INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND BANGLADESH Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis - 2018 Update Prepared by the staffs of the International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund Approved by John Panzer (IDA) and Kenneth Kang and Kevin Fletcher (IMF) This debt sustainability analysis (DSA) fully updates the May 2017 joint IMF/WB DSA. Bangladesh’s risks of external debt distress and overall debt distress continue to be assessed as low. The FY17 fiscal deficit remains well below the 5 percent of GDP budget target. Spending control and slower implementation of development projects more than compensated for revenue underperformance. The issuance of National Savings Certificates (NSCs) remains high. Over the medium term, debt ratios are projected to remain on a sustainable path, assuming continued spending restraint, with the deficit used to finance productive investment. Boosting budget revenue is key to creating fiscal space for diversification and growth. The authorities are delaying the implementation of the VAT reform further by two years. Any additional costs from spending pressures ahead of the parliamentary elections and from the Rohingya refugees remain key risks.1 1 For the purposes of this DSA, the public sector comprises the central government and nonfinancial public enterprises. This analysis is based on the joint Fund-Bank debt sustainability framework for conducting debt sustainability analysis in low-income countries. Under IDA’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), Bangladesh is assessed to be a medium performer, with an average rating of 3.32 during 2014–16. This DSA uses the indicative thresholds for countries for this category. BACKGROUND 1. This DSA presents staffs’ macroeconomic outlook and assumptions about the public sector’s external and domestic borrowing paths. The DSA is based on estimates of the stock of public external, domestic, and private external debt as of end-FY17 and analyzes the likely trajectories of standard debt sustainability (solvency and liquidity) ratios through FY38.1 2. As of end-FY17, total public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt is estimated to be US$35 billion (14.3 percent of GDP).2 Multilateral creditors account for a large share of the total public and publicly guaranteed debt, with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank being the largest creditors while China and Japan are the largest bilateral creditors. 3. Total public sector domestic debt as of end-FY17 amounted to 18.9 percent of GDP, Table 1. External (PPG) and Domestic Debt (end-FY17) or 180 percent of central government revenues, including grants. Domestic debt comprises mostly commercial banks’ holdings Percent of end- FY 2017 US$ billion of treasury instruments and non-banks’ PPG debt Total PPG Debt 35.0 100.0 holdings of NSCs. It also includes net credit Multilateral 23.3 66.6 by Bangladesh Bank. The issuance of of which World Bank (IDA) 13.1 37.4 expensive NSCs increased sharply in FY17 Asian Development Bank 8.2 23.5 Bilateral 5.8 16.7 and has remained high in FY18. of which Japan 3.2 9.2 China 1.0 2.9 UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS Short Term Debt 2.5 7.3 Guarantees (SOE) 3.3 9.5 4. The main changes to the macroeconomic assumptions relative to the Percent of end-FY 2017 Taka billion previous DSA are described below, primarily Domestic Debt Total Domestic Debt 3731.6 100.0 reflecting revisions to FY17 and the Bangladesh Bank 158.7 4.3 projections: Deposit Money Banks 1407.0 37.7 T-bills 235.2 6.3 T-bonds 1117.6 29.9 • Real GDP growth. Real GDP growth further Others 54.3 1.5 Nonbanks 2165.9 58.0 strengthened to 7.3 percent in FY17 from 7.1 NSCs 1909.0 51.2 percent in FY16, driven by domestic demand. Growth is expected to moderate slightly to 7.0 Source: Bangladesh Authorities percent in FY18, led by private consumption and investment. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (FY16 – 20) aims at increasing real GDP growth to 7.4 percent on average during FY16-20. 1 Fiscal year is defined from July to June. 2PPG external debt consists of medium to long term loans from multilateral and bilateral creditors, short term debt and borrowings of the state-owned enterprises. Domestic debt does not include the outstanding liabilities of state-owned enterprises to the banking system. 2 However, staff estimate growth to be around 7 percent, below the authorities’ target. A growth accounting exercise explains that to be able to reach their growth target over the next three fiscal years, the authorities will need to boost investment by a large margin. • Inflation. Headline inflation increased slightly to 5.9 percent in FY17 (y/y) towards the end of fiscal year due mainly to higher food prices. After picking-up in mid-2017 due to higher flood- related food prices, inflation is expected to decline to below 6 percent, close to the central bank’s 5.5 percent average inflation target. • Fiscal deficit. The FY17 fiscal deficit was 3.4 percent of GDP, well below the 5 percent of GDP budget target. Spending control and slower implementation of development projects more than compensated for revenue