World Development Report 1982 10887 International Development Trends Agriculture and Economic Development World Development Indicators World Development Report 1982 Published for The World Bank Oxford University Press Oxford University Press NEW YORK OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON HONG KONG TOKYO KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM CAPE TOWN © 1982 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Manufactured in the United States of America. The maps have been prepared exclusively for the convenience of readers of this book; the denominations used and the boundaries shown do not imply, on the part of The World Bank, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The world map on the cover is based on the equirectangular projection, which is attributed to the Greek astronomer-philosopher Anaximander about 550 B.C. ISBN 0-19-503224-1 cloth ISBN 0-19-503225-X paperback ISSN 0163-5085 The Library of Congress has cataloged this serial publication as follows: World development report, 1978 (New Yorkl Oxford University Press. v. 27 cm. annual. Published for the World Bank. 1. Underdeveloped areas-Periodicals. 2. Economic development Periodicals. I. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. HC59.7. W659 330.9'l 72'4 78-67086 Foreword This fifth World Development Re- India, both of which managed to middle-income countries too port is published at a time when maintain significant growth in the slow agricultural progress is a the world economy is beset by se- 1970s, are less affected by the ad- major cause of sluggish economic vere problems. Continuing reces- verse international environment growth. This Report uses the sion and heavy unemployment in than are the smaller low-income Bank's own experience and coun- the industrialized countries are countries with large export sec- try illustrations to highlight some accompanied by real interest rates tors. These countries, most of of the main policy, technical, and at unprecedentedly high levels; which are in Africa, fared badly institutional issues involved in most commodity prices are at their in the 1970s. Their prospects are stimulating more rapid agricul- lowest levels in three decades; the a matter of grave concern. Their tural development. Its conclu- volume of international trade has progress, more than that of any sions are basically optimistic. Ag- ceased to grow. Many developing other group, will depend heavily ricultural growth has been rapid countries, already struggling with on generosity and initiative in the in the past three decades, exceed- large debt repayments, have thus provision of aid. Nevertheless, ing all earlier experience and seen their problems exacerbated two areas of promise exist. One expectations. Given reasonable by the rise in interest payments, is the longer-term growth impact incentives and productive oppor- adverse trends in the terms of of the improvements in education tunities, farmers will innovate, trade, and depressed export vol- and health that have been save, and invest in agriculture; umes. achieved in virtually all develop- science-based agricultural re- The first part of the Report ing countries. The second is the search can promote new oppor- reassesses development pros- potential for improved perfor- tunities for growth; further gains pects against this background. It mance in agriculture, the subject can be had from past investment finds that low growth over the of Part II of the Report. in institutions and infrastructure; 1980s is more likely than was pro- The discussion of agriculture and increased attention to the ru- jected in last year's Report. How- stresses a key feature of devel- ral poor, shown in an array of ever, it should be possible for opment experiencethe strong new programs for small farmers many middle-income countries to association between agricultural in the 1970s, is already paying off. repeat the successful adjustment advance and overall economic The Report qualifies this opti- they made to the adverse condi- growth. In virtually all countries mism in three respects. First, the tions of the 1970s, and to achieve where agricultural development management of agricultural de- per capita income growth well in has been strong, economic growth velopment, including public sec- excess of that of the industrialized has advanced at a rapid rate. As tor policies, investment pro- countries. The prospects of ade- a result, in many middle-income grams, and institutional support quate growth will be greatly en- countries the worst kinds of ab- activities, is a difficult job, espe- hanced if restrictions on trade and solute poverty have largely dis- cially today when agricultural capital flows are minimized. appeared, although stark differ- growth depends less on expand- For the low-income countries, ences in standards of living persist. ing the cultivation frontier and in which the bulk of poverty is The low-income countries are more on raising land and labor concentrated, the picture is mixed still predominantly agricultural. productivity. Second, unless the but generally bleak. China and In many of themand in some rapidity of population growth III abates, it will limit the rate of in- culture, thus reducing the poten- opment Indicators, which pro- crease in per capita food con- tial gains from world specialization vide tables of social and economic sumption in many countries and in production and trade. data for more than a hundred require still faster increases in ag- As in previous years, the Re- countries. ricultural productivity. Third, pori includes the World Devel- taking full advantage of the pos- sibilities offered by agriculture will require significant policy changesboth in developing countries which have neglected this sector, and in those industrial countries which continue to pro- tect and to over-stimulate agri- A. W. Clausen This Report was prepared by a team led by David Turnham and comprising Chandra Hardy, Dale Hill, William Jones, Homi Kharas, Gary Kutcher, Per Ljung, Christopher Redfern, Harry Walters, and Arshad Zaman. The Economic Analysis and Projections Department prepared much of the data on which Part I is based, and supplied information and assistance for the whole Report. The team also worked closely with members of the Economics and Research staff and of the Agriculture and Rural Development Department, particularly Jean Baneth, Hans Binswanger, Graham Donaldson, Jack Duloy, Peter Miovic, and Donald Pickering. The authors would like to thank these and many other contributors, reviewers, and production and support staff. The work was carried out under the general direction of Bevan Waide. For the discussion of agricultural development, the team would like to acknowledge the considerable help and assistance provided by the staff of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). FAQ kindly provided material from their data collection which is used extensively in the text. Neither these organizations nor members of their staffs are responsible for views expressed in the Report. The judgments expressed are those of the World Bank staff and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Directors or the governments they represent. iv Contents Definitions viii Glossary of acronyms and initials ix I Overview International issues and past development Development prospects 2 Agricultural development 3 Conclusions 5 Part I International Development Trends 2 The world economy in transition Adjustment in 1973-78 7 Adjustment in 1979-82 9 Factors affecting adjustment 10 Conclusions 18 3 Long-term development trends 20 Output and income growth 20 Improvements in living standards 23 Long-term trends in the international environment 26 The role of domestic policies 27 Conclusions 30 4 Prospects for the 1980s 311 The industrial countries 311 International economic linkages 32 Commercial capital flows 34 Prospects for developing countries 35 Part II Agriculture and Economic Development 39 5 Agricultural development and economic growth 40 The pattern of recent growth 41 The role of agriculture in development 43 Managing agricultural development 45 The international environment 52 6 Sources of agricultural growth 57 Land 59 Intensive agricultural development 61 Technology 66 Research 67 Supports for agricultural growth 72 7 Rural poverty 78 Poverty and growth 78 Initiatives to counter rural poverty 80 Food security, distribution, and subsidies 86 8 Conclusions 90 Agriculture and economic growth 90 Policy priorities 91 Prospects 93 Bibliographical note 94 World Development Indicators 99 V Text tables 2.1 Growth of GDP, 1960-82 8 2.2 Resource gap as percentage of GDP, 1974-80 9 2.3 Response of consumption, investment, borrowing, and growth to external shocks, 1970-72 to 1975-78 9 2.4 Imports of manufactures by industrial countries, 1962-80 12 2.5 Growth of merchandise exports, 1970-81 12 2.6 Remittance inflows to major labor-exporting countries, 1978-79 13 2.7 Global current account balances, excluding official transfers, 1970-82 13 2.8 Current account financing of oil-importing and oil-exporting developing countries, 1979-82 15 3.1 Growth of population, GNP, and GNP per capita, 1955-80 21 3.2 Population, GNP, and GNP per capita: Shares, relationships, and growth, 1955-80 22 3.3 Trends in life expectancy, child mortality, and literacy, 1950-79 24 3.4 Shares of world merchandise exports, 1955-80 26 3.5 Composition of net capital flows to developing countries, 1960-62 and 1978-80 29 4.1 Export growth from developing countries, 1970-90 33 4.2 Average OPEC petroleum prices, 1970-95 34 4.3 Net financing flows, all developing countries, 1970-90 35 4.4 Growth of GDP in developing countries, 1960-90 37 5.1 Growth rates of agricultural and food output by major world regions (excluding China), 1960-80 41 5.2 Growth of agriculture and GDP in the 1970s 45 5.3 Official assistance (commitments) to agriculture, 1973-80 51 5.4 Oil-importing developing countries' food and beverage trade, 1970 and 1978 53 6.1 Changes in the structure of agricultural output by subsector and region, 1961-65 and 1976-80 65 7.1 Farm structure in Northeast Brazil, 1974 83 7.2 Selected government food-distribution programs: Coverage, impact, and cost 86 Text figures 1.1 Comparative agricultural indicators for developing and developed countries, 1979-80 average 3 2.1 Growth in real GDP, 1971-82 8 2.2 Share of investment in GDP, 1970-81 10 2.3 Trends in world trade volume, 1971-81 11 2.4 Annual fluctuations in developing-country export prices, 1971-82 12 2.5 Changes in real petroleum prices, 1971-82 14 2.6 Global current account balances, 1975-82 15 2.7 Change in nominal net capital inflows to developing countries, 1971-82 16 2.8 Price trends, 1971-82 18 2.9 US real rate of interest, 1970-81 18 3.1 Per capita GNP of selected countries as percentage of US per capita: IN GNP, 1913-79 21 3.2 Per capita GDP of selected countries as percentage of US per capita GDP, 1955-79 (ICP method) 22 3.3 Long-term patterns of economic growth, 1955-79 24 3.4 The demographic transition 26 3.5 Imports of manufactures from developing countries as percentage of GNP of developed countries 27 3.6 Weighted index of commodity prices, 1950-82 28 5.1 Agricultural and food output, by major world region and by country group, 1963-70 and 1970-78 4l 5.2 Cross-country share of employment and output in agriculture, 1980 43 5.3 Index and growth rate of world exports, by volume 52 5.4 Export growth rates, by country group 53 6.1 Major crop zones in developing countries 58 6.2 Features of major crop zones, 1978 59 6.3 Area expansion and intensification, by crop zone, 1961-80 59 6.4 Agricultural inputs in developing countries, 1960-79 61 6.5 Irrigation in major crop zones, 1978 62 6.6 Tractors in major crop zones, 1978 66 6.7 Fertilizer use in major crop zones, 1978 67 vi 6.8 Food grain yields in developing countries, 1961-65 and 1976-80 71 7.1 Indian rural household income, by source and by farm size, 1970-71 79 7.2 Number of farms vs farmed area: Comparative distribution, by region, selected countries, 1970 82 Text boxes 2.1 Italy's ODA policy changes 16 2.2 Inflation, balance of payments, and debt servicing 17 3.1 What are we trying to measure? 20 3.2 The International Comparison Project 23 3.3 Regional disparities within countries 25 3.4 Response to terms of trade shocks in Sri Lanka 28 3.5 Brazilian manufactured exports 29 4.1 Growth scenarios 32 4.2 Is there a protectionist danger? 33 4.3 Prospects for ODA from DAC members 36 5.1 Food versus feed? 42 5.2 Oil and agriculture: The Nigerian experience 46 5.3 Improving incentives in Chinese agriculture 47 5.4 Nominal protection and foreign exchange evaluation 48 5.5 Brazilian soybeans: Creating a comparative advantage 50 5.6 Private complements public: The Bangladesh experiment 51 5.7 Measuring the impact of agricultural protection 54 5.8 The "food crisis" and its food security aftermath 55 6.1 Forests and fuelwood: The Sahel's ecological dilemma 60 6.2 Downstream effects of irrigation 61 6.3 Rain-fed agriculture: The Mexican experience 63 6.4 New frontiers in agricultural science 64 6.5 The international agricultural research centers 68 6.6 The Green Revolution in Punjab, India 70 6.7 The yield gap and agricultural extension services 73 6.8 Decisionmaking on the African farm 74 6.9 Productivity and small farms: Intensive vegetable production in southern Greece 75 6.10 The Indian seed industry 76 7.1 Farmer education, farm efficiency, and nutrition in Nepal 80 7.2 The milk revolution in India 83 7.3 Employment Guarantee Scheme, Maharashtra, India 85 7.4 Food security in rural China 88 7.5 Famine comes from income insecurity 89 vii Definitions The principal country groups used Major exporters of manufactures Billion is 1,000 million. in the text of this Report and in include Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Tons are metric tons (t), equal the World Development Indica- Hong Kong, Israel, Republic of to 1,000 kilograms (kg) or 2,204.6 tors are defined as follows:* Korea, Portugal, Singapore, South pounds. Developing countries are di- Africa, and Yugoslavia. Growth rates are in real terms vided into: low-income economies, Industrial market economies are unless otherwise stated. with 1980 gross national product the members of the Organisation Dollars are United States dollars (GNP) per person of $410 and be- for Economic Cooperation and unless otherwise specified. low; and middle-income economies, Development (OECD, identified Symbols used in the text tables with 1980 GNP per person above in the Glossary) apart from Greece, are as follows: $410. Developing countries are Portugal, and Turkey, which are Not available. also divided into oil exporters and included among the middle-in- (.) Less than half the unit oil importers, identified below. come developing economies. This shown. Oil exporters comprise Al- group is commonly referred to in n.a. Not applicable. geria, Angola, Bahrain, Brunei, the text as industrial economies. All tables and figures are based Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Nonmarket industrial economies on World Bank data unless other- Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, include the following developed wise specified. Data for 1981 are Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, European countries: USSR, Bul- provisional and for 1982 are es- Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tun- garia, Czechoslovakia, German timated. isia, and Venezuela. Democratic Republic, Hungary, Oil importers comprise all other and Poland. This group is some- developing countries not classi- times referred to as nonmarket fied as oil exporters. economies. *For purposes of statistical continuity, High-income oil exporters (not in the tables in Part I of this Report included in developing countries) Economic and demographic terms Spain, Romania, and Iraq have been re- tained in their historical groups: middle- comprise Kuwait, Libya, Saudi are defined in the technical notes income oil importer, centrally planned Arabia, Qatar, and the United to the World Development Indi- economy, and high-income oil exporter, Arab Emirates. cators. respectively. Glossary of Acronyms and Initials CGIAR The Consultative Group Community comprises Belgium, economic research on selected on International Agricultural Re- Denmark, France, Federal Repub- policy problems affecting produc- search is an informal association lic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, tion, consumption, availability, of countries, multilateral organi- Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and equitable distribution of food, zations, and private foundations and United Kingdom. with particular reference to the that supports research on agri- FAO Food and Agriculture Or- needs of low-income economies. cultural problems of developing ganization of the United Nations. IITA The International Institute countries. IBPGR The International Board of Tropical Agriculture, based in CIAT Centro Internacional de for Plant Genetic Resources, with Nigeria, deals with cassava, cow- Agricultura Tropical, based in Co- headquarters in Italy, stimulates peas, soybeans, and local adap- lombia, is concerned with the hu- and coordinates the collection, tations of internationally devel- mid lowland tropics of the West- preservation, evaluation, and ex- oped strains of maize and rice, ern Hemisphere. It has programs change of seeds and other genetic and with the development of in cassava, field beans, rice, and materials of potential interest to farming systems for the humid tropical pasture. plant breeders in the developing tropics. CIMMYF Centro Internacional de countries. ILCA The International Live- Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo, ICARDA The International Cen- stock Center for Africa, based in based in Mexico, conducts re- ter for Agricultural Research in the Ethiopia, does multidisciplinary search on barley, triticale (a cross Dry Areas, with its principal sta- research to improve livestock pro- between wheat and rye), and tion in Syria, deals with crop in- duction systems in Africa. sorghum, in addition to its main vestment (barley, broad beans, ILRAD The International Labo- research on breeding improved lentils, and durum wheat), soil ratory for Research on Animal varieties of maize and wheat. and water management, and Diseases, based in Kenya, studies CIP Centro Internacional de la farming systems (including sheep two protozoal diseases which in- Papa, based in Peru, develops, husbandry) for zones of very low fect and are often fatal to cattle in adapts, and expands research to winter rainfall. parts of Africatrypanosomiasis solve priority problems limiting ICRISAT The International Crops (sleeping sickness) and theiler- potato production in developing Research Institute for the Semi- iosis (East Coast fever). countries. Arid Tropics, based in India, and IMF International Monetary DAC The Development Assist- with a large program in Africa, Fund. ance Committee of the OECD (see deals with the development of IRRI The International Rice Re- below) comprises Australia, Aus- systems of farming in semi-arid search Institute, based in the Phil- tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, zones and breeding improved va- ippines, has worldwide respon- Finland, France, Federal Republic rieties of groundnuts, sorghum, sibility for developing improved of Germany, Italy, Japan, Neth- pearl millet, chickpeas, and pi- varieties of rice and related farm- erlands, New Zealand, Norway, geon peas. ing systems. Sweden, Switzerland, United IDA International Development ISNAR The International Service Kingdom, United States, and Association. for National Agricultural Re- Commission of the European IFPRI The International Food search, located in the Nether- Communities. Policy Research Institute, based lands, provides assistance to de- EEC The European Economic in the United States, does socio- veloping countries to strengthen ix their research capacity and capa- key, United Kingdom, and United Development, US Department of bilities. States. State. OECD The Organisation for Eco- OPEC The Organization of Pe- USDA US Department of Agri- nomic Cooperation and Devel- troleum Exporting Countries culture. opment members are Australia, comprises Algeria, Ecuador, Ga- WARDA The West Africa Rice Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den- bon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ku- Development Association, based mark, Finland, France, Federal wait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi in Liberia, deals with rice re- Republic of Germany, Greece, Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and search and development in fif- Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Venezuela. teen West African countries. Luxembourg, Netherlands, New UNDP United Nations Develop- WHO World Health Organiza- Zealand, Norway, Portugal, ment Programme. tion. Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tur- USAID Agency for International x 1 Overview The world economy is at a low hard hit by the recession in the in the world economy. Since 1973, ebb, weakened by difficulties in industrial countries. they have grown roughly twice as adjustment and by faltering Chapter 3 describes the devel- fast as the industrial countries. growth in the major industrial opment achievements of the past Faced with sharply increased countries. For much of the past three decadesa period of un- prices for their imports of fuel and thirty years, growing interde- paralleled economic growth, but manufactured goods, developing pendencethrough trade, capi- growth which was spread very countries borrowed more, boosted tal, and migrationstrengthened unevenly around the world. exports, and substituted for im- the forces of economic expansion Growth was particularly slow in ports. In many of them, invest- and spread them around the the poorest countries; even there, ment rose as a proportion of GDP. world. But, as recent events have though, tremendous progress was A rising level of investment and illustrated, these links can trans- made in improving the quality of sustained growth are both cause mit problems from country to life and establishing the precon- and consequence of successful country just as surely as benefits. ditions for development. long-run adjustment. Most de- In the industrial countries, large Chapter 4 discusses the pros- veloping countries were able to fiscal deficits, tight monetary pol- pects for the 1980s in the light of make good use of their additional icies, and concern about inflation recent events as well as longer- borrowing in the 1970s. For a time, have raised real interest rates to term trends. It emphasizes that, rapid inflation and negative real unprecedented levels, curtailed although international prospects interest rates eroded the nominal growth, and depressed the export have worsened over the past year, value of their debt-servicing ob- earnings of developing countries, the middle-income countries ligations. Inflation is a mixed contributing to severe liquidity should be able to continue their blessing, however. It causes debts problems for many of them. With progress in narrowing the gap be- to be paid off earlier, because their ability to buy imports and tween themselves and the indus- nominal interest rates rise to re- service their debt thus reduced, trial countries. But the prospects flect lenders' anticipation of the many developing countries have for the low-income countries re- lower real value of loan repay- had little alternative in the short main a matter of grave concern. ments in the future. About one- term but to reduce growth. India and China may not be able half of total developing-country In this year's Report the dis- to sustain the progress they made medium- and long-term external cussion of the international econ- in the 1970s without continued debt carries variable interest rates. omy and the prospects for growth external assistance. In the other Much of the new debt contracted is arranged in three chapters. low-income countries, which are at fixed rates of interest has also Chapter 2 reviews the measures even more heavily dependent on incorporated expectations about taken by various groups of coun- aid flows, output growth is likely future inflation. The heavier bur- tries to cope with the sudden and to remain severely depressed. den of repaying existing debt and large shocks to the world econ- the slowdown in net new borrow- omy during the 1970s. It con- International issues and past ings caused by high interest rates cludes that most developing development has exacerbated the liquidity dif- countries adjusted better than the ficulties of many developing industrial countries over the 1974- During the 1970s the developing countriesand some of the coun- 81 period. But the low-income countries adjusted remarkably well tries of Eastern Europe. Since 1979, countries have been particularly to the more turbulent conditions the rise in real interest rates has :1 also reduced the real value of the investment have failed to pro- the 1980s are less aid, continued net resources transferred to de- duce high growth rates. weakness in commodity prices, veloping countries. In most developing countries, deteriorating export opportuni- Chapter 3 highlights the chang- low- and middle-income alike, re- ties, and poor prospects for com- ing structure of the international markable social progress was mercial borrowing. The first two economy over the past thirty achieved over the past three dec- factors are comparatively more years, with the emergence of new ades. Literacy, health, and life ex- serious for low-income coun- clusters of buoyant economic ac- pectancy not only reflect substan- triesand there is very little they tivity, notably in Japan and the tial gains made amidst extreme could do about them in the near Pacific rim of Southeast Asia, the poverty, but also create their own future. The other two would hurt Latin American economies, and momentum of growth. By broad- middle-income countries more; the oil exporters centered around ening domestic technical and but appropriate policy re- the Middle East. These changes managerial skills, changing the sponsesflexibility in policies to- became more conspicuous in the attitudes of farmers and workers, ward trade and industry, plus in- 1970s, as growth in North Amer- and, it is hoped, lowering the birth ternal adjustments to enhance ica and Europe slowed while a rate, human development offers creditworthinesswould miti- group of middle-income coun- the prospect that per capita living gate their harm. tries increased their investment standards can be improved faster The Low case growth rates are and exports and maintained more in the 1980s. This long-term im- clearly inadequate in the light of rapid growth. The oil exporters provement in human capital is one the developing countries' past and semi-industrial countries be- bright spot that is shared by al- performance as well as their po- gan to narrow the gap in relative most all developing countries. tential, expectations, and needs. terms between their per capita in- Even among the major exporters comes and those of the OECD Development prospects of manufactures and the oil ex- countries. The low-income coun- porters, unemployment and un- tries have, for the most part, re- Development prospects for the deremployment have character- mained on the periphery, lacking international economy, discussed ized all but a few of the fastest the energy resources or the man- in Chapter 4, have worsened over growing economies. Should the ufacturing capacity to achieve the past year. The list of reasons Low case come about, the social rapid growth through trade. But for pessimism is long: continuing and political tensions created by helped by very high domestic recession in the industrial coun- rising unemployment would se- savings, China and, to a lesser tries (which also heightens the riously complicate the tasks of extent, India and Pakistan have threat of protectionist measures); economic management. significantly improved their per the developing countries' adverse The Low and High cases are capita incomes. In many other terms of trade and depressed ex- neither forecasts of what will hap- cases, growth was hampered by port volumes; high and more vol- pen nor firm boundaries of fea- the weak performance of agricul- atile interest rates that limit bor- sible outcomes. They are, at best, ture, a weakness that grew more rowing; and large debt repayment likely outcomes under combina- marked in sub-Saharan Africa in burdens. If not soon overcome, tions of either reasonably good or the 1970s. these barriers to growth could relatively undistinguished poli- Although growth requires an condemn the world to the slug- cies in the developing countries increase in the primary factors gish growth that is outlined in the themselves, and of policies in de- used in production, improve- World Bank's Low case. Devel- veloped countries that are either ments in the efficiency of their use oped from work with the Bank's fairly helpful toward growth and have been responsible for most of global model, alternative scena- development or rather unhelpful. the growth in developing coun- rios illustrate some of the factors If the slow-growing countries were tries. In Africa, in particular, re- that will determine the pace of to emulate the average growth cent analysis suggests that the ab- growth in the world economy. The achieved in the past, while those solute amount of investment High case illustrates the condi- which had had average growth makes a less important contribu- lions for more rapid recovery from rates were to match the fastest tion to economic growth than the present difficulties. growers, even the High case pro- way investment is allocated and For developing countries, the jections could be comfortably ex- used. There are many examples most salient features of an unfa- ceeded. The final outcome cannot of countries where high rates of vorable international outlook for be forecast because it is not pre- 2 determined; it is to be decided. Figure 1.1 Comparative agricultural indicators Priorities for industrial coun- for developing and developed countries, 1979-80 average tries are, first, the restoration of Percentage Percentage their own economic health and Indicator developed developing continued growth. But the main- tenance of a liberal environment Population for trade and capital flows is es- Agricultural population sentially their responsibility as well. Although external finance Arable land and permanent crops accounts for only 13 percent of Irrigated area the total investment in develop- ing countries (or 4 percent of world Fertilizer coiisumption savings), it makes an important contribution by providing essen- tial imports of machinery, mate- Tractors rials, and technology. It also helps cushion balance of payments Agricultural shocks. To facilitate greater capi- production tal flows, aid must not be allowed to suffer from pressures to cut fis- cal deficits. Cereals The experience of the 1970s suggests that most developing Meat countries have weathered the dis- locations with remarkable disci- pline. Nevertheless, policymak- Milk ers need to continue to stress the importance of several factors: in- creasing levels of domestic sav- Eggs ings and investment, improving efficiency in the use of capital, and responsible management of ex- Root crops ternal debt. To lay the foundation for development over the longer term, however, attention must be Fruits given to strengthening economic management and to developing a Vegetables strategy for the 1980s. With very few exceptions, developing coun- 0 20 40 60 80 100 tries would gain significantly by Percentage giving greater priority to agricul- Source: FAO. ture. This is the theme of the sec- ond part of the Report. marketing. Elements of this rev- of developed and developing Agricultural development olution have been adapted to economies are illustrated in Fig- many developing countries, but ure 1.1. The character of world agriculture the variety of their circum- has changed dramatically during The discussion in Part II is or- stancesclimate and environ- ganized in four chapters. They the past thirty years. In the devel- ment (and the availability of tech- deal with: oped countries, scientific research nology appropriate to them), together with the increased use institutions, management, and The links between agricul- of industrial technology, chemical policyhas produced widely dif- tural growth and overall eco- fertilizers, and machinery have fering performance and progress. nomic development revolutionized production and Contrasts between the agriculture The sources of growth and 3 their application in differing cir- stimulate the rest of the economy, ensure that the world's agricul- cumstances while keeping it supplied with la- tural resources are more effi- Rural poverty and food se- bor leaving the land for more pro- ciently used to increase per capita curity ductive employment. supplies of food. One point emerges very clearly Policy considerations and from the diversity of experience The sources of growth conclusions. of the developing countries: rapid The tie between agriculture and growth in agriculture and in GDP nature distinguishes farming from Agriculture and economic growth go together. Where the pursuit of most other activities. Innovation industrializationthe favored and investment have to be related In the past three decades agri- target of planners in the 1950s and to the specific environmental con- cultural output has increased at 1960shas been successful, ag- texts. For example, the leading role twice the rate of earlier periods. ricultural progress has not been of water control (irrigation, drain- For the developing countries, sacrificed. Success in agriculture age, flood control) in populous these aggregates conceal large re- strengthens and helps sustain the Asia contrasts with the emphasis gional and intracountry differ- momentum of the whole econ- on basic infrastructure in some ences. In most poor countries omy. Of equal importance is the areas of Latin America and Af- population growth sharply re- contribution of sustained agricul- rica, where land is ample. The duced the benefitsfor low-in- tural growth to the reduction of public sector plays a dominant role come countries as a group to a poverty. in providing both infrastructure modest 0.2 percent a year per The balance of interests be- and large-scale irrigation sys- capita over the 1960sand per tween producers and consumers tems, and faces special problems capita agricultural and food out- is the central issue of agricultural of management and financing in put declined in the 1970s. The poor policy, and one governed by pric- operating them. It also takes the of the low-income countries still ing structures. In the pursuit of lead in biological research, face a severe food problem. goals other than agriculture's de- whereas mechanical and chemical Agriculture dominates low-in- velopment, developing-country innovations are dominated by the come economies, 70 percent of planners have often tilted their private sector. whose population depends on it. pricing policy against agricul- No universal package of pre- Its growth in large part dictates tureand paid a heavy price in scriptions can be offered. Nature, the growth of their GDP. The mass lost agricultural growth. Incen- feasible cropping systems, avail- of the population spends 60 to 70 tives to farmers to invest and pro- able technology and the means to percent of its income on food, duce is a key stimulant to agri- acquire and use itthey all vary while many nonagricultural activ- cultural growth. too widely for any simple formula ities depend on agriculturenot By contrast, the industrial to make sense. However, a few least government itself, through countries protect agriculture to lessons are clear. its agricultural tax base. maintain some parity in incomes Investments in agricultural As development proceeds, ag- between farmers and other work- research, the result of both inter- riculture's role diminishes, even- ers. This protection is extremely national and national initiatives, tually accounting for a small expensiveunnecessarily so, have paid off handsomely and fraction of both output and since it has spurred increases in have fueled growth during the employment at advanced stages agricultural output beyond eco- past twenty years. The blending of development. For most devel- nomically justified levels and has of basic science, applied research, oping countries, however, it re- seriously distorted international practical experience, adequate in- mains critical, because its prog- comparative advantage. centives, and investment has ress determines the speed at which For policymakers, the chal- yielded tremendous increases in countries can industrialize. In lenge is to adjust domestic poli- output for certain crops, princi- general terms, cost-reducing in- cies and to build a trading system pally rice and wheat, in certain novation and investment are cen- in which comparative advantage conditions. Given this high rate tral to speeding up agricultural can play a greater role in produc- of return, investment in research growth. The benefits of produc- tion. Faster progress on this front should be not only maintained but tivity gains are partially trans- is clearly desirable to enlarge the accelerated. Specifically, it should ferred to consumers, because low developing countries' access to be aimed at the hitherto neglected food (and other commodity) prices markets and, in the long run, to areas: rain-fed crops, root crops 4 (cassava),and coarse grains Efficient and equitable private help accelerate agricultural (sorghum, millet), so as to boost sector performance needs effec- growth. The intensive involve- productivity in humid and semi- tive government policies and ment of the local population in arid areasparticularly sub-Sa- administration. the planning, execution, and fi- haran Africa. nancing of these initiatives plus Water controllargely irri- Rural poverty sound design and good manage- gation but also drainage and flood Worldwide, absolute poverty is ment appear to be the major de- controlis a major source of in- overwhelmingly concentrated in terminants of their success. creased productivity. If a farmer the rural areas of developing Since the rural poor spend a is to adopt a new variety of seed countries. The 1980 Report esti- large proportion of their budgets and apply the right amount of fer- mated that 780 million people, on food, they benefit as con- tilizer, he must be assured of ad- excluding China and other low- sumers from cost- and price-re- equate supplies of water deliv- income centrally planned econo- ducing agricultural development, ered on time. Such assistance has mies, were living in absolute pov- especially if research is expanded generally provided high rates of erty. In China probably 150 mil- on the crops they produce and return, though it requires consid- lion people live just above the consume. But food security for erable investment and strong lo- poverty line. The one-fifth to one- poor people will remain a priority cal organization. Private sector ir- quarter of the rural poor who are for many years. This should in- rigation, mainly by means of effectively landless have much the clude famine-rela ted relief pro- tubewells and small pumps, com- same income as very small farm- grams and schemes to reduce plemented the Green Revolution ersclose to bare subsistence chronic undernutrition. in South Asia. Where this tech- but they are more vulnerable to Without careful