Doing Development Differently (DDD):
A Pilot for Politically Savvy, Locally Tailored and Adaptive Delivery in Nigeria

DELIVERY CASE STUDY

THE LAGOS EKO SECONDARY EDUCATION SECTOR PROJECT: TAILORING INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES TO IMPROVE EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES AT THE STATE LEVEL

MARCH 2016
The Lagos Eko Secondary Education Sector Project: Tailoring International Best Practices to Improve Educational Outcomes at the State Level


This case study was written by Sabrina Roshan, Roland Lomme, Halimatou Hima and Claudio Santibanez as part of the Delivery Case Studies series produced by the World Bank’s Nigeria Country Team under the guidance of Olatunde Adetoyese Adekola and Katherine Bain. The Delivery Case Studies series—part of the Doing Development Differently initiative—aims to generate knowledge on what works in Nigeria and why. These cases are among a number of instruments being piloted to help the World Bank continually improve its effectiveness as a partner to Nigeria. The Doing Development Differently pilot is task managed by Katherine Bain in the Governance Global Practice. The authors are grateful to Indira Konjhodzic for comments and support on earlier drafts. They also acknowledge the invaluable feedback provided by national stakeholders, including the former Project Coordinator and Special Assistant to the Governor, Ronke Azeez as well as editorial support from Amanda Green. The paper does not represent the views of the World Bank’s Board of Directors, and any errors are those of the authors alone.
# Contents

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Tracing the Process  
  - v
- Lessons Learned  
  - vi

## INTRODUCTION
  - 1

## THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE: NIGERIA'S HIGH DEMAND FOR EDUCATION, BUT LOW QUALITY
  - 2
  - The Structure of Nigeria's Education Sector  
    - 2
  - Challenges of Lagos State's Education Sector  
    - 3
  - The Education Sector Politics in Lagos State  
    - 4
  - Launching the Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project to Improve the Quality of Education  
    - 5
    - Positive Project Improve, 2009–13, then Decline in 2014  
      - 5
    - Results Setback in 2014  
      - 6
    - Test Scores Bounce Back in 2015  
      - 6

## THE DELIVERY CHALLENGE: TAILORING INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE TO LEVERAGE IMPACT IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT
  - 9
  - Targeting Interventions in Public Secondary Education to Maximize Impact in Lagos State  
    - 9
    - Why Target Secondary Education in Lagos State?  
      - 9
    - Why Focus on Education in Lagos State?  
      - 9
  - Identifying Best Practice Principles in Education Reform and Tailoring Them to the Local Context in Lagos State  
    - 9
  - Nurturing a Multilevel Culture of Performance in Lagos State  
    - 11

## TRACING THE PROCESS OF THE EKO PROJECT: FROM DESIGN TO IMPLEMENTATION AND BEYOND
  - 12
  - Challenges in Designing the Eko Project  
    - 12
    - Key Actors Trigger and Enable Change in the Education Sector  
      - 12
      - Alignment of Political and Institutional Leadership in Lagos State  
        - 12
      - Leaders with the Sector Experience Are Needed to Unpack Systemic, Root Problems  
        - 13
      - A Small but High-Powered PMU That Combined Internationally Competitive Technical Skills with Local System Knowledge and Effective Leveraging of State Institutions  
        - 13
      - A World Bank TTL Who Fostered a Partnership Based on Trust, Continuity, and Hands-on Supervision  
        - 13
    - Designing a Participatory Design Process Led by the State  
      - 14
      - Government-Driven Consultations Around a Clear Vision Leading to Strong Ownership of the Project's Design  
        - 14
      - Role of State-Level Constituencies: Teachers, Principals, and Unions  
        - 14
      - Role of Nongovernmental Constituencies in Education Reform: Parents and Community Members  
        - 14
      - Implications of the Participatory Design Process in the Eko Project  
        - 15
Eko Project Implementation Arrangements Designed to Span Government Levels with Clear Roles and Responsibilities 15
Design of Eko Project Systems for Data Collection and Analysis and Their Impact on Perceived Education Performance 15
Eko Project Implementation Challenges 17
Even in a Challenging Data Environment, a Data-Driven Approach Facilitates the Effective Use of Performance Incentives 17
Using Data Enables Accountability through Multistakeholder Monitoring of Program Performance 18
Adaptive Implementation Allows Flexibility to Seize Windows of Opportunity and Adequately React to Setbacks 18
Performance Data Can Help Identify Gaps and Provide Evidence in Support of Exit Strategies 19
The Status and Sustainability of Project Interventions at the Eko Project Closing Sustainability Is Enhanced by Proving the Value Added of a High-Performing System 20

LESSONS LEARNED 22
Eko Project’s Highly Consultative and Participative Design Process Leads to Achievements 22
Smooth Project Implementation Thanks to Participatory Design and International Best Practices 22
Building Project Sustainability from the Start 23
The Science of Delivery 23

BIBLIOGRAPHY 25

ANNEXES
Annex 1: Project Summary 26
Annex 2: Roles and Responsibilities for Project Implementation 27
Annex 3: Eko Project Implementation Arrangements 33
Annex 4: Basic Education Certificate Examination Results for Lagos State 38

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: The Dynamics of Change in the Eko Project 6
Figure 2: Implementation Arrangements under the Eko Project 16

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Primary and Junior Secondary Gross Enrollment Rates by Household Consumption Quintile, Lagos, 2006 3
Table 2: WASSCE Scores at Public Secondary Schools, Lagos State 7
Table 3: Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project, Intermediate Results Indicators 7
Table A2.1: Component Management and Institutional Responsibilities 29
Table A2.2: Roles and Responsibilities for Implementation—State Level 31
Table A2.3: Roles and Responsibilities for Implementation of Additional Financing—Local Levels 31
Table A4.1: Basic Education Certificate Examination Scores, Lagos State 38
Executive Summary

This case study seeks to understand how the Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project (Eko Project) in Nigeria tailored international best practices to leverage impact through education sector reforms in Lagos State's public secondary school system. As the economic center of Nigeria and a financial powerhouse in West Africa, Lagos State has benefited from significant education sector reforms initiated by reform-minded state officials. Demand for education has always been high in the state, but for many years the quality of secondary schools lagged behind. Infrastructure deficiencies, shortages in learning materials, and scarce opportunities for teachers' professional development compounded these problems.

In this context, a new governor took office in 2007, on a platform that placed education sector reforms at the top of the agenda. The governor recruited a top-notch program coordinator and sought the World Bank’s support to design and launch the Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project in 2009. Drawing on international best practices, the project set out to support improved learning outcomes through school development grants, performance-based incentives for schools, public-private partnerships for technical colleges, teacher training and mentoring, and more reliable performance measurement through improved standardized testing of learning achievement. The Eko Project, which is set to close in June 2016, has worked steadfastly toward achieving its development objective of improving the quality of public junior and senior secondary education in Lagos State, despite a significant drop in test scores in 2014—a setback that accentuated a national-level trend.

This case study explores how the Eko Project tailored international best practices to leverage impact in Lagos State's public secondary education system and assesses how the project resolutely responded to the challenges posed by the drop in test scores. Using a qualitative methodology based on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, the case study concludes that a proactive approach in a moment of committed political leadership from top to bottom—together with targeted program design, thoughtful adaptation of international experience, and efforts to foster a culture of performance—created the conditions for meaningful and sustainable reform, despite the challenges posed by demographic pressures and funding constraints.

TRACING THE PROCESS

During the Eko Project’s design phase, a small set of state actors served as essential change agents, leading a participatory and thorough design process that resulted in clear and effectual implementation arrangements to facilitate project execution. Among the most effective enabling actors were the governor and his deputy, who also served as commissioner of education; and, on the World Bank side, a task team leader (TTL) who fostered a partnership with the state based on trust, continuity, and close supervision. The yearlong design process made a conscious investment in local ownership, seeking and incorporating feedback from stakeholders to build on the clear vision presented by the governor and his team. During implementation, the project mobilized change agents along the entire delivery chain. The project deepened ties with the community over time through targeted and continuous engagement with a wide range of stakeholders. The project team was also able to forge a close and cooperative relationship with the teachers’ and principals’ unions by sequencing more sensitive project components.

In implementation, the availability of data—and training in its analysis—allowed the Eko Project team to monitor overall project outcomes and hold stakeholders accountable, thereby improving the performance of all actors involved in school operations. School performance information was posted publicly so all stakeholders were aware of how their schools fare in comparison to others and can argue for further change. This data-driven approach helped link incentives to actual performance, motivating key stakeholders to perform better and strengthening the project’s credibility. The use of data allowed for adaptive implementation, helping document performance gaps and guiding course corrections, including in response to the 2014 drop in test scores. Nonetheless, the project’s overall success was somewhat undermined by a weak monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework, which made it difficult to consistently rate project performance and highlights the need for project teams to pay more attention to establishing baselines, defining meaningful indicators, and identifying weaknesses in official data systems early on in project preparation. The Project Management Unit (PMU) reported a “cultural change” in “embedding” data-based performance monitoring among those who are involved in implementing secondary education in Lagos State.
LESSONS LEARNED

Many of the Eko Project’s achievements are a direct result of its participatory design process, which adapted best practices to the Nigerian context. In the case of the Eko Project, political, managerial, and professional leadership; an internalized delivery chain leveraged by a small but effective PMU; and close but flexible supervision by the World Bank encouraged improvements and amendments as implementation progressed and challenges arose. Key design lessons include the need to:

- Take advantage of political buy-in to ensure that leadership percolates down to the frontline delivery level.
- Ensure multilevel stakeholder involvement.
- Carefully articulate the respective roles of ad hoc implementing agencies (PMU) and established institutions (line ministry) to foster close interaction and ensure sustainability and ownership.
- Establish a robust M&E framework from the outset that takes into account constraints in the availability of relevant data.

**Eko Project implementation has been relatively smooth.**

With a highly skilled, albeit small, PMU at its center and strong collective leadership down the delivery chain in the state bureaucracy, innovative interventions have been introduced and followed through, resulting in positive outcomes. Key implementation lessons include the need to:

- Hire the right mix of skills in the PMU so that it has both political clout and managerial leverage.
- Empower a PMU to be flexible and aim at internalizing innovation.
- Ensure that the PMU interacts regularly with all stakeholders and helps build collective buy-in.
- For the TTL to be present and make sure the task team is available to help address implementation challenges.
- Use data and close supervision to identify problems and make course corrections in real time.

**Key sustainability lessons include:**

- Identify the sustainers early on.
- Use capacity building as a performance incentive.
- Sequence interventions carefully to ensure that reforms are not derailed early on.
- Gain exposure to other contexts where interventions in the sector have worked and apply them locally, in a strategic and nuanced manner.

Finally, an emerging framework on the science of delivery identifies key lessons from the Project such as: the importance of aligning political, managerial, and professional agendas; the need to engage leaders with significant political power to enhance the efficacy of delivery; the role of training as both an incentive and a means to develop skills for project implementation; and the significance of innovative and responsive quick thinking in establishing nontraditional solutions and relationships.
Introduction

This case study seeks to understand how the Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project (Eko Project) tailored international best practices to leverage impact through education sector reforms in Lagos State’s public secondary school system. These best practices include an intensive utilization of evidence-based policy making, the granting of autonomy to a variety of stakeholders together with the expectation of accountability for results, community participation, incentives for reform, support for public-private partnerships (PPPs), and adaptive implementation.

Research methods focus on the Science of Delivery1 case study guidelines, drawing on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders to better understand the implementation process and analyze the causal mechanisms for results achieved. First, the case study reviews contextual factors and the political setting in place when the project was launched, as well as project results. Second, the case study explores the ways in which the Eko Project tailored international best practices to leverage impact in the Nigerian context. Next, the case study traces the design process, which involved key enabling actors and a participatory approach, followed by an adaptive implementation process that used data to enforce accountability and build incentives, with a view to the sustainability of project interventions. Finally, a few key lessons that emerge from the Eko Project’s experience are discussed.

The case study is part of a Doing Development Differently Initiative within the Nigeria Country Team, which seeks to support the World Bank’s development effectiveness by putting institutions and governance at the center of what it does, tailoring interventions to the local context and building in adaptive learning techniques to projects. The Lagos Eko Project was selected as a case study in a series of case studies that aim to help the World Bank better learn from practice. This case study is also part of the Science of Delivery program that is contributing to the Global Delivery Initiative’s Library of Delivery Case Studies. The Global Delivery Initiative is a collaboration across the international development community to forge a new frontier in development efforts worldwide.

