Patrick Barron Sana Jaffrey Blai r Palm er , 53358 Ash ut osh Va rshney -e I"'~KOUNI"' I TllEWO'ROIANK IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers Since 1998, Indonesia has been undergoing a momentous political and economic transition. The fall of the New Order, the economic crisis, and radical decentralization havechangedthepolitical,economicandsocialcontext.Withinthisnewcontext,power relations are in flux, identities are being renegotiated, and institutions are changing. Changes in incentives, and in the role of formal and informal institutions at various levels,havealteredthewaysinwhichindividualsandgroupsrelatetoeachotherand the state. Understanding this new context, and the ways in which various actors (nationalandinternational)canpromoteprogressivesocialchangeisimportant. TheIndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapersseriesaimstofurtherdiscussiononarange ofissuesrelatingtothecurrentsocialandpoliticalcontextinIndonesia,andtohelpin the generation of ideas on how democratic and peaceful transition can be supported. The series will cover a range of issues including conflict, development, corruption, governance,theroleofthesecuritysector,andsoon.Eachpaperpresentsresearchon a particular dimension of social development and offers pragmatic policy suggestions. Papers also attempt to assess the impact of various interventions--from local and national actors, as well as international development institutions--on preexisting contextsandprocessesofchange. Thepapersintheseriesareworksinprogress.Theemphasisisongeneratingdiscussion amongst different stakeholders--including government, civil society, and international institutions--rather than offering absolute conclusions. It is hoped that they will stimulatefurtherdiscussionsofthequestionstheyseektoanswer,thehypothesesthey test,andtherecommendationstheyprescribe. PatrickBarron(serieseditor) pbarron@worldbank.org UnderstandingViolentConflictin Indonesia AMixedMethodsApproach PatrickBarron SanaJaffrey BlairPalmer AshutoshVarshney December2009 IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.15 Papers in the Indonesian Social Development series are not formal publications of the World Bank. They are published informally and circulated to encourage discussion and comment between those interested in Indonesian development issues. The findings, interpretations, judgments,andconclusionsexpressedinthepaperarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbe attributedto:theWorldBankandaffiliatedorganizations;membersoftheWorldBank'sBoard ofExecutiveDirectorsorthegovernmentstheyrepresent;oranyofthefundingagencies. ThefullrangeofpublicationsassociatedwiththebroaderstudyoflocalconflictinIndonesia(of whichthisreportisaproduct)isavailableonlineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org. Emailaddressesforcorrespondence: pbarron@worldbank.org sjaffrey06@gmail.com palmerblair@gmail.com Ashutosh.Varshney@brown.edu Copiesofthispaperareavailablefrom: PNPMSupportFacility JalanDiponegoroNo.72 Jakarta10310Indonesia Tel:+62(0)213148175 Fax:+62(0)2131903090 Acknowledgements ThispaperprovidesanoutlineofthemethodologybeingusedfortheViolentConflictin Indonesia study. The research is funded through a grant from the World Bank's Post Conflict Fund. Additional funds have been provided by USAID, through the IRDSERASI program.ChrisWilsonandAdrianMorelprovidedsubstantiveinputsintotheresearch design.ThankstoBrunoBoccara,SamuelClark,PaulFrancis,MarkusKostner,Stephen Miller, Dave McRae, William Wallace, Alys Willman, Susan Wong and Matthew Zurstrassen(WorldBank),YuhkiTajima(UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside),SidneyJones (International Crisis Group), and Supryoga Hadi (Bappenas) for comments on earlier draftsofthispaper.Theviewsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandnotof theinstitutionstowhichtheyareaffiliatedorofanyofthefundingbodies. ThepaperispublishedsimultaneouslyasSocialDevelopmentPaperNo.117. i TABLEOFCONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................................................ i TABLEOFCONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. ii 1.INTRODUCTIONANDBACKGROUND................................................................................................... 1 1.1THEVIOLENTCONFLICTININDONESIASTUDY ................................................................................................. 3 1.2RESEARCHTOPICS ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Patterns,incidentsandimpactsofviolentconflict................................................................................ 4 Routineviolence .................................................................................................................................... 4 Escalationofviolence ............................................................................................................................ 4 Deescalationofviolence ...................................................................................................................... 5 2.ANOVERVIEWOFTHEMETHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 6 2.1UNDERSTANDINGVARIATION ...................................................................................................................... 6 2.2WHYAREWEUSINGMIXEDMETHODS? ...................................................................................................... 6 2.3HOWAREWEUSINGTHESEMETHODS?....................................................................................................... 7 Trackingtrends:establishingpatternsofvariance ............................................................................... 7 Nestedcasestudies:theorybuilding..................................................................................................... 8 Theorytesting ....................................................................................................................................... 9 2.4QUANTITATIVEDATA:THEVICISNEWSPAPERDATASET ................................................................................... 9 Phasesofthenewspaperstudy ........................................................................................................... 11 3.PATTERNS,FORMSANDIMPACTSOFVIOLENTCONFLICT ................................................................. 14 3.1AIMSANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS............................................................................................................... 14 4.ROUTINEVIOLENCE .......................................................................................................................... 16 4.1AIMSANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS............................................................................................................... 16 4.2RESEARCHMETHODS ............................................................................................................................... 17 4.3CASESELECTIONANDFIELDWORK .............................................................................................................. 18 Provinces ............................................................................................................................................. 19 Districtsorsubdistricts ....................................................................................................................... 19 Incidents .............................................................................................................................................. 20 4.4COMPARATIVEFRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................................... 20 5.ESCALATIONOFVIOLENCE ................................................................................................................ 22 5.1AIMSANDRESEARCHQUESTIONS............................................................................................................... 24 5.2RESEARCHMETHODS,CASESELECTIONANDFIELDWORK ................................................................................ 24 Hypothesisgeneration ........................................................................................................................ 24 Caseselectionandcomparativeframework ....................................................................................... 25 6.DEESCALATIONOFVIOLENCE........................................................................................................... 28 6.1AIMSANDQUESTIONS ............................................................................................................................. 30 6.2RESEARCHMETHODS ............................................................................................................................... 30 6.3CASESELECTION ..................................................................................................................................... 31 Comparingdifferentdeescalationpatterns ....................................................................................... 31 Comparinglevelsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings.............................................................. 32 Comparingformsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings ............................................................. 33 Withincasestudyanalysis .................................................................................................................. 34 6.4FIELDWORKANDANALYSIS........................................................................................................................ 35 6.5TESTINGTHETHEORYONDIFFERENTTYPESOFCASES .................................................................................... 36 ii 7.TESTINGOURHYPOTHESES:LINKSTOOTHERQUANTITATIVEDATA ................................................. 37 Social/demographicfactors ................................................................................................................ 37 Economicfactors ................................................................................................................................. 37 Institutionalfactors ............................................................................................................................. 38 8.AUDIENCEANDOUTPUTS ................................................................................................................. 39 8.1AUDIENCES ............................................................................................................................................ 39 8.2OUTPUTS .............................................................................................................................................. 40 Policybriefingnotes ............................................................................................................................ 40 Workingpapers,journalarticlesandbook ......................................................................................... 40 Conflictdataset ................................................................................................................................... 40 Workshopsandcapacitybuilding ....................................................................................................... 41 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 42 ANNEXA:CONCEPTSANDDEFINITIONS ............................................................................................... 46 ANNEXB:PROVINCESANDESTIMATEDDISTRIBUTIONOFMEDIASOURCES......................................... 47 ANNEXC:CODINGTEMPLATE............................................................................................................... 48 ANNEXD:EXPLANATIONOFCODES...................................................................................................... 49 iii 1.IntroductionandBackground ViolentconflictinIndonesiaisinneedofserioustheoreticalandpolicyattention.Anew belief that conflict has deescalated in Indonesia has crept into popular and policy circles.However,itisnotclearwhetherthemovementtowardsdeescalationiscyclical or permanent. Nor is it clear that newer forms of conflict will not erupt in Indonesia. Comparative theory and evidence indicate that violence often reappears in areas that previously had acute conflict. Theory also suggests that unless suitable institutions or policies are imaginatively devised and put in place, a multiethnic or multireligious societyisvulnerabletothepossibilityoflongrunviolentconflict.Acarefulexamination ofIndonesia'srecenthistoryofconflict,andformsandpatternspresenttoday,isvital for ascertaining current risks. As the Indonesian government and society seek to consolidatethedemocraticgainsofthepastdecade,understandingviolentconflictisof upmostimportance. Bynow,theliteratureonconflictinIndonesiaisquitesubstantialandmanyelementsof thestoryarereasonablyclear.1ThefallofSuhartowasaccompaniedbytheoutbreakof intense group violence in several parts of the country. As a result, and in dramatic contrast to studies of Indonesia during the late New Order when the literature emphasized order, stability and economic dynamism, conflict became an important concern in scholarly and policy circles. The literature that emerged has especially advanced our understanding of some largescale conflicts ­ in Aceh, Kalimantan, SulawesiandtheMalukus. Yet there are limitations to the existing research on Indonesian conflict. Four are particularlyworthyofnote.First,theIndonesianmaterialshaveremainedbyandlarge unincorporatedintothelargertheoreticalandmethodologicalliteratureonconflict.The scholarshiponethnocommunalconflicthasmadeenormousadvancesoverthelastten years,butIndonesiaplaysvirtuallynopartinthisscholarlyeffervescence.2Verylittleis known about Indonesia's conflict dynamics beyond a small circle of Indonesia specialists. Indonesia needs theory and, equally, conflict theory needs Indonesian materials. The conflict dynamics in Indonesia, among other things, are likely to have relevance for those multiethnic and/or multireligious societies that used to have authoritarian political orders and have of late gone through a democratic transition accompanied by considerable group violence. Nigeria, postCommunist Eastern and CentralEurope,andCentralAmericaeasilycometomind,butthelistcanbeexpanded. A creative engagement with theory and comparative experience nearly always illuminates uncharted dimensions of a problem, inaugurating newer ways of thinking and,insomeinstances,suggestingnewpolicyandprojectinterventions. 1 Although,forthemostpart,thepolicyimplicationsoftheexistingresearchareunclear. 2 Foranoverview,seeVarshney(2007,2008). 