REPORT NO: AUS0001349 · MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA S TAT E O F T H E M A S H R E Q W O M E N F L A G S H I P 1 WOME N ’S ECO N O M I C PA RTI C I PAT I O N I N IR AQ, J ORDA N A N D L E BA N ON REPORT NO: AUS0001349 · MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA S TAT E O F T H E M A S H R E Q W O M E N F L A G S H I P 1 WOME N ’S ECO N O M I C PA RTI C I PAT I O N I N IR AQ, J ORDA N A N D L E BA N ON © 2020 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522- 2625; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This Report was produced as part of the Mashreq Gender Facility (MGF). This is a 5-year Facility (2019-2024) that provides technical assistance to Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to enhance women’s economic empowerment and opportunities as a catalyst towards more inclusive, sustainable, and peaceful societies, where economic growth benefits all. Working with the private sector, civil society organizations and development partners, the MGF supports government-led efforts, country level priorities and strategic regional activities that: (i) Strengthen the enabling environment for women’s economic participation; and, (ii) Improve women’s access to economic opportunities. The MGF is a World Bank - IFC initiative in collaboration with the governments of Canada and Norway. It is mainly supported by the Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (UFGE) with contributions from the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. This report was prepared by a core team led by Maria Ana Lugo (Senior Economist), Miriam Muller (Social Scientist) and Matthew Wai-Poi (Senior Economist). The team included Zeina Afif, Gharam Alkastalani Dexter, Aziz Atamanov, Samantha Constant, Rita Damasceno Costa, Jonna Lundwall, Samia Melhem, Mira Morad, Fatima Moussawi, Ana Maria Munoz Boudet, Claudia Noumedem, Lokendra Phadera, Laura Rodriguez, Hania Sahnoun, Meriem Ait Ali Slimane, Jayne Jungsun Yoo, Sara Hause Van Wie, Suhair Murad Al-Zubairi. Additional contributions were made by Shereen Abbady, Karina Brito, Ibrahim Dajani, Karem Edwards, Desiree Gonzalez, Nato Kurshitashvili, Amparo Lezama Manta, Dino Leonardo Merotto, Samuel Leone, Dalal Hasan Sharif Sayed Moosa, Nour Al Moghrabi, Haneen Sayed, Iman Sen, Hernan Winkler. Excellent comments were received from Peer Reviewers Harun Onder (Senior Economist), Eliana Rubiano (Economist) and Federica Saliola (Lead Economist), as well as from Kathleen Beegle. The report was edited by Nora Mara and the Executive Summary translated by Souleima Ghorayeb Boustany and Nour Al Moghrabi. Design is by KILKA Diseño Grafico. This report was produced under the overall guidance of Benu Bidani (Practice Manager) and Hans Hoogeveen (Practice Manager) and Carolina Sanchez-Paramo (Global Director Poverty and Equity Global Practice). Strategic guidance and key comments were provided by Saroj Jha (Country Director Mashreq Countries). https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/mashreq-gender-facility CONTENTS Executive Summary 11 How relevant is each barrier for different women in the Mashreq countries? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Constraints to Women’s Participation in the Labor Force . 15 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 The Road Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Chapter 3 112 Special Focus: International Experience.......................... 112 Introduction 25 Sustained increases in female participation from a Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 low starting point have been relatively rare but begin References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 with younger, more educated women joining the work force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Chapter 1 36 What works for women’s work? Insights from a systematic review of policies to increase female labor The state of women’s economic force participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 opportunities in the Mashreq today .....................................36 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Female economic participation remains low, References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128 particularly for less educated women, though younger generations are becoming more active . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Chapter 4 132 Women in the labor force are less likely to get a job and tend to be engaged in less productive activities . . . . . 43 The Road Ahead: Lowering Barriers and Increasing Female Participation................................. 132 Weak labor demand represents a first-order constraint for obtaining gainful employment for both Increases in female participation, although relatively women and men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 rare from a low base, offer the potential for a Women may face additional barriers, related to significant payoff in economic growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 their role in society and in their families, because The multifaceted barriers to greater female labor participation rates are lower for married women and participation require a coordinated and strategic those with young children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 First, legal restrictions must be removed, both on References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 paper and in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Second, understanding and measuring social norms Chapter 2 54 can then allow the design of interventions for positive change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Why is economic participation of women Finally, improved policies and access to child and in the Mashreq so low?.............................................................54 elderly care, as well as public transportation, are needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Economic participation is affected by barriers related to informal institutions, legal restrictions, In addition, digital jobs represent both a potential and markets, each of which intervene at critical life opportunity and additional barrier for women . . . . . . . . . .152 turning points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 Chapter 5 170 Conclusion................................................................................. 170 Effectiveness of policies will require a clear institutional framework to promote gender equality . . . . 173 There is a great need for much more frequent and relevant data to monitor progress and fill in knowledge gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Finally, the impacts of COVID-19 need to be assessed and addressed; the pandemic will make the structural changes identified in this report even more important . . 177 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181 Appendix 182 Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 LIST OF BOXES LIST OF FIGURES Box I.1 Economic participation among refugees in Iraq, Figure ES.1 Female labor force participation rates, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 selected Mashreq countries compared to rest of the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Box 1.1 Data sources: A comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Figure ES.2 Labor force participation in selected Box 3.1 Higher female labor participation in West Bank Mashreq countries, by education level . . . . . . . . 15 and Gaza was not necessarily a good thing . . . . . . .118 Figure ES.3 Female labor force participation rates in Box 3.2 Increasing female labor force participation in selected Mashreq countries, by age group . . . . 15 the Islamic Republic of Iran has largely been attributed to declining fertility, driven in part by Figure ES.4 Female workers’ contribution to growth, increasing education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Box 3.3 Female participation in Turkey followed the Figure ES.5 Critical turning points of women’s classic U-curve, falling with modernization then participation in the labor market . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 rising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Figure ES.6 Women’s views on working in selected Box 3.4 In Bangladesh, the dramatic growth of the Mashreq countries, by highest garment export industry drove young girls to education level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 gain more education, delaying marriage and Figure ES.7 Perceptions of whether (and when) fertility and underpinning the country’s sharp it is acceptable for women to work, increase in female labor participation . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Iraq and Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Box 4.1 Examples of digital jobs in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Figure ES.8 Ratio of female to male Internet access, Box 5.1 Example of mixed-methods data collection for selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 demand and supply of childcare in Eastern Figure ES.9 Ratio of female to male mobile phone Europe and Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 access, selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . 21 Figure I.1 Female labor force participation and GDP per capita around the world, c. 2019 . . . . . . . . . 28 Figure 1.1 Female and male labor force participation for ages 15–64, 10-year averages, 1990–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Figure 1.2 Participation rates, by age group, selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Figure 1.3 Adjusted participation, by education level, women and men ages 1–64 in selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Figure 1.4 Share of employment, by type, selected Mashreq countries and comparators, 2018 . . . . 44 Figure 1.5 Composition of workers, by gender and level of education, selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Figure 1.6 Projected working-age population and employment gap in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Figure 1.7 Adjusted labor force participation rates for Figure 2.14 Account ownership at a financial institution women and men aged 15–44, by different or with a mobile money service, Iraq, life events, selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . 49 Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Figure 1.8 Adjusted labor force participation rates for Figure 2.15 Female land ownership in Jordan, women aged 15–44, by different life events (% women ages 15-49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 and level of education, selected Mashreq Figure 2.16 Women’s participation in firms, selected countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Mashreq countries vs. MENA average . . . . . . . . 80 Figure 2.1 Critical turning points of women’s Figure 2.17 Female participation in firm ownership, by participation in the labor market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 firm size, selected Mashreq countries vs. Figure 2.2 Views regarding male vs. female leadership, MENA average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 by level of education, Iraq, Jordan, Figure 2.18 Procedures and time required to set up a and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 business, by gender, Iraq, Jordan, Figure 2.3 Views regarding a quota for women’s and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 political participation, by level of education, Figure 2.19 Perceptions of whether (and when) it is Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 acceptable for women to work, Iraq Figure 2.4 Views regarding jobs and women’s and Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 independence, by level of education, Iraq, Figure 2.20 Ability of women to find or access Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 a job in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Figure 2.5 Education enrollment rates in rural and Figure 2.21 Perceptions regarding being a housewife vs. urban Iraq, male vs. female, 2011–12 . . . . . . . . . 65 being employed, by highest education level, Figure 2.6 Views regarding importance of university Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 education for women and men, Iraq, Jordan, Figure 2.22 Perceptions regarding being a housewife and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 vs. being employed, by age group, Figure 2.7 Enrollment in tertiary education, by gender Iraq and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 and field of study, Jordan and Lebanon . . . . . . . 67 Figure 2.23 Views on family decision making, by level Figure 2.8 Women first married by age 18, Iraq, of education, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . 86 Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Figure 2.24 Views regarding income levels of husband Figure 2.9 Adolescent fertility rates, Iraq, Jordan, and vs. wife, by education level, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Figure 2.10 Gender norms and labor force participation, Figure 2.25 Views on equal rights to divorce, by selected countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 education level, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . 88 Figure 2.11 Views regarding male vs. female business Figure 2.26 Women’s experience of gender-based leadership, by highest educational violence, Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 attainment, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . 71 Figure 2.27 Women’s experience of controlling Figure 2.12 Views regarding employment priorities, by behaviors by husband or partner . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 age group, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . 72 Figure 2.28 Fertility rates, selected Mashreq countries Figure 2.13 Views regarding women’s travel, by highest vs. regional averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 level of education, Iraq and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . 76 Figure 2.29 Average number of hours spent on childcare, by gender, selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Figure 2.30 Views on acceptability of childcare, 2017–35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 by marital status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Figure 4.3 Attendance in organized early childhood Figure 2.31 Views on acceptability of childcare, education program, by mother’s education by age group, Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 level, Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Figure 2.32 Use of organized early childhood education Figure 4.4 Benefits of increased childcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 programs, by mother’s level of education, Figure 4.5 Elderly dependency ratio in Iraq, Jordan, Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 and Lebanon, 1950–2100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 Figure 3.1 Increased female labor force participation, Figure 4.6 Digital economy performance, Iraq, Jordan, selected economies, 1990–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 and Lebanon, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Figure 3.2 Labor force participation rates of urban Figure 4.7 Mobile broadband in the Middle East women in Turkey, by age cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 and North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Figure 3.3 Female labor force participation, by level of Figure 4.8 Share of population using the Internet . . . . . . . 158 education, women aged 25–54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Figure 4.9 Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people . . 158 Figure B3.1.1 West Bank and Gaza selected labor indicators, 2002–18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Figure 4.10 Ratio of female to male Internet access . . . . . . 159 Figure 3.4 Fertility rates, selected economies, Figure 4.11 Ratio of female to male mobile 1990-2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 phone access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Figure B3.3.1 The U-curve of female labor force Figure A.1 Adjusted labor force participation rates for participation in Turkey (1989-2010) . . . . . . . . . 122 women ages 15–44, by different life events, Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Figure 3.5. Share of female employment by sector, selected economies, 1990–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Figure A.2 Employment rates for women ages 15–44, by different life events, Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Figure 3.6 Estimated effects of childcare programs on female employment (unadjusted) . . . . . . . . 125 Figure A.3 Female labor force participation rates, by age cohort, selected economies . . . . . . . . . . 195 Figure 3.7 Estimated effects of tax changes on labor force participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Figure A.4 Female unemployment, selected economies, 1990–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 Figure 4.1 Decomposition of contribution to economic growth from females, 2000–17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Figure 4.2 Decomposition of contribution to economic growth from females, with female participation targets met and sustained, L I S T O F TA B L E S Table B1.1.1 Sources used in this report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Table 4.3 Current opportunities for digital work for different types of youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Table 2.1 Constraints facing women at critical turning points, potentially limiting their economic Table A.1 Selected development indicators, Mashreq engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 countries and comparators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 Table 2.2 Views regarding male vs. female leadership, Table A.2 Selected labor indicators using household Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 survey data, women ages 15–64 years . . . . . . . . 185 Table 2.3 Human Capital Index and respective Table A.3 Selected labor indicators using household components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 survey data, men ages 15–64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Table 2.4 Logarithm of labor earnings per month, Table A.4 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender gap per hour and hours worked across in logarithm of wages per month without and women and men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 with correction for selection, Lebanon 2011 . . . . 188 Table 2.5 Logarithm of labor earnings per month, Table A.5 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender gap per hour and hours worked across in logarithm of employment earnings per women and men, Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 month without and with correction for selection, Iraq 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Table 2.6 Legislation related to employment and payment conditions in selected Table A.6 Female labor force participation Probit Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 regressions, Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 Table 2.7 Legislation related to women’s mobility in Table A.7 Female labor force participation Probit selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 regressions, Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Table 2.8 Legislation related to assets and Table A.8 Female labor force participation Probit entrepreneurship in selected regressions, Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Table A.9 DHS participation regression results for ever- Table 2.9 Legislation related to getting married, married women ages 15–44 years, Jordan . . . . . 193 selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Table 2.10 Who makes the decision on how to spend women’s employment income, by education level (Married women ages 15–49) . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Table 2.11 Hours spent on chores and childcare, by gender, Jordan (2016) (Men and women ages 15–44) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Table 2.12 Legislation related to parenthood, selected Mashreq countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Table 2.13 Female participation regression results, by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Table 4.1 Recommended Women, Business and the Law legal reforms by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Table 4.2 Summary of considerations for different ways to increase access to childcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 EXEC U SUMM 10 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON U T IVE A RY 11 12 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON Female labor force participation in the Mashreq is exceptionally low, a problem likely to be exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. This report calls for action in the following areas: stronger economic growth, effective policy action to close legal gaps, promotion of more egalitarian attitudes, access to quality childcare, and the provision of safe transportation. The report also notes significant opportunities in the digital economy; however, without action to close the digital gender gap, those opportunities could become another barrier. INTRODUCTION Women’s participation in the labor mar- force, compared to two-thirds of women ket in the Mashreq countries of Iraq, with tertiary education in Iraq and Leb- Jordan, and Lebanon remains among the anon and half of those in Jordan (Figure lowest in the world. Less than 15 per- ES.2). Notably, differences in labor force cent of women work in Iraq and Jordan, participation between educated and un- and only 26 percent do in Lebanon. Al- educated women are larger than between though low levels of economic participa- educated men and women. With young- tion are found in other countries within er women increasingly having more ed- the region, Iraq and Jordan rank among ucation, labor force participation rates the countries with the lowest female par- among the young are significantly higher ticipation rates in the world, only after in Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, Jor- the war-torn Syrian Arab Republic and dan. (Figure ES.3). In some other coun- Republic of Yemen. The participation tries, a pattern of sharply increasing rates for women in these three countries participation among younger age groups lie between 25 and 35 percentage points marked the beginning of a generational below the international average given shift in which younger women partici- their per capita GDP (Figure ES.1). pate to a greater degree in the labor mar- Participation is particularly low for ket and older cohorts slowly leave the less educated women. Few non-tertia- working-age population. ry-educated women are in the labor EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 13 FIGURE ES.1 Female labor force participation rates, selected Mashreq countries compared to rest of the world 100 90 Female labor force participation rate, ages 15–64 (%) 80 70 60 Lebanon 26.3 50 Jordan 40 15.1 30 Iraq 20 13.0 10 0 Countries (from lowest to highest female labor force participation) S ource: Based on modeled I nt ern at io n a l Labo ur Org a n iza t io n dat a f ro m t he Wo r l d D eve l o p m e nt Ind i c a t o rs . Women in the Mashreq countries nation of high unemployment and low- governments have targeted increases in who are willing to participate in the la- er pay likely discourages some women women’s labor force participation rates bor market face high unemployment from seeking work at all. by 2025 of 5 percentage points in Iraq rates and tend to be paid less for similar and Lebanon and to a rate of 24 percent The governments of Iraq, Jordan, and work. Female unemployment is nearly in Jordan. If the targeted increases in Lebanon have set ambitious targets for twice that for men, reaching almost 25 participation of five points over five years increasing female labor participation, percent in Jordan—meaning that low are not only met but also continued for a which, if achieved and sustained over rates of female participation mask an further decade, annual economic growth the longer term, will have substantial even lower rate of employment. More- would be increased by 1.6 percentage potential impacts on economic growth. over, those women who do work tend points in Iraq, 2.5 points in Jordan, and From 2000 to 2017, the annual econom- to work in certain sectors and earn less 1.1 points in Lebanon by 2035. ic growth rate in Iraq was 1.4 percent; than men do for comparable jobs. The increases in the value added by female Achieving these targets will not be gender wage gap for women and men workers contributed 0.3 percentage easy; this report outlines the many con- working similar jobs with similar educa- points of this (Figure ES.4). In Jordan, straints on economic participation for tion and experience is about 17 percent females contributed 0.5 points of the women at different life stages and from in Jordan’s private sector and 18 percent 1.5 percent annual growth rate; in Leb- different backgrounds. Few countries and 22 percent for all workers in Iraq anon, they contributed only 0.2 points have achieved the increases targeted by and Lebanon, respectively. This combi- of the 1.5 percent growth rate. The three the Mashreq countries in such a short 14 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE ES.2 FIGURE ES.3 Labor force participation in selected Mashreq countries, by Female labor force participation rates in selected Mashreq education level countries, by age group Share of population in the labor force, ages 15–64 (%) 95.3 100 88.5 89.9 93.2 Share of female population in the labor force (%) 88.9 90.0 70 82.7 80 72.8 75.1 63.6 67.3 60 60 49.8 40 50 28.0 30.9 19.9 20 10.5 8.2 11.3 40 0 30 Less than secondary Some secondary Less than secondary Complete Secondary Less than secondary Complete Secondary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary 20 10 0 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 Iraq Jordan Lebanon (adjusted) Female LFP (adjusted) Male LFP Iraq Jordan Lebanon Sources: 2011/12 L e ba n o n Ho useh o ld B udg et S urvey ; 2 0 1 2 I ra q H o u s e ho l d So u rc e s : 2011/ 12 L e b a no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey ; 2012 Ira q H o us eh o l d Soci o-Economi c Survey ; 2 0 1 6 Jo rdan La bo r M a rket Pan el S ur vey 2016. So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey ; 2016 J o rd a n L a b o r M a r ket Pa ne l Su rvey 2 0 1 6 . Not e: Ad j u st ed labor fo rc e part ic ipa t io n ( LF P) rat e is defin ed a s t he s ha re Not e : Pa r t i c i p a t i o n ra t e s fo r wo m e n a g e d 25–64, exc l u d i ng th o s e wh o m ay of women (men) i n th e labo r fo rc e over t h e t ot a l po pula t io n , exc l u d i ng s t i ll b e e nro ll e d i n f u ll- t i m e e d u c a t i o n. t hose i n full-t i me educ a t io n . time and beginning from such a low starting point. This report summarizes CONSTRAINTS TO WOMEN’S the barriers to women’s economic partic- PARTICIPATION IN THE ipation and outlines a forward-looking agenda for policy makers and research- LABOR FORCE ers. It combines a life-cycle approach to analyze each constraint as it occurs at Weak labor demand represents the ma- demographic growth. The implication is a particular critical point in a woman’s jor constraint for obtaining gainful em- a persistently high unemployment rate, life (represented in Figure ES.5), while ployment for both women and men. The especially among youth and women. recognizing that this experience will be sluggish job creation in the Middle East Moreover, in the context of an econom- different for women of different socio- and North Africa (MENA) region is a ic slowdown, fiscal constraints, and the economic backgrounds. primary barrier to greater female par- conflict-related crisis in the region, weak ticipation in the economy. Compounded labor demand may continue to constrain with recent instability and crises, em- economic opportunities for women and ployment growth in these countries has men going forward. been unable to overcome the fast pace of EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 15 FIGURE ES.4 Female workers’ contribution to growth, selected Mashreq countries b. Projected, 2017–35, a. Historical, 2000–17 if female participation targets are met and sustained 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 Percentage Points Percentage Points 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0 0 -0.5 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 Iraq Jordan Lebanon Iraq Jordan Female value added Female value added Productivity Employment Productivity Employment Participation Demographic change Participation Demographic change S ources: Value added d at a a re fro m Wo rld Develo pm ent I n dic at o rs ( WD I) , Wo r l d Ba nk c a l c u l a t i o ns , a nd Wo r l d Ba nk ( fo r t hc o m i ng ) ; p o p u l a t i o n/ d e m o gra ph i c s data are from Uni t ed Nat i o n s Depa rt m ent of E c o n o m ic a n d S o c ia l Af fa i rs , Wo r l d P o p u l a t i o n P ro s p e c t s 2017 U p d a t e , a nd Wo r l d Ba nk c a l c u l a t i o ns f ro m Wo rl d Ban k (for t hcomi ng); and e m ploy m ent a n d pa rt ic ipat io n da t a a re fro m m o d e l e d Int e r na t i o na l L a b o u r O rg a ni z a t i o n e s t i m a t e s ( f ro m WD I) . H i s t o r i c a l c a l c ul a - tions d one wi t h t he Wor ld B an k ’ s Jo bsS t ruc t ure t o o l; fut ure c alc ul a t i o ns a re o r i g i na l fo r t hi s re p o r t . Women face additional barriers re- FIGURE ES.5 lated to social norms, legal constraints, Critical turning points of women’s participation in the labor market and market failures. Several factors have Entering disproportionate effects on women’s Getting Getting Having and ready married a child ability to effectively participate in the remaining labor market, including more limited access to capital (human, physical, and S o urc e: Or i g i na l f i g u re fo r t hi s re p o r t . financial) than men, lack of affordable and adequate childcare and of safe pub- lic transportation, and laws and societal Young women and girls encounter ucation is a challenge for Iraqi girls, par- preferences for men that result in their barriers as they develop the human cap- ticularly in rural areas. In addition, gen- taking the few available jobs. Moreover, ital needed to enter the labor force. Al- der gaps associated with certain fields of marriage and children dramatically re- though girls get an equal start with boys study may, in turn, be shaped by society’s duce a woman’s probability of working, in all three countries in terms of school expectations. albeit with differences across countries. attendance at early ages, completing ed- 16 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE ES.6 Women’s views on working vs being a housewife in selected Mashreq countries, by highest education level 60 50 Share of responses (%) 40 30 20 10 0 No formal Primary Secondary University No formal Primary Secondary University No formal Primary Secondary University Iraq Jordan Lebanon Agree strongly Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know Source: Wor ld Values S urvey Wave 6 ( 2 0 1 0 – 1 4 ) an d Wo rld B an k c a l c u l a t i o ns . Not e: Fi gure shows wo m en ’ s respo n ses t o t h e st a t em ent “ B eing a ho u s ew i fe i s j u s t a s f u lf i ll i ng a s wo r k i ng .” “A g re e ” a nd “a g re e s t ro ng ly ” have been c o m bi - ned , as have “di sagree” an d “ disag ree st ro n g ly ”. “ Do n ’ t k n ow ” i s l ow a nd exc l u d e d . In addition, several barriers prevent is even more dire in a country like Iraq decision-making power. Although the women from entering and remaining where insecurity and instability are wide- impact varies by country, for most wom- in the labor market. Harassment in the spread. Similarly, women with disabili- en of most education levels, the number workplace and on public transportation ties are even less likely to work, and poor who work drops significantly when they is common, preventing many women public transportation is likely an import- marry, likely reflecting a combination of from accessing economic opportunities. ant factor. In addition to safety concerns, personal preferences, an expectation of Poorer women are often disproportion- women face other restrictions related to having children soon, and social norms. ately affected, for instance, because they societal expectations of the role of wom- Importantly, most women in all three are the most reliant on public transport. en, to employers who are reluctant to countries and at all education levels agree About 1 in 3 women in the three coun- employ them, and in some cases to legal that being a housewife is just as fulfill- tries has ever been verbally harassed in restrictions (and a lack of awareness and ing as working (figure ES.6). Moreover, public; 1 in 5 women in Iraq and Leba- enforcement of rights and obligations) on women who do choose to work, contrary non and 1 in 10 women in Jordan have the nature of work women can do. to existing social norms, may suffer from been physically harassed. A recent sur- domestic violence as a result. In Jordan, Participation rates fall for married vey in Jordan found that 81 percent of working women are more likely to suffer women because of a combination of women think economic participation emotional or sexual violence, particular- preferences and social norms around would be improved through better and ly among the less educated. One possible women’s roles and responsibilities af- safer public transportation, and 47 per- explanation may be husbands’ attempt to ter getting married. Lower education cent said they had refused to take a job reassert power, control, and dominance is correlated with less equal views on because this was lacking. The situation gender roles at home and on women’s EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 17 over wives who are potentially trans- ing in the labor market; legal frame- The gap between the law on paper gressing their expected roles as wives. works and adequate facilities that might and the law in practice needs to be closed. support families in balancing work and Changes in the legal framework mean Finally, as women become mothers, family duties are incomplete. For exam- little if unaccompanied by public aware- additional barriers to participation in ple, in Iraq, 10 hours a week of house- ness or compliance and enforcement. the labor market emerge with further work is associated with a 20 percent These issues can arise because of unclear demands on household chores and chil- lower probability of working for women legislation, poor enforcement, women’s drearing. Acceptability, perceptions of with a tertiary degree and a 70 percent lack of knowledge, and women’s ability available quality of childcare provision, lower probability for those with less than or options to seek justice. For example, and its accessibility and affordability are secondary education; the results are sim- clear definitions of key behaviors that are all additional factors preventing women ilar for hours spent in childcare. likely to give rise to conflict are needed: with children from entering or remain- Exactly what constitutes discrimination or harassment? Is there a body to enforce THE ROAD AHEAD the laws and regulations, and, if there is, is it timely and effective? Furthermore, Many of the policies needed to address employment and sexual harassment in problems may arise when women do these issues have already been discussed the workplace and public spaces, espe- not pursue legitimate grievances because in the literature. Foremost, economic cially on public transportation. Women, they lack awareness of their legal rights growth needs to be stronger, and more Business and the Law 2020 identifies le- and the recourse they may have or be- jobs must be created. Although more gal deficiencies in Jordan and Lebanon, cause they are deterred by the high costs jobs are necessary for more women to as well as constraints on women travel- of action and a real or perceived limited work, however, job creation itself will ing outside the home in Iraq and Jordan chance of success. not be enough. In many cases, revisions (World Bank 2020). It identifies in all Improvements to public transporta- to laws and regulations are needed. In three countries legal deficiencies related tion are needed beyond responding to other cases, interventions are needed to to ensuring equal pay, hours, and access and criminalizing sexual harassment. address the issues with public transpor- to jobs and industries; marriage and do- It must be made safe, affordable, and tation and the supply of childcare that mestic violence; maternal and paternal reliable. A 2018 study by SADAQA, a prevent women from accessing econom- leave and protection of pregnant workers local organization that promotes wom- ic opportunities. Finally, although social from dismissal; prohibiting discrimina- en’s economic rights, makes a series of norms can be difficult to change, some tion in access to credit based on gender; recommendations for Jordan that would interventions have proven successful and ensuring equal rights to inheritance. similarly apply in Iraq and Lebanon. elsewhere, particularly those aimed at ILO (2018) summarizes additional care These recommendations include greater correcting misperceptions. Some im- policies required to make working more connectivity between cities to open up portant examples of each follow. family-friendly, including leave entitle- more economic opportunities for wom- ments for sick or disabled relatives and en; a focus on shortening time spent Further legal and policy reforms are family-friendly working arrangements in transit and improving cost efficien- needed. Women’s employment could po- such as part-time work, flex work, and cy; increasing the number of women tentially be increased by legislation elim- telecommuting. in public transportation management inating gender-based discrimination in 18 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE ES.7 Perceptions of whether (and when) it is acceptable for women to work, Iraq and Jordan 100 Share of responses (%) 80 60 40 20 0 Generally, it is It is acceptible for It is acceptible to It is acceptible to It is acceptible to acceptible that married women to leave children with work in a mixed return home after women work work a relative gender workplace 5:00 p.m. Jordan Kurdistan Region of Iraq Source: Wor ld Bank 20 1 8 b, Wo rld B a n k fo rt h c o m in g . as well as hiring more female conduc- public transport. It also emphasizes the early childhood development practic- tors, bus-drivers, and ticket sale offi- integration of urban planning, land use, es. Moreover, the expansion of care will cers to make it a more inclusive space; and transportation planning in order to create new jobs within the care industry, and making bus stops and depots safer make cities denser, which in turn helps many of which may be filled by women, through better lighting, continuous sur- cost and coverage. and contribute to economic growth. veillance, and access to security officers Addressing the care market can lib- Governments may be able to take in the case of emergency. Most import- erate women from unpaid housework actions to support scaling up the care ant, these changes need to be supported and care responsibilities while creat- economy. Jordan has recently made legal by adequate budgets, which may require ing new jobs, often for women. Despite revisions regarding childcare services in public subsidies. In addition to the re- prevailing social norms and preferences larger businesses (for employers whose port recommendations, locations could for performing such tasks at home, the employees have a total of 15 or more be made more accessible by installing Mashreq has a large unmet demand for children aged under five years) and to ramps for baby carts and providing child- and elderly care, especially as Iraq, the licensing system to facilitate more changing facilities, while smartphone Jordan, and Lebanon enter the transi- home-based nurseries. Other measures applications could provide information tion to aging societies. Existing childcare can also contribute, including expanding about bus schedules, stop locations and benefits richer households, which means public provision, streamlining regula- current arrival times. More generally, that greater access for other households tions of care providers, creating incen- World Bank (2014) provides other rec- will potentially free women to perform tives for private sector–led provision of ommendations targeted at increasing other tasks that may increase families’ childcare and for investors, and setting coverage and affordability, including earning capacity. Greater access to child- up and enforcing good industry stan- improved public transport expertise and care could also increase human capital of dards. For women who cannot afford an expanded but consolidated supply of poorer children if that childcare includes private services, a combination of tax-, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 19 cash-, or voucher-based incentives and derstand which norms are most binding; massive increases in participation; how- support schemes can be implemented; whereas almost all respondents thought ever, they can help circumvent existing Turkey provides an overseas example. it was acceptable in general for women barriers and be part of the generational to work, less than half thought it was ac- shift observed in other countries that did Barriers to gender equality are often ceptable for women to come home from subsequently experience rapid increases left unaddressed because of the per- work after 5:00 p.m. (figure ES.7). in participation. These new opportuni- ceived rigidity of traditional values. Re- ties are not restricted to highly educated cent research has shown, however, that Moreover, for the policies discussed young women, for whom participation correcting misperceptions of norms to be effective, they need to be designed is already relatively high. Low-skilled can increase economic participation of to complement each other and imple- and rural women can also benefit from women. In some communities, both mented in a coordinated fashion. This this digital transformation as opportu- men and women misperceive what they report emphasizes the multitude of legal, nities for impact outsourcing and plat- think their neighbors believe is appro- social, and market barriers that impede forms connecting small-scale farmers priate behavior, including when it comes women’s ability to work over their lives. and craftspeople emerge. Governments to activities such as whether it is appro- Although each of the different policies can play an important role in address- priate for women to work in various set- reviewed are needed to increase female ing specific constraints by investing in tings, or whether men should participate participation, none are likely to succeed digital infrastructure, platforms, finan- in childcare and other unpaid household without a strategic and coordinated cial services, and skills. Situations vary work. There is evidence in some coun- approach. Addressing any single issue across countries: Iraq needs investments tries that exposing such misperceptions without addressing the range of con- in all areas whereas Jordan and Lebanon where they exist can in some cases result straints women face is unlikely to im- present more advanced environments in a shift toward more mutually benefi- prove outcomes. for these activities. Nonetheless, increas- cial social norms. A recent study found Beyond the mentioned policies, fa- ing digital jobs will take time and work, that most young married men privately cilitating the development of digital jobs and not all such jobs may be right for all supported women working but under- provides a specific opportunity. World- three countries. estimated how others did. When this wide and in the Mashreq, an increasing misperception was corrected, those Unfortunately, the digital gender di- number of digital jobs will be created as men’s wives were more likely to enter the vide in the Mashreq is one of the widest technology transforms almost all eco- workforce. Another study in the Kurd- in the world; without closing it, digital nomic sectors. This transformation has istan Region of Iraq found that, where- transformation threatens to become less great potential for increasing opportuni- as 93 percent of individuals believed it of an opportunity and more of a barri- ties for women. The ability for women to was acceptable for women to work, they er. In Iraq, it is estimated that only 72 work from home with flexible hours en- also believed that only 62 percent of the women use the Internet for every 100 hanced by digital technology helps over- community agreed. Similar gaps exist men, a gender gap of 28 percent (figure come many of the constraints identified, for working when married, or in mixed ES.8), and only 89 women use mobile such as lack of safe and quality transpor- company with men, suggesting that an phones for every 100 men, a gender gap tation, lack of childcare, personal pref- awareness campaign could be effective. of 11 percent (figure ES.9). In Lebanon erences, and restrictive social norms. The study (and a similar one in Jordan) and Jordan, the Internet gap is smaller at The increased opportunities that digital also showed it is just as important to un- 10 percent, but the mobile phone gap is jobs offer will not by themselves lead to 20 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE ES.8 FIGURE ES.9 Ratio of female to male Internet access, selected Mashreq Ratio of female to male mobile phone access, selected Mashreq countrie s countrie s Iraq Jordan Lebanon Countries, by average ratio Countries, by average ratio Iraq Lebanon & Jordan 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Ratio of female to male Internet access Ratio of female to male mobile access Source: Created using data from Digital Gender Gaps, www.digitalgendergaps. So u rc e : Cre a t e d u s i ng d a t a f ro m w w w. d i g i t a l g e nd e rg a p s . Not e: IT U dat a u sed wh ere ava ila ble, ot h erw ise averag e of o nl i ne , c o m b i - Not e : G SM A d a t a u s e d w he re av a i l a b l e , ot he r w i s e ave ra g e of o n l i n e, c o m - ned , and offli ne est im a t es. b i ne d a nd of f l i ne e s t i m a t e s . larger than in Iraq—at 17 percent (Leb- and using the Internet out of concerns phone use; and the stock of digital skills anon) and 21 percent (Jordan). The dig- for their safety. young women have or need. ital divide means young women do not Progress needs to be monitored on Such monitoring requires new data access or excel in digital jobs as much several dimensions. This report identi- and analysis in many areas. There is a as young men do. This divide exists for fies various indicators that could poten- pressing need for more frequent basic several reasons: women are less likely to tially be monitored regularly using exist- data in the Mashreq countries. Leba- own mobile phones and, even if they do ing data, but other important indicators non last conducted a national household have a phone, are less likely to use mobile are not currently collected. Govern- survey in 2012, although results from a Internet, social media, or SMS services. ments, the international community, and recent 2018–19 labor force survey are This report discusses constraints that broader civil society can take efforts to being released. Iraq has a comprehensive keep young women from gaining dig- leverage existing instruments to collect national household socioeconomic sur- ital jobs at the individual level, because additional data or develop new survey vey, which is representative at the district of market failure related to laws, social instruments to do so, when needed. For level but is held only every six years or norms, safety and security concerns, and example, the current annual Labor Force so; but the country has no regular labor discrimination in the workplace. For ex- Survey conducted by the Jordan Depart- force survey. Consequently, monitoring ample, women enter science, technology, ment of Statistics could be modified to even the headline outcome of female la- engineering, and mathematics (STEM) collect more information on the number bor participation on a regular basis is not fields less than men in Lebanon and of different digital jobs being created and possible. There is also a need to collect Jordan, whereas some families may dis- performed by women; the gender gap more information that would illuminate courage girls and women from accessing in terms of Internet, mobile, and smart constraints to both the demand and the EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 21 supply of female labor, especially among local researchers using the new data for women are likely to be disproportion- younger women. For example, because collaborative inputs to the next report. ally affected by the labor market effects demographic and health surveys are not from COVID-19. Women will probably A key step would be to better under- regularly conducted in all three coun- experience a significant burden on their stand each country’s current institution- tries, some of the countries have only in- time given their multiple care responsi- al structures that are designed to protect frequent data on gender-based violence bilities as school closures and confine- women’s existing rights—and why these and sexual and reproductive rights and ment measures are adopted, possibly structures have not been as effective as health issues. In addition, more surveys leading to reductions in working time they could be. In some countries, a spe- of informal and microenterprise sectors and permanent exit from the labor mar- cialized legal commission has been es- would help reveal the constraints on fe- ket among those who currently partic- tablished to promote legal change and male microentrepreneurs. ipate. Women tend to be engaged in enforce women’s rights. Such bodies co- sectors that may be hit particularly hard To address the lack of data, a new ordinate gender policy, conduct analysis (services) and in vulnerable forms of survey on key issues has been launched and evaluation, and have an investigative employment (e.g. self-employment in in the three Mashreq countries to shed and corrective capacity with respect to small subsistence businesses, informal new light and to act as a benchmark gender discrimination in employment, domestic work), which often leaves against which to measure future prog- education, resources allocation, facili- them out of formal social protection ress. The survey will look at digital jobs, ties, and services. Alternative approaches measures targeted to workers, making the care economy, social norms, and the to establishing and implementing such it even more complicated to cope with de jure–de facto gap of the legal frame- bodies are discussed in the report using the crisis.  Moreover, in a context where works in place. The results will be pre- examples from the United States and the societal attitudes suggest that in times of sented at the Third Mashreq Conference Republic of Korea. scarcity of jobs, those should go to men, on Women’s Economic Empowerment Finally, this report was prepared women are also likely to be left out even in 2021. The World Bank will work with before the COVID-19 crisis. However, more than prior to this crisis. 22 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON REFERENCES Aloul, S., R. Naffa and M. Mansour. 2018. Gender in Public Transportation: A per- spective of women users of public transportation. SADAQA and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. ILO (International Labour Organization). 2018. Care Work and Care Jobs for the Fu- ture of Decent Work. Geneva: ILO. World Bank. 2014. Jordan Transport Sector Review. Washington, DC: World Bank. ———. 2018. A New Economy for the Middle East and North Africa. MENA Economic Monitor. Washington, DC: World Bank. ———. 2020. Women, Business and the Law 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank. ———. Forthcoming. Kurdistan Region of Iraq - Women’s labor force participation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: a study of social and psychological barriers (En- glish). Washington, DC: World Bank Group. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . 23 INT ROD 24 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON UCTIO N 25 26 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON Increased female economic participation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region contributes to inclusive growth and helps grow the middle class. Yet women generate only 18 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the MENA re- gion, compared to a world average of 37 percent. Some estimates suggest that increas- ing female labor force participation (FLFP) to the levels of men could boost regional GDP by 47 percent (World Bank 2017).1 In the three Mashreq countries included in this report (Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon), about 1 in 5 women works. Although similar- ly low levels of economic participation are found in other countries within the region, Iraq and Jordan rank among the three lowest FLFPs in the world, only after the war- torn Syrian Arab Republic and Republic of Yemen.2 Compared to other countries at a similar level of per capita GDP, participation rates for women in the three Mashreq countries included in this report lie between 25 and 35 percentage points below the respective peers (figure I.1). Recent evidence suggests that low FLFP rates in MENA countries may be associ- ated with initial conditions, economic structure, and social norms, rather than with the process of structural transformation. Earlier literature, such as Goldin (1995) and Mammen and Paxon (2000), argued that the observed U-shaped relationship be- tween development and female participation is related to the process of transforma- tion of the economy. As the economy moves from agriculture to industry and services and people move from rural to urban areas, FLFP first declines but later increases as childcare becomes available, fertility falls, and female education rises. This argument would suggest that as Mashreq countries develop participation rates will improve, from the process of development itself. More recently, however, Klasen (2019) pro- vides evidence that countries’ initial conditions, historic economic structures, struc- tural change, and social norms all interplay in determining women’s participation in the labor market. Over the past 25 years as MENA economies continued with the process of structural transformation, they saw a rapid decline in fertility rates and a rapid expansion of female education. Unlike in economies in Latin America and the Caribbean, such changes have not led to higher engagement of women in economic activities outside their homes. The author concludes: INTRODUCTION . 