Understanding how this project effectively tailored international best practices, while drawing on participatory, innovative, and adaptive interventions, offers practical lessons for other states in Nigeria and other countries facing similar challenges. The case study highlights four key contributors to the Eko Project’s politically savvy, locally tailored and adaptive delivery approach: (i) it managed to build on collective leadership along the entire delivery chain, from the political leadership of the governor down to the professional leadership of classroom teachers; (ii) it bounced back from a setback in outcomes by strengthening data collection and analysis of results; (iii) it struck the right balance between external and internal implementation mechanisms to make the most of established institutions; and (iv) it aimed at macro-level impact by reaching down to individual learning achievements.

---

1 It is important to note that even well-intentioned efforts at evidence-based policy making struggle in the Nigerian context, where data availability is limited and the political will for rigorous data collection and analysis can be low.
The Development Challenge: Nigeria’s High Demand for Education, but Low Quality

THE STRUCTURE OF NIGERIA’S EDUCATION SECTOR

Nigeria’s education system comprises nine years of basic education, including six years of primary school and three years of junior secondary school, as well as three years of senior secondary school and four years of tertiary education. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria distributes responsibility for education across the three tiers of government: secondary education falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state governments, and primary, adult, and vocational education are the joint responsibility of state and local governments. The constitution also ensures that part of the government revenue collected at the federal level is transferred to state and local governments. In effect, state governments are responsible for primary and secondary education while the federal government plays a dominant role in providing tertiary education. Local-level agencies called Local Government Education Authorities (LGEAs) are in charge of basic education, but they report to the state government rather than to local governments. The private sector is also active at all levels of the education system, especially at the primary and secondary level while the federal government plays a dominant role in providing tertiary education. Local-level agencies called Local Government Education Authorities (LGEAs) are in charge of basic education, but they report to the state government rather than to local governments. The private sector is also active at all levels of the education system, especially at the primary and secondary level. The enactment of the Universal Basic Education Act in 2004 at the federal level, and in 2005 by the Lagos State Government, bifurcated secondary education and schools into junior secondary (which falls into basic education along with pre-primary and primary) and senior secondary. Ad hoc executive agencies, such as the Universal Basic Education Commission at the federal level and State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs) at the state level, have been established to implement the universal basic education legislation and take over the management of earmarked budget resources.

The legal, policy, and institutional framework differs for junior secondary (which, as part of basic education, falls under the purview of SUBEBs) and senior secondary education. Nigerian federalism also applies differently to basic and senior secondary education, with fiscal transfers from the federation available only for basic education. The National Council of Education, an interstate coordination body, plays an important role in horizontal policy alignment; for example, it decides on the national curriculum and has been instrumental in the institutionalization of School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs) across Nigeria’s states.

On the whole, Nigeria allocates few resources to education. Total public expenditure on education amounts to less than 2 percent of gross domestic product. The fiscal burden of education rests largely with state and local governments. Close to half of public expenditure on education is allocated to basic education.

Lagos State—located in the southwest of Nigeria and home to the country’s largest and most economically dominant city, Lagos—offers tuition-free public education at the basic and secondary levels. Sitting for the West Africa Senior Secondary Certificate Examination (WASSCE) is also free of charge. As of 2007/08, when the Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project was prepared, 11,387 schools (public and private) enrolled an estimated 2.3 million students. Of these students, approximately 1 million (40 percent) were enrolled in public schools. In the tertiary sector, Lagos State had five public technical colleges, five universities (two public and three private), two polytechnics, one monotechnic, and four Colleges of Education (one federal and three private). Public education is at risk of being underfunded in Lagos as anywhere else in Nigeria, as it accounts for approximately 16 percent of total appropriations at the state level (that is, less than US$500 million). However, the state government is committed to safeguarding social expenditures, even in the context of fiscal pressures.

Demand for education is high in Nigeria and in Lagos State in particular. Rapid population growth, at 2.8 percent per year nationwide and 3.2 percent per
year in Lagos State, has placed constant pressure on the education system to make room for more students. In general, Lagos State enjoys a high student attendance levels, with primary gross attendance at 103 percent and net attendance at 69 percent. The secondary gross attendance rate is almost 117 percent and net attendance is 69 percent (NPC DHS 2014).2

The high demand for education has spawned a dramatic growth in the number of private schools in Lagos State over the past two decades. This increase is especially seen at the primary level, where most poor children are enrolled in private schools, at a high cost to their parents, due to the lack of public schools in poor neighborhoods and slums (Härmä 2013). As a result, the education sector has split along income lines. Inequalities persist at the secondary level as well, although with the opposite result with regard to private (more socially selective) versus public schools. Private schools in Lagos can often offer a more conducive learning environment through smaller classes and lower student-teacher ratios,3 better infrastructure,4 wider distribution of learning materials, and motivated and accountable teachers, as well as convenience factors such as additional childcare for working parents.

**CHALLENGES OF LAGOS STATE’S EDUCATION SECTOR**

At the time of the Eko Project’s design, the education sector in Lagos State faced several critical challenges. Despite high adult literacy rates in Lagos, at 93 percent in 2005/06 (Lagos State Government 2009), poor quality of education was evident in low student performance on examinations and inadequate skills development among graduates seeking employment. Infrastructure deficiencies, shortages in learning materials, and scarce opportunities for teachers’ professional development compounded these problems.

Below is a brief review of the key challenges in Lagos State’s education sector:

**Poor people had limited access to secondary education.** At the time of project inception, primary gross enrollment rates were quite high, reaching nearly 100 percent for children aged 6–14. Gross enrollment dropped to 65 percent by senior secondary school and reached only 40 percent among the lowest income quintiles (Table 1; NBS 2005 and 2006). Even with an overwhelming demand for public secondary education in Lagos, as evidenced by a high transition rate of 48 percent from primary to junior secondary school (NPC 2008), dropout rates before and after completion of legally compulsory basic education were concerning. In the first year of junior secondary school, 9 percent of those enrolled left school prior to completion. Similarly, although 96 percent of junior secondary school graduates continued to senior secondary school, the dropout rate was over 16 percent during the first year and 25 percent in the last year of senior secondary school.

This phenomenon reflected inadequacies in the learning environment (including poor infrastructure, overcrowding, and scarce learning materials), together with the insufficient availability of schools (public and private) to meet growing demand. The indirect costs

---

**TABLE 1: Primary and Junior Secondary Gross Enrollment Rates by Household Consumption Quintile, Lagos, 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Primary by Income Quintile</th>
<th>Junior Secondary by Income Quintile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NBS 2005 and 2006.*

*Note: 1 = lowest income quintile and 5 = highest income quintile.*

---

2 According to the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), the net attendance ratio (NAR) indicates participation in schooling among those of official school age (6–11 for primary and 12–17 for secondary). The gross attendance ratio (GAR) indicates school attendance among youth of any age, from 5 to 24, and is expressed as a percentage of the school-age population for that schooling level, although technically the GAR is not a percentage. The GAR is nearly always higher than the NAR for the same level, because the GAR includes participation by youth who are older or younger than the official age range for that level.

3 The number of students per classroom in public junior secondary schools deteriorated from 85 in 2011/12 to 101 in 2012/13 (Lagos State Government 2013, iii).

4 Only two-thirds of public junior secondary school classrooms are usable, and fewer than two-thirds of public junior secondary schools have access to safe water (Lagos State Government 2013, iv).
of education were also a factor; despite an official policy of free education, parents were often required to buy textbooks and teaching materials. Transportation difficulties brought about by urban expansion, including traffic congestion and growing distances to school, exacerbated problems in accessing education. Finally, the high opportunity costs at the secondary level, combined with the low employment rate of secondary school graduates, acted as an additional deterrent.

**Gender parity in secondary school attendance was only slightly higher than in Nigeria as a whole.** Lagos State ranked 13th among Nigerian states, with a gender parity index of 0.98 as compared to 0.93 at the national level (NPC and RTI International 2011).5

**The quality and relevance of education were inadequate for skills development.** The quality of primary and secondary education deteriorated markedly in the decade prior to the Eko Project. For example, despite a few high-performing schools, only 18 percent of candidates taking the WASSCE in Lagos State in 2009 obtained five credit passes and above (a score considered academically adequate for entry into university) in at least five subjects, including in English and mathematics. Skills acquired in school were also inadequate. As many as 60 percent of senior secondary school graduates were unemployable in 2007 (FMoE 2007), primarily because they did not have the skills needed to adapt to Nigeria’s dynamic business environment.

**School curriculum was not well aligned with labor market needs.** Low test scores reflected the lack of foundational skills, including basic literacy and numeracy, which are of critical importance in supporting the needs of the (formal and informal) labor market in Lagos. Technical colleges were in a shambles, and most secondary schools included little practical or technical content in the curriculum. At the same time, the poor reputation of Nigeria’s technical colleges as “schools of last resort” for dropouts or less capable learners had driven down enrollment in these schools and further eroded their quality.

**Public spending on education was inadequate, of low quality, and subject to limited accountability.** Data available at the time of Eko Project preparation suggested that education funding had been declining in real terms in Lagos State. The bulk of budget resources were allocated to teacher salaries, leaving few funds for learning materials, maintenance, and other critical expenditures. Weak accountability of capital expenditures was reflected in the quality of school facilities.

**Service providers were disenfranchised.** Evidence pointed to inefficiencies in the delivery of education services—in teacher deployment, for example, through a lack of qualified teachers in the areas most in need of them. With a top-down management structure, limited funds, and insufficient accountability mechanisms in place, underpowered education service providers on the ground struggled to address quality constraints.

**State capacity for policy making, management, and M&E was lacking.** With limited state-level political commitment came limited capacity for managing the education sector. From a policy perspective, there was an inadequate understanding of how to target education quality improvements. Traditionally, the state turned to constructing school buildings rather than strengthening the capacity of teachers and administrators. A history of problematic infrastructure development, brimming with accusations of overspending and potential corruption, also tainted the state’s education improvement interventions. Management constraints ranged from inefficient budget spending to scarce use of standardized testing data to improve performance and hold relevant stakeholders accountable.

**THE EDUCATION SECTOR POLITICS IN LAGOS STATE**

It is difficult to replicate the combination of political factors and sequencing in the political economy of education sector reform in Lagos State when the Eko Project was designed, but it is critical to understanding how the project identified and seized opportunities to achieve meaningful change and, ultimately, to deliver results. The politics behind how interventions are introduced and managed matters in reforming schools and systems, and the success of policy reforms depends a great deal on the capacity of their promoters to gather support within a specific political economy context. How and when decisions are made along the reform continuum and who is involved in decision making make a difference to the outcome of reforms that entail potential benefits—or losses—for various stakeholders.

The political economy literature stresses that successful education reforms necessitate longstanding support from a broad range of stakeholders, given their effect on power structures and the requirement that they be taken up by service providers down the delivery chain.

*Reforms like those in education required long chains of implementation activities and decisions.*

---

5 The gender parity index measures the ratio of girls to boys, with 1 indicating complete parity. A ratio of less than 9 indicates a smaller number of girls than boys.
Ultimately, education changes had to be adopted at the classroom level if they were to improve the extent to which children learned critical skills and abilities; this meant that multiple layers of implementers needed to be on board for new initiatives to succeed . . . These changes meant that governors, mayors, bureaucrats, teachers, students, parents, and communities needed to adopt new ways of thinking and behaving and learn to be more accountable in multiple ways” (Grindle 2004).

According to the project coordinator, at the time of the project’s preparation and implementation, there was a demand for change from the public—and this demand was complemented by a desire for reform among state leaders. Lagos State has a history of reform-minded leadership over the past 17 years, embarking on substantive economic and governance reforms beginning in 1999. Building on the groundwork laid by the previous administration, a new government was elected in April 2007 on a platform that placed education reforms at the top of the agenda. The Eko Project’s objectives and activities aligned closely with the incoming state governor’s agenda and benefited from his political capital and personal interest and involvement.

LAUNCHING THE LAGOS EKO SECONDARY EDUCATION PROJECT TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION

With the goal of improving the quality of public junior and senior secondary education, the Lagos State Ministry of Education launched the Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project in 2009, supported by a World Bank credit in the amount of US$95 million. Drawing on international best practices in the education sector and in-service delivery more broadly, the project set out to support improved learning outcomes for more than half a million public school students and 7,000 teachers and school administrators in 637 schools through school grants, performance-based incentives, teacher training, and standardized testing.

School improvement grants were made available to all public junior and senior secondary schools in Lagos State as an additional funding source to improve the quality of education services on the basis of an approved school improvement plan. Additional performance grants were awarded to the best-performing 40 percent of schools based on criteria such as test scores and teacher attendance. All five technical and vocational colleges in the state were included in the project and received grant funding to strengthen partnerships with the private sector, so as to improve the linkages between skills training and labor market demand.

The teacher training component focused on identifying training and capacity development needs among secondary school teachers and developing or linking them with interventions to address those needs. Standardized testing supported the program’s performance incentives by establishing a consistent, comparable method of measuring learning achievements. The Eko Project also supported project coordination and management, as well as efforts to strengthen the federal post-basic education strategy.

