I..SJTls LSM -73 AUG. 1990 Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper No. 73 Shadow Wages and Peasant Family Labor Supply An Econometric Application to the Peruvian Sierra Hanan G. Jacoby LSMS Working Papers No. 4 Towards More Effective Measurement of Levels of Living, and Review of Work of the United Nations Statistical Office (UNSO) Related to Statistics of Levels of Living No. 5 Conducting Surveys in Developing Countries: Practical Problems and Experience in Brazil, Malaysia, and the Philippines No. 6 Household Survey Experience in Africa No. 7 Measurement of Welfare: Theory and Practical Guidelines No. 8 Employment Data for the lMeasurement of Living Standards No. 9 Income and Expenditure Surveys in Developing Countries: Sample Design and Execution No. 10 Reflections on the LSMS Group Meeting No. 11 Three Essays on a Sri Lanka Household Survey No. 12 The ECIEL Study of Household Income and Consumption in Urban Latin America: An Analytical History No.13 Nutrition and Health Status Indicators: Suggestions for Surveys of the Standard of Living in Developing Countries No. 14 Child Schooling and the Measurement of Living Standards No. 15 Measuring Health as a Component of Living Standards No. 16 Procedures for Collecting and Analyzing Mortality Data in LSMS No. 17 The Labor Market and Social Accounting: A Framework of Data Presentation No. 18 7ime Use Data and the Living Standards Measurement Study No. 19 The Conceptual Basis of Measures of Household Welfare and Their Implied Survey Data Requirements No. 20 Statistical Experimentation for Household Surveys: Two Case Studies of Hong Kong No. 21 The Collection of Price Data for the Measurement of Living Standards No.22 Household Expenditure Surveys: Some Methodological Issues No.23 Collecting Panel Data in Developing Countries: Does It Make Sense? No.24 Measuring and Analyzing Levels of Living in Developing Countries: An Annotated Questionnaire No.25 The Demand for Urban Housing in the Ivory Coast No.26 The C6te d'Ivoire Living Standards Survey: Design and Implementation No.27 The Role of Employment and Earnings in Analyzing Levels of Living: A General Methodology with Applications to Malaysia and Thailand No.28 Analysis of Household Expenditures No. 29 The Distribution of Welfare in Cote d'Ivoire in 1985 No. 30 Quality, Quantity, and Spatial Variation of Price: Estimating Price Elasticities from Cross-Sectional Data No.31 Financing the Health Sector in Peru No.32 Informal Sector, Labor Markets, and Returns to Education in Peru No.33 Wage Determinants in C6te d'Ivoire No.34 Guidelines for Adapting the LSMS Living Standards Questionnaires to Local Conditions No. 35 The Demand for Medical Care in Developing Countries: Quantity Rationing in Rural C6te d'Ivoire No.36 Labor Market Activity in C6te d'Ivoire and Peru No.37 Health Care Financing and the Demand for Medical Care No.38 Wage Determinants and School Attainment among Men in Peru No.39 The Allocation of Goods within the Household: Adults, Children, and Gender (List continues on the inside back cover) Shadow Wages and Peasant Family Labor Supply An Econometric Application to the Peruvian Sierra The Living Standards Measurement Study The Lving Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) was established by the World Bank in 1980 to explore ways of improving the type and quality of house- hold data collected by statistical offices in developing countries. Its goal is to foster increased use of household data as a basis for policy decisionmaking. Specifically, the L1MS is working to develop new methods to monitor progress in raising levels of living, to identify the consequences for households of past and proposed gov- ernment policies, and to improve communications between survey statisticians, an- alysts, and policymakers. The LSMS Working Paper series was started to disseminate intermediate prod- ucts from the LSMS. Publications in the series include critical surveys covering dif- ferent aspects of the LSMS data collection program and reports on improved methodologies for using Living Standards Survey (LsS) data. More recent publica- tions recommend specific survey, questionnaire, and data processing designs, and demonstrate the breadth of policy analysis that can be carried out using LSs data. LSMS Working Paper Number 73 Shadow Wages and Peasant Family Labor Supply An Econometric Application to the Peruvian Sierra Hanan G. Jacoby The World Bank Washington, D.C. Copyright © 1990 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing August 1990 To present the results of the Living Standards Measurement Study with the least possible delay, the typescript of this paper has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formal printed texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibility for errors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data induded in this publication and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. 