FORCED DISPLACEMENT LITERATURE REVIEW

2019-20

Compiled by Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement

Note: The JDC Literature Review provides summaries of recently published research to encourage the exchange of ideas on topics related to forced displacement. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the literature included in this review are entirely those of their authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Data Center, UNHCR, the World Bank, the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. For convenience, the Literature Review contains links to websites operated by third parties. The Joint Data Center and its affiliate organizations do not represent or endorse these sites or the content, services and products they may offer, and do not guarantee the accuracy or reliability of any information, data, opinions, advice or statements provided on these sites.
INTRODUCTION
The Literature Review compiled by the Joint Data Center (JDC) on Forced Displacement highlights recent publications, academic scholarship, and thought leadership on issues relating to forced displacement. Our intention is to stimulate discussion, encourage the exchange of ideas, and support a ‘Community of Practice’ on forced displacement. By sharing up-to-date data and analysis, the Literature Review supports JDC’s overall mission: to enhance the ability of stakeholders to make timely and evidence-informed decisions that can improve the lives of affected people.

Our Literature Review is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of recent academic scholarship on forced displacement. Rather, JDC selects what it considers to be the most relevant literature based on a broad search of recent publications, including working papers, peer-reviewed academic journals as well as reports produced by international organizations, government agencies, NGOs, and research and policy institutes. Nor is this Literature Review intended to be a critical or integrative review of recent scholarship on forced displacement. Instead, it provides a short summary of the selected publications in a clear, concise and readable format.

This document—which we will update regularly—is a compilation of all previous issues of the forced displacement literature review, including prior issues prepared by the World Bank’s Fragility Conflict and Violence Group. It organizes the literature by theme into the following 11 chapters:

1. **Countries of Origin, Return, and Restitution**, covering drivers of forced displacement, as well as literature relating to the return of displaced people and the restitution of their land and property.

2. **Education**, including impacts on educational outcomes of host community and displaced children, barriers to improving educational outcomes, and education interventions in displacement contexts.

3. **Gender and LGTBI**, covering literature related to gender-based violence, marriage and fertility, and LGTBI issues.

4. **Geopolitics of Forced Displacement and Foreign Aid**, including the impact of aid on asylum seeker and refugee flows, global compacts and trade preferences, and responsibility- and burden-sharing.

5. **Health**, including mental health impacts and health interventions for displaced populations.

6. **Impact on Host Communities and Host Countries**, covering impacts on poverty, labor markets and firms, housing markets, education, politics, crime, migration dynamics, conflict and macroeconomic outcomes.

7. **Integration, Inclusion, and Social Cohesion** of displaced populations, including socio-economic profiles of displaced populations, access to services, labor market outcomes, poverty and
wellbeing, as well as policies and programs to promote economic integration. This chapter also includes literature on social cohesion and interactions with host communities.

8. **Internal Displacement**, drawing together the literature on the causes and drivers of internal displacement, specific vulnerabilities of IDPs, socio-economic impacts on host countries and communities, and the return and reintegration of IDPs.

9. **Private Sector**, including private sector initiatives to engage displaced populations and host communities as well as assessments of market potential.

10. **Technology**, covering emerging technologies in displacement contexts.

11. **Urban and Local Government**, including case studies of displacement in urban contexts.

We hope this easily searchable compilation of over 300 summaries will be useful to our subscribers. We welcome your feedback on this initial compilation as well as suggestions for future issues. Please address them to Zara Sarzin at zsarzin@worldbank.org.

If you are not already receiving the monthly issues of the JDC’s Literature Review, you can subscribe to new issues [here](#).

Björn Gillsäter
Head of the Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement

-- *a partnership between the World Bank and UNHCR*
# Table of Contents

## I. COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, RETURN, AND RESTITUTION .......................... 19

**Climate Change and Forced Migration**

- Missirian and Schlenker (2017) Asylum Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctuations ........................................... 20

**Decisions to Flee** ................................................................................................................................. 21

- Jaspars and Margie Buchanan-Smith (2018) Darfuri Migration from Sudan to Europe: From Displacement to Despair ....................................................................................... 20
- Kirwin and Anderson (2018) Identifying the Factors Driving West African Migration ...................... 21
- Ceriani and Verme (2018) Risk Preferences and the Decision to Flee Conflict.................................. 25
- UNODC (2018) Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018 ......................................................... 26
- Steele (2019) Civilian Resettlement Patterns in Civil War ................................................................ 29

**Communities Left Behind** ...................................................................................................................... 33

- Passey (2018) How Migration to Europe Affects Those Left Behind ............................................. 33
- Howe et al (2018) The Wages of War: Learning from How Syrians Have Adapted their Livelihoods through Seven Years of Conflict ................................................................. 34

**Return** ..................................................................................................................................................... 35

- Dadush (2018) The Economic Effects of Refugee Return .................................................................. 35
- Samuel Hall (2018) Syria’s Spontaneous Returns ........................................................................... 37
- IMPACT Initiatives (2018) Picking up the Pieces: Realities of Return and Reintegration in North-East Syria .......................................................................................................................... 38
Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2019) The Impacts of Refugee Repatriation on Receiving Communities .......... 40
World Bank (2019) The Mobility of Displaced Syrians - An Economic and Social Analysis................. 44

Restitution of Land and Property ........................................................................................................ 45
Clutterbuck (2018) Property Restitution in Post-Conflict Syria ............................................................... 45
Arraiza and Leckie (2018) A Vision for Restitution in Myanmar .............................................................. 46

Miscellaneous ........................................................................................................................................ 46

II. EDUCATION ....................................................................................................................................... 50
Impacts of Displacement on Educational Outcomes of Displaced People........................................... 51

Impacts on Educational Outcomes of Host Communities ........................................................................ 52
Tumen (2018) The Impact of Low-skill Refugees on Youth Education (PRELIMINARY) ....................... 52
Bataineh and Montalbano (2018) The Impact of Syrian Crisis on the Quality of Education in Jordan: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment ..................................................................................... 56
Tumen (2019) Refugees and ‘Native Flight’ from Public to Private Schools ........................................... 56

Barriers to Improving Educational Outcomes ...................................................................................... 58
OLive (2019) “Education is Key to Life”: The Importance of Education from the Perspective of Displaced Learners ............................................................ 58
Gladwell (2019) Accessing and Thriving in Education in the UK ................................................................. 59
Psycho-Social Support ................................................................................................................................. 60
McEvoy (2019) Feeling Safe Enough to Learn in a Conflict Zone .................................................................. 60
Singh and Tocchio (2019) Child-friendly Spaces: Enhancing their Role in Improving Learning Outcomes... 61
Iversen and Oestergaard (2019) Gender Equality in Education in Emergencies ........................................... 62
Disability ...................................................................................................................................................... 63
Barrett, Marshall and Goldbart (2019) Refugee Children with Communication Disability in Rwanda: Providing the Educational Services They Need ................................................................. 63
Adult Literacy ........................................................................................................................................... 63
Lanciotti (2019) Adult Literacy: An Essential Component of the CRRF .......................................................... 63
Digital Skills .......................................................................................................................................... 64
Peromino and Pierson (2018) The New World of Work and the Need for Digital Empowerment ............... 64
Displaced Teachers .................................................................................................................................. 64
Duale et al (2019) Teachers in Displacement: Learning from Dadaab ........................................................ 64
Connected Learning ................................................................................................................................. 65
Education Assessment Tools ..................................................................................................................... 66
Bali (2019) Improving Learning Environments in Emergencies through Community Participation ......... 66
Private Sector Engagement ....................................................................................................................... 67
Zakharia and Menashy (2018) Private Sector Engagement in Refugee Education ......................................... 67
Informal Education ................................................................................................................................. 68
Hagan (2019) Street Schools and School Buses: Informal Education Provision in France ....................... 68
Education Policy ....................................................................................................................................... 68
Viscontia and Galb (2018) Regional Collaboration to Strengthen Education for Nationals & Syrian Refugees in Arabic Speaking Host Countries ............................................................................................... 71
Simopoulos and Alexandridis (2019) Refugee Education in Greece: Integration or Segregation? ........ 72
Baron (2019) UK Immigration Policy: Restrictions on Asylum Seekers’ Right to Study ...................... 72
Purkey and Irving (2019) The Importance of Access and Accreditation: Learning from the Thailand–
Myanmar Border.......................................................................................................................... 73
Erden (2019) Child Labour and School Attendance in Turkey ........................................................... 73

Education Interventions in Displacement Contexts ........................................................................... 74
Refugees ........................................................................................................................................ 74
Save the Children (2017) Restoring Hope, Rebuilding Futures: A Plan of Action for Delivering Universal
Education for South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda ........................................................................ 75
Save the Children (2017) Promising Practices in Refugee Education ............................................... 75
Lacey and Viola (2019) Strengthening Education Systems for Long-Term Education Responses ............. 76
Shammout and Vandecasteele (2019) Inter-sectoral Cooperation for Afghan Refugee Education in Iran .... 77
Belghazi (2019) Learning in Resettlement ......................................................................................... 78

Miscellaneous .................................................................................................................................. 78
Kelcey (2019) Navigating Curricula Choices for Palestine Refugees ................................................ 79

III. GENDER AND LGBTI ................................................................................................................. 81

Gender-Based Violence .................................................................................................................... 82
Chynoweth (2018) Caring for Male and LGBTI Sexual Violence Survivors: Learning from Local
Organisations .................................................................................................................................. 82
World Bank (2018) Addressing Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in FCV Situations ................................. 82
Ager et al (2018) Local Constructions of Gender-based Violence amongst IDPs in Northern Uganda:
Analysis of Archival Data Collected Using a Gender- and Age-Segmented Participatory Ranking
Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 83

Marriage and Fertility ..................................................................................................................... 84
Mixed Methods Study in Lebanon ................................................................................................. 85
Lokot (2018) Syrian Refugees: Thinking Beyond Gender Stereotypes ................................................. 87
Pittaway and Bartolomei (2018) Enhancing the protection of women and girls through the Global
Compact on Refugees ..................................................................................................................... 88

IV. GEOPOLITICS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FOREIGN AID .......... 89
Impact of Aid on Asylum Seeker and Refugee Flows ........................................................................ 90
Dreher (2019) The Effects of Foreign Aid on Refugee Flows ............................................................ 91

Global Compacts and Trade Preferences ......................................................................................... 92
Lenner and Turner (2018) Learning from the Jordan Compact ......................................................... 92
Harper (2018) Unpacking (and Re-Packing) the Refugees Compact Experiment: Lessons From Jordan Two Years On.................................................................................................................. 93
Arroyo (2018) Promoting Labour Market Integration of Refugees with Trade Preferences: Beyond the EU-Jordan Compact ........................................................................................................................................ 94
Huang et al (2018) Tackling the Realities of Protracted Displacement: Case Studies on What’s Working and Where We Can Do Better ........................................................................................................ 96
Gilbert (2018) Indicators for the Global Compact on Refugees ............................................................ 98
Song (2018) Strengthening Responsibility Sharing with South–South Cooperation: China’s Role in the Global Compact on Refugees ............................................................................................................ 99
Aleinkoff (2019) The Unfinished Work of the Global Compact on Refugees ........................................ 100
Hathaway (2019) The Global Cop-Out on Refugees ........................................................................... 103
Goodwin-Gill (2019) The Global Compacts and the Future of Refugee and Migrant Protection in the Asia Pacific Region ........................................................................................................................................ 104
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Impact of Aid to Displaced Persons</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schillings (2018) The Macro-Economic Impacts of Syrian Refugee Aid</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics of Forced Migration</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braithwaite et al (2019) Refugees, Forced Migration, And Conflict: Introduction to the e Special Issue</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility and Burden Sharing</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betts and Milner (2019) Governance of the Global Refugee Regime</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Liberalization</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. HEALTH</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Communicable Diseases</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2018) Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) in FCV Situations</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health: Impacts, Interventions</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moya (2018) Violence, Psychological Trauma, and Risk Attitudes: Evidence from Victims of Violence in Colombia</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miscellaneous ........................................................................................................... 123

VI. IMPACT ON HOST COMMUNITIES AND HOST COUNTRIES...................... 127
Conceptual Framework and Meta-Analysis ................................................................. 128
Cazabat and Tucci (2019) Unveiling the Cost of Internal Displacement ......................... 129

General ....................................................................................................................... 131

Impact on Consumption Expenditures and Poverty .................................................. 135

Impact on the Labor Market and Firms ..................................................................... 138
Morales (2017) The Impact of Internal Displacement on Destination Communities: Evidence from the Colombian Conflict ........................................................................................................... 138


Peñaloza Pacheco (2019) Living with the Neighbors: The Effect of Venezuelan Forced Migration on Wages in Colombia

Bahar et al (2018) Integrating Venezuelans into the Colombian Labor Market


Impact on Housing Market

Impact on Politics

Rozo and Vargas (2018) Brothers or Invaders? How Crises-driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior

Steinmayr (2018) Contact Matters: Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right

Vertier and Viskanic (2018) Dismantling the “Jungle”: Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France


Fisunoğlu and Sert (2019) Refugees and Elections: The Effects of Syrians on Voting Behavior in Turkey
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Crime</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) Followed by Violence: Forced Immigration and Homicides</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang and Kvasnicka (2019) Immigration and Crimes against Natives: The 2015 Refugee Crisis in Germany</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entorf and Lange (2019) Refugees Welcome? Understanding the Regional Heterogeneity of Anti Foreigner Hate Crimes in Germany</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Migration Dynamics</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahba and Malaeb (2018) Migration Dynamics during the Refugee Influx in Jordan</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Conflict</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisk (2019) Camp Settlement and Communal Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Impacts</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d’Albis et al (2018) Macroeconomic Evidence Suggests that Asylum Seekers are Not a “Burden” for Western European Countries</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David et al (2019) The Economics of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Neighboring Countries. The Case of Lebanon</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. INTEGRATION, INCLUSION, AND SOCIAL COHESION</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Integration as a Durable Solution</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahimbisibwe et al (2017) Local Integration as a Durable Solution? The Case of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bardelli (2018) The Shortcomings of Employment as a Durable Solution .........................................................177

**Profiling Displaced Persons** .......................................................................................................................177
MIPS (2018) Profiling Study on Internal Mobility Due to Violence in El Salvador .........................................183
World Bank (2019) Informing the Refugee Policy Response in Uganda: Results from the Uganda Refugee and Host Communities 2018 Household Survey ........................................................................196
Beine, et al (2020) Refugee Mobility: Evidence from Phone Data in Turkey.....................................................199

**Legal Identity** .................................................................................................................................................200

**Access to Services** ......................................................................................................................................201
Lyles et al (2018) Health Service Access and Utilization among Syrian Refugees and Affected Host Communities in Lebanon ........................................................................................................202

**Labor Market Outcomes for Refugees and IDPs**..........................................................................................203
Ivlevs and Veliziotis (2018) Beyond Conflict: Long-Term Labour Market Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in Post-Socialist Countries ..............................................................................205
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assaad and Salemi (2018)</td>
<td>The Structure of Employment and Job Creation in Jordan 2010-2016</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayaoglu and Erdogan (2019)</td>
<td>Labor Market Activities of Syrian Refugees in Turkey</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betts et al (2017)</td>
<td>Thrive or survive? Explaining Variation in Economic Outcomes for Refugees</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del Carpio et al (2018)</td>
<td>Integrating Refugees into the Turkish Labour Market</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilgili and Loschmann (2018)</td>
<td>Refugees and Host Communities in the Rwandan Labour Market</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekren (2018)</td>
<td>Obstacles to Refugees’ Self-Reliance in Germany</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guiu and Siddiqui (2019)</td>
<td>Cities as a Refuge, Cities as a Home: The Relationship between Place and Perceptions of Integration among Urban Displaced Populations in Iraq</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozetić (2018)</td>
<td>Validating Highly Educated Refugees’ Qualifications</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belghazi (2018)</td>
<td>Supporting Recently Resettled Refugees in the UK</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledstrup and Larsen (2018)</td>
<td>From Refugee to Employee: Work Integration in Rural Denmark</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whyte et al (2018)</td>
<td>The Role of Rural Grocery Stores in Refugee Reception</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Quality of Work ................................................................. 229
Kattaa and Byrne (2018) Quality of Work for Syrian Refugees in Jordan ........................................ 229

### Social Cohesion and Interactions/Integration with Host Communities ................................. 230
Zoeteweij-Turhan (2018) Turkey: Between Hospitality and Hostility .............................................. 230
Sola (2018) The 2015 Refugee Crisis in Germany: Concerns about Immigration and Populism .... 233
Bosilkov and Drakaki (2018) Victims or Intruders? Framing the Migrant Crisis in Greece and Macedonia ................................................................................................................................. 234
Ghosn et al (2019) Violence, Displacement, Contact, and Attitudes toward Hosting Refugees .... 234
De Coninck et al (2019) Unpacking Attitudes on Immigrants and Refugees: A Focus on Household Composition and News Media Consumption ................................................................. 235
Mousa (2020) Creating Coexistence: Intergroup Contact and Soccer in Post-ISIS Iraq ................ 239

### Criminality and Extremism ................................................................................. 241
Mikhael and Norman (2018) Refugee Youth, Unemployment and Extremism: Countering the Myth .... 241

### Violence Against Refugees .............................................................................. 242
Fisk (2018) One-sided Violence in Refugee-hosting Areas ................................................................. 242
Savun and Gineste (2019) From Protection to Persecution: Threat Environment and Refugee Scapegoating ................................................................................................................................. 244

### Justice ............................................................................................................ 245

### Resettlement .................................................................................................... 245
Bansak et al (2018) Improving Refugee Integration through Data-driven Algorithmic Assignment .............................................. 246
Acharya (2019) Matching Refugees to Host Country Locations Based on Preferences and Outcomes ........................................... 247

**Sustainable Development Goals** ......................................................................................................................................... 248

**Miscellaneous** ................................................................................................................................................................... 249

**VIII. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT** ...................................................................................................................................... 251

**Global Estimates of Internally Displaced Populations** ............................................................................................................. 252

**Data Gaps** ............................................................................................................................................................................ 254

**Causes and Drivers of Internal Displacement** .......................................................................................................................... 255
Marston (2019) The Urban Displaced: Fleeing Criminal Violence in Latin American Cities ................................................................ 255

**Locations of IDPs** ...................................................................................................................................................................... 257
Huang and Graham (2019) How Urban are IDPs and What Does that Mean for Their Economic Integration? ................................................................. 257

**Specific Vulnerabilities of IDPs** ............................................................................................................................................. 258
Steele (2018) IDP resettlement and Collective Targeting during civil wars: Evidence from Colombia ................................................. 259
Ivlevs (2019) Are IDPs Satisfied With the Quality of Public Health and Education Services They Receive? A Long-term Perspective from Urban Areas in the Post-Socialist Countries ................................................................ 263
Nigeria Case Study ......................................................................................................... 266
Somalia Case Study ........................................................................................................ 269
South Sudan Case Study ................................................................................................. 271
Sudan Case Study ............................................................................................................ 273

**Socio-Economic Impacts of Internal Displacement on Host Communities and Countries** ........ 275
Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) Unexpected Guests: The Impact of Internal Displacement Inflows on Rental Prices in Colombian Host Cities ................................................................. 275

**Gender Dimensions of Internal Displacement** ........................................................... 277
Cazabat (2019) Sex Matters: A Gender Perspective on Internal Displacement ............... 277

**Return and Reintegration of IDPs** ................................................................................ 278
Hoogeveen et al (2018) Leaving, Staying or Coming Back? Migration Decisions During the Northern Mali Conflict .................................................................................................................. 278
Sydney (2019) “Tired of Running” Repeated Displacement and Premature Returns in South Sudan ........ 278

**Development Interventions in Response to Internal Displacement** ............................... 280

**Miscellaneous** ............................................................................................................ 281
Kälin and Chapuisat (2017) Breaking the Impasse: Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement as a Collective Outcome .............................................................................................................. 281
Sydney (2019) “Stuck in the middle” – Seeking Durable Solutions in Post-Peace Agreement Colombia ... 283

**IX. PRIVATE SECTOR** ........................................................................................................ 285

**Private Sector Initiatives** ............................................................................................. 286
IFC (2018) Summary of IFC’s Stocktaking Study of Private Sector Initiatives: Engaging Refugees and Host Communities .............................................................................................................. 286
IFC and The Bridgespan Group (2019) Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale ............. 286

**Market Potential** ......................................................................................................... 288
IFC (2018) Kakuma as a Marketplace .................................................................................. 289
X. TECHNOLGY

Juskalian (2018) Where Life Hangs by a Chain: A Jordanian Refugee Camp is a Test for Blockchain-Based Identity Systems


Pakzad (2019) Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging Technologies for the Refugee System


XI. URBAN AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT


Huang and Graham (2018) Are Refugees Located Near Urban Job Opportunities? An Analysis of Overlap Between Refugees and Major Urban Areas in Developing Countries, and Implications for Employment Opportunities and MNC Engagement


Kang (2019) Urbanization as a Result of Displacement - A Case Study of Bentiu, South Sudan

I. COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, RETURN, AND RESTITUTION
Climate Change and Forced Migration

Missirian and Schlenker (2017) Asylum Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctuations
Anouch Missirian and Wolfram Schlenker
*Science* Vol 358, Issue 6370, 22 December 2017
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/358/6370/1610.editor-summary

There is ongoing debate as to whether climate change has contributed to, and will amplify, migration flows to the European Union from war-affected countries such as Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq. For example, a 2015 study showed that the Syrian conflict was preceded by a record drought that led to lower agricultural yields and forced farmers to migrate to urban areas. The paper explores the effects of climate change on distress-driven migration by examining how recent weather variations (from 2000 to 2014) in 103 countries translated into asylum applications to the European Union. The authors find a U-shaped relationship between the weather in a source country and the number of accepted asylum applications, i.e. temperatures that are too low or too high will lead to more numerous asylum applications. Total precipitation, on the other hand, is not an important predictor of migration (consistent with research that indicates that temperature rather than precipitation is a stronger predictor of conflict). The authors suggest several mechanisms driving the sensitivity of asylum applications to temperature anomalies: (1) a strong nonlinear relationship between agricultural yields and temperature, i.e. hot and cold temperatures reduce yield; (2) gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates have been found to be very sensitive to temperature, even on the nonagricultural components of GDP and even in industrialized countries; and (3) aggressive behavior increases with temperature. The authors conclude that climate change, especially continued warming, will add another “threat multiplier” that induces people to seek refuge abroad.

Guy J. Abel, Michael Brottrager, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, and Raya Muttarak
*Global Environmental Change*, Volume 54 (2019), Pages 239-249

There is growing public interest in climate as a driver of conflict and forced migration, however there is little empirical evidence that demonstrates a causal path from climate to conflict to forced migration. This paper assesses the determinants of refugee flows to examine the causal link between climate, conflict and forced migration. Exploiting data on asylum applications for the years 2006–2015 for 157 countries, the authors employ a gravity-type model with endogenous selection to: (a) estimate the impact of climate on conflict; and (b) assess how conflict influences forced migration.

Key results:
• There is no empirical evidence of a robust link between climatic shocks, conflict and asylum seeking for the full period 2006–2015.

• Climatic conditions, by affecting drought severity and the likelihood of armed conflict, played a significant role as an explanatory factor for asylum seeking only in the period 2011–2015.

The severity of drought episodes is mostly able to explain conflicts occurring in the interval 2010–2012 and so appear related to the emergence of armed conflict in the context of the Arab spring and the Syrian war, during which many countries were undergoing political transformation.

The authors conclude that climatic shocks will not generate forced displacement everywhere, and the causal relationship is highly dependent on the specific country context. They argue that climatic variations are more likely to generate asylum seeker flows in countries undergoing political transformation where conflict represents a form of population discontent towards inefficient response of the government to climate impacts. The authors also suggest that policies to improve the adaptive capacity to deal with the effects of climate change in developing countries may have additional returns by reducing the likelihood of conflict and consequent refugee outflows.

Decisions to Flee

Jaspars and Margie Buchanan-Smith (2018) Darfuri Migration from Sudan to Europe: From Displacement to Despair

Susanne Jaspars and Margie Buchanan-Smith
Research and Evidence Facility (REF) and Overseas Development Institute (ODI), September 2018

This study examines the trends, causes and consequences of migration from Darfur, Sudan to Europe. Key findings include:

• Migration has long been a livelihood strategy in Darfur. Darfuris have traditionally migrated for work (seasonally or longer-term) and in response to food insecurity or famine, within Darfur, to central Sudan, to neighboring countries such as Libya, Chad and Egypt, and beyond to the Gulf countries. The outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003 disrupted traditional migration patterns, and forcibly displaced millions of people. When the crisis became protracted, migration resumed to Libya, and young Darfuri men also fled to Chad, Libya, Egypt, South Sudan, and Israel.

• Migration to Europe increased from 2013 coinciding with renewed violence and forced displacement in Darfur, and as a consequence of restricted options in the region (due to political instability in Egypt, deterrent measures in Israel, deteriorating conditions for refugees in Chad). The collapse of the Libyan state enabled smuggling networks to flourish, and migration for gold in Chad and Niger provided a new source of income for migration. An estimated 8,500 Sudanese arrived in Europe in 2015, 9,300 in 2016 and 6,200 in 2017.
The majority of Darfuris migrating to Europe are young men from the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit ethnic groups, which formed the main support base for the rebellion. Most are poor; Darfuris are among the poorest migrants travelling from Africa to Europe. Most have little education, but there are also considerable numbers of students. The consequences of being less well-educated and with minimal or no European-language skills compared with many other migrant groups puts Darfuris at a disadvantage in Europe. Most had a history of displacement; their migration journey began well before their decision to leave Darfur.

There are multiple, complex and interlinked causes migration including: (a) systematic persecution, surveillance, harassment, attack or arrest by government forces, paramilitary groups and militia; (b) loss of livelihoods and access to land due to displacement, discrimination and limited freedom of movement; and (d) social and family pressures, particularly for young Darfuri men, who are unable to meet their social obligations or get married. There is a deep sense of despair about the situation in Darfur; conditions in Darfur mean that migration is largely forced.

Migration to Europe occurs in stages, not all of which are planned in advance. Destinations change en route, e.g. untenable conditions in Libya forcing migrants on towards Europe. Once in Europe, onward movement is largely determined by the circumstances Darfuris find themselves in, or the information they receive from other migrants. Routes change quickly in response to border controls, however border controls have not stopped migration. Increased border controls and the effects of the Dublin III regulations have left Darfuris stuck in circular movements within Europe. Some Darfuris have been forcibly returned to Sudan, or return themselves, with little or no follow-up.

Smugglers are key facilitators of migration from Darfur to Europe. Paying in installments has enabled poor Darfuris to migrate to Libya and on to Europe, but they risk being held for ransom, sold or drafted into forced or slave labor. Darfuri migrants usually stayed in Libya for 2–3 years before accumulating money to cross the Mediterranean.

Social media and information networks are important facilitators of migration. Most young men got their information via social media from friends and relatives who have gone before, painting a much rosier picture than the reality. They made the decision to migrate to Europe on their own, preferring the short-term risks over “a slow and miserable death in Sudan”. There is a lack of knowledge among potential Darfuri migrants about their rights when they reach Europe.

Darfuris experienced exploitation, discrimination and physical violence throughout their journey. The most extreme cases of abuse and exploitation occur in Libya, where most Darfuris experience some form of detention during which they may be beaten, tortured and deprived of basic necessities. Darfuris who reach Europe face a combination of border controls (Italy–France and France–UK), slow asylum procedures and poor provision of assistance (France and Italy), use of force by police, lack of protection or assistance for those without legal status, and the possibility of arrest, detention and forced return to Sudan. Large numbers of Darfuris in transit in
Europe are living rough. The physical and mental health of Darfuris in Europe is poor, with high levels of trauma.

- **Migration of a son to Europe can have positive and negative economic, social and political consequences for family left behind.** This depends on whether the son makes it safely, whether the family has to pay a ransom, whether he is granted asylum in Europe and whether he finds work. In the longer term, the flow of remittances could become a vital source of income for families left behind. Families left behind also suffer the emotional pain of separation.

- **Lack of accessible legal migration channels fuels irregular migration and the use of smugglers.** Migration policies of European governments focus on deterrence and containment of irregular migration, and do little to address the root causes of migration from Darfur. Deterrence measures and border controls are expensive and mostly ineffective, influencing migration patterns rather than volumes, driving migrants to take more dangerous routes, and encouraging smuggling networks.

The authors recommend:

1. **Addressing migration management as one of a complex set of challenges facing Darfur after years of conflict and a protracted humanitarian crisis:** Effective migration management within Sudan requires an understanding of the causes, drivers and consequences of migration, and approaching migration from protection, humanitarian and livelihoods perspectives. Aid programs tackling migration must be politically informed and conflict sensitive.

2. **Addressing the root causes of migration of Darfuris to Europe:** This requires ending the persecution of particular Darfuri groups, addressing the unresolved causes of conflict and ongoing violence, stepping up monitoring of protection for IDPs and students, and supporting livelihoods.

3. **Addressing protection and humanitarian needs along the migration journey:** Decisions about returns should be informed by the findings of this study regarding the systemic persecution of certain groups. The authors also advocate for: addressing inconsistencies in asylum regulations and increasing burden-sharing; providing adequate assistance to refugees in transit and those waiting for asylum claims to be considered; ending police violence; providing treatment for trauma for Darfuris in transit and in destination countries; and improving communication about asylum procedures and rights in Europe.

4. **Increasing opportunities for regular migration and legal pathways to claim asylum.**

**Kirwin and Anderson (2018) Identifying the Factors Driving West African Migration**

Matthew Kirwin and Jessica Anderson

*West African Papers, July 2018 No. 17, OECD Publishing*
Since 2014 over 600,000 African migrants have arrived in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route. The authors note that while migration from West Africa to Europe is increasing, there is ten times as much migration within West Africa than migration to Europe. This paper examines the individual motivations for migration from West Africa, through nationwide surveys conducted in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal in 2016-17, and focus group discussions in Niamey and Agadez, Niger, two major transit points. Key findings include:

- **The number of people who would migrate if given the means and opportunity varied considerably**: Niger (11 percent), Mali (19 percent), Burkino Faso (23 percent), Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal (27 percent), and Nigeria (50 percent). Not all wish to migrate to Europe; most West African migration is intra-continental. Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali are among the poorest countries in the world and yet few people wish to leave their country, even when given the means and opportunity to do so. Men tend to be more likely to want to leave than women, but this varies by religion. Urban residents are more likely to want to leave.

- **The decision to migrate is not a spontaneous one, and the journey is a multi-stage process.** Migrants prepare their journey carefully, selling personal possessions, saving money, and relying on social networks to access resources and information (in their country and during their journey).

- **Migrants are aware of the dangers of the journey but remain undaunted.** Many of them experienced traumatic events but remained undaunted in their desire to migrate abroad.

- **Economic factors as the main reason for migrating.** The most common reason to stay in one’s country of origin was either family or patriotism.

The authors then focus on Nigeria, which accounts for a quarter of all Africans traveling to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route. Using quantitative methods, they find:

- **Half of the surveyed Nigerians were interested in migration if given the opportunity,** well above the number in neighboring countries.

- **Insecurity is not a driver of wanting to migrate.** In northeast Nigeria, the region most affected by Boko Haram violence, the desire to migrate is comparatively low and on par with levels in northwest Nigeria, a region that does not face high levels of insecurity. This suggests that insecurity is not necessarily a key driver in desire to migrate, or perhaps the population in the northeast are so marginalized that migration does not seem to be a viable option for them.

- **Individual perceptions of the strength of Nigeria’s democracy are most strongly associated with Nigerians’ desire to migrate abroad,** followed by low levels of trust in local police. Nigerians’ access to water as part of service delivery also had a significant effect on the desire to migrate.
• **An individual’s economic status does not have a significant effect on desire to migrate.** This suggests that desire to migrate from Nigeria cuts across different economic levels, and that economic development does not discourage migration until it reaches a high per capita income level. Other factors that did not have a significant impact on desire to migrate included: discrimination against ethnic groups, the government’s ability to fight terrorism, and provision of public education.

• **The profile of those who wish to leave is non-Muslim, educated, urban residents who use the Internet frequently.** Muslim Nigerians are less likely to want to migrate abroad (68 percent of Muslims want to stay, 39 percent of Christians want to stay). Gender does not have a significant effect on desire to migrate.

**Ceriani and Verme (2018) Risk Preferences and the Decision to Flee Conflict**

Lidia Ceriani and Paolo Verme  
February 2018  

This paper explores why most people affected by conflict do not migrate. The authors model the distributions of outcomes (in terms of expenditure per capita) for people affected by conflict who decide to stay or leave. The distribution for ‘stayers’ is observable and derived directly from the data while the distribution for ‘leavers’ is estimated. The authors eschew a traditional ‘expected utility maximization’ model, which assumes that individuals make decisions based on the mean expected outcome (with a preference for distributions with a smaller spread of outcomes when expected utility is equal). Instead, the authors predict migration choices using ‘quantile maximization’, i.e. people with different risk preferences focus on different parts of the distribution of outcomes. The authors hypothesize that, at the extremes, risk-averse individuals aim to minimize losses (i.e. downside risks) by choosing the lottery with the best outcome at the lower end of the distribution (i.e. worst case scenario), while risk-tolerant individuals aim to maximize gains (i.e. upside potential) by choosing the lottery with the best outcome at the higher end of the distribution (i.e. best case scenario). Using household and conflict panel data from Nigeria for the period 2010-2016, the authors find that risk-tolerant individuals have a significant preference for staying and risk-averse individuals have a significant preference for fleeing. The authors note that this is contrary to findings on economic migrants (who are less risk-averse and migrate with the expectation of reaping large rewards and better living conditions) and call for separate policies towards economic and forced migrants in both places of origin and destination.


By: Geraldine Bocquého, Marc Deschamps, Jenny Helstroffer, Julien Jacob, and Majlinda Joxhe  
Working Papers of Bureau d’Economie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), February 2018  
This paper examines refugees' risk preferences using an experimental approach. It also explores whether refugees' experience of violence may change their attitudes, either exacerbating risk-seeking behavior or diminishing it. Information about the migration decisions and risk preferences of refugees was gathered from 206 asylum-seekers in Luxembourg in 2017-2018. The authors propose a model of refugee migration that is based on 'cumulative prospect theory', which takes into account decreasing marginal utility, loss aversion (i.e. a loss is more painful than a gain is enjoyable) and probability distortion, as an alternative to standard 'expected utility theory'. The authors find that refugees' risk preferences have characteristics that clearly distinguish them from other populations. Compared to other populations, refugees were found to: (a) value gains more—refugees obtain increasingly higher utility levels for positive payoffs, e.g. migrating to a Western country with potentially very good opportunities is highly valued; (b) be less loss averse, e.g. if the status quo is war, then refugees do not have much to lose, and they may well be less sensitive to negative outcomes; and (c) be less likely to distort probabilities, e.g. risk of dying when crossing the Mediterranean.

UNODC (2018) Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2018

This report presents detailed information about 30 major smuggling routes worldwide, including the magnitude and value of smuggling routes, profiles of smugglers and smuggled migrants, modus operandi of smugglers, and risks faced by smuggled migrants. The report highlights the key differences between migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, pertaining to consent, purpose of exploitation, transnationality, source of criminal profits, and object of the crime. It also makes a distinction between smuggling of migrants (i.e. facilitating irregular forms of migration for a financial or other material benefit) and irregular migration (i.e. conduct and status of migrants themselves). Key findings include:

- **Migrant smuggling occurs in all regions of the world**, although intensity varies across locations.

- **Migrant smuggling is a big and profitable business.** At least 2.5 million migrants were smuggled in 2016 for an economic return of US$5.5-7 billion.

- **Migrant smuggling is driven by a myriad of supply and demand factors.** Smugglers advertise their services where migrants can be easily reached, e.g. diaspora communities, refugee camps or online social networks. Demand is determined by: (a) need to migrate due to armed conflict, persecution, socio-economic hardship, family reunification etc.; (b) mobility regulations and restrictions; (c) expensive and lengthy procedures to obtain regular travel documents; (d)
marketing and misinformation by smugglers; and (e) smugglers’ recruitment and community pressure. Demand is particularly high among refugees.

- **Routes and travel methods vary**, determined by geography, border control, migration policy in destination countries, smugglers’ connections across countries, and cost of services offered by smugglers. Land routes are more common than sea or air routes, which generally require more resources and organization. **Border control measures do not typically reduce the number of smuggled migrants but rather lead to changes in smuggling routes**, increased risk for migrants, and more opportunities for smugglers to profit. In contrast to routes, **smuggling hubs tend to be stable over time**.

- **The organization and scale of smuggling operations vary**. Smugglers may work largely on their own, within a small network in one or two countries, or as part of large, complex multinational organizations. Smaller-scale smugglers are either ethnically linked to the territories where they operate, or share ethnic/linguistic ties with the migrants they smuggle. Many smuggling networks engage in systematic corruption. However, smuggling networks are generally not involved in other forms of major transnational organized crime. In some parts of the world (e.g. along the border between the US and Mexico), smuggling networks do have links with large violent criminal organizations that they have to pay for the ‘right’ to safe passage for migrants.

- **Most smuggled migrants are young men**. On some routes, notably in parts of South-East Asia, women comprise large shares of smuggled migrants. Many smuggling flows **include unaccompanied or separated children**, who are particularly vulnerable to deception or abuse.

- **Smuggled migrants are vulnerable to a range of risks** including violence, theft, extortion, exploitation, sexual violence, kidnapping, trafficking and death. There are thousands of deaths due to smuggling activities each year, with around 50 percent occurring on the Mediterranean route due to drowning, harsh conditions and illness, homicides and vehicle/train accidents.

The report makes the following recommendations to tackle migrant smuggling:

- Ratifying/acceding to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and ensuring full implementation, including the defining element of ‘financial and other material’ (which protects persons who provide assistance to migrants solely for family and/or humanitarian motives).

- Equipping and training organizations providing assistance to migrants as well as law enforcement and migration authorities to address the particular vulnerabilities of children who are smuggled.

- Integrating different types of interventions and broadening geographical coverage to include countries of origin, transit, and destination. Targeting smuggling hubs, since these are more stable than routes.

- Taking into account the complex supply and demand factors that drive smuggling.
• Making regular migration opportunities more accessible in origin countries and refugee camps.

• Raising awareness in communities of origin, and particularly in refugee camps, about the dangers involved in smuggling. Engaging the private sector (e.g. telecommunications and social media corporations) to expand access to lifesaving information.

• Providing alternative livelihood programs to communities that rely on income from migrant smuggling to reduce the economic incentives that attract small-scale smugglers.

• Improving regional and international cooperation and national criminal justice responses, including financial sanctions (e.g. effective mechanisms to confiscate proceeds of crime).

• Enforcing anti-corruption mechanisms at borders and within consular and migration authorities.

• Improving data collection, analysis and research on migrant smuggling.

Justin Schon
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318806044

The author examines the timing of conflict-induced migration and why some individuals leave their homes earlier than others. The author reviews the existing research that emphasizes the role of violence in driving civilian migration decisions (either directly by increasing threat perceptions or indirectly by damaging the economy), but notes that migration timing often does not have a clear correlation with violence timing. Using structured interviews with Syrian refugees in Turkey, the author shows that witnessing violence and social status (social connections and wealth) affect the timing of an individual’s decision to flee.

• Civilians who witness violence will migrate later than those who do not witness violence. While some experiences of violence produce negative psychological responses such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), other experiences of violence may produce more positive effects due to post-traumatic growth (PTG) resulting in increased creativity in finding coping mechanisms. Literature suggests that witnessing violence (as opposed to ‘violence received’ or ‘violence to family members’) is the only experience of violence that is correlated with PTG without a clear correlation with PTSD. People who witness violence tend to undergo PTG, believe existing narratives for longer, suffer narrative ruptures later, and develop motivation to migrate later than those who do not witness violence.

• Civilians who perceive that they have ‘wasta’—providing the opportunity to migrate safely—will migrate earlier. People who have an advanced social status (‘wasta’), resulting from some combination of wealth and social connections, are better protected from selective violence along migration routes (e.g. allowing them to pass through checkpoints without incident) and
therefore are more likely to leave earlier rather than later. This protection does not help in the face of indiscriminate violence in residential areas.

The author examines the determinants of migration timing using Cox proportional hazard models. He demonstrates that:

- **Civilians must have both early motivation and opportunity in order to migrate at an earlier time during conflict.** Motivation without opportunity and opportunity without motivation are not enough.

- **Ties to armed groups is not a statistically significant determinant of the timing of migration, which supports the view that more information about armed group activities does not have a systematic relationship with motivation or opportunity for migration.**

- **‘Violence to family’ and ‘Violence received’ are not statistically significant determinants of the timing of migration, which supports an argument that the counter-intuitive effect of ‘Violence witnessed’ is not just driven by an endogenous relationship with migration timing. If witnessing violence were just more likely because somebody had stayed home for a longer duration and would have more violent experiences generally, then receiving violence or family members receiving violence should also be more likely as people stay home for a longer duration.**

**Steele (2019) Civilian Resettlement Patterns in Civil War**

Abbey Steele
*Journal of Peace Research, Volume 56, Issue 1 (2019)*
[https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318820576](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318820576)

The predominant approach to forced displacement draws on the ‘push-pull’ model from migration studies, which reasons that the displaced, like migrants, compare the conditions in their home community (security, economic conditions) with those elsewhere when deciding whether and where to go. This assumes that individuals/households decide independently. The author argues that **resettlement decisions also depend on decisions of others who are also displaced**, i.e. the displaced anticipate whether their safety depends in part on others who are also displaced, or not. The author **introduces a conceptual typology of civilian resettlement patterns in civil wars that incorporates two dimensions: (a) whether or not displaced civilians cluster together or resettle independently; and (b) whether civilians remain within their home country or relocate abroad.**

The interaction of how and where the displaced resettle creates four ideal-type patterns: (i) expulsion; (ii) segregation; (iii) integration; and (iv) dispersion. Expulsion and segregation occur when the displaced cluster, either abroad (expulsion) or within the home state (segregation). Integration and dispersion occur when the displaced do not cluster but seek to blend in with other communities, either locally (integration) or abroad (dispersion). The author argues that **the form of displacement civilians experience (cleansing or not) shapes whether or not they will try to resettle with others,**
and the actor that perpetrates the violence (state or not) explains if they will resettle within their home state or abroad.

- **Groups that experience political cleansing are likely to cluster together for safety.** There are three types of displacement: (1) individual escape, when people react to selective targeting by an armed group; (2) mass evasion, when civilians avoid indiscriminate violence; and (3) political cleansing, when armed groups expel civilians through collective targeting, based on a shared trait. The author argues that those who experience cleansing (i.e. targeted based on a shared trait that is difficult to shed) are the most likely to cluster together in their new location, because they face an ongoing security risk; if they resettle independently, they will stand out and face potential harm again. In contrast, those who experience selective targeting can try to seek anonymity in cities or new communities, and civilians who face indiscriminate violence can reduce the threat they face by relocating, whether or not they resettle with others.

- **The best destination options for the displaced to resettle depend on the perpetrator, which lead to clustering either within a state if the actor is non-state, or outside the state if the actor is the state or an ally.**

The article concludes by considering the implications of resettlement patterns for violence, conflict, and state building.

Cevat Giray Aksoy and Panu Poutvaara
Ifo Working Papers No. 289, January 2019

About 1.4 million refugees and irregular migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016. The authors model how refugees and irregular migrants are self-selected in terms of their skills and demographic characteristics. The authors **provide the first large-scale evidence on reasons to emigrate, and the self-selection and sorting of refugees and irregular migrants for multiple origin and destination countries.** The data used in this paper come from 2015 and 2016 Flow Monitoring Surveys carried out in Europe as part of the Displacement Tracking Matrix of the IOM, covering the demographic characteristics, intended destination countries and reasons for leaving their home countries for 19,000 refugees and irregular migrants aged 14 and over. 77 percent of respondents had emigrated mainly due to conflict or persecution, 21 percent for economic reasons or lack of basic services, and 2 percent due to natural disasters or other reasons, but there are large differences in reasons to emigrate across nationalities. Respondents were more likely to be single (70 percent), male (82 percent), and young (average age of 26). These data are combined with non-migration population data from Gallup World Polls to understand how migrant groups are self-selected from the source.
population in terms of observable characteristics and predicted income. Empirical results for individuals aged 25 to 64:

- **The probability of emigration is higher for men, younger people, and singles.** Among men, singles are more likely to migrate, while married women are more likely to emigrate than single women, reflecting that women typically migrate with their spouse.

- **Overall, educated people are significantly more likely to migrate.** Refugees and irregular migrants escaping major conflicts (both men and women) tend to be highly educated relative to the national average in their country of origin, consistent with the authors’ prediction that as the risk of being a victim of conflict increases, the probability of emigration becomes eventually increasing in human capital even if returns to human capital would be higher in the country of origin in the absence of conflict. Self-selection patterns between men and women are starkly different from countries with no or minor conflict, or if analyzing those whose main motivation to emigrate was not conflict or persecution: men do not differ much from non-migrants, while women are more educated than non-migrants. The authors posit that women’s positive self-selection in terms of education also from countries with no or minor conflict arises because of gender discrimination that depresses especially tertiary educated women’s job opportunities. Finally, **refugees are significantly more likely to have secondary and tertiary level education compared with those who cite other reasons for leaving their countries.**

- **Men who were in employment before migration are more likely to emigrate from countries suffering from major conflict but less likely to emigrate from countries with minor or no conflict,** again in line with the theory that emigration from no or low conflict countries is motivated by lack of economic opportunities. The opposite is found for women: those who were in employment before migration are less likely to emigrate from countries suffering from major conflict but more likely to emigrate from countries with minor or no conflict. The authors suggest that this finding may reflect “highly educated women’s relatively bad labor market opportunities to which those women who choose to pursue employment react more strongly”.

- **Refugees and irregular migrants are strongly positively self-selected in terms of their predicted earnings in all country groups** (that is, major conflict and minor or no conflict). Men are more strongly positively self-selected from all country groups compared to women.

- **Those with tertiary education are more likely to choose more unequal countries** and those with secondary education more equal countries than those below secondary education, suggesting that education may play an important role when refugees and irregular migrants choose their destination. They also find that **those with lower levels of education (educated to primary or secondary level) are relatively more likely to head for countries with lower unemployment rates, better migrant integration policies, faster asylum processes, easier access to the labor market for people who have successfully claimed asylum, and stronger social safety nets.**
• Border policies significantly affected the intended destinations of refugees and irregular migrants.

Mehmet Balcilar and Jeffrey B. Nugent
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2018.09.007

This study explores the relationship between refugees’ experiences of violence and their decisions to flee Syria, as well as the factors influencing their intentions to return or migrate elsewhere. The analysis is based on three waves of the Survey on Syrian Refugees carried out by the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (AFAD). Among the determinants of individual-level migration decisions subsequent to conflict, the authors consider: sex; education level; income level; conflict-related measures (such as death of family members and damage to home in Syria); the duration of time lived as a refugee; and the quality of services (water and hygiene, health, security) offered to the refugee household.

Key findings:
• Both the extent and duration of the violence in Syria and the duration of time as a refugee in Turkey raise the probability that a refugee will aspire to permanent settlement in another country and reduce the probability of return to Syria.
• The higher the quality of services provided to refugees in the form of health care and security, the more likely the refugees wish to stay in Turkey.
• Female refugees are more likely to return to Syria than males (but only if they are confident that it is safe to do so).
• Refugees with higher incomes, education, skills, and better access to migration networks are more likely to migrate out of Turkey to Europe and elsewhere.

Juan Francisco Saldarriaga and Yuan Hua
Cities, Volume 95, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102407

This article analyzes flows of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Colombia between 1986 and 2015 to identify some of the main factors associated with IDPs’ choice of destination. The authors
make use of gravity models to examine the correlation between an IDP’s path and the characteristics of the origin and destination municipalities. Besides the classical gravity model variables, such as population and distance, the authors consider: intensity of violence at origin and destination municipalities/regions; the level of community participation at origin and destination; and the extent of the social network at destination. The analysis is based on municipal-level data from the Registro Único de Víctimas, the official database of victims of the Colombian conflict for the period 1986-2016, as well as population estimates and data on community participation from the Colombian National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).

Key findings:

• Intensity of violence at the origin municipality appears to be the most important driver of forced displacement.
• Distance between origin and destination, and population size at the destination, are statistically correlated to the number of IDPs arriving in a municipality.
• The number of previously displaced people from the same origin at the destination municipality is the strongest predictor of displacement volume. This suggests a much stronger link between social networks of victims and their choice of destination.

The authors recommend that forced displacement be treated as a regional-level phenomenon and planners, city officials, and aid organizations should focus their attention on medium-sized regional centers. Given the importance of social networks in driving IDPs’ choice of destination, the authors propose that city officials, planners and aid organizations should closely collaborate with grassroots community organizations to allocate resources and plan for new arrivals.

Communities Left Behind

Passey (2018) How Migration to Europe Affects Those Left Behind
Megan Passey
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 35-37
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/passey

Families are frequently separated as a result of migration and displacement from the Middle East to Europe. Migrants often underestimate the time needed to reach their destination and for their asylum claim to be processed, and there is limited planning for those left behind. There may be positive consequences for those left behind if just one individual departs who faces a higher risk due to their age, gender, religion, occupation or political affiliation (e.g. young men approaching the age of military recruitment). However, in other cases family separation may create multiple challenges such as: (a) restricted access to livelihoods or reduced household income if the person who left was...
the main earner; (b) restricted access to basic services due to lack of funds to pay for transport, lack of a male chaperone, limited financial resources to pay for consultations, medicine and school books; (c) increased vulnerability and insecurity for women and children when an adult male leaves; (d) changing roles and responsibilities within the family, especially when the main earner or head of family leaves; and (e) psychological effects of family separation on health. **Humanitarian assistance for family members left behind is often difficult to access and insufficient to meet needs,** particularly for female-headed households. The single most important strategy to protect those left behind is for the household’s main earner to stay behind. In contrast, families comprising a woman on her own with young children were typically the most vulnerable.

**Howe et al (2018) The Wages of War: Learning from How Syrians Have Adapted their Livelihoods through Seven Years of Conflict**

Kimberly Howe, Roxani Krystalli, Vaidehi Krishnan, Jon Kurtz, and Reimar Macaranas
Mercy Corps, February 2018

This study **explores why some Syrians have been able to adapt their livelihoods during conflict.** Protracted conflict has had widespread impacts on people inside Syria: violent incidents causing property destruction, injuries and death occur on average twice per week; 90 percent of Syrians live with moderate to severe fear and psychological distress; 6.1 million Syrians are internally displaced (the average IDP has moved 3.7 times); two-thirds of households have lost one or more of their main income sources since the start of the conflict; and two-thirds of households do not have secure access to food. Security and access to livelihoods are primary push and pull factors for households to move within the country or to leave Syria.

Despite the widespread impact of the conflict, **one-third of Syrians have found ways to adapt their livelihoods**—achieving significantly better food security, higher expenditures, improved psychosocial wellbeing, and better housing conditions. “Adaptors” typically rely more on small business, trade, skilled labor and the private sector, while those who have not adapted depend more on agriculture and animal husbandry. Adaptors were not better off pre-conflict compared with the rest of the population. The study **identifies factors that have enabled livelihood adaptation including:** (a) access to functioning markets; (b) access to loans and remittances; (c) social networks; and (d) women and youth income earners (among households that have adapted their livelihoods, more Syrian women and youth are earning incomes outside the household than before the conflict).

The authors **recommend several strategies to reinforce existing coping strategies and livelihood adaptation:** (i) support the delivery of unconditional and unrestricted cash assistance; (ii) strengthen local markets and small-scale producers’ capacity to support food self-sufficiency; (iii) support business recovery, livelihood opportunities and skills training in key economic sectors; (iv) ensure humanitarian aid strengthens social networks; (v) design targeted livelihood programs for women
and youth, without ignoring men; (vi) engage women and youth in community rebuilding, and engage with male community leaders to create more buy-in for these roles; (vii) support technology-based skills development; (viii) remove funding barriers that parse human needs into emergency, early recovery and development; and (ix) support learning based on market-driven approaches.

Salmen, Assaf and Francis (2018) Surviving Firms of the Syrian Arab Republic: A Rapid Assessment
Kinley Salmon, Nabila Assaf and David Francis
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8396, April 2018
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29610

This paper details the results from a comprehensive survey of private firms in Syria (in Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Damascus) and provides some interesting insights into the impact of forced displacement on private enterprises. The survey highlights the major challenges facing firms in Syria including access to electricity, fuel, and water. Loss of workers, managers, and supply chain relationships are also cited as severe challenges. Three-quarters of surveyed firms reported a decrease in the size of their workforce since the start of the crisis, due in some degree to loss of life or forced displacement. For the 160 firms that were surveyed in 2009 and 2017, the average number of employees had decreased by more than 50 percent. Firms frequently reported the loss of employees as a major or severe problem (48 percent cited loss of skilled workers, 38 percent cited loss of managers; and 28 percent cited loss of unskilled workers). The paper also identifies the impacts of these problems on prices, sales, supply chains, taxation, and costs. The authors find evidence that some firms have responded by relocating or adjusting their operating hours. The authors note that reestablishing basic services will not be easy, but the bigger, more intractable challenge for Syria’s local enterprises will be restoring security and recovering from the devastating loss of life and mass displacement of people.

Return

Dadush (2018) The Economic Effects of Refugee Return
Uri Dadush
Economics Discussion Papers, No. 2018-22, 2018
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2018-22

This paper explores whether it is in the economic self-interest of advanced countries to return forcibly displaced persons. Voluntary returns from rich countries to poor countries are rare; in most cases voluntary returns are unrealistic due to continued insecurity in countries of origin as well as differences in wages between developing and advanced countries. The author argues that: the effect of refugees on growth is often positive (by stimulating investment in the long term) and can be significant (if the refugee inflow is large enough, and especially in slow-growing mature economies);
the effect of refugees on wages of unskilled workers, employment, and unemployment is likely to be mild; and the fiscal impact of refugee flows is likely to be small. The author makes the case that the costs of hosting asylum seekers and refugees are front-loaded, while the benefits accruing from their integration into the labor market and the host economy are often significant and typically take many years to materialize. Consequently, their return after a short stay may represent a costlier option than continuing to invest in their successful integration. Countries with a flexible labor market, strong investment climate, and a welcoming attitude to immigrants tend to see the economic benefits of refugee inflows materialize faster.

Keith and Shawaf (2018) When is Return Voluntary? Conditions of Asylum in Lebanon
Amy Keith and Nour Shawaf
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 62-63
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/keith-shawaf

Many refugees face physical, psychological or material ‘push factors’ arising from the lack of legal status. A key factor is refugees’ legal status in host countries. In Lebanon, 80 percent of Syrian refugees lack residency documents, which is a criminal offence, and increases the risk of arrest and detention. To avoid checkpoints, many refugees restrict their movements, reducing their ability to find work or access services. For those that find work, lack of documentation makes them vulnerable to exploitation. Reduced income makes it difficult for refugees to pay rent (increasing the risk of eviction) and meet other basic needs, and consequently many go into debt. There are two paths for refugees to acquire residency documents in Lebanon: (a) they can apply on the basis of a valid UNHCR registration, however in practice this still excludes the possibility of employment (even though the requirement to sign a pledge not to work was removed in mid-2016); or (b) they can obtain a pledge of responsibility (sponsorship) from a Lebanese citizen, however this exposes a refugee to high risk of exploitation (free labor, additional fees). The authors conclude that for returns to be truly voluntary, refugees need to be able to access a form of legal status that permits them to sustain themselves without requiring sponsorship.

Vignal (2018) Perspectives on the Return of Syrian Refugees
Leila Vignal
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 69-71
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/vignal

Discussions about the imminent return of large numbers of Syrian refugees are premature. Approximately two thirds of the former 21 million inhabitants of Syria have been forced to leave their homes (6.3 million IDPs, 5.2 million registered refugees and up to three million unregistered refugees). There is increasing talk of refugee returns, prompted by the new military situation in
Syria, closure of borders by neighboring countries, deteriorating conditions in Jordan and Lebanon, and high cost of humanitarian assistance. The author argues that these discussions are misguided because: the conflict continues, and the ‘quiet’ places of today may not be safe tomorrow; Syrian refugees do not want to go back to ‘stable and low-tension areas’ but to their own places of origin; and access to livelihoods, homes, infrastructure, basic services, education and health provision in Syria has disintegrated. Moreover, return cannot precede the political settlement of the war, and return requires: (a) the guarantee of safety, security and absence of retaliation; and (b) some prospect of a future in Syria, including reconstruction. While there is much interest in post-war reconstruction activities, it is not clear how these will be funded.

Samuel Hall (2018) Syria’s Spontaneous Returns
Samuel Hall, 2018
http://samuelhall.org/syrias-spontaneous-returns/

More than 440,000 IDPs returned to their homes in Syria in 2017, and 31,000 refugees returned to Syria in the first half of 2017. This study analyzes spontaneous returns to Syria, based on surveys in Homs, Idlib and Azaz governates, and Aleppo City. The researchers find that those who were more recently displaced are more likely to return, and the large majority return to their governorate of origin. The most common push factor for leaving places of displacement was lack of income/livelihoods. Secondary push factors differed between IDPs (lack of cash/savings, and insecurity in places of displacement) and refugees (difficult socio-cultural environment, racism and discrimination in places of displacement). The most common pull factors for return included homesickness, family reunification, a desire to search for work or to check on land and property, and the belief that security had improved. Split and temporary returns were a key component of spontaneous refugee returns. In order to return, refugees required information, money and transportation; the main sources of information were family and friends, mass media, and social media.

Top needs cited by returnees were: (a) livelihoods, income, cash; (b) healthcare; (c) safety; (d) basic infrastructure; and (e) education. Half of returned households were not satisfied with employment opportunities, one third of households rated housing conditions as sub-standard, 15 percent of households had children out of school, and 49 percent of households had health needs. The study assessed reintegration challenges across four dimensions of a ‘resilience index’: documentation, livelihoods, basic services and safety. Variations in reintegration outcomes appear to be determined by location rather than by displacement profile (with the exception that returned IDPs score lower on the livelihoods dimension of resilience). Common challenges relate to family separation, access to documentation, access to food, ability to borrow, social engagement, and psychosocial wellbeing. Overall, host communities share similar needs with returnee households.
73 percent of returned households wished to stay in their current location, 7 percent wished to move abroad, 4 percent wished to move within Syria, and 16 percent were uncertain of their plans.

IMPACT Initiatives (2018) Picking up the Pieces: Realities of Return and Reintegration in North-East Syria
IMPACT Initiatives, November 2018

From January to June 2018, an estimated 745,000 IDPs and 16,000 refugees returned to their areas of origin in Syria; the majority of returned IDPs had been displaced within their governates. Drawing on data collected from IDP returnees, refugee returnees, IDPs and non-displaced in areas under self-administration in Hasakeh and Raqqa governorates in north-east Syria (NES), the study examines: (a) push and pull factors in decisions to return; (b) returnees’ preparations and journey of return; and (c) returnees’ progress towards reintegration according to the IASC criteria of durable solutions. The study focused on households living in urban areas only and did not cover households living in IDP camps. Key findings:

- **The primary pull factor for return was improved safety at the community of origin** (66 percent of refugee returnees and 72 percent of IDP returnees). Homesickness and nostalgia were also significant pull factors, especially for refugee returnees.

- **The primary push factors for return were lack of employment opportunities, lack of services and lack of security at the displacement location**. For refugee returnees, the most common primary push factors were lack of economic opportunities (39 percent) and lack of services (25 percent). For IDP returnees, the most common primary push factors were lack of services (39 percent) and lack of security (34 percent). The level of humanitarian assistance at the community of origin was not a significant pull factor.

- Community network and resources (e.g. relatives, friends, neighbors) played an important role in facilitating returns and reintegration. This included: (a) influencing returnees’ motivation to return to unite with them; (b) providing information and assurance that return area was safe; and (c) providing reintegration support (e.g. restoring homes, providing loans). 34 percent of refugee returnees and 19 percent of IDP returnees reported the situation at their community of origin to be worse than they had expected. **Returnees’ threshold for return was extremely low**—some households were returning despite knowing their homes were damaged, and basic services and economic opportunities were lacking.

- 38 percent of IDPs considered conditions to be unsafe to return and 25 percent of IDPs did not have the money to move. Rather than a desire to stay and integrate, **IDPs do not have the**
option to return or move elsewhere even if conditions at the place of displacement continue to deteriorate.

Returnees do not appear to face higher levels of vulnerability (based on IASC criteria) compared to the non-displaced. IDPs scored lowest in progress towards durable solutions, compared to returnees and the non-displaced.

- Although improved safety was the primary pull factor for return, returnees feared explosive remnants of war (ERW), kidnappings, gun shootings and harassment, and feared renewed conflict that would force them to be displaced again.
- Only 30 percent of refugee returnee households and 40 percent of IDP households reported sufficient and regular access to drinking water. Returnees and IDPs highlighted high living costs and the need for assistance.
- 67 percent of IDPs, 76 percent of IDP returnees, 76 percent of the non-displaced and 78 percent of refugee returnee households reported having access to income-generating opportunities. A considerable proportion of refugee returnees (25 percent), IDP returnees (31 percent), IDPs (53 percent) and the non-displaced (23 percent) perceived unequal access to employment opportunities.
- 30 percent of IDP returnees and 29 percent of refugee returnees reported their home to be damaged.
- High proportion of households reported having access to documentation, however percentages are likely to be significantly lower for households in camps (not covered in this study).
- Refugee returnees (25 percent) had the highest proportion of households reporting family separation; compared to the non-displaced (7 percent), IDPs (9 percent) and IDP returnees (9 percent). A majority of respondents (67 percent) were reunited with all family members that were separated during displacement.
- A higher proportion of IDPs reported having access to humanitarian assistance (45 percent) compared to returnees and non-displaced (23 percent combined). A high proportion of refugee returnees (43 percent), IDP returnees (59 percent), IDPs (58 percent) and the non-displaced (67 percent) perceived their household to have unequal access to humanitarian assistance. This could have implications for community tensions.


Asha Abdel-Rahim, Dany Jaimovich, Aleksi Ylönen
https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2015.1095515
This paper compares the social and economic conditions of returnee households with the non-displaced population in eight villages of the Nuba Mountains in Sudan, by exploiting household data collected during a short-lived interwar period in 2008. In the South Kordofan region, 25 percent of the population consisted of returnee households in 2008 (mostly IDPs), with around 280,000 returnees in the Nuba Mountains. The authors find that:

• **Returnees have fewer assets** than those who stayed during the conflict, in terms of both land size and livestock ownership.

• The composition of agricultural production differs between the groups, with ‘stayers’ more involved in the cultivation of cash crops (requiring investment and better soil quality) and **returnees relying on staples**. The authors suggest that returnees appear to be in a less favorable position, and potentially falling into a poverty trap of permanently cultivating staples. This could justify targeted assistance to returnees to improve the conditions for the production of cash crops, or other viable alternatives.

• **Returnees are more likely to have extended family in the village and have clearer property rights over their land than the stayers**. The authors suggest that the expectation of recognition as a member of the community of origin and support for the claim of assets held before the conflict are important pull factors for return.

• **Even though returnees seem to face worse economic conditions, they tend to perform better than the rest of the villagers in a series of health indicators**, experiencing lower prevalence of a number of serious diseases common to the area as well as lower mortality rates. Using a detailed set of variables about hygiene and sanitary habits, the authors explore the hypothesis that **better health outcomes for returnees may be related to changes in attitudes** given the distinct experiences during displacement. Their results suggest that **returnee households are more likely to adopt these measures**, e.g. more likely to wash their hands, use mosquito nets, and engage in family planning, and they are also more likely to be members of community based organizations.

• **Many of the differences between returnees and stayers are gender-related**, as the female-headed returnee households are those that are more likely to only produce staple crops and less likely to generate agricultural wage income and own livestock.

Due to a lack of pre-conflict data or a geographically widespread sample these results can only be considered descriptive.

**Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2019) The Impacts of Refugee Repatriation on Receiving Communities**

Isabel Ruiz and Carlos Vargas-Silva, 2019

Between 2000 and 2016 around 600,000 Burundian refugees returned from Tanzania, the majority before 2010, and most settling in communities of origin. This paper examines the consequences of refugee repatriation for communities of return in Burundi, in a context in which refugees faced tight restrictions on economic activities and mobility while residing in refugee camps abroad. The authors analyze the impact of repatriation on ‘stayees’ (in terms of livestock levels, land access, subjective wellbeing, food security, health and crime) and adjustments they make in response to returning refugees (e.g. out migration, and redistribution of workers across economic activities). The analysis is based on longitudinal data collected between 2011 and 2015. The authors use an instrumental variable approach (based on geographical features of communities, such as altitude and proximity to the border) to address the potential source of endogeneity due to wealthier communities being more likely to seek asylum abroad.

Key results:

- **A greater share of returnees in a community is associated with less livestock ownership for stayees; the negative effect becomes stronger over time.** A one percentage point increase in the share of the population accounted for by returnees leads to a reduction in the livestock of stayee households which is equivalent to one fowl per adult member or about 5 percent with respect to the mean.

- **Refugee repatriation has a negative impact on land access; the negative effect becomes stronger over time.** A one percentage point increase in the share of returnees in the population leads on average to a 0.05 hectare reduction in the land holding of stayee households, which is close to a 4 percent reduction with respect to the mean land holding.

- **Repatriation has a negative impact on subjective wellbeing for stayees, at least in the short term.** This impact disappears across rounds of the survey.

- **Repatriation has a negative impact on food security for stayees, at least in the short term.** A one percentage point increase in the share of returnees in the community leads to a one percentage point increase in the likelihood of experiencing food difficulties on a daily basis. This impact disappears across rounds of the survey.

- The presence of returnees has no statistically significant effect on health outcomes or the likelihood of being a victim of theft.

- **Households adjust to the presence of returnees by changing income generating activities and relying less on land harvesting to produce food for household consumption.**

- The presence of returnees had no impact on out-migration of stayees.

The results suggest that refugee return can lead to hardship for communities experiencing return. The authors conclude that “promoting (or forcing) large-scale repatriation at times may not provide a sustainable solution to the ‘problem’, but may simply relocate it.”
Iraq hosts over 250,000 of the 5.6 million registered Syrian refugees in the Middle East region. 99 percent of Syrian refugees in Iraq have settled in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). This report examines the potential for local integration of Syrian refugees in Iraq. Research focused on urban areas of Erbil city and Dahuk city in KRI, and Qaim city in the Anbar governorate of Iraq, and covered Syrian refugee and host population households. Unregistered Syrian refugees, Syrian refugees in camps, and Iraqi IDPs were not covered. The study assessed access (and perceptions of equal access) to legal, material and physical safety based on the IASC indicators for durable solutions. It also looked at access to humanitarian assistance. **Overall, Syrian refugees have been able to integrate in the host community to a certain extent.** However, there are statistically significant differences between Syrian refugees and Iraqi residents for several indicators:

- **A lower proportion of Syrian households (59 percent) reported access to income-generating opportunities compared to Iraqi residents (78 percent).** Syrian refugees reported being limited to working in low-skilled sectors, and having to accept lower wages and longer working hours; some reported harassment in the workplace. Iraqi residents reported increased job competition due to the influx of Syrian refugees (and Iraqi IDPs). 74 percent refugees and 45 percent of residents perceived unequal access to employment opportunities. Access to employment opportunities is most likely to be a source of community tension.

- **A lower proportion of Syrian households had access to documentation.** While a majority of Syrian and Iraqi households reported having access to documents (birth certificates, marriage certificates, family booklet), only 30 percent of Syrian households had passports.

- **A majority of Syrian refugees reported being able to access basic services, however a lower proportion of Iraqi residents (65 percent) compared to Syrian households (77 percent) reported regular access to drinking water.** There were no statistically significant differences in access to basic food, housing, education and healthcare. Iraqi residents reported overcrowding and pressure on basic services due to the influx of Syrian refugees (and Iraqi IDPs). Perceptions of unequal access were moderately high with 22 refugees and 25 residents perceiving unequal access, suggesting a potential source of community tension.

- Although a majority of Syrian refugees (93 percent) and Iraqi residents (94 percent) reported feeling safe walking around their neighborhood, a **higher proportion of Iraqi residents (21**
percent) than refugee households (8 percent) reported having been a victim of a safety or security incident. Some Iraqi residents perceived that the arrival of Syrian refugees had negatively affected the level of safety in their neighborhoods.

- **The research highlights additional challenges faced by Syrian refugees including family separation and loss of property.** 45 percent of Syrian households reported that they were separated from family members during displacement; a greater number of households had relatives staying behind in Syria rather than being displaced to another location. Syrian households in Erbil (53 percent) and Dahuk (26 percent) reported loss of property in Syria.

- **Low access to humanitarian assistance combined with perceptions of unfair distribution of assistance are likely to be a source of community tension.** 11 percent of refugee households and 17 percent of resident households reported having access to humanitarian assistance. Only 14 percent of refugee households and 49 percent of resident households perceived their households to have equal access to humanitarian assistance compared to others in their community.

The research examines the enabling and limiting factors for local integration.

- **A shared Kurdish identity and language has facilitated socio-cultural integration of Syrian refugees in KRI.** Syrians found the host community to be hospitable and welcoming. Iraqi residents appreciated the positive contribution of Syrian refugees to their society and economy. However, some Syrian refugees reported feeling alienated or faced mistrust by the host community.

- **The influx of Iraqi IDPs has led to additional integration challenges for Syrian refugees,** e.g. increased rent, reduced wages, increased job competition, and the diversion of humanitarian assistance from refugees to IDPs.

- **Syrian refugees reported integration challenges to have shifted from socio-cultural barriers to economic barriers over time.** While social integration between Syrians and Iraqis has improved (including language and culture), economic integration has worsened due to KRI’s economic decline. Job competition has become a new source of tension.

- **There is currently no legal pathway offered to Syrian refugees to obtain Iraqi citizenship.** Syrian refugees reported experiencing fewer rights compared to Iraqis (e.g. freedom of movement from the KRI to the rest of Iraq) and restrictions in their ability to start businesses or own property.

The research also assesses Syrian refugees’ decision-making and intentions:

- **Most Syrian refugees intend to stay in Iraq.** In the short term, 78 percent of Syrian households intend to stay and only 1 percent intends to return to Syria. In the long term, 37 percent of Syrian households wish to integrate locally, 33 percent aspire to resettle in a third country, and 25 percent hope to return to Syria. 63 percent of Syrian households reported “feeling hopeless”
or “frequently negative” about the situation and the future. Households lacked future prospects and the ability to make long-term plans.

Key recommendations include: (a) authorities should establish a legal framework for the long-term protection of refugees reflecting provisions afforded to refugees and IDPs under Iraqi domestic and international law; (b) the humanitarian community should monitor and respond to protection concerns of Syrian refugees and coordinate effectively among all stakeholders to ensure that gaps between refugees, IDPs, and host community—in particular those related to accessing employment and livelihood opportunities—are closed in a principled and needs-based manner; and (c) the donor community should provide structural financial assistance to support Iraq in rebuilding the social fabric and infrastructures of the country and its capacity to host refugees, while at the same time increase third country resettlement quota to meet the needs of refugees.

World Bank (2019) The Mobility of Displaced Syrians - An Economic and Social Analysis
World Bank, February 2019
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31205

This report analyzes the “mobility calculus” of Syrian refugees through: (a) a review of international experience to identify push/pull factors; (b) an assessment of the conditions faced by Syrians in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq as they relate to these push/pull factors; (c) an analysis of the voluntary return of approximately 100,000 Syrian refugees between 2015 and 2018 in order to identify the relative importance of push/pull factors; (d) simulations and a scenario-based approach to project how these factors might play out in the future. Key messages:

- **Refugee return is not a monotonic or linear event:** it often includes an iterative, staggered, or cyclical process. Adverse conditions can lead to unconventional coping strategies, e.g. dispersal of family members between exile and return locations, and circular movements. Refugees act rationally, facing a set of constraints, to ensure the wellbeing of themselves and their families.

- **International experience suggests four groups of factors influence refugee mobility:** (i) peace, security and protection; (ii) livelihood and economic opportunities; (iii) housing, land and property; and (iv) infrastructure and access to services. These factors play out differently across refugee situations and across individuals. While formal peace agreements can provide the impetus for large-scale refugee returns, spontaneous returns to conflict-affected places are not uncommon. Poverty in the country of asylum may be a driver of return but the opposite may also be true, e.g. refugees with higher socio-economic status may have a greater propensity to return earlier than socio-economic groups impoverished by displacement. Returning refugees do not necessarily return to their places of origin, even with reintegration assistance—refugees from rural origins increasingly return to cities and there may be sizable secondary displacement of returning refugees. Return entails new hardships and additional challenges for women.
• Most Syrians face persistent hardships inside and outside of Syria. Insecurity is the primary concern among refugees regarding potential future returns. Countries of asylum provide better access to services and livelihood opportunities than in conflict-intensive regions of Syria, but this is not always true for other regions. **Most refugees face a tradeoff between security and other aspects of quality of life, which often takes an intergenerational form: short-term security comes at the expense of lower human capital accumulation that will disproportionately affect Syrian children and youth.** Syrian women face additional challenges.

• **Returns to date have been small-scale and selective** due to persistent concerns about insecurity in Syria. Refugees who are single, or male, or not members of a nuclear family have been more likely to return. Conditions in Syria have predictable and monotonous effects on the return of refugees, i.e. better security and service access in Syria consistently increase returns. **Host country conditions affect returns in more complex ways: a lower quality of life in exile does not always increase returns** (e.g. more education increases return at primary education level but not at secondary or tertiary education levels). Surveys detected a complex nexus of human-psychic and economic factors: refugees do not embrace financial issues in discussing mobility, but those issues still matter. The future mobility of Syrian refugees could be different from their past mobility.

• **Simulations confirm the importance of security and service provision for mobility in the future.** Service restoration is more effective in mobilizing refugees when security is less of an issue. The international community has a diversified policy toolkit to help refugees, their hosts, and the Syrians in Syria, including subsidies (return assistance), transfers (on a per capita basis within Syria), and service restoration in Syria. The simulations suggest that: (1) **“corner solutions” (using all resources through one tool only) are inefficient** because the problems addressed by these tools reinforce each other; (2) **policies should be used in an adaptive manner**, shaped by conditions on the ground, e.g. insecurity in Syria is a major deterrent to return and reduces the effectiveness of service restoration efforts, therefore with improvements in security, more resources can effectively be allocated to restoring services; and (3) **the policy objective should be to maximize the welfare of refugees, including those who return and who do not return, of their hosts, and of Syrians—not to maximize refugee returns.**

The report does not deal with issues pertaining to security-sector and cultural, ethical, and political dimensions of the conflict. Additionally, due to data constraints, it excludes a study of displaced Syrians in Syria, Turkey, and Europe.

**Restitution of Land and Property**

**Clutterbuck (2018) Property Restitution in Post-Conflict Syria**

Martin Clutterbuck  
*Forced Migration Review 57*, February 2018, pp. 66-68  
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/clutterbuck
Property restitution will be challenging in any post-conflict Syria. Restitution and compensation processes will need to take into consideration: (a) the complex, pluralistic legal system governing housing, land and property (HLP) rights in Syria; (b) the widespread destruction and displacement that has taken place; (c) loss and damage to property records; (d) the high proportion of displaced persons who were living in informal settlements before the conflict began; (f) particular challenges faced by women in claiming property and inheritance rights; (g) unlawful occupation of properties by others; and (h) widespread falsification of property documents; and (i) the widespread tendency for people in Syria to have HLP documents in someone else’s name. The return of IDPs and refugees is likely to result in competing claims over land and property by original owners, secondary occupants and illegal occupants. It will be critical to adhere to the UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (“Pinheiro Principles”), which provide a comprehensive set of international standards for HLP restitution, including specific ways to support women’s restitution claims. Lessons can also be learned from property restitution and reparations processes in other post-conflict situations, including the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo), Eastern Europe following the end of communism, Iraq and Colombia.

José Arraiza and Scott Leckie
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 72-74
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/arraiza-leckie

The authors advocate for a comprehensive HLP restitution program in Myanmar that establishes a clear and accessible remedy for past and present land grabbing and displacement and that creates a framework for peace between Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), government and army. Such a program needs to be based on international treaties, recognized by Myanmar, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and other relevant standards, such as the Pinheiro Principles. Standards need to be translated into laws and procedures from government to village level. While initiatives such as the National Land Use Council are welcome, nevertheless more needs to be done to ensure that restitution in Myanmar benefits everyone, including in the most remote areas of the country.

Miscellaneous

Nadia Siddiqui
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 64-65
The return of 3.1 million IDPs to their places of origin in Iraq is seen as a benchmark of success. The article highlights critical questions related to mitigating competing rights and protection needs of those who stayed, returned IDPs, and those still displaced. IDPs who have already returned may have particular protection concerns and grievances against those who have not yet returned, e.g. in northern Nineveh those that have yet to return are perceived to be affiliated with ISIS. The author recommends that: (a) a returns strategy should recognize victims’ needs to address suffering, taking into account all perpetrators of abuse; (b) a transparent process for vetting people for return should be in place; (c) clear criteria should be established for what constitutes ISIS affiliation, and the punishment that will be meted out according to the degree of affiliation; and (d) social cohesion and peace building efforts should be expanded to include those who are still displaced, before any further returns take place.


