

Report No. 17543

Recent Experience With Involuntary Resettlement Togo — Nangbeto

June 2, 1998

Operations Evaluation Department



Document of the World Bank

Acronyms

CEB	Communauté Electique du Bénin
DCA	Development Credit Agreement
GOB	Government of Benin
GOT	Government of Togo
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MHSAPW	Ministry of Health, Social Affairs, and the Position of Women
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
MW	Megawatts
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PCR	Project Completion Report
R&R	Resettlement and rehabilitation
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
SOTOCO	Société Togolaise de Coton

Director-General, Operations Evaluation	:	Mr. Robert Picciotto
Director, Operations Evaluation Dept.	:	Ms. Elizabeth McAllister
Manager, Sector and Thematic Evaluations	:	Mr. Roger Slade
Task Manager	:	Mr. Edward B. Rice

Contents

Preface.....	iii
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Description of the Project.....	1
Physical Layout and Affected Populations.....	1
Implementation of the Resettlement Program.....	2
Costs	6
3. Database and Survey Design.....	6
4. Compensation and Eligibility.....	7
Compensation Policy.....	7
Resettlers' Perceptions of Compensation.....	9
Use of Compensation	10
5. Income Restoration.....	10
Income Restoration Strategy	10
Resettlement Impact on Incomes.....	11
6. Assets and Living Standards.....	13
Housing	13
Expenditures and Debt	13
7. Social Infrastructures and Services.....	13
Electrification	13
Water Supply	13
Transportation	14
Health	14
Education.....	15
Other Infrastructure	15
Services	15
8. Resettlers' Perceptions of Resettlement.....	15
9. Other Issues.....	16
Participation by Resettlers.....	16

Participation by NGOs	17
Gender	17
Indigenous Groups	17
Host Communities.....	17
Monitoring and Evaluation.....	17
Changes in Policy on Involuntary Resettlement.....	18
10. Bank Performance	19
11. Borrower Performance.....	20
12. Conclusions.....	21
Map	
Nangbeto Dam Resettlement Project (IBRD 29019)	end

This report was prepared by Warren A. Van Wicklin III. William B. Hurlbut was the editor. Benjamin S. Crow provided administrative support.

Preface

This report is one of six impact evaluations to assess the resettlement process of Bank-supported projects and to determine the impact on involuntarily displaced people. A separate Overview report describes the purpose and objectives of the study, the methodology and selection of case studies, the history of resettlement in each project, and the principal findings, lessons, recommendations, and policy implications. This report covers each of the topics of the Overview for the Togo project.

This report is based upon a review of the project files, other relevant documents, and the results of a specially commissioned socio-economic survey. One Operations Evaluation Department (OED) mission visited the project area and conducted interviews with resettler and non-resettler households, village leaders, and village groups.

The draft report was sent to the Government of Togo on November 20, 1997. No comments were received.

The OED mission was accompanied by Mr. Komla Barthélemy Agouma-Ewomsan, founder and Executive Director, SNNORSEC, whose familiarity with the Nangbeto area enriched OED's understanding of the resettlement process at Nangbeto and is gratefully acknowledged. The OED mission was also accompanied and assisted by the interpretation services of Mr. Komlan Norbert Vaughn "Toto" Mensah. OED is also grateful for the assistance extended to the mission by Communauté Électrique du Benin (CEB), and to CEB resettlement officer Mr. Kouami Romain-Michael Aziablé whose management of the Nangbeto resettlement process from the beginning gives him unparalleled familiarity with the Nangbeto experience. Finally, OED would like to thank the dozens of resettlers and non-resettlers who shared their time and provided us their perspectives on their resettlement experience at Nangbeto.

1. Introduction

1.1 Nangbeto is the first hydropower project in Togo. A feasibility study in the 1960s identified the Nangbeto site on the Mono River as the best location for hydropower development in Togo. The Mono River is 530 kilometers (km) long—the last 80 kilometer before it flows into the Gulf of Benin forms the border between Benin and Togo—and has a catchment area of 15,680 square kilometers. The Nangbeto site—160 kilometers upstream of the coast and entirely inside Togo—is the only place where a dam of sufficient volume to regulate the Mono River flow is possible (see map IBRD 29019).¹ As demand for power grew, the decision was made in 1980 to proceed with Nangbeto as the preferred source for new generating capacity. The World Bank assisted construction of the Nangbeto Dam through Credits 1507-BEN and 1508-TO, \$15 million each, approved on June 28, 1984, fully disbursed and closed on June 30, 1992.² A Project Completion Report (PCR) was issued on December 30, 1993.

2. Description of the Project

Physical Layout and Affected Populations

2.1 Nangbeto is a composite dam with a 4.4-kilometer-long earth-filled lateral dike and a central rockfill section 500 meters long and 40 meters high. The reservoir covers approximately 180 square kilometers and has a volume of 1.465 billion cubic meters. It lies in a flat, broad valley, so small changes in its elevation flood large parcels of land. The powerhouse contains two turbines of 31.5 MW each. Nangbeto has one of the lowest ratios of hydropower to land flooded or people resettled of any dam in the world.

2.2 The dam and reservoir affected 34 villages and approximately 10,600 people. Twenty-one of the affected villages, generally those closest to the river, containing 1,285 households (7,626 people), lost their houses and land. These people were relocated 10 to 30 kilometers from existing settlements to nine new villages in five “resettlement zones” (see map) northeast of the Nangbeto Reservoir (“resettlement zone” resettlers). Several former villages were consolidated into each resettlement village, with the people’s consent and considering their ethnic and linguistic similarities. This was done mainly because it was cheaper and easier to build roads and community infrastructure for fewer, larger villages. Another 10 villages containing 3,000 people lost mainly their houses and moved just a few kilometers back from the river (“short move” resettlers) to make space for the reservoir. They continued to farm their previous fields. Finally, three villages totaling 1,400 people were excessively isolated by the reservoir, so new access roads were built to those villages, preventing the need for their resettlement.

1. World Bank, *Togo/Benin Nangbeto Hydroelectric Project: Staff Appraisal Report*, 1984, p. 58.

2. Although the dam, reservoir, and resettlement areas are all completely within Togo, hydropower development on the Mono River is shared between Togo and Benin. Togo and Benin jointly shared power even before the Nangbeto Project through the binational power company CEB.

Implementation of the Resettlement Program

2.3 The project was approved without much resettlement planning. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) claimed that plans were as advanced as they needed to be at that point, and a more detailed plan would be provided by December 31, 1985.³ It would be three more years before the reservoir would begin to fill, so there was little immediate pressure to complete the planning. The SAR does not indicate where the resettlers might move, what they would do when they got there, or any other arrangements. Issues such as irrigation, drawdown agriculture, and fishing were explicitly deferred. Even the estimated number of affected people—8,000—was 25 percent below the actual number.⁴ As a memo written the week the SAR was issued says: “The [resettlement] plan does not appear to have much operational content so far.”⁵

2.4 Because there was no impending need to work on resettlement, momentum built up slowly. Despite many Bank efforts to encourage planning to move forward, the project’s implementing agency, *Communauté Electrique du Bénin* (CEB, the binational power authority), did not appoint an interim resettlement officer until June 1985 or a permanent one until November 1985. Nevertheless, CEB met the target date of end-1985 for providing the detailed resettlement plan. CEB began preparations in the field in early-1986 using a highly participatory approach.