Additional financing of US$42.3 million was approved in March 2014 to: (i) add two additional rounds of grants to schools under the School Development Grant subcomponent, based on the same criteria and procedures as in the original project; (ii) continue teacher professional development; (iii) continue standardized testing of student learning achievement for 2014 and 2015; and (iv) continue collaboration with the private sector on technical education.

Positive Project Improvements from 2009–2013, then Decline in 2014

Implementation was relatively seamless, with the exception of a delay in the disbursement of additional financing until the end of 2014. According to the project’s Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) and other project implementation documents such as Financial Management Supervision Reports and Procurement Post Reviews, the few minor procurement and financial management issues that have arisen have been remedied or are being rectified. Results show significant improvement over baseline indicators until 2013 (Tables 2–3).

In 2014, however, Lagos State’s WASSCE test scores dropped considerably. The state’s WASSCE performance ranking dropped from first to sixth of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. The share of students obtaining five credit passes, including in English and mathematics, dropped from 46 percent in 2013 to 28 percent in 2014. In response, the governor asked senior education executives to urgently develop a strategy to address the decline in scores. The project coordinator noted that “nobody was talking about test scores before [the Eko Project]. For the first time, we started to feel embarrassed” by poor results.

As a result of the setback in test scores, together with insufficient progress toward some of the project’s intermediate results indicators (Table 3), the World Bank team has downgraded the Eko Project’s project development objective rating to “moderately satisfactory.”
Results Setback in 2014

Although not yet fully understood, the slippage in test scores may have resulted from the funding gap between closure of the original project and the delayed effectiveness of additional financing. Owing to this gap, most activities were frozen for 10 months—including school improvement grants, performance awards, teacher training, provision of essential materials, and the activities of volunteer teachers. In addition, there was a reduction in afternoon lessons, Saturday coaching, and monitoring and supervision activities by ZoPAs. Other potential reasons for the setback include the curriculum reform being undertaken at the time and the shortage of qualified and experienced teachers following a spate of retirements (500 of 3,000 teachers retired in District IV alone during this period), leading to a higher student-teacher ratio (World Bank 2015a). In addition, the setback in results took place in the context of a system-wide decline in 2014 WASSCE test scores across Nigeria, although those in Lagos State declined by a greater degree.

Although the decline in results was disappointing, the project coordinator felt that this “dip” in project implementation was “really what brought the project together,” as it encouraged the project team to develop better mechanisms for data collection and analysis and to strengthen M&E capacity at the district and school levels. The project team forged a partnership with Google for Education to create resource centers that could help strengthen the data management capacity of administrative staff; to mobilize online resources to train teachers; and to help localize content (including by ensuring that good teaching results were recorded). The team also developed strategies with regard to building classrooms and deploying teachers, and ZoPAs were instructed to monitor after-school lessons.

The drop in test scores sparked a policy debate in Lagos State. In response to a proposal that students be selected to participate in the WASSCE, the governor refused, arguing that passing the exam was a right not to be denied to any student.

Test Scores Bounce Back in 2015

Test scores for 2015 reveal significant improvement over the previous year, even meeting or surpassing the performance recorded in 2013 (Table 2). These improvements are demonstrative of the systematic, institutionalized cultural change embedded in the Eko Project’s delivery chain, which affects all public secondary schools in the state.
**TABLE 2:** WASSCE Scores (%) at Public Secondary Schools, Lagos State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>2009 Target</th>
<th>2009 Actual</th>
<th>2013 Target</th>
<th>2013 Actual</th>
<th>2014 Target</th>
<th>2014 Actual</th>
<th>2015 Target</th>
<th>2015 Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biology</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject average</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five credits, including English and mathematics</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 3:** Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project, Intermediate Results Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline and Baseline Date</th>
<th>Progress to Date</th>
<th>End Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11/4/2015</td>
<td>12/31/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School principals and vice principals trained on performance improvement and grant operations</td>
<td>0 (9/1/2008)</td>
<td>4,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School principals and vice principals trained on performance improvement and grant operations (cumulative)</td>
<td>0 (12/31/2009)</td>
<td>4,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers trained in core subjects (cumulative)</td>
<td>0 (12/31/2009)</td>
<td>9,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District staff trained in project monitoring, administration, and financial management (cumulative)</td>
<td>0 (12/31/2009)</td>
<td>1,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Education Management Information Management (EMIS) centers developed in the Education Districts</td>
<td>0 (12/31/2009)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts reporting against agreed data using the EMIS to produce reports</td>
<td>0 (12/31/2009)</td>
<td>0 (9/30/2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers trained in leadership and management (cumulative)</td>
<td>0 (12/31/2009)</td>
<td>12,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical college staff trained in project monitoring, administration, and financial management (cumulative)</td>
<td>10 (12/31/2013)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank task team implementation documents.

Note: The project was set to close on December 31, 2015. The government requested a six-month extension in additional financing to June 30, 2016. The rationale, as captured in the September 2015 Aide Memoire, was the delay in project effectiveness and implementation as a result of school closures due to the Ebola Virus Disease, the recent change in government, the retention of a new project coordinator, and the need to disburse the remaining/committed funds for the following activities: disaggregated analysis of 2015 test results to justify the increase in performance compared to 2014, monitoring and evaluation of school grants, and training of more district staff, school principals, and vice principals.

a. Baseline dates vary due to the lack of available data during project design.
The state government could not substitute for the delayed availability of funds, but it did react promptly to the setback in WASSCE test scores by strengthening delivery mechanisms, including information management to diagnose the underlying factors. The project team is still investigating the causes. There could be cases where, despite the governor’s objection, upstream selection of WASSCE participants by principals wary of low scores may have led to a biased increase in overall test scores. This would be attributed to a reduction in the number of candidates—which would be likely to exclude low performers—sitting for the exam.

According to the project team, other potential causes for the 2015 improvement in scores include: (i) increased monitoring and supervision by ZoPAs (from three times per month to four) to address the retirement of teachers; (ii) the conversion of a number of qualified volunteer teachers to permanent and regular staff positions; (iii) the reinstatement of afternoon lessons and Saturday coaching; (iv) the intensification and increased frequency of early morning lessons; (v) efforts to urge stakeholders, including SBMCs, to focus on teachers’ and pupils’ attendance and punctuality; and (vi) the inclusion of more teachers in training and retraining activities to boost morale and motivate them to boost their productivity (World Bank 2015a).

While there is no evidence of a single, definitive factor behind the 2015 increase in scores, the Eko project has clearly institutionalized a data-driven culture in Lagos State’s public secondary education system. Regardless of the ebb and flow of student scores, the fact that stakeholders at both the highest and lowest levels of the delivery chain turned immediately to the data to determine what went wrong and how to make things right again, demonstrates that the Eko Project has changed the game in the state’s secondary education sector. Commissioners, district officials, principals, teachers, parents, and community members all looked to strengthen data collection, increase the specificity of information gathered, and expedite responses to changes in results with a view to improving student performance. In the long run, this could help alter the broader approach to data in Nigeria, where political will and capacity for data collection and analysis are limited.

This case is illustrative of a shift in demand for the state to collect and provide constituents with reliable data. Stakeholders at all levels in Lagos State turned a negative into a positive: because of the lack of specificity in information on why the scores dropped, schools have ramped up strategic data collection and analysis.
The Delivery Challenge: Tailoring International Best Practice to Leverage Impact in the Nigerian Context

TARGETING INTERVENTIONS IN PUBLIC SECONDARY EDUCATION TO MAXIMIZE IMPACT IN LAGOS STATE

In an effort to support the government's priority of targeting needier students and schools, while also seeking to maximize program effectiveness, the Eko Project focused narrowly on public secondary education in Lagos State. These design decisions strategically concentrated program investments on issues identified as priorities by the state government, where there was reform traction and local ownership. The move toward more purposeful targeting was based in part on lessons learned in the implementation of past projects in Nigeria, including the Second Primary Education Project, implemented at the federal level.6

Why Target Secondary Education in Lagos State?

High primary school attendance, varied access to funding, and the significant level of private schooling guided the decision to concentrate on addressing quality deficits at the secondary level. As noted above, despite automatic progression of students from primary to junior secondary school, completion rates in secondary schools were considerably lower. As reported by the project’s task team leader (TTL), failure rates were so high that citizens began questioning why they were sending their children to public school at all. This concern was exacerbated by the low employment rate of secondary school graduates. Moreover, at the time of project preparation, primary schools had an edge in funding, as they received earmarked funding from the government for universal basic education (primary and junior secondary) as well as resources through the Second Primary Education Project, which provided federal and state counterpart funding to targeted primary schools across Nigeria. During this period, donor agencies—including the World Bank—were focusing their education sector investments at the primary level, providing little attention to secondary education.

Why Focus on Education in Lagos State?

In a country with significant disparity in socioeconomic development across 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, it may seem unexpected for the Eko Project to have focused on relatively well-off Lagos rather than on other states with more severe challenges in ensuring educational access and quality, especially in the north of Nigeria. According to the Project Appraisal Document (World Bank 2009), Lagos State was also selected on the basis of: (i) its significant role in Nigeria’s economic growth; (ii) the poor quality of public education, especially in urban slum areas (which shelter over two-thirds of Lagos’s population); (iii) the high quality of its Education Sector Plan; and (iv) its demonstrated commitment to and ownership in the development of the education sector.

IDENTIFYING BEST PRACTICE PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION REFORM AND TAILORING THEM TO THE LOCAL CONTEXT IN LAGOS STATE

Before launching public consultations on program design, the governor, the PMU, and the World Bank’s project team looked to international best practices to understand what had worked to improve secondary education. One of the main project lessons was that, at the design stage, resources needed to be targeted through a variety of quality-enhancing inputs and allocated in sufficient quantity to be able to achieve the intended impact (World Bank 2005).

6 The Second Primary Education Project was approved in May 2000, became effective in August 2000, and closed in December 2004.
education quality in other countries and why. The team found that successful reforms in other countries had several factors in common, including meaningful attention to and use of data, mechanisms for autonomy and accountability, community participation, incentives for reform, support for PPPs, and adaptive implementation. These intervention areas were complemented by an increase in infrastructure investment in secondary schools. The team applied international best practices to the local context, designing a blueprint around specific intervention areas and implementation approaches that played up Lagos State’s strengths and took account of its limitations.

Evidence-based policy making. Prior to the Eko Project, student performance in Lagos State was being measured through a system of standardized exams. What the project could contribute in this regard were clear and consistent procedures for data collection and utilization within the state’s public secondary education system to improve data accuracy and help ensure that this information was being used effectively to measure and monitor school performance based on criteria set either by individual schools, districts, states, or the federal government (World Bank 2008). It was also important to ensure that data were analyzed and presented in a manner that would support informed decision making and policy responses at each relevant level of policy implementation, including schools, districts, and the state.

Autonomy and accountability. The role of greater stakeholder autonomy in supporting mechanisms for accountability—upward to higher levels of government, downward to schools, and outward to the community—has provided an impetus for improved performance and clearer feedback on what is and is not working in the sector and how it might be strengthened. Together, these factors lead to higher-quality service delivery (World Bank 2008; World Bank Social Accountability Sourcebook).

Community participation. As a complement to stronger accountability tools, meaningful community participation improves oversight of the education sector. Community participation is an important element in providing effective oversight, including monitoring student and teacher attendance, tracking the results of school spending, and providing anecdotal evidence to support assessments of learning outcomes. Community participation can also be mobilized to provide financial or other material and nonmaterial support to schools (Uemura 1999; Jimenez and Sawada 1998; Heneveld and Craig 1996).

Reform Incentives. The design of incentives proved critical to the Eko Project’s successful implementation. The project team looked at how to build incentives into the project that aligned with key stakeholders’ interests (Vegas and Umansky 2006; Vegas 2005). Experience showed that incentives were most effective when they reached beyond monetary approaches, especially in cases where it would be difficult to enforce disincentives—for example, removing underperforming teachers from their positions (Vegas and Umansky 2006).

Support for PPPs. The role of PPPs in strengthening education sector outcomes was of significant interest to the project team, given the project’s focus on improving the employability of secondary school graduates in Lagos State and the importance of strengthening the links between the state’s technical colleges and the labor market for which they were to prepare their students. International experience suggested that PPPs could increase access to education (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, and Guáqueta 2009). PPPs have also improved the quality of education service delivery when coupled with strong oversight mechanisms for quality control and other interventions to improve schools (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, and Guáqueta 2009).

Adaptive implementation. The Eko Project team’s investment in an iterative design process resulted in successful adaptive implementation. The utility of this approach is supported by evidence across international development sectors (Glennister and Takavarasha 2013; Duflo and Kremer 2005; World Bank 2015b). Using this approach, the Eko Project was able to adapt to windows of opportunity during implementation—for example, by taking advantage of training opportunities and partnerships with global information and communications technology (ICT) service providers. The project also demonstrated effective adjustment to challenges and a willingness to respond to the evolving context, as evidenced by its flexible response to the drop in test scores in 2014.