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The complete backlist of publications from the World Bank is shown in the annual Index of Publications, which contains an alphabetical title list (with full ordering information) and indexes of subjects, authors, and countries and regions. The latest edition is available free of charge from the Publications Sales Unit, Department F, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A., or from Publications, The World Bank, 66, avenue d'Iena, 75116 Paris, France. ISSN: 02534517 Hanan G. Jacoby is assistant professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Rochester. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jacoby, Hanan. Shadow wages and peasant family labor supply: an econometric application to the Peruvian Sierra / Hanan G. Jacoby. p. cm.-(LSMS working paper, ISSN 0253-4517; no. 73) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8213-1637-0 1. Peasantry-Peru-Econometric models. 2. Self-employed-Peru- Econometric models. 3. Agricultural laborers-Peru-Supply and demand-Econometric models. 4. Agricultural wages-Peru- Econometric models. 5. Households-Peru-Econometric models. I. Title. II. Series. HD1531.P4J33 1990 331.12'5'0985-dc2O 9043877 CIP ABSTRACT A striking feature of developing economies is the large proportion of the work force that is self-employed. Lack of widespread labor market participation in the agricultural sector can pose a major obstacle to the empirical implementation of economic models of the peasant household, whether because wage data are simply not available, or because the assumptions required to make use of wage data stretch the bounds of credulity. This paper develops a methodology for estimating a structural labor supply model for primarily self-employed peasant households, which holds under a general agricultural technology and set of labor market conditions. The unique feature of the approach is that the opportunity cost of time, or shadow wage, of household workers is explicitly estimated from an agricultural production function and is subsequently used to identify a set of structural labor supply parameters. Recent household survey data form rural Peru is employed to estimate and perform various diagnostic tests on the model. The empirical findings lend support to the hypothesis that peasant households allocate their members' time as if to maximize a family utility function, aiid, moreover, demonstrate the tractability of the shadow wage methodology and its usefulness in estimating more elaborate time allocation models. v ACKNOWLEDGENENTS I wish to thank my thesis advisors James Heckman and Joe Hotz, and the Welfare and Human Resources Division of the World Bank for their support. vi INTRODUCTION I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . .1 II. The Theoretical Framework ....... . . ... 5 A. The basic recursive model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 B. A shadow wage model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 III. The Empirical Strategy . . ....... . 13 A. The estimating model and the stochastic environment .................. . 13 B. Identifying the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 IV. Estimation of the Agricultural Technology . . . . . . . . 17 A. The data .... . . . . . . . . . . . . i . . . . 17 B. Estimates of Cobb-Douglas production function . . .21 C. Estimates of a translog production function . . . . 25 V. Labor Supply Estimation .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 A. The specification of labor supply . . . . . . . . . 28 B. Labor supply estimates with the Cobb-Douglas technology .................. . 33 C. Labor supply estimates with the translog technology .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 VI. Conclusions .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 References .................. . 43 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations of Production Function Variables and Additional Instruments . . . . . 18 Table 2 Production Function Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Table 3 Tests of the Equality of Wages and Marginal Product for Labor Market Participants: Instrumental Variables Estimates .29 Table 4 Characteristics of Men and Women Working on Family Farms .31 Table 5 Estimates of Log-Linear Male and Female Labor Supply Functions .34 Table 6 Estimates of Labor Supply Parameters with Varying Instrument Sets and Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 vii I. INTRODUCTION A striking feature of developing economies is the typically large proportion of the work force that is not primarily engaged in wage labor. Self-employment is particularly pervasive in agriculture, where the dominant unit of production is the family farm. Lack of widespread labor market participation can pose a major obstacle to the empirical implementation of economic models of the peasant household. Such models are important in evaluating the effects of policies directed at this poorest segment of the population. Schooling, migration and fertility choices, and even the allocation of food among household members, are thought to depend upon current or future opportunity costs of time (see, e.g., Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977 and Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). For labor market participants this cost