2.5 The Bank’s sociology adviser and senior resettlement expert visited the project in May 1986. Although he confirmed that resettlement was being planned well, he expressed concern about the rehabilitation aspects.⁶ These included reestablishing production systems, the provision of agricultural technology to support resettlers in their new environment, compensation for lost trees and the ability to replace them in the resettlement zone, and insufficient farm land. He warned of a potential resettlement “disaster.”⁷

2.6 CEB attempted to respond to the perceived weaknesses and believed it did so. The actual relocation was expeditious and smooth. Relocation began in January 1987, after resettlers harvested their crops in December, and 7,600 “resettlement zone resettlers” were relocated in two months, in time to prepare fields for the next crop. The “short-move resettlers” were relocated over the next three months. There was no force, coercion, adverse incidents, or hostile reactions. Food aid was provided from January 1986 to January 1988 to ease the transition. CEB provided new, quasi-permanent, two-room core houses, and compensation for acquired houses so resettlers could finish new houses according to their needs and standards. The resettlement zone area was sparsely populated, and the soils were fresh and provided relatively good yields. There was little problem obtaining adequate land from host communities: “Existing chiefs have accepted the

3. SAR, p. 70.

4. The lower appraisal estimate might be because the decision to create a two-kilometer buffer zone around the reservoir for malaria prevention reasons had not yet been made. The number of affected villages in the SAR, 34, was accurate.

5. Memorandum, R. Crown, WAPAAE, to S. Eccles, WAP, May 24, 1984, p. 1.

6. For a detailed forewarning of many of the problems that later materialized, see Aide Memoire, M. Cernea, AGR, May 31, 1986.

7. Cited in a telex from R. Crown, WAPAAE, to C. Sigwalt, WAPEG, and M. Nguyen, WAPAE, July 7, 1986.

areas to be farmed by the new-comers.”⁸ CEB built good laterite access roads to the resettlement villages, which gave them unprecedented marketing opportunities. Schools, health clinics, drinking water systems (boreholes with pumps), and other community infrastructure were provided at higher standards than for most of Togo.

2.7 It is easy to understand why resettlement was perceived to be satisfactory at the time. The project “summary,” written in January 1988, said: “The resettlement and environment aspects of the project deserve special praise. The relocation of about 10,000 people has taken place on time and without incident, and economic life, mainly agricultural production, has progressed without significant interruptions. Furthermore, the basic quality of life—particularly for women—appears to have visibly improved, thanks mainly to the drilling of wells equipped with pumps. One of the main reasons for the success of the resettlement was the early and full involvement of the population concerned.”⁹ This perception of successful resettlement persisted for years. Even in September 1994 the task manager claimed that the resettlers were better off than before the dam.¹⁰ As the PCR said: “farmers were allocated land for cultivation, commensurate with the holdings they exploited before relocation. The resettlement operation was successfully completed before reservoir filling.”¹¹

2.8 However, resettlement cannot be completed two months after people move; in that time resettlers are just beginning to adjust to their new lives. As a February 1987 resettlement mission said: “The problem seems to lie in the Project’s conceptualization of resettlement as limited more or less to the construction of the physical infrastructure and the transfer of the affected population from their homeland to the new resettlement zones. Perhaps as a result of that the resettlement division now perceives its role and responsibility as nearing completion.” The consultant was concerned that CEB was likely to take an “abrupt hands-off policy” toward the resettlers and argued that the Bank should “alert [CEB] to the fact that the job is not over yet.”¹² The PCR statement that land was “allocated” based on “holdings they exploited” also hints at potential future problems.¹³ Land was allocated, but not formally given, to the resettlers by the host communities. The land tenure system was left ambiguous as CEB and the Government of Togo did not make a quasi-legal allocation, but preferred to leave land tenure up to traditional chiefs. Furthermore, “allocations” based on exploitation presumably refers to land under cultivation, but people in the Nangbeto area practiced extensive agriculture and depended on having secure access to five times as much land as they had under cultivation. The consultant said: “This seems to be the problem that worries the Project too much. The availability of land is a debatable issue but the resettlement officer feels that it does not present an urgent problem. According to him, perhaps after ten years or so it may become so for some zones such as zone 2.”¹⁴ This was

8. Memorandum, R. Crown, C. Sigwalt, and C. Aneur, WAPEG, to J.F. Bauer, WAPEG, and J. Peberdy, WAPAA, March 11, 1987, Annex A, p. 3.

9. Memorandum, “Togo/Benin Hydroelectric Project Summary,” C. Sigwalt, AF1IE, to C. Poortman, AF1IE, p. 3.

10. Memorandum, S. Mikhail, AF1IE, to K. Ivarsdotter, AFTES, September 22, 1994, p. 1.

11. World Bank “Togo/Benin Nangbeto Hydroelectric and Power Engineering and Technical Assistance Projects: Project Completion Report,” 1993, p. ii.

12. H. Fahim, *The Nangbeto Resettlement Scheme: A Review Report*, pp. 19, 28.

13. PCR, p. 5.

14. Fahim, p. 11.

beyond the time for which CEB accepted responsibility. Since the project did not provide all the land resettlers needed, land pressure has increased.

2.9 Conditions for resettlers, and most Togolese, deteriorated precipitously after 1990, when the government was nearly overthrown. The entire economy collapsed: the government ceased to provide many services, a general strike paralyzed the country for most of 1993, the 1994 currency devaluation made conditions worse, and incomes fell dramatically until 1995 when the economy gradually began to recover. The Bank program in Togo was dormant from 1992 to 1995, and there was no Bank dialogue with the government. Because the situation deteriorated for nonresettlers as well as resettlers, it is difficult to disaggregate the effects of resettlement from broader effects of Togo's economic decline. For this and other reasons elaborated in Chapter 3 (Database and Survey Design), the data are far from robust, and conclusions must necessarily be tentative.

2.10 Most of the water supply pumps broke down prematurely. When nearby host villages did not receive new water systems, they began using the resettlers' water systems and contributed to their deterioration. Resettlers took responsibility for pump maintenance for a while, but gave up as the pumps failed repeatedly and were too costly to maintain. The schools and clinics often lack supplies and staff, and medicines are no longer subsidized. The core (replacement) houses, intended only for temporary occupancy, were not well constructed; many were built on shifting soil and developed cracks or collapsed. Many of the older resettlers did not adjust to life in the new village and some died, perhaps for psychological as much as for physical reasons.¹⁵ Most important by far, however, was that most resettlers (and the experts consulted by the OED mission) report declining agricultural yields, per capita production, and income.

2.11 There are several reasons for the agricultural decline. Population steadily increased in the reservoir area, due both to substantial natural increase among the resettlers and their hosts, and significant in-migration from northern Togo as well as Sahelian countries. Ironically, the benefits of the resettlement program—development of the reservoir fishery and the road system— attracted in-migration. Satellite photographs document the rapid expansion of cultivated areas in the Nangbeto area from 1986 to the present. Increased population density made it impossible to sustain the former extensive agricultural system where household landholdings averaged 16 hectares of land, only 2 to 3 hectares of which was farmed in any one year, with land left fallow for 7 to 10 years. Even this was less than former fallow periods of 10 to 15 years indicating some intensification had already taken place.¹⁶ People had little choice but to adopt a more intensive agricultural system, resulting in increasing exhaustion of the soil. The resettlement plan implicitly assumed that resettlers would intensify their agriculture, but people are generally too poor to afford fertilizers, improved seeds, and other inputs to maintain productivity. This may have been possible earlier, but the combination of increasing population pressure, insecure land tenure, and the economic crisis prevented an organized transition to more intensified agriculture. The increased population also contributed to the overuse and breakdown of the water supply systems and the decrease in wild animals that could be hunted.

15. This observation was made about Abalokopé and Hodé villages, in resettlement zones 1 and 5, respectively, by K.B. Agouma, the senior agricultural economist who accompanied the OED evaluation mission in 1997.

