fisherfolk</td>
<td>Good interest in working with pastoralists and migrant fisherfolk</td>
<td>Personnel can support community mobilization and sensitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN)</td>
<td>Pastoralists Association with the largest network in Nigeria</td>
<td>Wide range of influence particularly among sedentary and semi-sedentary pastoralists</td>
<td>High level of interest in pastoral issues, but with low technical skills</td>
<td>Can support community mobilization and sensitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Technical Skills</td>
<td>Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Pastoral Resolve (PARE)</td>
<td>Pastoralists NGO with presence in many States of the Northern Nigeria</td>
<td>Influence with some groups of pastoralists.</td>
<td>High level of interest in pastoral issues with appreciable technical skills for research and community engagement</td>
<td>Can support research formulation and conduct, community mobilization and sensitization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN)</td>
<td>An umbrella organization of farmer organizations in Nigeria. Strong influence at the national and states levels</td>
<td>Influential among higher level policy makers, but low grassroots influence. Also strong linkages with some local level farmer cooperative organisations</td>
<td>High level of interest in farmer issues.</td>
<td>Can support with higher level advocacy and engagement with authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hayah Development Association</td>
<td>An organization of mainly Shuwa-Arab pastoral groups in the States of Borno and Yobe</td>
<td>Influential among the Shuwa-Arab pastoralists in the Northeast of Nigeria</td>
<td>High level interest in affairs of pastoralists, although with low level technical expertise</td>
<td>Can support community mobilization and sensitization, even though the insurgency in the Northeast is currently a major constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Natura International</td>
<td>Working with communities in the Niger Delta on conflicts management and development</td>
<td>Influential among some of the migrant communities in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>High level of interest in the affairs of communities in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>Can support community mobilization and provide suggestions on research approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development in Nigeria (DIN)</td>
<td>An NGO working with rural communities in some communities in the Niger Delta with headquarters in Calabar</td>
<td>Influential among many rural farming communities as well as border communities especially in Cross Rivers State</td>
<td>High level of interest in the affairs of communities in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>Can support community mobilization and provide suggestions on research approaches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Minority Groups and Geographic Marginalization in the Niger Delta

Minority groups and those that are geographically marginalized are at risk of exclusion from the ID system because they are hard to reach, both with information and physically, and often chose to remain disconnected from Government structures. Geographically marginalized groups in particular require targeted outreach and mobile enrollment systems in order to be reached by national ID systems.

Vulnerability Profile
The Niger Delta has both a physical and a political meaning for Nigerians. They physical meaning refers to a space of 5,600 square miles, encompassing several channels through which the River Niger empties its waters into the Atlantic Ocean. Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states are located within this geographical area, which has the lion share of Nigeria’s oil reserves. On the eve of independence, the departing British colonial authorities issued a report that recognized the intersection of ethnic diversity, inaccessible terrain, and low development as peculiarities of the region requiring special attention under future administrations. The Willink Commission, as it was known, noted that the region was developmentally far behind other parts of southern Nigeria in physical development, and it recommended the creation of a Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) to allay the fears of the numerous minority groups. Of the area where the Ijaw, the largest of these groups reside, the Commission prophetically observed, “theirs is a country which through no fault of man, has been neglected and which is unlikely ever to be highly developed.”

Many communities in the physical Niger Delta remain geographically isolated and inaccessible by their terrain (see recommendations below) due to poor road conditions and the necessity of water transportation. The government’s neglect of transportation infrastructure creates weak links to the government and a limited sense of belonging, and the recurring use of coercion in response to protests and rebellions since the 1960s has compounded the sense of frustration. The election of an ethnic Ijaw, Goodluck Jonathan, to the presidency in 2011 was a historic moment for Nigeria. But feeling of political disenfranchisement remain widespread and militant organizations remain, even after a major demobilization effort launched in 2009. While it would seem that communities lacking good infrastructure and basic necessities would embrace the national ID system as a means to improve their welfare, a long history of failed efforts and robust ethnic nationalism further complicate such expectations. Political mobilization by the Ogoni, for example, called for environmental