Kristin Fabbe, Chad Hazlett, Tolga Sınmazdemir
*Journal of Peace Research, Volume 56, Issue 1 (2019), Pages 103–117*
[https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318814114](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318814114)

Civilians who have fled violent conflict and settled in neighboring countries are integral to ending or prolonging conflict. Contingent on their attitudes, they can either back peaceful settlements or support warring groups and continued fighting. Attitudes toward peaceful settlement are expected to be especially inflexible for refugees who have been exposed to violence, which has been shown to produce a strong desire for revenge in diverse contexts. In a survey of 1,120 Syrian refugees in Turkey conducted in 2016, the authors use experiments to examine refugee attitudes towards two critical phases of conflict termination—a ceasefire and a peace agreement. They examine the rigidity/flexibility of refugees’ attitudes to see if subtle changes in how wartime losses are framed or in who endorses a peace process can shift willingness to compromise with the incumbent Assad regime. The results show that:

- Refugees are far more likely to agree to a ceasefire proposed by a civilian as opposed to one proposed by armed actors from either the Syrian government or the opposition. Specifically, refugee civilians in the sample are 11 to 14 percentage points more likely to agree with a ceasefire and peace process arrangement when proposed by Syrian civilians as opposed to Syrian military commanders from either the regime or the opposition, suggesting a special signaling value of civilian proposers of peace.
• Simply describing the refugee community’s wartime experience as *suffering* rather than *sacrifice* substantially increases willingness to compromise with the regime to bring about *peace*, by 14 to 18 percentage points. This holds whether the suffering is described within the family or the community, and it holds or is magnified among those who come from neighborhoods that have experienced direct violence.

Even among a highly pro-opposition population that has experienced severe violence, willingness to settle and make peace are remarkably flexible and dependent on: (a) the identity of actors who propose a peace agreement; and (b) the framing of wartime experience with violence.


Hisham Esper, Nandini Krishnan, and Christina Wieser

This paper examines the impact of cash assistance provided to Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan on household outcomes post-return. Specifically, the authors examine whether Afghan refugees who returned between July 2016 and March 2017 and received a larger reintegration allowance of US$400 per returnee are better off compared to those who received a reintegration allowance of US$200 per returnee. The analysis is based on three different post-return surveys (on average data was collected 16 months after return) combined with administrative data from UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation forms.

Key findings:

• **Households receiving US$400 per returning household member were more likely to use reintegration assistance for purchasing long-term assets, while those who received US$200 per returning household member were more likely to purchase immediate consumption goods.** Almost half of returnees who received US$200 per capita spent more than half of their reintegration assistance on food, compared to only 17 percent of those who received US$400. Returnees who received US$400 per capita were more likely to invest in purchasing land (21 percent) compared to those who received US$200 (7 percent). Returnees who received more cash were also more likely to invest in transportation and rental payments.

• **The likelihood of owning a dwelling for Afghan refugees is highly correlated with both the total payment received by the household, and the household size.** Households reporting owning their residence approximately 16 months post-return received US$2,253 in reintegration assistance on average, compared to US$1,655 for households not owning a house post-return.
• There was no long-term impact of reintegration assistance on reservation wages or employment. Households receiving US$200 per capita were as likely as those receiving US$400 per capita to have an employed household member.

• No significant impact of the variation in cash assistance on the likelihood of enrolling all household children in school. School education in Afghanistan is free, and an unconditional cash transfer to returnees might not affect school enrollment. Additionally, the data only permitted the authors to measure whether households enroll all their children in schools.

• Households receiving US$400 per returning household member were more likely to have legal documentation (tazkiras) for all household members compared to those receiving US$200 per returning household member. More than three quarters (76 percent) of households receiving US$400 per capita received tazkiras, compared to only 60 percent of returnees receiving US$200 per capita.

Overall, the impact of cash assistance has been significant, and large, especially on the likelihood of home ownership, legal documentation, and the difference in consumption patterns. Households who received US$400 per capita in cash assistance were 17 percentage points more likely to own a house, 30 percentage points more likely to have issued legal documentation for their household, and 40 percentage points less likely to have spent more than half of their reintegration assistance on food.
II. EDUCATION
Impacts of Displacement on Educational Outcomes of Displaced People


Maia Sieverding, Caroline Krafft, Nasma Berri, Caitlyn Keo and Mariam Sharpless

Syrian refugees experienced disruptions in their education in Syria due to the conflict, and in Jordan they have encountered impediments to enrolling and remaining in school. This paper examines educational outcomes for Syrian refugees in Jordan, and assesses how these outcomes have been affected by conflict, displacement, and educational opportunities and experiences after arrival to Jordan. The analysis is based on the Jordanian Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) of 2016, in-depth interviews with 71 Syrian refugee youth in November 2017, and comparisons with the 2009 Syria Pan Arab Project for Family Health (PAPFAM) survey, which captures national data in Syria prior to the conflict. Key findings include:

- JLMPS data indicates that enrollment and progression rates (as of 2016) have recovered to pre-conflict levels for basic education among Syrian refugees in Jordan. However, Syrian refugees in Jordan come from an educationally disadvantaged population within Syria, and net enrollment rates for basic education (80 percent) are well below universal and substantially worse than Jordanians.
- Enrollment rates in secondary education among Syrian refugees were low even before the conflict, and have not recovered to pre-conflict levels. However, those who managed to successfully transition to secondary school persist at higher levels than pre-conflict.
- Patterns of enrollment by age reveal that Syrian refugee children experience delayed entry into school (among the cohorts of children starting school in Jordan) and early exit, with enrollment rates dropping noticeably from around age 12.
- There was accelerated dropout during basic education in the peak conflict years (2011-2013) when most refugee children were in Syria or in the process of moving to Jordan.
- Syrian refugees face numerous challenges entering and remaining in school in Jordan, including: school interruptions leading to students being older than their classmates; discrimination from peers and teachers; and academic difficulty, particularly at the secondary level. For male youth, the pressure to work to support their families also contributes to non-enrollment decisions.
- For adolescents of later basic and secondary ages, parental education (a proxy for wealth) and alternative sources of financial support for the family play a critical role in keeping adolescents in school.
Sascha O. Becker, Irena Grosfeld, Pauline Grosjean, Nico Voigtländer, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya
NBER Working Papers 24704
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24704

This paper examines the long-run effects of forced migration on investment in education, by studying the population transfers of millions of Poles in the aftermath of WWII when Polish frontiers were moved westward. The former Eastern Polish territories (Kresy) became part of the Soviet Union, while the former German areas (the Western Territories) became Polish. The authors combine historical censuses with newly collected survey data to compare Poles with ancestors from Kresy (11 percent of respondents) to all other Poles. They find:

- While there were no pre-WWII differences in education, **Poles with a family history of forced migration are significantly more educated today.** Descendants of forced migrants have on average one extra year of schooling, driven by a higher propensity to finish secondary or higher education.
- Those forced migrants who had likely finished school by the time they were expelled from Kresy (i.e., the cohort born before 1930) do not differ from other Poles in terms of their education. For younger cohorts, there is a significant education advantage for Kresy descendants, even for those born two generations after their ancestors had been expelled.

Excluding other possible mechanisms, the authors suggest that **forced migration led to a shift in preferences, away from material possessions and towards investment in transferable human capital; the effects persist over three generations.** They support this interpretation by survey evidence, showing that descendants of forced migrants value material goods less, while having a stronger aspiration for education of their children. They also possess fewer physical assets, relative to the number of physical assets they can afford.

### Impacts on Educational Outcomes of Host Communities

Tumen (2018) The Impact of Low-skill Refugees on Youth Education (PRELIMINARY)
Semih Tumen
September 8, 2018
https://www.sandravrozo.com/refugee-workshop.html

This paper **examines the impact of Syrian refugees on high school enrollment rates of Turkish youth.** Syrian refugees in Turkey are, on average, less skilled and more willing to work in low-pay informal jobs than natives. There are two main channels through which refugees might influence high school enrollment rates among Turkish youth: (1) increased competition for schooling resources may discourage native youth and, as a result, high school enrollment may decline; and (2) the
decline in wages due to increased competition for low-skill jobs may encourage high school enrollment among native youth. The author uses Turkish Household Labor Force Survey data from 2006 to 2016 and employs quasi-experimental methods by exploiting the regional variation in Syrian refugee intensity and the exogeneity of the timing of the refugee influx. The author finds that **high-school enrollment rates increased by 4-6 percentage points among native youth in refugee-hosting regions.** A one-percentage point increase in the refugee-to-population ratio in a region generates around 0.5 percentage point increase in native’s high school enrollment rates before controlling for parental characteristics and by 1 percentage point after controlling for parental characteristics. **The increase comes from males and there is no increase in female high school enrollment rates.** The results are robust after controlling for: (a) variables proxying parental investment in human capital such as educational attainment of the household head, intact families (i.e. married and living together), and household size; and (b) changes in regional economic activity. The author also finds that that **the increase is more pronounced for young males with ‘lower parental backgrounds’ (i.e. lower education), which is consistent with the hypothesis that the increased competition for low-skill jobs may encourage high school enrollment among native youth.**


Ragui Assaad, Thomas Ginn, and Mohamed Saleh
Economic Research Forum, ERF Working Paper Series No. 1214, September 2018

This paper examines the impact of the Syrian refugee influx on educational outcomes for Jordanians, including school entry, progression through basic schooling, advancement to, and progression through, secondary schooling, and entry into higher education. The authors exploit the 2016 Jordanian Labor Market Panel Survey that records retrospective educational outcomes for a nationally representative sample of Jordanians. They use a difference-in-difference approach that compares various educational outcomes across individuals whose localities of birth experienced different levels of exposure to the refugee influx and who belong to age cohorts affected by the influx and ones that were too old to be affected. The authors’ assume that high and low exposure localities would have had similar trends in educational outcomes in the absence of the refugee influx. The authors find **no evidence that greater exposure to Syrian refugee has affected educational attainment of Jordanians.** Jordanian schools responded to the influx by adding a second shift in schools in high-refugee areas; teacher-to-student ratio and classroom size were both unaffected by the influx. This suggests that **the arrival of Syrians did not adversely affect the quality of schooling Jordanians received.**
Laurent Bossavie
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29944

This paper examines the effects of immigrant concentration in the classroom on the academic achievement of natives in the Netherlands. Recognizing that the effect of immigrant concentration in the classroom likely depends on the duration of stay of immigrant students in the host country, it separately estimates the impact of foreign-born peers who recently arrived to the Netherlands from those who arrived in the country at an earlier age. The author finds:

- Immigrant students who have been living in the country for a few years have no impact on natives’ test scores, in either mathematics or language.
- Immigrant students who have been in the country for a short period have a small negative effect on natives’ performance in language, but no effect on mathematics test scores. An increase by one standard deviation in the share of recent migrants in the classroom is found to reduce natives’ average language test scores by 0.03 of a standard deviation. Individualized time spent by teachers to support recent immigrant students is the most plausible mechanism behind these findings.
- Native students with high parental education are not affected by the concentration of immigrant classmates in their classroom, even if those are recent immigrants.
- When significant, effect sizes are quite small compared to other educational interventions and classroom peer effects estimated in other contexts.

These results suggest that assimilation and host country language acquisition play a role in the magnitude of the peer effects generated. That negative spillovers are small and short-lived suggests that putting in place integration programs for recently arrived migrant students could be sufficient to offset those effects, with a particular focus on host language acquisition.

Sonja Fransen, Carlos Vargas-Silva, and Melissa Siegel
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40176-017-0112-4

The authors use survey data from Burundi, which experienced large-scale conflict-induced emigration and substantial post-war refugee return, to explore differences in educational outcomes between returned refugees and individuals who never left the country during the 1993-2005 civil war (including those who were never displaced and those who were displaced internally). The survey was conducted 15 years after the signing of the peace agreement in Burundi and after the return of most former refugees to the country, which enables a long-term perspective on the impacts of forced displacement on educational outcomes. Given the low levels of schooling in
Burundi, the authors focus on primary completion rates. Controlling for pre-war characteristics and cohort effects, the authors find that former refugees who returned to Burundi had better educational outcomes than individuals who never left the country. Specifically:

- Returned refugees are 16 to 28 percentage points more likely to have finished primary school than their peers who never left the country. However, the average primary school completion rate for returned refugees was still low (37 percent).
- An additional year spent as a refugee while of schooling age is associated with a 4 to 6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of finishing primary school.
- There is suggestive evidence that returnees were also better off than their hosts in Tanzania, probably because of the specific schools that they had access to by virtue of being refugees.

Children who were of schooling age during the conflict and who were displaced to neighboring countries (particularly those displaced to camps in Tanzania) had better access to education facilities than those who stayed in Burundi. Children who stayed in Burundi were likely affected by the negative impacts of conflict on schooling (e.g. destruction of schools, killing and exodus of teachers, child soldiering, household income shocks, higher levels insecurity, and decreases in state investments in education). Children who stay behind when conflict erupts suffer serious gaps in their education, and the authors advocate educational support programs that allow these children to catch-up with those who were not as affected by conflict.

Bilgili et al (2019) Is the Education of Local Children Influenced by Living Nearby a Refugee Camp? Evidence from Host Communities in Rwanda

Özge Bilgili, Sonja Fransen, Craig Loschmann, and Melissa Siegel
WIDER Working Paper 2018/18, February 2018
Subsequently published in International Migration, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12541

The Rwandan government’s policy is to integrate refugees into local schools (where possible) and strengthen facilities by building classrooms, providing additional teachers and supplementing materials. Drawing on household survey data, community surveys and focus group discussions, the paper examines the impact of three Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda—Gihembe, Kiziba and Kigeme—on access to education and educational outcomes for children in host communities, in communities closer to (less than 10 km) and further away (greater than 20 km) from the camps. The researchers find that:

- Communities closer to a refugee camp are not more likely to have a primary or secondary school located within it.
- The average travel time to the nearest primary school is slightly lower for communities within a 10 km radius of Kigeme and Kiziba refugee camps compared to communities further away (but higher for communities within a 10 km radius of Gihembe refugee camp compared to communities further away).
• The average travel time to a secondary school is higher for communities within 10 km of three camps compared to communities further away.
• Children living within 10 km of a refugee camp are significantly more likely to attend school.
• Children living within 10 km of a refugee camp that has more local integration (Gihembe and Kigeme) are significantly more likely to benefit from school feeding programs.
• Children within 10 km of a refugee camp have better educational outcomes (i.e. on average they have completed more years of schooling and are more likely to have completed primary school), however other factors may explain these outcomes.
• Locals residing closer to the camps have mostly positive views on the effects of refugees on local education.

The authors conclude that the inflow of refugees from the DRC into Rwanda has an overall positive impact on the education of children residing in the areas surrounding the refugee camps.

Bataineh and Montalbano (2018) The Impact of Syrian Crisis on the Quality of Education in Jordan: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment
Abdullah Bataineh & Pierluigi Montalbano
Sapienza – University of Rome, Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali ed Economiche, Working Papers Series 7/2018
www.diss.uniroma1.it/sites/default/files/.../DiSSEBatainehMontalbanowp72018.pdf

This paper investigates the causal impact of the Syria crisis on education quality in Jordan, in particular, the consequences of overcrowding and ‘double-shifting’ in public schools. The analysis is based on data collected from a sample of Jordanian public schools in Qasabet-Irbid district in Northern Jordan, close to the Syrian border. The authors carried out a set of double differences (pre- and-post crisis comparisons of students’ scores in a group of affected schools with respect to a control group of unaffected schools) to determine the causal impact of the crisis on education quality in the affected schools. They find an overall negative impact of Syrian refugee enrollment due to both overcrowding and double-shift practices. The performance of students in affected schools deteriorated as measured by scores in four main subjects (Math, Science, Arabic, and English), relative to the counterfactual sample, particularly in Math and Science. This negative impact is confirmed by qualitative analysis.

Tumen (2019) Refugees and ‘Native Flight’ from Public to Private Schools
Semih Tumen
IZA Discussion Paper No. 12235, March 2019
Also published in Economics Letters, Volume 181 (2019), Pages 154-159
This paper exploits the large-scale arrival of Syrian refugees into Turkey after 2012 to estimate the impact of refugees on public-private school choice of natives in Turkey. The analysis is based on province-level school enrollment data covering the period between 2010/11 to 2015/16 academic years, and employs a flexible difference-in-difference approach based on province-year variation in refugee intensity and an instrumental variable strategy to address refugees’ location choices (i.e. refugees may be sorting into regions with better economic opportunities and these regions may also be the ones with stronger public schools). The author finds that Turkish children switch from public to private primary schools in response to increased Syrian-refugee concentration in their province of residence. A ten percentage-point increase in refugee-to-population ratio generates, on average, 0.12 percentage-point increase in private primary school enrollment. The response is slightly larger among males relative to females. This roughly corresponds to one native child switching to private education for every 31.6 refugee children enrolled in public schools—weaker than the typical estimates in the literature. There are several possible reasons for this weaker estimate: Syrian refugees in Turkey generally settle together in segregated neighborhoods and their children go to public schools located around those neighborhoods, so natives have an option to switch to other public schools with much less (or no) refugee students, especially in large cities; cost of private school tuition fees given the relatively fragile labor market conditions in Turkey and high frequency of aggregate shocks; the small number of private schools, mostly located in rich urban neighborhoods; and government efforts to sustain the quality and capacity of public education in response to the refugee in influx, e.g. through language support to refugee children, and the deployment of Syrian teachers to regions with high refugee concentrations to act as voluntary advisers.

**Tumen (2019) The Effect of Refugees on Native Adolescents’ Test Scores: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from PISA**

Semih Tumen


The recent literature has shown that: refugees in Turkey have, on average, lower skill levels than natives; since they do not have easy access to work permits, they tend to find manual jobs in the informal sector, displacing natives in these jobs; and refugees employed in manual tasks are complementary to formal native workers employed in more complex tasks. The author explores whether these labor market dynamics have any effect on human capital investment decisions and
educational outcomes of natives (in a separate paper he shows that increased competition for low skilled jobs increased high school enrollment rates, especially for males with lower parental education). This paper investigates the impact of Syrian refugees on the school performance of adolescent children in Turkey. The analysis is based on the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) microdata for 2009 and 2012 (pre-influx) and 2015 (post-influx), and employs a difference-in-difference approach based on province-year variation in refugee intensity and an instrumental variable approach to address the potential endogeneity of refugees’ location choices.

Key findings:
- Math, Science, and Reading scores of Turkish native adolescents have notably increased following the Syrian refugee influx, conditional on parental education, which is used as a proxy for unobserved ability.
- The increase in PISA scores is more pronounced for males than females.
- The increase in test scores mostly comes from the lower half of the test score distribution.

The author argues that the labor market forces that emerged in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis have led native adolescents, who would normally perform worse in school, to take their high school education more seriously, i.e. the increase in refugee concentration generates pressures in the low-skill labor market and those pressures provide incentives for increased school achievement.

Barriers to Improving Educational Outcomes

OLlive (2019) “Education is Key to Life”: The Importance of Education from the Perspective of Displaced Learners

OLlive course students, IT trainer and director
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/OLlive

In this article, refugee students in the UK discuss the difficulties of accessing student finance, housing and benefits, and the impact this has on their ability to study. The students identify several barriers to entry into higher education in the UK including: lack of awareness in universities and other educational institutions that asylum seekers have the right to study; ineligibility of asylum seekers to apply for government provided student loans or related student finance, and limited access for refugee students; lack of recognition of previous qualifications; inflexible requirements to provide evidence of English language competence and high cost of prescribed English exams; posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression and other mental health difficulties; unfamiliar academic culture and expectations, and perception that poor academic English or educational gaps are a reflection of intellect or skills; lack of support (e.g. child care) and exclusion; lack of access to
information (e.g. about scholarship schemes); and changing policies. The students make several recommendations including: courses for refugees and asylum seekers (similar to OLIve funded by Erasmus) to support them in pursuing higher education, with additional support for travel, child care and opportunities when the course ends; more scholarship opportunities; pre-sessional and foundation programs with fee waivers and additional funds for travel and study materials for forced migrants; and an open and accessible platform that provides information in several languages about the education system, application processes, students’ rights and available support.

Gladwell (2019) Accessing and Thriving in Education in the UK
Catherine Gladwell
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/gladwell

Research shows that significant barriers confront refugee and asylum-seeker children arriving in the UK, which prevent them from enrolling and thriving in school. The author identifies several barriers to accessing education including:

- Systemic level: long waiting lists; complex online application processes; challenges of rapidly securing places for children who arrive in the middle of the academic year.
- School level: reluctance by schools to enroll students at upper-secondary level for fear of negatively affecting schools' performance in national exams; and lack of readily available places for children with special educational needs (SEN).
- Contextual factors: extended stays in temporary accommodation during which time children are not enrolled in school in anticipation of moving; delays in access to education due to dispersal of unaccompanied children; and children being kept out of school until their status as a minor has been confirmed.

The author also identifies several impediments to thriving in schools including:

- Systemic level: an academic context that does not facilitate appropriate progression due to a student’s weak English language skills or interrupted education.
- School level: insufficient English as an Additional Language (EAL) support in some schools; challenges diagnosing and addressing SEN when combined with EAL needs; bullying and social issues; and a lack of awareness of broader issues (e.g. mental health, poverty) affecting refugee and asylum-seeker children.

The research found that the ability of refugee and asylum-seeker children to thrive in education is facilitated by: (a) the presence of a committed, caring adult, who will support them over an extended period of time; (b) education programs where content and curriculum have been appropriately adapted to meet their needs; (c) availability of substantial pastoral care and mental health support within the school setting; (d) partnerships between schools/colleges and specialist voluntary sector organizations that can facilitate the provision of on-site advice, guidance and
support; (e) peer support within the school/college (e.g. buddy schemes); and (f) training on the educational needs of refugee and asylum seeker children for teachers and staff.


Melissa Hauber-Özer  
*Forced Migration Review*, Issue 60, March 2019  
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/hauberozer

This article **discusses gaps in the provision of education to Syrian refugees in Turkey.** Education services for Syrian refugees in Turkey were initially provided through temporary education centers (TECs) established in refugee camps as well as in communities with large numbers of refugees. TECs provided schooling based on the Syrian national curriculum, taught in Arabic, supplemented with Turkish language and history lessons. Lack of teacher training, consistent funding, authority to issue diplomas, and lack of supervision by Turkish authorities raised concerns about the quality of education. As refugees moved out of camps into host communities, the Turkish government announced in 2016 that TECs would gradually be closed or turned into integrated public schools, with the goal of moving all Syrian children into Turkish-medium schools by 2020. Currently only 60 percent of Syrian refugee children are enrolled in school, much lower than pre-war enrollment rates in Syria and enrollment rates for Turkish children. Obstacles to enrollment include: schools refusing to enroll Syrian children; cost of school fees, transport, uniforms and text books; interrupted education; pressure to forgo education in order to work (mainly adolescent boys) or to stay home to avoid gender-based violence or to permit early marriage (in the case of girls). Syrian students who do attend school receive very little support in acquiring Turkish, in catching up on missed material, and in coping with psychosocial challenges associated with conflict, displacement and cultural adjustment. As a result, social integration and academic achievement are limited and dropout rates are high. The author also highlights the lack of understanding among teachers about the challenges faced by the students, indicating insufficient administrative support and knowledge about working with refugee children.

**Psycho-Social Support**

**McEvoy (2019) Feeling Safe Enough to Learn in a Conflict Zone**

Bethan McEvoy  
*Forced Migration Review*, Issue 60, March 2019  
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/mcevoy

In protracted displacement crises such as in Afghanistan, children are not only coping with past trauma, but are also experiencing ongoing fear and stress due to distressing experiences in their daily lives. In these contexts, **psychosocial programming must depart from traditional approaches** that address incidents that took place in the past and which are conducted in safety. Since
December 2017, NRC’s Better Learning Programme (BLP) has sought to address the acute psychosocial needs of children affected by trauma by strengthening children’s awareness of risk and stress, teaching them coping skills (including both practical strategies to deal with risks, as well as calming techniques such as visualizing a ‘safe space’ to deal with stress), and creating a feeling of safety through play, creative expression and trust exercises. An evaluation of BLP has indicated a reduction in nightmares, distressing emotions and physical illness, an increase in interest in attending school and completing homework, and an increased sense of safety.

Fatima Khaddour
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/khaddour

This article describes an initiative of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) to address widespread mental health issues among IDPs in the Salamieh District in the eastern Hama Governorate of Syria, by integrating psychosocial support into their early childhood development programming. The Me and My Child in Crisis program (MMIC), targeting both IDPs and host communities, incorporated non-formal friendly spaces and support to help children develop coping mechanisms, as well as activities to help parents understand their child’s psychological, social, cognitive, motor and linguistic development. With a view to the project’s long-term sustainability, implementation was eventually shifted to school-based parent-teacher associations. Subsequently, as the intensity of armed conflict decreased during 2018, the project was transformed into the Reading with Children (RWC) program, which incorporated topics of psychosocial support for parents and children. Several challenges were encountered during implementation including weak attendance and limited participation of fathers. The author suggests that the introduction of incentives and the use of mobile technology might help to address these challenges.

Gurvinder Singh and Charlotte Tocchio
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/singh-tocchio

In crises, child-friendly spaces (CFS) can promote psychosocial wellbeing and provide a safe space for learning but research has shown that their quality, relevance, effectiveness and sustainability vary widely. Red Crescent and Red Cross programs in Yemen and Kenya have included training in psychosocial support for volunteers and teachers and the establishment of CFS in schools to provide a place where children can: access psychosocial support; participate in activities designed boost self-
esteem, self-awareness and trust; learn protection skills (e.g. accessing protection, health and social services and getting to safety); and be taught about topics such as child rights and preventing child marriage. The authors highlight several challenges with CFS including: weak/limited evaluation of results; lack of robust evidence on the relationship between psychosocial wellbeing and learning outcomes; and lack of gender-responsive programming. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and World Vision International have developed a new CFS toolkit, based on evaluations conducted by World Vision and a review by IFRC of lessons learned in implementing CFS in emergencies. IFRC has also published a study examining the need to improve the protection of unaccompanied and separated children from sexual and gender-based violence in hard-to-access locations.

Iversen and Oestergaard (2019) Gender Equality in Education in Emergencies
Eva Iversen and Else Oestergaard
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/iversen-oestergaard

Conflict usually reinforces existing barriers to education and gender disparities. Evidence from Oxfam IBIS’ education in emergencies (EiE) programming identifies several barriers to gender equality in education including: (a) gender stereotypes and the devaluing of girls’ education—in times of conflict the gains that have been made in promoting gender equality can be lost; (b) economic deprivation that leads poor families to prioritize the education of boys, and the increasing rate of early marriage in displacement situations; and (c) risk of sexual harassment or violence on the way to school or at school, which increases with conflict. The authors call for all actors involved in emergency settings to incorporate gender responsiveness into their education programming. Interventions should be based on an analysis of how conditions for male and female children and youth are affected by crisis, specific risks they are exposed to, and any barriers to their education and safety. Interventions may include: (1) challenging gender stereotypes by sensitizing parents on the importance of education for both boys and girls in a time of crisis, training teachers on how to promote gender equality and safety in the classroom, and engaging female teachers to act as role models and advocates for girls’ education; (2) addressing economic barriers, e.g. by offering free school meals, providing free school learning materials, giving access to micro-credit programs, or providing cash transfers to girls; and (3) eliminating violence and ensuring safety, e.g. ensuring that the route to school is safe, providing separate toilet facilities for girls and boys, offering psychosocial support for children affected by violence, involving school management, parents’ associations and teachers, and sensitizing parents and communities.
Disability

Barrett, Marshall and Goldbart (2019) Refugee Children with Communication Disability in Rwanda: Providing the Educational Services They Need

Helen Barrett, Julie Marshall and Juliet Goldbart
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/barrett-marshall-goldbart

‘Communication disability’ (CD) refers to the barriers to participation in society experienced by people who have difficulties understanding what others are trying to communicate to them or being understood when they try to communicate with others. Education and early childhood development (ECD) services for refugee children from the DRC and Burundi are well established in Rwanda, however children with disabilities, in particular those with less visible intellectual or communication impairments, are often excluded from the education system from an early age. Research suggests that 15 percent of any population is likely to have a disability and the prevalence among refugees may even be higher. However, analysis of UNHCR’s registration data found that only 0.01 percent of refugees in Rwanda are recorded as experiencing a ‘speech disability/impairment’ and only 10 out of almost 55,000 refugee children under 12 in Rwanda are registered as having a special educational need. The authors are undertaking research in refugee camps in Rwanda to identify why CD is under-identified, the needs and wishes of carers of refugee children with CD, and the barriers to securing identification of needs and access to services for the children. Initial analysis suggests that CD is widely misunderstood, and narrowly defined as a speech impairment/disability and hearing impairment. As the needs of many children who experience CD are not even identified, it is unsurprising that their needs in an educational environment are largely unmet. Despite mounting evidence that inclusive education is cost-effective and results in better educational and social outcomes for some children with disabilities and their peers, a number of children with mild/moderate intellectual impairment and associated CD, and children with hearing impairment, have been sent to residential special schools/centers outside the camps.

Adult Literacy

Lanciotti (2019) Adult Literacy: An Essential Component of the CRRF

Massimo Lanciotti
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/lanciotti

Uganda and Ethiopia host large refugee populations from South Sudan where the literacy rate is just 27 percent. Both countries are pilots for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and have refugee policies that promote adult education and Functional Adult Literacy (FAL). FAL—the ability
to apply the skills of reading, writing and written calculations to daily life—is crucial for refugees to realize their rights to education, development and participation, and therefore an essential element of achieving the longer-term goals of the CRRF. However, the reality is that adult education and FAL is barely supported at all. In Uganda, the Finnish Refugee Council (FRC) has been supporting and facilitating FAL and English language learning groups in refugee settlements since 1997. Topics and themes are often suggested by participants, and combining literacy/language courses with livelihood skills training has helped to motivate learners. Several challenges remain including: poor monitoring and evaluation of program results; the program is not fully inclusive of people with disabilities; recruiting refugees to become instructors is challenging due to lack of skills, mobility of refugees and frequent resignation of skilled instructors to take up other employment; and numerous languages are spoken in the settlements, and selecting one of the main ethnic languages could fuel tensions between ethnic groups.

Digital Skills

Miguel Peromingo and Willem Pieterson

This article makes the case for empowering refugees with relevant digital skills to support their integration. The authors begin by describing the digital divide in terms of both access to technology as well as digital skills. The authors identify five types of digital skills, i.e. being able to operate a computer, use a mobile device, find and interpret relevant information, share information and curate friendships, and create online content. They suggest that successful participation in society depends more on information navigation, social and creative skills, rather than access to devices or operational skills. Digital skills are increasingly correlated with education, rather than age or gender, which suggests that the digital divide will persist. The authors suggest that forced migrants with low socio-economic status and poor digital skills need “digital empowerment” and that inclusion programs should incorporate digital skills training.

Displaced Teachers

Duale et al (2019) Teachers in Displacement: Learning from Dadaab
Mohamed Duale, Ochan Leomoi, Abdullahi Aden, Okello Oyat, Arte Dagane and Abdikadir Abikar
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/duale-leomoi-aden-oyatdagane-abikar

The authors (including refugee teachers) highlight several issues contributing to the poor performance of NGO-run schools in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, including: (a) inadequate training and resources provided to refugee teachers, who account for the majority of primary and
secondary school teachers in the camp; 72 percent of refugee teachers have only secondary school qualifications; (b) overcrowding in classrooms, which contributes to conflict between students and misbehavior, and the use of corporal punishment to maintain discipline; and (c) precarious working conditions for teachers. The authors propose investments to support: training of refugee teachers; reductions in class sizes; greater access to curriculum resources; and pay parity between nationals and highly qualified refugee teachers. They also call for long-term, fundamental reform of refugee education and the participation of refugees in the planning and provision of education.

Connected Learning


Hana Addam El-Ghali and Emma Ghosn
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/elghali-ghosn

Higher education institutions in Lebanon are beginning to use ‘connected learning’ to reach out to Syrian refugees and remote Lebanese students, i.e. teaching through information communication technology (ICT). Connected learning may be blended (online in combination with traditional teaching methods), fully online, or bridging (e.g. focused on language tuition). Connected learning methods may include real-time interaction between instructor and students (e.g. video-conferencing or live chats), non-real time interactions (e.g. posting on discussion boards or learning from videotaped lectures), or informal discussions on social media. The low cost of such courses, and their relevance to the labor market, make them attractive. However, there are several pedagogical and technical barriers to the expanded use of connected learning in Lebanon, including: as yet no policies recognizing online learning in Lebanon; limited awareness of and negative perceptions of online learning, including cultural barriers (Syrian female students not wishing to appear on camera); pedagogical barriers (e.g. limited skills to deliver online programs, support students and assess learning); and technical barriers such as slow internet connectivity, unreliable electricity supply and equipment shortages.


Moise Dushime, Eugenie Manirafasha and Kalenga Mbonyinshuti
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/dushime-manirafashambonyinshuti

This article is authored by graduates of a US-accredited undergraduate degree program for refugees (and Rwandan nationals) in Rwanda. The degree program is delivered using a ‘blended’ model encompassing online tuition from Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU) combined with face-to-face instruction and academic support provided by the NGO Kepler. The authors outline several recommendations for expanding access to higher education for refugees, drawing on their experience in the Kepler/SNHU program, including: (a) ensuring higher education opportunities are
more inclusive of women and vulnerable students from both refugee and host communities; (b) offering accredited degrees that enable students to pursue further education or compete in local/international job markets; and (c) programs should help students develop skills for the job market (e.g. learning popular software/online tools, facilitating internship opportunities, a careers office to build relationships with local employers and help students apply for jobs etc.) or, where refugees don’t have freedom of movement or the right to employment, to develop skills relevant for self-employment.

Education Assessment Tools

Bali (2019) Improving Learning Environments in Emergencies through Community Participation
Zeina Bali
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/bali

This article describes an education in emergencies toolkit developed by Save the Children that uses participatory assessments to improve learning environments in humanitarian settings. Assessments cover five areas: emotional and psychosocial protection; physical protection, teaching and learning, parents and community; and school leadership and management. Data is collected from teachers, parents, children, a head teacher or school checklist, and through a classroom observation. Results are fed rapidly back to the school community for validation and discussion. A school improvement team is elected (comprising adults and children from the community) to design a school improvement plan based on the assessment results, and to follow up on the implementation of the plan with the assistance of a small grant. Pilot programs in Uganda and Syria highlight: the importance of sharing and validating results with the school community (increasing accountability); the value of encouraging parents and teachers to identify local, low-cost solutions that needed minimal financial support (e.g. parents volunteering to clean the school compound and improving playground facilities); the reality that it takes time to engage people in planning, and visible improvements emerge only after a few months; and strong community ownership enhances long-term sustainability. The pilots also highlighted a number of broader dilemmas: tensions between local solutions and global values upheld by Save the Children; some disempowering effects (e.g. a teacher who was left anxious about the effects of their poor classroom environment); and the need to use more child-friendly language and information mechanisms to enhance child participation.

Nikhit D’Sa, Allyson Krupar and Clay Westrope
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/dsa-krupar-westrope
This article describes lessons learned from piloting a new education assessment tool in education centers and schools in the Rwamwanja and Kyangwali refugee settlements in western Uganda. The tool aims to provide a rapid, holistic understanding of displaced learners’ needs covering literacy, numeracy, social and emotional learning, and executive functioning. It also includes questions on demographic and household characteristics, socio-economic status, home learning environment, and disability. Three challenges emerged from the pilot: (1) in situations where several language are spoken, it is advisable to conduct a comprehensive language mapping before translating the tool, create a sampling frame based on languages spoken, engage assessors that speak the languages fluently, and incorporate child-friendly language; (2) rapid training of assessors in emergency situations can undermine the reliability of scoring; and (3) assessment results should be explicitly linked to tailored learning content.

Allyson Krupar and Marina L Anselme
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/krupar-anselme

The authors retrospectively applied Michael Newman’s theory of ‘good learning’ to a non-formal education program for youth in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. They demonstrate how learning theories can be used to assess learning in diverse EiE programs and how including such theories when programming could help ensure quality and relevance.

Private Sector Engagement

Zakharia and Menashy (2018) Private Sector Engagement in Refugee Education
Zeena Zakharia and Francine Menashy
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 40-41

Of the 144 non-state organizations engaged in Syrian refugee education in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (in the second half of 2016), 32 percent were businesses and 10 percent were foundations. Of these, 77 percent were headquartered in high-income countries and 62 percent did not have education as part of their mandate. The private sector has an important role to play in strengthening advocacy for refugee education and addressing educational gaps, however there are several concerns about their engagement in refugee education, including: (a) lack of coordination and knowledge sharing among actors; (b) over-emphasis on technology; (c) bypassing the public sector and establishing privately run schools, that lack accountability, often hire non-unionized and poorly trained teachers, and lack an exit strategy; and (d) ethical tensions between humanitarian and profit motivations. Nevertheless, given the scale of the impact of the Syrian crisis, reliance solely on traditional public sector engagement in education is both limiting and unrealistic.
The key question is how to harness the expertise and funds of the private sector in a coordinated and ethical way that is mindful of the state’s responsibility to be the primary provider and regulator of quality education.

Informal Education

Hagan (2019) Street Schools and School Buses: Informal Education Provision in France
Maria Hagan
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/hagan

In the face of increasingly limited access to schooling for asylum seekers and migrants in France, volunteer initiatives have sprung up to provide much-needed informal education. For example, the School Bus Program in Calais, seeks to provide basic education to youth living informally.

Education Policy

UNESCO, 2018

Globally, about 1 in 8 people are internal migrants, about 1 in 30 are international migrants (almost two-thirds in high-income countries), and about 1 in 80 are displaced by conflict or natural disaster (9 in 10 in low- and middle-income countries). This report presents evidence on the impacts of migration and displacement in the education sector, and discusses how reforms in the sector could address challenges and opportunities posed by migration and displacement. Key messages (focusing on displacement) include:

- Migration and displacement can affect education, requiring systems to accommodate those who move, those who stay, and those who host immigrants and displaced populations. Education also affects migration and displacement, as it is a major driver in the decision to migrate, and is key to providing citizens with critical understanding, promoting cohesive societies and fighting prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination.
- Displacement reduces access to education. Displaced people tend to come from some of the world’s poorest and least served areas, and their vulnerability is further exacerbated when displacement deprives them of education.
• **Education can help displaced people to realize their potential.** Access to education is critical to establishing normalcy, structure and hope. Education needs to help displaced populations cope with protracted displacement and prepare them for a variety of futures.

• **Education for the displaced lags in access and quality.** 52 percent of refugees are under the age of 18; at least 4 million refugees (age 5-17) were out of school in 2017. UNHCR estimates refugee enrolment ratios at 61 percent in primary school and 23 percent in secondary school. In low-income countries, refugee enrolment ratios are 50 percent in primary and 11 percent in secondary. The quality of refugee education is “bleak”. In many conflict-affected countries, refugees and IDPs strain already struggling education systems (e.g. South Sudanese refugees in Uganda settle in the poor West Nile sub-region, where the secondary net attendance rate was 9 percent in 2016, less than half the national rate).

• **Consensus has emerged that refugee education should not be provided in parallel systems** that lack qualified teachers, do not offer certified examinations and risk having their funding cut at short notice. For example, Ethiopia’s Refugee Proclamation gives refugees access to national schools and gives host children access to refugee schools, Iran decreed in 2015 that schools accept all Afghan children regardless of documentation, and Turkey has decided to include all Syrian refugee children in the national education system by 2020.

• **The degree and evolution of refugee inclusion in national education systems vary across displacement contexts, affected by geography, history, resources and capacity.** Refugees may share the host country’s curriculum, assessment and language of instruction but be only partially included due to geographical separation (e.g. camps in Kenya) or capacity/resource constraints (e.g. double-shift schools in Lebanon and Jordan). Even countries with more resources can face practical challenges in delivering education to refugees through the national system (e.g. planning and coordination problems in Greece). In several contexts, refugees continue to be educated in separate, non-formal community-based or private schools (e.g. Palestine refugees, Burundian refugees in Tanzania, Karen refugees from Myanmar in Thailand). Other impediments to refugee inclusion that are discussed in the report include: lack of identity documents and credentials; limited language proficiency; interruptions in education; and affordability of education (not limited to fees). IDPs tend to face challenges similar to those of refugees.

• **The report highlights examples of host countries addressing these challenges.** Chad included refugees in its temporary education plan in 2013 to address issues such as language of instruction, recognition of diplomas and the threat of loss of culture and national identity; it converted 108 refugee schools into regular public schools in 2018. Alternative education programs help children whose education was interrupted by displacement, e.g. an accelerated learning program in Dadaab camp, Kenya, which condensed the national eight-year curriculum into four years, increased access for refugee boys.

• **Teachers are the key to successful inclusion.** Teachers are sometimes the only resource available to students in displacement settings, when classroom space or learning materials are in short supply. Yet including the displaced in national education systems poses challenges for teacher recruitment and retention. Teacher shortages intensify in displacement contexts: if all refugee children enrolled in school, Turkey would need 80,000 additional teachers, Germany would need 42,000 teachers and educators, and Uganda would need 7,000 additional primary
teachers. Some countries help refugee teachers get certification and re-enter the profession. Compensating teachers in displacement situations is challenging; unregulated, substandard and short-term teacher contracts have a negative effect on working conditions. Teachers need training to develop strategies to deal with overcrowded, mixed-age or multilingual classrooms, as well as stress and trauma linked with displacement.

- Immigrants and refugees can suffer from prejudice and discrimination in school, which hampers their learning, and public attitudes can affect migrants’ and refugees’ sense of belonging. Education can shape attitudes towards immigrants and refugees by providing critical skills to enable engagement with different cultures, and by providing an opportunity for students to engage with immigrants and refugees in school and challenge their own stereotypes. Additionally, diversity of teachers is associated with minority students’ achievement, self-esteem and sense of safety.

- **Monitoring the education status of migrants and displaced populations presents numerous challenges.** Systematic data on the education status of migrants and refugees are patchy. Data tend to be collected relatively systematically in refugee camps, but less than 40 percent of refugees and even fewer IDPs live in camp settings.

- **Providing early childhood education and care for the displaced are crucial.** Over one-sixth of displaced are children under age 5, for whom the lack of adequate interventions and protective relationships can lead to long-term mental health, social and economic problems. Best practices for refugee children under the age of five should focus on families and caregivers, and adopt a multi-sectoral approach. A review of 26 active humanitarian and refugee response plans revealed that nearly half made no mention of learning or education for children under 5 and less than one-third specifically mentioned pre-primary education.

- **Tertiary education for refugees should not be a luxury.** Tertiary education opportunities increase refugees’ employment prospects and contribute to primary and secondary enrolment and retention, yet refugee tertiary participation is estimated at just 1 percent.

- **Addressing the technical and vocational education needs of migrants and refugees is important.** Adult migrant and refugee education needs are often neglected. Financial literacy can protect migrants and refugees against scams, and help households make the most of remittances. Recognition of qualifications and prior learning can ease entry into labor markets.

- **Refugee children with disabilities face several barriers to education.** Lack of physical accessibility is not the only barrier for refugee children with disabilities; lack of teacher education also matters. While research and data on disability in displacement remain limited, examples of good practice demonstrate that collecting high-quality data is a prerequisite for designing strategies to improve inclusion.

- **Language programs should include migrant and refugee voices in planning.** For example, as part of an evaluation of its first refugee integration strategy, the Scottish government consulted with 700 refugees and asylum-seekers on the design of language and literacy courses.

- **Technology can support education for displaced people.** The scalability, speed, mobility and portability of technology make it a suitable option for educating displaced people. But initiatives tend to provide content that is incompatible with national curricula in host countries.
International organizations that support such partnerships need to ensure that they serve inclusion of refugees in national education systems.

- **Humanitarian and development aid provided about US$800 million for refugee education in 2016, but without joint planning.**

The report makes seven recommendations that support implementation of the compacts on migrants and refugees: (1) protect the right to education of migrants and displaced people; (2) include migrants and displaced people in the national education system; (3) understand and plan to meet the education needs of migrants and displaced people; (4) represent migration and displacement histories in education accurately to challenge prejudices; (5) prepare teachers of migrants and refugees to address diversity and hardship; (6) harness the potential of migrants and displaced people; and (7) support education needs of migrants and displaced people in humanitarian and development aid.

**Viscontia and Galb (2018) Regional Collaboration to Strengthen Education for Nationals & Syrian Refugees in Arabic Speaking Host Countries**

By Louisa Viscontia and Diane Galb

As part of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) to assist Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, UNICEF is coordinating the No Lost Generation (NLG) initiative in the education sector to support host countries to: (a) expand access to formal and non-formal education for Syrian refugees; (b) promote the provision of quality, relevant education; and (c) strengthen education systems at national and sub-national levels. The paper provides a good summary of the responses to, and constraints on, meeting the education needs of Syrian refugee children in the region. Drawing on a review of educational reforms in Jordan and Lebanon, the authors argue that to successfully address the prospect of a “lost generation” of refugees and problems of youth under- and unemployment in the region, education reform should be tackled regionally. They suggest that this can be achieved by: (i) standardizing school curricula (in science, technology, engineering and mathematics) as well as accreditation requirements for secondary education; (ii) developing regional databases in Arabic of evidence-based best teaching practices; and (iii) enhancing linkages between universities and industry to secondary schools. The authors argue that this would make education more portable for refugees, equalize learning opportunities, and make education more relevant for both refugees and nationals.

**Chinnery (2019) Jordan: Education Policy in Transition**

Julie Chinnery
*Forced Migration Review*, Issue 60, March 2019  
[www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/chinnery](http://www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/chinnery)
As the education sector in Jordan moves from a humanitarian to a development response, a lack of planning for an appropriate transition risks excluding some groups of learners. Specifically, the response has narrowed from “children, adolescents and youth” to schoolchildren, and now excludes informal and other forms of vocational education. The author argues that it is those children who are outside the system that are the most vulnerable: children who remain outside the system because of poverty, largely adolescents and vulnerable Jordanians; and those who are pursuing certified non-formal education programs. What is needed is: clear, comprehensive transitional frameworks and a common narrative; consultation with a broad range of stakeholders; clarity of roles and responsibilities; and dedication of sufficient resources and capacity development.

Simopoulos and Alexandridis (2019) Refugee Education in Greece: Integration or Segregation?

Giorgos Simopoulos and Antonios Alexandridis
*Forced Migration Review*, Issue 60, March 2019
[www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/simopoulos-alexandridis](http://www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/simopoulos-alexandridis)

Although education policies in Greece have been designed to integrate refugee children into the public schools, they have resulted in the segregation of refugee children living in reception centers by creating separate afternoon classes in nearby public schools outside of regular hours. While this parallel system was devised to minimize potential tensions with host communities, nevertheless there were many incidents (some violent) and the system has further stigmatized refugees. Students enrolled in separate afternoon classes have had limited educational achievements and poor development of language skills (due to limited interaction with Greek-speakers), which has reduced students’ motivation. In contrast, refugee students living in urban areas have been able to integrate into public schools supported by morning reception classes, helping them to interact more effectively and improve their language and social skills. The authors note that the number of refugee students is only a small fraction of the 150,000 immigrant (including refugee) students that have been integrated into public schools since 1995, for whom it was not felt necessary to develop a special educational framework. The authors recommend: (a) integrating refugee children into the morning programs in public schools (acknowledging that separate afternoon classes may be necessary for large reception centers whose student populations cannot be absorbed by local schools, but that these should be a short term solution until students can be transferred to morning schools); increasing the number of morning reception classes; training and access to interpreters for schools and teachers; removing barriers to enrollment in upper secondary and tertiary education for children without documents; integrating pre-school-aged refugee students into public pre-schools; and progressive transition for students from reception classes to regular classes.

Baron (2019) UK Immigration Policy: Restrictions on Asylum Seekers’ Right to Study

Helen Baron
*Forced Migration Review*, Issue 60, March 2019
[www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/baron](http://www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/baron)
Changes to immigration legislation in the UK in January 2018 led to asylum seekers being prohibited from studying as part of their immigration bail conditions. Many young people had to drop out of their studies or were unable to access student finance and accommodation. In May 2018, Home Office policy was adjusted to include guidance about who should be subject to study restrictions, clarifying that in most situations asylum seekers should and will be allowed to study. The battle over study restrictions shows how statutory powers, granted for a specific and restricted purpose, can be misused by a government whose policies make life very difficult for those without legal status in the UK.


Mary Purkey and Megan Irving
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/purkey-irving

A large population of refugees and migrants from Myanmar has settled around Mae Sot in western Thailand; in the 1990s refugee teachers established informal schools called Migrant Learning Centres (MLCs). MLCs are not accredited, do not receive government funding, and many teachers lack formal teaching credentials. In 2006, a new government policy extended access to public schools for all children regardless of their legal status. However, a number of impediments have prevented most Myanmar children from attending Thai schools. This paper describes several initiatives to transition Myanmar children into formal education including: programs to transfer students to Thai government schools or, alternatively, to formal education in Myanmar; a three-year Thai government ‘catch-up’ program to introduce students to Thai language and curriculum; and a non-formal primary education program, established by the Myanmar government, that offers Myanmar classes and government exams in MLCs. Both the Thai and Myanmar programs offer accreditation, but neither provides funding support. In addition, community-based organizations are supporting the standardization and quality of instruction in the diverse MLC network in order to bring schools more in line with Thai pedagogical standards. Several challenges remain including: lack of funding and accreditation for MLCs; undocumented families are apprehensive about enrolling students in Thai schools; and economic hardships force children to drop out and work illegally. The authors suggest that in Southeast Asia, where migration and forced displacement have regional implications, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could create an education framework to support legal status for MLCs, the transfer of academic records and certification of teacher expertise.

Erden (2019) Child Labour and School Attendance in Turkey

Ozlem Erden
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/erden
The author argues that the emphasis on the ‘self-sufficiency’ of Syrian refugees in Turkey “trivialises education in comparison with work” and fosters a belief among Syrian adults and children that education will not immediately improve their quality of life and is therefore less important than gaining skills for work” leading to high drop out rates and child labor, particularly among Syrian boys. School teachers and administrators attribute high drop out rates and child labor among Syrian refugee children to shortcomings in Turkish school enrollment and attendance policies, which makes it difficult to track the attendance of refugee children without identity documents.

Education Interventions in Displacement Contexts


Husein Abdul-Hamid, Harry Anthony Patrinos, Joel Reyes, Jo Kelcey, and Andrea Diaz Varela
World Bank Studies, 2016

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) operates nearly 700 schools educating more than 500,000 students each year in West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In 2007 UNRWA students outperformed their peers at public schools by the equivalent of one year’s worth of learning, despite their socioeconomic disadvantages, having teachers with the same years of service and degrees, and lower/less predictable school funding. This mixed methods study investigates the reasons for success at UNRWA schools.

Using econometric techniques to analyze test scores and observed pedagogical practices, the study finds that better learning outcomes in UNRWA schools are largely explained by: (a) students’ self-confidence; (b) parental support and involvement; (c) teachers’ confidence, job satisfaction, and ongoing professional development and training; and (d) pedagogical practices.

Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) tools were used to identify policies and practices that contributed to these results. Importantly, UNRWA is more successful at recruiting high-quality teachers and establishes clear expectations for their work. UNRWA teachers have more mandated ongoing professional development, receive guidance and mentoring, and are supported by capable school principals. UNRWA also has fewer management layers and is more accountable for student outcomes. Additionally, UNRWA schools promote high-quality teaching and classroom time: there is less wasted time; teacher practices reflect a confidence to teach various subjects through a variety of methods; teachers implement more interactive learning activities and assignments; and students participate at higher levels through structured activities.

Moreover, UNRWA schools successfully create a culture of learning. UNRWA teachers model positive wellbeing, and support students’ competence in the face of adversity through academic guidance.
and socio-emotional support. Additionally, UNRWA’s close partnership with the refugee community creates shared accountability for learning outcomes.

Save the Children (2017) Restoring Hope, Rebuilding Futures: A Plan of Action for Delivering Universal Education for South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda

Save the Children, 2017

The majority of South Sudanese refugee children in Uganda are either out-of-school or attending overcrowded schools lacking teachers and books required for effective learning. The report warns that an entire generation of refugee children could be deprived of the education they need to rebuild their lives. The report argues that, while the Government of Uganda (GoU) has responded to the refugee crisis with extraordinary generosity, the international response has been grossly inadequate, leaving GoU and vulnerable host communities in West Nile to shoulder the burden of responding to the refugee crisis. Moreover, international donors fail to prioritize education, funding is overwhelmingly directed to short-term projects, and there is poor coordination. This report sets out a plan of action which could deliver quality universal pre-primary, primary and secondary education for South Sudanese refugee children in Uganda at an average cost of US$132 million per annum for three and a half years, equivalent to US$152 per child annually. Around one-third of the proposed spending would be directed towards the strengthening of systems for host communities. Proposed expenditures include: (a) construction of 304 new pre-primary and primary school sites; (b) construction of 110 new (semi-permanent) secondary schools; (c) provision of reading materials, text books and school supplies; (d) recruitment and payment of over 4,000 trained pre-primary caregivers; (e) employment of 5,307 primary and secondary teachers; and (f) recruitment, training and accreditation of 750 primary teachers from South Sudan.

The reports suggests there are opportunities to tap new sources of finance including: IDA’s regional sub-window for refugees; Global Partnership for Education (GPE); Education Cannot Wait: the fund for education in emergencies (ECW); and bilateral aid donors. The Education Commission, chaired by the UN’s Special Envoy for Global Education, could play a role in coordination. The report argues that predictable finance is a necessary but insufficient condition for universal refugee education, and outlines priority reforms. The report argues that Uganda has kept its side of the bargain by implementing the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and now the international community needs to provide support at the scale envisaged under the CRRF and warranted by the South Sudanese refugee crisis. Failure to do so, it argues, will put the wider CRRF process at risk.

Save the Children (2017) Promising Practices in Refugee Education

Save the Children, UNHCR and Pearson, 2017
https://www.promisingpractices.online/synthesis-report/
This report synthesizes key findings and lessons learned from a 2017 joint initiative by Save the Children, UNHCR and Pearson to identify, document and promote innovative ways to effectively reach refugee children and young people with quality educational opportunities. Half of the world’s refugees are children. Refugee children are five times more likely to be out of school than non-refugee children: only 50 percent of refugee children are in primary school, 22 percent in secondary school and only 1 percent enter tertiary education. The report includes brief summaries of 20 projects (for which detailed case studies are available online at www.promisingpractices.online), with promising practices. The report outlines recommendations aimed at improving refugee education policy and practice, specifically:

- Approaching the immediate crisis with a long-term perspective by: (1) strengthening inclusive national systems; (2) committing to predictable multi-year funding for education programming and research in refugee responses; and (3) improving collaboration and developing innovative partnerships.
- Understanding different contexts and meeting distinct needs by: (4) adopting user-centered design and empowering approaches; (5) establishing diverse pathways that meet distinct needs; and (6) using space and infrastructure creatively.
- Improving outcomes for all by: (7) supporting teachers to help ensure quality; (8) prioritizing both learning and wellbeing; (9) using technology as an enabling tool; and (10) building a robust evidence base.

Lacey and Viola (2019) Strengthening Education Systems for Long-Term Education Responses

Thea Lacey and Marcello Viola
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/lacey-viola

Street Child’s implementation of Education in Emergency (EiE) programs in Lusenda refugee camp in eastern DRC and in communities hosting IDPs in northeastern Nigeria demonstrate how the building blocks for long-term improvements in education can be laid in the earliest stages of an emergency response, even in challenging conditions. The secondary education program in Lusenda refugee camp, which demonstrated promising initial results after just one year, incorporated: (1) in-classroom mentoring of teachers, focusing on building core pedagogical competencies to offset the lack of qualifications and experience; (2) sustained focus on school management capacity (finance, administration, pedagogy) by working with head teachers and establishing parent committees; and (3) school-based income-generating projects to create additional resources for the school, engage parents and expand students’ skills. The EiE program in northeastern Nigeria supported: (a) the innovative design of temporary learning centers, which in future can be converted into permanent structures at low cost; (b) establishment of Community Education Committees to manage the centers; and (c) recruitment of local Community Volunteer Teachers who already hold a minimum
qualification, and advocacy with the government to establish a mechanism for their accreditation.

Key lessons learned:

• An EiE intervention can be used to both deepen and expand core teacher competencies and skills beyond those required to meet immediate teaching needs, and such an approach can be integrated easily and cost-effectively even within a short-term intervention.

• It is never too early in an emergency to rehabilitate weak school management and ineffective community engagement by instituting empowering, community-led models that focus on self-sufficiency.

• An emergency intervention can address the chronic challenge of a shortage of teachers in remote and hard-to-reach areas.

• The temporary-to-permanent infrastructure model piloted in Nigeria offers a potentially compelling approach to addressing long-term infrastructure gaps.

A core goal of interventions like these is to address, at least in part, the sustainability challenge caused by short-term funding.

Shammout and Vandecasteele (2019) Inter-sectoral Cooperation for Afghan Refugee Education in Iran

Reem Shammout and Olivier Vandecasteele
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/shammout-vandecasteele

There are up to two million undocumented Afghans living in Iran. While documented refugee children have always been able to access public education in Iran, undocumented Afghan children were only granted access to primary education in 2015 through the ‘blue card’ system. The new system removed legal barriers to education, leading to a surge in enrollments. However, other obstacles remain: the public education system is overstretched with overcrowded classrooms, inadequate educational materials and equipment, and school infrastructure in disrepair; many families can’t afford education-related costs, despite the priority they place on education; and many children find it difficult to continue to secondary and higher education.

The article describes the integrated approach of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to support undocumented Afghan families to access education, which encompassed: refurbishment of school infrastructure (buildings and WASH facilities); provision of educational materials and equipment; involving Afghan and Iranian parents, for example through hygiene promotion and life skills training (helping them to understand the value of education, particularly for girls); legal assistance to undocumented Afghan families to help them obtain a blue card and cash assistance to help them meet costs associated with documentation and schooling; enrollment of children in ‘catch up’ literacy and numeracy classes (through a government program); and helping undocumented families secure livelihood opportunities for adult members or establish their legal status (increasing the likelihood that children remain in school). The success of this approach has been attributed to:
decentralized implementation at provincial level; concentrating initial implementation in a small number of locations; and effective collaboration and information sharing across technical specialties. The major outstanding challenges are the lack of adequate school infrastructure to accommodate all children, and persistent financial barriers faced by families, with many relying on their children for income generation.

Belghazi (2019) Learning in Resettlement
Marwa Belghazi
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/belghazi

This article highlights several ways to support refugees to integrate into the educational system in the UK including: an admissions appointment in the presence of a bilingual practitioner; sensitizing parents about initial support provided to children (e.g. English as an Additional Language classes) including clear explanations of technical terms and processes; parents’ evenings attended by both children and parents, with the support of a bilingual practitioner; and giving students a voice, e.g. providing access to translation tools and visual representations of rules etc. Schools are also a good place in which to encourage host-community children to develop empathy towards their new classmates and to be involved in making school a caring, welcoming environment. The author emphasizes the importance of children continuing to use and learn their mother tongue, to maintain a link to their heritage/identity and ensure a clear communication channel with parents. She highlights an example of a school program that champions student diversity, by establishing an international group and dedicated space within the school to help refugee, asylum-seeker and migrant children, and unaccompanied minors to feel part of a group and express themselves. Schools can have further positive impacts on the family’s life beyond educating their children, such as empowering women and motivating them to learn English, and providing opportunities to interact with other parents. Some schools also provide language courses to parents.

Miscellaneous

Sophie Bray-Watkins
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/braywatkins

Conflict exacerbates the already poor state of education in many war-affected countries, and ensuring children’s safety in educational contexts continues to be difficult. This article highlights the ‘hidden’ problem of sexual abuse of children by teaching staff, and outlines recommendations for ‘breaking the silence’. A 2015 UNICEF survey in Liberia found that 86 percent of children said “sex for grades” was their biggest concern. Perpetrators can act with near impunity in places that lack
adequate community and government protection systems. The article lists numerous contributing and exacerbating factors including lack of investment in schools and teacher training, poor school governance, weak oversight mechanisms, unqualified or poorly paid teachers, and normalization of violence and corruption. The authors also highlight the impact on children such as: poor attendance and dropping out of school despite strong motivation to get an education; psychological consequences; STIs; pregnancies; and social stigmatization. The author recommends: emphasizing safety first; strengthening accountability so that perpetrators can no longer act with impunity; establishing child-friendly systems to report demands for sexual favors or payment; and instituting codes of conduct and communicating them clearly to teachers and students.


This article begins by making the case for gathering and disseminating evidence on the efficacy of Education in Emergencies (EiE) programming. The author reveals that educational research funding proposals submitted to Dubai Cares, a global education funder, showed an alarming absence of input from local actors and end-users at all stages in the research proposal: from choosing the model to be tested, to formulating research questions, to disseminating research outputs. Approaches tend to be developed by actors in high-income, non-emergency settings for use by actors in emergency contexts. The author advocates for research approaches that “explicitly empower and build the capacity of local actors to set the learning agenda”.

Kelcey (2019) Navigating Curricula Choices for Palestine Refugees

Jo Kelcey
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement/kelcey

There are longstanding disputes over the curricula taught to Palestine refugee who learn in schools run by the UN. Disagreements focus on the teaching of the geography and history of Palestine in UNRWA schools and in government and private schools that enroll Palestinian children, with accusations from Israel and prominent Western donors that refugees learn hatred and violence in their schools. The article describes a UNESCO review of textbooks used in UNRWA schools that recommended the editing or discontinuation of some textbooks. The Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian governments rejected criticism of their textbooks, while the Israeli government disagreed with the findings of the review, arguing that it was too lenient, and banning textbooks it deemed inappropriate. The result was shortages of teaching materials in schools in Gaza, the West Bank, as well as in schools in Syria and Jordan. In 2018, the US withdrew funding for UNRWA. While other donors have stepped in, the dispute continues to jeopardize the education of Palestine refugees.


Kylie Diebold, Kerri Evans and Emily Hornung
Forced Migration Review, Issue 60, March 2019
This article discusses the provision of educational services to unaccompanied children in government-funded shelters in the US. In the US, all children, regardless of their immigration status, are entitled to free public primary and secondary education. On-site educational services should prepare children for entering a local school after release. However, educational programming varies across shelters, reflecting differences in physical space available, staff expertise, lack of a standardized curriculum and degree of support from the local school district. The authors recommend: teachers help students to understand the rules, norms, practices and expectations of US schools, as well as daily living skills and US social norms; focusing assessments on the strengths and abilities of the student in his/her native language, rather than highlight knowledge gaps or lack of English language skills; shelters pursue partnerships with local schools; and the quick and fair enrolment of students in local schools once they have left shelters.
III. GENDER AND LGBTI
Gender-Based Violence

Sarah Chynoweth
*Forced Migration Review* 57, February 2018, pp. 41-42

Awareness of the vulnerabilities of boys and men and of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals to sexual violence has increased among humanitarian actors responding to the Syrian crisis, however targeted services remain scarce. Replicating interventions designed for women and girls is ineffective and may be harmful. **International humanitarian actors can learn from and build on the work of local organizations that are at the forefront of providing specialized care for male and LGBTI survivors of sexual violence.** Key to their success is their close collaboration with affected communities, and tackling several barriers to accessing care including negative attitudes from care providers, destructive socio-cultural norms and lack of awareness of available services. Local organizations also identified areas of overlap with traditional GBV interventions, such as community awareness raising around sexual violence. Their response was to: (a) train providers in the clinical management of male rape survivors; (b) integrate awareness raising on sexual violence services for men and boys into their mobile medical team; (c) engage community and religious leaders to raise awareness about sexual violence, including against males; establish men-only support activities, facilitated by male counselors; (d) and conduct outreach to refugee men and boys to engage them in group activities. The author argues that **sexual violence against both male and LGBTI persons can be addressed without compromising targeted services for women and girls.**

World Bank (2018) Addressing Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in FCV Situations
World Bank
HNP FCV TTL notes series, HNP-FCV-01 January 2018

This note **highlights best practices in designing, implementing and evaluating a project addressing GBV.** It makes the case for focusing on GBV in FCV situations, noting the high prevalence of GBV and its long-term consequences (e.g. low birth weight babies, higher incidence of HIV, stigmatization). It highlights the **heightened vulnerability of displaced people to GBV** including rape, forced and child marriages, or sex-selective genocide. It suggests that GBV interventions target: (1) women and girls (e.g. estimates of sexual violence against female refugees range from 21 to 50 percent); (2) men and boys as potential perpetrators and victims (e.g. a survey of 520 Syrian refugees showed that 10.8 percent of men and boys had experienced sexual violence); (3) unaccompanied children who are especially at risk of GBV; (4) community leaders as gatekeepers and role models, including for displaced populations; (5) service providers as first points of contact for refugees and who can
recognize/respond to GBV; and (6) security personnel, who can recognize/respond to GBV and who can also be potential perpetrators. The note presents a typology of GBV by stage of emergency, and lists recommended interventions. It emphasizes that interventions should include both an emergency response and a longer-term rehabilitation and recovery approach. While evaluation evidence on the effectiveness of GBV interventions is scarce, the note provides links to various guidelines on evaluating GBV interventions and lists possible indicators for measuring GBV and GBV services.


Alastair Ager, Carolyn Bancroft, Elizabeth Berger, and Lindsay Stark
Conflict and Health, Volume 12, Issue 10 (2018)

An assessment of prevalence of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in IDP camps in Northern Uganda found that 50 percent of women reported experiencing some form of violence in the previous year, 40 percent reported forced sex with an intimate partner and 5 percent reported having been raped by someone outside of their household. Drawing on archived data on the prevalence of GBV amongst IDPs in northern Uganda in 2006, the authors seek to understand the social experience of GBV in the IDP camps in Northern Uganda. The authors find that amongst forms of GBV faced by women, rape was ranked as the greatest concern amongst participants, followed by marital rape, and intimate partner violence. Girls ranked all forms of GBV as higher priority concerns than other participants. GBV was generally considered normalized within the camp. Gender roles and power, economic deprivation, and physical and social characteristics of the camp setting emerged as key explanatory factors in accounts of GBV prevalence:

- Central to the communal construction of gender is the role of women as property of their husbands or fathers, and the understanding of their lack of agency to make personal and sexual decisions.
- Extreme household poverty within the camp communities was emphasized as one of the key underlying factors contributing to the pervasiveness of sexual and physical violence.
- The majority of GBV was inflicted within the home and within familial circles, rather than chance attacks by strangers in the external environment. However, water sources and spaces on the outer boundaries of camp confines where firewood is collected were recognized as high-risk areas.

All groups acknowledged GBV to represent a significant threat for women residing in the camps (among other major concerns such as transportation, water, shelter, food and security). Given evidence of the significantly higher risk in the camp of intimate partner violence and marital rape, the relative prominence of the issue of rape in all rankings suggests normalization of violence within
the home. Programs targeting reduction in GBV need to address community-identified root causes such as economic deprivation and social norms related to gender roles.

**Marriage and Fertility**

Georgia Swan
*Forced Migration Review* 57, February 2018, pp. 43-44

Protracted Syrian displacement is exacerbating pre-existing drivers of child marriage (gender inequality, poverty, lack of opportunities for girls). Child marriage increases the risk of dropping out of school, early pregnancy, reproductive health issues, social isolation, and abusive/exploitative relationships. Married underage girls are also more likely to be poor. Children who are married unofficially do not have marriage certificates, creating obstacles for the registration of births. The International Catholic Migration Commission proposes several strategies for preventing and responding to child marriage, including: (1) change the behavior of key actors (girls and boys, parents and caregivers, sheikhs, community leaders, courts and judicial staff) through awareness raising; (2) keep boys and girls in school; (3) engage boys and girls as peer-to-peer educators to build the agency of young people themselves; (4) address basic needs to mitigate against the risk of child marriage as a negative coping strategy; (5) increase livelihood opportunities to address the economic drivers of child marriage.

Maia Sieverding, Nasma Berri and Sawsan Abdulrahim

This paper examines changes in marriage and fertility outcomes among Jordanians and Syrian refugees in Jordan. The analysis is based on the Jordan Labor Market Panel Surveys (JLMPS) of 2010 and 2016. Where possible, the authors compare outcomes for Syrian refugees in Jordan with their outcomes in Syria pre-conflict (2005-2009), and also refer to the Syrian Family Health Survey of 2009, the most recent nationally representative data available from Syria. Key findings relating to Syrian refugees:

- **Marriage patterns among Syrian refugees are affected both by the age distribution of the refugee population, and the fact that the refugee population is not representative of the population as a whole.** The Syrian refugee population in Jordan is very young (nearly half under the age of 15), men in the key marriage ages of 20-34 are underrepresented, and there is a
relatively small population above age 40. The refugee population in Jordan largely originates from rural areas in Syria, and from four governorates (Dar’a, Homs, rural and urban Damascus, and Aleppo).

• **Syrian refugees generally experienced an earlier transition to marriage than Jordanians.** 18 percent of Syrian refugee girls aged 15-19 were married (compared to 8 percent among Jordanian girls of the same age). As with Jordanians, marriage among 15-19 year old Syrian refugee boys was very low (less than 1 percent), but a higher percentage of Syrian refugee men aged 20-24 were married (30 percent) compared to Jordanian men (8 percent).

• **Rates of early marriage (before age 18) among Syrian refugee women were quite high, but there was no evidence that this represents a change in marriage practices since they have been in Jordan.** However, there does appear to be some increase in the rate of marriage before age 20.

• **Syrian refugees have a higher total fertility rate (4.4 births per woman in 2016) than Jordanians.** This is lower than the fertility rate of the refugee population prior to the conflict and their arrival in Jordan (4.9 births per woman in 2009).

• **Marriage and fertility patterns among Syrian refugees in Jordan are consistent with this population being a highly selected group from the Syrian population overall**—refugees are primarily from parts of Syria where earlier marriage and higher fertility rates were common prior to the conflict.

• **Syrian refugees in Jordan were more disadvantaged in their marriage outcomes**, including lower expenditures on marriage and lower rates of nuclear family residence. Women who married before age 18, both Syrian and Jordanian, also experienced poorer outcomes than those who married at older ages, including larger age and education gaps with their spouses, a lower likelihood of having a nuclear living arrangement and a higher likelihood of being related to their spouse, factors that are negatively associated with empowerment.


Susan Andrea Bartels, Saja Michael, Sophie Roupetz, Stephanie Garber, Lama Kilzar, Harveen Bergquist, Nour Bakhache, Colleen Davison, and Annie Bunting


[https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/1/e000509](https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/1/e000509)

Although child marriage did occur in Syria before the war (13 percent of girls under 18 married in 2006), forced displacement appears to have increased its prevalence (around 35 percent of Syrian refugee girls/women married before the age of 18). Using a mixed methods approach, this study explores the factors contributing to child marriage among Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The study is based on over 1,400 “self-interpreted” stories about the experiences of Syrian girls in Lebanon shared by married/unmarried Syrian girls, Syrian parents, and married/unmarried men; 40 percent of stories focused on or mentioned child marriage. The researchers found:

• Financial hardship, lack of educational opportunities, and safety concerns around sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are identified as underlying factors contributing to child marriage.
• Male and female respondents emphasize different underlying factors. Men commonly discussed child marriage as a financial coping strategy; fathers often viewed early marriage as a response to unfavorable economic conditions and safety concerns in the community. Women and girls were more likely to identify their stories as being about protection/security and education, and more often saw child marriage as a way to protect girls from SGBV and harassment.

• Female respondents were more likely to view girls as being ‘protected too much’, while men more often perceived girls to be ‘not protected enough’.

• Both men and women acknowledged the negative impacts of child marriage on young girls.

• Some Syrian girls are choosing to marry early as a way out of unfavorable living conditions.

• Parents’ concerns typically centered on preserving the honor of girls by limiting their exposure to sexual experiences before marriage as well as SGBV, and there was a clear sense that the risk of SGBV and harassment is higher for Syrian girls in Lebanon than it was in Syria.

• Girls were being married after knowing the groom for a very short time, if at all. Sexual exploitation of girls was also described including transactional sex and short-term contractual marriages.

The authors conclude that several factors contribute to early marriage including poverty, lack of educational opportunities, and concerns about SGBV; sexual exploitation under the guise of marriage is a reality for some Syrian girls. The authors recommend: (a) gender-specific strategies to reduce child marriage, given that men and women perceived child marriage differently, and engaging men and boys should continue to be a priority; (b) holistic interventions to address child marriage, including economic, social, educational, and familial strategies; and (c) strategies to improve safety for Syrian girls such as safe spaces and safe modes of transportation, enabling them to socialize and access support.
Maia Sieverding, Caroline Krafft, Nasma Berri and Caitlyn Keo

This paper examines changes in marriage practices among Syrian refugees in Jordan, including age at marriage and early marriage. The analysis is based on nationally representative survey data from Jordan in 2016 (JLMPS) and Syria in 2009 (PAPFAM), as well as qualitative interviews with Syrian refugee youth in Jordan. Patterns of the timing of marriage in JLMPS 2016 could be reflective of either select movements into Jordan or the consequences of conflict and displacement. The authors find:

• **Syrians who fled to Jordan are not representative of all Syrians, with implications for age at marriage.** Syrian women in Jordan are less educated and younger cohorts are over-represented in the population of Syrians in Jordan.

• **Rates of early marriage among Syrian refugees in Jordan have remained similar from pre-to post-conflict.** In PAPFAM 2009, 21 percent of women married before age 18, and 5 percent married before age 15. In JLMPS 2016, 24 percent married before age 18, and 4 percent before age 15. Although the rate of early marriage among Syrian refugees in Jordan has not increased since their displacement, it is still high compared to many other countries in MENA, including the host populations in Jordan and Lebanon.

• **The Syrian refugee population in Jordan had younger ages of marriage than the national (pre-conflict) rate in Syria.** In JLMPS 2016 the median age of marriage was 20 (compared to 22 in PAPFAM 2009) and the 75th percentile was 24 (compared to 30 in PAPFAM), indicating a compressed period of transition to marriage among the population of Syrian women now in Jordan—a larger proportion marry in their late teens and early twenties. (Many refugee women would have married in Syria.)

• **Drivers of early marriage may have changed.** Poverty and security concerns have created additional drivers for early marriage. Economic challenges faced by young refugee men have also created disincentives to marry.

• **Other marriage outcomes have important long-term implications for women’s wellbeing.** Marriage expenditures (including bride price) may be lower post-conflict, while independent residence upon marriage and consanguinity are less common.

**Miscellaneous**

Lokot (2018) Syrian Refugees: Thinking Beyond Gender Stereotypes
Michelle Lokot
The dominant gender narratives among NGOs responding to the Syrian refugee crisis are based on simplistic notions of the ‘traditional’ Syrian household and power dynamics. NGOs typically focus on deviations from ‘traditional’ gender roles once refugees are displaced, without taking into account how a woman’s class or the type of urban or rural environment in which she lived may have determined her status or access to education or work. Additionally, there is a tendency to analyze gender solely through the lens of the husband-wife relationship, which fails to consider the role of sons (who exert more power and influence as they mature), or power struggles between younger and older women (e.g. mother-in-laws).

Pittaway and Bartolomei (2018) Enhancing the protection of women and girls through the Global Compact on Refugees
Eileen Pittaway and Linda Bartolomei
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 77-79

Although the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of September 2016 has a strong focus on gender, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) remains weak on these issues. Progress on ensuring gender equality in the Compact, while slow, has been significant. The Compact needs to articulate the specific needs of women and girls, men and boys, and support transformation on the ground to genuinely address gender inequality and the endemic sexual violence which is a key barrier to achieving this.
IV. GEOPOLITICS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND FOREIGN AID
Impact of Aid on Asylum Seeker and Refugee Flows


Marina Murat
RECent Center for Economic Research, Working Paper 133, December 2017
http://155.185.68.2/campusone/web_dep/Recentpaper/recent-wp133.pdf

This paper tests the influence of aid from rich to developing economies on bilateral asylum inflows, by measuring the impact of bilateral aid on asylum seeker applications from 113 sending countries in 14 OECD destination economies for each year over the period 1993-2013. There are mixed views on the impact of aid on refugee flows: on one hand aid may help countries to overcome the political and economic crises at the root of the flows of refugees, and hence deters them, and on the other hand aid may enable resource-constrained people in the recipient country to afford the costs of migration, and hence increases asylum applications. The author’s hypothesis is that either effect depends on the level of development of the recipient country. Results show that aid effects on asylum applications are significant, but vary with the level of development of the recipient country.

Aid to poor economies—especially in Sub-Saharan Africa—deters asylum inflows to OECD countries by improving living conditions and providing individuals with incentives and resources to stay, or to move—perhaps temporarily—to a nearby location. This is consistent with empirical data showing that most movements of refugee people in Sub-Saharan Africa remain within the region. However, aid to medium-income developing countries can increase asylum applications (aid transfers have a lower impact on living conditions). Further findings are that:

- Both refugees and immigrant networks exert a pull effect on asylum seeker inflows.
- Aid leads to negative spillovers on applications across donors, i.e. more aid from other countries decreases the number of asylum inflows in the OECD destination. This implies that a potential donor can find free riding convenient.
- Distance between origin and destination or the level of political terror do not influence the effect of aid on asylum inflows.
- Foreign aid has no incidence on voluntary immigration, therefore aid provided with the goal of influencing asylum inflows will affect just these inflows, and not those of immigrants.
- Political terror and lack of civil liberties in the origin country have strong and robust push effects on asylum flows, therefore aid transfers made conditional on improvements in the economic and political institutions of the developing country will have stronger overall effects on asylum inflows.