16. For an elaboration of the land use patterns, requirements, and their implications for resettlement, see Crown and others, Annex A, pp. 2–3. Their estimates of the land needed for resettlement is considered a minimum. Other experts suggested the land requirements were up to 30 percent greater depending on the assumptions used.

2.12 As land pressure increased the host villages became increasingly reluctant to give resettlers access to land. Because resettlers have few nonfarm alternatives, they are largely at the mercy of the host villages, and their lack of secure land tenure has multiple consequences. First, resettlers are unable to obtain sufficient land to farm. Often they are given less desirable land than the host villages do not use or want. Second, the fields they can use are usually not contiguous with their villages or other plots, so raising livestock is difficult and has generally declined. Resettler animals get loose into nonresettler neighbors' fields and are seized or killed for trespassing. Conversely, livestock belonging to the host community graze on resettler crops with impunity because resettlers cannot complain for fear of losing access to land. Third, resettlers do not feel secure enough to plant trees because they might not reap the benefits. The situation is so bad in two of the "resettlement zone" villages, Abalokopé and Hodé, that resettlers are returning to their old villages to find land to farm.¹⁷ Unfortunately, shepherds now use much of that land. The host communities were never offered any incentives for accepting the resettlers. CEB in effect set up the resettlers in the midst of the host communities and left them on their own with no follow-up. In fact, the Bank advised CEB to turn over responsibilities to relevant government agencies.¹⁸ CEB claims it never committed to doing anything more than hand over responsibilities after relocation; but with no clear responsibility for follow-up, such an unsustainable resettlement strategy was excessively risky.

2.13 "Short-move" resettlers are not faring any better. While they have more secure land rights, they also suffer greater land pressure and soil exhaustion problems. The reservoir inundated some of their land, and finding replacement land is very difficult. Very few of them take advantage of fishing opportunities in the reservoir. They attempt to practice drawdown agriculture, but hippopotamuses eat crops in the drawdown area. This is a big problem in the village of Assanté Nangbeto, even more significant than the land problem. The reservoir has become a premier reserve for thousands of hippos. The hippos are protected by stiff fines and jail terms for those who harm them, an example where environmental protection and resettler rehabilitation conflict.

2.14 Not all resettlers are suffering. Foukoté Vossa and Atchinédji (villages in resettlement zones 2 and 3) appear to be doing well. Some "resettlement zone" villagers say their old land was already exhausted, and they are better off now. They used to grow rustic (unimproved) cotton, but inputs and marketing, supplied by the *Société Togolaise de Coton* (SOTOCO, the national cotton parastatal with programs throughout Togo, including the Nangbeto area), are much better now and provide the main cash crop. Those who are able to afford improved inputs and to sell their crops at the time of their choice (that is, not right at harvest time when many other farmers are trying to sell) realize much higher yields and prices. If that experience could be generalized, then there is some hope that the situation could be remedied. However, many resettlers are reluctant to go down the path of high-input, high-yield agriculture. They fear inadequate rains or some other factor would render the more expensive inputs uneconomic, that input prices may escalate (they used to be subsidized by as much as 85 percent), that they would be trapped in

17. Time did not permit sufficient analysis to determine the reasons for the relatively poor resettlement experience of these two villages. Among the potential known factors are these villagers (i) moved the farthest (see map), (ii) participated least in resettlement decisions, (iii) were most dissatisfied with their resettlement sites, (iv) had the most problems with their neighboring host villages, and (v) had their village heads imprisoned for six months because of misappropriation of resettlers' money.

18. Memorandum, D. Butcher, consultant, to J.F. Bauer, WAPEG, p. 5, makes numerous specific recommendations regarding the handover.

dependency on inputs to sustain yields, and that they could become indebted and end up losing everything.

2.15 Some resettlers have moved to Oké-Adogbenou, an unaffected host village near the resettlement zone and a crossroads trading town, which appears to be doing fairly well. While these resettlers have less land and water, the trading and marketing opportunities appear to more than compensate for the shortcomings. Oké-Adogbenou is definitely doing better than Tchounoukopé, another unaffected village, which is in the short-move area close to the reservoir. That village now appears to be worse off than before the dam.

Costs

2.16 The SAR aggregated resettlement and environment program costs, estimated at \$10.4 million. The majority of this was for resettlement. Costs increased only 6 percent, to \$11 million. This works out to just over \$1,000 per resettler, or \$6,000 per family. The Bank financed 48 percent of this, an unusually high percentage by Bank standards.

3. Database and Survey Design

3.1 Resettlement performance at Nangbeto is more difficult to evaluate than for any of the other case study projects for at least six reasons. First, there is no baseline information. Second, there was no monitoring or evaluation, so there was essentially no information on how resettlers fared after relocation. Third, there are no survey data, even for unaffected villages. Fourth, there were no NGOs (or other third party observers) during the relocation and the early years of rehabilitation that would have been useful sources of information. Fifth, the almost complete collapse of the Togolese economy makes it very difficult to disentangle the impacts of resettlement from other causes of declining income. Sixth, the situation is very mixed and complicated, with some villages doing much better than other villages, and some resettlers doing well even in villages where most resettlers appear to be in difficulty. In fact, OED received conflicting information on whether incomes, quality of land, livestock, and living standards were improving or worsening. People disagreed on whether the compensation and participation were adequate. Often it was difficult to determine if it was the perceptions or the realities that differed among respondents. Other recent Bank missions visiting Nangbeto have complained that resettler stories have changed over the course of successive surveys and interviews, further complicating the task of collecting reliable data. Obtaining accurate information was much more difficult than in any of the other case studies where none of the first five conditions prevails and which benefited from field surveys, multiple evaluation missions, and significantly greater corroborating evidence. Given the constraints and the limited nature of evaluation work performed at Nangbeto, conclusions must necessarily be tentative. Nonetheless, the story of resettlement at Nangbeto is too important to dismiss for lack of better information.

3.2 Because of the above limitations, the evaluation team chose not to conduct a full field survey with hundreds of household interviews as it did in the other five case study countries. There were no chronological data against which to compare 1997 survey data as in the other countries. A comparative survey of resettler and unaffected villages was considered, but given that the entire area is suffering from population pressures, that would have only confirmed whether resettlers are doing worse than other villages, not how their circumstances compare to

before the dam. Therefore, a rapid rural appraisal methodology was used. The evaluation mission visited four of the nine “resettlement zone” villages, five of the “short-move” villages, and two unaffected villages, one near the resettlement zone and one near the “short-move” resettlers. The four resettlement zone villages were in four different zones, and the one zone not covered is next to another zone. These four villages comprise 60 percent of the population in the resettlement zones. The five short-move villages were on both the left and right banks of the Mono. The evaluators conducted 22 household (at least two in each village except for two short-move villages), 11 village leader, and 11 group interviews covering household demographics, incomes by source, expenditures by category, household and farm assets, community infrastructure and services, and resettler perceptions and observations about the resettlement process and specific problems. The households were selected jointly with village chiefs to represent a range of experiences and outcomes and quite possibly are not proportionately representative of the entire resettler population. The evaluation mission was accompanied by the CEB resettlement officer, who managed resettlement at Nangbeto, and a senior agricultural engineer—originally from the area and familiar with pre-dam conditions at Nangbeto—with 30 years of experience working with small farmers throughout Togo.

3.3 OED attempted to obtain information from other sources to corroborate its field findings. The evaluation mission visited the Ministry of Rural Development to obtain agricultural census data on farmer household incomes and agricultural production both before and after the dam, for both affected and unaffected households. Unfortunately, the political turmoil of 1990–91 delayed the most recent agricultural census and the relevant data was still unprocessed. Furthermore, the agricultural census uses a sampling methodology that may well have missed the resettler villages.