is just their wage rate, which is usually taken as exogenous to the individual in empirical studies. The absence of wages for the self-employed complicates even a basic study of their labor supply behavior, not to mention the estimation of more elaborate time allocation models. This paper develops a general methodology for estimating a structural labor supply model for an agricultural household whose members are self-employed, and applies it to household survey data from rural Peru, where self-employment is the norm. The unique feature of the approach is that the opportunity cost of time, or "shadow wage", of individuals working exclusively on their own farm is determined from within the household, rather than by market forces. The endogeneity of shadow wages is presumed to result either from the imperfect substitutability of various labor inputs in the production process, or from transaction costs or other frictions in rural labor markets. 1 Thus, the methodology proposed here is not burdened by the unpalatable assumptions of previous studies of the peasant household. The methodology is closely related to the treatment of labor supply with progressive income taxes (e.g., Hall 1973). A concave budget constraint, in the form of an agricultural production function, is "linearized" at the household's optimum to obtain a set of shadow wages for different workers. At the equilibrium point, the shadow wage of a particular type of worker is just the marginal product of their labor in agriculture. Along with equilibrium farm profits, these shadow wages map out the structural labor supply parameters of each worker. The empirical strategy, therefore, is to first estimate an agricultural production function, which has different types of labor (that of men, women, children and hired workers) as distinct inputs. Since this study focuses on the labor supply of men and women, the marginal product of their farm labor is calculated for each household. Using these marginal products in place of wages, labor supply functions for men and women are estimated which are comparable to those of the neoclassical family labor supply model (e.g., Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974). The set of restrictions on the parameters of these labor supply functions implied by utility theory are then tested. Rosenzweig [1980] is the only previous attempt to confront the neoclassical family labor supply model with data from a developing country. Under the assumption that the labor market in rural India is efficient, Rosenzweig uses the wages of men and women to estimate their joint supply of time to the market. One criticism of his approach is that in testing the signs of market wage elasticities, the controversial hypothesis of efficient rural labor markets is inevitably being tested along with the implications of 2 utility maximization. But, perhaps more seriously, labor market participation in rural India, especially among women, is quite limited. So, even if labor markets are efficient, more assumptions are required before sex-specific market wages can be equated to the opportunity cost of time of all men and women in the sample. Rosenzweig's model is essentially an elaboration on the highly influential consumer-producer agricultural household models exemplified in the studies by Lau, Lin and Yotopoulos [19781 and Barnum and Squire [1979]. The empirical tractability of these models derives from their invocation of the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, giving them a "recursive" property. The recursive property says that farm profit can be maximized independently of preferences, and utility can then be maximized taking profit as given. This two-stage maximization problem implies an aggregate labor supply function for the family that depends only on a single market wage and on farm profit, regardless of the household's position in the labor market. The cost of this convenience, however, beyond maintaining labor market efficiency, is that the labor of all family workers, and that of family and hired workers, must be assumed perfectly substitutable in agricultural production. Rosenzweig's model implicitly allows the labor of adult males and females to be imperfectly substitutable, but it still requires that perfect substitutes for the labor of these family workers be available on the market. A model of peasant family labor supply is called for that retains the structure and tractability of these recursive agricultural household models, but that eschews their stringent assumptions.1 An advantage of the proposed ILopez [1984] is the only previous attempt to estimate a nonrecursive 3 model is that the implications of utility theory and the hypothesis of efficient rural labor markets do not have to be tested jointly. In addition, labor is not restricted to be perfectly substitutable in agricultural production, allowing relative variation in the shadow wages (i.e., marginal products of labor) of different workers across households, so that the labor supply parameters of these different workers can be compared. Finally, with the present approach, pure income effects on labor supply