With these building blocks in place, the World Bank’s education specialists led a brainstorming session with all stakeholders to discuss how international best practices could be tailored to the Lagos State context to most effectively address the governor’s twin priorities: low learning outcomes in secondary education and the employability of graduates. The consultations confirmed the need for effective accountability mechanisms to nurture meaningful demand for change, the importance of incentives that moved beyond financial resources, and the need to link resources to results.

In the search for context-appropriate responses to these systemic problems, the project team led multistakeholder study tours to Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States—countries that had achieved success in secondary education sector reform. Through these study tours, the joint government–bank team defined a set of principles for designing a program
to improve secondary school dropout rates and increase student employability after graduation within the Lagos State context.

NURTURING A MULTILEVEL CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE IN LAGOS STATE

The Eko Project’s performance orientation operated at four levels of implementation. First, at the state level, the governor made clear his high expectations for performance and was personally keen to seek improvements. Second, PMU level performance was spurred by appointing a project coordinator with whom the governor enjoyed a close advisory relationship. Third, district- and school-level accountability were strengthened by devolving significant responsibilities to ZoPAs, teachers, principals, and SBMCs, and by establishing lines of accountability between the PMU, the district, and the schools via implementation arrangements. Together with transparency mechanisms built into the project (including posting school and student performance scores on school notice boards), these implementation arrangements ensured that any achievement failures could be addressed. Benchmarking student learning achievements at the school and classroom levels incentivized good performance among teachers and school administrators. The alignment between political, managerial, and professional performance and incentives to perform was instrumental to the results achieved under the Eko Project.
Tracing the Process of the Eko Project: From Design to Implementation and Beyond

During the Eko Project design stage, a small set of actors served as change agents, leading a participatory design process that involved decision makers across various levels of government and resulted in clear and effectual implementation arrangements. Once implementation began, incentives were used in an effective way, linked to data-driven monitoring of school performance while remaining aligned with the preferences of key stakeholders. With a strong PMU in place and a flexible TTL, the project shifted its approach toward responding to needs on the ground, maintaining relevance, and avoiding potential pitfalls. Finally, the PMU engaged government counterparts early on so as to train and develop the skills of state and district officials who would eventually be responsible for sustaining Eko reforms after project closure. Over the Eko Project’s life span, the dynamics of change worked to leverage the lessons learned in other secondary education reform experiments into results on the ground in Nigeria. (See Figure 1 for a mapping of the dynamics of change in the project, each of which is explored below).

CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING THE EKO PROJECT

When the Eko Project was designed, the Government of Lagos State was aware of the significant challenges it faced in improving its provision of education and had put in place a high-quality strategic plan for the sector. Developed in 2007, the Lagos State Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy recognized that enhancing citizens’ access to education could help reduce extreme poverty and empower the population. The resulting Education Sector Plan, developed by the state government with support from the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and presented in 2008, aimed to provide accessible, equitable, quantitative, and qualitative education for all, fostering self-reliance and socioeconomic development in Lagos.

The Eko Project was designed to help the government translate this policy framework into tangible improvements in secondary education in Lagos State. The central elements of the program’s design are highlighted below.

**Key Actors Trigger and Enable Change in the Education Sector**

**Alignment of Political and Institutional Leadership in Lagos State**

Given his experience as deputy governor, the incoming Lagos State governor benefited from a smooth transition into office and was able to dive quickly into the substance of his reform agenda. He understood the education sector issues and had insider knowledge on how to implement political reforms. The governor was well acquainted with budget processes and the state bureaucracy. He was ready to start delivering on his agenda early on and was determined to do so differently by focusing on specific sectors with a targeted approach. He used unconventional methods to improve outcomes, including setting up a delivery unit inside the State Ministry of Education, bringing in an outsider to manage this project, and using evidence to inform policy making and incentives, among other tools.

Combined with the political clout that came with holding the highest political seat in the state, this background provided the governor with the bandwidth he needed to support the Eko Project implementation. He established a reporting structure through which the project coordinator updated him on project progress every two weeks and convened a monthly meeting of senior education executives to discuss sector issues.

Because of his focus on education sector reform, the governor appointed his deputy to serve simultaneously as commissioner of education. The commissioner’s background and expertise were in the education sector, as a former teacher and education administrator. While
this arrangement no longer holds, at the time it was emulated by other state governments.

Leaders with Sector Experience Are Needed to Unpack Systemic, Root Problems

Owing to their strong sector knowledge and focus, the state's leadership team made a clear diagnosis of systemic problems in the education sector. According to the project’s TTL, the leadership team recognized first that, without an effective accountability system there would be no meaningful demand for change—even if sector services were not working. Second, the team noted that the motivation to perform was inhibited in the sector by the fact that high performers did not attract greater resources. Finally, the team understood that results needed to be linked to resources to establish accountability, strengthen the quality of teaching and school facilities, and improve students’ test scores, learning outcomes, and employment opportunities.

The state's vision was clear. Rather than focusing on inputs with the support of a traditional investment project, it sought to reform how the entire system functioned, changing the rules of the game. As the project coordinator pointed out, there was a "yearning for change, whether it was social or political . . . there was a need for change in the education system and there was a leader at a high level who wanted that change, with highly skilled people in Lagos State to execute that change."

A Small but High-Powered PMU That Combined Internationally Competitive Technical Skills with Local System Knowledge and Effective Leveraging of State Institutions

Eko Project implementation has reaped the benefits of a well-functioning PMU, managed by a project coordinator who had significant experience with international donor agencies, relevant technical training, and strong leadership skills. The PMU’s strength and its leadership provided effective oversight, coordination, and communication with other stakeholders as part of the implementation process. The project coordinator also demonstrated political savvy in her project management approach. From the beginning she was aware that, as an outsider, she needed to build an internal coalition for reform in the sector. When engaging stakeholders from the National Union of Teachers, for example, she focused selectively on influential pro-reform counterparts—namely the Association of Nigeria Conference of Principals subgroup—resulting in efficient collaboration and bypassing bureaucratic barriers at the broader union level. The Association has actively supported Eko Project implementation by organizing peer exchanges of experience on best practices.

The rest of the PMU’s small team was hired on the basis of their experience with World Bank projects, and it was made clear that performance deficits could lead to dismissal. The project coordinator held staff accountable and delegated authority, thereby empowering an effective, adaptive, flexible, and independent team. As an advisor to the governor, the project coordinator had his ear, allowing for efficient resolution of any problems faced by the project. In addition, there has been consistency in the PMU throughout the life of the project, with no changes in staff until the most recent elections, when the project coordinator was replaced. More information on the PMU structure is provided below, in the section on implementation arrangements.

The project coordinator kept in close contact with the bureaucracy—including each district’s tutor general/ permanent secretary (TG/PS), zonal officers, and school principals—whom she convened every month. She met separately with school principals every term and with SBMCs and student representatives every year. To keep direct contact with officials in charge of implementation, she decided up front that the PMU would resist the secondment of officials from the state government.

A World Bank TTL Who Fostered a Partnership Based on Trust, Continuity, and Hands-on Supervision

The project has benefited significantly from two consecutive TTLs with a hands-on approach to project management and supervision, the first based in Washington, DC, and the current TTL based in Abuja, Nigeria. The DC-based TTL encouraged and enabled strong involvement on the part of Abuja-based staff, with strong substantive support from the education specialist in the country office. By the time the education specialist took over as the project’s TTL in 2012, he had considerable experience with the operation and a clear understanding of the supervision model. The DC-based TTL, who oversaw the project’s design and early implementation, continues to be engaged today.

The staffing continuity allowed for management consistency, and the new TTL’s location in the country office has enabled frequent, hands-on implementation support and fluid communications. Regular visits to Lagos have encouraged the development of a strong partnership built on trust and respect and a flexible working arrangement with the PMU, allowing for real-time problem solving and the ability to seize reform opportunities as they arise. As a result of this close working relationship, the PMU has space for a healthy degree of autonomy.
The highly consultative process of designing the Eko Project's interventions and implementation structure sought input on all project elements, including potential reforms, incentives, and oversight mechanisms. The approach was led by the government and involved stakeholders at the state and district levels, all of whom shared a clear vision of the project's goals and how it should be implemented. According to the project coordinator, this shared perspective arose from stakeholders' common interest in improving the quality of schools and channeling resources directly to schools, supported by the governor's clear vision from the start. The close attention paid to ownership in the project's design fed into a similar approach to effective project implementation through the alignment of incentives. The time and effort invested in creating a truly participatory design process paid off.

Following an initial brainstorming session, design-phase consultations with the World Bank and its education specialists took place at three levels: (i) between the governor and his policy team; (ii) between the commissioner of education and the PMU; and (iii) between teachers, parents, community members, and other school administrators. The project coordinator attended each consultation session and ensured that findings were communicated with each set of stakeholders. Owing to the early identification of two priority issues in secondary education (learning outcomes and employability) and three key mechanisms of two priority issues in secondary education (learning outcomes and employability) and three key mechanisms of project's interventions and implementation, a quarterly basis with representatives of the education sector, districts, including S

Role of State-Level Constituencies: Teachers, Principals, and Unions

State-level consultations took place four times during the one-year design period, bringing teachers, principals, and union representatives together to discuss planned reforms in the education sector. Most of the groups agreed on the need to improve poor student performance on state standardized exams. To initiate the conversation with these stakeholders, the World Bank and the project coordinator relayed a message from the governor: the state had access to resources through this project, and guidance was being sought on how best to spend them.

Every participant was given a voice. In fact, the National Union of Teachers, for example, successfully pushed back on a proposal to test teachers regularly on their performance based on agreed-upon criteria. To “get the ball rolling,” the project team agreed to steer clear of teacher performance assessments during the project’s initial phases. The decision to work closely and cooperatively with the unions was a deliberate design choice. This type of empowerment demonstrated the project team’s commitment to avoiding a top-down approach to project design. Areas of agreement also shaped the project’s design. For example, all state and nongovernmental constituencies advocated for transferring funds directly to schools—and this element was quickly incorporated into the project’s design.

The Eko Project’s approach demonstrates the feasibility of effective engagement and partnership with unions if those working with the unions understand their interests and adapt to them in a manner that does not directly or immediately compromise the efficacy of the interventions. One TG/PS in Lagos State reported that engagement with unions promoted transparency about school performance. As a result, even members who were doubtful initially became “less skeptical” over time as they saw a positive shift in test scores.

Role of Nongovernmental Constituencies in Education Reform: Parents and Community Members

Targeted and continuous engagement of nongovernmental constituencies was a priority, both at the design phase and in the early days of implementation, when most of the building blocks for the project were set in place. The project team consulted regularly with parents and other community members on the project’s design components, implementation plans, and expected results. During the design phase, this engagement occurred through three large stakeholder consultations.

Once implementation began, the project team met on a quarterly basis with representatives of the education district, including SBMCs and parents, to showcase progress toward planned reforms and build confidence in the project. They held similar meetings once per term at the community level, with a view to building a critical mass of people who had seen and understood the results of the Eko Project. The participation of parents and community members helped tailor project components to the operating environment, including, for example, how school performance was assessed.

7 It only introduced teachers’ competency testing in 2014.
Implications of the Participatory Design Process in the Eko Project

As a result of this design methodology, the PMU has been able to ensure multistakeholder ownership across all levels of government and among nongovernmental stakeholders to support the achievement of results during implementation. The project coordinator considered the role of the PMU to be that of a facilitator, supporting the education districts that would ultimately be responsible for sustaining the changes undertaken through the project. This is especially pertinent today, as the project moves toward closure. The PMU does not substitute for the established bureaucracy; the Eko approach leverages the established bureaucracy to initiate, implement, and sustain the reforms.

The project coordinator’s approach, which from the design phase involved high levels of engagement with the education districts to ensure both effectiveness and sustainability, was complemented by efforts to ensure buy-in from parents and teachers. This inclusive approach is demonstrated in all elements of the project’s implementation processes, including, for example, the monitoring of school performance conducted by ZoPAs, district project advisory committees (DPACs), SBMCs, parents, community members, and external consultants who specialize in monitoring and quality assurance.