3.4 The evaluators discussed the project with a professor of the Université du Bénin, a sociologist working with CEB to prepare the Adjarala Hydroelectric Project, for Bank consideration, downstream of Nangbeto on the Mono River. Adjarala will include a component to further assist resettlers at Nangbeto, as the Bank and CEB realize problems have emerged. The professor has visited Nangbeto several times in conjunction with the design of the resettler “retrofit” and has been visiting the Nangbeto resettlement zones since 1990, so he is in a position to judge resettler living standards during that period. He has no doubt whatsoever that the vast majority of resettlers have suffered declining incomes since 1990. While he acknowledges that many Togolese have suffered declining incomes during this period, he maintains that the decline among resettlers is even greater. The senior agricultural engineer participating in the OED mission, also with a long-term perspective on the Nangbeto resettlers, independently came to similar conclusions. Without any data, firm conclusions are impossible, but such conclusions by knowledgeable experts are troubling.

4. Compensation and Eligibility

Compensation Policy

4.1 CEB policy was to compensate resettlers for loss of house and land and the general inconvenience of having to move. This was done fairly. CEB planned to compensate them also for loss of trees and for clearing new fields in the resettlement zone, but never did.

4.2 Compensation for loss of house was the principal form of compensation. House compensation consisted of two components: (i) cash compensation for the lost house and (ii) construction of a quasi-permanent two-room core house. The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) carefully calculated compensation rates for houses based on their materials. Mud houses with thatch roofs were compensated at \$33 per square meter, mud houses with metal (zinc) roofs at \$48, and cement houses with metal roofs at \$95.¹⁹ If people were not home when the assessment was made, or if they disagreed with the calculation, the compensation rate was renegotiated until mutually satisfactory. Less than 1 percent of resettlers protested at the time. The decision to provide only a core house, leaving the remainder of the house construction up to resettlers, was based on experience at the Kossou dam in Côte d'Ivoire where resettlers would not occupy government-provided houses.²⁰ The core house was provided for each household as a means of temporary shelter while the household was expected to use its compensation money and other assets to construct its replacement house. CEB provided core houses composed of two rooms, each room 3.5 meters square and 2.8 meters high, made of cement with a zinc roof. Houseplots measured between 17x20 meters and 30x30 meters.

4.3 CEB took until 1990, three years after resettlement, to pay the final installments of house compensation. Payments were initially held up because of the closure of the rural development bank that was to make the payments. By the time new banking arrangements were made, CEB faced a cash flow crisis.²¹ The result was that resettlers had to build houses with their own resources, and some sold off assets to do so. CEB house construction techniques were poor, with insufficient cement content, mortar that washed away, and overly rapid construction that did not allow proper curing, resulting in houses that were much less durable than they could have been. CEB never intended them to be permanent, but the resettlers assumed they would be, especially considering that they were of higher quality materials than most of their former houses.²² Therefore, resettlers have faced additional expenses when the core houses were no longer usable. Resettlers were not well informed about the house compensation and replacement process and were cut off from food and other assistance with insufficient explanation. While CEB justified cutting assistance as avoiding resettler dependence, the result is that resettlers had inadequate information and therefore had to make speculative decisions that often were poor choices in hindsight.

4.4 Households were given \$222 additional compensation for moving voodoo items, religious ceremonies at the time of departure from the old village and arrival in the new village, and for the general inconvenience of having to relocate. CEB often refers to this compensation as a moral indemnity. It was a significant help to households with meager houses, as the total compensation varied between \$370 and \$5,555 among the interviewed households. For example,

19. Fahim, *op. cit.*, p. 9. Mr. Aziable, CEB, quoted rates at half the amount for the first two categories of housing during an interview on May 16, 1997, but presumably the rates from Fahim's report are correct. The differences could be because the exchange rate has fallen about 50 percent since 1987. All 1987 compensation rates are converted at an exchange rate of 270 CFA francs per dollar.

20. Interview with Mr. Aziable, CEB, May 21, 1997.

21. PCR, p. 5.

22. Zinc roofs are considered an indicator of relative prosperity by local standards. Most of the inundated houses had thatch roofs and simple mud walls, not mud-cement block walls. Therefore, the resettlers assumed that the replacement houses were meant to be permanent since they appeared to be more durable than their existing houses. In Togo, permanent is relative, as many houses need to be substantially rebuilt after about 10 years.

Hodé resettlers had primitive huts for which CEB tried to compensate, but they were nearly worthless. The moral indemnity represented a significant part of their total compensation.

4.5 Land compensation was handled quite differently than in many other countries in this study, but it was typical for Africa. Resettlers did not receive direct compensation for land as they were not legally the owners of the land they lost. Land belongs to the state, but traditionally it is distributed to households by village chiefs based on need. CEB attempted to move most of the resettlers into previously uninhabited or relatively sparsely populated areas where there were few if any existing users of the land. CEB allocated land houseplots and generally indicated which areas farmers could clear for farming. Resettlers themselves chose individual house and farm plots. Farm plots were not necessarily next to the villages; the location depended on land availability.

4.6 Given that the land was not under cultivation, it had to be cleared in preparation for planting. Togolese farmers clear lands annually to plant a yam crop, as yams require fresh soil. Because the resettlers were busy moving and building their new houses, they had little time to clear new land. At first CEB planned to clear the land for them, but in the spirit of participation, CEB decided to have farmers clear their own fields and to pay them \$222 per hectare cleared.²³ Later this was revised to \$111 per hectare up to a total of \$333 per household. In the end, CEB decided not to pay the farmers anything. "For fear of seeing the settlers spend this amount of money on purposes other than agricultural production such as performing costly funerals for their beloved dead and/or having more wives, the project decided to allocate this indemnity to SOTOCO towards the development and execution of an agricultural program."²⁴ At least no cropping seasons were missed and farmers cleared the land they wanted to plant. The main problem with this strategy is that it did not allocate sufficient lands for future farming based on extensive, rotating agriculture and a growing population.

4.7 The land by the river was relatively moist, and tree crops had an important economic function in the old villages. Trees often were a safety net. During times of need, farmers could sell their tree products for supplementary income. The most common trees were oil palm, teak, and coffee. CEB inventoried tree crops for compensation and listed 418 households with 181,638 oil palm trees.²⁵ CEB originally planned to pay cash compensation for the trees but changed its policy and offered replacement seedlings instead. Resettlers rejected seedlings as a substitute (except for 3,000 teak seedlings for shade trees) because the arid and rocky soils would not support tree crops, they feared they would have to pay taxes to harvest the grown trees, or they were concerned that host community farmers would interpret tree-planting as asserting ownership rights. The issue of compensation for lost trees other than teak has been left outstanding for 10 years. This has been a point of contention with the resettlers, and one of the ways they point out that they are worse off since the dam.

Resettlers' Perceptions of Compensation

4.8 Because resettlers are still disputing compensation, and preparation for Adjarala continues, they have incentives to express dissatisfaction with compensation in hopes of

23. Memorandum, M. Nguyen, WAPAE, to J. Peberdy, WAPAA, January 16, 1985, p. 2.

24. Fahim, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

25. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

receiving additional entitlements. In fact, it was difficult to evaluate resettlement impacts because resettlers often assumed that responses and appeals made to the evaluation team could affect future benefits for their households or villages. In some group interviews the anger of the resettlers became so intense and directed at the CEB resettlement officer that it was impossible to continue the interview without establishing rules of conduct.