underperformance. The projected larger fiscal deficit in FY18 is mainly driven by increases in the annual development program spending, which would compensate for the slower implementation in FY17 and expedite infrastructure development. Over the medium term, it is assumed that spending growth will be aligned to projections of revenue growth which currently do not include the VAT implementation. • Current account. In FY17, the CA Table 2. Macro Assumption Comparison turned into a small deficit (0.6 FY16 – FY20 percent of GDP in FY17). Exports FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 and imports of goods and services Real GDP growth Current DSA 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.0 7.0 grew by an estimated 1.7 percent Previous DSA 7.1 6.8 7.0 7.0 7.0 Inflation (annual average) and 9.0 percent, respectively, while Current DSA 5.9 5.4 5.9 6.0 6.0 remittances dropped by 14.7 Previous DSA 5.9 6.8 6.0 5.5 5.5 Fiscal deficit (in percent of GDP) percent. The CA deficit is projected Current DSA -3.5 -3.4 -4.3 -4.8 -4.4 to widen in FY18, with strong Previous DSA -3.5 -4.9 -4.7 -4.6 -4.4 Current account (in percent of GDP) import demand for capital Current DSA 1.9 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.4 Previous DSA 1.7 -0.4 -1.0 -1.6 -2.0 machinery and industrial raw Remittance growth materials and a temporary need for Current DSA -1.6 -14.7 9.0 3.5 4.5 Previous DSA -3.0 -17.0 3.5 3.5 4.5 food imports. Over the longer term, the CA is expected to remain in deficit in the expectation that investments will continue, as suggested by the strong import demand for capital goods. • Remittances. After a significant decline in FY17, Remittance Inflows into Bangladesh inflows are expected to pick up this year based on 16 16 Remittance (billions of USD) 14 14 Remittance (pecent of GDP) the increase in non-oil growth in the GCC and a 12 12 recovery driven by relatively stronger global growth. 10 10 Remittances are expected to grow modestly in FY18, 8 8 6 6 reaching US$14 billion by June 2018. However, 4 4 attaining historical levels of growth will be an uphill 2 2 task. 0 0 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 Sources: Bangladesh authorities, IMF Staff EXTERNAL DSA 5. All debt indicators under the baseline remain well within the respective policy- dependent solvency thresholds. Under the baseline scenario, the PV of PPG external debt 3 to GDP ratio is projected to increase from 10.4 percent of GDP in FY17 to 13.1 percent in FY23. It is projected to remain stable reaching 9.2 percent of GDP by FY38. Other PPG indicators remain well within the respective policy-dependent solvency thresholds under the baseline scenario (Figure 1 and Tables 2–3). The stress tests with the biggest impact on debt indicators are those involving a large depreciation, borrowing on less favorable terms, and an export shock. The threshold for external debt service to revenue is breached under the extreme stress test scenario under the depreciation shock, however, this breach is small and temporary. 6. External risks include contracting large amounts of short term debt, a protracted slowdown in key export markets, a rapid build-up of non-concessional debt, or a combination thereof. • Short term debt. The risk from contracting short term external debt is highlighted by the temporary breach of the threshold in the short term. While the probability of the most extreme shock – a thirty percent depreciation of the exchange rate – is low it, does highlight vulnerabilities that exist. • A protracted slowdown in key export markets. The RMG sector continues to maintain a large and steady share in total exports at around 80 percent. The growth in the sector has been tepid while its production costs continue to increase. Growth in FY 2017 was only 0.2 percent – the lowest observed in the last fifteen years – while the average growth in the past five years has been half of what it used to be in the five years preceding. Therefore, any slowdown in demand in the sector is flagged as a risk given how narrow the export basket currently is. • Rapid build-up of non-concessional debt. Per Hong Kong Trade Development Council, under the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese authorities have planned to finance several infrastructure projects, including investments from Chinese entrepreneurs in several sectors like telecom, agriculture, power, and energy. A line of credit with India totaling US$4.5 billion has been signed in October 2017. While the investments are much needed to boost infrastructure and address a shortage of power, higher non-concessionally externally-financed infrastructure spending could push up the debt path. PUBLIC DSA 7. The authorities remain committed to the 5 percent of GDP deficit target for FY18. As in previous years, the budget targets ambitious increases for both expenditures and revenues – 26 percent and 32 percent, respectively. But the authorities are likely to adjust their spending in response to weaker revenues partly due to the delay in the VAT reform. NSC issuance continues at a rapid pace, exceeding the budgeted amount by a large margin and leading to a net reduction in domestic