Eko Project Implementation Arrangements Designed to Span Government Levels with Clear Roles and Responsibilities

The Eko Project is essentially a state-level project, as opposed to a countrywide or federal intervention. The State Ministry of Education is responsible for project execution, in close coordination with the education districts, LGEAs, SUBEB, and federal agencies. The Federal Ministry of Finance (FMoF) acts as the Recipient for project activities that relate to the government’s financial and legal obligations; Lagos State has signed a subsidiary financial agreement with the FMoF. The Federal Ministry of Education (FMoE) plays a coordinating and monitoring role in project implementation, although it lends a significant portion of this responsibility to ZoPAs, DPACs, SBMCs, parents and community members, and external monitoring consultants/quality assurance officers. The FMoE is also responsible for implementing the project component on strengthening the federal post-basic education strategy. Provisional agencies established to support the project are closely interconnected with the permanent agencies of the bureaucracy, thus externalizing part of the delivery system rather than establishing a parallel one. This structure is intended to ensure that changes brought about by the project will remain after the project closes. The roles and responsibilities of each entity (Figure 2; Annex 2) are spelled out clearly in the project documentation and coordinated effectively by the PMU. (See Annex 3 for a more detailed description of implementation arrangements at the federal, state, district, and school levels.)

The deconcentrated approach adopted in the design of the Eko Project’s implementation arrangements, supported by a highly empowered PMU, established the kinds of accountability mechanisms (upward, downward, and outward) that enable autonomy and effectiveness. In the words of one teacher:

“I have a large role now . . . . there has been a decentralization of power since Eko; it used to be from the State Ministry. . . . There is even more information flow and teachers can complain to principals; ZoPAs oversee things including PICs [Project Implementation Committees], of which I am a member.”

Design of Eko Project Systems for Data Collection and Analysis and Their Impact on Perceived Education Performance

Generally, the results framework designed for the Eko Project has struggled to tell a consistent story about performance. This challenge stems in large part from the limited availability of baseline data during the design phase, the addition and removal of several results indicators during implementation, and the definition of overly ambitious targets during the additional financing period, coinciding with a dip in test scores.

In the design phase, the team faced difficulties in gathering reliable baseline data because the West African Examinations Council—the entity that administers the WASSCE—had little experience in systematically collecting and aggregating data for each state. Student scores were recorded and used by students to apply for additional schooling, but the scores were not being aggregated at the national, state, district, or even school level to provide an understanding of education sector performance more broadly. In some cases, therefore, the team used modeled estimates as baselines against which to measure project results.

During the implementation phase, the Eko Project’s innovative focus on encouraging the analysis of test scores by districts, zones, and schools yielded a growing appreciation among key stakeholders for capturing progress over time. By 2011, 80 percent of schools had begun requesting analyses of trends in test scores, including by subject, by test section, and by the psychometrics of test questions that helped standardize the degree of difficulty. However, this increased interest generated data that had not been foreseen during the
project’s design, and in 2013, several intermediate results indicators were added to the project’s results framework in an effort to reflect progress being made on a number of fronts. By 2015, however, the project team had come to the conclusion that the added indicators were burdensome to track and, in some cases, less meaningful because they did not link back to baselines set out at the start of the project. Moreover, the team realized that some of the more recently added intermediate results indicators measured activities and inputs rather than project outcomes, as intended. In response, the team removed some of the newer indicators from the results matrix, creating a degree of instability in the M&E framework and complicating efforts to delineate trends over time.

In the design of the additional financing operation, new targets were set to capture the later closing date and additional resources being devoted to Eko Project interventions. At the same time, two new core outcome indicators were added. Within a year, however, it became clear that the team had overestimated targets for the additional financing operation. This overreach occurred for two reasons: first, baselines were based on modeled estimates that may have underestimated the situation at the start of the original project, thus leading to an overestimation of possible progress, and second, in some cases, targets were set on the basis of internal World Bank estimates of student performance rather than the scores aggregated and presented by the state. Because performance against these indicators was then measured according to the state’s numbers, which have tended to be lower than the World Bank education team’s estimates, this mismatch in data artificially lowered perceptions of progress.

There are risks in both overestimating and underestimating results targets. Given that success is not invariable and task teams are eager to capture progress, increasing and adjusting results indicators may be the natural response to reporting and building on achievements appreciated on the ground. However, this experience demonstrates that even when cultural changes are embedded and improvements are being made in processes and outcomes, inconsistent reporting on results and the fragility of some achievements may have the potential to undermine a project’s accomplishments by eliciting caution and skepticism.
about results, thus potentially preventing the replication of useful techniques and interventions.

EKO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

Even in a Challenging Data Environment, a Data-Driven Approach Facilitates the Effective Use of Performance Incentives

The Eko Project introduced detailed performance measurement at the school level, disaggregated by subject to pinpoint specific improvement needs. The accuracy of school performance reports varied with the quality of data used. As project implementation began, Lagos State experienced some difficulty in gathering baseline data for these assessments, and the resulting low baseline measurements may have played a role in overestimating progress within the project’s M&E framework (along with discrepancies in test score data sources, as discussed above). The state’s data collection mechanisms have improved since the project’s inception, however, which bodes well for the efficacy of related incentive systems.

School performance reports drive the performance-based incentives embedded in the Eko Project’s design, and these are based on state-submitted test scores for each school. In math, for example, scoring is conducted for five subcategories: algebra, geometry, numeration, probability and statistics, and basic operations; for the English language, scoring is conducted separately for composition, comprehension, grammar and syntax, literary skills, and speech development. School performance reports benchmark each school’s performance at the level of the local government area and the district. Susceptibility to potential data collection weaknesses would thus affect this portion of a school’s overall performance score.

School scorecards capture other quantitative dimensions such as student and teacher attendance, as well as a wide array of qualitative factors such as the availability of extracurricular activities, school beautification efforts, staff training, student counseling, communication, student reading habits, and student interest in and availability for learning (for example, whether they are busy with menial jobs during school hours). Teachers are provided with records of their students’ achievements during the previous term to help them improve their teaching effectiveness.

The consistent, transparent, and data-driven approach to monitoring program performance helps link incentives to performance. The incentives were determined through a participatory approach involving open and candid discussions and interactive question and answer sessions, to ensure that the project responded to stakeholder preferences. The result has been an effective set of incentives that motivate key project stakeholders to perform well and strengthen the project’s credibility.

The incentives built into the Eko Project were in large part transformational, in that they encouraged positive behavioral changes and motivated higher performance. According to interviews, these incentives work in part because teachers and principals place a high value on recognition. Below is a list of those incentives that stakeholders most commonly reported as having a positive influence on their performance. Because there has not yet been a rigorous impact evaluation of the operation, the evidence linking these incentives to performance is based on qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions.

- **School grants and performance-based funding rewards for schools.** In addition to the school grants distributed to all schools covered by the project, high-performing schools were provided with awards in the form of school office items or funds to purchase such items. Teachers and principals demonstrated pride in purchasing goods through these awards by openly labeling these items.

- **The Governor’s Education Award for schools, teachers, and principals.** Schools have demonstrated pride in winning these awards by marking the years in which they have won them on the walls of the facilities. Several teachers and principals reported that the Governor’s Education Award was the most effective motivator of performance, owing to the level of prestige, appreciation, legitimacy, and credibility it conferred upon recipients. In the words of one teacher, “the most effective incentive is the Governor’s Award, because it is prestigious and everyone benefits since the whole school gets it . . . everyone who has worked for it . . . my school has won it twice . . . even students benefit.”

- **High-quality training opportunities as a staff performance incentive.** Teachers, principals, and even ZoPAs repeatedly reported being motivated by the opportunity to receive training in various issue areas, including leadership, budgeting, ICT, and M&E. They indicated that these opportunities have helped them understand how to do their jobs better and boosted their performance. This feature has the added benefit of strengthening skills in an area that is beneficial to project implementation.

- **The use of data to bolster competition between schools and facilitate peer learning.** The competitive nature of data-based performance monitoring is evident in the visual prevalence of test scores and other ranking factors in school buildings. In some cases, an idea implemented by one school to strengthen
learning outcomes has had a demonstration effect on other schools, driving students, teachers, principals, and community members to achieve what other project participants have achieved.

Using Data Enables Accountability through Multistakeholder Monitoring of Program Performance

The establishment and operationalization of an overall results-focused approach is one of the critical outcomes of the Eko Project, which has introduced a Secondary School Information Management System (SSIMS) that captures data at the district, zone, and school levels. The SSIMS goes further than the national Education Management Information System (EMIS) by capturing information on outcomes such as learning achievements. SSIMS data fall under the following categories:

1. Personnel records (such as deployment of staff by subject, including volunteer teachers, and participation in training and professional development);
2. Information on students (including total number, state of origin, and gender distribution);
3. Educational support to students (provided after school hours);
4. Grant management;
5. School information (including infrastructure); and
6. Student performance assessment results, disaggregated by gender, subject, grade, and so on.

The SSIMS monitors and assesses the performance of all stakeholders, including district administrations, ZoPAs, school-level Project Implementation Committees (PICs), the Parents Forum, and the SBMCs. In addition, it monitors the management of school grants. SSIMS centers have been established at the district level, but information is collected at the school level and aggregated at zone and district levels. SSIMS officers have been deployed to the districts and schools. Education district heads (TG/PS) have access to and make effective use of the data collected. An experienced TG/PS claimed, as a result, that the project made her “computer savvy.”

The availability of data, training in its analysis, and its effective use have allowed the Eko Project team to monitor overall project outcomes and hold stakeholders accountable, thereby improving the performance of all actors involved in school operations. Data collected on school performance are posted publicly so that students, teachers, principals, district representatives, and community members have access. One SBMC chairman claimed that students themselves make use of school-level WASSCE test scores when deciding in which school to enroll. In addition, all purchases made for schools using award or grant funds—whether they are desks, printers, or other supplies—are marked with a label that provides anyone entering the school with information on the year of purchase and funding source.

This transparent approach allows various stakeholder groups responsible for monitoring school performance (ZoPAs, DPACs, SBMCs, parents and community members, and external monitoring consultants/quality assurance officers) to hold each other accountable for results, with limited top-down pressure. The result has been an environment of self-reliance, legitimacy, trust, and motivation at the local level.

Adaptive Implementation Allows Flexibility to Seize Windows of Opportunity and Adequately React to Setbacks

On the relationship between project design and implementation, the former project coordinator observed that “a project document is rather bland; one cannot just read it, one must bring it to life.” The PMU and TTL’s flexible approaches have allowed for adaptive implementation, with good results. Examples include the engagement of private sector actors, a flexible approach to training, the adaptation of a more holistic index for measuring school performance, and collective mobilization in response to the drop in test scores in 2014.

The PMU and TTL have been effective in seizing windows of opportunity. In the case of PPPs for technical colleges, for example, the initial partnership between one technical college and a private sector provider was initiated when the TTL encountered one of his former students. This student had transitioned to work for Samsung, and their initial conversation led to formal talks with Samsung and eventually to the launch of a partnership. In another example, the TTL sought out potential partnerships in Silicon Valley and identified an entry point with Google. He immediately communicated this information to the project coordinator, who acted quickly on the opportunity. As a result, teachers now...

---

8 Interview with a TG/PS in Lagos State, June 16, 2015.
9 Interview with project coordinator, June 15, 2015.
10 The PPP schemes at work in the four state technical colleges (which involve a grant of land and a building from the state government, together with teacher payments and initial equipment) have resulted in the establishment of industry academies (including Samsung for electrical appliances and Fesko for automation) where students, as well as industry employees, clients, and franchisees, are trained. For example, at the Government Technical College, Agidingbi, Samsung has trained close to 4,000 students and over 4,000 salesmen since 2012.
receive training on Google Plus, through which they can download teaching materials and exchange best practices. Teachers have found this training opportunity to have a significant impact on their skills development; many wore Google Plus pins during interviews. In both cases, project activities tailored to the local context, where PPPs have been seen as a mechanism to deliver a shared vision, have supported improved learning outcomes in schools while promoting investors’ brands and developing future human capital for their operations.

School report cards were introduced as a benchmark. During an initial project assessment, schools wanted to know where their biggest performance gaps were. In response, the project team developed report cards summarizing each school's benchmark performance and identifying their most significant overall performance gaps.

The governor developed a Delivery Unit to oversee and hold leadership accountable for delivering results. This unit ensured that representatives from the governor’s leadership team were present at the monthly meetings that tracked deliverables and timelines. The governor realized that the only way to bring the project’s most senior decision makers together was to set up a forum for discussing education in Lagos more broadly, as well as the Eko Project specifically. This change created a team that kept leadership on track and speaks to the adaptive nature of the project at all levels of government. The Delivery Unit was in operation for three years, after which the governor felt the leadership team was strong enough to continue on its own, under the ongoing management of the education commissioner.

The role of the ZoPAs changed during implementation. During the initial implementation stages, the project team identified a significant communication gap between schools and education districts. This disconnect disabled the districts’ accountability with regard to grievances or inputs from the schools, including members of the PICs. In response, the PMU assigned the ZoPAs as liaisons between the two parties to enhance communication between schools and the districts, thus increasing upward, downward, and outward accountability, as well as enhancing project monitoring and supporting the improvement of results.