4.9 Many resettlers are upset with the compensation, but that may be due to misunderstandings and later developments. Resettlers frequently complained that CEB did not replace their house in the old village, or that the CEB-built house was smaller than their old house. This ignores the fact that the CEB-built house was a standard, core house, and compensation money was to be used to replace the former house. Resettlers complain that the CEB houses have deteriorated or even collapsed. CEB *never intended the houses to be permanent*. Resettlers claimed that they did not receive compensation, or that their names were left off or did not match the list, but often this was quickly disproved. One resettler who claimed he did not receive compensation later admitted he spent it all making trips to Lomé unsuccessfully contesting the compensation level, so in his mind he ended up with no (net) compensation. Resettlers also feel that CEB did not compensate them with adequate land. At the time no one felt that land was in inadequate supply, but population growth and in-migration have created a scarcity since then. CEB also did not compensate resettlers for clearing farm plots after raising expectations that they would do so. CEB clearly failed to compensate the trees it cut down, but even here CEB rightly claims that they offered resettlers seedlings, which they rejected. CEB had reasons for not compensating lost trees or land clearing and did provide other in-kind benefits as compensation. However, the change in compensation policy was not well understood by resettlers and led to mistrust and resettler dissatisfaction, whether justified or not. This is unfortunate as CEB had built up good will with resettlers before relocation.

Use of Compensation

4.10 As the compensation was received and spent many years ago, the use of compensation could be determined only through resettler recall during interviews. Furthermore, it is difficult to separate the use of compensation from other expenditures. The sample is too small to come to specific conclusions, but some indicative information suggests the broad trend. The largest part appears to have been used for consumption. Many resettlers had already built their replacement houses before they received all or any of their compensation, so not much compensation was spent on houses. The payment of compensation shortly preceded the general decline in the Togo economy, so many households spent their compensation on subsistence. As farmers were pressured toward more intensive agriculture, some used their money for improved inputs. A few households started businesses, paid for apprenticeships, and found other income generating uses for the money.

5. Income Restoration

Income Restoration Strategy

5.1 As already noted, the resettlement plan's only income restoration strategy was to relocate the affected people into a sparsely populated area where it was assumed the resettlers would re-create their former agricultural economy. Land intensification may have been implied, but did not come about in the absence of support services to facilitate such a transition. The breakdown of government services

during the economic crisis is at least partly responsible for the failure to implement more fully an intensification strategy. The only supplemental income strategy was to develop the reservoir fishery, but the Government of Togo vacillated on whether to permit fishing in the reservoir. Many of the Bank's communications noted the absence of any plans beyond relocation and warned repeatedly that CEB saw relocation as the end of its responsibilities.

Resettlement Impact on Incomes

5.2 As previously explained, it is impossible to determine accurately the impact of resettlement on incomes. The evaluators asked resettlers and unaffected people about their current incomes and how they compare with previous incomes, but there is little way to ascertain their honesty and accuracy. Furthermore, even in cases where incomes declined, attributing that to resettlement is often difficult. Resettler household annual incomes ranged from \$530 to \$4,140 and averaged \$2,000.²⁶ Interestingly, unaffected household incomes had an uncannily similar range, from \$550 to \$4,230, and also averaged about \$2,000. Income data from only 22 households must be used cautiously, especially since only five of these 22 households were unaffected. Five households cannot establish reliable income averages and provide indicative data only.

5.3 These limited data suggest that resettlers are currently no worse off than unaffected people. This is at odds with every other source of information. Both the professor and the agricultural economist that accompanied the evaluation mission, each with years of familiarity with the resettlers and the Nangbeto area, believe that resettlers have suffered disproportionately. More than half the resettlers reported declining acreage in production, yields, and incomes. Resettlers from two villages were returning to their former villages near the reservoir. Clearly, some resettlers were better off after resettlement and some were worse off. Therefore, resettlement impacts are highly village- and resettler-specific. Nonetheless, certain general impacts can be ascertained.

5.4 The most widespread impact has been on farming incomes. Like total incomes, some farm incomes have increased and others have decreased. Slightly more than half the resettlers interviewed said that their crop incomes had decreased, mainly due to declining yields. Because their area in production is limited to the amount of land they can work—and those already suffering falling incomes cannot afford to hire help to cultivate more land, put in irrigation, purchase improved inputs, or any other means of increasing their production—these farmers are trapped in a downward spiral unless they can find a landowner who is willing to give them access to land that is more productive than what they currently work. On the other hand, crop incomes increased for a number of resettlers. One way or another they go ahead of the curve, started earning a surplus, were able to hire agricultural labor, and brought more land into production. Often they were the farmers who could afford improved inputs and thus achieved increased yields, further contributing to their income and surplus, and fueling the growth cycle. Some of these gains are impressive. One farmer increased maize yields from 250 to 1,500 kilograms per hectare. Another one increased the land under cultivation from 1.5 to 12 hectares. These farmers also can afford to hold on to their harvest and sell at prices two to three times higher later in the year. In several ways the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer.

26. All 1997 prices are converted at an exchange rate of 550 CFA francs per dollar. One resettler family lived in two houses totaling 28 rooms, owned four cars and two motorcycles, had investment properties, an income well in excess of five million FCFA, and was so outside the range of all other people interviewed in the area that it is not included in the above range and average for resettlers.

5.5 Income from trees has undoubtedly decreased. Land in the old village was already marginal for tree crops, and the new land is generally too arid and rocky for oil palm and other lost economic trees. Resettlers attempted to plant some seedlings after they moved to their new villages, but they had very disappointing results, especially with oil palm trees. Only few have been able to grow economic trees successfully. The only form of tree income that appeared to be increasing is that from charcoal production, a sign more of desperation than opportunity. The returns to charcoal, which wholesales for \$7 per bag, are quite minimal and take a lot of work to produce and transport to the main highway for collection.

5.6 Livestock income also probably decreased. As previously mentioned, the resettlers' insecure land tenure discouraged livestock raising. Nonetheless, some resettlers reported increasing livestock herds. Those people had made satisfactory arrangements with neighboring hosts. The land tenure problem was not insurmountable, and land scarcity itself was not critical as many livestock subsist on agricultural wastes, not open grazing land. Again, resettlement impacts varied according to the individual situation.

5.7 The Government of Togo has had an inconsistent policy toward developing the reservoir for fishing. The SAR was largely silent on the subject, only mentioning the possibility of using the reservoir for fish production. For the first four years, 1987–91, fishing in the reservoir was prohibited by the Office of the President.²⁷ During a brief political liberalization the ban was lifted and fishing grew rapidly, particularly by skilled fishermen from Mali and Ghana. Following disputes between outside fishermen and locals and the general lack of a regulatory framework governing fishing, local authorities decided to reimpose the ban, but no regulations were formulated. Given the legal vacuum, locals have been discouraged from fishing. Migrants who came for fishing, and have few if any other local alternatives for supporting themselves, continue to fish. They have been quite successful, and it is unfortunate that the people displaced by the reservoir have generally not benefited from its fish production. Many of them were only occasional fishermen, but one resettler mentioned that he fished very successfully until he had enough money to develop a 12-hectare farm. Since then he also established a bar and is doing well.

5.8 Nonfarm income plays a very minor role among resettler sources of income, but it appears to be increasing. The main nonfarm income source is petty trading. There certainly are greater opportunities for marketing with the new road network. There are very limited services and no manufacturing in the area. For that, people have to go to the regional capital, Atakpamé, about 50 kilometers by road from the resettlement zones, with about 40,000 people. Even Lomé, the national capital, about 165 kilometers south of Atakpamé, has relatively few opportunities for resettlers. People whose farm incomes decline have few if any alternatives and are more or less trapped.

5.9 Conclusions about resettler incomes must necessarily be tentative. The empirical evidence is inconclusive. Both resettlers and unaffected households are suffering the effects of increasing land scarcity and soil exhaustion and declining production and incomes. Without alternative sources of income, households are unable to make up for this loss of agricultural income. On the other hand, large minorities appear to be doing reasonably well. Whether resettlers are worse off than unaffected households is very difficult to say. What can be asserted with reasonable confidence is that resettlers have lower incomes than before resettlement. Given that increasing land scarcity is putting pressure on farm incomes throughout the area, much of the reason may not be due to resettlement, but resettlement probably accelerated the process.