27 FIGURE I.1 Female labor force participation and GDP per capita around the world, c. 2019 100 Fema le labor force participation (% of women ages 15-64) 90 Nepal Iceland Burundi Sweden 80 Switzerland Ethiopia Angola Malawi Israel Canada Peru China 70 Benin Uganda Ghana Bolivia United States 60 Burkina Faso Brazil Indonesia Qatar Sierra Leone Italy South Africa United Arab Emirates Kuwait 50 Malaysia Mexico Bahrain Philippines Puerto Rico 40 Sri Lanka Bangladesh Turkey Tajikistan Libya Oman 30 Egypt, Arab Rep. Pakistan Tunisia Lebanon Somalia Afghanistan Morocco Saudi Arabia 20 India West Bank and Gaza Jordan Algeria Iraq 10 Yemen, Rep. 0 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 Log GDP per ca pita (current US$) S ource: Wor ld Develop ment I n dic a t o rs. In the Middle East and North The present report provides a de- also explores which policies and types of Africa, a combination of a strong tailed description of women’s economic shocks have worked elsewhere in driving stigma for educated women participation in Mashreq countries, an- up female economic participation. against working outside of white alyzing factors that might lie behind the Equal access to the economic oppor- collar services, remaining legal observed outcomes and going beyond tunities that men enjoy is a precondition barriers to some types of female the structure of the economy. The anal- for ensuring that women reach their full employment, and a stagnant ysis studies how occupational and social life potential (World Bank 2012). Gender or only slowly-growing public, barriers play out differently among men equality is important in its own right— health, and education sectors has and women across different socioeco- and not just because of its instrumental ensured that a strong education nomic levels. The study reviews barriers value for fair treatment of all individuals, expansion as well as fertility de- related to legal aspects and market con- as expressed in the Sustainable Develop- cline has only had a rather modest ditions as well as norms and stereotypes ment Goals (Goal 5). Greater economic impact on female participation related to women’s role in society, as participation by women in the Mashreq rates (World Bank 2004). This is they play out at different critical turning would not only potentially boost overall particularly the case in resource points in women’s lives (getting ready, economic growth but would also pro- rich countries, but prevalent ev- entering the labor market, getting mar- mote women’s personal agency. erywhere. (Klasen 2019, 188) ried, and having children). The report 28 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON Expanding women’s access to eco- tious targets to increase female economic earnings opportunities, rights and politi- nomic opportunities is also instrumen- participation by 2024. At the inaugu- cal participation” (Duflo 2012, 1053). As tally important for improving families’ ral high-level Mashreq Conference on such, economic opportunities represent welfare and contributing to poverty re- Women’s Economic Empowerment, held only one of the aspects of empowerment, duction. Access to credit, property rights, in Beirut, the three countries presented albeit an important one. The report ana- and labor markets are critical for in- their respective Women’s Economic Em- lyzes other aspects of female empower- creasing families’ earnings and the satis- powerment Action Plans and committed ment, but in particular as those aspects faction of basic needs for all household to their implementation over the coming influence, determine, and are affected by members. Additional resources can five years. Each country defined its tar- women’s participation in paid economic represent, in some cases, the difference get to increase women’s labor force par- activities. In this sense, women’s eco- between having children attend school ticipation rates by 2024. Specifically, the nomic activities cannot be disentangled and being properly fed or not. Evidence governments of Iraq and Lebanon com- from their broader social and political suggests that increasing women’s control mitted to increase FLFP by five percent- life, and thus form an integral part of over household incomes benefits chil- age points, and the government of Jordan the story. Economic opportunities en- dren (for example, Doss 2006; Hoddi- committed to increase it to 24 percent. compass the availability and possibility nott and Haddad 1995; Rubalcava, Teru- of taking advantage of earnings oppor- A major initiative facilitated by the el, and Thomas 2009; Schady and Rosero tunities as well as the existence of an en- World Bank Group was launched in 2008; World Bank 2012). abling environment in terms of the ap- early 2019 to support the implementa- propriate legal, institutional setting.3 At In addition, increasing female eco- tion of these government commitments; its core, however, the present report aims nomic participation is likely to enhance this report is part of that initiative. The to present evidence on the state of wom- the economic development of countries. Mashreq Gender Facility (MGF) is a en’s participation in labor markets, the Although economic development im- World Bank–IFC initiative in collabo- constraints women face toward increas- proves women’s empowerment (Duflo ration with the governments of Canada ing their participation in the Mashreq, 2012), it is also argued that increasing and Norway. The MGF is mainly sup- and what can be learned from what has gender equality brings about develop- ported by the Umbrella Facility for Gen- worked internationally. At the same ment, by improving health and educa- der Equality (UFGE). The goal of the time, relaxing the constraints to more tional outcomes in children as well as MGF is to enhance women’s economic participation will require an evolution in by reducing misallocation of the econ- opportunities, by supporting action plan the social understanding of the nature of omy’s resources. “When women’s labor development by countries, as well as to unpaid household work and the nature is underused or misallocated—because promote new region-wide research and of gendered roles in the workplace. they face discrimination in markets or public dialogue. societal institutions that prevent them The report builds on the 2012 World The main focus of the report is wom- from completing their education, enter- Development Report (WDR), which de- en’s economic opportunities, as opposed ing certain occupations, and earning the fines three drivers of gender equality: to the broader issue of women’s em- same incomes as men—economic losses formal institutions (refer to in this re- powerment. Female empowerment can are the result” (World Bank 2012, 3). port as “legal aspects”), informal insti- be understood as “the ability of women tutions (also referred to as “norms and To this end, in January 2019, Iraq, to access the constituents of develop- beliefs”), and issues related to markets, Jordan, and Lebanon announced ambi- ment—in particular, health, education, INTRODUCTION . 29 with a focus on women’s engagement in ity, affordability, availability, and access), tivities; subsequent reports are intended productive activities in the labor market. which may lead women to withdraw to focus on specific issues for a deep dive The WDR framework further implies from the labor market (having a child). in each of them. that gender outcomes in endowments, We present the evidence on the dif- The report discusses three central economic opportunities, and agency ferent barriers that women may face in questions. First, how limited is female may drive progress in other dimensions the Mashreq countries toward partici- economic opportunity in the Mashreq? of gender equality. Acknowledging this pating in the labor market during these Second, what are the underlying causes? connection, the present report embeds critical turning-points—and with a lens And third, what can be done? The report gender issues in endowments and agen- on whether the specific constraints wom- will also outline key potential issues for cy into the analysis but with respect to en face in each phase are related to legal more in-depth research, discussion, and their potential to facilitate economic aspects, informal institutions, and mar- follow-up forums, such as the role of the participation. kets. The countries’ legal frameworks, as digital economy, the disparities between Women encounter barriers at four part of formal institutions, shape wom- de jure and de facto laws and regulations, critical turning points at which women en’s engagement in paid work by prohib- and the importance of the care economy. may decide to withdraw from the la- iting (or not) discriminatory practices Issues of FLFP are well-known and bor market or never enter, with effects and promoting (or not) the balancing of have been researched in all three coun- possibly varying across backgrounds. family and work. Informal institutions, tries, this report represents a contribu- We refer to these turning points or life particularly social norms, also may con- tion to the literature. It combines the transitions as “getting ready,” “entering strain women’s economic participation known educational differences in par- and remaining,” “getting married,” and by framing gender roles that women ticipation with the life-cycle approach to “having a child.” Women and girls re- and men in specific societies deem ac- analyze each constraint as it occurs at a quire the ability to get the right skills and ceptable, implying specific shared be- particular critical point in a woman’s life, build and exercise their agency in order liefs about the appropriateness of certain while recognizing that these experience to get ready for their successful transi- characteristics and behaviors. Finally, will be different for women of different tion from school to work (getting ready). markets define the availability of oppor- educational backgrounds (which we In the second stage, women encounter a tunities and enablers of participation in treat as a socioeconomic proxy). In ad- number of barriers that may either pre- the labor market, such as the existence dition, the report synthesizes the large vent them from entering altogether or of job opportunities, and the quality of extant literature across this life-cycle lead them to withdraw if those barriers these jobs, as well as the availability and framework to understand how each is- turn out to pose constant constraints characteristics of care infrastructure and sue affects women with different edu- (entering and remaining). Marriage of- transport that influence women’s ability cational attainment. To the review, we ten comes with another set of constraints to access employment opportunities. add a systematic quantitative analysis to women’s participation in the labor This report is intended to be the first to determine which constraints (to the market given related social and legal in a series and includes a set of indicators extent they lend themselves to quantita- constraints related to their role as wives to monitor progress toward increased fe- tive analysis) matter and how much they (getting married). Finally, having a child male economic participation. This first matter relatively.  This analysis brings in implies additional barriers related to is- report will provide an overall picture of often unstudied (in a quantitative sense) sues around care (including acceptabil- women’s participation in economic ac- issues such as gender-based violence and 30 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON social norms (treating the woman, hus- facing host country women. For exam- institutions, and markets. The descrip- band, and community as holding poten- ple, legal barriers to working will be tion of barriers is structured around the tially separate views). Finally, the report much more important, and significant critical turning points. Chapter 3 pro- brings a strong distributional lens to the differences in education and skills also vides a brief description of international issue.  By analyzing each issue over the make it likely that female refugees will experiences with sizeable increases in life cycle by the women’s level of edu- work in very different sectors and occu- female participation in the labor market, cation, we emphasize how differently pations. Consequently, a focus on female while Chapter 4 expands to explore im- women experience the same constraint.  refugees requires a separate analysis (see portant areas where policies can be im- We apply the same lens when consider- Box I.1). proved in the Mashreq countries to low- ing policy responses, asking which sort er these barriers and close participation The rest of the report is structured as of women will benefit from different in- gaps, as well as an emerging opportunity follows. Chapter 1 provides a description terventions. that, if used well, can accelerate this pro- of women’s economic opportunities in cess. Chapter 5 concludes and reflects on The report does not cover issues re- Mashreq countries and highlights dif- how the COVID-19 outbreak and the lated to female refugees in these three ferences in labor participation across measures to contain it may exacerbate host countries. The incentives and con- critical life stages. Chapter 2 presents ev- some of the barriers faced by women. straints to female participation among idence on the different barriers faced by refugees in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon women toward participating in the labor are likely to be very different from those market, related to legal aspects, informal INTRODUCTION . 31 BOX I.1 Economic participation among refugees in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Over the past nine years, 35 years of development gains have unraveled in Syria. Despite the country’s classification as a lower-middle-income country as recently as 2018, current indicators place Syria’s lev- el of development alongside that of low-income, fragile states such as Afghanistan and Somalia (World Bank 2018). Among displaced Syrians, access to livelihoods is the second most reported conditionality on returns to Syria, after assurances of security (UNHCR 2019). While Syrians currently have better access to livelihoods in countries of asylum than they do in Syria, poverty prevails among all areas of displacement. With the unemployment rate among Syrian women at 43 percent in Jordan in 2018, 37 percent in Lebanon in 2018, and 32 percent in Iraq in 2017, the situation is particularly harsh for women (UNHCR et al 2018; UNHCR et al 2019; Tiltnes, Åge A. et al. 2019).a The LFP rate of Syrian women is higher in Syria (12 percent in 2017) than in Lebanon, and Jordan (11 percent in 2019 and seven percent in 2018, respectively), and just below the 14 percent for Syrian refugee women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI, where 98 percent of Syrian refugees are in Iraq) in 2017 (World Bank 2019a; Tiltnes, Åge A. et al. 2019). Overall, in these contexts, some reasons for low FLP are likely similar between refugees and non-displaced women – such as initial conditions, economic structure, and social norms – though they exist alongside more complex constraints and incentives related to displacement. As noted earlier in the introduction, low participation in the economic spheres comes together with limited political participation, access to capi- tal, and legal barriers; these issues are particularly salient among displaced persons, who face a host of political and social barriers and opportunities to accessing livelihoods as refugees in third countries that host country women do not. This differs further by context. Lack of access to income opportunities impedes return efforts, and blocks access to health, utilities, ed- ucation, and documentation. Despite this, as Syrian FLP before the crisis was even lower than in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, some female refugees may be less likely to look for work than their host community counterpart. However, as may be the case in lower income countries on the left of the U-shaped curve above, their displacement and poverty may force them to do so. In Jordan and Lebanon, Syrian refugees are employed largely in the informal sector, where they work without permits or formal contracts and, when in formal employment, are often limited to agriculture, manufacturing sectors, and home-based businesses in food processing, handicrafts, and tailoring. There is some evidence to suggest that these areas may be less desirable to men and deemed more socially “suitable” for women, perhaps increasing FLP (UNHCR et al 2019).b Moreover, harassment of Syrian men seeking work in Jordan and Lebanon may open opportunities for women to seek work. 32 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON However, there is also a documented fear of aid loss associated with formal employment, which can limit overall demand for employment (Amjad et al. 2018; CARE 2017). While Syrian refugees in the KRI are eligi- ble for work as long as they are not in a camp and have residency, they face a lack of formal jobs and long distances to available jobs (WFP et al. 2018).c Across contexts, refugee women face unique challenges in finding employment, including domestic and childcare responsibilities, familial and societal restrictions, and a documented fear of sexual harassment in the workplace (World Bank 2019b). Many refugee families may also begin to rely on child labor and early marriage to get by, further limiting women’s demand for employment. a. T hi s i s compared t o 2 2 perc ent fo r m en in Jo rdan ( 2 0 1 8 ) , 30 p e rc e nt i n L e b a no n ( 2018) , a nd 15 p e rc e nt fo r m e n i n t he K RI ( 2017) . U ne m p l oym ent ra tes i n Syr i a are 15 p erc ent ( 2 0 1 7 ) overall , in c ludin g 1 1 perc ent fo r m e n ( 2016) a nd 41 p e rc e nt fo r wo m e n ( 2017) . b . In L eb anon, Syr ian refug ees’ a bilit y t o wo rk is lin ked t o l e g a l re s i d e ncy, t i e d t o ref u g e e re g i s t ra t i o n w i t h U NH CR. Si nc e 2015, t he g ove r nment h a s n ot allowed UNHCR t o reg ist er refug ees, lim it in g refug ee a bility t o o bt a i n re s i d e ncy a nd wo r k . c. In-camp refu gees in t h e K R I are n ot im m ediat ely elig ible fo r wo r k a nd re s i d e ncy, a s o u t- of- c a m p ref u g e e s a re . O u t- of- c a m p ref u g e e s a re el i gi bl e fo r resi d ency u pon ap plic at io n , provided t h ey a re reg ist ered a s ref u g e e s w i t h U NH CR a nd t he Ku rd i s t a n Re g i o na l G ove r nm e nt . NOTES 1. The cited estimates are based on Aguirre et al. (2012), Daly (2007), and McKinsey Global Institute (2015); and they ignore “dampening factors, such as potential drop of labor market productivity and/or drop in average hours worked due to part-time employment” (World Bank 2017, 9). 2. Syria is not included in the World Development Indicators but had a pre-crisis FLFP rate of 13 percent (World Bank 2019). 3. According to the Millennium Development Goals, the main indicators that as- sess gender equality and women’s empowerment are Gender Gap in Education, Women’s Share of Wage Employment in the Non-Agricultural Sector, and the Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments. According to Ka- beer (2010), it is impossible to advance one without expanding the other two or to explain the limit in one without linking it to potential deficiencies in the other indicators. Since then, the fifth Sustainable Development Goal, Gender Equali- ty, entails a main target related to economic empowerment: “Give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws.” The goal is directly linked to indicators such as the conditions of women in the agricultural sector and the legal frameworks that regulate women’s rights. INTRODUCTION . 33 REFERENCES Aguirre, D., L. Hoteit, C. Rupp, and K. Sabbagh. 2012. “Empowering the Third Billion. Women and the World of Work in 2012.” Booz and Company. Conway, M., A. Khandros, A. Della Guardia, M. Wai-Poi, and G. Seshan. Forthcom- ing. “Forced Displacement in the Mashreq: Impact on Household Welfare.” World Bank, Washington, DC. Daly, K. 2007. “Gender Inequality, Growth, and Global Ageing.” Global Economics Paper 154, Goldman Sachs. Doss, C. R. 2006. “The Effects of Intrahousehold Property Ownership on Expenditure Patterns in Ghana.” Journal of African Economies 15 (1): 149–80. Duflo, E.  2012.  “Women Empowerment and Economic Development.”  Journal of Economic Literature 50 (4): 1051–79. Goldin, C. 1995. “The U-Shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic Devel- opment and Economic History.” In Investment in Women’s Human Capital and Economic Development, edited by T. S. Schultz, 61–90. Chicago: Chicago Uni- versity Press. Hoddinott, J., and L. Haddad. 1995. “Does Female Income Share Influence House- hold Expenditures? Evidence from Côte D’Ivoire.” Oxford Bulletin of Econom- ics and Statistics 57 (1): 77–96. Kabeer, N. 2010. “Women’s Empowerment, Development Interventions and the Man- agement of Information Flows.” IDS Bulletin 41 (6): 105–13. Klasen, S. 2019. “What Explains Uneven Female Labor Force Participation Levels and Trends in Developing Countries.” The World Bank Research Observer 34 (2): 161–97. Mammen, K., and C. Paxson.  2000.  “Women›s Work and Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (4): 141–64. McKinsey Global Institute. 2015. “The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12 Trillion to Global Growth.” McKinsey & Company, September. Rubalcava, Luis, Graciela Teruel, and Duncan Thomas. 2009. “Investments, Time Preferences, and Public Transfers Paid to Women.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 57 (3): 507–38. 34 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON Schady, Norbert, and José Rosero. 2008. “Are Cash Transfers Made to Women Spent Like Other Sources of Income?” Economics Letters 101 (3): 246–48. World Bank. 2012.  World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Develop- ment. Washington, DC: World Bank.  ———. 2017. “Progress towards Gender Equality in the Middle East and North Af- rica Region.” Note for Regional Gender Action Plan (RGAP) FY18–23, World Bank, Washington, DC. ———. 2019. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis. Washington, DC: World Bank. INTRODUCTION . 35 C HAPT 36 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TER 1 The state of women’s economic opportunities in the Mashreq today 37 38 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON This first chapter presents a succinct description of the key labor indicators for women and men associated with participation in the labor market in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon—the Mashreq countries examined in this report. It also highlights the differences observed as women go through critical life stages, for the total population and across levels of education (as a proxy for socioeconomic status). FEMALE ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION REMAINS LOW, PARTICULARLY FOR LESS EDUCATED WOMEN, THOUGH YOUNGER GENERATIONS ARE BECOMING MORE ACTIVE It is well established that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has the lowest female labor force participation (FLFP) rates in the world; Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon are no exception. According to the most recent International Labour Or- ganization estimates, on average 21 percent of women aged 15–64 in the region are active in the labor market, significantly below the next region, Latin America and the Caribbean, where 57 percent of women are active. FLFP rates in Iraq and Jordan are among the lowest in the MENA region (at 13.0 and 15.1 percent, respectively), and thus they are among the countries with the lowest participation rates in the world. Lebanon, at 26.3 percent, ranks 17th, which is rather low for its level of development but above other countries in the region (such as the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Is- lamic Republic of Iran, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia) and outside the region (including India and Pakistan). Given that men’s participation rates are similar to other countries in the world for their level of development, the gender gaps in labor force participa- tion in the Mashreq countries are among the highest in the world. CHAPTER 1 . 39 FIGURE 1.1 Female and male labor force participation for ages 15–64, 10-year averages, 1990–2018 a. Female labor force participaiton b. Male labor force participaiton 100 100 80 80 Share of labor force (%) Share of labor force (%) 60 60 40 40 20 20 0 0 Iraq Jordan Lebanon Middle World Iraq Jordan Lebanon Middle World East and East and North North Africa Africa 1990 - 99 2000 - 09 2010 - 18 1990 - 99 2000 - 09 2010 - 18 S ource: Wor ld Develop ment I n dic a t o rs; I nt ern a t io n al La bo ur Org a ni z a t i o n ( ILO ) m o d e l e d e s t i m a t e s . N ote: Ten-year averages a re repo rt ed g iven t h e int erpo lat io n pro c e d u re of ILO e s t i m a t e s w he n l a b o r fo rc e o r ho u s e ho l d s u r vey ye a rs a re m i s s i ng . Fo r Ira q, av ai lab le sur vey years a re 1 9 9 7 , 2 0 0 7 , 2 0 1 2 , 2 0 1 4 , 2 0 1 6 , an d 2 0 17; fo r L e b a no n, av a i l a b l e s u r vey ye a rs a re 2004, 2007, a nd 2009. Women’s participation in the labor accrued in the 2000s and mirrors the fall old, suggesting a generational shift that market in the Mashreq countries has in males’ participation during the same is not seen to the same extent in Iraq. In remained fairly stable over time, albeit period, likely linked to the Iraq war in the Lebanon, women aged 15–44 are twice as with slight improvements. As mentioned early 2000s. Since then, however, women likely to participate as those aged 45–64 in the introduction, although it is true do not seem to continue gaining ground (figure 1.2). In Jordan, the profile across that the three countries are currently lo- in the labor market. In Jordan, female age groups is similar, though at lower lev- cated at the lower part of the U-shaped participation also increased, by about els. Women aged 25–34 reached a partic- relationship between per capita gross do- 2 percentage points between the 1990s ipation rate of about 35 percent, whereas mestic product and female participation, and the 2010s, whereas male’s partici- less than 15 percent of those 45 and older the historical trend—available only since pation declined as the economy slowed participate in the labor market. As seen the early 1990s—does not suggest that down. In Lebanon, by contrast, women 4 in other countries, these patterns of dif- these countries have been following such seem to have been gaining ground in the ferential participation across age groups a pattern, or at least not strongly. FLFP economic sphere—albeit very slowly5 might represent a generational shift in is as of 2018 about 3 percentage points and without associated losses in men’s which younger cohorts participate more higher than it was in the 1990s (figure participation. often in the labor market than their old- 1.1), representing a rise of approximate- er counterparts (World Bank 2014). Go- In Lebanon and Jordan, participation ly 1 percentage point every 10 years. In ing forward, the changing demographic is significantly higher among younger Iraq, most of the increase in FLFP was profile of working women may push for women than among those over 45 years 40 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON BOX 1.1 Data sources: A comparison The present report draws labor market indicators from two different sources. For international benchmarking, the report uses information on labor force participation, unemployment, and employment by gender derived from the In- ternational Labour Organization (ILO) modeled estimates across countries and over time. These data have been har- monized to allow for comparison across countries, within the Mashreq and outside of the region. In addition, the ILO estimates labor indicators for years in which data are not available, using a series of econometric models to fill gaps. For participation rates, linear interpolations of logistic transformed rates are used to fill in missing data for coun- tries for which this is possible. In other cases, data are estimated using a weighted least squares model, across nine groups of countries, based on economic similarity and geographical proximity. Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon fall within the group of Middle East and North Africa countries (see ILO 2017 for detailed explanation). Explanatory variables include gross domestic product per capita , gross domestic product growth, and population shares by age groups. For analysis on more disaggregated statistics—such as female employment by levels of education and marital sta- tus—as well as for the regression analyses presented in the next section, the report uses survey data from each of the three countries in the Mashreq. Specifically, the surveys employed are the 2012 Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey, 2016 Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey 2016, and 2011–12 Lebanon Household Budget Survey. These sur- veys were chosen because of their national coverage and the availability of a range of variables useful to the analysis proposed. The Iraq and Jordan surveys are also publicly available, which allows for replication of results by a wider audience.a The headline indicators are consistent between these surveys and the ILO modeled estimates but do not always co- incide. Table B1.1.1 shows the estimates for female labor force participation using these different sources, as well as the official national source of reporting for labor indicators in each of these countries. TA B L E B 1 . 1 . 1 Sources used in this report International Labour Household survey Official labor force Organization modeled used in the report statistics estimate Iraq (2012) 12.6 15.5 11.9 Jordan (2016) 14.9 18.2 13.2 Lebanon (2012) 25.1 32.8 22.4 Source: Wor ld Bank . Not e: For L ebanon, t h e offic ial la bo r fo rc e st at ist ic c lo sest t o t he 2012 L e b a no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey i s fo r 2009. Re c e nt ly, t he Ce nt ral Adm i n i s - t rat i on of St at i st i c s publish ed a n ew la bo r est im at es based o n t he 2018- 19 L a b o r Fo rc e a nd H o u s e ho l d L i v i ng Co nd i t i o ns Su r vey. T he 2018/1 9 fem a l e lab or force par t i cipa t io n is 2 9 . 3 perc ent fo r wo m en a g ed 15 a nd a b ove . a. Access t o t he m ic ro dat a of t h ese t wo surveys c an be fo u nd i n t he fo ll ow i ng l i nks . Fo r t he 2012 Ira q H o u s e ho l d So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey, s ee https : // mi crodat a. wor ldban k . o rg / in dex . ph p/ c at a lo g / 2 3 3 4 . Fo r t h e 2016 J o rd a n L a b o r M a r ket Pa ne l Su r vey 2016, s e e ht t p : / / w w w. e r f d a t a p o r t a l . c o m / i n dex.ph p/ cat alog/139 CHAPTER 1 . 41 FIGURE 1.2 FIGURE 1.3 Participation rates, by age group, selected Mashreq countries Adjusted participation, by education level, women and men ages 15–64 in selected Mashreq countries Share of population in the labor force, ages 15–64 (%) 95.3 100 88.5 89.9 93.2 88.9 90.0 Share of female population, by age group (%) 82.7 70 80 72.8 75.1 63.6 67.3 60 60 49.8 50 40 28.0 30.9 19.9 20 10.5 8.2 11.3 40 0 30 Less than secondary Some secondary Less than secondary Complete Secondary Less than secondary Complete Secondary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary 20 10 0 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 Iraq Jordan Lebanon Iraq Jordan Lebanon (adjusted) Female LFP (adjusted) Male LFP S ources: 2011–12 L eb ano n Ho useh o ld B udg et S urvey ; 2 0 1 2 I ra q H o u s e ho l d So u rc e s : 2011–12 L e b a no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey ; 2012 Ira q Ho us eh o l d S oci o-Economi c Su r vey; 2 0 1 6 Jo rdan La bo r M a rket Pan el S urvey. So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey ; 2016 J o rd a n L a b o r M a r ket Pa ne l Su r vey. N ote: Soli d li nes represe nt pa rt ic ipat io n ra t es; dot t ed lin es exc l u d e t ho s e Not e : Ad j u s t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n ra t e i s t he s ha re of wo m e n ( b l u e b a rs ) a n d in full-t i me educat i on. m e n ( o ra ng e l i ne s ) i n t he l a b o r fo rc e ove r t he t ot a l p o p u l a t i o n exc l udi n g t ho s e i n f u ll- t i m e e d u c a t i o n. L F P = l a b o r fo rc e p a r t i c i p a t i o n. increasing female participation as older en with tertiary education are either em- for Jordan). In the rest of the report, it cohorts leave the labor force. In Iraq, ployed or seeking a job. These rates are will be critical to distinguish between the distinction across age groups is less similar to those found in high-income these different groups. Education is used stark, with participation rates remaining countries, as well as among male coun- also to signal other family and individual almost unchanged for women between terparts in their own countries. But characteristics, such as socioeconom- 20 and 54 years old. This consistency women with tertiary education represent ic status, location, and individual em- may suggest that in Iraq the generational a small proportion of the total female powerment associated with achieving a shift is yet to come. population in these countries: about 12 certain level of education. In Iraq, 9 out percent in Iraq, 27 percent in Jordan, and of 10 women living in rural areas have Women’s participation in the labor 31 percent in Lebanon (see table A.2 in no secondary education, even among market is particularly low for less ed- the appendix). Therefore, low labor force the younger age group. Across Mashreq ucated women. Both men and women participation is a feature of less educat- countries, less educated women live in participate more the higher their educa- ed women, who represent most of the larger households with lower household tional achievement, yet the association population of these countries (see Ata- income or expenditure per person (table between education and participation is manov, Constant, and Lundvall 2016 for A.2 in the appendix). much stronger for women (figure 1.3). In Lebanon; Winkler and Gonzalez 2019 the three countries, two-thirds of wom- 42 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON WOMEN IN THE LABOR By far the most common type of work arrangement among women who are FORCE ARE LESS LIKELY working is through wage employment, TO GET A JOB AND TEND partially reflecting a more educated pull TO BE ENGAGED IN LESS of female workers relative to men. In Iraq, slightly over 60 percent of working PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES women receive a salary or wage (10 per- centage points below the share for men), 11 percent contribute to the family busi- As in other countries of the region, un- appendix). Of women who work in Leb- ness, and only 25 percent are self-em- employment among women is about anon and Jordan, over two-thirds work ployed (figure 1.4). This composition of twice as high as that of men, and less than in service sectors, including the pub- employment seems closer to the one ob- a quarter of women are employed. Fe- lic sector (among more highly educat- served in upper-middle-income coun- male unemployment is particularly high ed women) and domestic employment tries, despite Iraq’s status as a lower-mid- in Jordan, reaching nearly 25 percent of (among less educated ones). Women are, dle-income country. In Jordan and women in the labor force (compared to however, significantly less likely to be in- Lebanon, for their part, women engage 13 percent among men). Iraq and Leb- formal than men, because they are over- almost exclusively in wage employment anon present lower levels of unemploy- represented in public sector jobs. These activities, and to a much larger extent ment (12 and 10 percent, respectively), differences remain, even controlling for than men, contrasting to observations but these rates are still almost twice the other characteristics (Angel-Urdinola et for the MENA region as a whole and av- rates experienced by men.6 The result al. 2014). A possible reason is that wom- erages across different income levels. In of the low female participation and rel- en who participate tend to be more ed- part, the high share of wage employees atively high unemployment rates is that ucated and are able to queue for better relative to other types of employment is only 10 to 20 percent of all adult women paid formal public sector jobs. Within associated with the fact that women who are engaged in some economic activity. the private sector, women are paid less participate in the labor market are more By contrast, between half and two-thirds than their male counterparts. In Jordan, educated than men (figure 1.5), and that of men are employed (table A.1 in the the private sector gender wage gap is more-educated workers are more likely appendix). estimated to be about 17 percent, after to have a wage employment. It may also Working women seem to be restrict- controlling for observable characteristics reflect a different structure of the labor ed to certain sectors and earn less than (Kasoolu et al. 2019). In Lebanon, the market and differential gender barriers men for comparable jobs. As in other earnings gap for the whole universe of faced by workers in these countries. countries in the region, when women are workers is estimated to be about 22 per- employed, they tend to work in specific cent, after controlling for characteristics In Iraq and Jordan, most wage-earn- “‘feminized’ industries and occupations and selection.7 In addition, in Lebanon ing women work in the public sector. in relative isolation from men” (Tzanna- women tend to occupy lower-paid jobs In Jordan, for example, about half of tos 2016). In Iraq, 24 percent of employed on a fixed-term contract basis and are all women work in the public sector, women work in agriculture, compared less likely to attain fixed long-term posts, compared to just over a third of men to 18 percent of men, and most have and very few reach management or se- (Winkler and Gonzalez 2019). More low levels of education (table A.2 in the nior positions (Wallace 2013). highly educated workers—both men CHAPTER 1 . 43 FIGURE 1.4 FIGURE 1.5 Share of employment, by type, selected Mashreq countries and Composition of workers, by gender and level of education, comparators, 2018 selected Mashreq countries 2.8 5.2 3.4 3.3 4.7 Men 6.4 Lebanon 11.0 8.3 15.8 15.1 18.0 9.5 10.0 25.0 21.6 Share of employment (%) 20.4 12.4 31.0 Women 24.1 28.1 24.3 38.1 27.7 52.8 42.3 Men Jordan 96.7 83.4 83.1 72.3 70.2 70.5 61.6 Women 56.8 58.7 60.0 52.6 51.7 35.7 31.3 Men Iraq Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Women Iraq Jordan Lebanon MENA LMIC UMIC World 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Wage employment Own-account workers Share of workers (%) Employers Contributing family workers Less than secondary Secondary Tertiary S ource: Wor ld Develop ment I n dic a t o rs, ba sed o n I nt ern a t io n al La b o u t So u rc e s : Wo r l d Ba nk c a l c u l a t i o ns b a s e d o n 2011–12 L e b a no n H o us eh o l d O rg ani zat i on mod eled est im at es. Bu d g et Su r vey, 2012 Ira q H o u s e ho l d So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey, a nd 2 0 1 6 N ote: L MIC = lower-mi d dle-in c o m e c o unt ries; M E N A = M iddle E a s t a nd J o rd a n L a b o r M a r ket Pa ne l Su r vey 2016. N orth Afr i ca; UMIC = upper-m iddle-in c o m e c o unt ries. and women—are more likely to be em- acceptable job for women. Nonetheless, cent). The relatively high participation ployed in government. But the relation with job growth in the public sector con- of Iraqi women in own-account activi- is much sharper among women (Assaad, strained by fiscal pressures in all three ties is directly associated with own-farm Hendy, and Yassine 2012). Over half countries, increases in female participa- activities. Indeed, half of women with of tertiary-educated Jordanian women tion will require a change in the type of less than primary education are listed are employed in the public sector, com- job many women are seeking. as own-account workers, and the large pared to a quarter among those with majority of those are engaged in agricul- The low level of entrepreneurship less than complete secondary education tural activities. Still, their access to as- among women observed in the Mashreq (table A.2 in the appendix). Even starker sets is low. As will be shown in the next is reflected (or affected) by women’s lim- differences are found in Iraq and Leba- section, only one in five women in Iraq, ited access to assets. Even accounting for non. In some countries, such as Jordan, and one in three in Lebanon, has a bank the different educational profile of wom- the larger presence of public sector jobs account at a financial institution. In ad- en relative to men, women’s engagement among women may reflect the tertiary dition, given the inheritance rights in in self-employed or employer activities education gap of women over men or, these countries, women’s access to land is extremely low in Jordan (at less than 3 alternatively, public norms on what is an titles is often restricted. percent) and low in Lebanon (at 12 per- 44 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON WEAK LABOR DEMAND trade, FDI, and remittances for Jordan. Together, these headwinds have hurt Jor- REPRESENTS A FIRST- dan’s growth rate (i.e. per-capita income ORDER CONSTRAINT growth has been negative every year FOR OBTAINING GAINFUL since 2010) and, in turn, its employment rate. The country’s business environment EMPLOYMENT FOR BOTH has also stymied job creation. The World WOMEN AND MEN Bank Enterprise Surveys report lists high tax rates as firms’ largest obstacle, and the World Bank’s DPF2 program The lack of insufficient job creation (par- gross domestic product growth rate of 6.2 recommends lowering social-security ticularly of good quality jobs) lies at the percent per year or higher. In Lebanon, and labor taxes. In addition, the pub- center of the observed patterns of partic- the moderate growth, uneven because of lic-sector wage premium is 300%, SOEs ipation and employment among women. large and frequent shocks (mostly politi- are relatively dominant, and firm entry/ Weak labor demand in the MENA region cal) has not translated into sufficient job exit rates are among the lowest in the has been documented extensively (see, for creation. In addition, the jobs created world. These factors likely crowd out pri- instance, Schiffbauer et al. 2015; World have typically been of low quality and in vate-sector labor demand. Bank 2013) and is likely to be a first-order low productivity sectors (Le Borgne and Iraq’s political instability and oil de- determinant of observed economic out- Jacobs 2016). Estimates from Le Borgne pendency are hostile to robust job cre- comes for women. The greater political and Jacobs (2016) put Lebanon’s employ- ation. With the 2003-2011 Iraq War and instability in the region has increased the ment-to-growth elasticity at 0.2, which is the 2014-2017 Iraqi Civil War, violence burden on economies. Economic growth low even among MENA countries. The has been a significant barrier to Iraq’s in the region has slowed in the since 2010 implication is persistently high unem- growth prospects. In addition, Iraq’s and, with it, the rate at which jobs are cre- ployment, especially among youth and system of sectarian power sharing (or ated. Employment growth in Mashreq has women. Behind the limited job creation, “Muhasasa” system) has created an in- not been able to overcome the fast pace the authors point to weak firm entry and centive for ministers to reward political of demographic growth (driven by high productivity growth. supporters with government jobs. This fertility and influx of workers from neigh- Both external geopolitical shocks inflates the public-sector wage premium boring countries). Winkler and Gonzalez and the internal business environment (which is 300%-400%), limits compe- (2019) project that employment rates in have suppressed Jordan’s labor demand. tition and contestability in the private Jordan will remain at 50 percent or less of The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have con- sector, and decreases labor demand. the labor force until 2040 at current rates strained Jordan’s ability to trade with its Iraq’s dependence on oil exports has also of job creation and would reach only 80 neighbors and led to a large influx of caused an incidence of Dutch Disease, percent of the working-age population refugees; as a result, the IMF estimates with agriculture and manufacturing if the rate of employment creation in- that the Syrian crisis alone has destroyed now accounting for less than 6% of GDP. creased to 5 percent every year from 2015 the equivalent of one-fifth of Jordan’s Overall, the World Bank Doing Business through 2040 (figure 1.6). Given current annual GDP. Similarly, lower oil prices report ranks Iraq 175th in the world for employment-to-growth elasticities, this since 2014 have stalled the GCC econ- its ease of doing business. employment creation implies a required omies, which are important sources of CHAPTER 1 . 45 FIGURE 1.6 Projected working-age population and employment gap in Jordan 9.000.000 8.000.000 7.000.000 Number of people 6.000.000 5.000.000 4.000.000 3.000.000 2.000.000 1.000.000 - 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 Tot al Employ ment (low) Work ing Age Popul ation Tot al Employ ment (high) S ou rce: W i nkler and Gonza lez 2 0 1 9 . In a context of economic slowdown result is that employment opportunities sures in all three countries, growth of and conflict-related crisis in the region, for women are highly concentrated in the public sector jobs might be limited, add- weak labor demand may continue to public sector; in a context of fiscal pres- ing to labor demand constraints. constrain economic opportunities for women and men going forward. Wom- en, however, may face additional barriers WOMEN MAY FACE that could affect them to an even larger ADDITIONAL BARRIERS, extent. Low job growth for all affects RELATED TO THEIR ROLE women more than men, because the general societal preference for men in IN SOCIETY AND IN THEIR the few available jobs reduces women’s FAMILIES, BECAUSE chances of entering productive activities. PARTICIPATION RATES According to the World Values Survey 2010-12 a large majority of Jordanians ARE LOWER FOR MARRIED believes that, “when jobs are scarce, men WOMEN AND THOSE WITH should have more right to a job than women.” In addition, in countries such YOUNG CHILDREN as Iraq, which are highly dependent on Beyond these demand-side constraints, ample, access to different types of capital, oil-related industries that are not labor supply-side factors compound the weak including human, physical and financial, intensive and tend to be male dominat- demand issues and affect women more access to safe public transportation, laws ed, the economy generates less demand than men. These barriers include, for ex- and regulations, and societal preferences for women in the private sector.8 The 46 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON for men taking the few available jobs. thout children, however, are more li- with one substantive difference rela- Additional women-specific barriers kely to participate than their married tive to Iraq: women without children, constraining their participation are as- counterparts (22 percent compared to unmarried or married, present simi- sociated with their position in society as 14 percent). Indeed, the latter group lar levels of participation, about 70 a whole and in their families—as wives, presents the lowest participation rate percent. With young children (birth mothers, and care providers. Participa- among groups all considered. Al- to three years) this rate drops dras- tion rates vary significantly as women go though differences are small, women tically to less than 30 percent. No- through these various stages. with older children experience higher netheless, as their younger children In all three countries, getting mar- participation than those with young reach school age, women enter the ried and having children is associated ones. After the youngest child finishes labor force to a slightly larger extent with lower probability of participating in compulsory education, participation but the rate recovers only after the the labor market. Noticeable differenc- reaches the same level as for women youngest child leaves compulsory es exist, however, across countries. Ex- without children. Disaggregating this education. The effect of having young tending analysis done by Assaad, Hendy, pattern by urban and rural areas re- children is also seen within the uni- and Yassine (2012) for Jordan, this sec- veals some interesting distinctions. verse of employed women. Among tion looks at how participation rates for Differences in participation rates re- women without children, less than men and women varied as they changed main small across these life events, 10 percent work in a part-time job their position in the family. Figure 1.7 but they increase in rural areas after (figure A.2 in the appendix). But, for shows participation rates for women children are four years old. By the those with children under four, this and men aged 15–44 and not in school, time their children exit compulsory proportion shoots up to 50 percent. from being unmarried to being married education, women have participation Despite a later decline, part-time to having children; the youngest child rates that are 7 percentage points hi- work shows a permanent effect as a is segmented into the ages of infancy, gher than when they were unmarried desirable option for those with chil- preschool, compulsory schooling, and (see figure A.1 in the appendix). The dren—even after those children leave older. Participation rates are adjusted in opposite is true among urban Ira- compulsory education. Once women the sense that they exclude women and qis. Unmarried urban women have have a child, they either exit the la- men who are inactive because of being the highest participation rate, which bor force or, if they can, switch to a in full-time education. Although these falls once they marry and have young part-time arrangement. comparisons do not represent the same children. Although this rate increases • Finally, in Jordan, married women individuals over time, they provide a after children reach the aged of four, with no children have a 20-percen- first approximation of how these key life these women’s participation, even af- tage-point lower probability than events affect women’s and men’s partici- ter their children are out of compul- unmarried women of participating pation in the labor market. The following sory education, remains 5 percentage in the labor market. Having children, insights emerge for each of the countries: points lower than that of their unma- lowers the participation even more, rried counterparts.9 • In Iraq, participation in the labor but these differences are not statisti- market is low irrespective of family si- • Lebanon also exhibits a fertility im- cally significant. tuation, with rates never higher than pact, albeit with much higher initial • It is worth noting that in all three 25 percent. Unmarried women wi- rates and subsequent declines and countries men experience the oppo- CHAPTER 1 . 47 site profile, with higher participation percent. The recovery for women with in the three countries, getting married rates for married men and for men children is significant only once children and having young children affect wom- with younger children than for their are out of compulsory education. en’s likelihood of entering or remaining unmarried counterparts. in the labor force, even if the degree to In sum, economic participation of which they do so varied across countries. The profile for the average women women in the Mashreq countries is gen- hides substantial heterogeneity across erally low, with differences across the These differences across education women with varying levels of education. three countries. Iraq presents one of the groups (taken as proxy for socioeconom- In all three countries, tertiary-educated lowest FLFP rates in the world, across ic status), suggest that barriers to enter- women have higher participation rates all age groups, and women who do par- ing and remaining in the labor market from the start, similar to their male ticipate tend to do so only part time. At vary and bind to different extent for each counterparts (figure 1.8). As women the other extreme, despite continued low of these groups. Therefore, as we review marry and have young children, their economic engagement in Lebanon (rela- these factors that constrain women’s en- engagement in the labor market falls—in tive to its development), the behavior of gagement in economic activities, we will some cases by as much as 20 percentage younger cohorts suggests a generational consider their importance for women points—but still remains within the par- shift not seen to the same extent in Iraq. of different levels of education (proxy ticipation observed in upper-middle- Jordan falls somewhere in between, clos- for socioeconomic status) as they go and high-income countries. At the other er to Iraq in terms of women’s engage- through these critical life stages. Some of extreme, less educated women seldom ment in the labor market (participation these barriers are related to the opportu- enter the labor market (less than 20 per- rates and importance of public sector) nities open to women if they decide to cent do so in all three countries), a situ- and closer to Lebanon in terms of the engage in paid economic activities. Less ation that changes slightly, though from level of education of its population. educated women are more likely to live already low levels, as they go through in rural areas and engage in agriculture Despite the differences, some simi- marriage and have children. This find- (in Iraq) or in urban areas in unpaid or larities also appear across countries for ing is true for both Iraq and Jordan, but low-wage services, such as domestic em- specific groups associated with their lev- not for Lebanon. For a third group in the ployment (in Jordan or Lebanon). At the el of education, particularly with respect middle, both getting married and having other extreme, a typical tertiary-educat- to how participation varies as women go young children lower the probability at ed woman who enters into any economic through different critical life stages. In each of these stages, with starker differ- activity does so in an urban public sec- all three countries, half of all tertiary-ed- ences in Iraq than in Jordan. tor job. In between, secondary-educated ucated women are engaged in the labor women are more likely than their coun- Unlike in Iraq and Jordan, in Leba- market, in significantly higher propor- terparts to experience unemployment in non, the participation profiles of women tion than their less educated counter- Iraq and Lebanon. with less than secondary and with com- parts. In part, the differences between pleted secondary are almost identical. Iraq and Lebanon in average participa- The lowest participation among those tion rates relate to the differential levels with children aged three years is less than of well-being (Lebanon’s population is 20 percent, substantially lower than those generally richer and more educated than without children (married or not) whose Iraq’s) and the structure of their econo- participation reaches between 60 and 80 mies. Beyond these differences, however, 48 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 1.7 Adjusted labor force participation rates for women and men aged 15–44, by different life events, selected Mashreq countries a. Iraq 1.0 Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-12 +13 Married children Age of youngest child Female Male b. Jordan 1.0 Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-15 16+ Married children Age of youngest child Female Male c. Lebanon 1.0 Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-12 16+ Married children Age of youngest child Female Male Sources: Wor ld Bank st a ff c alc ula t io n s ba sed o n 2 0 1 1 – 1 2 Leb a no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey ; 2012 Ira q H o u s e ho l d So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey ; 2016 J o rda n L a bo r Mar ket Panel Sur vey. Not e: The x-axi s cat eg o ries a re n ever m arried, m a rried w it h o u t c hi l d re n, m a r r i e d w i t h yo u ng e s t c hi l d a g e d 0–3 ye a rs , m a r r i e d w i t h yo u ng e s t c h i l d a ged 4 – 5 years, mar r i ed wi t h yo un g est c h ild a g ed 5 – 1 6 years, a n d m a rr i e d w i t h yo u ng e s t c hi l d a g e d 16 ye a rs o r o l d e r. Ad j u s t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n ra t e i s t he ra ti o of wo - men (men) i n t he lab o r fo rc e over t h e t ot a l po pula t io n , exc lud i ng t ho s e i n f u ll- t i m e e d u c a t i o n. CHAPTER 1 . 