Overall, the deterring effects of aid on inflows from poor countries are stronger when transfers are coordinated across donors and are made conditional on economic and institutional improvements in the recipient economy.
This article analyzes whether, and to what extent, foreign aid is effective in tackling the root causes of flight and reducing the flow of refugees. The authors: (a) analyze whether inflows of foreign aid are effective in reducing the total outflows of refugees from recipient countries (to any destination); and (b) estimate the effects of aid on the number of refugees going to donor countries. The authors employ an instrumental variable approach, using the interaction between donor government/legislature fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid from a particular donor as an instrument for bilateral aid. The analysis is based on refugee data for 141 origin countries from 1976 to 2013 and bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) data.

Key findings:

- **No evidence that total aid to origin countries reduces total refugee outflows in the short term.** Only with long lags of eleven years or more does aid reduce refugee outflows, which appear to be driven by lagged positive effects of aid on economic growth.
- **However, where the share of humanitarian aid in total ODA is sufficiently high, aid reduces the number of refugees leaving their country in the short term.** Humanitarian aid is more effective in reducing refugee flows in the short run, compared to general development aid—aid reduces refugee outflows as long as the share of humanitarian aid exceeds seven percent of total ODA receipts two periods after it has been disbursed.
- Aid is also more effective (or less ineffective) in countries that are more likely sources of refugee outflows, such as countries that are poorer, more repressive, or hit by more severe conflict and disaster.
- **In the short term, donor countries experience increases in refugee inflows,** possibly driven by an improved image of donor countries through aid, or by enabling people to afford the cost of fleeing to another country.
- **Aid induces recipient governments to encourage the return of their citizens in the short term.**
- **Aid increases the number of IDPs in the short run,** possibly by enabling people to escape imminent threats to their lives, or by supporting the establishment of IDP camps that allow citizens to seek refuge within their own country.
- **Aid given to origin countries’ neighbors reduces the flow of refugees from the origin country to the rest of the world and to donor countries in particular,** i.e. donors successfully use their aid to induce countries bordering the refugees’ homes to block refugee flows. In the long run, aid to neighbors increases refugee flows, possibly because it becomes comparably easier and more attractive to seek refuge in a neighboring country.


Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Sarah Langlotz
*European Economic Review*, Volume 112 (2019), Pages 127-147
Global Compacts and Trade Preferences

Lenner and Turner (2018) Learning from the Jordan Compact
Katharina Lenner and Lewis Turner
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 48-51
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/lenner-turner

At the 2016 donor conference in London, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey committed to improving economic opportunities for Syrian refugees; and Jordan announced a compact to provide 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees. By January 2018, 80,000 work permits were issued/renewed in Jordan, however only 35,000-40,000 work permits are valid at any time, and it appears unlikely that the 200,000 target will be met. The article highlights the lessons learned from implementing the ‘Jordan Compact’ for future livelihood interventions including:

(1) Government approval is necessary but insufficient—the interests of other stakeholders shaping the political economy and labor market dynamics need to be recognized, e.g. government’s emphasis on recruiting Syrians to work in the garment industry failed to take into account the rights/circumstances of the existing migrant labor force and exploitative labor practices, which were unappealing to Syrians;

(2) “The critics are sometimes right”, e.g. experts highlighted several problems with plans to use Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and renegotiated terms of trade between the EU and Jordan (allowing preferential access to EU markets for firms based in particular zones and employing Syrian refugees as a minimum proportion of their workforce) in particular employers’ preferences for migrant workers who can be exploited more easily, and SEZs often failing to attract investment (due to high production/transport costs) or having a positive impact on the broader economy;

(3) Implementing agencies have lost sight of progressive goals to improve employment rights and conditions of Syrians, instead focusing on targets set by donors for the number of work permits, e.g. implementing agencies have encountered difficulties trying to formalize employment of the Syrians due to vested interests in the informal sector.

Cindy Huang, Nazanin Ash, Katelyn Gough and Lauren Post
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 52-55

Analysis of progress to date under the Jordan Compact highlights a number of shortcomings that need to be addressed if the model is to be used elsewhere. Achievements to date include: 83,000 work permits issued (however only 40,000 are currently active, and many have gone towards formalizing existing jobs); work permits no longer tied to a single employer in the agriculture and
construction sectors; provision of basic vocational training to approximately 2,600 Jordanians and
Syrians; 18 new categories or subcategories of work opened up to Syrian refugees (however the
available sectors are still too narrow, and new sectors largely limited to low skilled jobs); and five
companies have started exporting from the Special Economic Zones (SEZs). However targets focus
on outputs (number of permits issued) rather than outcomes (jobs secured, increases in household
incomes), leading to insufficient attention to critical investments and policy changes, e.g. trade
concessions and SEZs have a mixed record, especially in advancing decent opportunities for
vulnerable populations and are unlikely to improve the quality of jobs for Jordanians or refugees in
the short term. Additionally, Syrian refugees continue to face significant barriers to owning a
business. These shortcomings are not unique to the Compact design but are endemic challenges
that need to be addressed more broadly (e.g. cumbersome regulatory environment, high business
tax rates). For compacts to work, there must be: clearly defined outcomes for refugees and host
communities; improved collection and sharing of data and evidence; identification and transparent
documentation of barriers to economic and social inclusion; and a common set of benchmarks
against which programs are measured.

Harper (2018) Unpacking (and Re-Packing) the Refugees Compact Experiment: Lessons From
Jordan Two Years On

Erica Harper
WANA Institute, Royal Scientific Society in Amman, Jordan, February 2018
wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/.../Publication_LondonCompact_February2018.pdf

The London Compact Agreements encapsulated host country commitments to integrate refugees
into their labor markets, conditional upon significant increases in donor funding, concessional loans
and market access. The refugee compacts represented a paradigm shift by (a) recognizing that low-
and middle-income countries host the vast majority of refugees and carry a disproportion share of
the fiscal burden; (b) revealing the willingness of European states to pay a high price to stem the
flow of asylum-seekers; and (c) the huge concessions made by Compact partners despite competing
political imperatives. However after two years, there has been slow progress on both work permits
and pledges in Jordan due to several challenges: (i) appeal of legalized working status for refugees
was significantly overstated; (ii) sectors where Syrians were expected to be most easily integrated
required employees to undergo significant in-house training and businesses were unwilling to make
this investment in refugees; (iii) even if all male and female Syrians who were able/willing to work
could find employment, Jordan would still only be able to reach around 80 per cent of its 200,000
work permit goal. Donors were unwilling to make good on pledges until formalization had taken
place, and catalytic investments were needed to incentivize employers to regularize informal
employment or hire Syrians. The author suggests that Jordan might seek to renegotiate the terms
of the Compact Agreement by demonstrating that they are bearing most of the costs of forced
displacement. Investment should reorient from manufacturing towards sectors where Jordan might
develop a comparative market advantage (e.g. water-savvy agriculture, renewable energy and ICT).
Jordan would need to address institutional impediments (opaque regulatory framework, difficulty accessing credit and high energy costs). The author argues that labor force integration makes sense for refugees, humanitarian actors and their donors, as well as countries of future repatriation, however how host states fare depends on their economy. Where an economy is stagnant or contracting, refugees compete with existing labor; if the influx is large relative to the size of the economy, wages and employment will most likely be negatively affected. This impact will be felt by both refugees and nationals, and may persist for many years. In such situations, assistance will be needed in the form of economic stimulus.

To realize the potential of refugee compacts, the author recommends: (1) early investment of humanitarian funds in livelihoods programming; (2) leveraging wealth in global capital markets, by introducing mechanisms to diffuse risk and overcome the bureaucratic hurdles that dissuade investors from deploying their capital, identifying motivated investors, and building new public–private investment institutions that can provide finance to frontier markets through mechanisms other than debt financing; and (3) transferring risk to the insurance sector.

The author concludes that “...against the challenges of protraction, the [status quo] humanitarian model being applied is astonishingly inefficient. Dependent on long-term humanitarian assistance, refugees forsake dignity, opportunity and self-determination. For host states, systemic development deficits are exacerbated, while new economic and social cohesion challenges are introduced. Donors support the basic assistance needs of unprecedentedly large population groups, and then face backlash when they withdraw. And when countries recover from conflict, they are returned a depreciated human capital pool, often stripped of its best and brightest”. She argues that the humanitarian community should embrace burden-outsourcing, because it is an improvement on the status quo, and far better than the alternative outcome.

Arroyo (2018) Promoting Labour Market Integration of Refugees with Trade Preferences: Beyond the EU-Jordan Compact

Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2018/42, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/57124

A new approach to refugee protection is gaining ground, which advocates for a shift from humanitarian assistance in camps towards a developmental model that encourages economic self-reliance and integration of refugees in countries of first asylum. This approach is often linked to proposals to employ refugees in special economic development zones with financial support from donors and private investment, in some cases backed by special trade preferences for products manufactured in them. For example, as part of the EU-Jordan Compact, the EU agreed to increase its financial assistance to Jordan and ease the rules of origin that it applies to Jordanian exports in
exchange for commitments by Jordan to facilitate the access of Syrian refugees to formal employment and its educational system. This paper assesses the trade policy component of the EU-Jordan Compact and discusses the potential for using trade preferences to promote the economic integration of refugees in developing countries.

The initial results of the EU-Jordan Compact have been disappointing, with limited job creation for Syrian refugees. This contrasts with the relative success of the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) initiative launched by the United States for Jordan and Egypt, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) adopted by the United States for Sub-Saharan African countries. These initiatives demonstrate that trade preferences can have powerful export and employment-generating effects. However, the actual scope for using trade preferences is not large because many of the top refugee-hosting countries already enjoy a high degree of preferential access to developed countries and because improving their preferential access will inevitably erode the value of the preferences already granted to other vulnerable countries also deserving protection. The main lessons learned are:

- Trade concessions are only effective if they create sufficiently attractive preferential margins and if those margins are not eroded over time through subsequent changes in trade policy benefiting key competitor countries.
- Rules of origin are essential for the effectiveness of trade preferences.
- Beneficiary companies must be sufficiently competitive and have the necessary marketing networks.
- Refugees must have the appropriate skills to work in the sectors targeted by them.
- Donor countries should overcome the resistance of their national lobbies to extend trade preferences to sensitive products where refugees have relevant experience and can be easily employed.
- Refugees must have appropriate incentives to work in zones or sectors targeted by the trade preferences, in terms of pay, transport costs, cultural attitudes and working conditions.
- While clustering and economies of scale tend to support the idea of special economic development zones, these advantages might be counteracted by the constraints that they entail.
- It is important to ensure that efforts to stimulate refugee employment do not result in a deterioration of working conditions.
- Host countries should remove regulations (e.g. sectoral quotas or work permit restrictions) that hinder the participation of refugees in labor markets, particularly in sectors targeted by trade concessions.
- Trade preferences schemes should be adopted for a sufficiently long period of time.

The author concludes that “while trade preferences have their limits, if they are carefully calibrated and are part of a wider strategy, they can help underpin a new approach to refugee protection based on the creation of real livelihood opportunities, economic autonomy and dignity for refugees.”
Huang et al (2018) Tackling the Realities of Protracted Displacement: Case Studies on What’s Working and Where We Can Do Better
Cindy Huang, Sarah Charles, Lauren Post, and Kate Gough
Center for Global Development, CGD-IRC Brief, April 2018
https://www.cgdev.org/publication/tackling-realities-protracted-displacement-case-studies-whats-working

UNHCR is leading the preparation of the first Global Compact on Refugees incorporating the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which aims to foster greater inclusion of refugees in host communities, ease pressure on host countries, expand resettlement in third countries, and foster conditions for voluntary returns. At the same time, the Bank “has emerged as a new and catalytic actor and partner to UNHCR” and through the Global Concessional Financing Facility and IDA18 regional sub-window for refugees and host communities, the Bank is providing “critical leadership, expertise, and multi-year financing to forge more sustainable solutions”. This policy brief assesses progress of the CRRF and Bank financing to support refugees and host communities, focusing on initial efforts in Ethiopia, Uganda and Jordan. For each country, the policy brief covers the displacement context, policy commitments and financing, progress on policies and programs, and recommendations for governments, the Bank, UNHCR, and other stakeholders. The authors identify several common implementation issues including: (a) fragmentation of governance structures; (b) lack of alignment of goals, policy changes, program plans, and resources; and (c) inadequate mechanisms to hold all actors to account for shared outcomes. The authors make the following recommendations to address these challenges: (i) define shared outcomes and targets at the global and country levels to enable systematic evaluation of results, and support governments and their partners to improve data collection and analysis; (ii) engage a wide range of stakeholders through improved partnership and coordination models; (iii) conduct joint analysis and planning to align approaches, along with explicit exchanges of knowledge and expertise (e.g. recognizing the expertise of the Bank in working with governments to meet the needs of the poor and vulnerable, and UNHCR’s and NGOs’ expertise in refugee status and rights); and (iv) put in place clear accountability mechanisms.

Michael W Doyle
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey046

This article discusses whether the Global Compact on Refugees (Refugee Compact) provides sufficient specificity on responsibility sharing to address the lack of binding commitments on responsibility sharing in the 1951 Refugee Convention and New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. The author argues that States, international organizations and non-governmental
organizations need to take on additional “responsibility by culpability” and “responsibility by capability” and establish a formal system for collective action.

- “Responsibility by culpability”: The author argues that forced expulsion, a crime against humanity, warrants international sanction by the UN Security Council under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, and the UN Security Council would be justified in seizing the overseas financial assets of perpetrators (e.g. Syrian State or terrorist group) with sizable assets and using them to support refugees.

- “Responsibility by capability”: The author argues that the 1951 Refugee Convention indicates a moral commitment to international cooperation, irrespective of fault. He suggests determining each State’s share of the global responsibility to protect refugees (e.g. resettlement quotas for Syrian refugees) according to the European Union (EU) formula for responsibility based on four criteria: (a) population; (b) GDP; (c) unemployment; and (d) past refugee loads. The author acknowledges that such a system for responsibility sharing is unlikely to succeed due to a lack of solidarity and ‘buck-passing’. More moderate proposals may be more politically viable. For example, States set their own level of responsibility and offer pledges (e.g. resettlement visas, assistance to refugees in countries of first asylum), which it would justify in a summit with other States. Another possibility would be to identify pathways other than formal resettlement to gain residence in third countries, e.g. refugees prioritized for other categories of visas (family, labor, student etc.). Capability might also be enhanced by mobilizing the private sector, for example: (i) encouraging private sponsorship of refugee resettlement; (ii) investing in cell phone technology and internet platforms to improve connectivity for refugees; (iii) matching refugees with job opportunities through the creation of virtual platforms that link employers with refugees looking for jobs; (iv) crowdsourcing that allows individuals to make direct contributions; and (v) subsidizing private investment supported by risk sharing.

Jeff Crisp
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey050

This article discusses the proposal in the Refugee Compact for a global academic network on forced displacement and statelessness “to facilitate research, training and scholarship opportunities which result in specific deliverables in support of the objectives of the global compact”. The author notes that the proposal is consistent with the compact’s intention to promote “evidence-based responses” based on “reliable, comparable, and timely data”. He commends its pluralistic approach and intention to “ensure regional diversity and expertise from a broad range of relevant subject areas” given that currently most refugee-related research is produced in the global North in a narrow disciplinary base. However, he raises several issues with the proposal: (a) the value added of the initiative is questionable given the field is already highly networked, and there is potential overlap with existing activities; (b) the stated purpose of producing ‘specific deliverables in support of the objectives of the global compact’ may be unappealing to researchers who have expressed
skepticism of the compact; (c) UNHCR’s capacity to maintain a global academic network should be questioned given serious funding shortfalls and UNHCR’s previous experience in academic networking; and (d) research and analysis do not lead inevitably to effective policy. The author concludes that the proposal lacks clarity with respect to its purpose, added value, resource requirements, and management arrangements.

Marina Sharpe
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey052

This brief article acknowledges that the Global Compact on Refugees may ameliorate refugee protection in Africa because its objectives—easing pressure on host countries, expanding third country solutions, enhanced refugee self-reliance and supporting conditions for return in safety and dignity—address the main protection challenges on the continent, namely: (a) limited resources coupled with the scale of the refugee problem; (b) violations of refugee rights; and (c) the frequently protracted nature of refugee situations. The compact also contains specific commitments to concretize its objectives. However, the author contends that even if States deliver on their Refugee Compact commitments and the instrument achieves its overarching objectives, this will not transform refugee protection in Africa, because the compact does explicitly address the need for conflict prevention. While the compact covers ‘prevention and addressing root causes’, it does not specify the precise nature of root causes. The author argues that to eliminate root causes, particularly those in Africa, conflict prevention must be mainstreamed in the implementation of the Refugee Compact, including by disaggregating the inherently imprecise notion of ‘root causes’ and through effective collaboration between humanitarian and peace actors.

Gilbert (2018) Indicators for the Global Compact on Refugees
Geoff Gilbert
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey053

This brief article considers the kinds of indicators that might be appropriate to measure the implementation of the Refugee Compact, focusing on the compact’s fundamental principles “to operationalize the principles of burden- and responsibility-sharing to better protect and assist refugees and support host countries and communities”. Even though the compact is non-binding, the author suggests that indicators for better protection and assistance to refugees and host communities may be drawn from existing international human rights law standards given that refugee protection has been an international obligation since 1951. The author argues, however, that indicators for burden- and responsibility-sharing would need to measure how the
The international community supports countries of asylum (i.e. obligations between states) and in this regard there is a more limited legal framework to draw on. He suggests that this makes the establishment of detailed indicators, underpinned by robust statistics, even more important. He highlights some of the practical difficulties of measuring States’ diverse contributions (refugee resettlement, contributions to aid budgets, contributions to peace-keeping missions etc.) and suggests that it will take time and experience to ensure that indicators reflect the complex reality of refugee protection.

Song (2018) Strengthening Responsibility Sharing with South–South Cooperation: China’s Role in the Global Compact on Refugees

Lili Song
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey059

China remains a major source of refugees and asylum seekers, and in the past 20 years it has also emerged as a destination and transit country. China has also started to demonstrate growing interest in influencing and leading international refugee affairs. The article highlights several trends relating to China’s recent activities in relation to the negotiation of the Global Compact on Refugees, and refugee assistance in general:

• China’s refugee aid focuses on Asian and African countries as part of the One Belt, One Road initiative.
• Despite China’s increasing monetary contribution to refugee aid, it has shown no signs of willingness to engage in resettlement. China sees itself as a developing country and part of the global South, and thus with a different share of responsibility for refugees when compared to the global North.
• China shows particular interest in taking a leadership role in solving the Rohingya crisis, motivated by: (a) geographical proximity of the crisis to China and potential spillover into China; and (b) the fact that Rakhine State in Myanmar is the starting point of the strategically important oil and gas pipelines linking the Andaman Sea and China’s Yunnan province, enabling China to reduce its dependency on the Malacca Strait.

While noting that China’s view on how to achieve durable solutions to refugee movements does not echo that of the West, as exemplified by the Rohingya crisis, the author argues that it is important and possible for China and international stakeholders to find common ground and ways to develop constructive partnerships. At the same time, if China is to achieve its aspiration to be a leader in global refugee governance, it will have to convince the international community that it upholds the core principles of refugee protection.


Alexander Betts
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019
This article argues that the Refugee Compact must have a clear-sighted theory of change on how to translate text into practice. The author distinguishes between obligations to refugees within a State’s jurisdiction as defined by law (‘asylum’), and commitments to refugees on the territory of another State that are shaped by politics (‘responsibility sharing’). He notes that this disjuncture has led to a power asymmetry within the refugee system in which geography and proximity to crisis de facto define State responsibility. He contends that the Refugee Compact addresses this problem by establishing an intergovernmental consensus around a set of principles and practices relating to responsibility sharing, specifically by: (1) offering a summary of the actors who can contribute to responsibility sharing; (2) identifying areas in which they can contribute and some of the mechanisms for financial or in-kind contributions; and (3) proposing new structures to elicit contributions. The author argues that rather than change the international refugee regime, the compact’s basic aim is to get more resources into the system. He suggests that the success of the compact with be judged on whether States and others increase their commitments, and whether this makes a difference in the lives of displaced persons. The compact envisages two mechanisms of change: (i) the rollout of the CRRF adapted to refugee-hosting contexts, focused on self-reliance, economic inclusion, the creation of enabling environments, support for both refugees and host communities, and engagement with development actors; and (ii) political facilitation. The author contends that new structures, like the Global Refugee Forum and Support Platforms, are a necessary but insufficient condition for the success of the Refugee Compact. He argues that the key success factor for the Refugee Compact is UNHCR’s organizational capacity for political leadership, and the ability to understand States’ political interests and to propose principled yet pragmatic agreements based on reciprocity.


T Alexander Aleinikoff
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey057

The author notes that the (non-binding) commitment in the Refugee Compact for additional funding does not come with conditions that host States guarantee refugee rights, and he argues that an emphasis on ‘national ownership’ of the refugee response may create problems if accountability structures for how States spend new refugee resources are not robust. The author argues that, despite the limited reach and scope of the Refugee Compact, it can create opportunities for forward movement on some of the unaddressed challenges facing the international protection regime, in particular:

- The lack of a global responsibility sharing strategy and structure: A comprehensive responsibility-sharing strategy to address protracted refugee situations would not impose...
significant costs on any resettlement country (22 million refugees are less than 0.5 per cent of the world’s population). While the compact does not tackle this head on, it creates new modalities for international cooperation including: (a) the Global Refugee Forum at which States can make pledges of assistance, additional resettlement numbers, and other ‘complementary pathways for admission’; and (b) ‘Support Platforms’ for specific large-scale or protracted refugee situations. The author argues that Support Platforms could have a meaningful impact if they go beyond traditional ‘solutions’ of repatriation, resettlement, and local integration, and experiment with new modalities such as enhanced regional mobility for refugees seeking to move to locations where they can best pursue self-sufficiency.

- **The need to protect forced migrants who do not come within the definition of ‘refugee’ in the 1951 Refugee Convention:** While the compact’s language restricts the ‘need for international protection’ to persons already protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention and regional instruments (para 65), it also urges States to close protection gaps in a way consistent with, but not constricted by, existing international and regional norms (para 61) and, in doing so, it provides an opportunity for advocacy on behalf of all those in need of international protection. Forced migration linked to climate change ended up in the Migration Compact due to State pressure on UNHCR to keep the Refugee Compact limited to Convention refugees, and so the Refugee Compact and the Migration Compact will need to be read together to develop approaches for climate change-related migration. Sudden-onset disasters produce forced migrants for whom legal norms and institutions will need to be established. **The absence of commitments regarding IDPs remains the most troubling gap in the Global Compacts.**

Costello (2019) Refugees and (Other) Migrants: Will the Global Compacts Ensure Safe Flight and Onward Mobility for Refugees?

Cathryn Costello
*International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019*
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eyy060

The article discusses the delineation between the Migration Compact and the Refugee Compact, and the implications for refugee mobility. The author argues that the suppression of refugee mobility is a serious deficit in the global protection regime. She contends that:

- **Distinction between refugees and migrants in the compacts is problematic.** The Migration Compact distinguishes between migrants and refugees on the basis that only refugees are entitled to specific international protection as defined by international refugee law (para 4). This is problematic because many refugees may never receive formal recognition of their status, and neither of the compacts reflect the breadth of the notion of ‘refugee’ under UNHCR’s mandate (e.g. refugees in States that have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention but have forms of group-based protection etc.). Additionally, the Migration Compact refers to migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin due to “other precarious situations” (para 21), which could overlap with expanded refugee definitions in the OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration.

- **Migration control policies and practices often bear down particularly heavily on refugees and would-be refugees.** The author argues that the distinction in the Refugee Compact between flight (for protection) and onward movement (for a solution) is part of the “problematic framing
of onward mobility in the regime tainted by containment”. Since refugee resettlement only benefits a miniscule proportion of refugees, it bolsters refugee containment both practically (by creating an incentive for refugees to endure protracted displacement and human rights violations) and symbolically (refugees who engage in onward movement are skipping a ‘queue’). The Refugee Compact may open up resettlement opportunities and/or promote better resettlement processes, but it may also serve to legitimate refugee containment rather than open up greater mobility opportunities for refugees. Refugees and those in search of protection often have no legal travel routes, and are barred from using regular means of travel due to carrier sanctions, however carrier sanctions are not mentioned in the Compacts.

The author concludes that bifurcated Global Compacts risk endorsing an overly narrow conception of ‘refugee’ and may legitimate refugee containment in the global refugee regime. However, she also offers a more constructive reading of the compacts, emphasizing the overarching concept of international protection, and obligations to avoid harm in migration governance.

Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey061

This article examines how the Refugee Compact relates to existing international refugee law and discusses its normative implications. The author begins by identifying several common features of existing ‘compact’ instruments: (a) a focus on multi-stakeholder involvement and best practice; (b) issue linkage as a means to ensure cooperation and accountability in areas where direct reciprocity and more formal institutionalization are difficult to achieve; and (c) emphasis on political and practical cooperation as opposed to legal commitments. Compacts may also outline technical and operational principles, linked but subsidiary to existing binding international agreements. The author argues that the normative impact of the Refugee Compact depends on the extent to which it sets out sufficiently clear principles and rules that gain traction with States, eventually paving the way for binding international law.

The author suggests that the closest thing to a substantively new commitment in the Refugee Compact is the ambition to develop a “predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing among all United Nations Member States”, however this does not entail any normative or predetermined commitments. He argues that the Refugee Compact may, however, come to serve a norm-filling role to the extent that it sets out specific understandings and interpretation of existing rules of international law (e.g. reference to core political rights, such as the principle of non-refoulement, and attention to socio-economic issues, such as food security). However, it fails to offer any language pushing interpretation on more controversial issues of international refugee law, such as detention and non-penalization for illegal entry, and is weak on core socio-economic issues, such as the right to work, avoiding any kind of rights-based formulations or reference to existing
standards under international law. The author concludes that the Refugee Compact represents a step back from international law, reflecting States’ lack of political will to make further binding commitments with respect to refugee protection, and a conscious choice by UNHCR to avoid discussion on the existing international legal framework at a time of repeated challenges to refugee rights in many parts of the world. Rather, the main impact of the Refugee Compact is likely to be its norm-preserving role.

James C Hathaway
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eev062

The Refugee Compact and its companion Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) seek to address the major failing of the 1951 Refugee Convention to establish a common operational mechanism to ensure that protection burdens and responsibilities are fairly shared among States. While acknowledging the constraints imposed by the current political environment, the author contends that the Refugee Compact is a ‘tepid response’ that does not address the operational deficits of the refugee regime (e.g. where most of the resources are spent to address the claims of a tiny number of refugees able to reach rich countries) but rather establishes a bureaucratic “endless procession of voluntarist pledging conferences that may, or may not, deliver”. He argues that affirmative action is required to answer the perception that the provision of asylum is inattentive to the concerns of receiving communities and there is ‘no upper limit’ to the duty to provide asylum to those who arrive. Furthermore, the continued appeal of multilateralism depends on ensuring real benefits at the local level.

The author proposes that a robust alternative to the Global Compact would entail: (a) refugees’ access to protection in whatever country they can reach; (b) internationally run, normally group-based refugee status assessment would take place, and refugees would be assigned a destination based on algorithms that reflect destination State and refugee preferences; (c) no constraints on freedom of movement once they arrived in their assigned State of protection for the duration of risk; (d) making asylum doable for poor states by having funds guaranteed by the international agency, with funds raised under a common burden-sharing formula, and contingent on respect for refugee rights by the receiving country; and (e) resettlement guarantees (approximately 1.7 million resettlement places per annum) for those who cannot return or integrate locally. The author believes such a system is possible citing several historical examples. He goes on to enumerate the benefits of such a system to refugees (access to protection, and durable solution within a reasonable period of time), poor host countries (guaranteed funds for protection of refugees and to benefit host communities, and no indefinite hosting) and the developed world (by undermining smuggling market and reduce the use of the refugee channel for economic migration). The author outlines a number of practical challenges that would need to be met including: (i) agreement on the formulae that would define both a fair sharing of (financial) burdens and (human) responsibilities which would
ground the proposed system of common, but differentiated, responsibility; (ii) a strong central actor able and willing to administer the quota and assignment program; and (iii) a political champion. A further ethical challenge is whether such a system undermines refugee autonomy, and the author defends his proposed system on the basis that it is better than the current system.

**Goodwin-Gill (2019) The Global Compacts and the Future of Refugee and Migrant Protection in the Asia Pacific Region**

Guy S Goodwin-Gill  
*International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019*  
[https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey064](https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey064)

The Asia Pacific region is generally under-represented in the 148 States that are now party to the Refugee Convention and/or the Protocol, even though historically it has played a significant role in receiving refugees and in contributing to solutions. The author argues that it is not so much a dearth of ratifications in the region that is the issue—many Asia Pacific States are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—as it is one of incorporation or practical implementation. There has long been a tendency to deal with the non-citizen arbitrarily. The author concludes that *international conventions on the protection of refugees and migrants should have a future in the Asia Pacific region because they can provide States with clarity in determining national policy and practice, and if they are integrated into the new or reinvigorated schemes of practice proposed by the two Global Compacts, they can open avenues for protection and solutions as well as enhanced support for host communities.*


Volker Turk  
*International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019*  
[https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey068](https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey068)

Volker Turk reflects on the Global Compact on Refugees and its potential to shape collective approaches to refugee situations. He describes the context for the formulation of the Refugee Compact (increasing numbers of forced displacement, the majority hosted in developing countries, containment and externalization of asylum processing by some countries), the scope and objectives of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and its implementation so far, initiatives of the World Bank to support refugees and their host communities, as well as the formulation of the Refugee Compact, its key elements, and its relationship to the Migration Compact. Key messages:

- The answer to the high number of refugees can be found in a more robust, comprehensive, and good-faith application of the tenets of protection. This requires that the international refugee protection system be better capacitated to absorb the growing pressures
- The success of the Refugee Compact depends upon the engagement of a wide range of actors. Currently 93 per cent of UNHCR’s funding is provided by just 10 countries. Partnerships are
pivotal, e.g. development actors can complement humanitarian assistance by supporting host communities, and the private sector can introduce initiatives to stimulate job creation and economic growth benefiting refugees and their hosts.

- New arrangements in the Refugee Compact represent the best that can be achieved in a document that aims to articulate commitments for everyone, but which is at the same time voluntary and legally non-binding. While the text does not meet all the ambitions of everyone, it does provide a means to achieve a more sustainable response to displacement and to improve the lives of refugees and their host countries and communities.

- The fact that the resolution on the Refugee Compact was put to a vote in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly showed how seriously States take the responsibilities set out in the Compact and the import they attribute to it, as well as how such a non-binding text could nonetheless influence State behavior.

Vitit Muntarbhorn
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey070

The article examines the interface of the Global Compacts with children in immigration detention. The author notes that there are at least four groups of children who might be caught in immigration detention: (1) child victims of trafficking; (2) asylum seekers or refugees who find themselves in large camps or encampments beyond urban areas; (3) asylum seekers or refugees who end up in cities; and (4) migrant worker children and children who accompany migrant worker families, particularly those who are undocumented or in irregular situations. He also notes that the issue of children in immigration detention is dealt with by the Migration Compact rather than the Refugee Compact, even though this is an issue pertinent to both. He argues that commitments in the Migration Compact fall below the standard already applied by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which advocates resolutely against the immigration detention of children. A holistic response demands that the reference point for child protection, including children in immigration detention, must be the CRC and related standards.

Eunice Ndonga Githinji and Tamara Wood
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey072

This brief article explores the prospects for the Global Compacts in Africa and considers whether they are ‘adapted to the realities and peculiarities’ of people movement in the region. The authors contend that some of the most significant refugee- and migration-related issues facing African States are not adequately addressed in the two Compacts. In particular, ‘mixed migration’ which
characterizes much of the movement in Africa, is poorly dealt with in both the structure and the content of the Compacts, and the Compacts may be criticized for promoting the ‘unhelpful binary thinking between voluntary and forced migration’. The authors argue that clearer financing and responsibility sharing mechanisms are necessary for the Global Compacts to achieve meaningful responsibility sharing. Furthermore, the compacts overlook the role of African civil society organizations, which have long played an important role in complementing and filling gaps in State action to ensure protection and assistance for both refugees and migrants. The authors conclude that, while Africa stands to benefit from the Compacts, concrete international commitments to responsibility sharing and support for homegrown solutions must be key priorities in their implementation.

**Macroeconomic Impact of Aid to Displaced Persons**

Schillings (2018) The Macro-Economic Impacts of Syrian Refugee Aid

Tobias Schillings

Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 43-44

[https://www.fmreview.org/economies/schillings](https://www.fmreview.org/economies/schillings)

This article describes a recent study of the macroeconomic impact of humanitarian assistance in response to the Syrian crisis, which finds significant positive impacts for economic growth and job creation in the region. The core response of the international community to the Syrian crisis is the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), which builds on plans developed by national authorities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The study estimates the potential GDP impact based on fiscal multipliers (e.g. a 2015 study of Lebanon found that each dollar of refugee aid generated an additional 0.6 dollars of revenue, making the multiplier 1.6). Using historic data to quantify the relationship between changes in unemployment and output at the macroeconomic level for each country, the study translated the national GDP impact into expected job creation. The study estimated that with a total spend over 2017 and 2018 of about $9 billion, the 3RP is projected to generate a $17–25 billion increase in GDP and 75,000–110,000 jobs. This contribution to GDP and jobs has mostly been overlooked in public discourse yet offers a powerful narrative for policymakers to foster social cohesion among host communities.

**Geopolitics of Forced Migration**


Eugénia C. Heldt

EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2018/36, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

[http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/56404](http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/56404)
The author seeks to explain the EU’s policy failure during the refugee crisis, attributing it to four causes. First, a partial empowerment of supranational institutions on migration and asylum policy without clearly defined competences between the Council of the EU and the European Commission hindered effective and rapid action by Frontex and the European Asylum Support Service (EASO), the agencies in charge of refugees and mass migration issues. Second, the European Commission took a low profile by acting reluctantly during the refugee crisis and was therefore unable to take a transformational leadership role. Third, the inability of EU Member States to speak with a single voice impacted their external and internal effectiveness in solving the refugee crisis. Finally, this “cacophony of voices” led to unilateral action, culminating in the temporary suspension of the Schengen system, with several Member States closing their borders, and eroding the authority of the Commission. The author concludes that “the mantra that the EU undergoes many crises but always emerges stronger has lost plausibility”.

Anne Koch, Annette Weber and Isabelle Werenfels (eds.)
SWP Research Paper 4, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), July 2018

Under the banner of “combating the root causes of migration”, cooperation with countries of origin and transit countries is being promoted to reduce irregular migration to the EU. Development aid is being instrumentalized for migration policy purposes, and the barriers to cooperating with authoritarian regimes have lowered. This has led to a growing number of cooperation formats and project funds related to migration and an increased focus by the EU on the African continent. This study analyses migration cooperation in countries with different degrees of proximity and interaction with Europe and examines whether, and to what extent, authoritarian rulers benefit from this cooperation. The study focuses on: Egypt; the Maghreb states Algeria and Morocco; the Sahel state of Niger; as well as Sudan and Eritrea. The analysis shows that the impact of external EU migration policies varies according to the internal conditions in partner countries:

- Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is using the high priority that the EU attaches to migration policy cooperation with third countries to consolidate his power.
- The Sudanese regime faces a multitude of cooperation options, whose importance and priorities have not been clearly identified by the EU and do not meet Khartoum’s expectations.
- Niger’s government hopes that cooperation will improve relations with the EU, however Niger must deal with problematic consequences in its own country if, for example, the transport of irregular migrants as a source of income is halted and local conflicts become a threat.
- The Moroccan government has its own design ambitions on migration policy and is acting strategically, placing the EU’s migration policy offers at the service of its own modernization agenda.
- Algeria has so far largely avoided cooperation, so there are no potential “migration profits”, but there are signs of a cautious opening towards more cooperation.
• The Eritrean regime remains categorically opposed to partnership-based cooperation.

The degree of centralisation, assertiveness, and regional ambitions of regimes are decisive in determining whether European offers are perceived as a welcome influx of project funds or as an opportunity to pursue overarching political goals, or neither of the two. While the degrees of authoritarianism do not correlate significantly with willingness to cooperate with the EU, nevertheless the interests in maintaining power and the legitimacy strategies of the elites play decisive roles in responding to offers of cooperation in all countries examined. The willingness to cooperate is not necessarily tied to a desire for more financial support but linked to strategic interests, such as the lifting of sanctions or the normalization of relations and international recognition. These insights are important for European decision-makers in order to avoid contradictions between the migration policy agendas and longer-term development policy objectives, as well as any potential for domestic political conflicts in partner countries. The study cautions against restricting regional freedom of movement, which has promoted the economic development of African states. The study also highlights that states for which remittances from Europe are an important economic factor have a greater interest in enhancing the possibilities of legal migration than states whose citizens primarily send money home from the Gulf States.

William Allen, Bridget Anderson, Nicholas Van Hear, Madeleine Sumption, Franck Duvell, Jennifer Hough, Lena Rose, Rachel Humphris and Sarah Walker
Geopolitics, Volume 23 Issue 1, pp. 217-243, 2018

This collection of essays explores questions such as: Who counts as a migrant, refugee or citizen? How are these categories constructed and by whom? How are these categories challenged and subverted? What are the implications for mobility, citizenship and the nation state? The introduction notes that legal categories such as ‘refugee’ emerge from particular moments in history, revealing the primacy of (geo)politics—not law—in deciding who counts. The following essays specifically address issues of forced displacement:

• Van Hear argues that three pathways— the ways in which people move away from, mobilize against, or endure challenging conditions—require different capacities and powers (i.e. socioeconomic position, standing and networks, emotional and mental strength), and that “to understand mobility, we need to account for the relationship with those who do not move, but mobilize to contest adversity or hunker down and endure it.”

• Duvell discusses how the Turkish government and the EU continue to use migration issues to achieve policy objectives, sometimes in conflicting ways. For example by calling Syrians in Turkey ‘brothers’ or ‘guests’ instead of refugees.

• Hough discusses the words used for North Korean defectors/refugees/settlers.

• Rose argues that assumptions about European secularisation need to be revisited in order to respond to tensions between lived religion and the secular state.
Filippo Dionigi
International Migration, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12468

This article proposes a conceptual analysis of borders applied to the examination of forced displacement and its response from a receiving state, focusing on the case of more than 250,000 Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). The author argues that the flight of Syrian refugees to KRI is the manifestation of dynamics more complex than can be explained by traditional notions of statehood and sovereignty. The author argues that there is a “thin border” between Syria and Iraq because there are active cross-border interactions among Kurds, which have become even more significant with the loss of control of the Syrian state, a weak Iraqi state, and an emboldened Kurdish authority. The analysis illustrates the ways that a thin border shapes the dynamics of displacement from Syria and contributes to a relatively receptive attitude towards Syrian Kurdish refugees. Refugees can count on political interests, social solidarity, and economic opportunities to ease their integration in KRI. The author concludes that a thin border has scarce containment capacity, and that the relations that connect two sides of the border establish a shared space for politics, society, and economies.

Braithwaite et al (2019) Refugees, Forced Migration, And Conflict: Introduction to the e Special Issue
Alex Braithwaite, Idean Salehyan, Burcu Savun
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318814128

This article introduces a special issue on refugees, forced migration, and conflict. It describes the evolution of the international refugee regime and identifies theoretical and methodological advances in the relevant literature. The authors argue that the current refugee crisis, and responses to it, threaten to place the international refugee regime at risk. They note that during the Cold War, refugees—particularly from communist-controlled nations—were often welcomed as a way to discredit the Soviet bloc and promote the formation of opposition groups in exile. However, after the Cold War, and especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, refugees were often viewed with suspicion, particularly those from Muslim nations. They argue that populism, immigration restrictions, and border fortifications reflect a new narrative in which refugees and migrants in general are viewed as a challenge, if not a threat, to the way of life of Western nations. Recognizing this backsliding, efforts have been made since 2016 to craft a new Global Compact on Migration that outlines a framework for response by member-states, as well as a program of action to ensure implementation by governments and relevant stakeholders. Nevertheless, they suggest that we are likely moving into an era of additional restrictions on refugee entries and increasing efforts to force the return of refugees. They argue that academic research can shed light, through systematic analysis, on the causes and consequences of refugee flows. The article concludes with a discussion of the individual articles in the issue, which seek to address gaps in the literature with
respect to explaining motivations for refugee departures, understanding the relationship between refugee populations and political instability in host countries, and tracking public attitudes towards hosting refugee populations.

Responsibility and Burden Sharing


Kathleen Forichon
OECD Development Co-operation Working Paper 48, December 2018
https://doi.org/10.1787/22220518

This report examines financing for refugee-hosting contexts by members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), in order to construct a baseline for monitoring progress towards the goals of the Global Compact on Refugees (“Refugee Compact”) for “funding and effective and efficient use of resources” as a key tool for effective burden- and responsibility-sharing among the international community. Data was collected via a survey sent to DAC members to identify trends in official development assistance (ODA), plans for future funding, and other, non-funding efforts and responses. Key findings include:

• **The majority of DAC members intend to maintain or increase ODA spending on refugees and host communities**, which totaled almost US$26 billion over 2015-17, contributed either bilaterally, through pooled funds or through international organizations.

• **Overall, there is a heavy reliance on humanitarian assistance for refugee hosting contexts (70 percent of ODA), and a preference for short-term rather than multi-year funding.** While humanitarian assistance is critical for meeting immediate needs in crises, protracted refugee situations might not be receiving the assistance that they need. The author notes that contributions from other development partners such as Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are beyond the scope of the survey. The growing engagement of MDBs will be catalytic in drawing other development partners, and also indicates a trend toward greater development spending in refugee-hosting contexts.

• **Nevertheless, DAC members are integrating issues related to refugees into their development policies**—a positive change that can help donors support the commitments of the Refugee Compact.

• **The Middle East receives the most ODA** from DAC members to support refugees and their host communities (35 percent of geographically allocated contributions). Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq together account for a third of ODA allocations to refugee-hosting contexts. The author suggests that contributions to international organizations can provide funding to contexts that otherwise do not receive high levels of donor attention.

• **Donors are, for the most part, contributing ODA where it is needed.** However, in some cases, certain contexts may receive less attention from the international community than others, e.g. three of the 21 major refugee-hosting contexts (Iran, Rwanda and Burundi) did not make it to the list of top 21 ODA recipients from DAC members.
• There is little accessible data on ODA to programs and projects that support refugees and their host communities, and greater investments in data are needed.
• In addition to funding, DAC members are also supporting the Refugee Compact through policy changes and advocacy.

The data presented in this report provides insights into the efforts donors are making towards the goals of the Refugee Compact, and will inform discussions about the most effective types of financing for situations of forced displacement.

UK Government, House of Commons, International Development Committee, 2019
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmintdev/1433/143302.htm

The International Development Committee of the UK House of Commons has published a report summarizing the findings of its inquiry into forced displacement in Africa, which examines: (a) the effectiveness of DFID’s work to support refugees and IDPs in Africa; (b) the adequacy of DFID’s support to host countries; (c) whether DFID gives sufficient priority to forced displacement, and internal displacement in particular; (d) the effectiveness of DFID interventions to address the root causes of displacement, human trafficking and smuggling; (e) priorities for action against sexual exploitation and abuse in relation to forced displacement; (f) effectiveness of DFID’s support of delivery partners; (g) effectiveness of UNHCR; and (h) potential impact of the Global Compact on Refugees and how the compact might be supported by the UK Government. Key findings include:

• Inadequacy of funding for the refugee responses in Sub-Saharan Africa, which hosts over 20 million IDPs and refugees. It calls for an overhaul of the ‘begging bowl’ approach to raising funds for refugee crises, and the creation of a new system that recognizes that countries hosting refugees are providing a global public good. The Committee questions the approach of the World Bank’s IDA18 sub-window that requires many host countries to take on additional debt in order to support refugees. It suggests that the UK government should use its influence and example to encourage other donors to increase their contributions to refugee crises in Africa. The Committee was unable to establish how much DFID is spending on forcibly displaced persons, and it calls for more transparent data on spending by country, distinguishing between refugees and IDPs.

• Over half of those displaced in Africa are children; the vast majority of whom are missing out on an education. The report advocates for the integration of refugees into national education systems in host countries in line with the aims of the Refugee Compact.

• The right to work and move freely are essential if refugees are to be more self-reliant, but granting these rights can create tensions in host countries. Countries like Uganda and Ethiopia that persist with progressive, and often unpopular, policies should be equipped with the necessary resources and support. Schemes, such as the Ethiopia Jobs Compact, must be considered carefully to avoid unintended consequences. Donors should lead by example; DFID
cannot continue to ask poor countries to grant refugees the right to work while the UK Government limits asylum seekers’ right to work in the UK.

- **Protection of those on the move remains vital, especially women and children, who are the most vulnerable to violence and abuse.** DFID should ensure that the highest safeguarding standards are met by all of its partners on the ground, and appropriate mechanisms are in place to support those who have experienced, or feel under threat from, sexual abuse and exploitation, including by aid workers. Putting women at the forefront of refugee responses could lead to better protection for those at risk and greater self-reliance for refugee women. Child protection must be central to any refugee response programme carried out by DFID and its partners.

- **Where there is the potential to be repatriated, refugees must have access to comprehensive information about the situation they will return to and sufficient support for reintegration.** The Committee has **significant concerns about Somali refugees being returned from Kenya** and asks DFID to use its influence with UNHCR and the Kenyan Government to ensure that ‘push’ factors—such as the poor conditions in the Dadaab refugee camps—are addressed, **proper process is followed and refugee returns are entirely voluntary.**

- **Donors should support host countries (technical and financial support) to find complementary pathways or to integrate refugees, where there is very little chance of them returning home.** The report highlights the Kalobeyei settlement, on the outskirts of Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, as a good example of greater self-reliance for refugees alongside integration into the host community. The UK Government must also look at the example it is setting through its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK.

- **Opportunities for refugee resettlement should be expanded.** The UK takes a very small number of refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa (448 out of 5,756 in 2017/18). The Committee **calls on the UK to increase the number of annual resettlement places to 10,000 and argues that a quarter of places should be reserved for refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa.**

- **UNHCR’s work remains urgent and essential** and should continue to be supported by the UK. However, **cases of corruption, mismanagement, or other harmful conduct cannot be ignored.** Where cases arise, UNHCR must act urgently to put safeguards in place whilst it investigates, to prevent disruption to its life-saving operations. DFID should react swiftly and proportionately to protect UK aid, whilst limiting the impact on refugees who rely on UNHCR’s services.

- **DFID should push for robust accountability processes at the international level, including the development of indicators to track progress, in order to ensure continued commitment to, and tangible results from, the Refugee Compact.**

- **13 million IDPs living in some of Africa’s poorest conflict-afflicted countries are being failed by their governments and the international community.** DFID must place **greater emphasis on targeting and supporting IDPs** through its humanitarian and development programmes, working, where appropriate, in partnership with governments to do so.

- **When responding to displacement crises in Africa, it is essential that the UK Government continues to uphold the commitments it made under the Grand Bargain, agreed at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.** This includes a commitment to localization, i.e. **humanitarian spending directed through local organizations.** DFID needs to find ways to effectively support
local and community-based organizations, including those led by women. It must also find an effective way of tracking the proportion of humanitarian funding that is directed to national and local responders.

- The Committee highlights the transformative effect of cash-based assistance on the lives of refugees, in encouraging dignity and self-reliance as well as being an effective way to deliver humanitarian support.

- The report highlights the need for sustainable, multi-year funding for humanitarian support in displacement situations.

- The report highlights the need for a more coherent approach to migration and displacement across the UK Government. UK policy on displacement and migration is frequently opaque, disconnected and incoherent. DFID encourages host governments to give refugees the right to work, whilst the Home Office limits asylum seekers’ right to work in the UK. DFID pushes for durable solutions for refugees, whilst the Home Office limits resettlement places in the UK.

- There is a real risk that policies pursued by some parts of the UK Government could come into conflict with the work of others. The UK Government’s desire to address migration to Europe, particularly through the Khartoum Process and engagement in Libya, is undermining its commitment to human rights and protecting the most vulnerable refugees.

- The UK Government needs to take a comprehensive look at its policies on migration and forced displacement in order to address these inconsistencies and formulate a coherent cross-Government approach. Above all, “the [UK] Government must begin to practice what it has preached”.

Alexander Betts and James Milner
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/governance-global-refugee-regime

The authors argue that the global refugee regime, distinct from its component organizations, lacks a clearly defined system of governance due to: diffuse governance arrangements; conflation of governance of the regime with governance of UNHCR; and lack of effective coordination, dialogue and political engagement necessary for international cooperation and the realization of the regime’s core objectives of protection and solutions for refugees. Individual states are responsible for implementing the regime’s norms within their jurisdictions, with control over the quantity and quality of asylum they grant to refugees on their territory, while outcomes for refugees are increasingly shaped by decisions taken in other fields (e.g. development, humanitarianism, human rights, labor migration, travel, security). Additionally, there are no binding obligations on states to cooperate to ensure the functioning of the regime or to share the burden or responsibility for refugee protection.

In response to these gaps, the authors propose enhanced governance arrangements for the global refugee regime that would contribute to enhanced protection and solutions for refugees and more predictability for states and the international system. They identify four functions needed to
facilitate collective action—dialogue, facilitation, expertise and oversight—and propose: (a) a forum for dialogue between refugee-hosting and donor states and other stakeholders, including the private sector, NGOs and refugees themselves; (b) the capacity for political facilitation between actors, i.e. to identify principled yet practical bargains that can meet states’ interests while advancing refugee protection and solutions; (c) enhanced capacity for analysis and evidence-based planning; and (d) oversight and accountability to ensure compliance with international norms.

Specific recommendations are as follows:

- **New governance mechanisms**: The Global Refugee Forum (GRF) and Support Platform, detailed in the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), should be supported as new governance mechanisms that, if combined, could provide a mechanism for dialogue, facilitation, expertise, delivery and oversight. Working groups should be authorized to develop responses to specific refugee situations and make proposals that require political and material support. If the GRF proves inadequate, the ten largest host and ten largest donor countries should establish a ‘R20’ mechanism. New governance mechanisms should be supported by a secretariat that can provide political analysis and research.

- **Ensuring coherence**: A special representative of the UN Secretary-General for displaced persons should be tasked with ensuring sustained engagement and complementarity across the UN system and with regional organizations and other actors, and more predictable efforts to address root causes of displacement and to respond to displacement when it occurs.

- **Strengthening accountability**: Mechanisms are needed to ensure more consistent state compliance, including through authoritative and legitimate monitoring, enforcement and accountability mechanisms to address causes of displacement and provision of protection and solutions.

- **Addressing gaps**: Notwithstanding the potential benefits of the GCR, the reliability of the refugee regime would benefit from additional instruments and mechanisms to ensure that burden and responsibility sharing for refugees is ultimately predictable, equitable and sufficient in both scope and scale.

**Policy Liberalization**


Guy Grossman, Christopher W. Blair, and Jeremy Weinstein
November 6, 2019
JDC seminar recording available at: [https://worldbankgroup.webex.com/recordingstrategy/sites/worldbankgroup/recording/43d37c88f4ff44ddadf4177ca4b508eb](https://worldbankgroup.webex.com/recordingstrategy/sites/worldbankgroup/recording/43d37c88f4ff44ddadf4177ca4b508eb)
Despite the fact that more than 84 percent of the world’s forced migrants are hosted in developing countries, refugee and asylum policies in developing countries are largely neglected in the academic literature, in part due to: (a) lack of data on migration policies outside the OECD; and (b) presumption that de jure policies don’t matter in developing contexts because of weak enforcement and limited policy knowledge. The authors introduce a new dataset of asylum policies in the developing world, and employ it to study the correlates of asylum policymaking in the developing world, as well as the role of de jure policies as pull factors in flows of forced migration. The dataset includes 229 national-level laws relating to forced displacement in 92 African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian developing countries between 1951 and 2017. For each law, the dataset includes codes for 54 provisions across five policy fields: (1) access: ease of entrance and security of status; (2) services: provision of public services and welfare; (3) livelihoods: ability to work and own property; (4) movement: encampment policies; and (5) participation: citizenship and political rights.

The data suggests the following stylized facts:

- **There is much diversity in asylum policy liberality**, which cannot be explained by regional clustering.
- **Developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and the post-Soviet space, have been gradually liberalizing their asylum and refugees policies**, while developed countries have been moving in more restrictive directions. Policy liberalization has been particularly prominent on status and entry procedures (access) and rights to free movement and documents (movement), and comparatively slower on civic participation and citizenship rights.

Key findings:

- **Developing countries alter their asylum policies when intense civil wars break out in neighboring countries, leading to expectations of future forced migrant flows.**
- **Policy liberalization is more likely when co-ethnic kin are excluded from power in neighboring countries in conflict**, i.e. liberalization is a function of co-ethnic solidarity. This suggests that countries may be willing to bear greater costs to host kin groups.
- **No generalized evidence that repressive regimes liberalize in exchange for aid**, although this dynamic is relevant for some specific cases (e.g. Uganda).
- **As in Western countries, national wealth is associated with migration policy restrictions in the developing world.**
- **Liberal asylum policies pull forced migrants, conditional on facilitating factors (information and ethnic kin).** Liberal policies on access to services (e.g. education), employment, and free movement are the strongest pulls. In contrast to evidence from data on the OECD, there is no significant association found between asylum-seeking and citizenship or political rights.
- **Transnational ethnic kin networks and mobile-phone and internet penetration are sources of information diffusion about de jure refugee and asylum policies.** Ethnic kinship networks have
been previously identified as a pull factors directly affecting migration choice by reducing integration costs. However, part of the effect of kinship networks on destination choice is indirect by increasing knowledge about the asylum policies of (potential) target countries.

- The effect of kin as a pull factor is more important the more liberal asylum policies are.
V. HEALTH
Non-Communicable Diseases

**World Bank (2018) Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) in FCV Situations**

Many FCV countries now have higher mortality due to NCDs than communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutrition related conditions, due to changing disease epidemiology. This note highlights best practices in designing, implementing and evaluating a project that includes an NCD focus or component. The note sets out several arguments for investing in NCD interventions, including the high economic cost of NCDs and good rate of return on NCD interventions. It makes the point that people in FCV situations are often more vulnerable to NCDs due to the increased prevalence of negative coping strategies (e.g. smoking and alcohol consumption), weak/disrupted health systems, and, in emergency situations, the greater likelihood of experiencing a stroke or heart attack. In particular, migrants and refugees have an increased vulnerability to NCDs due the lack of regular treatment available during travel. It goes on to highlight the gaps in the guidelines for implementing NCD interventions in FCV and refugee situations, noting that treatments for different populations may vary (e.g. Syrian refugees tend to be older and suffer more from chronic disease than other refugee populations). The note provides a typology of NCD interventions, and also summarizes the common challenges faced by TTLs when addressing NCDs in FCV situations together with lessons learned. The note concludes by highlighting several emerging trends in practices of evaluating NCD programs in FCV contexts.

Mental Health: Impacts, Interventions


Conflicts have extensive psychological impacts on refugees, particularly youth and children, which are exacerbated by the “daily stressors of displacement, poverty, lack of resources and services to meet basic needs, risks of violence and exploitation, discrimination and social isolation”. However, humanitarian programs do not consistently address the psychological needs that have an impact on social cohesion. Evidence from peace education work with young displaced Syrians shows that addressing trauma is critical in overcoming psychological barriers to social cohesion, e.g. by creating safe spaces to allow children to develop a sense of physical and psychological safety and supporting young people to deal with traumatic memories in non-aggressive ways. Rather than
being seen as a separate programming focus, addressing the impact of trauma should be a building block for all social cohesion efforts when working with communities affected by conflict and displacement.


Tania Josiane Bosqui and Bassam Marshoud
Conflict and Health (2018) 12:15
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-018-0153-1

Children and adolescents exposed to war, armed conflict or political violence have higher prevalence of psychiatric disorders, e.g. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, depression and anxiety. They also experience cognitive, emotional and behavioral impacts, such as externalizing (e.g. aggression), internalizing (e.g. self-harm) and toxic stress. This report identifies mechanisms of change associated with psychosocial interventions for children and adolescents affected by war, armed conflict or political violence:

- **Basic services and security**: (1) creating a protective environment; and (2) playing.
- **Strengthening family and community support**: (3) community capacity building; (4) increasing social support; (5) family and caregiver capacity building; (6) family and caregiver relationship strengthening; and (7) engaging with values, traditions, beliefs, and ideologies.
- **Focused non-specialist support**: (8) learning about the presenting problem, medication, and how to access services; (9) learning stress management skills; (10) emotional regulation and bearing negative emotions (pschoeducation); (11) problem solving; and (12) learned helpfulness.
- **Specialist support**: (13) pathologizing normal reactions (adverse mechanism), which can be avoided by combining psychosocial interventions with basic health and welfare interventions; (14) trauma processing; (15) restructuring unhelpful cognitions and appraisals; and (16) therapeutic rapport.

Only four mechanisms were supported by strong empirical evidence (family and caregiver capacity building, family and caregiver relationship strengthening, problem solving, and therapeutic rapport). The poor quality of supporting evidence limits what can be inferred from this review’s findings. The poor coverage of conflict-affected countries and regions limits the generalizability of research findings to these settings. The authors conclude that existing and widely used non-specialist interventions in the field urgently need rigorous scientific testing to inform their continued practice.
Sidika Tekeli-Yesil, Esra Isik, Yesim Unal, Fuad Aljomaa Almossa, Hande Konsuk Unlu, and Ahmet Tamer Aker

This article compares the frequencies of some mental health disorders between Syrian refugees living in Turkey and IDPs in Syria, and identifies factors associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder. The authors carried out a survey of 540 IDPs in Syria and refugees in Turkey (in geographically and culturally close areas). They found that mental disorders were highly prevalent in both populations. Most mental disorders, including PTSD, were more prevalent among IDPs in Syria than among refugees in Turkey. However, major depressive disorder was more frequent among refugees in Turkey than among IDPs in Syria. The authors also found that posttraumatic stress disorder was associated with post-migration factors (i.e. working status after migration, family unity, satisfaction about living in current settlement, and having stopped somewhere else before current settlement). The likelihood of major depressive disorder was predicted by stopping somewhere else before resettlement in the current location. The authors conclude that the resettlement locus and the context and type of displacement seem to be important determinants of mental health disorders, with post-migration factors being stronger predictors of conflict-related mental health. These findings suggest that IDPs may benefit more from trauma-focused approaches, whereas refugees may derive greater benefit from psychosocial approaches.

HNP FCV TTL notes series, HNP-FCV-01 January 2018

This note highlights best practices in designing, implementing and evaluating a project involving a mental health and psychosocial support component. It sets out the arguments for investing in mental health and psychosocial support in FCV situations, including the high prevalence of mental health disorders in FCV settings, their consequences (for individual wellbeing, educational achievement, employment, economic growth, and vulnerability to and perpetration of violence), and the cost-effectiveness of investments in mental health. Victims of conflict and violence, including displaced people, are more likely to develop extreme distress, depression, PTSD, somatization disorder and alcohol abuse, due to their displacement, social isolation, poor access to education and employment, and financial hardship. Other groups in FCV situations who have particular mental health needs include: survivors of SGBV, children and adolescents, wounded and disabled people, people affected by pandemics and emergencies, and helpers and service providers. The note provides links to best practices for the delivery of mental health and psychosocial support services in FCV situations, and emphasizes that international guidelines recommend low-intensity and low-cost
Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MPSS) interventions in non-specialized health care and community settings, complemented by referral of severe cases to specialized health facilities. It also summarizes best practices for specific vulnerable groups in FCV settings, as well as technologies to support mental health programs, noting that people affected by conflicts, particularly displaced populations, have a high ownership rate of cell phones. The note summarizes the common challenges faced by TTLs when incorporating MPSS interventions in FCV situations together with lessons learned. The note concludes by providing links to various resources on evaluating MPSS interventions.

Josephine N. Musau, Maxwell Omondi, and Lincoln Khasakhala
Journal of Internal Displacement, Volume 8, No. 1, 2018

This study examines the prevalence of PTSD and associated socio-demographic factors among IDPs following the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007/8. During the post-election violence, many IDPs were exposed to overwhelming and distressing experiences, and were left feeling frustrated and powerless. The onset of PTSD is a common adverse reaction to severe trauma and may persist for many years after initial exposure. Left untreated, PTSD may complicate other adverse mental health outcomes, presenting as comorbid depression, anxiety and substance abuse disorders. The researchers focus on Maai Mahiu camp in Nakuru County, which at the time accommodated 786 IDPs. The inclusion criteria for participants consisted of traumatized adults who consented voluntarily to participate in the study. The findings indicate that there is a negative impact of post-election violence on survivors, resulting in a PTSD prevalence rate of 62.1 percent, which is comparable across genders (57.8 percent and 62.8 percent among male and female respondents respectively). The authors attribute the high PTSD prevalence to the fact that the respondents were IDPs who had been violated by neighbors who were known to them and who were still living in the same region, despite the fact that the country was at peace. The data reveal no socio-demographic variable as a predictor for PTSD development. Collectively, these findings indicate that traumatic experiences can have adverse effects that act to the detriment of survivors and their ability to recover and rebuild their lives. The authors call for governments to adequately plan for and program mental health interventions for IDPs.

Moya (2018) Violence, Psychological Trauma, and Risk Attitudes: Evidence from Victims of Violence in Colombia
Andrés Moya
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.11.001
This article analyzes the effects of violence on risk attitudes, and explores whether violence affects poverty dynamics through a behavioral channel. The analysis is based on microdata data collected from a sample of IDPs in Colombia on: (a) the severity and temporal proximity of their exposure to violence; and (b) their symptoms of psychological trauma. The author finds that more severe and recent experiences of violence lead to higher levels of risk aversion, by inducing severe anxiety disorders, which can alter a victim’s economic decisions and contribute to their vulnerability. The author finds that the effects are not permanent and fade over time. The results suggest that violence can affect poverty dynamics through a behavioral channel, i.e. creating a behavioral poverty trap. The author highlights the need to incorporate mental health programs into assistance for victims of violence, IDPs, and refugees.


Andrés Moya and Michael R. Carter
World Development, Volume 113 (2019), Pages 100-115
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.015

This paper explores whether violence diminishes expectations about future socioeconomic mobility and discusses the implications of this possible behavioral effect for poverty dynamics. The analysis is based on microdata collected from a sample of IDPs in Colombia on: (a) the severity of the household’s experience of violence; (b) symptoms of psychological trauma; and (c) beliefs about socioeconomic mobility. After controlling for current socioeconomic circumstances and asset losses, the authors find:

- **A more severe experience of violence leads victims to believe that there is a higher likelihood of being in extreme poverty.** A one standard deviation increase in the number of violent events experienced by the household raises the perceived probability of extreme poverty in the following year by 54 percent relative to the mean. In the long run, the anticipated extreme poverty rate will be almost three times higher for victims at the top quartile of the distribution of the severity of violence than for those at the bottom quartile of the distribution.

- **Beliefs of diminished prospects of economic mobility are consistent with a sense of hopelessness,** i.e. an emotional state of despair and pessimism based on the expectation of negative outcomes and the perception of few pathways for progress and recovery. The behavioral effect is explained by the psychological consequences (depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder amongst others) of experiencing violence and forced displacement, which induce feelings of hopelessness.

The authors acknowledge that their analysis is limited by the small, non-representative sample and by lack of data to test whether victims’ beliefs map into actual behavior and economics transitions. Nevertheless, they conclude that psychological consequences of violence can create a behavioral poverty trap, akin to that which can result from the loss of conventional assets. Psychological constraints associated with the experience of violence can reinforce the effect of more discernible material constraints and lead victims to believe that there are even fewer prospects for
socioeconomic mobility. This in turn affects economic behavior and hence poverty dynamics. The authors highlight the importance of rethinking strategies to promote the socioeconomic recovery of victims of violence.

**Miscellaneous**


Sigrid Lupieri  
*Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 25-27*  
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/lupieri

Older refugees are often a neglected population, particularly when it comes to health. In Jordan, an estimated 77 percent of Syrian refugees over age 60 have specific needs related to mobility, nutrition and health care, and more than half suffer from psychological distress. However there is an overwhelming focus on the health needs of women and children and a perception that the elderly are taken care of by their families. The specific health needs of older Syrian refugees in Jordan tend to be overlooked due to (a) inadequate data on the number, needs and vulnerabilities of older refugees, disaggregated to show the heterogeneity within the ‘over 60’ age category; (b) a narrowing of institutional mandates, where individual organizations often prioritize categories considered vulnerable such as women, children and persons with disabilities, resulting in a lack of expertise on cross-sectoral issues such as ageing; and (c) the nature of the humanitarian response, which is still geared towards an emergency situation and life-saving treatment and which is no longer adequate for a protracted crisis or for addressing complex and chronic health needs. The author advocates for greater inclusiveness of older refugees in the humanitarian and development response.


Winifred Ekezie, Stephen Timmons, Puja Myles, Penelope Siebert, Manpreet Bains, Catherine Pritchard  
*Journal of Public Health, 2018, Pages 1–10*  

The objectives of this study were to assess camp conditions in IDP camp-like settings in Nigeria; and to evaluate if their management and organization met international Standards (Sphere minimum standards), with a specific focus on health impact. Data was collected in nine camps across seven states from camp managers, and direct observation in September–October 2016. The results showed significant disparities between IDP living standards in Nigeria and the Sphere minimum standards. The authors found that 5 of 15 assessed standards were met to some extent, including the availability of water and shelter. Sanitation and vaccination were unmet in five camps, with severe overcrowding in five camps, and inadequate waste disposal in all camps. Health program
implementation was uneven, and especially poor in self-settled and dispersed settlements. **Inequality in the distribution of humanitarian support was observed across different settings**, which could lead to a higher likelihood of water, food and air-related diseases and consequently, a poorer quality of life for IDPs. The authors conclude that ensuring standardized health assessments could promote a more even distribution of resources across IDP locations.

Zilic (2018) **Effect of Forced Displacement on Health**

Ivan Zilic  
*Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A (Statistics in Society), Volume 181, Issue 3 (2018), Pages 889-906*  
[https://doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12322](https://doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12322)

This paper analyzes health consequences of forced displacement during the war in Croatia between 1991-1995, part of the larger-scale conflicts that accompanied the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Specifically, the authors test whether displacement is relevant in explaining various dimensions of health of females, including measured and self-assessed health. The authors employ an instrumental variable approach to address the potential endogeneity of displacement status (using civilian casualties across counties as an instrument for displacement status). The analysis is based on data from the 2003 Croatian Adult Health Survey 2003, which coincides with the return of the majority of IDPs to their homes.

Key findings:

- **Displacement has an adverse effect on measured and self-assessed health outcomes for females.** Displacement significantly increases the risk of hypertension and tachycardia and it also reduces self-assessed health and subjective indicators of emotional and mental health. Incidence of obesity is not affected by displacement status.
- **Faced with armed conflict, individuals with better latent health, conditional on age and education level, were more likely to move.**
- No robust and significant effects of displacement on healthy behaviors, nor on marriage status and labor activity.
- **Displacement leads to a higher probability of reporting below average household income.** This suggests that displaced individuals are, due to dispossession, facing adverse economic conditions.


Soazic Elise Wang Sonne and Paolo Verme  
Between 1993 and 2001, northwestern Tanzania hosted large numbers of refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and Congo, the majority in temporary camps near the border and a short distance to Tanzanian villages. This paper examines whether Tanzanian children born to mothers who spent their early childhood in high refugee-receiving areas have poorer health outcomes. The analysis is based on the geocoded 2015/16 Tanzanian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) capturing migration histories of mothers and fathers.

Key results:

- **Children of mothers exposed to the 1993-2001 refugee crisis in northwestern Tanzania are more likely to be stunted.** Almost 15 years after the refugee influx, children under five year’s of age born to mothers who were themselves under five during the 1993-2001 refugee crisis and living closer to refugee camps have lower Height-for-Age Z-scores and are more likely to be stunted than a comparable sample of children whose mothers were more than five years old at the time of the refugee crisis.

- **Mothers who were in utero and less than 24 months at the time of the high refugee influx period (1993-1996) are more likely to give birth to children who are stunted.**

- No differentiated impacts between male and female children.

The authors suggest several possible mechanisms to explain these results. Previous studies on the impact of refugees in Tanzania have shown that wellbeing increased for host households living near the refugee camps, in particular by increasing employment opportunities. However, there was also a reallocation of labor away from primary health care and education services and towards low-skilled services to the aid community during a period characterized by increased demand for these services and a general downgrading of schools and health centers. This could have resulted in an intra-household reallocation of labor, with increased demands on women and possibly negative effects on childcare, and leading to children experiencing a combination of decreased standards in education, health care and home care services. Using additional data from the 1991 and 1996 DHS, the authors show that:

- **There was an increase in female labor force participation during the refugee crisis.**
  Grandmothers in 2015/16 who were mothers in 1996 (during the crisis) had higher labor force participation than those who were mothers in 1991(before the crisis). There was no increase in the labor market participation of grandfathers during the same period.

- **Mothers exposed to the refugee crisis during their first five years were less likely to complete more than secondary education, less likely to own land and a house, and more likely to participate in the labor market later in their life.** Increased labor force participation can
potentially translate into reduced child care at home and poorer anthropometrics of their under five-year-old children.

- **Parents in their early age during the refugee influx suffered from decreased nutritional standards and increased morbidity.** Children in refugee receiving areas in 1996 had lower Weight for Age, Weight for Height and Biomass Index scores, and were more likely to be wasting, underweight, have diarrhea or fever. This is expected to affect the anthropometrics of their own children in 2015-2016.
VI. IMPACT ON HOST COMMUNITIES AND HOST COUNTRIES
Conceptual Framework and Meta-Analysis


Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IAASA)
The ripple effect: economic impacts of internal displacement, June 2018

Estimating the economic impact of internal displacement on affected people, countries and regions would help make the case for increased country-led investments in risk reduction and durable solutions. However, a systematic, quantitative estimate of the overall impact of internal displacement on an economy has yet to be made, and doing so requires new concepts and methods. This document proposes a conceptual framework to assess the economic impact of internal displacement comprehensively across dimensions, time, countries and displacement contexts. It notes that internal displacement encompasses a wide range of situations that vary significantly in scale and severity. While there may be positive and negative impacts of internal displacement on an economy, evidence suggests that the overall impact of internal displacement is negative, particularly when it is not well managed. The impacts of internal displacement may be direct or indirect, short term or long term, tangible or intangible, and individual or societal. Internal displacement translates into significant financial costs for individuals, households, communities of origin and destination, the private sector, local and national governments and humanitarian aid agencies and international donors. The proposed conceptual framework adopts a broad approach that includes the cost of humanitarian aid and emergency responses, as well as longer-term consequences on the economic potential of individuals and societies. Previous studies have highlighted seven interrelated dimensions through which internal displacement has a potential impact on an economy, including housing and infrastructure, livelihoods, social and cultural, education, health, security and the environment. IDMC has identified three priority areas for the first phase of this work: (1) to assess the impacts of existing displacement by highlighting both the cost of long-term and protracted displacement and the positive contributions that IDPs make to their host communities and economies; (2) to estimate the cost of new displacement and displacement risk in order to illustrate the financial burden of recurring displacement on national budgets and highlight the additional costs associated with future risk; and (3) to model the different ways in which internal displacement affects an economy and the relationship between those dimensions to better reflect complex realities and inform policy options.


Paolo Verme and Kirsten Schuettler
The paper examines 49 empirical studies that estimate the impact of forced displacement on host communities. The reviewed studies cover 17 major forced displacement crises occurring between 1922 and 2015, to host countries at different levels of economic development and different types of forced migrants. The authors undertake a comparative analysis of the empirical models used in this literature and identify the specific modeling and econometric challenges that this type of work entails. They find that all studies can be classified as ex-post quasi-natural experiments. The unexpected nature of the crisis and the randomness of the allocation of displaced persons are used to defend the natural experiment assumption. However, all papers address the question of endogeneity, mainly using an instrumental variable approach focusing on either distance from the shock or previous location of migrants. There is a preference for partial equilibrium modeling, differences-in-differences methods, and cross-section econometrics, depending on the type of data available. Employment is the outcome most studied followed by wages, prices and wellbeing. The authors also conduct a meta-analysis of 762 empirical results emerging from this literature, and find:

- **About half of the results on income, consumption or wealth indicate net improvements in household wellbeing.** 45-52 percent of the results are positive and significant, 34-42 percent of the results are non-significant, and 6-20 percent are negative and significant. Overall, between 80 and 94 percent of results are either positive or non-significant indicating that the likelihood of a forced displacement shock resulting in a negative outcome for host communities is less than 20 percent.

- **The majority of results on employment and wages are not significant.** 12-20 percent of the results are positive and significant; 63 percent are non-significant, and 22-25 percent are negative and significant. Overall, the likelihood of a forced displacement crisis resulting in a negative impact on employment for the host population is below 25 percent; negative and significant results are associated with young and informal workers. The overall evidence for wages shows that only about one in four results are negative and negative results seem to turn positive in the long-term.

- **The results on prices show asymmetric behavior across types of products.** 37-46 percent of results are positive and significant, 18-23 percent are non-significant, and 36-39 percent are negative and significant. Overall, a forced displacement crisis generates significant changes in prices. The probability of these changes being positive or negative is approximately similar but associated with the type of product or service observed. Prices for food and rents tend to increase whereas prices for labor intensive products and services tend to decline.

- **Overall, less than one in five results can be considered negative for host communities.**

**Cazabat and Tucci (2019) Unveiling the Cost of Internal Displacement**

Christelle Cazabat and Marco Tucci

*IDMC Thematic Series, “The ripple effect: economic impacts of internal displacement”, February 2019*

This report describes IDMC’s methodology for estimating the costs of internal displacement. [The report uses ‘financial’ and ‘economic’ costs interchangeably, but largely captures financial costs.] The methodology takes into account only the direct and immediate costs associated with internal displacement including: (a) cost of providing shelters and temporary accommodation, non-food items, WASH services, and camp coordination; (b) loss of incomes due to loss of livelihoods; (c) cost of providing temporary education; (d) cost of providing food assistance; (e) cost of providing emergency health care; and (f) cost of providing security in host areas. Due to lack of data and the complexity of the problem, the methodology does not account for: the longer-term consequences of internal displacement (e.g. future reduction of income; consumption and income tax linked with a displaced child’s inability to access an education); the cost of adapting infrastructure and services to cope with the arrival of large numbers of IDPs in host communities; impacts on host communities; or social and environmental costs. Using publicly available data, the report presents estimates of the cost of displacement crises in eight countries, representing a cross-section of the conditions under which major displacement crises can occur: the Central African Republic, Haiti, Libya, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Key results include:

- Applying the methodology, the authors estimate the average annual economic impact associated with internal displacement ranges from less than one per cent to 11 per cent of their pre-crisis GDP, mostly depending on the number of IDPs and the severity of the crisis. Unsurprisingly, crises that displace the highest number of people for the longest time result in the highest economic impacts.

- In all countries, the highest financial burdens come from the impacts of internal displacement on livelihoods, housing and health. The costs and losses associated with security and education are generally secondary to these burdens, but are still significant. The authors acknowledge that estimates of the cost of providing education are based on metrics derived from humanitarian requirements, which are notoriously under-funded, and which are likely to underestimate true costs.

- The average economic impact for each affected person [i.e. for the subset of IDPs in need of assistance] is highest in Ukraine ($970 per annum) and Libya ($708 per annum) mainly due to loss of livelihoods, as these two countries have the highest median income. The total impact per affected person for all other countries ranges from $357 per annum for flood-related internal displacement in Somalia to $589 per annum in South Sudan.

- The average economic impact per IDP [i.e. all IDPs including those not requiring assistance] is highest in CAR ($451 per annum) and South Sudan ($399 per annum) and lowest in Ukraine ($230 per annum) and Somalia floods ($174 per annum). The average economic impact per IDP appears to be heavier in poor countries (CAR, Haiti, South Sudan, Somalia) compared to lower-middle (Ukraine) or upper-middle income countries (Libya), possibly because the population was already in a critical situation before the crisis and their capacity to respond to its impacts is very limited.

- The average economic impacts per IDP are estimated at $310 for one year of displacement. Applied to the total number of IDPs recorded across the world at the end of 2017, this would mean the total cost of internal displacement globally would be nearly $13 billion a year.
The authors conclude that while the estimates capture only some of the costs associated with internal displacement, nevertheless these amount to a significant share of each country’s GDP.

General

Helidah Ogude
World Bank and UNHCR, April 2018

This literature review explores the impact of refugee presence on host populations in Tanzania, with a view to informing policy responses globally. There is a considerable body of relevant qualitative, mixed-methods and empirical literature, mostly analyzing the impact of refugee inflows from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) on host districts in northwestern Tanzania. The review begins with a brief history of refugee policy and practice in Tanzania, and an overview of some mediating factors that influenced impacts, including:

- **Pre-existing livelihood strategies in host communities**, specifically, how differences in poverty, education, business/trade experience, and capacity for agricultural production can lead to varied capacity for hosts to take advantage of refugee presence.
- **Immediate policy responses to the refugee influx**, such as camp locations, restrictions on refugee-host interactions, and limits imposed on refugees to engage in agricultural production.