27. PCR, op. cit., p. 9.

6. Assets and Living Standards

Housing

6.1 It is unclear how present houses compare to those in the old, inundated villages because there were no data on the old village. Most resettlers complained that their new houses were smaller and had fewer rooms than their old houses, but the decline was marginal, approximately 10 percent, among the resettlers interviewed. The quality of materials improved, as many houses now have zinc roofs and some have cement walls. Compensation for lost housing arrived too late to have much impact on house quality as it was consumed for other purposes. Whether resettlers had better housing or not depended largely on the economic fortunes of the household. Some households have acquired the financial means over the years to build better houses, but many have not.

6.2 Data were collected on household or farm assets, but there were no previous data against which to make comparisons. Inspection of dozens of houses revealed modest levels of assets. Almost every household owned bicycles, radios, and leisure furniture, the first indicators of some economic surplus. Some resettlers reported previously owning bicycles or even motorcycles, but being forced to sell them as their circumstances deteriorated; others had only recently acquired these items as their incomes increased. Again a very mixed picture emerges.

Expenditures and Debt

6.3 Expenditure data are unreliable, and households have too few assets to assess accurately their living standards. Debt is not a very good indicator. People have little access to credit, and when they do, it is often to a moneylender who charges 100 percent interest. People tend to borrow for emergencies or to buy farm inputs that are repaid upon sale of the harvest. Two-thirds of the households reported not having any debt. For the one-third that did, debt ranged from \$36 to \$360 and averaged \$120.

7. Social Infrastructure and Services

Electrification

7.1 None of the resettlers had electricity before or after the dam. Clearly Nangbeto could provide electricity, but few resettlers could afford electric appliances. Those who could used battery- or gas-powered appliances (for example, refrigerators). There was some resentment that none of the power being generated was available in the resettlement villages, but resettlers did not list electricity among their top priorities.

Water Supply

7.2 Resettlers used to obtain water from the Mono River, although at distances up to 7 kilometers. At least it was a good-quality, reliable supply. One of the most important considerations in moving to the resettlement zones was that people be provided adequate water supply. Therefore CEB increased the planned number of boreholes from 27 (in 1985) to 62, or

one for every 120 people compared to every 500 people elsewhere in Togo.²⁸ Given that there were many fewer villages after resettlement, not only is the ratio better, but the distance has been reduced. Most resettlers were within one kilometer of a borehole with pump. The resettlers were undoubtedly encouraged by the prospects of improved water supply. Unfortunately those expectations have been disappointed.

7.3 From the beginning the pumps were used more than planned. Even as early as March 1987 a resettlement specialist noted “that 30 to 40 women were queuing to have their turn at the pump at 2:30 p.m., in a society where water is normally drawn early in the morning and at dusk, may indicate that the rate of water flow is just adequate. The numerous women walking from nearby ‘host’ villages to also draw water is doubtless putting a strain on the water supply not envisaged by CEB.”²⁹ CEB assumed responsibility for pump maintenance for several years, but then expected the villages to assume responsibility for operation and maintenance. The villagers did take over for several years, but overuse of the pumps led to repeated breakdowns. At \$500 per repair, the villages grew weary of this recurring expense. Consequently, resettlers now have a worse water supply situation than even before the dam. People have to go up to 15 km to find water (though sometimes on a moped). Others have hand-dug open wells up to 7 meters deep, but the water is brackish and unreliable. The situation is close to intolerable.

Transportation

7.4 The transportation situation has definitely improved since before the dam. Previously there was not even a good bridge over the river, and people on the left bank of the Mono (northeast of the river) were quite isolated. People used to carry goods to market in Atakpamé on their head. The project constructed about 100 kilometers of roads. Now there is a good laterite road system to all the villages and an asphalt road much of the way from Nangbeto to Atakpamé. Access to markets, educational and health facilities, and so on is greatly improved. The only drawback is the distances have increased as the resettlers in the resettlement zone are now 20 to 30 kilometers farther from the main north-south highway in Togo, but the improved quality of access more than compensates.

Health

7.5 The change in the health care situation is mixed. The health care facility is much better. The new dispensary, in fact a health center, has in- and out-patient treatment, a sanitary educational unit, a pharmacy, and a vaccination unit. But it is short of supplies and staff. Furthermore, drugs are no longer free or subsidized, thus putting them out of the financial reach of many. This is related to the general reduction of government services and subsidies in Togo.

28. The original planned figure of 27 boreholes is from M. Nguyen, *op. cit.*, p. 1, and the final completed figure of 62 boreholes is from the PCR, p. 5. In their memo, Crown et al., Annex A, pp. 1–2, mention that some pumps are already breaking down, that CEB is supplying water by water tankers, and in addition to the 42 boreholes installed CEB intends to drill about 30 more. The PCR suggests CEB drilled 20 more.

29. Butcher, *op. cit.* p. 5.

Education

7.6 The education situation definitely improved. CEB built or rehabilitated 10 primary schools.³⁰ Several villages did not have schools in their previous location. Atchinédji, in resettlement zone 3, now has a secondary school. Furthermore, the in-migration of people from other areas led to increased interaction, and this area is no longer so isolated. Resettlers are now exposed to a broader set of ideas and experiences.

Other Infrastructure

7.7 CEB also built two agricultural stores, grain storage warehouses, 13 market hangars, and a communal hall.³¹

Services

7.8 CEB attempted to turn over all provision of services after relocation to other government agencies and parastatals, but with very limited success. The exception is SOTOCO, which provides a cotton production and marketing service for the entire area to both resettlers and unaffected people. This is a very highly valued service as it provides the one source of improved inputs, services, and assured marketing. Cotton was the major cash crop for 15 of the 22 farmers interviewed.³²

8. Resettlers' Perceptions of Resettlement

8.1 Resettlers generally have a fairly critical perspective on the resettlement experience. The same reasons previously given on their incentives for exaggerating the shortcomings of compensation apply more generally to their views on all aspects of resettlement. Therefore, it is difficult to differentiate between what they say and what they really think.

8.2 Resettlers have mixed feelings, believing some aspects of their lives have improved while others have worsened, and certainly there is a range of experiences. Overall, most people seem unhappy. But most people in Togo have suffered a real decline in living standards during the 1990s. The following remarks are therefore limited to aspects specific to their resettlement.

30. Fahim, op. cit., pp. 31–2.

31. Ibid.

32. Cotton is exclusively a cash crop, while most of the other cash crops are also partly consumed. There are very limited markets for some crops because transport costs are too high relative to volume and value. If the value of home consumption is imputed, then cotton would not be the most valuable crop for most farmers.

8.3 Overall, resettlers are negative about their change in housing. Many have smaller houses than before (but sometimes built of better materials), and even those who now have larger houses often had smaller houses for several years before they recovered and could afford to build new houses.

8.4 Views on community infrastructure and services are mixed. Water supply generally improved where all or most of the pumps are still functioning; where they are broken there is extreme dissatisfaction. Inadequate water supply is one of their most frequent complaints. The majority feel that health care is worse now. That is largely because of increased costs, which reduces their access. Resettlers are much more positive about changes in education. Schools are generally closer to their homes now, and secondary education is within reach. Resettlers reported that they value education more now; they have a greater appreciation of its contribution. Transportation has improved so much that some resettlers say they would like to have stayed in their old villages if only good access roads had been built to those villages.