1 Second, the emphasis in the literature has been virtually entirely on the colossal episodes of collective violence, especially in the Malukus, in Central Sulawesi, and the May 1998 riots in Jakarta, as well as the war in Aceh. This focus is understandable in lightofhowhorrifictheseviolentepisodeswere.However,itresultsinseveralserious limitations. The literature has more or less ignored routine acts of violence, such as fights over land or vigilante justice, which appear to be common in some parts of Indonesia. These have not been systematically studied despite their potential policy importance. If these forms of violence cumulatively have serious human security impacts, or if they are a precursor to larger outbreaks of unrest, an important part of thepictureismissing.3 Third,themethodsbywhichthelargescalecasesofviolencehavebeenstudiedhave led to incomplete explanations. One stream has focused on the structural conditions that lead to, or allow for, violence. Books by Bertrand (2004), Sidel (2006) and van Klinken(2007a)alltakemultiplecasestudiesandlookforcommonalitiestodetermine causal factors. These scholars may well be right about the causes of violence, but without a comparison with peaceful cases, they cannot, in principle, be sure that the causesofviolencetheyhaveidentifiedareindeedtherightones.4Foracausaltheory to be right, it is not only important to identify what is common across the many episodes of violence, but it is also critical to demonstrate that the causal factors associated with violence are absent in peaceful cases.5 Studies based on the commonalityofoutcome(orunvaryingvaluesofthedependentvariable)cancertainly allowonetobuildatheory,butasKing,KeohaneandVerba(1994)haveargued,such studiescannotgiveusanadequatelyverifiedtheory.Forthat,weneedvariationinthe researchdesign.6 3 Therearesomeexceptions.Lynchingisperhapsthebeststudiedoftheformsofroutineviolence.See Welsh's(2008)analysisoflynchinginfourprovinces;Vel's(2001)onSumba,andHerriman's(2007)onthe `witchdoctor' killings in East Java. The edited volume by Colombijn and Lindblad (2002) contains some researchon`everyday'formsofviolence.TheWorldBank'sConflictandDevelopmentprogramhasalso analyzed `local conflict' in Lampung (Barron and Madden 2004; Tajima 2004), and Flores and East Java (Clark2005;BarronandSharpe2005,2008). 4 Oneothertypeofresearch­largenininspiration­oughttobenoted.Barronet.al.(2009)andMancini (2005)usesurveydatatodeterminefactorsassociatedwithconflictpropensity.Thissortofworkdoes covervariationinthedependentvariable,butasistrueoflargenworkingeneral,itisunabletoidentify themechanismsthroughwhichtheindependentanddependentvariablesmightbeconnected. 5 Wesaymoreonthislater.SeealsoVarshney(2007)andAspinall(2008). 6 Onthewhole,aresearchdesignbasedoncomparingsimilarepisodesisusefulintheorybuilding,notin theorytesting.Underonecondition,however,theorytestingisalsopossiblethroughthismethod.Ifa theoryisdeterministic,notprobabilistic,thenevenonecase,letaloneafew,whereviolencetakesplace intheabsenceoffactorsidentifiedwithviolence,isenoughtoinvalidatethetheory.KarlPopper'sfamous exampleisrelevanthere:anynumberofwhiteswansthatweobservewillnotprovethatallswansare white, but one black swan can prove that not all swans are white (Popper 2002). The Popperian observation,itshouldbenoted,doesnotapplytoprobabilistictheories,whichtheoriesofviolence,along with a lot of other social science arguments, tend to be. In a probabilistic scheme of things, one black swancouldsimplybeanoutlier. 2 Finally,thereisalmostnosystematicinformationavailableatallonthepost2003years of conflict ­ its forms, causes, and trajectories.7 Varshney et. al. (2008) have put together a database for the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) which records incidents of largescale violence for the period 19902003; BarronandSharpe(2005,2008)havecreatedadatasetonsmallscaleviolenceinFlores andpartsofEastJavafor20012003.Yetrelativelylittleinformationexistsonformsof conflictsince2003.8Thesedataarecriticalforunderstandingconflictanditsimpactsin Indonesia.Withthemassivedecentralizationinitiative,awholehostofnewinstitutions havecomeintoexistence,alteringthesites,groupincentivesanddynamicsofconflict.It is important, and a priority of the Indonesian government, to build an empirical base thatallowsforconsiderationofconflictpatternsandtrendsinthepostdecentralization era. 1.1TheViolentConflictinIndonesiaStudy The Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study (ViCIS) is a new World Bank project aimed at plugging gaps in the literature and adding to popular knowledge on violent conflict in Indonesia.ThestudyaimstohelptheGovernmentofIndonesiaandotherstoformulate programs and policies to promote peaceful development and effective violence prevention. It seeks to bring a marriage of Indonesian conflict materials with the comparative theories of ethnic and communal conflict; it focuses attention on the widespread routine violence in Indonesia; it explores, within a broad comparative framework, how small clashes are transformed into large episodes of violence; and it investigates the process of deescalation, asking whether Indonesian conflict de escalation is likely to represent a permanent decline, or if there is evidence to the contrary. Finally, it aims to put together a comprehensive database of violence, updating and deepening the UNSFIR dataset (Varshney et. al. 2008) to include local conflict,violentcrimeandconflictsince2003,usingaround100newspapersassources.9 Havingstartedinmid2008,theprojectwilllastforroughlythreeyears. 7 OneexceptionisthePotensiDesa(PODES)surveyconductedbytheGovernment'sBureauofStatistics. The2005surveycontainedaquestionontheincidenceandimpactsofconflict,forallIndonesianvillages. Whilethe2002PODESdatahasbeenused(Barronet.al.2009),noonehasyetanalyzedthe2005data. ThoughthescaleofthePODES(itisimplementedineveryvillageinIndonesia)isimpressive,thefactthat itcollectsdataatasinglepointintimepreventsanalysisofhowconflictevolvesovertime,andtheremay be reliability issues, given incentives for respondents (primarily Village Heads) to over or underreport conflict.Nevertheless,whereadvisable,wewillusethemostrecentPODESdatatosupplementourother datacollectionmethods. 8 Acehistheoneexception.Here,theWorldBankhasbeenmonitoringconflictincidentsreportedinlocal media since the tsunami (e.g. World Bank 2008). Some case evidence (e.g. van Klinken 2007b) and reportsbytheInternationalCrisisGroupalsoprovideinformation.Butthesehavenotcomparedcurrent conflict incidence and patterns with those in earlier periods, making it difficult to know how serious violenceistodaycomparedwiththatoftheimmediatepostSuhartoperiod. 9 SeeAnnexAfordefinitionsemployedinthestudy. 3 ViCIS builds upon and extends previous research conducted by the World Bank, other development agencies, and scholars on conflict in Indonesia. Since 2002, the Conflict and Development program of the World Bank has produced a number of studies on localconflictinIndonesiaanditsinteractionwithdevelopmentprojectsandprocesses.10 ThisresearchledtotheformulationofaprogramofsupporttotheAcehpeaceprocess, andhasalsoinfluencedthedesignandrefinementoftwolargegovernmentprograms funded in part through World Bank loans and credits: the KDP/PNPM community development program, which operates in every village in Indonesia, and the SPADA programwhichsupportslocalgovernanceanddevelopmentinIndonesia'spoorestand mostdisadvantagedareas.UNSFIR,withsupportfromtheUnitedNationsDevelopment Programme, created the conflict dataset discussed above. The new project will draw uponevidence,theoryandmethodologicaltechniquesdevelopedinthepriorwork,as wellasinsightsfromtheexistingliteratureonconflictinIndonesia,andwillcomplement thiswithfreshdatacollectionandcomparativeanalysis. 1.2ResearchTopics Theprojectwillhavefourmaincomponents:11 Patterns,incidentsandimpactsofviolentconflict ViCISwillprovidequantitativeevidenceontheformsofviolenceprevalentinIndonesia, their impacts, and how these have varied over time. This will also allow us to identify the geographic distribution of violent conflict, its forms and impact in different areas, andwillhelpanswerquestionsabouttheextenttowhichitisconcentratedinalimited numberofareasorisdistributedmorewidely. Routineviolence A major focus of the project will be on `routine' forms of violent conflict, such as lynchings,landconflicts,andlocalpoliticalviolence.ViCISwillhelpusmapwhichforms arethemostprominentinIndonesia,whattheircollectiveimpactsare,andwherethey are concentrated. Qualitative work will focus on establishing why levels and impacts varybetweenareas,andonunderstandingtheprocessesbywhichsmallscaleconflicts anddisputesacquireviolentforms. Escalationofviolence Theprojectwillprovidenewcomparativeevidenceonhowsmallscaleviolentconflicts escalateintolargeroutbreaksofmassviolence,andwhysomeareashavebeenproneto thiswhileotherhavenot. 10 Thisworkhasresultedinalargenumberoflocalcasestudies,includingin"nonconflictareas"(Barron andMadden2004),workondevelopingconflicttypologiesandconflictmappingtechniques(Barronand Sharpe 2005, 2008), and evaluations of the impacts of projects on local conflict (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock2006).Theseandotherpapersareavailableatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org 11 Fuller discussion of the research questions, and methods to be utilized, under each of these topics is giveninSectionsIIIVI. 4 Deescalationofviolence There has been little attention paid to forms and levels of violent conflict in the `postconflict'areasofIndonesia.ViCISwillprovideinsightsintohowformsofviolence evolve after largescale conflicts formally end, and why some areas become peaceful relatively quickly while in others sporadic violence continues. The analysis will help identify the extent to which these areas remain vulnerable to further outbreaks of violence, and the forms of intervention that can help ensure that peaceful conditions consolidate. 5 2.AnOverviewoftheMethodology 2.1UnderstandingVariation The study will combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. The fundamental premiseofourmethodologyisthatfiguringoutwhytherearevariationsintheoutcome of interest ­ namely, violence ­ is the one of best ways to understand the causes of violence.12 Suppose X represents violence and Y represents peace. With some exceptions, most explanations of violence have so far taken the following form: if transmigration (a), incomedifferentialsbetweentwoethnicorreligiouscommunities(b),anddemographic imbalances in the local military or police units (c) are present in X, they have been treatedasthecauses ofviolence. Methodological discussions ofthelast fifteenyears, inspiredbyKing,KeohaneandVerba(1994),havebynowclearlyestablishedthatthis sortofcausalreasoningisfallacious.Factors(a),(b)and(c)cancauseX,ifonecanshow that they are not present in Y, which represents peaceful cases. Conversely, if (a), (b) and(c)arepresentinbothXandY,butanotherfactor(d)ispresentonlyinY,notinX, then(d)willbethecauseofwhyXisdifferentfromY.13Wecannothaveconfidencein our theory of violence if we study only the violent cases. Rather, it requires studying appropriatelychosencasesofpeaceandviolence.14Thatisoneofthekeyimplications oftheprincipleofvariationforthestudyofconflict(Varshney2007).Weneedtoavoid `selectionbias'inqualitativeresearch. 2.2WhyAreWeUsingMixedMethods? Methodological arguments in the social sciences are increasingly headed towards the view that both quantitative and qualitative approaches have distinct utilities and limitations,anexclusiveuseofeitherapproachcanundulyconfinethescopeofanalysis, andideallythetwoshouldbecombined(Gerring2007).Largendatasets,forexample, typicallyallowtwokindsofanalyses:(a)identificationofbroadpatternsandtrends,and (b)establishmentofcorrelationsbetween`independent'and`dependent'variables.On the whole, if not always, largen datasets are unable to establish causality, whereas 12 Thoughadmittedlyitisnottheonlyway. 13 Assumingallelsethatmayberelevantisidentical. 14 However, we ought to note that the causal factors we consider in our study of variation must be significantinananalytical,notmechanical,sense.Takeanexample.Supposeinastudyofmurder,(a) standsformen,(b)forhatredbetweenthem,(c)foraknife,and(d)forhandcuffs.Furtherassumethat (d)ispresentinY(peace)butnotinX(murder).Ifwemechanicallyfollowthelogicoutlinedabove,the absence of handcuffs (factor d) could be viewed as the cause of violence. Rather, factor (d) should be viewed as the "cause" of violence only in the specific context where (a), (b), and (c) are also present. Thus,interventionstomitigateviolencemightneedtoaddress(a),(b),and(c),aswellas(d). 6 qualitativeresearch,bysystematicallylookingatwhicheventsledtoviolence(`process tracing'),allowsustoseparatecausesandeffects.15 Of course, there are conditions under which largen datasets can move beyond correlations.Theycanallow ustoassigncausality,ifgood`instrumentalvariables'can be identified. However, even under such conditions, we need qualitative case studies. Instrumentalvariablescangiveusagoodsenseofcausaleffects(whatistheeffectofX onY?),butnotofcausalmechanisms(howdidXcause,orleadto,Y?).16 Followingthisreasoning,theobjectiveofthequantitativeapproachinthisprojectwill be to generate a usable largen dataset, building on and supplementing existing datasets, which will allow for identification of trendsin conflict types,formsand their impacts. Based on the empirical results of the quantitative work, targeted qualitative studies will be carried out to determine the causes of the most frequent and high impactconflicts,andofdifferingpatternsofconflictescalationanddeescalation.17 Itshouldbenotedthatthereisanotherwaytoproceed.Sometimes,itissaidthatcase studies are good at theory building, not for theory testing, for which largen datasets mayberequired(Gerring2007).Ouruseofcasestudiesaboveisnotconceptualizedin thisvein.Asofnow,wedonotplantomovefromcasestudiestodatasets:ratherwe will proceed from datasets to case studies. Our contention above is that our largen dataset will establish patterns and case studies will establish causes underlying such trends. For example, it is possible that large episodes of violence are concentrated in cities,notvillages.Ifso,ourcasestudieswillbeaimedatsortingoutwhythisisso.18 2.3HowAreWeUsingTheseMethods? Trackingtrends:establishingpatternsofvariance Thelargendatabasewillenableustoobservepatternsofvarianceintheincidenceand impactsofconflictatmultiplelevels.Identificationofsuchpatternsisnotonlynecessary toanswertheresearchquestionsposedinthisstudybutalsohasseriousimplications for policymakers who need to identify areas and issues most vulnerable to violent conflict. 15 Thisisparticularlytrueforresearchonviolence,wherethedirectionofcausalitycanbeimpossibleto determine(seeBarronet.al.2009). 16 FordetailsseeGerring(2007,pp.4348).SeealsoGeorgeandBennett(2005). 17 Aseconduseofourdatasetisalsopossible.Wecantestwhethersomeexistingtheoriesinthelarger literature­forexample,theethnolinguisticfractionalization(ELF)argument­areapplicabletoIndonesia. Thisisnotthemainthrustofourproject,butifweareabletotestsomepreexistingtheoriesthisway,we certainlywill(seeSectionVII). 18 Wearesureaboutthisuseofourdataset,butweremainopentothealternativemethodologicalroute. Our case materials will inevitably generate some theories of violence. If the elements or factors they identifyascausescanbemeasuredwell,andifourdatasetalreadyhasrelevantinformation,wemayalso subjectourtheoriestoalargentheorytesting.Beforefiguringoutwhattheorieswillemerge,itishard tobecertainaboutwhetherwewillbeabletouseourlargenknowledgefortheorytesting. 