49 FIGURE 1.8 Adjusted labor force participation rates for women aged 15–44, by different life events and level of education, selected Mashreq countries a. Iraq 1.0 Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.6 Proportion of women by level of education 0.4 • Less than secondary: 64.2% • Some secondary: 24.5% • Tertiary: 11.3% 0.2 0 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-12 +13 Married children Age of youngest child Before secondary Secondary Tertiary b. Jordan 1.0 Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.6 Proportion of women by level of education 0.4 • Less than secondary: 52.6% • Completed secondary: 20.4% 0.2 • Tertiary: 27% 0 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-15 16+ Married children Age of youngest child Before secondary Secondary Tertiary c. Lebanon 1.0 Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.6 Proportion of women by level of 0.4 education • Less than secondary: 52.8% 0.2 • Completed secondary: 16.4% • Tertiary: 30.8% 0 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-15 16+ Married children Age of youngest child Before secondary Secondary Tertiary S ources: Wor ld Bank st aff c a lc ulat io n s based o n 2 0 1 1 – 1 2 Leban o n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey ; 2012 Ira q H o u s e ho l d So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey ; 2016 J orda n L a bo r Market Panel Sur vey. N ote : ad j u st ed p ar t i ci p at io n ra t es is t h e ra t io of wo m en / m en in t h e l a b o r fo rc e ove r t he t ot a l p o p u l a t i o n exc l u d i ng t ho s e i n f u ll t i m e e d u c a t i o n. 50 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON NOTES 4. The decline in male participation since 2009 is concentrated among people in cen- tral ages (Winkler and Gonzalez 2019). 5. Recent released estimates show that, according to the 2018–19 Labor Force and Household Living Conditions Survey FLFP is 29.3 percent for women aged 15 and above (CAS 2020). This rate is similar to the one observed in the 2011–12 Household Budget Survey, although these two surveys are not strictly comparable because of differences in the questionnaires, fieldwork designs, and nonresponse rates. 6. Based on the World Development Indicators and International Labour Organiza- tion modeled estimates. 7. Calculations based on the 2011 Household Budget Survey. 8. Using Do et al. (2011), World Bank (2013, 57) shows that oil-rich countries (with high per capita oil reserves) “have relatively low export driven supplies of fema- le-friend jobs” compared to oil-poor MENA countries. Still, the authors argue, oil-rich MENA countries have labor participation rates well below what would be predicted by their oil reserves or potential demand for female labor, suggesting that other factors may be behind this. 9. We use the terms “falls” and “increase” only figuratively, because we are not obser- ving the same individuals as they go through these different life events. CHAPTER 1 . 51 REFERENCES Angel-Urdinola, D. F., A. Bodor, R. Gatti, and J. Silva. 2014.  Striving for Better Jobs: The Challenge of Informality in the Middle East and North Africa. Directions in Development, Human Development. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Assaad, R., R. Hendy, and C. Yassine. 2012. “Gender and the Jordanian Labor Market.” ERF Working Paper # 701, Economic Research Forum, Cairo. Atamanov, A., S. M. Constant, and J. M. Lundvall. 2016.  “Lebanon Gender Note.” Unpublished manuscript, World Bank, Washington, DC. Central Administration of Statistics [CAS]. 2020. “Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey 2018-2019 Lebanon”, Lebanese Republic Central Administration of Statistics, International Labour Organization, European Union (EU). International Labour Organisation [ILO]. 2017. ILO Labour Force Estimates and Pro- jections: 1990-2030 (2017 Edition) Methodological description. Geneva: Inter- national Labour Office. Kasoolu, S., R. Hausmann, T. O’Brien, and M. Angel Santos. 2019. “Female Labor in Jordan: A Systematic Approach to the Exclusion Puzzle.” CID Faculty Working Paper 365, Center for International Development at Harvard University. Le Borgne, E., and T. J. Jacobs. 2016. “Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity.” Systematic Country Diagnosis, World Bank, Washington, DC. Schiffbauer, Marc, Abdoulaye Sy, Sahar Hussain, Hania Sahnoun, and Philip Keefer. 2014. Jobs or Privileges: Unleashing the Employment Potential of the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. Tzannatos, Zafiris. 2016. Effects of Gender Inequality in Employment and Pay in Jor- dan, Lebanon, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Three Questions An- swered. Geneva: International Labour Office. Wallace, T. 2013. “Women’s Work in Lebanon: Making the Invisible Visible.” CRTDA, Beirut. Winkler, Hernan, and Alvaro Gonzalez. 2019. Jordan Jobs Diagnostic. World Bank, Washington, DC. 52 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON World Bank. 2013. Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa. MENA Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. ———. 2014. “Turkey’s Transitions: Integration, Inclusion, Institutions.” World Bank, Washington, DC. CHAPTER 1 . 53 C HAPT 54 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TER 2 Why is economic participation of women in the Mashreq so low? 55 56 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON This second chapter describes the evidence on the different barriers that women may face in the Mashreq countries toward participating in the labor market. Constraints are related to legal aspects, informal institutions, and markets. These barriers function differently as women go through four critical turning points at which they may decide (or not) to withdraw from the labor market or never enter. The evidence on barriers is structured around these critical turning points: getting ready, entering and remaining in the labor market, getting married, and having a child. ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IS AFFECTED BY BARRIERS RELATED TO INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS, LEGAL RESTRICTIONS, AND MARKETS, EACH OF WHICH INTERVENE AT CRITICAL LIFE TURNING POINTS There seem to be four critical turning points at which some women decide to with- draw from the labor market or never enter, the effect of which may vary across back- grounds. We refer to these turning points or life transitions as “getting ready,” “entering and remaining,” “getting married,” and “having a child” (Figure 2.1). Women and girls require the right skills and the ability to exercise their agency in order to get ready for their successful transition from school to work (getting ready). In the second stage, women encounter a number of barriers that may either prevent them from entering altogether or may lead them to withdraw if those barriers turn out to pose constant CHAPTER 2 . 57 constraints (entering and remaining). Countries’ legal frameworks, as part rity, paid leave, and maternity leave; and Marriage often comes with another set of formal institutions, shape women’s the right to bank loans, debts, and other of constraints to women’s participation engagement in paid work by prohibiting forms of financial credit as put forward in the labor market given related social (or not) discriminatory practices and by in The Convention on the Elimination and legal constraints linked to their role promoting (or not) the balancing of fam- of All Forms of Discrimination against as wives (getting married). Finally, hav- ily and work. Laws and regulations can Women (CEDAW), one of the most ing a child implies additional barriers either promote, protect, or prohibit the significant women’s rights references in related to issues around care (including economic participation of women and the world (World Bank 2020). CEDAW acceptability, affordability, availability, ensure their right to work in similar con- was signed in 1979 and approved by 180 and access), which may lead women to ditions with men and to make an equal countries. It was ratified by Iraq in 1986, withdraw from the labor market (having contribution to the economy (Tzanna- Jordan in 1992, and Lebanon in 1997; a child). tos 2016). The World Bank’s Women, however, the three countries differ in Barriers that women encounter at Business and the Law Report 2020 cites the extent to which they adhere to these each of these critical turning points can evidence showcasing that legal improve- principles, as will be discussed in this be grouped along three drivers of gender ments in the dimensions measured by chapter. equality: legal aspects, informal institu- the Women, Business and the Law in- Informal institutions, particularly tions, and markets. The present report dex—covering 50 years, 190 economies, social norms, also may constrain wom- builds on the 2012 World Development and 35 aspects of the law (and used en’s economic participation. Informal Report (WDR) on Gender Equality and throughout this report)—is associated social institutions are here understood Development, which defines three driv- with greater labor force participation of as “the mechanisms, rules, and proce- ers of gender equality as being formal women, a result that holds when studied dures that shape social interactions but institutions (referred to as “legal aspects” on a global scale (Hyland, Djankov, and do not pertain to the functioning of the from here onward), informal institutions Goldberg 2019). Beyond instrumental state” (World Bank 2012). Social norms (also referred to as “norms and beliefs”), value (on increasing participation in the frame gender roles that women and men and issues related to markets, all of labor market), woman’s right to work is in specific societies deem acceptable, im- which can pose specific barriers to wom- important in itself for equity consider- plying specific shared beliefs about the en’s economic participation—the focus ations, including the right to equal pay appropriateness of certain characteristics of this report. for equal work; the right to social secu- and behaviors. Specific broadly shared perceptions, attitudes, and customs FIGURE 2.1 may define the most acceptable ways of Critical turning points of women’s participation in the labor market how young women and men transition to adulthood, whether or not and at Entering Getting Getting Having which age they get married, and the role and ready married a child remaining of women and men after marriage, in- cluding the sharing (or not) of domestic S ource: Or i gi nal fi gure for t h is repo rt . chores, their potential interactions with others (and specifically with men), and the expectations toward care arrange- 58 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON ments. These social norms become effec- termine the returns to household deci- prerequisite throughout all stages, wom- tive and shared among the members of a sions and investments. Constraints arise en and girls need to be able to fully exer- certain society through the enforcement from the interplay of formal institutions cise agency, the ability to make relevant that materializes through social sanc- (comprising all that pertain to the func- decisions for their presents and their fu- tions. tioning of the state) and markets but also tures. This is a crucial element through- reflect the influence of informal institu- out all stages and will therefore be treat- Finally, markets define the availability tions (World Bank 2012). ed at the very beginning of this section. of opportunities and enablers of partici- pation in the labor market. The existence This does not mean that there is no BUILDING AGENCY AND of job opportunities, and the quality of room for individual specific behavior F O R M I N G A S P I R AT I O N S these jobs, as well as the availability and and that individual decisions are deter- Agency is a prerequisite for women’s characteristics of care infrastructure and mined solely by external factors. The re- ability to take advantage of opportuni- transport will influence women’s ability port focuses on outcomes and opportu- ties available and, hence, is crucial in the to access employment opportunities. nities available to women, and on those getting ready stage (World Bank 2012). aspects that may influence those choices At this stage, it is important to ac- Agency is defined as the capacity to make that lie outside ones’ unique and individ- knowledge that aggregate outcomes— decisions and transform those decisions ual preferences. 10 Table 2.1 summarizes such as getting an education, entering into desired outcomes. Expressions of some of the potential barriers women the labor market or remaining in the agency include control over resources, encounter at each of the critical stages of home, or working and studying in cer- the ability to move freely, decision mak- engagement in economic participation, tain fields—are most often a product ing over family formation, freedom from which will be reviewed in this section. of women’s individual choices, which risk of violence, and the ability to have a partly reflect their own preferences. This voice in society and to influence policy. G E T T I N G R E A DY: emphasizes that individual preferences Increased agency also enables girls BARRIERS WOMEN for economic participation across the and young women to form aspirations FAC E W H E N different stages in women’s life partial- for their lives and futures in relation to PREPARING FOR ly explain differences in participation their households, communities, and so- PA RT I C I PAT I O N I N rates across and within countries. At THE LABOR MARKET ciety and to pursue those aspirations. As- the same time, however, it is important pirations are shaped, however, in context The getting ready stage is the one in to recognize that decisions are based on and through social interactions; there- which the foundations are set for girls’ individual preferences, incentives, and fore, they often reflect social norms and successful school-to-work transition. constraints of different family members, internalized expectations (Appadurai This period requires investments in the and in relation to their relative voice 2014). Norms relative to family forma- early years, particularly in health and ed- and bargaining power. In turn, prefer- tion, work, and education are particular- ucation, followed by girls’ entering and ences are shaped by gender roles, social ly powerful and may translate into pref- continuing formal education. Crucially, norms, and social networks (which we erences from both men and women that they also need to gain the right skills and group under the label informal institu- perpetuate inequalities or create barriers to have the support available in order to tions). Incentives are largely influenced for others whose aspirations contradict be fully prepared once they transition by markets (including the markets for societal norms (World Bank 2012). into the labor market. As an essential labor, credit, land, and goods), which de- CHAPTER 2 . 59 TA B L E 2 . 1 Constraints facing women at critical turning points, potentially limiting their economic engagement Critical turning Barriers related to points Informal institutions Legal aspects Markets • Agency and self-confidence to make • Regulation regarding child marriage • Access to health and education ser- decisions for oneself vices—investing in the early years 1. Getting • Family formation (early marriage and ready teenage pregnancy) • Expectations about getting an educa- tion and the right skills • Societal expectations toward the role • Legal restrictions on getting a job, • Availability of jobs of women in work equal pay, sector of work, starting a • Access to assets and firm ownership  2. Entering • Employer discrimination (hiring and business, and mobility and remaining • Availability and accessibility of in the labor pay) • Regulation on violence and harass- transport market • Violence against women in the work- ment in public • Adequate infrastructure—water and place, including sexual harassment • De jure versus de facto law electricity • Expectations about women’s role • Legal restrictions for married 3. Getting once married women married • Intrahousehold bargaining • Intimate partner violence • Acceptability of childcare • Legal provisions related to having a • Availability and affordability of 4. Having a • Distribution of household chores and child: maternal and paternal leave childcare child time use policies, flex work, and mandatory childcare regulations S ourc e: Or i gi nal t ab le for t h is repo rt . Societal views on the role of wom- than women. Lebanon has the smallest attitudes statements, women and men in en—whether they should have jobs or share of people strongly agreeing with Lebanon agree least with such statement be in leadership positions—can influ- the statement among the three countries. (compared to Iraq and Jordan). ence women’s interest in investing in Women largely support views that Among Lebanese men and women, their own education, leadership skills, men make better political leaders. Inter- a clear correlation exists between lev- and getting jobs. Across countries in the estingly, the gaps in agreement between el of education and disagreement with Middle East and North Africa (MENA) men and women are largest in Lebanon the notion that men make better polit- region, Iraq and Jordan specifically are (11 percentage points), smaller in Jordan ical leaders. In Iraq, men and women among the top six in terms of respon- (7 percentage points), and even smaller in with tertiary and those with basic or less dents agreeing with the statement “men Iraq (2 percentage points)—with women education tend to agree slightly more make better political leaders than wom- in all observed countries agreeing less (compared to those with secondary edu- en” on the World Values Survey (2014). with the statement than men do (table cation) whereas, in Jordan, the opposite Most citizens in Iraq and Jordan consider 2.2). Consistent with other values and is true: women and men with secondary men to be more capable political leaders 60 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.2 Views regarding male vs. female leadership, by level of education, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Tertiary Men Secondary Lebanon Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Jordan Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Arab Barometer Wave V. Not e: Fi gure shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h the s t a t e m e nt “In g e ne ra l , m e n a re b et t e r a t p o l i t i c a l l e a d e rs hi p t ha n wo m e n.” TA B L E 2 . 2 less education. In Jordan, agreement with Views regarding male vs. female leadership, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon a women’s quota decreases as education decreases among women. Jordanian men Male (%) Female (%) Difference with tertiary or basic education tend to (percentage points) agree more than those with secondary Jordan 78 71 7 education (figure 2.3). Lebanon 55 44 11 Iraq 73 71 2 Interestingly, UN Women (the Unit- ed Nations Entity for Gender Equality Source: Arab Barometer, Wave V. Not e: Fi gure shows level of a g reem ent o r disa g reem ent w it h the s t a t e m e nt “In g e ne ra l , m e n a re b et t e r and the Empowerment of Women) and at p oli t i cal lead ership t h a n wo m en .” Promundo (2017) also report differenc- es in opinion between men and women in Lebanon on the subject of women’s education agree slightly more than their quota for women’s political participation leadership. Although the report observes peers with either tertiary or basic/less is correlated with the level of education in certain openness to women’s increased education (figure 2.2). Iraq and Lebanon: women and men with representation in such roles, men were higher education tend to be more in fa- Regarding women’s leadership roles, much more likely than women to express vor with a quota compared to those with agreement with the question supporting a resistance to women in public leadership. CHAPTER 2 . 61 FIGURE 2.3 Views regarding a quota for women’s political participation, by level of education, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Tertiary Men Secondary Lebanon Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Jordan Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree S ourc e: Arab Baromet er Wave V. N ote: Fi gure shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h t h e s t a t e m e nt , “In o rd e r t o a c hi eve fa i re r re p re s e nt a t i o n a c e r t a i n p e rc e nt a g e of e l e c ted po s i - tion s should b e set asi de fo r wo m en .” FIGURE 2.4 Views regarding jobs and women’s independence, by level of education, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Tertiary Men Secondary Lebanon Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Jordan Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree S ource: Wor ld Values Su r vey Wave 6 2 0 1 0 – 1 6 . N ote : Fi gu re shows agreem ent o r disag reem ent w it h t h e st a t em ent , “A j o b i s t he b e s t w ay fo r a wo m a n t o b e i nd e p e nd e nt .” 62 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON Related to societal views of the role outcomes. Mobility is an essential factor sured using under-five mortality rates), of women, the share of those respon- in enabling girls’ participation in institu- measures of quality and quantity of dents who believe that getting a job is the tions, communities, and societies more schooling,12 and health measures (adult best way for a woman to be independent broadly — including the labor mar- survival rates, the rate of stunting for increases with level of education in all ket. Data for Lebanon suggest that girls children under age five). Significant gen- countries observed here (figure 2.4). face more restrictions on their mobility der gaps with regard to one’s opportuni- during childhood than boys do: 64 per- ty to accumulate and form one’s human Besides overall societal views—which cent of male respondents agreed with the capital during the early years can have a can limit young women’s aspirations and statement, “It was easier for my brothers significant impact later on in life for girls capacity to translate those aspirations and me to go outside the home,” and 55 and boys. into real outcomes—parental support is percent of female respondents agreed It is striking that in the Mashreq very important when young people form that “my sisters and I had less freedom to countries health and education invest- their aspirations and attempt to realize go outside the home when I was growing ments reflect largely equal treatment of them. A qualitative study in Jordan sheds up” (UN Women and Promundo 2017). daughters and sons and a slight advan- light on differences in parental expec- tage, if at all, for girls (see table 2.3). In tations and aspirations related to boys In the absence of direct measures Iraq, the HCI for girls is actually higher and to girls: families more often reserve (and applicable data) of women’s agen- than for boys, and girls fare better than their wasta (special connections) to help cy, this report considers child marriage boys in every single component of the their educated sons, rather than their and teenage pregnancy, manifestations HCI. Although the probability of sur- educated daughters, to secure good jobs of the lack of women’s agency, to better vival to age five is the same for both girls (World Bank 2013a). Similarly, data for understand barriers to women’s agency and boys (97 out of 100 children born in Lebanon show that, whereas most wom- in Mashreq countries.11 Iraq survive to age five), there are more en and men would allow their daughter I N V E S T I N G I N T H E E A R LY significant gaps in terms of schooling: to work outside the home if she chose to YEARS girls who start school at age four can ex- do so, women are more likely than men pect to complete 0.3 years more of school to support it (97 percent versus 88 per- Early access to health and education is by their 18th birthday compared to boys cent) (SWMENA 2010). Among those central to the formation of one’s human the same age. And girls fare better than who would not allow their daughters capital. The World Bank’s Human Capital boys on harmonized test scores (377 ver- to work outside the home, 46 percent Index (HCI) measures the amount of hu- sus 353 on a scale in which 625 represents of women cite household and childcare man capital that a child born today can advanced attainment and 300 represents responsibilities and 29 percent mention expect to attain by age 18, given the risks minimum attainment). Factoring in safety reasons. Conversely, most men (71 of poor health and poor education that what children actually learn in school, percent) cite childcare responsibilities prevail in the country where he or she girls are still advanced compared to boys (SWMENA 2010). lives. The HCI is specifically designed to (with 4.2 expected years of school versus Parents and extended families also highlight how improvements in current 3.8). Finally, girls are also slightly favored have an influence on girls’ capacity to health and education outcomes shape when it comes to stunting: 79 girls versus move around freely—which can pose the productivity of the next generation of 77 boys out of 100 children are not stunt- significant constraints to young women’s workers. The HCI includes measures of ed, which means, however, that 23 boys ability to translate their aspirations into survival from birth to school age (mea- CHAPTER 2 . 63 TA B L E 2 . 3 Human Capital Index and respective components Iraq Jordan Lebanon Component Boys Girls Overall Boys Girls Overall Boys Girls Overall HCI 0.39 0.41 0.4 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.54 Survival to age five 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 Expected years of schooling 6.7 7 6.9 11.4 11.8 11.6 10.7 10.4 10.5 Harmonized test scores 353 377 363 391 428 409 405 405 40.5 Learning-adjusted years of 3.8 4.2 4 7.2 8.1 7.6 7 6.7 6.8 schooling Adult survival rate 0.81 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.98 0.95 0.94 Not stunted rate 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.91 0.94 0.92  —  —  — S ourc e: Wor ld Bank 2020. and 21 girls out of 100 are stunted and mensions. Girls and boys show the same correlates with better labor market out- therefore at risk of cognitive and physical outcomes in survival rates to age five. Al- comes and lower levels of agency depri- limitations that can last a lifetime. though girls have slightly fewer expected vations (such as child marriage, lack of years of schooling, they have the same control over resources, and condonation In Jordan, the HCI is also higher for test scores as boys and slightly lower ad- of wife beating). girls than for boys—and this result holds justed years of learning. Gender gaps in education present true in each of the individual compo- distinct patterns across Mashreq coun- nents. As in the case of Iraq, the rate of To summarize, it is noteworthy that tries: girls are more likely than boys to survival to age five is the same for girls in the three countries girls generally fare reach higher levels of education in Jor- and boys. Girls can expect more years of better than boys in terms of human capi- dan, whereas girls in Iraq lag boys in schooling (11.8 versus 11.4). Girls also tal formation in the early years. primary and secondary enrollment and fare better than boys on harmonized test I M P O RTA N C E O F G E T T I N G attainment. The rate of enrollment of scores (428 versus 391). The adjusted A N E D U C AT I O N A N D T H E Jordanian girls remains higher than that years of schooling also show an advan- RIGHT SKILLS of males for both secondary and tertiary tage for girls, who can expect almost one levels. These findings are similar to the additional year of learning. Finally, girls Success in the labor market depends average of the Arab World and MENA.14 are also slightly favored when it comes to highly on whether or not women (and Not only do girls achieve similar levels stunting: only 6 girls out of 100 are stunt- girls) invest in education and skill devel- of education in Jordan, but they also ed, compared to 9 boys out of 100. opment prior to entering the labor mar- outperform boys in standardized test- Of the three countries, Lebanon is ket.13 Women’s education translates into ing. Although results in mathematics the only one in which the overall HCI significant benefits in other dimensions and science test scores are low in MENA score is the same for girls and boys, with of women’s lives. Klugman et al. (2014) (Mullis et al. 2016), 8th-grade girls in similar scores across the different di- demonstrate that enhanced education 64 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.5 Education enrollment rates in rural and urban Iraq, male vs. female, 2011–12 100 80 Enrollment (%) 60 40 20 0 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Age (years) Urban male Urban female Rural male Rural female Source: Iraq H ouseho ld S o c io ec o n o m ic S urvey 2 0 1 1 – 1 2 . all participating MENA countries, in- barriers may include concerns related and 10 percent in Lebanon agree with cluding Jordan, demonstrate statistically to girls’ safety traveling to school and the statement that “university educa- significantly higher scores than boys in parental preferences not to send daugh- tion is more important for men than for science (World Bank 2017).15 ters to schools with only male teachers. women.” In all three countries men tend Lack of access to hygiene products, fam- to agree with the statement more than In Iraq, gender gaps in education are ily and household responsibilities, and women do, but the level of agreement is more pronounced in rural areas (figure early marriage are also factors affecting relatively low in all countries. There is a 2.5). Overall, only slightly more than half low enrollment or early dropout for girls correlation between level of education of Iraqi girls complete primary school- in rural communities. In addition, as a and disagreement with this question in ing—compared to three quarters of result of years of conflict, Iraq faces addi- Iraq and Jordan, whereas in Lebanon boys—and 40 percent continue into sec- tional challenges related to the creation agreement varies little among different ondary level. Girls, particularly those liv- of human capital (UNESCO 2015). educational groups (with a slight tenden- ing in rural areas, begin to drop out after cy to greater agreement among women they reach nine years of age. The enroll- In the three countries, however, dif- with tertiary education) (figure 2.6). ment gap grows as children age, with the ferences in educational outcomes do not largest gap observed at age 13: whereas seem to stem from society’s views: most Importantly, however, data from the 80 percent of boys still attend school, people in all three countries believe that World Values Survey show that individ- only 40 percent of girls do so. A com- higher education is important for wom- uals with higher levels of education tend bination of institutional, structural, and en. According to data from the recent to disagree more with the statement that normative barriers contributes to these Arab Barometer, only 21 percent of in- a university education is more important gender gaps (World Bank 2017). These terviewees in Iraq, 17 percent in Jordan, for a boy than a girl. This finding is true CHAPTER 2 . 65 FIGURE 2.6 Views regarding importance of university education for women and men, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Tertiary Men Secondary Lebanon Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Jordan Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree S ource: Arab Baromet er Wave V. N ote : Fi gu re shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h t h e s t a t e m e nt , “ U ni ve rs i t y e d u c a t i o n fo r m a l e s i s m o re i m p o r t a nt t ha n u ni ve rs i t y e d u c a ti o n fo r fe males.” for Iraq and Jordan (except that individ- likely to study technical and classical de- education as instrumental for improving uals with no formal education tend to grees (such as business, administration, men’s employment opportunities, finan- disagree more than those with primary engineering, manufacturing, and law), cial independence, and confidence; but education). In Lebanon, that trend also whereas female students tend to concen- they seem to value women’s education largely holds, but those with primary trate in arts and humanities, health, and for its positive impact on child rearing education disagree more strongly com- social sciences (Figure 2.7). and improving the family status (Feli- pared to those with secondary educa- cio and Gauri 2019). When resources Qualitative research in Jordan reveals tion. It may therefore be a valid assump- are scarce, however, almost one in three that women’s aspirations for the next tion that parental support for higher men in Lebanon believes that it is more generation often center around gaining a education for girls may be stronger in important to educate sons than daugh- good education; however, the motivating households with parents with higher lev- ters.16 Women tend to agree to a much factor, particularly among older women, els of education. lesser degree (slightly more than 1 in 10) for improved education is for women to with such a statement (UN Women and Society’s preferences might influ- have virtuous qualities. Younger women Promundo 2017). ence the fields of study in which gen- stress their wish for their daughters to der differences at the tertiary level are achieve their goals and dreams and gain Data from the Lebanon Household evident across countries. In Jordan and the skills needed to do so. Men (and, Living Conditions Survey 2012 show Lebanon, male students are much more specifically, nonworking men) perceive that girls seem to be involved in house- 66 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.7 Enrollment in tertiary education, by gender and field of study, Jordan and Lebanon Male Lebanon Female Male Jordan Female 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Enrollment (%) Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and veterinary Arts and humanities Business, administration, and law Education Engineering, manufacturing, and construction Health and Welfare Natural sciences, mathematics, and statistics Services Social sciences, journalism, and information Information and communications technologies Unspecified fields Source: Wor ld Bank Educ a t io n st a t ist ic s. hold chores to a much larger extent than 50.4 percent of 15- to 17-year-olds in prevalence of child marriage also reveals boys are. Such use of their time may that category, 71.5 percent are boys. societal norms centered around wom- already indicate girls’ restrictions to en’s role in the family instead of in some the private space and to domestic tasks E A R LY F A M I LY form of economic activity (Klugman et from early ages onward—even before F O R M AT I O N – C H I L D al. 2014; Wodon et al. 2017). marriage. The share of girls involved in MARRIAGE AND TEENAGE Child marriage is prevalent in Iraq household chores (48 percent) is much PREGNANCY and, although lower in Jordan and Leb- higher than that of boys (39 percent), Child marriage is associated with lower anon, is still present in those countries with about 43.5 percent of all children economic outcomes for women, is likely (figure 2.8). In Iraq 25 percent of girls surveyed involved in household chores. to affect girls’ ability to continue invest- are married by the age of 18. The share While across age groups girls are uni- ing in their education, and overall is a of women married by the age of 18 is 9.7 formly more involved than boys in form of violence against women. Re- percent in Jordan and considerably lower household chores, boys, however, make search indicates that girls married before in Lebanon (6 percent). In Jordan, early up the majority of children who only the age of 18 are more likely to experi- marriage accounts for 32 percent of Syr- work (and do not study); of the 72.0 ence poor health outcomes, drop out of ian marriages, twice the rate observed in percent of children aged 15–17 years in school, earn less over their lifetimes, ex- Syria before 2011 (UNICEF 2017). The that category, 86.9 percent are boys. The perience intimate partner violence, and share is even higher for younger women same trend appears for children both live in poverty compared to their peers (20–24 years of age) at 41 percent (UN- working and attending school: of the who marry at later ages. Importantly, FPA 2017). CHAPTER 2 . 67 FIGURE 2.8 The incidence of teenage pregnancy Women first married by age 18, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon in Jordan, although not as high as previ- ously seen, is significantly higher among women of lower education levels.17 The 24.3 Enrollment (%) adolescent fertility rate for girls who have finished only primary education is 139 births per 1,000 women ages 15–19. 9.7 6.1 This rate is on par with countries that have the highest incidence worldwide. Iraq Jordan Lebanon Among girls who have completed sec- ondary education, the rate decreases to S ource: Wor ld Develop ment I n dic a t o rs, 2 0 1 9 da t a, ht t p:/ / da t aba n k. wo r l d b a nk . o rg . 32 and then to just 1 among those with higher education. Legislation regarding child marriage Judges have the authority to decide if In sum, during the getting ready varies between countries in the Mashreq, marriage of girls between 15 and 18 stage, young women and girls may en- but none prohibits child marriage with- years of age is in “their best interest” and counter several barriers that will prevent out exceptions. In Iraq, the legal min- to adjudicate the marriage contract (U.S. them from pursuing a job. Attending imum age of marriage is 18, but the Department of State 2018a). Lebanon is school and completing their education law allows a judge to permit children the only country that has no legal mini- is a challenge for Iraqi girls, particularly as young as 15 to marry if fitness and mum age for marriage, and the govern- those in rural areas. Some issues that are physical capacity are established and the ment does not perform civil marriages. specific to this context relate to aspects of guardian does not present a reasonable Instead, religious courts set the marriage safe mobility and child marriage. Jorda- objection (Personal Status Law, Articles age on the basis of the personal status nian and Lebanese girls achieve similar 7 and 8). Iraqi law criminalizes forced law, and the minimum age for marriage levels of education and may even per- marriage but does not automatically varies accordingly (U.S. Department of form better than boys. In these countries, void forced marriages that have been State 2018c). gender gaps are associated with fields of consummated. Within Iraq’s Kurdish study, which, in turn, may be shaped In line with child marriage results, region, the legal minimum age of mar- by expectations (their own aspirations, the adolescent fertility rate in Iraq is riage is also 18, but law permits children as well as those of parents and society much higher than in the other two coun- as young as 16 to marry under the same at large) and the perceived purpose of tries. Iraqi women ages 15–19 experi- conditions applied under Iraqi law (U.S. education: to be good family members ence 72 births per 1,000 compared to 26 Department of State 2018b). Jordanian versus engaging in the labor market. As- per 1,000 among Jordanian adolescents law also establishes 18 as the minimum pirations for future generations might be and 15 per 1,000 among their Lebanese age for marriage; however, with consent evolving, however, consistent with the counterparts (figure 2.9). Adolescent fer- of both a judge and a guardian, approv- generational shift that was observed in tility rates for Jordan and Lebanon are, in al can be granted for children as young participation rates among the youngest fact, well below the MENA average of 40 as 15 (Personal Status Law, Article 10). cohorts. per 1,000. 68 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.9 lack the support system to do so, and Adolescent fertility rates, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, in 2017 they may face resistance (from employ- ers, family, partners, friends, or even legal restrictions) when trying to do so. Births per 1,000 women ages The prevalence of traditional gender norms is associated with low female la- 15 –19 72 bor force participation. Middle Eastern countries, including Jordan and Leba- 26 non, are among those with low female 15 labor force participation and more re- Iraq Jordan Lebanon strictive gender norms with respect to work (figure 2.10). In a context of limited Source: Wor ld Develo pm ent I n dic at o rs. overall economic opportunity and weak labor demand, social norms preferring men over women for the few available BARRIERS WOMEN to become entrepreneurs. In some coun- jobs are likely to severely limit women’s ENCOUNTER WHEN tries, the absence of a legal framework ability to obtain gainful employment. ENTERING AND that protects women against discrimi- REMAINING IN THE nation, harassment, and sexual abuse, But these views vary widely across LABOR MARKET or that allows women to own assets, gender. In Lebanon, men generally con- represents a first-order barrier; in other sider their employment and opportunity When women consider entering the countries, regulations might be in place to be more important than women’s in labor market, their decisions are shaped but are not enforced. times of scarcity (Singh, Parvez Butt, and by several constraints and barriers—and Canepa 2018). A recent World Values Sur- exposure to these barriers may lead them S O C I E TA L E X P E C TAT I O N S vey (Wave 6 2010-2014) shows that wom- to withdraw from work once in. Infor- REGARDING THE ROLE OF en have significantly different and more mal institutions in the form of societal WOMEN, INCLUSIVE OF egalitarian views than men in five of eight expectations regarding women’s roles ECONOMIC ACTIVITY statements relative to women’s rights.19 at home and in the economy, as well as Economic participation of women is Significantly lower shares of female re- discriminatory hiring and pay practices, often limited because of a set of social spondents agree that men are better polit- and the prevalence of violence or harass- norms and beliefs (informal institutions) ical leaders, are better business executives, ment in the workplace and in the streets, associated with expected gender roles and should have priority over women for all potentially affect women’s willingness (UN Women and Promundo 2017). Soci- jobs; and significantly lower shares of fe- to enter and remain in the labor market. etal perceptions about the work of wom- male respondents agree that a child suffers The absence of safe transportation may en, and about their positioning inside if mother works. Similarly, significantly inhibit women’s mobility in ways that firms and sectors, may shape the de facto higher shares of female respondents in the cause even willing women to refrain participation of women in the world of three countries agree that having a job is from participating in the labor market. (paid) work.18 Women may not feel enti- the best way for a woman to be indepen- Additionally, low access to physical and tled or willing to pursue a job, they may dent (see figure 2.4). financial assets restricts women’s ability CHAPTER 2 . 69 FIGURE 2.10 Gender norms and labor force participation, selected countries 0.9 0.8 Egypt, Arab Rep. Jordan Men should have more right to a job than women (1=agree) Azerbaijan Yemen, Rep Saudi Arabia Pakistan 0.7 Tunisia Iran, Islamic Rep. Libya Qatar Bangladesh Iraq Nigeria 0.6 Kuwait Mali Morocco Turkey Algeria Armenia 0.5 Indonesia India Burkina Faso Albania Kazakhstan 0.4 Rwanda North Macedonia Lebanon Haiti China Moldova Hong Kong SAR, China 0.3 South Africa Korea, Rep. Zambia Zimbabwe Poland Belarus Bosnia Herzegovina Argentina Cyprus Tanzania Puerto Rico (US) 0.2 Bulgaria Russian Italy Colombia Federation Guatemala France Estonia Mexico Brazil 0.1 Canada Serbia Slovenia Finland Ethiopia Israel Sweden New Zealand 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 – Labor force participation rate, females ages 15 - 64 (%) S ource: Wor ld Bank calcula t io n s ba sed o n Wo rld Va lues S urvey ro u nd s 1999–2004, 2005–09, 2010–14 a nd Wo r l d D eve l o p m e nt Ind i c a t o rs fo r Int e r na ti o n a l Labour Organi zat i on–modeled est im a t es fo r fem ale la bo r fo rc e pa r t i c i p a t i o n. N ote : Fi gu re shows respon se t o t h e st a t em ent , “ M en sh o uld h ave p r i o r i t y a c c e s s t o j o b s i n c a s e of s c a rc i t y.” Gender differences in views also vary all three countries, the level of agreement the wider public regarding women’s role by socioeconomic status. Respondents with the statement “men make better in the economy are often reinforced by who are more educated, wealthier, and business executives than women” de- family. Some families put great pres- younger have more equitable views—as creases with increased level of education. sure on young working women, asking do those whose mothers have higher lev- them not to work specific (long) hours, Family constraints reduce the choic- els of education or whose fathers partici- not to work at night, and so on. Such es young women have in terms of the pate in domestic work (UN Women and pressure may have an impact on wom- type, load, and location of work. These Promundo 2017). Generally, a larger en’s growth potential within their jobs restrictions include the expectations share of better-educated men and wom- (Felicio and Gauri 2018). In some cases, about women’s role within the family en appear to support gender equality. “suitable” occupations may also not be in and define what is appropriate for girls This relationship between level of edu- the most productive and growth sectors to do in terms of choice of study and cation and more gender-equitable atti- or in higher-level positions with deci- places of work. Social norms shared by tudes can be seen in figure 2.11. Across sion-making capacity.20 70 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.11 Views regarding male vs. female business leadership, by highest educational attainment, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Tertiary Men Secondary Lebanon Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Jordan Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Wor ld Values S urvey, Wave 6 , 2 0 1 0 – 1 2 . Not e: Fi gure shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h the s t a t e m e nt , “M e n m a ke b et t e r b u s i ne s s exe c u t i ve s t ha n wo m e n d o .” Along with concerns that women ne- favor a more active role of women in the remarkable, though, are the differenc- glect their domestic roles when working labor market, particularly in Lebanon. es between countries, with respondents outside the house, an additional concern Although only 40 percent of respondents in Iraq and Jordan being much more in may be related to their being around in Lebanon agreed that men should have agreement compared to Lebanese re- men while at work. The degree of “pub- a priority over women if jobs are scarce, spondents (figure 2.12). licness” of the job and the working en- in Jordan on average 81 percent do so. vironment (that is, whether it has a lot Similarly, more gender-balanced atti- E M P LOY E R of men) seem to influence women’s deci- tudes are found in Lebanon with regard D I S C R I M I N AT I O N ( I N sions according to research conducted in to the statements “men are better busi- H I R I N G A N D PAY ) Jordan (Felicio and Gauri 2018). Issues ness executives,” “men are better politi- Besides limiting women’s potential to of prevalence of sexual harassment and cal leaders,” and “being housewife is as enter the world of work, social norms violence—which might directly affect fulfilling as working for pay.” As seen 21 may also play a role in the quality of women’s willingness to engage in eco- in other dimensions, younger cohorts jobs available for women, lead to occu- nomic activities outside the home—are across the three countries, though more pational segregation, and prescribe what reviewed later in this section. strongly in Lebanon, seem to embrace are acceptable jobs for women. Certain a more gender-equal idea of women’s attitudes and norms around women’s Within Mashreq countries, however, role in economic activities. Even more place in society—such as whether or younger generations may be evolving to CHAPTER 2 . 71 FIGURE 2.12 10 hours more than women in a week, Views regarding employment priorities, by age group, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon which has an equalizing effect on earn- ings per hour (table 2.4). This difference 64 Iraq 63 in hours can be associated with prefer- 74 ences but also with a lower number of 77 hours of work observed in education, Jordan 82 health, and public administration sectors 82 in general, which are sectors that employ 34 a large share of women (Atamanov, Con- Lebanon 41 50 stant, and Lundvall 2016). Share of respondents (%) Differences in wages between men and women can also be partly explained Age: Up to 29 Age: 30–49 Age: 50+ by differences in the observable character- S ource: Wor ld Values Su r vey, Wave 6 2 0 1 0 – 1 2 . istics of the workers, such as skills and the N ote : Fi gu re shows agreem ent w it h t h e st a t em ent , “ W h en jo bs a re s c a rc e , m e n s ho u l d have m o re r i g ht sectors where they are employed, as well as to a j ob t han women.” by discrimination in the returns to those characteristics or in other unobserved fac- not it’s acceptable for them to work— ly commitments as the major drawback tors. The Oaxaca-Blinder method allows can also be reinforced by employers. In in hiring women. Male entrepreneurs for decomposition of the wage gap into that sense, employers that resist hiring consider women less committed to their two parts: the “explained” and the “un- women or paying them the same wages work because of, for example, higher ab- explained,” with the latter often being as- as their male counterparts may add to sence rates and unavailability for work- sociated with discrimination (Jann 2008; women’s constraints to enter and remain ing overtime. In the view of employers, Oaxaca 1973). Because men and women in the labor market. Such preference to women’s reproductive, household, and participating in wage employment are employ men despite the growing skilled caregiving roles and responsibilities often a selected, nonrandom population, profile of women amplifies the paradox seem to have a significant negative im- one must correct for this selection bias for women of having a high level of ed- pact on their expected performance. when using the Oaxaca-Blinder method ucation but a low level of employment Employer discrimination becomes to understand the drivers of the gender (Karam and Afiouni 2018). particularly evident when wage discrim- wage gap (Badel and Pena 2010; Stanley Survey data from Iraq show that 49.2 ination can be observed. In Lebanon, and Jarrell 1998). This may be of a particu- percent of interviewed women perceive the unconditional gender gap in (log) lar relevance in countries such as those in gender inequality in favor of men in the monthly wages favors men (table 2.4). If the Mashreq where a low share of women private sector. With respect to the pub- we consider the number of hours worked, is engaged in wage employment. lic sector, the share of women perceiv- however, the gender gap changes and ac- ing gender inequality in favor of men In Lebanon, a wage gap in monthly tually favors women. The reason is that is lower at 32.4 percent (Vilardo and wages favors men, and the gap is driv- men spend on average 53 hours working Bittar 2018). Similarly, a World Bank en by the “unexplained” part, which per week whereas women work 42 hours (2009) study shows that 40 percent of may indicate gender discrimination in per week—that is, men work on average Lebanese entrepreneurs mention fami- the wage labor market. The “explained” 72 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E 2 . 