attention to tar- nology can be applied, it remains calamities and harder to reach with geting, food distribution pro- an important factor in boosting development programs. grams to combat malnutrition agricultural output. In the future Economic growth is the ulti- often involve heavy budgetary as in the past, however, the size mate remedy for rural poverty. In costswithout necessarily doing and collective nature of the in- fast-growing economiesmainly much to improve nutrition among vestments will require heavy re- middle-income countriesabso- the rural poor. Governments liance on public sector irrigation. lute poverty has been greatly re- should therefore consider whether In the larger irrigation systems, duced as new employment was these programs could not be bet- intelligent water management is created off the farm, in both rural ter targeted and the resources a precondition for high produc- and urban areas. saved then spent on direct in- tivity. Further investment in irri- Certain special initiatives will vestments in agriculture itself. gation should go hand in hand help reduce rural poverty and Food subsidies are invariably po- with efforts to reform the man- stimulate growth at the same time. litically charged, so governments agement of the systems already Projects aimed at small farmers may find it difficult to rearrange completed and operating. The can boost productivity, especially their budget priorities. But limit- waste of scarce and expensive ir- if the projects are simple, focused ing distribution of subsidized food rigation water remains very large. on priority problems, and well in- to the needy would cut the budg- With urbanization and the tegrated with government admin- etary costs of subsidies without growth of the cash economy, istration. Employment away from compromising their nutritional marketed food production will the farm also boosts incomes and objectives. need to increase very rapidly. This has a direct relationship with ag- will require considerable invest- ricultural prosperity. Agrarian re- Conclusions ments in crop storage, process- form that increases security of ing, and transport. Here espe- tenure can also increase produc- For many years, the contribution cially, there is need for tivity, and sometimes so can land of agriculture to growth and the governments to consider care- reform, though most of the rural capacity of traditional farmers to fully the respective roles of the poor live in areas where farms are change were controversial and lit- public and private sectors in fi- already small and land inten- tle understood issues. That is no nancing and managing those in- sively used. Rural public works longer so. Economic growth has vestments. Public schemes need can reduce rural poverty, often gone hand in hand with agricul- continuous scrutiny to ensure that very cheaply; by converting am- tural progress. All farmerssmall, they are employed to best effect. ple labor into needed capital, they medium, and largerespond to 5 economic incentives. Far from developed and adapted to local environment. The proper incen- being "tradition-bound peas- conditions. The lack of technolog- tive to farmers must be comple- ants," farmers have shown that ical improvements suitable for Af- mented by infrastructure. New they share a rationality that far rican conditions is a main reason research breakthroughsespe- outweighs differences in their so- for Africa's poor performance so cially for controlling tsetse fly and cial and ecological conditions. far. Internationally financed pro- developing improved varieties of Farmers can contribute to agri- jects in agriculture are necessary coarse grains, roots, and tubers cultural investment. Even those to overcome obstacles, to dem- could open up and increase the farming only a few acres, save a onstrate how to increase output, productivity of vast areas. The in- substantial part of any extra in- and assist in devising programs ternational community can and come and invest it on their farms. to benefit the poor. Major invest- should provide support. They also use their own and their ments in irrigation, transport, and Aid for agriculture increased in families' labor to level land, grow marketing networks are also the 1970s, reflecting both a rising trees, dig ditches, and build paddy needed, which require external volume of aid in general and the terracesall activities that create assistance. increased share going to agricul- the capital to produce more ag- The constraints on agricultural ture in particular. That in turn re- ricultural output in the future. growth do not lie in the behavior flects changing perceptions among Small farmers can be highly pro- of farmers; they are willing to work both donors and recipients about ductive, typically producing more hard, to adopt profitable inno- the role of agriculture and a clearer from each acre than large farmers vations, or to invest for the fu- understanding of its importance do. Programs and policies favor- ture. Instead, the constraints are in dealing with poverty. The ex- ing smallholders can thus offer to be found in the environment perience of aid-supported agri- good economic returns as well as in which farmers operate: the cultural development in the 1970s increase employment and reduce technology available to them, the was in many cases novel. Aid rural poverty. incentives for production and in- helped finance a wider variety of Given incentives and opportu- vestment, the availability and price programs and embraced more nity, farmers will expand output. of materials such as fertilizers, and countries than ever before, forg- That does not mean that govern- the provision of irrigation. ing new partnerships between ments and other official agencies The future thus depends on a donors and recipients. That past should confine themselves solely number of factorsparticularly provides the spur for the future. to fixing those incentives. Re- the policy framework, advances search and technology need to be in research, and the international 6 Part I International Development Trends 2 The world economy in transition In the early 1970s, after more than ful developments of the later 1970s Adjustment in 1973-78 two decades of rapid develop- in international trade and capital As described in more detail in ment, the world economy en- flows. Nonetheless, even for World Development Report 1981, tered a period of transition. It be- thriving middle-income coun- countries have four ways of re- came necessary to adjust to tries, the current economic envi- sponding to external shocks. The inflation, the realignment of cur- ronment is fraught with difficul- current account deficit can be rencies following the collapse in ties. For many people in the brought back to sustainable levels 1971 of the Bretton Woods system poorest developing countries by (1) slower growth, which cuts of fixed exchange rates, the 1972- particularly in sub-Saharan Af- the demand for imports, or (2) 74 food crisis, the 1973-74 quad- rica, where income per person has switching production toward ad- rupling of oil prices, and the de- not grown for a decadethe abil- ditional exports and import sub- celeration of growth in oil sup- ity to maintain even basic pro- stitutes. External borrowing can plies. These factors led to a short, duction activities may be compro- be used to provide countries with sharp recession in 1974-75. Then, mised. additional investment resources after three years of recovery, a This chapter reviews how (3) to help make these structural further adjustment was required countries have adjusted and de- adjustments or (4) to postpone as oil prices doubled in 1979-80, scribes the actions taken to re- making adjustments. inflation accelerated, and ex- store external deficits to sustain- All four mechanisms were at change and interest rates became able levels, with or without work after 1973: the annual growth unusually volatile. reductions in economic growth of developing countries as a group The recession these events in- rates. The review identifies poli- fell sharply, from 5.8 to 4.6 per- duced has been unexpectedly ciesboth those which can cent, but there was a more drastic prolonged. In the industrial coun- strengthen individual economies deceleration in industrial coun- tries, economic policies that had and those which can improve the tries, from 5.1 to 2.4 percent (Table successfully coped with earlier international environmentthat 2.1 and Figure 2.1). The general cyclical downturns, and even to would help development prog- patternof better growth per- some extent with the recession of ress in the remainder of this dec- formance by middle-income 1974-75, are proving inadequate, ade. Alternative projections of countries than by richer or poorer and growth has faltered. The de- growth in the 1980s are discussed countries (Figure 2.1)conforms veloping countries, despite the rise in Chapter 4. They are based on to that since 1960. Among devel- in their current account deficits a long-term view of determinants oping countries, the low-income from $40 billion in 1979 to $115 of growth and, in particular, on sub-Saharan countries were least billion in 1981, have been much assessments of the developing able to make structural adjust- more successful than the indus- countries' ability to modify their ments; but in India and China, trialized countries in adjusting to economic structures. To provide with large, relatively self-suffi- the new situation. Many have this perspective, Chapter 3 ana- cient economies, the effect of ad- been helped by policies they in- lyzes trends in the groups of de- verse external events was more stituted in response to events of veloping countries, and their re- than offset by high domestic in- the early 1970s, by their high in- lations with the international econ- vestment and good agricultural vestment rates, and by the help- omy, over the past three decades. performance. 7 Most oil-importing developing income oil producers; thus im- was the volume of domestic in- countries borrowed more in the ports other than oil were permit- vestment and consumption, rather immediate aftermath of the 1972- ted to rise while adjustment than the need to accommodate to 73 events. Nonconcessional cap- measures were implemented. By changes in the terms of trade, that ital flows, mostly from commer- 1976, most deficits had been shaped the use of external fi- cial banks, expanded rapidly in brought down substantially (Table nance. The contribution of in- 1973-75, as did concessional flows 2.2). In the process of imple- vestment to the adjustment proc- from industrial countries and high- menting adjustment policies, it ess was especially vital to raise production capacities for exports and import substitutes, notably Table 2.1 Growth of GDP, 1960-82 energy, to effect permanent im- (average annual percentage change) provements in the structure and Counfr cruup 1960-73 1973-80 1980 1981 1982 level of trade of developing coun- tries. (The trade adjustment Air developing countries 5.8 4.6 4.0 2.2 3.9 Low-income 4.1 4.5 5.9 3.9 3.9 mechanism is analyzed in detail China 4.7 5.3 6.8 3.0 in the 1981 World Development Re- India 3.5 3.8 6.5 5.6 port, Chapter 6.) Other 3.8 3.1 2.9 4.3 Africa 3.8 1.3 0.4 2.7 All country groups, apart from Asia 3.8 5.2 5.5 5.9 the least developed and the in- Middle-income 6.4 4.7 3.5 1.7 3.8 dustrial countries, increased the Oil exporters 6.4 4.4 3.0 3.3 4.6 Oil importers 6.3 4.8 3.7 1.0 3.5 ratio of investment to GDP, in part East Asia and Pacific 8.2 7.5 3.5 7.2 at the expense of consumption Latin America and Carib- (Table 2.3). The industrialized bean 5.9 5.4 5.6 -2.5 countries were unable to restrain Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 3.3 4.2 1.7 Middle East and North consumption, and the least de- Africa 5.0 3.6 4.7 -0.5 veloped countries had little scope Southern Europe 7.0 3.4 1.4 2.0 High-income oil exporters 8.6 8.3 4.5 -11.3 - 1.0 for doing so. The inability of least Industrial market economies 5.1 2.5 1.4 1.2 0.2 developed countries to raise real Industrial nonmarket economies . . 2.7 1.8 3.0 investment rates despite substan- tial foreign capital inflows jeop- ardized their economic adjust- ment and left them vulnerable to Figure 2.1 Growth in real GDP, 1971-82 further shocks. In other groups, Annual percentage change Industrial market economies however, notably South Asia, the 10 Developing countries a investment upsurge was helped Low-income oil importers by additional domestic savings. Middle-income oil importers As noted below, the developing 8 Oil exporters countries' ability to maintain high investment rates, while those of the industrialized countries fell (Figure 2.2), was a key to their superior growth performance in the 1970s. Within groups of countries, ad- justment experience of course varied widely, depending impor- tantly on their domestic policies as well as on their economic structure and the differential im- pact of external forces. Among semi-industrial and primary pro- 1971 72 73 74 76 ducing countries, as noted in the 75 77 78 79 80 81 82 a. Excludes China ncludes Spain. 1981 Report, those with outward- looking trade policies (for exam- 8 pie Ivory Coast, Republic of Ko- in the industrial economies out- 1982, as many of these economies rea, Philippines, Singapore, Thai- put continued to grow at mod- seek to curtail inflation through land, Tunisia, or Uruguay) erate rates through 1979. Output restrictive demand management generally adjusted more effec- began to stagnate in the course of policies while adapting their pro- tively than those with inward- 1980, beginning a slowdown duction structures. looking policies (such as Colom- which is likely to continue through The developing countries' per- bia, Kenya, Peru, Turkey, or Yugoslavia). Table 2.2 Resource gap as percentage of GDP, 1974-80 Country group 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Adjustment in 1979-82 Primary producing 3.0 5.3 3.2 4.6 4.0 3.0 4.6 Least developed 7.3 11.2 6.9 5.5 9.0 7.2 5.2 Overall, the immediate slow- Populous South Asia 1.9 2.3 0.6 1.2 1.5 down in growth rates in 1980-81 Semi-industrial coun- was less marked than in 1974-75, tries 5.9 5.8 3.5 2.5 1.9 2.7 4.2 suggesting that previous adjust- Latin America 3.4 3.4 1.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 1.9 Southeast Asia 7.2 6.3 2.0 0.4 3.6 5.6 6.1 ment actions had created more re- Others 8.6 8.4 6.6 6.2 4.0 4.4 6.1 silient economic structures. The Oil exporters -15.7 -0.9 1.0 5.0 7.1 -1.3 -3.2 doubling of oil prices in 1979-80 Industrial market economies 0.4 -0.6 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9 brought about the same terms of trade loss, some 2 percent of GDP, Note: Country groups are as defined and analyzed in the World Development Report 1981, p. 65. Fifty-six countries, for which adequate data exist, are included in the calculations as the quadrupling in 1973-74, but of the analytical group totals. Table 2.3 Response of consumption, investment, borrowing, and growth to external shocks, 1970-72 to 1975-78 (percentage of 1970-72 GDP) Semi- Semi- Industrial Least Populous Primary industrial industrial Other semi- Oil market Item developed South Asia producing Southeast Asia Latin America industrial exporters economies Impact of external shocks Loss due to relative price changes 1.0 1.0 0.4 1.8 0 1.8 -20.2 1.7 Investment price effects 0.6 2.4 0.8 0.4 -0.3 1.1 -4.0 0.9 Consumption price effects 0.4 -1.4 -0.4 1.4 0.3 0.7 -16.2 0.8 Mode of adjustment Absorption reduction -4.1 1.3 -2.3 3.4 0.2 -1.2 -24.8 1.2 Decrease in real investment shares 0.3 - 1.5 -2.0 -4.5 -1.8 -1.2 -13.6 2.6 Decrease in real consumption shares -4.4 2.8 -0.3 7.9 2.0 0 -11.2 -1.4 Additional real external capital flows 5.5 -0.8 2.8 0.4 0 3.4 4.6 0.5 Change in external deficit due to change in GDP' -0.4 0.5 -0.1 -2.0 -0.2 -0.4 0 0 Memorandum item Growth in GDP per capita, 1970-79 0.6 1.5 2.7 6.1 4.2 3.2 3.5 2.3 Note: Country groups are the same as in Table 2.2. The above table may be interpreted as follows. Losses in national income arise from unfavorable movements in import prices compared with export prices. When these price movements are measured relative to the GDP price index, they can be translated into increases in the price indexes of investment or consumption goods relative to the GDP price index. The distribution of the total shock between these components is influenced by government policies. This information is shown for the major country groups in the upper part of the table: their sum equals external shocks to which adjustment was necessary. Countries responded to these shocks by (1) reducing absorption which was distributed over consumption and investment; (2) borrowing from abroad and, where necessary, (3) slower growth. The relative reliance on these modes of adjustment appears in the lower part of the table. Thus, in the semi-industrial Southeast Asia group, for example, the average annual terms of trade loss in 1975-78 relative to 1970-72 was 1.8 percent of average 1970-72 GDP. These fell more on consumption goods (1.4 percent) than on investment goods (0.4 percent). The losses were more than fully accommodated by reduced real domestic expenditure relative to GDP: the net domestic resources thus conserved (3.4 percent of 1970-72 CDI') were attributable to large reductions in the real consumption share (7.9 percent) offsetting a rise in the real investment share (4.5 percent). Real external capital flows accounted for an additional 0.4 percent of 1970-72 GDP. Together these modes of adjustment were sufficient to permit growth. For a more detailed discussion of the methodology, see Hardy and Kharas. a. This line reflects the impact on the external deficit of changes in CDI' measured in 1970-72 US dollars. It therefore incorporates both real domestic growth and real exchange rate movements. 