The report then covers areas of research that have been more comprehensively analyzed, such as:

- **Labor market outcomes—jobs and wages**. The presence of refugees led to an increase in farming/livestock activities and expanded agricultural production in host communities, due to increased demand for local produce and the availability of cheaper refugee labor. There was no impact on the likelihood of running a small business, possibly due to the entry of entrepreneurs from other regions. And there was a reduced likelihood of working outside the home as an employee, possibly because refugees took available agricultural jobs. Consequently, casual laborers were more likely to suffer from increased competition in the labor market and higher prices for several goods, while non-agricultural workers and self-employed farmers were more likely to benefit from the refugee presence. The entry of larger-scale entrepreneurs from other regions had a deleterious effect on existing small businesses. The presence of humanitarian organizations increased employment opportunities for hosts and increased salaries, however this led to large numbers of skilled workers leaving government jobs to take higher paying work with humanitarian organizations.

- **Labor market outcomes—gender and age**. Impacts varied by gender and age. Women, in particular women aged 30 or younger, were less likely to engage in employment outside the home and more likely to engage in household chores relative to men (due to increased time spent collecting firewood because of deforestation and additional competition for
water/firewood). More literate/numerate women were more likely to employ refugees for low wages to do household tasks, freeing them to pursue outside employment.

- **Labor market outcomes-casual Labor.** Casual wages fell significantly. Local farmers hired refugees to do agricultural work, build houses, tend livestock, and fetch water or firewood. Many of the locals who were casual workers before the arrival of refugees changed to other activities, including self-employment.

- **Local economy and food prices.** The arrival of refugees effectively moved markets closer to villages, however border trading centers and border communities were negatively affected. The refugee influx improved market efficiency and trade dynamism, in part because of road investments made by international organizations.

- **Food security and prices: refugee and humanitarian impact.** The prices of certain local crops popular with refugees, aid workers and hosts increased sharply (e.g. bananas), while the prices of food items in refugee rations fell (e.g. beans and maize).

- **Local infrastructure and services.** Border area schools were damaged in the early weeks of the influx; local health facilities and referral hospitals became overstretched; and the criminal justice system was overburdened. Social services improved after the construction of infrastructure in the camps and the implementation of development projects in host communities.

- **Environmental impacts.** The environmental impacts of refugees indirectly affected the food security of the host community through deforestation, soil erosion and land degradation, unsustainable water extraction and water pollution. Other scholars suggest that the depiction of refugees as “exceptional resource degraders” was emphasized along with human security issues as a way to justify encampment/containment policies, even though it was difficult to distinguish between the environmental impacts of refugees and local communities.

- **Security and social cohesion.** One study found that crime rose sharply, but increases in crime were not fully attributed to the influx of refugees; refugees did not necessarily have a greater propensity to commit crimes. Refugees’ nationalities and previous localities of residence (city or rural dwellers and perhaps the accompanying preferred occupations), influenced hosts’ attitudes toward them and refugees’ opportunities.

- **Long-run welfare impacts** While there is little literature on long-run impacts, one study found that the refugee presence had a persistent and positive impact on the welfare of the local population, possibly due to: (a) more efficient labor markets as a result of labor pooling; (b) investments to expand transport infrastructure (which reduced transport costs and lowered prices of goods); (c) increase in local tax revenue; (d) arrival of economic migrants from other parts of Tanzania; (e) improved management skills and institutional efficiency of local authorities due to dealing extensively with international organizations; and (f) following the repatriation of refugees, continued trade with the local population.

The report concludes with lessons learned, policy and practice options, and a brief taxonomy of areas for possible further research. Several lessons focus on the distributional impacts of refugee presence on host communities, implying the need to identify vulnerable groups (women, casual laborers, unskilled etc.), evaluate their vulnerabilities and coping strategies, and tailor responses accordingly. Other recommendations for policy and practice include:
• Identify how refugees’ integration can contribute to the host country’s developmental objectives.
• Devise responses in collaboration with host governments, and ensure their local political backing.
• Government policies should be devised in a manner that benefits both refugees and host communities, with consideration for short-term costs and long-term benefits.
• Humanitarian and development actors should be as concerned with refugee policies and practices.
• Humanitarian and development organizations should try to mitigate the depletion of labor from public institutions.
• Responses should be geared toward building the skills and capacity of local producers to respond to increased demand in food; and consider preexisting socio-economic conditions and policies that constrain and enable host adaptation mechanisms—such as road infrastructure and encampment policies.
• Food security of host communities could be protected by: (a) no encampment policies; (b) using a settlement structure; (c) in the case of encampment policies, careful selection of camp location; and (d) environmental programs such as reforestation and soil conservation.
• Humanitarian short-term assistance should pave the way for development interventions that support hosts in the gradual or sudden departure of refugees.
• Local governments and development actors should prioritize road provision and maintenance to support the reduction in the cost of traded goods and transport costs.

Jennifer Alix-Garcia, Sarah Walker, Anne Bartlett, Harun Onder and Apurva Sanghid
Journal of Development Economics, Volume 130, January 2018, Pages 66-83

The paper examines the impact of Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya on the economic welfare of host populations in the Turkana region. Using nighttime lights data as a proxy for economic activity, the authors show that refugee inflows have positive but very localized impacts on economic activity, i.e. host populations within a 10 km distance from the camp. The authors estimate that luminosity effects correspond to a 5.5 percent increase in consumption for every 10 percent increase in the refugee population. They also observe that household consumption within 10 km of the camp is 25 percent higher than in areas further away. Based on the available data the authors infer two mechanisms driving the positive impact on economic activity: (1) increased availability of new employment, i.e. proximity to the refugee camp is associated with more low skill jobs and wage labor, particularly for households with secondary education, and this effect dominates the impact of any labor competition from refugees; and (2) price changes in agricultural and livestock markets that are favorable to local producers, i.e. agriculture occurs almost exclusively close to the refugee camp, and livestock prices are positively correlated with high refugee and aid presence. The results show average effects only and so mask important heterogeneity, e.g. some households may not be
able to access employment opportunities due to age or educational attainment, or may not be able to farm or raise sufficient numbers of livestock and so are negatively impacted by price increases.

Jean-Francois Maystadt and Gilles Duranton

This paper assesses the long-term effects of temporary refugee inflows from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) on the welfare of the host population in Tanzania. The authors are particularly interested in whether the changes in the host economy after the departure of refugees result from a switch to a new (and better) equilibrium in a multiple-equilibrium setting or, alternatively, whether the changes are the consequence of post-shock investments that shift the supply curve and thus the equilibrium. The authors exploit Tanzanian household panel data (1991–2010), and find:

- **A sizeable increase in welfare for villages more exposed to refugees long after these refugees returned to their home country.** The refugee presence significantly increased real consumption per adult equivalent between 1991 and 2004 and between 1991 and 2010, although most refugees left between 1996 and 2000. The presence of refugees had a **positive and persistent impact on the host economy**, which did not fade over time.

- **The most important channel of transmission for this persistent change in welfare is a sizable decrease in transport costs following increased road building.** The presence of refugees had a positive and significant impact on road accessibility. The sizeable decrease in transport costs, due to large-scale investments in roads by international organizations, is strongly associated with the persistent welfare improvement in high-refugee areas. The welfare-improving impact of road accessibility in high-refugee areas is **corroborated by the decreasing effect on good prices**.

- **No evidence that changes in the provision of local public goods, agglomeration economies, or enhanced trade with neighboring countries constitute an alternative explanation for the persistent increase in real consumption in high-refugee areas compared with other areas.**

The authors conclude that the **temporary population shock induced a persistent shift in the equilibrium through subsequent investments rather than a switch to a new equilibrium in a multiple-equilibrium setting.** The findings undercut the view that refugees are a burden for host communities. The authors suggest several policy implications:

- **In the short run, the priority should be to improve the ability of the local population to cope with changes in the price of final goods and factors.**
- **Progressively, humanitarian assistance should give way to long-term developmental efforts, capitalizing on road investments made by international organizations.**
- **Local integration of refugees into the local economy could act as a multiplier of the welfare-improving effects of better roads.**
- **Fostering regional integration with neighboring countries may be an interesting second best option to consider when repatriation (or resettlement) is favored as a solution to a protracted refugee situation.**
Impact on Consumption Expenditures and Poverty


Sandra Rozo and Micaela Sviastchiy
September 11, 2018
https://www.sandravrozo.com/refugee-workshop.html

This paper examines the impacts of Syrian refugee inflows on consumption expenditures and incomes of Jordanian nationals. The 2015 Housing and Population Census identifies 1.3 million Syrian refugees in Jordan; approximately 650,000 have registered as refugees. Exploiting the fact that Syrian refugees locate disproportionately in regions closer to the three largest refugee camps, the authors compare Jordanian nationals living in areas closer and farther away from the three main refugee camps, before and after the Syrian conflict onset in 2011. They find that:

- Jordanians living closer to the refugee camps experience changes in the composition of their consumption expenditures, but not in the overall level of consumption expenditures. Expenditure on housing increases while expenditure on non-durables (including food) and health care falls. Higher expenditures on housing are accompanied by worse dwelling quality for young individuals working in the informal sector.
- Jordanians located closer to the refugee camps have higher property and rental income, lower self-employed income, and experience no changes in their salaried income.
- Jordanians closer to refugee camps own fewer assets (mostly luxury goods) relative to individuals who live farther away from the camps.
- There is no evidence that changes in the pattern of consumption expenditures (away from non-durables and health care) have consequences for access to health or education, or children’s development outcomes.

Since more than 80 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan live outside refugee camps, the authors suggest that the observed increments in housing expenses could be due largely to the demand shock that the higher population may be having in housing markets, given a static housing supply. The authors argue that addressing increasing housing expenditures is crucial to prevent welfare losses in the host population and prevent tensions between Jordanian hosts and refugees. They advocate for further research to examine the effectiveness of different approaches to increase the supply of quality housing for refugees.


Lucia Hanmer, Diana J Arango, Eliana Rubiano, Julieth Santamaria, and Mariana Viollaz
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 8616, Gender Global Theme, October 2018
By applying a gender lens to UNHCR data on Syrian refugees in Jordan, the authors quantify differences between male- and female-headed households’ incidence of poverty and identify some of the demographic characteristics that are linked to greater poverty risk. UNHCR data identify the Principle Applicant (PA) for each household; a third of registered Syrian refugee households in Jordan have female PAs. **Demographic characteristics of male and female PA households are very different:**

- 93 percent of female PAs have an absent spouse or no spouse, compared to 31 percent of male PAs.
- 94 percent of female PAs live in nontraditional households (single person, single caregiver, couple without children, unaccompanied children, sibling household, extended and other, polygamous), compared to 36 percent of male PAs. Most female PAs are single caregivers (55 percent) and single persons (30 percent).

**There are several gender gaps that influence the poverty risk faced by households:**

- A higher proportion of adult males live in households with a male PA and the opposite is true for households with a female PA. Having a larger number of adult males is linked to lower risk of household poverty for both male and female PAs, since male labor force participation is less constrained than female labor force participation.
- Some categories of households are especially vulnerable if the PA is female. Single-caregiver households with female PAs have more children on average but less access to employment than male PA single caregiver households. Compared with unaccompanied children with a male PA, unaccompanied children with a female PA have little access to employment compared with other family types, and their expenditure levels before assistance are the lowest of any category.

The authors find that **distinguishing between different types of male and female PA households is important.** Overall, there is no difference between the poverty rates of male and female PA households before humanitarian assistance is received; poverty rates for couples with children (44 percent) do not differ by gender of the PAs. However, for nontraditional households, poverty rates are higher for those with female PAs (51 percent for female PA households compared to 19 percent for male PA households; 35 percent overall). Households formed following forced displacement, such as sibling households, unaccompanied children, and single caregivers, are extremely vulnerable, especially if the PA is a woman or girl. **Poverty gaps between male and female PAs for nontraditional households persist after humanitarian assistance is received.** The authors highlight several policy implications:

- Unless gender disadvantage is considered in the design of development policies to replace humanitarian assistance, poverty reduction gains may not be sustained.
- In the short-term it will be important to build the capacity for women to move into the labor market so that they can access economic opportunities that can replace the value of assistance or the advantages that an adult male brings to a household.
- Including cash transfers and other types of social protection that can reach especially vulnerable households (unaccompanied children, siblings and single caregivers) is also important.
The strong protective role that education plays underlines the importance of ensuring remedial action is taken so that all children and young adults who have missed education due to displacement can make up the schooling they have missed.


Jennifer Alix-Garcia, Sarah Walker, and Anne Bartlett
World Development, Volume 121 (2019), Pages 63-74
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.04.015

Over 60 percent of refugees in Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp receive remittances, over half through informal money transfer services. On average, remittances comprise half of the income of families that receive them. In April 2015, in response to an Al Shabaab terrorist attack on Garissa University College, the Kenyan government shut down Somali-operated money transfer agencies, known as hawala. **Hawala** is most commonly used by Muslims, since its modalities are consistent with Islamic norms. Hawala operators in Kakuma camp were estimated to transfer US$3 million into the camp each year. This paper **examines the impact of the remittance shut down on refugees in the Kakuma refugee camp in terms of access to financial resources and household consumption, as well as the impact on host communities living in proximity to the camp.** The authors rely on qualitative interviews and household surveys in Kakuma refugee camp and surrounding host communities during or shortly after the shut down.

**Key findings:**

- The remittance shutdown decreased remittance inflows into the camp, at least temporarily.
- Although overall consumption of food items did not change for the average refugee household, **households most likely to use Islamic transfer schemes experienced large decreases in the consumption of milk, meat and phone cards.** Refugees who actively used hawala in the past or were members of ethnicities likely to be Muslim decreased their consumption of meat and milk by magnitudes ranging from 26 to 33 percent.
- At the same time, households more likely to use other transfer systems increased their consumption of these same items, suggesting that prices may have decreased due to weakened demand from remittance-receiving households.
- Less than 10 percent of host households living in close proximity to the camp receive transfers, compared to over 60 percent of refugees.
- Prior to the shutdown, host households living in close proximity to the camp had higher purchases of some key items, suggesting that host households living round the camp are somewhat better off than those farther away.
- The shut down **negatively affected host households living in close proximity to the camp, which were less likely to purchase sugar and tea.** These households experienced statistically significant decreases of 12 and 25 percent in the probability of purchasing sugar and tea, which
These findings highlight the economic integration of refugee camps and surrounding host communities, even when refugees are limited in their ability to engage in the labor market, and demonstrate the multiplier effects of remittances. The authors conclude that policies that directly reduce the ability of refugees to purchase goods are likely to hurt the host populations living near the camps. Conversely, policies supporting refugee’s ability to purchase goods, such as cash transfers rather than in kind assistance, are likely to have positive repercussions for host populations.

Impact on the Labor Market and Firms

Clemens and Hunt (2017) The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: Reconciling Conflicting Results

Michael A. Clemens and Jennifer Hunt
CEP Discussion Paper No 1491, July 2017
cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1491.pdf
Subsequently published in the ILR Review (2019)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793918824597

Recent research has challenged the consensus that sudden inflows of refugees have little or no impact on natives’ wages and employment, claiming instead that there are uniformly large detrimental effects on natives without school qualifications. The authors offer two new explanations for the conflicting results in the literature: one is large compositional changes in the underlying survey data introduced by the selection of narrow subgroups of workers to study; the other is specification choices in the use of instrumental variables. The authors conclude that the impact of immigration on average native-born workers is small, and fails to substantiate claims of large detrimental impacts on workers with less than high school educations.

Morales (2017) The Impact of Internal Displacement on Destination Communities: Evidence from the Colombian Conflict

Juan S. Morales
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.10.003

The paper examines the impact of internal displacement in Colombia between 1998 and 2005 on wages in destination municipalities. The analysis suggests that influxes of IDPs lead to a short-run
negative impact on wages, i.e. a one percent increase in population due to internal displacement leads to an overall reduction in wages of 1.4 percent in the short-run. The author examines the wage effects by skill level and by gender, and finds that the decrease in wages is more pronounced for women, i.e. a one percent increase in population due to internal displacement decreases wages for low-skilled women by 2.2 percent, and for high-skilled women by 1.7 percent. The analysis shows that in the long run (over five years) there is no overall impact on wages, probably due to labor reallocation in receiving municipalities, i.e. following inflows of IDPs there is an increase in outmigration of local residents. However, the negative impact on wages persists for low-skilled women, who are less mobile, coupled with the fact that IDP women adapt well to new labor markets.

Akgündüz and Torum (2019) Two and a Half Million Syrian Refugees, Tasks and Capital Intensity
Yusuf Emre Akgündüz and Huzeyfe Torun
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Working Paper No. 19/23, August 2019

This paper investigates how the rapid increase in the low-skilled labor supply in Turkey induced by the inflow of 2.5 million Syrian refugees changed the tasks performed by Turkish workers and the capital intensity of Turkish firms. Despite the unexpected nature of the refugee inflow, refugees’ choice of location may be endogenous to labor market opportunities of host regions. To handle this endogeneity, the authors identify the causal effects of Syrian refugees by using the distance between the host cities in Turkey and hometowns in Syria in an instrumental variables approach. The empirical analysis also builds on the stylized fact that most Syrian refugees have few skills that are valued in the Turkish labor market and that the low-skill labor they provide will be complements with some inputs and substitutes for others. The analysis is based on several administrative and survey datasets (using 2014 and 2015 as treatment years and 2010 and 2011 as control years).

Key findings:

- Overall, the refugee inflow pushed Turkish workers from manual-intensive jobs towards more complex jobs that involve abstract tasks—either by replacing Turkish workers in manual intensive jobs or by transforming the mix of tasks performed by Turkish workers.

- Young and highly educated natives moved towards higher complexity jobs. Highly educated workers are better able to adapt their occupations to those that are complementary to the labor supply of refugees. Their employment and abstract intensity rises while routine and manual intensities fall. The reallocation of employees to more complex tasks occurs for younger employees aged 15-34.

- Lower educated employees show no significant change in their tasks and also drive the negative effect on native employment. Refugee labor is a substitute for the tasks performed by
the lower educated, who are driven out of employment as result. Their inability to adjust to tasks that are complementary to Syrian labor inputs may explain why their employment outcomes are negatively affected.

- The refugee inflow causes a decline in the capital intensity and investment rates of manufacturing firms in refugee hosting regions. This effect is larger and more precisely estimated for smaller firms compared to medium and large firms.

The authors conclude that the adjustment to the large-scale refugee shock is rapid, varied for different skill and age groups and affects both labor tasks and capital inputs. Specifically, highly educated Turkish workers moved to more complex tasks and firms reduced their capital use in refugee-hosting regions implying a substitutability between refugee labor supply and manual tasks and capital; and complementarity between refugee labor supply and abstract tasks. The authors argue that the reduction in capital is particularly worrying if it damages long-term investments and productivity. They warn that Turkish firms may end up reliant on informal refugee labor and may be left with a suboptimal mix of capital and labor inputs if the refugees return to Syria after the settlement of the crisis.


Onur Altindag, Ozan Bakisy, and Sandra Rozo
June 1, 2018

The authors examine the impact of the sudden arrival of more than three million Syrian refugees on businesses in Turkey. This case is useful to investigate causal effects because: (a) the timing and scale of the refugee inflow were exogenous to economic conditions in Turkey; and (b) refugees clustered in regions with a higher share of Arabic speakers, leading to substantial geographic variation in exposure to refugee inflows. The vast majority of Syrian refugees work in the informal labor market, mostly in low-wage jobs in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and service industries.

The analysis is based on data from multiple sources including annual censuses of firms, labor force surveys, business registrations and trade statistics, as well as official population and migration figures from 2006 to 2015. The authors employ an instrumented difference-in-differences approach that exploits province-year variation in refugee inflows, accounting for the endogeneity between firm outcomes and refugee inflows using ‘predicted refugee inflows’ as an instrumental variable (interaction of the number of Syrians who left their country each year and the share of Arabic speaking populations in Turkish provinces in 1965).
Key findings:

- **No significant effect of refugee inflows on firms’ formal production figures** (reported sales and gross output), but **strong evidence of a positive effect of refugee inflows on production proxies such as oil and electricity consumption, which correct for firms’ underreporting**. A one-percentage-point increase in the share of refugees to total population boosts firms’ electricity and oil consumption by 4.3 percent. These effects are stronger for smaller firms and those in construction and hospitality.

- **Refugee inflows had a positive impact on firm creation**, as revealed by a substantial increase in the number of new firms, especially those that include foreign partnerships. A one-percentage-point increase in the share of refugees to total population leads to 1.5 percentage-point increase in the number of firms and a 6.3 percentage-point increase in the number of firms with foreign partnership. A significant proportion of new firms were established by Syrians partnering with Turkish citizens to overcome barriers to market entry.

- **The effects of refugee inflows are largely concentrated in the informal economy, with a net displacement of native workers**. Refugees are replacing native workers in the informal labor market and reducing labor costs for firms. Among male native workers, a one-percentage-point increase in the ratio of refugees to overall population decreases the informal employment of native workers by 0.4 percentage points and decreases the number of hours they worked by 1.3 percent. Native workers also see their wages drop by 1.9 percent.

- **No evidence of significant effects of refugee inflows on firm exit, or on Turkish exports/imports.**

The authors suggest several mechanisms for these results including:

- The likelihood of permanently leaving their original location might have induced refugees to bring most of their accumulated wealth to the host country and to invest it there.

- Fixed costs associated with initial resettlement, such as housing and setting up a new business, might be contributing to the positive shock, especially in the construction sector.

- Aid provided to refugee settlement locations by the Turkish government, international governments, and NGOs is mainly supplied by local firms, which might contribute to increased firm output.

- Reduced labor costs due to the informal hiring of refugees might contribute to the local production boom in refugee hosting areas.


Yusuf Emre Akgunduz, Marcel van den Berg and Wolter Hassink
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29291
The authors examine the impact of Syrian refugee inflows into Turkey on firm entry and performance. While total firm entry does not seem to be significantly affected, there is a substantial increase in the number of new foreign-owned firms in refugee-hosting regions. The authors find some evidence that the increase in new foreign-owned firms is driven by sectors most likely to benefit from low-skilled labor. There is also some indication of growth in gross profits and net sales in refugee-hosting provinces. The authors suggest that the influx of refugees creates opportunities for new firms due to: (1) increased demand for goods and services; and (2) increased supply of low-skilled labor and consequent decreased production costs.

Jason Anastasopoulos, George J. Borjas, Gavin G. Cook, and Michael Lachanski
Working Paper 24580, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), May 2018
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24580

This paper examines the impact of immigration on labor market opportunities in the United States. The authors exploit the Conference Board’s Help-Wanted Index (HWI), a monthly job vacancy index that counted the number of help-wanted ads published in local newspapers in 51 metropolitan areas in the United States between 1951 and 2010. The index is highly correlated with various measures of labor market conditions. The authors begin by analyzing the impact of the Mariel boatlift, a migration of 125,000 Cubans from Cuba’s Mariel Harbor to the United States between April and October 1980. Most of these immigrants chose to settle in the Miami metropolitan area, increasing the overall labor supply by 8.4 percent. The supply shock disproportionately increased the size of the low-skill workforce; the number of workers in Miami without a high school diploma increased by 18.4 percent. The authors find a marked decrease in Miami’s HWI relative to many alternative control groups in the first 4 or 5 years after Mariel, followed by recovery afterwards. The authors find a similar initial decline in the number of job vacancies after two other supply shocks in Miami: (a) the initial wave of Cuban refugees that arrived between 1960 and 1962 (before the Cuban missile crisis abruptly stopped the flow) that increased the labor supply in Miami by almost 17 percent; and (b) the 1995 refugees, initially detoured to Guantanamo Bay, who increased the labor supply in Miami by 3.9 percent. The authors also examine correlations between changes in the HWI and immigration across metropolitan areas, and show that more immigration is associated with fewer job vacancies despite the obvious endogeneity bias created by the non-random settlement of immigrants in cities where there are job openings. The authors suggest that these results reflect changing labor market conditions for low-skill workers (in terms of both wages and employment). They conclude that immigration-induced supply shocks are followed by a short-run period of slackness in the local labor market, as measured by the number of advertised job openings, however the local labor market returns to its pre-immigration equilibrium within 5 to 10 years.
Most refugees, especially in developing countries, do not have formal labor market access. Even when permitted by law, administrative and practical barriers often limit access. The authors argue that granting refugees formal labor market access has the potential to create substantial benefits for refugees and hosts, including reduced vulnerability and higher incomes for refugees, improved labor market outcomes and higher incomes for natives, and positive fiscal effects for host governments. Even short of formal labor market access (where legal and de facto barriers to access are minimal or nonexistent), greater rights and fewer barriers around work and business ownership enable greater benefits. In many cases, policies restricting access to formal work can exacerbate negative effects rather than mitigate them, e.g. restricting refugees to certain geographies and/or informal sector intensifies competition between refugees and hosts in those areas, increasing the likelihood of negative effects on wages and employment. However, there may be some costs associated with granting formal labor market access for certain groups in the host population (e.g. some degree of labor market competition between refugees and natives, governments may have to marginally increase spending to accommodate refugees if donors do not provide enough support, and quality of services can decline if the right policies are not in place), and the full range of benefits is not guaranteed. Formal labor market access itself can mitigate labor market impacts on hosts (e.g. by reducing competition in the informal labor market), and complementary policies can mitigate or eliminate the costs to host workers associated with formal labor market access for refugees. For example, freedom of movement minimizes the concentration of any negative impacts while allowing refugees to maximize their potential for productivity in the economy. For those natives that experience job displacement, programs can be implemented to help them find new employment opportunities and upgrade to higher-paying positions.

The existence and magnitude of benefits and costs is shaped by: (a) the current extent of informal labor market access for refugees; (b) characteristics of the labor market; (c) the skill and demographic profiles of refugees; (d) the geographic location and concentration of refugees; and (d) policy choices and the political context. The authors argue that once a country is hosting refugees, there will be many more benefits to letting them work than to not letting them do so. Policymakers can amplify the benefits of formalization and mitigate the costs by creating and implementing policies that: (1) help natives adjust to and benefit from changes (e.g. by facilitate occupational upgrading, supporting the most vulnerable native populations, and supporting government spending on refugees); (2) facilitate labor market integration for refugees (through livelihood support, skill verification and recognition, lower administrative barriers to formal labor market access, and by
creating a perception of stability); and (3) grant refugees complementary rights (e.g. freedom of movement, financial access, and access to education) that minimize the concentration of any negative impacts while increasing refugees’ productivity by enabling them to find jobs that better match their skills and experience.

Bilal Malaeb and Jackline Wahba
Economic Research Forum, Working Paper 1194, April 2018
http://erf.org.eg/publications/impact-of-refugees-on-immigrants-labor-market-outcomes/

Jordan hosts 1.3 million Syrian refugees in addition to 1.6 million foreigners residing in Jordan; the non-national population of refugees and immigrants has increased Jordan’s population of 6.6 million by about 45 percent. Drawing on Jordanian Labor Market Panel Survey data from before (2010) and after (2016) the Syrian refugee influx, this paper examines the effect of the influx of Syrian refugees on immigrants in the Jordanian labor market. The authors find that economic immigrants experience negative labor market outcomes as a result of the influx of Syrian refugees, because immigrants and refugee compete in the labor market. Immigrants are more likely to work in the informal sector, work fewer hours, and receive lower total wages as a result of the refugee inflows. The decline in total wages appears to be driven by the decline in hours of work rather than the hourly wage.

Doruk Cengiz and Hasan Tekguc
University of Massachusetts, Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper 454, February 2018

The authors exploit the large and geographically varying inflow of over 2.5 million Syrian migrants into Turkey between 2012 and 2015 to study the effect of forced migration on host local economies in Turkey, including employment and wage effects on native workers. More than 90 percent of Syrian refugees do not have a high school degree; they cannot work formally and therefore pursue work in the informal sector. The authors find:

- No evidence of an employment decline for natives without a high school diploma.
- Average wages in the informal sector declined by more than 10 percent.
- However, there is no effect on the average wages of natives without a high school diploma, due to an increase in formal employment for this group.
- Workers with at least a high school degree have benefited from the inflow of Syrian refugees; their wages have increased by 5.7 percent.

There have been several demand side effects of the Syrian refugee inflow that helped offset the impact of a labor supply shock:
• Turkish workers’ participation in the formal sector rose in response to the inflow of Syrian refugees, consistent with complementarity of migrants and native-born workers.

• Forced migration led to an increase in residential building construction (new dwelling units increasing by more than 34 percent).

• Syrian refugees brought capital and entrepreneurs to the host regions, spurring new business creation. The number of new companies increased by more than 24 percent, including Syrian-founded and non-Syrian founded companies.

The authors conclude that migration-induced increases in regional demand and capital supply enable local labor markets to absorb inflow of migrant labor, and prevent sizable wage decline or job loss for native workers.


Ege Aksu, Refik Erzan, and Murat G. Kirdar
IZA Discussion Paper No. 12050, December 2018

This paper estimates the distributional effects of the Syrian refugee influx on the labor market outcomes of natives in Turkey. The authors use data from the end of 2015, when there were 2.5 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey, almost all of whom were working in the informal sector. Most previous studies the impact of Syrian refugee flows use regional variation in the migrant influx in a difference-in-differences methodology. Pointing to data that shows significant regional differences and strong time trends in labor market outcomes in Turkey (e.g. an increase in employment in the formal sector, decrease in employment in the informal sector, and increase in real hourly wages in the informal sector from 2004 to 2011), the authors argue that a key assumption of the difference-in-difference methodology—that the trend in outcomes are uniform across regions—is not valid. Rather, they relax the common-trend assumption in a number of ways, most importantly by allowing the year effects to vary across groups of regions. Key findings include:

• There are no adverse effects of the Syrian refugee influx on overall employment or wages of native men. The decrease in employment of men in the informal sector is offset an increase in employment of men in the formal sector. A shift from wage employment to self-employment and unpaid family work takes place.

• There are no adverse effects of the Syrian refugee influx on wages for native women, however total employment of native women falls due to a decline in part-time employment. Women who lose their part-time jobs exit the labor market.

• The Syrian refugee influx has favorable effects on complementary workers in the formal sector; both wage employment and wages of men in the formal sector increase. Increases in prices in the product market and in capital flow to the treatment regions contribute to the rise in labor demand in the formal sector.
• **Native workers in the labor-intensive and informal-dominated construction and agriculture sectors are substantially adversely affected.** In the construction sector, native men’s employment is remarkably reduced. In the agricultural sector, women’s employment and both men’s and women’s wages are substantially adversely affected (an increase of 10 percentage points in the ratio of migrants to natives causes a 15–20 percent fall in agricultural wages for both men and women).

• **In the manufacturing and services sectors, jobs generated in the formal sector exceed jobs eliminated in the informal sector.** Both men’s and women’s wages in the formal manufacturing sector and men’s wages in the formal services sector increase.

• **The negative effects of the arrival of Syrians on wage employment and wages in the informal sector are more pronounced among the less educated and younger workers.** The positive effects on wage employment and wages in the formal sector are also stronger for the less educated and younger workers.

Unlike Cengiz and Tekguç (2018) who claim no adverse effects of the refugee influx on natives’ employment or wages overall, this paper finds robust adverse effects on employment of men in the informal sector and for women in the overall labor market, as well as adverse effects on the overall wage employment of men. A key difference of the findings of this paper is that the refugee influx has a positive effect on the wages of men in the formal sector and the wages of women employed full-time in the formal sector.


Ragui Assaad, Caroline Krafft, and Caitlyn Keo

This paper examines trends in labor force participation, unemployment and employment in Jordan between 2010 and 2016, in the context of large inflows of Syrian refugees as well as rapid increases in educational attainment among Jordanians. The analysis is based on data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Surveys (JLMPS) of 2010 and 2016 supplemented with annual data from the Jordanian Employment and Unemployment Survey for the intervening years. Key findings:

• **There has been a large increase in the working age population in Jordan since 2010 due to both the increase in the Jordanian population as well as the growth in the refugee and migrant population.** The population increased by 50 percent and the working age population increased by 60 percent. More than 50 percent of this increase was due to the influx of Syrian refugees coupled with the continued growth in the number of migrant workers.

• The average level of education declined slightly due to the influx of less educated Syrians.

• **Labor force participation rates declined for both Jordanians as well as for refugees and migrants.** Labor force participation rates among Jordanians declined from 43 percent in 2010 to
39 percent in 2016. Participation among Jordanian men declined from 70 percent in 2010 to 63 percent in 2016, across all age groups but especially among men aged 35-55. Participation among Jordanian women stagnated at 17 percent despite the rapid increase in their education levels; participation rates fell for the most educated women. Participation rates declined the most among Syrian men who were primarily migrant workers in 2010 (participating at 92 percent) and were mostly refugees in 2016 (participating at 44 percent).

- Employment rates for Jordanians, already at very low levels in comparison to other countries, have declined substantially for both men and women. Employment rates among Jordanian men of working age fell from 64 percent to 55 percent. Employment rates among Jordanian women declined from 14 percent to 11 percent. Employment rates among Syrian men in Jordan fell from 88 percent to 36 percent, reflecting the shift from migrant workers to refugees.

- Declining employment rates were partly accommodated through rising unemployment rates, but also through declining participation rates, as discouragement and early withdrawal from the labor force increased. Unemployment rates among Jordanians increased from 11 percent to 18 percent (more rapidly for women).

Peñaloza Pacheco (2019) Living with the Neighbors: The Effect of Venezuelan Forced Migration on Wages in Colombia

Leonardo Peñaloza Pacheco
Serie de Documentos de Trabajo del CEDLAS No. 248, July 2019
Center of Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS), Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata

This paper investigates the impact of Venezuelan migration on the real wage in Colombia. The author exploits the exogenous shock to the Colombian labor supply due to large-scale inflows of Venezuelans beginning in the second half of 2016 when the borders between the two countries were reopened after about a year of being closed. The analysis relies on labor and socioeconomic data from the Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares of Colombia’s Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), data on migratory flows of Venezuelans in Colombia from the Unidad Administrativa Especial de Migracion Colombia (UAEMC), and data on the numbers of Venezuelans living irregularly in Colombia from the Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos (RAMV).

Key findings:

- Following the opening of the border between Colombia and Venezuela in the second half of 2016 there were significant inflows of Venezuelan migrants to Colombia, the majority settling in regions near the border. The Economically Active Population (EAP) of the border regions of L...
Guajira and Norte de Santander is estimated to have increased by approximately 10 to 15 percent since the reopening of the border in 2016.

- The increase in labor supply in La Guajira and Norte de Santander caused a decline in real hourly wages of approximately 6 to 9 percent on average.

- The decline in real wages was larger for workers with lower skills (defined as individuals with less than a secondary-level education). Low-skilled workers experienced a decline in real wages, on average, 7 percentage points greater than that experienced by skilled workers. This result is consistent with other studies indicating the ‘downgrading’ of migrants and refugees, i.e. regardless of educational attainment and skill level, migrants and refugees frequently work in low-skilled jobs, generating pressure on real wages in this segment of the labor market.

- The effect was also stronger for informal workers (defined as individuals without employer contributions to a pension fund or contributory health plan). On average, wages fell by approximately 9 percentage points more for informal workers compared to formal workers. This result suggests that Venezuelan migrants are participating mainly in the informal labor market.

- There is a stronger decline in the real wage for men than for women, consistent with a traditional role assignment within households. The male labor supply increased at a greater rate than the female labor supply, producing a larger wage decline for male workers.

In his conclusion, the author argues for state intervention in regions receiving Venezuelan migrants to mitigate the effect of the labor supply shock on real wages, including programs to generate employment and/or boost aggregate demand.

Bahar et al (2018) Integrating Venezuelans into the Colombian Labor Market
Dany Bahar, Meagan Dooley, and Cindy Huang
Brookings Institute, Policy Brief, December 2018
https://www.brookings.edu/research/integrating-venezuelans-into-the-colombian-labor-market/

As of December 2018, Colombia hosted more than one million forced migrants who had fled the escalating economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Colombia has embarked on a process of regularizing more than 442,000 eligible Venezuelan migrants—undocumented migrants who voluntarily registered with the Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos (RAMV)—providing them with a Permiso Especial de Permanencia (Special Stay Permit; PEP) that allows them to stay and work in Colombia. This policy brief describes the main characteristics of the population of Venezuelan migrants undergoing the regularization process and the potential impacts on the Colombian economy.

Key messages:
• The population of newly regularized migrants is predominately young, moderately educated, and ready to engage in the labor force. Over 75 percent are of working age, and 83 percent of those have completed at least secondary education. Compared to the Colombian labor force, the newly regularized migrants are younger and more educated. If well integrated into the labor force, they could contribute to economic growth and productivity.

• Newly regularized Venezuelan migrants are highly concentrated around the border, with eight municipalities (out of 1,122 municipalities) hosting over 31 percent of all Venezuelan migrants. Puerto Santander (Norte de Santander), Villa del Rosario (Norte de Santander), and Maicao (La Guajira) have the largest per capita concentration of Venezuelan migrants: 23.6 percent, 17.5 percent and 16.6 percent, respectively. However, in the vast majority of municipalities, newly regularized migrants make up less than one percent of the municipal population. Large metropolitan centers have low per capita concentrations of Venezuelan migrants (Bogota, 0.53 percent; Medellin, 0.46 percent; Cali, 0.43 percent; Barranquilla, 1.74 percent and Cartagena, 1.34 percent).

• The impact of regularized Venezuelan migrants on the labor market depends on whether their labor is a substitute for or complement to native workers. If migrants are complements to native workers, then wages of natives would increase; if migrants are substitutes for native workers, their entry into the labor market would put downward pressure on wages. The authors surmise that regularized Venezuelan migrants are more likely to be complements to native workers given differences in their demographic profile and educational attainment, but acknowledge the potential for negative labor market outcomes, especially in areas with high concentrations of migrants. The authors note that in countries like Colombia where the informal sector is already large, granting formal labor market access may have less of an impact on labor market outcomes for natives.

• Economic integration is potentially beneficial for host countries as well as migrants. When migrants join the formal labor force, they increase their incomes and reduce their reliance on social assistance. They can also attain greater bargaining power in the workplace, which they can use to push for better salaries and safer working environments, with positive spillover effects in the informal labor market. Host countries benefit from the expansion in the tax base, as well as the injection of new skills and ideas into the economy, which can lead to economic innovation and the creation of new businesses and jobs.

• Colombia can enhance the impact of regularization of migrants by investing in complementary policies to mitigate the negative effects of migrant integration and promote positive labor force outcomes. The authors recommend measures to avoid job displacement of those Colombians whose skills could be substitutes for migrant labor, for example by injecting capital into highly impacted regions. In addition, the authors recommend a policy of voluntary, incentivized relocation of Venezuelan migrants within Colombia to both ease pressure on infrastructure in the border regions and give migrants access to more dynamic sub-national economies. Such a relocation scheme would need to take into account factors such as regional unemployment rates, relative sizes of informal labor markets, and the business climate.
This paper investigates the causal effect of the influx of Syrian refugees on the Turkish labor market. The analysis is based on demographic and labor market data from the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (HLFS) from 2010 to 2015 (inclusive), together with data on the regional distribution of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The authors select five refugee-hosting regions close to the Syrian border with the highest refugee-to-population ratio as treatment regions and four comparable regions with a low refugee-to-population ratio as control regions. Using a difference-in-differences approach the authors analyze the effects of Syrian refugees on labor force participation, unemployment, informal employment, and formal employment (employed individuals are classified as being in formal employment if they were registered with the social security).

Key findings:

- Overall, labor force participation decreased and unemployment increased for the total sample after the influx of Syrian refugees.
- Syrian refugees reduced the likelihood of Turks having an informal job in the treatment regions compared with the control regions. Informal Turkish workers in the refugee-hosting regions were 3.9 percent more likely to leave their job than workers in regions that did not widely host refugees.
- The influx affected Turks heterogeneously, by gender, age, and level of education, with more pronounced adverse effects among female, older and less-educated workers. Female, older and less educated workers were more likely to leave the labor force, while male, younger and more educated workers were more likely to stay in the labor force and become unemployed. The authors surmise that: Syrian refugees may have competed especially with female and less-educated Turks for informal jobs; socio-cultural barriers in the Turkish society may have prompted females to withdraw from the labor market after the Syrian refugee shock; and older workers may have withdrawn from the labor market because employers prefer young refugees to older Turks in the informal, physical, labor-intensive sector.
- Negative impacts on labor market outcomes became larger in 2014–2015 compared with 2012–2013. The negative impact on the likelihood of Turks having an informal job doubled in 2014–2015 compared with the impact in 2012–2013. The probability of being unemployed also more than doubled in 2014–2015. The authors suggest that the rapid increase in the number of refugees since 2014 may explain the larger impacts in 2014–2015 than in 2012–2013.

The authors argue that since refugees have displaced Turkish informal-sector workers, and since social security programs do not cover informal workers, their living conditions are likely to worsen.
They recommend that the government increase efforts to include informal workers in social programs, such as unemployment benefits, job training, and matching to potential employers.

Belal Fallah, Caroline Krafft, Jackline Wahba
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According to the 2015 Population Census in Jordan, there were 1.3 million Syrians living in Jordan compared to a population of 6.6 million Jordanian citizens. Until 2016, Syrians were not officially permitted to work, although many found employment in the informal sector. Since 2016, Syrian refugees were allowed work permits in certain sectors, such as agriculture, construction, food, and manufacturing; these sectors disproportionately employed migrant labor even prior to the refugee influx. This paper investigates the short-term impacts of the Syrian refugee influx on labor market outcomes for Jordanian citizens. The authors make use of Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey data from before (2010) and after (2016) the Syrian refugee influx, combined with information on where the refugee influx was concentrated.

Key findings:

- From 2010 to 2016, the number of working-age Syrians rose from 19,000 to 644,000. Although the Syrian working age population was about 16 percent the size of the Jordanian population in 2016, the Syrian labor force was equivalent to about 9 percent of the Jordanian labor force. There were 1.3 million employed Jordanians in 2016 compared to 117,000 employed Syrians.

- Overall, Jordanians living in areas with high concentrations of refugees have had no worse labor market outcomes than Jordanians with less exposure to the refugee influx. This result hold across unemployment, employment, characteristics of employment (formality, occupation, open sector, health and human services sector, private sector), hours, and wages.

- Overall, Jordanian workers in areas with high concentrations of refugees experienced a significant increase in job formality, an increase in hourly (but not monthly) wages, and a shift in employment from the private to the public sector. For a percentage point increase in the share of the locality that is Syrian, the probability of formal employment increases by 0.3 percentage points and hourly wages increase by 0.9 percent. However, because hours have decreased (insignificantly), the effect on month wages is insignificant. Additionally, Jordanian workers exposed to a greater refugee influx are less likely to work in the private sector and more likely to work in the public sector.

The author posit that several channels that may have ameliorated any potentially negative impact of the massive influx of Syrian refugees including: (a) the composition and characteristics of Syrian
refugees in Jordan (predominantly young and with a higher proportion of female-headed households) means that their labor force participation is low (only 45 percent of men and 4 percent of women are in the labor force); (b) the take-up of work permits by Syrians has been low (by the end of 2017 only 87,141 work permits to Syrians were issued out of 200,000 available permits) and therefore few Syrians are competing in the formal labor market; (c) the number of non-Syrian immigrants in Jordan has not decreased in the same period, and Syrians mainly compete with economic immigrants in the informal sector; (d) the inflow of foreign aid may have created labor demand among Jordanians; and (e) the increase in demand for public services, in particular education and health, has resulted in the Jordanian government increasing the provision of those services, which in turn increased the demand for workers (almost exclusively Jordanians) in those sectors. The results suggest that allowing refugees to work legally, and complementing legal work opportunities for refugees with aid and trade opportunities may yield offsetting effects for natives’ labor market outcomes.


Giovanni Peri and Vasil Yasenov
Journal of Human Resources, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring 2019, Pages 267-309
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/724354

This article reexamines the labor market effects of the migration of almost 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States between April and September 1980, known as the Mariel Boatlift. The Mariel Boatlift has been the subject of several economic studies because it provides a natural experiment to test theories about the effects immigration on the wages and employment of native workers. The majority of the Mariel Cubans settled in Miami, increasing Miami’s labor force by about 8 percent, and increasing the workforce without a high school degree by around 18 percent. Card’s (1990) seminal paper found no evidence of any effect on the wages or employment of low-skilled non-Cubans in Miami, while Borjas (2017) found that the wages of low-skilled workers fell by 10 to 30 percent. The authors of this paper argue that they improve on previous studies by employing a synthetic control method, which involves identifying an ‘optimal’ control group or ‘synthetic’ city, that best matches Miami’s labor market trends pre-Boatlift. The authors look for a significant difference in Miami’s labor markets’ outcomes from those of its synthetic control between 1981 and 1983, as potential evidence of an effect of the Mariel Boatlift on local labor markets.

Key findings:
• There is no significant difference in the labor market outcomes of high school dropouts between Miami and its synthetic control, confirming the results of Card (1990). Neither wages nor unemployment rates of high school dropouts differ significantly between Miami and its control group during the 1981–1983 period.
• There is no consistent evidence of large negative effects such as those presented in Borjas (2017). By focusing on small subsamples and matching the control group on a short pre-1979 series, as done in Borjas (2017), it is possible to find large wage differences between Miami and the control because of large measurement error.

The authors conclude that the lack of a significant wage effect is consistent with the recent literature emphasizing mechanisms that allow absorption of immigrants through complementarity, technology adjustment, increases in demand, and efficiency.

Impact on Housing Market


Binnur Balkan, Elif Ozcan Tok, Huzeyfe Torun, and Semih Tumen
IZA Discussion Paper, No. 11611, June 2018

This paper examines the short-term impact of Syrian refugee inflows on the housing market in Turkey. The unexpected influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees is used to construct a quasi-experimental design (the first wave of refugees, arriving between January 2012 and mid-2014, were clustered in some provinces, with no refugees in the rest of the country). Since the housing supply cannot respond in the short-term, the refugee influx resembled a positive demand shock to the housing market. And, since the average Syrian refugee in Turkey is younger and less skilled than the average native, the authors argue that refugees mostly seek low-cost, temporary accommodation.

The authors find that refugee inflows led to a 2-5 percent increase in housing rents, almost entirely for high quality housing units. There is no statistically significant effect on the rents of lower quality units. This finding supports a residential segregation story, which suggests that natives seek native-predominant neighborhoods with better amenities in response to the influx of refugees. The authors suggest that this result may be generated by negative attitudes towards refugees, arising from decreased labor market opportunities, congested public services, and increased psychological distress.


Ibrahim Al Hawarin, Ragui Assaad, and Ahmed Elsayed
Economic Research Forum, ERF Working Paper Series No. 1213, June 2018
This paper examines the causal impact of the Syrian refugee influx on housing outcomes for Jordanians. The authors evaluate the change in housing conditions and rental prices in areas with relatively higher inflows of Syrian refugees compared to areas with relatively lower inflows of Syrian refugees. Key results:

- Housing conditions for Jordanians have been adversely affected by the incoming flow of Syrian refugees, but the average effect is relatively modest.
- The impact is not homogenous across different groups. Poor households that directly compete for housing with refugees were more negatively affected in terms of housing quality, whereas richer households with greater exposure to refugees seem to have improved their housing outcomes, possibly because they upgrade away from the kind of housing demanded by refugees.
- Rent prices increased in response to the share of Syrian refugees, but only in regions closer to the Syrian border. However, other housing outcomes (e.g., average area per household member, house quality index, etc.) are more negatively affected by the Syrian refugee influx in regions that are relatively distant from borders. One potential reason for this could be the inability of local municipalities, in areas with low populations particularly in the south to cope with the increased pressures on services. Another possible reason could be the concentration of several international donors for refugees in the regions closer to borders.

Impact on Politics

Rozo and Vargas (2018) Brothers or Invaders? How Crises-driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior

Sandra Rozo and Juan F. Vargas
https://www.sandravrozo.com/refugee-workshop.html

This paper explores the motivations driving negative political attitudes of local voters towards immigration, specifically whether these attitudes can be explained by self-interest or sociotropic motives. Self-interested voters predominantly care about the impact of immigration on their personal economic status, while sociotropic voters view immigrants as a threat to local cultural or social norms. The paper focuses on Colombia, which permits the analysis of both internal displacement and international migration on voter behavior. The authors exploit the fact that both IDPs and international migrants (displaced by the crisis in neighboring Venezuela) disproportionately locate in municipalities with early settlements of individuals from their town of origin. The authors find that, while internal displacement does not affect voting behavior, international migration reduces support for the incumbent party and increases support for right-wing candidates. These results are consistent with political attitudes being driven by sociotropic motives, and cannot be accounted for by other socio-economic impacts (e.g. crime or economic growth) of migration flows on receiving municipalities. The authors conclude that negative political perceptions about migrants are not explained by detrimental economic effects on local populations, but rather are more likely associated with the perception that migrants with different nationalities, races, or religions are a threat to local social or cultural norms.
Steinmayr (2018) Contact Matters: Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right

Andreas Steinmayr, 2018
https://sites.google.com/site/andreassteinmayr/research

An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title: “Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right: (Unexpected) Results from Austria”, available as IZA Discussion Paper No. 9790.

This paper investigates how exposure to refugees in Upper Austria affected voting for the far right Freedom Party of Austria. In state elections in September 2015, at the peak of the refugee crisis, the Freedom Party doubled its share of the vote with nationalistic, anti-immigration, and anti-asylum campaigns. Upper Austria experienced two different types of exposure to refugees: (a) very short-term exposure to transiting refugees in municipalities bordering Germany; and (b) more prolonged exposure in municipalities that hosted refugees who applied for asylum in Austria. These two types of exposure permit empirical testing of the intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954), which predicts that contact between an in-group (native population) and an out-group (refugees) reduces prejudice provided certain conditions are met, namely: equal status of the groups in the situation; common goals, intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom. To account for the endogeneity in the distribution of refugees, the author uses pre-existing accommodation suitable for hosting large groups as an instrumental variable (buildings were constructed for purposes other than hosting refugees). Key findings:

- Hosting refugees in a municipality dampens the positive overall trend in support for the Freedom Party by 3.45 percentage points in state elections. Votes predominantly go to the conservative, center-right Austrian People’s Party. Local authorities and NGOs facilitated interactions between natives and refugees, and competition for local economic resources was limited (refugees were not permitted to work until their asylum application was approved, they stayed in organized accommodation and did not compete with natives for real estate, and financial assistance for refugees was funded from the state budget). The presence of refugees also decreased support for the Freedom Party in neighboring municipalities.

- Municipalities on the border that experienced the transit of refugees on their way to Germany, show an above average increase in Freedom Party vote shares by 2.7 percentage points in state elections. Refugees only stayed for a few hours before continuing their journey, in chaotic circumstances. This suggests that short and unmediated exposure without possibility for contact can lead to increased far-right voting.

The author concludes that the findings are in line with the predictions of the intergroup contact theory that maintains that contact can improve attitudes towards refugees provided certain conditions are met. However, micro-level exposure can have the opposite effect if these conditions are not met. The author notes that macro-level exposure to the refugee situation (e.g. through social media and political rhetoric) might also affect voting decisions; insofar as the refugee crisis is the cause for the strong increase in support for the Freedom Party, macro-level exposure seems to be the primary mechanism.
Vertier and Viskanic (2018) Dismantling the “Jungle”: Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France

Paul Vertier and Max Viskanic

This paper investigates whether the relocation of approximately 6,400 migrants from the Calais “Jungle” to temporary migrant-centers (CAOs) in France affected votes for the Front National in the 2017 presidential election. The assignment of CAOs was not random, and was likely to be endogenous to political outcomes; citizens of volunteering cities are arguably more tolerant toward migrants and less likely to be affected by the presence of a CAO. To isolate exogenous variation in the exposure of French municipalities to relocated migrants, the authors instrument the presence of a CAO with the presence and size of holiday villages in the same municipality. (One of the criteria for locating CAOs was potential additional space for migrants in holiday villages. The stock of holiday villages was determined before the current migrant surge that led to the creation of the CAOs). Key findings:

- **The presence of a CAO had a negative effect on the vote share of the far-right party Front National.** The presence of a CAO reduced the vote share increase of Front National by about 15.7 percent (about two percentage points) in those municipalities. At the same time there was an increase in the share of votes received by the far-left party Front de Gauche, which has a more open stance towards migrants, but similar political platform on other issues.

- **Spillover effects of the presence of the CAOs on neighboring municipalities.** Municipalities within a five km radius decrease their support for the Front National by around 1.8 percent.

- **A stronger decrease of vote shares of the Front National in municipalities with a larger share of younger people and existing migrants.** The authors suggest this may be the case because younger people have “less fortified” opinions towards migrants and so may be more willing to connect with new people joining their municipality; and pre-existing communities from the same country of origin of the migrants could facilitate initial contact.

- **Effects are dampened in municipalities that were exposed to larger numbers of migrants and where the mayors volunteered to welcome them.** In municipalities that had over 39 migrants per 1,000 residents the impact on the Front National vote outcome is positive, a result consistent with findings on large inflows of migrants. The authors posit that citizens living in volunteering cities are less likely to be prejudiced against migrants, so actual contact with them is less likely to affect their political choices.

- **The arrival of migrants does not appear to have affected local economic activity.** While migrants in CAOs do not legally have the right to work and do not receive any monetary allocation, their arrival might have an effect on local economic activity through increased demand in the catering or building sectors; these potential variations in local economic activity might affect electoral outcomes. The authors do not find any significant difference of net job creation per inhabitant over the period 2012-2014 between municipalities that received a CAO and those that did not.
The authors conclude that the results are consistent with the contact theory (Allport, 1954). Citizens in exposed municipalities developed a greater degree of acceptance towards migrants and were therefore less likely to vote for the Front National. However, the electoral response to actual migration seems to depend crucially on the size of the inflow.

Authors exploit a natural experiment, whereby: Elias Dinas, Konstantinos Matakos, Dimitrios Xefteris and Dominik Hangartner
Political Analysis, Volume 27 (2019) Pages 244–254
https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2018.48

This article examines the impact of a large influx of refugees on natives’ political attitudes and behavior in Greece, which received more than half of all refugees arriving in Europe in 2015. Most refugees left the islands of first arrival within a very short period, typically less than 48 hours. The (a) Greek islands were differentially exposed to the influx of refugees because they were closer to or farther away from the Turkish coast; (b) refugees tended to be housed within specific areas on each island; (c) during the study period, the first election took place on January 25, 2015 just before the onset of the refugee crisis and a second election took place on September 20, 2015 at the height of the refugee crisis; and (d) many islands belong to the same electoral and administrative district, which ensures that they are identical across many observable and unobservable characteristics. Placebo tests suggest that pre-crisis trends in vote shares for exposed and non-exposed islands were virtually identical, enabling the authors to obtain unbiased estimates of the electoral consequences of the refugee crisis. Applying both a difference-in-differences strategy and an Instrumental Variables approach (using distance from the Turkish coast as an instrument of refugee exposure), the authors find:

- Among islands that faced a massive but transient inflow of refugees passing through just before the September 2015 election, vote shares for Golden Dawn (GD), the most extreme-right party in Europe, increased by 2 percentage points (a 44 percent increase at the average).
- These effects are further amplified by the intensity of exposure to refugees, measured by the number of refugees per resident who arrived in the treated islands. The authors arrive at this result by employing within-island variation in proximity to refugee hotspots and measuring the number of refugee arrivals per resident.
- The increase in the vote shares for GD did not affect the vote shares for the governing leftist coalition parties. Rather, voters turned away from the major opposition party, the centre-right Nea Dimokratia, whose electoral agenda was dominated by economic issues and the financial bail-out negotiations. Additionally, overall turnout increased in treated islands, which suggests that the refugee crisis also enabled GD to mobilize new voters who previously had not participated in elections.

The authors note that the refugees’ transitory presence on the island eliminated most avenues for sustained interactions between locals and refugees, a prerequisite for the contact theory to work (Allport, 1979). Additionally, given the temporary presence of the refugee population on most
islands, the results are difficult to reconcile with theories of realistic group conflict (Campbell, 1965), which posits that conflict between the outgroup and dominant group emerges over scarce resources such as access to jobs, housing, or education. Therefore, the authors conclude that mere exposure to refugees is sufficient to fuel prejudice and change political behavior.

Dominik Hangartner, Elias Dinas, Moritz Marbach, Konstantinos Matakos, and Dimitrios Xefteris
American Political Science Review, Volume 113, Issue 2 (2019), Pages 442-455
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000813

This paper examines the impact of the refugee crisis on natives’ attitudes, policy preferences, and political engagement in Greece. The authors exploit a natural experiment in which: (a) distance to the Turkish coast causes dramatic variation in the number of refugee arrivals on Greek islands; (b) islands with and without arrivals are identical across many observable and unobservable characteristics; and (c) among those islands with refugee arrivals, refugees were concentrated in particular ‘hotspots’. The analysis is based on a targeted survey of 2,070 island residents covering: attitudes toward refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities; preferences regarding asylum, immigration, and integration policies; and political engagement to enact policies affecting refugees. The authors use distance to the Turkish coast as an instrument for refugee arrivals to resolve the selection bias associated with refugees choosing their arrival island based on preexisting levels of hostility toward outgroups. Key findings:

- Residents of islands that experience large and sudden influxes of refugees become more hostile toward refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities, and are more likely to support and lobby for more restrictive asylum policies than natives in similar islands that receive fewer or no refugees. Respondents directly exposed to the refugee crisis experience a 1/4 standard deviation (SD) increase in their anti-asylum seeker and anti-immigrant attitudes as well as a 1/6 SD increase in their anti-Muslim attitudes. Compared to respondents on unexposed islands, they are more likely to oppose hosting additional asylum seekers, more likely to support the ban of refugee children from schools, less likely to donate to UNHCR, and less likely to sign a petition that lobbies the government to provide better housing for refugees. Exposure to large numbers of refugees causes natives to become more hostile not only toward refugees, but also toward economic migrants and Muslims, including native Muslims who have been residing in Greece for centuries.

- Across all these outcomes, a direct exposure to the refugee crisis has a long-term impact on natives’ hostility. Almost twelve months elapsed between the passing of the last refugee in March 2016 and the fielding of our survey in 2017.

- Respondents who receive their income primarily from tourism do not necessarily react more strongly to refugee arrivals. This finding supports the argument that rather than egocentric economic concerns, the chaotic management of the refugee crisis triggered hostility among the local population.

- Proximity to refugee hotspots significantly and substantially increases respondents’ hostility toward asylum seekers and economic immigrants and also increases their support for
exclusionary policies. This pattern is consistent with the idea that the highly localized and spatially concentrated chaos surrounding the hotspots created a feeling of threat and triggered exclusionary reactions among natives.

- **Exposure effects are spread quite uniformly across the ideological spectrum.** Those with less exclusionary attitudes react similarly negatively to the refugee crisis as those with already strong exclusionary attitudes. The effects are fairly similar between right-wing/extreme-right and centrist/leftist voters.

Since refugees only passed through the Greek islands, the findings challenge both standard economic and cultural explanations of anti-immigrant sentiment and demonstrate that mere exposure suffices in generating lasting increases in hostility. Even if the transient refugee arrivals did not threaten the economic, political, or cultural prerogatives of the local population, the lack of adequate medical, sanitary and waste collection services for refugees caused chaotic scenes and disruptions at hotspots and sparked concerns about the spread of diseases. The uniform effect of exposure to the refugee crisis across the sample suggest that this threat triggered exclusionary reactions not only among those already predisposed against immigration, but also among respondents who otherwise would exhibit inclusionary attitudes and have not voted for (extreme) right-wing parties in the past.


Theresa Gessler, Gergo Toth, and Johannes Wachs
January 2019

This paper investigates how short-term contact with refugees during the 2015 European refugee crisis affected political behavior in Hungary. Refugees passed through Hungary in an irregular manner and their interactions with locals were transient (many Hungarians were only exposed to refugees on a single occasion); this contact occurred in the context of strong anti-refugee sentiment among the governing elites, which actively promoted fears of refugees. The analysis relies on data on the presence and movement of refugees during the crisis, and results of a 2016 national referendum on proposed EU refugee quotas. Key findings:

- **Settlements through which refugees traveled showed significantly higher anti-refugee voting in a national referendum on refugee quotas in 2016.** The effect, estimated between 1.7 percent and 3.6 percent, decreased sharply with distance from points of exposure.

- **Settlements exposed to refugees voted more for the far-right Jobbik party in the 2018 parliamentary elections, while the ruling Fidesz party, also right-wing and anti-refugee, lost votes.** This result suggests that incumbents are punished by voters in these settlements skeptical of immigration regardless of their policy position.

- **Survey data suggests that exposure to refugees seems to galvanize anti-refugee attitudes only for right-wing partisans.** Survey data supports the finding of competition among right-wing parties, as individuals in exposed settlements are more fearful of immigrants and support more restrictive policies, though only if they identify as right-wing partisans.
In their conclusion, the authors suggest that the length and conditions of contact are decisive mediators in the formation of public opinion about refugees. While left-wing voters may become more tolerant with long-run exposure, they conclude that right-wing voters are significantly less tolerant of refugees after transient encounters. While most work on improving refugee integration outcomes focuses on the long-term and through targeted interventions, the finding that transient short-term contact inflames anti-immigrant attitudes indicates the value of improving crisis management policy.

Christian Dustmann, Kristine Vasiljeva, Anna Piil Damm
The Review of Economic Studies
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy047
Also, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM) Discussion Paper No. 19/16

This paper estimates the causal effect of refugee migration on voting outcomes in parliamentary and municipal elections in Denmark. The authors also examine how particular characteristics of a population augment or diminish the effects of refugee allocation on electoral outcomes. The authors address the problem of immigrant sorting by exploiting a policy that assigned refugee immigrants to municipalities on a quasi-random basis. The analysis is based on data from the 13 years of Denmark’s random refugee dispersal policy, which encompass three parliamentary and municipal electoral cycles. Key findings:

- In all but the most urban municipalities, allocation of larger refugee shares between electoral cycles leads to an increase in the vote share for right-leaning parties with an anti-immigration agenda. In all municipalities except those with a population above the 95th size percentile, a one percentage point increase in the refugee share of the municipal population between electoral cycles increases the vote share for anti-immigration parties by 1.23 and 1.98 percentage points in parliamentary and municipal elections, respectively. Centre-right parties similarly increase their vote share in response to refugee allocation, although to a lesser extent, while parties on the left side of the political spectrum lose. The effect of refugee allocation on voting for the extreme right is stronger in municipalities with: (a) a larger share of previous immigrants; (b) higher crime rates; (c) larger shares of more affluent individuals; and (d) higher dependency of existing immigrant populations on welfare. On the other hand, the higher the share of the municipality population that pays church taxes (interpreted as a measure of altruistic beliefs), the lower the shift in votes to anti-immigration parties in response to refugee allocation. These findings conform to group threat theories, but contradict the contact hypothesis.

- In the largest and urban municipalities, increased refugee allocation causing a decrease in the vote share for anti-immigration parties, possibly because anti-immigration parties’ rhetoric does not entice urban voters. The effect becomes larger with the share of rich individuals, becomes smaller with the share of unemployed, and is unaffected by the share of previous immigrants or immigrant welfare dependency.

- No evidence of an impact of refugee allocations on turnout for parliamentary elections, but some evidence for a higher turnout for municipality elections. A one percentage point increase
in the refugee allocation share increases voter participation by between 0.6 and 1.8 percentage points.

- **Anti-immigration parties respond strongly to refugee allocations when deciding in which municipality to stand.** These effects are exacerbated by the share of pre-policy immigrants who live in the municipality; there is little evidence that other municipal characteristics influence the magnitude of the refugee allocations effect on the probability of anti-immigration parties standing for election.

Overall, the authors find considerable heterogeneity in municipal populations’ responses to refugee allocation in terms of pre-policy characteristics, and different responses in large and urban municipalities versus small and more rural municipalities. Additionally, past immigration and current refugee settlement are major factors in determining the regional spread of anti-immigration parties. The authors suggest that allocation practices that take municipal (or even country) characteristics into account, rather than random allocation based on equalizing the share relative to the resident population, may be preferable as they mitigate the emergence of radical parties.

Fisunoğlu and Sert (2019) *Refugees and Elections: The Effects of Syrians on Voting Behavior in Turkey*

Ali Fisunoğlu and Deniz Ş. Sert


https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12455

There were 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey as of February 2018. Overall Syrian refugees comprise 4.4 percent of the total population of Turkey but there is substantial variation in the number of refugees and their ratio to the local population across provinces. Exploiting the geographical variation of refugees, the authors examine whether Syrian refugee inflows impacted voting behavior in Turkey using the outcome of the June 2015 national election. Recent literature on the impact of refugees on electoral behavior in host countries suggests that the presence of refugees causes a decline in the support for the ruling parties and an increase in the votes of anti-migrant, far right movements. Drawing on a unique subnational dataset and ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least squares (GLS), and difference-in-differences (DiD) regressions, the study compares cities hosting few refugees (control group) with cities with large refugee populations (treatment group) to determine whether significant differences in voting patterns emerged. The authors **find a negative, but insignificant, impact on the incumbent political party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP).** The strongest determinant of the JDP’s vote share in a province is its vote share in the same province in the previous election. The authors suggest several reasons for these results: the impact of refugees is likely to be higher in local elections; there was still no anti-immigrant rhetoric in Turkey; rationalist, economic voting models do not provide a robust explanation for the behavior of the Turkish electorate, and the increasing polarization in the country has seen voters, especially JDP ones, weigh ideological cues much more heavily, making partisanship a more critical variable; the effect of refugees on Turkish elections have not been significant because the JDP has been successful in delivering social and public services. The authors suggest that the main policy implication is that continuous delivery of social and public services, especially to those
citizens who would consider refugees as a group competing for the same resources, is key to keep anti-immigrant tensions under control. Increased access to and effective provision of social and public services together with constructive framing of refugees in the media can reduce tensions emerging with immigration.


Matteo Gamalerio
CESifo Working Paper Series 7212, CESifo Group Munich

This paper investigates how electoral incentives affect the reception of refugees in Italy. Since immigration has been shown to have an impact on electoral outcomes, and given that politicians can anticipate voters’ reactions, the author hypothesizes that governments can be expected to manipulate immigration policies to gain votes or to avoid losing popularity. The author uses data from Italian municipalities from 2005 to 2017, and exploits important features of the Italian government’s refugee allocation policy, which provides substantial fiscal grants to municipalities that choose to open a reception center for refugees and asylum seekers. Although municipal governments can decide whether or not to open a reception center, the timing of tenders is exogenous to local circumstances and elections. The author compared mayors who are in the final year of their term (i.e. just before elections) when a tender is issued, with mayors in other years of their term. Key results:

- **Electoral incentives have a detrimental effect on the reception of refugees.** Specifically, the probability of opening a reception center in a municipality is 24 per cent lower when a tender is launched in the final year of a mayor’s term (i.e. just before new elections), compared to municipalities in other years of the term.

- The author shows that the effect is stronger in municipalities where: (1) voters overestimate the presence of immigrants by more; (2) the pre-treatment share of migrants is higher—consistent with the theory that natives perceive migrants as a bigger threat to their economic resources and cultural dominance in places where the pre-existing fraction of foreigners is higher, and consistent with political economy research that shows that the effect of immigration on the success of extreme-right parties and anti-immigration policies is stronger where the pre-existing fraction of migrants is higher (but inconsistent with the theory that continuous contact between different groups should lead to more acceptance); (3) there is a higher share of voters with extreme-right political preferences; and (4) political competition is lower—consistent with the idea that, where political competition is higher, political parties compete for the support of swing voters, who normally care about non-ideological issues such as economic growth, rather than divisive issues like migration.

- **Voters learn about their misperception from opening a reception center (i.e. the arrival of new migrants need not constitute a threat).** Distinguishing between the opening of new reception centers and the renewal of existing centers, reveals that the only mechanism driving the effect on the renewal of existing centers is the share of extreme-right voters. Voters who express anti-immigration preferences do not change their position after hosting refugees.
There are electoral costs associated with opening a refugee center in the final year of a mayoral term. There are electoral costs only for mayors who open a reception center just before elections (opening a refugee center in other years of the term is positively correlated with the vote shares at the following election), suggesting that electoral punishment may be driven by voters’ misperception of immigrants and by municipalities in which a bigger foreign population induces voters to perceive the arrival of new migrants as a threat. Voters may change views about the reception of refugees if given enough time to understand what hosting refugees means.

The effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees can persist beyond the end of the electoral term, leading to an unbalanced reception of refugees in the medium and long run. Municipalities in which electoral incentives affected the reception of refugees more strongly in the past host a smaller share of refugees and have a lower probability of opening a refugee center in the last year available in the data. This medium run persistence may be driven by municipalities in which voters overestimate the presence of migrants and by municipalities with higher shares of migrants and higher shares of extreme-right voters. Political competition seems to attenuate this medium run persistence of the negative effect.

By refusing to host refugees, Italian mayors give up fiscal resources that could benefit the local economy. The reception of refugees is associated with an increase in total municipal expenditures, which seems to be funded by grants from higher levels of government, and not by local taxes. This increase in expenditures is redistributed toward types of expenditures that could benefit the local economy.

The author concludes that the heterogeneity behind the negative effect of electoral incentives may explain why is difficult to redistribute refugees evenly across and within countries. Moreover, the fear of losing popular support induces municipal governments to forgo resources that could benefit the local economy.

Impact on Crime


Fabian T. Dehos
Ruhr Economic Papers, No. 737, December 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.4419/86788857

This paper provides empirical evidence on the crime impacts of the recent refugee influx to Germany from 2010 to 2015. The author considers asylum seekers and recognized refugees separately, since asylum seekers are subject to dispersal policies and locational restrictions, while recognized refugees can freely choose where they want to live. Additionally, the literature suggests that asylum seekers and refugees may face different incentives to engage in crime due to different expected benefits, sanctions and legal options. The author finds that asylum seekers have no impact on crime except for migration specific offenses (i.e. violations against the residence act, the asylum procedure act or the law on free movement). For recognized refugees, who may endogenously
choose their location, the author uses a shift-share instrument and finds a positive association between the share of recognized refugees and local crime, driven by non-violent property crimes and frauds. The author postulates that the different results for asylum seekers and recognized refugees are explained by a subset of recognized refugees (“compliers”) whose choice of location is based on the presence of communities from the same country of origin. Earlier studies suggest that ethnic networks tend to attract low-skilled migrants and, according to the Becker model, lower educational attainment has a crime enhancing impact because it translates into inferior labor market characteristics and poorer legitimate earning opportunities. The author does not detect interactions with preexisting ethnic networks, nor an indirect crime response of German residents.

Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) Followed by Violence: Forced Immigration and Homicides
Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J. Santos
Documento de Trabajo IE-PUC, N° 513, 2018
Instituto de Economía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

This paper examines the causal impact of inflows of internal displaced people (IDP) on homicides in Colombian host municipalities during the period 1999 to 2014. A priori, the authors suggest that IDP inflows might increase crime because: (a) IDPs were exposed to violence and research indicates that this can engender violent behaviors; (b) IDPs lack economic opportunities; (c) IDPs tend to be younger, are more likely to be male and have low levels of education; and (d) IDP inflows reduce unskilled wages and increase low-income rentals in host cities, and to the extent that this affects economic conditions, it may be expected that criminality increases for both IDPs and non-IDPs. Using an instrumental variables approach (to address the potential endogeneity of the location choices of IDP), the authors find that there is a sizable impact of IDP inflows on criminality. A standard deviation increase in IDP inflows, increases the homicides rate by 0.6 standard deviations. This effect is larger in cities and among men. The results are mostly explained by homicides of permanent residents in the municipalities. While IDP inflows are associated with increasing homicide rates for all age groups, the effects are larger for young individuals (15-19 and 20-24 years old). The impact of IDP inflows on homicides is short lived, lasting at most 5 quarters.

Juan Felipe Mejia Mejia, Hermilson Velasquez Ceballos, and Andres Felipe Sanchez Saldarriaga
https://repository.eafit.edu.co/handle/10784/12579

This paper examines the relationship between internal displacement and crime in Colombia. The authors consider five categories of crime: homicides, kidnapping, personal injuries, automobile theft and residence burglary. The main explanatory variable is the number of IDPs in each municipality. The authors find that each category of crime has different determinants and dynamics:
• The presence of IDPs is associated with higher rates of homicides and kidnapping in adjacent municipalities. A 1 percent increase in the IDP population is associated with a 2 percent increase in homicides in the host municipality. More significantly, a 1 percent increase in the IDP population is associated with a 17 percent increase in homicides and 6 percent increase in kidnappings in adjacent municipalities. The authors posit that “these patterns suggest a mobility of criminals to nearby places for committing these types of crimes.”

• The presence of IDPs is associated with lower personal injury rates. A 1 percent increase in the IDP population is associated with a 2 percent decline in personal injuries in the host municipality and a 13 percent decline in personal injuries in adjacent municipalities. The authors suggest that this is due to “an increase in social control in adjacent places due to the reception of displaced persons.”

• The presence of IDPs is associated with an increase in burglaries in the host municipality, and a reduction in burglaries in adjacent municipalities. A 1 percent increase in the IDP population is associated with a 17 percent decline in residence burglaries in adjacent municipalities.

• Automobile theft is found to be unrelated to the presence of IDPs in host or adjacent municipalities.

Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Cynthia Bansak, and Susan Pozo
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) Discussion Paper 11612, June 2018

In the United States, growing skepticism about refugees has resulted in expressed concerns regarding their impact on public safety and the possibility that they might bring with them the terror and crime that afflicts many of their countries of origin. The authors examine whether there is any basis for the fears that refugees may commit acts of terrorism or engage in criminal behavior. The authors exploit the variation in the geographic and temporal distribution of refugees across counties in the United States to ascertain if there is a link between refugee settlements and local crime rates or terrorist events in the United States. The authors fail to find any statistically significant evidence of a connection between the presence of refugees and local crime rates or terrorist events in the United States. The results are robust to focusing on counties receiving larger refugee inflows or to restricting analysis to refugees from specific national origins.

Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2018) Jobs, Crime, and Votes – A Short-run Evaluation of the Refugee Crisis in Germany
Markus Gehrsitz and Martin Ungerer
ZEW Discussion Paper No. 16-086, June 2018
This paper examines the short-run impacts of refugee inflows in 2014/2015 on labor markets, crime, and voting behavior in Germany. The authors exploit exogeneous variations in the number of refugees per county within and across states. Key findings:

- **Refugees are unlikely to have displaced native workers;** if anything, the employment prospects of natives appear to have been positively affected. However, larger inflows of refugees are associated with increases in non-German unemployment, suggesting that refugees have themselves struggled to find gainful employment.

- **Evidence of a small positive effect of refugee inflows on crime rates;** in particular counties with bigger reception centers have seen increases in drug offenses and violent crime, as well as the number of non-German suspects in relation with these crimes, although this finding might partly be driven by higher alertness of police in these counties.

- **While at the macro level increased migration was accompanied by increased support for anti-immigrant parties, at the local level higher refugee inflows might depress support for the main anti-immigrant party, AfD.**

Huang and Kvasnicka (2019) Immigration and Crimes against Natives: The 2015 Refugee Crisis in Germany

Yue Huang and Michael Kvasnicka  
IZA Discussion Paper No. 12469, July 2019  

During the 2015 refugee crisis, nearly one million refugees settled in Germany, raising concerns that the influx of refugees would lead to more crime against natives. Previous studies investigating the impact of refugees or migrants on crime do not use actual rates of victimization of natives by refugees or foreigners, but inappropriately rely on crude crime or victimization rates. Included in the latter are crimes committed by foreigners against foreigners, crimes committed by natives against natives, and crimes by natives against foreigners. The authors draw on novel county-level data on regional refugee distributions and regional measures of criminal activity of immigrants (refugees) against natives (Germans) to study the impact of the 2015 refugee crisis on the scale and type of crime committed in Germany, using first-difference and 2SLS regressions. The authors find:

- **Overall crime (excluding immigration-related offences), total victimization rate, and victimization rate of Germans all declined between 2014 and 2015.** The dramatic surge in the population share of refugees between 2014 and 2015 was not accompanied by a surge in crimes (excluding immigration-related offences), which declined from 2014 to 2015. Moreover, the total victimization rate (total victims per 100,000 population) and the victimization rate of Germans (per 100,000 German population) also declined from 2014 to 2015. However, there was a significant increase in crimes (excluding immigration-related offences) with refugee suspects in 2015. The authors note that crimes with refugee suspects do not necessarily imply harm done to Germans (if directed at other immigrants, including refugees).

- **Evidence for a hump-shaped relation between the scale of refugee inflows and both the overall crime rate and the overall victimization in a county.** A one standard deviation increase
in refugee inflows raises the county-level crime rate by 1.67 percent and the county-level victimization rate by 2.27 percent from 2014 levels. **Decentralized accommodation of refugees, at given levels of refugee immigration to a county, tends to reduce the crime rate** (while refugee sex ratios exert no effect). The authors emphasize that systematic associations between immigration and measures of total crime incidence may have multiple and confounding causes, including changes in crime incidence exclusively among natives or among refugees, or changes in anti-refugee crimes by natives if these are affected by refugee immigration too.

- **No evidence for a systematic link between the scale of refugee immigration (and neither the type of refugee accommodation or refugee sex ratios) and the risk of Germans to become victims of a crime in which refugees are suspects.** This result holds true not only for total crimes with victim recording in the Police Crime Statistic (PCS) data, but also for various sub-categories of such crimes, including robbery (economic crimes), bodily injury (violent crimes), and rape and sexual coercion (sex crimes).