4 daily earnings, the gap is inverted and fa- Logarithm of labor earnings per month, per hour and hours worked across women and men, vors men (table 2.5). Lebanon ABSENCE OF LEGAL Log wage, monthly*** Log wage per hour** Hours usually worked RESTRICTIONS: GETTING per week*** A JOB, RECEIVING EQUAL Male 6.8 1.46 53 PAY, W O R K I N G C E R TA I N Female 6.7 1.60 42 SECTORS Source: At amanov, Co n st a nt , a n d Lun dvall 2 0 1 6 , c alc ula t ed b a s e d o n H BS 2011 In addition to social norms dictating Not e: Indi vi d uals rep o rt in g zero w ag e in c o m e a re exc luded fro m c a l c u l a t i o ns . H o u r ly e a r ni ng s a re c a l- culat ed u si ng var i ab le sh owin g usual h o urs wo rked per week . * * * Si g ni f i c a nt d i f fe re nc e a t 1% l eve l , whether employment is a desirable out- **at 5% level , and * a t 1 0 % level . come for women, or what type of jobs are TA B L E 2 . 5 acceptable, laws and regulations (which Logarithm of labor earnings per month, per hour and hours worked across women and themselves are a reflection of society’s men, Iraq views) can pose unsurmountable barri- ers to women’s entering the labor force.22 Hours usually Log daily Log hourly Log total days Pro-equality legislation, however, can worked per earnings earnings*** worked*** promote women’s economic participation week*** Male 2.98 1.18 17.52 46 and even be a force for change in people’s Female 2.97 1.52 28.64 31 perceptions of what is acceptable. Table 2.6 provides an overview of la- Source: Wor ld Bank c alc ula t io n s ba sed o n I raq Ho useh o ld S o c i o e c o no m i c Su r vey 2012. bor laws and regulations for Iraq, Jordan, Not e: *** St at i st i cally sig n ific ant a t t h e 1 perc ent level . and Lebanon that matter for women’s employment and pay. Some countries, part actually favors women, because perience. Moreover, a large share of the such as Jordan, are currently in the pro- the education and the economic sectors gap cannot be explained by the returns cess of promoting legal changes23 to en- where they are employed contribute to to education, experience, sector of em- able women’s participation in economic higher wages for women. Table A.4 in ployment, or hours worked and suggests activities. These changes include, for the appendix shows results of the Oaxa- a fixed gender penalty in women’s wages. instance, legislation to provide greater ca-Blinder decomposition of log wages in In Iraq, average hourly wages also flexibility for the provision of childcare Lebanon. Controlling for selection into present a gap that favors women but in the workplace, to remove restrictions wage employment, observed differences again, as in Lebanon, women work sig- on types of jobs and hours for women, in education and sector of employment nificantly fewer hours than men per and to address gender wage gaps (World favor women and reduce the wage gap, week (31 versus 46). Interestingly, wom- Bank 2019d).24 but the lower number of hours worked en work more days than men on average. by women increase it. Conversely, each At present, all three countries restrict These differences in hours worked might additional year of experience (proxied in some way the types of jobs women can be due to the sectors where women work by age) favors men’s wages more than it participate in. In Lebanon and Iraq wom- or to other specific characteristics of the favors women’s, suggesting discrimina- en can legally get a job or pursue a pro- type of jobs that women do. In terms of tion in the compensation for extra ex- fession in the same way as a man. Jorda- CHAPTER 2 . 73 TA B L E 2 . 6 port as one with need for future data Legislation related to employment and payment conditions in selected Mashreq and evidence. According to Kiwan et countries al. (2016), laws related to equal remu- neration and wages and the equivalent Legislation Lebanon Jordan Iraq chance for employment are neglected or Workplace unenforced in the three countries, espe- Women can legally get a job or pursue a trade or profes- sion in the same way as a man. Yes No Yes cially in the private sector, because of a Law mandates non-discrimination in employment based lack of monitoring. Another report men- Yes No Yes on gender. tions that, despite having laws related to There is legislation on sexual harassment in the work- equal ownership, the state or its legal ap- No No Yes place. paratus does not monitor them in order There are criminal penalties or civil remedies for sexual No No Yes to ensure their enforcement; thus, most harassment in employment. family bank accounts are registered with Pay men’s names instead of women (UNDP Law mandates equal remuneration for females and No Yes Yes 2018b). Some laws have vague determi- males for work of equal value. Women can work the same night hours as men. Yes Yes No nations or interpretations that allow a Women can work in jobs deemed dangerous in the same biased implementation in favor of men, Yes Yes No way as men. and other laws are habitually contra- Women can work in the same industries as men. No No Yes dicted by the social code that is usually practiced putting them in dysfunction. S ource: Wor ld Bank Dat a - Wo m en , B usin ess a n d t h e Law ( 2 0 2 0 ) . Importantly, the applicability of these laws is restricted to the public sector, nian women are not allowed to work the gender. In Jordan and Iraq, the law man- with little to no enforcement in the pri- same night hours as men (although they dates equal remuneration for work of vate sector or in the informal part of the can in Lebanon and Iraq), and Jordani- equal value. economy (ILO 2018a).25 an and Lebanese women cannot work Because these laws do not apply to Despite the provisions on paper, in the same industries as men (although the informal sector—which constitutes a Mashreq women’s rights to economic they can in Iraq). Women in Jordan and vast part of the labor market in the three opportunities may be limited because Lebanon (but not Iraq) can work in jobs Mashreq countries—they leave a signifi- of an absence of enforcement and mon- deemed dangerous just as men can. cant number of women unprotected. For itoring of these laws. Enforcement and With regard to legal protections for compliance may vary—and such vari- example, the Jordan Labor Watch (2018) women at work, although Jordan and ation (or deviation from de jure law) suggests that most women working in Lebanon (but not Iraq) have legislation will determine the extent to which legal the informal economy, and in small on sexual harassment in the workplace, frameworks will affect (or not) women’s businesses, are routinely subject to vio- they do not foresee penalties or civil economic opportunities and outcomes. lations of the rights stated in Jordanian remedies for such harassment. In both The limited availability of data on the law and international standards. Many Iraq and Jordan, the law prohibits dis- de jure–de facto differences is an area women work over eight hours a day and crimination in employment based on that will be highlighted later in this re- are deprived of the right to social secu- 74 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON rity and vacation days. Many of these TA B L E 2 . 7 women earn low wages, have no access Legislation related to women’s mobility in selected Mashreq countries to contractual and stable jobs, and are significantly exposed to different forms Legislation of verbal, physical, and emotional abuse. Mobility Lebanon Jordan Iraq A woman can apply for a passport in the same way as Yes No No a man. VIOLENCE AGAINST A woman can travel outside the country in the same way WOMEN IN THE Yes No No as a man. WORKPLACE – SEXUAL A woman can travel outside her home in the same way HARASSMENT as a man. Yes No Yes Despite the existence of regulations A woman can choose where to live in the same way as Yes No No a man. protecting women, violence against them in the workplace is prevalent in S o urc e : Wo r l d Ba nk D a t a - Wo m e n, Bu s i ne s s a nd t he L aw ( 2020) . the Mashreq countries, which prevents them from participating in paid work (UNFPA 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). The Syrian refugees compared to 50 percent restrictions that limit their mobility—a most common form of violence against of Jordanian women). In general, aware- key prerequisite for economic activity women in the workplace in Iraq, Jordan, ness on reporting mechanisms remains (table 2.7). In both Jordan and Iraq legal and Lebanon is sexual harassment (Avis very minimal in these situations, expos- restrictions exist with regards to women’s 2017; Community of Democracies 2017; ing women to more violence or resulting right to travel outside the country and Latif 2017b; UNDP 2015). Although Jor- in job exit. with a woman’s right to choose where to dan and Iraq recently passed laws and live in the same way as a man. Restric- penalties in this regard (in 2015 and AVA I L A B I L I T Y A N D tions also exist with regards to travel out- 2017, respectively), there is still con- ACCESSIBILITY OF side her home in Jordan (only). On top siderable reluctance in enforcing them. TRANSPORT of that, women in Jordan and Iraq face Consequently, women are still at risk of legal restrictions applying for a passport Infrastructure26 can play a social role in being exposed to such violence at work in the same way as men. defining restrictions on people’s mobility and therefore refrain from starting work According to a large body of re- and accessibility. Although both wom- or quit many positions. search, women have different mobility en and men endure the burden of poor According to the Arab Renais- patterns and hence transport needs than infrastructure, such deficiencies affect sance for Democracy and Development men, relying more on public transport women more because of gendered re- (ARDD), Jordanian women are more and walking (Peters 2002; Rosenbloom sponsibilities that depend on a heavy use likely to quit their jobs than to report 2006; Srinivasan 2008; Vance and Iovan- of infrastructure services. Aside from sexual harassment (ARDD 2018). The na 2007). Even within the same socio- availability, acceptability, and accessibil- same report reveals that violent incidents economic status, women and men use ity of a public transport system, some at work are more likely to occur with transportation differently because wom- legal restrictions apply to women’s mo- women refugees—who are socially and en tend to face additional constraints in bility in a broader sense. In the Mashreq economically more fragile (73 percent of accessing public transportation systems countries, women are exposed to legal CHAPTER 2 . 75 FIGURE 2.13 Views regarding women’s travel, by highest level of education, Iraq and Lebanon Tertiary Men Secondary Lebanon Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree S ource: Arab Baromet er Wave V. N ote : Fi gu re shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h t h e s t a t e m e nt , “ It i s p e r m i s s i b l e fo r a wo m a n t o t rave l a b ro a d by he rs e lf.” and lower transport accessibility to job are available for Iraq). Within each sex for women accessing their jobs in remote locations than men. Differences become and country group, agreement with the areas (Latif 2017b). greater among women and men of low- question of whether travel is permissi- Women’s and men’s experiences with er socioeconomic status (Lecompte and ble for a woman alone is correlated with transport differ, particularly when related Bocarejo 2017). Women’s economic in- higher levels of education. to safety and personal security. A lack of volvement is directly proportional to Public transportation becomes eas- adequate, safe, and affordable transporta- their level of mobility (Aloul at al. 2018). ier within the cities; however, Lebanese tion is thought to represent a significant Restrictions on women’s mobility women remain at risk of exposure to barrier to women’s participation in the may also reflect perceptions that wom- gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual workforce (World Bank 2019d). Girls en’s mobility is inappropriate. Despite harassment once in public transporta- may stop going to school, and women a lack of data on attitudes related to lo- tion. In addition, public transportation is may not look for jobs away from home cal mobility of women (which may be limited in Lebanon compared to private or may give up their jobs if they cannot very different from traveling abroad), transportation because it does not con- travel to work or childcare services in it is still worthwhile to look at levels nect all Lebanese areas, leaving women reasonable time and safety. Of women of agreement with allowing women’s in remote and rural areas disconnected interviewed in Lebanon, 57 percent re- travel abroad. Figure 2.13 shows that from urban centers and the capital. The ported having experienced some form such agreement is significantly low- poor transportation systems, especially of sexual harassment in the street (UN er in Jordan than in Lebanon (no data in rural areas, also impose an obstacle Women and Promundo 2017). Con- 76 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON versely, 33 percent of men reported hav- Affordability puts another set of of its nature for the sector in Jordan, and ing ever carried out this harassment. Re- constraints on women’s use of public it will regulate passenger, driver, and op- search for Jordan shows that women tend transport. Given women’s gender roles erator conduct in public transport, in- to avoid public transportation because of and associated travel patterns that often cluding ride hailing. The CoC makes ex- safety concerns, and about 40 percent of require them to make shorter, more fre- plicit references to sexual harassment and public transport users report having been quent journeys with multiple stops and gender-based discrimination as infringe- subjected to harassment. Safety on buses often with accompanying dependents, ments of the CoC, includes enforcement and taxis is also a significant issue, partic- they are likely to be disadvantaged and measures, details a public feedback mech- ularly for women. For those without the face higher costs by using public trans- anism with various reporting lines, and option of owning a car, access to work is port with ticketing systems that charge sets indicators to monitor the progress. constrained (World Bank 2014). flat rates per line or per journey. Imple- The CoC will be introduced in the service menting integrated fare collection sys- agreements between the Land Transport Poorer women—who face more dif- tems including flexible ticketing systems Regulatory Commission and public trans- ficulty in opting out of public services would encourage greater use of public port and ride-sharing operators. and switching to private ones—are more transport by women. affected by unsafe and inadequate trans- In Jordan, women constitute only port systems. According to data from In Jordan, 80.5 percent of surveyed about 2.7 percent of all employed in trans- the Jordanian Labor Market Panel Sur- women (in a study covering different cit- portation and storage as compared to vey (2010–16), women with less than a ies and rural areas) consider that the eco- 97.3 percent for their male counterparts. high school degree mainly use public nomic participation of women can im- Because the transport sector remains transportation to go to work (47 percent) prove through a better and safer public male-dominated (in Jordan as in most oth- compared to only 29 percent among uni- transportation system (Aloul et al. 2018). er countries in the world), women’s voices versity degree holders. Only 15.2 percent The study shows that the main challenge and needs as transport users are often not of those with less than a high school de- women face with regard to transport is heard. It also means that women are left gree commute in a private car, compared having to use more than one means of out of an important potential sector for to 36.4 percent among university degree public transportation to reach a work- employment. As part of transport reforms, holders (Kasoolu et. al 2019). place, followed by the lack of nearby the government has a great opportunity public transportation and its high cost. to encourage women’s employment in the Similarly, in Iraq, infrastructural chal- The same study shows that 47 percent of sector by tackling the barriers that impede lenges impact women’s access to job mar- surveyed women have refused to take a women’s participation, such as gender ste- kets or to daily care, work, and household job because of the deficiency and lack of reotypes that see transport positions as a activities (UNDP 2017a). The lack of safe safety in public transportation. male occupation, and addressing health transportation is among the most prom- and safety issues and sexual harassment in inent infrastructural issues faced by Iraqi Recognizing the importance of ade- the workplace. Employing more women in women, affecting their access to jobs and quate public transportation, the govern- the public transport and ride-hailing in- their physical security. When assessed ment of Jordan has been making signif- dustries can lead to more gender-sensitive outside the home, GBV occurs mainly icant strides toward developing quality transport service development and con- when women are using public transpor- standards for the sector, including most tribute to closing gender gaps in female tation (United Nations 2013). recently the development of a Code of labor force participation. Conduct (CoC). This CoC is the first ever CHAPTER 2 . 77 FIGURE 2.14 Lebanon claim that women’s share of Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile money service, Iraq, inheritance should be equal to that of Jordan, and Lebanon men; but support for these rights falls to 29 percent in Iraq and 17 percent in Share of population ages 15 + (%) Jordan. Inequitable attitudes regarding inheritance rights can undermine legal guarantees even where those guarantees 56.3 56.7 exist. in Jordan, 93 percent of women do not own land, only 4 percent own jointly 32.9 25.8 26.6 with their husbands, and only 3 percent 19.5 own land alone (figure 2.15). Asset ownership is critical not only Iraq Jordan Lebanon for women’s economic security but also Female Male for their ability to take advantage of en- S ource: Wor ld Bank Gender S t a t s, 2 0 1 7 . trepreneurship opportunities. Enter- prise Survey data from Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon show significant differences ACCESS TO ASSETS AND marriage. Other restrictions, however, in women’s participation in ownership, OWNING A FIRM are in place with regard to women’s man- management, and full-time work in Women in the Mashreq countries have agement of assets. In none of the three firms across the Mashreq (figure 2.16). less access and face additional barriers to countries do sons and daughters have Female participation in ownership of key productive assets, limiting their abil- equal inheritance rights from their par- firms ranges from 6.8 percent in Iraq to ity to participate equally in economic op- ents. Similarly, females and males do not 43.5 percent in Lebanon. Both Jordan portunities. Such significant disparities in have the same inheritance rights from a and Lebanon exceed MENA regional access to inputs, including access to land, spouse. With regard to entrepreneurship, averages for women’s majority partic- credit, and asset ownership, can lead to women in all three countries can legally ipation in ownership of firms; but all productivity gaps for women (World register a business in the same way as a countries lag behind regional averages in Bank 2012). Throughout the Mashreq, man; they can also open a bank account firms with a top female manager. women are less likely to have an account in the same way (legally) and sign a con- Interestingly, women’s participation at a formal financial institution or mo- tract in same way as a man. The law does in firms does not seem to be concen- bile money service provider (figure 2.14). not, however, prohibit discrimination by trated in small and medium firms in the Women also have low rates of property creditors based on sex or gender when Mashreq. In Jordan, women’s partici- ownership or of joint land titling. accessing credit (table 2.8). pation in ownership increases by firm Legally, women and men benefit Attitudes and norms also play a role size, whereas women’s participation in from the same ownership rights to im- with respect to land ownership and ownership in Lebanon is concentrated movable property in all three countries overall inheritance. According to data in small (5–19 employees) and medium and both women and men have equal ad- collected in Arab Barometer’s Wave V (20–99 employees) firms (figure 2.17, ministrative authority over assets during survey, 65 percent of respondents in panel a). Women are majority owners of 78 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E 2 . 8 Legislation related to assets and entrepreneurship in selected Mashreq countries Legislation Lebanon Jordan Iraq Assets Men and women have equal ownerships rights to immovable property. Yes Yes Yes Sons and daughters have equal rights to inherit assets from their parents. No No No Female and male surviving spouses have equal rights to inherit assets. No No No Law grants spouses equal administrative authority over assets during marriage . Yes Yes Yes The law provides for the valuation of nonmonetary contributions. No No No Entrepreneurship The law prohibits discrimination by creditors based on sex or gender in access to credit. No No No Women can legally register a business in the same way as a man. Yes Yes Yes Women can legally open a bank account in the same way as a man. Yes Yes Yes Women can legally sign a contract in the same way as a man. Yes Yes Yes Sou rce: Wor ld Bank D a t a - Wo m en , B usin ess a n d t h e Law 2 0 2 0 . FIGURE 2.15 Female land ownership in Jordan, (% women ages 15-49) 3.3 3.5 93.1 Women who do not own land Women who own land alone Women who own land jointly Source: Wor ld Bank G en der S t a t s, Da t a 2 0 1 2 . CHAPTER 2 . 79 FIGURE 2.16 Women’s participation in firms, selected Mashreq countries vs. MENA average 43.5 Share of firms (%) 25.4 22.6 6.8 8.1 5.3 3.9 6 3.1 2.3 4.4 Firms with female Firms with majority Firms with a female top participation in ownership female ownership manager Jordan (2019) Iraq (2013) Lebanon (2013) MENA (2019) S ource: Wor ld Bank Ent er prise S urveys, la t est available. N ote : MENA = Mi ddle East an d N o rt h Afric a . FIGURE 2.17 Female participation in firm ownership, by firm size, selected Mashreq countries vs. MENA average a. Firms with female participation in ownership 42.8 43.6 Share of firms (%) 35.7 35.7 28.1 24.2 22.4 20.7 21.3 9.3 5.1 3.1 Jordan (2019) Iraq (2013) Lebanon (2013) MENA (2019) Sma ll (5–19) Medi um (20 –99) Large (100+) b. Firms with majority female ownership c. Firms with female top manager 8.3 13.3 Share of firms (%) 6.5 Share of firms (%) 5.6 7.8 6.8 3.8 5.7 4.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 4.3 2.5 3.7 3.6 2.9 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.1 Jordan (2019) Lebanon (2013) MENA (2019) Jordan (2019) Iraq (2013) Lebanon (2013) MENA (2019) Sma ll (5–19) Medi um (20 –99) Large (100+) Sma ll (5–19) Medi um (20 –99) Large (100+) S ourc e: Wor ld Bank Ent er prise S urveys, la t est yea r available. N ote: MENA = Mi d dle East an d N o rt h Afric a . 80 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.18 Procedures and time required to set up a business, by gender, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon 27 26 Number of procedures Number of days 15 15 13 12 9 8 8 8 8 7 Start-up Time required to Start-up Time required to Start-up Time required to procedures to start a business procedures to start a business procedures to start a business register a (days) register a (days) register a (days) business business business Iraq Jordan Lebanon Female Male Source: Wor ld Bank Ent erprise S urveys, la t est yea r available. 13.3 percent of large (100+ employees) tions regarding the role of women may still face a discrepancy between de jure firms in Jordan, significantly higher than impede women from pursuing a job in and de facto law: protections guaranteed in Lebanon (2.9 percent) and the MENA the first place. As data from the World in writing may not be applied in real life average (3.6 percent) (figure 2.17, panel Values Survey and the Arab Barometer because of the lack of training of rele- b). For rates of female management of suggest, significant shares of the popula- vant staff, lack of capacity of the justice firms, Jordan and Iraq lag behind MENA tion in the countries observed share atti- system overall to protect these rights, or averages in firms of every size; however, tudes with regard to women’s roles in so- simply a gap between the spirit of the law in Lebanon, female management of me- ciety, families, and the economy that do and the attitudes and beliefs of those im- dium-sized firms greatly exceeds MENA not favor women’s economic participa- plementing the law. averages (figure 2.17, panel c). Women tion or leadership. Similarly, employers With regard to market constraints, in Iraq and Jordan have slightly high- may resist employing women, given the an overall precondition needed for er requirements than men for starting various assumptions or beliefs about, for women to access jobs is the availability a business, in terms of both procedures example, the quality of women’s perfor- of those jobs. In the Mashreq countries, and time required; but these gaps do not mance at work. In addition, women face the scarcity of jobs makes it difficult for exist in Lebanon (figure 2.18). some legal constraints to their economic women to find paid work. Furthermore, participation (constraints that prohibit Women in the Mashreq countries the lack of transport systems—particu- them from working in certain sectors or face a number of specific barriers when larly of transport systems that are safe for certain hours of the day, that put a spe- trying to enter the labor market—and women to use—and legal restrictions to cial burden on their starting a business, some of those barriers may pose con- women’s mobility may further constrain that prevent their mobility, and so on). straints to their remaining in the labor women’s access to jobs. Women also face Once the legal barriers fall, women may market. Importantly, societal expecta- difficulties in accessing assets (with some CHAPTER 2 . 81 difficulties motivated by social norms FIGURE 2.19 and attitudes, and others by legal restric- Perceptions of whether (and when) it is acceptable for women to work, Iraq and Jordan 96 tions), which relates to their capacity to 100 93 Share of men and women who agree (%) open a business in similar ways as men 90 78 80 do. Once women marry, some of the bar- 72 70 64 riers that emerge from informal institu- 56 60 54 tions, legal aspects, and markets become 50 40 more relevant, and new ones are added. 40 38 The following section discusses those ad- 30 26 ditional or enhanced barriers. 20 10 B A R R I E R S R E L AT E D 0 Generally, it is It is acceptible for It is acceptible to It is acceptible to It is acceptible to TO GETTING acceptible that married women leave children work in a mixed return home MARRIED women work to work with a relative gender workplace after 5pm As mentioned earlier, informal insti- Jordan Kurdistan Region of Iraq tutions (attitudes, norms, and values) S o urc e: Wo r l d Ba nk 2018b a nd Wo r l d Ba nk ( fo r t hc o m i ng ) . around women’s roles and responsibil- ities after getting married may signifi- FIGURE 2.20 cantly constrain women’s capacity to Ability of women to find or access a job in Lebanon work for pay outside the house. Women may be expected to refrain from par- Married women able to find a job 34.1 ticipating in the public space; they may also be expected to perform certain Single women able to find a job 58.7 time-consuming domestic and unpaid Percent tasks. Furthermore, certain restrictions on the type and location of work may S o urc e: UN D P 2018b . emerge more strongly once women mar- ry. Finally, married women may have less power to decide for themselves and aspirations of young women and girls, or work late hours (figure 2.19) (World may have to depend on their husbands to marriage appears to introduce an ad- Bank 2018). make decisions on their behalf. ditional layer of constraints to women’s Similarly, a survey in Lebanon ex- access to work. A survey conducted in plores the enhanced difficulties married E X P E C TAT I O N S A B O U T Jordan shows the decrease in acceptance women—as compared to single women— A WOMAN’S ROLE ONCE of women’s work outside the home once face in finding a job (figure 2.20) (UNDP SHE MARRIES married. Importantly, working outside 2018b). It finds that married women face Although certain social expectations the home becomes even less acceptable an additional burden, at the same time, around a woman’s role in society may if women leave children with relatives, the survey does not explore the underly- limit the choices and capacity to form work in a mixed gender environment, ing reasons behind that increase. 82 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.21 Perceptions regarding being a housewife vs. being employed, by highest education level, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon University Lebanon Secondary Primary No formal Jordan University Secondary Primary No formal University Secondary Iraq Primary No formal 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Don´t know Source: Wor ld Values S urvey Wave 6 , 2 0 1 0 – 1 4 . Not e: Fi gure shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h the s t a t e m e nt , “Be i ng a ho u s ew i fe c a n b e j u s t a s f u lf i ll i ng a s hav i ng a j o b .” A gender diagnostic in Lebanon sheds factor in determining whether a job would ment with the statement “being a house- light on several challenges women face in be suitable given the need to balance work wife is just as fulfilling as working for joining and remaining in the labor force and family, especially among married pay” in Lebanon and Iraq. In Lebanon, and in finding a job—highlighting the women with children. younger cohorts (15- to 19-year-olds importance of fulfilling traditional female and 20- to 24-year-old women) are near- The World Values Survey (2010–14) roles as a major barrier for married wom- ly twice as likely as older cohorts (from finds that, in addition to fears that wom- en.27 One of the main takeaways is that ages 40 to 69) to strongly disagree with en’s employment will lead to neglect in men question female employment on the the statement (figure 2.22). Likewise, fulfilling domestic and traditionally grounds that it would cause neglect of tra- in Iraq, women in younger age cohorts female and unpaid tasks, a significant ditional tasks such as childcare and cook- are less likely to agree or strongly agree share of the population believes that “be- ing. The same study shows that balancing with the statement, whereas no women ing a housewife is just as fulfilling as hav- family and work emerges as a barrier spe- above age 50 strongly disagreed with the ing a job.” Overall the agreement with cific to women. Although both women and statement and all women over 65 either this statement is lower in Iraq and Leb- men cited salary, working hours, and ben- agreed or strongly agreed with the state- anon than in Jordan. In addition, figure efits as crucial factors when job seeking, ment. No generational trends are evi- 2.21 clearly shows that level of education some factors were particularly important dent for women in Jordan or among men is directly correlated with levels of agree- for women. Those factors included prox- in any of the Mashreq countries. ment—the survey finds higher levels of imity to home, stability of employment, agreement among the less educated. Another survey, also conducted in family approval, flexibility, and long-term Lebanon, shows that 30 percent of male Data from Arab Barometer Wave V employment prospects. Importantly, work- respondents and 23 percent of female surveys show generational gaps in agree- ing hours were among the most important CHAPTER 2 . 83 FIGURE 2.22 Perceptions regarding being a housewife vs. being employed, by age group, Iraq and Lebanon 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 Lebanon age group 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 Iraq age group 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree S ource: Arab Baromet er Wave V. N ote : Fi gu re shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h t h e s t a t e m e nt , “ Be i ng a ho u s ew i fe i s j u s t a s f u lf i ll i ng a s wo r k i ng fo r p ay.” respondents agree that marriage is more In Iraq, societal expectations remain BARGAINING WITHIN THE important for women than having a ca- a barrier to women’s engagement in em- HOUSEHOLD reer (UN Women and Promundo 2017). ployment (Vilardo and Bittar). Vilardo An additional layer of constraints to At the same time, most Lebanese wom- and Bittar (2018) refer to negative per- women’s participation in the labor market en (86 percent) and slightly fewer men ceptions among a vast part of Iraqi so- arises from the intrahousehold bargain- (79 percent) agree with the statement ciety toward the frequent presence of ing effects once women marry. Women that married women should have the women outside their homes, especially may have to negotiate with their partners same right to work outside the home as without their husbands. a number of decisions regarding their their husbands (UN Women and Pro- own lives—including their participation Shteiwi (2015) argues that it is pos- mundo 2017). Such conflicting expec- in the labor market. Bargaining power of sible that gender norms are evolving to- tations about women’s role within the household members is defined by their ward increasing support for female eco- family reduce women’s choices in terms ownership of and control over resources, nomic participation. Shteiwi observes of the type and location of work (UNE- their exit options, social norms, and dis- that younger cohorts exhibit more pro- SCO 2018). crepancies in individual power. gressive attitudes toward gender equality. 84 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON Legal restrictions specific to married TA B L E 2 . 9 women may limit their capacity to bar- Legislation related to getting married, selected Mashreq countries gain with their husbands and make de- Legislation cisions by and for themselves (table 2.9). Marriage Lebanon Jordan Iraq For instance, in Iraq and Jordan, some le- Is there no legal provision that requires a married wom- gal provisions require a married woman Yes No No an to obey her husband? to obey her husband. In those two coun- Can a woman be head of household in the same way as tries, women cannot be head of house- Yes No No a man? holds in the same way as men. In none Is there legislation specifically addressing domestic Yes Yes No of the three countries can women obtain violence? a judgement of divorce in the same way Can a woman obtain a judgment of divorce in the same No No No way as a man? as a man, nor do women have the same Does a woman have the same rights to remarry as a rights to remarry in any of the countries. No No No man? All of those restrictions may affect the way in which women are able (or unable) S o urc e : Wo r l d Ba nk D a t a - Wo m e n, Bu s i ne s s a nd t he L aw ( 2020) . to make their own decisions—including those related to whether or not and how port having the final say on whether or 2018). In Iraq, another survey shows to participate in paid work. not the couple uses contraception; 20 that 19.2 percent of men report that the In 2019, countries in the MENA re- percent also report having the final say husband has the right to prevent his wife gion concluded 19 legal reforms, with on whether or not women can leave the from working (Vilardo and Bittar 2018). “getting married” a significant area of house. Twenty-five percent of women More generally speaking, a significant change. Four economies—Algeria, Bah- state that men make the decision on share of interviewees in all three coun- rain, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia—intro- whether women can work or get a job tries believes that husbands should have duced domestic violence laws captured outside the house. Decisions on how to the final say in all family decisions. Iraq by this indicator. Iraq had the most spend money on large investments are leads this share with 70 percent of inter- changes toward gender equality in the also taken exclusively by men, according viewees, followed by 51 percent in Jordan region, reflecting a reform trend in post to 51 percent of women (UN Women and 50 percent in Lebanon (Arab Ba- conflict economies. Iraq’s new passport and Promundo 2017). rometer 2019). A clear discrepancy exists law repealed the requirement that wom- In a mixed methods study in Jor- between male and female respondents in en under 40 be accompanied by a guard- dan, both men and women agreed that the three countries with regard to wheth- ian when applying for a passport (World men are the ultimate decision makers in er husbands should have the final say in Bank 2020). the household, including deciding for family decisions. Positive response to this Available data suggest that men con- women on whether to accept a job offer. question is strongly and negatively cor- tinue to have a large say on a number of More than 90 percent of women respon- related with education: those with higher intrahousehold decisions. For instance, dents said that, in the decision to work, levels of education are significantly less in in the 2017 IMAGES study in Lebanon the views of male household members favor of unequal decision-making within completed by UN Women and Promun- (mostly husbands) are important or ex- households (figure 2.23). do, 20 percent of male respondents re- tremely important (Felicio and Gauri CHAPTER 2 . 85 FIGURE 2.23 Views on family decision making, by level of education, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Tertiary Men Secondary Lebanon Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Jordan Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree S ource: Arab Baromet er Wave V. N ote : Fi gu re shows level of ag reem ent o r disag reem ent wit h t h e s t a t e m e nt , “ H u s b a nd s s ho u l d have t he f i na l s ay i n fa m i ly d e c i s i o ns .” Norms around male decision making ure 2.24). Those with less education cent among ages 25–29 versus 53 per- vary among MENA countries. In Jordan, tend to agree more with the statement, cent among women ages 60–64, 50 per- the share of those agreeing with the state- “If a woman earns more money that cent among ages 65–69, and 67 percent ment in a survey two years earlier was 7 her husband, it’s almost certain to cause among ages 70–74). Iraqi men showed percentage points higher at 58 percent, problems.” Having more income than more consistent agreement among age whereas the the share of respondents in a male partner would not only contra- groups (39 percent agreement among the MENA region who agreed slightly dict traditional roles of providers (male) men ages 20–24, 35 percent ages 35–39, increased (2 percentage points). At the and homemakers (female) but would and 38 percent ages 50–54). No clear same time, there may be significant dis- also raise women’s bargaining capacity trends among men or women emerged crepancies within countries. For instance, in nontraditional ways. In Iraq, gener- on this question in Jordan or Lebanon. in the Kurdistan province of Iraq, women ational trends emerge among women In line with the above finding, re- are socially more encouraged to pursue a with respect to attitudes on women’s search for Jordan shows that women career and find a job compared to other income: younger women are much less with higher levels of education also seem parts of the country (UNDP 2015). likely to agree with the statement in Arab to have more decision-making capacity Barometer Wave V surveys (13 percent Most interviewees in the three coun- relative to their husbands (Dababneh agreement among women ages 15–19, 12 tries find it problematic if women have 2016). The higher the level of educational percent among ages 20–24, and 11 per- more income than their husbands (fig- level achieved, the greater the likelihood 86 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.24 Views regarding income levels of husband vs. wife, by education level, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon University Lebanon Secondary Primary No formal Jordan University Secondary Primary No formal University Secondary Iraq Primary No formal 0 20 40 60 80 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Don’t know Source: Wor ld Values S urvey Wave 6 , 2 0 1 0 – 1 4 Not e: Fi gure shows a g reem ent o r disa g reem ent wit h t h e st a t e m e nt , “If a wo m a n e a r ns m o re m o ney t ha t he r hu s b a nd , i t ’s a l m o s t c e r t a i n t o c a u s e pro bl em s .” that a woman will participate in deciding TA B L E 2 . 1 0 how to spend the money she has earned Who makes the decision on how to spend women’s employment income, by education level (table 2.10) (Dababneh 2016). (Married women ages 15–49) When it comes to the right to divorce, most respondents in all three countries Jointly with Women alone (%) Husbands alone (%) husbands (%) agree that women should have equal Elementary 32.4 57.8 9.8 rights to men. At the same time, there Preparatory 53.4 43.5 3.1 is a clear gender gap: women in all three Secondary 44.2 52.6 3.2 countries agree more than their male Higher than counterparts do. Among women, there 37.0 59.7 3.3 secondary is also a correlation between agreement and education levels in the three coun- S o urc e : D a b a b ne h 2016, b a s e d o n a q u a nt i t a t i ve re s e a rc h t ha t t o o k p l a c e i n 2015 i n d i fferent J o rda - n ia n c i t i e s . tries. Among men, that correlation holds in Iraq and Lebanon, whereas in Jordan those with tertiary as well as basic or less education agree more than those with secondary education (figure 2.25). CHAPTER 2 . 87 FIGURE 2.25 Views on equal rights to divorce, by education level, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon Tertiary Men Lebanon Secondary Basic or less Women Tertiary Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Jordan Basic or less Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less Tertiary Men Secondary Basic or less Iraq Tertiary Women Secondary Basic or less 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree S ource: Arab Baromet er Wave V. N ote : Fi gu re shows level of ag reem ent of disag reem ent wit h t h e s t a t e m e nt , “Wo m e n a nd m e n s ho u l d have e q u a l r i g ht s i n m a k i ng t he d e c i s i o n t o di vo rc e.” I N T I M AT E PA RT N E R product, equivalent to US$ 1.5 trillion— female hospital visits due to physical vi- VIOLENCE approximately the size of the economy of olence (Aizer 2011). For India, a study Violence against women and girls neg- Canada (UN Women 2016). concludes that women’s employment in atively affects women’s participation in Empirical evidence linking GBV paid work and ownership of property sig- education, civic life, and employment, (particularly domestic violence) and nificantly decreases violence (Bhattacha- and undermines poverty reduction. women’s participation in paid work is rya et al. 2009). Also in India, women’s GBV is a major threat to women’s ad- unclear. Some theories argue that labor asset ownership has been significantly vancement in private and public spheres market participation of women has a and negatively associated with psycho- and reduces their economic contribu- “protective” effect: as women earn in- logical and physical violence (Panda and tion (Anani 2013). Women may suffer come, they gain better intrahousehold Agarwal 2005). Other theories argue isolation, inability to work, loss of wag- bargaining power, have a credible exit that women’s labor market participation es, higher medical costs, job instability, option, and consequently experience increases domestic violence, and wom- lack of participation in regular activities, lower levels of violence (Farmer and en experience a “backlash” from men as and limited ability to care for themselves Tiefenthaler 1997; Tauchen, Witte, and traditional gender roles are undermined and their children (IWPR 2017; WHO Long 1991). This theory is supported (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). Sim- 2017). Research indicates the cost of vi- by empirical studies, such as one in the ilarly, empirical studies have found a olence against women could amount to United States that finds that a reduction correlation between increased economic nearly 2 percent of global gross domestic in the gender wage gap results in fewer empowerment and more violence, such 88 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON as in Ethiopia (Hjort and Villanger 2011) FIGURE 2.26 and Bangladesh (Heath 2012). Women’s experience of gender-based violence, Jordan Few studies in Mashreq countries Spousal Violence: Any form of emotional, 25.9 physical, or sexual violence have been completed to clarify the re- Spousal Violence Spousal violence: Emotional 20.6 lationship between GBV and female la- bor force participation. One study finds Spousal violence: Sexual 5.1 a positive relationship between wom- Spousal violence: Physical 17.5 en’s participation in paid work and in- Sexual violence 5.2 cidence of violence in the Middle East (Kishor and Johnson 2004). Lenze and Physical violence (since age 15) 20.8 Klasen (2013) argue, however, that ex- isting studies ignore the endogeneity of Sha re of women ages 15–49 who have experienced gender -based vi olence (%) women’s work, which may confuse the links between labor force participation S o urc e : J o rd a n D e m o g ra p hi c a nd H e a lt h Su r vey 2017–18. and violence. Using quantitative data from 2007 in Jordan, their study finds on GBV; however, several smaller-scale show high rates of reported controlling that, without controlling for endogene- studies suggest that GBV—including behaviors: 66.4 percent report that her ity, women’s participation in paid work physical, sexual, and psychological vio- husband or partner gets jealous if she enhances violence. Conversely, when lence by an intimate partner—is preva- talks to other men, 32.2 percent report a endogeneity of female employment is lent in Lebanon. Family members com- husband or partner insisting on knowing considered, the results become insignif- mit 65 percent of reported incidents of where she is at all times, and 15.2 percent icant, suggesting that women’s work has violence experienced by women, and report prohibition from seeing female no causal influence on marital violence. 71 percent of incidents take place inside friends (figure 2.27). The authors argue that, despite a lack of the survivor’s or perpetrator’s household proof in their research of the “protec- In Lebanon, 7.8 percent of ever-mar- (UNFPA 2017). tive” nature of women’s labor force par- ried men report ever having used phys- ticipation on their likelihood to experi- Jordan is the only country among ical violence against a female partner; ence violence, their findings suggest that the three that collects official GBV data 23.2 percent reported ever having perpe- women should not fear constraints when through its Demographic and Health trated some form of emotional violence involved in paid work. Survey (DHS). According to the 2017– against their wives; and 8.8 percent re- 18 DHS, 25.9 percent of ever-married ported sexual violence (forced sex). In Domestic violence is an issue of con- women (ages 15–49) report having expe- all three countries, men who witnessed cern in all three countries, with a signifi- rienced any form of emotional, physical, their fathers using violence against their cant share of women having experienced or sexual violence. One in five women mothers, and men who experienced this form of violence at some point in (20.8 percent) reports having ever expe- some form of violence at home as chil- their lives. Availability of good quali- rienced physical violence and 5.2 per- dren, are significantly more likely to re- ty data on GBV is a challenge in many cent of women have experienced sexual port perpetrating intimate partner vio- countries. Lebanon, for example, has no violence (figure 2.26). DHS data also lence in their adult relationships. Jordan nationally representative prevalence data CHAPTER 2 . 89 and Lebanon both have a dedicated law FIGURE 2.27 against domestic violence, but Iraq does Women’s experience of controlling behaviors by husband or partner not (UN Women and Promundo 2017). Husband or partner is jealous or angry if she 66.4 talks to other men In addition (and likely also a driver of the observed phenomena), there are high Husband or partner insists on knowing 32.2 where she is at all times levels of acceptance of GBV, particular- ly in Iraq, where half of women believe Husband or partner tries to limit her 10.6 contact with her family that it is justified for husbands to beat their wives under certain circumstances Husband or partner does not permit her to 15.2 meet her female friends (World Values Survey 2014). The share of those women is smaller in Jordan (23 Husband or partner frequently accuses her 7.8 of being unfaithful percent) and Lebanon (10 percent). Share of respondents (%) This section has laid out the specific and additional barriers to women’s par- S o urc e: Jo rd a n D e m o g ra p hi c a nd H e a lt h Su r vey 2017–18. ticipation in the labor market that arise when women get married. Expectations ing, safety, and human rights of the sur- access to education and birth control, about their roles as wives and mothers, vivors but also their capacity to generate and women’s ability to make decisions imposed by society and by their own income and participate in paid work. over their own reproductive behaviors. families and often internalized, are not This section discusses how having consistent with using time to work out- side the house. In addition, working B A R R I E R S R E L AT E D children leads women to further with- TO H AV I N G draw from the labor market. It also ex- outside the house, being “public,” may CHILDREN plores, as far as data permit, some of the simply not be acceptable in certain en- High fertility has commonly been linked channels that may cause that phenom- vironments. Another layer of complexi- to lower education and employment enon. Channels include the enhanced ty is introduced because married wom- rates among females. Less time dedicat- demand on women’s time for household en often have to negotiate life decisions ed to childbearing and rearing enables chores and care, societal views with re- with their partners—in marriage, women women to spend more time in activities gard to childcare, legal provisions, and lose the capacity to make decisions for such as education and work for pay out- availability of care options. themselves and by themselves. Women’s decision-making capacity may also be side the home as well as to increase their political representation. Since the early DISTRIBUTION OF affected by certain legal restrictions that 1990s, all MENA countries have experi- HOUSEHOLD CHORES AND may limit their capacity to decide, head TIME USE households, remarry, and divorce among enced a drastic decline in fertility rates. others. Finally, intimate partner violence, Lebanon has one of the lowest rates in Globally, women’s care work remains a phenomenon for which good data are the Mashreq (lower than the MENA and often invisible and “normalized” (Fol- not always available in the countries ob- Turkey averages) whereas Iraq has the bre 2006; Oakley 2016). Men—as the served, seems to be an issue of severe highest (figure 2.28). This indicator is perceived breadwinners who generally concern. It affects not only the well-be- linked to reproductive norms, women’s work outside the home for pay—usual- 90 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.28 the difference amounts to about one Fertility rates, selected Mashreq countries vs. regional averages hour or more on average (ILO 2018d). Furthermore, unpaid care work increas- Turkey 1.8 es in contexts of conflict and displace- Iraq ment. Women consistently invest most 4.3 of their time and energy, as the provision Lebanon 1.7 of care work has become a part of wom- en’s identity in the Iraqi social context Jordan 3.3 (Dietrich and Carter 2017). Middle East and North Africa 2.7 In Lebanon, women reported (almost unanimously) washing clothes and clean- Arab region 3.3 ing the kitchen, sitting room, bathroom, Number of births per woman or toilet, whereas only 26 percent of ev- er-married men reported ever carrying Source: Wor ld Bank Wo rld Develo pm ent I n dic at o rs 2 0 1 9 . out these tasks. Qualitative research ac- companying the survey results finds that ly do not put in the same unpaid work limits women’s participation in the pub- certain household shocks, such as shifts hours as women. Women, by contrast, lic sphere and prevents them from hav- in livelihoods, a working wife, migration, will likely face a double burden when ing access to the labor market. and other factors can lead some men to trying to manage housework and paid Time use is clearly a reflection of roles take on more domestic work (UN Wom- work outside the house. Despite chang- carried out by women and men (figure en and Promundo 2017). ing attitudes in some countries of the 2.29). In Iraq, males account for 14 per- Family and care work responsibilities world regarding female chores inside cent of the hours dedicated to care work, affect Lebanese women’s decision and the home along with the rise of initia- whereas females (ages 15+) account for ability to take paid work and their deci- tives related to child and elderly support 86 (ILO 2018d). According to the Iraq sion related to the type, load, and place of and pensions for the elderly, women still Household Socio-Economic Survey work, and the number of hours (Ajluni carry the major share of domestic work (2012), Iraqi women carry most of the and Kawar 2015). When Lebanese wom- and national economic figures continue unpaid household work burden, with en with children enter the workforce, to exclude their care work (Folbre 2012, mothers, older unmarried daughters, they often carry the burden of two jobs. 2014). Worldwide—where data avail- and elderly women engaging most in this Spending long hours in unpaid family ability allows—a significant gap between unpaid work. Iraqi women spend on av- work may reduce their availability for the number of hours spent by men and erage more than six hours a day perform- paid economic activities (Habib, El Zein, women in providing care work in the ing unpaid activities, such as cooking and and Hojeij 2012). Additionally, Lebanon house can be observed (ILO 2018d). Al- childcare (Vilardo and Bittar 2018). lacks proper pension plans that can con- though this work is critical to the proper tribute in supporting older individuals, Iraqi rural women share a larger bur- functioning of communities and house- which results in an increased need for den of unpaid work if compared to their holds, unpaid care work remains a barri- the care provision usually done by fe- urban counterparts: According to the In- er to reaching gender equality because it male family members (Wallace 2013). ternational Labour Organization (ILO), CHAPTER 2 . 