can be obtained because farm profits capture the returns to quasi-fixed productive assets, such as land. In Rosenzweig's study no adequate measure of non-labor income for poor households is available. The next section of the paper fixes ideas by briefly spelling out the assumptions and implications of the standard recursive agricultural household model, before the more general shadow wage model is presented. In section III, the latter model is made operational and the identification issue is addressed. The next two sections report the empirical work, with the production function estimates in section IV and the labor supply estimates in section V. Conclusions drawn from this study appear in the final section. agricultural household model, where work on the family farm and market work are imperfectly substitutable in utility and production. His model is estimated using aggregate Canadian data and relies on some strong flnctional form assumptions, including constant returns to scale in production. Lopez ignores heterogeneity of labor by sex and age of worker. 4 II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The basic recursive model To understand the recursive nature of the agricultural household models most often found in the literature, consider the following schematic version. The household produces agricultural output, Y, according to the strictly d concave function F such that Y = F(L , A), where A is the fixed quantity of land and L is the total amount of labor employed (other variable inputs are ignored without loss of generality). Embodied in this production technology is the restriction that all types of labor are perfectly substitutable; i.e., the marginal rate of transformation between these inputs is unity. Normalizing the price of the consumption commodity, C, and setting it equal to that of farm output, and letting W be the market wage, the household's one-period budget constraint is written as (1) C = Y - W Ld + W LS = f + W Ls. where L is the family's supply of both on and off-farm labor and E is farm profit. Implicit in this constraint is the assumption that the price at which the household can hire labor is equivalent to the price at which it can sell 2All asset accumulation decisions are presumed to have been made at an earlier stage of the family's multi-stage budgeting process. 5 labor; i.e., the labor market is competitive and free of transactions costs. The single price of time, W, means that the leisure of various household members can be aggregated to form a Hicks composite commodity. Household utility can thus be expressed as a function of total family consumption and total family leisure, 2 = T - L , where T is the family's endowment of time. In addition, a vector of taste shifters Z is introduced so that utility is written as u=U(C,Y;Z). The familiar first order conditions for the household's utility maximization problem imply, (2a) U / Uc =W (2b) FL =W . Conditions (2a) and (2b) describe the standard neoclassical separation result or recursive property. The production, or labor demand, decision is determined solely by real factor costs (W), resource endowments (A), and the technology, entirely independently of preferences. Meanwhile, consumption depends on production only through the level of profits; that is, via the budget constraint. The recursive property becomes even clearer by setting up the equivalent two-stage maximization problem, (3) Tn(W, A) = Max [F(L , A) - W L] Ld Max U(C,T-L ) s.t. C = n* + W Ls. Ls Here the maximized level of farm profits, 1I , plays the role of nonlabor or property income in the pure consumer choice problem. 6 Solving the first order conditions yields explicit expressions for the demand and supply of labor as functions of the exogenous variables, d d (4) L =L (W, A) (5) L = L (W, EI , Z). Again, the essence of the recursive property is the absence of the taste shifters, Z, from the labor demand equation, and the fact that no variables from the production side of the model (fixed inputs or prices of variable inputs, if any) enter the labor supply equation separately. An equation based on (5) can be estimated straightforwardly by ordinary least squares, once the profit function has been estimated. Clearly, the assumption that labor is perfectly substitutable is extremely useful, since it means that in an efficient labor market the going wage is the price of time of all workers in the household, whether they are selling their labor or not. Recent work, however, has begun to question the homogeneity of labor in peasant agriculture. Deolalikar and Vijverberg [1987], for example, reject the hypothesis that family and hired labor are perfect substitutes in a production function using two different LDC data sets, and suggest that differences in the nature and timing of tasks performed or in work incentives may be at the root of the finding.3 3Laufer [1985] finds evidence of a division of labor between male and female workers in estimates of a flexible production function for different crops in rural India, indicating imperfect substitutability of family labor. 