The results do not support the view that Germans were victimized in greater numbers by refugees as measured by their rate of victimization in crimes with refugee suspects. The authors show that the use of crude crime or victimization rates, as is standard in the literature, lead to significantly biased inference, misinformed public policy, and misled public opinion.

**Entorf and Lange (2019) Refugees Welcome? Understanding the Regional Heterogeneity of Anti Foreigner Hate Crimes in Germany**

Horst Entorf and Martin Lange
IZA Discussion Paper No. 12229

This paper examines the effect of the influx of asylum seekers to Germany in 2014 and 2015 on anti-foreigner hate crime. By exploiting the quasi-experimental assignment of asylum seekers to German regions, the authors estimate the causal effect of changes in the share of the foreign-born population on anti-foreigner hate crime. The authors examine why some regions are more prone to hate crime against asylum seekers than others, and consider several channels of influence including economic, demographic, and social conditions. The analysis is based on recent official administrative hate crime records at the county level. Key findings:

- **The size of the refugee inflow does not automatically translate into a higher number of attacks against asylum seekers.** Recent inflows of asylum seekers only impact the rise in hate crimes when they were assigned to areas with a previously very low share of foreign-born inhabitants, to regions under economic strain, or to those with a legacy of anti-foreigner hate crimes.
- **There is a much larger upsurge in hate crimes in East than in West Germany.** When East-West German differences are controlled for, the predominance of native-born residents at the local level is the single most important factor explaining the sudden increase in hate crime. Economic conditions or a legacy of hate crime cannot explain the grave differences between the former two parts of Germany.
The authors conclude that the defended neighborhood hypothesis of Green et al. (1998) is the most robust explanation of the rise in hate crime in both East and West Germany, i.e. hate crime victimization tends to be higher when a rapid increase in ethnically different migrants occurs in a previously homogenous area with a predominant racial group of incumbents. When analyzing violent hate crimes only, the hypothesis on defended neighborhoods retains its explanatory power.

Impact on Migration Dynamics

Wahba and Malaeb (2018) Migration Dynamics during the Refugee Influx in Jordan

Jackline Wahba and Bilal Malaeb

This paper examines migration dynamics in Jordan between 2010 and 2016, a period in which Jordan experienced large influxes of Syrian refugees. The analysis is based on data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Surveys (JLMPS) of 2010 and 2016. Refugees are defined broadly as individuals in household where at least one member (a) has arrived after 2011 and (b) has fled violence and conflict or is registered as a refugee. The authors find:

• Around two-thirds of current emigrants living abroad in 2016 emigrated from Jordan in the previous five years, while approximately half of emigrants in 2010 had migrated in the five years leading up to 2010. The authors speculate that the substantial increase in emigration from Jordan after 2010 could be correlated with the Syrian refugee influx.

• Between 2010 and 2016, there was a substantial increase in the proportion of immigrants (excluding refugees) in the total population of Jordan, in particular an increase in the proportion of Egyptian and non-Arab immigrants, while the proportion of other Arab immigrants decreased. The increase in immigration is counterintuitive given the large increase in the number of Syrian refugees during this period, which one would expect might make Jordan less attractive to immigrants.

• Data reveal a change in immigrants’ geographical distribution (residence and work location) in 2016 compared to 2010. There are increases in immigrants’ work locations in areas of lower refugee concentration (e.g. Balqa, Madaba, and Aqaba) and a decrease in Amman, which hosts the largest of refugees both in residence and place of work. Interestingly, there is an increase in immigrants’ work in Mafraq despite a decrease in immigrants’ residence in this governorate.

• Immigrants and refugees have a similar distribution of occupations (concentrated in services and sales, and craft and related trade work), but starkly different distributions across economic sectors. Between 2010 and 2016, immigrants have increased their engagement in informal work, and the share of immigrants in the manufacturing sector and ‘elementary’ occupations (including construction workers) has declined. Overall, there is some suggestive evidence of competition with refugees, who are concentrated in the manufacturing and construction sectors.
• The fact that the majority of Syrian refugees were women and young children, rather than working-aged men, may have dampened any potential negative effects on immigrants at least in the short run.

Nelly El-Mallakha, and Jackline Wahba

This paper examines the impact of Syrian refugee inflows on the international, return and internal migration patterns of Jordanians. The analysis is based on data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) of 2016, which is used to construct individual and household panel data relying on retrospective information to track Jordanians’ mobility before and after the beginning of the Syrian war. The authors find that Syrian refugee inflows in Jordan do not have any effect on the international and return migration patterns of Jordanians. However, Syrian refugee inflows increase the probability of Jordanian internal migration. In particular, being a resident of governorates with refugee camps increases the probability of moving out while decreases the probability of moving in. This may be driven by potential negative impacts on the labor market pushing out natives, or an increase in the price of services and housing, or congestion and competition in access to services.

Impact on Conflict

Zhou and Shaver (2018) Do Refugees Spread Conflict?
Yang-Yang Zhou and Andrew Shaver
Princeton University, January 23, 2018

The paper explores whether the presence of refugees increases the likelihood of civil conflict. The paper includes a good summary of the literature on the relationship between refugees and civil conflict, including the mechanisms for how refugees might spread conflict. Using new geo-coded data on refugee sites (formal camps and informal settlements) and civil conflict data at the subnational level from 1989 to 2008, the authors find no evidence that the presence of refugee sites generates or sustains civil conflict either in the province where the refugee site is located or in other provinces within the same country. Where refugees are concentrated within a single province of a country, which is the case in most refugee-hosting countries in any given year over the study period, refugee-hosting provinces actually experience large decreases in their likelihood of civil conflict. The authors suggest that this “conditional risk reduction effect” is probably due to
increased state presence and humanitarian activities (i.e. increased infrastructure, assistance, and security) that are focused in refugee-hosting provinces because refugees are not dispersed throughout the country. Where refugees are dispersed throughout the host country, there is still no effect on civil conflict. These findings contradict conventional wisdom and existing quantitative research, which find that increased refugee populations from neighboring countries are associated with increased likelihood of conflict onset.

Rüegger (2019) Refugees, Ethnic Power Relations, and Civil Conflict in the Country of Asylum
Seraina Rüegger
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318812935

Past research indicates that refugees from neighboring states increase the risk of armed conflict in asylum countries by upsetting the ethnic balance. (The paper includes a review of the literature on forced displacement and political violence.) However, previous research has not systematically analyzed the ethnic group membership of refugees or tested the ethnic balance mechanism. This article explores how refugee flows may affect the risk of armed ethnic conflict in the receiving state, depending on local ethnic politics and ethnic ties between refugees and the host population. The author shows that the vast majority of refugees worldwide do not cause conflict in the asylum state, however if refugees arrive in countries with pre-existing exclusion of a refugee group’s co-ethnics, there is a higher risk of exacerbated domestic tensions. The author attributes this to a two-step process:

- A refugee influx leads to an increase in the size and political leverage of their ethnic group in the host country (including by sharing rebellious ideas or increasing the manpower of the ethnic group), allowing them to challenge the predominance of other political groups and upset the ethnic equilibrium in host states.
- This is perceived as a threat by politically dominant groups, which may pre-emptively or reactively suppress either refugees or their ethnic kin in the host country.

Only when refugees share ethnicity with excluded domestic groups in host states does the risk of civil conflict appear to increase, i.e. internal problems caused by the marginalization of ethnic groups may intensify in the context of refugee migration. The author concludes that host governments should pursue inclusionary policies towards their population, to prevent dangerous instability, instead of closing borders or blaming refugees for domestic problems.

Fisk (2019) Camp Settlement and Communal Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa
Kerstin Fisk
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318814588

This article explores whether areas that host encamped refugees are more likely to experience
communal conflict, and under what conditions? Past research indicates that settling refugees in camps can intensify inter-communal tension in host communities. (The paper includes a review of the literature on the security implications of hosting refugees.) The author investigates the relationship between settling refugees in camps and communal conflict—conflict between non-state groups formed along communal identity lines—in 39 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. She first examines whether there is a general relationship between the overall presence and population intensity of encamped refugees and communal conflict, and then examines whether the effect of refugee encampment on communal conflict is moderated either by interethnic linkages or political and economic marginalization within the host region. Key results:

- **Communal conflict occurs more frequently in regions where refugees are camp-settled.** Regions hosting camps in general, as well as those hosting greater population intensities of camp-based refugees, experience significantly higher rates of communal conflict at the subnational level.

- **Refugee camps have a significant marginal effect on conflict only if they are located in areas with politically marginalized host groups.** The author finds some suggestive evidence that the relationship between encampment and communal conflict is stronger in areas where host groups are politically marginalized.

- **Origin country/host region ethnic ties exert significant moderating effects.**

- **The form of refugee settlement matters, as the presence and population intensity of self-settled refugees are related to decreases in the occurrence of communal conflict.**

These results indicate that while host governments attempt to justify refugee encampment policies on security grounds, **congregating refugees in camps can reduce the physical security of refugees and hosts alike.** The findings imply that policies could be designed to reduce the likelihood that host regions experience such violence, e.g. by redressing host population marginalization and bolstering mutually beneficial economic and social interactions between locals and refugees.


Tobias Böhmel, Vincenzo Bove, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch
[https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318804592](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318804592)

This article looks beyond the effects of refugees on conventional conflict and **considers how refugee flows may affect the risk of non-state actor violence**, i.e. conflict between groups outside of and not affiliated with the state that are identified by shared communal identities, and are often fought over land distribution or access to natural resources, or are a result of socio-economic inequalities. The article also **considers the potential mitigating influence of state capacity.** The authors argue that large refugee populations can strain economic resources, creating tensions between the local population and refugees, and eventually increasing the likelihood of communal violence. However, this relationship is conditioned by host government capacity. States with high administrative and economic capability are better placed to manage pressures from refugee influx and reduce the local
population’s grievances through the sufficient provision of public goods and services. The moderating influence of state capacity is important, as developing and emerging countries host the most refugees and suffer disproportionately.

The authors find that **refugees can increase communal conflict, but only in states that have poor capacity to manage risks.** A larger number of refugees can be associated with a higher non-state conflict risk, but not a higher risk of civil war, i.e. state-based conflict. Only in weak states are large refugee flows associated with an increased risk of non-state violence. These findings highlight the importance of third-party assistance to strengthen state capacity, especially economically, in many developing countries that host the majority refugee population. The analysis lends little support to the alarmist calls for restricting refugee access in developed countries on security grounds.

**Macroeconomic Impacts**

*d’Albis et al (2018) Macroeconomic Evidence Suggests that Asylum Seekers are Not a “Burden” for Western European Countries*

Hippolyte d’Albis, Ekrame Boubtane, Dramane Coulibaly
Science Advances, Volume 4, 20 Jun 2018
http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/6/eaaq0883

This paper **aims to quantify the economic and fiscal effects of inflows of asylum seekers into Western European countries** from 1985 to 2015. Using an empirical methodology to estimate the macroeconomic effects of structural shocks and policies, the authors examine effects on host countries’ economic performance, as measured by public spending per capita, net taxes per capita, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate. They show that:

- **Inflows of asylum seekers do not deteriorate host countries’ economic performance or fiscal balance because the increase in public spending induced by asylum seekers is more than compensated for by an increase in tax revenues net of transfers.**
- **As asylum seekers become permanent residents, their macroeconomic impacts become positive.**

The results suggest that the migrant crisis currently experienced by Europe is not likely to provoke an economic crisis but might rather be an economic opportunity.

*David et al (2019) The Economics of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Neighboring Countries. The Case of Lebanon*

Anda David, Mohamed Ali Marouani, Charbel Nahas and Björn Nilsson
This paper examines the economic and social impact of the Syrian war on Lebanon. The main channels are the reduction of trade, the large influx of refugees, and foreign assistance to refugees. The authors employ a dynamic general equilibrium model to capture forced displacement, discrimination and segmented labor markets. Key findings:

- The costs of lower trade and tourism in Lebanon are high given the importance of these sectors for the Lebanese economy.
- The influx of Syrian refugees yields a positive impact on growth, slightly reinforced by humanitarian aid flows.
- Limited or no adverse effects on high-skilled native workers, but a negative impact on the most vulnerable Lebanese workers.
- When aid takes the form of investment subsidies, significantly better growth and labor market prospects arise.


Elie Murard and Seyhun Orcan Sakalli

This paper examines the long-term impact of the 1923 forced resettlement of 1.2 million Greek-Orthodox citizens of Turkey to Greece in the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish war. The mass resettlement of refugees increased the host population in Greece by more than 20 percent within a few months. Refugees resettled in rural areas were provided with arable land parcels, farm inputs and cattle, in addition to individual houses. The analysis is based on a geocoded dataset that combines historical data on refugee settlement with contemporary socio-economic outcomes at a disaggregated administrative level. The authors employ several empirical strategies that rely on different margin of spatial and temporal variation in the refugee inflow.

Key findings:

- In places of resettlement, refugees contributed to higher industrialization and structural transformation away from agriculture. Places of refugees’ resettlement display higher level of prosperity in 1991 relative to other localities without refugees: conditional on geographical and pre-resettlement characteristics, the former have higher night light luminosity, dwelling with better amenities (e.g. electricity), a larger manufacturing sector and higher average earnings.
Resettlement produced smaller economic gains in places where the local population was predominantly refugees, as well as in municipalities where refugees were segregated into separate villages. There is a hump-shaped relationship between the share of refugees and long-run prosperity, with prosperity first increasing and then declining when refugees make up more than 40 percent of the local population. The economic gains of the resettlement were also lower in places where refugees were clustered in separate enclaves and where their skills were less easily transferable. This highlights the crucial role of social interactions and knowledge sharing, which were facilitated by the fact that refugees and natives often spoke the same language and shared the same religion.

No evidence of negative spillover effects in nearby localities, suggesting that the results are not driven by the reallocation of economic activity into places of resettlement, but rather by the creation of new activity.

Long-run benefits in rural localities of northern Greece appear driven by the transfer of new specific knowledge in textiles and the provision of new agricultural know-how by mostly farmer refugees. Resettlement led to the expansion of the textile sector and manufacturing especially in places with a greater suitability for the cultivation of textile crops (e.g. cotton), where refugees’ knowledge could be more effectively transferred and employed. The resettlement produced smaller economic gains in localities where the interactions between refugees and natives were less likely, either because the local population was predominantly refugee and thus less diverse in terms of skills—hence the hump-shaped relationship between the refugees’ share and long-run prosperity—or because of a higher segregation of refugees into separate villages within the same municipality. There was no empirical evidence for alternative mechanisms such as agglomeration economies, investments in public infrastructure or the economic integration of second-generation refugees.

The authors conclude that by providing complementary (not necessarily superior) knowledge, refugees can generate significant benefits in the long run, even when they do not bring higher human capital, and provided that sufficient investments are made in their resettlement. The author suggests that resettlement policies should avoid clustering refugees in separate enclaves while targeting locations where newcomers’ skills are the most easily transferable.
VII. INTEGRATION, INCLUSION, AND SOCIAL COHESION
Local Integration as a Durable Solution

Ahimbisibwe et al (2017) Local Integration as a Durable Solution? The Case of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda
Frank Ahimbisibwe, Bert Ingelaere, and Sarah Vancluysen
IOB Discussion Paper 2017-02

UNHCR has invoked the cessation clause for Rwandan refugees, which after several postponements came into effect on December 31, 2017. This paper considers options for durable solution for some 17,000 Rwandan refugees in Uganda, and argues that a policy facilitating local integration is the preferred option for many Rwandan refugees in Uganda. Taking into account the perspectives of Rwandan refugees, the authors analyze the impediments to local integration, including: (a) refugees’ fears of losing their culture or language; (b) scarcity of resources, particularly land; (c) resentment or xenophobia fueled by competition for employment and land, and additional pressure on infrastructure and services; (d) the perception that opposition parties would not support local integration; and (e) legal obstacles to citizenship. The authors recommend that: (1) local integration as a durable solution can be encouraged through assistance programs that benefit both refugees and local communities; and (2) Uganda’s conflicting laws need to be addressed in order for refugees to acquire citizenship.

Sebnem Koser Akcapar and Dogus Simsek
Social Inclusion Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2018, Pages 176-187
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/socialinclusion/article/view/1323

This article explores the changing concept of citizenship in Turkey following the arrival of Syrian refugees, and evaluates the conditions and rationale for extending Turkish citizenship to Syrians. Turkey hosts more than 3.5 million Syrians under temporary protection (excluding unregistered Syrians and those with residence permits). An important turning point in the legal status of Syrian refugees was the amendment to the citizenship law to permit naturalization. The authors argue that this was a direct outcome of recent migration flows and pressures to successfully integrate migrants into Turkish society. The law remains selective, targeting Syrians with cultural and economic capital, and those from a Sunni background, to facilitate their acceptance by the host society in the context of rising tensions in many major cities in Turkey. They argue that citizenship is used both as a reward
for skilled migrants and a way to engage them in the integration of unskilled and uneducated migrants. It also reflects other social, political and demographic concerns of the Turkish government, e.g. shrinking population, fear of losing qualified Syrians to the West, possible backlash if unskilled masses are given citizenship, etc.

Using a recent ethnographic study of Syrians and local populations in two main refugee-hosting cities in Turkey, Istanbul and Gaziantep, the authors identify the successes and weaknesses of this strategy by exemplifying the views of Syrian refugees on gaining Turkish citizenship and the reactions of Turkish nationals. They find that Syrian refugees in Turkey prefer dual citizenship because it would give them increased mobility and access to rights, retirement options and business opportunities in two countries. Most Turkish people (86 percent), regardless of their political affiliations and voting behavior, would like Syrian refugees to repatriate when the war is over. The authors caution that citizenship alone is not enough to foster integration or eliminate discrimination and social exclusion in society, and integration policies are urgently needed.

Bardelli (2018) The Shortcomings of Employment as a Durable Solution

Nora Bardelli
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 54-55
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/bardelli

The author takes issue with the increasing emphasis on improving refugees’ economic participation as a solution to protracted displacement, in contrast to official durable solutions that recreate an individual’s link with the State and the possibility of citizenship. The author suggests that this approach inevitably favors some and excludes/marginalizes others, and overlooks social and political questions.

Profiling Displaced Persons


Thea Yde-Jensen, Nandini Krishnan, Xiayun Tan, and Christina Wieser
Poverty and Equity Global Practice, The World Bank Group, 2018
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30267

This paper analyzes data from the 2013-14 Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) to compare the socio-economic profiles of returned refugees, IDPs, and non-displaced hosts. The survey covers the largest return of Afghans following the fall of the Taliban in 2002, but precedes the more recent large-scale return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan in 2016-17. Data was collected just prior to the transfer of security responsibilities from international troops to the Afghan National Security Forces in 2014, which was associated with a subsequent decline in aid and a sharp drop in economic activity. Results show:

• Widespread socio-economic hardship affecting most segments of Afghan society at the time of ALCS 2013-14 including low educational attainment, poor living conditions, limited coverage of
basic services, high household debt levels, and inadequate access to stable employment. On most socioeconomic variables, there were sharp urban/rural and gender disparities.

- 6.7 percent of the surveyed population were returned refugees (back in Afghanistan for an average of 9 years), and 2.4 percent were IDPs.

- **Returnees were more urbanized than other groups.** Almost half (45 percent) of returnees lived in urban areas, compared to less than a quarter of IDPs and hosts. About 45 percent of returnees lived in Kabul province alone. **Returnees’ higher urbanization was associated with relatively better education, dwelling characteristics, access to infrastructure, and labor market outcomes.** On the other hand, returnees suffered higher indebtedness, and were less likely to own their own homes. The authors note that the group of returnees captured in the ALCS 2013-14 were part of a largely voluntary return after the fall of the Taliban, and their characteristics and outcomes may differ markedly from subsequent returns.

- **Educational attainment was very low across all groups** (more than 50 percent had no formal education, only 35 percent could read or write), and there were sharp urban/rural and gender disparities. **Returnees had more exposure to formal education and higher literacy rates** than IDPs and non-displaced hosts.

- **Returnees were twice as likely to use the Internet as members of other groups,** presumably linked to their higher urbanization and educational attainment. 13.2 percent of returnees used the Internet, compared to 5.5 percent of hosts and 4.3 percent of IDPs.

- **While labor market outcomes were very poor across all groups, IDPs had the lowest employment rates.** Employment sectors varied across displacement groups, consistent with differences in their education levels and rates of urbanization. IDPs and hosts were more likely to be employed in the agriculture sector, while returnees were more likely to be employed in construction and the service sector. Returnees tended to hold the most secure jobs, though access to secure, salaried jobs was low across all groups.

- **IDPs had the lowest employment-to-population ratios but the highest labor force participation rates.** Over 30 percent of IDPs in the labor force were unemployed (40 percent of IDPs in urban areas were unemployed). Returnees and IDPs had higher unemployment and underemployment rates compared to hosts, an indication that finding work for displaced populations was challenging.

- **Returnees enjoyed better dwelling characteristics and greater access to services, in line with their higher rates of urbanization, but had lower housing ownership, relative to other groups.** Non-displaced hosts had the highest rates of ownership of dwellings and agricultural land.

- **While rates of indebtedness were high across all groups, displaced households (returnees and IDPs) were more likely than hosts to have debt.**

- **In line with their better education, better labor market outcomes, and higher urbanization, returnees reported the highest rates of ownership of nonagricultural assets.**

- **IDPs experienced the least favorable outcomes on many measures,** e.g. they reported the highest unemployment rates, lowest rates of access to infrastructure, and higher indebtedness, although IDPs’ debt per capita was lower than that of the other groups.

By Caroline Krafft, Maia Sieverding, Colette Salemi, and Caitlyn Keo

This paper profiles the Syrian refugee population in Jordan in terms of demographic characteristics, participation in the labor market, education, and health outcomes. The authors rely on data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) of 2016, which over-sampled areas identified as having a high proportion of non-Jordanians in the 2015 census. The authors define refugee households broadly as those who had at least one adult household member who either: (a) is currently registered as a refugee and arrived in Jordan in 2011 or later, or (b) left a previous residence in 2011 or later due to violence, conflict, or a lack of security. They then consider all other members of the household to also be refugees. Using this definition, 93 percent of Syrians in Jordan are considered refugees. Key findings:

- Syrian refugees in Jordan are disproportionately young, with 48 percent of the refugee population under age 15. There were notably few older adults among Syrian refugees. Men aged 20-34 were under-represented relative to women, potentially due to their decision to remain in Syria to fight, differential mortality rates in the course of the conflict, or men choosing to claim asylum elsewhere.

- Syrian refugees had larger households on average (5.2 members compared to 4.6 members for Jordanian households) driven by a larger number of children in the household not non-nuclear members. Young children, aged 0-5, were present in 64 percent of Syrian refugee households compared to 41 percent of Jordanian households, and older children, aged 6-17, were present in 70 percent of Syrian refugee households and 48 percent of Jordanian households.

- Syrian refugee families were more likely to have a female head of household (23 percent of refugee households) than Jordanian families (14 percent of Jordanian households). Among currently married Syrian refugees, 9 percent had an absent spouse.

- The large majority of Syrian refugees (83 percent) lived in Jordanian host communities in urban areas, compared to 4 percent in host communities in rural areas and 13 percent in official camps.

- More than half (51 percent) of Syrian refugees (aged 6 and over) arrived in 2013, 9 percent arrived at the onset of the conflict in 2011, 28 percent arrived in 2012, and only 13 percent arrived in 2014 or later, partly due to the government’s decision to close the northern border to asylum-seekers in 2015.

- Refugees’ settlement location has varied by year of arrival. Almost all (97 percent) who arrived in 2011 lived in host communities in 2016. The percentage of Syrian refugees residing in official camps, as of 2016, increased progressively for later arrivals, as border authorities became more adept at directing asylum-seekers directly to formal camps, and as conditions for leaving camps became more restrictive.

- 16 percent of refugees were internally displaced in Syria before coming to Jordan.
• Despite the availability of work permits, only 19 percent of refugees are working (compared to 32 percent of Jordanians), primarily in informal employment and working without permits. 38 percent of Syrian men aged 15-64 are working (compared to 55 percent of Jordanian men) and 3 percent of Syrian women are working (compared to 11 percent of Jordanian women). The unemployment rate was 17 percent for Syrian refugee men (compared to 13 percent for Jordanian men). Among male Syrian refugees, 40 percent in host communities were employed compared to 24 percent in camps. Unemployment was particularly high among men in refugee camps. Most employed Syrians were engaged in informal regular wage work (53 percent of employed Syrian men, compared to 13 percent of employed Jordanian men) and irregular wage work (28 percent of employed Syrian men, compared to 6 percent of employed Jordanian men). Jordanian men were primarily engaged in public sector wage work (42 percent), which Syrians cannot access. To a certain extent, Jordanians and non-Jordanians are segmented into different parts of the labor market: Syrians may be competing with other migrant workers more so than Jordanians. Jordanians competing in the same sectors as Syrian refugees and other nationalities are likely to be the poorest and least educated. Among employed Syrian refugees, 43 percent had a permit to work (73 percent of those employed in the formal sector, and 40 percent of Syrian refugees in the informal sector).

• Syrian refugees aged 6-22 were enrolled in school at much lower rates than Jordanians. The enrollment gap widened considerably and persisted for those older than 10 years. Typically, Syrian refugees did not return to school once they left.

• Among women, Syrian refugees and Jordanians had comparable self-rated health. Jordanian men had similar self-rated health to both groups of women. However, Syrian refugee men had worse health than all other groups from their teens up through their 30s. For both men and women, Syrian refugees had higher rates of chronic illness than Jordanians starting at age 25. Refugees have limited access to health insurance and although most do access health services, they are more likely than Jordanians to rely on charitable organizations and pharmacies as their usual source of care.

• Despite food support, refugees suffer from higher levels of food insecurity, particularly those residing in camps.

Ahmed Elsayed
http://erf.org.eg/publications/housing-and-living-conditions-in-jordan-2010-2016/

This paper investigates living and housing conditions in Jordan, comparing in-camp and out-of-camp refugees with Jordanians. The analysis is based on data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Surveys (JLMPS) of 2010 and 2016. The author finds:

• Living and housing conditions for Jordanian households (both established and newly-formed) improved between 2010 and 2016. The share of home ownership and the share of households living in private houses, relative to flats, increased between 2010 and 2016.
91 percent of refugees live outside of camps, and only 9 percent live in refugee camps. Housing conditions for out-of-camp refugees are quite similar to that of locals and other foreigners, however in-camp refugees suffer from much worse conditions manifested in smaller living areas, worse access to public facilities, and less ownership of durable assets. The average living area per person is 38 square meters for non-refugee, 36 square meters for out-of-camp refugees, but only 11 square meters for in-camp refugees.

Refugees’ heads of household, on average, have low levels of education, with more that 50 percent reporting less than basic education level.

https://www.jips.org/jips-publication/profiling-report-kosovo/

A survey of IDPs in Kosovo was conducted in 2016 under the guidance of a steering body (Profiling Management Group) comprising the Ministry for Communities and Return of Kosovo, the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of the Republic of Serbia, UNHCR and Danish Refugee Council, with technical support from the Joint IDP Profiling Service. The survey covered key demographic and socio-economic characteristics of IDPs, their access to rights and services, their preferences for their permanent location of residence, and the challenges faced in achieving their preferred durable solution. Key findings include:

- IDPs have lower overall school attendance rates compared to the general Kosovo population, and women show overall lower access to education than men. Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs face particular challenges in relation to education. The reported illiteracy level of the surveyed Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs (18 percent) is higher than those of the general Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian population (13 percent) and the general Kosovo population (4 percent). A large proportion of individuals have completed no formal education (41 percent of men and 54 percent of women) reaching 75 percent among the population aged 60 and above. Lower school attendance rates can be observed than among the general Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian population and compared to the general Kosovo population, across all education levels.

- Many IDPs are residing in inadequate conditions (makeshift shelters, informal settlements or collective centers). 12 percent of Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs are living in inadequate conditions; all Serbs are living in collective centers.

- IDPs have much lower home ownership rates compared to the general Kosovo population: 56 percent of Albanian IDPs, 39 percent of Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs, 33 percent of Serb IDPs in private accommodation, and 0 percent of Serb IDPs in collective centers, compared to 96 percent of the general Kosovo population (and 83 percent of the general Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian population).

- Many IDPs are living in dwellings that are not connected to the sewerage system or do not have running water. 17 percent of Albanian IDPs, 34 percent of Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs, and 27 percent of Serb IDPs in collective centers are living in dwellings that are not connected to...
the sewerage system. 12 percent of Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs and 27 percent of Serb IDPs in collective centers are living in dwellings without running water.

- **Many IDPs reported struggling to access health care.** 7 percent of Albanian IDPs, 17 percent of Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs, 12 percent of Serb IDPs in private accommodation and 42 percent of Serb IDPs in collective centers.

- **A significant share of IDP households rely primarily on social benefits as a source of income:** 8 percent of Albanian IDPs, 67 percent of Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs, 13 percent of Serb IDPs in private accommodation and 27 percent of Serb IDPs in collective centers (against a 4 percent rate among the general Kosovo population). Among Albanian IDPs, pensions were reported as the main income source for over a fourth of Albanian IDPs against 11 percent of the general population. Among Roma/Ashkali/ Egyptian IDPs, 17 percent reported salaries or wages as the main source of income (against a 57 percent rate among the general Kosovo population). Among Serb IDPs, salaries were reported as the main source of income by 57 percent of the Serb IDPs in private accommodation and by 17 percent of the collective-center residents (compared to 57 percent in general population).

- **A substantial proportion of IDP households have no employed members:** 40 percent of Albanian IDP households, 80 percent of Roma/Ashkali/ Egyptian IDP households, 40 percent of Serb IDP households in private accommodation and 70 percent of Serb IDP households in collective centers. There are **high rates of unemployment among IDPs compared to the non-displaced population:** 41 percent among Albanian IDPs, 84 percent among Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs, 48 percent of IDPs in private accommodation (reaching 71 percent of youth) and 62 percent of IDPs in collective centers, compared to 28 percent of the non-displaced. For Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs, the unemployment rate reaches 92 percent of women and 87 percent of youth. Even though the labor force participation rate is higher among Albanian IDPs than the general population (43 percent versus 39 percent) due to much higher labor participation rates for female Albanian IDPs relative to females in the general population (31 percent versus 19 percent), nevertheless the unemployment rate among Albanian IDPs is much higher than the general population (41 percent versus 28 percent).

- **On average IDPs in Kosovo earn less than the general population.** Substantial proportions of employed IDPs earn less than EUR 300 per month (50 percent of Albanian IDPs, 100 percent of Roma/Ashkali/ Egyptian IDPs, 66 percent of Serb IDPs in private accommodation and 82 percent of Serb IDPs in collective centers) compared to an average of between EUR 300 and EUR 400 in Kosovo.

- **Food represents a higher proportion of monthly expenditures among surveyed IDPs.** 55 percent of monthly expenditures for Albanian IDPs and 59 percent among Roma/Askali/Egyptian IDPs, against an average of 42 percent for the general Kosovo population.

- **Few IDP households had regained access to their properties in places of origin.** 928 IDP households possessed one or more properties in their place of origin, with 530 properties were reported as illegally occupied and 801 properties as damaged or destroyed. Few households reported having regained access to their property after submitting a claim for repossession (11 percent of Albanian IDPs, and 4 percent of Serb IDPs in private accommodation).
The majority of Albanian IDPs (62 percent) prefer to return to the place of origin, while local integration is preferred by 22 percent of the surveyed households. The majority of Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian IDPs (80 percent) prefer to integrate in the place of displacement, while return to the place of origin is preferred by under 5 percent of the surveyed households. The majority of Serb IDPs (93 percent of those in private accommodation and 83 percent of those in collective centers) prefer to integrate in the place of displacement, while return to the place of origin is preferred by 1.4 percent and 1.5 percent of the surveyed households in the respective groups.

MJPS (2018) Profiling Study on Internal Mobility Due to Violence in El Salvador


This study profiles individuals and families internally displaced due to criminal violence in El Salvador. A mixed-methods approach was employed including: a review of secondary information; qualitative mapping (interviews and participatory workshops with key informants in 20 selected municipalities); and enumeration and household surveys (covering 431 families with at least one displaced member, and 254 non-displaced families). Key findings:

- **Internal migration is common in El Salvador.** 22 percent of enumerated families had at least one member who changed his or her place of residence within the country during the period 2006-2016.
- **Internal migration in El Salvador is a multi-causal phenomenon.** The main causes of internal migration are: economic reasons (57 percent of families); family reasons (40 percent of families); and acts of violence or crimes (5 percent of families).
- **1.1 percent of families in El Salvador at end-2016 had at least one member who was displaced between 2006-2016 due to violence.**
- **Families forced to flee violence tend to be younger** (average age of 30 compared to 33 among non-displaced families) due to higher number of adolescent members (ages 12-17) and young adult members (ages 18-29) associated with the increased risk of violence for teens and young adults. 54 percent of individuals displaced by violence are female (compared to 53 percent of non-displaced). 40 percent of displaced families are headed by women (compared to 42 percent of non-displaced families).
- **Displaced families have a lower dependency ratio** (dependent population/working age population) of 45 percent (compared to 57 percent among non-displaced families) due to a larger proportion of working age members and a smaller proportion of elderly members.
- **The displaced population has a lower average educational attainment** (31 percent have secondary or higher education, compared to 36 percent among the non-displaced).
- **The vast majority of the displaced population is forced to move because one or more immediate family members are victims.** 87 percent of population displaced by violence fled because one or more family members were direct victims of violence. Major causes included:
threats, intimidation or coercion (69 percent); extortion (24 percent); violence/insecurity in community of origin (20 percent); homicides (11 percent); and personal injuries (6 percent).

- The most affected municipalities are capitals of each department, as well as those that register high levels of criminal violence. 42 percent of displacement due to violence occurs within municipalities (allowing the displaced to maintain employment).

- Impacts of internal mobility due to violence include: emotional or psychological trauma (affecting 70 percent of the displaced population); and economic impacts due to the abandonment of properties in places of origin (42 percent), the separation of families (29 percent), loss of sources of income (28 percent), and interruption of education of minors (22 percent).

- Families displaced by violence have specific vulnerabilities: only 33 percent of displaced families own property (compared to 70 percent of non-displaced families); 31 percent of displaced families live in overcrowded dwellings defined as three or more people per bedroom (compared to 20 percent of non-displaced families); and 49 percent of displaced families have no title deeds or written lease agreements (compared to 29 percent of non-displaced families).

- Although access to education is similar among displaced and non-displaced families, children displaced in the last two years have less access to education compared to children displaced more than five years ago (75 percent versus 84 percent). The impacts of disruptions in education can have significant consequences for the children affected.

- Participation in the labor force (including people working or looking for work) among displaced families is higher than among non-displaced families (64 percent versus 55 percent), reflecting their more acute economic needs. However, the proportion of those who cannot find employment is also higher (6 percent versus 4 percent).

- Displaced families prefer to remain “invisible” and generally do not go to state or non-governmental institutions for assistance, fearing retaliation by criminal gangs. 70 percent of victims do not report events forcing them to move; 70 percent do not seek assistance.

- 84 percent of the displaced population intends to remain in the place where they currently reside, and only 3 percent intend to return.


Stephanie Matti, 2017
A Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (CCCM) exercise co-led by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with technical support from JIPS and NorCap

This report analyses the displacement situation in and around Sittwe Township, the capital of Rakhine State in Myanmar, where ethnic violence has displaced more than 121,000 people since 2012. The profiling exercise, initiated in 2016, covered four population groups in and around Sittwe Township: (1) displaced Muslims living in IDP camps on the outskirts of the town; (2) displaced Rakhine living in relocated or locally integrated sites; (3) non-displaced residents of Muslim villages; and (4) non-displaced residents of Rakhine villages. Data collection methods included: a desk review
and informant interviews; enumeration in Muslim camps; household survey administered to 4,662 households; focus group discussions; and camp mapping. Key findings:

- **Almost 100,000 IDPs were living in rural camps, the majority displaced in 2012 from urban areas.** 17,618 households (97,484 individuals) were enumerated in the Muslim IDP camps in rural Sittwe. 94 percent of the population was displaced in 2012. 84 percent originate from Sittwe Township and 11 percent from Pauktaw Township; 76 percent came from urban areas.

- **Muslims were less likely to be literate, or to speak Rakhine and Myanmar languages.** Less than a third of Muslim females and half of Muslim males were literate (with slightly lower literacy rates in Muslim villages than in camps) compared to 85 percent adult literacy rates for Rakhines (slightly higher in Rakhine villages than in relocated sites). While more than 95 percent of Rakhines spoke Myanmar, younger Muslims were less likely to speak Rakhine or Myanmar languages (correlated with more secure sources of income for people in the camps, and critical for early warning systems including for severe weather).

- **Muslim households were less likely to own radios, televisions or mobile phones.** Less than two percent of Muslim households own a radio and less than 1 percent own a television, raising concerns about disaster early warning systems. Rates of mobile phone ownership among the Rakhine population (50 percent for villages and 67 percent for the relocated sites) was nearly double that of the Muslim population (30 percent in villages and 34 percent in camps), but lower than the national average of 73 percent.

- **Muslims, particularly those in villages, had lower school enrollment rates.** Among Rakhine children, there are high primary and middle school enrollment rates for both IDP and host community children (94 percent), but high school attendance rates are higher in Rakhine villages (80 percent) than in Rakhine relocated sites (55 percent). Among Muslim children in the camps, over 80 percent of primary school-aged children were attending school or temporary learning spaces. This was similar for middle school-aged boys but dropped to 71 percent for girls. Only 31 percent of high school-aged girls and 62 percent of boys were attending school or temporary learning spaces. School attendance rates were lowest in Muslim villages, with less than two-thirds of primary school-aged children attending school. There is a large gender divide among Muslim children attending school. Middle school-aged Muslim boys are nearly twice as likely to attend school as girls. Expenses were the main reason for Muslim boys and younger girls to not attend school. Cultural norms were the main reason given for older Muslim girls (from age 10 to 13) not attending school.

- **The majority of IDPs in rural camps were living in small temporary and makeshift shelters.** Temporary shelters have become increasingly congested and the condition of the shelters has deteriorated significantly since the camps were established. Average space in the formal temporary shelters was 2.8m² per person (68 percent of people had less than 3.5m²).

- **Outside the camps, home ownership rates were lowest in Rakhine relocated sites.** Average home ownership rates were 93 percent in the Rakhine villages, 82 percent in Muslim villages, and 66 percent in Rakhine relocated sites.

- **Most IDP camps in rural areas meet SPHERE standards for water and sanitation.** There is an average of one latrine for 21 people in the rural camps (SPHERE standard is 20 people per latrine) and 80 people using each borehole. All camps in Sittwe rural areas with the exception of
Thae Chaung meet SPHERE standards for access to water (at least 1 hand pump for 192 people). Ownership of water storage containers was high across Muslim camps (93 percent) and lower among Muslim villages (62 percent), Rakhine relocated sites (48 percent) and Rakhine villages (32 percent).

- **Healthcare was a key expense for both Muslim and Rakhine households, and was one of the main reasons households took out loans.** More than three-quarters of households that experienced a serious health issue in the past six months sought healthcare. Roughly 30 percent of pregnant women in Muslim camps reported having had serious pregnancy-related issues in the past six months.

- **Less than 10 percent of Muslim children under five had birth certificates,** compared with two-thirds of Rakhine children of the same age.

- **Muslims, particularly those in IDP camps, were less likely to participate in the labor force.** 85 percent of working-age Rakhine males were participating in the labor force, compared to 74 percent of males in Muslim villages and 66 percent of males in Muslim camps. Approximately 44 percent of working-age Rakhine females were participating in the labor force, compared to less than 15 percent of Muslim females. For all target populations, the proportion of people in salaried employment was much lower than the national average. Muslims were in salaried employment at a rate less than half the national average. Less than 10 percent of all target populations owned businesses; the rate was lowest among Muslim camp households (3 percent). However, 22 percent of Muslim camp households reported having owned a business or trade stall prior to displacement. Few people in Muslim camps use their job skills from before displacement, those that work in the same sector earn much less for the same work. A lack of start-up capital and movement restrictions were key factors limiting job growth in the camps.

- **Muslim households, particularly those in IDP camps, had lower median incomes.** Half the households in the Muslim camps had a median income of 25,000 MMK per month or less, compared with 35,000 MMK for Muslim villages, 75,000 MMK for Rakhine villages, and 100,000 MMK for Rakhine relocated sites. The higher median income among Rakhine relocated sites compared with Rakhine villages may reflect the fact that the Rakhine relocated sites are in urban settings, while the Rakhine villages are in a combination of urban, peri-urban and rural locations. The highest monthly expense across all population groups was food, followed by fuel and healthcare.

- **Rates of indebtedness are high, particularly in Muslim villages and camps.** 67 percent of households in Rakhine villages and 65 percent in Rakhine relocated sites were indebted, nearly double the national average of 35 percent. The rate of indebtedness was even higher for Muslim villages and camps (84 percent).

- **Muslim households had lower food consumption scores, particularly households in Muslim villages that do not benefit from food distributions:** The majority of Rakhine households in villages (95 percent) and relocated sites (98 percent) had acceptable food consumption compared with just 67 percent of households in Muslim villages and 73 percent in Muslim camps. Most people in the Muslim camps and Rakhine relocated sites rely on food distributions as their main source of food. The main source of food was own production in Rakhine villages (79 percent) and Muslim villages (58 percent). Around 40 percent of Rakhine households
reported not having enough food or money to buy food in the past week; this was higher in the Muslim camps (72 percent) and villages (69 percent). 45 percent of Rakhine groups and 73 percent of Muslim groups resorted to negative coping mechanisms to meet basic expenses (borrowing money, selling non-food item distributions and selling food).

- **Although Rakhines and Muslims had frequently interacted with one another in the past, this became much less common following the outbreaks of violence in 2012.** Less than one percent of Rakhine households surveyed said they had interacted with Muslims in the past week, and only about one in ten Muslim households said they had interacted with Rakhines. Many Rakhine respondents expressed anxiety about living near Muslim settlements. Many younger Muslims are unable to speak the Rakhine or Myanmar languages, and have few opportunities to learn them.

- **Community relations within communities were perceived to be generally positive.** However, sources of tensions in the Muslim camps included: living in close proximity to each other; urban/rural cultural differences; deteriorating infrastructure in the camps; and socio-economic divisions. There were high levels of interaction between people in Muslim camps and villages, with approximately two-thirds of households having some form of interaction in the week prior to the survey. While interaction was reported to be generally collaborative and positive, some sources of tension included: camps being located on host village farming land; less land available for breeding animals; and increased demand for limited firewood.

- **Food was the most frequently cited top non-cash priority need across all groups.** After food, health services and job opportunities, education and shelter/housing assistance were the most frequently cited priority needs across all target populations.

- **94 percent of residents in Muslim camps said they would prefer to return to their place of origin due to better access to education, job opportunities, reconnecting with pre-displacement social networks, better access to healthcare, and safer, more reliable housing.** Prerequisites for return include: housing and a plot of land, access to employment opportunities and peaceful coexistence with the local community.

**Overall, the Muslim population fares significantly worse than Rakhine population for most indicators.** Muslims in camps settings and surrounding villages face many of the same constraints in terms of segregation and access to civil documentation, and so it cannot be generalized that the Muslim camps are worse off than the villages or vice versa.

**UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP (2018) Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) 2018**

UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, December 2018

This report examines the socio-economic situation of a representative sample of Syrian refugee families in Lebanon. The survey covered 4,446 Syrian refugee households randomly selected from 26 districts across Lebanon, and representative at district, governorate and national level. Key findings:
Demographic profile: 54 percent of the refugee population is under the age of 18. While there are almost equal numbers of male and female refugees (49.5 percent male, 50.5 percent female), there are fewer males aged 20-29, possibly because men in this age range are drafted into the army, resettle in a third country or are reluctant to make their presence known. 29 percent of girls aged 15-19 were married.

Household characteristics: Average household size has declined from 7.7 in 2013 to 4.9 in 2018. 18 percent of households are female-headed. The average dependency ratio was 1.02. 64 percent of households have at least one member with a specific need such as chronic illness, disability, temporary illness, serious medical condition or in need of support in daily activities. 5 percent of households have at least one child who is disabled.

Legal documentation: 73 percent of refugees aged 15 and older reported not having legal residency. The main obstacle cited was the cost of renewal (76 percent) or difficulty finding a sponsor (27 percent).

Relations with host community: The majority of households (51 percent) reported that their relationship with the host community was positive or very positive. Only 3 percent of households reported experiencing a security incident in the last three months (most commonly verbal harassment, arrests and detention).

Child labor and marriage: 2 percent of Syrian refugee children aged 5-17 were engaged in child labor. Boys were more affected than girls (3.4 percent versus 0.9 percent). 1 percent of girls aged 13 to 17 were married.

Housing: 66 percent of households were living in residential buildings (apartments or houses), 19 percent were living in non-permanent structures (mostly informal tented settlements), and 15 percent were living in non-residential structures (agricultural rooms, engine rooms, pump rooms, construction sites, garages and farms). There is wide variation across governorates, with largest shares of refugee households living in residential buildings in Beirut, Mount Lebanon and El Nabatieh (91 percent to 85 percent), and the largest shares of refugee households living in non-permanent shelters in Baalbek-El Hermel, Bekaa and Akkar (51 percent to 29 percent). Rent cost was the most commonly cited reason for selecting a place of residence. 30 percent of households were living in shelters that did not meet humanitarian standards, and a further 5 percent were living in shelters in dangerous conditions. 34 percent refugee families were living in overcrowded shelters (less than 4.5 square meters per person). Eviction is one of the main reasons forcing refugees out of their homes. 37 percent of households who changed accommodation in the last six months did so due to eviction by landlord or authorities.

Water, sanitation, and hygiene: 91 percent of households reported using improved drinking water sources; the main sources of improved drinking water are bottled mineral water (43 percent), water taps/network (14 percent), and water tanks/trucked water (8 percent). 85 percent reported use of basic drinking water services (i.e. water source in dwelling/yard/plot or water source within 30 minute round trip). 87 percent of households had access to improved sanitation facilities, and 68 percent of households used facilities that were not shared.

Energy: 97 percent of households had access to electricity. 95 percent of refugees were using electricity from the national grid, through either legal or illegal connections, but 56 percent also relied on private generators.
**Education:** There are around 488,000 school-aged Syrian refugee children in Lebanon (3-18 years). Enrollment rates by age (regardless of the grade level they are enrolled in) are: 20 percent for pre-primary education (ages 3-5); 68 percent for children aged 6-14; and 23 percent for children aged 15-17. More than half of refugee children (aged 3 to 17) were still out of school, mainly adolescents and youth. Starting at age 12, boys are especially vulnerable to dropping out. The main reasons for not attending school were cost of transportation (21 percent) and cost of educational materials (19 percent), with the need to work becoming more prevalent among upper secondary children (10 percent of children aged 15-17). 61 percent of Syrian refugees aged 15 to 24 were not employed, not in education, and not attending any training (NEET). While more girls than boys are enrolled in secondary school, the NEET rate is higher for female youth (79 percent) than for males (41 percent), due to lower female employment. The NEET rate is higher among youth 19 to 24 years of age (67 percent) than those aged 15 to 18 (54 percent).

**Health:** 87 percent of households reported receiving required primary health care (PHC) services (varying from 70 percent in Beirut and Mount Lebanon to 98 percent in Akkar). Most households received services through PHC outlets. Half of households received subsidized health care, 7 percent benefited from free health care, and 20 percent paid in full. Three quarters of households requiring hospitalization were able to access it. The main barrier to accessing PHC or hospitalization was cost (of service, treatment/medication, transportation).

**Food security:** 34 percent of households are moderately to severely food insecure. Food-insecure households had lower per capita expenditures and more debt, and they allocated the majority of their expenditures to food. Female-headed households are more vulnerable than male-headed households. One third of Syrian refugees had poor food consumption scores. Households reported using coping strategies that depleted their assets to cope with lack of food or money to buy it, including: buying food on credit (79 percent), reducing food expenses (75 percent), reducing expenses on health (51 percent) and education (22 percent), spending savings (30 percent), and selling household goods (22 percent).

**Economic vulnerability:** 51 percent of Syrian refugees are below the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) of US$ 2.90 per person per day. 69 percent of households are below the poverty line. Nearly 9 out of 10 households acquired debt and 82 percent borrowed money during the three months prior to the survey, indicating that refugee households continued to lack enough resources to cover their essential needs. Households headed by females are more vulnerable than those headed by males.

**Livelihoods:** The labor force participation rate was 43 percent (73 percent for men, 16 percent for women). 68 percent of households had at least one working member. Nearly one in five working males (and one in ten working females) had more than one job. Only one in four employed Syrian refugees reported having regular work. While men worked mostly in construction (32 percent), agricultural activities (21 percent) and occasional work (11 percent), the few women that were employed worked mainly in agricultural activities (38 percent), occasional work (10 percent) and cleaning (4 percent). The average unemployment rate was 40 percent (61 percent for women, 35 percent for men), varying significantly across governorates. Sources of household income remained unsustainable: 26 percent reported WFP assistance as
their primary source of income, followed by informal credit/debt (16 percent), construction (16 percent), services (11 percent) and agriculture (9 percent).

- **Coping strategies**: Nine out of ten households adopted food-related coping strategies, most commonly: consuming less preferred/less expensive foods (86 percent), reducing the number of meals (57 percent) or reducing portion size (51 percent). 97 percent of households have applied a livelihood coping strategy, most commonly: buying food on credit (79 percent), reducing essential non-food expenditures (55 percent), reducing expenditures on health (51 percent) and spending savings (30 percent).

- **Assistance**: Between 2017 and 2018, more than 170,000 of the most vulnerable families were reached with UNHCR or WFGP cash-based assistance (cash for winter, cash for food, multipurpose cash, child-focused grants).

- **Gender**: Female-headed households remain more vulnerable than male-headed households, possibly because 55 percent of female-headed households did not have any member working (compared to 27 percent of male-headed households). Unemployment is a particular challenge for women (61 percent unemployment rate compared to 35 percent for men). Female-headed households resort to more negative coping strategies than male-headed households. Shelter types for female-headed households are more frequently non-permanent and non-residential structures (45 percent residing in non-permanent and nonresidential shelters, compared to 33 percent of male-headed households). A larger proportion of female-headed households identified proximity to family as a determining factor for choosing accommodation. While female-headed households had nearly equal access to an improved drinking water source compared to their male counterparts, they had less access to basic sanitation services. The gender parity index indicated that the number of girls in primary school remained almost equal to that of boys. For secondary school, more girls are enrolled than boys, particularly in upper secondary (grades 10-12). There was a significant difference in the rates of child labor between boys and girls (3.4 percent and 0.9 percent, respectively). Early marriage is a concern, with three in ten girls between the ages of 15 and 19 currently married.


Harry Brown (UNHCR), Nicola Giordano (Action Against Hunger UK), Charles Maughan (Action Against Hunger UK) and Alix Wadeson

UNHCR Jordan, 2019


The 2019 Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) population study examines different dimensions of vulnerability across multiple sectors among a representative sample of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, stratified by case size and governorate of displacement. Data collection was carried out in October-November 2018 covering 2,248 households, equivalent to 10,400 individuals or 3,712 cases (unit of registration in UNHCR’s ProGres database). Key findings:

- **Household characteristics**: More than half (54 percent) of households were composed of a single case (the mean number of cases living together as a household was 1.6), 28 percent of households were female-headed, 33 percent of cases were female-headed (female-headed
cases are more likely to live in a male-headed household), households mostly comprised of immediate nuclear family members, and the sample was young with relatively few older people (mean age of 24, median age of 21).

- **Welfare**: 78 percent of respondents fell below the Jordanian poverty line of 68 JOD per capita. There is a small cohort with high expenditure that raises the overall average (mean expenditure is 135 JOD, while median is only 85 JOD). Lower expenditure per capita is associated with: larger cases; female-headed households; and, a higher proportion of females in a case. The proportion of females at the case-level is a better predictor of expenditure patterns than the gender of the household head. There is little variation across governorates, except that per capita expenditure is higher in Amman (where there are a greater proportion of single-cases).

- **Coping strategies**: The most common negative coping strategies were: (a) buying food on credit; (b) accepting socially degrading, exploitative, high risk or illegal temporary jobs; and (c) reducing essential non-food expenditures. Surveyed refugees used 2.5 of a possible 14 coping strategies in the 30 days prior to the survey. More frequent use of negative coping strategies is associated with: larger cases (possibly due to higher dependency ratios); higher proportion of females; higher incidence of disabilities; and higher ratio of non-autonomous adults. There is only a weak relationship between expenditure per capita and emergency coping strategies such as child begging. There is variation across governorates. There is a correlation between children being withdrawn from school, early marriage and child labor.

- **Dependency ratio**: 49 percent of surveyed refugees have more than 1.8 dependents per non-dependents in their case. 21 percent of individuals reported a disability. Larger case sizes tend to have higher dependency ratios and live in households with more reported disabilities.

- **Basic needs**: 40 percent of individuals have debts of more than 100 JOD per capita. 76 percent of respondents have per capita expenditure below the level required to maintain the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB).

- **Education**: Education materials, rather than transport, private school fees or other expenses, are the largest component of education costs. Higher education costs are correlated with larger case size, regional location, and overall expenditure per capita, but not distance to school. Higher incidence of out-of-school youth is associated with: higher education costs; frequency of coping strategies; larger case size; and lower proportion of females in the case (distance to school has a very low correlation). Cultural and social norms about the value of education, family obligations and disinterest in culture are the top reasons for non-attendance. Cases with a higher proportion of females are more likely to maintain expenditure on education even with low levels of income (less likely to withdraw children from school), and are less likely to have children engaged in begging.

- **Food security**: There is no severe food insecurity in the sample: 13 percent of respondents are moderately food insecure, 67 percent are marginally food secure, 19 percent are food secure. About 90 percent have an acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS). Female-headed households are able to achieve the same FCS as male-headed households but with lower food expenditures.

- **Health**: There is a high incidence of trauma. 21 percent of individuals report having at least one disability (37 percent of cases and 45 percent of households have a member with a disability).
Higher medical expenditures are associated with: more medical issues in the household; lower levels of income; larger cases; and a higher proportion of females in the household. 47 percent indicated that they had noticed an increase in health care costs over the last six months, and also reported high levels of unsustainable debt likely related to recent health care policy changes in Jordan.

- **Shelter:** 95 percent of respondents live in finished buildings, and 3 percent live in informal settlements. There are important geographical variations in shelter conditions (Mafraq stands has a high proportion of households living in substandard buildings or informal settlements and the highest overall sub-standard shelter scores). A written rental contract is strongly associated with higher quality shelter. As the ratio of females in the household increases, spending on rent tends to decline and the quality of shelter improves.

- **WASH:** 40 percent of respondents report that they cannot afford to buy some basic hygiene items. Single cases spend nearly twice as much per person on WASH than cases with six or more people. Expenditure on WASH is a determinant of overall expenditure. As the proportion of females in a household increases, expenditure on water and hygiene items declines.

- **Livelihoods, income and expenditure:** Median income from employment is below the level required to maintain the MEB in all sectors. For some sectors, such as agriculture, services and mining, median earnings fall below the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB). Having a work permit is associated with higher expenditure and income per capita, and more manageable debt. However, less than five percent of cases in the sample had a work permit.

- **Debt:** 64 percent of respondents are indebted. The most common reasons for incurring debt are: paying rent (36 percent), health care (17 percent) and buying food (11 percent). Higher debt is associated with higher rentals, case size and gender. Cases in female-headed households have a lower median income, but also lower median debt than cases in male-headed households. Smaller cases living in male-headed household are particularly prone to high per capita levels of debt.

- **Working children and child labor:** Around 5 percent of children aged 5-17 are working children (compared to 1.8 percent among host community). Nearly 95 percent of working children are engaged in child labor and 77 percent are exposed to hazardous labor. Working children are most frequently employed in the services (31 percent) and construction (17 percent) sectors. Child labor affects boys more than girls, however domestic work (often carried out by girls) is not measured.

The authors highlight the importance of the proportion of females in a household for several dimensions of vulnerability; a higher proportion of females is associated with lower expenditure per capita, more frequent use of negative coping strategies, lower incidence of out-of-school youth, higher medical expenditures, lower rentals, better quality shelter, and lower expenditure on water and hygiene items. Some geographic variation exists but it is a weak indicator of vulnerability. Rather, household structure and size is more important. The number of people within a case is negatively associated with expenditure per capita.
Based on data from a national household survey implemented between November 2017 and January 2018, this report describes and contrasts the living conditions and livelihoods of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The analysis covers six localities: Amman; Zarqa; Irbid; Mafraq; the other governorates taken together; and the refugee camps. The report is based on information from 7,632 households and 40,950 individuals (97 percent registered with UNHCR). The authors find that the situation of refugees in Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid is significantly better than in the camps, Mafraq, and other governorates. Key findings:

- **Locations of origin**: Almost half (48 percent) of Syrian refugees originate from Dara’a governorate in Syria, with smaller numbers from Homs (19 percent), Aleppo (10 percent), Rural Damascus (9 percent) and Damascus (8 percent).

- **Duration of displacement**: 95 percent of respondents arrived after 2011 (including their children born in Jordan). 97 percent are registered with UNHCR. Average duration of displacement is 4.6 years. Two percent have been back in Syria.

- **Demographic profile**: 48 percent of refugees are below age 15 (younger than the population in Syria prior to the crisis). There are more women than men aged 25 and over. Syrian refugee women marry much earlier now: while around 3 percent of 15-year-olds in Syria were married before the war, this number has risen to 14 percent; 71 percent of women aged 20 are married, compared to 43 percent in 2008. Men also marry earlier: while very few men had married by age 20 before the war, 23 percent had married as refugees in Jordan.

- **Household characteristics**: Syrian refugee households in Jordan typically contain five people. Large, three-generation and extended households are rare. 22 percent of households have a female head.

- **Housing conditions**: While pre-fabricated housing is the norm inside camps, out-of-camp refugees tend to live in apartments rather than stand-alone houses, particularly in Amman. Most dwellings are 2-3 rooms, except in camps where 1-2 rooms is the norm. Refugees in Mafraq and the camps live in more cramped conditions than elsewhere—whether measured by the number of rooms or the space in square meters. In-camp refugees do not pay rent; 98 percent of out-of-camp refugees rent a dwelling on the private market, with monthly rents in the range of JD120-150.

- **Water**: 99 percent of refugee households rely on piped water or buy it from tanker trucks. 39 percent use this water for drinking, 57 percent use filtered water purchased in large containers, and 4 percent buy water in smaller bottles.
• **Household income**: 70 percent of households rely on a combination of two or more income sources, most commonly: wages (61 percent) self-employment income (3 percent), private transfers (14 percent), institutional transfers (90 percent), property income (1 percent) and other income (11 percent). Institutional transfers are most common in the camps (100 percent) and least common in Amman and Other governorates (79 percent). Wage income is more common in Amman than elsewhere (69 percent). One-third of households are totally dependent on transfer income while another one-fourth rely mainly on such income. One-tenth of refugee households combine transfer and employment income while one-fourth primarily make a living from employment income. For Amman, Irbid and Zarqa, the median annual household income is around JD3,000; it is about JD1,000 lower in the camps, Mafraq and Other governorates.

• **Ownership of durable goods**: Access to durables is lower among households in camps, but many durables are found in most households: most households have access to TVs (95 percent), satellite dishes and receivers (89 percent), refrigerators (89 percent) and washing machines (82 percent). However, very few own computers (2 percent) or have an Internet connection at home (4 percent). Only 1 percent of refugees own a car.

• **Household expenditures**: Median monthly household expenditure comprise: rent (JD135); energy (JD21); food (JD120); tap water (JD5); bottled water (JD3); transportation (JD10); phone/mobile (JD10); and medical treatment (JD17, mean). Refugees in the camps, in Mafraq and in Other governorates have lower expenditures than refugees in Amman, Irbid and Zarqa.

• **Savings and debt**: Two percent of all households have savings. Two-thirds of all refugee households have debt; the median debt among indebted households is JD450.

• **Food insecurity**: The moderate and severe prevalence rate of food insecurity is 40 percent, while the severe prevalence rate is 18 percent (higher than the average severe prevalence rate of 12 percent for the region and 12.5 percent for Jordan as a whole).

• **Health**: 16 percent of refugees report chronic health failure. The incidence of chronic health conditions is higher than in the Jordanian population. About one in five of the Syrian refugees attribute their problem to the war in Syria or the flight to Jordan.

• **Health services**: Refugees with chronic conditions more frequently use public and NGO-provided services, but many refugees (particularly those in Amman) also use private health care providers. Refugees with acute illnesses also tend to rely on public and NGO provided services, but use private clinics and hospitals more often. The poorest refugees tend to rely most on NGO services, which are often free or heavily subsidized.

• **Educational attainment**: Educational attainment of Syrian refugees in Jordan is slightly lower than that of pre-war Syria, and considerably lower than educational attainment among Jordanians. 15 percent of adults aged 20 and above have achieved a secondary or post-secondary degree, 24 percent have completed basic education. 26 percent did not complete elementary school.

• **Educational enrolment**: Enrolment and retention rates have improved substantially since 2014. For children aged 6-10, enrolment is nearly universal but then declines, particularly from age 12. Most refugee children (95 percent) enrolled in basic education attend a public school, 4 percent attend a private school and 1 percent attend an UNRWA school. In the refugee camps, all schools operate two shifts (girls attend the morning shift and boys attend the evening shift).
Outside the camps, 71 percent of refugee children are enrolled in two-shift schools (two-thirds attend the afternoon shift). Ten percent of refugee children currently enrolled in basic education have repeated at least one school year. Only 3-5 percent of Syrian refugees aged 19-20 attend higher education compared to over 0 percent of Jordanians of the same age. Enrolment in post-secondary education is strongly associated with economic circumstances—about half of enrolled Syrian refugees are members of the 20 percent of households with the best score on the asset index.

- **Labor force participation:** Labor force participation rates have improved since 2014. The labor force participation rate for men is 59 percent (ranging from 48 percent in Mafraq to 65 percent in Amman), comparable to that of the general population. The labor force participation rate for women is 7 percent, which is less than half the national rate (16 percent) and is the main reason why the overall labor force participation rate of Syrian refugees still lags behind the national rate. Labor force participation is higher for women in the camps. Refugees with post-secondary education are more often economically active than those with less education.

- **Unemployment:** In addition to individuals defined as employed and economically active using the previous week as the reference period, another 7 percent of adults (mostly men) had held one or more jobs during the 12 months leading up to the survey. Unemployment has dropped from 61 percent in 2014 to 25 percent in 2018, comparable to the national unemployment rate for the 4th quarter of 2017 (18.5 percent). The unemployment rate is 23 percent for refugee men and 46 percent for women (the female unemployment rate has been halved since 2014).

- **Profile of employment:** Major occupations for men are: craft and trades workers (37 percent), service and sales workers (25 percent), elementary occupations (23 percent), and white-collar workers (5 percent). A substantial share of women work as professionals (11 percent) or associate professionals (5 percent), many in the education sector. The major industries for Syrian refugees are construction (21 percent), manufacturing (18 percent), wholesale and retail trade, and repair of vehicles (17 percent), other services (12 percent) and agriculture (8 percent). Education, health and social work are key sectors for women (25 percent of female employment). Occupations and sectors are comparable to those in Syria before the war, except that in Jordan ‘accommodation and food services’ has absorbed a larger proportion of people and ‘agriculture’ employs relatively fewer people than it used to. Among refugees with work experience in Syria, 11 percent are not currently employed in Jordan. 20 percent of refugees had benefited from short-term contracts from the UN, NGOs etc. (mostly in camps) in the year preceding the survey.

- **Working conditions:** One-third of employed refugees report having a valid work permit. Median employment incomes are in the range JD150-250 (highest in Amman; lowest in Mafraq and camps) and increase gradually with educational attainment. Over 70 percent of work being done by refugees can be characterized as temporary, irregular, seasonal and daily labor. Non-pay benefits are rare.

- **Child labor:** Approximately 1 percent of children aged 9-14 are employed and another 0.5 percent are both employed and enrolled in school. Incidence of child labor is higher among boys (1.7 percent are employed and not in school; 0.9 percent combine work and school) than girls (of whom 0.3 and 0.1 percent, respectively, do the same). Around 12 percent of Syrian refugee
children—boys and girls alike—are neither working nor enrolled in school. More than nine in ten employed children aged 9 to 14 work out of economic need. Mean and median weekly work hours for children aged 9 to 14 are 38 and 30 hours, respectively.

- **Willingness to work in Special Economic Zones**: A minority of refugees know about the Special Economic Zones; one-third would accept a job there given the right incentive (pay, travel time).

**Return intentions**: Looking two years ahead, there are more Syrians who think they will still be in Jordan than there are those who think they will have returned to Syria. Three in ten claim they are considering a move to Europe.

**World Bank (2019) Informing the Refugee Policy Response in Uganda: Results from the Uganda Refugee and Host Communities 2018 Household Survey**

World Bank, 2019

Uganda hosts about 1.3 million refugees in 13 districts, the majority from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This report analyzes the socio-economic profile, poverty, and vulnerability of refugees and host communities in Uganda based on data from the 2018 Uganda Refugee and Host Communities Household Survey (a collaboration between the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), Office of the Prime Minister, and the World Bank). The survey is representative of the refugee and host population in Uganda, as well as the refugee and host population in the West Nile and South West regions, and the city of Kampala. The 2014 Population Census provided the sample frame for hosts, while UBOS constructed a new sample frame for refugees. Data was collected from 2,200 households in all 13 host districts in Uganda.

Key findings:

- **Demographic characteristics of refugee households contribute to their vulnerability.** Refugees are younger on average, with 57 percent of refugees below the age of 15 compared to 48 percent of hosts. One in two refugee households is female-headed, compared to less than one in three host households. The dependency ratio is higher among refugee households (1.7 dependent members for every non-dependent member, compared to 1.2 for hosts).

- **There is widespread poverty among refugees.** Almost half of refugees (46 percent) are living in poverty, compared to 17 percent of hosts. Poverty is highest in the West Nile region where 57 percent of refugees and 29 percent of hosts are poor. A household is less likely to be poor if the household head has some secondary education or is employed. Factors contributing to poverty include a larger proportion of children under 15, being a refugee, and residing outside Kampala, particularly in the West Nile region.

- **Food insecurity is high for both refugee and host households.** Seven in ten refugee households and five in ten host households experienced severe food insecurity.

- **Ownership of assets is lower among refugees, particularly outside Kampala.** Overall, refugees have fewer productive assets (livestock, land, and solar panels) than hosts. Refugee households
also own less non-agricultural land compared to hosts, but there is little difference in the ownership of homes or appliances. Unlike asset ownership, dwelling conditions depend more on the household’s region of residence than its refugee status.

- **The incidence of agricultural shocks is high for both refugee and host households outside of Kampala.** Most households, irrespective of refugee status, relied on savings, the help of family/friends, and changed cropping practices when faced with an agricultural shock.

- **For some services (water, improved sanitation, electricity, health care), refugees have better access than host communities, reflecting the significant humanitarian response.** Among refugee households, 94 percent have access to improved water (compared to 66 percent of host households), 39 percent have access to improved sanitation (compared to 26 percent of host households), and 52 percent have access to electricity (compared to 49 percent of host households). With the exception of Kampala, health care centers are slightly more accessible to refugees, both financially and in terms of geographical proximity.

- **Uganda’s policy of providing education to refugee children is leading to equitable school enrollment rates for primary school-age children.** Refugee children are enrolled in primary schools at a similar rate to that of hosts (net primary enrollment rate of 65 percent and 68 percent, respectively). However, primary completion rates are low for both populations, particularly for refugees (only 14 percent of refugees between the ages of 15 and 17 completed primary education, compared to 34 percent of hosts in this age group). Moreover, net secondary enrollment rates are low (9 percent for refugees and 27 percent for hosts) and secondary completion rates are low for both populations (14 percent for refugees and 34 percent for hosts). Both refugees and hosts identify cost as the main constraint to staying in school.

- **Aid dependence among refugees is high, particularly among recent arrivals.** 54 percent of refugee households report aid as their main source of income. While aid dependence declines with duration in the country, aid is still the main source of income for 37 percent of refugees who arrived five or more years ago.

- **72 percent of refugees are unemployed,** compared to 36 percent of hosts. Unemployment rates decline with duration in the country (77 percent for refugees who have been in Uganda for less than two years compared to 54 percent for refugees who have been in Uganda for five years or more), suggesting that, with time, refugees are better able to integrate into the labor market. Unemployed refugees are more likely to be young (average age of 25 years), have low levels of education (70 percent have no formal education or have some years of primary education but did not finish), and come from agricultural backgrounds (45 percent previously worked in agriculture and around 23 percent previously worked in services and sales). Only 8 percent of refugees have received skills and job training.

- **Self-employment is more prevalent among refugees, except in Kampala.** In Kampala, three quarters of refugees are in wage employment (compared to 55 percent of employed hosts), while outside Kampala only a quarter of refugees are in wage employment (similar proportion to hosts). Among the wage employed, refugees earn wages that are 35 to 45 percent lower than the wages earned by hosts, even when considering the workers' observable characteristics. For
both host and refugee communities, agriculture is the main sector of employment followed by small trade (services). Half of employed refugees (including self and wage employed) changed occupation after arriving in Uganda. One in five refugee households owns a non-agricultural enterprise.

- **Agricultural productivity is low among refugee and host communities.** On average, half of refugees have access to land. The large majority of refugees with access to land grow crops for their own consumption and a little more than half sell some of their crops. Almost 100 percent of refugee and host households in agriculture are engaged in rain-fed agriculture, which leaves them vulnerable to weather shocks. There is almost no adoption of improved inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.

- **Refugees are part of and contribute to local economies.** In the West Nile and Southwest regions, approximately 20 percent of refugees purchase their non-durable goods, and 17 to 18 percent purchase their durable goods in local markets outside refugee settlements. **Refugee enterprises generate jobs for Ugandan nationals.** About 1 in 5 employees of refugee enterprises were Ugandan nationals. In Kampala, the proportion is much higher: around 3 in 4 employees of refugee enterprises are Ugandan nationals.

- **There are positive signs of social integration between refugees and host communities, particularly in Kampala.** Around 60 percent of refugee households in the West Nile and Southwest regions and 84 percent of refugee households in Kampala report that their children have Ugandan friends with whom they share recreational spaces. Most refugees feel secure and welcomed in Uganda, a reflection of the country’s overall openness towards refugees.

- **With the exception of refugees in Kampala, refugees participate in social groups.** Around 13 percent of refugees participate in agricultural or livestock associations, 14 percent participate in savings groups and 9 percent participate in women’s associations.

**Conclusions:**

- **Uganda’s progressive approach to hosting refugees has contributed to refugees having good access to basic services**, such as primary education and health care, as well as feeling safe and welcome in the country. In addition, refugees participate and contribute to the local economy, and help create jobs for Ugandan nationals.

- Despite feeling secure and welcome, **the refugee population in Uganda lives in precarious conditions with high rates of poverty and food insecurity**, particularly among new refugee cohorts. It is necessary to continue programs aimed at alleviating poverty and food insecurity, particularly among recent refugees.

- **Ensuring the self-reliance of refugees and reducing aid dependence should be at the core of policies and programs.**

- **Refugees are an untapped source of labor**, which could contribute to Uganda’s economy. Skills formation and training of unemployed refugees should consider their characteristics in terms of
education, occupational background, and access to land. It is vital to stimulate labor demand in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities.

- **Enhancing agricultural productivity and investing in water management may increase the wellbeing of refugees and hosts.**
- **Investing in access to basic services in host communities will contribute to their development and peaceful coexistence of both populations.**
- **Social groups and associations represent a tool in implementing refugee initiatives**, outside Kampala.

**Kuscevic and Radmard (2019)** *Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: A Spatial Study*

Casto Martin Montero Kuscevic and Hossein Radmard  
*Applied Economics Letters, 2019*  
[https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1623862](https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1623862)

Lebanon hosts the second largest population of Syrian refugees and has the highest per capita population of Syrian refugees in the world. This paper examines the spatial distribution of Syrian refugees across districts in Lebanon and investigates the factors that explain settlement patterns. The analysis is based on district-level data from the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) for the period 2015-2017. The authors find:

**Access to credit appears to explain the distribution of refugees across districts.** Other examined factors (food consumption and living conditions) are not statistically significant determinants of refugee location.

- Refugees cluster in a few districts, which are surrounded by districts with small numbers of refugees. The authors suggest that since credit is more likely to come (directly or indirectly) from other refugees, clustering increases the likelihood of accessing credit.

**Beine, et al (2020)** *Refugee Mobility: Evidence from Phone Data in Turkey*

Michel Beine, Luisito Bertinell, Rana Comertpay, Anastasia Litina, Jean-Francois Maystad, and Benteng Zou  

This paper examines the mobility of refugees across provinces in Turkey as a measure of their social integration. The analysis is based on call detail records from the Data for Refugees Turkey (D4R) challenge, combined with socioeconomic data at the province level (nightlight density from satellite data as a measure of income) and indices for various types of news (leadership change, boycotts, violent protests, economic aid, humanitarian aid, and asylum grants). The authors employ
a standard gravity model to empirically estimate determinants of refugee movements—compared to non-refugee movements—including: province characteristics; distances between provinces; income levels; network effects; refugee-specific determinants such as the presence of refugee camps and the intensity of phone call interaction among refugees; and certain types of news events.

Key findings:

- **Non-refugees move further and more frequently than refugees.** Given that refugees are mostly free to move within Turkey (in some provinces restrictions may apply but they are not strictly enforced), the authors posit that the imperfect integration of refugees is the main reason for reduced mobility.
- **Low income levels in the province are a push factor for refugees.** Refugees tend to leave poorer provinces but may not be able to reach wealthier provinces (possibly due to restrictions on refugees).
- **Distance between provinces has a negative impact on mobility.**
- **Number of refugee calls (a measure of network effects) has a positive impact on mobility.** Refugees tend to move to regions where other migrants have already settled.
- **Refugees tend to leave provinces with an ongoing rally for leadership change.** This may capture political instability and pre-election rhetoric that might be directed against refugees. However, this does not act as a pull factor.
- **Higher incidence of boycotts is associated with lower mobility.** Provinces with a higher incidence of boycott-related news could be more active in political and humanitarian spheres, which may encourage immigrants to settle. However, this does not act as a pull factor.
- **Refugees tend to move to provinces with more economic aid and leave as economic aid decreases.** Humanitarian aid, however, does not have any effect on mobility.
- **News of asylum grants acts as a pull factor for refugee movements.**
- **The presence of a refugee camp in the origin or destination province does not have any effect on mobility.**

Overall, the authors conclude that the **standard gravity determinants apply such as distance, income levels, as well as network effects. Policy interventions associated with political stability, the granting of asylum, and economic aid also matter.**

**Legal Identity**


Martin Clutterbuck, Laura Cunial, Paola Barsanti and Tina Gewis
Protracted conflict in Syria, the destruction or closure of civil registries, and complicated processes for issuing documents to refugees in host countries, have had a serious detrimental effect on many Syrians’ ability to prove their legal identity. In Syria, the ‘family booklet’ is the primary civil record and the basis for obtaining all other civil documents; 40 percent of IDPs no longer have a family booklet, and those that do have not been able to add children to it if they are displaced in non-government controlled areas. Children become eligible for national identity cards when they reach age 14, but a quarter of IDPs aged 14 and over do not have a national identity card due to the closure of civil registries. In host countries, many Syrians cannot access civil registration procedures due to: (a) lack of documentation (e.g. marriage certificate and proof of legal stay is often required); (b) lack of familiarity with procedures (including strict time limits for registration); (c) fear of repercussions of approaching their own embassy; (d) costs; and (e) language barriers in Turkey. Refugees often resort to returning to Syria to access documents or purchasing forged documents, which exposes them to protection risks. The authors identify several practical steps towards full realization of the right to legal documentation, including: (i) restoration of national civil registration systems in Syria; (ii) a process for replacement of documents issued by non-governmental actors; (iii) a non-punitive process to replace forged documents; (iv) measures established by host countries to provide documentation to Syrian refugees that can be retained when refugees cross international borders.

Access to Services


Colette Salemi, Jay A. Bowman and Jennifer Compton

This paper provides an overview of services available to Syrian refugee youth and children (aged 6-29) in Jordan, including education, cash assistance, nutrition, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, shelter, and protection. The analysis is largely based on documents listed in the sectors of interest in UNHCR’s document library uploaded prior to November 2017. The authors identify several factors negatively affecting access to services and institutions for Syrian refugee children and youth in Jordan:

- **Lack of documentation**: In 2016, youth were found to be three times more likely to not be registered with UNHCR, often because they were unaware of registration requirements and procedures. Refugees who leave camps outside of the official bail out procedures are not allowed to reapply for asylum in Jordan, and without the required documents from UNHCR and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), these refugees are unable to access various types of assistance that they may be eligible for. Palestinian-Syrians are not allowed to cross the border
into Jordan and for those that enter illegally, formal registration with UNHCR and MOI could result in deportation. Consequently many of these refugees remain undocumented and have extremely limited access to services. Children born in Jordan to Syrian refugee parents who are legally married can obtain birth certificates and Syrian citizenship, however many parents struggle with obstacles to birth registration.

- **Poverty**: A large portion of Syrian refugees in host communities face chronic poverty, leading to coping strategies (skipping meals, reducing food intake, child labor, early marriage) that negatively affect the wellbeing of young people. Female-headed households are particularly likely to have children who are foregoing school for work. Youth in poor and undocumented households are especially at risk due to the prohibitions on their receipt of assistance.