9 Figure 2.2 Share of investment in GDP, 1970-81 economies which, by 1979, had Percent already exhibited six years of slow 35 Industrial market economies growth and partial adjustment. Developing countries In most of these countries, fixed Low-income oil importers capital formation has yet to re- Middle-income oil importers vive. Although some adjustment Oil exporters 30 has occurredprincipally in en- ergy conservationmany coun- tries have found it difficult to speed the pace of change in their economic structures. In the OECD 25 countries, civilian employment increased by 30 million between 1970 and 1980: with a decline in agricultural employment of 7 mil- 20 lion, other sectors absorbed 37 million workers, of whom 35 mil- lion or 95 percent have gone into the service sector, while only 2 15 million more jobs have been cre- 1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 ated in industry. But this struc- tural shift, though large, was not enough. Both unemployment and inflation continued to grow, ag- formance improved in 1980. Some exporters' economies offset the gravated by productive capacities benefited from increased oil ex- overall slowdown in world trade, that are high in cost and by rig- ports, and others were able to and among the large countries of idities in labor markets. draw on substantial accumulated South Asia, where higher invest- Governments of the major in- reserves and short-term funds. ment and good harvests were dustrial countries continue to give Investment had reached 25 per- joined by migrant workers' re- priority to curtailing inflation, cent of GDP in 1975 and was mittances. principally through tighter mon- maintained at that level thereafter Additional developing coun- etary policies. Higher interest rates (Figure 2.2), and many countries tries have recently joined those have depressed investment, how- had considerable success in at- that pursued successful adjust- ever, and differences in these rates tracting capital from new sources, ment policies in the 1970s. Brazil between countries have induced improving the allocation of re- responded to its crisis by raising wider fluctuations in exchange sources, and expanding exports. agricultural producer incen- rates and capital flows. This has In 1981, however, growth de- tivesand exports quickly fol- brought a new element of uncer- clined, especially in middle-in- lowed. Turkey was able to stim- tainty into the international en- come oil-importing countries. ulate exports through monetary, vironment of the early 1980s. Latin America experienced its fiscal, and exchange rate reforms, worst year in over three decades, even though world trade as a Factors affecting adjustment with negative growth in Brazil and whole was stagnant, and thus substantial slowdowns in most brought some idle industrial ca- In this section we examine in more other countries. Africa, including pacity back into use. detail how developing countries low-income African countries; The tentative recovery of de- responded to changes in the in- continued in a decade-long trend veloping countries' growth in 1982 ternational environment in the of sluggish growth. Some excep- is likely to be similar to that in 1970s, drawing some lessons for tions to the general pattern were 1976, and similarly aided by the future policymaking. Long-run found among East Asian coun- current weakness in oil prices. The trends from the 1950s, analyzed tries, where strong trade penetra- main difference between the in Chapter 3, and events since 1973 tion of existing markets in the in- aftermath of the events of the early indicate that those developing dustrial countries and exploitation 1970s and those of 1979-80 lies in countries that have increased the of new markets in the buoyant oil the behavior of the industrial level of investment and domestic 10 savings and diversified their ex- Figure 2.3 Trends in world trade volume, 1971-.81 ports have generally grown more Annual percentage change rapidly than those that have not. 20 Total merchandise Outward-looking developing Agriculture economies with vigorous export Minerals and fuels 15 Manufactures promotion policies captured Fuels growing shares of the market for manufactured goods, largely at the expense of industrialized coun- tries. For countries that were cred- itworthy, much more private capi- tal became available, and at low real rates of interest through 1980. The large economies of India and China, with half the popu- lation of the developing world, a high degree of self-sufficiency, and sustained high investment rates based largely on domestic sav- 1971 72 73 74 75 7b 77 78 79 80 81 ings, have been relatively insu- lated from the international eco- nomic changes of the 1970s. But for many small poor countries, nonetheless expanded. World- 4.5 percent of GDP in 1974-75 to whose export earnings and in- wide, a doubling in the growth around 1.8 percent in 1978. While comes are highly susceptible to of imports of manufactures more still strongly protectionist, these fluctuations in primary commod- than made up for slower growth newcomers have begun to lower ity markets, the 1970s were a har- in imports of food and raw ma- trade barriers, following in the rowing decade. These economies terial other than fuel. This expan- footsteps of the earlier exporters remained dependent on imported sion of trade in manufactures was of manufactures. fuel, were unable to raise com- spearheaded by a small group of Also like the pioneers, these mercial loans, and suffered from industrializing countries which, new exporters of manufactures aid levels still low, though rising, by vigorously promoting exports have concentrated at first on in per capita terms. They man- and diversifying production into clothing, textiles, footwear, and aged to make progress in devel- new, more skill-intensive product other labor-intensive goods. The oping human resources through lines, were able to widen their more established exporters mean- education, health, and other pub- markets even in the recessionary while have moved into higher lic services, but by and large they 1973-75 period and provide a base quality goods and into markets in have not yet been able to under- from which to expand thereafter. new areas. East and Southeast take the shifts in their production A second group of countries, Asian exporters have continued structures that would make them including Cyprus, Indonesia, Jor- to specialize in labor-intensive ex- less vulnerable to external shocks. dan, Malta, Mauritius, and Mo- ports, now producing types of rocco, expanded manufactured clothing, textiles, and electronics Trade exports from a low base at a rate that require more design and other Though growth in world trade has of over 20 percent a year in the skills, and supplying a greater va- slowed down during the recent 1970s, faster than the major ex- riety of consumer goods and light economic difficulties (Figure 2.3), porters of manufactures. Reflect- engineering components. They until recently it has remained ing their export gains, these have also expanded into heavy faster than the growth of output, economies grew faster than others engineering products such as as it has been for the past twenty- at comparable income levels. Their ships, oil rigs, and hydroelectric five years. Although the indus- increased exports of manufac- generators that require consider- trialized countries' GDP growth tures were accompanied by rising able drafting and other skilled la- rates declined in the 1970s, their investment, higher per capita bor inputs. Because they are able imports of merchandise other than growth rates, and rapid reduction to combine the latest technology fuel from developing countries of external deficits from around with skilled management and rel- 11 atively low wages for technicians, for example, now compete with Developing countries were able these countries have become in- Japanese firms in the US market. to raise their share in the manu- ternationally competitive in heavy By thus displacing other export- factured goods imports of indus- industries. Producers of capital ers, they avoid protectionist pres- trial countries to 13 percent in 1980 goods in the Republic of Korea, sures from local manufacturers. from under 7 percent in 1970. Al- though the pressures for in- Table 2.4 Imports of manufactures by industrial countries, 1962-80 creased trade barriers remain strong, this has been done with- Industrial countries 1962 1970 1975 1980 out eliciting higher protection, Imports of manufactures as percentage of GNP partly because of the continued All industrial countries 4.1 6.2 7.7 9.6 low absolute weight of such Europe 7.7 11.1 12.6 15.2 trade-just 1.3 percent of indus- Germany 5.9 8.8 9.7 12.4 Japan 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.6 trial-country GDP, despite a tri- United States 1.2 2.6 2.3 4.9 pling over the past decade. In- Percentage of imports of manufactures from developing deed, markets in the industrial countries economies grew more open All industrial countries 5.3 6.8 10.0 13.1 throughout the 1970s, and man- Europe 4.2 4.8 7.5 9.6 Germany 4.6 6.3 10.8 12.9 ufactured imports took 9.6 per- Japan 5.9 11.4 21.4 25.1 cent of the industrial countries' United States 12.3 14.7 21.0 26.7 GNP in 1980, up from 6 percent in 1970 (Table 2.4). Table 2.5 Growth of merchandise exports, 1970-81 In their markets for agricultural (average annual percentage change) products, however, the industrial countries are far from open. Be- Country group 1970-78 1978 1979 1980 1981 hind protectionist walls, the Eu- All developing countries 5.1 7.1 6.3 -4.0 -2.3 ropean Economic Community Oil importers 8.8 12.6 9.8 3.5 3.1 (EEC), for example, has become Oil exporters 0.4 -1.6 1.1 -18.0 -16.0 Industrial market economies 6.4 5.7 5.5 4.0 2.0 increasingly self-sufficient in a World' 6.0 5.4 5.9 1.5 0.0 broad range of agricultural com- a. Excluding centrally planned economies. modities. This topic is pursued further in Chapter 5. Since 1973, the demand for agricultural im- Figure 2.4 Annual fluctuations in developing-country export prices, 1971-82 ports has grown most rapidly in Annual percentage change oil-exporting countries, other 40 _______ Total newly industrializing countries, Metals and the nonmarket economies. Food All told, world trade continues Nonfood agriculture to be an engine of growth for many countries. The oil-import- 20 ing developing countries, whose exports account for only one- eighth of the world's total, have not been as severely affected as the industrial countries by the re- cent slowdown in world trade (Table 2.5). In 1982, continuing a pattern of the 1970s, exports from these economies are likely to grow faster than those of the world as a whole and those of the indus- 1971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 trial market economies. For countries dependent on Note: Based on a sample of 33 commodities, excluding petroleum, sveighted by current values of developing-country commodity exports, deflated by the manulacturing unit vatue index. primary commodity exports, however, the trade environment 12 of the past decade has been un- lated oil-exporting countries (no- tion of merchandise exports; for even. Peaks in the prices of com- tably Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, the modities other than fuel were re- Arabia, and the United Arab fraction was over 75 percent in corded in 1973-74 and again in Emirates) led to a massive growth 1978-79 (Table 2.6). Some coun- 1976-77 (Figure 2.4) and helped of remittances to South Asia and tries, notably the Republic of Ko- many countries offset the rise in Arab labor-exporting countries. rea, became successful in win- fuel import bills. But many poor There are also considerable re- ning construction contracts in the countries, such as Bangladesh, mittance flows from the United Middle East. Earnings from such Tanzania, and Zambia, suffered States to Mexico and Central activities are an important source greatly in the 1970s from low America and from South Africa of funds for adjustment. Certain commodity prices, which led to and certain West African coun- countries can increase their share squeezes not only on their bal- tries to neighboring nations. For in construction activity in the ances of payments but also on fis- more than a dozen countries, re- Middle East, but overall the real cal budgets. In the current world mittances became a sizable frac- rate of growth of remittances from recession, commodity prices are severely depressed. For oil-im- Table 2.6 Remittance inflows to major labor-exporting countries, porting countries, these adverse 1978-79 trends have been mitigated some- Remittance in lion' as what in 1982 by a 9 percent fall Remittance inflow perceiitae of in the real price of petroleum. Region and country (millions of dollars) merchandise exports Even so, low-income countries Europe and North Africa have suffered far more from fall- Cyprus 70 18 ing commodity prices and export Greece 990 30 Morocco 760 51 volumes than they have gained Portugal 1,690 69 from falling petroleum prices. Spain 1,750 13 Tunisia 220 25 Turkey 1,010 77 Remittances Yugoslavia 2,940 43 Middle East Remittances into Portugal, Tur- Egypt 1,760 89 Sudan 70 12 key, Yugoslavia, and other coun- Asia tries of southern Europe from their Bangladesh 115 21 nationals working abroad grew at India 1,020 15 Pakistan 1,300 77 over 30 percent a year from 1960 Africa to 1972, and thereafter grew at 15 Benin' 25 17 percent in current dollars. From Mali 30 33 Upper Volta 65 60 1973 onward, the large flow of migrants to the sparsely popu- a. 1977. Table 2.7 Global current account balances, excluding official transfers, 1970-82 (billions of current dollars) Country group 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 All developing countries' -10.9 -40.2 -24.5 -27.7 -43.6 -40.2 -77.5 -115.2 -109.2 Oil importers -8.6 -37.1 -25.2 -23.2 -25.3 -43.7 -73.3 -88.0 -82.4 Low-income -1.7 -3.7 -0.8 -1.6 -4.8 -7.1 -12.1 -12.2 -12.9 Middle- income -6.9 -33.4 -24.4 -21.6 -20.5 -36.6 -61.2 -75.8 -69.5 Oil exporters -2.2 -2.5 -0.3 -5.5 -17.6 5.1 -1.7 -29.3 -26.8 High-income oil exporters 2.8 31.2 36.6 33.0 18.6 57.3 103.3 76.1 35.0 Industrial nonmarket economies 2.0 -6.4 -4.5 -2.1 0.5 0.8 2.4 . . Industrial market economies 12.1 22.1 1.7 -3.2 28.0 -11.8 -40.1 1.8 15.3 World 6.0 6.7 9.3 0.1 3.5 6.1 -11.9 -37.3 -58.9 a. China is included in all developing countries" but not in the subaggregates. 13 the Gulf states is expected to slow edly sharp drop in the demand lion resulted almost entirely from down. for oil as consumption in the in- increases in interest payments dustrial countries was curtailed, triggered by higher interest rates. Capital flows both by price effects (Figure 2.5) In 1982 no further significant in- The global pattern of current ac- and by the growth slowdown. The crease in their deficit is expected: count balances and net capital oil producers restrained output to a growth slowdown has been used flows in 1979-81 in part followed some extent, despite burgeoning to curtail borrowing require- that of 1974-76. Rapid initial in- development expenditures, but ments. creases in the surplus of high-in- not by enough to prevent the oil The composition of total finan- come oil exportersto over $100 price from falling in real terms in cial flows (Table 2.8, Figure 2.7) billion in 1980began to be eroded the second half of 1981 and early is changing. First, until 1978, as the latter absorbed imports and 1982. The shift in the ownership growing financial transfers from reduced exports. Whereas the of the balance of payments sur- commercial banks provided for- volume of oil exports from the pluses is not expected to have a eign exchange well in excess of major producers fell about 20 per- significant effect on the pattern of developing countries' total debt- cent following the first price rise, financing of developing coun- service obligations. These com- by 1982 it is projected to be almost tries' deficits. mercial bank loans were largely 40 percent below its 1979 level. Oil-exporting developing coun- untied and provided a welcome The surplus of high-income oil tries moved from a near balance element of flexibility in balance of exporters, $76 billion in 1981, may on current account in 1980 to def- payments management. This easy fall to about $35 billion in 1982. icits of $29 billion in 1981 and per- relationship did not last for long; In the industrial market econo- haps $27 billion in 1982 as their a substantial and growing pro- mies the contraction of aggregate accelerated development plans got portion of commercial bank loans demand reduced a $40 billion def- under way. Their borrowing re- now consists of export credits tied icit in 1980 to near balance in 1981; quirements have therefore ex- to specific supplies, and financing a surplus in excess of $15 billion panded. The oil-importing devel- tied to specific projects. The de- could emerge in 1982 (Table 2.7). oping countries have been cline in net flows and the reduced This decline in the high-income dissuaded from additional bor- availability of untied balance of oil producers' surplus, and the rowing by high interest rates, both payments financing are an under- reemergence of a surplus on the nominal and real, and their re- lying reason for the increasing liq- part of the industrialized coun- ceipts of aid flows have grown uidity difficulties experienced by tries, has been more rapid than only slightly. The deterioration of many developing countries. expected. This change has re- their current account deficit in 1981 Second, the role of aid in rela- sulted partly from an unexpect- (Table 2.7, Figure 2.6) to $88 bil- tion to net capital flows dimin- ished; the share of official devel- opment assistance (ODA) in these Figure 2.5 Changes in real petroleum prices, 1971-82 flows fell from 43 percent in 1970 Annual percentage change to 35 percent in 1979. Though their share declined, aid flows rose 200 markedly over the decade, and played a crucial role in easing the adjustment process, especially for the low-income countries. In ad- dition to the 4 percent annual real 100 increase in net aid disbursements from the industrial countries, the high-income (and even many middle-income) oil exporters de- 0 voted a sizable fraction of their greatly increased income to aid. Relative to their incomes, OPEC members were six times more 1971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 generous in their aid efforts than the industrial countries. Official 14 development assistance from remaining $183 billion owed to of- adjustments on variable rate loans, OPEC jumped from about $350 ficial lenders. The interest pay- the rise in interest on which partly million in 1970 to $5.9 billion in ments of all developing countries compensates lenders for the re- 1977, and declined in 1978, but rose to $51 billion in 1981 and are duced real value of repayments after further oil price rises in 1979 likely to be $56 billion in 1982, relative to the principal lent. In- and 1980 it reached an estimated more than twice the level in 1979. terest payments rose from about total of $7 billion by 1980. All in Part of this increase reflects the one-third of total debt service in all, almost one-fourth of the total ODA provided in 1975-80 came from the high-income oil-export- Figure 2.6 Global current account balances, 1975-82 ing countries. Since 1980, growth Billions of current dollars in ODA has remained weak, with direct detrimental effects on the poorest countries. Some DAC do- nor countries, however, are plan- ning to improve their perform- ance (Box 2.1). High-income oil exporters Debt and debt service Industrial countries Another characteristic of the re- cent adjustment period has been Centrally planned European the rapid rise in levels of debt and economies debt service. Net disbursements Oil-exporting of medium- and long-term loans developing -50 countries stagnated at $56 billion in 1979- 80, before rising to an estimated $71 billion in 1981 and perhaps to $81 billion in 1982. Total debt out- Oil-importing developing standing reached $517 billion in -100 countries 1981, with debt to private lenders 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 accounting for $334 billion and the Table 2.8 Current account financing of oil-importing and oil-exporting developing countries, 1979-82 (billions of current dollars) Oil importers Oil exporters 1979 1980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982 It em Current account balance (excluding official transfers) -43.7 -73.3 -88.0 -82.4 5.1 -1.7 29.3 -26.8 Net official transfers 8.0 9.8 10.3 10.1 2.1 2.3 2.5 3.5 Net private direct foreign investment 6.0 7.9 9.4 9.9 3.3 4.4 5.9 5.9 Medium- and long-term loans, net disbursements 39.6 41.9 51.4 59.0 16.3 15.4 20.0 22.0 Official 12.4 15.7 17.4 19.0 3.3 4.7 6.0 6.0 Private 27.2 26.2 34.0 40.0 13.0 10.7 14.0 16.0 Other capital 0.5 9.2 4.9 -1.4 -13.5 -9.3 1.4 -3.5 Changes in reserves -10.4 5.0 12.0 4.8 -13.3 -11.1 -0.5 -1.1 Memorandum items Net official development assistance 15.1 18.3 19.2 21.1 4.0 4.5 4.4 4.7 Debt outstanding and disbursed 265.4 307.3 358.7 417.7 117.1 137.9 157.9 179.9 Official 101.2 116.9 134.3 153.3 35.9 42.5 48.5 54.5 164.2 190.4 224.4 264.4 81.2 95.4 109.4 125.4 Private Debt service payments' 46.5 56.2 71.7 81.9 24.8 26.0 33.6 37.1 Interest payments 17.1 23.9 34.2 37.8 8.2 11.3 16.9 18.2 Amortization 29.4 32.3 37.5 44.1 16.6 14.7 16.7 18.9 Debt service as percentage of exports' 14.7 15.2 19.3 19.5 17.5 16.0 20.7 20.5 Net transfers 22.5 18.0 17.2 21.2 8.1 4.1 3.1 3.8 Note: Developing countries exclude China. a. Includes debt service payments on private nonguaranteed debt. 15 Figure 2.7 Change in nominal net capital inflows to 1979 to almost one-half in 1981 developing countries, 1971-82 (Box 2.2). Annual percentage change The changing composition of 80 