How schools were scored changed during implementation. The participative and adaptive environment that the Eko Project fostered has allowed it to overcome a “learning by doing” hurdle encountered in the implementation of school performance scores. Initially, the project foresaw the use of test scores alone to measure performance. Teachers, administrators, and other stakeholders, however, did not feel that test scores alone would reflect the holistic progress of schools based on project interventions. As described by one TG/PS, the concern was that every school could not be measured against a single standard because every school faced different constraints.

In response to this concern, elicited during a consultation meeting with all stakeholders, the project established a composite score that took into account test scores, the school environment, the participation level from parents and community members, sanitation at the school, and student opinions on school performance. The same template was put to use across all of the Eko Project secondary schools, thus holding all stakeholders accountable—from teachers, students, and principals who are involved in improving test scores and the parents and community members whose participation is so valuable, to the school administrators and other faculty members who are responsible for school grounds beautification, and staff who are responsible for sanitation.

Performance Data Can Help Identify Gaps and Provide Evidence in Support of Exit Strategies

Although the Eko Project’s mandate does not extend so far as to implement explicit exit strategies for low-performing schools, the performance data it collects may be used by stakeholders to document performance gaps and provide evidence in support of sanctions. For example, the public placement of school performance information inside school buildings has the effect of penalizing low performance. One interviewee reported that nonperforming principals are sometimes moved from senior to junior secondary schools or demoted to classroom teaching positions. Only the education commissioner and the education district have the authority to remove teachers, principals, and administrators, and in many instances, performance issues take place without proper documentation.

Overall, however, there is an emphasis on improving the performance of those lagging behind, whether they are teachers, students, principals, or other stakeholders involved in school management. For example, students who are struggling are given extra coaching. Teachers who are not performing well are engaged and offered cluster-based professional development support within the school, zone, and district. Incentives are awarded based not on absolute performance but on the magnitude of incremental progress.

The Eko Project is currently supporting the state’s thinking on creating a Teachers’ Competency Framework (TCF) to document the achievements of performers and the deficits of nonperformers. The TCF idea was first introduced in early 2014. The framework sets standards for teachers based on experience, marking the skills these
professionals should have to achieve the next level of promotion. While teachers' base salaries would remain unchanged, high performers would be eligible for greater increases in income. The TCF takes the different education levels into account—that is, primary school teachers will be tested on different skills areas than secondary school teachers—and it emphasizes development of and proficiency in ICT skills. This proposal does not go as far as competency tests introduced in other states such as Ekiti or Edo, however. The TCF has been designed to support consistent training and related capacity building of educators. The next step will be to engage the National Union of Teachers and solicit their views; progress in this regard has been slowed by the recent attention to national elections. While TCF implementation would not address the problem of nonperforming employees in the civil service over the long term, it would encourage performance within the project and could possibly have a demonstration effect through its implementation. It should be emphasized, however, that this proposal is likely to arise as a sensitive area for the unions and a matter of necessary compromise.

THE STATUS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECT INTERVENTIONS AT THE EKO PROJECT CLOSING

Sustainability Is Enhanced by Proving the Value Added of a High-Performing System

Ensuring the sustainability of project interventions was a key part of the Eko Project's overall vision from the start. Unfortunately, the Eko Project did not put in place a plan for impact evaluation, and it is too early to judge the overall sustainability of the efforts. The project's design phase focused on fostering change through incentives, data-driven accountability, and a broad community of support. The project coordinator, recognizing her transitory role, aimed to ensure the sustainability of a well-functioning system: “From the beginning, in the back of my mind, I knew I was not here permanently . . . I knew that this was a short-term project, that we were facilitators of change and had to work closely with the education districts because they are the ones responsible for sustaining the changes.” The project implementation framework rests essentially on established state institutions, apart from a small PMU. In her view, and according to several other key stakeholders, the project has achieved a functioning system from which it would be difficult to turn back and, as such, is likely to be sustainable.

The PMU reported that a “cultural change” had taken place, and that the mindset of data-based performance monitoring is “embedded” in the understanding of those involved in implementing secondary education in Lagos State. Teachers, ZoPAs, principals, and other stakeholders reported that the data-driven performance management system would continue to be part of their operational approach moving forward. In response to a question on how the districts and schools expected to maintain the project’s approaches after the project closes, one ZoPA member reported having “internalized, adopted the Eko approach.” Below are the elements of the Eko Project, and of the “cultural change” is has engendered, that have been cited by stakeholders as most likely to be sustained:

Giving autonomy to and encouraging performance in schools through school grants. The PMU and other stakeholders indicated that because school grants have been so successful and critical to implementation, they planned to continue within the system, albeit on a smaller scale. The grants have served as a driving incentive and a mechanism to demonstrate school pride across the state. As such, key stakeholders were highly positive about the continuation of these grants, believing that any incoming politician who saw how critical these grants have been to successful project implementation would gladly incur what they viewed as marginal costs in the state education budget for the grants.

Close monitoring of outcomes through student assessments. Various stakeholders at the school and district levels reported that they would continue to use student assessments to make decisions on how to move forward in developing school improvement plans, even after project closure.

Deconcentrated data generation and the role of ZoPAs in monitoring and management. The role of ZoPAs in monitoring and management is outlined clearly in the project’s implementation arrangements, and they will remain in place when the project closes. It is with this perspective that the PMU has maintained close communication with district-level stakeholders. Through the capacity building supported by the Eko Project, ZoPAs have had significant exposure to training on data collection and analysis. In an interview, one reported that the use of data is among the most powerful instruments for sustainability, and that ZoPAs have learned to organize, advocate, and work without depending on the government. This combination of technical training and leadership understanding signals a strong likelihood that ZoPA members will continue to implement data-driven, performance-based school planning.

Building collective leadership along the delivery chain, down to service providers. The Eko Project has promoted collective leadership at the school level. School principals no longer hold a monopoly on managerial responsibility; although they remain the chief accounting officers in their school, they have become primus inter pares. In
some schools, all PIC members sign off on bid evaluations and contract awards, checks bear two or three signatures, and so on.

**Investing in mentoring and training teachers while holding them accountable for performance.** According to interviews with ZoPAs, teachers, principals, TG/PSs, and other stakeholders, the training of all parties involved in project implementation has been so robust that skills will continue to be transferred via training of new principals, teachers, and others by those who have been exposed to the Eko Project. One senior secondary school principal reported that she had been surprised this past academic school year with a transfer of 28 new teachers who had not yet been exposed to Eko Project interventions. With little guidance from the district, she was able to train them quickly, transferring the skills she built as an Eko principal. One teacher reported that “principals will be handing over mantles, even teachers are in Project Implementation Committees so [skills] will be passed along, everyone is involved so it is easy to pass on the baton.” The likelihood of skills transfer was emphasized repeatedly during interviews in response to concerns about principals who have undergone significant capacity building as a result of the project, but are nearing retirement age.
Lessons Learned

EKO PROJECT’S HIGHLY CONSULTATIVE AND PARTICIPATIVE DESIGN PROCESS LEADS TO ACHIEVEMENTS

Many of the Eko Project’s achievements are a direct result of its highly consultative and participative design period, a strong political champion, an effective PMU that worked both inside and outside the government, a significant level of managerial and professional capacity along the delivery chain, and an accessible and flexible TTL that supported adaptive implementation. At the same time, weaknesses in the design of the project’s M&E framework have complicated efforts to accurately understand and consistently track performance. Several lessons emerge from the Eko Project’s participatory and flexible approach to program design, as well as its challenges in accessing reliable data at the project’s inception, as follows:

Take advantage of political buy-in by ensuring that leadership percolates down to the frontline delivery level. If considerable political buy-in exists at the project design stage, political leadership can help build strong ownership and participation around a clear vision for the design of project interventions and implementation arrangements. This combination of strong leadership and meaningful participation can foster an operating culture that is based on a high level of accountability and, as a result, is highly efficient. Positive impact can be traced to the complementarity between political leadership and institutional, managerial, and professional capacity. In the context of the Eko Project, the Lagos State governor was highly interested in the education sector, and the technically strong project coordinator was supported by a top-notch implementation team. The culture of accountability and ownership, combined with various training initiatives, has developed and strengthened professional capacity at all levels, including down to individual schools.

Ensure multilevel stakeholder involvement. Although it is important for the project design process to be led by the government, with World Bank support, pushing for the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders at various levels of government can help promote ownership during design and implementation and thus strengthen project effectiveness. Although this project had the advantage of single-state implementation—with fewer complexities in administration, management, and the political economy of reform—the Eko Project’s multistakeholder approach to project design can be replicated to some extent in multistate or national projects. The project also benefited from upstream sector reforms at the national and state levels and parallel donor support. For example, SBMCs have been introduced in every school, by law, to give schools more independence. The SBMCs have been actively supported by other donors (including DFID).

Carefully articulate the role of ad hoc implementing agencies vis-à-vis established institutions. Positioning a PMU so that it can act both inside and outside the government system can enable a more flexible, empowered, and effective semi-autonomous management unit. Its capacity to leverage established institutions is paramount. While the proximity and direct reporting between the project coordinator and the governor may be unique in this case, establishing a mainstreamed PMU with a leader who has the credibility and authority of an “insider,” but with less politically motivated incentives as an “outsider,” can be a successful operating model.

Establish robust M&E from the outset that takes into account the availability of relevant data. The credibility of a project’s performance rests on its ability to demonstrate achievement of outcomes. The results frameworks for World Bank operations influence their performance ratings, and low performance limits the potential for project scale-up, follow-on operations, and application of lessons learned to other contexts. Careful consideration of indicators used, reporting consistency, and diligent monitoring of results indicators should be meticulously managed from project inception throughout implementation.

SMOOTH PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION THANKS TO PARTICIPATORY DESIGN AND INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES

Based on a desk review of all fiduciary and nonfiduciary project documents, and on interviews with the TTL, the PMU, and project beneficiaries, Eko Project implementation was relatively smooth, thanks in part to the careful attention paid to a participatory design process that aimed to adapt international best practices to on-the-ground realities in Lagos State. With a rigorously recruited PMU serving as the project’s nucleus, innovative interventions were introduced and kept up, resulting in positive project outcomes.
Key lessons learned in implementing the Eko Project design are as follows:

**Hire the right mix of skills in the PMU so that it has both political clout and managerial leverage.** Recruiting civil servants recommended for their experience on donor projects helps support efficient project management. When hiring PMU staff, it is important to ensure that there is sufficient capacity for both policy initiative and day-to-day project management.

**Empower a PMU to be flexible and aim at internalizing innovation.** It is important to give the PMU the flexibility and authority to alter project details in response to opportunities that may arise, and to correct for design features that are not working well. Once innovations are successfully tested, project implementation should promote their institutionalization and mainstreaming beyond the scope and timeline of the project. The Eko Project TTL not only supported the PMU in doing this, but also encouraged adaptation by identifying opportunities for their consideration.

**Ensure that the PMU interacts regularly with all stakeholders and helps build collective buy-in.** Flexible and adaptive project execution depends on updating and receiving feedback from nongovernmental stakeholders on a regular and consistent basis. Empowering a PMU to be flexible during implementation will not on its own allow for the execution of new ideas and implementation changes. Nongovernmental stakeholders who are part of the design process should receive regular, consistent communication from the PMU, so as to support flexible and adaptive project execution that allows for quick adjustments based on elements that are not working or opportunities that arise during implementation.

**Be present and make sure the task team is available to help address implementation challenges.** A TTL who is in country, consistently present on the project site, and able to stay with the project over time can establish a high level of trust with the PMU, thus allowing the project team to more effectively overcome obstacles and respond to opportunities. Eko Project implementation was well served by such an arrangement.

**Use data and close supervision to identify problems and make course corrections in real time.** Progress is not linear and should not be expected to be; part of adaptation is to collectively regroup and reassess options when results do not meet expectations. Data, at the right level of disaggregation, should be used not only to monitor project performance, but also to help build a system of accountability among those implementing the project and its beneficiaries and to support an effective reaction to unexpected or disappointing results. Moreover, in a project that relies on performance incentives, data can be used to spur competition, determine how rewards are distributed, and help redress low performance. Transparent data availability can help build a system of accountability across those implementing the project and its beneficiaries. The Eko Project benefited greatly from the identification of data that were already being collected and could be internalized to help improve the quality of secondary education.

**BUILDING PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY FROM THE START**

Because of the project coordinator’s “insider-outsider” role, sustainability beyond World Bank support has been at the core of the project from the start. Although it is too early to draw lessons from this project as it nears closing, some tentative suggestions on improving the likelihood of sustainability beyond project closure include the following:

- **Identify the sustainers early on.** Government stakeholders who will play a crucial role in sustaining project-related reforms after closing should be identified at the design stage and granted the capacity building they need to conduct this role effectively. This process requires building managerial and professional leadership within public institutions.