7 First, we will consider spatial variation in the incidence and impacts of conflict. The design of the database will allow identification of patterns at the regional, provincial, district(ruralkabupatenandurbankotamadya)andsubdistrict(kecamatan)levels.We willbeabletoascertainwhichregions,provinces,districtsandsubdistrictshavebeen themajorsitesofviolence. Second,temporalvariationintheincidenceofconflictwillbetracedacrosstheeleven year period (19982008). This will allow us to understand which regions, provinces, districtsandsubdistrictshavemovedfrompeacetoviolence(andtowhatdegree)and viceversa. Third,wewillanalyzevariationinconflicttypes(religious,ethnic,resourceconflict,etc.) andforms(demonstrations,riots,lynching,etc)acrossregionsandacrosstime.Wewill thus know which forms and types of violence have been prevalent where, and how formsandtypeshavechangedindifferentpartsofthecountry. Nestedcasestudies:theorybuilding While the dataset will be used to identify trends of conflict in Indonesia, causes or causal mechanisms will be established by conducting targeted case studies based on patterns detected in the data.19 The project will adopt two case study approaches to determinethecausesofviolence. Thefirst,involvesmatchedcasecomparisons.Casesexhibitingdifferentlevelsofconflict (high, medium and low) in the dataset, or showing different patterns of conflict escalationanddeescalation,willbeselectedaftercontrollingforsomefactorsthatwe will identify later to detect causes or causal pathways. Comparisons will be made at multiple levels (regional, provincial and district level) to allow for the identification of causal mechanisms. It is entirely possible that different causes or mechanisms are at workatdifferentlevelsofthepolity.Thispossibilitycannotbetheoreticallyruledout. Thesecondentailslookingatwithincasevariation.Variationofviolencewithinasingle casewillbestudiedacrosstime.20Forexample,ifadistrictexhibitsanoveralltrendof highviolence but is not uniformly violent across time, the case study will be used to establish the mechanisms through which violence occurs at specific times in that particulardistrict.Forexample,weknowthatAmbonandPosousedtobepeacefuluntil horrific violence rocked the two cities in 1999. Over the last three years, Ambon has becomequitepeaceful,butPosohaswitnessedarecurringpatternofviolence,though 19 FurtherdiscussionofthequalitativecomponentsofthestudyisgiveninSectionsIVVI. 20 For the purposes of this study, we define a case as being a geographic area. For different types of analysis, cases will be at different levels ­ provinces, districts, subdistricts. Our choice for the unit of analysis will depend primarily on the level at which variation is observed. When we discuss withincase analysis,weprimarilymeanlookingattemporalvariationswithinasinglegeographicarea. 8 notatthesamelevelasinthe19992002period.Withincaseanalysiscanhelpidentify whyviolencelevelsmayhavechangedwithineachdistrictovertime. Theorytesting The main purpose of this study is to build theory in order to ascertain causal mechanisms. Process tracing based on case studies nested in the dataset will make possible.However,asdiscussedabove,wewillremainopentotheideathatourdataset may allow some preexisting hypotheses to be tested on a largen template. Such hypotheses may be based on Indonesiaspecific scholarship, or that emerging from elsewhere in the world. Depending on how good our newspaperbased dataset turns outtobe,theorytestinginthismannerisconceivable.21 2.4QuantitativeData:theViCISNewspaperDataset The main quantitative data source will be a comprehensive newspaper dataset that recordsallincidentsofconflict(violent andnonviolent)andviolentcrimereportedin localnewspapersfortwentytwoprovincesovertheperiod19982008.22Thedecision toemploythismethodologyhasbeentakenafterconsideringthelimitationsofseveral otheroptions.Householdsurveysareweakatmeasuringconflictincidenceandimpacts, as they tend to record perceptions of conflict and have a tendency to underreport because (violent) conflict is a generally rare event that does not affect all in a community. Key informant interviews, as used by the PODES survey, create perverse incentives to under or overreport conflict depending on the expectations about how thesurveyresultswillinfluencepolicydecisionsandresourceallocations(Barronet.al. 2009).Furthermore,surveymethodsrelyonthememoryofrespondentsandarehence lessreliableforrecordingthedetailsofolderincidentsofviolence,makingitdifficultto create time series data. A comparison of police, hospital and NGO sources with newspaperdataalsorevealsthatthereissystematicunderreportingofviolentimpacts, especiallyfatalities,aspoliceandhospitaldataonlyincludecasesthatarereportedto thepoliceorvictimswhoareadmittedtohospitals.23Furthermore,theserecordsdonot 21 SeethediscussioninSectionVII. 22 Fordefinitionsoftheconceptsofconflict,violence,andcrime,seeAnnexA.Foralistofprovinces,see AnnexB.Weincludeviolentcrimeinthedatabase,inadditiontoconflict(whichisourprimaryfocus),for threereasons.First,knowingwhetherthereisahighlevelofdeathsfromviolentcrimeisimportantin understandingthenethumansecurityimpactsofviolence.Studyingviolentconflictbutneglectingviolent crimewouldgiveapartialviewofsecurityimpacts.Second,violentcrimessometimesplayanimportant role in conflict escalation. Collecting data on violent crimes will thus allow us to study this aspect of escalation.Finally,thereisamethodologicalreason,inthatnewspaperreportsoftenmakeitdifficultto determinewhetheraviolentincidentwastheresultofaconflictoracrime.Attemptingtocaptureonly violentconflictcouldmeanexcludingtheseincidentsfromthedatabase,eventhoughitmayturnoutthat manysuchunclearincidentswereinfactconflict.Asaresult,wewishtoincludeallviolence(including whatappearstobecrime). 23 ApilotconductedinMalukuandNorthMalukucompareddeathsreportedbynewspapers,thepolice andhealthcareprovidersbetweenJanuaryandJune,2005.Itfoundthatnewspapersreported24deaths, policerecordedonlytwelve,UNIncidentTrackingfound17deaths,andtheMalukuInterfaithAssociation 9 contain the level of detail that would allow for a distinction to be made between incidentsofconflictandthoseofformsofviolentcrimesuchasassaultandarson. Incontrast,thenewspapermonitoringmethodologyhasbeenshowntobeeffectivein both high and low conflict regions (Barron and Sharpe 2005). UNSFIR showed that buildinganationaldatasetrecordingconflictsreportedinnewspaperswasbothpossible and useful. Since August 2005, the local newspaper methodology has been used to monitortheAcehpeaceprocess.Existingdatasetshaveexpandedourunderstandingof violenceinIndonesia.Yetgapsremain.ThenewViCISconflictdatasetwillbuildonprior effortsinanumberofways. First, the dataset will expand on current spatial and temporal coverage. The UNSFIR dataset contains data on conflict in fourteen provinces for 19902003. Data collected sincethenthroughWorldBankstudiesandpilotshavedevelopedmorecomprehensive methodologiesforrecordingconflictdatabuthavefocusedonasmallersetofregions for shorter time periods.24 The new ViCIS dataset will expand coverage by collecting data from 22 provinces, which cover 341 of Indonesia's 457 districts and 86% of Indonesia's population, and by collecting data from 1998 to 2008 (BPS 2007a, 2007b). ThiswillenableustotracetrendssinceUNSFIRacrossandwithinmoreregions. Second, a larger set of sources of data will be used. The first iteration of the UNSFIR dataset collected data from national Indonesian newspapers. UNSFIRII utilized provincial papers when it became clear that smaller conflict incidents were seriously underreportedinnationalnewspapers(Varshneyet.al.2008).Furtherstudies,primarily basedonsubprovinciallevelnewspapersinlowerconflictprovinces(BarronandSharpe 2005; Welsh 2008), demonstrate that provincial papers still miss certain forms of conflict:incidentsofroutineviolence,suchaslynchingandlanddisputes,arereported in district level newspapers, but often not in the provincial media. An emerging conclusion about the Indonesian newspapers as sources of conflict data is that at differentlevelsofcoverage,newspapersdifferintheirperceptionofwhichconflictsare newsworthy.Whilelargeepisodesofviolencearereportedbythenationalnewspapers, lynchingsarebettercoveredinthedistrictlevelnewspapers(Varshney2008).Ourstudy buildsonthesefindingsbyusinganestimated57districtlevelnewspapersinaddition to42provincialpapers.Thiswillprovideamoreaccuratecountofconflictincidentsand theirviolentimpacts.25 recordedonlyfourdeaths.HospitalrecordsrecordedonlyonedeathinAmbon,comparedwiththeseven reportedinnewspapers(forAmbon).Thelevelofunderreportingwasmostpronouncedoutsideofthe provincialcapital(Sharpe2005). 24 TheseincludetheKDPandCommunityNegotiationdataset(forFloresandpartsofEastJava;20012003 ­ see Barron and Sharpe 2008), a newspaper conflict monitoring pilot in Maluku and North Maluku provinces in 2005 (Sharpe 2005), and the Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates (2005ongoing ­ see, for example,WorldBank2008). 25 Fortheestimateddistributionofnewspapersacrossprovinces,seeAnnexB. 10 Third,thenewdatasetwillimproveonprioreffortsbyexpandingtherangeofincidents included, and by developing a more detailed coding system that allows for more extensive disaggregation of data. UNSFIRII, the most ambitious project to compile quantitative data on conflict in Indonesia to date, focused almost exclusively on large incidentsofcommunalviolence.Thenewdatasetwillalsoincludelocalviolentincidents betweenindividualsandformsofviolentcrime.Thecodingsystem,developedforour proposeddatabase,expandstheanalyticalcategoriesbyallowingdisaggregationofboth violent and nonviolent incidents, by conflict types (resource, administrative, religious, ethnic and political, etc.) and conflict forms (demonstrations, riots and group clashes, etc.). A broader classification of actors, interventions and impacts will enable us to capturedetailedinformationaboutconflictdynamicsinIndonesia.26 Phasesofthenewspaperstudy Whilenewspapersappearbethebestsourceofdataformappingconflictpatternsand trends in Indonesia, they are not without weaknesses. The study anticipates the followingproblemsandstrategiesbybreakingthedatacompilationprocessintothree stages. 1.Addressingbiases:mediaassessments Before selecting specific newspapers for data collection in each province, exhaustive media assessments will be carried out to profile existing provincial and district newspapers.Thestaffofnewspaperswillbeinterviewedtoassessthefollowing: · Coverage.Evenifweuseprovincialanddistrictlevelnewspapers,itislikelythatthe reporting coverage will be uneven across districts and subdistricts. By compiling informationaboutareaswhereeachnewspaperhaspermanentoffices,permanent reporting staff and freelance reporters, we will be able to: (a) select newspapers withthebestregionalcoveragefordatacollection;(b)supplantaweakercoverage paperwithothersinthatregion;and(c)identifythestrongandweakersectionsof ourdata,evenifanewspaperwithlimitedcoverageisselected. · Accuracyofreporting.Accuratereporting,especiallyasitpertainstoassessmentof impacts(deaths,injuriesandpropertydamage),iscrucialforthevalidityofourdata. Itislikelythatsomenewspapersdonotemphasizeaccuratecollectionoffactsprior topublicationofincidentreports.Gatheringinformationaboutnewspapers'sources ofinformationandtheirpolicyonfactchecking,willenableustoselectnewspapers withhighstandardsofreportingandtoestablishhowaccurateourdataislikelyto be. 26 Bertrand(2008)hasarguedthatexpandingtherangeofincidentsincludedwillleadtoalackofanalytic clarity,becausetheforcesdrivinglargescaleviolencewillprobablydifferfromthoseleadingtosmaller scale unrest. However, the coding categories employed mean that it will be possible to disaggregate different types of violence (largescale communal, localized, violent crime, etc.). This will allow for consideration of the different causal factors and processes that lead to different outcomes; it will also allowforBertrand'shypothesistobetested. 11 · Reporting biases and censorship. There is widespread consensus that the press in postSuharto Indonesia is relatively free. However, previous research shows that selfcensorship in editorial policy due to the SARA legacy of the New Order or to prevent conflict escalation,27 and `envelope' journalism, where newspapers are sponsored by certain local groups or individuals and become advocates of those parties,stillexist(BarronandSharpe2005).Assessingtheinstitutionalandpersonal biases in conflict reporting is vital for ascertaining the accuracy of the dataset. Extensive interviews with newspaper staff, eliciting responses about not only their ownreportingstandardsbutaboutthereputationsofotherpapersinanarea,will help us evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our data and how it can be analyzed.28 · Completionofarchives.Asidefromconductinginterviewstogaugetheaccuracyof reporting, the media assessment process will also obtain an accurate count of all existing archives in every province. By aggregating this information from the field, we will be able to: (a) select newspaper with the most complete archives for the elevenyearperiodofthestudy,and(b)identifypotentialgapsinourdatatohelp strategizehowtoovercomethem. 2.Datacollectionandcoding Datacollectionandcodingwillbethemostcrucialpartsofthequantitativestudy.Field teamswillcollectreportsofconflictandviolentcrimeincidentsfromlocalandprovincial newssourcesandsendthisrawdatatoJakarta.Astandardizedcodingtemplatewillbe completed for each reported incident and information about location, date, conflict type,form,actorsinvolved,andviolentimpactswillbecoded.29Thecodeddatawillbe subsequentlyenteredintoasearchabledatabase.Toensureaccuracyanduniformityof collectionandcoding,thefollowingmeasureshavebeentaken: · Training.Ateamofresearchershasgonethroughasixdaytrainingprogramtolearn theconceptsofviolentandnonviolentconflictandviolentcrime,asdefinedinthis study,andhowtomapandcollectdata.Aseparatetraininghasbeenconductedfor thecodingstafftoteachthemthenuancesofthecodingsystemdevelopedforthe ViCISdataset. · Qualitycontrol.Giventhatthedefinitionsofconflictandcrimeusedinthisstudyare complex, there are bound to be errors in the selection of articles in the field. We havedevelopedsystematicqualitycontrolproceduresthatwillenableustomonitor the number of mistakes being made in the field in real time, so these can be correctedonanongoingbasisandadditionaltrainingcanbeprovidedifnecessary. Procedures will also allow us to identify the newspapers and articles that were 27 On ethnocommunal issues, the New Order government had a socalled SARA policy. SARA was an acronym for ethnic (suku), religious (agama), racial (ras), and intergroup (antargolongan) differences. Thesedifferenceswerenottobediscussedinthepublicrealm. 28 For example, if a newspaper acts as a mouthpiece for a politician, it cannot be used for an accurate countofconflictsrelatedtoelections.However,itbutmaystillbeusefulforreportsonlynching,etc. 29 Forthecodingtemplateandanexplanationofthecodesused,seeAnnexesCandD. 12 subjected to quality control in the field so that they can be rechecked for the reliability of the quality control procedures themselves. Ten percent of coding templateswillberandomlycheckedforaccuracyanduniformity. 