A seminal study of the Niger Delta in 2006 by the UNDP documented the region’s difficult topography and its vast under-development:
• People tend live in small communities. Out of an estimated 13,329 settlements, 94 percent have populations of less than 5,000;
• Only 20-24 percent of rural communities, and 45-50 percent of urban communities, have access to safe drinking water;
• There is only one primary health care facility for every 9,805 people, with the average facility serving a 44 square kilometer area; this means there is one facility for about every 43 settlements;
• Only 34 percent of people use electrical lighting, while 61 percent use kerosene or a lantern

cleanup and reform of the federal mechanisms for sharing oil revenue, but these claims were also embedded within challenges to the dominant ethnic groups of the region. As in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, the legal concept of indigeneity further alienates the estimated 40 minority groups in the Niger Delta. They see it as a mechanism of political control. Where these populations reside in slums, such as in Port Harcourt, beyond their traditional geographical home, these populations’ vulnerabilities intersect with insecure property rights and other forms of discrimination.

The “political” Niger Delta encompasses the physical Niger Delta and all other Nigerian states where oil production takes place (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River State, Edo, Imo and Ondo). The federal government has used this broader concept of Niger Delta for administering compensations for the negative effects of oil production. Political agitation and militant attacks in the physical Niger Delta led to the creation of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPIADEC), and its successor, the Ministry of Niger Delta and Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).

The impact of such efforts however has been limited. Oil exploitation, which accounts for up to 90 percent of Nigeria’s export revenue, produces significant negative externalities that shape how the people of the region see the federal government and external partners. First, pollution of land and rivers has jeopardized sources of livelihood. Between 2006 and 2016, there were 9,343 documented spills. Since the discovery of oil more than a half century ago, the equivalent of one Exxon Valdez spill occurs each year in the Niger Delta.\(^{113}\)

Second, mass mobilization and democratic channels have been unable to reform the distribution of oil rents with a revenue allocation formula that adequately compensates for oil’s negative externalities. The current formula involves a “vertical” distribution that allocates a fixed percentage to the federal, state and local governments, and then a horizontal distribution that allocates across states according to population, size, developmental needs and other criteria. In addition, there is a “derivation principle” which stipulates that 13 percent of revenue from a commodity (such as oil) which the federal government has control of should be returned to the state of origin.\(^{114}\) The result is that the region that is by far the country’s biggest revenue earner gets less with the principles of population and equality of states weighted 50 percent each, in the sharing of the less than the 40 percent balance of oil revenues, in inter-state and inter-local government allocation. As a recent editorial of a widely circulated newspaper puts it, “the federal government seizes 55 percent of the nation’s financial resources, fritters away the national patrimony on a wasteful and inefficient federal bureaucracy and intrudes into the geographical space of states in the guise of a questionable national unity.”\(^{115}\) The lopsided financial result decisively manifests itself in widespread feelings of political alienation, social injustice, and mistrust of Government.

At the time of independence in 1960, the principle of derivation stood at 50 weight in the sharing of revenue collected by the federal government. Following a coup in 1966, the military progressively whittled down this principle. It was further wiped out through the 1981 Revenue Allocation Act during the short-lived Second Republic (1979-1983). When Niger Delta leaders then sought to ameliorate the negative impact of oil through mass mobilization, the military resorted to extreme repression. The best known example is what John Major, Prime Minister of

\(^{113}\) Watts, “Ecologies of Rule,”133-68.


\(^{115}\) The Guardian, 23 April 2018, p.16
the United Kingdom, described as the “judicial murder” of Mr. Kenule Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists on November 10, 1995. Through the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Saro-Wiwa had built alliances with international human rights and environmental organizations sympathetic to Ogoni complaints about pollution and ethnic disenfranchisement. Democratic channels after the transition to democracy in 1999 similarly failed to redress demands for redistribution. For example, in 2001 Representative Temi Harriman introduced a private bill for “resource control” (ie, of the Niger Delta’s oil wealth) which was roundly defeated in by the National Assembly. The five major oil-bearing states of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta and Rivers have just 46 members in the 360 seat House of Representatives.