- **Use capacity building as a performance incentive.** Using training opportunities as an incentive can drive improved performance. In the long term, training and on-the-job learning can have significant impacts on results and their sustainability.

- **Sequence interventions carefully to ensure that reforms are not derailed early on.** Project design and implementation should be built on a transitory outlook that brings the project’s sustainability after closure to the forefront of its planning and approach.

- **Gain exposure to other contexts where interventions in the sector have worked and apply them locally, in a strategic and nuanced manner.** Local realities inform how sectoral interventions are designed and what their outcomes are. Focusing on how other countries have applied local knowledge, technical experience, stakeholder consultation, and adaptive implementation can be critical in ensuring that international experiences can integrate successfully into the local context over the medium to long term.

**THE SCIENCE OF DELIVERY**

During the fall of 2013, the World Bank (in collaboration with academics) analyzed case study work on the science of delivery. The emerging framework identifies five elements, listed below, that are seen as important for enabling science-of-delivery approaches. The delivery
lessons from the Eko Project are generally applicable to other education projects and other sectors. These include the importance of aligning political, managerial, and professional agendas. In addition, there are lessons on engaging leaders with significant political power to enhance the efficacy of delivery; the role of training as both an incentive and a means to develop skills for project implementation; and the significance of innovative, responsive, quick thinking in establishing nontraditional solutions and relationships.

Relentless focus on citizen outcomes. From design to implementation, the Eko Project focus has been on improving the quality of educational outcomes. This case study shows that international best practices, when tailored to the local context, can provide implementers with a powerful set of “tested” toolkits to achieve results faster. Instilling a culture of excellence and accountability in a system that has gradually degraded is one of the project team’s most significant achievements. This shift has caused previously discouraged parents to regain interest and hope that a public education system of good quality is possible in Lagos State. The PMU understood that this was not a merely technical task, but one that would require regaining trust after years of deficient service delivery: “We needed to improve the confidence of parents. Parents were losing hope in public education. We needed to showcase what we were doing.”

Multidimensional response. The Eko Project has demonstrated that improving targeted educational outcomes demands a multidimensional approach. For the first time in Nigeria’s education sector, the public and private sector have successfully come together as partners. PPPs between technical schools and private entities such as Samsung have brought a new set of eyes through which to measure success. For example, in addition to measuring graduation rates, these schools look at employability and strive to provide their students with a relevant, hands-on learning experience. This approach may sound intuitive, in retrospect, but in a context that sees professional schools as “schools of last resort,” as stated earlier, it is innovative. Private partners are invested in developing a workforce with the best technical skills, while schools show noticeable improvement in the quality of their programs and the employability of their graduates. Second, the project team has chosen to tackle the direct causes of poor students’ performance by: (i) changing the incentives of key stakeholders, such as teachers and principals; (ii) empowering students to run small gardening and laboratory projects in their schools; and (iii) keeping principals accountable for teachers’ performance, and holding teachers and parents accountable for students’ educational outcomes. This accountability system has set a strong basis for performance, spurring overall gains in students’ educational outcomes. Third, the inclusive nature of the project’s design has created space for greater collaboration during implementation. For instance, parents have felt invested and informed enough to help track progress by working closely with the SBMCs.

Evidence to achieve results. The case study shows how access to data can help unlock performance by fostering a spirit of competitiveness among teachers and principals. Data help identify weak points and monitor trends, while also highlighting high performance areas. In this regard, students’ results are displayed publicly and the best teachers are rewarded. Similarly, schools that have shown the greatest improvement in educational outcomes are rewarded. Even with nonlinear progress throughout its lifespan, the project has instilled in school administrators a sense that data collection is a means to chart a better direction for their schools.

Collective leadership for change. Even with the focus on delivering high-quality services, the results achieved under the Eko Project may have been difficult to sustain without the leadership provided by the governor from the outset. In addition to identifying education as a priority sector, the governor recruited a highly skilled project coordinator who had worked in the sector and understood its complexities but could also function as an “outsider” with respect to the government. To lead the change process, the project team staffed the PMU with people who had experience working on World Bank projects specifically. According to the project coordinator, this approach sent a signal that underperformance would not be tolerated. Individual leadership that inspires collective action, particularly through communities’ involvement in school management committees, has been at the heart of the Eko Project’s implementation progress.

Adaptive implementation makes participation meaningful. At various stages of its implementation, the project has had to adjust to account for changing realities and for the multiplicity of ideas generated by stakeholder consultations. The project’s adaptive approach has lent greater legitimacy to stakeholder consultations; if people see some of their ideas taken into account, they are more likely to be open to a participatory process. The adaptive nature of the project’s design and implementation process may be one of the reasons why a truly participative process has taken root at various levels in the delivery of secondary education in Lagos State.


Annex 1: Project Summary

PROJECT COMPONENTS

Component 1: Promoting Secondary School Effectiveness through School Development Grants (estimated base cost: US$62.6 million): The objective of the school development grants is to raise education outcomes in junior and senior secondary education by providing public secondary schools in Lagos access to yearly discretionary resources with an explicit focus on improving the quality of education services as priority needs are defined at the school level. School progress will be rewarded through additional performance grants for the top 40 percent of schools based on criteria for measuring quality improvements (such as test scores and teacher attendance). Grants based on private sector partnerships are also provided for the five technical colleges.

Component 2: Enhancing Quality Assurance for Junior and Senior Secondary Schools (estimated base cost: US$13.7 million): The objective of this component is to establish a standardized system for measuring students’ learning achievements in core subject areas and support teachers to develop the skills needed to better teach these areas. This component would support the improvement of the quality assurance systems in Lagos State to measure progress, identify deficits, provide feedback to service providers, and establish appropriate benchmarks/standards.

Component 3: Project Coordination and Management (estimated base cost: US$4.6 million): Effective implementation of the project will depend upon efficient coordination mechanisms, proper financial management and procurement practices, timely implementation, and effective M&E of project outcomes in Lagos. This component will provide the necessary resources for effective coordination and M&E, and the implementation of an information and communications strategy.

Component 4: Strengthening of the Federal Post-Basic Education Strategy (estimated base cost: US$5 million): The objective of this component is to provide capacity building and technical assistance to the Federal Ministry of Education to enhance the development of the national post-basic education strategy and support policy dialogue on the strategy with States.

RESTRUCTURING AND ADDITIONAL FINANCING

The project was restructured twice, once in November 2013 and again in June 2014. The initial restructuring led to a recommitment of funds from the Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project in the amount of US$36.3 million. The second restructuring allowed for an extension of the project closing date, as there was a need to complete requisite procedures to gain effectiveness of the additional financing.

Finally, while the project was set to close on December 31, 2015, the government requested a six-month extension in additional financing to June 30, 2016. The rationale, as captured in the September 2015 Aide Memoire, was the delay in project effectiveness and implementation as a result of school closures due to the Ebola Virus Disease, the recent change in government, the retention of a new project coordinator, and the need to disburse the remaining/committed funds for several activities. These activities include the disaggregated analysis of 2015 test results to justify the increase in performance compared to 2014, monitoring and evaluation of school grants, and training of more district staff, school principals, and vice principals.
Annex 2: Roles and Responsibilities for Project Implementation

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

State Project Advisory Committee (SPAC): The SPAC reviews progress reports, approves annual work programs and budgets, advises on key implementation issues, and ensures that the agreed performance targets and timelines for activities under the different project components are met. The SPAC is chaired by the Commissioner of Education of Lagos State, and members include the Permanent Secretary of the State Ministry of Education (Vice Chair), Chair of the State Universal Basic Education Board, six Tutors-General/Permanent Secretaries of Education (one from each education district), the Permanent Secretary from the Teachers Establishment and Pensions Office, the Chair of the House Committee on Education, the Chair of the State Central Parents and Teachers Association, the Senior Special Assistant to the Governor on Technical-Vocational Education, two Representatives—one from the community (SBMCs) and the other from civil society/nongovernmental organizations, and the Project Coordinator of the PMU, who is the nonvoting executive secretary of the SPAC. The SPAC meets twice a month and is assisted by the PMU.

School-Based Management Committees (SBMC): School-Based Management Committees have been established for all school clusters to provide a fundraising, community outreach and oversight role while supporting school planning and development. Members include those from the community that the schools are a part of—these could include parents and members of the community who want to serve as interlocutors between schools and the relevant communities. They participate to ensure that community inputs, grievances, and needs regarding their schools are addressed.

Project Management Unit (PMU): The PMU was formally created under the direct supervision of the commissioner of education—at the time also the deputy governor—and later the Executive Governor himself. During project implementation, the PMU reports directly to the Governor and formally to the State Ministry of Education. This semi-autonomous, hybrid arrangement allows for the PMU to simultaneously work “inside” and “outside” the State Ministry of Education at the same time. It also ensures that the PMU is aligned with and has the backing of the most powerful person in the state, allowing for efficient resolution of implementation bottlenecks, while also ensuring that it has buy-in from the public sector. The Federal PMU implementing the Science and Technology Education in Post-Basic Education (STEP B) project manages the federal activities under Component 4. One of the key responsibilities of the PMU is to interface meaningfully with the technical departments at the state, district, and zonal levels to ensure efficient implementation.

These implementation arrangements enable the PMU to maintain consistent contact with the schools, allowing for extremely robust oversight and for sustainability purposes. It does so by meeting with all stakeholders regularly (including the SBMC and parents) but with a specific emphasis on the education districts. The Education District Team and the Tutor General/Permanent Secretary are charged with leading resource management. The PMU informs this leadership team whenever funds are being disbursed, and this team monitors activities, outcomes of activities, school development plans, and so on. The PMU holds meetings with all stakeholders about what needs to be done at each school and then meets with each school’s education districts. The education districts then inform the PMU, which sends the funds to schools electronically. As such, the school administration districts are never out of touch with their schools, and funds are disbursed based on tangible real-time needs while the PMU stays informed on the status of project implementation. As facilitators of change, the PMU works closely with the education districts that will be responsible for sustaining the changes following project closure.
The PMU team is composed of a project coordinator who serves as an advisor to the governor. She is paid by the state government as a public servant, with a consolidated salary including all allowances, accommodations, and so on. While not comparable to the private sector, this salary is similar to that of a permanent secretary in government. The PMU team includes an education specialist (with expertise in teacher training), a procurement officer, a project accountant, an administrator, and a M&E specialist. They are all civil servants paid on the civil servant salary scale. Based on a request by the project coordinator and their applicable experience/expertise, the core team is redeploym from relevant departments/units within government. This is an open and transparent process through direct transfer and assumes that PMU staff would return to their respective positions in government after the project closes, without loss of seniority or entitlements. While the project coordinator did not personally handpick the team members, she did and continues to institute a working system through which she ensures that nonperformers are removed from the PMU. The team members were selected on the basis of their experience working on other World Bank projects. Such experience was emphasized, in particular, for the procurement and finance officers who were suggested by the PMU. The team members were selected on the basis of their experience working on other World Bank projects.

District Project Advisory Committee (DPAC): The DPAC primarily oversees Component 1 by providing policy oversight, evaluating and approving school grant proposals, and monitoring performance indicators. The DPAC Chair is the tutor general/permanent secretary of each district; that is, he ranks as the highest nonelected official within the State Ministry of Education. The DPAC meets twice a month. Besides the Chair, other members include representatives of School-Based Management Committees, representatives of the Teachers Establishment and Pensions Office, representatives of the State Universal Basic Education Board, and District Directors for Junior and Senior Secondary Schools who oversee Zonal Project Administrators. The DPAC also oversees the Lagos State Technical and Vocational Education State Board, which governs the public private partnership grants for technical and vocational colleges and manages the capacity-building activities to help the colleges create their proposals and provide support to the DPAC for approving the public-private partnerships.

Zonal Project Administrators (ZoPAs): ZoPAs are key players in the M&E system, as they are responsible for collecting school-level data, verifying the data, and aggregating the data at the district level.

Project Implementation Committees (PICs): PICs are established in each public secondary school and include the school principal as chairman, the vice principal (academic) as secretary, the vice principal (administrative) as treasurer, three classroom teachers (with a preference for core subject teachers), a representative from the Parent Teachers Association, and a representative from the School-Based Management Committee. The PICs are responsible for the preparation of school improvement plans for strengthening student performance in core subjects. In addition, they support the ZoPAs in data collection, collaborate with local community members on M&E activities, manage grant procurement, mobilize community support for the school, and oversee the financial management of grant implementation. The PICs receive requisite training for school grant implementation and school improvement planning.

Delivery Unit: The governor introduced a tailored delivery unit to ensure that representatives from the leadership team (including the tutor general/permanent secretary, commissioner of education, permanent secretary at the State Ministry of Education, chairman of the State Universal Basic Education Board, and the PMU) were present at a monthly meeting that traced and tracked deliverables and timelines. This practice allowed the governor to hold leadership accountable for results.