7 A shadow wage model This section considers a more general model in which there are two types of workers (e.g., male and females, as in Rosenzweig 1980) whose time inputs are imperfectly substitutable in production, and where hired labor is not a perfect substitute for family labor. Labor heterogeneity of t -i ' destroys the recursive property. Of course, even if perfect substitutes for each type of family worker are available for hire, transactions costs or other frictions in the labor market may drive a wedge between market wage rates and the marginal products of farm labor, and lead to a breakdown in recursiveness. The latter eventuality is explored empirically in section V. In what follows, the assumption of access to an efficient labor market is maintained, although it is important to understand that the analysis applies equally well to a household that is completely isolated from the labor market. With labor heterogeneity, the general form of the agricultural production function is Y = F(L1,L2,H1,H2,A), where H1 and H2 are the quantities of pac ,/h type of labor hired by the household at wage rates WH and W1, respectively.2 Each family worker (i=1,2) allocates Ti hours between work on the family farm (Li), work in the labor market (M,), housework (SI) and leisure (tI). Workers can choose not to participate in the labor market, so that M Z0, but if they I do participate they earn a wage Wi, which is not necessarily equal to Since off-farm wages W1 and W2 need not always move in unison, the family's leisure no longer forms a composite commodity, so that u = U(C, 21P 2; Z). 4Another interpretation of this inequality constraint is that, in a poorly functioning labor market, sometimes a worker is "rationed out"--unable to find any work off the farm at all at the going wage. 8 In Peru, for example, women who work on the family farm also spend a great deal of time in housework activities, such as cooking and cleaning (see table 4 below). To account for this phenomenon, a concave production function for housework services, Q, is postulated, of the form Q = t(Si, S2, I), where I is a vector of fixed characteristics which affect housework production. Each worker is presumed to engage in at least some housework, which is not produced jointly with farm output. It is also assumed that C and Q are perfect substitutes in utility (Gronau, 1977, makes an identical assumption), so that Q can be absorbed into the composite consumption good. Let r = C + eQ be this new composite commodity, where 6 is the marginal rate of substitution in utility between C and Q. The family is assumed to solve Max U( 11 2 Z) subject to C,Q,Li,9Mi.,SiH IH 1 1 1 111 2 1 C t' FLL29H1,H2,A) - WH1H - W2H2 + WlM1+ W2M2 Q = t(ZS1,S2,I) T .+ Li+ Mi+ S. and M.2 0 i=1,2. The corresponding Lagrangian is given by (7) U(C + eQ, T-L1-M --S1, T-L2-M2-S2 Z) + .5[F(L ,L H ,H A) -WHH 2WHC +W 1 2' 1' 2' 1 1 2 + W1M1+ W2M - C] + p[C(sivs2,I) - Q] + AI1 +XM U ( 2 wuL' ac2L 2tq bfAL>t L~(L where 8, yi and A. are Lagrange multipliers. Maximization of (7) yields (8a) U2i U= W + A /a = Wi i=1,2, 6>0 (8b) FLi W.i i=1,2 (8c) e4 = W. i=1,2 (8d) F i i=1,2 Hi 1 Equations (8a-c) show that the allocation of time to leisure, farm work and housework is determined by equating the returns to each activity in terms of the numeraire to what can be interpreted as a shadow wage, 1.i. When the individual participates in the labor market, so that AC=O, condition (8a) says that the shadow wage is just the off-farm wage. Otherwise, A i/ represents the amount of compensation above and beyond this market wage required to induce the individual to spend his or her marginal hour in market work or any other non-leisure activity. The shadow wage, defined by conditions (8a-c), is a function of Z, A, I and depends on the forms of the preference function and both of the household's technologies; i.e., it is endogenously determined. The violation of the recursive property brought about by the decision of various family members not to work off the farm leads to a household budget constraint that is generally nonlinear in the leisure goods. At the optimum, however, the gradient of the budget constraint is just the shadow wage vector {Wi}. Thus, at this point the constraint is linear. In particular, define full income at the household optimum by (9) A = n (W + T 2 ' where t 'W' f >vC'ttyj WS- C 10 - V\9 S 9 K- 1 1 = Max F( 1L H 1H 2A) < HH - 0), then immediately the recursive property breaks down. Although each labor supply function would still depend on the exogenous W1, they would also each depend on W2 and A, which are determined by preferences and the technology. When neither worker participates in the market, all the arguments of the labor supply functions are endogenous. To get standard comparative static results with respect to changes in the shadow wages, notice that the dual to the utility maximization problem, the constrained minimization of (10) with respect to t, £1 and £22 gives the expenditure function, A (W1, W , u). The Marshallian and Hicksian labor 1'2' supply functions can then be equated, (12) h.