Third, federal presence in development of the region is negligible. For example, the entire territory carved out from Rivers State in 1996 as Bayelsa State was not connected to the national electric power grid. The NDDB had hardly been launched when the military seized power in 1966, and it soon faded into oblivion. Other special agencies subsequently created for the development of Niger Delta have been undermined by inadequate funding as well as their replication for other regions of Nigeria. A former Minister of Agriculture recalls that the idea of River Basin Development Authority was meant for the Niger Delta. However, in its implementation, i.e., the establishment of the Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority (NDRBDA), the federal government replicated it all over Nigeria with eleven other river basin development authorities. The NDDC established by an Act in 2000 for the development of Niger Delta has been duplicated in the north as The Hydro-Electric Power Producing Areas Development Commission (Establishment) Act No. 7, 2010.

Fourth, one of the main findings from a 2008 government-sponsored study of the Niger Delta is that additional studies were not necessary. Rather, the ideas and recommendations from 17 previous government panels and commissions, starting with the Willink Commission, needed to be addressed and implemented. While the government did proceed to implement a disarmament and demobilization plan for militant groups then active at the time, other recommendations including a drastic increase in revenue allocation for the region and the end of gas flaring at oil wells went unaddressed. OMPADEC, established in 1992 for the development of the Niger Delta, offers an earlier example of an abandoned government effort. It was supposed to be funded through 3 percent of oil revenues, used to stave off the growing agitations in the Niger Delta over the revenue sharing formula’s alleged bias toward non-oil producing regions. However it was never funded as the law stipulated.

Such experiences of oppression, alienation and lack of due consideration have shaped negative perceptions of the federal government. In this regard, the ID program may be seen by the Niger Delta ethnic minorities as another distraction from the issues of concern to them.

Capacity assessment
While many of the vulnerable populations discussed in this report possess a low capacity to address their grievances, the peoples of the Niger Delta have demonstrated highly variable capacities to advance their interests. They have organized at both grassroots and elite levels, made demands on the federal government through subnational governments and civil society,

and utilized tactics ranging from mass non-violence to legislative politics to armed insurgency. The presence of foreign oil companies, which operate through partnership agreements with the federal government, mean that the private sector has an unmistakably large footprint in the region, introducing important set of powerful stakeholders. Also, activities of local gangs (or “cults”) whose membership history may overlap with insurgent groups, can make it difficult to distinguish on the one hand between ordinary criminal behavior, and on the other hand, rebellion by armed groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) that articulate demands largely within mainstream political discourse. A well-developed NGO sector adds a further layer to this complex matrix of state-society relations and stakeholders engaged in coalition building, political confrontation, or community development.

Niger Delta elites mobilize to challenge marginalization in a variety of ways, and they often have the capacity to mobilize popular support. Historically, elites formed cultural solidarity organizations to advance their interests amidst inter-ethnic competition or to resist government policies. Minority status within an administrative unit (such as state) often provides elites with a ready tool for articulating a discourse of solidarity alongside complaints about alienation from larger political units or populations. Prior to Nigeria’s independence, minorities with a significant population in the Niger Delta formed ethnic associations for self-preservation.

MOSOP is one of the most enduring and consequential ethnic associations for state-society relations. Its formation drew on personal deprivations such as land degradation and loss of farmlands to oil exploitation. As noted above, MOSOP challenged the existing revenue allocation formula which was and still largely tilted in favor of the major ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba). It forced the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) out of Ogoni lands in 1993, and at one point contemplated secession from Nigeria. Its mass mobilization was emulated by other minorities of the Niger Delta who formed similar ethnic associations to pursue their demand for a fair share of oil revenues. The repression deployed by military regimes in the 1990s continued after the handover to civilians in 1999, with massive violence in Gbaramatu, Odi, and other communities seen as sympathetic to rebels. In the broader context of ethnic politics, minority groups such as the Ogonis feel marginalized by the major ethnic groups who control federal power and other stakeholders within the Niger Delta itself. For example, Ogonis sought an embargo on Nigeria’s oil exports to the United States in order to pressure the military regime of Sani Abacha (1993-1998) to make concessions. However, the federal military government and multinational oil companies successfully defeated a core demand: a bill in the U.S. Congress that would have banned oil imports from Nigeria. Another example of how minority groups advance their claims is the current legal suit filed by the Ogale people in British courts. With the backing of a coalition of human rights, environmental and development groups, they are suing SPDC over the pollution of their land during over a half century of oil exploitation. Other ethnic associations that are stakeholders

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are Ijaw National Congress, Ijaw Youth Council, Urhobo Progressive Union, Ogbakor Ikwere Cultural Organization Worldwide, and Isoko Development Union.