3.Testingtheaccuracyofcompileddata Afterthecompilationofthedatabase,thefinalaccuracyofourdatawillbetestedby: · CrosscheckingthedatawiththePODESsurvey; · ComparingcollecteddatawiththeUNSFIRIIdatabasefortheperiod19982003; · Checking and augmenting the newspaper data with other sources such as police reports,courtdocuments,andNGOreports; · Comparing the quantitative newspaper data with results of the qualitative case studies;and · Presentingresultstopeersforregularfeedback. 13 3.Patterns,FormsandImpactsofViolentConflict Aprimaryfocusofthestudyistodescribetheoverallpatternsandtrendsofviolencein Indonesia today, and over the past eleven years. This will address several of the key gaps in our understanding of violence in Indonesia. The newspaper database will providethemostcomprehensivequantitativedescriptiontodateofpatternsofviolence acrossregions,andtrendsinviolenceovertime. 3.1AimsandResearchQuestions Inthiscomponentofthestudywewillseektoansweranumberofquestions:30 1. What have been the cumulative impacts of violent conflict in postSuharto Indonesia?31 · Patternsoftemporalvariationinimpacts; · Patternsofspatialvariationinimpacts(inparticular,isthereaconcentration ofviolenceinasmallnumberofregions?) 2. Whichtypesofviolentconflicthavehadthelargestimpacts? · Patternsoftemporalvariationinthetypesthathavebeenthemostfrequent orhadthehighestimpacts; · Patterns of spatial variation in the types that have been most severe (in particular,whichtypesofviolencearesevereinwhichplaces?) 3. Whichtypesofviolencehavethelargestimpactperincident(i.e.themostfatalities perincident)? · Patternsoftemporalvariationinthemostdeadlytypes; · Patterns of spatial variation in the most deadly types (in particular, which typesofroutineviolencearedeadlyinwhichplaces?) 4. How does urban and rural violence differ? Do they have different impacts? Are theirformsdifferent?Aretheyequallydeadly? 5. Whichactorsaremostlikelytobeinvolvedinviolentconflicts,andinparticularin thedeadliestones?Aretherevariationsovertimeandspace? 6. Which weapons are used most frequently in violent conflicts, and in deadliest conflicts?Aretherevariationsovertimeandspace? 7. What are the variations in nonviolent conflict types and incidence? How is non violentconflictrelatedtoviolentconflict?Forexample,ifthereismorenonviolent conflict,istheregenerallymoreviolentconflictalso,orisittheotherwayaround? 30 The following list is not exhaustive. The database will also provide a host of other information (see templateandcodes,attachedinAnnexesCandD).Besidesbeingofusetothecurrentstudy,thedataset willbeavailableforusebyotherresearchers. 31 Asnotedearlier,thedatabaseprovidesinformationonimmediateimpactsofviolence,suchasdeaths, injuries,andpropertydamage,notonlongertermeconomicandpoliticaleffects,whichmaybestudied throughothermeans. 14 8. What are the gender dimensions of violence? For example, what is the role of womenasvictims,andasactors,inviolence?Arewomenspecialvictimsofspecific typesofviolence?32 9. Whoarethevictimsinthemostviolentormostdeadlytypesofviolence?Howdoes thisvaryovertimeandspace? 10.Which cleavages most commonly drive violent incidents ­ ethnic, religious, tribal, political,orindigenous/local? · Whichcleavagesarepresentinthedeadliestincidents? · DoesIndonesiahavewhatmightbecalleda`mastercleavage'liketheHindu Muslim cleavage in India, the MalayChinese cleavage in Malaysia, the SinhalaTamil cleavage in Sri Lanka, or the racial cleavage in the United States?33 32 Newspaperdatabasescannotgenerallyrevealmuchaboutformsofviolencesuchasrapeanddomestic violence, due to both underreporting and editorial priorities. Although we can not thus expect comprehensive or accurate data on violence against women from this database, it will provide some informationongenderaspectsofviolence,whichmaybefollowedupthroughqualitativework. 33 A`mastercleavage'isonewhich,forawholevarietyofhistoricalreasons,isaprimary,ifnottheonly, determinantofpoliticsandviolence. 15 4.RoutineViolence Routine violence is one of the most glaringly neglected aspects of the current scholarship.34 We define routine violence as: "frequently occurring forms of violence (such as the beating of suspected thieves, intervillage brawls, or fights over a plot of land) which are not part of a large or widespread conflict, and where the impacts of single incidents are typically low (less than five deaths)". Such incidents involve local actors struggling over local issues, rather than largescale mobilization by identity characteristics(suchasethnicity,religionorregion). Routine conflict does not have to be violent; it can take both nonviolent and violent forms.Examplesincludedemonstrations,protests,petitionsandgroupmobilization.On the whole, such expressions of grievance are quite healthy for a polity. Freedom of expressioninapluralisticsocietyisinevitablyaccompaniedbysuchlegitimatemodesof politics. These nonviolent forms should be separated from incidents of routine violence.Bothnonviolentandviolentroutineconflictsareimportantforunderstanding thedynamicsofviolenceinIndonesia. Thereareseveralimportantjustificationsforthestudyofroutineviolence.First,small butfrequentviolencecanexactabigtoll.Althoughfatalitiestendtobelimitedineach incident,thetotalnumberofthosekilledthroughroutineviolencecanbelarge,ifsuch episodes are common or frequent (Barron and Madden 2004; Barron et. al. 2009; Barron and Sharpe 2008; Welsh 2008; Tadjoeddin and Murshed 2007). Second, such smallscale violence has serious systemic consequences. If some regions of a country developatraditionoflynching­amobkillingasuspectedculpritinsteadofhandinghim over to the police or administration ­ it impedes the growth of the rule of law. Moreover,ifthefrequencyofsuchactsishigh,itdeadenspopularsensibilities,arguably creating greater acceptance of largescale violence as well. Finally, sometimes small incidents initiate a process that leads to huge conflagrations. Often, if not always, the starting point of a big episode of violence is a small clash between two groups or individuals. If we develop a better understanding of why small acts of violence occur, especially if such violence is frequent and widespread, and of which people or groups are in conflict in these forms of violence, we can perhaps generate a policyrelevant theory that can identify the institutions and strategies relevant to minimizing the occurrenceorlimitingtheeffectsofsuchviolence. 4.1AimsandResearchQuestions Thiscomponentofthestudywillseektoansweranumberofquestions: 1. WhataretheoverallimpactsofroutineviolenceinIndonesia? 34 Forexample,routineviolenceisnotafocusofattentioninthethreemostrecentbooklengthworkson groupconflictinIndonesia(Bertrand2004;Sidel2006;vanKlinken2007a). 16 2. Whichtypesofroutineviolencehavethegreatestimpactsacrossthecountry? 3. Which types of routine conflict most often become violent, and which types very rarelybecomeviolent? 4. HowdoesroutineviolencevaryacrossIndonesia? · Are there some provinces or districts which suffer much higher impacts than others?35 · Are these the same regions which also suffer from largescale violence, or are theseregionstypicallythoughtofas"lowconflictregions"? 5. Howdoesviolencevarybetweenurbanandruralcontexts?36 6. Howhasroutineviolencevariedovertime? · Aresomeformsincreasinglyprevalentnow? · Areothersonthedecrease? 7. Whydosomeareasexperiencehighlevelsofroutineviolencewhileothersdonot? 8. Whydosomeareasexperienceparticularformsofviolencewhileothersexperience differentforms? 9. Whydocasesofroutineconflictescalateintoviolenceinsomeplaces(andatsome times)andwhynotinotherplacesandatothertimes? 4.2ResearchMethods All but the last three of these questions can be answered through the newspaper dataset. The previous section described how the ViCIS database will provide detailed informationonthetypesandimpactsofviolenceinIndonesia,anditsgeographicand temporal variations. However, the database cannot tell us why these patterns vary across regions and across time periods, and why some types of routine conflict very often become violent while other types rarely do.37 No understanding of routine violenceinIndonesiawouldbecompletewithoutattemptingtounderstandvariationin time and space, and the transition from nonviolent conflict to violence. Insights into these questions will likely have significant policy implications, as Indonesia seeks to strengthen its peaceful democratic system in ways most appropriate to each local context. A series of qualitative case studies will be used to understand these `why' questions. Case studies will each focus on a particular type of routine violence, and will be 35 Regionalcomparisonsofviolentimpactswillbeconductedinbothabsoluteandpercapitaterms.Each hasitsownmeritsforanalyzingviolence. 36 Understanding differences between urbanandruralpatternsofviolenceisimportantfortheory,and for policy ­ especially as Indonesia becomes more urban, and given the ease of mobilization and escalation in urban environments, where heterogeneous communities compete over limited resources andoftenrelyheavilyonethnicnetworks. 37 Although comprehensive comparisons have not yet been carried out, several studies have indicated thatpatternsofroutineviolencedovarybetweenregions.Forinstance,lynchingsappeartobefarmore commonontheislandofJavathanelsewhereinIndonesia(Varshneyet.al.2008;Welsh2008).Similarly, BarronandSharpe(2008)showhowviolentlandconflictismuchmoreprominentinEastNusaTenggara provincethaninEastJava. 17 designedtounderstandvariationinitsimpactsacrossregions(and,laterinthestudy, overtimewithineachconflictcase).Casestudiesareneededforthereasonsdescribed above:largenworkcaneasilyidentifycorrelationsbutnotcausalmechanisms.Process tracingwithincasestudieswillthusbeusedtoidentifycausalmechanisms.Comparinga certain type of routine violence across locations will require obtaining information about local structural conditions (demographics, institutions, politics, and so on) that will not be provided by our newspaper database. Finally, we want to understand the transitionfromnonviolencetoviolence,butnonviolentepisodesarenotconsistently reported by newspapers. Qualitative work is thus needed to explore why routine conflicttakesdifferentformsandhasdifferentimpactsindifferentplaces. 4.3CaseSelectionandFieldwork Thefirststepistoselectwhichtypesofroutineviolencewillbestudied.Ourattention will focus on the three types of routine violence with the highest aggregate impacts across Indonesia. Based on the previous literature, we expect that types of routine violencesuchaslynchings,landconflicts,andgangfightsmaybeamongthosechosen. However,adecisiononwhichtypestostudywillbemadeafterthedatabaseproducesa clearerpictureofviolenceimpactsandforms. The next step is to select where we will conduct case studies. For each of the three types to be studied, nested case study comparison will be used, selecting provinces, districts,subdistricts,andindividualincidents.Figure1laysouttheplan.Thestrategy allowsforcomparativeanalysisatanumberoflevelstohelpidentifycausalprocessesat each. Figure1:CaseSelectionPrinciplesforStudyingRoutineViolence High Low PROVINCES violence violence DISTRICTS / High Low High Low SUB-DISTRICTS violence violence violence violence V V NV V NV V NV CASES V V NV V V NOTE:VrepresentsviolentandNVnonviolent. 18 Provinces First, two provinces will be chosen for each type of routine violence we are studying, one with a high level of impacts and one with a low level.38 Efforts will be made to controlforotherfactorsasfollows: · Levels of nonviolent conflict. Provinces will be chosen that have similar levels of nonviolent conflict of the type being studied. In the case of land conflicts, for example, this means that we would select two provinces with similar numbers of landconflicts,butwherethenumberofviolentlandconflictsismuchhigherinone. Inthecaseoflynching,suchidentificationwillnotbepossiblebecauselynchingsare by definition violent. Because of this, we will use proxy indicators for factors that tendtoleadtolynchings,suchasthepresenceoftheft,asabasisforselectingthe control areas. (We are aware that this may be particularly challenging, given that newspaperstendnottoreporttheftifitdoesnothaveaviolentimpactorwhenitis small in scale. Assuch, we will attempt to incorporate other data sources,such as policecrimedata,andlocalknowledge,todrivecaseselection). · Structuralfactors.Provincesselectedshouldnotdiffersubstantiallyacrossstructural factors (economic levels, education levels, etc.). Which factors are most important will be determined later, with consideration to the type of routine violence being studiedandthelikelihoodofstructuralfactorsbeingpertinenttoit. · Reportinglevels.Afterconductingthoroughassessmentsofmediacoverageineach province,wewill be able to ratethe coveragewhichour database providesofthe news in each province (see discussion above). It would be misleading to compare rates of violence in a province with minimal coverage to rates of violence in a province with excellent coverage. Thus in order to be confident of selecting provinceswithdifferentlevelsoflynchingviolence,theyshouldhavesimilarlevelsof reporting.39 Districtsorsubdistricts Fourdistrictsorsubdistricts40willbechosenforeachtypeofroutineviolence:twoin the `high violence' province and two in the `low violence' province. As with the provincialselection,thedistricts/subdistrictswillbechoseninsuchawaythatcontrols for exogenous factors that might affect the (reported) incidence of routine violence. Where possible, we plan to choose neighboring districts to control for higher level 38 By impacts here, as we have already stated, we primarily mean deaths. For certain types of routine violence, other kinds of direct impacts (injuries or property destruction) may be more prominent, and hence become a basis for selection. Other indirect impacts--such as effects on the economy, psychologicalimpacts,andsoon--willbeanalyzedinthecasestudies.However,thesecannotbeusedas abasisforcaseselectionbecausewedonothavequantitativedataonthem. 39 Mediaassessmentsconductedpriortonewspaperselectionwillenableustoidentifylevelsofdistrict reporting. 40 Whetherwechoosetocomparedistrictsorsubdistrictswilldependonwhereintraprovincialvariation is most marked. This decision will be taken later after we have analyzed the basic patterns of violence fromthenewspaperdataset. 19 factorsthatmaydrivevariation.Comparativeanalysisofthefourdistricts/subdistricts will help us tease out which of the factors leading to variation exist at the provincial level,andwhichatlowerlevelsofgeographicspecification. Incidents Particularincidentsofviolentandnonviolentconflict(VandNVinthefigureabove)will be chosen in each of the districts/subdistricts concerned. We will likely oversample violent cases.41 The number of incidents to be studied will be decided later based on resource issues and the insights coming from early case studies. Case histories will be developed by the researchteams. Withincase process tracing will help us understand why some became violent and others did not, and how these factors relate to the structuralconditionspresentineachplace. Inanalyzingeachincident,thefollowingresearchquestionswillbeuseful: · Whydidtheconflictbecomeviolent? · Whydidthepoliceorotheractorsnotpreventthisviolence? · Didthepolicearresttheperpetrators? · Howdolocalsperceivethiscaseandthewayitwashandled? · Whatstructuralfactorsareconnectedtothiscase? · Whoweretheactors,whowerethevictims? 