- **Fear and insecurity**: In and out of camps, insecurity keeps many youth at home, especially girls and young women.

- **Trauma and life interruption**: Trauma, injuries, and fears restrict mobility and service access. Stigma associated with mental health or SGBV often keep young people from seeking psychological support services.

- Even when young refugees seek services, they may face delays and queues for obtaining a doctor visit, or a place in school. Infrastructure and staffing may be inadequate to meet the increased demand for services.

**Lyles et al (2018) Health Service Access and Utilization among Syrian Refugees and Affected Host Communities in Lebanon**

Emily Lyles, Baptiste Hanquart, Lara Chlela Michael Woodman, LHAS Study Team, Fouad M Fouad Abla Sibai, Shannon Doocy

*Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 31, Issue 1 (2018), Pages 104–130*

[https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fex014](https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fex014)

This paper examines adult health needs, care-seeking behaviors and barriers to health care among Syrian refugees and affected host communities in Lebanon. The analysis is based on a 2015 survey of 1,376 Syrian refugee households and 686 host community households. The authors find that refugees have worse access to health care and medication compared to the host community; the primary barrier to care in both groups was cost. Specifically:

- A substantial proportion of households, both refugee (89 percent) and host community (94 percent), reported that medical care was needed for an adult household member in the month preceding the survey. Infectious diseases were the main reason for needing medical care followed by chronic conditions, obstetric/gynecological needs and injuries. Just over half of Syrian refugee households had one or more members with a chronic health condition.

- **For households that needed health care for an adult member, 85 percent of host community households and 69 percent of refugee households received care**. Cost was the most commonly reported reason for not seeking care.

- Approximately half of refugees who sought care did so in primary care facilities, followed by private clinics, pharmacies and hospitals, while most host households sought care in private
clinics, followed by a much smaller proportion seeking care at primary care facilities, pharmacies and hospitals.

- **Among refugees prescribed medication, 89 per cent were able to obtain all of the prescribed medications (compared to 97 percent for hosts).** For refugees unable to obtain medications, the primary reason was that the household could not afford the medication, with a smaller proportion citing that the medication was out of stock at the facility.

- **Average host community household out-of-pocket costs were significantly higher than refugee households for consultation and medication.** While lower in absolute terms among refugees, when considering the exceptionally poor financial circumstances of most refugee households, even modest out-of-pocket payments are likely to present a significant financial burden to many households, which in some cases left health care out of reach.

- **Hospitalization of a household member in Lebanon for reasons other than childbirth in the year preceding the survey was significantly lower among refugee households (20 percent) compared to host community households (43 percent).** No significant differences were observed between those using private versus public hospitals in either population group.

The authors suggest that strengthening primary health services and educating communities about rational care seeking and home treatment of mild illness may decrease health costs and reduce the burden on the Lebanese health system. Moreover, health system reform towards universal health care for refugees and vulnerable Lebanese that is supported by the international community could help to ensure integration and provide less costly and more sustainable health services access for refugees.

**Labor Market Outcomes for Refugees and IDPs**

Torosyan et al (2018) *Job Market Outcomes of IDPs: The Case of Georgia*

Karine Torosyan, Norberto Pignatti and Maksym Obrizan

*IZA Discussion Paper Series, January 2018*

ftp.iza.org/dp11301.pdf

The paper examines labor market outcomes for IDPs in protracted displacement in Georgia. Using 13 years of Integrated Household Surveys, the authors find that labor market outcomes for IDPs are much worse than those of local residents and ‘voluntary movers’ with similar observable characteristics, and disparities persist over time. Specifically, IDPs are 3.9 to 11.2 percentage points less likely to be in the labor force, depending on the period and duration of IDP status. While all new internal migrants (both voluntary and IDPs) have around a 20 percent lower labor force participation rate compared to locals who have always lived in their current location—over time voluntary internal migrants regain labor market activity and almost catch up to locals, but IDPs labor market participation does not seem to improve with length of tenure in the same location. IDPs are also up to 11.6 percentage points more likely to be unemployed, sometimes even after 20 years of
forced displacement. Approximately one out of every 4 or 5 working aged IDPs is unemployed, which in some periods is almost double the incidence of unemployment among local residents, and employment prospects do not seem to improve with length of tenure in the same location. Additionally, **IDPs residing in a locality for more than five years receive persistently lower wages than local residents with similar characteristics, with the gap widening over time**, reaching some 16 percent in the last period under analysis. The authors conclude that **labor market costs of forced displacement are long lasting in nature and warrant serious attention from researchers and policymakers**. One exception is the situation of new IDPs in the Mtskheta/Kartli area in the period 2013-2016, which followed a significant period of support by the government and international organizations for IDPs from the 2008 conflict (who concentrated in this area) and overlaps with a period when the government was looking for more long-term solutions to the IDP problem.


Caroline Krafft and Mariam Sharpless  
May 2018  
[https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2018/05/07/syrian-refugees-limited-participation-jordans-labour-force/](https://theforum.erf.org.eg/2018/05/07/syrian-refugees-limited-participation-jordans-labour-force/)

This article discusses the reasons for the low labour force participation among Syrian refugees in Jordan; 77 percent of Syrian refugees are out of the labor force. Working illegally and informally remains common among Syrian refugees in Jordan, despite the work permit program. Refugees may choose not to obtain work permits due to a perceived higher risk of exploitation, fear of losing other aid or costs such as social security. The authors suggest that one possible way to increase the proportion of refugees in the labor force and with legal protections would be to change the annual renewal of the work permit to a more substantial increment of time.

**Fasani et al (2018) (The Struggle for) Refugee Integration into the Labour Market: Evidence from Europe**

Francesco Fasani, Tommaso Frattini, and Luigi Minale  
IZA Discussion Paper No. 11333, February 2018  

The large influx of refugees and asylum seekers into the EU15 area has raised concerns about their integration into European labor markets and societies. The authors use repeated cross-sectional survey data to **examine the labor market performance of refugees relative to voluntary migrants, across several EU countries and over time**. The authors suggest several possible channels for poor labor market outcomes for refugees relative to voluntary migrants, including: (a) different selection and self-selection mechanisms; (b) different impacts of economic conditions on arrival; and (c) the role of asylum policies and uncertainty in the asylum process.
Compared with natives, voluntary migrants perform poorly in European labor markets along many dimensions (e.g. employment probability, likelihood of working in a skilled occupation, earned income). The authors find that labor market outcomes for refugees are consistently worse than those for voluntary migrants, and this “refugee gap” persists for about ten years after immigration. The gap remains sizeable even after controlling for observable individual characteristics (age, gender, education) and unobservables (origin area, entry cohort, and destination country fixed effects, and the interactions between them). Refugees are 11.6 percent less likely to have a job and 22.1 percent more likely to be unemployed than voluntary migrants with similar characteristics. Their income, occupational quality and labor market participation are also weaker. Refugees from Africa and the Middle East struggle the most. There is some evidence that worse health status and lower language proficiency of refugees may partly explain their poor labor market performance.

The authors also assess the role of asylum policies (dispersal policies) and uncertainty in the asylum process (refugee status recognition rates, and application processing time) in explaining the refugee gap. They find that refugee cohorts exposed to dispersal policies have persistently worse labor market outcomes, an effect seemingly related to inefficient refugee allocation upon arrival given that it diminishes over time as refugees are eventually allowed to relocate. Additionally, refugee cohorts admitted when refugee status recognition rates are relatively high integrate better into the host country labor market. The authors caution that short-term political considerations may induce policymakers to favor measures that minimize immediate costs rather than maximizing long-run benefits, leading to potential underinvestment in refugee integration, e.g. dispersing asylum claimants and refugees in relatively deprived areas justified by immediate budget savings from lower accommodation costs.

Ivlevs and Veliziotis (2018) Beyond Conflict: Long-Term Labour Market Integration of Internally Displaced Persons in Post-Socialist Countries

Artjoms Ivlevs, and Michail Veliziotis
Journal of Vocational Behavior, Issue 105 (2018), Pages 131-146
Also available at: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/177019/1/dp11215.pdf

This paper analyzes how IDPs fare after displacement in terms of their labor market outcomes, focusing on the long-term labor market disadvantage of IDPs (10 to 15 years after conflict). The conceptual framework draws on the theory of cumulative disadvantage and theoretical explanations of the long-term effects of unemployment. The empirical analysis focuses on nine post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Russia, Serbia and Tajikistan), which, throughout the 1990s, witnessed some of the worst military conflicts of modern history that led to the internal displacement of millions of people. The authors discuss several factors that are likely to exacerbate
the initial, displacement-related shock (in particular, make the initial loss-of-activity spell longer) and hamper the subsequent labor market integration efforts of IDPs, including: (a) loss of assets; (b) psychological trauma; (c) uncertainty; (d) reception at host communities; (e) institutional and administrative barriers; (f) loss of education; (g) gender-related considerations; and (h) selection into moving and selection into destinations. The empirical analysis reveals:

- **IDPs in nine post-socialist countries experience a significant long-term labor market disadvantage.** People who fled conflict 10-15 years ago are more likely to be long-term unemployed, experience a recent job loss, and work informally. These long-term impacts support the main insight of the cumulative disadvantage theory: an unfavorable relative position experienced by an individual at one point in life forms a basis for a relative disadvantage later on.

- **IDPs are more likely to experience a recent (crisis-related) job loss because they were more likely to work informally.** Informal work represents an additional source of vulnerability for IDPs.

- **Conflict-affected ‘non-movers’ are not different from people not affected by conflict in terms of labor market inactivity/long-term unemployment, recent job loss, or informal work.** This suggests that it is forced displacement, rather than the conflict per se, that leaves a long-lasting negative impact on labor market integration.

- **Displaced women consistently experience a greater labor market disadvantage than displaced men.** The authors suggest that the gender difference could be due to the greater negative impact of forced displacement on the mental health of women than men, as well as a return to traditional gender norms, not least because of religious revivals in some post-socialist countries.

- **People affected by conflict (both displaced and non-displaced) are more willing to acquire further education and training.** This result most likely reflects the desire of IDPs to make up for the conflict- and displacement-inflicted breaks in formal education, as well as the necessity to update or acquire skills that are relevant for the labor markets of host communities. The highest effect is observed in the younger age group (18-34), which could be explained by the destruction of educational infrastructure in conflict zones and the resulting breaks in formal education.

- **Displacement and conflict are insignificant predictors of job satisfaction.** The authors suggest that even if IDPs need to take up less desirable jobs (which would generally reduce job satisfaction), having any job would increase job satisfaction for people who are extremely vulnerable to poverty. In the long term people adjust expectations and may adapt to whatever job they have.

Overall, the results highlight a long-lasting vulnerability of the forcibly displaced in developing and transition economies. The authors highlight a number of policy implications:

- Special support should be provided to IDP women, who experience a greater labor market disadvantage than men in terms of both not working and working informally.

In the localities with large numbers of IDPs, as well as in the former conflict zones, decision makers could subsidize and improve the education/training offered to those affected by conflict in the past.
The paper investigates the relationship between forced displacement and wages in Colombia. Using data from the Quality of Life Survey (2011–2014), the authors analyze the differences in wages between those forced by violence to move to other regions, and those who moved for other reasons. Applying Propensity Score Matching techniques to compare workers from the two groups, the authors find that forced displacement is related to decreases of between 10 and 29 percent in the wages of males, and between 18 and 37 percent in the wages of females, relative to their counterparts. Thus, forced displacements are related to poorer labor market outcomes in terms of wages. The results are consistent with prior results showing that forced displacements due to violence are related to negative labor market outcomes.

This paper examines the transition of young Jordanians from school into the labor market between 2010 to 2016 in the context of a demographic shock due to the influx of Syrian refugees and slowdown in economic growth. The analysis is based on data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Surveys (JLMPS) of 2010 and 2016. The author finds that:

- The number of Syrians increased by 1.2 million, increasing their share in the total population from 0.4 percent in 2010 to 13.3 percent in 2016. The share of Jordanian nationals among the youth (15-34) fell from 91.3 percent in 2010 to only 70.6 percent in 2016, while the share of Syrians among the youth increased from 0.5 percent in 2010 to 11.9 percent in 2016.

- Despite improvements in the educational attainment of Jordanian youth between 2010 and 2016, their labor market outcomes have deteriorated. The unemployment rate rose sharply, for both men and women at all educational levels and for all age groups. Labor force participation of young men declined sharply for all age groups and all educational levels. Female labor force participation decreased among the most educated. The proportion of NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) among young people has increased, particularly sharply among young men. A larger proportion of young men and women are unemployed or inactive after leaving the education system. Entry in the labor market has been delayed for both men and women and a greater proportion does not enter the labor market in 2016 compared to 2010.
This paper examines trends in the structure of employment and job creation in Jordan from 2010 to 2016, in the context of declining rates of employment growth due to a slowdown in economic growth, the influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees, and the growth in the migrant worker population. The analysis is based on data from the Jordan Labor Market Panel Surveys (JLMPS) of 2010 and 2016. Key findings:

- **Syrians accounted for only a fifth of the non-Jordanian workforce in 2016.** Non-Jordanian workers comprised 31 percent of total employment in Jordan 2016. The non-Jordanian workforce was composed of Egyptians (54 percent), Syrians (20 percent), and other Arabs (20 percent), mostly non-nationalized Palestinians and Iraqi nationals. The authors estimate that 50-70 percent of net job growth in Jordan over the period 2010 to 2016 has been contributed by non-Jordanian workers.

- **Employment rates declined for Jordanians and non-Jordanians.** The employment rate for Jordanians (aged 15 and over) declined from 36 percent in 2010 to 30 percent in 2016, and there was also a sharp decline in employment rates among non-Jordanians, from 46 percent to 32 percent, reflecting the increasing share of refugees versus migrants in the non-Jordanian population.

- **Public sector employment among Jordanians increased from 39 percent in 2010 to 42 percent in 2016 (although this trend appears to have reversed in more recent data).** Within the public sector, demand for teachers and health workers has increased, partly as the result of the need to provide services to a growing number of refugees, which has mostly benefited Jordanian women.

- **Employment became more precarious for the poorest, least educated Jordanian workers.** Unskilled Jordanian males shifted out of informal regular wage employment into irregular work as well as non-employment. They have not managed to increase their chances of public sector employment like other groups.

- **The transition from school to work is very protracted, with a large fraction of youth remaining in NEET for an extended period of time.** Nearly 36 percent of young men and 90 percent of young women in NEET in 2010 had not transitioned to employment by 2016.

- **Non-Jordanians are mostly employed informally and are increasingly concentrated in sectors that are highly dependent on cheap, flexible labor to stay competitive, such as agriculture.**

- **Informality among private wage workers varies substantially by nationality** (32 percent of Jordanians, 86 percent of Syrians, 75 percent of Egyptians and 70 percent among other nationalities).

Kayaoglu and Erdogan (2019) Labor Market Activities of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Aysegul Kayaoglu and M. Murat Erdogan

As of December 2018, there were 3.7 million Syrian refugees registered in Turkey, a fifth of whom wish to remain in Turkey even after the conflict in Syria ends. This paper examines the factors
associated with the economic integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey. The analysis is based on the 2017 Syrian Barometer survey of 1,235 Syrian refugees in ten major refugee-hosting regions. Descriptive statistics reveal that 58.3 percent of refugees in the sample (aged above 11) are in the labor force including 38.6 percent who are employed and 19.7 percent who are unemployed. The employment rate is higher for self-settled refugees (43.0 percent) compared to refugees in camps (24.5 percent). Among employed refugees, only 40.7 percent work in regular paid jobs while 49.3 percent work as seasonal or irregular (daily) jobs without regular wage income.

The empirical analysis reveals:

• **On average, refugees who are younger, male, have post-secondary school qualifications, had higher incomes in Syria, and have better Turkish language proficiency, are more likely to be employed.** Older Syrians are less likely to find a job (probability of unemployment increases while probability of employment decreases) and are more likely to leave the labor market when they live outside of camps. Compared to male refugees, female refugees have a 37 percent higher probability of being inactive in the labor market (lower probability of being employed and unemployed). Syrians with post-secondary school qualifications have 9 percent lower probability of being unemployed compared to those without any post-secondary qualifications, and have a 12 percent higher chance of being employed and 17 percent lower chance of being inactive in the labor market. A higher income level in Syria decreases the probability of being unemployed and increases the chance of being employed. Higher Turkish language proficiency reduces the risk of being unemployed and increases the likelihood of finding employment.

• **Self-settlement is found to decrease the probability of being unemployed and increase the probability of being out of the labor market, compared to refugees living in temporary protection camps.** Living outside camps increases the probability of being inactive in the labor market while decreases the probability of being unemployed by 5.5 percent.

• **Marriage seems to decrease the probability of being unemployed compared to single people.** This could be due to greater financial responsibilities and consequently increased pressure to find a job.

• **Duration of displacement seems to play little role in economic integration.** Months since migration has only a small association with a decrease in unemployment and no statistically significant effect on employment.

• **Women at all ages are found to have a higher probability of being inactive compared to men in the same age groups.** For example, at age 30, women have 50 percentage point higher probability of being inactive.

• **Refugees who have higher levels of education, are female, have better Turkish language proficiency, belong to later cohorts (except 2016) and live in Bursa, Gaziantep and Izmir have a higher probability of working in a regular job once they are employed.** Having an above high school diploma increases the chance of being employed in a regular job by 37.8 percent and decreases the probability of working in a casual job by almost 40 percent compared to Syrians without a diploma. Women have a 12.4 percent higher likelihood of working in a regular job.
Turkish proficiency does not contribute to the probability of self-employment but increases the chance of having a regular job while decreases the probability of being in a casual work. These results do not change when non-border provinces are excluded from the sample.

- **Refugees who are older, had higher incomes in Syria and who live outside the camps are more likely to be self-employed.** Syrians who are older are less likely to work in a casual job and are more likely to be self-employed. Previous income in Syria is positively correlated with the probability of being self-employed and decreases the probability of working in a casual work. Living outside the camps increases the probability of being self-employed by almost 17 percent and decreases the chance of working in a casual work by 11 percent.

In their conclusion, the authors **highlight the significant role of education and Turkish language proficiency in the employment prospects of refugees and recommend that the government focuses urgently on policies that will bring improvements in these areas.**

**Poverty and Wellbeing**

Sharma and Wai Poi (2019) *Arrested Development: Conflict, Displacement, and Welfare in Iraq*

Dhiraj Sharma and Matthew Wai-Poi
World Bank, 2019

In 2014, Iraq suffered two simultaneous crises: an economic crisis driven by a sharp decline in oil prices, and a security crisis caused by the war against the Islamic State. This paper provides the **first estimates of monetary poverty and non-income dimensions of wellbeing in Iraq since the 2014 crises** based on data from the Survey of Well-Being via Instant, Frequent Tracking (SWIFT) conducted in 2017-18. It also draws on household survey data from before the crises (2012 and 2014) to **analyze trends in wellbeing.** The authors disaggregate trends by region and household displacement status, and find evidence that:

- **IDPs are significantly poorer than the non-displaced.** In both KRG and the North where IDPs constitute a substantial share of the population, displaced households are more than twice as poor as non-displaced households in monetary as well and non-monetary poverty. The causal relationship between poverty and displacement could run in either direction; a poor household might be more likely to be displaced, or a household may fall into poverty because of displacement.

- **The loss of welfare of IDPs is so severe that it drives the overall increase in poverty in Kurdistan and North.** IDPs make up about a seventh of the population in the North and Kurdistan, but account for almost a third of the poor.

- **IDPs are not only poorer than non-displaced households, but also more than twice as likely to become or stay poor in the next period** (33.6 percent average vulnerability compared to 16.7 percent for non-IDPs).
The conflict has wiped out the wealth of IDPs and residents of conflict-affected governorates. **IDPs lag non-displaced households in the ownership of non-portable as well as portable assets** (cars, motorcycles, vacuum cleaners, televisions, personal computers, iPad/tablets, and mobile phones).

**IDPs are less likely to be economically active** (39 percent labor force participation rate, as a percentage of the working age population) than non-displaced persons (43 percent).

**The unemployment level of IDPs is substantially higher than that of non-displaced persons** (17 percent versus 9 percent).

**Labor underutilization is particularly severe among internally displaced persons compared to non-displaced workers** (24 percent versus 16 percent).

IDPs are poorer and more likely to fall in poverty, which is likely associated with the loss of jobs and livelihoods through displacement. The authors recommend the rapid deployment of the planned public works program, which can provide short-term employment and income to IDPs and other poor families, suggesting that the rehabilitation and restoration of public infrastructure through public works program may also encourage displaced persons to return home, provided the conditions for safe and dignified return are in place.


Hai-Anh H. Dang and Paolo Verme

Refugees are, for the most part, excluded from global poverty statistics, due to the lack of micro survey data on displaced populations. This paper presents the first application of recent advances in cross-survey imputations to estimate poverty among Syrian refugees living in Jordan. The authors exploit data on about 40,000 households captured in both:

- Administrative data from UNHCR’s profile Global Registration System (proGres)—while proGres does not capture data on income, consumption or expenditure, it contains socio-economic data that are potential predictors of consumption; and
- Survey data from UNHCR’s Jordan Home Visits (HV) Round 2 (November 2013 to September 2014), covering a third of registered refugees in Jordan—HV includes data on income and expenditure, as well as a large set of individual and household socio-economic characteristics.

The authors test the accuracy of the poverty estimates imputed from proGres data, by comparing them with ‘true’ poverty rates produced directly from the HV survey. The main model specification uses only variables available in proGres: household size, and the characteristics of the Principal
Applicant (age, gender, educational attainment, occupation group, marital status, religion, governorate/city of origin). The authors demonstrate that:

- **Imputation-based poverty estimates are not statistically different from non-predicted consumption-based poverty rates.** This result is robust to various validation tests, including alternative poverty lines and disaggregation by case size.
- Imputation-based poverty estimates are found to perform better or have smaller standard errors than other poverty measures based on asset indexes or proxy means testing.
- **Imputation models require relatively few predictor variables that are already available in UNHCR’s proGres database.**
- Relatively small survey samples may be combined with a census-type registration system to provide cost-effective and updated estimates of poverty. However, the methodology may not apply to other country contexts, sources of data or welfare measures.

**Factors Explaining Economic Outcomes for Refugees and IDPs**

Betts et al (2017) Thrive or survive? Explaining Variation in Economic Outcomes for Refugees

Alexander Betts, Naohiko Omata, Louise Bloom
*Journal on Migration and Human Security*, Volume 5(4) Pages 716 – 743, November 28, 2017

The paper focuses on three questions: (1) what makes the economic lives of refugees distinctive from other populations; (2) what explains variation in refugees’ income levels; and (3) what role does entrepreneurship play in shaping refugees’ economic outcomes? In doing so, the authors seek to inform interventions that enhance market-based opportunities for refugees by building on the “skills, capacities and agency of refugees themselves” rather than focusing only on their vulnerabilities. The paper draws on data from a survey of 2,213 refugees in Uganda located in Kampala, protracted camps (Nakivale and Kyangwali settlements), and emergency camps (Rwamwanja). The authors argue that **refugees are distinctive because they face different institutional barriers and distortions in their economic lives** compared to nationals or other migrants. They suggest that **differences in refugees’ income levels can be explained by a number of variables including: regulatory context, education, occupation, social networks, gender, and the number of years spent in exile.** They argue that that entrepreneurship explains “outliers” within the refugee community, i.e. why some refugees have significantly higher incomes.

The authors propose the following implications for policy and practice: (i) support market-based interventions that build on what already exists; (ii) rethink the role of the private sector, recognizing that displaced people can also be considered part of the private sector; (iii) create an enabling environment by nurturing the capacities of refugees through improved opportunities for education, skills development, access to microcredit and financial markets, business incubation, better
transportation links and infrastructure, and internet access and connectivity; (iv) invest in research and data on the economic lives of refugees across different regulatory environments, different phases of displacement crises, and different categories of displacement (e.g. refugees versus IDPs); and (v) analyze the political context and create more favorable state policies.


Alexander Betts, Naohiko Omata and Olivier Sterck
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/refugee-economies-in-kenya

Drawing on qualitative and quantitative data collected in and around Kakuma refugee camps and Nairobi, this report examines variations in economic outcomes within the refugee population, and between refugee and host communities in Kenya in terms of livelihoods, living standards and subjective wellbeing. The data shows that:

- Refugees are significantly less likely than Kenyans to have an economic activity, but refugee employment rates and income levels vary by location.
- Refugees are not always worse off than local host communities and there is significant variation in living standards across contexts and nationalities. Living standards are on average higher in Nairobi than Kakuma.
- Host communities report higher subjective wellbeing than refugees in all contexts.

The authors consider four sets of explanatory variables (regulation, networks, capital, and identity) and conclude that:

- Restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement and right to work constrain their economic opportunities relative to host communities.
- Refugees’ networks are economically useful for accessing supply chains, remittances and social protection.
- Access to finance and education are positively correlated with having an economic activity and higher earnings, while poor health is associated with lower income, poorer diet and lower life satisfaction.
- Identity (gender, ethnicity, religion and social class) shapes refugees’ economic opportunities.

The authors find some evidence that the degree of perceived/actual economic contribution, and the distribution of costs/benefits among the host community, influence refugee-host relations. The authors highlight several implications for policymakers:

- Even in a restrictive regulatory context, refugees engage in diverse economic activities and a range of interventions are available to promote economic participation.
- Regulation of refugees’ economic participation may be interpreted and implemented differently in different local contexts.
- Data offer opportunities to identify the mechanisms through which particular interventions may lead to particular outcomes, e.g. higher income levels among refugees are correlated with access
to credit, education, and good health.

- Refugees’ own networks are among the most important sources of protection and assistance for refugees, and should be routinely recognized, mapped, and supported.
- The costs and benefits of hosting refugees may be unequally distributed among different parts of the host community, leading to varying attitudes towards refugees.
- Refugees face different development outcomes due to differences in regulation, networks, capital, and identity. Advocacy, programming, and policy should focus on these areas to enhance economic outcomes, and improve relationships between refugees and hosts.
- Every major refugee-hosting area should have an economic policy/strategy specifically for refugees and the immediate host community, based on robust analysis and consultation.


Roger Zetter and Héloïse Ruaudel
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 4-7.
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/zetter-ruaudel

While the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) provides for a refugee’s right to work, most countries are reluctant to give refugees access to the labor market and impose restrictions on legal entitlements to work. Restrictive approaches are common in countries with limited labor market capacity, weaker economies, and less resilience to economic shocks. There is significant variation in refugees’ right to work across countries, regardless of whether countries are signatories to the 1951 Convention, reflecting not only a country’s legal and policy frameworks but also its compliance and enforcement mechanisms. There are also indirect barriers on the right to work, such as: (a) costly and burdensome procedures to obtain work and/or residence permits; (b) requirements to have a job offer before a refugee can get a work permit; (c) limits on entrepreneurship or accumulating capital; and (d) poor access to immigration offices and/or slow refugee status determination procedures. Consequently many refugees work informally, entailing significant risks and disadvantages especially for women, youth and children. Refugees are rarely able to accumulate sufficient capital or skills either to finance their own legitimate pathway to self-reliance (and possible integration) or to support their return and reintegration to their home country. Governments, international organizations and NGOs are beginning to tackle some of these constraints, e.g. by easing processes for obtaining work permits, providing incentives for refugees to find employment, recognizing qualifications, and improving skills training. The authors recommend:

- Governments should pursue labor market policies that lead to more sustainable livelihoods and better economic conditions for refugees and host communities.
- Governments, employers, trade unions and civil society should promote equality of rights and counter negative stereotypes of refugees, including raising awareness of refugees’ workplace rights.
- Improved training, education and language/skills development for refugees.
International funding and underwriting of labor market developments and job promotion should be buttressed by support for legislation, policies and standards for decent work.

Del Carpio et al (2018) Integrating Refugees into the Turkish Labour Market

Ximena V Del Carpio, Sirma Demir Seker and Ahmet Levent Yener
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/delcarpio-seker-yener

Turkey hosts nearly 3.3 million registered refugees, mostly from Syria, concentrated in provinces with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment rates than the national average. In 2016 the Turkish government passed a regulation to allow Syrian refugees to obtain formal work permits. However at least half of the over 2 million working-age Syrians work informally, and there continue to be barriers to the formal economic integration of refugees in Turkey, including: (a) refugees receiving EU-financed cash assistance risk losing benefits if they work formally; (b) refugees are restricted to seeking formal work in the place where they are registered, and changing their registration location is a costly and cumbersome procedure; (c) low education levels among Syrians in Turkey; (d) limited data on the types of skills and experiences of Syrians in Turkey; (d) information barriers faced by refugees and employers on how to obtain work permits; and (e) largely manual procedures for processing permits. The article describes two programs supported by the Ministry of Labor, Turkish Public Employment Services (ISKUR), World Bank and EU to address supply-side challenges (relating to access to work permits and employability) and demand-side challenges (relating to employment and economic activity) to be implemented from 2018 to 2021. Supply side activities include: (i) setting up systems for assessing skills, counseling and job search assistance in Arabic; (ii) language and skills training; (iii) financial incentives and support, e.g. on-the-job training coupled with financing for wages and insurance premiums; and (iv) outreach campaigns to improve knowledge of the work permit process, and improvements in IT systems for processing permits. To guide training providers, the programs will support the assessment of employers’ demand for occupations and skills in refugee hosting provinces. Demand side activities aim to promote entrepreneurship and formal job creation among refugees and host communities and include: (v) support for the creation of social enterprises that engage self-employed females to produce goods for sale; and (vi) micro-grant schemes to encourage Syrian entrepreneurs to establish new businesses, register existing businesses, and expand production capacity in order to hire new workers. Two lessons have emerged from pilot activities:

- Importance of identifying contextual barriers to employment and employability from the outset in order to address them early on.
- Investments to serve people should be made in such a way that they are sustainable and increase the efficiency of spending and effective use of resources.

Bilgili and Loschmann (2018) Refugees and Host Communities in the Rwandan Labour Market

Özge Bilgili and Craig Loschmann
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 22-23.
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/bilgili-loschmann
This article highlights findings from household surveys of Congolese refugees in three of the largest refugee camps in Rwanda (Gihembe, Kiziba and Kigeme) and of locals living nearby. The authors find that although Congolese refugees officially have the right to work, in reality their experiences in the local labor market differ considerably from that of local Rwandans. Specifically:

- Refugees are significantly less likely to be employed than locals. Major obstacles to employment include local employers’ lack of knowledge of refugees’ right to work, and high cost of transportation to local commercial hubs. These problems might be addressed by: (a) issuing identity documents to refugees that local employers recognize and accept; (b) an information campaign targeting employers to ensure that refugees’ legal rights are clear to all; and (c) providing cheaper transportation to make it viable for refugees to seek employment beyond immediate camp areas.

- Inside the camps, international organizations and NGOs employ many refugees, raising the question of refugees’ dependency on humanitarian organizations beyond basic protection and needs. Refugees with professions and qualifications are in a more advantageous position than those with fewer skills.

- Within host communities there is a shift away from subsistence agricultural activities. Working-age individuals within 10km of a camp are more likely to be engaged in wage employment than in farming or livestock production. Females living near a camp are more likely to be self-employed than those residing further away. It tends to be the financially better-off who engage commercially with refugees and who presumably benefit. Locals’ labor market activities do not seem to be negatively affected by refugees; rather, the more dynamic local economy provided increased opportunities for wage-earning jobs and self-employment. There was no evidence of either increased competition in the labor market or resentment from local people due to the presence of refugees.

The authors conclude that granting refugees the right to work is not sufficient to promote sustainable self-reliance, and a more comprehensive strategy is needed incorporating standardized identity documents for refugees, information provision for local employers, and better transportation provision outside the camps.

Ekren (2018) Obstacles to Refugees’ Self-Reliance in Germany

Elizabeth Ekren
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 30-32
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/ekren

This article discusses the impediments to refugees’ employment and self-reliance in Germany. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany rely on government welfare. There are many practical barriers to work including: (a) access to government language courses, employment programs and job offers depends on an asylum seeker’s country of origin and likelihood of their application for asylum being accepted; (b) some localities still require citizen priority checks when refugees apply for jobs; (c) state and municipal residency requirements for refugees prohibit them from relocating unless they can find jobs in advance of moving that meet legally defined minimum salary requirements; (d) even lower-skilled jobs tend to require a working knowledge of German,
and there are varying waiting times for access to a government language course which take 12-24 months to complete; (e) government language courses do not include specialized language training required for higher-skilled jobs; (f) long bureaucratic processes to review foreign qualifications; (g) crowded living conditions can cause noise and residential conflict that hamper daily routines and disrupt bathing, studying, eating and sleeping on a schedule that is compatible with working hours; (h) shelters in smaller cities are often poorly connected to public transport; and (i) once they report income, refugees become responsible for paying their own accommodation costs in shelters, which are frequently unaffordable. The author makes the case for integration policies that eliminate obstacles to employment and promote mutual long-term benefits for refugees and host communities, including greater flexibility in job equivalency reviews and skills testing, easier entry into lower skilled or in-demand jobs, and more opportunities for on-the-job learning of both skills and language. At a minimum, laws and processes regarding asylum applications, shelter transfers, residency status renewals, case appeals and deportations should be streamlined.


Olivier Dagnelie, Anna Maria Mayda, and Jean-Francois Maystadt
February 14, 2018
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZlGslieAr4PSZaoO6KjBkiiuC6uPAgzG/view

The paper examines whether entrepreneurs in the social network of refugees, from the same country of origin, facilitate refugees’ labor-market integration by hiring them in their businesses. The authors analyze the universe of refugee cases without ties to the United States (i.e. without family or friends in the United States) who were resettled there between 2005 and 2010. Refugees without ties to the United States do not decide where they go on arrival in the United States, i.e. refugees do not sort into specific labor markets nor do resettlement agencies place them according to unobserved individual characteristics. The authors address threats to identification due to strategic placement by resettlement agencies (based on the characteristics of the location where they might place refugees). They find that the probability that refugees are employed 90 days after arrival is positively affected by the number of business owners in their network, but negatively affected by the number of those who are employees. At the mean, doubling the number of business owners in the refugee’s network raises the probability that the refugee is employed by about 1.3 percentage points, and doubling the number of employees in the refugee’s network decreases the probability that the refugee is employed by about 4.9 percentage points. This suggests that network members who are entrepreneurs hire refugees in their business, while network members working as employees compete with them, consistent with refugees complementing the former and substituting for the latter. The authors suggest a new policy option to provide business incentives and opportunities to tenured refugees and migrants to both facilitate their self-employment and to ease the labor market integration of newcomers. Additional findings in the paper include:

• Almost a third of refugees (without ties to the United States) are employed 90 days after arrival.
• The probability that a refugee is employed 90 days after arrival is positively correlated with the refugee’s level of education, negatively correlated with most “support” variables (e.g. applicant’s
access to government cash or medical assistance) and follows an inverse U-shaped pattern over the life cycle.

- Controlling for the level of education, age and other individual-level controls, the greater the number of household members who accompany the refugee, the lower the probability that the refugee is employed after 90 days.

Guiu and Siddiqui (2019) Cities as a Refuge, Cities as a Home: The Relationship between Place and Perceptions of Integration among Urban Displaced Populations in Iraq

Roger Guiu and Nadia Siddiqui
Background paper for the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019

Cities in Iraq have absorbed the majority of IDPs since the beginning of the ISIL conflict in early 2014—at the peak of the conflict only 12 percent of the 3.4 million IDPs settled in camps while 88 percent settled in urban areas. By the end of 2018 there were 1.8 million IDPs, mostly in urban and peri-urban areas. Drawing on panel data from a longitudinal study conducted by IOM and Georgetown University, the authors test whether place (overall physical, cultural, and socio-economic dimensions of the host community) influences the likelihood that IDPs feel integrated. Integration is measured by questions on belonging (whether the respondent felt they belonged to the host community) and influence (whether the respondent felt they had influence in making their host communities a better place to live). The authors find that place factors matter in explaining IDP integration in urban areas. Specifically:

- **IDPs are more likely to feel integrated, when their basic needs are provided, and when they have cultural compatibility with the host community.** Movement restrictions and mistrust of host community impact negatively on feelings of belonging (but appear to be disconnected from feelings of influence). Having friendships with local residents and membership into local organizations or groups are found to be positively related with feelings of influence (but disconnected to feeling of belonging). Family ties in host community and safety in displacement appear to be disconnected to either dimension of integration.

- **Higher educational levels are generally associated with positive integration outcomes.** **IDPs from rural origins or belonging to a national minority are less likely to feel integrated.** Owning property elsewhere in Iraq is also negatively correlated with belonging. Lack of personal documentation and living in critical shelter is negatively associated with belonging and influence, respectively. There is no connection between integration and gender of head of household or whether households have savings or not.

- **An IDP who belongs to an ethno-religious group that is present within the subdistrict’s host community, but is not the majority, is less likely to feel integrated, compared to an IDP who is a member of the largest (or only) group in the community.**

- **Higher educational attainment and community engagement among the host community is significantly correlated with integration.** Additionally, IDPs living in areas with a higher percentage of immigration are more likely to feel strong belonging, while areas that experienced
previous waves of displacement are correlated with a higher likelihood of IDPs reporting to have influence. Higher endowment of public services is not significant.

- **Counter intuitively, IDPs in poorer and less developed areas are more likely to feel integrated.** This may be due to the fact that these locations tend to be more transient, making it easier to access for newly arriving populations. **Lower levels of social trust and lower quality of local institutions are also both significantly associated with a higher likelihood of belonging.** This may be because looser social ties and weak institutional capacity may allow IDPs to integrate into the host community with less restriction and oversight. The more fractionalized the subdistrict (more divided into smaller ethno-religious groups), the less likely it is for IDPs to feel a strong sense of belonging.

These findings highlight a seemingly inherent tension: what is initially best for IDPs may not be a status quo that is favorable to the host community. One caveat to these findings is that the data is collected from an IDP population that at the time was displaced for only around 1.5 years. The authors argue that it is critical to improve conditions for all in fragile urban areas where IDPs reside, but it is also imperative to make more stable environments more inclusive to prevent pockets of self-reinforcing fragility.

**Policies and Programming to Promote Economic Integration**


Miki Takahashi, Michael Moroz, Jonathan Peters, Jason Pronyk and Richard Barltrop

Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 45-48


The ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’ conference in London in 2016 set an ambitious target to create up to 1.1 million new jobs for refugees and host communities by 2018—but there was no clarity around how, where, and for whom these jobs would be created. A 2016 joint assessment by the ILO, UNDP and WFP in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria identifies several approaches to generating economic opportunities in refugee-hosting countries, which have been successful in at least one country and are potentially replicable in the region, including: (1) **expanding access to EU market**, e.g. widening access to certain Jordanian exports to the UK has stimulated investment and employment of Jordanians and Syrians; (2) **facilitating Syrian private investment and allowing Syrians to start businesses and access industrial infrastructure**, e.g. in Egypt and Turkey this has led to economic growth in some sectors and the employment of both nationals and refugees; (3) **expanding refugees access to information**, e.g. establishment of community centers in refugee hosting areas in Turkey to share information about work opportunities; (4) **encouraging aid organizations to use direct, local procurement**; (5) **providing concessional financing for infrastructure**; (6) **allowing Syrians to provide services for other Syrians**, e.g. employment of teachers and medical workers in Turkey; and (7) **including both refugees and host communities as beneficiaries in all projects**. The joint assessment also highlights challenges
relating to: coordination, work permits (insufficient on their own to expand meaningful employment opportunities for Syrian refugees), vocational training, information, and designing humanitarian assistance to encourage work. The authors argue that the formulation and implementation of evidence-based policies requires close engagement between relevant national bodies and international organizations offering assistance, and steady support from international donors. Additionally, further thought needs to be given to the types of jobs national and international actors are trying to create. Key risks include: donors fail to deliver the level of concessional financing expected by host countries; and economic pressures and/or political developments change attitudes of host countries towards assisting refugees.

Mozetič (2018) Validating Highly Educated Refugees’ Qualifications

Katarina Mozetič

Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 37-39

https://www.fmreview.org/economies/mozetic

This article highlights initiatives in Sweden and Norway to streamline procedures for validating refugees’ qualifications. There are lengthy processes for validating foreign qualifications in Norway, Sweden and Germany, which prevent some highly educated refugees from entering the workplace. For occupations regulated by law (e.g. doctors and teachers), refugees need to obtain national licenses, requiring proof of language skills, examinations, supplementary courses, and usually a period of practical training. Many refugees no longer have their original qualifications certificates, which are required to validate their qualifications, and encounter difficulties obtaining new certificates from institutions in their home countries. Sweden and Norway have introduced initiatives to streamline the process of validating foreign qualifications.

- In Sweden, fast-track programs have been established for occupations with labor shortages (chefs, teachers, social workers), which enable refugees to undertake Swedish language courses, internships and supplementary theoretical courses in parallel to reduce the time to obtain a license.
- The Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education (NOKUT) developed a Recognition Procedure for Persons without Verifiable Documentation (i.e. missing, insufficient or unverifiable documentation), which includes input by NOKUT employees with knowledge about the educational system in the applicant’s country of origin and two external experts with subject-specific expertise. An applicant’s educational background is verified through a questionnaire, interview and oral/written assignments relating to the applicant’s field of expertise. Similar procedures exist in Sweden.
- Due to the increasing number of refugees, NOKUT has developed a faster, cheaper evaluation procedure for those without verifiable documentation, combining an evaluation of available documentation and a structured interview carried out by an experienced NOKUT case officer.


Ziad Ayoubi and Regina Saavedra

Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 39-43
This article explores the potential contributions of governments, development actors, the private sector, and humanitarian actors to support refugee livelihoods. The authors begin by making the case for the early economic inclusion of refugees in order not to prevent or delay the potential contribution of refugees to host economies, noting that this is less easily accomplished in developing countries with high rates of poverty and unemployment. The authors highlight the potential contribution that development and private sector actors can make to support refugees’ livelihoods and economic inclusion, citing the World Bank’s Global Concessional Financing Facility as a significant example. They also note the evolution of UNHCR’s livelihood interventions towards more targeted, market-based and results-oriented programming, i.e. identifying and prioritizing specific sectors, and analyzing opportunities for refugee inclusion within the ‘value chains’ of each sector based on potential for growth, relevance to refugee capacities and feasibility of intervention. The sector selection takes into account economic trends but also: the political, legal and socio-cultural context, including rules, regulations and norms; available supporting services; and profile of refugee and host communities. The article also describes several approaches taken by UNHCR and its partners including:

- The MADE51 (Market Access, Design and Empowerment) initiative which aims to build the technical capacity of local, ethical social enterprises to manage unique collections produced by refugees and to support them in branding and marketing products internationally.
- The Graduation Approach to lifting households out of poverty through short-term humanitarian assistance, livelihoods training, employment or self-employment support and coaching.
- UNHCR is working with the Swedish Development Agency to establish a credit guarantee facility for financial service agencies providing loans to refugees and host populations, i.e. rather than managing revolving funds directly, taking a facilitative approach to ensure access to financial services.

The authors call for more models to be tested and more development funding, with continuous monitoring to identify lessons learned.


Abigail Hunt, Emma Samman, Dina Mansour-Ille and Henrieke Max
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 47-49
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/hunt-samman-mansourille-max

This article explores the challenges and opportunities presented by the gig economy for Syrian refugees in Jordan. Research with Syrian female refugees in Jordan suggests that, despite significant challenges, the gig economy (where workers and purchasers of their services are brought together via online platforms) has potential to expand refugees’ access to work opportunities. The authors identify several challenges associated with the gig economy including: (a) the small size of the gig economy (1.5 percent of the active workforce); (b) the fact that the gig economy does not offer decent work as defined by the ILO; (c) barriers to entry for marginalized communities, e.g. those with limited internet connectivity, limited digital literacy, or women requiring permission from male
family members to use the internet; (d) lack of legal clarity around whether non-Jordanian gig workers require a work permit—supporting gig work might mean supporting access to informal work, with the associated risks; (e) challenging work conditions, e.g. lack of social protection and bargaining power; and (e) in the case of refugees, apprehensions about submitting private information online that might put them at risk. Nevertheless, the gig economy presents opportunities for livelihood programming: (i) early engagement provides the opportunity to shape these technologies and impacts; (ii) the platform provides some protections to workers, e.g. independent log of hours worked, which alleviates the risk of wage theft and facilitates prompt payment on task completion; (iii) the platform permits refugees to undertake crowd work, i.e. tasks are commissioned and carried out via the internet using suitably skilled ‘crowd workers’ located anywhere in the world; and (iv) potential to help overcome the barriers that restrict the mobility and participation of female refugees in the labor force.

The authors make the case for livelihoods programming in Jordan to include opportunities in the gig economy, if implemented alongside protection measures and other employment options. They suggest: (1) engaging in dialogue with government to clarify the applicability and enforcement of existing labor regulation in relation to the gig economy; (2) supporting refugee engagement in navigating gig work; (3) encouraging responsible company engagement; (4) facilitating refugee association; (5) exploring cooperative models; and (6) supporting the collection of evidence about gig worker experiences in order to inform programming and advocacy. These steps would help to increase the individual capacity of workers to engage within the gig economy and improve work conditions.


Michaela Slotwinskiy, Alois Stutzerz and Roman Uhligx
Working Paper 2018/08, Faculty of Business and Economics – University of Basel, 1 March 2018
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bsl/wpaper/2018-08.html

This paper evaluates whether inclusive labor market policies increase the labor market participation of asylum seekers, by exploiting the variation in asylum policies in Swiss cantons to which asylum seekers are randomly allocated. During the period from 2011 to 2014, the employment rate among asylum seekers varied from 0 percent to 30.2 percent across cantons. The authors find: (a) labor market access regulations are responsible for a substantial proportion of these differences, in which an inclusive regime increases participation by 11 percentage points; (b) inclusive labor market access regulations are more beneficial for asylum seekers who speak a language that is closer to the language in their canton of residence; (c) the activation and education of asylum seekers in integration programs is a substitute to early employment and related to slightly lower employment rates; and (d) there is no evidence that more or less generous social welfare payments are related to employment. The authors conclude that inclusive labor market access regulations substantially increase the employment chances of asylum seekers, in particular if the language distance is short.
Belghazi (2018) Supporting Recently Resettled Refugees in the UK

Marwa Belghazi
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 8-10
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/belghazi

The author offers several lessons learned from supporting refugees in their search for employment in the UK, including the importance of:

- Continuous support to navigate a new system, e.g. through regular group/individual discussions to share frustrations, strategies for looking for work etc.;
- Capitalizing on a refugee’s first language, which could be an asset for employers seeking bilingual candidates;
- Professional mentoring;
- Embedding support within a framework of universal vulnerability, i.e. the idea that we are all vulnerable to differing degrees and our vulnerability is situational;
- Recognizing that some individuals require time and support to address their mental and physical health needs before they are ready to enter the labor market;
- Challenging perceived failure, e.g. by encouraging feedback from employers or partner organizations to better understand and address reasons for rejection;
- Finding creative ways to attract attention of employers, e.g. by harnessing interest in supporting refugees; and
- Exploring new opportunities by using their skills in different roles.

Ledstrup and Larsen (2018) From Refugee to Employee: Work Integration in Rural Denmark

Martin Ledstrup and Marie Larsen
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 14-16
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/ledstrup-larsen

This article describes Red Cross Denmark’s Fast Track program, which aims to facilitate early access to the local labor market for refugees while they are still in the asylum phase. It allows participants to remain in the municipality where they claim asylum rather than being assigned to another municipality when they are granted refugee status. The program supports a skills assessment, followed by training covering Danish culture, language skills, vocational training and potential local internships, techniques for job searching, information about local work culture, network building and sustaining motivation. In socio-economically vulnerable rural areas and islands, which are suffering from depopulation, refugees are regarded as a much-needed boost to local sustainability. In preparation for the implementation of the Fast Track program in Bornholm island, interviews were conducted about refugees, integration, and the local labor market, revealing potential challenges for refugee integration, specifically: (a) sufficient Danish to function in the workplace as well as continuous language development for career advancement and to extend interactions beyond the workplace; (b) uncertainty around whether refugees will stay in the local community after the mandatory three-year placement period; (c) the type and size of workplaces
are significant in terms of facilitating integration—smaller workplaces have less resources to devote to refugee integration; (d) there is an acute need for skilled labor, but when refugees search for unskilled work they compete with unskilled Danish workers.


Shahla Namak, Fatin Sahhar, Sarah Kureshi, Fadya El Rayess and Ranit Mishori
*Forced Migration Review 58*, June 2018, pp. 16-18

This article identifies a number of obstacles faced by refugee doctors wishing to practice medicine in host countries, despite the significant contribution they can make in areas with doctor shortages and/or large immigrant or refugee populations. The authors describe efforts in the UK, Sweden and Turkey to integrate refugee doctors into national health-care systems, necessitating the involvement of different stakeholders including medical associations, regional and national health services, private organizations and universities. In the United States, refugee doctors must undergo time- and labor-intensive processes involving certification, examination, residency periods, and licensing before they can practice medicine. The authors highlight several small programs that assist refugee doctors. The article concludes with recommendations to improve the integration of refugee doctors in the US.

**Whyte et al (2018) The Role of Rural Grocery Stores in Refugee Reception**

Zachary Whyte, Birgitte Romme Larsen and Mona Schaldemose
*Forced Migration Review 58*, June 2018, pp. 24-25
[https://www.fmreview.org/economies/whyte-larsen-schaldemose](https://www.fmreview.org/economies/whyte-larsen-schaldemose)

This article describes research with rural grocery store managers in Denmark to explore perceptions of asylum centers. In Denmark, asylum seekers are required to stay in asylum centers while their asylum applications are processed. Rural municipalities, which administer more than half of asylum centers, are characterized by ageing/reducing populations, declining job opportunities, and closure of local businesses and welfare institutions. There are therefore good economic arguments for rural municipalities to host asylum centers: the centers create jobs and secondary economic benefits; the enrollment of asylum-seeker children in local schools staves off school closures; and asylum seekers buy food at local grocery stores. The authors suggest that grocery stores could function as points of interaction between asylum-seekers and the local community. For asylum centers, having good relations with local communities can open opportunities for cooperation with local institutions and voluntary associations, which can widen social opportunities and combat the sense of isolation and frustration that tends to characterize their waiting time. However, local communities sometimes complain about the relative seclusion of asylum centers from local community life. The authors call for asylum centers to strengthen relations with local associations and institutions, e.g. by buying locally, using local venues for events, hiring locals, and developing shared recreational facilities.

Heng Zhu, J. Edward Taylor, Anubhab Gupta, Mateusz Filipski, Jaakko Valli, Ernesto Gonzalez-Estrada

Selected paper prepared for presentation at the 2018 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 5-7, 2018
https://www.sandravrozo.com/refugee-workshop.html

The authors examine the impact of refugee’s access to cultivable land on refugee welfare in Uganda, through a comprehensive survey of refugees in Rwamwanja settlement and local households and businesses living within 15 kilometers of the settlement. Land allocation for refugee families at Rwamwanja settlement is based on availability at the time of arrival. The authors demonstrate that household characteristics are largely uncorrelated with the probability of receiving land upon arrival or allocated plot size. The authors exploit this ‘quasi-random’ nature of land allocation to estimate the impact of an initial land endowment on refugee welfare (as measured by household income, the share of household income that is not aid, quality of dwelling, food security, consumption, and dietary diversity), as well as the spillover effects on income and production in the surrounding host communities. The authors find that refugee households with agricultural land have significantly better welfare and self-reliance. Refugee households with access to cultivable land have significantly higher consumption levels as well as dietary diversity; the initial land-endowment effects on food security are positive but not significant. Moreover, refugee households receiving larger plots of cultivable land have better quality dwellings. The authors also find that there are positive income spillovers within the local economy of the refugee settlement and extending to households and businesses within 15 kilometers of the settlement.


Alexander Betts, Imane Chaara, Naohiko Omata and Olivier Sterck
Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford, January 2019

Uganda’s refugee policies have been widely recognized as among the most progressive in the world. Its ‘self-reliance model’ permits refugees to work and choose their place of residence, allocates plots of land for refugees to cultivate, and encourages integrated social service provision and market access. This report examines the impact of Uganda’s self-reliance model, by comparing outcomes for refugees and host community members in Uganda and Kenya—neighboring countries with contrasting refugee policy frameworks. The authors compare Kampala in Uganda with Nairobi in Kenya, as refugee-hosting capital cities, and compare the Nakivale settlement in Uganda with the Kakuma camp in Kenya. The authors find:

- Refugees in Uganda enjoy greater mobility and lower transaction costs for economic activity.
  This allows them to adopt economic strategies that might not otherwise be possible, including
split-family strategies. Mobility is particularly important for Somalis whose commercial activities are often connected to national and transnational supply chains. In Kenya, refugees are working and moving outside the camps but they incur far higher transaction costs as a result of doing so.

- **Refugees with jobs in Uganda generally enjoy higher incomes and more sustainable sources of employment than refugees in Kenya**, even though there is not a significant difference between the surrounding host communities. The exception is Congolese refugees in Nakivale who are worse off than Congolese refugees in Kakuma; Congolese refugees in Nakivale mainly engage in subsistence agriculture, while Congolese in Kakuma are mainly employed as incentive workers by NGOs. Somalis generally engage in commercial activities, and are able to earn higher incomes across the research sites in Uganda than those in Kenya.

- **Refugee employment levels in Uganda are surprisingly lower compared with refugees in Kenya**. In Kakuma, this is largely due to the availability of ‘incentive work’ supported by international organizations and NGOs, whereas refugee employment in Nakivale relies on self-employment in agriculture and market-based sources. In Nairobi, the difference may reflect that the city offers a larger labor market.

- **Access to education is more limited in Uganda**. Being in Nakivale is associated with three years less education than being in Kakuma for refugees who arrived before the age of sixteen. This may be partly due to the greater involvement of the international community in parallel service provision in Kenya compared with direct national government provision in Uganda.

- **The more land farming households have access to, the better they do in terms of dietary diversity, food security, and calorie intake**. However, the authors raise questions about the viability of current land allocation practices since: (a) the approach does not benefit all communities: although many Congolese households take up the opportunity to cultivate land, Somalis refrain from agricultural activity; (b) there is insufficient land for newly arrived refugees: the overwhelming majority of land is cultivated by families who arrived before 2012; and (c) although Congolese refugees who have access to land do better than those who do not, and more land is associated with better food security outcomes, subsistence agriculture is inherently limited as a pathway to high income levels.

- **Aside from land allocation, levels of assistance in Uganda and Kenya are broadly comparable**. This suggests that the most important explanation for refugees in Uganda’s generally better welfare outcomes is the different regulatory environment rather than the assistance model.

- **Host communities in Kenya are slightly more likely to have positive perceptions of refugees than in Uganda**, particularly for the Turkana around Kakuma and ethnic Somali Kenyans in Eastleigh. The difference seems to be based on a perception that refugees bring a positive economic contribution, notably through employment. In the camp context, this difference may be because whereas the economic activities of refugees and hosts are complementary in Kakuma, refugees and hosts undertake similar economic activities in Nakivale, making competition more likely.

Overall, the research offers a strong endorsement of the value of allowing refugees the right to work and freedom of movement, however, the authors call for a more nuanced view of the strengths and weaknesses of refugee assistance in Uganda. The authors conclude with recommendations for refugee policy in Uganda and globally.
• In Uganda: (a) providing refugees with the right to work and freedom of movement makes a difference, and in this regard Ugandan refugee policy deserves to be seen as exemplary; (b) due to growing refugee numbers, the quantity and quality of land available to new arrivals is inadequate and agriculture should be promoted alongside a range of other pathways to self-reliance; (c) Uganda’s integrated service provision model may need greater international support in order to overcome practical barriers to access; (d) it is necessary to revisit the assumption that refugees who choose to reside in urban areas are able to support themselves—a better level of social safety net may need to be available to some urban refugees; (e) for refugees in Uganda who are unable to make an adequate livelihood from cultivating small, low-fertility plots of land, it may be worthwhile for international organizations to consider a structured program of incentive work; and (f) international donors should consider piloting direct funding to refugee-led community-based organizations.

Globally, the authors call for: (a) promoting the right to work and mobility for refugees, since socioeconomic freedom for refugees not only is a right under international refugee and human rights law but also leads to better welfare outcomes for refugees and may contribute to improved outcomes for host communities; (b) nuancing country-specific ‘models’ through more precise evidence relating to exactly what works, for whom, and under what conditions; (c) benchmarking against comparative data; (d) rethinking the role of parallel services, which may sometimes be associated with improved outcomes for refugees; (e) distinguishing ‘self-reliance policies’ from ‘self-reliance outcomes’, acknowledging that all policies and practices under the label of ‘self-reliance’ do not necessarily lead to better welfare outcomes for refugees; and (f) creating population-specific enabling environments, recognizing that not all refugee populations perform equally well within the same model.

ReDSS (2019) Are Integrated Services a Step Towards Integration in Northern Uganda?
Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), 2019

This study examines the longer-term implications of assistance that targets both South Sudanese refugees and their host communities in Northern Uganda. It examines current policy and practice in terms of shared services, social and economic implications of shared services from the perspectives of refugees and host populations, and the longer-term implications of an integrated service delivery model. Fieldwork was undertaken in Alere, Mirieye and Maaji III settlements in Adjumani district, Rhino Camp in Arua district, and surrounding host communities, focusing on education and livelihoods. Key findings:

• Many of the longer-term objectives featured in Uganda’s policies have yet to be achieved in practice. The current approach is characterised by a short-term emergency focus. Many refugee services sit outside national service delivery structures.
• Despite the rights offered to refugees in Uganda (right to work, access to basic services, access to land for cultivation, relative freedom of movement) and social networking within the vicinity of the settlements, few refugees living in settlements are fully or even informally integrated into host communities. Integration is hampered by lack of naturalization opportunities,
insecurity in refugee communities, the use of aid to anchor refugees to settlements, and limited prospects for sustainable livelihoods. Refugees who are unregistered and opt out of Uganda’s policy framework are often those who are most self-reliant and integrated.

- Host communities are “the first donors in the refugee response”. At present, host communities in the vicinity of refugee settlements do benefit from the support and services provided to refugees, which assists host communities in their initial decision-making about whether to accept refugees. However, this initial bargain can be affected by unmet expectations relating to direct tangible benefits to host community households and the land-related tensions that can develop in settlement situations.

- When host communities are included in a refugee response, their specific needs tend to be treated as secondary considerations within that response, with implications for the relevance of support provided. The significant financial and opportunity costs to host communities (e.g. environmental degradation) and to specific individuals who are negatively affected by refugee hosting are downplayed, and these costs may become more pronounced as refugee stays become more protracted. The 70:30 principle (30 percent of support is provided to the host community) helps ensure host communities benefit from the overall refugee response, but its application is unclear and inconsistent giving rise to tensions.

- Support for education and livelihoods struggles to meet core objectives, thus limiting the potential for economic integration. There is some evidence that shared education facilitates a degree of peaceful coexistence (both between learners from refugee communities and across refugee and host communities), but as yet there is no indication that this supports the broader social integration of communities. The location of services in geographically isolated settlements where there are low numbers of relatively dispersed Ugandans not only limits the number of Ugandans who can benefit from these services but restricts the potential for social interaction between refugees and host communities. Additionally, the services established in settlements are oriented to support highly concentrated refugee communities, which means that services are likely to be established as parallel refugee services, and that services are unlikely to be sustained should refugee repatriation occur. The overall refugee response model in Uganda does not currently provide prospects for economic integration for most refugees.

- Social integration of South Sudanese refugees is occurring on a localised level, especially where host communities are on the periphery of settlements or in towns, creating social bonds and developing trust, contributing to interdependence, peaceful coexistence and economic interaction.

- Against a backdrop of mainly positive relations between refugees and host communities in the vicinity of settlements, there are areas of significant strain. Many of these revolve around issues of access: to natural resources, services and humanitarian assistance. The harmony across refugee and host communities is in contrast to the more strained relations within refugee communities, which erupt into violence at times (often inter-ethnic but also relating to access to services and opportunities).

- The identity and social capital of both refugees and host communities are key determinants in their level of integration. Additional factors are equally important, including: proximity to host
communities; the availability and proximity of services; and the quality and amount of land upon which they are settled.

- There is a danger that focusing primarily on the productive capacities of refugees risks excluding from policy discussions more thorough consideration of their rights and protection needs. **It is essential to go beyond support for economic activities and to understand the importance of social integration as a core element in refugee self-reliance strategies.**
- **Longer-term development programmes aimed at addressing the vulnerability of refugees and their hosts should take an area-based approach.**

The report proposes five recommendations designed to improve refugee-related policy and programming in mutually beneficial ways for both refugees and host communities:

- Drive forward, fund and ensure coordinated support for current efforts to integrate and localise the Ugandan refugee response (e.g. integrate refugees into the National Development Plan II, sector-specific response plans etc.).
- Ensure the Livelihoods and Jobs Response Plan incorporates an achievable strategy of self-reliance for refugees both within and outside settlements that is linked to the economic development and social integration of refugee-hosting districts.
- Prioritise and fund settlement and site planning so that refugees in settlements have better prospects of self-reliance and land sensitivities are managed more effectively.
- Engage host communities in a more systematic way and address the actual financial costs and opportunity costs of refugee hosting.
- Recognise and address the diversity of the South Sudanese refugee population and increase capacities for conflict management.

**Quality of Work**

**Kattaa and Byrne (2018) Quality of Work for Syrian Refugees in Jordan**

Maha Kattaa and Meredith Byrne  
*Forced Migration Review 58,* June 2018, pp. 45-46  
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/kattaa-byrne

Over 100,000 work permits have been issued to Syrian refugees in Jordan as of May 2018, providing an indicator of formalization of employment but not necessarily job creation nor quality of work. This article makes the case that obtaining a work permit is only the first step towards formalizing Syrian workers in Jordan, and policies must also improve working conditions. A 2017 ILO rapid impact assessment found:

- Only 20 percent of Syrian workers with work permits reported being covered by social security; 13 percent did not know whether they were covered.
- Labor inspectors appear to prioritize verifying that all foreign workers, including Syrian workers, have the required permits but pay less attention to work conditions. Only 8 percent of Syrian
workers with work permits reported that their working conditions were checked during labor inspections.

- Syrians with work permits are more likely to have written work contracts, but hourly wages, safety provisions and relations with employers are not necessarily better. Syrians with permits are working in excess of a standard 40-hour work week, but none reported receiving overtime compensation.

The authors recommend that government policies must continue to promote decent work conditions including mechanisms that bring workers into national social protection systems. They also suggest that labor inspectors could help to promote decent work if they were equipped to provide recommendations to employers and workers to help them comply with regulations and standards.

Social Cohesion and Interactions/Integration with Host Communities

Zoeteweij-Turhan (2018) Turkey: Between Hospitality and Hostility

Margarite Helena Zoeteweij-Turhan
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 55-56

The 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey increases the legal certainty for asylum seekers and refugees by establishing enforceable rights for refugees. However, refugee status is granted only to those coming from European countries; most asylum seekers fall under a temporary protection regime and are offered ‘conditional refugee’ status only. With the closure of borders of several European countries and the increase in the size of the refugee population, attitudes of the host population towards refugees are less welcoming. Additionally, recent political developments in Turkey have the potential to limit the rights of refugees. For example, an amendment to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, made by presidential decree in October 2016, increases the risk of refoulement since asylum seekers suspected to be involved in terrorist or criminal organizations or who are deemed to pose a threat to public order, public safety or public health can be issued with an immediate removal decision.

Omata (2018) Refugees’ Engagement with Host Economies in Uganda

Naohiko Omata
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 19-21
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/omata

This article discusses research on refugees’ economic lives and their interaction with host communities across four sites in Uganda: established refugee settlements in Kyangwali and Nakivale; the relatively new settlement in Rwamwanja; and the capital city of Kampala. Key findings include:

- In Kyangwali and Nakivale settlements, there are diverse economic activities (dominated by commercial agriculture since refugees have been given land to cultivate), which are embedded
within national and regional commerce. Refugees play an active role in the import and export of goods (e.g. export of agricultural produce, and import of goods from Ugandan wholesalers) and the settlements have become active trade hubs in their remote, rural locations.

- In Rwamwanja, economic activity is still embryonic and less connected with national and regional economies. However, refugees' business activities are being gradually linked with surrounding economies and appear to play a role in revitalizing host communities, demonstrating the dynamic process through which a ‘refugee-induced economy’ emerges following an influx of refugees, even in an underdeveloped region.

- In Kampala, Congolese and Somali refugees have sought their own economic space in the wider host economy, not necessarily in conflict with nationals.

In each site, there is economic interdependence between refugees and host communities rather than a zero-sum game of economic rivalry, and refugees play an important role in wider commercial sectors in Uganda. The author recommends situating interventions to enhance economic opportunities for refugee and host populations within the context of wider economic systems and structures. The author calls for interventions that either build on existing markets/businesses or help refugees to more effectively engage with those markets. Moreover external actors need to help create an enabling environment (rights, conditions) to allow refugees to be “market creators” (i.e. to identify and employ unique livelihood assets) while avoiding intensifying competition with host populations.


Joanna P. de Berry and Andrew Roberts
World Bank, June 2018

This study examines the concept of social cohesion as it relates to forced displacement, with a view to enhancing diplomatic, policy and operational responses to address social tensions associated with forced displacement. The review comprises three parts:

- **A review of literature on the conceptualization of social cohesion:** There is no consensus on what constitutes social cohesion. Recent definitions highlight several dimensions of social cohesion: (a) belonging/isolation; (b) inclusion/exclusion; (c) participation/non-involvement; (d) recognition/rejection; and (e) legitimacy/illegitimacy. Definitions are informed by Intergroup Threat Theory, which attempts to explain how perceived threats lead to prejudice and antagonism between social groups. The authors outline three indexes of social cohesion, comprising horizontal (integroup) and vertical (person-state) indicators. Much of the literature originates in Europe or North America and focuses on the impact of minority groups on social majorities, and the relationship between integration and social cohesion. Additional indicators are needed for particular displacement contexts.

- **A review of literature on the impacts of forced displacement on social cohesion:** There are several factors that mediate social relations in the context of forced displacement including:
perceptions of identity; preexisting relationships between displaced and host communities; capacity/readiness of communities to host displaced people; duration of displacement; perceived/real disparities between different groups affected by forced displacement; patterns of settlement; and pre-existing stressors including national and regional conflict dynamics. The specific context determines how these factors interact and play out, and so social cohesion must be understood as part of the wider social fabric. Still, forced displacement can exaggerate social tensions, and the literature suggests that in societies with rigid relationships and social identities, there is less capacity to maintain social cohesion under conditions of rapid change such as forced displacement. Issues of return and repatriation are largely absent in the literature. The literature is also weak in acknowledging that the composition of ‘local’ groups can vary and change.

• **A review of the Bank’s portfolio of forced displacement projects:** A review of 30 projects found a number of gaps: (a) lack of clear definition of social cohesion; (b) lack of systematic identification of existing social cohesion challenges; (c) lack of analysis of the political and historical context that determines social relations; (d) lack of coherence in project design, with a tendency to be over-optimistic about the extent to which a project can promote social cohesion; and (e) lack of monitoring and evaluation to establish influences on social tensions. Project design tends to be based on the assumptions that: (i) addressing inequity in service provision between host and displaced persons will produce social cohesion; and (ii) community driven development can foster collective action and solidarity. However, theories of change remain obscure and little monitoring and evaluation has been undertaken to assess the validity of these assumptions.

The authors recommend:

• Applying a simple definition of social cohesion (e.g. “the set of relationships between individuals and groups in a particular environment and between those individuals and groups and the institutions that govern them in a particular environment”).
• Investing in a nuanced political economy study and historical analysis.
• Taking a longer-term strategic approach to supporting social cohesion, which incorporates measurement and assessment of the social cohesion context via social cohesion indices, such as those used in the SCORE and UNDP initiatives.
• Incorporate indicators of: propensity to collective action (including perhaps peaceful protest, violent protests, self-defense); pervasiveness and effect of perceptions of ethnic or other identity-based bias; indicators of identity; threat perception; trust in institutions (particularly judicial, security); and perceived threat over access to resources.


Ana Uzelac, Jos Meester, Markus Goransson and Willem van den Berg
*Forced Migration Review 57,* February 2018, pp. 28-30

The authors argue that **refugees can create ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital even in situations of relative vulnerability.** In Lebanon, refugees often choose to settle in locations where they have
preexisting social networks (leading to strong ethnic/kinship clusters), where they revive and grow their social networks. Bonding social capital can also help refugees to move within Lebanon to access better employment opportunities and/or lower housing costs. **Refugees leverage their social capital to access livelihoods** (through information sharing and mutual assistance to find jobs, or by looking after each others children to allow parents to work), **to save costs** (e.g. to find more affordable accommodation through their in-group network), **use social capital as a form of basic social insurance** (by pooling resources), and **protect against exploitation** (in-group networks can warn of exploitative or unreliable employers or landlords). The ability of refugees’ to both create and then convert social capital into tangible benefits varies across locations and appears to be determined by the extent to which refugees have other resources to share or invest in the network. In places where immediate needs outweighed any considerations of future benefits, social networks appeared to break down completely—a sign of extreme vulnerability. The authors argue that assessments of refugee populations should examine social capital (e.g. by looking at homogeneity of refugee communities, or density of social networks), and this understanding should be reflected in targeting and programming.

**Sola (2018) The 2015 Refugee Crisis in Germany: Concerns about Immigration and Populism**

Alessandro Sola
SOEP Papers, Issue 966, 2018

This paper investigates the effect of the refugee crisis on German concerns about immigration, and whether these concerns are associated with the recent success of right-wing populism in Germany. The author suggests that individual concerns about immigration may arise for economic or cultural reasons, i.e. self-interested individuals could hold negative attitudes based on the perceived impact of immigration on wages and taxes, or the arrival of refugees could “threaten the national identity”. Exploiting exogenous variation in survey interview timing of the German Socio-Economic Panel survey, the author employs a difference-in-differences method to estimate the short-term causal effect of the refugee crisis, and the related government’s asylum policy, on concerns about immigration. The analysis reveals that concerns about immigration increased by 22 percent compared to the pre-refugee crisis baseline level. This increase was twice as large for East Germans compared to West Germans. The author shows that **education levels are strongly negatively correlated with concerns about immigration.** Moreover, concerns about immigration are positively correlated with political support for the right-wing populist party, **Alternative for Germany** (Alternative fur Deutschland, AfD), and not with support for other political parties. However, using the variability in concerns generated by the refugee crisis, the author finds no evidence of a causal effect of concerns on political preferences in the short-term. The author acknowledges the limitations of these results, since individuals do not fully disclose their real political preferences, especially for a right-wing populist party expressing radical and xenophobic positions. Additionally, the analysis focuses on the short-term and it is possible that AfD mobilized large shares of the electorate closer to the election.
Bosilkov and Drakaki (2018) Victims or Intruders? Framing the Migrant Crisis in Greece and Macedonia

Ivo Bosilkov and Dimitra Drakaki
Journal of Identity and Migration Studies, Volume 12, Number 1, 2018
http://www.jims.e-migration.ro/

This article explores how the media shapes public attitudes towards immigration. The authors analyze how online news content about the migrant crisis is framed by media in Greece and Macedonia. They define framing as the way in which reality is organized by journalists and news organizations through their working routines, in order to provide the meaning of the story and capture the essence of the issue. The authors apply two overarching, contrasting frames of “security/threat” and “humanitarian/victim” in migration coverage in six print media outlets in both countries. They find dominant portrayals of refugees as illegal trespassers, potential terrorists and social burdens in both countries.

- Macedonian news outlets followed a more traditional way of reporting on immigration, focusing on the illegality of the intruders and the perils for society. Most Macedonian articles employ negative framing of refugees, with 62 percent of articles portraying them as clandestines and social intruders of society. When the Macedonian press utilized the victim frame, it was mainly to portray the refugees as helpless (15 percent of articles) and victims of inadequate assistance. Political ideology of the publication did not seem to play a defining role in framing of immigration news.

- Greek media approached the topic in more diverse ways, as political affiliation of the newspapers played a crucial role in editorial decisions. Half of the articles framed refugees as victims and focused on the perils of their journey, insufficiency of aid supply and poor rescue operations and the hard living conditions in refugee camps. In the Greek press the illegal frame was used 17.2 percent of the time, but almost only in the conservative and right leaning press. The authors suggest that the variation between Macedonia and Greece is due to: differences between their media systems (Macedonian media are under much greater direct control of a right-wing ruling party); the policies supported by their respective governments; and the political and social consequences for each of the countries, with regards to the closure of the Balkan route in March 2016.

Ghosn et al (2019) Violence, Displacement, Contact, and Attitudes toward Hosting Refugees

Faten Ghosn, Alex Braithwaite, Tiffany S Chu
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318804581

This article explores the role of an individual’s personal exposure to violence, their own personal experience of being displaced, and their recent contact with refugees influence their attitudes about hosting refugees. The authors draw on a 2017 survey of 2,400 Lebanese residents where they identify individuals who experienced violence during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90), those forced
to flee their homes during that conflict, and those who enjoy recent contact with Syrian immigrant and/or displaced populations. They find that:

- **Historical exposure to violence and experience of displacement have no discernible impact on individual attitudes toward hosting refugees.** This may be because of the protracted nature of the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon, i.e. over time positive sentiments begin to wane.

- **Attitudes towards refugees are associated with whether individual respondents have had contact with Syrians in Lebanon;** those with such interactions are significantly more likely to support hosting refugees, to consider hiring a refugee, or to allow one of their children to marry a refugee. Findings do not confirm a causal relationship between these factors, but they do suggest contact and positive sentiments go hand-in-hand.

- **Men are significantly more likely than women to be supportive of hosting refugees, hiring refugees, and allowing their child to marry a refugee.**

- **Shia Lebanese are consistently less likely than Sunni Lebanese to relay positive attitudes regarding Syrian refugees.** These findings reflect that the majority of refugees are Sunni.

- **Respondents with lower levels of education are more likely to support hosting refugees and those with medium and high levels of income are more likely to be willing to hire refugees.**

The authors conclude that exposure to violence by itself does not correlate to positive sentiments toward refugees, especially over time. Finding ways to create positive contact between refugees and native populations may be associated with improving attitudes and relations between the two populations.

**De Coninck et al (2019) Unpacking Attitudes on Immigrants and Refugees: A Focus on Household Composition and News Media Consumption**

David De Coninck, Koen Matthijs, Marlies Debrael, Rozane De Cock and Leen d’Haenens
*Media and Communication, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2019), Pages 43–55*

This study examines how household composition, news media consumption, and trust in media are related to attitudes towards immigrants and refugees in Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands. Literature suggests that household members socialize one another and influence attitudes on a number of domains. Additionally, news media affect attitudes of its public, especially attitudes on minority groups, since the public has rather limited real-life contact with these groups. Using structural equation modeling and data from online questionnaire distributed to 6,000 respondents aged 18 to 65, the authors find that:

- **Swedes hold the most positive attitudes towards both immigrants and refugees, while the French are found to be most negative.** The Belgians and Dutch hold moderate attitudes. There is also evidence that attitudes on refugees are more negative than attitudes on immigrants in Sweden and France, but not in Belgium and the Netherlands. These results be related to recent terror attacks in France, perpetrated by individuals who posed as refugees. (Belgium and Sweden were also affected by this phenomenon, but attacks occurred more frequently and were more severe in France.)
• People with a migration background hold more positive attitudes towards both immigrants and refugees than those without. No other socio-demographic characteristic relates directly to attitudes in this model. While household composition is not directly related to attitudes, indirect effects through socio-economic status and media consumption indicate that singles hold more negative attitudes than couples.

• Public television consumption, popular online news consumption, and trust in media are positively related to attitudes, whereas commercial television consumption is negatively associated with them. Television news consumption proves to be the most important news medium in terms of attitude formation.


Ala’ Alrababa’h, Andrea Dillon, Scott Williamson, Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner, and Jeremy Weinstein


Most of the evidence on factors influencing attitudes toward migrants has emerged from research in developed countries (mainly Europe and the United States), which finds: (1) little evidence that egocentric economic concerns about labor market competition drive attitudes towards migrants in developed countries, where unemployment is low, welfare states are expansive, and migrants typically don’t speak the same language and are lower-skilled than natives; (2) sociotropic concerns about the negative impact on the host country’s economy, welfare system, and public services shape attitudes toward migrants; (3) attitudes toward migrants are substantially shaped by perceived cultural threat and concerns that migration will change the host country’s dominant culture and identity; and (4) humanitarianism may also influence attitudes. The authors posit that in developing countries, egocentric economic concerns about labor market competition and sociotropic concerns about the host country economy are likely to be stronger (due to weaker economies, welfare systems and public service delivery), cultural concerns are likely to be weaker (due to the increased likelihood of shared cultural and religious identities), and humanitarianism is likely to be weaker (since developing countries have a much larger refugee burden).

To address this geographical limitation, the authors conduct a large-scale representative survey of public attitudes toward migration in Jordan, one of the countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. The survey covered 1,500 Jordanians in regions with both high and low concentrations of Syrian refugees. The authors find:

• Economic concerns do not drive Jordanians’ attitudes toward Syrian refugees. Jordanians who have been more economically impacted by the crisis, either personally or in their communities, are no more likely to hold negative attitudes.
• **Humanitarian and cultural factors drive Jordanians attitudes towards Syrian refugees.** Jordanians who are more exposed to refugees’ challenging living conditions and who are less sensitive to cultural threat demonstrate more positive attitudes toward refugees.