8.5 One of the most frequent complaints was the resettlers' sense of abandonment, that CEB dropped them near uncompensated host villages, and left them to fend for themselves. Compared to their expectations, their CEB houses deteriorated more rapidly; the water systems were less productive, more overused, broke down more often, and cost more to repair; tree crops were never compensated and seedlings did poorly in the different environment; hosts became increasingly less welcoming and land tenure and access became an increasingly thorny issue; subsidies on drugs, agricultural inputs, and so on were reduced or eliminated placing these goods out of the reach of most; and life overall became much more difficult. CEB and the dam are unfairly blamed for much of this, but that is their perception.

9. Other Issues

Participation by Resettlers

9.1 Resettlement planning and implementation were relatively participatory, especially by the standards of the time. Each village formed a committee to supervise its resettlement, and committee members were paid. CEB held many public meetings, and both resettlers and host communities were consulted on and involved in resettlement planning. Affected people participated in designing the program, constructing the replacement houses, and selecting village sites and household plots within villages.³³ Locations of new villages and farms changed because of people's inputs.³⁴ For example, people in Adjigo wanted to be in Zone 3 instead of Zone 2 and were granted their preference. The people of Assanté Nangbeto claim they were not consulted, so they protested and were given a new site, right on the road to the dam, which subsequently was paved. The people of Foukoté Vossa and Atchinédji also say they participated in the selection of the sites for their new villages. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the people of the two villages who insist they were not consulted—Hodé and Abalokopé—are the least satisfied, are suffering the most now, and are farthest from the reservoir.

33. PCR, p. 5.

34. Memo, J. Lowe, WAPEG, to J.F. Bauer, WAPEG, June 27, 1985, p. 2.

Participation by NGOs

9.2 NGOs were not possible under the military regime that held power at the time of Nangbeto's construction and the resettlement program. NGOs are just beginning to develop in Togo. So far none are working in the Nangbeto area, but there certainly is ample need for their services.

Gender

9.3 It was very difficult to speak to women and get them to respond. They were very deferential to men. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of women's perceptions. The project demonstrates no awareness of gender issues. That women are less able to contribute toward communal projects than is their tradition is an indicator that they suffered a disproportionate decline in income, but how that compares to changes in household income is impossible to say.

Indigenous Groups

9.4 There are no indigenous groups among the resettlers. All the resettlers are from closely related ethnic groups. This was not an issue.

Host Communities

9.5 Relations with host communities are complicated and explain much of what happened, but they are far from universally negative. Many resettlers have relatives among the host communities. Many said they were able to borrow land from host people for no more than a cola after harvest. Given that the host communities were not offered any incentives to accept resettlers, and did not even receive water systems they believe they were promised, they have been hospitable. That they use resettler village water systems is understandable considering the expectations they had of receiving their own systems. Through March 1987, when relocation to the resettlement zones was completed, there was no conflict. Tensions developed only over time. Hosts too are suffering land shortages, because of in-migration and resettlers, so they are only trying to protect their own interests. Only Abalokopé resettlers seemed to have a current problem with their host neighbors. The sociology professor believes that the host villages did not welcome the resettlers, but it seems they accommodated them. On the other hand, resettler-host disputes over livestock grazing have not been resolved in many instances.

Monitoring and Evaluation

9.6 The February 1987 resettlement mission recommended monitoring because "the grouping of previously scattered and small villages into larger settlements side by side with existing host villages has created a new situation, that requires special attention in the social, health, and economic domains."³⁵ It would also help to allay resettlers' and hosts' fears that they are being neglected. The Bank recommended that CEB conduct a baseline survey in 1987, to be repeated in one year, against which to measure future changes. Another resettlement mission report that same month says: "CEB will continue to be responsible for reporting to the Bank on

35. Fahim, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

resettlement until closure of the Credit” (which was extended until June 30, 1992).³⁶ The same report mentioned “the proposed monitoring surveys to be organized by the Ministry of Health, Social Affairs, and the Position of Women (MHSAPW)” and that “CEB should request the MHSAPW to carry out the socio-economic survey, as discussed and agreed during the mission.” Finally, the supervision mission that month says: “We would highlight the need for continued monitoring,” and details the items to be monitored.³⁷ All three missions made recommendations regarding monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and discussed these with CEB.

9.7 Unfortunately no baseline or follow-up surveys were ever carried out. Far more damaging, however, is that without any M&E, conditions deteriorated without anyone noticing, so nothing was done to mitigate the growing dilemma. As the PCR said: “The lack of socio-economic and public health surveys after project completion makes it difficult to assess present living conditions in the resettled villages.”³⁸ The PCR warns that numerous tubewells are not functioning and that there is now considerable pressure on public facilities and on land for cultivation, due both to demographic growth and in-migration, but the PCR did not cause enough concern to initiate any actions. The preparation missions for the Nangbeto “retrofit” as part of the upcoming Adjarala project have not uncovered the extent to which income projections for many resettlers have not been achieved, at least partly as a result of resettlement. It was only with the evaluation mission that the depth of these problems was explicitly drawn to the attention of CEB and the Bank. However, the Adjarala project, if it is approved, will include measures to address the most urgent needs identified in the Nangbeto resettlement zone.

Changes in Policy on Involuntary Resettlement

9.8 Neither Togo nor CEB has any resettlement policy. Nangbeto resettlement was executed under project-specific agreements.

36. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

37. Crown et al., *op. cit.*, p. 1, and Annex A, p. 6.

38. PCR, p.iii.

10. Bank Performance

10.1 Bank performance lacked follow-through and CEB did not heed many of the recommendations of several resettlement specialists who visited the project. Bank financing for the project was approved despite the lack of a resettlement plan. The Bank stipulated that an adequate plan be prepared in time. During preparation Bank staff continued to complain that there was no resettlement plan, no functioning unit, and no resettlement staff. The Bank's sociology advisor and senior resettlement expert visited the project in May 1986 and pointed out numerous flaws in rehabilitation planning and warned of a "potential disaster." During the actual relocation the Bank sent three overlapping resettlement missions. The first mission urged the Bank to send telexes and other communications to show concern regarding the resettlement component as well as numerous other actions to facilitate the re-establishment of the resettlers in their new location.³⁹ The second mission advocated surveys and services and specified the monitoring process that should be established. The Bank drew up terms of reference for the socio-economic study. The third mission's back-to-office report makes it clear that they expect SOTOCO's M&E unit to take over responsibilities from CEB for monitoring the condition of the resettlers and providing services as needed.⁴⁰

10.2 None of this was ever done. Nobody performed the socio-economic study, M&E, or many ongoing services. The flurry of activity and attention during relocation appears to have had little effect. Despite a side letter (dated July 24, 1984) to the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) in which the government and CEB undertook to continue "detailed work on resettlement...for at least three years after reservoir filling," there is no evidence that anything was done, and the side letter was totally ignored.⁴¹ The Bank utterly failed to follow up to see if any of its recommendations or agreements were implemented once the relocation was completed. Eight post-relocation supervision missions neglected to examine resettlement. It has been suggested that possibly because the two missions with the most suggestions were from outside the country department and not integral to the project team, their suggestions were not internalized and followed up. The PCR, five years later, warned that all the feared developments—broken tubewells, increasing population pressure, and the like—were coming to pass, but even that failed to provoke any reactions. Such a lapse of follow-through, after repeated warnings to guard against precisely this sort of situation, is unacceptable. It is hoped that the "retrofit" under preparation will remedy this, but it should have been done under the Nangbeto project itself, not as part of the preparation for Adjarala.

11. Borrower Performance

11.1 The Governments of Togo (GOT) and Benin (GOB) were the borrowers, and CEB and the two national power distribution companies were the beneficiaries. CEB was the implementing agency. This section will comment on the performance of CEB and GOT.