4.4ComparativeFramework The comparative framework outlined in Figure 1 above will allow for a number of controlledcomparisonsincludingthefollowing: · Comparison between cases with similar outcomes (high levels of violence) but differentdistricts/subdistrictsconditions; · Comparison between cases with similar outcomes (high levels of violence) but differentprovincialconditions; · Comparisonsbetweenviolentandnonviolentcaseswithinhighviolenceareas; · Comparison of two districts/subdistricts (one high violence, one lower violence) withinhighorlowviolenceprovinces. Selection of provinces and districts/subdistricts will be guided by one additional consideration. If the database has shown that a number of provinces or districts/sub districts contain a particular concentration of violence, then efforts will be made to focusseveralofthecasesstudiesonthoseareas.Thatis,locationsformorethanone case study ­ perhaps, lynchings as well as land conflicts ­ will be selected from those 41 Withinthelowviolencedistrict/subdistrictinthelowviolenceprovince,wewillnotdoanycasestudies ofspecificincidents(violentornonviolent).However,fieldworkwillbeconductedtoseewhatstructural factorsmightbedrivingthelackofviolenceinthisarea. 20 regions.Thiswillenableustofocusextraattentiononthesehighviolenceplaces,across thevarioustypesofroutineviolence. Later in the data collection process (when earlier years of data are available), further case studies may examine temporal variation in routine violence within a particular geographicarea. 21 5.EscalationofViolence AnextensiveliteraturehasemergedonlargescaleviolenceinpostSuhartoIndonesia. However, we still do not have a good theory for why the small sparks of localized violence and tensions erupt into the large fires of intergroup collective violence. Developingsuchatheoryisimportantforunderstandingnotonlythedeadlyoutbreaks ofcommunalviolenceinthepast,butalso(a)thepotentialforsmallscaleconflictand routine violence elsewhere in the archipelago to escalate, and (b) the scope for intervention­bythegovernmentand/orcivilsociety.If,withtheaidoftheory,wecan understandhowtopreventsparksfrombecomingfires,perhapsonecanalsohopefor fewerandlessdeadlyviolentconflictsinthefuture. Intercommunal ethnic or religious violence in West and Central Kalimantan, the Malukus and Central Sulawesi, separatist conflicts in Aceh and Papua, and the Jakarta riotsofMay1998havereceivedthegreatestattentionofIndonesiaexperts.42Initially most analyses focused on individual cases with few attempts at crosscase analysis. More recently, three scholars (Bertrand 2004; Sidel 2006; van Klinken 2007a) have written books on the broader issue of violence in Indonesia, examining multiple conflicts.Crosscaseanalysishasbeenusedtodevelopframeworkstounderstandwhy different forms of conflict arose in different places at different times, concentrating largelyonsimilaritiesinstructuralconditionsthatpredatedtheoutbreakofwidespread violence. This new work has undoubtedly enhanced our understanding of the specific conflicts and has pointed to general systemic factors, all largely a product of Indonesia's post Suharto transition. Yet the books also have a number of weaknesses that need to be remedied. The greatest problem is methodological. None of these works is based on the idea of variationinresearchdesign.Allhaveconcentratedonlyonepisodesofviolence,mostly on largescale episodes, and none systematically compares why violence occurred in some places, not others. Bertrand (2004) studies violence in East Timor, the Malukus andKalimantan;Sidel(2006)focusesontheburningofChurchesinJavaintheearlyto mid1990s, the violence in Jakarta, and intercommunal conflict in the Malukus and Sulawesi;andvanKlinken(2007a)concentratesonriotsinKalimantan,theMalukusand 42 See,forexample:vanKlinken(2001)andWilson(2008)onMalukuandNorthMaluku;Acciaioli(2001), Aragon (2001) and McRae (2008) on Central Sulawesi; McGibbon (2004) on Papua; van Klinken (2000), Davidson(2008)andSmith(2005)onWestorCentralKalimantan;Aspinall(2006,forthcoming),Schulze (2004), Sukma (2004), Barron, Clark and Daud (2005), Reid (2006) on Aceh; and Siegel (1998), Purdey (2006) and Mietzner (2008) on the Jakarta riots. The reports of the International Crisis Group (ICG), availableatwww.crisisweb.org,havealsoilluminatedmanyoftheconflicts.Anumberofeditedvolumes have brought together pieces of conflicts, often drawing parallels with historical patterns of violence in Indonesia:see,Tornquist(2000),Anderson(2001);WesselandWimhofer(2001);ColombijnandLindblad (2002);HuskenandJonge(2002);Anwar,Bouvier,SmithandTol(2005)andCoppell(2006). 22 Sulawesi. Methodologically, the choice of areas in all three books are examples of `selectionbias'.Agoodtheoryrequiresshowingthatthefactorsidentifiedascausalin makingviolencepossibleweremissinginplacesthatdidnotexperienceviolence.43As discussed earlier, if we do not study peace and violence together, we cannot conclusivelyshowwhichfactorswerereallycausalinproducingeither.44 Threemoreshortfallsareworthnoting.TheseproblemsmarkBertrand(2004)andSidel (2006), but not van Klinken (2007a).45 First, the comparative work has not fully considered the processes of escalation, which turned existent social tensions into smallerscale acts of conflict to largescale episodes of violence. Second, the explanations have largely been structural, and hence often rather deterministic, focusing on demographic shifts, economic balance, and changing access to political power, and have underplayed the importance of the processes of mobilization. Third, there has been an overriding emphasis on macro explanations for the outbreak of violenceincertainlocalities.Bertrand(2004),forexample,concentratesondifferential groupaccesstopowerinJakarta,andtheirroleintheIndonesiannationandpolity,to explain why the Dayaks, Christians and Muslims rose up at certain points. This sort of approach can explain why violence gets clustered around certain periods (temporal variation), but it cannot help us understand why violence has geographically specific locations(spatialvariation).46 For understanding the latter, we need to pay attention to micro or local factors in explaining violence (Aspinall 2008; Varshney 2002, 2008). Too often in the Indonesian literature,locallevelconclusionshavebeendrawnfromnationallevelcrises.Unlessthe localnationallinksareclearlyestablished,suchcausalreasoningisflawed.Anational level crisis is, by definition, a constant for all localities, both violent and peaceful. It cannotexplainbothpeaceandviolence.Logically,aconstantcannotexplainvariation. 43 Van Klinken (2007a) does develop a `vulnerability index' in order to compare the provinces of high violencetootherprovinceswherelargescaleviolencedidnotbreakout.Heidentifiesfactorsofrapidde agrarianization and high dependence of the local economy on the state as important in differentiating highviolence and lowviolence provinces. However, the focus of the book is not on establishing how these factors led to violence through a comparison of dynamics in highviolence and lowviolence provinces,butrathertracingtheevolutionofviolenceinthehighviolenceprovinces. 44 Foramoredetaileddiscussion,seeVarshney(2008). 45 VanKlinken(2007a)doesconcentrateonescalation,processesandlocaldynamics,thethreepointswe makebelow.However,hisprimaryfocuswasnottoisolatecausalfactorsinordertodeveloppoliciesfor conflict mitigation, whereas this project does aim to do so. Van Klinken discussed one aspect of escalationforeachoffivebigconflicts:WesternKalimantan,CentralKalimantan,Maluku,NorthMaluku and Central Sulawesi. As a result, we learn how Indonesian violence supports Tilly and his colleagues' conceptual categorization of the dynamics of contentious politics (McAdam et. al. 2001), and how elementsofthattheorycanshedlightonunderstandingviolenceindifferentprovinces.Butthelackofa comparative framework (even within high violence locations) mitigates against generating a broader understandingofwhyescalationoccursinsomeplacesandnotinothers. 46 Bertrand(2008)agreeswiththispoint. 23 5.1AimsandResearchQuestions The second component of the study aims to develop and empirically test causal explanations as to why smallscale conflicts and tensions escalate into largescale violence in some cases and not in others. This can be used to increase our understanding of (a) why the large outbreaks of violence in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and theMalukusoccurred47;(b)howtheyescalated;(c)whatexplainstheirtiming,location, and the form they took; (d) the potential risk for escalation of local conflicts in other parts of Indonesia; and (e) potential areas for fruitful intervention by government, developmentagencies,civilsocietyandtheprivatesectortopreventfutureescalation of conflicts. Answers to these questions may also have applicability in conflictprone areasinothercountries. Theresearchquestionsareasfollows: 1. Givenlarge,systemicandsuddenshocks(suchasthefalloftheNewOrderandthe financialcrisis),howandwhydolocalconflictsescalateintolargeconflictsinsome places,andnotinothers?48 2. In the absence of large shocks, how and why do local conflicts escalate into large conflicts?49 3. How,andbywhom,aregroupsmobilized? 4. Inbothcontexts,whatexplainsvariationinincidence,timingandform? 5. What potential exists for the escalation of routine violence across Indonesia into largeconflicts,andwhichareasareparticularlyvulnerable? 6. Whatpoliciesandprojectscanhelppreventfutureescalation? 5.2ResearchMethods,CaseSelectionandFieldwork Hypothesisgeneration Given that more has been written on largescale violence in Indonesia than on local conflicts, a first step will be to commission a literature review of the existing studies. The studies of particular conflicts and some of the crosscase treatments cited above provide indepth chronologies, including of the actors involved, violence triggers and 47 Van Klinken (2007a) has studied all three of these conflicts. However, as discussed above, he has focusedoncommonalityofoutcomes(largescaleviolence),notoutcomevariation(violenceandpeace), asawaytobuildhisargument.Asaconsequence,wecannottesthisargumentwithhismaterialsalone, eveniftheargumentisright. 48 Weareinterestedinfourdifferenttypesofescalationhere:(a)escalationfromindividualtogroup contention;(b)escalationfromnonviolenttoviolentconflict;(c)escalationinimpacts;and(d)escalation ofconflictformsandtypes,wherelessseriouskindsofconflictchangeintomoredeadlyones(e.g.landto religiousconflict). 49 ThisisparticularlyimportanttounderstandgivenwhereIndonesiaisnow.Economically,Indonesiahas now fully recovered from the financial crisis (as measured in GDP per capita terms) and enjoys political stabilitynotseensincetheSuhartoera.Therecentglobalfinancialcrisiscouldbeanewshock,although currentpredictionsarethatIndonesiawillcontinuetogrowandpovertylevelswillcontinuetofall. 24 hypothesizes causes. From these, along with other studies of largescale violence, and especially riots, from around the world, we will distill hypotheses on potential factors andcausalmechanismsthatmaybeassociatedwithconflictescalation. Caseselectionandcomparativeframework Qualitative fieldwork will then be employed. The hypotheses will be developed and testedinanumberofways. First, we plan to conduct structured, controlled and indepth case comparisons of the sitesoflargescalerioting(suchasAmbon,Poso,Ternate,Sampit)withthosethathad very little violence (such as Manado, Palu and Yogyakarta). Controls will be specified later.Comparingthetwowillhelpelicitinformationonwhyviolenceescalatedinsome areasandnotinothers. Second, structured, controlled and indepth comparisons will be made of the sites of high violence (e.g. Ambon, Poso) with those that had medium levels of violence (i.e., locationswhereviolencerosebutdidnotescalatebeyondapoint,suchasMedan,Solo, Kupang,Lombok).Again,controlswillbespecifiedlater. Figure2showsthetypesofcomparisonsthatwillbemade.Therearethreehypothetical cases,consistingoflargescalerioting(suchasinAmbon),mediumscalerioting(suchas in Solo), and low violence (such as in Manado). The first kind of comparison involves comparing cases of largescale rioting (the top line) with cases of low violence (the bottom line) for the first three months on the graph. The second kind of comparison involves the next two months of the graph (from month 3 to 5), where the top line keepsrising,whilethemiddlelinebeginsdeclining. Figure2:Threedifferenttrajectoriesofviolence: largescaleriotingvs.mediumscaleriotingvs.lowviolence Large Scale Rioting Medium Scale Rioting Low Violence 60 50 Number of deaths 40 30 20 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months 25 The analyses above will help identify the structural differences between areas that experience largelevel conflict escalation and those that do not (or those experience escalation,butofalesserextent).However,suchanalyseswillnotinandoffthemselves identifythetriggersthatledtoconflicttoescalateatagivenpointintime.Athirdform of analysis will thus examine varying conflict patterns within a case. This can help identifytheturningpointsinconflicttrajectories.Forthis,thenewspaperdatasetwillbe used to map patterns of conflict over time within a given geographic area. From this, pointsofheightenedescalationcanbeidentified(seethearrowsinFigure3).Fieldwork willfocusonthesepointstoseewhatwashappening. Figure3:Withincaseanalysisofconflicttrajectories 45 40 35 30 Number of deaths 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months Crossareacomparisonofsuch`turningpoints'canthenhelpustoascertaintheextent towhichtherearecommonalitiesinthefactorsleadingtoheightenedescalation. Finally, some of some hypotheses derived from the literature and fieldwork can be testedstatistically.Theconflictdatasetweconstructwillcontaininformationonconflict outcomes (over time). It can also be used to understand how different incidents oi conflictrelatetoeachother­forexample,ifconflictsofacertaintype(e.g.alynching) atagivenpointoftimetendtobeassociatedwithconflictsofadifferenttype(e.g.an intergroupbrawl)atalaterpointintime­ 50andwillcontaininformationonprocess variables (how escalation began, how it did, or did not, rise beyond a point; which institutionsororganizationsintervenedtostopescalation,etc.). Other causal explanations may be more structural in nature, focusing on the social/demographic,economicorinstitutionalconditionsthattendtopredictdifferent 50 Doing such `process analysis' is exceptionally difficult within quantitative datasets, even where informationiscollectedcontinuouslyratherthanatseparatedpointsintime.However,wethinkwewill beabletodosomesuchanalysis.Separateconflictincidentswithinthedatabasewillbe`linked'toother conflict incidents through the generation of a `Conflict ID'. This should allow for some process tracing analysis. 26 patternsofconflictescalation.Thisdatawillnotbecapturedfromnewspapersbutwill be taken from surveys conducted by the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS) such as PODES,SUSENAS,andvariouscensuses.SectionVIIprovidesmoreinformationonhow suchstatisticaltestingcanbeconducted. 