Total international capital flows, and the Nonconcessional loans high level of interest rates, have Official Development Assistance Direct investment placed a number of developing countries in a liquidity squeeze. Debt renegotiations by the Paris Club and by commercial banks in- creased sharply in 1980 and 1981. Eight multilateral agreements were reached in 1981 for the Central African Republic, Liberia, Mada- gascar, Pakistan, Senegal, logo, Uganda, and Zaire. In addition, Bolivia, Jamaica, and Sudan signed 1971 72 73 74 75 76 agreements with commercial 77 78 79 80 81' 82 Estimated. banks, Turkey arranged debt re- Forecast. lief with noninsured creditors, and Guinea and Tanzania continued to refinance bilateral debt with China. The ratio of debt service Box 2.1 Italy's ODA policy changes to exports of the oil-importing de- veloping countries rose from 9 As a percentage of its GNP, Italy's con- (66 percent of the country's total ODA percent in 1972 to 15 percent in tribution to multilateral official develop- in 1980), with special efforts to channel 1979, accelerated to 19 percent by ment assistance (ODA) has traditionally it to cofinancing operations with other 1981, but is expected to remain at been up to the average of the members donors and international financial insti- this level in 1982. of the Development Assistance Commit- tutions. tee (DAC); but its contribution to total To speed the enactment of the latter ODA was well below this average be- directive, Italy has recently agreed to Inflation, interest, and exchange cause of the very limited scope of its bi- provide 450 billion lire of concessional rates lateral aid. Italy's determination to en- assistance for cofinancing of World Bank large its aid program substantially is an (IDA and IBRD) projects over a three- Over the past decade, inflation has encouraging illustration of the potential year period. With this agreement, the accelerated and interest and ex- impact of a dedicated, well-informed, and largest of its kind concluded so far by change rates have become more energetic information campaign. Though the World Bank, Italy intends to support volatiletrends that complicate its GNP per ca pita is about half the DAC the role of multilateral institutions, while the management task of policy- average, Italy has recently laid the foun- expanding its bilateral aid. makers. Inflation predates the oil dation for a much larger and more di- In the context of a development assist- verse assistance program despite severe price increases as a global prob- ance plan for 1981-83, the legislature has budgetary and balance of payments con- approved appropriations totaling 4,700 lem. Double-digit inflation arose straints. billion lire ($4 billion). The government is in oil-importing developing coun- In 1979 the government agency re- also committed to strengthening the De- tries in 1971, in oil-exporting sponsible for aid policy (Interministerial partment for Development Cooperation in countries in 1973, and in indus- Committee for Foreign PolicyCIPES) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is trial countries in 1974, but efforts stated the medium- and long-term tar- mainly responsible for implementing the to reduce inflation were clearly gets in this sector: development assistance policy. made more difficult by the two Rapid growth of official develop- Italy's ODA commitments in 1981 are large and sudden increases in oil ment assistance to raise the ratio of ODA estimated to have reached US$1.5 billion, prices during the 1970s. While the to GNP in 1983 to the average level for a level three times as high as that of 1977- inflationary surge of the early DAC countries (0.37 percent in 1980); a 79. Net ODA disbursements in 1981 were 1970s subsided for a period in the further increase in this ratio to the level more than twice as high as the average of 0.70 percent by the end of the decade. level of 1977-79, equivalent to almost 0.2 latter two groups, inflation con- An increase in bilateral aid to the percent of GNP (against 0.10 percent in tinued at rates of over 20 percent average level of DAC member countries 1977-79). in oil-importing developing coun- tries and accelerated further to- 16 Box 2.2 Inflation, the balance of payments, and debt servicing Inflation affects the value and signifi- the loan onto interest payments. For bor- cance of certain balance of payments items rowers this means that the burden of Public external debt and debt service for 87 developing countries, 1972-79 in several ways. First, it reduces the real exceptionally high interest rates is, in ef- impact of nominal increases in current fect, an acceleration of principal repay- Outstanding external debt account deficits and debt. For example, ments. Billions of US dollars 250 the $88 billion deficit of the oil-importing Developing countries are currently developing countries in 1981 is only two servicing large amounts of debt at vari- and a half times greaterin terms of the able interest rates incurred since the mid- 200 volume of manufactured imports that this 1970s. With new capital inflows discour- Nominal representsthan the $11 billion deficit of aged by the historically high level of real 150 1971. interest rates, the effective shortening of Deflated by 100 export unit Similarly, when interest rates on the the maturities of outstanding loans has stock of outstanding foreign assets and created severe liquidity problems. These liabilities (debt) are not fully adjusted for have been additionally compounded by 50 inflation, a country's overall current ac- Deflated by import unit values count position may not be an accurate 0 reflection of the change in the real value Jmpact of inflation on real debt 1972 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 of its net external assets. Cumulative net burden of a ten-year maturity loan disbursements to oil-importing devel- Real debt service Debt service oping countries from official and private as percentage of loan 40 lenders were $237 billion (in 1978 dollars) 25 from 1973 to 1980. But overall real debt Nominal 30 increased by only $81 billion. The differ- 20 15 percent inflation ence ($156 billion) represents the capital gain to developing countries from the 20 Deflated by erosion in the real value of their debt 15 exporl unit values obligations. This far outweighs the $86 10 billion of deflated interest payments they 10 paid an indication that real interest rates Deflated by were on average negative during this pe- 0 import unit values riod. 1972 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Recently real interest rates have risen 0 sharply. The nominal dollar interest rate averages over 16 percent and the real :1 4 7 'p interest rate about 7 percent in 1981. The Years falling export revenues from commodi- difference compensates the lender for the Note: A variable interest rate is assumed. ties and limited supplies of aid. The drain Amortization payments are ei1ually divided decline in the real value of repayments and the real interest rate is 5 percent. The on real incomes and deceleration of in- of principal by shifting a larger portion nominal interest rate fully incorporates the vestment growth exacerbate the long-run inflation. of the real debt service over the life of problems of managing external debt. ward the end of the decade (Fig- tion in individual countries. high ratios of imports to GDP. Al- ure 2.8). Econometric studies indicate that, though the statistical evidence on Some countries managed to fluctuations transmitted through a direct causal relationship be- control price increases. Industrial changes in the price of traded tween inflation and economic countries that did so included goods explain less than a quarter growth is as yet inconclusive, it Austria, the Federal Republic of of the change in country inflation is clear that the problems of eco- Germany, Japan, the Nether- rates over the past twenty years, nomic management are accen- lands, and Switzerland. Among even when the cases of acute and tuated when prices are rising developing countries, India, Ma- chronic inflation are excluded. In- rapidly. laysia, Senegal, and Singapore deed, experience suggests that in- Differences in inflation rates and were successful. Their experience flation has been better controlled the type of adjustment under- suggests that world inflation, in open economiesthough they taken by industrial countries have transmitted through imports, has are most susceptible to imported also affected interest and ex- not been a leading cause of infla- price increases because of their change rate movements (Figure 17 2.9) and the capital flows that link were rapidly absorbed. But ment in many industrial countries. them internationally. The oil-ex- whereas after the first oil price in- Because almost all debt from pri- porting countries ran large pay- crease real interest rates were low vate sources is at variable rates of ments surpluses after 1973-74 and and even negative, after 1980 the interest, the emergence of high again after 1979-80. In those with rate of interest was sharply higher. rates affected not only new loans, ambitious development pro- This trend is strongly rein- but also the stock of debt. In 1980- grams, especially the larger coun- forced by the tight monetary pol- 81 the transfer of income from tries, the incremental resources icies that now accompany adjust- lenders to borrowers was thus rapidly replaced by transfers from Figure 2.8 Price trends, 1971-82 borrowers to lenders, a shift that Annual percentage change ended the long-term decline in real All developing countries income from lending. 50 Middle-income oil importers The sharp appreciation of the Low-income oil importers US dollar against other major cur- Industrial market economies rencies in 1981 and 1982 has brought exchange rate manage- 40 ment issues to the fore in many developing countries. First, those that tie their currencies to the dol- 30 lar may have lost competitiveness in export markets against prod- ucts from countries whose cur- 20 rencies are not so tied, such as those in West Africa which are tied to the French franc. Second, fluctuations in the major currency 10 exchange rates imply rapid shifts in competitiveness and greater uncertainty about the real prices 0 at which international trade is 1971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 conducted. Third, exchange rate Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. movements can create shifts in the terms of trade. Primary product prices are sensitive to exchange Figure 2.9 US real rate of interest, 1970-81 rate movements. As the dollar ap- Percentage preciates, the price of, say, cocoa Nominal falls, but there is no correspond- 15 Real' ing fall in dollar-denominated debt service. This introduces an ex- change-risk element into national 10 planning and cost-benefit analy- sis of projects. Conclusions The current prolonged recession is a reflection of the major indus- trial countries' attempt to curb in- flation while adapting their pro- ductive structures to the changes 5 in the world economy, even 1970 71 72 73 though adjustment is retarded by 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 a. Deflated by US GDP deflator. low investment rates. Developing countries have, overall, per- 18 formed better than industrial to be very painful. The decline in ing against them. Even if these countries in both recessions of the real aid in 1981, the hard terms deteriorating trends are halted and past decade and in the interven- and constrained volume of other reversed, more of a premium is ing recovery period. Multiple real capital inflows, and the col- placed on developing countries' growth poles have emerged in East lapse in commodity prices have own development efforts and Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, severely affected those countries policies. Before examining pros- and Latin America, and in all these which have least adjusted and are pects for the 1980s, however, we regions are economies that have least able to adjust. Sub-Saharan discuss in Chapter 3 some of the responded vigorously to the low-income countries have faced, longer-term determinants of changed economic environment. and continue to face, the prob- growth, such as human and in- Many other developing coun- lems to a severe degree. stitutional development, and the tries, in particular the least de- On balance, it appears that a immense expansion in interna- veloped, have yet to adjust. Since number of external factors that tional trade and capital flows that these countries have limited room helped developing countries' ad- has changed the production for maneuver, the adverse terms justments in the 1970s (notably, structures of countries and of trade developments have taken growth in remittances, trade, and strengthened the economic links their toll of GDP growth and con- concessional aid) are now oper- between them. sumption progress. Necessary ac- ating less strongly and others (es- lions to raise investment are likely pecially interest rates) are work- 19 3 Long-term development trends The temptation to succumb to the every region of the world sur- oping economies grew faster than rampant pessimism surrounding passed both expectations and the industrial ones, but higher the 1980-82 recession should be previous records. Though popu- population growth limited their avoided. In this chapter we ex- lation rose from 2.8 billion to 4.4 per capita income gains (Table 3.1). amine briefly the trends and les- billion, income per capita dou- The oil exporters, benefiting from sons of the past three decades, so bled. While incomes do not strictly changes in the terms of trade, and as to lay a firm base for the analy- measure well-being (see Box 3.1), the major developing-country ex- sis of prospects for the 1980s in the quality of life improved in most porters of manufactures made Chapter 4. As the events de- parts of the world. Many devel- striking gains in real income rel- scribed in Chapter 2 make clear, the current recession is unex- pectedly prolonged. But it should Box 3.1 What are we trying to measure? not obscure the achievements of Gross national product (GNP) measures Welfare could not be fully measured the developing countries or the economic activitynot welfare. But as a even if it were possible to collect perfect important structural changes that measure of aggregate economic output GNP data for each country, based on have taken place in the world and expenditure, GNP data are often Standard National Accounting defini- economy, both of which are pos- ambiguous or deficient. Ambiguity ex- tions, and make international compari- itive elements for future progress. ists, for example, because public services sons based on the International Com- The growth performance of most such as administration and defense are parison Project (which overcomes some developing countries has im- treated as final rather than as interme- of the limitations of exchange rate con- proved markedly over the past diate services, and purchases of con- versions; see Box 3.2). GNP does not three decades. The international sumer durables other than residences are measure items that are important to environment has been more fa- regarded as consumption rather than in- welfare in most societies, such as the dis- vestment. Moreover, GNP does not make tribution of income and wealth, employ- vorable to growth than ever be- allowance for the varying amounts of ment status, job security and opportu- fore, and the relative income gap capital, including mineral and other nat- nities for advancement, availability of between the industrialized coun- ural resources, used up during produc- health and education services, unpaid tries and most middle-income tion. These are notoriously difficult to services, the quality of the environment, countries has narrowed. Even estimate. Gaps exist in basic data, most and climatic differences. The complexity during difficult periods of adjust- notably for subsistence production in de- of incorporating these conditions into a ment to external shocks, the mo- veloping countries and for illegal activi- comprehensive welfare indicator leads mentum of growth and change has ties in most countries. Measurement economists to settle for partial measures been sustained, as has the closer problems also arise because of lack of such as GNPwhich at least covers most integration of all but the very poor consistency among countries in calculat- of the goods and services available to countries into the world econ- ing changes in real output over time; this meet important consumption needs. GNP is particularly true between the market data, however, need to be comple- omy. economies and the centrally planned mented by other indicators, particularly economies Moreover major problems those which relate more directly to the Output and income growth arise in intercountry comparisons of lev- "quality of life" such as the social data els of GNP converted to a common cur- in Table 3.3. From 1955 to world output 1980 rency by using exchange rates. tripled in real terms, as growth in 20 ative to the United States, and growth rate mainly reflects the decade. other middle-income countries relatively strong performance of The country groupings used in were able to grow in relative terms China and, more recently, India. this Report are based on current too. Income per capita in the other low- income levels. (Box 3.2 explains The structure of the world income economies, mostly in sub- the way in which the use of in- economy has changed out of all Saharan Africa and South Asia, ternational prices would modify recognition over this period. In grew at 1.2 percent on average over the comparisons of income levels 1955, the United States domi- the twenty-five years, and unfor- based on US dollars that are used nated the world economy, pro- tunately not at all over the past in the Report.) However, the slow ducing two-fifths of global out- put. As this share has fallen-to Table 3.1 Growth of population, GNP, and GNP per capita, less than a quarter in 1980-other 1955-80 groups of countries have risen in (average annual percentage change) economic importance (Figures 3.1 Population CS/P CNP per capita and 3.2, Table 3.2). Western Eu- Country group 1955-70 1970-80 1955-70 1970-80 1955-70 1970-80 rope, growing annually at 3.4 percent per capita, became a larger All developing countries 2.2 2.2 5.4 5.3 3.1 3.1 economy than the United States, Low-income 2.1 2.1 3.7 4.5 1.6 2.4 China 2.0 1.8 3.3 6.0 1.3 4.1 which grew at 2 percent. Japan, India 2.2 2.1 4.0 3.4 1.8 1.3 with a 7.2 percent per capita Other 2.4 2.7 4.4 2.7 2.0 0.0 growth rate for twenty-five years, Middle-income 2.4 2.4 6.0 5.6 3.5 3.1 Major exporters of has become the second largest manufactures 2.1 1.8 6.1 5.6 3.9 3.6 OECD economy. The Soviet bloc Other oil importers 2.6 2.6 5.9 5.3 3.2 2.6 has grown in relative strength too. Oil exporters 2.5 2.7 6.0 5.7 3.4 2.9 High-income oil exporters 37 5.1 8.6 6.3 4.7 1.3 These poles of economic activ- Industrial nonmarket economies 1.4 1.1 7.3 3.9 5.8 2.8 ity had already emerged a decade Industrial market economies 1.1 0.8 4.7 3.2 3.6 2.4 ago. Since then, the income and Europe 0.7 0.2 4.8 2.6 4.1 2.4 Japan 1.0 1.1 10.3 5.4 9.2 4.2 trade map has changed still fur- United States 1.4 1.0 3.4 3.1 2.0 2.1 ther with the rise of the Middle World 1.9 1.9 5.1 3.8 3.1 1.9 Eastern high-income oil export- ers. About a dozen middle-in- come countries in Latin America Figure 3.1 Per capita GNP of selected countries and southern Europe and on the as percentage of US per capita GNP, 1913-79 Pacific rim of Asia accelerated their Percent relative growth, rapidly expand- 120 ing production in both agriculture Germany, Fed. Rep. and manufacturing and capturing increasing shares of world mar- 100 France kets. This group has a record of growth in industry and agricul- 80 ture second only to Japan's. The Japan middle-income oil-exporting countries grew almost as fast. The United Kingdom 60 progress of other middle-income oil-importing countries was less Italy spectacular, particularly in agri- 40 culture in which their share of world production fell, but their Yugoslavia real income per capita nonethe- 20 Argentina less doubled in a generation. The Brazil low-income countries, by con- trast, achieved only a 2 percent 0 annual rate of increase in income 1913 29 37 50 55 60 70 79 per capita (Table 3.1). Even this 21 Table 3.2 Population, GNP, and GNP per capita: Shares, relationships, and growth, 1955-80 Per capita GNP in Share in world current prices as Per capita GNP in population Shore in world GNP' percentage of US GNP constant 1980 dollars Country group 1955 1980 1955 1980 1955 1980 1955 1980 All developing countries 68.1 73.6 20.7 21.5 4.5 6.4 340 730 Low-income 44.7 47.1 8.1 4.8 2.7 2.2 160 260 China 22.0 22.2 4.7 2.5 3.2 2.5 160 290 India 14.4 15.2 2.2 1.6 2.3 2.2 170 260 Other 8.3 9.7 1.2 0.7 2.1 1.7 140 190 Middle-income 23.4 26.5 12.6 16.7 8.1 13.7 700 1,580 Major exporters of manufactures 7.1 7.3 5.1 7.7 10.7 22.9 1,050 2,650 Other oil importers 6.7 8.0 3.8 4.0 8.4 10.9 600 1,260 Oil exporters 9.6 11.2 3.7 5.0 5.8 9.7 500 1,120 High-income oil exporters 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.4 8.1 95.8 4,900 11,080 Industrial nonmarket economies 12.4 10.7 8.6 12.4 10.4 25.0 940 2,880 Industrial market economies 19.3 15.4 70.6 64.8 54.7 91.8 4,940 10,610 Europe 9.2 6.5 26.6 27.9 43.2 92.8 4,640 10,720 Japan 3.3 2.6 2.4 9.5 11.0 77.9 1,600 9,010 United States 6.0 5.1 40.3 23.7 100.0 100.0 7,030 11,560 World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 14.9 21.7 1,320 2,510 a. Evaluated at current prices and exchange rates. tage of a long development his- Figure 3.2 Per capita GDP of selected countries as percentage of US per capita GOP, 1955-79 (ICP method) tory. Agricultural and political re- Percent forms had occurred, education Germany, Fed. Rep. was widespread, and these coun- 80 tries were well situated to benefit France from the expanding trade and Japan capital flows of the 1960s and 1970s. Investment levels were United Kingdom 60 above average and were sup- ported either by large capital in- Italy flows or by oil revenues. Among the fastest growing economies, all 40 except Brazil and the oil produc- Mexico ers had above average literacy rates for their income levels; all Brazil / Malaysia achieved growth across sectors, 20 including vigorous market-based Colombia agriculture; and most, especially I'hilippines in the 1970s, considerably ex- / Pakistan panded their trade with industrial Kenya 0 and developing countries alike. 