91 Balancing the different demands on FIGURE 2.29 their time is a real challenge for wom- Average number of hours spent on childcare, by gender, selected Mashreq countries en—in Lebanon as well as in the other Mashreq countries—who are willing to engage in the labor market. Qual- Hours spent on childcare itative research conducted in Jordan finds that having children is the main reason expressed by women during fo- 6.0 cus group discussions for not working 3.7 3.6 or for disengaging from the workforce. 2.0 Long working hours make it difficult for 1.3 1.2 some women to balance paid work with Iraq Lebanon Jordan childcare and household responsibilities. Women Men Similarly, a study for Iraq relates wom- en’s inability to find a job to the absence S o urc e: I LO 2018d . of childcare services and to social expec- TA B L E 2 . 1 1 tations toward women in fulfilling care Hours spent on chores and childcare, by gender, Jordan (2016) (UNDP 2015). (Men and women ages 15–44) Using more recent data, we calculate All Men Women an even more significant gap in terms of Time spent on chores time use related to domestic work (in- 2.10 0.30 4.02 (hours) cluding chores and childcare) for Jordan. Time spent on childcare Women spend 3.7 hours more on chores 1.19 0.41 2.02 (hours) compared to men, and they spend about S o urc e: Jo rd a n L a b o r M a r ket Pa ne l Su r vey ( 2016) . 1.6 hours more on childcare on average (table 2.11). enrollment rates in nurseries to 20 per- of childcare services, with an estimated A C C E P TA B I L I T Y A N D cent, Kindergarten 1 to 35 percent, and 50,000 to 60,000 children in unlicensed AFFORDABILITY OF Kindergarten 2 to 100 percent within 10 home-based childcare facilities.28 CHILDCARE SERVICES years (NCHRD 2016). Although data are As noted earlier, in the Mashreq With regard to actual enrollment in not robust, the estimate of day care fa- countries, having children is significant- childcare facilities, Jordan’s national cilities in Jordan suggest a total of 1,340 ly correlated with women’s dropping out strategy for human resources develop- facilities in aggregate, divided among of the labor market—especially among ment estimated 2016 enrollment rates in public schools (570), nongovernmen- less educated women. Beyond the addi- nurseries at 3 percent, in Kindergarten 1 tal organizations (31), private facilities tional time women may have to invest at 18 percent, and in Kindergarten 2 at (603), and workplace-based facilities for care, they may also face barriers relat- 60 percent (NCHRD 2016). The strat- (136) (Slimane and Lundvall 2017). Key ed to the acceptability of childcare. Fam- egy suggests interventions to increase informants also cite informal provision ilies, communities, and societies may 92 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 2.30 Views on acceptability of childcare, by marital status Single Lebanon Married Jordan Single Married Single Iraq Married 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Share of respondents (%) Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know Source: Wor ld Values S urvey Wave 6 , 2 0 1 0 – 1 4 . Not e: Fi gure shows level of ag reem ent of disag reem ent wit h the s t a t e m e nt , “A p re s c ho o l c hi l d s u f fe rs w i t h a wo r k i ng m ot he r.” FIGURE 2.31 Views on acceptability of childcare, by age group, Iraq 100 90 Share of respondents (%) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74 Age group Agree or strongly agree Disagree or strongly disagree Source: Arab Barometer, Wave V. Not e: Fi gure shows a g reem ent o r disa g reem ent wit h t h e st a t e m e nt , “Whe n a m ot he r wo r ks fo r p ay, c hi l d re n s u f fe r.” impose sanctions on women who leave mother. Those attitudes are particular- agreement or strong agreement with the their children to be cared for by some- ly strong among Jordanians compared statement “when a mother works for pay, one else while they go to work and make to the other two countries and slightly children suffer” decreases from 100 per- an income. Large shares of the popula- stronger among married individuals (fig- cent among 70- to 74-year-olds to 44.7 tion in the three countries believe that ure 2.30). In Iraq, Arab Barometer data percent among 20- to 24-year olds (fig- a preschool child suffers with a working reveal a generational gap in attitudes: ure 2.31).29 CHAPTER 2 . 93 FIGURE 2.32 state that putting your child in nursey is Use of organized early childhood education programs, by mother’s level of education, no longer a stigmatized issue.30 Jordan The different evidence makes it un- Higher 22.6 clear whether affordability is a major limitation preventing families from us- Secondary 7.4 ing childcare services. At the same time, Mother’s education level available data for Jordan show that the Preparatory 4.9 cost for nursery equals 28 percent of the average wage of women with low edu- Elementary 4.4 cational attainment. This figure com- pares to 33.7 percent on average in the None 5.1 United States. Consequently, childcare should be similarly or even more afford- Share of children ages 36 - 59 month attending (%) able on average than in the United States S ource: Jordan Demograp h ic an d Healt h S urvey, 2 0 1 7 – 1 8 . (Kasoolu et. al 2019). N ote : Fi gu re shows share of c h ildren , ag ed 3 6 – 5 9 m o nt h s, livin g w i t h t he i r m ot he r a nd a t t e nd i ng a n e arly chi ld hood educat i on pro g ra m . LEGAL PROVISIONS R E L AT E D T O H AV I N G A C H I L D : M AT E R N A L An ILO study about women’s em- children of mothers who have prepara- A N D PAT E R N A L L E AV E ployment in Jordan reveals that Jordani- tory, elementary, or no education at all. POLICIES, FLEXIBLE an women are expected to be “normal- Other barriers that may prevent WORK ARRANGEMENTS, ly” providing care work and domestic women from using existing childcare A N D M A N D AT O RY responsibilities, especially in rural areas services include the lack of affordability C H I L D C A R E R E G U L AT I O N S (ILO 2018a, 2018b). Such expectations to and the quality of childcare. Qualitative Legal provisions around childcare are prioritize their familial and social duties research in Lebanon shows that most fundamental in providing parents (and over their personal growth likely prevents participants find childcare expensive specifically women) with the space and many Jordanian women from entering and worry about quality. In that study, time to balance work and care. Table the labor market, or from remaining in it the perception of a lack of quality of ex- 2.12 shows that paid maternity leave of after they have a child (Dababneh 2016). isting services shapes a strong preference at least 14 weeks is available only in Iraq. One can observe differences, however, in to care for children at home. Perceptions In Lebanon, Laws Nos. 266 and 267 of the behavior of highly educated versus and beliefs about the importance of ma- 2014 extended maternity leave for wom- non- or low-educated women. Women ternal involvement in the early years are en from 49 to 70 days with 100 percent with higher education make more use of also important in shaping participants’ of employee wages covered during leave organized childcare as data from Jordan preferences for home-based care. Impor- (Women Business and the Law 2016); evidences (figure 2.32). More than 1 in tantly, views about child rearing being however, the country still has no legisla- 5 children of mothers with higher edu- a mother’s duty are stronger among in- tion on paternal or parental leave. Only cation attends an early childhood educa- terviewed men, whereas women largely in Jordan does the government admin- tion program compared to about 1 in 20 94 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E 2 . 1 2 ing model system have reported that it Legislation related to parenthood, selected Mashreq countries has positively affected the workplace. Of those companies, 70 percent report a Parenthood Lebanon Jordan Iraq positive impact on productivity of both Is paid leave of at least 14 weeks available to women? No No Yes male and female employees. Sixty percent Length of paid maternity leave (days) 70 70 98 of participating firms report increased Does the government administer 100% of maternity No Yes No employment and retention of women in leave benefits? their companies. Women are dispropor- Yes, Is paid leave available to fathers? No No tionally represented among flex work 3 days Is there paid parental leave? No No No contractors (45 percent of contracts), in- Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited? Yes No No dicating that the regulation mainly ben- efits them and supports their remaining Source: Wor ld Bank D at a - Wo m en , B usin ess an d t h e Law ( 2 0 20) . in their jobs—despite other demands on their time related to unpaid and care work (Jordan Times, Oct. 25, 2018). ister 100 percent of maternity leave ben- to provide or support childcare services efits. Parental leave does not exist in any when they employ women (Labor Law Jordan has made additional changes of the countries, and only Lebanon for- of 2015, Art. 92(2)). Although childcare to the legislation with the aim of sup- bids the dismissal of a pregnant worker. services at the workplace can stimulate porting a better balance of work and Parental leave policies are very im- women’s participation in jobs, such pro- care. Those changes include an amend- portant ways of enhancing women’s ca- visions can also create disincentives for ment to the labor law32 asking employ- pacity to balance responsibilities at work employers to hire women. ers whose employees (men and women) and for her child. It is noteworthy that in have 15 or more children below the age Jordan’s bylaw31 on flexible work was Jordan, through the recent legal change of five to provide childcare services ei- enacted in 2017 based on article 140 of (Labor Law Nr. 14, 2019), parental ben- ther in the workplace or by using the ser- the labor law in Jordan, and it is now re- efits were also added to the amended la- vices of childcare providers. Prior regu- flected in the new labor law. This regula- bor law, although minimally, in the form lations asked employers with at least 20 tion applies to employees with three or of 3-day paid parental leave. female employees who had 10 children more continuous years at work; employ- under the age of four to provide child- As mentioned earlier, Jordan has re- ees with family responsibilities; pregnant care services—resulting in a disincentive cently amended its labor law, adding defi- women; employees who provide care for to hire women. Furthermore, recently nitions of flexible work and amending a child, family member, or elder person enacted regulatory frameworks allow the requirement for employers to pro- due to illness; employees who are study- the licensing of home-based businesses. vide childcare based on the number of ing at university; and employees with The nurseries bylaw (number 77 for the children instead of the number of female disabilities. The bylaw provides various year 2018) stated that regulations will be employees (Article 72 B of the Labor Law forms of flexible work arrangements. forthcoming on the operation of home- Nr. 14, 2019). Lebanon’s labor law does The results of this new regulation based nurseries; these regulations will not require employers to provide child- seem promising: 95 percent of the orga- likely cover, among others, number of care. In Iraq, employers are mandated nizations that applied the flexible work- children allowed, their ages, characteris- CHAPTER 2 . 95 tics of the home, and number of children per caregiver. This change is quite note- HOW RELEVANT IS EACH worthy because home-based businesses BARRIER FOR DIFFERENT have the potential to provide childcare WOMEN IN THE MASHREQ services to a large number of children (World Bank 2019d). COUNTRIES? Providing early education for chil- dren between three and six years old This chapter has reviewed the extant women. For Iraqi women with less than (and making it compulsory) can also literature on different constraints to secondary education, there is a small be an important measure. Lebanon and working that different women face in drop of 3 percent if the woman marries Jordan foresee 10 years of compulsory each country. This section attempts to young (between 15 and 18 years old). In education, compared to 6 years in Iraq.33 quantify the relative importance of each Lebanon, the marriage effect on chance of these constraints. As this and the pre- of working is 25 percent for those with This section has discussed the addi- vious chapter have emphasized, women less than secondary education, 56 per- tional barriers to labor market participa- face a number of different constraints at cent for those with secondary education, tion that women face when they have a different times in their lives. In addition, and 36 percent for those with tertiary ed- child. Roles and responsibilities may be women from different backgrounds (as ucation. In Jordan, the reduction in the strictly assigned within families, suggest- proxied here by education) experience likelihood of being out of the labor mar- ing that women shoulder the largest bur- those constraints in different ways. We ket when a woman is married is 12 per- den of unpaid housework, as evidenced employ a regression framework to try cent for women with less than secondary in available time use data. Acceptability, and understand which ones are binding education and 23 percent for those with perceptions of available quality of child- for which women and to quantify their tertiary education. No effect is found for care provision, accessibility, and afford- relative importance. Not all constraints those with secondary education in Jor- ability are all potential factors that may are amenable to such analysis; a coun- dan.34 The interpretation of the marriage prevent women with (small) children try’s legal framework, for example, can- effect could reflect that women expect from entering or remaining in the labor not be examined in this manner. The to have children shortly upon marriage market. A number of legal provisions remainder of this chapter summarizes and exit the labor market in anticipation, can support families in balancing work the findings of the quantitative analysis which may in turn reflect a lack of fami- and family duties—for instance, those (presented in table 2.13), the details of ly-friendly policies or childcare options, related to maternity, paternity, parental which can be found in the appendix. or it could reflect a wife’s preferences or a leave, provision of childcare by the em- For most women in all countries, husband’s beliefs, or those of the broader ployer, or flexible work arrangements. getting married dramatically reduces the community. There is little evidence that Despite recent progress, those provisions probability of working. In Iraq, married the age gap between husband and wife are missing in several dimensions in the women with a secondary education are matters, nor that marrying young does, countries observed. 36 percent less likely to engage in the la- aside from the mentioned small effect for bor market than an unmarried woman less educated women in Iraq. with the same education. Similarly, the In Jordan, among ever-married drop is 19 percent for tertiary-educated women, divorced, widowed, or separated 96 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON women with secondary and tertiary edu- participation decision. Thus, only when more likely to work than those in urban cation are more likely to work than those the family grows further is there an ad- areas with the same education. Women still married. For women with secondary ditional reduction in the participation with higher education living in rural ar- education, those who are no longer mar- decision, possibly related to the extra eas are 13 percent less likely to partici- ried because they divorced, widowed, or constraints that more children imply. pate in the labor market, compared to separated are 76 percent more likely to women with the same education living In Iraq, household chores and child- work compared to women still married in urban areas. care make women less likely to work; (and who have a small age gap with their there may also be evidence of social Disability significantly reduces the husband). Those in the same categories norms against women working in less chances of working for less educated and with tertiary education are 28 per- educated households. For every hour of women. In Iraq, women with low ed- cent more likely to work than those who household work, Iraq women are 2 per- ucation and a disability are 7 percent are married and have the same level of cent, 4 percent, and 7 percent less likely less likely to participate than their peers education. For ever-married women to participate in the labor market based who do not have disabilities, rising to 40 with less than secondary education, a on their education—from less than sec- percent for women at the secondary lev- large age gap between the woman and ondary to secondary to tertiary, respec- el. In Lebanon, disability at the low and her husband lowers the likelihood of tively. Ten hours a day doing house- secondary education levels is associated working by 10 percent. work decreases Iraqi women’s chances with close to 27 percent less chance of The incremental effect of having chil- of working by 20 percent to 70 percent, participating. dren after getting married differs across depending on their level of education. 35 In Iraq and Lebanon, and to a less- countries and education levels, which A similar result holds for hours spent in er extent, Jordan, there is evidence that could reflect norms or anticipatory fer- childcare. In addition, for women with household norms on working constrain tility. In Lebanon, women with low or less than secondary education, every or empower women within the same medium education are incrementally hour of religious activity reduces the household. The presence of another less likely to economically participate probability of participating by 2 percent. woman aged 15–64 years in the house- after having children. In Jordan, there An interpretation of this finding is that hold and whether she is working can is an incrementally negative effect for religious activity itself is not a constraint provide indirect evidence of the house- women with secondary or tertiary ed- but that religiosity is correlated with a hold norms on women’s work. In Iraq, ucation. In Iraq, the effect appears only social conservatism that does not sup- the presence another woman in the for women with secondary schooling. port female work (or at least, only under house who does not work means it is less Moreover, these effects are apparent certain conditions that are not met in the likely for a woman to participate in the mostly for women with at least two chil- market). labor market. Conversely, if the house- dren but not when comparing women Less educated women in Iraq are hold includes another woman who is without children to those with just one more likely to work if they live in rural working, a woman is more likely to work child. As already mentioned, one inter- areas rather than urban, but more ed- as well. This finding holds at the low and pretation for these results is that women ucated women are less likely to work. high education levels.36 In Lebanon, and are already anticipating having children Women in Iraq with low (less than sec- to a lesser extent in Jordan,37 the same when marrying and the effect of having a ondary) and medium education (sec- result holds for less educated women. child quickly is already included in their ondary) are 7 percent and 13 percent These results are interpreted to mean CHAPTER 2 . 97 that it is more likely that all the wom- with lower rates of female employment. ipation in the labor market. These results en in a household work or that none of A similar effect is also observed in Jor- indicate the positive association between them does. An alternative reason could dan among ever-married women.38 This economic empowerment within house- be that, if there are few jobs in the area, finding supports the idea that observ- holds and female work, although it is un- no women in the household tries to ing a collective pattern or behavior may clear whether women can work because work; if there are many jobs, everyone encourage others to behave in a similar they are empowered or are empowered does. Because female unemployment at way, in this case women participating in because they work. the local level (district in Iraq and Jor- the labor market. GBV might be used by husbands to re- dan) is controlled for, it is unlikely that For married women in Jordan, mea- 39 assert control when women work. On the these results reflect this alternative labor sures related to empowerment within the one hand, some behaviors affect women’s demand explanation. Furthermore, less household indicate a positive effect on participation; we observe that, when the educated women in Iraq and women working. Women who have a voice in the husband displays controlling behaviors,40 across all education levels in Jordan are decisions on issues regarding their health women with less than secondary educa- less likely to participate if there is a male care (for secondary and tertiary educated tion are 5 percent less likely to work. On in the house who is not working (con- women), large household purchases (for the other hand, although there is a typical trolling for local male unemployment). secondary educated women), and their underreporting of these events, 41 we also This finding may suggest that women do husband’s earnings (for tertiary educat- observe that women who suffered from not look for work if men are not work- ed women) have a higher likelihood of sexual violence by their partners are 10 ing, which is supported by the social working compared to those in the same percent (in the case of women with less norms literature that says that people be- education level but for whom the hus- than secondary education) and 11 per- lieve that jobs should go to men ahead of band makes all the decisions. Moreover, cent (for women with secondary educa- women when jobs are scarce. those with less than secondary education tion) more likely to be employed. Those Similarly, seeing other women in the who have a bank account are 16 percent in the lower education category and who local area work may encourage female more likely to work than those who do suffered from emotional violence are also participation in the labor market. In Iraq, not have one, and 25 percent more likely 7 percent more likely to work. A specula- women of all education levels who live in the case of tertiary education. Similar- tive hypothesis for this result is that hus- in areas with higher rates of local (sub- ly, among all women in Jordan, having bands use sexual and emotional violence district) female employment are more applied for a loan, a proxy for access to to reassert control when women bring in likely to participate than women in areas finance, is associated with greater partic- independent income. 98 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E 2 . 1 3 Female participation regression results, by country     Lebanon Iraq Jordan Jordan (DHS) Secondary Secondary Secondary Secondary secondary secondary secondary secondary Topic Variable Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Below Below Below Below Marriage Marriage   Early marriage   Age difference with spouse Children 1 child   2 children   3 or more children Housework Hours chores and childcare   Hours childcare Disability Disability Household Another female in hh not norms about working work Another female in hh   (working) Another male in hh not   working Local female employment Conservative Hours religious norms Rural Rural Economic Has bank account empowerment   Applied for a loan Decision About own healthcare making About large household   purchases   About husband’s earnings Gender-based Emotional violence violence   Sexual violence Husband has controlling   behaviours Sources: 2012 Iraq H o useh o ld S o c io ec o n o m ic S urvey, 2 0 1 2 Leb a no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey, 2016 J o rd a n L a b o r M a r ket Pa ne l Su r vey, 2012 J o rda n D em o gra - phi c and H ealt h Sur vey ( DHS ) an d Wo rld B an k c alc ula t io n s. Not e: Sample i s women 1 5 – 4 4 yea rs o ld n ot c urrent ly in sc h o o l i ng exc e pt i n t he J o rd a n ( D H S) c o l u m n w he re t he s a m p l e i s re s t r i c t e d t o eve r- m a rri ed wo m en . T he di rect i on of t he arrow in dic a t es t h e direc t io n of t h e asso c i a t i o n b et we e n e a c h v a r i a b l e a nd fe m a l e l a b o r fo rc e p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( fe m a l e e m p loym ent i n th e Jord an (DH S) colu mn) . T he number of ar rows in dic at e t h e m ag n it ude of t h e a sso c ia t i o n ( we a k medium s t ro ng , ve r y s t ro ng ). T he t able shows a se lec t ed sam ple of va riables t h at h ad a sta t i s t i c a lly s i g ni f i c a nt ( a t l e a s t a t t he 10 p e rc e nt l eve l ) a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h fe m a l e pa rti c i pa ti o n i n any of t he cou nt r y spec ific a t io n s a n d t h at a re disc ussed in t he t ex t . B ecau se of dat a cons t raint s, n ot a ll t h e c o unt ry spec ific at io ns i nc l u d e d a ll t he v a r i a b l e s , b u t w i t hi n c o u nt r i e s t he s p e c i f i c a t i o ns we re t he s a me. Fo r th e full resu lt s see t he ap pendix . CHAPTER 2 . 99 NOTES 10. As WDR 2012 discusses at length, those who frame gender equality as equality of opportunity defend the view that differences in outcomes are the product of in- equalities in contexts and differences in preferences (World Bank 2012). Converse- ly, those who frame gender equality as equality of outcomes suggest that prefer- ences matter but that they are not inherent to women and men but are learned and are products of internalizing social norms and expectations. In line with WDR 2012, this report will take a pragmatic approach, focusing on both outcomes and opportunities following an understanding that both are deeply interconnected. 11. Political representation is another important indicator of women’s agency because it reflects women’s capacity to participate in public spheres, an important con- dition for accessing work opportunities (OECD 2018). According to Xu (2015), there is a direct relationship between a country’s female political participation and women’s economic empowerment and to the general economic growth. Wom- en’s greater voice and participation can also affect other areas of women’s lives, including economic opportunities and access to services (Klugman et al. 2014), and it may also affect the legal framework with regard to women’s rights to asset ownership, as in cases in Rwanda and South Africa (IDEA 2005), or lead to repeal- ing discriminatory laws (Hallward-Driemeier, Hasan, and Rusu 2013). Women in the Mashreq are underrepresented in decision-making positions and show weak political participation in general (ESCWA 2017). Women’s participation in parlia- ment ranges from 4.7 percent (6 of 128 seats) in Lebanon to 15.4 percent (20 of 130 seats) in Jordan to 25.2 percent (83 of 329 seats) in Iraq (UN Women 2019). Female political participation in Lebanon, although lowest among the Mashreq countries, is the highest in the country’s history. 12. The quantity of education is measured as the number of years of school a child can expect to attain by age 18 given the prevailing pattern of enrollment rates across grades. The quality of education reflects ongoing work at the World Bank to harmonize test scores from major international student achievement testing programs. These scores are combined into a measure of learning-adjusted school years using the “learning-adjusted years of school” conversion metric proposed in the 2018 World Development Report. 13. No recent education data for Lebanon are available through World Development Indicators, Genderstats, or Edustats. 14. World Development Indicators. 100 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON 15. No data are available for Iraq and Lebanon. 16. Such data are, unfortunately, not available for the other two countries. 17. Data from Jordan’s 2017–18 Demographic and Health Survey. Information by ed- ucation and area of residence is not available for Iraq and Lebanon. 18. Singh, Parvez Butt, and Canepa (2018) state that social norms are “a set of rules that define what is considered normal in a group and can be rules that group members share when they interact with each other.” 19. The World Values Survey investigates several social, cultural, and religious top- ics, including women’s rights. The eight statements that are evaluated under the “women’s rights” module are as follows: (1) “A woman can become President or Prime Minister of an Arab country”; (2) “In general, men are better at political leadership than women”; (3) “University education for males is more important than university education for females”; (4) “It is permissible for a woman to travel abroad by herself ”; (5) “Women’s share of inheritance should be equal to that of men”; (6) “women’s inheritance should be equal to that of men”; (7) “Women and men should have equal rights in making the decision to divorce”; and (8) “Hus- bands should have final say in all decisions concerning the family.” 20. A study in Jordan indicates that traditional attitudes and social inequities continue to limit the participation of women in work even in the public sector, where they are limited in executive and managerial positions (Shteiwi 2015). For Jordan, Da- babneh (2016) mentions that social patriarchal traditions are continuously resi- lient in and continue to contribute to significant differences in perceptions around the economic roles and responsibilities of women and men. 21. From the 2014 World Values Survey. 22. This section is based on the Women, Business and the Law Database, 2020 data. 23. Labor and financial laws (Law No. 37) in Iraq were stated in the 2015 Constitution while Inheritance and family finances policies were stated in 1959 and revisited in 2008. In Jordan, laws related to Labor and finances were ratified in 1996 and revisited in 2017 while the inheritance and family finances policies were set in 1959 and slightly amended in 2011. In Lebanon, Labor laws were set in 1963 then changed gradually in 2009 and later in 2017. Inheritance and family finances be- long to the Personal Status laws that are adopted in 1926 in the Lebanese constitu- tion (UNDP 2018a, 2018b, and 2018c). 24. Article 72B of the Labor Law Number 14, Decision N. 2/2018 on amendment to Article 69, and Labor Law Number 14 for 2019, respectively. CHAPTER 2 . 101 25. An additional complication in terms of harmonizing laws and regulations relat- ed to women’s empowerment and gender equality arises in the case of Lebanon where personal status laws are governed by the country’s political and social sys- tem of confessionalism. Lebanon’s constitution and system of governance require that religious communities have representation in public office and are included in any decisions made by the state. Religious communities apply their own family codes, and those can vary significantly depending on one’s religious community (Atamanov, Constant, and Lundvall 2016). 26. This section focuses on transport; however, access to water and electricity also has significant impact on women’s capacity to generate an income. For instance, water scarcity (an issue in concern particularly in Jordan and Lebanon) affects women’s economic and care work (cleaning and controlling water) in addition to their agricultural activities given that they perform water-related activities and are responsible for managing water within the household. Limited access to water will therefore allocate more pressure on women as the end users of scarce water resources. According to Canpolat and Maier (2019), infrastructural impact is also assessed through the shortage of electricity in Iraq, which severely affects wom- en’s economic activity. Unreliable provision of electricity exposes women who run household businesses such as sewing and handcrafting to income loss and to work interruption and discontinuity. Additionally, women in public spaces in particular are exposed to augmented insecurity and limited mobility as a result of a defective electricity provision. 27. For more information, see the World Bank’s Gender Data Portal, http://datatopics. worldbank.org/gender/indicators. 28. Employment Promotion Program implemented by the German Agency for Inter- national Cooperation. 29. Wave V data in Arab Barometer do not show clear generational trends for men or women in Jordan or Lebanon. 30. INFOPRO Research 2018. 31. Flexible Work Bylaw 22 for the year 2017. 32. Labor law number 14 for the year 2019. 33. Data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Institute of Statistics, http://data.uis.unesco.org/. 34. In general, the number of observations in the data for this category of women is not large, so finding no effect does not mean it does not exist. 102 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON 35. The lower effect of less educated women reflects the low chance of their working to begin with. 36. The results for women with secondary education are in the opposite direction. One possibility, although less clear, is that for these women there is substitutability of women’s work inside and outside the household, thus if other women in the household are working, you are more likely to have to pick-up the housework. 37. In Jordan, we observe this pattern in the DHS data of ever-married woman but not in the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey data, which include all women. 38. We also observe the opposite-sign effect in the JLMPS data for women with se- condary education. 39. Issues related to empowerment and gender-based violence are only explored in the Jordan DHS data. 40. Being jealous or angry if the woman talks to other men, frequently accusing her of being unfaithful, not permitting her to meet her female friends, trying to limit her contact with her family, or insisting on knowing where she is at all times. 41. 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CHAPTER 2 . 111 C HAPT 112 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TER 3 Special Focus: International Experience 113 114 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON SUSTAINED INCREASES IN FEMALE PARTICIPATION FROM A LOW STARTING POINT HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY RARE BUT BEGIN WITH YOUNGER, MORE EDUCATED WOMEN JOINING THE WORK FORCE Very few countries have managed—or sustained—the increases in female labor force participation (FLFP) targeted in the Mashreq from a similarly low base. In the cross-country data available on FLFP since 1990, 64 economies around the world ex- perienced a five-percentage-point increase in female participation over five years, the target set by the Mashreq countries. Most of those economies, however, are high-in- come and already had high participation rates; as such, they are not comparable to Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. After restricting the initial participation rate to below 40 percent and eliminating the 5 economies with a sustained decline afterward, only the 12 economies in figure 3.1 remain (Bangladesh, Belize, Costa Rica, Fiji, Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Nicaragua, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and West Bank and Gaza) and only 5 economies started from low initial rates (Ban- gladesh, Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives, Turkey, and West Bank And Gaza). In the economies with initially low participation that then increases rapidly, great- er participation starts among younger cohorts who stay in the workforce as they age. In Turkey, the beginning of a generational change in participation can be seen in figure 3.2 starting after 2007 for the youngest four cohorts (born between 1968 and 1987), with an increase of about 10 points in under five years (World Bank 2014c). Significantly higher rates of younger women entering the work force and staying there CHAPTER 3 . 115 FIGURE 3.1 Increased female labor force participation, selected economies, 1990–2020 i) Lower-middle income ii) Upper-middle income iii) High income iv) Upper-middle income Mashreq 60 Malta Belize Nicaragua 55 Costa Rica 50 United Arabs Emirates Maldives 45 40 Bangladesh Fiji 35 Turkey 30 Lebanon 25 West Bank and Gaza 20 Jordan 15 Irán, Islamic Rep. Iraq 10 5 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 Female labor force participation S ource: Mod eled Int er nat io n a l Labo ur Org a n iza t io n est im a t es using d a t a f ro m Wo r l d D eve l o p m e nt Ind i c a t o rs . N ote : Fi gu re shows econo m ies wit h a t lea st a five-perc ent a g e-po i nt i nc re a s e i n fe m a l e l a b o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n ove r f i ve ye a rs , s t a r t i ng f ro m a n i ni t i a l ra te of bel ow 40 p ercent . combined with older women ageing out ucation—that is, more than secondary— proportion with advanced education re- of the working-age population mean the increased from 19 percent to 34 percent mained very low (see box 3.4 later in the average FLFP rates have continued to (figure 3.3). Even more dramatically, it section). climb since (see figure 3.1). This change increased from 22 percent to 64 percent Fertility has fallen dramatically in all occurs in all five of the economies identi- over a similar period in West Bank and five economies; more educated women fied earlier as FLFP rates rise significant- Gaza. Higher education does not trans- having fewer children and at an older ly for older cohorts over the transition late into jobs, however, if no jobs exist; age allows them to enter the workforce. to higher participation (see figure A.3 in West Bank and Gaza’s sharp increases Although at different stages of the de- Appendix). in FLFP were associated not with sharp mographic transition, all five economies increases in employment but with sharp In Turkey and West Bank and Gaza, saw large declines in the average number increases in female unemployment (box the increase in participation is also as- of children per woman over her lifetime 3.1). Bangladesh also saw educational sociated with significant increases in between 1990 and 2017 (figure 3.4). By improvements; however, in contrast to education; however, in Bangladesh, in- the end of this period, Bangladesh, the the other countries, these improvements creased participation is related to an in- Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives, and were more modest increases in the pro- crease in less-skilled workers. In Turkey, Turkey had (largely) completed the tran- portion of female workers with a basic between 2002 and 2018, the proportion sition to about two children per woman. or intermediate education, whereas the of females working with an advanced ed- Although their childbearing rates have 116 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 3.2 Labor force participation rates of urban women in Turkey, by age cohort 45 40 1983-87 Female labor force participation rate (%) 1988-92 1978-82 1973-77 1968-72 35 30 1963-67 25 20 1958-62 15 10 1953-57 1948-52 5 1933-37 1928-32 0 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 Age cohort Source: Wor ld Bank 20 1 4 c ba sed o n vario us yea rs of Turk ish St a t i s t i c a l Ins t i t u t e ( Tu r k St a t ) L a b o r Fo rc e Su r vey. FIGURE 3.3 Female labor force participation, by level of education, women aged 25–54 100 2.31 4.27 9.19 16.21 15.55 Female labor force participation rate (%) 80 42.22 54.66 18.2 27.79 41.18 61.67 60 40 16.1 36.92 33.7 63.9 31.12 14.8 20 33.6 15.7 22.3 10.6 19.2 3.7 5.2 0 Bangladesh Bangladesh West Bank West Bank Turkey 2002 Turkey 2018 2006 2017 and Gaza and Gaza 2000 2018 Advanced Intermediate Basic Less than basic Source: Nat i onal L abo r Fo rc e S urveys. CHAPTER 3 . 117 BOX 3.1 Higher female labor participation in West Bank and Gaza was not necessarily a good thing As seen in figure 3.1 in the main text, West Bank and Gaza is one of only five economies since 1990 to achieve at least a five-percentage-point gain in female labor force participation in a five-year period. Female participation increased across the age distribution—in fact, the increase in participation among those aged 15–24 years old was less than that of the rest of the working-age female population, although this discrepancy may reflect the sharp increases in advanced female education (figure B3.1.1, panel a; see also figure 3.3 in the main text). This headline trend masked some disturbing undercurrents that highlight the peril of focusing just on participation rates and not on employment. Athough male participation rates grew by about the same 10 points as female participation did, male unemployment fell over the same period for all age groups (figure B3.1.1, panel b). At the same time, female unemployment skyrocketed—up from 17 percent to 51 percent for all working-age women and a shocking jump from 36 percent to 71 percent for women aged 15–24. Fi- nally, more educated women experienced greater increases in unemployment whereas women with basic education were far less affected (figure B3.1.1, panel c). This higher unemployment for educated women may reflect an increase in their numbers entering the labor market to earn additional income at a time when economic conditions were harsh, or it might reflect the degree of marginalization and segregation in agriculture and services as well as high barriers to entrepreneurship faced by Palestinian women (al-Bot- meh 2015). Similarly, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, concern has arisen that expanding education provides a path to the public sector but does not give young graduates the skills desired by the private sector, thus increasing participation but doing so in the form of unemployment (Esfahani and Sharaji 2012). FIGURE B3.1.1 West Bank and Gaza selected labor indicators, 2002–18 40 a. Labor force participation 80 40 b. Unemployment 80 60 c. Female unemployment, by education level 50 30 70 30 70 40 20 60 20 60 30 20 10 50 10 50 10 0 0 40 0 40 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Female, 15-64 (left axis) Female, 15-24 (left axis) Female, 15-64 (left axis) Female, 15-24 (left axis) Advanced Intermediate Basic Male, 15-64 (right axis) Male, 15-24 (right axis) Male, 15-64 (right axis) Male, 15-24 (right axis) S ource: Wor ld Develop m ent I n dic at o rs. 118 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON yet to finish falling, women in West Bank the Islamic Republic of Iran’s FLFP has combination of increased education and and Gaza went from having nearly sev- been attributed to the decline in fertility delayed marriage and fertility (World en children each to having fewer than (box 3.2), whereas in Turkey increased Bank 2014c). four. About 60 percent of the increase in participation has been attributed to the FIGURE 3.4 Fertility rates, selected economies, 1990-2017 Selected economies Mashreq Lower-middle income Upper-middle income Upper-middle income 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 Total fertility rate 4.5 4.0 Iraq 3.5 West Bank and Gaza 3.0 Jordan 2.5 Lebanon 2.0 Bangladesh 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 Source: Uni t ed Nat i on s Wo rld Po pula t io n Pro spec t s. Not e: Tot al fer t i li t y rat e represent s t h e n um ber of c h ildren t h a t wo u l d b e b o r n t o a wo m a n i f s he we re t o l i ve t o t he e nd of he r c hi l d b e a r i ng yea rs a n d bea r chi ldren i n accordanc e wit h a g e-spec ific fert ilit y rat es of t h e s p e c i f i e d ye a r. A g g re g a t i o n m et ho d = we i g ht e d ave ra g e . BOX 3.2 Increasing female labor force participation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has largely been attribut- ed to declining fertility, driven in part by increasing education The exact connections between education, fertility, and female labor force participation (FLFP) are unclear. The following summary follows Esfahani and Sharaji (2012). Popularly held to be positive for FLFP, educa- tion can have a theoretically ambiguous effect: as education expands, its returns in the labor market may decline, thus discouraging labor market participation by women who tend to have rather elastic labor sup- plies. The literature provides a number of examples of stagnant or declining participation in countries with significant increases in education (Chioda 2011; World Bank 2012a). In the United States, participation of women with at least high school diploma has declined; and, in Turkey, FLFP fell from 77 percent in 1955 to 24 percent in 2007 (Tansel 2001; World Bank 2009). See box 3.3 for Turkey’s subsequent reversal and possible reasons for it. The Islamic Republic of Iran had a similar experience from the 1950s to the 1980s (Esfahani and Sharaji 2012). Conversely, increasing female participation and declining fertility have long been closely related (Bloom et al. 2009; World Bank 2012a),a with research finding that exogenous fertility shocks have strong impacts on female labor participation. Declines in fertility, however, are themselves driven in part by increased education. Mehryar et al. (2004) and Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2008) find that CHAPTER 3 . 119 about one-third of the fertility decline in the Islamic Republic of Iran may be attributable to the expansion in female education. Esfahani and Sharaji (2012) study the drivers of increased female participation in the Islamic Republic of Iran up until 2006: We find about 60 percent of the rise in female LFP [labor force participation] rate between 1986 and 2006 can be attributed to the decline in fertility. The expansion of education, on the other hand, accounts for about 10 percent of the rise. The limited role of education is partly due to the limited range of jobs that are available for educated women, hence intensifying competition among them and reducing the returns to their education. Alleviating this jobs constraint may allow the role of education to rise two to three times. In addition, part of the fertility effect can be attributed to female education, which has played an important role in lowering the number of children ever born. Since fertility is unlikely to decline further, female education could become the main driving force in the continued rise of women’s LFP. We also find that women who join the labor market as a result of tertiary education, especially at the graduate level, have a much higher chance of joining the private sector, especially as employers and self-employed, than the average person in their cohort. Contrary to the common perception, the association between ed- ucation and public employment is stronger for men than for women. Interestingly, they also find that tertiary education does not fully result in higher FLFP; the probability of participation and employment are lower for women in districts with a higher female tertiary education rate, which they attribute to “the limited range of available jobs preferred by educated women.” That is, the presence in the labor force of more tertiary-educated women leads to greater competition for a small number of jobs, suppressing wages and discouraging female participation. The effect is so strong that Esfahani and Sharaji (2012) estimate it has reduced the impact of tertiary education on participation by two-thirds. Moreover, greater education increases participation more than employment, so the chances of unemployment are one percent higher for women with secondary education and two percent higher for women with tertiary education, compared to women with primary education. West Bank and Gaza has had a similar experience with greater education, more participation, and more unemployment, albeit in different economic circumstances. a. Concer ns exi st ab out sim ult a n eit y— educ a t io n , fert ilit y a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n d e c i s i o ns c o u l d a ll b e d u e t o c u lt u ra l fa c t o rs t ha t e nc o u ra g e g re a t e r c a reer orient at i on among wom en ( E va n s 1 9 8 8 ) . T h e result s repo rt ed h e re , howeve r, c o nt ro l fo r s i m u lt a ne i t y a nd ot he r fa c t o rs . Fertility declines have also occurred The slow change in FLFP in these coun- dren, more women in other countries in the Mashreq countries but without tries over this time of sharply declining live in households with extended fami- the associated increases in female par- fertility suggests that, although further ly who could assist with childcare; such ticipation. Already low in 1990, the declines in fertility can be expected in is the case in Bangladesh (36 percent), demographic transition is complete Jordan and especially Iraq, they will not Maldives (47 percent), and to a lesser in Lebanon. In Iraq, fertility has fallen necessarily be associated with significant extent West Bank and Gaza (23 percent) since 1990 from about six children to increases in female participation as in and Turkey (20 percent), compared to three and a half; in Jordan it has fallen the other economies examined. More- Jordan (only 9 percent).42 from five and a half to fewer than three. over, in addition to having far fewer chil- 120 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON BOX 3.3 Female participation in Turkey followed the classic U-curve, falling with modernization then rising Esfahani and Sharaji (2012) discuss the most common approach to thinking about female labor force par- ticipation (LFP) over a country’s development—the “U-curve,” which holds that participation falls then ris- es over the process of modernization (Boserup 1970; Lincove 2008; Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1989; Rau and Wazienski 1999; Scott and Tilly 1975; World Bank 2012a). Under this theory, women in traditional societies are largely economically active as unpaid family workers who lack education but have skills for traditional tasks such as agriculture or basic weaving. In the early stages of industrialization, men learn the skills for the new economic activities whereas women lose the ability to participate and must stay at home, with men’s greater earning power reinforcing this division of labor (Goldin 2006). As education and contraception expand, women can participate again in the labor market, offering firms the opportunity to lower their employment costs. Over time, social norms on women working change (Boserup 1970; For- sythe, Korzeniewicz, and Durrant 2000; Goldin 2006; Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1989).a Thus, education increases the opportunity cost of homemaking for women because income and status from working are higher for more educated women. Esfahari and Sharaji (2012) argue that it seems to be strong in countries that have reached the rising segment of the modernization U-curve, where attitudes have changed and technological and economic developments trans- form the nature of jobs, offering new positions that women can attain through higher education. At such a stage, educational opportunities also contribute to reduced fertility, which in turn has a significant positive impact on female LFP and on investment in children. They also note that Tansel (2001) and Gündüz-Hoşgor and Smits (2008) conclude that higher education is an important factor in women’s participation for Turkey. The World Bank (2014c) agrees (see figure B3.3.1), arguing that Turkey seems, thus, to be following the U-shape pattern for female LFP typical of past develop- ment paths in many emerging markets (Goldin 1994; Mammen and Paxson 2000). Agricultural shedding and urbanization were the main drivers of decreasing female LFP rates through the middle of the 2000s. Female workers, who were mostly unpaid family workers in agriculture, could not participate in the urban labor force after migration to cities, contrary to their husbands (World Bank 2014), primarily due to low levels of education. Lack of childcare in cities as op- posed to the availability of family members in rural areas added another constraint facing rural migrants. Since then, the pace of job creation among better educated females has begun to ex- ceed the decline in female employment as less skilled women move from rural areas to the city and employment rates are increasing. However, Turkey is still at a relatively shallow end of the ascendant part of the U. CHAPTER 3 . 