27 6.DeEscalationofViolence In Indonesia and beyond, there has been little consideration of processes of de escalationafterepisodesoflargescaleviolencehavetakenplace,oroftheconditions underwhichremainingtensionscanreescalateintonewoutbreaksofsevereviolence. Thefourthcomponentofthestudywillseektodeveloptheoryexplainingvariationsin thesuccessofpeacestabilizationinareasthatexperiencedmassiveunrest,thefactors thatexplainthereemergenceofviolentconflictinsomeareasandnotinothers,and why `postconflict' violence takes different forms in different areas. This will have implications for the design of postconflict programs and approaches in Indonesia and beyond. Areas that have experienced largescale outbreaks of violence are prone to the resurgenceofviolence.Collieretal.(2003)havedemonstratedthatthereisasignificant chance of violent conflict reemerging in areas where civil wars have formally ended, withinfiveyearsofwartermination.Thereareanumberofreasonsforthis:signinga peace settlement does not necessary mean that conflicting parties, who may still see advantages in a future reescalation of conflict, have fully `bought in' to peace; expectationsoverthebenefitsofpeacemaynotbemet;poorprogramsandpoliciesin postconflictsettingscancreateincentivesforpreviouslywarringpartiestopickuparms again.51 Conflicts also play a role in hardening identities and group cleavages, reconfiguringnormsregardingtheacceptabilityofviolenceinwaysthattakedecadesto overcome.Suchfactors,andothers,canleadtotheresumptionofwarinareaswhere peaceagreementshavebeensigned(Stedman,RothchildandCousens2002). `Postconflict' areas can also experience new forms of violence (e.g. Rogers 2007; ChauderyandSuhrke2008;Fortna2008).Insomecases,thehumansecurityimpactsof such violence can be as great as those experienced during the initial period of war (Muggah2009).InElSalvador,GuatemalaandNicaragua,forexample,homiciderates arenowhigherthantheywereduringtheconflictperiod(Waiselfisz2008).InIndonesia too, such `postconflict' forms of violence are also present. In Aceh, for example, the Helsinkipeaceagreementofficiallybroughttoanendathreedecadeconflictbetween theIndonesiangovernmentandGAM,arebelgroup.Yetwhilethepeaceprocesshasby andlargegonewell,therehavebeenrisinglevelsoflocalizedroutineviolencesincethe signingofthepeaceagreement(Figure4). 51 SeeMuggah(2009)foradiscussion. 28 52 Figure4:ViolentconflictsinAceh:January2005January2009 Source:Barron(2009) In Indonesia and elsewhere, relatively little is known about the forms of violence that emergeafterpeacesettlements.Thishasnegatedfromanunderstandingofthefactors that lead to violence reescalation. Most of the crosscountry quantitative analyses, which aim to give causal explanations resumption of war, have implicitly treated violenceasabinaryvariable:thelackofthereemergenceoffullscalecivilwarisseenas asuccess.Patternsofpostconflictviolenceareinherentlyimportantforunderstanding the potential for war or largescale violence to restart. Yet, they have not been adequatelyincorporatedintotheoriesforwhywarresumesinsomeplacesanddoesnot in others; Tilly's (1995) argument that understanding the `causes' of war and its reoccurrencearelessimportantthandevelopingdeeperunderstandingsofthenature ofpostwarviolencehas,toalargeextent,notbeentakenupbyresearchers. Further,therehasbeenrelativelylittlestudyofhowandwhyviolenceformsmorphin postconflict settings, and how this negatively impacts on human security and stability (even without reescalation to war or largescale violence). Variations in the levels or forms of postconflict violence that have not escalated to fullscale civil war are not considered.InIndonesia,thetreatmentsofthehighconflictareaswhereviolencehas seemingly subsided (the Malukus, Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and now Aceh) have focused on initial actions taken to end the conflicts such as the Helsinki agreement (Aceh)andtheMalinoaccords(PosoandMaluku).Noonetoourknowledgehassought tosystematicallycomparelevelsandformsofnewviolenceand/ortensionssincethese conflicts peaked. Little data (quantitative or qualitative) has been collected to permit 52 NotethattheHelsinkiMoUwassignedinAugust2005. 29 such comparisons. This lack of postconflict data makes it hard to analyze how conflict subsides,takesnewforms,and(potentially)reescalates. 6.1AimsandQuestions Thefourthpartofthestudywilllookatissuesrelatingtothedeescalationofconflictin areas that have been affected by large outbreaks of intercommunal violence in Indonesia.Thisinvolvesmappingoutlevelsofviolenceand/ortensionsforanumberof years after the larger conflict has ended and carrying out more indepth work to understandhowthesedifferentpatternsemerged.Theresultswillhaveimplicationsfor understanding preemptive and responsive conflict resolution strategies in postconflict settings, allowing for the generation of policy recommendations applicable in both conflictandpostconflictsettings. Thefollowingquestionswillbeaddressed: 1. What patterns of conflict emerge after largescale episodes of violence end, and howdothesechangeovertime? 2. Whatexplainsvariationintheincidenceandformsofpostconflictviolence?53 3. Howdopastpatternsofviolenceshapethepotentialforconflictreescalationdown theline? 4. What is the relationship between patterns of postconflict routine violence and patternsofdeescalation? 5. Has the deescalation of conflict in Indonesia acquired the properties of a permanent decline (a sustainable peace), or there is a real possibility of the reemergenceofviolenceinsomeareas? 6. What policies and strategies can consolidate peace in both the shortrun (the immediate period after agreements are signed or when conflict significantly de escalates)andinthelongerrunpostconflictperiod? 7. To what extent are patterns of deescalation similar in areas affected by intercommunalandseparatistviolence? 6.2ResearchMethods Quantitative and qualitative evidence will be used to answer these questions. The formerwillbeusedtoidentifypatterns.Thiscanthenbeusedtoselectcasesformore indepthfieldwork. 53 Thiswillincludeconsiderationofthedifferentaidinterventions,whichmayhavecontributedtoconflict deescalation(orwhichmayhavehelpedleadtonewviolence).Thisisparticularlyimportantwithinthe WorldBankgiventheemphasisondocumentinglessonslearnedondifferenttoolsforpostconflictareas (e.g.KostnerandJohnsonforthcoming).OtherworkunderthePCFgrantinvolvesevaluationstotestthe efficacyofreintegrationprogramsinPosoandAceh,conflictresolutiontraining,psychosocialprograms for traumatized conflict victims, and public information peacebuilding programs. Insights from these studieswillhelpinformouranalysis. 30 The quantitative dataset will be used to map violence by incidence, impact and form acrossthoseprovincesthatexperiencedhighlevelsofcommunalviolentconflictinthe postSuhartoperiod:Maluku,NorthMaluku,WestKalimantan,CentralKalimantan,and CentralSulawesi.54Thekeyperiodsofconcernaretheyearsofhighlevelviolenceand subsequent years. Importantly, both routine violence and largescale violence will be included(althoughtheywillbedisaggregated).55 Such mappings will help us select areas for comparative study. However, indepth fieldwork will be needed to understand causal factors that explain variation. For the escalation component of the study, many studies already exist, meaning that less fieldwork is necessary. In contrast, very little work on deescalation has been done whichfocusesonrecentyearsandthepresentday.Thus,itislikelythatteamswillneed tospendasubstantialamountoftimeinthefield. 6.3CaseSelection Caseswillbeselectedtoallowforanumberofdifferentcomparisonstobemade: · Variationsinlevelsandtemporalpatternsofdeescalation · Variationsintheextenttowhichnewformsofviolencearelinkedtooldconflictera forms · Variationsinthetypesofpostconflictviolencethatemerge Comparingdifferentdeescalationpatterns First,withinthesampleoffivepostconflictprovinces,wewilllookforvariationinlevels of deescalation. Such variation might be in aggregate levels (e.g. to a certain level of violence) or in patterns of deescalation (e.g. in the speed at which violence has de escalated).Figures5aand5billustrate.InFigure5a,districtAhasseenadeescalation of violence as has district B. However, the scale of such deescalation differs, being greaterindistrictB.InFigure5b,incontrast,bothdistrictAanddistrictBendupwitha similarlevelofviolence.However,thespeedofdeescalationdiffersbetweenthetwo, asdoestheextenttowhichitislinear,beingfasterandmorelinearindistrictB. 54 Aceh will be excluded from the initial analysis because of the different nature of conflict there. Likewise,ourfocuswillnotbeonotherareasthatexperiencedonlyshortrunviolence,suchasJakarta. 55 Inpractice,distinguishingbetweenlargescale("big")violenceandroutineorsmallscaleviolencewill notbesimple.Inmanypostconflictcontexts,newformsofviolencethatemergeareoftenlinked(directly orindirectly)totheinitialconflict.However,ourdatasetcontainsanumberofvariablesthatshouldallow ustoseparateroutineandlargescaleviolence,includingconflicttypes,actorsinvolved,andtheconflict cleavage. 31 Figure5aDifferentscaleofdeescalationintwodistrictsFigure5bDifferentspeedofdeescalationintwodistricts District A District B District A District B 60 60 50 50 Number of deaths Number of deaths 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months Months Comparingsuchcases--throughindepthfieldworkand,totheextentpossible,areview of the case literature--can help in the development of causal theories for why de escalationpatternsdiffer. Comparinglevelsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings We are also interested in the relationship between routine violence and forms of violencethatwereprevalentintheconflictperiod.Evenwhereaggregatelevelsofde escalation are similar across areas, varying forms of violence may emerge in different places. Some of these may have direct links to the forms of violence prevalent during theconflictperiod,whileothersmaybenew. The four hypothetical scenarios laid out in Figures 6ad illustrate. In each, the shaded space represents the trajectory of the original, largescale, violence, and the red line representsroutine, smallscale, violence. All four figures show steadily declining large scale violence, but four different trajectories in the evolution of routine violence. In Figure6a,routineviolencecontinues,unaffectedbythedeclineinlargescaleviolence. InFigure6b,bothlargescaleandroutineviolencedecline,atasimilarrate.InFigure6c, thetworatesofdeclinearedifferent,withroutineviolencetakinglongertodecline.In Figure 6d, largescale violence declines over time, but routine violence increases in its stead. 32 Figure6:Differentlevelsofroutinepostconflictviolence Figure6a Figure6b Large-scale violence Routine violence Large-scale violence Routine violence 35 35 30 30 25 25 Number of deaths Number of deaths 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months after end of conflict Months after end of conflict Figure6c Figure6d Large-scale violence Routine violence Large-scale violence Routine violence 35 35 30 30 25 25 Number of deaths Number of deaths 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months after end of conflict Months after end of conflict Comparingformsofroutineviolenceinpostconflictsettings Variationintheformsofpostconflictviolencepresentwillalsobeconsidered.Figures7a and 7b break down further the different forms of postconflict violence observable in two areas. In each, levels of violence remain similar but violence has taken different forms. Figure 7a shows a rise in vigilantism, while Figure 7b shows a rise in land conflicts. 33 Figure7a:RiseinvigilantisminpostconflictperiodFigure7b:Riseinlandconflictsinpostconflictperiod Total Violence Large - scale violence Total Violence Large -scale violence Land conflicts Vigilantism Land conflicts Vigilantism 60 60 50 50 Number of deaths Number of deaths 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months Months Withincasestudyanalysis Much can also be learned by looking at variations within cases in levels and forms of violence. The quantitative dataset will allow us to look for sharp rises and falls in violence over the postconflict period. In the qualitative cases, time will be spent identifyingreasonswhysuchrapidchangesoccurred. Our within case analysis will focus on comparing periods of conflict escalation with thosewhereconflicthasreescalated(afterinitialdropsinviolence).Figure8showsthe pattern of violence over time in a hypothetical district. Comparative analysis of two periods(markedwitharrows)withinthesameconflictcanhelpindeterminingwhether arecentperiodofviolencereescalationisaprecursortoafutureperiodofextended violence or whether the characteristics are different, with reescalation a temporary blip.Withincaseanalysiswillalsobeconductedforperiodsofconflictdeescalation. Figure8:Withincaseanalysisofdeescalation 45 40 35 Number of deaths 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Months 34 Finally, within case analysis will compare conditions after conflict deescalation with thosebeforetheoriginalperiodofviolence.Arethefactorswhich(wehypothesize)led to the initial violence missing or do they remain. (These will be identified in the component of the project on escalation). If these underlying factors remain, we can positthatviolencemayreemergeagaininthefuture? 6.4FieldworkandAnalysis Variation along these dimensions will be used to select a number of cases (to be decided)forcomparativeanalysis.Thelevelatwhichcasecomparisonswilltakeplace (province,districtorsubdistrict)willbedecidedafterweobtaininformationindicating thelevelatwhichvariationismostmarked(whichwillcomefromthedatabase).Ideally, wewillmatchcasesatmultiplelevels(provincial,district,subdistrict)tohelpteaseout thefactorsateachlevelthatcontributedtodifferentialtrajectories. Qualitative fieldwork will then be needed. As with the work on routine violence and escalation,structuredcomparisonswillbeemployed.Aftercasesareselected,indepth fieldworkwillthencarriedouttotrytoteaseoutthesourcesofthedifferentformsof variation.Whenthere,theywillfocusonanumberofissueswhichmayinclude:56 · Whatareinformants'(villagers,leaders,conflictactors,government,etc.)viewson whyviolencehasdeclined(ornot)? · How have conflict actors reorganized themselves? Are their former networks still strong?Towhatextentaretheiridentifies,andtheirpositionsincommunities,still definedbytheroletheyplayedintheconflict? · Whatrolehavegovernmentpoliciesandactionsplayed?Howdidlocalandnational governmentrespondtotheconflict,eitherdirectlyorinprovidingbelligerentswith positionsofpowerorresources? · Whatrolehaveaidandpeacebuildingeffortsplayed?Howhavetheycontributedto limiting/triggeringrenewedviolence? · What preexisting social networks exist? What crosscutting relationships and institutionsexistedbeforetheperiodoflargescaleviolentconflict,howwerethey affectedbytheviolence,andhowhavetheybeenreconstituted(ornot)? 56 Other focus areas will be identified once the quantitative data is in. This will allow us to develop hypothesesthatcanbetestedduringthefieldwork.Relevantliteraturesthatmayalsohelpinhypothesis formulationincludethatonsocialmovements(e.g.Tarrow1994),sourcesofrevolution(Wolf1969;Scott 1976; Skopkal 1994); the security dilemma (Posen 1993); the organization of violence and rebel movements(Kalyvas2006;Weinstein2007);institutionalorganization(e.g.North1990;Fukuyama2004); and broader work on the political economy of democratic transitions (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Bates2001). 