Project Implementation Manual: Institutional Arrangements

1. Effective and successful implementation of the Lagos Eko Secondary Education Project will be based on the following governance principles:
   • Intensive coordination across tiers and branches of government;
   • Compliance with clearly defined project implementation rules (for example, for efficient management and allocation of resources according to agreed work plans); and
   • Transparency and information sharing, especially on matters of performance within the public sector and with the public at large.

2. Implementation arrangements have been developed with the objective of ensuring that effective collaboration can occur within the established institutional structures and personnel. In order to support the coordination of activities across these structures and different levels of government, a Project Management Unit (PMU) has been established headed by the Special Adviser to the Lagos State Governor to report directly to the Lagos State Governor. The
PMU will receive support through the project with the following objectives in mind:

- Effective collaboration between the institutions responsible for project implementation;
- Clearinghouse for overall financial management and large procurement packages;
- Promotion of mainstreaming of procedures within the current government structures;
- Provision of project oversight, M&E of activities;
- Provision of an appropriate link between government and development partners;
- Promotion of adequate stakeholder consultations; and
- Promotion of government leadership as a basis for ensuring program sustainability.

3. **Institutional Framework.** Table A2.1 lists project components and the responsible implementing agencies. Figure 1 shows the institutional framework for planning, approval and execution of the project.

4. A **National Education Sector Steering Committee** (NESSC) will provide a forum where project performance and implementation issues can be discussed and knowledge can be shared at the State and Federal level. Lagos State will join the NESSC. Although the NESSC will not have any directproject implementation role since this function will be the primary responsibility of each State Ministry of Education (SMoE), it will become a particularly important forum for the following: (a) providing oversight and coordination of all donor education

### TABLE A2.1: Component Management and Institutional Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Responsible Institution</th>
<th>Implementation Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td><strong>Promoting Secondary School Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Sub-component 1.1: Secondary School Development Grants; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Sub-component 1.2: Secondary School Performance Awards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Sub-component 1.3: Public-Private Partnership in Technical Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td><strong>Enhancing Quality Assurance for Junior and Senior Secondary Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Sub-component 2.1: Standardized Testing for Secondary Schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Sub-component 2.2: Strengthening the Capacity of Teachers and Principals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td><strong>Project Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the state level</td>
<td>State Project Advisory Committee (SPAC)</td>
<td>Broad oversight project implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the district level</td>
<td>District Project Advisory Committees (DPAC)</td>
<td>Responsibility of the district headed by TG/PS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
programs (for example, Lagos Eko, SESP, and ESSPIN); (b) ensuring compliance with ongoing federal reforms; (c) monitoring performance targets and timelines for activities and addressing cross-cutting issues; and (d) sharing of information among stakeholders about effective project implementation.

5. The Committee would be managed and chaired by the Federal Ministry of Education (FMoE) or his/her representative and includes key stakeholders responsible for project monitoring and implementation. This is the main policy body for all state-based education projects at the federal level. The NESSC will include Commissioners of Education, Permanent Secretaries, participating states, relevant directors of the FMoE, Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance (FMoF), Director General of the Debt Management Office and National Planning Commission, and additional members selected on the basis of their potential to add value to the work of the committee (such as heads of federal agencies and professional associations, private sector, and so on).

Roles and Implementation Responsibilities

The Project will be implemented in all public junior and senior secondary schools (including the five technical colleges) in Lagos State. To support implementation at the school level, capacity strengthening, management and oversight would be organized at the state and district levels. The Technical Committee on Partnerships (TCP) would be responsible for reviewing the proposal submitted for support. The Technical committee will be made up of representatives of Lagos State Technical and Vocational Education Board (LASTVEB) and the Technical Colleges and PMU. The TCP would review the grant proposal, recommend the proposal for grant awards and ensure high standards of probity in discharging its responsibilities, and perform other tasks as may be assigned to it by the TCP. The TCP would consist of up to four LASTVEB representatives with technical expertise and experience in technical education matters. Other members will include nominated Government College Principals.

6. State Level. At the state level, the governor chairs the SPAC. To ensure coordination of all education sectorwide policies and strategies, SPAC meets on a monthly basis covering all aspects of the education sector including primary, secondary, technical and broader education sector plans such as MTSS and activities supported by other donor agencies. To guarantee that the project has clear leadership and direction, the governor has appointed a Special Adviser, reporting directly to the governor ensuring progress, annual work programs, budgets, and key implementation issues are agreed with the governor and SPAC. The SPAC members would include the following:

1. CHAIR: Governor, Lagos State
2. Commissioner of Education Lagos State, Vice Chair
3. Special Adviser to the Governor, Lagos Eko Project
4. Chair of SUBEB (the agency responsible for junior secondary education)
5. Chairman, LASTVEB
6. Permanent Secretary, SMoE
7. Six Tutors-General/Permanent Secretaries of Education (TG/PSEs), one from each education district
8. Permanent Secretary, Teachers Establishment and Pensions Office

District Level

7. At the district level, the project would be governed by District Project Advisory Committees (DPAC). This program management committee would be chaired by the TG/PS of the district. The committee would meet at least twice yearly or more frequently as may be ordered by the TG/PS. The committee members would include the Education Secretaries, District Directors, Zonal Project Administrators (ZoPA), and SBMC representatives of the following Districts:

- District I—LGAs of Agege, Alimosho, Ifako/Ijaye
- District II—LGAs of Ikorodu, Kosofe, Somolu
- District III—Epe, Etiosa, Ibeju/Lekki, Lagos Island
- District IV—Apapa, Lagos Mainland, Surulere
- District V—Ajegunle/Ijede, Amuwo-Odofin, Badagry
- District VI—Ikeja, Mushin, Oshodi/Isolo
**TABLE A2.2: Roles and Responsibilities for Implementation—State Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **State Project Advisory Committee (SPAC)** | a. Reviews the Eko Secondary Education Project Progress Report;  
b. Supports the achievement of the Project work plan program by the PMU;  
c. Assists in attainment of agreed performance targets and timelines for activities under different components. |
| **Project Management Unit (PMU)** | a. Monitors grant implementation progress to ensure that the project focuses toward its desired outcomes and provides continuous feedback to improve performance of project implementation;  
b. Interfaces meaningfully with the technical departments at districts and zonal levels to ensure efficient implementation at the school level;  
c. Supports the technical departments or other implementing units as facilitator of the flow of credit funds and project resources;  
d. Acts as the clearinghouse for securing Bank action on procurement and disbursement of funds on the activities, goods, works and services contract financed from the IDA credit;  
e. Handles the regular management of the fiduciary aspects (procurement, financial management, M&E, etc.) of the project;  
f. Establishes and maintains regular communication and maintains liaison with the World Bank, DFID, SMoE and relevant authorities in all matters that concern the project; and  
g. Provides oversight functions in all respects and is an arbiter in matters needing clarification related to project implementation. |

**TABLE A2.3: Roles and Responsibilities for Implementation of Additional Financing—Local Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **District Project Advisory Committee (DPAC)** | a. Provides strategic guidance for grant implementation at the district level;  
b. Ensures that agreed timelines for activities under the different components are met;  
c. Ensures effective grant implementation through monitorable performance indicators;  
d. Addresses and resolves critical issues that could hinder grant implementation;  
e. Verifies the eligibility of the grant proposals prepared by schools;  
f. Endorses the eligibility of school improvement plans for approval of the TG/PS of Education through the DPAC;  
g. Monitors project-supported teacher training activities for deployment of policy and other programmatic activities;  
h. Consolidates and reviews monitoring and other reports prepared by the Zonal Project Administrator for submission to the PMU. |
| **District Technical Review Committee (DTRC)**  
*Formed by DPAC ad hoc* | a. Provides technical inputs to the school improvement plan submitted annually;  
b. Reviews grant proposals and verifies the eligibility of the grant proposals prepared by schools; and  
c. Endorses the school improvement plan to the DPAC. |
TABLE A2.3: Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone/School</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Zonal Project Administrators (ZoPAs) | a. Provides technical support to schools in general planning and implementation and facilitates training;  
                                        b. Interfaces between the schools and the Education District;  
                                        c. Ensures that all required data are collected, compiled, and submitted to the District on grant-related matters (e.g., performance indicators, targets, etc.) and on other project-related matters (nongrant monitoring reports); and  
                                        d. Represents the zones at DPAC meetings. |
| Schools Project Implementation Committees (PICs) | a. Prepares annual School Improvement Plan for effecting improvement in student performance in English, math and sciences;  
                                        b. Assists in identifying teacher training needs for grant- and nongrant-assisted teacher development programs;  
                                        c. Collects data on grant implementation as requested by ZoPA;  
                                        d. Collaborates with local community members on matters related to performance reviews and M&E activities;  
                                        e. Manages the day-to-day running of the project with the assistance of ZoPA;  
                                        f. Provides information to the school community and a channel for community’s voice to be heard in the school;  
                                        g. Mobilizes community support for the school;  
                                        h. Identifies school needs and means of addressing these needs;  
                                        i. Draws up and monitors School Improvement Plans in accordance with the guidelines set out in the manual; and  
                                        j. Oversees the financial management of the school grant to ensure transparency and accountability. |
Annex 3: Eko Project Implementation Arrangements

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS—OVERALL

The majority of project activities are implemented at the state level. For the state activities, the State Ministry of Education is the responsible agency for project execution in close coordination with the Education Districts, LGEAs, SUBEB, and federal agencies. The Federal Ministry of Finance (FMoF) is the representative of the recipient as it relates to the financial and legal obligations of the government. Lagos State has signed a subsidiary financial agreement with the FMoF. The FMoE and FMoF have oversight of the project and the FMoE plays a coordinating and monitoring role in the implementation of the project. The FMoE is also responsible for implementation of the activities under Component 4.
IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS—FEDERAL LEVEL

- The federal component of the project is coordinated by the Federal Ministry of Education, Department of Basic and Secondary Education, but the project is mostly implemented at the state level by the Lagos Ministry of Education.
- A technical officer in the STEP-B Project Management Unit (PMU) manages the implementation of this component and is responsible for day-to-day project implementation and serves as the main link between the Federal Ministry of Education and the World Bank. The Federal PMU implementing the STEP B project will undertake management of the federal activities under Component 4.

- Members include the Commissioners of Education, Permanent Secretaries, participating states, relevant directors of the FMOE, Permanent Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, Director General of the Debt Management Office, and national Planning Commission, among others.
- The NESSC is responsible for: (a) providing oversight and coordination of all donor education programs (e.g., Lagos Eko, SESP and ESSPIN); (b) ensuring compliance with ongoing federal reforms; (c) monitoring performance targets and timelines for activities and addressing cross-cutting issues; and (d) sharing of information among stakeholders about effective project implementation.
IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS – STATE LEVEL

State Project Advisory Committee (SPAC)
The SPAC reviews progress reports, approves annual work programs and budgets, advises on key implementation issues, and ensures that the agreed performance targets and timelines for activities under the different components are met.
DIRECT PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (DPAC)
Primarily oversees component 1 by providing policy oversight, evaluating and approving school grant proposals and monitoring performance indicators.

LAGOS STATE TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION BOARD (LASTVEB)
The PPP grants for technical and vocational colleges are governed by the newly established LASTVEB. LASTVEB oversees the capacity building activities to help the colleges create their proposals and provide support to the DPAC for approving the PPS.

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS – DISTRICT LEVEL

Chair: TG/PSE of each district
District Directors for JSS and SS
Representatives of SUBEB
Representatives of TEPO
Representatives of SBMCs
ZoPAs
PICs
Schools
IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS – SCHOOL LEVEL

Project Implementation Committee (PIC)
Established in each public secondary school and responsible for: preparation of school improvement plan for impacting student performance in core subject areas, support to ZoPAs for collection of data, collaborating with local community members on M&E activities, managing grant procurement, mobilizing community support for the school and overseeing financial management of grant implementation.

- Chairman: School Principal
- Secretary: Vice Principal, Academic
- Treasurer: Vice Principal, Administrative
- Three classroom teachers (preferable core subjects)
- Representative from PTA
- Representative from SBMC
Annex 4: Basic Education Certificate Examination Results for Lagos State

The Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) is conducted for candidates in their third year of junior secondary school. The BECE covers 22 subjects. Candidates are expected to sit for a minimum of 10 subjects and a maximum of 13. A candidate is deemed to have passed the BECE if he or she earns a pass grade or above in at least six subjects, including English and mathematics.

Lagos State’s BECE results have not been used in this case study because, for junior secondary schools, it plays the role of an intermediary exam. The following table presents the state’s BECE results for the three most recent years, as compared to a baseline of 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic science</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject average</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public junior secondary students at or above credit for averaged subjects of English, mathematics, and basic/integrated science</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