bank financing. By the end of 2017, the stock of NSCs reached more than double the amount compared to outstanding government borrowing from the banking sector. The budget faces risks, including from spending pressures ahead of the parliamentary elections and additional costs associated with the Rohingya refugees. International support will continue to be essential in addressing the 4 influx of Rohingya refugees. Per the DSA, the PV of public debt to GDP ratio is projected to increase from 29.2 percent in FY17 to 35 percent in FY23 and then trends down over the long term, remaining well within the benchmark value under the baseline and for all standard stress tests (Figure 2 and Tables 4-5). The relatively high level of the total public debt service to revenue ratio underscores the need to boost revenues, including by implementing the delayed VAT reform. 8. Contingent liabilities from high non-performing loans (NPLs) in state owned commercial banks (SOCBs) could result in higher domestic debt. However, the potential impact appears to be manageable. While the NPLs approach 30 percent of total SOCBs loans, the total amount represents only about 2.0 percent of GDP. This amount provides a magnitude of the potential risk to the government’s balance sheet. Actual NPLs could be higher than reported and could increase in the future, but bank’s provisions against bad loans mitigate the fiscal risk. Moreover, the authorities are taking steps to address the NPLs in the SOCBs (see Staff Report). Liquidity concerns in the SOCBs are currently limited. STAFFS’ ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO 9. To highlight risks from the expenditure arising from the Rohingya crises, staff includes the impact of the costs and its effects on debt sustainability as an illustrative scenario. The Rohingya are a stateless Muslim minority in Myanmar, a majority of whom are women, children, and the elderly. As of March 2018, close to 900,000 refugees reside in Bangladesh. In the medium and long term, the economic, social, and environmental impacts of the crisis could be large if repatriation does not proceed as swiftly as planned. 10. In October 2017, the international community pledged US$360 million under the Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response Plan to meet expenses until February 2018. Several donors have announced in-kind assistance worth more than US$50 million. A second Joint Response Plan was launched in March 2018 to cover the needs of both refugees and host communities from March until December 2018, with a funding request of US$951 million. The UNHCR launched a supplementary appeal of US$238 million for 2018 to enhance protection and step up emergency preparedness. 11. The impact on the budget will depend on relief efforts and the extent to which donor support continues. Currently, the authorities are coping with costs as they emerge, but are confident that with external support and some re-allocations, additional spending pressures can be met without exceeding the budget deficit target. 12. However, donor support could wane, which would then increase the burden on the authorities. To illustrate the impact of these costs, it is assumed that the authorities will meet these costs from domestic and external resources. Over the next six years, it is presumed that approximately Tk. 440 billion (US$5.4 billion) will be raised domestically borrowed with a higher interest rate and a little over US$ US$1 billion will be borrowed externally on non-concessional terms given donor fatigue. Additionally, it is also expected 5 that import growth will increase from 8 percent (baseline) to 9 percent to meet increased demands. 13. Under the illustrative scenario, the debt sustainability outlook is affected by the worsening of the PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio and the external debt service ratios. On the external side, the most important result is the deterioration and breach of the external debt service-to-revenue over the medium term. The other external indicators also deteriorate but remain below their respective thresholds. On the public debt, the PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio deteriorates by almost 1.5 percentage points of GDP on average over the projection period. This scenario strengthens the argument to create the fiscal space by implementing the VAT and the need for continued donor support from the international community to address the refugee crisis. In the case of needs that arise from the refugee crisis, it is also important to continue to rely on concessional financing to the extent possible to maintain sustainability. CONCLUSION 14. The risk of external debt distress and overall debt distress remains low. While the threshold for the external debt service to revenue is breached temporarily under the most extreme stress test scenario, staff judge the risk of external debt distress to be low given the small and temporary nature of the breach. The need for donor support to mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis, especially over the next few years, is highlighted. As in the case of project financing, it is important that the authorities rely on