121 FIGURE B3.3.1 The U-curve of female labor force participation in Turkey (1989-2010) 50 GOAL: 1980 - High Female LFP 45 - High GDP/capita 1985 - Enough jobs for high and low skilled workers Female labor force participation 40 (in percent, 15+) 1989 35 1988 1990 e 1991 cation ildcar ents 1992 - Edu quality charrangem 1995 ig h r k - H ible wo and valu e s -A shed ani 1994 1996 1999 - Flexial norms gr d za 30 -U 1997 - Soc icu ing tio 1998 rb 2001 2002 2000 2010 ltu 1993 ra 2003 2009 l 25 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 n 20 Change 2007-2010: Increased female LFP and GDP/capita 15 30 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12, 000 GDP/capita (current US$) S ource: Wor ld Bank 2014 c . a. Alt hough t hi s hypot hesis is bro a dly plausible in m o st c o unt r i e s , i t d o e s not ex p l a i n t he p e rs i s t e nt ly l ow p a r t i c i p a t i o n ra t e s i n s o m e c o u nt r i e s o r signi fi cant var i at i ons a c ro ss t h o se of sim ilar develo pm ent ( Fo rs y t he , Ko r z e ni ew i c z , a nd D u r ra nt 2000; M o r r i s o n a nd J ü t t i ng 2005; Wo r l d Ba nk 20 1 2 a ). C om mon exp lanat i ons a re spec ific lo c a l c o n dit io n s o n dem o g ra p hi c s , s o c i o e c o no m i c c ha ra c t e r i s t i c s , c u lt u re , a nd g ove r nm e nt p o l i cy ( Chi o d a 20 1 1 ; Gündüz-H oşgor and Sm it s 2 0 0 8 ; Hijab 2 0 0 1 ) . Changes in female employment by most Bangladeshi women still work in the share in services is high and rising. sector vary by country. Even before the agriculture, although the trend away The very high share of women working period of increasing FLFP, both Bangla- from agriculture is likely to continue. in services already in the Mashreq sup- desh and Turkey experienced sustained The shares of both industry and services ports the idea that these countries are drops in the share of females in agricul- increased by about the same amount, not waiting for structural transforma- ture for many years (figure 3.5). In Tur- although it is Bangladesh’s garment ex- tion out of agriculture to bring women key’s case, this drop is consistent with port industry contribution to increas- into the workforce but are struggling the theorized U-curve, as discussed in es in FLFP that is famous (box 3.4). with labor demand. box 3.3. Turkey saw a sharper decline, Meanwhile, in the Mashreq countries, International experience shows few with the agricultural share falling by already at the very bottom of the glob- large increases in FLFP from a low start, nearly 50 percentage points, most of al U-shaped curve (see figure I.1 in the with declining fertility and increasing which went to services. Bangladesh ex- introduction), the agricultural share of education being necessary but not suf- perienced a more modest decline—30 female employment has been relatively ficient to raise that participation. Of points over the nearly 30-year period; low and declining for decades, whereas the economies studied, all had declines 122 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 3.5 Share of female employment by sector, selected economies, 1990–2018 a. Employment in agriculture Selected economies Mashreq Lower-middle income Upper-middle income Upper middle income 90 80 70 60 Bangladesh 50 40 30 Turkey Iraq 20 Iran, Islamic Rep. Lebanon 10 Jordan 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 Share of female employment (%) b. Employment in industry Selected economies Mashreq Lower-middle income Upper-middle income Upper middle income 40 35 30 Iran, Islamic Rep 25 20 Maldives Bangladesh Jordan 15 West Bank and Gaza Turkey Lebanon 10 Iraq 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 Share of female employment (%) c. Employment in services Selected economies Mashreq Lower-middle income Upper-middle income Upper middle income West Bank and Gaza Jordan 80 Maldives Lebanon 70 Iraq 60 Turkey 50 Iran, Islamic Rep 40 30 Bangladesh 20 10 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 1990 2000 2010 2020 Share of female employment (%) Source: Modeled Int ern at io n a l Labo ur Org a n iza t io n est im a t es u s i ng d a t a f ro m t he Wo r l d D eve l o p m e nt Ind i c a t o rs . CHAPTER 3 . 123 BOX 3.4 In Bangladesh, the dramatic growth of the garment export industry drove young girls to gain more education, delaying marriage and fertility and underpinning the country’s sharp increase in female labor participation The explosion of the garment industry led to a high demand for labor. Heath and Mobarak (2015) show, however, that employers also valued literacy and numeracy, so girls near the factories stayed in school for one and a half years longer on average than their brothers, which is 50 percent longer than girls further from factories. This demand leads the same young girls to continue working in the factories when aged 17–23, instead of getting married. “In summary, access to factory jobs significantly lowers the risk of early marriage and childbirth for girls in Bangladesh, and this is due to both the girls postponing marriage to work in factories, and the girls staying in school at earlier ages.” The demand for education generated through manufacturing growth appears to have a much larger effect on female educational attainment compared to a large-scale government conditional cash transfer program to encour- age female schooling. Mahmud et al. (2018) go beyond Heath and Mobarak’s geographical focus on the area around Dhaka to cover the entire country. They confirm the earlier results, finding that an extra year of schooling leads to an 18-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of working in the nonfarm sector and a 7.5 percent reduction in the number of births. in fertility and increases in education. in India is low (33 percent), the country have seen sharp increases in female par- Economies that achieved significant in- has high variation in participation across ticipation. In addition, the filtering pro- creases in female participation did so by districts, ranging from near zero to near- cess at the start of this section could be having a generational shift of younger, ly 90 percent (Kotikula and Abate, forth- relaxed to identify economies that may more educated women into the work- coming). The political structure of India have had a less sharp increase than that force as they delay childbirth and then and the strong policy role for state gov- targeted by the Mashreq countries but keeping them there when they have (few- ernments may offer a number of lessons that have nonetheless enjoyed a longer, er) children. In the case of West Bank from particular areas within India that sustained but more gradual increase. and Gaza, increased FLFP meant sharp increases in female unemployment; la- bor demand remains vital. Meanwhile, WHAT WORKS FOR the sustained shift out of agriculture and WOMEN’S WORK? INSIGHTS into services (as in Turkey) or industry FROM A SYSTEMATIC and services (as in Bangladesh) are less relevant for the heavily urbanized Jordan REVIEW OF POLICIES TO and Lebanon. INCREASE FEMALE LABOR More study of international expe- FORCE PARTICIPATION rience relevant to the context of the Mashreq countries would add value. For Policy interventions to increase FLFP from women’s participation become example, although overall participation have multiplied as investments and gains more evident. Among these, efforts 124 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 3.6 Estimated effects of childcare programs on female employment (unadjusted) 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 Chile United States Japan United States United States United States Argentina Sweden United States United States Norway Italy United States Spain Japan United States United States Brazil United States United States United States Germany Mozambique Germany United States Denmark Norway Colombia Argentina Argentina Mexico Ecuador Brazil Source: Rei mao, Mu no z B o udet an d Reven g a ( fo rt h c o m in g ) Not e: Dot color i nd i ca t es in c o m e level of c o unt ry : blue = h ig h i nc o m e , o ra ng e = m i d d l e i nc o m e , g re e n = l ow i nc o m e . P ro g ra m s a l o ng t he z e ro l i n e a re un ders - t ood t o have no si gnific a nt effec t s o r la rg e va riat io n of effec t s ( i d e nt i f i e d by e r ro r l i ne s ) . ranging from skills development to labor market policies such as skills training, Africa compared with other regions (in market information or childcare access job search support, and public works fact, the database includes only one pa- policies clearly identify a relevant gap, programs. It covers research from 1990 per for Jordan). Results also show mixed but less has been documented system- to 2019, complementing other similar outcomes of the different policies. atically in terms of their effectiveness in efforts, such as those looking at active For example, for childcare policies it promoting women’s labor force partici- labor market policies and skills training seems that the effect in promoting FLFP pation or women’s employment. programs (Azevedo et al. 2015; Card et (getting women to enter the labor force) Insights from research (Reimao, al. 2009), microfinance and microcredit is more muted than the effect these pro- Munoz Boudet, Revenga, forthcoming) (McKenzie and Woodruff 2013; Meeh- grams have in promoting women’s em- documenting the role that active pub- ra et al. 2013; Vaessen et al. 2015; van ployment (finding a job when already lic policies have had in increasing FLFP Royen et al. 2012), and early childhood actively looking). This finding might be show a mixed picture. The authors take education (Cho and Honorati 2014; Diaz related to the fact that women face addi- stock of evaluated policies that have in- and Rodriguez-Chamussy 2013; Leroy et tional barriers beyond childcare to make tended directly or indirectly to affect al. 2012; UN Foundation 2014), among the transition from nonparticipation to women’s labor market engagement. The others. participation, and a single-element pol- research looks at maternity and paren- Results from the analysis show a icy does not resolve those barriers. For tal leave policies, income tax reforms, concentration of these policies in high- women’s employment, when comparing childcare and early education interven- er-income countries and fewer efforts in the estimated effect of each program tions, credit programs, and active labor regions like the Middle East and North along with the 95 percent confidence in- CHAPTER 3 . 125 terval (figure 3.6) we can see that the ef- ket insertion appears to improve young care; child credits paid per child, regard- fects of childcare and early education are women’s chances of entering and staying less of care modality; income credits; and generally positive in developing coun- in the labor market, and such policies changes in the tax structure. Although tries, but they have less impact in raising have been widely evaluated—for exam- these credits are generally not deployed female employment in wealthier coun- ple, the Jovenes (youth) programs im- in the hopes of raising female employ- tries. Three of the programs with positive plemented across Latin America (Aedo ment or labor force participation, they effects (Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico) and Nuñez 2004; Aedo and Pizarro do target parents with young children—a share a set of similar features: they are ei- 2004; Ñopo, Robles, and Saavedra 2007). key demographic when considering fe- ther free or subsidized, are locally based Similarly, in Africa, vocational train- male employment and FLFP policies. (in the community or spread around the ing programs have been found to raise Income credits seem to have an effect city, including proximity to workplaces), the likelihood of participation in in- on women’s labor force participation and have a full-day schedule, target women come-generating activities. These pro- employment. Examples of such credits for whom paid care is not an option, and grams, however, do not always work—as include the Earned Income Tax Credit include a strong focus on care-related el- shown in the case of Jordan (Groh et (EITC), offered at the federal level and ements, such as nutrition. al. 2012)—because they don’t address supplemented by some states in the Unit- additional barriers, including prefer- Of the 22 papers documenting em- ed States, and the Working Tax Credit in ences. The most effective of these pro- ployment or labor force participation the United Kingdom, which often offers grams are broader in design, covering effects of maternal and parental leave more generous benefits to parents and skills (both technical and job-search or policies, all in high-income countries, is designed to encourage employment life skills), assisting with job placement the range of impacts goes from nega- for low-income households. Although (internships, on-the-job training, and tive (decreasing the likelihood of em- income credits do not explicitly target intermediation services), and providing ployment after taking leave), to null, to women, it appears that such credits do a financial incentive both to jobseekers some positive cases. Because high-in- encourage female employment. and employers. These findings are in line come countries have had these policies Despite assumptions that policies de- with Card et al. (2015) who find gains are in place for a long time, it has been pos- signed to improve women’s participation larger for programs that put an emphasis sible to document and evaluate changes in the labor market do increase female on a broader set of human capital–cre- in duration of leave, who is entitled to participation or employment, most of ation elements. take leave, payment amounts, and oth- these policies fall short of such impact, ers; the findings indicate that policies for Interesting, too, are studies on the role even if they, in many cases, document an shorter leave (up to a year) that has clear that taxes play in female employment or outcome. It is clear that more evidence in-system return dates, has declining labor force participation (figure 3.7). Al- is needed to identify families of policies payments, and is shared between men though all the identified studies included that can actually be successful in raising and women (parental) offer the strongest in the meta-analysis are again based on FLFP in absolute and relative terms. likelihood of women returning to formal high-income countries in Europe and employment. North America, the different tax incen- tives seem to be surprisingly effective. With regard to active labor market The studies look at childcare credits given policies, documented evidence shows to parents who do not use public child- that combining training with labor mar- 126 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 3.7 Estimated effects of tax changes on labor force participation 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 Spain United States United States United States Canada Norway United States United States Canada Canada Canada Netherlands Netherlands United States United States Canada Spain Canada United States Canada United Kingdom Canada United States United States United States United States Child care credit Child care credit Child care credit Child care credit Source: Rei mao, Mu no z B o udet an d Reven g a ( fo rt h c o m in g ) NOTES 42. UN Population Services. Data for the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon are not available. 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CHAPTER 3 . 131 C HAPT 132 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TER 4 The Road Ahead: Lowering Barriers and Increasing Female Participation 133 134 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON INCREASES IN FEMALE PARTICIPATION, ALTHOUGH RELATIVELY RARE FROM A LOW BASE, OFFER THE POTENTIAL FOR A SIGNIFICANT PAYOFF IN ECONOMIC GROWTH Historically, small increases in female participation have made modest contributions to overall economic growth.43 From 2000 to 2017, the annualized economic growth rate in Iraq was 1.4 percent, with increases in the value added by female workers contributing 0.3 percentage points, or 22 percent of total growth. In Jordan, females contributed 29 percent, or 0.5 points of the 1.5 percent annual growth rate; in Leba- non, they contributed only 11 percent, or 0.2 points of the 1.5 percent growth rate. Of the total female contribution, increases in female participation were the main driver (figure 4.1). Even if more women want to work, however, a lack of jobs or selection into less productive sectors reduces their contribution to growth. Increases in female unem- ployment actually reduced annual growth slightly in Iraq and Jordan (0.05 and 0.1 points, respectively; figure 4.1). For women entering the workforce who do find work, their contribution is less as well if that work is in less productive sectors. Changes in the sectoral composition of female employment reduced annual growth by 0.5 points in Lebanon (figure 4.1). In order for women’s participation to make a more significant contribution, the targeted increases in each country not only need to be met but also need to be sus- tained over the long term. Holding historical trends in employment and produc- tivity constant, increasing female participation by the targeted five points over five CHAPTER 4 . 135 FIGURE 4.1 Decomposition of contribution to economic growth from females, 2000–17 0.8 Women’s contribution to economic growth 0.6 (percentage points) 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 Iraq Jordan Lebanon Productivity Employment Participation Demographic change Female value added S ource: Value added : Wor ld Develo pm ent I n dic a t o rs ( W DI ) an d Wo r l d Ba nk c a l c u l a t i o ns ; p o p u l a t i o n/ d e m o g ra p hi c s : U ni t e d Na t i o ns D e p a r t m e nt of E c o n o m i c and Soci al Affai rs, Wor ld Po pula t io n Pro spec t s 2 0 1 7 Updat e; em pl oy m e nt a nd p a r t i c i p a t i o n: m o d e l e d Int e r na t i o na l L a b o u r O rg a ni z a t i o n e s t i m a t e s (fro m WD I). C al culat ed u si ng t he Wor ld B a n k ’ s Jo bsS t ruc t ure To o l . years would increase overall economic until 2035, an extra 0.1 point of annual more productive in current sectors could growth, but only by 0.5 points in Iraq, 0.8 growth would result in Iraq and Jordan complement increases in female partici- points in Jordan, and 0.4 points in Leba- and 0.6 point in Lebanon. Less female pation and lead to even higher economic non. Sustaining this one point per year 44 unemployment and females moving into growth. increase for 18 years, however, would more productive sectors or being made increase annual economic growth by 1.6 percentage points in Iraq, 2.5 points in Jordan, and 1.1 points in Lebanon (fig- THE MULTIFACETED ure 4.2). BARRIERS TO GREATER Ideally, however, increased female FEMALE LABOR participation must be matched with job PARTICIPATION REQUIRE creation and increased productivity. The contribution of increased female partici- A COORDINATED AND pation would be partly offset if historical STRATEGIC RESPONSE trends of increasing unemployment con- tinue in Iraq and Jordan or if the selec- Creating more jobs remains the most low participation of women is very much tion of female workers into less produc- important driver to enabling more wom- also an issue of weak labor demand in tive sectors continues in Lebanon (figure en to work. Although this report focuses general. With the creation of more jobs 4.2). If female unemployment and pro- on the (serious) constraints to female la- and increased demand, the opportunity ductivity were to remain unchanged bor supply, as discussed in chapter 1, the cost of staying at home, at least for some 136 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 4.2 Decomposition of contribution to economic growth from females, with female participation targets met and sustained, 2017–35 3 Women’s contribution to economic growth 2.5 2 (percentage points) 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 Jordan Lebanon Iraq Productivity Employment Participation Demographic change Female value added Source: Valu e added : Wo rld Develo pm ent I n dic at o rs ( W DI ) , Wo r l d Ba nk c a l c u l a t i o ns a nd Wo r l d Ba nk , fo r t hc o m i ng ; p o p u l a t i o n/ d e m o g ra p hi c s : U n i ted Na ti o n s Depar t ment of Econom ic an d S o c ial Affairs, Wo rld Po pulat io n P ro s p e c t s 2017 U p d a t e a nd Wo r l d Ba nk c a l c u l a t i o ns f ro m Wo r l d Ba nk , fo r t hc o m i n g; em pl oy m ent and p ar t i ci p at i on: mo deled I nt ern at io n a l Labo ur Org a n iza t io n e s t i m a t e s ( f ro m WD I) . Not e: Host cou nt r y p o pula t io n o n ly. C o nt ribut io n of Sy rian ref u g e e s re m ove d f ro m G D P, nu m b e r of Sy r i a n ref u g e e s re m ove d f ro m p o p u l a t i o n fo r per c a pi ta pur p oses. Met hod ology desc ribed in Wo rld B a n k , fo rt h c o m in g . women, will increase and women will discrimination and sexual harassment household preferences, combined with enter the labor market, as was seen in in the workplace and public spaces and community norms on the role of wom- Bangladesh (see box 3.4 in chapter 3). In fostering growth in high-paying knowl- en in the house and at work, and under turn, this increased participation leads to edge-intensive business service sectors to which conditions women might work, changing of social norms and can relax expand private sector opportunities for often reinforce legal barriers by creating other constraints. women, especially the more educated. 45 strong restrictions on women working. Barriers for different women have Third, two key missing markets also The key policy actions can be been identified in each country along inhibit women’s participation. An inad- grouped into three categories: (i) re- with some recommendations to address equate supply of child and elderly care moving legal barriers, (ii) relaxing so- these issues. Kasoolu et al. (2019) see constrains many women from entering cial norms, and (iii) addressing missing improving public transportation access, the work force. In addition to policies markets. First, not only are continued quality, and safety as well as increasing creating a more family-friendly work- legal reforms necessary to remove legal educational attainment as keys to getting ing environment, the development of a barriers to women working (and pre- more low-skilled women into the work- commercialized care economy has the paring for and getting to work), but the force in Jordan. At the same time, all potential not only to relax the childcare gap between the law on paper and the women’s employment could be increased constraint many women face but also law in practice also needs to be mea- by legislation eliminating gender-based to create new jobs, many of which may sured and closed. Second, individual and CHAPTER 4 . 137 be filled by women. At the same time, a the fragmented and piecemeal approach transport sectors in the same way as lack of safe, reliable, and affordable pub- of such efforts. A change in the law on fe- men. lic transportation means many women, male mobility achieves nothing without CLOSING THE GAP especially those less educated and less safe transportation. Less restrictive com- BETWEEN THE wealthy, either cannot or choose not to munity preferences for women to look LAW AS WRITTEN commute to work. after their own infants at home rather AND THE LAW AS than in daycare services will not change Increasing female labor participa- OBSERVED participation if such services are neither tion will require a coordinated policy available nor affordable. And, above all, A gap between de jure and de facto law response that addresses all three issues. solutions to all three barriers mean noth- renders meaningless any strong legal A major limitation of previous efforts to ing without jobs for women to do. framework for female participation. The increase female participation has been legal framework is so important to es- tablishing gender equality and enabling FIRST, LEGAL RESTRICTIONS female labor force participation (FLFP) MUST BE REMOVED, BOTH that it is one of the three main drivers in the 2012 World Development Report ON PAPER AND IN PRACTICE (as “formal institutions”; see World Bank 2012). Changes in the legal framework to promote equal rights to employment, GETTING THE LAW move the gaps related to women’s abili- access to finance and assets, and free- RIGHT ty to apply for passports in Jordan, the dom from discrimination at the work- Significant legal reform is needed for passport application form could be up- place and sexual harassment in public Mashreq countries to achieve gender dated to equalize the requirements and places mean nothing if not accompanied equality under the law.  Table 4.1 lists documents for women and men and by public awareness or compliance and recommended reforms in a wide range by removing the requirement to pres- enforcement. of areas currently presenting gender ent the Family Book, which is granted Zhang (2016) identifies several rea- gaps that can limit women’s ability to to the husband by default. Additional- sons for the de jure–de facto gap in le- make economic decisions that are best ly, Articles 57 and 58 of the Civil Status gal protection of women’s labor rights. for them, their families, and their com- Law could be amended to grant women He does so in the context of China, but munities.  The areas included are mo- and men the status of head of household the reasons are applicable more broadly bility, starting a job, obtaining equal pay equally. In the case of Lebanon, remov- and are adopted as a framework here for for work of equal value, remarrying or ing the restrictions that prevent women a broader discussion. He identifies issues divorcing in the same way as men, start- from working in certain industries (a re- with (i) legislation, (ii) enforcement, and ing and running businesses, accessing striction common to the three countries) (iii) women’s lack of knowledge, ability, property and inheritance, and getting a would require changing Lebanon’s Labor or options to seek justice. pension at the same age as men. It goes Code of 1946, which currently prevents The first problem is that the legisla- beyond the scope of this report to detail women from working in the mining, tion itself can be too vague. Many laws the actual laws that need to be changed manufacturing, energy, agriculture, and do not include clear definitions, par- in each country. As an example, to re- 138 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E 4 . 1 Recommended Women, Business and the Law legal reforms by country   Iraq Jordan Lebanon Constraints on Allow women to choose where to live in the Allow women to choose where to live in the   women’s freedom of same way as a man. same way as a man. movement Allow women to travel outside the home in Allow women to travel outside the home in   the same way as a man. the same way as a man. Allow women to travel outside the country Allow women to travel outside the country in the same way as a man.  in the same way as a man. Equalize the procedure to apply for a pass- port for women and men. Laws affecting   Allow women to get a job in the same way Introduce legislation or amendments that women’s decisions as a man. prohibit sexual harassment in employment to work Introduce legislation or amendments that and impose criminal penalties or civil   mandate nondiscrimination in employment remedies. based on gender. Introduce legislation or amendments that prohibit sexual harassment in employment and impose criminal penalties or civil remedies. Laws and regulations Allow women to work the same night hours Allow women access to employment in all Introduce legislation mandating equal affecting women’s as men. industries. remuneration for work of equal value. pay Allow women access to employment in all Allow women access to employment in all jobs like men. industries. Legal constraints Remove women’s obligation to obey Remove women’s obligation to obey Allow women to obtain a judgment of related to marriage husbands. husbands. divorce in the same way as men.   Allow women to be heads of household Allow women to be heads of household Allow women to remarry in the same way instead of men. instead of men. as men. Enact legislation specifically addressing Allow women to obtain a judgment of domestic violence. divorce in the same way as men. Allow women to obtain a judgment of Allow women to remarry in the same way divorce in the same way as men as men. Allow women to remarry in the same way as men Laws affecting Amend legislation to shift responsibility Introduce amendments to extend paid leave Introduce amendments to extend paid leave women’s work after for paying maternity leave benefits to the available to mothers to 14 weeks (98 days) available to mothers to 14 weeks (98 days) having children government. with maternity benefits administered by the with maternity benefits administered by the   Introduce legislation or amendments pro- government. government. viding for paid paternity and parental leave. Introduce legislation or amendments pro- Introduce legislation or amendments pro- Prohibit dismissal of pregnant workers. viding for paid parental leave. viding for paid paternity and parental leave. Prohibit dismissal of pregnant workers. Constraints to Introduce legislation or amendment Introduce legislation or amendment Introduce legislation or amendment starting and running prohibiting gender-based discrimination by prohibiting gender-based discrimination by prohibiting gender-based discrimination by businesses creditors in access to credit. creditors in access to credit.  creditors in access to credit. Gender differences in Grant male and female children equal Grant male and female children equal Grant male and female children equal property and inher- inheritance rights. inheritance rights. inheritance rights. itance Grant female and male surviving spouses Grant female and male surviving spouses Grant female and male surviving spouses   equal rights to inherit assets. equal rights to inherit assets. equal rights to inherit assets. Provide for the valuation of nonmonetary Provide for the valuation of nonmonetary Provide for the valuation of nonmonetary contributions. contributions. contributions. Laws affecting wom- Equalize age at which men and women can Equalize age at which men and women can Introduce a mandatory contributory pension en’s pensions retire with full pension benefits. retire with full pension benefits. scheme for private sector workers.   Equalize mandatory retirement age for men   Account for periods of absence due to child- and women. care in pensions benefits. Source: B ased on dat a fro m Wo m en , B usin ess a n d t h e Law data b a s e , 2020, ht t p s : / / d a t a c a t a l o g . wo r l d b a nk . o rg / d a t a s et / wo m e n- b u s i ne s s - a nd - l aw. CHAPTER 4 . 139 ticularly of key behaviors that are like- tion in charge of discrimination may not know what recourse they have. ly to give rise to conflict. For example, or equal employment promotion. Even if a woman has full awareness of discrimination and harassment are ob- As a result, when it comes across her legal rights, the high cost of taking vious candidates for behaviors banned issues of employment discrimi- action—and the real or perceived limited by well-meaning laws, but exactly what nation, the Ministry of Human chance of success—may deter her from constitutes discrimination or harass- Resources and Social Security is doing so. Thus, as with other constraints ment may be poorly defined. Moreover, unable to solve them rapidly and on female participation, this one also af- legislation may not specify punishments efficiently, nor can it attach spe- fects different women differently, being clearly or may include punishments that cial attention to gender discrimi- more of a constraint for less educated are insufficient to discourage noncom- nation in daily work... According and poor women than those who are pliance. Fines may not be a sufficient de- to the Law on the Protection of well educated and more well-off. terrent for many behaviors. Moreover, as Women’s Rights, when their legal Zhang (2016) makes three recom- Zhang (2016) observes: “[O]ften there is interests are harmed, women can mendations that are highly relevant in no clear standard for the number of fines complain to the women’s federa- the Mashreq. He recommends strength- and civil compensations in laws. Since tions; and, the latter can ask relat- ening the laws and regulations, as well as it’s hard to evaluate and define the harms ed agencies to investigate to pro- enhancing legal supervision, which, in caused by discrimination in employ- tect the legal interests of women. the Mashreq, could mean establishing ment, and the lack of specific standards Besides, women’s federations compliance processes and mechanisms causes difficulties for practices, in some also provide legal consultations. in relevant government agencies, as degree the authority of laws has been However, since women’s federa- World Bank (2019a, p27) recommends highly cut back.” tions are only non-governmen- for Jordan: tal organizations, and lack the A second problem is enforcement. Is All legal reforms proposed above coercive force, their functions in there a body to enforce the laws and reg- will require that relevant govern- protecting women’s interests and ulations, and if there is, is it timely and ment agencies develop processes promoting gender equality could effective? In China, Zhang (2016) ob- and mechanisms to ensure com- not be played to the most. serves the following, which could easily pliance. These include, among be imagined to be the case elsewhere: A third problem is that women do others, improving labor inspec- not pursue legitimate grievances through [T]here lacks specific bodies for tion processes, mechanisms to the legal system, perhaps because less enforcement. At present, the main deal with complaints on harass- educated or rural women may lack le- departments in China promoting ment and processes to address gal awareness. First, deep-rooted social gender equality include the Min- wage discrimination. In this re- norms about gender roles may mean istry of Human Resources and gard, the grievance and redress that women do not even recognize cer- Social Security, the State Council mechanism of the Ministry of tain behaviors as discrimination or ha- Working Committee on Wom- Labor will need to be upgraded rassment. Second, if they do understand en and Children, the All-China to handle this new type of com- them as wrong, they may not know the Women’s Federation and relat- plaints. behaviors are illegal. Third, even if they ed judicial departments, among The most important recommenda- know the behaviors are illegal, women which there is no specific institu- 140 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON tion is the need to set up a specialized and obligations under them is essen- assessed by surveys, but perhaps also by legal body to protect women’s rights. tial—as is monitoring compliance and tracking and analysis of judicial or arbi- Zhang (2016) provides two examples of enforcement. Monitoring can also be tration outcomes. such bodies established in other coun- tries, the first being the Republic of Ko- rea’s Ministry of Gender Equality. Its SECOND, UNDERSTANDING main responsibilities are gender policy AND MEASURING SOCIAL coordination, analysis and evaluation, NORMS CAN THEN and it has an investigative and correc- tive capacity with respect to gender dis- ALLOW THE DESIGN OF crimination in employment, education, INTERVENTIONS FOR resources allocation, facilities, and ser- vices. The second example is the Equal POSITIVE CHANGE Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in the United States, which in- THE ing exposed to sexual harassment, leav- vestigates discrimination complaints I M P O RTA N C E O F ing children in the care of others, being and can initiate lawsuits on behalf of U N D E R S TA N D I N G , married or unmarried, and supporting the complainants. These two examples MEASURING, AND the family business (unpaid); the accept- suggest alternative ways of reducing the MONITORING ability of men reporting to women; the financial barrier to women’s grievances: NORMS acceptability of women managing their the state finances the costs of legal com- Systematically understanding and mea- own financing, childcare, or elderly care plaints and in fact pursues them and pro- suring social norms and expectations responsibility; and the impact of wom- vides the legal expertise, or the body it- regarding women’s behavior makes it en’s behavior on family status (positive self has the legal power to mediate labor feasible to design appropriate inter- or negative). Across the wide range of disputes and issue binding orders. Either ventions to increase women’s econom- norms, understanding which ones are approach is an effective way to make le- ic participation and, in turn, lead to relevant to behavior and which ones are gal recourse accessible to poorer women. broader economic development and binding within the specific context re- An important complement to these growth. When targeting norms that af- quires a set of diagnostic efforts. Qualita- actions is to measure the de jure–de fac- fect women’s economic empowerment, tive research allows for the identification to gap, tracking public awareness and it is important to investigate if a certain of these norms, which, once identified, measure monitoring compliance and behavior is under the influence of social can be measured. enforcement. Relatively scant data exist norms, and, if so, which norms. For in- When social norms are adequately for the Mashreq and little evidence on stance, FLFP is determined by a variety diagnosed using quantitative or qualita- the degree of compliance (and existing of norms, including the acceptability of tive approaches, monitoring becomes es- evidence suggests a large de jure–de fac- women working in general, working in sential to track changes to social norms to gap, as chapter 2 discusses). Thus, the the house, working outside the house, that occur over time. For instance, on the need to regularly conduct surveys that mixing in public, using private or public basis of extensive work in Ethiopia and assess awareness of laws and the rights transportation, working with men, be- Sri Lanka, CARE has developed the So- CHAPTER 4 . 141 cial Norms Analysis Plot (SNAP) tool to interventions in support of addressing actual support for female participation, measure shifts in social norms along five legislative reforms as well as institution- correcting the misperceived social norm dimensions: (i) empirical expectations, al transformation to ensure proper en- that prevented men from supporting (ii) normative expectations, (iii) sanc- forcement and adoption of the new pol- their wives in finding jobs. The exper- tions, (iv) sensitivity to sanctions, and icies and programs supporting women’s iment had positive results: the wives of (v) exceptions. In doing so, the frame- empowerment. Additionally, providing the men who received that information work seeks to identify potential signs of skills training is an important interven- applied and interviewed for a job outside change by asking the following key ques- tion. Skills-building programs not only their home (Bursztyn, Gonzalez, and tions: Are social sanctions weakening or equip women with needed skills but Yanagizawa-Drott 2018). Such interven- lessening over time? Are there changes in have also been shown to have a positive tions have been deemed successful in the type, severity, certitude, or influence impact on women’s self-esteem and atti- addressing bullying in schools, in energy of social sanctions? Are (more) nonnor- tudes (ILO 2017). To be successful, how- consumption, and in college drinking. mative behaviors perceived to be possi- ever, interventions also need to address What is unique about such interventions ble? When it is okay to deviate from the the behavior of men, whether as fathers, is that, rather than focusing on changing norm? Is there an increase in the number husbands, employers, or employees. individual attitudes toward the norm, of people deviating from the norm? One intervention is to correct they instead correct the misperception of misperceptions in the case of pluralistic others’ behavior and highlight the actual INTERVENTIONS ignorance. When misperceptions exist behavior norm (IRH 2017). TO CHANGE SOCIAL about a certain norm—when a major- Mass media have also had success NORMS ity of group members privately reject a in changing social norms—when used This section details some of the examples norm but go along with it because they properly. Although mass media have of successful interventions. Although assume, incorrectly, that most others in often been used to elicit change in be- not an exhaustive list, it highlights inter- their group accept it (pluralistic igno- liefs and behaviors, most interventions ventions that hold promise for shifting rance)—an intervention that corrects have been in the form of traditional social norms. Today, most of the evi- the misperception and presents the ac- media campaigns or awareness raising dence on effective interventions has cen- tual norm could be sufficient to change campaigns. Research shows that effica- tered around health and gender-based the social norm. A recent study in Saudi cy of such campaigns is weak (Krish- violence. The increased interest in sup- Arabia showed that, when married men naratne et al. 2016; McCoy et al. 2010), porting women’s economic empow- were provided with information about with campaigns being often ignored erment in the Middle East and North preferences of other married men within or not engaging, using the wrong mes- Africa region and beyond presents an their social group with regard to FLFP, it sengers, or sounding preachy. Some in- opportune time to build and strengthen significantly improved the former’s will- terventions, such as educational enter- evidence on what works and what does ingness to let their wives work. The study tainment (edutainment), have proven not to address social norms preventing revealed that 72 percent of participants to be effective (Singhal et al. 2004). In women’s empowerment. Furthermore, underestimated other men’s support for a randomized experiment, Rwandese such interventions can be more effective female participation. It also included a communities listened to radio soap op- and sustainable when implemented in follow-up experiment in which it dis- eras containing messages about social an integrated manner, such as through closed private information about others’ conflict and resolution (the treatment 142 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON group) or reproductive health (the con- plying principles of behavioral science. human-centered design can ensure that trol group). Results from interviews, fo- For instance, widely circulating messag- campaigns target the appropriate social cus groups, role-playing exercises, and es about the prevalence of a harmful be- norms, frame messages in a way that in- unobtrusive measures of collective deci- havior may produce the opposite effect creases their receptiveness, identify the sion making indicated that the treatment as the behavior becomes normalized right messenger, and ensure the content program changed people’s perceptions of rather than condemned. is properly contextualized to the differ- social norms regarding the appropriate- ent characteristics of the target group. Other forms of media such as social ness of open expression and dissenting media are promising. Because of short Legislative interventions remain nec- behavior (Paluck and Green 2009a). In- attention spans and an overflow of con- essary when trying to instill behavioral terestingly, the intervention altered both tent competing for the attention of the change where most individuals are op- perceptions of norms and individual be- audience, 360-degree campaigns (co- posed to this change and publicly express havior, even though individual attitudes ordinated campaigns in TV, radio, and that opposition. In this context, authori- were unchanged. The implication is that social media) could help complement tative actions, such as laws, can make the targeting social norms may be a more home learning or violence prevention desired behavior salient to transgressors, fruitful avenue for changing prejudiced efforts. Marketers realize the importance and naming and shaming techniques can behaviors than is targeting personal be- of 360-degree communication (reach- use public pressure to inflict potential liefs, although the staying power of such ing audience members in consistent reputational costs on transgressors. Leg- interventions needs further investiga- but multiple ways) to improve brand islative change can also facilitate behav- tion. The radio soap operas are espe- salience, increase the effectiveness of ioral change by removing the stigma of cially interesting because they changed behavior change strategies, and achieve going against the (harmful) social norm people’s perceptions of norms in conflict organizational objectives. The govern- (Bicchieri 2016). As cases of successful areas, whereas an extensive review of the ment of India with the support of Path- laws against female genital mutilation literature indicates that many other poli- finder International launched in 2007 in African countries attest, however, the cies to reduce prejudices have been inef- Project Raksha (“protection” in Hindi) effectiveness of legislative interventions fective (Paluck and Green 2009b). to reduce maternal mortality and mor- hinges on important preconditions such In edutainment interventions, the bidity by promoting institutionalized as trust in legal systems and the rule of audience is attracted by the entertain- delivery. The project included targeted law—without which behavioral change ment function, and messages are re- interventions at the household, com- is unlikely to happen (Bicchieri and Ma- peated through different storylines and munity, local government, and clinical rini 2016). characters. Such intervention engages levels. Most interventions proved effec- Demonstrating effectiveness of inter- the audience at a deeper level, with char- tive in addressing the targeted types of ventions requires more investment. Ev- acters and celebrities as trusted messen- delay that contributed to maternal mor- idence around successful interventions gers (Alatas et al. 2020; Bandura 2002, tality in the project areas. The project to change and shift social norms remains Banerjee et al. 2019a and 2019b; Costica, also incorporated a 360-degree feedback weak, not because of the interventions’ Orozco, and Leight 2020; Murphy et al. mechanism that provided key data on its potential effectiveness, but because of 2011). These interventions would need persuasion efforts (Deshpande, Bhanot, the lack of rigorous impact evaluations careful design considerations, employ- and Maknikar 2015). Application of dis- and experimenting of interventions. ing a contextualized approach and ap- ciplines such as behavioral science and Furthermore, the interventions that have CHAPTER 4 . 143 been evaluated tend to be small in scale and individuals). For example, interven- could be further diffused through soap and short in time. With millions of dol- tions targeting men were prioritized for operas or other types of edutainment lars being spent on awareness campaigns married couples. Interventions were rec- programming. Interventions still need and interventions, investing in building ommended to publicize and emphasize to be designed to address binding gen- evidence and running iterative yet larg- positive norms—such as the perceived der norms around childcare, as well as er-scale interventions with longer time- norm that women’s employment im- removal of legal barriers that could pre- lines could contribute significantly to proves the financial status of the family. vent women from accessing jobs. On the field, positively influencing interven- Furthermore, messages that increase the the latter, promoting adoption of fami- tions targeting a wide range of norms, visibility of women in the market and ly-friendly policies through incentives from increasing FLFP, to reducing gen- promote those in leadership roles are im- such as public recognition to companies der-based violence, to improving wom- portant for raising aspirations of wom- could encourage them to increase hiring en’s health. Furthermore, tackling social en and changing individual perceptions of women. These interventions and oth- norms around masculinity will be im- about the true extent of women work- ers are currently being implemented and portant to ensure that women (and men) ing, especially ones in leadership roles. evaluated in the next two years (World have the proper environment—whether These messages and use of role models Bank 2019b). at the household level, in public, or in the workplace—to realize their potential. FINALLY, IMPROVED An example of more evidence com- ing from the Mashreq is the Kurdistan POLICIES AND ACCESS Region of Iraq Social Norms study, which TO CHILD AND ELDERLY found that normative expectations did CARE, AS WELL AS PUBLIC not appear to influence FLFP, yet empir- ical expectations (what other women in TRANSPORTATION, ARE the reference group are doing) seemed to NEEDED influence women’s willingness to work. Furthermore, social norms about work- ILO (2018) summarizes the range of care after and developed; long-term care for ing women were not deeply internalized policies required to make working more the elderly or disabled, the responsibili- and, hence, possible to change. Although family-friendly. They include the legal ty for which also usually falls to women the study found that it was generally ac- provision of both maternity and pater- without public or private provision; and ceptable for women to work, needs re- nity leave to allow mothers and fathers family-friendly working arrangements lated to expected gender roles—such as to take paid time off work for immediate such as part-time work, flex work, and childcare and flexible work hours—were childcare; leave entitlements for sick or telecommuting. For women who cannot binding constraints. disabled relatives, whose care often falls afford private services where this is the On the basis of these findings, an in- upon women; early childhood care and main provision, a combination of tax, tegrated and holistic approach was rec- education programs, which can be either cash or voucher-based incentives, and ommended with a set of interventions regular center-based or licensed home- support schemes can be implemented. for different systems and target groups based, but in either case allow mothers The care economy can liberate wom- (institutions, community, household, to work while their children are looked en from unpaid housework and care 144 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON responsibilities while creating many Development sets a 2021 target for an to the bond between a mother and her new jobs, often for women. ILO (2018) enrollment rate of 10 percent of chil- child. One respondent said, “If you have highlights a range of care work, both dren. Achieving this target will require to leave your kid with someone, you direct (such as child- or elderly care) or about 3,000 additional nurseries (with should leave him with a family mem- indirect (such as cooking and cleaning) 30 children on average), or over twice as ber not a nursery. Grandparents are the and paid or unpaid. Much of the unpaid many as currently exist. By 2025, the tar- preferable option.” Another noted that work is done by women, preventing get is 20 percent of children. In order to “people, especially men, consider you a them in many cases from taking up paid achieve this target, over 7,000 addition- bad mother if you leave your children at work. In Iraq, for example, women spend al nurseries will be needed, or over five a nursery.” 5 times more hours on childcare than times as many as currently exist. Moreover, existing childcare benefits men and 14 times more hours on house- In Lebanon, the lack of childcare richer households. In Jordan, one-third hold chores.46 The commercialization of options puts restrictions on women’s of children from the richest 20 percent care work could both allow many wom- ability to work. A qualitative survey con- of households enjoy the limited supply of en to enter the paid work force as they ducted to improve understanding of the existing childcare facilities and a quarter are released from their domestic respon- challenges faced by Lebanese women in of the second-richest 20 percent (figure sibilities and create new jobs in the care joining and remaining in the labor force, 4.3), compared to less than 8 percent for economy, most of which perhaps would finding a job, and accessing self-employ- the rest of the population. In Lebanon as go to women. This section looks at the ment combined focus group discussions well, childcare is seen as an option most- potential for increasing FLFP through with men and women and in-depth in- ly for well-off families. In the qualita- formalizing childcare and elderly care.47 terviews with employers and firms (Elzir tive survey, one respondent noted, “The Assy 2019). Survey results show a con- woman works to help her husband not CHILDCARE sensus that women would use high-qual- incur additional costs. If the family can A large an unmet demand for childcare ity and affordable childcare and go back afford a nursery, the woman would not exists in the Mashreq countries. Chapter to work. One survey respondent stated, have had to go to work in the first place. 2 discusses some constraints on the de- “We should not forget that children are People who can afford to enroll their kids mand for childcare, such as social norms the main reason why women leave their in nurseries are usually from the high and cost. Despite these constraints, a jobs. A woman will not be able to man- classes of society.” large unmet demand exists. For example, age her job with young children, espe- Increasing availability and quality Jordan48 has an estimated 1,340 licensed cially since we do not have nurseries; this of childcare provides benefits through nurseries (see “Acceptability and afford- will lead her to resign from her job.” several channels (figure 4.4). Along ability of childcare services” in chapter In addition to the lack of childcare with building human capital, increasing 2); however, given that the population options, women also must contend with family welfare, and improving women’s of children below the age of five years a strong social preference for keeping productivity, the expansion of childcare in Jordan is 1.3 million,49 and assuming childcare within families. In Lebanon, will also create new jobs within the care that each nursery serves an average of 30 for example, many female participants industry, many of which will be filled by children, then these nurseries serve only and most male participants held the view women and also contribute to economic 3 percent of the children under five. The that childcare, particularly in the early growth. National Strategy for Human Resources years of development, was detrimental CHAPTER 4 . 