35 6.5TestingtheTheoryonDifferentTypesofCases Theanalysisabovewillhelpgeneratetheoryonwhyviolencedeescalatesindifferent waysandwhatconditionsmakeforsustainablepeaceinpostconflictareas.Oursampled provinces were all sites of largescale intercommunal violence. To what extent do the same factors and dynamics that lead to deescalation and sustainable peace in these areasleadtosimilar outcomesin areasthathaveexperiencedothertypesofextreme violence? Thisquestionhasparticulartheoreticalrelevance.Inmuchoftheliteratureitisassumed thatresumptionofintercommunalviolencehasverydifferentcausestothosethatlead torenewedviolenceagainstthestate.57Thissoundsplausible,butisittrue?Weplan toapplysomeofthehypothesesgeneratedfromtheanalysisabovetothecaseofAceh, whereconflictbetweenasecessionistmovementandtheIndonesianstateledtoover 15,000 deaths. The method and analytical steps will be similar to those above. The quantitativedatasetwillidentifypatternsofpostconflictviolencebyareawithinAceh. We will then look for variation in current violence levels, and in patterns of de escalation.Fieldworkcanhelptestwhetherthesamefactorsledtodeescalationhere asinthesitesofintercommunalviolence. 57 Onthedifferencebetweenethnicwarsandotherviolentconflicts,seeHorowitz(1985),Fearon(2004), andDoyleandSambani(2006). 36 7.TestingourHypotheses:LinkstoOtherQuantitativeData Aswehavesaidabove,wealsoremainopentotheideathattheViCISstudydatacanbe used for econometric testing of hypotheses about what causes violent conflict in countriesandwhataccountsforvariationsinviolentconflictlevels.Anewliteratureon themicrodynamicsandfoundationsofcivilwarandlocalconflicthasemergedinrecent years. These studies look at the impacts of local social, economic and institutional factorsinshapingviolencepropensity.58Oneweaknessofmanyexistingstudiesisthat thedependentvariable(incidenceorimpactsofviolentconflict)ispoorlymeasuredor collected at only one point in time. This is an artifact of the use of household or key informantsurveys. Thenewspaperconflictdatasetwillprovideaseriesofdependentvariables(presenceof violent conflict, levels of violent conflict, presence of particular forms of violence, etc) that can be used for econometric analysis. The dataset will have limited data on independent variables. However, these can be integrated from other existing datasets suchasSUSENAS,PODESandtheGovernanceandDecentralizationSurvey. As such, we expect that a final stage of the project will be to merge the newspaper conflictdatasetwithotherssurveydatasets.Thiswillallowforformaltestingofsomeof thehypothesesdevelopedfromthecasestudywork. At this point we cannot determine what hypotheses we would like to test, and hence whatvariableswewouldwanttomergeintothedataset.However,areasofhypotheses are likely to relate to three areas: (a) social/demographic causes of violence; (b) economic causes of violence; and (c) institutions and violence. Independent variables mayincludethefollowing: Social/demographicfactors · Percentageofunmarriedmen · Youthbulge:highorincreasingproportionofyouth(especiallyyoungmen) · Ethnicheterogeneity­ELF,withtemporalaspect(changesinELF) · Inmigration · Seasonandtemperature Economicfactors · Economicshocks:nationalandlocal · Changesinwages · Unemployment,changesinemploymentlevels(especiallyforyoungmen) · Changesininflation · Changesincommodityprices 58 SeeKalyvas(2007)forasummaryandcritique. 37 Institutionalfactors · Perceptionsofgovernance · Proximitytoreligiousinstitutions · Representativeness of government institutions (for example percentage of civil servantsbyethnicity) · Districtsplitting(pemekaran) · Changesingovernmentafterlocalelections · Remotenessfromurbancenters 38 8.AudienceandOutputs 8.1Audiences The project aims to speak to a number of distinct audiences. First, ViCIS will provide dataandinsightsofusetopolicymakersinIndonesia.ThesewillfeedintoBappenas's (the National Planning Agency) strategy for developing of conflictaffected disadvantagedareas.Thestudywillbefinanced,inpart,fromfundsfromajointWorld BankBappenasgrantfromthePostConflictFund(PCF),whichaimstobuildknowledge of conflict in Indonesia, and to build the capacity of the state and nongovernment organizations to respond to it in effective ways. Counterparts from Bappenas will be involvedinpeerreviewingmaterialsthroughoutthestudytohelpensurethatthestudy contributes information useful to the government's Medium Term Development Plan 20102014. Bappenas will be responsible for disseminating results and ideas from the studytootherGovernmentministries. Results will be fed into the drafting of the law on conflict management, which is scheduled togoto parliament in2009or2010.Withsupport fromBappenas,outputs from this study will be streamlined with the timeline of the drafting of legislation to informlawmakersaboutconflictdynamicsineveryprovinceandenablethemtodevise effectiveconflictmanagementstrategies. Resultswillalsobedisseminatedwidelytolocalgovernmentstostrengthentheirrolein conflict management and prevention. These are increasingly important to promote conflict sensitivity in participatory planning process within the policy context of Bappenas' support of the Musrenbang process. It is envisioned that funds for pilot projectresponsesbasedonfindingswillbefoundfromothertrustfunds,otherdonors, andgovernmentbudget.59 Second, ViCIS will provide key information for development practitioners from aid agencies and national and international NGOs. The study will help these groups prioritizeareastoworkin,typesofprogramstofinanceandimplement,andwillgivea broadsenseoftheextenttowhich"conflictprogramming"shouldremainapriorityas Indonesiamaturesasademocracy.Findingswillfeedintotheongoingimplementation of largescale Bankfinanced projects such as PNPM/KDP and SPADA that operate in many conflictaffected areas in Indonesia. Materials may be of use in building the capacity of facilitators and other project staff to understand, analyze and manage conflictintheirareas. 59 Somedonors,especiallyUSAID,haveexpressedinterest,ashasBappenas. 39 Third, the project will provide fresh insights to Indonesian and Indonesianist scholars and to the broader global community working, and writing, on conflict issues. The analyticapproachesshouldhelptocontributetoanswerstosomeofthekeyquestion on conflict in Indonesia today (as discussed earlier). ViCIS will provide key data and frameworksthatwillhaveapplicabilitytounderstandingconflict,andhowtodealwith it, in other countries. In addition, our conflict data may be used by others to perform their own analyses. Materials will be published through international fora, and workshops will be held in Washington and elsewhere to disseminate findings. The project aims to help in the process of incorporating Indonesian materials into internationaldebatesandworkonviolentconflict. Finally, the study also aims to build the capacity of local research organizations to conduct empirical policyfocused research. Large portions of the fieldwork will be implemented by partners. Local research institutes will assist in the quantitative data collection,whilemuchofthequalitativedatacollectionwillbecontractedtoIndonesian social scientists (political scientists, historians, anthropologists), selected from local universitiesinsiteschosenforcasestudieswhereverpossible.Thiswillalsohelpensure capacitybuildingactivitiestargetorganizationsoutsideofJava. 8.2Outputs Given the diverse audiences for the project, outputs will take a number of different forms. Policybriefingnotes Regular briefing notes will be produced summarizing data and analysis. Key target audience is the government. Briefing notes will also be produced for an international audience and will be disseminated through the World Bank's Crime, Conflict and ViolenceteaminWashington. Workingpapers,journalarticlesandbook Workingpaperswillbeproducedforeachofthefourresearchtopics.Therewillbean emphasisongettingdataandearlyanalysisoutquicklytohelpmaximizeusefulnessfor government and practitioners in Indonesia. At a later point, more conceptual and theoretical papers will be produced aimed at a wider audience. A book will bring togetherthefindingsfromthestudy. Conflictdataset TheprojectwillproduceacomprehensivedatasetonviolenceinIndonesia.Thiswillbe online and freely available for conflict researchers, government, NGOs, etc. It is planned that the dataset will be maintained in partnership with Bappenas to ensure dataiskeptuptodatewhentheprojectends. 40 Workshopsandcapacitybuilding Theprojectaimsnotonlytoproducegooddataandtheory,buttobuildthecapacityof local groups in Indonesia. Regular workshops will be held to disseminate and discuss data.Overtime,itishopedthatfundswillbeavailablefortargetedcapacitybuildingof localgovernmentandcivilsocietygroupstointerpretthedataandfindings,andtoplan responses. 41 References Acciaioli, Greg (2001). "Ground of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in ViolenceAvoidanceinLinduPlain,CentralSulawesi."Indonesia72(October):81114. 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Waiselfisz,JulioJacobo(2008).MapadaViolencia:OsJovensdaAmericaLatina:2008.Brasilia:Institute Sangari. Weinstein,JeremyM.(2007).InsideRebellion:ThePoliticsofInsurgentViolence.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Welsh, Bridget (2008). "Local and National: Keroyakan Mobbing in Indonesia." Journal of East Asian Studies8(3):473504. Wessel,Ingrid,andGeorgiaWimhöfer(eds.)(2001).ViolenceinIndonesia.Hamburg:Abera. Wilson,Chris(2008).EthnoReligiousViolenceinIndonesia:FromSoiltoGod.London:Routledge. Wolf,Eric(1969).PeasantWarsoftheTwentiethCentury.NewYork:Harper&Row. st th World Bank (2008). Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: October 1 November 30 . Banda Aceh: World Bank. 45 AnnexA:ConceptsandDefinitions Conflict "Astruggleovervaluesandclaimstosecurestatus,power,andresources,a struggleinwhichthemainaimsofopponentsaretoneutralize,injure,or eliminaterivals"(Coser1956). ViolentConflict Includesallformsofconflictbetweenindividualsandgroupsthatinvolveany formofphysicalactionthathasconcreteconsequencessuchasdeaths,injuries anddestructionofproperty,orwhichhasaviolentform. NonViolent Includesallincidentsthatinvolve:(1)theformationandmobilizationofagroup Conflict and(2)wherethegrouptravelstoalocationanddeliversademandforactionor response. ViolentCrime Includesallviolentcriminalincidentsthathavenotbeencodedasconflict.These includethoseillegalactivitiesthatinvolveanyformofphysicalactionthathas concreteimpactssuchasdeaths,injuriesanddestructionofpropertyorthat haveaviolentform.Crimediffersfromconflictinthatthereisnoissueover whichthepartiesareindispute. Escalation Thefollowingwillbeconsideredinthestudyofescalation: Changefromnonviolentconflicttoviolentconflict. Increaseinscale,i.e.numberofparticipants,impacts,numberofincidents. Escalationwithinincidentsaswellasacrossincidents. Escalationintolargehighprofileconflicts. Escalationonamuchsmallerscale:fromademonstrationtoafewsmallriots withnodeaths. Deescalation Thefollowingwillbeconsideredinthestudyofescalation: Changefromviolenttononviolentform. Decreaseinscale,i.e.numberofparticipants,impacts,numberofincidents. Mutualresolutionofunderlyingissuesbetweenparties. Routine Frequentlyoccurringformsofviolence,whichhavelowperincidentimpacts Violence (maximumfivedeaths)andwhicharenotpartofalargeorwidespreadconflict. Suchincidentsinvolvelocalactorsstrugglingoverlocalissues,ratherthanlarge scalemobilizationbyidentitycharacteristics(suchasethnicity,religion,or region). 46 AnnexB:ProvincesandEstimatedDistributionofMediaSources Province NoofDistricts ProvincialPapers SubProvincialPapers Aceh 23 2 2 Papua 20 2 2 WestPapua 9 2 2 CentralSulawesi 10 2 2 Maluku 8 2 2 NorthMaluku 8 2 1 Jakarta 6 3 CentralJava 35 2 4 Lampung 10 2 3 EastNusaTenggara 19 2 3 EastJava 38 2 4 NorthSumatra 26 2 4 WestKalimantan 13 2 3 WestNusaTenggara 9 2 3 NorthSulawesi 13 2 2 Yogyakarta 5 2 2 CentralKalimantan 14 2 2 WestJava 26 2 4 SouthSulawesi 23 2 2 Riau 11 2 3 Bengkulu 9 2 2 Banten 6 2 2 Total 341 42 57 47 AnnexC:CodingTemplate 48 AnnexD:ExplanationofCodes SECTION1 Coderinitials Enteryourinitialsinthisfield. IncidentID AssigneachincidentbundleauniqueincidentIDfromthelistofIDsprovidedbythe ProjectManager. FortwoormoreeventstobeconsideredasingleIncidentandhavethesameIncident IDtheymustbedrivenbythesameissue,involvethesameactorsandoccuronthe samedate. Sourceinfo Entertheinitialsofnewspapers(fromtheprovidedlist)anddateofeveryarticle attachedtoincidentbundle. SECTION2 Actors · Enterminimumoneactorpersideandmaximumtwoactorsperside. · If more than 2 actors involved on a side, or if three sides are involved in one incident,writethisinthe`CodingIssues'Section. · Ifthereisaclearpelakuandaclearkorban,enterthepelakuinSide1andthe korbaninSide2. · Each set of actors, or `sides', should be coded for General, Type, Total and Women. General · At`General',enterthecodeforthebestdescriptionoftheformofparticipantto theincident: 1. Individual 2. Group 3. Institution Type · At`Type',enterthecodeforthebestdescriptionofwhotheactorsareaffiliated with,oractingonbehalfof: 1. Individual,groupofindividualswithnoclearaffiliation 2. Group(warga,massa)withnoclearaffiliation 3. Militias(ethnic,religious,martialarts) 4. IDPs 5. Government ­ elected or bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g. courts,DepartmentofHeath) 6. Foreignaidorganization/NGO(includingemployees) 7. IndonesianNGO(includingemployees) 8. Privatecompany,contractor,shop 9. Politicalparty 10. Ormas­secularsocietalgroupsuchasyouthorganization,PP 11. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group, NU, JI). Includes premanlikegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI. 12. TNI(Indonesianarmedforces) 13. Brimob(Policespecialforces) 14. Police 15. Separatistgroup(GAMbeforeMoU,RMS,OPM) 16. Tradeunion/workersgroup(formalorinformal) 17. Electoralinstitution(iePanwas,KPUD,KPU) 18. Students 88AUNCLEAR 99AOTHER(Explain) 49 Total · Enter the total number of actors involved for every actor. Follow the following guidelines: o IFrangesarementioned,estimatenumbersusingthefollowingrules: Beberapa2 Belasan11 Puluhan20 Ratusan100 Ribuan1000 Range(e.g24)lowernumber. o IF multiple sources report different totals, use the LOWEST estimate (UNLESSthelowestiszero). o IF revised numbers are published by newer sources, use the revised numbers. ? · IFyouhaveestimatedatotalfromarange,ORifthedifferencebetweentotals reportedbymultiplesourcesismorethan5,tickthe?boxnexttothatTotal. Women? · Tickthisboxifwomenwereprominentinthissetofactors. Cleavage? · Tickthisboxifyoufeeltheremaybeacleavageassociatedwiththisconflict.(See definitionofcleavages). Ifyoutickthisbox,thenentercodesforGenericandLocalCleavages. Genericcleavage · Thereisspaceformaximum2genericcleavages.Ifyoudetectmorethan2,write thisintheCodingIssuessection. · Enterthecodeforthegenericcleavageyouthinkispresentbetweenthetwosides ofactors: 1. Ethnic 2. InterReligious (Choose between several options, Muslim Christian, Muslim Hindu,HinduChristianandOther). 