• Both humanitarian vulnerability and cultural similarity outweigh egocentric and sociotropic economic threats in determining which Syrian refugees Jordanians prefer to host. These results undermine egocentric arguments about attitude formation toward migrants, and call into question an emerging consensus around the importance of sociotropic economic factors. However, in line with existing research focused on Europe (e.g. Basak et al covered in an earlier edition of the literature review) the results highlight the potential for humanitarian concerns to sustain public support for hosting refugees over extended periods of time, even in challenging economic circumstances. However, most Syrian refugees in Jordan share cultural similarities with their hosts. If these similarities were replaced by cultural differences, the results suggest that Jordanians would be much less likely to let humanitarian motives override the perceived economic costs of hosting so many refugees. This paper therefore reinforces the consensus on the importance of cultural factors in shaping attitudes toward migration.

**Alfeo et al (2019) Assessing Refugees’ Integration via Spatio-temporal Similarities of Mobility and Calling Behaviors**

Antonio L. Alfeo, Mario G. C. A. Cimino, Bruno Lepri, Alex S. Pentland, Gigliola Vaglini
*IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems*, Volume 6, Issue 4 (2019), Pages 726-738

This paper analyzes the conditions that can contribute to the integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey by analyzing Call Details Record (CDR) datasets including calls from refugees and locals in Turkey throughout 2017. The authors propose the following set of metrics to assess the social integration of refugees:

• **Refugee’s Interaction Level:** percentage of calls made by a given refugee to a local in a given period of time, an indicator of the refugee’s social connections in the local community.

• **Refugee’s Calling Regularity:** number of calls made by a person in a given hour of the day during a given period of time. The similarity between the calling patterns of locals and refugees (dependent on daily routines) may be considered as a proxy for integration.

• **Refugee’s Mobility Similarity:** similarity between refugees’ and locals’ mobility patterns.

• **Residential Inclusion by District:** the coexistence of resident locals and refugees in a given district in a given month, based on the assumption that most calls during the night and early morning are made from a person’s residence.

• **District Attractiveness:** based on the percentage of resident refugees who do not leave the district in that month, i.e. continue to reside in the district the following month.
• District Cost of Living: average rent cost per square meter in a given district, as an indicator of the cost of living for that district.

The authors employ a novel computational technique (Computational Stigmergy) to analyze spatio-temporal patterns. They focus their analysis on the cities of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, which have the larger density of antennas (granularity of mobility patterns) and larger calling activity made by refugees. They find:

• Interaction level and calling regularity are positively correlated, suggesting that refugees that exhibit greater interaction with locals may have similar daily routines.

• Districts in Istanbul with higher residential inclusion may also be characterized by higher similarity between locals’ and refugees’ routines. This suggests that a minimum number of refugees per area is required for triggering integration.

• District attractiveness and cost of living are significantly and inversely correlated, suggesting that districts with a lower cost of living are more attractive to refugees.

• Calling regularity of refugees living in a district is correlated with the cost of living in that district. This suggests that calling regularity may be used as a proxy for daily routine similarity and for the economic capacity of refugees (i.e. the ability to meet a certain cost of living), and may therefore indicate the employment of refugees. This result is confirmed by evaluating the correlation of the cost of living with the distances between calling patterns of locals and refugees; as the distance increases, the district’s cost of living decreases.

• Variables with the strongest correlation with calling regularity are district attractiveness and cost of living, suggesting that economic capacity (e.g. being employed) and a long-term residence provide the greatest contribution to integration.

• Mobility similarity is correlated with interaction level. The more refugees have interactions with locals, the more they share urban spaces with locals.

• Social tension (drawn from news reports of violent brawls, clashes and terrorist attacks etc.) affects the behavior of refugees by reducing the amount of shared urban space with locals (i.e. lowering the mobility similarity after the event). Moreover, in terms of calls made toward locals, the social tension event has a greater effect on the group of refugees with lower interaction levels.

The authors conclude that mobility similarity and calling regularity have great potential as measures of social integration, since they are: (i) correlated with the amount of interaction between refugees and locals; (ii) calling regularity is an effective proxy for refugee’s economic capacity, implying refugee’s employment; (iii) mobility similarity is affected by social tension events; and (iv) the behavior of less integrated refugees appears to be significantly more affected by social tensions. The authors acknowledge that findings may be limited by the representativeness of a behavioral model based on call data (i.e. excludes other communication and messaging platforms).

Neal Marquez, Kiran Garimella, Ott Toomet, Ingmar G. Weber, Emilio Zagheni

This paper analyzes Call Detail Record (CDR) data to assess how communication and segregation between Turkish natives and Syrian refugees differ over time and space. The authors: (a) use CDR data to create metrics of geographic activity space and residential dissimilarity, as measures of segregation; (b) calculate spatial-temporal measures of the probability of refugees contacting Turkish citizens by phone and text, as a measure of group isolation; and (c) use Twitter posts that mention refugees to examine the relationship between the sentiment of tweets (revealing positive or negative attitudes towards refugees) and changes in segregation over space and time.

Key findings:

- **Metrics of activity space, i.e. the movements of refugees and Turkish citizens as indicated by CDR data, varies across major metropolitan areas.** Of the major metropolitan areas, Ankara had the highest activity space dissimilarity, while Istanbul had the lowest, though district level variance was twice as high in Ankara. There were significant differences over time at both the district and province level.

- **Residential dissimilarity was strongly correlated with activity space dissimilarity.** Activity space dissimilarity was frequently less than residential dissimilarity.

- Twitter sentiment was found to change significantly over time but not over locations. The data did not provide any significant evidence that higher dissimilarity and urban areas produced unfavorable sentiment towards refugees.

- **There is a significant positive relationship between social segregation, as measured by calls from refugees to Turkish citizens, and the sentiment expressed in tweets about refugees.** As weekly Twitter sentiment scores increased, i.e. revealing more positive attitudes towards refugees, there was a higher probability of refugees contacting non-refugees. The probability between cross-group connections was larger in urban areas than non-urban areas, and higher when dissimilarity was higher.

Mousa (2020) Creating Coexistence: Intergroup Contact and Soccer in Post-ISIS Iraq

Salma Mousa
The ‘contact hypothesis’ proposes that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice if it is positive, cooperative, endorsed by communal authorities, and places participants on equal footing (Allport et al, 1954). This paper examines the causal impact of meaningful intergroup contact on attitudes and behaviors among Iraqis displaced by ISIS. The analysis is based on a field experiment among Iraqi IDPs and returned IDPs in Qaraqosh (an Assyrian town in the Nineveh Governorate of northern Iraq) and Ankawa (a predominantly Assyrian suburb of Erbil in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq). The author randomly assigned amateur soccer players to an all-Christian team, or to a team mixed with Muslims, for a two-month league. The experiment meets the following conditions for the contact hypothesis: (a) a positive experience (if teams perform well); (b) a common goal (within mixed teams, but not necessarily the case for all-Christian teams encountering Muslim players as opponents in the league); (c) cooperation to achieve that goal; (d) equal power status within the intervention; and (e) endorsement of communal authorities, customs, or laws (the leagues were endorsed by an NGO operated by the Syriac Catholic church).

Key findings:

• **Intergroup contact improved tolerant behaviors toward Muslim peers.** Christians who had Muslim teammates were: 12 percentage points more likely to sign up for a mixed soccer team; 16 percentage points more likely to vote for a Muslim player (not on their team) to receive a sportsmanship award; and 34 percentage points more likely to train with Muslims six months after the end of the intervention.

• The endorsement of local leaders and coaches played an important role in bolstering new norms, which spilled over to the close-knit residents of Ankawa and Qaraqosh in the short term.

• A successful team performance was decisive in producing tolerant behaviors, with the top-performing teams being more likely to attend a mixed social event, and to patronize a restaurant in Muslim-dominated Mosul, an especially high bar for comfort around Muslims.

• **These improvements did not come at the expense of ‘backlash effects’ among all-Christian teams** who encountered Muslims competitively as opponents in the league (as shown by match-level data on yellow and red cards).

• **However, prejudice toward Muslim strangers remained the same.** Christians who had Muslim teammates were more likely to believe in coexistence, but did not change their beliefs about Muslims more broadly.

The author concludes that meaningful intergroup contact can build tolerant behaviors toward outgroup peers — even if underlying prejudice seems to persist. The author posits that war entrenches latent prejudice and hardens group boundaries. Nevertheless, improving interactions with outgroup peers is a worthwhile and feasible goal, given that these secondary relationships are key to rebuilding social trust. She suggests that endorsement from communal authorities is needed, and that a positive experience is decisive in amplifying contact effects.
Criminality and Extremism

Christopher M Hays
Forced Migration Review 58, June 2018, pp. 26-28
https://www.fmreview.org/economies/hays

Armed groups in Colombia have a dramatic impact on the local economy of displaced communities, and collaboration with armed groups can significantly undermine efforts to foster economic opportunities for IDPs. The author undertook research in three major cities (Medellín, Bogotá and Cartagena), two municipalities (Tierralta and Puerto Libertador in Córdoba) and two small rural communities (in the regions of Córdoba and Cauca) to understand **how and why many IDPs collaborate with armed groups and criminal organizations**. The research revealed that:

- IDPs collaborate with criminal groups both directly (e.g. drug trafficking and the extortion of protection money) and indirectly (e.g. providing supplies or transporting gasoline to those cultivating illicit crops). Armed groups in certain communities control the supply of water, sale of foodstuffs, and transportation in and out of the community.
- IDPs collaborate for several reasons including: (a) perceived lack of economic opportunities and inducement of easy money; (b) fear rooted not only in the danger that the armed groups represent but also in a feeling that IDPs have been abandoned by the government and the police; (c) cooperation may be seen by IDPs as more legitimate than an outsider might appreciate because in the absence of police and government representatives, criminal groups effectively function as local government; and (d) IDPs may choose to collaborate with or even join an opposing criminal group as a reaction against the violence they suffered at the hands of a different armed group.

The author argues that addressing non-economic motivations for collaboration with armed groups and criminal organizations requires cooperation with government agencies, NGOs and faith-based organizations. Moreover development interventions should be accompanied by a robust governmental and police presence in communities, along with initiatives to help raise the communities’ civic and political self-awareness.

Mikhael and Norman (2018) Refugee Youth, Unemployment and Extremism: Countering the Myth
Drew Mikhael and Julie Norman
Forced Migration Review 57, February 2018, pp. 57-58
https://www.fmreview.org/syria2018/mikhael-norman

Refugee youth unemployment has been linked to increased risk of extremism and/or exploitation because unemployed youth may be more likely to respond to financial incentives or be attracted by a sense of purpose or social identity. However, the authors’ research suggests that **there is no direct causality between refugee youth unemployment and extremism**—unemployment is one of many factors that can lead to extremism. Relative deprivation, social marginalization, and political
exclusion also can push youth to explore other paths of inclusion or validation. Interventions that provide skills trainings for refugee youth to increase their employability can be misguided because: (a) in the absence of jobs, young people are more likely to become frustrated when their skills do not translate into meaningful employment; (b) programs that privilege refugees can increase tensions with host communities; and (c) on their own, these interventions do not address structural problems (e.g. corruption, patronage) that contribute to the lack of jobs. The most successful programs addressing youth susceptibility to extremism are “psychosocial interventions and the promotion of hope, and creating opportunities for socio-economic development and civic engagement.” The authors conclude that: (i) education and job training are not enough; (ii) employment-based interventions should couple job training with job creation; (iii) external interventions are insufficient; and (iv) there should be more support for local NGOs and social workers.

Violence Against Refugees

Fisk (2018) One-sided Violence in Refugee-hosting Areas

Kerstin Fisk
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716656447

This paper studies the relationship between within-country patterns of refugee settlement and patterns of civilian victimization during armed conflict. The author posits that:

- **Armed actors victimize civilians at higher rates in areas with larger refugee populations**, because: (a) these areas offer armed groups opportunities for concealment/sanctuary as well as “refugee resources” (humanitarian aid, recruitment potential) that enhance their strategic value; (b) consequently these areas may be more likely to be militarized by armed groups (storage and trafficking of arms, presence of active and ex-combatants, recruitment, military training, use of camps as military bases) leading to violence against civilians; (c) government forces and government-affiliated non-state armed groups (from both origin and host countries) are more likely to target militarized areas to eliminate strategic advantages for their opponents; and (d) difficulties of distinguishing combatants from civilians lead to collective targeting of refugee and local civilian populations in these locations based on ascriptive clues (nationality, ethnicity, language).

- **Armed actors victimize civilians at higher rates in areas that host larger self-settled refugee populations**. Compared to locations that host camp-settled refugees or no refugees, areas home to self-settled refugees (who live among the local population, do not have official legal status as refugees, and cannot rely on formal/dedicated protection and assistance) may be used as a proxy for rival support since self-settled refugees are more likely to share an affinity (language, kinship ties, ethnicity) with the host community. This makes collective targeting more likely in these locations.
The analysis is based on an original dataset on the locations and demographics of refugee populations within host countries in Africa from 2000 to 2010. Key findings:

- There is evidence of **systematic violence against civilians in refugee-populated regions throughout Africa** in the period under investigation.
- **Locations with larger refugee populations experience a significantly higher number of intentional attacks on civilians**—by both sending country and host country combatants—compared to other locations.
- **The effect of refugee population size on civilian victimization is conditional upon how they are settled in the host country.** While regions hosting larger numbers of self-settled refugees experience a significant increase in incidents of one-sided attacks on civilians compared to other regions in the host country, larger camp-settled populations are shown to be unrelated to the level of violence.

The findings draw attention to the importance of simultaneously addressing the security challenges refugee populations can potentially pose as well as threats to refugees themselves.

**Gineste and Savun (2019) Introducing POSVAR: A Dataset on Refugee-related Violence**

Christian Gineste and Burcu Savun
[https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318811440](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318811440)

One of the most studied aspects of forced migration is the potential security consequences of refugee flows for host countries. However, data limitations have hampered scholars’ ability to test some crucial questions on refugee-related violence. This article **introduces the Political and Societal Violence By And Against Refugees (POSVAR) dataset**, which provides cross-national, time-series data on refugees’ involvement in acts of physical violence in their host state, either as the victims or the perpetrators of violence, individually or collectively, in all countries between 1996 and 2015. The article defines the main concepts and scope of the dataset, which includes data on violence against refugees (by the government, by civilians, by non-state actors, and terrorism against refugees) and violence perpetrated by refugees (refugee-on-refugee violence, against civilians, against the government, terrorism by refugees, refugee riots, and refugee recruitment by non-state actors), and describes the methodology used to collect and code the data. The authors present a series of descriptive statistics, and use the dataset to conduct preliminary tests on some of the arguments found in the empirical literature on refugee-related violence. Key findings include:

- **Over the past two decades, violence against refugees was systematically reported in a larger number of host states than violence by refugees.** Among countries hosting at least 10,000 refugees, a larger number of host states experienced terrorist attacks against refugees than terrorist attacks by refugees.
- **States and their agents are the primary perpetrators of violence against refugees.** Civilians are relatively less prone to anti-refugee violence. And while refugee victimization by non-state actors (NSAs) is the least common form of anti-refugee violence, NSAs are generally responsible for the most systematic forms of violence against refugees.
• Refugee-on-refugee violence is the most frequent form of victimization, and is often motivated by ethnic and sectarian divisions within or among refugee communities residing in the same camp.

• Overall, refugees’ lack of protection in their host state remains a far greater risk than refugee violence.

• The level of recruitment of refugees by foreign rebel or terrorist groups is a statistically significant predictor of the risk of civil conflict in the host state, providing suggestive evidence for the claim that refugee flows increase the risk of civil war diffusion by facilitating the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies. Additionally, the militarization of refugee groups is a stronger predictor of civil conflict than the size of the hosted refugee population.

Limitations of the dataset include underreporting bias, lack of consistent data in country reports and news sources on the exact count of refugee-related violence (consequently the dataset describes the prevalence of violence in an ordinal scale, 0–3, rather than a continuous measure), and it does not, at this stage, provide information at the refugee group level.

Savun and Gineste (2019) From Protection to Persecution: Threat Environment and Refugee Scapegoating

Burcu Savun and Christian Gineste
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318811432

This article explores violence perpetrated against refugees, which the authors contend is a more common than violence caused by refugees. They argue that host states are more likely to violate the physical integrity of refugee populations in the wake of terrorist attacks. Governments are pressured to respond to security crises but prefer to take actions without jeopardizing public support. In this context, refugee groups can be strategically attractive targets of repression because they lack electoral power and the public is often supportive of government crackdown against foreigners in times of security crises. The authors conjecture that repression of refugees may not be a security maximizing strategy as long as leaders perceive it as politically rewarding, at least in the short run. Given that leaders have stronger incentives to respond to voters’ demands quickly in democracies, the authors also investigate whether the effect of terror attacks on violence against refugees is stronger in democratic host states. Using a global dataset on anti-refugee violence perpetrated by states between 1996 and 2015, the authors show that:

• Terrorist attacks in host states lead to an increase in the prevalence of violence against refugees by state agents.

• A scapegoating mechanism may be at work. The propensity of states to repress refugees when they are reportedly tied to terrorism is not significantly higher than when there are no reported ties between refugees and terrorist attacks.

• Host states are more likely to violate the physical integrity of refugee populations in the wake of terrorist attacks as the level of democracy increases. The marginal effect of transnational
terrorism on violence against refugees is lower in countries that are less democratic, and significantly higher in countries that are more democratic.

**Justice**


Carolien Jacobs and Patrick Milabyo Kyamusugulwa

*Journal of Refugee Studies*, Volume 31, Issue 2, 1 June 2018, Pages 179–196,

https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fex025

This article examines the justice concerns of IDPs and the extent to which their rights are violated, and considers the strategies they use to solve everyday disputes and claim their rights (with or without the support of formal and informal justice providers). The article begins with a literature review summarizing what is known from other regions about the justice concerns of IDPs and refugees and the strategies they pursue to claim their rights. Data was collected in the city of Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in eastern DRC, through interviews with IDPs, residents, and local administrative chiefs as well as a quantitative survey of IDPs and residents. The main findings are as follows:

- Little assistance is provided to IDPs in Bukavu and both state and non-state actors have limited knowledge of their situation.
- The authors identify three categories of common disputes, specifically disputes relating to: (a) housing conditions; (b) the marginalization and discrimination of IDPs by longer-term residents; and (c) labour and labour conditions.
- There was little evidence of IDPs taking their justice concerns to formal state justice providers, with the exception of local administrative chiefs, who play an indispensable role as justice providers at the street/neighborhood level.
- The most important strategies for resolving disputes and claiming rights are: (a) consulting the local chief; (b) consulting the church; or (c) not doing anything.
- Mobilization of personal connections is key for IDPs to find justice, either directly or indirectly. The authors suggest that helping IDPs to strengthen their social networks in town could be a strategy for policy makers and practitioners to improve IDP’s access to justice and to better respect their rights.

**Resettlement**

Eckert et al (2018) *The Return to Big City Experience: Evidence from Danish Refugees*

Fabian Eckert, Mads Hejlesen, Conor Walsh

July 2018

The authors exploit the random settlement policy for refugees in Denmark between 1986-1998 to examine the effect of locations on refugees’ wages. During this period, the Danish government assigned 80,000 refugees across 271 municipalities, in proportion to local populations and without regard to labor market relevant characteristics of refugees. Eighty percent of refugees were still living in their assigned location after 20 years. Settled refugees initially earned similar hourly wages across regions, but those placed in Copenhagen saw their wages grow 0.81 percent faster, equivalent to a 16 percent wage premium after 20 years. The authors identify two mechanisms for this result: (a) the greater density of high-productivity, high-wage paying firms in Copenhagen allows refugees to accumulate more experience with these types of employers; and (b) Copenhagen offers relatively greater opportunities in skilled service jobs and fewer opportunities in manual and agricultural jobs compared to the rest of the country. Most refugees start in low-skill service jobs (e.g. cleaning and sales), and then, move onto higher paying occupations, which differ by location. Outside Copenhagen, refugees are more likely to move into manual jobs, whereas Copenhagen workers are more likely to move into high-skill jobs. The authors were able to dismiss several other mechanisms, including separate wage trends between locations, the effects of ethnic enclaves, and variation in educational take-up across locations. Finally, the authors explore the possibility that assignment to a big city has differential effects conditional on ability, which manifest in the more frequent matching of high-ability workers with high-productivity firms, and decreased job finding rates for low-ability workers. They find that this sorting was significant in explaining the observed patterns, accounting for more than 50 percent of the dynamic experience premium.

**Bansak et al (2018) Improving Refugee Integration through Data-driven Algorithmic Assignment**

By Kirk Bansak, Jeremy Ferwerda, Jens Hainmueller, Andrea Dillon, Dominik Hangartner, Duncan Lawrence, and Jeremy Weinstein

Science Volume 359, Issue 6373, 19 January 2018

[https://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6373/325.full](https://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6373/325.full)

When refugees are resettled in third countries, resettlement countries do not fully leverage the factors that promote refugee integration such as: (1) geographical context (e.g. economic and social opportunities available in resettlement locations); (b) personal characteristics of refugees (e.g. country of origin, language skills, gender, age, education); and (c) synergies between geography and personal characteristics (e.g. expected employment returns associated with personal characteristics can vary across different resettlement locations). The authors developed a data-driven algorithm that assigns refugees across resettlement locations to improve integration outcomes by leveraging synergies between refugee characteristics and resettlement sites. The algorithm was tested on historical registry data from two countries (United States and Switzerland) with different assignment practices and refugee populations. The proposed approach led to gains of 40-70 percent in refugees’ employment outcomes relative to current assignment practices. The authors suggest that this approach can provide governments with a practical and cost-efficient policy tool that can be immediately implemented within existing institutional structures.


Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers, Alessandro Martinello
Asylum seekers are often assigned to a locality in their host country based on uninformed random mechanisms, which do not consider the characteristics of the asylum seekers in the matching process. Consequently, this approach may lead to an inefficient and unfair (“envious”) assignment. This paper proposes a dynamic mechanism for matching asylum seekers to localities, which considers the background of the asylum seeker and consequently the probability of successful integration at different localities. The proposed dynamic mechanism differs from traditional approaches because: (a) the sequential arrival of asylum-seekers introduces dynamics; and (b) the preferences of both the localities and the asylum seekers have to be estimated based on characteristics and historical data. The model is based on priority and rejection assumptions, which determines the assignment of highly demanded and “non-demanded” asylum seekers respectively. Using both theoretical and simulation methods, the authors demonstrate that the proposed mechanism leads to more efficient and less envious matchings.

Acharya (2019) Matching Refugees to Host Country Locations Based on Preferences and Outcomes

Avidit Acharya, Kirk Bansak, and Jens Hainmueller
https://immigrationlab.org/working-paper-series/matching-refugees-host-country-locations-based-preferences-outcomes/

The idea of refugee matching is to select resettlement locations that are likely to be a good fit for a given refugee to thrive. Research has shown that the place of initial settlement has a profound impact on the long-term integration success of refugees [see for example Bansak et al (2018) included in a previous edition of the literature review]. Two main approaches to refugee matching have emerged: preference-based (i.e. assigned on the basis of the preferences of the refugees or the preferences of the locations), which is uncommon, and outcome-based matching (i.e. maximize refugees’ predicted integration success, e.g. as measured by employment or earnings). The authors summarize the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The authors developed a mechanism that assigns refugees based on optimizing both refugee preferences and expected outcomes. The government first proposes a metric of integration success (e.g. refugee employment, earnings, health outcomes, etc.), and a minimum level of expected integration success that should be achieved, ‘g’. Secondly, refugees are matched to locations based on their preferences subject to meeting the government’s specified threshold. The algorithm then maps preferences to a feasible matching by serially assigning refugees to locations in a way that accommodates their preferences subject to being able to maintain the minimum average level of expected integration success. The authors illustrate this proposed mechanism using simulations and refugee data from the United States. They show that:

• There is a clear tradeoff between realized preference ranks and outcome scores in all simulations because enforcing the requirement for a higher value of g requires the mechanism to deviate from the preference-based optimization. Conversely, if preferences and outcomes
are positively correlated, then matching based on preferences should indirectly also lead to outcome-based matching, and hence deviation from the preference-based solution will not occur until a higher level of \( g \) is reached. If, in advance of their preference reporting, refugees were given information on their predicted outcomes in each location, they could incorporate such information into their preference determination, which would help alleviate the tradeoff in the mechanism.

- **The more similar are different families’ preferences, the more rivalrous is the matching procedure, and hence the more difficult it is to match families to one of their top-ranked locations given limited capacity in each location.** Given a negative correlation between preferences and outcome scores (i.e. preference-based assignment is counter to the goal of optimizing for realized outcome scores), a positive correlation across families’ preferences has a significant impact on how the tradeoff affects the realized mean outcome score, with the tradeoff being more severe with a low correlation across preference vectors.

- **The more positive is the correlation between preference and outcome vectors, the later the tradeoff kicks in.**

The proposed mechanism strikes a compromise by allowing governments to ensure a minimum level of expected integration success while at the same time respecting refugee preferences to the extent possible. It is also strategy proof, does not require refugees to rank all locations, and could be incorporated into existing assignment mechanisms by eliciting refugee preferences for their top locations.

**Sustainable Development Goals**


Allison Grossman and Lauren Post
International Rescue Committee, September 2019

This paper examines how refugees are faring in relation to national populations in terms of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Key messages:

- **Refugees are being “left behind”.** Four out of five fragile and conflict-affected states are not on track to achieve the SDGs. The vast majority of refugees are located in fragile contexts (12 out of 15 countries hosting the highest share of refugees are fragile). Moreover, statistics indicate that refugees have unique vulnerabilities and are frequently worse off when compared with the non-displaced population.

- **Refugees are being “left out”.** Refugees are excluded from SDG-related data collection, monitoring frameworks, national reporting, and national development plans. Of 42 countries
that submitted 2019 Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs)—an optional self-assessment of national progress toward SDGs—only 13 mentioned refugees and none included data on refugees to measure their progress towards the SDGs. There is a lack of data on refugee outcomes and on their progress towards the SDGs.

- **There is no shared strategy for ensuring refugees achieve the SDGs**, despite UN Member States’ commitment to “Leave No One Behind”.

To meet the SDGs by 2030, the authors advocate efforts to: (1) collect data that permit comparisons between refugees and non-displaced populations, align humanitarian data with SDG indicators, and invest in national statistical capacity; (2) include refugees in SDG planning and monitoring, including VNRs and national development plans; and (3) remove barriers and scale-up approaches to improve refugee wellbeing alongside national populations, including both policy reforms and evidence-based interventions.

**Miscellaneous**


Leon Isaacs, Sarah Hugo, Gemma Robson, Charlie Bush, Poppy Issacs, Iñigo Moré Martinez
KNOMAD Working Paper 33, July 2018

This report examines the impact of regulations and regulatory policies on a refugee’s ability to send and receive formal, cross-border remittances, drawing on seven country case studies (Denmark, Ethiopia, Germany, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The analysis covers both regulations related to refugees’ legal status (including their right to open bank/financial accounts, obtain IDs, travel, obtain housing, work, etc.), as well as the regulatory environment for sending and receiving remittances, especially barriers that are specifically relevant for refugees to access formal remittance services, including anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing regulations (AML/CFT). The authors find that:

- **The main challenge for refugees and asylum seekers is lack of access to formal remittance services because they don’t have the necessary forms of identification** or because of their legal status. They may face additional impediments such as limited Internet or mobile connectivity, and lack of freedom of movement.

- There are very few remittance service providers facilitating money transfers to the required destinations, due to de-risking activities by banks in the past five years. Those providers that do serve countries considered high-risk or subject to sanctions, face impediments to opening bank accounts.

- There is little information on refugee and asylum seeker remittance needs, and a lack of data on remittance flows, volumes, access points, and channels.

- Enabling refugees to use mobile money can act as a gateway to financial inclusion.
• In the seven countries covered by this report, there are no specific regulations (or mentions within regulations) on remittances made by refugees and asylum seekers. There is also poor interpretation at the local branch level of the limited regulations and guidance.

The authors make several recommendations to address these challenges including:

• Put greater focus on issues of remittances and refugees, through further research, evidence-based policy making, and product design.
• Enhance regulatory guidance on remittance services for refugees, and raise awareness about these regulations among relevant staff of financial service providers.
• Ensure that government departments dealing with AML/CFT work closely with regulators on issues of asylum seekers and refugees, to address and clarify contradictions and gaps in the regulations.
• Expand refugees and asylum seeker access to basic bank accounts and/or mobile money accounts.
• Take account of existing guidance in countries where transaction or mobile accounts may become (or are already) more prevalent than bank accounts.
• Provide training on remittance services to refugees and asylum seekers.
• Consider using or developing new forms of identification for asylum seekers and refugees.
VIII. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
Global Estimates of Internally Displaced Populations


IDMC, 2019

The 2019 Global Report on Internal Displacement presents global figures for internal displacement in 2018, including internal displacement due to conflict and violence.

- An estimated 41.3 million people were living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2018, the highest figure ever recorded, and an increase of about 1.4 million since 2017. Three-quarters (30.9 million people) were located in just ten countries: Syria (6.1 million), Colombia (5.8 million), DRC (3.1 million), Somalia (2.6 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), Yemen (2.3 million), Nigeria (2.2 million), Ethiopia (2.1 million), Sudan (2.1 million), and Iraq (2 million).

- 10.8 million new displacements due to conflict and violence were recorded in 2018. The main causes were armed conflict (4.9 million), communal violence (4.2 million), political violence (995,000), and criminal violence (255,000). Ethiopia (2.9 million), DRC (1.8 million) and Syria (1.6 million) accounted for more than half of new conflict-related displacements in 2018. Substantial new displacements were recorded in Somalia (578,000), Nigeria (541,000), CAR (510,000), Cameroon (459,000), Afghanistan (372,000), South Sudan (321,000) and Yemen (252,000).

- The majority of new displacements (7.4 million) occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In Ethiopia, conflict over resources and ethnic violence displaced 2.9 million people. In Somalia, regional clashes, fighting between al-Shabaab and pro-government forces and forced evictions caused the highest number of new displacements in a decade. New waves of violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region combined with the ongoing insurgency of Boko Haram and other armed groups in the northeast displaced 541,000 people. New conflict in the Anglophone region of Cameroon displaced 459,000 people. New conflicts also erupted in Mali and Burkina Faso, linked to the emergence of extremist groups, inter-communal clashes and unresolved socioeconomic grievances. There were an estimated 16.5 million conflict IDPs in SSA as of the end of the year, including more than 3 million in DRC (a conservative, incomplete estimate).

- 2.1 million new displacements were recorded in the Middle East. While the conflict in Syria subsided, it nevertheless contributed to large-scale displacement. Government offensives to retake parts of Idlib and Dara’a governorates and the Damascus suburbs triggered most of the 1.6 million new displacements. Conflict in Yemen escalated in the second half of 2018. Ongoing insecurity and widespread destruction continues to prevent returns.

- Several countries, e.g. Ethiopia, Nigeria and Afghanistan, were affected by displacement related to both conflict and disasters. Many people who fled disasters in countries such as Syria, Somalia, Iraq and Yemen, had already been displaced by conflict.
• **Data on internal displacement is incomplete.** Figures for DRC, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen are underestimates, and data are scarce for other countries including Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela.

The 2019 report **focuses on internal displacement to urban areas and discusses the consequent humanitarian and development challenges.** Of the 41.3 million conflict IDPs in 55 countries at the end of 2018, location information was obtained for 19.8 million in 12 countries. Within these 12 countries, specific caseloads were selected where good quality geo-referenced data was available. IDMC’s analysis concluded that **52 per cent of IDPs were living in urban settings in these 12 countries.** Key messages:

• **Internal displacement is increasingly becoming an urban phenomenon.** Cities are often the preferred destination for IDPs. Airstrikes and shelling in cities (e.g. in Dara’a in Syria, Hodeidah in Yemen and Tripoli in Libya) accounted for much of the new displacements recorded in the Middle East. Widespread destruction and unexploded ordinances (e.g. Mosul in Iraq and Marawi in the Philippines) prevent people from returning despite the end to active conflict.

• **This creates challenges for cities and can aggravate existing risk factors.** Urban IDPs face poverty, tenure insecurity and secondary displacement due to flooding and evictions (e.g. IDPs in Kabul and Mogadishu).

• **Lessons can be learned from new initiatives** (e.g. Medellín in Colombia, Mosul in Iraq) where local governments and communities have taken the lead in responding to internal displacement.

• **Service delivery to IDPs** continues to be a humanitarian imperative in active crises and camp settings, but **is also central to development efforts in urban and protracted displacement situations.**

The report **identifies three main areas for effective action at the city level:**

• **Data and analysis:** systematically account for urban IDPs; record their number and the duration and severity of their displacement, disaggregated by sex, age, disability and other relevant criteria; monitor movements and conditions of displaced over time; undertake profiling exercises that include both displaced and host populations; and ensure that any data collected is interoperable.

• **Capacity and participation:** build on communities’ existing capacities, including for the collection of data on their vulnerabilities and needs, as well as their existing resources, skills and community services; strengthen the capacity of local organizations and government departments for data and statistical analysis; work with IDPs and those at risk of displacement to identify priority areas in service delivery and infrastructure development; and identify urban development approaches that accommodate informality (e.g. flexible and secure tenure arrangements, adaptive labor market strategies).

• **Incentives and political will:** estimate the impacts of IDPs on city development and assess risks of inaction for the economy, security, stability and social wellbeing; advocate for new financing mechanisms to support city action and make displacement risk one of the core considerations in urban planning and development; document successful responses to internal displacement in...
cities and provide a platform for exchange and learning; recognize IDPs as local citizens, even when return is their preferred solution, by allowing voting rights, and supporting public participation and access to documentation.

Data Gaps


Álvaro Sardiza Miranda, Adrián Calvo Valderrama and Michelle Kissenkoetter
IDMC, November 2019

Internal displacement in the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA) is a serious and growing issue. However there are no comprehensive and reliable data on internal displacement to properly understand the scale, triggers, drivers, patterns and impacts of the phenomenon, prevent the conditions that lead to internal displacement, and inform programming, policymaking and advocacy for IDPs’ protection and assistance. This report presents the current situation in terms of data on internal displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, highlights critical data gaps and recommends areas for improvement.

The report identifies several challenges:

• Complex drivers and triggers of displacement in the region, many of which overlap or are interlinked, make it difficult to capture reliable data.
• Governments’ unwillingness to recognize that internal displacement is taking place in their country and that they are required to lead an effective response.
• The lack of a shared conceptual framework of internal displacement.
• Lack of communication and coordination between civil society organizations that collect and analyze data on internal displacement, leading to isolated pockets of data. Additionally, governments have been reticent to share data that might reveal the magnitude of displacement in their country.
• Significant security risks associated with recording information on internal displacement and being identified as an IDP in the NTCA.

The authors recommend:

• Government authorities should formally recognize the phenomenon of internal displacement, regardless of its causes, triggers and drivers.
• Defining and framing internal displacement in the context of each country to enable the definition of populations and groups in scope of those definitions, and subsequently, the official statistical categories and their indicators.
• Tools and methods for collecting, aggregating and sharing of data should be identified and developed taking into account requisite data protection mechanisms and responsible data management to avoid the dissemination of sensitive or personal data.
• Governments should invest, with the support of civil society and international organizations, in efforts to establish a comprehensive set of baseline data.
• Coordination and alignment in terms of concepts and indicators, and the tools and procedures to capture, share and disseminate data.
• Better coordination among donors, and the allocation of resources and support for the development of shared and harmonized data collection, aggregation and dissemination tools would ensure more tangible outcomes and results.
• Extensive capacity building for government and civil society entities with responsibilities for capturing and addressing internal displacement, to ensure they can apply the required practices, tools and methodologies.

Causes and Drivers of Internal Displacement

Tilman Brück, Moritz Hennicke, and Antje Schumann
Universite Libre de Bruxelles, ECARES Working Paper 2018-27, October 2018

This paper examines how inequality and ethnicity relate to victimization in ethnic conflicts, by studying forced displacement in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. Ethnic resentments and socio-economic grievances between the two largest ethnic groups, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, were major drivers of the conflict, which left more than 400 dead and displaced 375,000 people out of a total population of 6 million. The authors investigate whether displaced individuals were advantaged/disadvantaged within and between ethnic groups. They use secondary education to measure socioeconomic inequality. Variation across districts (controlling for the distance to violence) demonstrates that communities with higher disparities in education within and between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks experienced higher displacement rates. The authors find that socio-economic advantage matters differently within an ethnic group (vertical inequality), and between ethnic groups (horizontal inequality). Socioeconomic advantage within an ethnic group increased the likelihood that an individual was displaced, but decreased the likelihood of displacement compared to the other ethnic group. Highly educated individuals above the last quintile of their own ethnicity’s local distribution (vertical inequality) exhibited a tendency to be displaced. Highly educated individuals above the last quintile of the other ethnicity’s local distribution (horizontal inequality) were more likely to stay.

Marston (2019) The Urban Displaced: Fleeing Criminal Violence in Latin American Cities
Jerome Marston
Background paper for the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019
This paper examines forced displacement triggered by organized crime in Latin American cities, and seeks to answer the questions: Who flees? What triggers their flight? Where do displaced persons go and what are their experiences? The author describes broad trends in Latin America and highlights specific insights from Medellín, Colombia based on a survey of three peripheral neighborhoods in mid-2017. Key points:

- Criminal violence-induced urban displacement occurs when individuals are provoked, directly or indirectly, to leave their homes in a city for another location by organized crime or other armed groups with criminal elements and/or exchanges between organized crime and state forces.

- Those displaced by criminal violence are disproportionately poor, have completed relatively few years of schooling, and may also belong to sexual or ethnic minorities. Compared to those left behind, displaced people in Medellín are generally: younger, have more children, have more savings (even if very little), lived in homes made of lower quality materials with fewer utility connections, are less likely to have possessed tenure documentation, and more likely to have been active in their communities. 51 percent had lived in their house more than ten years before fleeing, and 5 percent for thirty or more, i.e. they flee despite deep roots in the community.

- Displacement often occurs within the same city, from one marginal, under-served neighborhood to another. Nearly all of Medellín’s violence-induced displacement occurs in the city’s peripheral neighborhoods. All are underserved and marginal (compared to other parts of the city), but some are more developed than others. A third of respondents fled from the least developed neighborhoods, while two thirds fled slightly more developed, though still marginal, neighborhoods.

- Street-level gangs are most often responsible for displacement in Latin American cities. People may flee due to targeted threats against specific residents, or generalized, indiscriminate violence caused by organized crime (and state security forces). In Medellín, the most common reasons for flight are: generalized violence/fear of being caught in shootouts; attempted recruitment of a child or family member into the gang; a threat for (suspected) collaboration with a rival gang; extortion; and murder of a family member, either by the gang or an unknown attacker. One-fifth of survey respondents fled within Medellín (or another city) more than once. In Medellín, street-level neighbourhood gangs are most commonly reported as having provoked respondents’ flight (73 percent).

- Displaced persons typically resettle in a location comparable to their neighborhood of origin, or one that is worse-off, due to financial losses from fleeing. In Medellín, a significant percentage of people who fled urban violence suffer food insecurity. They live in homes made of comparable materials and with utility connections as people who had not fled violence. They tend to be less active in their communities than their peers who live in the same neighborhoods but have not fled violence.

The author concludes with several policy recommendations to strengthen civil society (by training community mediators, develop youth-engagement programming, and establishing a crime hotline), strengthen the rule of law and state capacity (by increasing police presence and improving response times, and strengthening well-performing government offices and develop relevant new
ones), and reduce gang violence (by providing employment opportunities for gang members). Additional recommendations include: reduce gangs’ extortion of residents; design interventions to be long-term and carried out in-neighborhood; deploy interventions to peripheral neighborhoods, in their entirety; and monitor the telltale signs of displacement and prepare aid accordingly.

Locations of IDPs

Huang and Graham (2019) How Urban are IDPs and What Does that Mean for Their Economic Integration?

Cindy Huang and Jimmy Graham
Background paper for the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019
Also available as a policy note at: https://www.cgdev.org/publication/how-urban-are-idps-and-what-does-mean-their-economic-integration (May 10, 2019)

Given the economic challenges faced by IDPs in lower and middle-income countries (LMICs), and the wide-ranging consequences of these challenges, there is an emerging consensus that IDPs and refugees should be allowed to pursue self-reliance through local economic integration. Some of the greatest opportunities for expanding IDPs’ economic integration are in urban areas, where economic activity clusters. The authors analyze the known locations of IDPs in LMICs and visualize them in an interactive map. Key observations include:

- **There is a substantial lack of location data for IDPs.** The data covers only 9.3 million conflict-displaced IDPs in 17 countries (out of 40 million conflict IDPs at the end of 2017).

- **About half of conflict IDPs are located in urban areas (about 4.4 million out of a sample of 9.3 million in 17 countries).** Nearly 1.5 million conflict IDPs are in major urban areas with populations over 300,000. Just under half of these are working aged adults. While the dataset is incomplete, these figures nevertheless provide a useful lower bound.

- Ten countries have at least 50,000 IDPs in urban areas and 10 countries have at least 10,000 in major cities. Some countries have very large urban populations, e.g. Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Iraq each have over 500,000 IDPs in urban areas and at least 100,000 in major urban areas.

- **There is significant variation in urban-rural composition across countries** that may partly reflect a country’s overall urbanization rate. While some IDP populations are mostly urban, others (e.g. Chad, Niger) are almost entirely rural. In some cases IDP populations are disproportionately rural compared to national populations, suggesting a potential opportunity to incentivize urbanization in these contexts.

The authors suggest three policy implications:

- **Support IDPs to capitalize on the relatively large number of economic opportunities available in urban areas.** This could include: humanitarian assistance to non-camp urban IDPs to increase access to basic services; vocational training or job-matching programs; involvement of the private sector (e.g. by hiring IDPs and supplying from or investing in IDP-owned businesses); broad development programs that invest in urban planning, infrastructure and services; and
specific support for female IDPs who account for about half of working-age IDPs. Governments can ensure that there is an enabling policy environment (e.g. legal permission for IDPs to reside and work). Efforts to support IDP economic integration should also include host communities.

- **Create sustainable growth opportunities in rural areas and/or consider incentivizing IDPs’ voluntary relocation to urban areas.** This could include leveraging the economies that grow out of IDP camps, e.g. investing in infrastructure, encouraging private sector investment by offsetting risk, and supporting the development of IDP and host businesses and employability. If there is a skills mismatch between rural IDPs and job opportunities, consideration could also be given to subsidizing or incentivizing some IDPs’ voluntary relocation to urban areas.

- **Invest in collecting more data to inform strategic decisions.**

**Specific Vulnerabilities of IDPs**


Samuel Hall, NRC and IDMC, 2018
Commissioned by NRC and IDMC and funded by the European Union and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

A record 653,000 Afghans were internally displaced during 2016, bringing the estimated number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan to more than 1.5 million at the end of 2016. Many IDPs have been displaced multiple times. At the same time, the humanitarian space in Afghanistan is shrinking due to escalating conflict, lack of respect for international humanitarian law, and humanitarian organizations’ overcautious approach. Consequently, outside of government-controlled areas there is little information about IDPs and most do not have access to protection or assistance. This report **assesses the causes of prolonged and multiple displacement in Afghanistan and identifies the protection challenges confronting IDPs**, based on quantitative and qualitative data collected from rural, semi-urban and urban areas in the provinces of Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz and Nangarhar. The sample was not random (due to security, access and data challenges) nor was it representative of all IDPs in Afghanistan (since it was limited to government-controlled areas).

Key findings include:

- Internal displacement in Afghanistan is increasing, linked to the withdrawal of most foreign troops, escalating violence, and expanding areas under Taliban or ISIL control. Most displacement occurs within provinces. People tend to flee rural areas for regional centers.
- Newly returned refugees are adding significantly to the IDP caseload. Many were compelled to return due to pressures in Iran and Pakistan or reducing asylum acceptance rates for Afghans.
internationally. A returned refugee can become a “returnee-IDP” when they are unable to return to their place of origin, or when they become displaced after returning to their place of origin. 72 percent of surveyed returnee-IDP households had been displaced twice and 27 percent displaced three times.

• Three quarters of IDP households do not receive aid assistance, and half have trouble meeting their food needs. Many resort to harmful coping strategies (skipping meals, child labor).
• IDP registration procedures are complex, costly and prevent aid from reaching those who need it (there is little/no access to the petition system outside government-controlled areas).
• IDPs are not aware of their rights or the entitlements and remedies available to them.
• Durable solutions remain elusive for most IDPs due to the ongoing conflict and worsening security. Most IDPs would prefer to integrate locally.
• IDPs’ lack of sustainable housing solutions and limited job opportunities continue to be their main protection concerns.
• IDPs are benefiting from national and international program that target them for support.
• Female IDPs are highly vulnerable and often lack access to specialist support.

The report recommends:

• Addressing the priorities identified by IDPs including housing and shelter, livelihood opportunities, education, child protection, and psychosocial and GBV services for woman.
• Collective efforts to implement Afghanistan’s national policy on IDPs, requiring additional resources for the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation and its provincial offices.
• Multi-year funding to bridge the gap between new and protracted IDP caseloads.
• Reform and streamlining of the IDP petition system.
• Earlier engagement of development actors to address the longer-term needs of displacement-affected communities.
• Developing a strategy to improve responses to IDPs in areas outside of government control.
• Improving provision of psychosocial and child protection support.

Steele (2018) IDP resettlement and Collective Targeting during civil wars: Evidence from Colombia
Abbey Steele
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318763706

This article explains why and how IDPs become endangered, even in civil wars that are not defined by an ethnic or sectarian cleavage. The author argues that armed groups are likely to target IDPs based on:

• **Where IDPs are from and when they left.** Territorial conquest is typically accompanied by displacement, and IDPs are often assumed to have collaborated with the ‘losing’ side. The armed group responsible for the expulsion could target IDPs for strategic purposes (e.g. IDPs have taken refuge in an area the armed group wishes to control) or because of animosity/revenge.
• **Resettlement patterns.** Resettling alone is risky, because individuals living in new communities can be ‘discovered’, either based on the timing of their arrival and their region of origin, or
based on their appearance or language. These stigmatized households have incentives to cluster together to reduce the risk of violence to their household. While clustering may reduce a particular household’s likelihood of suffering violence, the group is endangered because it is more easily detected. Armed groups can collectively target IDPs who resettle in clusters, either for strategic or retributive reasons. These displacement circumstances and resettlement patterns endanger civilians by signaling their loyalties, even in the context of non-ethnic civil wars. Exploiting spatial and temporal variation in civilian resettlement and violence in the Colombian civil war, the author demonstrates that the probability of violence increases in municipalities where IDPs seek refuge, and that the probability of violence increases as the ratio of IDPs from the same municipality (an indicator of IDP clustering) increases. The author concludes that collective targeting of IDPs occurs even in civil wars without an ethnic cleavage, following voluntary resettlement patterns.


Philip Verwimp and Juan Carlos Muñoz-Mora
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2017.1311407

This paper investigates the food security and nutritional status of formerly displaced households (HHs) after return to Burundi, and tests whether it is the duration of displacement that matters for current welfare (divergence process) or the time lapsed since returning (convergence process). The authors use the 2006 Core Welfare Indicator Survey for Burundi to compare calorie intake and level of food expenses of various categories of formerly displaced households with those of their non-displaced neighbors. Key findings:

• IDPs who returned home just before the time of the survey are worse off compared to IDPs who returned several years earlier.

• On average, returned IDPs have 5 percent lower food expenses and 6 percent lower calorie intake compared with the average Burundian household.

• The authors find evidence in favor of the divergence argument, but not for the convergence argument. For every two years that the HH was absent, the calorie-intake as well as the food expenses decreases by 1 percent with respect to the average HH. On average, returned IDPs had 13 percent less expenses on food and 10 percent less calorie intake than those HHs who were never displaced.

• The negative effect of displacement has long-term consequences, because years after returning home the effect is not cancelled out.

A longer duration of displacement has been shown to make it harder to re-adapt and earn a living, thus reducing household welfare.
This paper examines the experiences of non-camp Iraqi IDPs. Drawing on panel data from a longitudinal study conducted by IOM and Georgetown University, the authors analyze the experiences of IDPs in terms of their livelihoods, standards of living, security and social cohesion. The authors find that experiences of IDPs vary depending on whether they have been displaced to an urban or rural location. For IDPs displaced to urban locations, experiences vary depending on whether they have rural or urban backgrounds. Key findings include:

- **IDPs described several obstacles to establishing livelihoods** including: mismatch of skills to job opportunities in displacement locations; lack of tools, equipment and inventories that had been left behind or destroyed; and a labor surplus in governates hosting displaced populations. In the Kurdistan Region, there are also regulatory restrictions that may prevent IDPs working in their field, e.g. a Kurdish-language requirement for doctors.

- **In the absence of jobs in agriculture, business, or the public sector, most urban and rural IDPs found employment in the informal sector**, often through social connections. Urban IDPs rely primarily on informal commerce (45 percent of urban IDPs) and business (19 percent), and to a lesser degree on public sector jobs (14 percent) and pensions (11 percent). Rural IDPs rely primarily on informal commerce (39 percent of rural IDPs) and public sector jobs (28 percent), and to a lesser extent on business (14 percent) and pensions (7.5 percent). In most cases, public sector employees were able to maintain their employment in displacement locations; approximately 20 percent of urban IDPs and 23 percent of rural IDPs said they held government jobs prior to displacement. Only 4 percent of IDPs worked in agriculture, compared to 23 percent prior to displacement.

- **Urban displacement provided some opportunities for IDPs, particularly women and young people.** Women are entering the labor market and acquiring skills. Young people displaced from rural areas have greater access to services, job opportunities, and educational opportunities.

- **More than 70 percent of IDPs reported being able to provide for their basic needs** (housing, food and water, health care, and education). Among those displaced to urban areas, a slightly higher share of those originally from urban areas said their situations had deteriorated (35 percent) compared to those originally from rural areas (27 percent), possibly because of poorer living conditions in rural areas. IDPs perceive that host communities are better off (more frequently reported by rural IDPs than urban IDPs). While many IDPs owned houses or land in their rural homes, in displacement they paid a significant portion of their income every month to rent (and often to live in lower quality homes or in shared homes). High rents were often cited as a reason for secondary movements.

- **Nearly 30 percent of IDPs reported cutting back on food and other expenses; few IDPs reported pulling children out of school. Borrowing or receiving money was the most common strategy to**
help meet basic needs (55 percent of urban IDPs and 48 percent of rural IDPs). While more than 90 percent of IDPs reported needing to borrow money, less than half were able to do so. Over 90 percent of IDPs reported not receiving aid, and when they do (usually food and water), it is intermittent (more frequently reported among rural IDPs).

- **Over 90 percent of IDPs reported feeling completely or moderately safe in their host communities.** However, only one third of urban IDPs, compared to nearly half of rural IDPs, reported feeling completely safe. The majority of urban IDPs reported feeling moderately safe. In the absence of personal networks or tribal affiliations to solve problems, IDPs turned to state institutions. However, trust in state institutions was significantly lower among urban IDPs.

- **Most IDPs felt strongly or somewhat accepted by the host community,** though strong feelings of acceptance were higher among rural IDPs. IDPs from rural areas living in urban areas reported feeling accepted at lower rates than urban-urban IDPs. The extent of IDP integration into host communities varied widely. Among urban IDPs, pre-existing familial ties, humanitarian gestures initiated by the host community, and the urban environment itself (which offers job and educational opportunities) were commonly mentioned as factors that facilitated assimilation. IDPs mentioned that legal hurdles, discrimination, and cultural and linguistic barriers impeded their integration.

The authors argue for a shift from humanitarian aid to development assistance, echoing IDPs’ calls for new business development loans/grants, housing projects, and employment projects that help rebuild destroyed areas. They argue that IDPs who worked in agricultural are likely to remain in urban areas unless they are given considerable assistance to make their land safe again (demining and unexploded ordinance removal), restore destroyed land improvements (e.g. irrigation) and replace damaged machinery. Strong feelings of safety, security, and acceptance offer an excellent opportunity to build new civil society and community institutions (e.g. community centers, youth clubs, etc.). Unlike many IDP situations, IDPs are not at odds with their government, and the authors call for continued support to Iraqi government initiatives to support IDPs.


Mohammad Abdoh and Anna Hirsch-Holland
Background paper for the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019

Over 55,000 IDPs have settled in Kabul’s informal settlements, characterized by the poor physical condition of shelters and infrastructure, and insecure tenure of residents. This paper examines the status of land ownership and tenure security in three informal settlements in Kabul in order to understand how power dynamics and interests intersect to prolong displacement in inadequate and insecure conditions. The authors find that residents have limited knowledge about land ownership and tenure arrangements. In one of the three settlements, residents have managed to purchase land with a written document proving their ownership. They have been able to build permanent structures, set up a school for their children, and plan for the future. In the other two sites (more typical of informal settlements in Kabul), residents have little or no tenure security; they live in fear
of eviction, prevented from upgrading their shelters, and not enrolling their children in school on the assumption that they may have to leave any day. This is largely due to the weak policy and legal frameworks that should promote durable solutions either by formalizing the stay of IDPs where they are currently living (regularization of land occupancy, upgrading of settlements, and provision of services), or through relocation to allocated state land. This allows landowners to exploit the ambiguities in the system for their private gain, e.g. earning substantial income from charging rent to informal settlement residents, speculatively protecting land for potential real estate development (using the presence of IDPs to protect the land until such a time as they are willing to develop it) or grabbing land from others (including the state) who may hold a claim to it.

Ivlevs (2019) Are IDPs Satisfied With the Quality of Public Health and Education Services They Receive? A Long-term Perspective from Urban Areas in the Post-Socialist Countries

Artjoms Ivlevs
Background paper for the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019

In most displacement contexts IDPs incur losses to their material assets (housing, land and livestock), leading them to invest in mobile human capital (education) in an attempt to reduce the socio-economic disadvantage that they or their children are likely to experience as a result of displacement. Consequently it may be expected that IDPs actively seek and obtain adequate public education services and, as a result, be no less satisfied with the quality of education services compared to people not affected by conflict. This paper analyses IDPs’ self-reported satisfaction with public health and education services in urban areas of post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe that experienced violent conflict in 1990s and 2000s. The analysis draws on the Life in Transition-II survey, conducted by EBRD and the Bank in 30 post-socialist countries, focusing on the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia) and the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Tajikistan). In the sample of nine countries, approximately nine percent of respondents are former IDPs, 60 percent of whom live in urban areas. Key findings include:

- IDPs are disproportionately more likely to be dissatisfied with the quality of public health services 10 to 15 years after displacement. IDPs are more likely to report disrespectful treatment by staff, lack of medication, long waiting lists/lines, unclean facilities, and requests for unauthorized payment for services that should be free. Some of these findings can be explained by the concentration of IDPs in areas where health services are underfunded or were damaged by conflict, while others point to discrimination and prejudice against IDPs. Overall, these results point to the long lasting vulnerability and disadvantage of IDPs in terms of access to and satisfaction with public health services.
- There is no difference in satisfaction with public education services between IDPs and non-IDPs. Greater satisfaction with education but not health services is consistent with the hypothesis that forcibly displaced are more likely to invest in education to compensate for the loss of material possessions.
- Relative to people who were not affected by conflict, IDPs are 4.2 percentage more likely to file a complaint if dissatisfied with public education services. There are no differences between
IDPs and non-IDPs in relation to the likelihood of filing a complaint about public health services. This further supports the conjecture that the forcibly displaced are particularly keen to invest in education.

Pape and Sharma (2019) Informing Durable Solutions for Internal Displacement in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan: Volume A: Overview

Utz Johann Pape and Ambika Sharma
World Bank, 2019

This report presents findings from comprehensive microdata surveys covering IDP and host populations in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Refugees in Ethiopia from Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan were also surveyed. The analysis includes:

- Profiles of IDPs and hosts (covering displacement history, demographics, poverty, food insecurity, living conditions, access to services, livelihoods, social capital, and return intentions), permitting comparisons across countries, between IDPs and host communities, as well as the analysis of differences among IDPs.
- Classification of households (for the purposes of targeting) into three groups based on their ability to generate income: (1) ‘support-dependent households’ that either have no working-age adults without disabilities or are female-headed with only the household head in the working age and without disabilities; (2) ‘productive but poor households’ that have working-age members without disabilities, yet are still poor; and (3) ‘self-reliant households’ that have working-age members without disabilities and are not poor.
- Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to draw different profiles of IDPs based on their past conditions (cause-based indicators), present situation (needs-based indicators), and future intentions (solutions-based indicators). MCA illustrates how the full displacement trajectory can indicate tailored solutions.

Key findings:

- Conflict, violence, and insecurity are the main reasons that IDPs fled from their original residence across the four countries, except for 40 percent of Somalis who were displaced due to climate events.
- IDPs tend to be displaced within their own state or region.
- The majority of IDPs are children under 15 years. Consequently, IDP households have high dependency rates, especially among female-headed households.
- IDPs are generally poorer and more vulnerable than host communities, although rural hosts are nearly as poor as IDPs. Overall, more than 8 out of 10 IDPs in Somalia, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sudan live below the international poverty line of US$1.90 per person per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. IDPs tend to be poorer than residents, with the exception
of Nigeria where hosts are similarly poor. Poverty is also widespread among non-displaced populations in rural areas.

- **IDPs are highly food insecure, often more so than hosts.** In most cases, IDPs are more likely to be hungry (Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan).

- **IDPs, especially in camps, have access to basic facilities but still face poor living conditions.** Few IDPs have access to improved housing, apart from the long-displaced IDPs of Sudan. Displaced households often have comparable or marginally better access to basic services—water sources, health facilities, schools, and markets—than host communities. Most IDPs have access to improved drinking water, and their access is similar to (or better than) the non-displaced, but this does not factor in overcrowding. While a large share of displaced households use improved sanitation facilities, overcrowding often renders these facilities worse than those used by hosts. Many IDPs have access to health care, though less than hosts. IDP children are less likely to be enrolled in school than children from resident communities. About half of IDPs are literate and their literacy rates are comparable to hosts.

- **IDP and refugee populations have significantly lower access to land, livestock, and income-generating assets than they did before displacement.**

- **Social relations between IDPs and residents are generally good, except in South Sudan.**

- **IDPs face risks differentiated by sex.** Displaced women are more food insecure: 70 percent of displaced women compared to 57 percent of displaced men are highly food insecure. Displaced women are often tasked with the collection of water for the household, exposing them to increased risk of gender-based violence (GBV). Water collection often involves long wait times, leading to missed education and labor opportunities—reflected in worse education and labor outcomes for women versus men.

- **IDPs with agricultural/pastoralist backgrounds who are displaced into urban areas face difficulties adjusting to labor markets and have higher poverty rates than ‘non-agricultural’ IDPs.** IDPs typically relied more heavily on agriculture before displacement than their hosts do now: 42 percent of IDPs relied on own-account agriculture as their primary livelihood before displacement, compared to 26 percent of hosts who currently rely on agriculture. An overall shift in livelihoods away from agriculture is evident in each country except South Sudan. Agricultural IDPs have adjusted to current labor markets in different ways depending on country context. Agricultural IDPs are poorer overall (82 percent compared to 75 percent of non-agricultural IDPs), and are more likely to wish to return to their original residence than non-agricultural IDPs, possibly reflecting a desire to restore agricultural livelihoods.

- **Camp-based IDPs are more likely to be poor, have lower access to services, and be dependent on aid compared to hosts and IDPs outside camps.**

- **Inequality and heterogeneity among hosts can affect their perceptions of IDPs.** Host communities with high levels of inequality are more likely to believe that the arrival of IDPs have worsened job prospects. More prosperous host communities have better relations within the community and more favorable perceptions of IDPs. Heterogeneity along characteristics other than income also affects a community’s perceptions: areas with higher proportions of female-
headed households report better social relations but worse perceptions of employment opportunities; higher literacy of household heads is associated with less favorable social relations and perceptions of employment prospects; employment of household heads is associated with less favorable employment perceptions and attitudes towards IDPs; and having aid-receiving host households in the area leads to more favorable perceptions of IDPs.

- IDPs displaced further from their original residence are more often non-agricultural, have been displaced longer, and prefer to return.
- Most IDPs wish to stay in their current location or return to their origin; few want to resettle in a new location. 50 percent of IDPs in Sudan, 58 percent of IDPs in Nigeria, 58 percent of IDPs in South Sudan, and 70 percent of IDPs in Somalia wish to remain in their current location. 23 percent of Somali IDPs, 33 percent of South Sudanese IDPs, 25 percent of Nigerian IDPs, and 25 percent of Sudanese IDPs wish to return. IDPs identify security as the most important factor in any future decision.

The authors conclude that policy and programming interventions are urgently needed to improve living conditions by investing in food security, housing, sanitation and education. Additionally, improving security and increasing economic opportunities in return and host areas are critical for durable solutions. The authors note that contextual analysis is crucial—the country cases of Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia (see below) provide key insights. And, while socioeconomic challenges for IDPs are reflected in their quantitative profiles, such profiles do not adequately convey the suffering of IDPs. The Pulse of South Sudan and The Somali Pulse websites contain hundreds of video testimonials recorded with tablets during fieldwork to capture the voice of the people and give a face to the data.


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World Bank, 2019

These case studies are stand-alone displacement profiles that depict the socioeconomic conditions of IDPs and non-displaced communities.

Nigeria Case Study

Nearly two million people are internally displaced in Nigeria. About 60 percent of IDPs live in host communities and 40 percent live in camps. The Nigeria IDP Survey (IDPS) 2018 covered IDP and host households in six northeastern states where most IDPs are living (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
Taraba, and Yobe). IDPs were surveyed in two settings: in camps and among host communities. About 1,400 IDP and 1,400 host households were interviewed.

Key findings:

- **Armed conflict is the main cause of internal displacement.**
- **95 percent of IDPs have fled within their state of origin, but outside their local government area.**
- **The majority of IDPs are children.** 57 percent of IDPs are children under age 15.
- **Nearly 40 percent of IDP and host households are headed by women.** Female-headed households tend to be smaller with higher dependency ratios.
- **While the religious composition of IDPs is largely uniform (95 percent Muslim), IDPs belong to various ethnic tribes.** Most IDPs identify with the Kanuri tribe, and many are from Hausa and other smaller tribes.
- **Almost all IDPs are poor, food insecure, and doing badly on a range of basic living outcomes.** 87 percent of IDPs live below the international poverty line, and poor IDPs consume less than 30 percent of the poverty threshold. 61 percent of IDPs are highly food insecure. IDPs suffer from overcrowding, in terms of housing and sanitation. Displaced women are less likely than host women to give birth in a hospital or clinic. IDPs have lower school enrollment rates—many IDP children have not attended school for three years or more and some not since their displacement. Most IDPs lost homes that their families had owned for many years, and now live in worse housing conditions than they did before. Many IDPs lost agricultural land owned by their households.
- **Though slightly better off than IDPs, host communities face widespread poverty and poor living standards.** Host households are more likely to own homes and agricultural land than IDPs, though their home ownership rate is only about 50 percent. They have higher primary and secondary enrollment rates, are more likely to use a doctor or clinic for childbirth, and are less likely to have overcrowded sanitation facilities. Hosts and IDPs have a similar level of access to water, sanitation, schools, and markets. However, despite faring better than IDPs on most welfare measures, host communities face significant challenges. 8 out of 10 host households are poor, consuming on average less than 40 percent of the poverty threshold. 48 percent of host households are highly food insecure, and one in five working-age hosts do not participate in the labor force.
- **IDPs in camps have worse living standards than IDPs in host communities.** While IDPs in camps and IDPs in host communities have similar poverty levels, the latter are slightly better off on a number of dimensions. IDPs in camps face slightly more overcrowding in dwellings, and substantially more overcrowding in toilets (nearly 70 percent share a toilet with more than four households, and over 40 percent share with more than ten households). Camp-based displaced women who are members of male-headed households are less likely to give birth in a clinic or hospital. Camp-based children are more likely to stay out of school for longer than children in...
host communities; about half the children in camps have been out of school for over 3 years compared to only 16 percent of displaced children living in host communities.

- A majority of camp-based IDPs wish to return home, while most IDPs living in host communities intend to stay. 60 percent of IDPs (70 percent of IDPs in host communities, 20 percent of IDPs in camps) wish to remain in their current location while 40 percent prefer to return to their homes.

- IDP and host women have worse educational and labor outcomes than men, but displaced women face additional challenges. About 60 percent of IDP households send girls/women to collect water (compared to 43 percent of host households) which often involves long waiting times, with the opportunity cost of educational or labor force engagement. Water collection chores can also increase the risk of GBV. Displaced women are more likely than host women to deliver babies at home without a doctor/nurse/midwife. School enrollment rates are lower for girls than boys, and women have lower educational attainment than men. Women are also more likely than men to be inactive in the workforce.

- 65 percent of IDPs are employed, mostly in agriculture. 46 percent of working-age IDPs are employed, and 19 percent are employed and enrolled in education. 20 percent of working-age IDPs are unemployed or inactive in the labor force, which is similar to inactivity rates in host communities. 70 percent of IDP households rely primarily on agriculture for their livelihoods, compared to 50 percent before displacement. IDPs have lost agricultural land, but renting land from host communities could be allowing them to maintain agricultural livelihoods. IDPs who are inactive cite a lack of opportunities, skills, and capital, while host communities primarily cite a lack of opportunities.

- Both IDPs and host communities agree that they enjoy good relations, with the latter feeling that IDPs do not get enough aid.

- Both IDPs and host community households rely on their social networks for credit, which they perceive as difficult to tap.

- IDPs are less likely than hosts to participate in public meetings or meet community leaders.

- IDPs living in host communities and in Borno are most likely to be support-dependent. 71 percent of IDP households are productive but poor, 19 percent are support-dependent, 10 percent are self-reliant. Host communities have a slightly larger proportion of self-reliant households, but most households are productive but poor. IDPs living in host communities are more likely to be support-dependent than hosts and camp-based IDPs. Support-dependent IDP households are concentrated in Borno state.

- IDPs have two distinct typologies, which can be identified from their locations and return intentions. Both groups came from similar places of origin, had similar living standards at origin, and were displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. However, prior to their displacement, Group 1 (74 percent of IDPs) was more engaged in wages or non-farm business, while Group 2 (26 percent of IDPs) was more engaged in agriculture. Group 1 households are more likely to have smaller household sizes, higher dependency ratios or unemployed women as household heads. Group 1 is more likely to live in host communities, while Group 2 is more likely to live in camps.
Group 2 IDPs are more likely to rely on agriculture and receive assistance compared to Group 1, although both groups are equally poor and food insecure. Group 1 has higher levels of satisfaction with the current situation, preferring to stay in the current location. Group 2 is more likely to have lower levels of satisfaction with the current situation, feel less safe, feel more pessimistic about the future, and prefer to return to their origin. Group 1 households require more access to safety nets and gender-responsive programs. Group 2 IDPs can benefit from increased access to agricultural land and skill building to diversify their income.

The authors conclude that substantial investment is required to improve living conditions among host communities and sustain their ability to accommodate disadvantaged and vulnerable IDP groups. Coupled with raising hosts’ living standards, durable solutions for IDPs must prioritize security, both in displacement and return areas, and address the specific needs of the most vulnerable groups: women and IDPs in camps. Additionally, dependable and accurate information is an important resource for IDPs and should form part of a broader humanitarian response plan.

Somalia Case Study

Of Somalia’s total population of 14 million, about 2 million people are internally displaced. Insufficient rainfall over four consecutive rainy seasons, combined with clan-based conflict, and violence by armed non-state actors, caused a surge in displacement from late 2016 to late 2017. The Somali High Frequency Survey (HFS) 2017–18 sampled the Somali population in secure areas (Middle Juba was excluded due to insecurity) including: (a) IDPs in settlements; (b) host communities in urban areas adjacent to IDP settlements; and (c) non-host urban and rural populations. Several households originally part of the urban or rural sample, self-identified as IDPs, resulting in data on IDPs outside of settlements.

Key findings:

- **Climate events and conflict are the main causes of displacement cited by IDPs.** 38 percent of IDP households are displaced due to climate events (drought, famine, flood) and 40 percent due to conflict.
- **About 7 in 10 IDP households live in the same districts as they did originally,** and fewer than 1 in 10 are in a different region, federated member state, or country.
- **Most IDPs are in urban areas (75 percent of IDP households) and in formal settlements (62 percent of IDP households).**
- **IDPs, like the rest of the Somali population, are overwhelmingly young.** Over 50 percent of IDPs are under 15 years and less than 1 percent are above age 64, driving high dependency ratios (larger than 1 in 1).
- **Like the national population, every second IDP household is headed by a woman.**
- **The incidence and depth of poverty are greater among IDPs than urban residents, but about the same as among rural residents.** 74 percent of IDPs live below the international poverty line, compared to 63 percent of urban residents and 70 percent of rural residents. The poverty gap
among IDPs (35 percent) is higher than that of urban residents (24 percent) and the national population (27 percent), but similar to that of rural residents (32 percent).

- **Hunger is more common among IDPs.** 55 percent of IDPs experienced hunger, compared to 43 percent of rural residents and 17 percent of urban residents. More than half of IDP households are food insecure.

- **IDPs have worse living conditions.** One in four IDPs have access to improved housing, which is much worse than among the national population, and host and non-host communities, but similar to the share among rural residents (18 percent). IDPs have better access to improved sanitation and health care than rural residents. However, IDP settlements are severely overcrowded, which largely negates access to improved drinking water and sanitation. IDP settlements are also located further from essential facilities than host communities.

- **Displaced children have lower levels of human capital.** Displaced children are less likely to attend school than children from host communities or children in urban areas. Displaced adults have lower literacy rates than non-IDP adults in urban areas.

- **IDPs participate in the labor force at similar rates to the urban and rural population.** Women are much more likely than men to be economically inactive. Most IDPs do the same work they did before being displaced, but about half of the poorest IDPs and those outside settlements have had to change their main employment.

- **IDPs receive relatively low remittances, indicating a lack of safety nets.**

- **Most IDPs feel safe and report good relations with communities around them.**

- **73 percent of IDPs are productive but poor, 26 percent are self-reliant, and less than 1 percent are support-dependent.** Host communities have a larger share of self-reliant households. Household vulnerability varies by region: almost all IDPs in lower Juba are self-reliant, whereas most households in Banadir, Middle Shabelle, Gedo, Woqooyi Galbeed, and Bay are productive but poor.

- **Somali IDPs have two distinct typologies.** Group 1 (40 percent of IDPs) are more likely to come from agricultural backgrounds and to have been displaced by drought, and their living conditions before being displaced were generally worse than their current living conditions. Group 2 households (60 percent of IDPs) were less dependent on agriculture, had better housing quality before being displaced, and are more likely to have been displaced by conflict. Currently, Group 2 households tend to be less poor, less food insecure, and in better housing conditions than Group 1 households. 70 percent of households in both groups prefer to stay in their current location rather than return to their place of origin or relocate. For both groups, security is the main factor driving preferences to stay, return, or resettle. The typology suggests different home and livelihood restoration efforts for the two groups. Resilience to drought would be key to a durable solution, especially for Group 1.

The authors highlight several priorities for durable solutions for IDPs in Somalia including: investments in human capital to prevent lifelong gaps in social and economic development; improvement of hosts’ living conditions; substantial investment in infrastructure (particularly in urban and peri-urban areas where most IDPs reside) to prevent a decline in service and livelihood...
quality of hosts and IDPs and preserve positive IDP-host community relations; support to rural development and resilience to drought to enable IDPs to return or relocate to rural areas; and support to enhance access to education and employment opportunities, especially for the younger population.

**South Sudan Case Study**

The conflict in South Sudan that began in December 2013 has displaced an estimated 4 million people including about 2.1 million refugees and 1.9 million people IDPs, 15 percent of whom are in camps. The Crisis Recovery Survey (CRS) was conducted in 2017 in four of the largest Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites, all in urban areas (Bentiu PoC in Upper Nile, Bor PoC in Jonglei, Juba PoC in Central Equatoria, and Wau PoC in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal). The fourth wave of the High Frequency Survey (HFS) South Sudan 2017 allows for comparisons of IDPs to urban residents, and represents urban areas in 7 of the 10 pre-war states of South Sudan. HFS 2017 does not cover two of the pre-war states (Jonglei and Unity). Consequently, comparisons are drawn at the overall urban and IDP level.

Key findings:

- **IDPs predominantly fled due to armed conflict** (79 percent of IDP households).
- **IDPs tend to be younger than urban residents, driving high dependency ratios.** About 45 percent of IDPs are under 15, compared to 32 percent of urban residents.
- **IDPs and urban residents have fewer adult men than women.**
- **IDPs are mostly from the Nuer tribe,** which is associated with the opposition group.
- **Most IDPs are displaced within their state of origin and have not travelled far.**
- **About 37 percent of IDP households and 30 percent of urban households have separated members.** IDP households have less contact with separated members, and most do not have access to family reunification mechanisms.
- **Poverty is widespread among IDPs and rural residents.** More than 90 percent of IDP households are poor, compared to 86 percent of rural residents and 75 percent of urban residents. IDPs have deeper poverty gaps: 54 percent for IDPs compared with 51 percent for rural and 40 percent for urban residents.
- **Despite being poorer, IDPs are less hungry than urban residents.** About 24 percent of IDPs have experienced hunger three or more times during the four weeks prior to the survey compared with 32 percent of urban residents. The lower hunger rates among IDPs may be due to more predictable and stable access to food due to aid.
- **IDPs have experienced a drastic deterioration in living standards—their current living conditions are significantly worse than those of urban residents.** Before displacement, 43 percent of IDPs had improved housing, and 86 percent owned their home. The pre-conflict housing conditions of IDPs were better than those of urban residents today; 21 percent of urban residents occupy improved housing and 78 percent own their dwelling. Now, almost all IDPs live in overcrowded tents/temporary shelters. Severe overcrowding in dwellings and sanitation
facilities reduces living standards, contributes to the spread of communicable diseases, and increases the risk of GBV.

- **IDPs have better educational outcomes than rural residents but worse than urban residents, and men are more likely to be literate.** 53 percent of IDPs above age 14 are literate, compared with 33 percent of rural and 62 percent of urban residents. Women are much less likely than men to be literate in all three groups. While more than half of IDPs are literate, few have studied beyond primary school. About one in four IDPs has a secondary school or university education.

- **Displaced youth are more likely to be idle.** Displaced youth have lower labor force participation than urban youth (32 percent and 63 percent, respectively). One in four displaced youth are idle—neither working, nor looking for work, nor studying.

- **Sex-based disparities in the working-age population are starker for IDPs.** Young women have higher labor force participation and lower educational enrollment than young men. This is particularly evident among IDPs: 51 percent of young men are in education, compared to 28 percent of young women. Among displaced adults, labor force participation trends are reversed; men are more likely to be active in the labor force while women are more likely to be idle.

- **IDPs have lost most of their income-generating assets and depend on aid.** Access to agricultural land fell from 0.8 acres per household before the conflict to about 0.2 acres today. Livestock holdings fell from 42 to 2 livestock units per household. More than 75 percent of IDP households rely on aid as their main source of livelihood.

- **Many IDPs do not feel safe in the camps, and perceptions of safety are quite low.**

- **58 percent of IDPs wish to stay in their current location, 34 percent wish to return to their place of origin and 7 percent wish to resettle in a new location.** IDPs who wish to stay are motivated by better security, services, and assistance in the camps. Security and services are also the most important concerns for IDPs who wish to leave their current location.

- **13 percent of IDP households are support-dependent (mostly located in Bor, Juba and Wau PoCs), 64 percent are productive but poor, and 23 percent are self-reliant.** Urban resident and IDP households are equally likely to be support-dependent, but urban households are four times more likely to be self-reliant than IDP households.

- **IDPs have two typology profiles.** Before displacement, Group 1 households (40 percent) were more likely to derive their income from wages and businesses. Group 2 households (60 percent) were more likely to have agricultural livelihoods, and worse housing quality. Group 2 households tend to be larger, poorer, more aid dependent, and with higher dependency ratios. They also feel less safe in their current environment, and are more confident of returning or resettling soon. However, Group 1 households are more optimistic about their future. Group 1 households are primarily located in Juba and Bor PoCs, while Group 2 households are concentrated in Bentiu and Wau PoCs. Both groups reported the need for regular and reliable information about the security and political situation in origin areas, as well as in potentially new areas.

The authors highlight several priorities for durable solutions for IDPs in South Sudan including: preserving human capital by strengthening food security, improving living conditions, and improving access to health care, education and employment opportunities; improving access to services and
humanitarian assistance; and reliable information provided to displaced populations about the security and political situation in their original place of residence, as well as in any new re-location area where better living conditions. However, any solution will depend on the improvement of security conditions in the country.

Sudan Case Study

Current estimates suggest that as many as two million individuals, five percent of Sudan’s population, are internally displaced. The Sudan IDP Profiling Survey 2018 represents IDPs in two camps near Al Fashir. The two camps, Abu Shouk and El Salam, are in the sub-urban and peri-urban areas of Al Fashir, the capital city of the North Darfur state. The host population (residents of Al Fashir) is also represented in the survey.