145 FIGURE 4.3 Attendance in organized early childhood education program, by mother’s education level, Jordan Richest 20 percent Fourth Third Second Poorest 20 percent 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Percent Under 5 Years Enrolled S ource: Jordan Demograp h ic an d Healt h S urvey, 2 0 1 7 – 1 8 . N ote : Fi gu re shows share of c h ildren , ag ed 3 6 – 5 9 m o nt h s, livin g w i t h t he i r m ot he r a nd a t t e nd i ng a n e a r ly c hi l d ho o d e d u c a t i o n p ro g ra m . Greater access for poorer as well as ment in school; emerging evidence of when they might otherwise be tasked wealthier households will potentially in- better nutrition outcomes; better cogni- with looking after their young brothers crease the human capital of poorer chil- tive and socioemotional skills leading to and sisters, which particularly benefits dren. With the assumption that the first better employment prospects and higher adolescent girls (Devercelli and Bea- 1,000 days (and the first five years) are the earning potential. ton-Day 2020). most important period for a child’s devel- Along with the benefits for children Finally, women’s access to childcare opment, a large literature documents the from increased access to childcare, fam- can increase business productivity and impacts improved childhood develop- ilies benefit as well from higher family increase economic growth in three ways ment can have throughout the rest of a income as women’s earnings positively (Devercelli and Beaton-Day 2020). First, child’s life (see, for example, Engle et al. affect both women and their families. In- access to childcare can reduce attrition 2011; Heckman and Masterov 2007). As creased earnings mean greater economic of women employees, saving the signif- Devercelli and Beaton-Day (2020, p9) security for the family and increase gen- icant cost of recruitment and training observe, “[D]uring this time, children der equality and women’s independence, of someone new and the loss in short- need nurturing care and stimulation, bargaining power, and voice (Devercelli term productivity (Devercelli and Bea- protection from stress, adequate health- and Beaton-Day 2020, citing Wodon and ton-Day 2020, citing Boushey and Glynn care and nutrition, and opportunities to De le Briere 2018). Moreover, a greater 2012 and IFC 2017) and increasing pro- play and learn. Children left in unsafe or share of income controlled by women ductivity through reduced absenteeism unstimulating environments without ap- increases spending on education, health, and greater focus (Devercelli and Bea- propriate adult care are at risk of develop- nutrition, and housing, benefitting them ton-Day 2020, citing Addati, Cassirer, ing deficits that persist through life,” cit- and their children (Devercelli and Bea- and Gilchrist 2014 and IFC 2017). Sec- ing benefits of quality childcare including ton-Day 2020, citing World Bank 2012). ond, as discussed earlier in the chapter, improved school readiness, reduced rep- The additional income also means that large increases in female participation etition and drop out, and higher achieve- older siblings can stay in school longer can lead to large increases in economic 146 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 4.4 Benefits of increased childcare Labor Household Demand Welfare Female Economic Participation Growth Childcare Attrition Productivity Child Human Capital Intergenerational Mobility Source: Or i gi nal fi gu re fo r t h is repo rt . growth for the Mashreq countries, as it in training and public works programs. 2020). Public financing can have signifi- did in Hong Kong SAR, China; the Re- There is considerable variation in the cant returns; an investment of 2 percent public of Korea; Singapore; and Taiwan, mix and application of these strategies; of GDP in childcare would increase the China (Devercelli and Beaton-Day 2020, table 4.2 summarizes why a policy mak- employment rate by an estimated 1.4 citing Young 1995). er might use each one and what to con- to 3.7 percentage points (World Bank sider during implementation. 2019a implementation of De Hanau, Devercelli and Beaton-Day (2020) Himmelweit, and Perrons 2017). And, review the many different ways coun- Along with the approaches in table in addition to meeting parents’ childcare tries engage in childcare, each of which 4.2, improving access to childcare re- needs and expectations, policy makers has its advantages and disadvantages, quires several other considerations and can implement family-friendly policies, which are not mutually exclusive. They steps by policy makers. Regulations and such as paid maternity and paternity note the five most common approach- quality assurance must ensure that child leave, breastfeeding breaks, and child es governments use to increase access outcomes improve and that parents opt assistance grants (UNICEF 2019). to childcare: (i) providing childcare di- for the childcare (Devercelli and Bea- rectly, (ii) providing financial support ton-Day 2020, citing Bouguen et al. 2013 Within the Mashreq, Jordan has to parents for childcare, (iii) providing and Richter and Samuels 2017). A pre- made recent legal revisions that are incentives to nonstate actors to enter requisite for ensuring quality is a capa- likely to increase the demand for child- the market, (iv) mandating employ- ble, caring, and qualified workforce (see, care (World Bank 2019a). They require er-supported childcare, and (v) provid- for example, Wolf, Aber, and Behrman employers with employees having 15 ing childcare to maximize participation 2018, cited in Devercelli and Beaton-Day or more children under five to provide CHAPTER 4 . 147 TA B L E 4 . 2 Summary of considerations for different ways to increase access to childcare Approach Policy rationale Implementation considerations Government- provided One of the best ways to ensure • Requires significant financial and human resources, implementation childcare accessible and affordable childcare capacity, and political commitment. for the most disadvantages families, • In lower-income countries, a commitment to universal access to child- if there is strong political commit- care—provided through various types of providers—might be more ment and government capacity for effective to achieve scale. It will require a clear and comprehensive free or highly subsidized services implementation structure • Accompanying government policies on accreditation, quality assurance, and the ECD workforce that include the private sector are essential to support implementation. Government financial Important way to alleviate the costs • Widespread provision needs to be already available or with accompanying support for parents of childcare without the implemen- strategies to encourage the expansion of provision. tation burden that could require • The level of financing should be realistic to make the cost affordable for higher levels of capacity parents and to allow childcare providers to offer a decent quality service. • Capacity is required to administer a scheme, regulate, and ensure quality. Incentives for nonstate Given the large and urgent demand • Given the additional costs and complications of providing childcare, provision (high- and for childcare, as well as the clear especially for younger children (ages 0–3 years), some level of grants, low-cost providers, market opportunities indicated by subsidies, or other government contributions (such as providing a teacher franchises, communi- private preschool provision, the or land) is helpful for encouraging providers to enter the market and ty-based, NGO-run, or nonstate sector can complement maintain quality. home-based services) other government expansion • Accompanying government policies on accreditation, quality assurance, strategies. and the ECD workforce that include the private sector are essential to support implementation. Mandated employ- Given the strong business rationale • Because mandated employer-supported childcare is often limited to er-supported childcare for individual companies to invest large, formal-sector companies, this strategy should not be the only one in childcare, this can be an effective deployed by governments, especially for countries with a large informal way to diversify provision, freeing sector. up government resources to focus • Despite good business rationale, companies may need support in recog- on vulnerable populations. nizing the business case (IFC 2017). • Policies should be based on minimum number of employees, rather than on numbers of female employees, to avoid gender-based discrimination. • Policies should offer employers different options to meet the mandate (for example, provision of on-site or near-site childcare, stipends, vouchers, consortia with other employers, and so on) in order to meet employee needs. • Accompanying policies on quality assurance and the ECD workforce are essential to support implementation. Childcare to maximize Many governments and develop- • Training programs should include both theoretical components and prac- participation in training ment partners are investing sub- tical components, giving trainees time to practice the skills they acquire. and public works pro- stantial sums in skills training and • After initial training, opportunities for continuous professional develop- grams and as a training public works programs and could ment and mentoring and coaching should be supported. stream in skills training multiply the return on investment programs by incorporating childcare as a • A training track for both ECD practitioners and for childcare entrepre- training stream, as well as provid- neurs may be appropriate. ing childcare to participants. S ource: Devercelli and Bea t o n -Day 2 0 2 0 . N ote : ECD = ear ly chi ldhoo d develo pm ent ; N GO = n o n g overn m ent a l o rg a ni z a t i o n. 148 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON childcare services (whether directly or As an important step to designing The problems facing the home health through a provider), and changes to the 50 and implanting country-specific poli- care market in Jordan are likely emblem- licensing system have made home-based cies, all three Mashreq countries are con- atic of the region and are illustrative of nurseries more likely. Additional recom- ducting in-depth childcare assessments the obstacles that need to be addressed. mendations for improving Jordan’s child- with the World Bank and International As World Bank (2019a) summarizes, the care provision include (i) expanding Finance Corporation under the Mashreq market is highly fragmented and under- the public sector provision of childcare Gender Facility. The aim of this work is regulated. A lack of home health care services; (ii) stimulating employer-sup- to assess the status of childcare services insurance coverage reduces demand, but ported childcare though more flexibility in each country, particularly from the most challenges occur on the supply side. in how it is provided; (iii) streamlining angle of legislation, quality, affordability, There is a lack of qualified trustworthy regulations affecting childcare provid- accessibility, and sufficiency of such sup- home care services51 and a lack of pro- ers; (iv) providing a stimulus package ply, as well as to assess the demand for fessional home care training. Challenges to support private sector-led provision such services. A gap analysis could pro- facing the sector include a shortage of fe- of childcare; (v) attracting international vide useful information. male staff (which is in turn an opportu- investors in childcare provision; and (vi) nity if the other issues can be addressed), setting up and enforcing good industry E L D E R LY C A R E “lack of governance and regulation, poor standards (World Bank 2019a). In the next 10 years, Lebanon, Jordan, management, unethical practices, lack and then Iraq will begin to age as soci- of referral systems, and low accessibility Elzir Assy (2019) has also identi- eties and an increasing number of elder- of the poor and less privileged as home fied various policy options in Lebanon. ly individuals will need caring for by a health care services are not included Access to childcare services could be shrinking proportion of the working-age in health insurance schemes” (World improved by piloting the provision of population. Since 1950, the elderly de- Bank 2019a, p37, summarizing Ajlouni, vouchers, subsidies, or tax breaks to pendency ratio—the number of people Dawani, and Diab 2015). families to use for private childcare ser- vices. This approach, although fiscally over 65 years old per 100 working-age Jordan’s National Health Strategy expensive, could reach all women, in- people aged 15–64 years old—has re- aims to make home care services acces- cluding wage workers and those who are mained relatively steady at fewer than sible to all and recognizes the coming self-employed, employed in the formal 1 elderly person per 10 working-age increase in the elderly (and the associat- sector, unemployed, and inactive. An- adults. Already in Lebanon, however, ed health costs if they stay at hospitals). other option is to bring down the age and beginning in 2030 in Jordan and Making this goal a reality, however, re- requirement of children from three years 2035 in Iraq, the number of elderly per quires a series of actions in legislation, to four months in the National Social working-age adult will begin to climb increased private sector provision, and Security Fund (NSSF) benefit of family (figure 4.5). In 30 years, Jordan will have the inclusion of service costing in public allowance. Although reaching only for- nearly one elderly person for every five and private health insurance schemes. mally employed women, this approach working-age adults and the ratio in Leb- Specific World Bank (2019a) recommen- works within an existing system (the anon will be one to three. By 2100, Iraq, dations included the following: NSSF family allowance) and may there- Jordan, and Lebanon will have 27, 47, • Conduct a market study on the po- fore be more politically feasible. and 62 elderly persons per 100 work- tential of the care economy and el- ing-age adults, respectively. derly care in particular. CHAPTER 4 . 149 FIGURE 4.5 Elderly dependency ratio in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, 1950–2100 70 60 Dependency ratio (%) 50 40 30 20 10 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100 Iraq Jordan Lebanon S ource: Based on dat e fro m Un it ed N at io n s Po pula t io n Divisio n . N ote : Dep end ency rat i o i s t h e n um ber of peo ple ag ed 6 5 yea rs o r m o re d i v i d e d by t he wo r k i ng - a g e p o p u l a t i o n ( 15–64 ye a rs o l d ) . • Implement the National Health Stra- General availability of transport op- that very few women use buses or taxis, tegy’s recommendation for insuran- tions—and in particular, whether those primarily because of safety and harass- ce-covered home healthcare. options have adequate first- and last- ment concerns (World Bank 2014). A mile connectivity—affect the mobility of 2018 study by SADAQA, a local organi- • Improve the regulatory home health women and girls more than that of men zation that promotes women’s economic care services. and boys. Public transport that does not rights, found that 47 percent of women • Expand the provision of training to serve internal routes in communities, is said they have refused a job because of care givers, especially non-medical available only at certain times (such as public transportation issues (Aloul, Naff, care workers. during the daytime), or offers infrequent and Mansour 2018). In fact, 81 percent • Set up and enforce good industry service results in women walking long of the women surveyed by SADAQA standards for all types of elderly care. distances or taking informal modes of believe that public transportation is inte- transport to cover internal routes, which gral for women’s economic participation, • Attract international investors in el- can be expensive and unsafe. emphasizing how women view transpor- derly care provision. Studies for Jordan and Lebanon show tation’s role in their labor participation. PUBLIC that safety on public transportation is a In Lebanon, consultations and surveys T R A N S P O RTAT I O N major issue. A study conducted by the during the preparation of a public trans- International Youth Foundation in 2014 portation project in Beirut showed that Beyond responding to and criminaliz- in Jordan indicated that 30 percent of women lack a reliable and safe alterna- ing sexual harassment, improvements parents do not allow their children to tive to private vehicles given the safety to public transportation must make it use public transport (IYF 2014). In ad- and harassment concerns in existing available, safe, affordable, and reliable. dition, women’s associations indicated public transport. Lower-income wom- 150 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON en depend on their husbands to provide As a male-dominated sector, transport important step to increase confidence in their transportation needs (usually one offers little opportunity for women’s the system ((Ajlouni, Dawani, and Diab car per household) or are forced to use voices as transport users to be heard, and 2015; World Bank 2018c). Jordan has existing unsafe public transportation transport services have few incentives made positive progress with the devel- (World Bank 2018c). Thirty-five percent to respond to particular needs of female opment of a Code of Conduct (CoC), the of women report being verbally harassed passengers. Encouraging women’s par- first of its kind for the sector. The CoC in public spaces in Lebanon all or most ticipation would involve tackling bar- will regulate passenger, driver, and opera- of the time and a further 26 percent oc- riers such as gender stereotypes, which tor conduct in public transport, including casionally (IFES and IWPR 2010). see transport positions as a male occu- ride hailing. It makes explicit references pation, and addressing health and safe- to sexual harassment and gender-based A transportation policy that takes ty issues and sexual harassment in the discrimination as infringements of the into account gender at its core is neces- workplace. Employing more women can CoC, and it includes enforcement mea- sary. Policy recommendations include lead to more gender-sensitive transport sures, details public feedback mechanism greater connectivity between cities to service development, and increasing the with various reporting lines, and sets open up more economic opportunities number of women in decision-making indicators to monitor the progress. The for women and a focus on shortening positions in public transport govern- CoC will be introduced in service agree- time spent in transit and improving cost ing bodies can ensure that the women’s ments between the Land Transport Reg- efficiency (Ajlouni, Dawani, and Diab agenda is addressed continuously and ulatory Commission (LTRC) and public 2015.). For example, given their gender consistently in future policy planning, transport and ride-sharing operators. roles—and associated travel patterns drafting, and implementation (Ajlouni, often requiring shorter, more frequent These changes all need adequate bud- Dawani, and Diab 2015). journeys with multiple stops and often gets, which may require public subsidies. with accompanying dependents—wom- Appropriate gender-sensitive phys- As an area that demands significant re- en are likely to be disadvantaged and ical design of transport infrastructure sources, public transportation often sur- face higher costs by public transport is another critical consideration. Such vives only with strong political support ticketing systems that charge flat rates design includes making bus stops and and substantial public funding. The inte- per line or per journey. Implementing depots safer through better lighting, con- gration of a proper gender policy might integrated fare collection systems in- tinuous surveillance (cameras at stations involve extra costs, and it needs not just cluding flexible ticketing systems would and buses), and access to security officers funds but also clear public support, en- encourage greater use of public trans- in case of emergency. Training of a range forcement measures, and continuity in port by women. of stakeholders, particularly drivers, on policy and decision making (Ajlouni, how to address harassment in public Dawani, and Diab 2015). The integra- Increasing the number of women in spaces and undertaking public awareness tion of different policy areas—including public transportation management as campaigns can play an important role in urban planning, land use, and transpor- well as hiring more female conductors, condemning inappropriate behavior in tation planning—is also crucial for mak- bus drivers, and ticket sale officers would the public space, creating a better travel ing cities denser, which in turn helps cost make public transportation a more inclu- experience for all users, and encouraging and coverage (World Bank 2014). sive space. In Jordan, for example, wom- greater use of public transport. Creating en constitute only about 2.7 percent of all reliable channels of complaint is also an employed in transportation and storage. CHAPTER 4 . 151 IN ADDITION, DIGITAL which digital jobs are accessible by dif- ferent subgroups in the context of Iraq, JOBS REPRESENT BOTH A Jordan, and Lebanon. POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITY Increases in the many types of digital AND ADDITIONAL BARRIER jobs come from various sources—with FOR WOMEN four significant drivers: the public sec- tor, the private sector, online outsourc- ing, and digital platforms (World Bank 2018a).54 W H Y D O E S D I G I TA L FLFP began in other countries. Digital Changes in the way both local and T R A N S F O R M AT I O N jobs offer strong promise as a “potential- OFFER SUCH A national governments operate are cre- ly catalytic opportunity,” particularly for LARGE POTENTIAL ating many digital opportunities (World young women in many Middle East and O P P O RT U N I T Y ? North Africa countries with very low Bank 2016). Many governments have made significant investments incor- Digital technology has enormous po- FLFP rates and in stark contrast to the porating ICT into their administrative tential to provide job opportunities for parity in education (World Bank 2018a, functions and operations, such as setting the young—and especially for women p43). Young women are more likely than up websites, allowing income taxes to be (World Bank 2018a).52 In the informa- older women to already have the skills filed online, and adopting online busi- tion and communication technology to participate in the digital economy or ness registration processes. Automated (ICT) sector, the creation and growth of to be able to quickly learn them. Girls in fiscal management systems are nearly ICT-intensive jobs, such as mobile app school have an even better opportunity to universal, and most countries use online development, offer employment oppor- develop these skills, when exposed daily systems for customs processing and tax tunities for well-educated and skilled to much of the technology. Nonetheless, management. The worldwide move to young women.53 More important, that digital jobs can also induce older women digitalization of civil records requires growth has led to the creation of ICT-de- to return the workforce after having chil- enormous amounts of young workers to pendent jobs—those that cannot be per- dren; those with particular skills such as quality-check or provide manual over- formed without technology—such as on- speaking English or practicing account- writing of digital scans. line freelancing work and customer call ing can return to work online without centers. Jobs that offer women the ability violating norms on returning to work The ICT sector itself accounts for a to work from home with flexible hours or the need to care for young children. small fraction of the workforce in devel- help overcome many of the constraints And digital jobs are open not only to the oping countries and “may not become a identified in the previous chapter, such highest educated—for whom economic major generator of direct employment... as lack of safe and quality transportation, participation is already high—but also to The greatest potential for digital tech- childcare availability, and restrictive so- those with more basic educational levels, nologies to improve employment op- cial norms. because some activities do not require portunities is outside the ICT sector... Moreover, digital jobs are likely to be significant professionalization. Table 4.3 [with] the need for workers with basic, particularly attractive to younger wom- provides an interactive assessment tool intermediate and advanced digital skills en, with whom generational shifts in that can be used to map the degree to increasing across all sectors in nearly all 152 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E 4 . 3 Current opportunities for digital work for different types of youth Results Drivers of Demand for Digital Jobs Youth Population Characteristic Gender Location Income Group Education Level Male Female Urban Rural Bottom-40% Top-60% Low High (M) (F) (U) (R) (B40) (T60) (L) (H) I. PUBLIC SECTOR A. Public Sector Agencies II. PRIVATE SECTOR A. ICT Sector B. Non - ICT Sector C. Digital Entrepreneurship III. ONLINE OUTSOURCING A. Business Process Outsourcing B. Virtual Freelancing C. Microwork IV. DIGITAL PLATAFORMS FOR IMPROVING LIVEHOODS A. On-Demand Services Plataforms B. Business Services for SMEs C. Job-Matching Platforms Many Emp loyment Oppo rt un it ies S o m e E m ploy m ent O p p o r t u ni t i e s L i m i t e d E m p l oy m e nt O p p o r t u ni t i e s Source: Wor ld Bank 20 1 8 a. countries,” including Iraq, Jordan and the number of jobs being created by the and health. Impact sourcing can focus Lebanon, as more firms adopt new tech- formal private sector. on young women with low education nologies that can improve productivity or in rural areas to connect them with A third driver is online outsourcing, (World Bank 2018a, p20). The ICT sec- microwork and BPO opportunities “the contracting of third-party workers tor also offers opportunities for digital and provide on-the-job skills training, and providers, often overseas, to sup- entrepreneurship, which is the process of as currently done in India, Kenya, and ply services or perform tasks via inter- creating an Internet-enabled or delivered Uganda. Thirty percent of BPO employ- net-based marketplaces or platforms” business, product, or service (Van Wel- ees in India and 55 percent in the Phil- (Kuek et al. 2015, p1). Online outsourc- sum 2016). Digital entrepreneurship is ippines are women, making it a partic- ing includes business process outsourc- particularly important in countries like ularly attractive option for increasing ing (BPO) in which a third-party pro- Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon where fiscal female participation. Although English vider, often based in another country, constraints limit the number of public language fluency has been an advantage, performs entire processes such as cus- sector jobs—a traditional source of em- outsourcing in other languages is grow- tomer service functions in call centers ployment for women in the Mashreq— ing and Arabic language outsourcing and specialized business functions in and where slow economic growth limits could also represent a BPO opportunity accounting, finance, human resources, CHAPTER 4 . 153 in the Mashreq countries, although the has enabled very small-scale entrepre- gins, however, ICT’s benefits are limited. Arab Republic of Egypt currently dom- neurs and craftspeople—40 percent of According to Viollaz and Winkler (2020), inates market share. Two other forms of sellers on the platform are women—to when the Internet spurs FLFP, it does online outsourcing—virtual freelancing reach global markets (World Bank 2016) not necessarily stimulate female employ- and microwork—provide self-employ- and has indirectly created an estimated ment: for women with a primary edu- ment opportunities. Freelancers perform 36 million jobs in 2017 (The Econom- cation or lower, a 1.0-percentage-point outsourced professional services, are ic Times 2018). Online services help increase in Internet access leads to a well-paid, and usually possess technical farmers connect to more customers and 1.1-percentage-point increase in unem- or professional skills. Microworkers per- better determine market prices for their ployment. Making searching easier does form tasks that can be completed in sec- goods. About 1 percent of online stor- not mean women will always find a job. onds or minutes and often have only ba- eowners are persons with disabilities In addition, there is no evidence that in- sic numeracy, literacy, and digital skills. (World Bank 2016), suggesting oppor- creased labor force participation increas- Although pay for microwork is generally tunities for women, who are less likely es women’s bargaining power within the low (Kuek et al. 2015), workers—espe- to be working if they have disabilities. household. Taken together, these results cially females—benefit from the flexibili- Finally, online job matching enhances suggest that weak labor demand, low ty (Berg 2016).55 equity by enabling jobseekers without human-capital investment, and gender Internet but with mobile phones to con- inequities mitigate ICT’s effect on female Digital platforms are the final driv- nect to employers and to improve social empowerment. er of increased jobs. The flexibility pro- networks. vided by some of these platforms is at- W H AT D O E S tractive to many women because they There is some evidence that ICT can D I G I TA L can balance working and childcare and improve female labor market outcomes T R A N S F O R M AT I O N household responsibilities (IFC 2016). in the Mashreq. Using Jordanian data, REQUIRE, AND Such platforms can reshape jobs in Viollaz and Winkler (2020) show that a W H AT C A N P O L I C Y which women are heavily represented, 1.0-percentage-point increase in Inter- MAKERS DO? such as babysitting and housecleaning; net access leads to a 0.7-percentage-point Policy makers in the Mashreq can re- two Indian companies providing app- increase in FLFP. For those with a sec- duce the main constraints on drivers of based domestic services are reportedly ondary education or higher, a 1.0-per- demand while increasing the supply of expanding by 20 percent to 60 percent centage-point increase in Internet access female workers who can do these jobs. per month (Kadakia 2016). Online plat- leads to a 0.5-percentage-point increase Investments will be needed in the five forms make it easier for women to start in employment. One mechanism driving pillars of the digital economy: (i) digi- businesses and access markets. LadyJek, this result is that women can use ICT as tal infrastructure, (ii) digital platforms, launched in Indonesia in 2016, features a tool in their job search. Another is that (iii) digital financial services, (iv) digital women-only drivers and passengers in expanded Internet coverage can shift a entrepreneurship, and (v) digital skills response to security concerns of women country’s social norms: Jordanian wom- (World Bank 2018b). Figure 4.6 shows riders (see box 4.1 for some examples of en got married later, had fewer children, the current status on each pillar for the online platforms in Jordan and how the and were more comfortable disagreeing Mashreq countries. Jordan has a rea- government can help enable them). Ali- with their male relatives. sonable base in digital infrastructure, baba, the online retail platform in China, Without improvement on other mar- 154 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON BOX 4.1 Examples of digital jobs in Jordan Jordan already has a range of new digital start-ups providing various outsourcing and online platform services. In terms of business process outsourcing (BPO), some examples include the following: • Crystel Call is an independent, multilingual contact center providing a range of inbound and out- bound contact center services, consultancy, and BPO to various customers in markets across Eu- rope, the Middle East and North Africa, and North America (www.crystelcall.com). The company recently announced that it was able to employ 20 women through flexible or remote working. • E3mar is a specialized customer contact center providing services in Arabic or English (www.e3mar. com). • Estarta Solutions recently launched a plan to recruit 400 additional agents, capitalizing on the highly qualified workforce in information technology (IT) BPO. They have also implemented gender diver- sity management with GIZ and are working to position themselves as an employer of choice for women (https://web.facebook.com/Estarta.Solutions/videos/462350407903741/) • Focus Training and Development provides call center training courses (headquartered in the Arab Republic of Egypt but with activities in Jordan). It provides call center certifications and diplomas to individuals and certifies call centers for quality (www.focustandd.com). • Aspire Services is not a call center but provides IT outsourcing services to clients from the United States. Services include application engineering, mannual and automated testing, systems analysis, content management, and customer, remote network, and DBA Support. Aspire has grown from 4 employees in 2003 to 132 IT professionals (www.aspire-services.net). Jordan also has a healthy ecosystem of online platforms, including the following examples: • Altibbi is an online repository of medical articles for a lay audience, daily news, comprehensive list of medicines available in the Middle East and North Africa market, a free Q&A submission section, and paid telephone consultations with doctors available 24 hours. It also maintains an online system that gives doctors access to their patients’ files. • Carers is a domestic cleaning services app that has had success without conflicts with social norms; the idea of women working late night and entering other people’s homes is being accepted. • Belforon is an app-based food delivery service that matches home-based food businesses to indi- viduals and catering to businesses, facilitating more home-based work for women. Some barriers and uncertainties still exist for these sorts of businesses. For example, some licensing frameworks are designed for businesses only and do not accommodate individuals operating a business. The Jordan Food and Drug Association has imposed a pre-licensing process, not applied to restaurants, before a home-based food business can start. If the government takes steps to make it easier for digital entrepreneurship and online platforms, the industry and related digital jobs could thrive in Jordan. CHAPTER 4 . 155 platforms, entrepreneurship and skills, ternet gap is better at 10 percent, but the account the population’s initial degree but those pillars need to be developed mobile phone gap is larger than in Iraq of digital skills. Training programs for further to be truly competitive; and fi- at 21 percent (Jordan) and 17 percent women should consider different needs nancial services lags relative to modern (Lebanon). Although additional data are women might have to enable them to ful- digital economies. Lebanon is similar not available for the Mashreq, a survey ly participate (childcare on training lo- but needs additional investments in dig- of 23 low- and middle-income countries cation, safe accommodation, travel costs ital infrastructure as well as financial found that women are 10 percent less if required). When the population has a services. Iraq needs investment across all likely to own mobile phones than men deep lack of trust in modern technology, five pillars. and, even if they do have a phone, are 18 training programs can include a digital Internet and mobile penetration have percent less likely to use mobile Internet, literacy module to address safety, priva- yet to reach everyone in the Mashreq social media, or SMS services (GSMA cy, and dependability. Other strategies countries (figure 4.7). Connectivity Connected Women 2018). The main include staggering the training process is uneven; for example, 78 percent of barriers for women to ownership are through time, especially if all targeted Lebanon’s population has access to the cost, low literacy and digital skills, and beneficiaries live in a close geographical Internet, but there are only 64 mobile safety concerns. The main reasons they proximity; once the first batch completes subscriptions per 100 people, one of the do not use mobile Internet are that they its training and starts using ICT tools lowest rates in the world (figure 4.8 and do not know how or believe that it is not (such as a digital government service), figure 4.9). Conversely, less than half of relevant to them. their positive experience will influence all Iraqis use the Internet (49 percent), others. Alternatively, trainers can get in The gender digital divide means that but there are 95 mobile subscriptions per touch with influential people in the area young women do not access or excel in 100 people. Jordan is in the middle on (for example, teachers or local govern- digital jobs as much as young men do. both measures, with 67 percent of people ment representatives), and conduct in- In order to address this gap, countries using the Internet and 88 subscriptions tensive training with them. Once those should consider their current level of per 100 people. individuals start using ICT tools, the education and skills in the short run, demonstration effect may propel others Increasing opportunities for women and they can implement policies that in- to use them as well. through technology will require closing crease such skills in young women who the digital gender gap. One reason for have left school and those still in it. In- Public sector digital jobs tend to the Mashreq countries’ relatively low troducing training programs can be an benefit more-educated, urban women. Internet and mobile phone usage in in- effective way to increase digital skills for Governments can create such jobs by ternational context is because they have women (World Bank 2018a). For these providing a range of accessible online some of the largest gender gaps in such programs to be successful, they need to services. The shortage of ICT specialists usage in the world. In Iraq, it is estimat- take into account basic literacy levels (or in many government agencies can offer ed that only 72 women use the Internet lack thereof), which would influence the opportunities for educated, young wom- for every 100 men, or a gender gap of 28 mode of training. In certain contexts, en with the right skills; however, as noted percent (figure 4.10), and that only 89 learning by doing and audio- and visu- previously, countries have had difficulty women use mobile phones for every 100 al-aided classes could have more efficacy encouraging young women into science, men, or a gender gap of 11 percent (fig- than text-based learning. The content technology, engineering, and mathe- ure 4.11). In Jordan and Lebanon, the In- of the training should also take into matics (STEM) careers. Policy options 156 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 4.6 Digital economy performance, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, 2019 Digital economy performance by Pillar a. Iraq Digital economy performance by Pillar Digital infrastructure Digital economy performance by Pillar Digital infrastructure Digital economy value (0-10) Digital platforms Digital infrastructure MENA Digital platforms MENA Lebanon average Digital financial services average Digital platforms minus GCC Digital financial services Pillar 1: Digital entrepeneurship Digitalfinancial 3.97 5.00 4.18 Digital services infrastructure Digital entrepeneurship Pillar 2: Digital platforms 4.08 5.44 4.81 Digital skills Digital entrepeneurship Pillar 3: Digital financial 3.47 5.34 4.39 Digital skills services Needs Emerging Advanced Very Digital skills development advanced Pillar 4: Digital Needs Emerging Advanced Very 2.95 4.18 3.55 entrepeneurship development advanced Needs Emerging Advanced Very Pillar 5 : Digital skills 2.83 4.68 3.94 development advanced b. Jordan Digital economy performance by Pillar Digital economy performance by Pillar Digital infrastructure Digital economy value (0-10) Digital economy performance by Pillar Digital infrastructure MENA MENA Digital Digital platforms infrastructure Lebanon average average Digital platforms minus GCC Digital financial services Digital platforms Pillar 1: Digital 5.70 5.00 4.18 Digital financial services infrastructure entrepeneurship Digitalfinancial Digital services Pillar 2: Digital platforms 5.02 5.44 4.81 Pillar 3: Digital financial Digital entrepeneurship 3.98 5.34 4.39 Digital skills services Digital entrepeneurship Pillar 4: Digital Digital skills 5.59 4.18 3.55 Needs Emerging Advanced Very entrepeneurship Digital skills development advanced Needs Emerging Advanced Very Pillar 5 : Digital skills 5.13 4.68 3.94 development advanced Needs Emerging Advanced Very development advanced c. Lebanon Digital economy performance by Pillar Digital economy value (0-10) Digital economy performance by Pillar Digital infrastructure MENA Digital economy performance by Pillar MENA Digital infrastructure Lebanon average average Digital platforms minus GCC Digital infrastructure Pillar 1: Digital infrastructure 4.37 5.00 4.18 Digital platforms Digital financial services Digital platforms Pillar 2: Digital platforms 6.01 5.44 4.81 Digital financial services Pillar 3: Digital financial 4.49 5.34 4.39 entrepeneurship Digitalfinancial Digital services services Digital entrepeneurship Pillar 4: Digital 5.10 4.18 3.55 Digital skills entrepeneurship Digital entrepeneurship Pillar 5 : Digital skills 5.45 4.68 3.94 Digital skills Needs Emerging Advanced Very Digital skills development advanced Needs Emerging Advanced Very development advanced Needs Emerging Advanced Very development advanced Source: B ased on Wor ld B a n k Dig it a l E c o n o my Perfo rm a n c e c o u nt r y s u m m a r i e s . CHAPTER 4 . 157 FIGURE 4.7 Mobile broadband in the Middle East and North Africa Share of households with access (%) 90 Internet connection speed (Mbps) 80 82 80 80 80 71 69 70 63 56 57 56.95 60 52 52.99 49 50 44 40 33.54 30 30 Global Average Speed 20.91 22.24 15.56 16.97 17.83 18.61 20 12.36 8.16 10 3.94 4.52 0 Syrian Arab Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Iran, Islamic Rep. Iraq Libya Algeria Jordan Morocco Tunisia Saudi Arabia Lebanon United Arab Emirates Qatar Ookla Speed Test (Download Link, in Mbps) MB Mobile Broadband Penetration S ource: Wor ld Bank 2018b . N ote : Mb ps = Megab i t s p er sec o n d. FIGURE 4.8 FIGURE 4.9 Share of population using the Internet Mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people Lebanon All countries, by level of access All countries, by level of access Jordan Iraq Iraq Jordan Lebanon 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 100 200 300 400 Share of population with access (%) Subscriptions per 100 people S ource: Wor ld Develop ment I n dic a t o rs, 2 0 1 8 o r la t est yea r availa b l e . So u rc e : Wo r l d D eve l o p m e nt Ind i c a t o rs , 2018 o r l a t e s t ye a r av a i l abl e. 158 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE 4.10 FIGURE 4.11 Ratio of female to male Internet access Ratio of female to male mobile phone access Iraq Jordan Lebanon Countries, by average ratio Countries, by average ratio Iraq Lebanon & Jordan 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Ratio of female to male Internet access Ratio of female to male mobile access Source: Di gi t al Gend er Ga ps, ww w. dig it alg en derg a ps. So u rc e : D i g i t a l G e nd e r G a p s , w w w. d i g i t a l g e nd e rg a p s . Not e: Fi gure shows result s fo r a ll c o unt ries in c luded in t h e d a t a b a s e . In- Not e : F i g u re s hows re s u lt s fo r a ll c o u nt r i e s i nc l u d e d i n t he da ta ba s e. GS M t er nat i onal Telecom m un ic at io n Un io n dat a used wh ere availa b l e , ot he r w i - A s s o c i a t i o n d a t a u s e d w he re av a i l a b l e , ot he r w i s e ave ra g e of o n l i n e (us i n g se average of onli ne ( usin g t h e Fac ebo o k Gen der Gap I n dex ) , c o m b i ne d t he Fa c e b o o k G e nd e r G a p Ind ex ) , c o m b i ne d ( u s i ng t he Fa c e b o o k Gen der (u si ng t he Facebook Gen der Ga p I n dex c o m bin ed wit h ot h er of f l i ne i nd i c a - G a p Ind ex c o m b i ne d w i t h ot he r of f l i ne i nd i c a t o rs o n t he c o u ntry’ s deve- t ors on t he cou nt r y’ s develo pm ent st at us suc h as it s Hum a n D eve l o p m e nt l o p m e nt s t a t u s s u c h a s i t s H u m a n D eve l o p m e nt Ind ex ) , a nd offl i n e (us i n g Index), and offli ne ( usin g o n ly offlin e in dic a t o rs o n t h e c o unt r y ’s d eve l o p - o nly of f l i ne i nd i c a t o rs o n t he c o u nt r y ’s d eve l o p m e nt s t a t u s s uc h a s i ts ment st at us su ch as it s Hum an Develo pm ent I n dex ) est im at e s . H u m a n D eve l o p m e nt Ind ex ) e s t i m a t e s . include promoting ICT careers outside than other sectors, lack of access to cred- Digital skills will become increasing- the formal education system, as Mexico it or financial assets may make it more ly important for young people, especial- has done, or developing ICT training ex- difficult for women to enter this area. As ly women, to obtain digital jobs. These plicitly targeting young women for ICT noted earlier, however, the BPO sector skills range from basic to intermediate occupations, as in Kosovo and Georgia has many women in customer services; to advanced; Basic skills are generic ICT (World Bank 2016). Policy options to the flexibility of microwork offers many skills required for nearly all digital jobs, encourage women into STEM careers opportunities for women. Investments such as using a keyboard, searching on- are discussed in detail in World Bank in reliable connectivity and power can line, and sending email. Intermediate (2018a), chapter 6. help, as can those attracting internation- skills are generally job-ready skills for al BPO companies and stimulating do- digital work functions, such as digital Private sector digital jobs current- mestic demand. Microworker jobs can marketing and social media manage- ly favor men over women. Online out- be driven by active government outreach ment. Finally, advanced skills are needed sourcing, by contrast, offers more op- to potential partners; the Kenyan and to create and manage ICTs, such as soft- portunities for women, especially those Ghanaian experiences are notable. Dis- 56 ware development and cloud computing who are poorer or rural. Low numbers advantaged women, especially in rural (see figure 3.2 in World Bank 2018a). of young women in STEM education and areas, are often targeted by impact sourc- jobs result in a low proportion of wom- For young women to obtain and ing companies that provide co-working en ICT specialists, and, although digital excel in digital jobs, they must also de- spaces, computers and training. entrepreneurship requires less capital velop increasingly valued nondigital CHAPTER 4 . 159 work-relevant skills such as cognitive when it comes to digital jobs. Individual and SMS-based services. Although they skills, soft skills, foundational litera- constraints that affect all youth, particu- go into some STEM topics at a similar cies, competencies, and character qual- larly young women, include low digital rate as men, in aggregate women lag con- ities (see World Bank 2016). Examing literacy, lack of complementary non-ICT siderably in Jordan and Lebanon. the sources of new jobs and the likely skills, lack of voice and agency, limited Increasing digital jobs in the Mashreq demand for digital and other skills can mobility, low self-confidence, limited countries will take time and work, but help policy makers understand the skills control of assets, and financial exclusion. women will fall farther behind if active required and develop training programs Constraints affecting only young women policies are not implemented to bring that foster workers with the right skills are household and family care respon- them into the digital economy. Not all of for future jobs in the Mashreq. Assess- sibilities, bias against pursuing ICT-re- the digital jobs under each of the drivers ments—for example, using the World lated education and careers, and online may be right for Iraq, Jordan, and Leb- Bank’s Skills Towards Employment and safety concerns. Similarly, in terms of anon; the feasibility of each will need to Productivity (STEP) skill measurement market and government failures, women be studied, including understanding the program—can highlight the job-rele- are disproportionately impeded by a lack digital skill base of young women. The vant skills in a labor market. In addition of access to capital, lack of information increased economic opportunities for to the training programs discussed ear- about digital jobs and about workers, women offered by digital jobs will not lier, other possibilities to develop wom- low bargaining power, the gender pay by themselves lead to massive increases en’s interest and skills in new technolo- gap, promotion bias, and occupational in participation. They can, however, be gies include working with academia or segregation. Finally, at the macro lev- part of the generational shift (observed industry to link girls and women with el, young women are more constrained at the beginning of this chapter) in the female role models or to a mentorship than men by the unavailability of ICT in- countries that did go on to experience program with women in STEM (World frastructure, constraints to business and rapid increases in participation. More- Bank 2018a). Other options include or- job creation, and conflict and violence. over, as the Mashreq economies under- ganizing networking events for women Women also face barriers related to go a digital transformation, like other (or with a minimum quota for wom- laws, unequal access to education, social economies around the world, they must en)—such as meetups, hackathons, and norms, safety and security concerns, and address the gender digital divide high- conferences for women to engage, sup- discrimination in the workplace. The lighted earlier in this chapter or women port, and collaborate with other women high rates of women working in the BPO will be left behind. in STEM—and facilitating links between sector has already been noted, but legal STEM graduates and tech companies. restrictions on hours would need to be The constraints that keep young lifted in Iraq; Lebanon has no such re- women from gaining digital jobs exist at strictions, and Jordan removed them in the individual level, because of market 2019 (see World Bank 2020). In nearly and government failure, and for mac- every country of 31 countries surveyed, ro reasons (see table 4.1 in World Bank men have greater digital fluency than 2018a). In many ways, these constraints women (Sweet 2016), which in turn mirror those that keep women out of the makes it more difficult for women to gain workforce in general but are magnified digital skills and fully use mobile phones 160 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON NOTES 43. The historical analysis in the following section was produced using the World Bank’s JobsStructure tool. Details on the methodology and how it was adapted for the future projections can be found in a technical Annex. 44. Jordan’s target is to increase female participation to 24 percent, but an increase of five points is used here for comparability to Iraq and Lebanon. 45. Specifically, “education and healthcare, finance and insurance, professional, scien- tific and technical activities; as well as information, communications and technol- ogy” (Kasoolu et al. 2019). 46. World Bank staff calculations using data from the 2012 Iraq Household Socioeco- nomic Survey. 47. Although domestic work such as cleaning and cooking has a similar potential to relieve women who want to work of their responsibilities as well as to create new jobs, in Jordan and Lebanon at least, most of this work is performed by relatively cheap migrant labor. World Bank (2019a) estimates that less than 1 percent of workers in domestic services in Jordan are Jordanian—most are Egyptian. 48. The following analysis is from World Bank (2019a). 49. Based on Department of Statistics population estimates for the 2018. 50. Labor Law Number 14, 2019. 51. World Bank (2019a, p37) notes the range of services that come under elderly care: Elderly care services range from medical to non-medical care: medical care and physical therapy care provided by certified nurses in gerontology and physical therapists; activities of daily living such as administration of basic medication, bathing and changing, performed by trained care providers; and domestic services such as shopping, cooking and feeding, performed by less skilled providers. All of these have a psychological support component. Ensuring the supply of trained and qualified care providers for each category will be important for the develop- ment of the elderly care sector. 52. This section summarizes key findings of World Bank (2018a). See also World Bank (2019c) for a comprehensive review of the changing nature of work. 53. “Digital jobs exist across all industries but vary in how much they rely on tech- nology, along three types: (i) ICT-intensive jobs directly created through the ICT sector intensively using ICT, such as mobile app development; (ii) ICT-depen- CHAPTER 4 . 161 dent jobs that cannot be performed without technology, such as online freelancing work and customer call centers; and (iii) ICT-enhanced jobs that use digital tech- nologies but could be performed without ICT, such as accounting and graphics design.” World Bank (2018a, p13). See also reference to ICT potential for women’s employment in World Bank (2013a). 54. See table 3.1 in World Bank (2018a) for definitions and examples of categories of each driver, type of digital work and the digital and other skills required, and the type of work arrangements it lends itself to. 55. Although outsourcing can provide opportunities for vulnerable youth who have few options, the informal nature of the work and lack of social protections can make them vulnerable to exploitation (UNGA 2017). 56. Kenya’s Ajira Digital Programme has trained 40,000 young men and women to perform microwork online (World Bank 2018a, referencing ITU 2016). E-Ghana was a World Bank–funded project aimed at generating growth and employment in Ghana by leveraging ICT and public-private partnerships to develop the infor- mation technology enabled services industry and to contribute to the improved efficiency and transparency of selected government functions through e-gov- ernment applications. It contributed to significantly expand employment in this sector with half the jobs created being held by women (54 percent of new jobs created). 