concessional financing to address the needs stemming from the refugee crises. AUTHORITIES VIEWS 15. The authorities agree with the low risk of debt distress and consider the level of debt as manageable. The composition of the current stock of public and publicly guaranteed external debt is largely concessional. However, they recognized the need for prudent debt management as terms from creditors are expected to harden reflecting the country’s graduation from lower income status. They clarified that the current large disbursements reflect debt for large infrastructure. They emphasized that fiscal policy continues to be guided by the 2009 Public Money and Budget Management Act, which stipulates that public debt as a percent of GDP should be gradually declining. The authorities noted that the Rohingya refugee crisis is not expected to have a major impact on government deficits and public debt. An internal debt sustainability analysis has also been planned. 6 Figure 1. Bangladesh: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2018 −2038 1/ (In percent, unless otherwise mentioned) b a. Debt Accumulation b.PV of debt-to GDP ratio 2.0 30 50 1.8 25 40 1.6 1.4 30 20 1.2 1.0 15 20 0.8 10 10 0.6 0.4 0 5 0.2 0.0 0 -10 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 -20 Rate of Debt Accumulation 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 Grant-equivalent financing (% of GDP) Grant element of new borrowing (% right scale) c.PV of debt-to-exports ratio d.PV of debt-to-revenue ratio 200 300 250 150 200 100 150 100 50 50 0 0 -50 -50 -100 -100 -150 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 e.Debt service-to-exports ratio f.Debt service-to-revenue ratio 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 -5 -5 -10 -10 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 Baseline Historical scenario Most extreme shock 1/ Threshold Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2028. In figure b. it corresponds to a One-time depreciation shock; in c. to a Terms shock; in d. to a One-time depreciation shock; in e. to a Exports shock and in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock 7 Figure 2. Bangladesh: Indicators of Public Debt, 2018−2038 1/ (In percent) Most extreme shock Non-debt flows Baseline Fix Primary Balance Most extreme shock 1/ Historical scenario Public debt benchmark 60 PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio 50 40 30 20 10 0 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 450 PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 60 Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ 50 40 30 20 10 0 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 2038 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2028. 2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants. 8 Table 1. Bangladesh: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2015 −2038 1/ (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) 6/ 6/ Act Act Est Historical Standard Projections Average Deviation 2018-2023 2024-2038 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Average 2028 2038 Average External debt (nominal) 1/ 19.1 18.5 18.5 17.5 17.2 17.2 17.6 18.2 18.8 19.7 20.8 of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) 15.1 14.5 14.3 14.2 14.5 15.0 15.5 16.2 16.9 17.5 10.9 Change in external debt 1.5 -0.6 0.0 -0.9 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.1 -0.1 Identified net debt-creating flows -4.7 -4.8 -2.2 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.4 Non-interest current account deficit -2.2 -2.3 0.0 -1.2 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 Deficit in balance of goods and services 5.2 4.1 5.1 6.3 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.7 Exports 17.3 16.7 15.1 14.6 14.3 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.7 15.3 16.8 Imports 22.5 20.8 20.2 20.9 20.7 20.5 20.3 20.1 19.9 20.2 21.5 Net current transfers (negative = inflow) -8.1 -6.9 -5.3 -8.8 1.6 -5.3 -5.0 -4.8 -4.6 -4.4 -4.2 -3.7 -2.9 -3.5 of which: official 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 -0.3 Net FDI (negative = inflow) -0.9 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 -1.2 -1.1 Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ -1.6 -1.9 -1.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.2 Contribution from nominal interest rate 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.4 Contribution from real GDP growth -1.0 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 Contribution from price and exchange rate changes -1.0 -1.1 -0.9 … … … … … … … … Residual (3-4) 3/ 6.2 4.1 2.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.1 -0.6 of which: exceptional financing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 PV of external debt 4/ ... ... 14.1 13.3 12.9 12.9 13.3 14.0 14.6 16.2 18.9 In percent of exports ... ... 93.5 90.7 90.4 90.6 92.4 96.0 99.4 105.6 112.4 PV of PPG external debt ... ... 9.9 9.9 10.3 10.8 11.2 12.0 12.7 14.0 9.0 In percent of exports ... ... 65.5 67.9 71.9 75.4 77.9 82.4 86.6 91.4 53.4 In percent of government revenues ... ... 