Key findings:

- **Most surveyed IDPs were displaced at the height of the Darfur conflict in 2003–04.** About half wish to remain where they are. Most working-age IDPs engage in income-generating activities in or around the camps. Many IDPs who wish to remain in the camps cite concerns about security, but IDPs also appreciate the health and education services offered in the camps. Almost one in two IDPs were either not born or below the age of five at displacement and have grown up in the camps.

- **IDPs are young—**their demographic profile resembles that of non-IDP populations more than that of newly registered IDPs. 43 percent of IDPs are less than 15 years of age, compared to 40 percent of hosts. Protracted IDPs are older than what is typically observed among newly registered IDPs.

- **IDPs and hosts are extremely poor.** More than 8 out of 10 IDPs and 6 out of 10 hosts fall below the international poverty threshold.

- **Food insecurity is higher among IDPs** (64 percent) than among hosts (31 percent).

- **IDPs’ dwellings are permanent structures and similar to their houses before the conflict.** 99 percent of IDP households live in tukuls (traditional dwellings with circular mud walls and a roof), or other permanent mud or wood structures.

- **While access to many services in the camps is better than at IDPs’ places of origin, access to food and electricity is often deficient.** Most IDPs have access to improved sources of drinking water and improved sanitation facilities, as well as health centers, schools, and markets—though they have lower school enrollment than hosts. However, 60 percent of IDPs have high levels of food insecurity and only 9 percent of IDP households have electricity in their homes.

- **Literacy rates among IDPs are similar to those of the host population, but there are significant gaps between men and women.** While IDPs have lower levels of educational attainment, literacy rates among IDP and host populations are similar (70 percent). 78 percent of displaced men are literate, compared to 62 percent of displaced women. Members of female-headed households are less likely to be literate.
• Employment levels are similar for adult IDPs and hosts, displaced women are more likely to work than host women, and displaced youth are more likely to be working than to be in education.

• Before displacement 95 percent of IDP households depended on agriculture as their main source of income; currently less than half of IDP households depend on agriculture. IDPs who currently rely on agriculture tend to be the poorest. Only one in three IDP households has access to agricultural land and only one in five IDP households owns livestock.

• 6 percent of IDP households depend on aid as their main source of income, and only 20 percent receive any aid at all. This independence is generally positive, but also reflects limitations on aid access. IDPs largely generate their own income, yet it is barely enough: IDPs who wish to relocate frequently cite the lack of employment and livelihood opportunities in the camps as their main reason.

• Relations between IDPs and hosts are mostly perceived as good or very good on both sides.

• IDPs feel considerably less safe in their neighborhoods than hosts.

• Neither IDPs nor host communities exhibit high levels of civic engagement.

• IDPs remain economically vulnerable and more so than hosts, despite being productive. About 70 percent of IDP households are productive but poor, 10 percent are support-dependent. Only 50 percent of host households are productive but poor, and only 4 percent are fully support-dependent.

• IDPs have two distinct typologies, which can be differentiated based on their displacement year, location, and return intentions. Before being displaced, Group 1 (39 percent of IDPs) relied more heavily on agriculture. Group 1 IDPs are more likely to have been displaced in 2003-2004. They are more likely to live in a shelter provided by the camp and are therefore closer to services and more likely to have access to an improved water source. However, Group 1 households have a higher poverty rate and a deeper average poverty gap. They are more likely to face food insecurity and to rely on assistance. Most Group 1 households want to relocate, primarily to obtain better access to employment. In contrast, most Group 2 households prefer to stay where they are for security reasons. More than half of Group 2 households are headed by women. Group 2 also seems to have less access to services and worse housing, perhaps because most of them are located far from the main centers of the camps. Supporting Group 1 IDPs implies improving their skills to help them diversify their incomes. Group 2 households require gender-responsive programs, increasing their access to safety nets and better living conditions.

The authors conclude that a durable solution for protracted displacement in Al Fashir must: (a) improve living conditions for hosts and IDPs in camps that have become a permanent residence for many; (b) improving the security situation and expanding economic opportunities in return areas; and (c) business skills development and better access to employment opportunities, mainly for agricultural IDPs.

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World Bank, 2019

Volume C of the study describes some of the innovations in survey methodology and analysis. Specifically:

- In response to underreporting of consumption patterns, the authors propose the adoption of “honesty primes” in survey design. Honest primes were randomly administered to half of the survey respondents in IDP camps and urban areas interviewed across South Sudan in the 2017 HFS. They included: (a) an emphasis on the importance of accurate answers at the beginning of the survey (appeal to honesty); (b) a short fictional scenario which requires passing judgment on the behavior of one of the characters (moral primes); and (c) additional questions to determine when was the last time that the household had a meal, forcing the respondents to explicitly report that they have not eaten in the last week (investigative probing). While the first two questions target intentional misreporting, the latter addresses classical measurement error. The primes helped ascertain whether there was indeed some misreporting of consumption, which might be the case if there was a differential impact on the consumption reported by IDPs relative to non-IDPs, or among the poorest. The results suggest that there was indeed some underreporting and that the honesty primes had an impact on the consumption reported by poorer and more vulnerable respondents.

- The authors also propose clustering approaches to derive typologies of IDPs, to inform the required specificity of programs, and to find durable solutions. Among the displaced, different groups can have different trajectories in displacement. Initial circumstances of displacement can translate into different needs and solutions depending on the displacement trajectory, which is pertinent for policy and programming. Clustering analysis helps to identify the different typologies of the displaced. The aim of the analysis is to exploit the socioeconomic micro-level data to identify different groups or profiles of displaced households across countries. These typologies are drawn using data on the causes of displacement, the current needs of displaced people, and the potential solution to end displacement.

**Socio-Economic Impacts of Internal Displacement on Host Communities and Countries**

Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) Unexpected Guests: The Impact of Internal Displacement Inflows on Rental Prices in Colombian Host Cities

Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Rafael J. Santos
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.05.006](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.05.006)
The article examines the causal impact of IDPs inflows on rental prices in Colombian cities, over the period 1999 to 2014. IDPs affect the housing market in several ways: (a) IDPs are poor and increase demand for low-income rental units; (b) IDPs provide cheap labor, which is partially absorbed by the construction sector; (c) competition in the labor market may depress wages for both IDP and non-IDP workers; (d) IDP inflows may be associated with deteriorating living conditions, which may translate into lower housing prices; (e) heterogenous effects are likely to emerge due to the segmentation of the market along income levels, e.g. serviced, affordable land for low-income housing is scarce; and (f) local government may pursue policies to deter low-income households moving into their jurisdictions. Using an instrumental variables approach (to address the potential endogeneity of location choices of IDPs), the authors find that as IDP inflows increase, low-income rental prices increase and high-income rental prices decrease. Between 2004 and 2014, low-income rental prices increased by 14 percent and high-income rental prices decreased by 37 percent. The authors provide empirical evidence on two potential mechanisms for these findings. First, excess demand for low-income housing puts upward pressure on rental prices, but this is not followed by an increase in the supply of low-income housing. The authors show that while the total number of construction licenses does not vary with IDP inflows, construction licenses for low-income housing units are crowded-out by construction licenses for high-income housing units. Moreover, real wages in the construction sector are negatively affected by the arrival of IDP, suggesting IDPs fuel the construction sector in more affluent areas (lowering rental prices). And second, increasing supply of high-income housing coupled with rising homicide rates puts downwards pressure on rental prices. A 10 percent increase in IDP inflows increases the homicide rate by 6.4 percent with respect to its mean. This depresses rental prices, however in poorer areas, the boost in housing demand outweighs the impact of crime.

[From Paolo’s paper: Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) use the weighed sum of IDP outflows from all municipalities (except the receiving host city), where the weights are the inverse of the road distance between the host city and each municipality of origin. Depetris-Chauvin’s and Santos’ (2018) OLS estimates show a significant positive impact of IDP inflows on average rental prices for low- and middle-income housing, which may last up to 10 quarters. Results for high-income housing are non-significant. Their IV approach does not show statistically significant impacts on rental prices on average; but rental prices for low-income housing increase while they decrease for high-income housing. This is one of the few papers that explores potential channels through which the IDP inflow might impact the variable of interest. They provide evidence that the heterogeneous impact on rental prices might be due to an increase in supply of high-income housing, as licenses for new non-social interest housing increase while those for social interest housing decrease, and wages in the construction sector decrease, reducing construction costs. At the same time, they find evidence of a large housing deficit in the low-income areas of the host cities. The second channel might be an increase in crime associated with the inflows of IDPs, measured by the homicide rate in the host cities, which has a negative impact on high-income rental prices.]
Gender Dimensions of Internal Displacement

Cazabat (2019) Sex Matters: A Gender Perspective on Internal Displacement
Christelle Cazabat
IDMC Briefing Paper, February 2019
http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/sex-matters-a-gender-perspective-on-internal-displacement

Building on a review of nearly 1,000 publications, this briefing paper presents some of the most frequently reported gender inequalities linked to internal displacement, including:

- **Displaced men and boys** may resort to harmful coping strategies if they lose their usual source of income. School-age boys may engage in child labor, interrupting their education and jeopardizing future livelihoods. Men and boys are particularly at risk of recruitment by armed groups, which increases insecurity for the entire community, potentially leading to further displacement. Actual or perceived association of men with conflict has been found to lead host communities to be less welcoming to them than to displaced women and children. Men have been found at higher risk of certain medical conditions associated with internal displacement. Men also seem more vulnerable to increased consumption of alcohol in situations of displacement. Erosion of status, through loss of work, home and social ties, has been shown to increase violence inflicted upon displaced women.

- Internal displacement amplifies pre-existing vulnerabilities and inequalities (economic, social, legal, political) for **displaced women and girls**. Displaced women often suffer greater disadvantage than displaced men in the labor market. Inability to legally own or rent a house, or to secure enough income to pay for it, can lead displaced women to live in camps or informal settlements where they find fewer livelihood opportunities. Women and girls may also resort to transactional sex or prostitution, placing them at higher risk of sexually transmitted diseases and unintended pregnancies. Displaced pregnant women receive less antenatal care and are more exposed to violence, malnutrition, poor hygiene conditions and communicable diseases. Displaced and returning women may also be more vulnerable to post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and anxiety than displaced men or non-displaced women. Displaced women living in insecure shelters are at higher risk of sexual violence. Women and girls who return home after having been displaced often face stigmatization because of common knowledge of the prevalence of sexual violence. Violence against women can also take other forms (intimate partner violence including forced sex, forced abortions, control over contraception, and violence during pregnancy).

- **Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, intersex or queer (LGBTIQ)** displaced persons face specific challenges and suffer from formal or informal discrimination. The risk of gender-based violence increases in times of displacement for people from sexual minorities.
Return and Reintegration of IDPs

Hoogeveen et al (2018) Leaving, Staying or Coming Back? Migration Decisions During the Northern Mali Conflict

Johannes G. Hoogeveen, Mariacristina Rossi and Dario Sansone
The Journal of Development Studies, 2018
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This paper makes use of high frequency panel data from mobile phone interviews to analyze: (a) the characteristics of refugees, IDPs, and returnees during the recent crisis in Northern Mali; (b) willingness of IDPs and refugees to return to their place of origin, actual migration decisions, and how migration decisions change over time; and (c) how employment and safety affect migration decisions. The authors find:

• At the beginning of the study (in August 2014, more than two years after the start of the conflict) 93 per cent of surveyed refugees and 81 percent of surveyed IDPs wished to return, however during the 12 months of the study only 0.3 percent of surveyed refugees and 2.4 percent of surveyed IDPs actually returned.

• Among those who did not wish to return, the main reason offered was insecurity in the north, followed by ‘life is easier here’, lack of means, or business reasons.

• Among those who had already returned, most decided to go back because Northern Mali was their home (23 percent), the area had been liberated (10 percent) or to search for a job (9 percent); family was often mentioned as a secondary reason for having returned. The main challenges identified by returnees included poverty, scarce food, lack of infrastructure and jobs, absence of drinkable water, and insecurity.

• **Individuals who were employed while displaced were less willing to return.** This suggests that economic factors play a major role in return decisions even in the context of forced displacement.

• **Individuals who experienced difficulties with the security forces (police, gendarme, army) during displacement were more likely to have already returned, and those who owned a gun were more likely to plan to go back.** Whether an individual felt safe during the day (or at night) was not correlated with the likelihood of planning to go back.

The analysis suggests that returnees are a self-selected group more likely to have been inactive during displacement, and therefore international organizations should be aware of this weakness and provide these returnees with additional support.

Sydney (2019) “Tired of Running” Repeated Displacement and Premature Returns in South Sudan

Chloe Sydney
IDMC’s ‘Invisible Majority’ thematic series, November 2019
As of December 2018, there were 1.9 million IDPs in South Sudan, and a further 2.3 million South Sudanese had sought refuge abroad. Despite the unstable situation, around 183,500 refugees had returned spontaneously to South Sudan by the end of June 2019. As many as 684,000 IDPs may have returned since 2016, although they are unlikely to have found durable solutions. This report examines the relationship between internal displacement, cross-border movements and durable solutions in South Sudan including: drivers of displacement and onward movements within and across borders; IDPs’ and refugees’ priorities/preconditions for voluntary return; and obstacles and opportunities faced by returning IDPs and refugees to achieve durable solutions. The analysis is based on more than 200 interviews with IDPs, returning IDPs and returning refugees in and around Bentiu and Juba in July 2019 (data is not representative).

Key findings include:

- **Repeated displacements are very common.** Over three-quarters of those surveyed had been displaced more than once. Around a third had tried to return to their homes, only to be displaced again by renewed violence.
- **Not all IDPs who want to leave the country are able to do so.** Almost 80 percent of surveyed IDPs cited cost as a barrier to cross-border movement, and two-thirds of IDPs mentioned insecurity as another barrier.
- **Refugees have often been first internally displaced.** More than 80 percent of surveyed returning refugees had previously been IDPs before they left the country.
- **Returns of IDPs and refugees have increased following the signing of the revitalized peace agreement in 2018.** The majority of the surveyed returning refugees had returned in 2018 and 2019.
- **Not all refugee returns have been voluntary, particularly among refugees returning from Sudan.** Some returning refugees said the security forces had forced them to leave or they had been threatened with arrest and deportation, and others returned because of political unrest in Sudan.
- **Among refugees who returned voluntarily, improved security in South Sudan was the main motivation, followed by reunification with family and friends.** Poor living conditions in displacement were an important secondary motivation.
- **Returning IDPs surveyed said they mainly wanted to recover their livelihoods.**
- **The majority (around 85 percent) of returning refugees live in IDP-like situations.** Predominantly because of insecurity, two-thirds of surveyed returning refugees were living outside their area of origin, including in Protection of Civilians sites (PoCs). Others, as well as many returning IDPs, live in temporary shelters because their homes were destroyed.
- **Destruction of property is a major barrier to durable solutions for both IDPs and returning refugees.** More than 80 percent of the IDPs surveyed had property before their displacement, but 70 percent of these said it had since been destroyed.
- **PoC sites provide essential protection, but more support is needed for those who return.** 80 percent of the IDPs surveyed want to return to their area of origin, but only half think they will
be able to within a year. Many are unwilling to return because they do not trust the revitalized peace agreement. PoCs provide essential protection for those afraid of being targeted on ethnic grounds. Those who do choose to return are in significant need of support, which so far has not been forthcoming.

Development Interventions in Response to Internal Displacement


Greta Zeender and Bronwen James Crowther
OCHA Policy and Studies Series, June 2019
https://www.unocha.org/publication/policy-briefs-studies/reducing-protracted-internal-displacement-snapshot-successful

This report presents examples of projects that enhance humanitarian-development cooperation in order to reduce the vulnerabilities of IDPs and host communities and work towards durable solutions. Projects were selected to cover a variety of internal displacement situations (in Colombia, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan and Ukraine) with a primary focus on the improvement of the lives of IDPs, taking into account the needs of host communities, and covering issues such as education, training, livelihood support, housing and protection. Based on a desk review of available evaluation reports, the authors identify the following factors contributing to the success and sustainability of projects in the context of protracted internal displacement:

• Humanitarian and development organizations have combined their respective expertise or relied on specific local knowledge for the project.
• Project design is flexible enough to adapt over time and respond to the evolving needs of IDPs.
• Strong coordination with national and local authorities to enable government ownership, as well as knowledge transfer, is built within the project’s design.
• Projects take into account local business and market needs, identifying the need for specific skills or profitable products.
• Projects are tailored to the local environment, using an area-based approach that benefits IDPs and host communities and include them in project planning and implementation. Successful projects also took into account the needs of specific vulnerable groups.
• Projects in cities include strong urban planning elements to provide innovative housing solutions and ensure sustainability.
• Projects are part of wider strategies, supported through multi-year funding.
This study describes the impact of protracted internal displacement and proposes steps to address internal displacement where durable solutions remain elusive. This analysis draws on case studies of protracted internal displacement in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Philippines, Somalia and Ukraine. Key messages:

- An increasing number of IDPs are in situations of protracted displacement, characterized by entrenched vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalization. Rather than focusing on duration of displacement (which can affect displaced groups differently across contexts), the authors define protracted displacement as “situations in which tangible progress towards durable solutions is slow or stalled for significant periods of time because IDPs are prevented from taking or are unable to take steps that allow them to progressively reduce the vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalization they face as displaced people, in order to regain a self-sufficient and dignified life and ultimately find a durable solution”.

- Protracted displacement can be found in six general contexts: ongoing conflict and violence situations; ‘frozen’ conflict situations (absence of a peace agreement preventing return); post-conflict situations; mega-disaster events; long-lasting, repeated, small-scale or seasonal disasters; and mixed situations. Addressing protracted displacement requires actions that allow IDPs to progressively reduce their vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalization and take steps towards a self-sufficient and dignified life.

- Protracted displacement leaves IDPs in a situation of vulnerability that exposes them to various protection problems that often increase over time including: risks relating to safety and security; restrictions on freedom of movement; greater difficulties in maintaining an adequate standard of living including access to food, drinking water, basic shelter and housing, health, education; impediments to securing employment or livelihoods; challenges asserting housing, land and property rights; difficulties obtaining or replacing lost documents; inability to fully participate in public affairs; and heightened social, cultural and economic marginalization and stigmatization.

- Protracted internal displacement can severely impact host families, communities, local governments and host countries.

- Major causes of protracted internal displacement are: prolonged conflict; lack of political will and inadequate frameworks at the country level to address internal displacement; limited engagement by international actors to move beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance; and lack of dedicated financial resources to address protracted displacement or prevent new displacement from becoming protracted.

- Addressing protracted internal displacement is not a purely humanitarian concern, requiring far-reaching changes in how governments and the international community address internal
displacement, i.e. working towards collective outcomes that reduce the particular needs, risks and vulnerabilities of IDPs and increase their resilience. IDPs should not have to wait until a conflict is fully resolved or all impacts of a disaster have ceased before they can begin rebuilding their lives and move towards self-sufficiency in accordance with fundamental standards of human rights and dignity.

- Achieving collective outcomes requires: (a) creating an evidence base (on causes and impacts of protracted internal displacement, and capacities of IDPs and host communities); (b) defining collective outcomes; (c) ensuring a strategic outlook by formulating a common problem statement; (d) integrating collective outcomes into relevant planning tools, e.g. national development plans; (e) promoting and creating normative and institutional frameworks (i.e. adequate laws and policies); (f) implementing multi-year collaborative interventions (rather than mandate-driven projects); and (g) securing transversal financing (i.e. transcending humanitarian-development divide).

- Governments should lead efforts where possible, prioritizing action to ensure IDPs’ and host communities’ access to livelihood opportunities, adequate housing with security of tenure and basic services. This should be done within National Development Plans, with adequate normative and institutional frameworks, and support to municipalities (based on population including IDPs).

- International development and humanitarian actors should support government efforts by integrating concrete and measurable outcomes into their own planning and activities, prioritizing actions that strengthens the resilience of IDPs and host communities through investments in livelihoods, housing and services, and support to strengthen government capacity. In urban areas, comprehensive urban planning approaches should be promoted and supported.

- Donors should provide more flexible and long-term funding.

**Sydney and Milano (2019) Impact and Experience - Addressing Severity of Conflict Displacement**

Chloe Sydney and Leonardo Milano
IDMC, February 2019

IDMC aims to complement displacement figures with an assessment of displacement severity in order to call attention to situations of particular concern, highlight key threats to IDPs’ safety and wellbeing, and better measure progress towards finding solutions to internal displacement. This report outlines the methodology adopted by IDMC to assess displacement severity, and provides preliminary results for Colombia and Iraq. IDMC’s severity assessment is aligned with the eight criteria outlined in the IASC framework for durable solutions. Three (closed) questions have been identified for each category, designed to assess the severity of displacement in the absence of quantitative data on standardized indicators, and without comparing IDPs to their host communities or the national average:
• **Safety and security**: Is the area to which IDPs are displaced free from active fighting? Is the area to which IDPs are displaced free from explosive hazards? Are IDPs free from persecution or human rights abuses (including GBV) in the area to which they have been displaced?

• **Livelihoods**: Are there income-generating opportunities for IDPs? Do IDPs have enough to eat? Can IDPs avoid resorting to negative coping strategies such as child labor, prostitution or child marriage?

• **Housing**: Are IDPs living in safe, adequate shelters able to withstand the local climate (i.e. not in unfinished buildings, tents, etc.)? Are accessible and effective mechanisms in place for IDPs to apply for property restitution or compensation for their lost or damaged property? Are IDPs protected from forced evictions?

• **Services**: Do IDPs have appropriate access to water and sanitation? Are there accessible and affordable health care services? Are primary-age IDP children in school?

• **Documentation**: Do IDPs have documentation to access services or assistance track? Do IDPs have access to easy and affordable mechanisms for replacement documentation? Are IDPs able to travel freely?

• **Family reunification**: Are IDPs living with their close family members? Are there any family tracing and reunification mechanisms available to IDPs? Are protection mechanisms in place for unaccompanied and separated children?

• **Public affairs**: Can IDPs vote in elections in their area of displacement? Are the issues of IDPs represented in the platforms of political parties? Are IDPs able to participate in decision-making regarding their displacement?

• **Remedies and justice**: Do IDPs have access to legal counsel and/or representation? Do IDPs have access to effective law enforcement? Do IDPs have access to effective remedies and justice for harms that they suffered?

To answer these questions, IDMC monitoring experts will contact their data sources and partners in the field to evaluate each category of displacement severity, and triangulate information provided. The monitoring experts will decide whether the relevant indicator should be coded red (2), yellow (1), or green (0) depending on severity (or white, if there is insufficient data available). IDMC acknowledges that their severity assessment is qualitative in nature, and reflects subjective judgment by IDMC experts and partners in the field. **IDMC plans to examine severity among IDPs in around 50 different countries in 2019, and preliminary results for a selection of displacement situations will be included in this year’s Global Report on Internal Displacement.**

**Sydney (2019) “Stuck in the middle” – Seeking Durable Solutions in Post-Peace Agreement Colombia**

Chloe Sydney
IDMC, March 2019
This study examines the relationship between internal displacement, cross-border movements and durable solutions in Colombia. Based on almost 200 interviews with IDPs, refugees and returning refugees, the study examines drivers of displacement and onward movement within and across borders, provides a better understanding of priorities and preconditions for return, and explores obstacles and opportunities for durable solutions. While the sample is not representative, the research offers insights into respondents’ knowledge, experiences, attitudes and aspirations. Key findings include:

- Research participants were displaced by a wide range of displacement triggers including: armed groups seeking to seize control of their land; armed confrontations between groups; persecution and death threats for attempting to bring crimes to justice, perceived affiliation to armed groups or political parties, or because of their sexual orientation; extortion; and fear of forced recruitment.

- Despite the peace agreement signed between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in 2016, internal displacement continues—around 139,000 new displacements associated with conflict and violence were recorded in 2017. Additionally, the crisis in Venezuela has led to the return of between 300,000 and 500,000 Colombian refugees and vulnerable migrants. Many have been unable to go back to their areas of origin because of insecurity, and have returned to a life of internal displacement.

- More than a third of respondents said they had been displaced more than once. Cross-border movements often take place when IDPs are unable to find safety in Colombia. Around three-quarters of refugees and returning refugees interviewed had been internally displaced before fleeing Colombia.

- The early stages of displacement are particularly hard and can be marked by hunger and homelessness both in Colombia and abroad. Many IDPs and refugees struggle to access adequate housing, employment and services. Internal displacement to peripheral urban areas may increase people’s exposure to violence, leading to further forced movements.

- Difficult conditions in displacement motivate some IDPs and refugees to return, but these movements are sometimes premature and often unsustainable. Less than a quarter of returning refugees surveyed were living in their areas of origin, partly because of continued insecurity. Given the challenges faced by returning refugees, nearly a third of those interviewed wish to leave the country again.

- Colombia has one of the world’s most comprehensive legal frameworks on internal displacement, with sophisticated mechanisms for assistance, compensation and land restitution. However, implementation of legislation is slow and only around 10 percent of victims have so far received compensation.
IX. PRIVATE SECTOR
Private Sector Initiatives

IFC (2018) Summary of IFC’s Stocktaking Study of Private Sector Initiatives: Engaging Refugees and Host Communities

IFC, February 2018

The role of the private sector in responding to protracted refugee situations is shifting from traditional approaches (e.g. financial donations, or provision of goods and services as a contractor) to approaches that leverage private sector capabilities. An IFC survey of private sector initiatives working with refugees and host communities in 25 low- and middle-income countries found several emerging types of private sector engagement in protracted refugee situations: (a) funding of humanitarian assistance; (b) leveraging private sector capabilities—often technology or technical expertise—to provide humanitarian assistance, education or financial services; (c) extending or adapting business models to provide goods and services to refugees (e.g. telecoms and banks); (d) providing job training and entrepreneurship support, often via online platforms or focused on technology skills; (e) hiring refugees, and/or working with smaller enterprises that hire refugees; and (f) selling goods and services to refugees, and often providing them with local employment opportunities. Technology and financial services companies lead one-third of identified initiatives. Private sector engagement is still nascent—with mostly small initiatives, in early stages, and with limited evidence of impact. There is wide geographic spread, with a focus on Syrian crisis. There is significant variation of efforts necessitated by each country’s unique context and constraints. The study identifies common success factors and challenges, and recommends areas for improvement.

• Common success factors: designing initiatives from the perspective of refugees and host communities; partnerships with public and nonprofit organizations with relevant expertise/experience; commitment from CEO-level leadership; and clear goals.
• Common challenges: policy and regulatory constraints; limited understanding of forced displacement; inherent risks in serving refugee populations; and limited accessibility to refugees.
• Suggested areas for improvement: developing mechanisms for coordination and learning; equipping private sector actors with tools and information to engage refugees; emphasizing more engagement of the local private sector; catalyzing large scale philanthropy and (impact) investment; and supporting social entrepreneurship.

IFC and The Bridgespan Group (2019) Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale

IFC and The Bridgespan Group, 2019
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sub-saharan+africa/resources/psr-pathways-to-scale
The development community is increasingly working to empower refugees as agents of their own lives and economic contributors, e.g. by providing skills training, offering employment or enabling access to financial products and services. Private sector actors are well positioned to enhance and scale these efforts, given their strategic capabilities and business models. This report presents research on 173 early-stage private sector initiatives that engage refugee and host communities. Many originate in host countries where there is an enabling policy environment, i.e. where refugees can participate in economic activities, and are offered opportunities for income-generation and education. The researchers also undertook a survey on actors’ motivations, the barriers they face, and their outlook on future engagement.

The research identifies five common ‘pathways of private sector engagement’ beyond funding humanitarian assistance, and includes five case studies illustrating how a specific private sector actor explored, evaluated, and approached one of the five pathways to engaging refugees and host communities. The research also identified several barriers to growth and scale, including insufficient tools and information to engage refugees and inadequate coordination across stakeholders. The five pathways to private sector engagement are:

- **Sharing capabilities** (e.g. technology or technical expertise) to provide access to humanitarian assistance, education, or financial service, e.g. IrisGuard’s iris recognition technology has streamlined the process of registering and delivering services to refugees in Jordan and elsewhere. Refugees no longer have to wait at distribution points, are less susceptible to theft and corruption, and have more agency in how they receive assistance.

- **Extending services** by adapting current business models to sell goods/services to refugees, e.g. Equity Bank provides banking products and services to thousands of refugees in Northern Kenya.

- **Enabling employment** by providing job training and/or entrepreneurship support to refugees, e.g. Luminus Education is Jordan’s first private institute to provide employment training for refugee youth. 70-80 percent of Luminus’s refugee students find employment—and in some sectors, like hospitality, all of them do.

- **Integrating into value chains** by hiring refugees directly and/or working with smaller enterprises that hire refugees through sourcing or subcontracting work, e.g. Sanivation is using an innovative approach to bring more hygienic sanitation solutions and cleaner fuel alternatives to refugee communities in Kenya, while also providing a range of employment opportunities, from manufacturing to sales.

- **Building a business** through the selling of goods and services tailored to refugee populations, e.g. Inyenyeri’s innovative cooking system is addressing cooking needs, household air pollution, and fuel efficiency issues in refugee homes in Rwanda. This affordable, market-based solution aims to reach 3,500 households in Kigeme Camp and start expanding into several other camps in 2019.

The researchers also undertook a deeper analysis of 110 initiatives across Africa and the Middle East and identified three factors that are critical for impact and scale:
• **Flexible financing**: Venture capital-like approaches to funding, with smaller, more flexible, and need-based investments—even within the existing pool of capital—can better enable testing and scaling for the early-stage, innovative, yet unproven initiatives that comprise much of the landscape and pipeline of work with refugees.

• **Cross-sector partnerships**: Given its scope and multifaceted nature, addressing refugee needs requires collaboration across the government, humanitarian, NGO, private, and development finance sectors.

• **Investment information**: Increasing the information flow on refugee qualifications, needs and preferences, local context, and existing efforts can ensure informed decisions by all private sector actors—especially those without the resources or connections to access such information themselves.

**Market Potential**


BFA Global  
FSD Africa, 2018  

This study **assesses the demand for financial services in refugee populations in Rwanda and estimates the business case for financial institutions to provide these services**. The report makes the case that refugees have a strong need for comprehensive financial services to support their livelihoods including: (a) savings or transaction accounts to safely store income and minimize theft; (b) loan products to support business ventures and meet other personal needs; (c) insurance to minimize the financial impact of unpredictable events; and (d) convenient access to channels to receive remittances. The demand for financial services has increased as World Food Programme (WFP) in Rwanda transitions from in-kind food assistance to cash grants.

The report is based on four research activities: (i) segmenting and sizing refugees by their sources and amounts of income; (ii) translating the segments into business cases to assess potential for serving this market; (iii) creating profiles of segments based on field research in refugee camps (refugees with salaried jobs, refugees receiving remittances, self-employed refugees, refugees receiving cash transfers only); and (iv) assessing the regulatory environment to provide financial services for refugees. Key findings include:

• Most refugees in Rwanda receive cash assistance. Refugees in six of seven refugee camps receive cash assistance, and the remaining camp, Mahama, is expected to transition to cash assistance by the end of 2018.
• **Refugees in Rwanda have enough income to be potential customers for financial service providers (FSPs).** 90 percent of refugee households report monthly income above RWF 25,000, the median for a Rwandan bank account holder. There is evidence that cash transfers help to build other types of income.

• Extending financial services to refugees in Rwanda would expand the market for financial services by an estimated 44,000 individuals.

• Many refugees have used financial services before and there is significant untapped demand for savings, transaction, and loan products.

• **Refugees have as much potential to generate profit for FSPs as typical low-income Rwandan customers.** Refugees who own a small business, earn income from odd jobs, or have a salary income could be a profit-generating segment for FSPs. Refugees who only receive cash transfers may not immediately present a profitable proposition, but there is potential to cross sell these customers an insurance policy or a loan if they begin a business or start a salaried job.

• One of the biggest challenges refugees face in accessing financial services is satisfying the ID requirement for ‘know your customer’ (KYC) purposes. A directive from the National Bank of Rwanda that lists Proof of Registration issued by MIDIMAR as valid KYC documentation would make it easier for refugees to satisfy KYC requirements.

**IFC (2018) Kakuma as a Marketplace**

International Finance Corporation, May 2018


This report **aims to understand Kakuma as a potential market and identify business opportunities and challenges for the private sector,** including commercial firms, social enterprises and local entrepreneurs. Based on a survey of 1,400 households in the refugee camp (home to 160,000 refugees from South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, DRC, and Sudan) and neighboring Kakuma town (with a population of 60,000, mainly ethnic Turkana people), the study finds:

• **There is already a thriving informal economy in Kakuma.** 12 percent of refugee respondents identify as business owners or self-employed, and 39 percent of respondents in Kakuma town own businesses. Most run “dukas” (small general stores), which account for 33 percent of businesses in the camp and 31 percent of businesses in town. Other common businesses are grocery stores, food stalls, restaurants/cafes, and M-Pesa kiosks. 38 percent of respondents in the camp and 51 percent in town have registered their businesses (but it is unclear whether businesses are legally registered or respondents believe payments to local authorities to be registration).

• **Education is positively correlated with employment status, business ownership, and income.**

• **Refugees and town residents face several impediments to starting a business.** 99 percent of respondents in town and 95 percent of respondents in the camp lack capital to start a business. Refugees are also constrained by high rental charges, movement restrictions, lack of premises to rent, lack of support from camp administration, and time required to obtain a travel pass.
- **Women in the camp are less likely to be entrepreneurs than men** (7 percent versus 23 percent of men), and their businesses are more likely to be informal (22 percent registered versus 49 percent for men) and women typically have less invested in their businesses. This is not the case in Kakuma town where 39 percent of women own businesses compared to 40 percent of men.

- **Levels of employment and income are lower in the camp due to impediments faced by refugees**, including legal restrictions, poor educational attainment, insufficient skills/capital to start a business, lack of formal job opportunities, and limited access to external markets. Consequently, unemployment is higher in the camp than in the town (27 percent versus 14 percent), and refugee households are less likely to have a regular income (73 percent of households in the camp have a regular income compared to 84 percent of households in town). Refugee income includes Bamba Chakula e-vouchers (57 percent), salaries/business earnings (27 percent), proceeds from selling rations (12 percent), and remittances (11 percent), whereas most town residents earn salary income (72 percent). The average monthly income in the camp is about one-third of that in the town (KES 5,597 compared to KES 15,863). Only three percent of refugee households earn more than the minimum wage.

- **Formal jobs in Kakuma town are generally based on the local economy, while salaried jobs in the camp depend on NGOs**. 79 percent of Kakuma town residents are employed in the local economy as drivers, duka employees, barbers, and house cleaners. 58 percent of refugees are employed by NGOs as teachers, guards, translators, and community mobilizers.

- **Total annual consumption of Kakuma is conservatively estimated to be $56 million**, with the camp contributing $16.5 million ($94 per capita) and the town contributing $39.7 million ($602 per capita). This lags behind national consumption in Kenya ($800 per capita).

- **Almost half of consumption is in the consumer goods market**, which is valued at $26.2 million. The largest components of the consumer goods market are rice/pasta, ugali flour, and milk powder. People also consume household goods (TV, motorbikes, solar panels and power generators). The most common consumable nonfood items are cooking fuel and charcoal, electricity, loan repayments, airtime, and mobile phone charging. Although fragmented, spending on energy-related products (generation, charging, fuel) would be substantial if combined.

- **Mobile phone penetration is high** (69 percent of households heads in the camp and 85 percent in town), making it a potentially attractive market for mobile banking. 86 percent of respondents in the town use their phone/SIM for mobile banking or money transfers, while only 31 percent do so in the camp. There is significant opportunity to increase penetration in the camp, which would depend on improving refugees’ financial literacy and access to Alien ID cards (required to register with M-Pesa).

- **The Kakuma market has potential to grow.** Demand for financial services is high and likely to grow (currently only 54 percent of respondents in the town and 10 percent in the camp have a bank account). UNHCR is transitioning to unconditional cash transfers, which will increase liquidity. Residents in both locations are willing to pay for improved energy, housing, and sanitation services.

- **There are several challenges to private sector investment**: (a) legal limitations (refugees do not have property rights, and there are practical impediments to exercising legal rights to
employment and freedom of movement); (b) high levels of informality; (c) low educational attainment (50 percent of refugees and 33 percent of town residents have no schooling); (d) limited access to markets due to poor road connections and absence of a commercial airport; (e) lack of capital to start a business; (f) low financial literacy (73 percent of respondents in the camp and 45 percent in town have no information on financial matters); (g) low savings; and (h) high cost of doing business.

The report notes the significant benefits of private sector engagement for both refugees and host communities including expanded job opportunities, improved services, greater choice, reduced prices, improved self-reliance, and enhanced socioeconomic integration. Private sector engagement would require: (1) attracting private businesses to enter the market and providing opportunities to scale up enterprises already in the market; (b) developing refugee and host communities’ entrepreneurship potential, with a focus on youth and women, by supporting their businesses to grow and providing vocational skills training, business development services, and microfinance opportunities; and (c) supporting policy dialogue and advocacy focused on creating a more conducive business environment.


John Kluge, Timothy Docking, and Joanne Ke Edelman
Refugee Investment Network (RIN), October 2018
https://www.refugeeinvestments.org/paradigmshift/

The report highlights the massive and urgent need to bridge private capital to help mitigate the current refugee crisis, and highlights concrete and sustainable opportunities to do so, along with strategies for success. The authors argue that “changing the current investor paradigm to usher in an era of refugee investments is not only achievable—it’s already underway.”

• For the purposes of this investor framework, the term “refugee” refers to an inclusive group of people who are externally or internally forcibly displaced, whether through armed or political conflict, ethnic tension, systematic discrimination, climate change or natural disaster, or the displacement of indigenous communities.

• The report notes that a growing body of evidence demonstrates that refugees are “investable, employable and bankable”. The authors highlight that: 13 percent of the total resettled refugee population in the United States are entrepreneurs (compared to 11.5 percent of non-refugee immigrants and 9 percent of US-born entrepreneurs); IMF has shown that “investing one euro in welcoming refugees can yield nearly two euros in economic benefits within five years, as long as refugees are permitted to work”; the hardest working immigrants in the United States are from refugee-sending or large refugee-receiving countries; and companies that hire refugees increase their employee retention rates.

• The authors suggest that investors are interested in putting capital to work for and with refugees. The authors found more investors than they expected had executed “refugee investments”, but it was only through a process of inquiry that they (and the investors) realized they were active in the sector.
• The authors argue that forced migration is the defining social challenge of our time, however traditional development financing is insufficient, and philanthropic capital is neither supporting durable solutions nor directly reaching refugees.

• Investors have persistent concerns around risk and finding a pipeline of viable investments. The authors note that over 80 percent of refugees live in developing countries and concerns are associated with investing in emerging markets: poor regulatory frameworks, weak ecosystem, and currency instability, etc. The authors discuss investor concerns in four categories: (a) sourcing; (b) structuring; (c) capacity building; and (d) policy and regulatory environment.

• The authors highlight the role of RIN to “to support the development of an investment ecosystem by helping to source, structure, and capitalize investment opportunities that benefit both displaced people and the communities that host them, while supporting entrepreneurs in displaced communities to develop that pipeline.” They provide a useful timeline of the investment market for forcibly displaced populations (page 23) culminating in the Financing for Refugees Conference at the Hague and refugee Self-reliance Initiative (September 2018) and the launch of RIN at SOCAP18 (October 2018).

• The authors propose a framework (or “refugee lens”) for refugee and forced migration investing. It sets out the detailed criteria for a refugee investment (see page 25) including refugee ownership, refugee leadership, and ‘refugee supporting’, i.e. activities that positively affect the lives and wellbeing of refugees or their hosts through direct products and services, workforce development, or by improving humanitarian capacity. They also define refugee-supporting loans and investment funds, including targets for refugee involvement and impact. The authors exclude refugee-led enterprises that do not consciously attempt to improve the lives of refugees, or unsustainable corporate responsibility efforts aimed at refugee populations.

• The report shares several case studies demonstrating how the use of blended capital and other creative financing structures can mitigate risks.

• The report concludes with several recommendations for impact investors, foundations and corporations, and institutional investors and faith-based investors.
X. TECHNOLOGY
Juskalian (2018) Where Life Hangs by a Chain: A Jordanian Refugee Camp is a Test for Blockchain-Based Identity Systems

Russ Juskalian
MIT Technology Review, Volume 121, No. 3, May/June 2018

This article discusses the piloting of a blockchain-based system to deliver cash-for-food aid to refugees in Jordan. Since early 2017, WFP’s Building Blocks program has distributed cash-for-food aid to over 100,000 Syrian refugees in Zaatari camp in Jordan, and will reach 500,000 refugees by the end of 2018. When refugees buy necessities at participating retailers in the camp, iris scans at checkout are used to confirm their digital identity using a traditional UN database, and query family accounts stored on a permissioned (i.e. private) variant of the Ethereum blockchain. The pilot has demonstrated several benefits including: (a) a 98 percent reduction in transaction fees associated with cash transfers, by eliminating costly verification by regional and local banks; (b) timelier transfers, since beneficiaries don’t have to wait for local banks to transfer their money; (c) improved protection of refugees’ data, since they don’t have to share identifying information with banks, lowering the risk that their information is stolen or misused; and (d) enhanced control, flexibility, and accountability for WFP, e.g. WFP can quickly set up new refugees on the system (a process that previously took weeks involving paper vouchers), and WFP can tally refugee purchases and pay participating retailers in local currency.

While critics say that WFP could just as easily use a traditional database, the use of blockchain technology is consistent with the eventual goal of digital wallets owned and controlled by beneficiaries. A digital wallet would contain a refugee’s camp transaction history, government ID, and access to financial accounts, all linked through a blockchain-based system. It would provide a mechanism for employers to deposit pay, for banks to review refugees’ credit histories, and for border or immigration authorities to check identities, which could be attested to by the UN, host government, etc. In future, a digital wallet might store all claims made by the user (e.g. name, date of birth), evidence for those claims (e.g. copies of birth certificates or utility bills), and third-party attestations (e.g. government confirmation of details on a birth certificate). This data could be used to prove educational credentials, demonstrate family relationships, or get a loan. Blockchain enabled digital wallets would not be dependent on any state or central authority, allowing a person to move their data between countries backed up online in encrypted form, and able to survive disasters that might wipe out centralized record-keeping systems. They would also be more secure than conventional identity records by cutting out third-party intermediaries and separating authentication systems from personal data.

The author highlights two other examples of blockchain-enabled digital IDs. MONI, a blockchain startup, has collaborated with the Finnish Immigration Service to give refugees a prepaid...
MasterCard associated with a digital identity number stored on a blockchain, which allows them to open a bank account without a passport, receive benefits directly from the government, and get loans from people who know and trust them, helping them build rudimentary credit histories. A public-private alliance called ID2020 aims to help achieve the UN goal of providing a legal identity to everyone.

The author highlights the risk that corporations or governments may use these systems to control people’s digital existence. The author suggests that WFP offer its technology to other organizations for tracking cash transfers, eventually adding entries for land ownership, educational credentials, and travel history. If other organizations were allowed to add nodes to the blockchain’s network, it could become more like a public blockchain, with the advantage of being harder to hack because it is decentralized.


World Bank, May 2018

This report highlights the potential for big data analytics to inform responses to forced migration, by supplying accurate real-time data on forced migration flows and the needs of displaced people. Big data also offer the potential to understand the causes of forced displacement and to predict forced migration flows. The report defines “Big Data” as “high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety datasets that can be analyzed to identify and understand previously unknown patterns, trends and associations.” Big data are usually produced in the course of another activity (e.g. making a cell phone call, using geo-located applications such as Twitter or email), and frequently draw on social media and the Internet. Crowdsourcing and crowdseeding can rapidly provide critical information to inform decision-making (e.g. mapping crisis hotspots, determining the cause and magnitude of violence, and identifying affected groups and their needs), by sourcing data directly from displaced and host populations. Remote sensing technologies, such as satellite imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), can supply data on migration flows and drivers such as environmental change or conflict. Weather data layered onto geospatial data can detect problems that may lead to forced migration, such as pocket droughts, especially in areas already affected by violent extremist activity.

The report profiles several experimental approaches, as follows:

- **Monitoring hate speech**: PeaceTech Lab undertook social media monitoring of hate speech terms to better understand the links between hate speech, fake news and conflict in South Sudan. A similar approach in Myanmar combined human and machine learning to construct data visualizations of real-time trends in sentiments alongside instances of hate speech online. Such approaches can be used to: (a) monitor trends in instability; (b) prevent atrocities and forced migration (i.e. employed as an early warning system); (c) understand refugee integration problems; and (d) demonstrate whether refugee integration interventions have had an impact.
• **Monitoring risk indicators for future conflict:** PeaceTech Lab developed the Open Situation Room Exchange (OSRx) to aggregate and visualize two large datasets of geospatial data on global protests, violent events and conflict.

• **Predicting movement of people from weather data:** aWhere’s global agronomic modeling system constructs daily agro-meteorological datasets for geographical grids of around nine kilometers in size. This method can detect early indications of pocket droughts, which could lead to competition over scarce resources and forced migration, particularly in areas affected by violent extremism. Remote sensing data can also be used to predict population movements, e.g. researchers at the University of Colorado Boulder have shown that Mexican rainfall estimates and other climate data from satellite imagery were predictive of domestic and international migration, particularly in regions where agriculture is the largest sector of the local economy.

• **Predicting outbreaks of mass atrocities:** Harvard and NASA developed a set of algorithms to assess the risk of future atrocities using data from past atrocities and the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) platform. If real-time data were available, the algorithm could provide early warning of the risk of mass atrocities and potential forced migration.

• **Mapping Syria’s conflict:** Since 2014 the Carter Center’s Syria Conflict Mapping Project and Planatir have analyzed open-source data to profile the Syrian conflict. By mining social media posts, they identified attributes for over 5,600 armed groups and documented evidence of mass atrocities.

• **Crowdsourcing for situational analysis:** The open-source Ushahidi crowdsourcing platform was developed to map post-election violence in Kenya in 2008, using information submitted via the Internet and cell phones. It has since been used for monitoring natural disasters, elections, and high-crime areas. In 2012, the platform was deployed in Syria (Syria Tracker) to complement an open-source web and social media tracking platform that mines thousands of online sources for evidence of human rights violations.

• **Profiling needs through satellite imagery:** In Nigeria, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) advised on the use of satellite data to inform assessments of post-disaster needs. Detailed images taken from satellites and UAVs are also being used to track the growth or contraction of refugee camps, e.g. in Jordan and Syria.

• **Predicting food insecurity:** USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), which provides early indicators and analysis of food insecurity to inform humanitarian assistance, has been used to assess forced migration in response to food insecurity and conflict in South Sudan. The project was based on analysis of DigitalGlobe’s satellite imagery and crowdsourced data of dwellings and cattle tagged by 25,000 volunteers using the Tomnod crowdsourcing platform. Combined with existing data on food production, FEWS NET was able to more accurately project food insecurity.

• **Migration tracking from population based models:** Researchers have collaborated with Flowminder Foundation and its open-source demographic analytics resource WorldPop to aggregate census microdata and spatial data to model migration patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa. These gravity-type spatial interaction models have been shown to be effective in explaining and predicting migration. Flowminder researchers have also pioneered the use of anonymous mobile network data to monitor population displacement following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and
2015 earthquake in Nepal, using data showing people’s movements as they travelled between individual cell phone transmitter towers adjusted for normal population movement patterns.

- **Geotagging internet data to follow movements**: In 2013, researchers at Queens College CUNY, the Qatar Computing Research Institute and Stanford University used geo-tagged login information for Yahoo! users to track their international mobility. Researchers at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration have also mined the Internet to create a vast database that seeks to pre-emptively identify threats likely to lead to population dispersion.

- **Analyzing and visualizing information from big data sources**: The World Bank’s Research Insight Tool (RIT) aggregates big data from news articles, social media and various sectoral sources. It analyzes text and curates data by tagging topics and key information, enabling full text searches.

- **Analyzing social media for responses to migration**: In 2017, UN Global Pulse and UNHCR published analysis of how aspects of the European refugee crisis were conveyed on Twitter, in particular host communities’ sentiment towards migrants.

Challenges in the use of big data include: (a) individual privacy concerns and the ability to access proprietary data; (b) less developed contexts may lack the technological resources to collect data, including smartphones, sensors, or access to cloud-based processing; (c) biases can be introduced when data is not representative, e.g. the lower end of the income distribution can be missed from data collected through cell phones.

**Scheel and Ustek-Spilda (2018)** *Big Data, Big Promises: Revisiting Migration Statistics in Context of the Datafication of Everything*

Stephan Scheel, Funda Ustek-Spilda
Border Criminologies Blog, June 2018
[https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/06/big-data-big](https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/06/big-data-big)

The authors argue that we are witnessing the “datafication” of mobility and migration management across the world, driven by the digitization of data that can be searched, exchanged, linked, and analyzed with unprecedented scope and efficiency. Big Data is promoted as promising alternative sources for producing more reliable statistics on international migration. The authors discuss three reasons why it is unlikely that Big Data will solve the most important known limitations of migration statistics, specifically:

- **Politics of numbers**: Migration policy actors may count migrants in particular ways to produce numbers that provide evidence in support of certain policy objectives or institutional agendas.

- **Politics of method**: Use of alternative data sources like mobile phone or Twitter data raise several methodological issues, such as selection bias. Big Data-based methods are unlikely to replace established methodologies, rather they might complement them, adding to the existing methodological heterogeneity.
• **Politics of (national) distinction**: Migration concerns a core issue of national sovereignty—the claimed authority of nation-states to decide on the terms and conditions of entry to and stay within their respective jurisdiction.

Pakzad (2019) *Opportunities and Challenges of Emerging Technologies for the Refugee System*

Roya Pakzad


This paper *explores the potential role of technology in fostering greater accountability in the refugee system*. The paper begins by describing several ways that technological solutions have improved the transparency, accountability and efficiency of refugee crises management.

- Digital platforms (from Skype to online maps) can increasingly aid in the **monitoring and documenting of human rights violations**, and a number of civil society and academic groups have begun to use different methods to scrape, analyze and categorize publicly available social media content to document potential war crimes and human rights violations. Similar techniques are being used in **monitoring conflict zones and enabling early-warning systems** to better detect, analyze and react to potential factors leading to conflict and displacement.

- Early stage technologies are being applied to **streamline and add transparency to bureaucratic processes relating to refugees including identification, financial inclusion and humanitarian service management**. Blockchain technology has begun to demonstrate some promise for addressing the issue of identity verification for refugees, financial inclusion and even “smart contracts” (digital protocols that facilitate the execution of a contract), and has potential for administering humanitarian aid with greater transparency. However, tying refugees’ identities and financial power to biometric data could have irreversible consequences in the event of a data breach and identity theft. A lack of privacy protection measures and attention to informed consent are also significant concerns.

- Novel **machine-learning algorithms are being applied to resettlement programs** in host countries. The model is optimized, based on a refugee’s background and skill set, to match them to a host city in which they have a greater chance of finding employment. Researchers have also proposed using **machine-learning techniques to improve impartiality of asylum-seeking adjudication cases**.

However, new technologies also introduce new concerns surrounding privacy security and equality of refugees, e.g. risk of racial and gender discrimination as a result of training on incomplete data sets and flaws in models and learning algorithms. The paper *sets out several recommendations to minimize the potential downsides and to improve the impact of emerging technologies*, including: (a) quantifiable metrics for sharing information across public and private initiatives; (b) a pledge to ‘do no harm’, the equivalent of a “Hippocratic oath”, for technologists working in the humanitarian...
field; (c) development of predictive early-warning systems for human rights abuses; and (c) greater accountability among funders and technologists to ensure the sustainability and real-world value of humanitarian apps and other digital platforms.


Carleen Maitland
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/digital-developments-harbinger-

Information and communication technologies have arguably improved refugees’ lives, and by some measures, improved humanitarian assistance (e.g. aid delivered via mobile money), yet they can potentially cause harm. This paper discusses three interrelated digital developments with the potential to profoundly change the notion of refugee protection:

• The emergence of a ‘digital refugee’, i.e. the digital representation of a bona fide refugee constructed by humanitarian organizations (using demographic, biometric, and psychometric data) and by refugees themselves (using photos, videos, texts).

• A reconfiguration of aid toward ‘digital humanitarian brokerage’, i.e. the use of digital platforms by humanitarian organizations to broker the provision of goods and services (housing, food, education) to refugees by other actors. The digital humanitarian brokerage trend is most clear in the move to digital cash programming.

• Refugees’ growing use of digital technologies to enable self-sufficiency, e.g. remote digital work, or the use of refugee community data to support community problem solving.

Efficiency and transparency advantages of digital tools in humanitarian programs obscure attention to their disadvantages and potential harms: data stored on refugees’ phones can make them targets for interrogation and torture; easy access to disinformation can increase refugees’ vulnerability to fraud; devices can become infected with viruses and spyware, compromising sensitive information or impinging upon privacy; and humanitarian agencies’ use of complex information systems can create other vulnerabilities (in particular privacy concerns relating to biometric data, disclosure of information on sexual and gender-based violence etc.). The author recommends three responses to help amplify benefits and minimize harms from these new technologies: (a) comprehensive digital protection policies safeguarding all refugee data and digital assets (phones, computers, access), including the data they generate themselves; (b) independent analyses of digital humanitarian brokerage and digital self-sufficiency; and (c) involvement of refugees in making and evaluating policies and programming on the applications of ICT.


Sadra Abrishamkar and Forouq Khonsari
Machine Learning and Applications: An International Journal (MLAIJ), Volume 6, Issue 1, March 2019
https://airccj.org/csecfp/library/jvol.php?last=MLAIJ&volname=6&volno=1
This paper proposes an approach for analyzing a collection of news articles to extract ‘signals of violence’, which can be used in prediction models to forecast forced displacement. The authors test their proposed approach using news articles drawn from the Expanded Open Source dataset—including over 680,000 news articles on Syria and Iraq from January 2012 to June 2017—as well as monthly refugee population data from UNHCR. The approach involves the following steps:

- Automatically processing and analyzing news articles using topic modeling techniques to identify a set of distinct topics for each month, i.e. based on the probability that certain keywords appear together in a particular topic.
- Manually labeling and categorizing the extracted topics for each month, using the following categories: violence/terrorism; economic issues; environmental issues; political issues; religious conflicts; refugee crisis; and relief.
- Estimating a ‘violence score’ for each month equal to the total number of ‘violence’ topics for each month divided by the total number of topics for each month.
- Building prediction models for forecasting the number of refugees from Syria and Iraq.

The authors demonstrate that violence scores, constructed from information extracted from news articles, can be effective in improving the performance of models predicting forced displacement.
XI. URBAN AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
This case study examines the impacts of the Syrian refugee influx on Tripoli, with a focus on urban poverty. By January 2017, Tripoli hosted some 70,000 registered Syrian refugees, representing a 17 percent increase in the city population. Prior to the Syrian refugee influx there were already 30,000 Palestinian refugees living in Tripoli. Many Syrian households have relocated to the Palestinian ‘gatherings’ to take advantage of low rents, prospect of aid from Islamic charities, and smaller Lebanese military presence in these settlements. Half of Tripoli’s residents are considered poor and the unemployment rate exceeds 35 percent; 74 percent of Syrian refugees are living below the poverty line. Competition over jobs has been a key source of social tension between refugees and Lebanese residents in Tripoli. Decreases in wages and household incomes between 2012 and 2015 have been attributed to the willingness of Syrian refugees to work for lower wages and longer hours. Lebanese workers with similar skills have lost their jobs to Syrians, and everyone has suffered from rising commodity prices and rents. Increased demand for housing has placed pressure on the city’s housing stock particularly in heavily populated, low-income neighborhoods. Additionally, the Syrian influx has put pressure on municipal services like garbage collection, and on already precarious basic infrastructure assets, such as power grids, roads, and buildings. Generally, Lebanese residents in Tripoli resent job creation activities that target Syrians, believing that Lebanese are entitled to available jobs and that Syrian refugees should not be prioritized for work and aid. However Syrians are still widely accepted in Tripoli due to shared cultural and religious values.

Syrians face several government regulations that make life much more difficult for them, including: (a) the need to apply for and renew residency permits, which prevents them from moving freely in search of livelihood opportunities or to access services, such as health and education; (b) new employment regulations that restrict Syrian refugees to jobs in the construction, environment (mainly waste management), and agriculture sectors; and (c) lack of coordination amongst public institutions managing refugee affairs. Many Syrian refugees have adopted negative coping strategies such as: (i) relocation to marginalized neighborhoods; (ii) accepting low wages and poor working conditions; and (iii) working in exchange for housing.

The authors warn that urban poverty and the influx of Syrian refugees combine to create a high risk of economic and social collapse in Tripoli. They recommend: (1) support for the sectors in which Syrians are eligible to legally work; (2) technical assistance for municipal actors; and (3) rapid employment initiatives.
Lebanon’s Beka’a region hosts 360,000 registered Syrian refugees and has the highest proportion of refugees relative to host population. A series of crises in 2017 (including evictions of refugees, demonstrations against Syrian shop owners, destruction of two refugee settlements by fire, and military operations by Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces) have raised tensions between refugees and host communities. Local authorities have generally played a positive stabilizing role in the Beka’a region, e.g. by providing fire fighters and Lebanese Red Cross personnel in response to fires, mediating between Lebanese and Syrian communities, or through municipal coordination bodies. The author questions whether humanitarian and development organizations are sufficiently supporting municipalities in their efforts to promote peaceful coexistence, and argues that municipalities are the natural unit for planning and coordination (rather than sectors or agencies), and that donors should channel resources through municipalities to address local needs. As a pilot initiative, UNDP and UNHCR are endeavoring to integrate development and humanitarian planning in the Arsal Action Plan.


Lauren Wyman
UnSettlement: Urban displacement in the 21st century, IDMC, February 2018
http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/unsettlement-urban-displacement-in-the-21st-century

This case study examines the process of socio-economic integration of urban IDPs in Maiduguri in northern Nigeria and considers the opportunities and challenges they encounter in securing employment. The research finds that urban IDPs in Maiduguri engage in a range of economic activities, but opportunities are not equally distributed between men and women. Financial institutions are working to increase the number of Nigerians with bank accounts, but a lack of financing opportunities means that many IDPs are unable to restart their livelihoods or establish new ones once they arrive in the city. The paper concludes by recommending actions to help IDPs re-establish their lives and livelihoods, specifically: (a) coordinating livelihood programming across sectors; (b) expanding access to financing; and (c) promoting womens’ livelihoods.


Marina Lažetić and Teodora Jovanović
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2018
https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/belgrade-serbia-refugees-in-towns/

This case study examines the legal, social, and economic situation of migrants and refugees in Belgrade, Serbia. Since 2014, Belgrade has been a focal point for more than 920,000 migrants and refugees transiting through the Balkans. When the Balkan Route to Western Europe closed in March 2016, the average stay of migrants in Serbia increased from less than 72 hours to durations of over a
By June 2017, there were 7,000 migrants “stuck” in Serbia, mostly single men from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, Somalia, Syria, and Tunisia. As migrants stayed longer in Belgrade’s city center, health and security problems arose. Host communities, who were initially welcoming, became increasingly uneasy about the presence of migrants. By May 2017 the government had relocated most migrants to asylum centers across Serbia, including more than 13,000 migrants to two centers on the periphery of Belgrade, and banned aid distribution outside of government asylum and reception centers. Some 350 migrants remain in the city center around the main train and bus station.

Most migrants do not wish to remain in Serbia, and so they are treated as temporary residents by the government. Only a small minority of migrants who seek and are granted asylum are able to access full education, health, and other social welfare services. Since most migrants do not have legal status, integration is primarily concerned with access to rights and services rather than inclusion of migrants and refugees in the social, cultural, and economic life in Serbia. The presence of migrants has generated increased economic activity in neighborhoods where they are located. The possibility of protracted stay raises questions about labor market access for refugees and migrants, security, and the ability and willingness of migrant populations to integrate into Serbian society.


Barnabas Ticha Muvhuti
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2018
https://www.refugeesintowns.org/publications/

This report explores the “educational integration” of first generation migrant/refugee students in Cape Town. The research participants had completed their primary education in their home countries (Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rwanda, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other African countries), and were enrolling in secondary school. The report provides an overview of the refugee situation in South Africa and a summary of South Africa’s refugee policy. It describes the challenges faced by foreign students such as: (a) language and cultural barriers; (b) economic disadvantage; (c) difficulties obtaining the necessary permits to remain in school; and (d) discrimination. The report offers recommendations to improve the integration of immigrant students including: (i) offering French; (ii) developing a toolkit to help educators deal with immigrant students; (iii) issuing the necessary documents for a minimum period of one year to avoid disruptive renewal procedures; and (iv) regularizing the stay of qualified foreign teachers to ameliorate teacher shortages.


Aisling O’Loghlen, Nondo Nobel Bwami
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2018
https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/dar-es-salaam-tanzania-refugees-in-towns/

There are approximately 10,000 refugees in Dar es Salaam, the majority from DRC and Burundi. The report examines the vulnerabilities of urban refugees and the difficulties they encounter in
accessing basic services. The report begins with an overview of the refugee situation in Tanzania generally, and in Dar es Salaam in particular. Urban refugees in Dar es Salaam live alongside the city’s urban poor in informal settlements, where they face many of the same challenges such as: (a) rapid urban population growth, which is putting pressure on urban land and services including housing, transport, water and sanitation; and (b) the vulnerability of informal settlements to flooding and the effects of climate change. Refugees highlight several additional challenges including: (c) difficulties affording rent; (d) exploitative practices by landlords; (e) difficulties accessing sanitation (50 percent of respondents shared a toilet with five or more families); and (f) discrimination (half of respondents had experienced discrimination at work). Many have suffered traumatic events such as separation from their children, killings of family members and rape.

The report outlines government policy on refugees, including the restrictive encampment policy. The majority of urban refugees do not have permission to live in the city, which has several consequences: (i) refugees are at constant risk of arrest, incarceration or deportation; (ii) they frequently pay bribes to police or neighbors who threaten to report them (half of those interviewed had paid a bribe since arriving in Dar); (iii) to avoid detection by authorities, refugees restrict their movements and limit interaction with Tanzanians (a quarter of refugees interviewed stated they had no Tanzanian friends); (iv) it is extremely difficult to register refugee children in schools; and (v) the majority of refugees work in low-skilled, low paying and insecure jobs, even though a significant proportion is qualified to work in the formal sector. Reducing food consumption is one of the primary coping mechanisms adopted by refugees when their income falls. The report is critical of UNHCR’s lack of assistance to urban refugees, and their lack of advocacy for an urban refugee policy. The report recommends:

- Granting freedom of movement and providing identity documents to asylum seekers and refugees.
- Improving access to business licenses and work permits for asylum seekers and refugees, and exempting them from obtaining employer sponsorship and other conditions that they are unable to satisfy because of their displacement.
- Enhancing protection from refoulement by ensuring asylum seekers are given prompt access to fair and individualized RSD.
- Mapping existing urban services in order to provide displaced populations with information on where they can access services, and to provide humanitarian organizations with information on service gaps.

The report notes that the Tanzanian government has recently withdrawn from the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and delayed publishing the 2014 urban refugee survey, which suggests it is unlikely that urban refugees will be granted more freedoms in the foreseeable future. The final section of the report is a summary of lessons and good practice from other countries.

Jessica Sadye Wolff
This case study explores the spatial, ethical, social, and economic implications of Germany’s new refugee housing policy and its impact on integration. The report begins with an overview of the refugee situation and asylum process in Germany. In Hamburg, the influx of 55,000 asylum seekers exacerbated shortages of social housing units. Consequently, the national government approved an unprecedented land use policy enabling land-constrained city-states, such as Hamburg, to construct refugee and asylum seeker accommodation in non-residential zones. There has been widespread opposition to the development of proposed social housing sites, since residents did not want large numbers of asylum seekers (more than 300 individuals) in their neighborhoods, and the selection of sites did not include typical public engagement processes. Neighborhood organizations successfully petitioned the government to limit the number of asylum seekers living in any one location. The distribution of asylum seeker housing in Hamburg is disproportionately skewed towards poorer neighborhoods, quite far away from other residential developments, and often not integrated with the existing street grid network.

The report documents integration challenges cited by asylum-seekers including: (a) uncertainty in the asylum process; (b) the inability to work or rent housing while asylum claims are being processed; (c) increasingly lengthy stays in initial reception facilities; (d) lack of control over location of government provided housing and lack of privacy; (g) lack of affordable houses in the city’s real estate market, and landlords who are unwilling to rent to refugees; (h) risk of exploitation by employers in “black market jobs”; and (i) lengthy procedures for obtaining work permits. While local residents of Hamburg are generally eager to support asylum seekers, there is little opportunity for interaction due to the physical locations of asylum seeker and refugee accommodation. The author concludes that as Hamburg continues to require additional follow-up housing, greater consideration regarding spatiality and distribution of housing could facilitate better integration and ease local residents’ concerns. Additionally, supplementing the existing site selection process with additional spatial indicators that relate to facets of the integration experience could further improve the system.

Zeynep Balcioglu
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2018
https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/sultanbeyli-istanbul-refugees-in-towns/

More than 90 percent of refugees in Turkey live in cities. This case study explores the social integration of refugees in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul and their impact on the neighborhood. The report includes an overview of the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey, focusing on the situation of some 485,227 Syrian refugees in Istanbul. Syrian refugees are mostly clustered in the poorer and more religiously conservative districts of Kucukcekmece, Sultangazi, Bagcilar, and Sultanbeyli. In Sultanbeyli, there are over 20,000 Syrian refugees, 90 percent of whom are from Aleppo. Commonly,
a male member of a family establishes themselves in Sultanbeyli before other family members join them (74 percent of refugees chose to settle in Sultanbeyli because they had family there). Many Syrian refugees are unemployed and of those that work, most have jobs in the informal sector with long working hours, no social security, and exposure to other forms of exploitation. Many refugee families stay in their close circles and do not develop new social connections. Refugees view their families as the most reliable source of information about daily life in Sultanbeyli, and most find accommodation or jobs through their own social networks. For refugees, language is the primary barrier to integration. Nevertheless, almost 60 percent of refugee families are content with their neighbors because they feel welcomed. All but a few Syrian refugees in Sultanbeyli are Sunni Muslims, and share similar cultural and religious backgrounds with their Turkish neighbors.

Huang and Graham (2018) Are Refugees Located Near Urban Job Opportunities? An Analysis of Overlap Between Refugees and Major Urban Areas in Developing Countries, and Implications for Employment Opportunities and MNC Engagement

Cindy Huang and Jimmy Graham
Center for Global Development Brief, June 18, 2018
https://www.cgdev.org/publication/are-refugees-located-near-urban-job-opportunities

Multinational corporations (MNCs) are increasingly seeking social impact alongside profit, and are emerging as important partners in the push to expand refugee employment and entrepreneurship. When refugees are located in urban areas, where economic activity and MNCs tend to cluster, they have a much greater likelihood of being in close proximity to potential employers. The authors created an interactive tool to map the locations of working-age refugees, and analyzed the extent to which refugees overlap with major urban areas in 31 of the 37 developing countries hosting at least 25,000 refugees. This tool demonstrates where MNCs, regional and local businesses, and other actors are best positioned to expand economic opportunities for refugees. They also consider the number of OECD MNCs, and the number of people employed directly by these MNCs in each country. The authors find:

- **Substantial overlap between refugees and urban economic opportunities** in the 31 developing countries in their sample: **2.2 million working-age refugees are living in major urban centers with at least 300,000 people**, including 0.9 million working-age refugees living in the most populous urban area in the host country.

- **In addition to the fact that the majority of refugees are in urban areas, there are also substantial proportions of refugees in major and largest urban areas.** Based on a sample of 23 countries with the best data, 62 percent of working-age refugees are in urban areas (close to the global 60 percent figure). Among these urban working-age refugees, 62 percent are in major urban areas with at least 300,000 people (2 million people), and about 24 percent of them are in the largest urban area in the host country (0.8 million people).

- **There is substantial variation across these 23 countries:** 6 countries have at least 50,000 refugees in or around major urban areas (Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Malaysia); 3 countries have between 25,000 and 50,000 refugees in or around major urban areas (Sudan,
Uganda, Kenya); and 5 countries have between 7,000 and 5,000 refugees in or around major urban areas (Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo).

- Countries with significant overlaps of refugees and major urban areas are located in a variety of regions, and most of the countries with substantial overlap have a significant MNC presence. While proximity is not a major barrier to expanding employment for refugees in many contexts, there are other significant obstacles, including: lack of legal right to work in most developing countries; vulnerability of refugees working in the informal sector to exploitation and deportation; and, even where refugees are allowed to work, de facto barriers like discrimination affect their ability to access the labor market. Other challenges include skill mismatches between refugees and employers’ needs and a lack of equal labor protections. The authors note that regardless of how much MNCs prioritize refugee hiring, the overall proportion that they hire may be substantial but minor; MNCs can create impact by including refugees in their supply chains, and by influencing other local, regional, and global businesses to engage refugees.

ICRC, August 2018

This report examines the experiences of IDPs and host communities in cities and towns, and how well the current humanitarian response is aligned with people’s needs and expectations. The report is based on field research in Mosul in Iraq, Baidoa in Somalia, Maiduguri in Nigeria, and San Pedro Sula in Honduras. Key findings include:

- **Internal displacement is increasingly urban.** IDPs flee to urban areas in search of security, services, markets, livelihoods opportunities, social networks, and assistance from relatives and friends. In cases of targeted violence, cities and towns offer the prospect of anonymity. There are also widespread negative perceptions of living conditions in camps; people avoid camps to maintain their freedom of movement, keep their animals, avoid authorities managing camps etc. In some cases there are no camps, or people lack the social (clan) connections to access informal camps. Choices are not static and IDPs move in and out of camps (e.g. move into a camp after failing to live independently in the city).

- **Most IDPs receive limited support and struggle to meet their basic needs.** IDPs often end up living in slums or informal settlements, on the periphery of cities or in disadvantaged neighborhoods where they lack security of tenure and adequate services. IDPs struggle to meet basic needs (food and water, shelter, education, health care), frequently resort to harmful survival strategies (e.g. sending children to work or beg, trading sexual favors or resorting to transactional marriages), and experience acute feelings of dislocation and indignity. Efforts to regain autonomy are often hampered by social discrimination, the political and legal system, and security situation (e.g. insecurity in San Pedro Sula limits freedom of movement to seek employment and access services, undermines psychological well-being, and may force people to move repeatedly).
• Compared to other urban poor, IDPs have specific vulnerabilities/needs associated with experiences of violence, family separation, loss of assets and income, lack of official documentation, and lack of familiarity with their new environment; they often lack capital to start a new business or the social networks to access livelihood opportunities, and they may not have skills suitable for the urban environment.

• Host communities often perceive IDPs as a burden when displacement becomes protracted and when assistance from governments or humanitarian organizations is inadequate. Displacement exacerbates pre-existing problems of employment and markets, land and housing, infrastructure, waste management and other public services. While displacement in urban areas is overwhelmingly portrayed as a burden, it can also create opportunities for host communities and cities.

• The humanitarian response to internal displacement outside of camps tends to be ad hoc and insufficient. Humanitarian responses tend to focus on IDPs in camps, despite the significant numbers of IDPs settling out of camps in urban settings. This may reflect the mistaken view that IDPs in urban areas are better off than those in camps because they benefit from the assistance of host families and host communities. Humanitarian responses in urban areas are often “belated and incomplete” focused on emergency needs, even in situations of protracted displacement. They also tend to be “blanket” programs (e.g. provision of urban infrastructure and services) rather than support to individuals/households, reflecting the erroneous assumption that IDPs are difficult to identify in urban settings.

The report outlines several recommendations for improving the humanitarian response to urban displacement, including:

• Humanitarian responses should be informed by the experiences of IDPs. Humanitarian programming should address the holistic needs of IDPs, the many consequences that flow from displacement, and the social, political and legal systems that facilitate or prevent integration.

• Humanitarian organizations must do a better job of reaching out to IDPs and helping them to safely access humanitarian assistance. The performance of humanitarian organizations should be assessed against their ability to include populations affected at every stage of the response.

• Long-term considerations must also be part of the humanitarian response. The humanitarian response should aim to simultaneously meet emergency needs, while at the same time helping people regain their dignity and autonomy, and building resilience. The report notes that “striking the balance between short- and long-term needs and addressing these simultaneously rather than sequentially remains a major challenge”.

• The work of humanitarian organizations is complementary to that of development actors. Development organizations may be better placed than humanitarians to work with public authorities on broader, structural issues of unemployment and poverty reduction, but they are often not in a position to address specific vulnerabilities at the individual and household levels.
Kang (2019) Urbanization as a Result of Displacement - A Case Study of Bentiu, South Sudan

Tarnjeet K. Kang
Background paper for the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019

In South Sudan there are six Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites in or adjacent to UNMISS bases, which host a tenth of the country’s IDPs (over 190,000 people). Continued conflict since 2013 has meant that PoC sites have become fixtures in host communities, and humanitarian responses go beyond food assistance, health care and non-food items, to include infrastructure and services. Using a host community perception survey and qualitative interviews conducted in August of 2018, this case study examines the impact of the Bentiu PoC site on urbanization in Bentiu town and neighboring Rubkona town in Unity State, South Sudan, as well as perception of the host community. Key findings:

• **Urbanization in Bentiu and Rubkona has been impacted by broader national events, rather than the establishment of the PoC**, including the withdrawal of oil revenues, which supported the state budget and funding of public services and infrastructure, and insecurity in the area, which has interrupted development in both towns.

• **Host community members tended to perceive the needs of those in the PoC site as different than their own and did not expect humanitarian organizations to provide the same services in their localities.** Most respondents reported a “very friendly” or “friendly” perception towards IDPs and returnees. The majority of respondents said that they actively supported IDPs by sharing food or tools.


Joint IDP Profiling Service
Melissa Weihmayer, Margharita Lundkvist-Houndoumadi, Laura Kivelä
Background paper for the Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019

Evidence on the experience of displaced populations in cities remains sparse, due in part to the difficulties of collecting and analyzing information on urban populations. This paper discusses how to overcome certain methodological challenges of analyzing internal displacement in urban settings, drawing on lessons learned from profiling exercises carried out in: Mogadishu, Somalia (2015 - 2016); Erbil, Iraq (2015 - 2016); and various cities in Syria (2018 – 2019). The objective of a profiling exercise is to create an agreed-upon evidence base to inform policies and programs in support of durable solutions for displaced populations. Profiling exercises typically include: a detailed review of existing data on population statistics in order to establish a baseline on the magnitude of displacement in a given area; and further data collection such as an enumeration, a
sample-based household survey, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and a review and triangulation of secondary data. Profiling exercises should cover both displaced and non-displaced households living in the same areas in order to identify unique/shared challenges and vulnerabilities. They also need to be adapted to the local circumstances.

- **Case study 1: Informal Settlements with Mixed Populations in Mogadishu, Somalia.** Since most urban residents have been displaced, the profiling exercise focused on IDPs in settlement areas. There was no comprehensive, up-to-date information on the locations and delineations of the settlements, no agreement on population estimates, and settlements also accommodated economic migrants, refugees, and non-displaced people. Therefore, the settlements were mapped, populations were enumerated, and migration histories were collected to categorize residents based on agreed definitions. From this data, a representative sample was drawn, and data were gathered on access to services, tenure security, livelihoods, perceptions of safety and security among other topics. The survey found that: all residents were at risk of evictions, with slightly more (37 percent) of IDPs expecting to be evicted within the next six months compared to economic migrants and local populations; and if evicted, the majority of IDP expected that they would move to another settlement with likely the same risks and potentially worsening conditions. This case study demonstrates the benefits of an extensive mapping and enumeration when baseline population estimates of the displaced are required, including the identification of displaced persons based on their migration history. A major limitation was that it was not possible to analyze spatial and social links between informal settlements and surrounding urban areas.

- **Case study 2: Informing area-based approaches in Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq:** The challenge was to capture differences across areas, as well as differences between population groups. Therefore, the methodology stratified the analysis by population groups (IDPs, refugees and non-displaced) and area types. However, identifying the most relevant way of including the area-based stratification in the household survey proved challenging. The need for urban planning expertise, as well as dedicated time and resources, were crucial for working out relevant area classifications and demarcations. Classification based on distance to the urban center (as opposed to combined indicators related to standards of living or quality of housing) proved not only more feasible, but also more relevant to governorate actors, who planned their work by area in the city. Leadership by the local authorities was critical to ensuring that the exercise was more useful/relevant. A major limitation was that it was not possible to analyze pressure on city services affected by displacement.

- **Case study 3: Understanding Displacement in the Context of Damaged Cities in Syria:** Syrian cities differ from the other two case studies because of the heavy damage to urban infrastructure, widespread displacement, minimal access to populations, and restrictions on data collection methods due to security risks and government policies. IDPs living in Syrian cities were likely to be facing similar and similarly acute challenges as those of the local residents that remained in those areas. Therefore, the analysis first aimed to establish what services the city was able to provide given the impact of the conflict, and then assess whether services were reaching areas of the city and populations equitably. The methodology borrowed techniques for data collection from damage assessments and conflict analysis. A key lesson learned is the need for a comprehensive analytical framework to guide the different types of information needed in
a conflict context that has sustained heavy damage. Due to restricted access to populations, the profiling exercise could not produce data on population needs disaggregated by displacement status.

Profiling methodologies need to reveal both how displaced populations get by in cities and how cities cope with their arrival, i.e. an analysis of the capacities and needs of the population groups coping with internal displacement, combined with a broader analysis of the city, which requires specialized technical expertise and forging stronger partnerships and joint planning by humanitarian responders and urban technical experts.