In addition to tensions between major and minor ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, and resentment toward the federal government, are rivalries among communities. Hosting an oil company brings jobs, scholarships and various possibilities for compensation, stimulating intense competition. Moreover, inter-generational differences can accent contrasts between grassroots and elite organizing. Youths who are distrustful of elders, including traditional rulers, compete with them as the “legitimate” voice for their communities. For example a recent Partners4Peace report finds that the government environmental cleanup program of Ogoni has triggered “competition among those who feel they are stakeholders… and should be given a prime seat at the table when discussing aspects of the Cleanup project….and how contracts and compensations are doled out” (P4P 2017: 3). The clash of interest compounds negotiations between oil producing communities on the one hand and government and oil companies on the other, making necessary cooperation of oil communities for the smooth execution of programs/projects by oil companies and government very unlikely. The infiltration of the ranks of agitators of oil communities by criminal gangs starting from 2004, has increasingly put the execution of projects of government and oil companies at risk with the high incidence of kidnapping for a huge ransom. These various alternative governance structures undermine perceptions of government.

**Vulnerability Dynamics of Project Implementation**

This government’s history of broken promises, corruption, and haphazard implementation of recommendations has bred deep distrust. For example, the amnesty program launched by the Umar Yar’Adua administration in 2008 has paid over 35,000 young men to abandon militancy. But it has failed to address pollution, infrastructural under-development, and other causes of the rebellion. An important consequence, which needs to be carefully considered as a vulnerability dynamic is the perception of violence as a legitimate means of obtaining concessions from the government. For example, a survey on the post-amnesty environment organized by the University of Port Harcourt asked, “how justified is violence if peaceful demands [are] continually ignored?” 43.0 percent of respondents in Akwa-Ibom, 33.8 percent in Delta State, 32.7 percent in Rivers, and 43.3 percent in Ondo said it was either “justified” or “well justified.” State violence socializes communities into believing that the government is against the identity associated with their group. Violence fosters insecurity and challenges the implementation of government programs such as road construction and other forms of intervention meant to redress the neglect of the Niger Delta. It may be difficult to divorce the national ID system from this context.

A second important vulnerability dynamic is the history of failed reforms. Authors of the Mitee Report said its usefulness will depend on the “sincere and sustained” actions of especially government to implement it. True to the authors’ skepticism, Presidents Yar’Adua and Jonathan implemented only a handful of the recommendations and tended to equate the decline of violence during the amnesty period with successful reform. Similarly, the government’s

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123 Adunbi, *Oil Wealth and Insurgency in Nigeria.*
126 Adunbi, *Oil Wealth and Insurgency in Nigeria.*
127 Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 12.
program for cleaning up Ogoni areas recommended by the United Nations Environmental Protection Program (UNEP) is widely seen as compromised. According to a former president of MOSOP, these are provision of alternative water source, public enlightenment as to the danger of fishing in polluted water, replacement of old pipelines, extermination of illegal refineries that expose the environment to further pollution and provision of alternative sources of livelihood.\textsuperscript{128}

While the national ID could be seen as yet another technocratic solution to the problems of the Niger Delta, it could have important practical benefits. For example, universally accepted identification could help ameliorate the marginalization resulting from the principle of indigeneity. The ID could also earn peoples’ confidence if they see it as a way of reducing corruption through the revenue allocation system, which grants money to politicians as their surrogates. At the same time, outreach that does not balance the inter-generational, -communal, and -ethnic rivalries mentioned above could undermine universal enrolment.