97.1 94.6 97.8 101.5 106.0 113.3 120.2 131.8 83.1 Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 7.6 8.6 10.3 16.7 15.5 14.1 13.0 11.9 11.0 11.3 28.6 PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 3.9 4.5 4.4 11.8 11.2 10.4 9.5 8.7 8.0 8.5 7.0 PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 7.1 7.6 6.5 16.5 15.2 14.0 13.0 12.0 11.2 12.2 11.0 Total gross financing need (Billions of U.S. dollars) -0.3 3.4 9.2 17.9 17.8 16.7 15.3 14.8 14.0 21.2 84.8 Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio -3.7 -1.7 0.0 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.2 0.7 0.5 1.4 1.6 Key macroeconomic assumptions Real GDP growth (in percent) 6.6 7.1 7.3 6.3 0.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) 5.9 5.9 5.1 5.5 3.2 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 Effective interest rate (percent) 5/ 2.7 2.2 3.6 1.7 0.9 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3 3.9 4.4 7.4 5.6 Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) 2.7 9.4 1.8 11.1 9.5 6.0 7.0 9.0 10.0 10.3 10.3 8.8 9.5 9.8 9.7 Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) 0.3 5.0 9.2 11.6 15.7 13.3 8.3 8.3 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.4 9.2 9.2 Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent) ... ... ... ... ... 27.3 24.0 21.4 21.5 15.0 13.4 20.4 9.6 6.8 8.7 Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) 9.6 10.0 10.2 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.8 10.7 Aid flows (in Billions of US dollars) 7/ 2.8 3.3 3.3 4.5 5.7 6.4 6.8 8.3 8.7 9.2 15.3 of which: Grants 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.2 2.8 of which: Concessional loans 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.9 5.2 5.9 6.2 7.6 7.9 8.0 12.5 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 8/ ... ... ... 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 8/ ... ... ... 34.6 29.8 26.7 26.3 21.1 19.7 18.9 21.5 19.7 Memorandum items: Nominal GDP (Billions of US dollars) 195.1 221.4 249.7 272.6 298.5 326.5 356.4 388.9 424.5 645.1 1476.2 Nominal dollar GDP growth 12.9 13.5 12.8 9.2 9.5 9.4 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.2 8.6 8.6 8.7 PV of PPG external debt (in Billions of US dollars) 24.2 26.6 30.1 34.4 39.2 45.8 53.1 88.9 132.8 (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.3 0.8 Gross workers' remittances (Billions of US dollars) 15.2 14.9 12.7 13.9 14.4 15.0 15.7 16.5 17.3 23.0 41.3 PV of PPG external debt (in percent of GDP + remittances) ... ... 9.4 9.5 9.8 10.3 10.7 11.5 12.2 13.5 8.7 PV of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) ... ... 48.9 50.4 53.8 57.0 59.6 63.8 67.8 74.1 45.8 Debt service of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) ... ... 3.3 8.8 8.4 7.8 7.3 6.8 6.3 6.9 6.0 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 0 1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt. 2/ Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms. 3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes. 4/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value. 5/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock. 6/ Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability. BANGLADESH 7/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief. BANGLADESH 8/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt). 9 Table 2. Bangladesh: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators for Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2018−2038 (In percent) Projections 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2028 2038 PV of debt-to GDP ratio Baseline 10 10 11 11 12 13 14 9 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2018-2038 1/ 10 7 5 3 1 0 -5 -14 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2018-2038 2 10 11 12 12 14 15 18 15 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 10 10 11 11 12 13 14 9 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 3/ 10 11 13 13 14 14 15 9 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 10 10 11 11 12 12 14 9 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 4/ 10 8 7 7 8 9 11 8 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 10 7 5 6 7 8 10 8 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2019 5/ 10 14 15 16 17 18 19 13 PV of debt-to-exports ratio Baseline 68 72 75 78 82 87 91 53 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2018-2038 1/ 68 51 34 19 9 2 -35 -83 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2018-2038 2 68 74 81 87 95 102 118 88 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 68 70 74 76 81 85 89 53 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 3/ 68 79 101 103 107 110 110 62 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 68 70 74 76 81 85 89 53 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 4/ 68 57 46 50 55 61 74 49 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 68 52 38 42 49 55 71 49 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2019 5/ 68 70 74 76 81 85 89 53 PV of debt-to-revenue ratio Baseline 95 98 102 106 113 120 132 83 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2018-2038 1/ 95 69 45 26 13 3 -50 -129 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2018-2038 2 95 101 109 118 130 142 170 137 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 95 97 102 107 114 121 132 84 