3. IntraReligious 4. MigrantLocal 5. Separatist 99AOTHER(Explain) Localcleavage · Eachregionmaydevelopasetoflocallyrelevantcleavagecodes.Thesemightbe furtherspecificationofthegenericcodes(i.e.whichethnicitiesareinconflict,or whichgeographicregions),ortheymaybedifferentcleavagestothoseinthe genericlist(inwhichcase`other'wouldbeselectedasthegenericcleavage). Localcleavagecodeswillvaryfromregiontoregion.Listoflocalcleavagesfrom yourprovinceareattachedattheendofyourcodingkey. Intervention · If some parties came to the scene of the conflict and attempted to stop the eventsinthisincident,thisinterventionmustbenoted. · Thereisspaceforenteringupto3interventions.Ifyoudetectmorethan3,write thisintheCodingIssuessection. Foreachintervention,youmustidentify,theintervener,theresultofthe intervention,theconflictform(1or2)inwhichtheinterventionhappenedandifthe intervenerswerealsotheactors. Intervener · Foreveryinterventionenterthecodefortheintervenersfromthefollowinglist: 1. Individual,groupofindividualswithnoclearaffiliation 2. Group(warga,massa)withnoclearaffiliation 3. Militias(ethnic,religious,martialarts) 4. IDPs 50 5. Government official, formal or informal (includes Village Heads, Camat, memberofparliament) 6. Government ­ bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g. courts, DepartmentofHeath) 7. Foreignaidorganization/NGO(includingemployees) 8. IndonesianNGO(includingemployees) 9. Privatecompany,contractor,shop 10. Politicalparty 11. Individualpoliticalfigure 12. Supportersofpoliticalcandidate(s)orindividualpoliticalleader. 13. Ormas­secularsocietalgroupsuchasyouthorganization,PP 14. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group, NU, JI). IncludespremanlikegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI. 15. TNI(Indonesianarmedforces) 16. Brimob(Policespecialforces) 17. Police 18. Separatistgroup(GAMbeforeMoU,RMS,OPM) 19. Tradeunion/workersgroup 20. Electoralinstitution(iePanwas,KPUD,KPU) 21. Students 77ANONE 88AUNCLEAR 99AOTHER(Explain) Result · Foreveryintervention,enterthecodefortheresultoftheattemptedintervention: 1. Werecontactedbutdidnotcome 2. Werecontactedbutcamelate 3. Cametothescenebutdidnotintervene 4. Cametothescene,triedtointervenebutwereunsuccessful 5. Came,intervenedsuccessfullytostoptheviolence,madenoarrests 6. Came,intervenedsuccessfullyandarrestedpartiestotheconflict 7. Cameandtookintocustodythevictimofviolence 8. Cameandaggravatedtheviolence 88AUNCLEAR 99AOTHER(Explain) Conflictform1 · Iftwoconflictformswerepresentinthisincident,enterthenumberofconflict or2? forminwhichthisinterventiontookplace.(1or2?) Intervener · Tickthisboxiftheaffiliationoftheinterveneristhesameasoneoftheactors. affiliatedwith (e.g.,iftheconflictisbetweenFPIandAhmediyyaandthereligiousleaderwho anactor? triestointerveneisalsoamemberoftheAhmediyyabutwasnotpresentatthe scenebefore). Violentimpacts · Beforewritinganynumbersintheimpactsboxes,readallsourcesthatreportthis incident and all followup articles (attached) to ensure there isn't any more specificinformation. · InViolentImpacts,youshouldwriteinformationaboutbothhumanandbuilding impacts. Totals(Deaths, · For every type of impact, enter the total number following the following Injuries, guidelines: Kidnappings, SexualAssaults o IfitisclearthattherewereNOimpacts,write77A(NONE)inthosefields. andBuilding o IF no impacts are mentioned in any of the sources but you think there Impacts) mayhavebeensomewrite88A(UNCLEAR)inthosefields. 51 o IF impacts are mentioned in ranges estimate numbers using the followingrules: Beberapa2 Belasan11 Puluhan20 Ratusan100 Ribuan1000 Range(e.g.,24)lowernumber. o IF multiple sources report different totals, use the LOWEST estimate (UNLESSthelowestiszero). o IFrevisednumbersarepublishedbynewersources,usethemostrecent numbers. ? · IFyouhaveestimatedatotalfromarange,ORifthedifferencebetweentotals reportedbymultiplesourcesismorethan5,tickthe(?)boxnexttotheTotalof thatimpact. FemaleVictims · If it is not clear how many victims were male or female write 88A in correspondingfields. · Ifyouknowforafactthattherewerenomale/femalevictims,write77Ainthose fields. · Ifyouknowthebreakdownofthemalefemaleimpacts,enterthemhere. · Ifyouestimatedthebreakdownfromarangeorifthedifferenceinbreakdowns reportedbymultiplesourceswasmorethan5,tickthe?boxnexttothemale femalebreakdown. Breakdown · If it is not clear how many buildings were damaged or destroyed write 88A in (damaged correspondingfields. destroyed · Ifyouknowforafactthattherewerenodamagedbuildings(onlydestroyed)or buildings) that there were no destroyed buildings (only damaged) , write 77A in those fields. · If you know the breakdown of the damageddestroyed buildings, enter them here. · Ifyouestimatedthebreakdownfromarangeorifthedifferenceinbreakdowns reportedbymultiplesourceswasmorethan5,tickthe?boxnexttothemale femalebreakdown. BuildingType · Tickallthebuildingstypesthathavebeendamagedordestroyedinthisincident. OtherImpacts · Usethisspacetodescribeanyotherviolentimpactsthatyoucouldnotrecordin theotherfields(e.gburningofcarsetc) Weapons · Thereisspaceforuptotwoweapons.Ifyoufoundthatmorethantwoweapons wereused,writethisintheCodingIssuessection. · Enterthecodeofweaponsusedfromthefollowinglist: 1. Club/rock 2. Knife/Spear/othersharp,cuttingweapon 3. SmallFirearm. 4. LargeFirearm. 5. Firearm(butsizenotclear) 6. Molotov/grenade/bomb 7. Homemadeweapon. 8. Fire 77ANONE 88AUNCLEAR 99AOTHER(Explain) 52 SECTION3 Conflict · TickthisboxiftheincidentisConflict(violentORnonviolent) incident? Conflicttypes · ForeveryincidentclassifiedasconflictyouwillenterminimumoneConflictType andmaximumtwo. · If you think more than two conflict types are present, write this in the Coding Issuessection. · To assign a Conflict Type, enter the number of the Type and the letter of the correspondingConflictsubtype(e.g.aResourceIssueovercommonLandwillbe codedas`1A',ResourceissueoverprivateNaturalResourceswillbecoded`1D' · Ifasubtypeisnotlistedinourcodes,choosethe`OTHER'subtypeandexplainit inthespaceprovided.(Writecode199A,299A...etc) · IftheConflictTypedoesnotfitinanyofourtypes,enter99A. · IftheConflictTypeisentirelyunclear,Enter88A. 1.Resourceissues:ownership,access,anduse A) Land(common):ownedcommunallyordesignatedpublicusebythestateor ownedbyindividuals/families,privatecompaniesorthestate. B) Naturalresources. C) Manmaderesources. D) Markets,routes,customers,etc. E) Accesstojobs,markets,routesandservices. F) CommodityPrices G) Pollution,environmentaldamage,noise 99A)Other(explain) 2.Administrativeissues A) Tenderrelatedissues. B) Corruptionormisuseofgovernmentfundsnotrelatedwithtenderissues. C) Public services (quality of a public service, e.g. a education, healthcare utilities, this includes services provided by government and private institutions) D) Other program implementation issues for government funds, including funding priorities and complaints about implementation or unaddressed needs,includingsubsidies. E) Corruption or misuse of funds for nongovernment aid and development programs F) Nongovernment aid or development projects that are not related to corruptionoffunds. G) Laborrelated(industrialaction,complaintsoverpay,conditions) H) Splittingofregions(pemekaranwilayah)orgeographicborder I) Arrestorotherlawenforcementissueorlegalprocedure. 99A)Other(explain) 3.Politicalissuesandcontestsoverposition,influenceandpower A) Government position a national level (e.g. National elections, calls for resignationofnationalMPs,PresidentorVicePresident) B) Government position at provincial level (e.g. Provincial elections, calls for resignationofelectedofficials) C) Governmentpositionatdistrictlevel(Pilkadaandlegislativeelectionsetc) D) Government position at subdistrict level (e.g. dispute over Camat appointment) E) Governmentpositionatvillagelevel(e.g.Pilkades,BPDelections) F) Position/influence/powerwithinapoliticalparty G) Position/influence/power of appointed government workers outside AE 53 above,includingcivilserviceandbureaucraticappointments H) Struggleforindependence/separationfromNKRI,orspecialautonomywhich govern the province's relationship with the central government (eg Aceh/Papua). I) Internationalissue. 99A)Other(explain) 4.Identityissues A) Ethnic issues (eg disputes over cultural attributes of migrants, name of district,monumentetc) B) Religious issues (ie attacks on Church for holding service or on gambling parlour,JIattacksieBalibomb) C) Intrareligious(egattacksonAhmadiyah,enforcementofshariah) D) Migrationrelated E) Migration and Ethnicityrelated (use if the issue involves BOTH Migration ANDEthnicity) F) Geographic(ieintervillagefight) G) Genderrelated 99A)Other(explain) 5.MoralIssues A) Humiliation/lossofface/offense B) Accident C) Debt D) Theft E) Damagetoproperty F) Sexualindiscretion G) Murder/Assault H) Gambling/Alcohol/Narcotics I) Witchcraft 99A)Other(explain) Conflictforms · For every incident classified as conflict, enter minimum one and maximum two conflictforms. · Ifyouthinkmorethantwoconflictformswerepresentinthisincidentthanwrite thisintheCodingIssuessection. · Enterthecodefortheconflictformspresentfromthefollowinglist: Nonviolent 1. Demonstration 2. FormalDelegation(delegasi) 3. Formal complaint or protest (formally aired through media, or by submitting complainttorelevantauthority) 4. Dispute(squabblebetweenparties) 5. (nonviolent)Threat 6. Blockade 7. Strike(stopwork) 8. Courtcase(grouptakesachallengetocourt) Violent 9. Riot:Groupattackinganddamagingproperty 10. Riot:Group(over10,massa)attackingpeople 11. Groupclash(over10oruseofIndonesianterms­kelompok,massa) 12. Fight(smallgroupsorindividuals­beberapaorang) 13. SmallerGroupAttack(manyagainstoneortwoieVigilantism,beatingofpolitical 54 opponents) 14. Terrorstyle attacks, where an individual or small group attacks people or buildings(i.e.attackswhichareintendedtocausefear,suchasabombthrown intoacrowd,ortheAcehgrenadeattacks) 15. Vandalism,arson 16. Assault/sexualassault(onesided) 17. Sweeping/Forcibleentry 18. Kidnapping 88AUNCLEAR 99AOTHER(Explain) Violence? · TickthisboxifyourecordedviolentimpactsforthisconflictincidentAND/ORyou choseatleastoneviolentConflictForm Organizationin · In case of Riots (Conflict Form 9 or 10) tick this box if there was any sign of riots? organization, such as coordination, funding, leading by any individuals and / or organizations. · Enterthecodeofactorresponsiblefororganizingtheriotfromthefollowinglist: 1. Individual,groupofindividualswithnoclearaffiliation 2. Group(warga,massa)withnoclearaffiliation 3. Militias(ethnic,religious,martialarts) 4. IDPs 5. Government official, formal or informal (includes Village Heads, camat, memberofparliament) 6. Government ­ bureaucracy (civil servant or government body, e.g. courts, DepartmentofHeath) 7. Foreignaidorganization/NGO(includingemployees) 8. IndonesianNGO(includingemployees) 9. Privatecompany,contractor,shop 10. Politicalparty 11. Individualpoliticalfigure 12. Supportersofpoliticalcandidate(s)orindividualpoliticalleader. 13. Ormas­secularsocietalgroupsuchasyouthorganization,PP 14. Religious leader or group (Church, Islamic group, santri group, NU, JI). IncludespremanlikegroupswhichclaimtobereligiousgroupssuchasFPI. 15. TNI(Indonesianarmedforces) 16. Brimob(Policespecialforces) 17. Police 18. Separatistgroup(GAMbeforeMoU,RMS,OPM) 19. Tradeunion/workersgroup 20. Electoralinstitution(iePanwas,KPUD,KPU) 21. Students 88AUNCLEAR 99AOTHER · Specify which form of organization occurred in the notes section. In field provided,indicatethetypeofactorinvolvedinorganizingtheincident. Election · Ticktheboxprovidediftheconflictconcernedanelection.Tospecifythelevelof conflicts? election,choosetheappropriateConflictType3. Relatedto · Tickthisboxiftheconflictincidentyouarecodingisrelatedtoacrime crime? committedpreviously. Individualissue? · Tickthisboxiftheincidentwasapurelyindividualdisputeandnotconcerninga groupissue.Tickthisboxif"thedisputeconcernsthe`status,powerand 55 resources'ofacentralindividualactororsmallnumberofindividualsandnot thoseofthewidercommunity". Changefrom · Tickthisboxiftheissuechangedfromindividualtoagroupissuewithinthesame individualto incident. groupissue? Relatedtoother · Tickthisboxiftheconflictisrelatedtoanotherconflictinthesameprovince. conflict? ConflictID · TOBECOMPLETEDBYTHECODINGTEAMLEADERafterthetemplatehasbeen coded. SECTION4 Purecrime? · TickthisboxiftheincidentisaPureCrime(makesureyouhaven'tenteredany informationinSection3) Crimeform · For every incident classified as pure crime, enter minimum one and maximum twocrimeforms. · If you think more than two crime forms are present, write this in the Coding Issuessection. · Enterthecodeforthecrimeformfromthefollowinglist: 1. Murder/Manslaughter 2. Assault 3. Rape,SexualAssault 4. Robbery 5. Deprivationofliberty(iekidnapping) 6. Domesticviolence 88AUNCLEAR 99AOTHER SECTION5 Incident Write a brief summary, 23 sentences, so that the reviewer can understand what summary happened without needing to look at the article. Try not to repeat too much informationwhichisalreadycodedonthetemplatebutdothefollowing: · Identifyspecificactors · Distinguishbetweensides · Explainsequenceofevents · Otherimportantdetails Codingissues · Noteanyproblemsyouhadchoosingappropriatecodes,orcodingissueswhich arose,sothattheycanbereviewed. 56 IndonesianSocialDevelopmentPapers No. Title Authors(s) Date 1 TheDynamicsofDistrictGovernance:Forums,BudgetProcessesand LuthfiAshari May04 Transparency DynamikaPemerintahanKabupaten:Forum,PerencanaanAnggaran danTransparenci 2 ViolenceandConflictResolutioninNonConflictRegions:TheCaseof PatrickBarron Aug04 Lampung,Indonesia DavidMadden 3 MobilizingforViolence:TheEscalationandLimitationofIdentity YuhkiTajima Aug04 Conflicts 4 MoreThanJustOwnership:TenLandandNaturalResourceConflict SamuelClark(ed.) Dec04 CaseStudiesfromEastJavaandFlores BukanSekedarPersoalanKepemilikan:SepuluhStudiKasusKonflik TanahdanSunberDayaAlamdariJawaTimurdanFlores 5 Crisis,SocialTies,andHouseholdWelfare:TestingSocialCapital AnnaWetterberg Apr05 TheorywithEvidenceFromIndonesia 6 VillageCorruptioninIndonesia:FightingCorruptioninIndonesia's AndreaWoodhouse Apr05 KecamatanDevelopmentProgram 7 CountingConflicts:UsingNewspaperReportstoUnderstandViolence PatrickBarron May05 inIndonesia JoanneSharpe 8 Aceh:ReconstructioninaConflictEnvironment AdamBurke Oct05 Afnan 9 MediaMapping:UnderstandingCommunicationsEnvironmentsin JoanneSharpe Apr07 Aceh ImogenWall 10 ConflictandCommunityDevelopmentinIndonesia:Assessingthe PatrickBarron Jul06 ImpactoftheKecamatanDevelopmentProgram RachaelDiprose MichaelWoolcock 11 PeacefulPilkada,DubiousDemocracy:UnderstandingAceh'sPost SamuelClark Aug08 ConflictElections BlairPalmer 12 CommunityBasedReintegrationinAceh:AssessingtheImpactsof PatrickBarron Dec09 BRAKDP MacartanHumphreys LauraPaler JeremyWeinstein 13 DeliveringAssistancetoConflictAffectedCommunities:TheBRAKDP AdrianMorel Dec09 PrograminAceh MakikoWatanabe RobWrobel 14 DDRandLocalizedViolentConflict:EvaluatingCombatant DaveMcRae Dec09 ReintegrationProgramsinPoso,Indonesia 15 UnderstandingViolentConflictinIndonesia:AMixedMethods PatrickBarron Dec09 Approach SanaJaffrey BlairPalmer AshutoshVarshney Papersareavailableonlineatwww.conflictanddevelopment.org 57