### Stakeholder Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Key characteristics</th>
<th>Nature and extent of influence</th>
<th>Nature and extent of interest</th>
<th>Potential role in the program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People</td>
<td>Umbrella Ogoni civil society organization and widely regarded by Ogoni people</td>
<td>Influence among the youth, women and the marginalized groups of the Ogoni</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of entire Ogoni especially the youth</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its leaders and the leaders of its affiliates who are familiar with the nooks and crannies of Ogoni land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijaw National Congress</td>
<td>Umbrella Ijaw civil society organization and widely regarded by Ijaw people</td>
<td>Influence among the youth, women and the marginalized groups of the Ijaw</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of entire Ijaw especially the youth</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its leaders and the leaders of its affiliates who are familiar with the nooks and crannies of Ijaw land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijaw Youth Council</td>
<td>Ijaw youth civil society organization and widely regarded by Ijaw people</td>
<td>Influence among the youth</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of especially the youth</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its leaders and the leaders of its affiliates who are familiar with the nooks and crannies of Ijaw land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urhobo Progressive Union</td>
<td>Umbrella Urhobo civil society organization and widely regarded by Urhobo people</td>
<td>Influence among the youth, women and the marginalized groups of the Urhobo</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of entire Urhobo especially the youth</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its leaders and the leaders of its affiliates who are familiar with the nooks and crannies of Urhobo land</td>
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</tbody>
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\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Victor Isumonah, 21 May 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>High interest in the welfare of entire population</th>
<th>Community mobilization; use of its leaders and the leaders of its affiliates who are familiar with the nooks and crannies of Ikwere land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ogbakor Ikwere Cultural Organization Worldwide</td>
<td>Influence among the youth, women and the marginalized groups of the Ikwere</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of entire Ikwere especially the youth</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its leaders and the leaders of its affiliates who are familiar with the nooks and crannies of Ikwere land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isoko Development Union</td>
<td>Influence among the youth, women and the marginalized groups of the Isoko</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of entire Isoko especially the youth</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its leaders and the leaders of its affiliates who are familiar with the nooks and crannies of Isoko land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger Delta Forum and Niger Delta People’s Congress</td>
<td>Influence among the various segments of the Niger Delta populations</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of entire Niger Delta</td>
<td>Community mobilization; use of its leaders who are familiar with the difficulties of the Niger Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nengi James Foundation</td>
<td>Influence among the youth and the middle class of Bayelsa State</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Community mobilization; its founder, Chief Nengi James (08038697958) and a grassroots mobilizer will be a great facilitator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law</td>
<td>Influence among civil society organizations in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of vulnerable groups</td>
<td>Community mobilization; its founder, Chief Executive, Dr. Anyakwe Nsirimovu, and a grassroots mobilizer will be a great facilitator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>Highly influential; partnering with communities and various governments in the Niger Delta</td>
<td>Recognized champion of the interest of vulnerable groups such as the unemployed youth, women and children</td>
<td>Community mobilization; its directors will be helpful in advocating the ID project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier-General Paul Boro</td>
<td>Influence among beneficiaries who are mostly the youth category</td>
<td>High interest in the welfare of demobilized militants</td>
<td>Community mobilization; he as Chair of the Amnesty program will be a great facilitator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Rights Action</td>
<td>Highly popular among civil society and rights organizations</td>
<td>Influence among civil society groups</td>
<td>High interest in the environment and livelihoods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendations to Minimize Risk and Optimize Participation

1. **A mix of mobile and stationary registration**
   The team saw many advantages of fixed access points for registration for the national ID. For example, it would reduce confusion about where to enroll and help standardize procedures that could otherwise be subject to discretion. Nigeria’s recent shift from a brief voter registration period to an ongoing, continuous process administered by INEC offers an encouraging model. Nevertheless, mobile registration will likely be necessary first because transhumant populations and groups with seasonal residency, such as the migrant fisherfolk and pastoralists, will likely require mobile registration timed to coincide with their movements. Communities with a history of mistrust toward Government or who are geographically or culturally isolated will also need to be reached through mobile registration processes which are tailored to their particular circumstances. Again, INEC’s use of mobile voter registration appears to offer useful lessons. NIMC may seek to partner with INEC in using the existing polling units as registration points for prospective citizens, since INEC currently have a well-defined system of voter registration and voting in the country. Second, mobile registration will facilitate enrollment in geographically remote areas. Examples of such hard to reach areas identified by researchers include:

- Mahanga, Jol, Rim and Riyom local government areas in Plateau State
- Ese-Odo local government in Ondo State, which includes the Arogbo and Ijaw peoples
- Ovia South-West local government in Edo State, with Ijaw and Ofunama peoples
- Warri South-West local government in Delta State, which includes Madagho/Escravos, and Itsekiri peoples
- Ekeremo local government of Bayelsa State, which includes Agge and Ijaw
- Bonny local government of Rivers State, which includes Bonny and Ijaw
- Eastern Obolo local government of Akwa Ibom State, which includes Iko and Ijaw
- Bakassi local government of Cross River State, which includes Abana and Efik peoples

2. **Messaging in Local Languages**
   In the light of the high level of illiteracy across rural communities in the country, NIMC and other stakeholders concerned should craft messages in languages that can easily be understood by the people. For example, in the Middle Belt alone, this would likely include Berom, Goemai, Ngas, Tarok, Mwaghavul in Plateau State; Alago and Eggon in Nasarawa State; as well as Jukun, Kuteb and Tiv in Taraba State. Although Hausa is an important lingua franca across the Middle Belt states, outreach in these other languages could increase the legitimacy of the ID system. The situation would be much the same in the Niger Delta. Persons with auditory disabilities also require messaging in local sign language as well as ASL in order to have full access to information.

3. **Data privacy**
   Since several marginalized populations here are already subjected to government coercion or harassment, researchers emphasized the importance of strong data privacy protocols clearly conveyed to ID participants. Data fidelity must minimize the danger of loss of control over personal information and eliminate the risk of accessing personal data for surveillance or targeted violence, whether by third parties or by the government.
4. **Variable outreach to IDPs**
Registered IDPs are all officially handled by the same Nigerian government agencies. But the outreach and enrollment will need to be tailored to the different types of IDPs, noting that most are in informal camps or host communities, rather than government-run camps. In registered camps, outreach will need to be sensitive to the informal self-governance structures within the camps, which often carry more legitimacy than the official structures.

5. **Assessment of intersectionality**
Because gender, disability and several categories of vulnerability act as multipliers for potential exclusion, enrollment strategies need to consider which characteristic offers the best entry point for outreach.

6. **Sensitivity to form of outreach**
Even though Nigeria has some of the highest rates of smart phone usage in Africa, radio and traditional means of communication remain important for outreach for IDPs, pastoralists, and different migrant communities. Persons with disabilities also require targeted messaging through all media (written, radio, TV, and via community-based channels) in order to ensure their full access to information about ID enrollment.
In all cases, the message, the medium, and the “face” of the messenger will need to consider the likelihood of positive reactions to stimulate enrollment. The communications strategy will also want to consider contingency plans with local stakeholders who can help quickly correct any misinformation. The risk of such misinformation is greater in communities with high levels of distrust in the government.

7. **Calculated timing of outreach**
Migrant populations, including pastoralists and some farmers and fisherfolk, will be more receptive to outreach if it coincides with the times of year when they have more free time and when their locations are known.

8. **Leverage lessons from recent elections**
Recent elections offer some potentially important administrative and logistical lessons. INEC organized the 2015 national elections in 119,979 polling units and a total of 151,882 voting points (since units in more populous areas had more than one place to vote). Over 607,000 ad hoc personnel assisted with administration for over sixty million registered voters. Problems that INEC is working to address in future elections, with relevance for ID enrollment include:

- Siting, naming and coding of polling units sometimes impeded access by inconsistently referencing appropriate local landmarks. Most polling units are in schools, but other others operate in markets squares, community halls, around churches/mosques and other public facilities. This inconsistency especially created confusion for newer residents of these areas.
- Despite INEC’s experience, it still encountered widespread logistical problems. For example, in the 2011 general election, only 68 percent of polling units had opened for accreditation by 8:00am, and in 2015 this had only increased to 72 percent. This attests to both logistical challenges and the potential for administrative confusion in an operation this large. The riverine areas of Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta and Ondo states
all presented significant transport challenges. In the northeast, Adamawa and Borno states pose the greatest terrain challenge to access of polling units especially around the mountainous areas. The Mandara mountains near Toungo, Gwoza and Ganye local governments in Borno State, and Madagali, Michika and Hong local governments in Adamawa State, where particularly challenging.

- Lessons from continuous voter registration suggest that treating national ID enrollment as an ongoing process, rather than an “event” will increase participation.