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 3/ 95 102 120 124 130 136 141 85 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 95 96 99 104 111 118 129 82 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 4/ 95 77 61 67 76 84 106 76 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 95 69 49 55 64 73 98 74 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2019 5/ 95 136 141 147 157 167 182 116 Table 3. Bangladesh: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators for Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2018−2038 (Concluded) (In percent) Debt service-to-exports ratio Baseline 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 7 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2018-2038 1/ 12 11 9 7 6 5 0 -5 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2018-2038 2 12 11 10 10 9 8 10 10 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 7 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 3/ 12 12 12 11 11 10 11 8 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 7 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 4/ 12 11 10 8 8 7 7 6 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 12 11 10 8 8 7 6 6 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2019 5/ 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 7 Debt service-to-revenue ratio Baseline 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 11 A. Alternative Scenarios A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2018-2038 1/ 16 15 12 10 8 6 0 -7 A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2018-2038 2 16 15 14 13 12 12 15 16 B. Bound Tests B1. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 16 15 14 13 12 11 13 11 B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 3/ 16 15 14 14 13 12 14 12 B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 16 15 14 13 12 11 12 11 B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2019-2020 4/ 16 15 13 11 10 10 10 10 B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 16 15 13 11 10 9 9 9 B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2019 5/ 16 22 20 18 17 16 17 15 Memorandum item: Grant element assumed on residual financing (i.e., financing required above baseline) 6/ 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ Variables include real GDP growth, growth of GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows. 2/ Assumes that the interest rate on new borrowing is by 2 percentage points higher than in the baseline., while grace and maturity periods are the same as in the baseline. 3/ Exports values are assumed to remain permanently at the lower level, but the current account as a share of GDP is assumed to return to its baseline level after the shock (implicitly assuming an offsetting adjustment in import levels). 4/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI. 5/ Depreciation is defined as percentage decline in dollar/local currency rate, such that it never exceeds 100 percent. 6/ Applies to all stress scenarios except for A2 (less favorable financing) in which the terms on all new financing are as specified in footnote 2. Table 4. Bangladesh: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2015−2038 (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) Act Act Est Projections 5/ Standard 5/ 2018-23 2024-38 Average 2015 2016 2017 Deviation 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Average 2028 2038 Average Public sector debt 1/ 33.7 33.3 33.2 34.0 35.2 36.1 37.0 37.9 38.8 40.5 34.3 of which: foreign-currency denominated 15.1 14.5 14.3 14.2 14.5 15.0 15.5 16.2 16.9 17.5 10.9 Change in public sector debt -1.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 -0.2 -0.9 Identified debt-creating flows 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.0 -0.5 Primary deficit 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.4 0.4 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.5 1.4 1.0 1.3 Revenue and grants 9.8 10.1 10.2 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.8 11.0 of which: grants 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Primary (noninterest) expenditure 11.6 11.5 11.9 13.2 13.6 13.3 13.1 13.1 13.0 12.2 12.0 Automatic debt dynamics -1.8 -2.1 -2.0 -1.7 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.8 -1.7 Contribution from interest rate/growth differential -1.3 -1.5 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7 -1.5 of which: contribution from average real interest rate 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 of which: contribution from real GDP growth -2.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.5 -2.5 -2.1 Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 ... ... Other identified debt-creating flows 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 Privatization receipts (negative) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Recognition of implicit or contingent liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Debt relief (HIPC and other) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other (specify, e.g. bank recapitalization) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 Residual, including asset changes -1.6 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 Other Sustainability Indicators PV of public sector debt ... ... 