39. Fahim, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

40. Crown et al., *op. cit.*, p. 3

41. PCR, p. 5.

11.2 Although CEB was slow to staff up for resettlement and to develop the resettlement plan, and it “was not as explicit as it could have been, CEB and the GOT agencies have in general done most of the right things, for example: selected, on the basis of land capability and land use maps, areas generally suitable for resettlement; let the people to be displaced decide on where they want to go, and with which ‘chiefs’; put the onus of rebuilding houses in the communities on the people, but provided food aid as an incentive to build them; assisted people with transport to the new villages; provided key services including water supply, schools and a dispensary; involved key ministries in the resettlement process; no attempt was made to introduce radical changes in technology, especially agriculture, letting farmers retain their personal initiative; and village development committees are being formed in order that the communities can discuss problems and decide things for themselves.”⁴² The 1987 Bank supervision mission found the CEB resettlement team—including the resettlement officer, three assistants, and four social workers seconded from the Ministry of Health, Social Affairs, and the Position of Women—to be highly motivated and competent.⁴³ CEB also clearly thought it was being responsive to the Bank’s suggestions and expressed disappointment that the Bank’s sociology advisor was not part of any of the three Bank missions in February 1987.⁴⁴ Apparently they wanted to show him how his suggestions from nine months earlier had been acted upon.

11.3 However, there was a failure to make the transition from relocation assistance to rehabilitation, and the government agencies that were entrusted to provide follow-up did not do so except for SOTOCO (cotton extension) and water pump repair for a few years. As one of the February 1987 Bank missions said: “CEB is agreeable to maintaining overall responsibility for resettlement for eighteen months longer, but is progressively involving the responsible ministries and agencies to provide public services in the area.”⁴⁵ While there were many instances where the Bank suggested and CEB indicated that responsibilities should be transferred to government agencies, there is no record of what various agencies agreed to. Lacking clear specification of what that follow-up would entail, it is not possible to determine what actions were not implemented nor is it possible to determine whose lapse led to the lack of follow-up, but certainly the GOT and CEB share some of this responsibility.⁴⁶ That the CEB resettlement officer did not visit the Nangbeto resettlement villages for nearly 10 years is revealing in itself.

11.4 CEB officials admit there are problems now, but argue that this was their first experience and they did their best at the time. They note that not even the Bank was very advanced in its resettlement performance 10 years ago. The Bank shares responsibility in not performing any supervision of the Nangbeto resettlement since the resettlers were relocated. Now CEB and the Bank are committed to remedying the situation of Nangbeto resettlers as part of the Adjarala project. For that remedial work to be effective, CEB needs to become fully cognizant of the predicament in which Nangbeto resettlers find themselves. So far CEB continues to maintain that “the resettlers are not doing that badly” and they “do not think the resettlers’ situation has

42. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

43. Crown et al., *op. cit.*

44. Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 1

45. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

46. Part of the problem in ascertaining the situation is that the project files relevant to resettlement virtually disappear after May 1987, so very little is known about what monitoring, surveys, services, Bank supervision, and other follow-up was undertaken.

worsened.” Unfortunately, repairing some broken pumps or even compensating for lost trees, 10 years late, will not solve the fundamental problem of insecure land tenure, insufficient land (or inputs), and declining per capita production, yields, and incomes. The problem will be to determine what are the Bank’s and CEB’s responsibilities, especially when much of the decline was not due to resettlement. CEB cannot solve these problems. Besides, they are prevalent throughout the country and need to be addressed as part of the country’s development strategy and the Bank’s country assistance strategy.

12. Conclusions

12.1 Resettlement at Nangbeto raises some very interesting questions concerning the limits of responsibilities and how to evaluate such a project. At what point should income restoration be measured; how many years after relocation? If an entire economy, or region, is declining, what is an appropriate income restoration target in this context? If some villages prosper and others do not, or some households do well but others in the same village do not, what are the implications for judging resettlement performance? If the project implementing agency lives up to its agreements, but those agreements are inadequate, who is responsible for the poor outcomes?

12.2 The compensation process was satisfactory overall; the main shortcoming regarded lost trees. Even on that count, CEB allowed resettlers to take their final harvest and offered seedlings.⁴⁷ This offer was inappropriate considering that the areas to which the resettlers were moving were unsuitable for oil palm. This raises the question of how to compensate an asset that cannot be replaced. At the very least, CEB should have compensated for the cash value of the lost trees, and CEB now agrees. It is unfortunate that this rather small shortcoming marred an otherwise good compensation process.

12.3 The relocation process was well planned and implemented. The sites were well chosen, the process was generally participatory (and worked better where it was), the disturbance was minimal, and in many ways it was a model. The entire problem was what came next, or rather, what did not come next. Nangbeto is a case study in resettlement without rehabilitation. There was no income restoration strategy beyond re-creating the previous farm economy, nothing done for the host communities, no definitive resolution of the land tenure question, no baseline surveys or monitoring, no clear delegation of responsibility for ongoing services, no follow-up, and no way to really know what was happening to resettlers. R&R (resettlement and rehabilitation) effectively ended with relocation, final compensation payments, and cessation of food assistance. Ironically, at the time that appeared satisfactory (except to Bank resettlement specialists) and no one objected. At most they expressed concern about the future and the need for ongoing monitoring.

12.4 Despite compensation and relocation being generally well handled there was frustration due to poor communication, confusion, and misunderstanding during the resettlement process. CEB inventoried trees, prepared to pay compensation, offered seedlings, and then dropped the matter. Resettlers thought that CEB would clear the land for them, then that they would be paid

47. It should be noted that slaughter tapping for palm wine is the cultural practice in Togo (and Ghana), unlike the method used in Sierra Leone, Senegal, Gambia, and part of Nigeria, where sap for palm wine is collected by tapping the living palm, Butcher, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

for clearing new land, but finally they did the work but were not paid. They thought CEB was replacing their old houses, and that the CEB houses were meant to be permanent, not temporary. The compensation payments dragged on for years. The food assistance was for an indefinite period, and then cut off without warning. CEB maintained the pumps for years, but then quit. Fishing was prohibited, then banned, and now lies somewhere in between. These shortcomings are not all CEB's fault, but the net effect of this vacillation is that resettlers have a sense of distrust or even betrayal.

12.5 While the agricultural decline due to population pressure and insecure land tenure was not exclusively the fault of the project, certainly more could have been done to avert its worst impacts, especially as these problems were anticipated from the outset. The Bank's resettlement experts warned, even before relocation, that the extensive agricultural system in practice required more land than was being provided in the resettlement zones. The CEB resettlement officer foresaw a shortage in the future. The ambiguous land tenure situation was noted but not resolved. The potential for poor relations with the host communities was pointed out. The PCR's warnings that the situation was deteriorating as forecast were ignored. Basically, everyone abdicated responsibility and let the problem unfold. If it were not for the Adjarala project in preparation and the OED mission, it is unclear when, if ever, anything would have been done to ameliorate the situation.

12.6 The difficult issue for evaluation is that many of these problems would have unfolded eventually regardless of what actions were taken. People displaced by Nangbeto cannot be sheltered from making the shift from extensive to intensive agriculture. What can be done is that they be assisted during this transition. They desperately need affordable credit and agricultural technician services, but then so does much of the country. CEB is very wary of creating a privileged class of resettlers. Nonetheless, the Bank's stated policy of restoring pre-project incomes in an environment where most incomes have declined would do just that, protect resettlers from declines affecting most other people. This suggests the need to clarify the Bank's resettlement policy in situations where incomes are declining. Presumably the Bank's policy of do no harm should be interpreted to mean that resettlers should be no worse off in relative terms (relative to nearby, similar, unaffected people), not in absolute terms.

MAP SECTION