(W1* W2, u) = hI(w1, 2, A( u)) i,2 and differentiated with respect to the shadow wages to give the Slutsky equations for i=1,2 and j=1,2 (13) ahI/8Wj= ahI/88 j + (T- )8hIA. When the household cannot hire perfectly substitutable workers from the outside, it can be thought of as participating in "shadow markets" for the labor of its members. The household's net position in a particular shadow market, or its point of compensation, is just its own supply of that type of labor. Utility theory implies that when i=j the first term on the right hand 5Thus, if the family has several type 1 workers, say, the point of 12 side of (13), the compensated own wage effect, is unambiguously positive, and that the compensated cross wage effects are equal; i.e., h 1/8W21 = 8h2/8W1 | U. III. THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY The estimating model and the stochastic environment Labor supply functions (11) can be made operational by substituting the marginal product of farm labor for the corresponding shadow wage, using condition (8b), and by replacing full income with farm profits to give i= _' W~~*H 1- LJ (14) h h (FL, FL. ' (FL F W_); Z) i=1,2. Li' FLI, L2' 1. 2 Both the marginal products and farm profits are evaluated at the optimal--i.e., the observed--labor supply choices of each household. Note that in a sample containing part-time wage earners it may be desirable to use the market wage, when available, rather than the marginal product of farm labor in equation (14). But, before imposing the restriction that the marginal product equal the wage for these workers, that restriction should be tested (see below). The general empirical model consists of a production function and a pair compensation for each individual worker is the sum of the labor supply of all type 1 workers. Note also that the derivative of labor supply with ;espect to A could just as well be replaced by the derivative with respect to IT 13 IS - vA 94a 7tSQ5s of labor supply equations, (15) Y = [f(L1, L2, X, A, 13), £) (16) hi= gI(r, Z ', a'. uI) i=1,2 where r =(f fL, f - fL L -f L -P X) and where e and ui are the production and labor supply disturbances, respectively, X is the vector of variable inputs with prices Px, A are the fixed inputs, and 1 and 7i are the production and labor supply parameters, respectively. r contains the marginal products and farm profit expressions and depends, in particular, on Li and g. The functions 0 and gi permit either additive or multiplicative disturbances. The interpretation of the error term in an agricultural production function is an old question. Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze [1966] regard the disturbance (e.g., a weather shock) as orthogonal to the variable inputs, as long as it is not revealed to the farmer in advance of his input decision. If the shock is anticipated, or if the error contains unobservables, such as managerial ability, which are known to the household, simultaneity bias in the production function estimates could result. Although it is important to test for the presence of such bias, it should be noted that the endogeneity of the variable inputs is unrelated to the question of whether the underlying agricultural household model is recursive or not. Whereas nothing in the theoretical model says that £ is necessarily correlated with the regressors in the production function, that is certainly not the case of ui in the labor supply functions (16). These disturbances can be interpreted as unobserved differences in the preference for leisure. The 14 correlation between uI and the shadow wages is a direct consequence of the nonrecursive nature of the model. Thus, in order to get consistent estimates of the i., instruments must be found for the elements of r. Rather than estimate the system formed by (15) and (16) jointly, a more pragmatic two-step method is adopted. First the production function is estimated and r is calculated using the estimates of f. Then instrumental variable estimates of the labor supply parameters are obtained and their covariance matrices are adjusted for the fact that r is a function of pre-estimated regressors. Identifying the model Ideal instruments for variable inputs in a production function are the prices of those inputs. In the absence of such data, variables which proxy indirect costs (such as remoteness of the village or the degree of modernity) can be employed. Instruments for the family's own labor input are those variables which covary with the returns to other uses of time, such as housework and leisure; the housework inputs, I, and taste shifters, Z, are natural choices. In addition, the variation across households in the number of people working on the farm can be exploited. Given that the labor inputs of family 6If the production and labor supply disturbances are correlated, then greater efficiency might be achieved by employing a full-information estimation method (as in Lopez 1984). The difficulty is that even if the production function is linear in 3, and the labor supply functions are linear in TV the latter functions will generally not be linear in (13ti) The approach adopted here is similar to that used by MaCurdy and Pencavel [1986] in an entirely different context. 