28.8 29.7 31.0 31.8 32.7 33.7 34.6 37.0 32.4 of which: foreign-currency denominated ... ... 9.9 9.9 10.3 10.8 11.2 12.0 12.7 14.0 9.0 of which: external ... ... 9.9 9.9 10.3 10.8 11.2 12.0 12.7 14.0 9.0 PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Gross financing need 2/ 7.8 6.5 9.2 9.8 8.5 7.2 7.1 5.7 5.4 4.4 3.9 PV of public sector debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) … … 281.4 277.6 289.7 296.1 305.1 313.1 321.5 342.3 294.5 PV of public sector debt-to-revenue ratio (in percent) … … 282.9 282.8 294.6 300.6 309.4 318.8 327.4 348.4 299.6 of which: external 3/ … … 97.1 94.6 97.8 101.5 106.0 113.3 120.2 131.8 83.1 Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio (in percent) 4/ 26.8 25.5 55.4 49.8 45.0 38.3 39.2 27.1 27.0 26.6 25.3 Debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 4/ 27.3 25.7 55.7 50.7 45.8 38.9 39.8 27.6 27.5 27.1 25.7 Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio 3.4 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.9 Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions Real GDP growth (in percent) 6.6 7.1 7.3 6.3 0.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 Average nominal interest rate on forex debt (in percent) 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.1 0.2 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.6 2.9 3.5 4.0 3.8 Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent) 4.7 4.2 2.8 3.9 1.1 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation) -4.0 -4.5 -1.8 -3.4 3.8 0.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 5.9 6.7 6.3 7.0 0.9 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.7 5.5 5.9 5.5 5.5 5.6 Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent) 4.2 5.4 11.0 2.1 3.7 19.1 10.5 4.2 5.6 7.4 5.6 8.7 4.5 6.8 6.0 Grant element of new external borrowing (in percent) ... ... ... … … 27.3 24.0 21.4 21.5 15.0 13.4 20.4 9.6 6.8 ... Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ [Indicate coverage of public sector, e.g., general government or nonfinancial public sector. Also whether net or gross debt is used.] 2/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period. 3/ Revenues excluding grants. 4/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term debt. 5/ Historical averages and standard deviations are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability. 12 Table 5. Bangladesh: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2018−2038 (In percent) Projections 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2028 2038 PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio Baseline 30 31 32 33 34 35 37 32 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 30 30 30 30 30 31 33 32 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2018 30 30 31 32 33 35 41 46 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 30 31 32 33 34 35 38 36 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2019-2020 30 31 33 34 35 37 40 37 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2019-2020 30 30 30 31 32 33 36 32 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 30 30 30 31 33 34 38 35 B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2019 30 35 36 36 37 38 41 39 B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2019 30 41 41 41 42 43 44 39 PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ Baseline 278 290 296 305 313 322 342 295 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 278 277 276 278 281 285 305 295 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2018 278 285 292 302 310 321 375 416 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 278 290 297 307 315 325 352 323 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2019-2020 278 295 307 319 329 340 371 336 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2019-2020 278 279 280 289 298 307 330 286 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 278 280 281 293 304 315 347 315 B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2019 278 329 331 338 345 353 382 350 B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2019 278 380 381 386 391 397 411 355 Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio 2/ Baseline 50 45 38 39 27 27 27 25 A. Alternative scenarios A1. Real GDP growth and primary balance are at historical averages 50 45 38 38 24 23 22 24 A2. Primary balance is unchanged from 2018 50 45 38 39 27 27 29 38 A3. Permanently lower GDP growth 1/ 50 45 38 39 27 27 27 28 B. Bound tests B1. Real GDP growth is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2019-2020 50 46 39 41 28 29 29 30 B2. Primary balance is at historical average minus one standard deviations in 2019-2020 50 45 38 38 25 25 25 24 B3. Combination of B1-B2 using one half standard deviation shocks 50 45 38 38 25 25 27 27 B4. One-time 30 percent real depreciation in 2019 50 48 45 46 34 34 36 38 B5. 10 percent of GDP increase in other debt-creating flows in 2019 50 45 44 51 40 40 37 36 Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. 1/ Assumes that real GDP growth is at baseline minus one standard deviation divided by the square root of the length of the projection period. 2/ Revenues are defined inclusive of grants. 13