1955 1970 1979 In the world at large, standards Source Kr,,vls and others, ICI' III, World a,ul l,uonu, of living are much higher than they were thirty years ago. But although the differences between growth of the low-income coun- Among developing countries middle-income and industrial na- tries is not explained by the fact with relatively low per capita in- tions have been reduced, there are that fast-growing countries no come at the beginning of the pe- now greater gaps between rich and longer belong to this group: al- riod, the majority have achieved poor, both in real purchasing though there were marked shifts only slow growth since then (Fig- power, as indicated in the Inter- in relative positions within groups, ure 3.3). Most of the rapidly national Comparison Project (ICP), few countries have moved from growing developing countries and in more simple nominal in- one income group to another over were in the middle-income group come comparisons (Table 3.2). By the past three decades. in the 1950s and had the advan- the end of the 1970s, the 47 per- 22 cent of the world's population liv- ing in the low-income countries Box 3.2 The International Comparison Project accounted for only 4.8 percent of For want of a better alternative, com- country reduces the productivity gap be- the dollar value of world output parisons of income levels across coun- tween itself and a slow-growing, high- (perhaps two to three times more income country, its overall relative price tries have for years been made at official in ICP numbers), whereas the exchange rates. These comparisons yield level rises: its currency tends to appre- richest 15 percent of population estimates that are known to misrepre- ciate in real ternt't When fast-growing accounted for 65 percent of out- sent the actual purchasing power of cur- countries are compared with countries put. rencies. In particular, they tend to un- with slower growth, their relative GNP In the past it has taken dec- derstate incomes in poor countnes relative at current pnces and exchange rates tends ades, sometimes centuries, to es- to those in rich ones. This is because the to converge faster than their relative GNP tablish the preconditions for ac- prices of nontraded goods are generally celerated growth. The accumu- lower in poor countries than in rich. In- Exchange-ratedeviation index ternational trade tends to drive the prices in relation to real GDP per capita, lation of educated and skilled thirty-four countries, 1975 of tradable goods toward equality across people, of physical infrastructure, countries; with equal or nearly equal Exchange-ratedeviation index of directly productive capital, and prices, differences in wages among 4.0 of institutions which encourage and reward entrepreneurship and countries reflect differences in labor pro- ductivity in the production of tradable . savings is a difficult process at low- 3.0 income levels. It may be impeded goods. Wage levels are the basis for eval- . by a shortage of resources or in- uating items that are not traded inter- U u terrupted by unfavorable external nationally, most notably services. In most services, producti ity differs little among 2.0 . events, mismanagement, or po- countries, so in the high-income coun- . . .U U. litical disorder. But it is a process tries high wages lead to high-priced ser'- 1.0 UU . which inescapably depends on ices while in countries with low wages, policy actions. To prevent a fur- services are cheap. 0 ther widening of the income gap The United Nations International 0 20 40 60 80 100 Comparison Project (ICP), which the between rich and poor nations re- World Bank has helped support since Real GDP per capita quires actions both from the in- (United States = 100) 1969, has developed a methodology for ternational community and from Note: The index is the ratio of the actual comparing incomes in terms of the real exchange rate to the notional exchange rate domestic policymakers. resources needed to purchase precisely that would equalize the average price of GOP to the average price of US GDP. specified goods and services. With this Source: Kravis and others, ICP III, methodology, comparisons can be made World Product and Income. Improvements in living not only across countries but also across, standards say, different socioeconomic groups at constant prices. For similar reasons, which face different price levels. this is also true for countries with im- As stressed in World Development The results of the third study in the proving terms of trade. Thus, from 1955 Report 1980, improvements in lit- ICP, recently published, provide com- to 1980, Japan's constant (1980) price per eracy, health, nutrition, and other parisons of real GDP per capita for thirty- capita GNP rose 3.4 times faster, while aspects of social welfare not only four countries in 1975, made up from its current price per capita GNP rose 7.1 alleviate the worst aspects of ab- price and quantity estimates for 151 cat- times faster, than those of the United solute poverty, but also create a egories of goods and services. Because States. The corresponding ratios were 1.4 momentum for growth in output the study provides estimates of detailed and 2.15 for northwestern Europe, and and incomes. Although the low- components of GDP, it affords insights 1.53 and 2.14 for the developing coun- income countries' per capita in- into comparative economic structures. For tries which are major exporters of man- come growth has lagged, their example, it shows the extent of country- ufactures. In the future, the same phe- standards of social welfare have to-country price differences in invest- nomenon can be expected to help reduce ment goods and other components of the apparent gap between fast-growing risen fast and converged with GDP in real (price-corrected) terms. developing countries and the industrial those of richer countries (Table countries, and to increase it between both ICP information can be used to make 3.3). By broadening technical and comparisons of per capita welfare or of these groups and the slowest growing managerial skills, by improving economic power between countries at low-income countries. the knowledge and efficiency of different income levels. It can also be farmers and workers, and by used to interpret the catching-up proc- helping to reduce fertility, the in- ess. When a relatively fast-growing vestments in human develop- 23 Figure 3.3 Long-term patterns of economic growth, 1955-79 in the low-income countries: only one-fifth of the population could Per capita GNP growth rate (percentage) 8 read and write in the 1950s, but . today about half can do so. If progress continues at recent rates, . a literacy rate of 78 percent in the . .0 6 -.---- U low-income countries of today can . .. U' be expected by the year 2000. 4 . U .. Health U., Life expectancy in the developing . U U. countries now averages 58 years, .U. U 1 2 U U. . 'L I U . U a level attained in the industrial countries only in the 1930s. Over the past thirty years developing . countries, aided by medical ad- 0 U. . . U vances, have achieved as much U U . progress as had the industrialized . countries in two centuries. There 10 1111111 I 111111 I II are, however, considerable differ- 100 1,000 ences among income groups and Per capita GNP (1955 dollars) regions. Life expectancy in south- ern Europe and Latin America, for ment of the past thirty years offer especially education, preventive example, stands at 68 and 64 years, hope that incomes in these coun- health services, and family plan- respectivelycomparable to that tries can improve faster in the ninghave not done so at the cost in the industrial countries in the coming decades. of long-run growth. Rather, the 1950swhile in Africa it lags con- Many countries, despite their reverse is true. siderably behind, at 48 years. The growth in aggregate income, con- gains made by industrialized tinue to have large pockets of Literacy countries in lengthening life ex- poverty, both among disadvan- About one-third of adults in the pectancy are thought to be ap- taged residents of relatively developing countries were liter- proaching the biological maxi- wealthy areas and in backward ate in 1950. By 1979, the literacy mum. If developing countries regions (Box 3.3). Governments rate had risen to 56 percent. The continue to progress at the rates that have given sustained atten- middle-income developing coun- achieved in the past three dec- tion to the social policies that af- tries have already achieved a lit- ades, they should reduce the re- fect the distribution of consump- eracy rate of 68 percent. There maining differential quite rapidly. tion and access to public services have also been impressive gains Experience in improving nutri- Table 3.3 Trends in life expectancy, child mortality, and literacy, 1950-79 Life expectancy (years) Child rnortahty Literacy rate (percent) Country group 1950 1960 1970 1979 1950 1960 1970 1979 1950 1960 1970 1979 All developing countries 43 48 54 58 28 22 16 12 33 38 46 56 Low-income 41 47 53 57 28 22 16 12 20 27 29 51 Africa 35 39 43 46 44 38 32 27 . 17 17 29 Asia 41 48 53 58 27 21 15 11 20 28 31 52 Middle-income 46 50 55 59 28 22 16 11 48 49 64 68 Africa 37 41 46 50 42 35 27 22 16 22 37 Asia 42 47 53 59 28 22 14 9 54 54 69 75 Latin America 51 56 60 64 23 17 12 8 57 65 72 78 North Africa 42b 47 52 57 40b 36 27 15 19 19 24 40 Middle East 48 53 57 30 18 16 . 17 35 49 Southern Europe 59 62 66 68 10 7 5 3 75 80 85 85 High-income oil exporters 46 51 57 35 20 11 . . 14 26 32 Industrial market economies 68 70 71 74 3 2 1 1 95 97 98 99 a. Deaths per thousand children aged I to 4 years. b. The 1950 data for North Africa include the Middle East. 24 tion and reducing child mortality has varied widely among coun- Box 3.3 Regional disparities within countries tries, a variation that mainly re- The common overall policy framework The Brazilian government has been flects the performance of govern- provided by a central government does trying for at least a century to reduce the ment programs in these fields. not ensure equal progress in living disparities between the Northeast and the Remarkable improvements in standards for different regions of a coun- rest of the country. Before World War II, some or all key measures of wel- try. Specific policies to reduce income most of these efforts took the form of differentials among regions can, how- public works programs. More recently, fare have been attained even at ever, be quite effective over time. they shifted to promoting integrated ru- low levels of per capita GNP, as In India, with the major exception of ral development and, through fiscal and in China, Sri Lanka, and Tanza- West Bengal, the states with the highest credit incentives, a modern industrial nia. In contrast, progress in health income levels in 1960 have grown fastest base. and literacy lags behind rises in since then. They have also had higher These direct action programs, substan- average incomes in some wealth- levels of education and better health fa- tial emigration (over 2 million North- ier countries such as Brazil, Mex- cilities than the less favored states. In- easterners migrated to other regions dur- ico, and Peru where incomes are terstate differences have been dimin- ing the 1970s), and the increased growth much less equally distributed. In ished by large-scale movements of people momentum within the region as its per health, as in literacy, average to regions with higher income levels and capita income has grown have at last be- achievements in Asian countries better opportunities. gun to reduce the Northeast's lag behind far exceeded those in Africa, re- In Brazil, there are poor people in all the rest of the country. During the 1970s areas, but by far the majority are in the its real per capita GNP increased some- flecting, in part, the capacities of Northeast. Thirty-five million people live what faster than that of the country as a public administration. whole, while infant mortality declined there, about a third of Brazil's popula- tion. In 1979 average per capita income and literacy rates improved more than Population growth in the region was just under $800, about the national average. Further progress Improvements in health and nu- 40 percent of the national average. The will depend on the continued energetic trition have led initially to higher Northeast's infant mortality rate was 40 pursuit by the government of programs rates of increase in population in percent higher, and its adult literacy rate to reduce the disparity. both low- and middle-income de- 40 percent lower, than the Brazilian av- veloping countries, and this is erage. holding back the achievement of higher per capita income. This is India: Progress in living standards related to income levels of particularly the case in the low- 1960-61, by groups of states income countries, where output Per capita net domestic product expansion has been sluggish and (1960 rupees) Hospital beds where high population growth has Group Group Group Growth rate, Share of Literacy per 1,000 limits, average, average, 1960-61 to population, rate, population. imposed heavy demands on pub- 1960-61 1960-61 1977-78 1977-78 1960-61 1971 l9'9 lic expenditure and administra- tion. Population growth in many Under 254 235 263 0.66 32 26.4 4.8 255-329 281 320 0.77 35 29.3 6.2 countries of this group has reached Over 330 382 456 1.05 33 39.3 9.8 2.6 percent a year and is accel- erating; this compares with a rate of population increase in the in- dustrialized countries of 0.7 per- ing countries at slightly over 40 The causes of reductions in birth cent a year currently or 0.5 per- per thousand for some two cen- rates are complex. Among the cent a year at the time of their turies before 1950, but declined to economic factors to which birth own industrial revolutions. just above 30 per thousand by 1980 rates are related are per capita in- The rise in population growth (Figure 3.4). Only China, among come, the extent of education (es- rates, whether in nineteenth-cen- the low-income developing coun- pecially primary education and the tury Europe and Japan or in de- tries, and a group of smaller mid- education of women), income veloping countries this century, dle-income countries (such as distribution, the degree of urban- has largely reflected declining rates Cuba, Greece, Hong Kong, Por- ization, and, more broadly, the of mortality. Although birth rates tugal, Singapore, Romania, and various costs and benefits asso- have varied much more widely Yugoslavia) have managed to ciated with childbearing and fam- than mortality rates, they gener- lower the birth rate to below 20 ily size. Given all these influ- ally remained stable in develop- per thousand. ences, family planning services are 25 import the goods and services Figure 3.4 The demographic transition' necessary for overall growth, and Per 1,000 population it also determines, together with 50 overall growth, their capacity to Birth rate Death rate Developing countries service debt and hence to borrow 40 / abroad. The developing coun- tries' export performance in a 30 widening global trading environ- ment has been one of the most 20 successful aspects of the past thirty years' growth. The middle-in- 10 come exporters of manufactured Developed countries" goods were able to raise their share 0 in world exports, as were coun- 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 tries that export oil, in the wake Rate of population increase = birth rate - death rate of rising oil prices: the latter in Ccude birth and death rates. The projected increases in death rates after about 1980 reflect the rising 1980 supplied 18 percent of world proportion of older people in the population. Includes industrialized countries, the USSR and Eastern Europe. trade (Table 3.4). In manufac- tured goods there was growing market penetration (Figure 3.5). Table 3.4 Shares of world merchandise exports, 1955-79 By contrast, most primary com- (percent) modity exporters, including most Country group 1955 1965 1970 1980" of the low-income and many pri- All developing countries 27.3 20.2 18.4 21.4 mary-producing middle-income Low-income 5.6 3.4 2.5 1.9 countries, did not have the pro- China 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.9 ductive structure to allow them to India 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.4 Other 2.8 1.5 1.1 0.6 participate in manufactured goods Middle-income 21.7 16.8 19.5 19.5 trade. They also suffered a dete- Major exporters of manufactures 6.8 5.7 6.2 8.0 rioration in their terms of trade Other oil importers 6.9 4.1 4.3 3.9 (Box 3.4), since prices of most Oil exporters 8.0 7.0 5.4 7.6 High-income oil exporters 2.1 2.5 2.4 10.2 nonfuel primary commodities Industrial nonmarket economies 8.5 10.9 10.1 7.9 weakened with respect to those Industrial market economies 62.1 66.5 69.0 60.5 of petroleum (Figure 3.6) and of Europe 36.1 41.1 42.5 38.5 Japan 2.1 4.5 6.2 6.5 manufactured goods. The low-in- United States 16.5 14.6 13.6 10.9 come countries now supply only World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2 