15 workers of a particular type are perfectly substitutable, output is just a function of the total labor input of each worker type. The number of wcorkers is obviously highly correlated with their total labor input. At the same time, if that number is a quasi-fixed asset of the household, It is uncorrelated with the disturbance in the production function. Thus, the number o farm workers of each type in the household should make excellent Instruments for their various f lab ns_ { cQ4>-& /V4i- 2 Interpreting the number of workers tegory as resource endowments of the household also allows them to be used as instruments fo r the marginal products or shadow wages in the labor supply functions. Intuitively, the presence of another adult male in the household should affect the labor supply of adult males only by lowering their marginal product and raisirg the family's profit from farming. If, however, demographic variables are also taste shifters, they cannot be legitimately excluded from the labor supply equation. Moreover, if the number of household members allocated to farmn work Is part of the short run labor supply decision, then using such variables as instruments may be inappropriate. The validity of these instruments is ultimately an empirical question, which can only be resolved by testing the overidentifying restrictions supplied by the theoretical model. Additional exclusion restrictions for the labor supply functions are the fixed farm inputs and characteristics, the effects of which should already be captured in the shadow wages and farm profits via the production function. Also, condition (8c), equating the marginal returns from housework to the shadow wage, implies that the housework production shifters, I, are valid instruments for the shadow wages. dX&2.ktil4Xw es ; , 6,( At&.AY ', :I I ° a~~~~L IV. ESTIMATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY The data The Peruvian Living Standards Survey (PLSS) was administered by the World Bank between 1985 and 1986 throughout the whole of Peru, and provides detailed information on the activities of about five thousand households and the time use of their members. Only households from the highlands region, or Sierra, that worked land and reported harvesting some crops are selected for this analysis. It is in the Sierra where most of Peru's subsistence farming is concentrated, and this region is ecologically distinct from both the coast and eastern jungle. Since this study focuses on the productivity and joint labor supply decisions of adult males and females, the final sample consists of the 1,034 households in which at least one adult male and female worked on the family farm (thus dropping about 500 agricultural households). Sample statistics are reported in table 1. Because most farm households in the Sierra grow several crops and raise livestock as well, and since data on all inputs (particularly labor and land) are not broken down by crop or activity, the different crop outputs are aggregated using the medians of their reported prices within each village as weights. Obtaining the value of output from livestock production (e.g., cattle or sheep herding) poses a problem because of the difficulty of measuring the appreciation in the value of the herd over the year. Thus, in what follows, livestock output is taken to be the sales of dairy, wool and other animal products, plus some fraction of the value of the household's 17 TABLE 1 DEFINITIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF PRODUCTION FUNCTION VARIABLES AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTS Standard Definition of production function variables Mean deviation Value of output Value of all crops harvested + 8885 553109 sales of animal by-products + .2 x value of livestock (see text) Land Land area in hectares, owned and 4.6 20 worked by the household, or rented or sharecropped Equipment Value of farm equipment 580 8880 Insecticide Expenditures on insecticide 71 215 Fertilizer Expenditures on fertilizer 142 567 Transportation Expenditures on transportation 66 342 Livestock Expenditures on livestock inputs 173 568 Hired labor (Days of labor hired + days received 292 1235 in labor exchange) x 10 Adult male Hours farm work, all male 2354 1491 labor household members, age>19 Adult female Hours farm work, females age>19 1940 1311 labor Teenager labor Hours farm work, ages 12-19 1050 1609 Child labor Hours farm work, ages 6-11 541 963 Farm animals Value of oxen, horses and mules 1541 3414 Irrigation Proportion of land irrigated .30 .40 Head's age Age of household head 48.1 13.5 Head's schooling Years schooling of head 2.9 2.9 Permanent crops? Dummy: 1 if had perennial .41 .49 (e.g., tree) crops (O otherwise) Harvest season? Dummy: 1 if interviewed during .23 .42 harvest season Planting season? Dummy: 1 if interviewed during .28 .45 planting season. Off-season? Dummy: 1 if interviewed between .25 .43 harvest and planting season North? Dummy: 1 if live in northern Sierra .21 .41 Central? Dummy: 1 if live in central Sierra .33 .47 18 TABLE 1--Continued Definition of additional instruments I. Household composition variables: Number of males age>19, females age>19, males 15