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Beyond the need to create additional jobs, the recommendations centered around job demand include making public transportation safer, revising certain laws and regulations, providing childcare services (of good quality), addressing social norms that prevent women from earning their own income, and closing the gap between the law on paper and the law in practice. Chapter 4 also suggests that the digital economy can be an opportuni- ty for increasing women’s labor force participation because it allows women to work from home with flexible hours and to overcome many of the identified constraints (lack of safe and quality transportation, lack of childcare, personal preferences, and restrictive social norms). Aside from the specific areas for improved action, it will also be important to ensure that the institutional framework is prepared to effectively design, implement, and monitor those policies. EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICIES WILL REQUIRE A CLEAR INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY Addressing the low FLFP in the Mashreq countries—and gender equality gaps more broadly—requires a consistent and clear institutional framework, which cuts across different sectors and levels of government. An important initial step would be to bet- ter understand each country’s current institutional structures designed to protect women’s existing rights—and why these structures have not been as effective as they could be. In some countries, a specialized legal commission has been established to promote legal change and enforce women’s rights. Such bodies coordinate gender pol- icy, conduct analysis and evaluation, and have an investigative and corrective capacity with respect to gender discrimination in employment, education, resources alloca- tion, facilities, and services. Gender equality concerns need to be tackled in a comprehensive and multisectoral manner; hence, roles and responsibilities across those different sectors need to be clear and complementary. Experience from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests that “whole-of-government” approaches are most successful at promoting gender equality and closing gaps across a variety of sectors, including health, education, employment, finance, representation, and more (OECD CHAPTER 5 . 173 2014). Government-wide strategies that Eighty-four percent of OECD coun- annual report, “Women and Men in coordinate policy and programmatic tries report using GIAs when draf- Spain,” that includes data on emplo- efforts across sectors and that establish ting legislation, and 37 percent use yment, salaries, income, social inclu- realistic targets for the medium and long GIAs to better understand the gen- sion, education, work-life balance, term are essential to close gender gaps. der impacts of existing legislation. science, technology, crime, violence, The following principles of institution- Another tool used by 57 percent of and decision making. al setups to effectively close gender gaps OECD countries is gender-respon- • Capacity and willingness to enforce have been identified as important: sive budgeting, which enables analy- gender legislation. Several countries sis of gender-differentiated effects • Strong and gender-diverse institutions worldwide have made progress in the of budgeting policies (OECD 2014). and mechanisms to ensure accoun- legislative framework to promote gen- Spain, through its National Equal tability and sustainability of gender der equality, but implementation of Opportunities Strategic Plan, aims initiatives—with clear roles and res- such legislation often lags. One inte- to improve the evaluation of regu- ponsibilities to enhance collaboration resting example of such enforcement lations and budgeting with a gender and complementarities. Although all comes from Iceland. In 2018, Iceland perspective. The annual state budget OECD countries have central gen- became the first country in the world includes a gender impact report, with der institutions and oversight me- to legally enforce equal pay for men all ministerial departments required chanisms, they differ widely in type and women (Bjarnason and Hauser to submit to the State Secretary for and function. Nonetheless, good 2018). Despite 1961 legislation man- Budgeting and Expenditure a report practice shows that clear institutio- dating equal pay for men and women, that includes a gender impact assess- nal roles, diversity among decision Icelandic women continued to earn ment of their programs. Since 2011, makers, and citizen and civil society between 14 and 20 percent less than the reports are publicly disclosed on engagement are critical for effecti- men for equal work (Statistics Iceland the Ministry of Treasury’s website.58 ve implementation of gender policy 2016). In an effort to raise awareness (OECD 2014). For example, in the • Collection and use of reliable sex-di- of the gender wage gap, women or- Netherlands, the government moni- saggregated evidence to inform policy ganized a 2016 protest in which they tors progress of gender equality po- decisions. National statistical systems left work at 2:38 pm, the time of day licies through the Ministry of Educa- and performance measurement and when they stopped being paid for tion, Culture and Science, but it also monitoring mechanisms that are able equal work. This protest was followed partners with nongovernmental or- to collect data for women and men’s by the Equal Pay Standard, which ganizations and social institutions to empowerment are critical. In Spain, requires companies with at least 25 determine the implementation and the Equality Law mandates data co- full-time employees to analyze their evaluation of policy plans. 57 llection disaggregated by gender for salary structures every three years to both the National Statistics Institute ensure that men and women are re- • Tools for evidence-based policy ma- (INE) and other public administra- ceiving equal pay for equal work. The king. Within the OECD, the gen- tions that produce data. Since 2006, companies must report to the gover- der impact assessment (GIA) is one in collaboration with the Institute nment for certification or face penal- tool used to embed gender consi- for Women and Equal Opportuni- ties, including fines. Although the law derations into policy and program ties, INE has produced an extensive does not address gaps resulting from development and implementation. 174 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON gendered selection into different sec- source of national economic growth, under eight years of age may reduce tors—engineering and nursing or which includes career development their workday by one hour without teaching, for example—proponents support for young women, leader- loss of pay for up to two years. The argue that increased transparency ship and management training for government has pledged to expand and legally binding commitments to midcareer professionals, and reem- afterschool care to relieve childca- equal pay improve outcomes for wo- ployment strategies (employment re burdens of households with two men in Iceland. counseling, vocational training, in- working parents. Under the new po- ternship opportunities, job place- licy, afterschool care was extended to • Addressing gender equality as an ment, and follow-up mentorship) cover all elementary aged children important avenue toward economic for women who have left the work- (up to age 12) and to extend services growth and poverty reduction. The force but desire to reenter. Simulta- from 5 p.m. until 7 p.m. A total of 1.1 Republic of Korea faces several obs- neously, the government has taken trillion won (equivalent to US$1 bi- tacles that may challenge its long- steps to reduce disincentives that llion) was pledged from the national term sustainable growth: a potential keep companies from employing wo- budget to accomplish this additional demographic crisis due to slowing men. Recent legislation amended the childcare coverage (He-Rim 2018). fertility rates and, concurrently, the Equal Employment Opportunity and lowest economic participation of In general, it is important to note that Work-Family Balance Act of 2007 women among OECD countries. no “one size fits all” solution exists for in- to extend paid paternity leave (Act Women who participate in Korea’s stitutionalizing gender equality, but the No. 16557 of August 27, 2019) and workforce tend to exit after having principles listed above are important to to enable men to share the leave pe- children; if they reenter the workfor- ensure effective cross-government col- riod. The amended Act also extends a ce, they face limited opportunities for laboration and coordination to effective- period of reduced working hours for career growth and advancement.59 In ly design, implement, and monitor poli- recent parents. Workers with a child order to improve sustained econo- cy progress toward gender equality. mic growth and to improve gender equality outcomes relative to equita- ble economic opportunities, Korea’s THERE IS A GREAT NEED government began implementing se- FOR MUCH MORE FREQUENT veral policies and programs to ensu- AND RELEVANT DATA TO re that women can successfully enter and remain a part of the work force. MONITOR PROGRESS AND The Ministry of Gender Equality and FILL IN KNOWLEDGE GAPS Family, created in 2001, supports the creation and implementation of po- As mentioned in the previous exam- collect more information that can illu- licies that foster women’s economic ples of good institutional setups, data, minate constraints to both the demand opportunity as a driver of economic knowledge and evidence are important and the supply of female labor, especially growth. The Ministry has outlined a ingredients to inform an effective gen- among younger women. life cycle–based policy for fostering der equality policy setup. In the Mashreq Several indicators essential to mon- female economic participation as a countries, there is an urgent need to itor progress can be tracked with exist- CHAPTER 5 . 175 ing data and benchmarked against other lence (GBV), other sexual and reproduc- vey data in the region, both Jordan and countries. These indicators include the tive rights, and health issues. They also Iraq face problems as well. Iraq has a existence of legal barriers through the suggest a series of surveys or studies of comprehensive national household so- Women, Business and the Law database, informal and microenterprise sectors to cioeconomic survey (IHSES) which is the experience of violence against wom- understand the constraints on female representative at the district level, but is en (such as intimate partner violence and microentrepreneurs, as well as to only held every six years or so, and there child marriage) through Demographic is no regular labor force survey. Conse- Gain a better understanding of and Health Surveys, several economic quently, monitoring even the headline women’s decision-making pro- outcomes through Labor Force Surveys, outcome of female labor participation cesses as they relate to the choos- attitudes and norms through the Arab on a regular basis is not possible.60 More- ing education and entering and Barometer and World Values Surveys, over, more data and analysis are need- exiting the labor market, by us- and asset ownership and entrepreneur- ed to facilitate progress in some of the ing mixed methods. To unpack ship outcomes through Enterprise Sur- specific areas of opportunities—such as the unexplained factors behind veys. Finally, administrative data should digital jobs for women. Increasing FLFP these decisions it would be use- be explored and analyzed more consis- through digital jobs will require under- ful to conduct a qualitative study tently (related to women’s educational standing young women’s current stock of on issues related to community involvement, asset ownership, and the digital skills and how it compares to the context (gender norms, access offer and use of care services). skills required for different digital jobs to formal and informal support (and which digital jobs are in demand in At the same time, important indica- systems, violence, public safety, each country). This information in turn tors are missing and are not currently etc.), intra household decision can guide government efforts to sup- collected. Governments, the internation- making (role of family forma- port the development of digital jobs that al community, and broader civil society tion, care responsibilities, time match the skillset of the young women should take efforts over the target period use, etc.) and individual agency in the country as well as identify which to modify existing instruments in order and assets (aspirations, exercise skill gaps to address through education to collect additional data or to deploy new of power over personal decisions systems and training programs. instruments. For example, the current and life projects, role models, … annual Labor Force Survey conducted by personal social networks, etc.). As noted previously, the other area the Jordan Department of Statistics could (Atamanov, Constant, and Lund- of potential for furthering the agenda is be modified to collect more information vall 2016, p35). the care economy. Devercelli and Bea- on the number of different digital jobs ton-Day (2020) repeatedly note the lack The need for more frequent basic data being created and performed by women; of good data on childcare in low- and in the Mashreq countries is even more the gender gap in terms of Internet, mo- middle-income countries, especially of pressing, however. In this context, Atama- bile, and smart phone use; and the stock data on parental preferences and barri- nov, Constant, and Lundvall (2016, p35) of digital skills young women have. ers to usage (see also Diaz and Rodri- say “Finally, on a general note, it is im- guez-Chamussy 2016). They provide Atamanov, Constant, and Lundvall portant to point to the lack of high-qual- an example of a mixed-methods data (2016) highlight three areas of data and ity statistical information [in Lebanon].” collection for the demand and supply of analytical need in Lebanon. They note However, while Lebanon might suffer childcare (box 5.1). the lack of data on gender-based vio- from the most extreme lack of basic sur- 176 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON BOX 5.1 Example of mixed-methods data collection for demand and supply of childcare in Eastern Europe and Central Asia To better understand the context of childcare (and elder care) provision in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, a survey on the distribution of care was designed and implemented in seven countries across urban and rural areas. The field work was divided broadly into two components: a demand assessment and a supply assessment. The demand assessment included data on time use, care needs, perceptions, preferences about care responsibilities, and barriers in access to childcare services. Where possible, it followed the dynamics of care demand and supply at the household level, with women and their labor force engagement at the center. This assessment included quantitative individual-level questionnaires as well as qualitative fo- cus group discussions. Core questions included the following: What childcare arrangements are parents using? What is the demand for childcare services? What factors are the most important for parents in different contexts? What is the willingness of parents to pay, and how sensitive is the use of childcare to price (price elasticity)? The supply assessment included data on the types of childcare services available (both public and pri- vate); their quality, cost, and accessibility; and the social perception and normative views around care and the use of the different available alternatives. Methodology included site visits, mixed-methods interviews, and, when appropriate, quantitative observational checklists. Core questions included the following: What does the supply of childcare look like? What is the number of providers, operating models, quality, and so on? What are the current fees, including as a percentage of working women’s income? Sou rce: Wor ld Bank 2 0 1 5 . Finally, there is the need to monitor the gap between de jure and de facto le- FINALLY, THE IMPACTS gal protections for women. Data are crit- OF COVID-19 NEED TO BE ical for guiding policy maker response ASSESSED AND ADDRESSED; on this issue. Does a gap exist between women’s legal rights on paper and what THE PANDEMIC WILL MAKE is observed in practice? If so, what is the THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES cause? Is it women’s lack of awareness of IDENTIFIED IN THIS REPORT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT the law and their rights, or of the process for redress? Is it an inability to afford to take legal action? Is it poorly written leg- islation? Are courts not enforcing regu- As this report was being finalized, the and Lebanon. By late July, Iraq had lations? COVID-19 pandemic hit the world, about 118,000 cases and 4,600 deaths. with different impacts on Iraq, Jordan, Jordan, which instituted an early and CHAPTER 5 . 177 severe lockdown, had about 1,180 cases ant to consider that the disruption of out of the labor market as the crisis hits. and 11 deaths. Lebanon had about 4,200 services with school closures can lead to In addition, women tend to be engaged cases and 55 deaths. All three countries, an increase in the burden of care-relat- in sectors that may be hit particularly however, suffered significant economic ed tasks—likely affecting girls more than hard (services) and in vulnerable forms shocks, compounded by a preexisting boys. After containment, it will be cru- of employment (such as domestic work). political, currency, and economic crisis cial to ensure that this disruption will not The fact that women were to a signif- in the case of Lebanon and a political cri- affect the ability of girls to stay engaged icant extent out of the labor market be- sis followed by an oil price shock in Iraq in education. A related problem could be fore COVID-19 implies that they are also (most of whose public revenue comes the pressure boys will experience to con- left out of formal social protection mea- from oil). tribute to family earnings: this pressure sures targeted to workers. It will be im- In Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, as in may lead them to drop out permanently portant, therefore, to consider targeting other countries, the gender differen- after containment—especially in light of cash transfer programs to the most vul- tial impacts of the pandemic will likely the anticipated scarcity of resources and nerable groups—including women-only be channeled through gender differ- earning of other family members. households (for example, single mothers ences that existed before COVID-19. The pandemic will most likely have with children, widows, or female farm- COVID-19 is expected to amplify those a negative effect on FLFP, which this re- ers) both as part of the emergency re- preexisting gender gaps in endowments, port shows was already very low before sponse and in the longer term. agency, and economic opportunities (De COVID-19. As documented, the greater The report also suggests an associa- Paz et al. 2020). Previous infectious dis- responsibility of women in Iraq, Jordan, tion between women’s exposure to GBV ease outbreaks have shown that women and Lebanon for care work had already and their inability to work for pay. De- and girls can be affected in particular resulted in a significant burden on their spite limited data on GBV in the three ways and, in some areas, face more nega- time before COVID-19. As a result of Mashreq countries, international ev- tive impacts than men. Across countries the outbreak, women will likely experi- idence suggests an increase in GBV globally, gender gaps will be affected ence a significant increase in that bur- (and its severity and frequency) due to differently depending on the context den. School closures and the increased confinement. Paired with difficulties of and specific characteristics of different number of sick people requiring care will service providers to ensure attention to groups of women before COVID-19. affect how women can use their time, and protection of victims, impunity for Because the pandemic is still evolv- further constraining their opportunities perpetrators may be on the rise. Inno- ing and its full effects are yet to be an- to work for pay. Even families with two vative solutions to provide reporting alyzed, understanding the specific and working adults prior to COVID-19 may mechanisms for women survivors and to multiple effects of COVID-19 is outside be confronted with the need to prioritize accommodate them and their children the scope of this report. Nonetheless, the the highest-paid job in the household— will be necessary. Social awareness will findings and policy implications high- often belonging to the man. Among be key, along with engaging informal lighted here become even more import- many households—and as document- support networks and health workers. ant. In the Mashreq countries, women ed in the data—the bias toward a male Not only is it important to be aware will likely be disproportionally affected breadwinner persists, and priority in in the short term of the differential roles across a number of dimensions. With times of scarcity of jobs tends to be given women and men will play in the efforts regard to education, it will be import- to men. Women are more likely to stay 178 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON to fight the crisis, but the pandemic also inclusion in (or return to) economic ac- suring access to care support—in con- makes the longer-term action identified tivity will play a central role. In this con- junction with incentives on the demand by this report even more urgent. The text, the recommendations in chapter 4 side—will be particularly necessary. In gender-related challenges that are likely become even more important: dedicated addition, support will need to consid- enhanced by the COVID-19 outbreak efforts will be needed not only to provide er differences between different groups and subsequent crisis will need to be ac- incentives to enter for those who were of women because some subgroups are knowledged and adequately addressed out of the labor force prior to COVID-19 expected to be particularly vulnerable to to safeguard recent improvements and but also to support the return to eco- the effects from COVID-19. Overall, the prevent a widening of existing gaps. nomic activity by those women who lost response to the pandemic will likely be With regard to labor force participation, their jobs during the pandemic. When more effective when taking into account specific programs to support women´s work outside the house resumes, en- the gender implications of COVID-19. CHAPTER 5 . 179 NOTES 57. Information from the European Institute for Gender Equality’s web page on “Gen- der Mainstreaming: Netherlands” (accessed March 25, 2020), https://eige.europa. eu/gender-mainstreaming/countries/netherlands. 58. Information on Spain in this section comes from the European Institute for Gen- der Equality’s web page on “Gender Mainstreaming: Spain” (accessed March 25, 2020), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/countries/spain. 59. For more information, view a March 6, 2015, discussion with Kim Hee-jung, Min- ister of Gender Equality and Family, titled “Q&A: How is South Korea closing the gender gap?” at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/qa-how-is-south-ko- rea-closing-the-gender-gap/. See also the Ministry’s website at http://www.mogef. go.kr/eng/pc/eng_pc_f002.do. 60. Even though the 2018 MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) includes infor- mation on information and communication technology assets, digital skills, and domestic violence and safety and security concerns. 180 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON REFERENCES Atamanov, A., S. M. Constant, and J. M. Lundvall. 2016.  “Lebanon Gender Note.” Unpublished manuscript, World Bank, Washington, D.C. Bjarnason, E., and Hauser C. 2018. “Iceland Makes Companies Prove They’re Not Paying Women Less.” New York Times, January 3, 2018. https://www.nytimes. com/2018/01/03/world/europe/iceland-equal-pay.html?_r=0. De Paz, C., M. Muller, A. M. Muñoz, and I. Gaddis. 2020. “Gender Dimensions of the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Policy Note, World Bank, Washington, DC. https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33622. Devercelli, A., and F. Beaton-Day. 2020. Better Jobs and Brighter Futures: Investing in Childcare to Build Human Capital. World Bank.He-rim, Jo. 2018. “Government to Increase Day Care Services for Elementary School Students.” Korea Herald, April 4, 2018. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180404000929. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2014. Women, Government and Policy Making in OECD Countries: Fostering Diversity for In- clusive Growth. Paris: OECD Publishing. Statistics Iceland. 2016. “Women’s Income from Work Was Less than 30% of Men’s 2015.” New Release, October 24, 2016, https://www.statice.is/publications/ news-archive/wages-and-income/unadjusted-gpg-2015/. World Economic Forum. 2020. Global Gender Gap Report 2020. Geneva: WEF. CHAPTER 5 . 181 APPEN 182 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON N DIX 183 APPENDIX A TA B L E A . 1 Selected development indicators, Mashreq countries and comparators Iraq Jordan Lebanon MENA LMICs UMICs World Labor force participation (% of female/male ages 15-64) Female 13.0 15.1 26.3 21.7 37.5 61.1 53.1 Male 75.5 67.4 76.3 77.2 79.9 81.3 80.3 Ratio of female to male % 17.3 22.3 34.5 28.1 47.0 75.1 66.1 Unemployment (% of female/male labor force) Female 12.3 23.0 9.8 17.7 5.1 6.1 5.4 Male 7.2 13.3 5.0 7.8 3.4 6.0 4.7 Ratio of female to male % 170.6 172.5 198.8 226.3 148.0 100.4 116.7 Ratio of female to male youth unemployment rate (% ages 15-24) 197.3 164.3 134.6 177.5 128.3 112.2 119.7 Employment by sectors (% of female/male employment) Female Wage employment 61.6 96.7 83.1 70.2 31.3 58.7 52.6 Own-account workers 24.1 1.3 10.0 12.4 42.3 24.3 27.7 Employers 3.2 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.7 Contributing family workers 11.0 0.4 5.2 15.8 25.0 15.1 18.0 Agriculture 23.6 1.1 15.7 21.8 44.6 19.1 27.6 Industry 7.7 15..4 9.8 12.4 15.4 23.0 16.9 Services 68.8 83.5 74.5 65.8 40.1 57.9 55.5 Male Wage employment 72.3 83.4 56.8 70.5 35.7 60.0 51.7 Own-account workers 21.6 9.5 28.1 20.4 52.8 31.0 38.1 Employers 3.3 6.7 11.7 5.8 3.2 4.4 3.7 Contributing family workers 2.8 0.5 3.4 3.3 8.3 4.7 6.4 Agriculture 18.1 3.9 11.0 15.8 37.7 23.5 28.7 Industry 26.0 26.6 26.2 29.9 24.8 29.3 26.8 Services 55.9 69.5 62.8 54.2 37.4 47.2 44.5 Year of employment data (modeled ILO estimates) 2018 2018 2018 2018 2018 2018 2018 Firms with female top manager (% of firms) 2.3 2.4 4.4 5.4 20.5 18.4 17.9 Year of firm data 2011 2013 2013 2018 2018 2018 2018 Account at a financial institution female (%age 15+) 19.5 26.6 32.9 38.0 53.0 69.3 64.8 Account at a financial institution male (%age 15+) 25.8 56.3 56.7 56.8 62.7 77.0 72.3 Year for data on account at financial institution 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 S ource: Wor ld Develop ment I n dic a t o rs. N ote : ILO = Int er nat i onal Labo ur Org a n iza t io n ; LM I C = lower-m iddl e - i nc o m e c o u nt r y ; M E NA = M i d d l e E a s t a nd No r t h Af r i c a ; UMI C = u pper-mi ddle-i nco m e c o unt ry. 184 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E A . 2 Selected labor indicators using household survey data, women ages 15–64 years Iraq Jordan Lebanon Education level Education level Education level Less than Some Less than Some Less than Some Total Tertiary Total Tertiary Total Tertiary secondary secondary secondary secondary secondary secondary Proportion of female by education 100.0 69.4 18.0 12.6 100.0 52.6 20.4 27.0 100.0 52.8 16.4 30.8 Female FLP 15.5 10.5 11.4 49.2 18.2 6.7 7.7 48.3 32.8 26.7 22.4 48.9 (adjusted) Female FLP 17.4 10.5 19.9 63.6 20.1 8.2 11.3 49.8 12.5 28.0 30.9 67.3 Proportion in full-time education 10.8 0.4 42.8 22.7 17.7 18.3 32.9 5.1 15.3 4.4 27.7 27.4 Proportion in rural areas 26.2 37.0 2.0 0.9 12.5 13.7 10.0 12.1 Female LFP in rural areas 15.5 14.1 20.9 60.5 20.5 9.5 6.6 55.2 Female LFP in urban areas 18.2 8.4 19.8 63.8 17.3 6.2 7.8 46.8 Of women in the labor force 100.0 46.9 13.2 39.9 100.0 19.4 8.6 71.9 100.0 43.1 11.2 45.8 Proportion in rural areas 27.6 49.7 14.3 6.1 14.6 19.5 8.7 14.0 Female Unemployment rate 36.5 33.9 50.4 34.9 36.8 39.1 27.3 37.3 12.5 10.3 18.8 13.1 Of women employed 100.0 48.8 10.3 40.9 100.0 19.0 9.9 71.1 100.0 44.1 10.4 45.5 Full time 36.8 35.5 51.2 34.6 70.4 58.1 77.2 72.8 80.0 89.9 78.2 70.9 Economic sector Agriculture 32.9 65.3 8.1 0.5 6.2 26.7 0.2 1.6 3.2 6.1 3.9 0.2 Manufacture 10.1 10.1 18.2 8.1 8.2 19.1 8.0 5.4 6.4 8.1 11.0 3.6 Services 57.0 24.6 73.7 91.5 85.6 54.2 91.8 93.1 90.4 85.8 85.1 96.1 Sector of employment public 60.2 29.4 74.8 93.3 45.8 26.0 36.9 52.4 12.2 1.2 20.9 20.9 private 39.3 70.5 23.7 6.0 52.7 73.9 62.8 45.6 87.1 98.3 79.1 78.0 othersec 0.5 0.1 1.6 0.7 1.5 0.1 0.3 2.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.1 Type of employment Wage employee 73.8 51.3 84.8 97.9 91.6 67.1 98.4 97.3 84.3 82.5 73.6 88.5 Self-employed 26.2 48.7 15.2 2.1 1.3 5.2 0 0.5 11.5 12.2 20.8 8.6 Employer 0.9 2.9 1.0 0.3 1.4 0.8 2.4 1.6 Unpaid* 3.0 5.2 1.2 0.8 6.2 24.9 0.7 1.9 2.9 4.5 3.2 1.3 Average household characteristics among all women Household size 8.3 9.3 6.0 6.0 5.3 5.5 5.5 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 Number of children 3.0 3.4 2.5 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 Number of elderly 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 Per capita household income/concume 202,657 179,995 225,710 294,858 8,300 7,262 8,239 10,115 S o urces : Wor ld B a nk s ta ff ca l cul a ti on s bas ed o n 2 0 1 1 /12 L eba no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey, 2012 Ira q H o u s e ho l d So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey, 2 0 1 6 J o rda n L a bo r M a rket Pa n el S urvey 2 0 1 6 . Not e: L F P = l a bor fo rce pa rti ci pat i on . * In Ira q, th e ca t ego ry “ unpa i d” workers refers t o a ll in div i dua l s w ho have d o ne a ny u np a i d wo r k d u r i ng t he p a s t 12 m o nt hs . It i nc l u d e s p e o p l e wh o a re a l s o c a tego ri z ed a s wa ge em pl oyee o r s elf- em- APPENDIX . pl oyed fo r oth er a c tiv i ti es do n e duri ng t he pa s t 12 mo nt hs . 185 TA B L E A . 3 186 Selected labor indicators using household survey data, men ages 15–64 Iraq Jordan Lebanon Education level Education level Education level Less than Some Less than Some Less than Some Total Tertiary Total Tertiary Total Tertiary secondary secondary secondary secondary secondary secondary Proportion of male by education 100,0 54,9 26,7 18,4 100,0 57,8 19,0 23,2 100,0 54,0 15,5 30,6 Male FLP 76,7 87,4 53,1 78,9 63,6 61,1 55,0 76,7 78,4 85,6 57,4 71,2 (adjusted) Male FLP 89,6 88,5 89,9 93,2 75,7 72,8 75,1 82,7 90,7 88,9 90,0 95,3 Proportion in full-time education Proportion in rural areas Male LFP in rural areas Male LFP in urban areas Of men in the labor force Male unemployment rate 14,1 16,7 10,3 9,2 13,8 15,6 8,4 13,3 6,5 6,4 5,4 7,4 Of men employed 100,0 60,7 19,3 20,0 100,0 54,4 17,5 28,2 100,0 59,1 13,4 27,5 Full time 0 86,1 85,1 85,8 86,4 88,2 92,9 88,5 83,6 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON Economic sector Agriculture 0 1,7 3,7 1,6 1,2 3,5 5,9 2,6 1,3 Manufacture 0 15,1 22,3 21,1 12,3 23,6 31,2 18,7 17,3 Services 0 83,2 74,0 77,3 86,5 73,0 63,0 78,7 81,4 Sector of employment public 0 41,3 36,9 46,2 46,7 15,1 11,9 24,4 17,3 private 0 57,2 62,0 52,8 50,6 84,3 87,3 75,3 82,2 othersec 0 1,5 1,1 1,0 2,7 0,6 0,8 0,3 0,5 Type of employment Wage employee 0 86,1 78,2 84,0 88,5 67,7 63,3 68,1 77,0 Self-employed 0 5,0 6,7 6,1 4,3 21,7 25,4 20,5 14,1 Employer 8,3 13,9 9,2 6,7 10,0 10,6 10,8 8,3 Unpaid* 0 0,6 1,1 0,8 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,5 So urc es : Worl d B an k s ta ff c a lc ul at i on s ba s ed o n 2 0 1 1/1 2 L eba no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey, 2012 Ira q H o u s e ho l d So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey, a n d 2 0 1 6 J o rda n L a bo r M a rket Pa n el S urvey 2 0 1 6 FIGURE A.1 Adjusted labor force participation rates for women ages 15–44, by different life events, Iraq a. Women in rural areas b. Women in urban areas 1 1 Labor force participation rate Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0 0 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-12 +13 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-12 +13 married children Age of youngest child married children Age of youngest child Source: Wor ld Bank st aff c a lc ulat io n s base o n 2 0 1 2 I ra q Ho u s e ho l d So c i o - E o no m i c Su r vey. Not e: Ad j u st ed p ar t i c ipat io n ra t e is t h e rat io of wo m en in t he l a b o r fo rc e ove r t he t ot a l p o p u l a t i o n exc l u d i ng t ho s e i n f u ll- t i m e e d u c a t i o n. FIGURE A.2 Employment rates for women ages 15–44, by different life events, Jordan b. Women’s employment, urban by education level a. Women’s employment, rural Labor force participation rate 1 1 Labor force participation rate 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.4 0 0.2 Never No 0-3 4-5 6-15 +16 0 married children Age of youngest child Never No 0-3 4-5 6-15 +16 married children Age of youngest child Tertiary Less than secondary Secondary Source: Wor ld Bank st aff c a lc ulat io n s based o n 2 0 1 1 / 1 2 Leb a no n H o u s e ho l d Bu d g et Su r vey. Not e: Ver t i cal li nes represent 9 5 perc ent c o nfiden c e int erva l . APPENDIX . 187 TA B L E A . 4 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender gap in logarithm of wages per month without and with correction for selection, Lebanon 2011 2) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 1) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition with correction for selection Men 6.75 Men 6.75 Women 6.65 Women 6.53 **difference 0.09 *difference 0.22 ***explained -0.17 ***explained -0.17 ***unexplained 0.26 ***unexplained 0.39 Explained ***education -0.19 ***education -0.19 Experience 0.01 Experience 0.00 *economic sector -0.02 *economic sector -0.02 ***hours of work 0.04 ***hours of work 0.04 Unexplained Education -0.02 Education -0.02 **experience 0.10 *experience 0.08 Economic sector 0.02 Economic sector 0.02 Hours of work -0.07 Hours of work -0.08 **constant 0.23 **constant 0.38 S ourc e: Wor ld Bank st aff c a lc ulat io n s based o n 2 0 1 1 Ho useh o ld B u d g et Su r vey. N ote: Ear ni ngs i nclu de wa g es a n d self-em ploy m ent in c o m e. I n divi d u a l s re p o r t i ng z e ro i nc o m e a re exc l u d e d f ro m c a l c u l a t i o ns . M i ll s ra t i o i s c a l c u l a ted o n the Prob i t model exp lai nin g fem ale part ic ipa t io n in wag e em ploy m e nt by a g e , m a r i t a l s t a t u s , a nd nu m b e r of c hi l d re n b e l ow s i x ye a rs o l d . * * * p <0. 01, ** p <0. 05, * p < 0 . 1 188 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E A . 5 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender gap in logarithm of employment earnings per month without and with correction for selection, Iraq 2013 2) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 1) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition with correction for selection Men 6.35 Men 6.36 Women 6.30 Women 6.18 **difference 0.06 *difference 0.18 ***explained -0.20 ***explained -0.16 ***unexplained 0.25 ***unexplained 0.34 Explained ***education -0.15 ***education -0.15 ***experience -0.06 ***experience -0.05 ***economic sector -0.06 **economic sector -0.05 ***hours of work 0.08 ***hours of work 0.09 Unexplained **education -0.04 Education 0.00 Experience -0.01 Experience 0.00 ***economic sector 0.094 ***economic sector 0.07 Hours of work -0.12 ***hours of work -0.18 ***constant 0.316 Constant 0.45 Sou rce: Wor ld Bank s t aff c a lc ulat io n s based o n I ra q Ho useh o l d So c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey 2012/ 13. Not e: Ear ni ngs i nclude wag es an d self-em ploy m ent in c o m e a nd net p rof i t . Ind i v i d u a l s re p o r t i ng z e ro i nc o m e a re exc l u d e d f ro m c a l c u l a t i o ns . Mi ll s ra ti o i s calculat ed on t he Pro bit m o del ex pla in in g fem ale part ic ipa t io n i n w a g e e m p l oy m e nt by a g e , m a r i t a l s t a t u s , a nd nu m b e r of c hi l d re n b e l ow s i x yea rs . *** p<0. 01, ** p <0. 05 , * p< 0 . 1 APPENDIX . 189 TA B L E A . 6 Female labor force participation Probit regressions, Iraq Iraq Less than secondary Secondary Tertiary [Marginal effects] Participation = 1 Participation = 1 Participation = 1 Household head 0.012 -0.169 -0.255 (0.034) (0.192) (0.234) Age difference with husband 0.002 0.001 0.005 (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) Married -0.029 -0.364*** -0.189* (0.021) (0.105) (0.105) Early married -0.034** -0.095 0.119 (0.015) (0.062) (0.169) Rural 0.073*** 0.132*** -0.132* (0.012) (0.049) (0.074) Disability -0.069* -0.405*** 0.108 (0.039) (0.141) (0.198) Number of children (base = no children) 1 child 0.014 -0.119 -0.021 (0.027) (0.105) (0.084) 2 children 0.032 -0.193* -0.096 (0.024) (0.102) (0.085) 3 or more children 0.015 -0.103 0.002 (0.017) (0.104) (0.075) Another female (age 15+) in the household not working -0.094*** 0.201* -0.278*** (0.036) (0.109) (0.101) Another female (age 15+) in the household (working) 0.058** -0.439*** 0.204 (0.025) (0.150) (0.153) Another male (age 15+) in the household not working -0.032*** 0.019 0.030 (0.012) (0.048) (0.060) Another male (age 15+) in the household -0.050 -0.108 -0.107 (0.050) (0.162) (0.138) Individual use of Internet -0.057 0.001 -0.003 (0.058) (0.078) (0.065) Chores hours -0.017*** -0.036*** -0.067*** (0.004) (0.012) (0.017) Children caring hours -0.019*** -0.044*** -0.046*** (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) Religious activities hours -0.018** -0.001 -0.060 (0.008) (0.029) (0.041) Nahiya paying for nursery 1.021** 1.652 -2.924** (0.441) (1.276) (1.482) Nahiya avg. time to workplace -0.013 -0.051 -0.001 (0.016) (0.089) (0.096) Nahiya avg sh of people walking to work -0.285 -0.158 0.038 (0.320) (1.750) (1.888) Nahiya avg sh of people taking public transport to work -0.254 -0.331 -0.048 (0.326) (1.803) (1.898) Nahiya avg sh of people taking private transport to work -0.227 0.099 0.542 (0.319) (1.783) (1.914) Nahiya female employment rate 0.735*** 0.990** 1.316* (0.094) (0.482) (0.685) Observations 6,325 744 633 S ource: Wor ld Bank st aff c a lc ulat io n s based o n I ra q Ho useh o ld S o c i o - E c o no m i c Su r vey 2012/ 13. N ote : Samp le i s women 15 t o 4 4 yea rs o ld c urrent ly n ot in sc h o o l . All m o d e l s c o nt ro l fo r a g e , a g e s q u a re d , g ove r no ra t e f i xe d ef fe c t s , a nd l o c a l u nem pl oy- me nt . Nahi ya i s t he su bdist ric t level . S t a n da rd erro rs a re in pa rent he s e s . Si g ni f i c a nc e l eve l s a re d e not e d a s fo ll ows : * p <0. 10 * * p <0. 05 * * * p <0. 0 1 . 190 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E A . 7 Female labor force participation Probit regressions, Jordan Jordan Less than secondary Secondary Tertiary [Marginal effects] Participation = 1 Participation = 1 Participation = 1 Household head 0.0155 0.0197 -0.0644 (0.0438) (0.0851) (0.0959) Age difference with husband -0.000743 -0.00628 -0.00658** (0.00141) (0.00386) (0.00260) Married -0.122* -0.176 -0.233** (0.0622) (0.162) (0.106) Age at first marriage 6.44e-06 0.00436 3.79e-05 (0.00202) (0.00487) (0.00407) Rural 0.0228 -0.0459 0.0219 (0.0145) (0.0300) (0.0280) Disability 0.00640   0.184 (0.0725)   (0.196) Number of children (base = no children) 1 child -0.0109 -0.0563 -0.0902** (0.0279) (0.0590) (0.0449) 2 children -0.0275 -0.0427 -0.133*** (0.0261) (0.0632) (0.0452) 3 or more children -0.0143 -0.110* -0.135*** (0.0238) (0.0583) (0.0482) Another female (age 15+) in the household not working 0.0686 0.113 0.0791 (0.0591) (0.135) (0.107) Another female (age 15+) in the household (working) -0.0317 -0.0279 -0.0743 (0.0572) (0.117) (0.0945) Another male (age 15+) in the household not working 0.0392* -0.0181 0.0856 (0.0219) (0.0641) (0.0676) Another male (age 15+) in the household -0.0369** -0.0790*** -0.0893*** (0.0149) (0.0294) (0.0284) Household has Internet 0.0713*** 0.0278 0.0847*** (0.0159) (0.0283) (0.0232) Household has car -0.00520 0.0241 0.0622*** (0.0125) (0.0256) (0.0228) Children caring hours 0.000513 0.000511 0.000242 (0.000434) (0.00108) (0.000780) Applied for a loan 0.145*** 0.0848 0.216*** (0.0533) (0.106) (0.0612) Household has savings 0.0702 0.160 0.0497 (0.0830) (0.127) (0.0574) Subdistrict female employment rate -0.00958 -0.263* 0.0192 (0.0792) (0.138) (0.179) Observations 2,528 720 1,801 Source: Wor ld Bank St a ff c alc ula t io n s ba sed o n Jo rdan La bo r M a r ket Pa ne l Su r vey 2016. Not e: Sample i s women 1 5 t o 4 4 yea rs o ld c urrent ly n ot in sc ho o l . All m o d e l s c o nt ro l fo r a g e , a g e s q u a re d , g ove r no ra t e f i xe d ef fe c t s , a nd l o c al un em pl oy- m ent . St and ard er rors a re in pa rent h eses. S ig n ific a n c e levels a re d e not e d a s fo ll ows : * p <0. 10 * * p <0. 05 * * * p <0. 01. APPENDIX . 191 TA B L E A . 8 Female labor force participation Probit regressions, Lebanon Lebanon Less than secondary Secondary Tertiary [Marginal effects] Participation = 1 Participation = 1 Participation = 1 Household head 0.144 0.071 -0.053 (0.113) (0.099) (0.109) Married -0.253*** -0.555*** -0.356*** (0.060) (0.087) (0.081) Age difference with husband 0.000 0.002 0.003 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) Disability -0.278*** -0.263* 0.132 (0.100) (0.152) (0.206) Number of children (base = no children) 1 child -0.033 -0.142* 0.087 (0.055) (0.083) (0.089) 2 children -0.088* -0.029 -0.031 (0.053) (0.097) (0.082) 3 or more children -0.127*** 0.014 -0.136 (0.044) (0.093) (0.093) Another female (age 15+) in the household (working) 0.136** -0.164 -0.067 (0.060) (0.102) (0.087) Another female (age 15+) in the household not working -0.148*** -0.019 0.010 (0.049) (0.092) (0.086) Another male (age 15+) in the household not working 0.017 -0.059 0.037 (0.032) (0.068) (0.046) Household has Internet 0.027 0.102 0.058 (0.056) (0.066) (0.044) Household has car 0.013 -0.146*** 0.096* (0.038) (0.055) (0.057) Household has motorbike -0.105 -0.028 -0.103 (0.100) (0.117) (0.102) Transportation (taxi, bus, minibus) is more than 10-min walk -0.007 -0.068 0.041 (0.035) (0.066) (0.049) Household receives remittances from abroad -0.120** -0.061 -0.002 (0.057) (0.091) (0.056) Household receives remittances from residents -0.061 0.049 -0.054 (0.048) (0.080) (0.105) Observations 1,085 273 537 S ourc e: Wor ld Bank st aff c alc ula t io n s ba sed o n Ho useh o ld B udg et Su r vey 2011. N ote: Samp le i s women 15 t o 4 4 years o ld c urrent ly n ot in sc h o o l . All m o d e l s c o nt ro l fo r a g e , a g e s q u a re d , re g i o n f i xe d ef fe c t s , a nd l o c a l u ne m p l oy m ent . S tand ard er rors are i n p arent h eses. S ig n ific an c e levels a re den ot e d a s fo ll ows : * p <0. 10 * * p <0. 05 * * * p <0. 01. 192 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON TA B L E A . 9 DHS participation regression results for ever-married women ages 15–44 years, Jordan Jordan DHS Less than secondary Secondary Tertiary [Marginal effects] Employed = 1 Employed = 1 Employed = 1 Household head 0.003 -0.014 -0.058 (0.049) (0.074) (0.084) Early marriage (before age 18) -0.029 -0.021 -0.018 (0.024) (0.039) (0.066) Age difference with husband (base = husband older by 0 to 4 years) Divorced/widowed/separated 0.104 0.756*** 0.283** (0.078) (0.091) (0.130) Husband older by 20+ years -0.098* -0.027 -0.067 (0.051) (0.058) (0.065) Husband older by 5 to 20 years -0.038 -0.010 0.013 (0.024) (0.030) (0.022) Older than husband -0.046 0.015 -0.024 (0.036) (0.054) (0.032) Number of children (base = no children) 1 child -0.002 0.096 0.017 (0.041) (0.071) (0.042) 2 children -0.062* 0.043 -0.006 (0.035) (0.065) (0.046) 3 or more children -0.069* 0.011 -0.043 (0.037) (0.048) (0.042) Rural -0.051** 0.009 -0.014 (0.023) (0.041) (0.019) Another female (age 15–49) in the household 0.157*** -0.013 0.197** (0.046) (0.090) (0.091) Another female (age 15–49) in the household (not working) -0.118** 0.048 -0.147 (0.054) (0.112) (0.099) Household has a has car/truck 0.060*** 0.009 0.053** (0.020) (0.031) (0.025) Has used Internet in the past -0.011 0.000 -0.001 (0.023) (0.034) (0.080) Owns a mobile telephone -0.073*** 0.077 0.078 (0.022) (0.056) (0.093) Has an account in a bank or other financial institution 0.155*** 0.043 0.253*** (0.025) (0.040) (0.026) APPENDIX . 193 Jordan DHS Less than secondary Secondary Tertiary [Marginal effects] Employed = 1 Employed = 1 Employed = 1 Own house alone or jointly -0.006 0.015 0.007 (0.049) (0.046) (0.033) Own land alone or jointly -0.066 -0.029 0.042 (0.072) (0.043) (0.037) Decide alone or jointly with husband/partner On own health care 0.021 0.136* 0.141** (0.032) (0.074) (0.070) Large purchases 0.008 0.177*** -0.004 (0.043) (0.067) (0.047) Visits to family/relatives 0.000 0.008 -0.025 (0.035) (0.059) (0.061) Husband’s earnings 0.033 -0.034 0.057* (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) Justified hitting/beating of wife by husband in some situations -0.014 -0.006 0.017 (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) Husband has some control issue -0.048** 0.006 0.016 (0.020) (0.036) (0.027) Domestic [current/last] spousal violence Any emotional violence 0.071** -0.005 -0.055 (0.030) (0.042) (0.034) Any physical violence -0.030 -0.073 0.020 (0.032) (0.053) (0.044) Any sexual violence 0.098*** 0.113* -0.005 (0.030) (0.060) (0.065) Subdistrict female employment rate (ages 15–49) 0.005** 0.007* 0.009*** (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) Observations 2,879 846 1.984 S ourc e: Wor ld Bank st aff c a lc ulat io n s based o n Jo rda n Dem o g ra phi c a nd H e a lt h Su r vey 2017. N ote: Samp le i s ever-married wo m en 1 5 t p 4 4 yea rs o ld selec t ed fo r d o m e s t i c v i o l e nc e m o d u l e a nd c u r re nt ly not i n s c ho o l . All m o d e l s c o nt ro l fo r a ge, a ge s quared, gover norat e fi xed effec t s, an d lo c al ( fem ale) un em ploy m e nt . St a nd a rd e r ro rs a re i n p a re nt he s e s . Si g ni f i c a nc e l eve l s a re d e not e d a s fo ll ows : * p< 0 .10 ** p<0. 05 *** p<0. 0 1 . 194 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON FIGURE A.3 Female labor force participation rates, by age cohort, selected economies Bangladesh participation rate 60 45.3 47.9 Labor force 35.1 40.6 40 37.5 39.7 22.4 26.1 27.6 26.7 20 12.3 8.6 - 15 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55 - 64 65 Age cohort 2012 2018 Iran, Islamic Rep. participation rate 30 26.9 23 Labor force 18.4 20 17.2 16 14.9 11.7 10.5 11.3 10 6 3.1 4.5 - 15 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55 - 64 65 Age cohort 1998 2005 West Bank and Gaza participation rate Labor force 40 22.4 23.3 20.5 20 15.2 15 14.3 15.9 8.2 8.1 6 2.5 4.7 - 15 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55 - 64 65 Age cohort 2002 2007 Turkey participation rate 47.1 47.1 Labor force 50 36.1 31.3 30 29 23.4 21.4 19.1 14.9 5.7 5.4 - 15 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55 - 64 65 Age cohort 2006 2018 Source: Int er nat i onal La bo ur Org an izat io n m o deled est im at es f ro m Wo r l d D eve l o p m e nt Ind i c a t o rs . APPENDIX . 195 FIGURE A.4 Female unemployment, selected economies, 1990–2018 50 45 40 35 Female unemployment (%) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 Maldives Bangladesh Turkey Iran, Islamic Rep. West Bank and Gaza S ource: Int er nat i onal L abo ur Org an izat io n m o deled est im at es fro m Wo r l d D eve l o p m e nt Ind i c a t o rs . 196 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON APPENDIX B To estimate the historic contribution of women’s participation in the labor market on economic growth, analysis for this report uses the World Bank’s JobStructure Tool.61 This note describes the methodology of the tool, the data and assumptions made for this report, and the modifications made to estimate the projected contribution to growth if women’s participation increased by five points in five years. The following description draws on the official documentation of the tool (World Bank 2019) highlighting the aspects modified for the purpose of the analysis in this report. The JobStructure tool uses the Shapley decomposition method to assess the contributions to per capita output growth62 to the growth in each of its four components: productivity, employment, economic participation, and labor force (the working-age population63). This approach and the tool have been used widely to produce jobs diagnostics for a range of developing countries (Merotto et al. 2018) The decomposition can be better seen by expressing per capita value added (Y/N = y) as Y — Y =— — E L A * *—*—=y =w*e*p*a=y • N E L A N where Y is total value added, N is total population, E is employment, L is labor force, A is working-age population, y is value added per capita, w is value added per worker, e is employment rate, p is participation rate, and a is working-age population share. Using the Shapley decomposition equation,64 the marginal contribution of changes in participation between times t0 and t1 would be p ∆yt0,t1 = αp (s,m) * [(wt0 et0 pt1 at0 ) — (wt0 et0 pt0 at0 ) + (wt1 et1 pt1 at1 ) — (wt1 et1 pt0 at1 ) + (wt1 et0 pt1 at0 ) — (wt1 et0 pt0 at0 ) + (wt0 et1 pt1 at0 ) — (wt0 et1 pt0 at0 ) + (wt0 et0 pt1 at1 ) — (wt0 et0 pt0 at1 ) + (wt1 et1 pt1 at0 ) — (wt1 et1 pt0 at0 ) • + (wt1 et0 pt1 at1 ) — (wt1 et0 pt0 at1 ) + (wt0 et1 pt1 at1 ) — (wt0 et1 pt0 at1 )] s! (m _ s _ 1)! where the weight for each term αp (s,m) is given by the formula αp (s,m) = m! , where s is the total number of variables other than p taken at t1 and m is the total number of variables (four in this case). When s = 0 or 3, αp (s,m) = 1/4 . When s = 1 or 2, αp (s,m) = 1/12. Simplifying and applying the parameters: p 1 [ ∆p αp (w e a ) + ∆p (w e a )] ∆yt0,t1 = — 4 t0 t0 t0 t1 t1 t1 1 [ ∆p (w e a ) + ∆p (w e a ) + ∆p (w e a ) + ∆p (w e a ) +— 12 t1 t0 t0 t0 t1 t0 t0 t0 t1 t1 t1 t0 • + ∆p (wt1 et0 at1 ) + ∆p (wt0 et0 at1 )] The aim of the analysis was to have a sense of the potential role of increasing female labor force participation (FLFP) for the country’s overall growth. We first used this methodology to estimate the historic (2000–17) contribution of FLFP.65 The JobStruc- ture Tool draws on historical employment and value added data from the World Development Indicators and population data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.66 The challenge for the analysis in this report is that the tool APPENDIX . 197 does not contain data to produce disaggregated analysis on a gender basis. In particular, estimates of gender-disaggregated value added per worker are not routinely produced and thus not available to estimate the contribution of FLFP on growth. We address this challenge by estimating female value added by weighting national value added by the share of female employment in the economy. Implicitly, this estimation assumes that productivity is constant across genders. An alternative would have been to adjust value added using the gender wage gap instead. In a context of gender wage discrimination, however, the wage gap would not be an accurate reflection of the productivity gap; hence, we opted for the aforementioned approach. In the context of the Mashreq countries, another issue with the aggregate data available within the tool is the inclusion of migrants in the population and value added figures. Because the analysis in this report is focused on the host country population only, it was important to net out the contribution of refugees from the estimates. We used the estimates from World Bank (forth- coming) to remove the contribution of the Syrian refugees from gross domestic product and population figures in Jordan and Lebanon. This adjustment was not deemed necessary for Iraq, given its much smaller influx of refugees. For the projection scenarios, we used the same methodology as in the JobStructure Tool but built our own Excel-based tool to carry out the estimates. Although the JobStructure Tool has the capacity to simulate various scenarios, it did not easily allow for changing the desired parameters to simulate the scenario in this report (that is, the growth effect given by a 1-percentage-point increase per year in the FLFP rate). For the projections, we also needed to make assumptions about the growth rate in population, productivity per worker, and employment rates. For the last two, we assumed that the growth rates remained as in the historical trends in each country.67 For the population projections in Iraq, we used the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs’s medium-fertility scenario projections. For Jordan and Lebanon, we opted not to use these projections because they refer to the total population in the country, including the large numbers of refugees currently living in those countries; moreover, we assumed that a significantly large number of Syrian refugees would return to their country of origin in a short time frame. As an imperfect alternative, we used the Iraq projected population growth rates and applied them to the net-of-refugees population numbers in Jordan and Lebanon. This assumption is less problematic in Jordan where the population structure before the refugee influx was relatively similar to that in Iraq. It could be more prone to error in Lebanon, where fertility rates are lower, and the structure of the population was narrower at the bottom. 198 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON NOTES For more information, see https://worldbankgroup.sharepoint.com/sites/Jobs/ 61. Pages/Jobs-Diagnostic-Tools--03182019-095113.aspx. 62. The tool also allows for calculation of the contributions of each economic sector (agriculture, industry, and services) to aggregate productivity and employment growth. For the purpose of this report, we use only the aggregate results. 63. The working-age population definition in the tool is people ages 15–64 years. 64. The idea of the Shapley value is to consider all possible sequences of variables that eliminate each of the variables that compose an index (in this case, per capita value added). 65. Growth rates are compound annual growth rates (CAGR). The results are expres- sed as a share of national value added growth, which we also estimated using the tool: Y t+T 1/T CAGR: g t,t+T = —1 Yt where, g t,t+T is the average growth rate in value added in the period between years t and t+T; Yt and Y t+T are value added in years t and t+T, respectively. 66. For more information on the United Nations Department of Economic and So- cial Affairs’ World Population Prospects 2017 revision, https://population.un.org/ wpp/. 67. We also simulated a scenario where the female employment rate and productivity per worker remained unchanged. APPENDIX . 199 REFERENCES Merotto, D., M. Weber, and R. Aterido. 2018. “Pathways to Better Jobs in IDA Coun- tries: Findings from Jobs Diagnostics.” Jobs Series, World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. 2019. “JobsStructure Tool Version 13-Nov-2019.” Documentation sheet, World Bank, Washington, DC. https://development-data-hub-s3-public. s3.amazonaws.com/ddhfiles/160361/jobstructure_tool.pdf. World Bank. Forthcoming. Syria Regional Economic and Social Impact Analysis. World Bank. 200 WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN IRAQ, JORDAN AND LEBANON