percent of world exports. Memorandum item World exports (billions of dollars) Some primary producers, such Current prices 94 186 313 1,995 as Colombia, Ivory Coast, Ma- 1978 prices 420 542 821 1,405 lawi, and Malaysia, were able to a. Includes some estimates. move into processing or expand output and did relatively well. a necessary but not a sufficient straints in the 1970s, yet they have Difficulties in supply limited the component of population policy. performed very differently. In expansion of primary commodity Many countries in the Middle East, trade, the General Agreement on exports elsewhere, particularly in Latin America, and Africa have Tariffs and Trade (GATT) led to sub-Saharan Africa, where most yet to formulate social policies in a series of multilateral reductions countries were unable to take ad- these areas. in tariffs and other protective bar- vantage of recent opportunities for Long-term trends in the riers. World trade grew much expanded food trade. Indeed, the faster than output, averaging 5.1 weakness of agriculture has been international environment percent annually from 1955 to 1980 an important reason for the poor All countries faced essentially the and 6.9 percent annually from 1965 growth performance in sub-Sa- same favorable international eco- to 1980. haran Africa. In Latin America, nomic environment in the 1950s Export growth is crucial to the rising domestic demand coupled and 1960s and faced similar con- developing countries' ability to with agricultural protection by the 26 industrial market economies Figure 3.5 Imports of manufactures from developing countries caused the loss of export markets as percentage of GNP of importing countries for several agricultural products Percent in the 1960s. Despite the fall in 2.0 Latin America's share of world merchandise exportsfrom 12 percent in 1950 to 8 percent in United Kingdom 1960 and about 5.5 percent in the Germany, Fed. 1.5 1970ssome countries, notably Rep. Europe Brazil, nonetheless made remark- United States able progress in manufactured ex- All industrial ports (Box 3.5). South Asian countries countries' exports, large and di- 1.0 verse in the 1950s, fell in relative terms over this period, as did those of Middle Eastern nations, Japan except for petroleum. The East and 0.5 Southeast Asian countries in- creased their share of trade rap- idly from decade to decade. About a third of the exports from the newly industrializing countries went to other developing coun- 1965 70 75 80 tries. The rapid expansion of world trade over the past three decades Furthermore, foreign capital in- have been misjudgments by bor- was paralleled by similar growth flows typically play an important rowers and lenders alike (for ex- in capital flows, aided by reduc- role in countries characterized by ample, the excessive use of sup- lions in controls on capital move- rising investment and accelerat- pliers' credits in the 1960s or ments, easier convertibility among ing growth, and also help cush- overborrowing by countries such currencies, and the development ion balance of payments shocks. as Turkey and Zaire in the 1970s), of international financial institu- Official flows to developing na- on the whole, flows from private tions. After World War lithe tions grew rapidly in the 1950s, sources have gone to those coun- United States fueled the growth reaching about 0.4 percent of in- tries best able to use these addi- of the world economy through aid dustrial countries' GNP in the tions to domestic savings. flows of unprecedented generos- early 1960s, and have grown more ity, and gave impetus to the cre- slowly since then. The centrally The role of domestic policies ation of the international frame- planned economies' contribution work for monetary relations, to aid has been negligible, but Economic structures become more trade, and financing reconstruc- high-income oil exporters have flexible as a country accumulates tion and development. The latter made substantial contributions resources. There are obviously began and continued the virtuous since the early 1970s. There have structural reasons behind the dif- circle of capital flows and trade. been slow but steady improve- ferent patterns of development of On average, foreign capital has ments in the quality of aid, as the the past thirty years. Yet a review financed about one-seventh of to- grant element of total flows has of these patterns shows emphat- tal investment in developing increased and less aid has been ically that the degree to which countries. Although domestic supplied in kind. countries managed to participate savings are almost always the Commercial capital flows to de- in international economic expan- principal source of finance for in- veloping countries account at most sion was determined largely by vestment, foreign capital signifi- for 4 to 5 percent of world sav- the policies they pursued. cantly augments countries' capac- ingsand usually for less. They Economic management after the ities to import the machinery, have evolved steadily (Table 3.5), depression and during World War materials, and techniques needed especially since the emergence of II demonstrated that public policy for investment and production. OPEC surpluses. Although there could be used to help solve eco- 27 Box 3.4 Response to terms of trade shocks in Sri Lanka Sri Lanka provides a dramatic example ever, the increase in the volume of CDI' volume of per capita CDI' almost 70 per- of adjustment to external shocks, and of was once again offset by deteriorating cent higher than in 1960, a fourfold in- the elusiveness of success in the face of terms of trade, although to a lesser ex- crease in real per capita investment, an continued deterioration of the interna- tent than in the 1960s. Per capita con- extraordinarily high (and clearly unsus- tional environment. At independence, Sri sumption stagnated, but investment grew tainable) capital inflow, yet reduced per Lanka's exports consisted largely of tea, even faster than in the 1960s, this time capita consumption. Sri Lanka repre- rubber, and coconut products, whose largely financed by sharply rising capital sents an extreme, although perhaps not relative prices have fallen almost contin- inflows. Throughout the postwar period, a unique, case of the terms of trade loss ually. The increase in the value of per Sri Lanka was exceptionally successful in that can affect a specialized, raw-mate- capita gross domestic product between protecting the poor from the worst ef- rial-exporting economy. It also shows the 1960 and 1980 was reduced from 2.6 per- fects of falling consumption and in im- difficulty of adjusting to continuous terms cent a year in real terms to 1.1 percent proving, albeit slowly, the high quality of trade losses despite considerable suc- after changes in the terms of trade are of life as measured by various social in- cess in reducing consumption and in- taken into account. dicators. creasing production. Despite the loss in the terms of trade, In 1980 Sri Lanka found itself with a Sri Lanka adjusted by raising invest- ment; but in the face of declining capital inflows, this necessitated consumption Sri Lanka restraint. Thus, as shown in the table, 1960 1970 1980 while the volume of production rose in the 1960s, per capita consumption fell Indexes in constant irices per capita markedly. This was enough to allow Sri CDI' 100 126 167 Lanka to raise per capita investment in Cross domestic income adjusted terms of trade loss 100 100 125 constant prices by more than 60 percent. Consumption 100 90 90 Rising investments helped further to Investment 100 163 407 increase the growth momentum of CDI' Percentage of CDP in current prices in the 1970s, notably through the devel- Net capital inflow 4.2 3.1 22.0 opment of food crops, some import-sub- Consumption 90.4 84.2 86.2 Savings 9.6 15.8 13.8 stituting industries, tourism, and, more 35.7 Investment 13.8 18.9 recently, exports of manufactures. How- nomic problems in essentially Figure 3.6 Weighted index of commodity prices,' 1950-82 market-oriented systems, and Index (1974-76 average = 100) greatly improved capacities for Commodities" Petroleum policy formulation and adminis- 150 tration gradually emerged. The importance of trade policy has been documented elsewhere (see, for example, World Development 100 Report 1981). Here, two domestic determinants of growthinvest- ment and human resource devel- opmentare noted. The shares of national income 50 used for investment go some way toward explaining the very slow growth rates of most low-income 0 countries and the much faster 75 80 growth rates of China and the 1950 55 60 65 70 middle-income countries. The low- a. Thirty-three commodities, exclud,rsg petroleum. income countries other than China 28 Table 3.5 Composition of net capital flows to developing countries, 1960-62 and 1978-80 (percent) Box 3.5 Brazilian manufactured exports Net capital flows 1960-62 1978-80 Since the mid-1960s Brazil's economy has Official development assistance 59 34 Other nonconcessional flows, mainly official 7 13 been growing at 8.4 percent a year. Ex- Private nonconcessional flows 34 53 ports make up quite a small share of GDP, Direct investment 20 14 but their composition has shifted mark- Export credits 7 13 edly from primary products (notably cof Financial flows 7 26 Total 100 100 fee) to manufactured goods. Overall, the Memorandum item proportion of manufactures in exports Total amount (billions of dollars) grew steadily from 8 to 49 percent be Current prices 9 84 tween 1965 and 1981. This trend was ac- 1978 prices 25 76 companied by increases in real wages in Source: OECD. manufacturing to relatively high levels, whose effect on the international com- petitiveness of Brazil's exports was offset and India had average invest- Many countries with improved in part by energetic export promotion ment shares of about 10 percent growth records raised investment policies. of GNP in 1960, rising to 18 per- shares with the help of high cap- Brazil's manufactured exports grew at cent in 1980. China devoted 23 ital inflows. Pakistan, for exam- 19.5 percent a year between 1965 and percent of its GNP to investment ple, in contrast to India, was able 1981. The growth in exports of capital in 1960 and 31 percent in 1980. to use foreign financing to reach goods and certain technologically so- phisticated products was more spectac- The corresponding ratios were 21 an investment rate of over 20 per- ular, even considering the low base. The and 26 percent in the middle-in- cent in the early 1960s. That was current dollar value of exports of non- come countries. followed by the only period dur- electrical machinery, for example, in- Increasing investment shares is ing which its economic growth rate creased from $17 million in 1965 to $864 a painful process, especially if markedly exceeded India's. million in 1979, that of transport equip- achieved by rapidly raising do- Throughout this century, sus- ment from $8 million to $1,248 million, mestic savings. By 1960, at very tained growth has been associ- and that of scientific and other equip- different levels of development, ated not only with investment in ment from zero to $65 million. China, Romania, Yugoslavia, the physical facilities but also with The example of aircraft exports is typ- other nonmarket economies of prior educational achievements, ical. Brazil's first aircraft was built in 1910, and a Brazilian, Santos-Dumont, was one Eastern Europe, and the USSR had especially widespread primary of aviation's pioneers, but the story of savings and investment rates education. The spread of basic this industry really began with the cre- much higher than those of most education tends to lower birth ation of a Ministry of Aeronautics in 1940. other countries at similar income rates as well as increase produc- Other public research and training insti- levels. Each had relatively high tivityfor example, by making tutions were organized later and pro- growth rates during the late 1950s producers more responsive to vided a tradition of strong government and early 1960s, though declines economic signals. In all econo- involvement. The drive for export mar- in investment rates and in the ef- mies businessmen, farmers, la- kets began in 1969 with the formation of ficiency of investment were im- borers, and housewives make Embraer, a mixed state-private enter- portant reasons for their lower daily decisions on how to work prise. The public sector contributed cap- growth in the 1970s. Except for and what to consume. In indus- ital and a team of engineers from its aer- substantial food aid in the mid- trialized as well as in developing ospace research center, which had designed a prototype, the Bandeirante. 1960s, India financed its invest- countries, the weight of evidence Embraer produced 2,070 aircraft, mostly ment largely through its own sav- points to the benefits of education under license, in its first decade. ings efforts: after a slow rise from in quickening adjustment to new The Bandeirante, a twelve- to eight- 17 percent in 1960, the invest- events. In the farming sector in een-seat turboprop designed for markets ment share reached 24 percent in developing countries, where out- in the developing countries, found a niche 1980. Although it is too soon to put expansion and export growth in industrialized countries for feeder be certain, this apparently sup- are closely tied to the spread of routes as fuel prices rose. In 1980, out of ported an acceleration of growth new technology, schooling has a total production of 250, 90 planes were late in the 1970s, despite the neg- played an important role in the exported, 30 of them to the United States. ative impact of external shocks. rapid diffusion of high-yielding 29 varieties of crops. Studies of pro- justed to new circumstances from resources at low-income levels ductivity for a variety of food crops time to time, is also important. have been impressive, although in Latin America, Africa, and Asia This requires a degree of political continued poverty, as measured indicate strongly that where mod- cohesion and administrative ca- by both economic and social in- ern farming technology is avail- pacity. dicators, remains the dominant able, its use, and hence the yields characteristic of their economies. achieved, depend to a great ex- Conclusions Slow growth in many low-income tent on the literacy of farmers. countries reinforces the central Although the conditions for This review of long-term trends worldwide concern with the steady growth are impossible to emphasizes that there is some- growing gap between rich and prescribe, high levels of invest- thing of a virtuous circle in suc- poor. Only the relatively self-suf- ment, efficiently deployed, are cessful countries. Growth is not ficient economies of China and obviously necessary. This in turn automatic, but must be carefully India have laid foundations for requires either substantial domes- nurtured, more so in times when continued per capita income tic savings or foreign capital in- the international environment is growth through high rates of in- flows. Human development that unfavorable. Investment is sus- vestment. The majority of low-in- reduces the rate of natural pop- tained over long periods if re- come countries, however, remain ulation growth is also vital: high turns are high, which in turn en- extremely vulnerable to interna- rates of population growth re- courages both domestic savers and tional economic pressures. duce savings, use up capital, di- foreign lenders. The ability to The problems faced by the less minish the ratio of available land produce exports and import sub- successful middle-income coun- and other resources to popula- stitutes at internationally compet- tries, particularly those still de- tion, and thus, especially in ag- itive prices helps provide foreign pendent on primary commodity riculture, increase the capital re- exchange and raise investment ef- exports, and by poor groups in quired for additional output. Social ficiency. For the remainder of the middle-income countries, should programs have succeeded in re- 1980s, most of the middle-income not be underestimated. Nonethe- ducing fertility in many middle- developing countries now have less, it is clear that in the years income countries and several low- sufficient flexibility to continue to come, development assistance income countries, and strikingly their growth, provided that the should be concentrated in the low- so in China, Sri Lanka, and parts international framework of trade, income countries. The people of of India. By contrast, population capital, and labor movements is these countries start the decade growth rates in many other South sustained. most vulnerable to failures in Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin For many of the low-income growth, but with enough aid to American, and most African countries, the long-term trends sustain the implementation of ra- countries remain high despite high offer less reassurance for the fu- tional policies, they could now mortality. A stable set of public ture. The achievements of these begin the transition to a rapid ex- policies, capable of being ad- countries in developing human pansion in incomes. 30 4 Prospects for the 1980s This chapter updates the exten- output in the industrial countries Polish debt difficulties have had sive discussion of the prospects in the 1980s lay between 2.8 and a chilling effect on the world en- for the world economy in the 1980s 3.6 percent. As unemployment vironment for capital flows, which contained in last year's Report. reaches 30 million in these coun- is beginning to be felt by several While the events of the past year, tries, many observers have be- countries including Romania and described in Chapter 2, have not come increasingly concerned Hungary. substantially changed the longer- about the adequacy of existing In addition to recovery in the term view, it will clearly be less policies for achieving the joint OECD, the High case presup- easy than was earlier thought for goals of stable prices, full em- poses strong efforts to maintain growth in the developing coun- ployment, and satisfactory out- and enlarge international trade tries to reach the High case (see put growth. Unless industrial flows. Such measures are partic- Box 4.1 for discussion of illustra- countries come quite close to the ularly important for the middle- tive growth scenarios). Industrial- High case, it is unlikely that they income countries needing to serv- country growth may be re- will be able to reduce unemploy- ice large debt obligations. But low- strained; aid and remittances will ment to acceptable levels in this income countries would also ben- grow more slowly than forecast decade. The High case implies efit. In particular, smooth in- earlier; new debt will be costlier growth of output from now until creases in energy export volumes and will come on top of existing 1990 at 4.3 percent a year (which and prices are desirable, since er- debt, the repayment of which is compares, say, with 5.1 percent ratic changes have in the past in- less likely to be eased by inflation in 1960-73). This could be duced inflation and large swings than was the case in the 1970s. It achieved, but with considerable in trade and payments balances, may be more difficult for devel- difficulty. Such a high rate of and inhibited growth. In addi- oping countries to repeat past growth would at first be facili- tion, trade expansion facilitates, achievements in export growth tated by cyclical recovery, but it and is in turn encouraged by, and in penetrating markets in in- would need to be sustained by larger capital movements. Low- dustrial countries. The prospects high investment in the produc- income economies are especially for nonfuel commodity prices are tive and service sectors and in en- constrained by shortages of for- particularly poor. Given the liq- ergy conservation. Such invest- eign exchange; greater flows of aid uidity squeeze and the greater ment is at present held back in and other capital are an integral difficulty of borrowing at high in- many OECD countries by high real component of High case growth terest rates, developing countries' interest rates. for these countries. external adjustment may have to For the industrial nonmarket These elements of the High case be achieved by accepting lower economies, the outlook has also scenario, however, are only partly growth, especially in the first half worsened over the past year as visible at present. The current of the 1980s. the magnitude of their structural weakness in oil prices is a mixed crises has become apparent. Their blessing for developing countries. growth prospects are important For the oil exporters, who make The industrial countries for the few developing countries up one-fifth of the population of Last year a plausible set of scen- tied to Eastern Europe and the developing countries, it often arios for the annual growth of USSR through trade and aid. The means curtailing planned devel- 31 opment expendituresas in Ni- geria. For oil importers, both de- Box 4.1 Growth scenarios veloped and developing, there is a useful pause in the rising trend Growth projections in the form of alter- be able to borrow to maintain the high native scenarios are useful ways to illus- imports which have helped them expand in import costs, but progress to- trate possible outcomes under various quickly. Such an international environ- ward adjustment to higher en- combinations of decisions and events. The ment would enable developing countries ergy prices in the long term is in- World Bank uses a global model to yield to sustain growth at least at their 1970- hibited by price weakness or internally consistent projections of de- 80 rates. uncertainty. Countries that re- veloping-countsy growth rates. The model The unfavorable set of assumptions ceive concessional aid and other takes into account likely developments embodied in the Low case would result capital flows from oil-producing in world trade and capital flows that en- in a very different world in 1990. Lower countries are also adversely af- force internal and external balance across growth in the industrial economies would fected by the decline in the oil all regions of the developing world. depress demand for primary products and producers' surpluses. Despite The High case scenario would illus- thus keep the prices and volume of de- weak oil prices, many of the in- trate successful economic adjustment by veloping-country exports of these prod- dustrial countries are still not ad- the industrial economies to current prob- ucts down. Trade barriers, especially lems of low growth and high inflation. against manufactured goods, could tend justingin the sense of bringing Rapid recovery from the current reces- to grow as a means (albeit self-defeating) investment and savings into equi- sion would be followed by sustained of containing the rise in unemployment librium at a high enough level to growth of over 4 percent a year for the in the industrial nations. As a result, ad- sustain rapid growthand if gov- remainder of the decade. Under the High justment problems would be exported to ernments that are making the ef- case assumptions, the developing coun- developing countries. This would restrict fort to do so are stymied by po- tries would benefit from higher levels of the growth of non-oil imports into those litical pressures, then low global trade with the developed world, in both countries; debt repayments on loans dis- growth for the rest of the decade manufactured goods and primary prod- bursed in the past decade would, for would follow. ucts. Increases in aid and exports would many borrowers, prevent further large help alleviate the problems of the least net financial transfers, so rates of growth developed countries. Oil exporters would would be constrained. International economic linkages High and Low case assumptions The world economy is gradually Lou' case Hsh case becoming less dependent on a single source of growthit is in- Average real annual growth rates, 1980-90 creasingly an oversimplification Industrial economies' GDP' 2.8 3.6 to see it as driven exclusively by Industrial countries' exports 3.8 5.5 developments in the advanced Industrial countries' imports 3.0 4.8 countries. South-South trade (in- 1990 scenarios cluding trade with high-income Demand for capital Low High Trade barriers High Low oil exporters) accounts for over 7 Official development assistance as percent of world trade and over percentage of GNP (DAC Countries) 0.33 0.37 a quarter of the South's exports, a. Given estimated rates of growth from 1980-82 (Table 2.1), the implied rate of growth despite trade restrictions. There from 1983 to 1990 is 4.3 percent a year in the High case and 3.3 percent in the Low case. are also multiple development poles for which trade with nearby industrial countries contributed to income oil-exporting countries, countries is important; for exam- the overheating of the world influence the cost and the volume ple, the development plans of the economy, a primary product of credit to the developing coun- Middle Eastern oil exporters af- boom, and subsequent oil price tries. In some countries high fect Turkey's exports, and the increases and recession. Their growth and reduced unemploy- countries of the Pacific rim share overall growth rates and their ment also tend to facilitate, and links with each other and with openness to imports have strongly slow growth to restrict, flows of Japan. influenced the volume and prices aid. The outlook in each of these Nevertheless, actions by the in- of developing country exports. areas is discussed below. dustrial economies shape the out- Fiscal and monetary policies, and look for developing countries in the related balance of savings and Trade many important ways. In 1972-73 investments, not only in the in- The recession in the industrial the simultaneous actions of the dustrial countries but also in high- countries is limiting demand for 32 Box 4.2 Is there a protectionist danger? Attempts by interest groups in various just as they had not declined following changes since the mid-1970s from which countries to gain protection from imports its implementation in 1978. In the first to conclude that protection has not in- now make frequent front-page news. five months under the automobile re- creased significantly. Further, exports Beef, sugar, tobacco, clothing, textiles, straint agreement between the United may well have been discouraged by footwear, electronics, automobiles, and States and Japan, Japanese automobile threats of restrictions. Today's institu- steel are cases in point. With the reduc- exports to the United States were only tionalized restrictions (in textiles and steel, tion of tariffs in the industrial countries 0.2 percent higher than a year earlier, for example) were yesterday's temporary to negligible levels for most products, but the average price per car was almost measures. The very "grayness" of pre- protection has largely taken the form of 25 percent higher. Therefore, without the sent measures may help interest groups nontariff barriers: quotas, so-called vol- quota, a larger number of automobiles at in importing countries resist future re- untary restraints, orderly marketing ar- lower prices would presumably have been ductions in barriers. And the coming rangements, price-maintenance agree- available to consumers. Quotas clearly economic recovery may not immediately ments, more intense application of anti- restrict imports of Japanese automobiles reduce the pressures for protection, since dumping legislation, countervailing du- to France and of textiles and footwear it will take time to reduce unemployment ties and safeguard procedures, subsidies into Norway and Canada. The impact of substantially and put slack industrial ca- for supplier's credits, as well as, more the EEC's cartel-like arrangements on steel pacity back into full use. New restric- recently, measures that directly increase trade is more uncertain. tions might therefore continue to mount. incentives for domestic producerssuch Some observers feel that recent calls Though inward-oriented policies are as subsidies to industries (notably ship- for protection are unlikely to be reflected not warranted, since they would sacrifice building) or to individual firms facing in new legislation and that this augurs the immense potential gains from trade, foreign competition. Unlike tariffs, many well for the future. lhey note that un- nevertheless there are valid reasons for of these forms of protection are bilateral, filled quotas still exist even in the Multi- fearing increased protection. In the words restricting imports from only one coun- Fibre Arrangement, and that most new of the director general of GATT, "There try. They are largely outside the scope protection mechanisms are selective and may be a need for the friends of the open of GAfl regulations, and many need only not yet institutionalized. When imple- trade system to recognize that passive administrative, rather than legislative, mented, the cuts agreed to in the Tokyo support is no longer enough if the sys- decisions to come into force. Round will offset some administered re- tem is to be preserved." Preservation of The degree of protection olfered by strictions, and the next round of GATT the system is, of course, a minimum tar- such increasingly important nontariff discussions is likely to address many ot get. Policies that have led over the past forms cannot be measured directly, and the new protective mechanisms specifi- thirty years to the trends toward grow- it is therefore far more difficult than with cally. In addition, economic recovery is ing openness, in developed and devel- tariffs to assess how greatly they restrict expected to reduce domestic demands for oping countries alike, must be actively trade. For example, imports did not surge protection. and forcefully encouraged. following the expiration of the US re- A less sanguine view is that there has straint agreement on footwear in 1980, been no systematic analysis of world trade imports from developing coun- The High and Low scenarios strong growth momentum built tries, and the relative prices of imply that exports from the de- up over the past thirty years than primary products are likely to re- veloping countries will grow at the a renewal of protectionism. Im- cover only slowly. There are also rates shown in Table 4.1. The de- ports into the high-income oil-ex- increasing pressures in devel- veloping-country export growth porting countries, and remitt- oped countries for protection rates implied by the High case are ances from them, should also against imported manufactured crucial for permitting adjustment grow at more modest rates than products (Box 4.2), although so with sustained growth. Nothing those since 1973. On balance, the far most have been successfully is more likely to jeopardize the prospects over the next few years resisted. If the High case is achieved, however, and there is Table 4.1 Export growth from developing countries, 1970-90 sustained growth from 1983 on- (average annual percentage change) ward, productive capacity would 1980-9 0 be more fully used and the pres- Exports 1970-79 Lou' case High case sures for protection lessened be- fore further trade barriers are con- Total exports 5.2 3.5 6.8 Exports of manufactures 14.0 4.7 11.4 structed. 33 are for the relatively slow growth influence on prices, as will pro- ket economies but modified by the of world trade and only a modest duction levels, which in Iran and "spread" each borrower pays) af- recovery from the present se- Iraq are now curtailed by war. fect the volume of debt a country verely depressed commodity Barring disruptive events, the can prudently afford to incur. Real prices. most likely outcome is no change interest rates are now very high in real terms until about 1985, with (the London Interbank offer rate Oil prices increases of 2.5 to 3 percent an- averaged 16.5 percent in 1981, After rising until mid-1981, the real nually thereafter if production ex- while real interest rates on US price of oil fell for a period, as it pands roughly in line with de- dollar commercial loans seem to did from 1975 to 1978; but this fall mand. It would take until around be well over 7 percent), and nom- is not likely to affect the long-term 1995 to reach a price of $41 per inal rates still exceed most fore- upward price trend. This trend is barrel (in 1981 prices). This is casts of inflation by a wide mar- determined by demand and sup- slightly lower than was assumed gin. Although both inflation rates ply conditions, which have not last year, and such a trajectory and interest rates are expected to substantially changed over the would help support higher decline as monetary policies be- past year. As expected, some suc- growth. But if, because of supply gin to achieve their objectives, real cessful oil exploration has added constraints, the oil price rose by interest rates are likely to remain modestly to reserves, but invest- over 3 percent annually over the well above the 2 percent real rate ment in alternative fuel sources 1980s or increased sharply in a that prevailed from 1960 to 1970, has declined somewhat. Gas de- single year, this would have an and far above the negative rates velopments are also lagging. Ex- adverse effect on growth. Both oil of much of the 1970s. Second, the ploration for oil and gas and in- importers and oil exporters have developing countries' ability to vestment in new developments an important role in avoiding the service future debt depends on the are capital-intensive activities with price fluctuations that have proved buoyancy of their exports. Thus, long lead times. Such activities so damaging to their own econo- for both reasons, if the present tend to be curtailed when interest mies, to those of the oil import- austere environment were to con- rates are high. The impetus for ers, and to the world economy as tinue throughout the 1980s (that substituting coal for oil has be- a whole. is,if the Low scenario were to come, for the time being, less prevail), developing countries' strong, and investment in the ex- Commercial capital flows borrowing from financial institu- traction of fuel from tar sand and tions would scarcely grow at all shale has likewise been almost The international environment af- in real terms (Table 4.3). Net me- abandoned as capital costs have fects commercial capital flows to dium- and long-term borrowing risen. The price increases from developing countries in two ways. would average about $90 billion 1973 to 1981 have induced sub- First, interest rates (determined a year for the rest of the 1980s. stantial conservation in most mainly by the industrialized mar- If the industrial countries re- countries, but more fundamental cover rapidly, the developing changes in the design of new countries' borrowing would in- buildings and equipment have Table 4.2 Average OPEC crease, underwritten by larger ex- been delayed by the slowing down petroleum prices, 1970-95 port revenues; their net annual of investment in industrial coun- 1981 dollars borrowing over the decade would tries. The stock of capital is, by Year per barrel average at least $115 billion. Eco- and large, still much more energy 1970 4.1 nomic recovery in industrial intensive than available technol- 1974 19.9 countries would not only enlarge ogy would permit, and this con- 1978 15.3 1979 19.8 the market for manufactured ex- strains efficiency. 1980 29.4 ports but also strengthen those for Overall, a real increase in the 1981 34.3 agricultural products and min- price of oil of some 2 percent an- 1982 32.0 1985 32.0 erals. The rapidly growing and nually from 1982 to 1995 seems 1990 37.0 exporting countries may well find most likely (Table 4.2), although 1995 41.0 access to capital markets easier it is impossible to be precise about Note: For 1970 this price refers to Saudi than the High scenario implies for the trajectory. Rates of growth in Arabian light, fob. Ras Tanura; for the the group as a whole. Low-in- industrial countries, the main following years it refers to the weighted average fob, price of petroleum exports come countries, whose share is consumers, will exert the major from OPEC countries. 2.2 percent of total private flows, 34 are likely to gain little additional on ODA, provided they replace balance of payments surpluses. access to capital markets. such assistance with nonconces- Despite the expected reduction in Private direct investment may sional flows gradually enough to the size of these surpluses, in the also be a source of buoyancy. After remain creditworthy and to man- absence of data on official inten- remaining at a plateau in the 1974- age their debt-service obligations. tions, aid from high-income oil 77 period, private direct invest- Official flows can play a key role exporters is assumed to remain at ment in developing countries has in the transition because the ma- its present level in relation to GNP. grown at over 20 percent a year turity of these loans is relatively in nominal terms. Some countries long. that earlier had not sought to at- If industrial countries' recovery Prospects for developing tract private investment are now is further delayed, aid flows are countries changing their policies to take ad- assumed to grow in real terms vantage of the technology and even more slowly than GNP, thus The performance of developing management package it can bring. reducing the share of official de- countries in the 1980s will depend This change in policies is likely to velopment assistance in the GNP partly on developments in the in- increase total capital inflows of DAC member countries to about ternational environment, de- somewhat, particularly to coun- 0.33 percent. The share of private scribed above, and partly on do- tries that are growing well. financing in total capital flows mestic policies. As was stressed In the 1980s some forty coun- would thus grow markedly. In the in Chapter 2, in very large de- tries will continue to rely almost High scenario a slightly higher veloping countries and in indus- entirely on official development growth of aid is postulated to trial and newly industrializing assistance (ODA) to supplement maintain the ratio of ODA to GNP countries, growth paths depend domestic resources for physical at about 0.37 percent. If the de- largely on domestic policies, which and human development. This is velopments of the past three years can be chosen from among a va- particularly the case in sub-Sa- are continued, the latter could be riety of possible options. But small haran Africa. For some countries, achieved (Box 4.3). Official as- low-income countries have lim- if aid flows are large enough and sistance from OPEC, and in par- ited policy options, and global combined with improved domes- ticular from the high-income oil economic conditions are of the ut- tic policies, the 1980s could be the exporters, has been much higher most importance to them. The de- turning point in development. in relation to GDP than that from velopment of the poorest, most Another fifty countries should be OECD countries; this has been slowly growing countries in sub- able to reduce their dependence made possible largely by their Saharan Africa in the immediate Table 4.3 Net financing flows, all developing countries, 1970-90 (billions of current dollars) Annual grou'th rates Projected, 1990 1980-90 1980-90 Net financing 1970 1980 1981 1982 Low case High case 1970-80 Low case High case Official transfers 1.2 12.1 12.8 13.6 28.3 32.7 26.0 8.9 10.5 Private direct investment 2.5 11.8 15.3 15.8 19.4 24.4 16.8 5.1 7.5 Medium- and long-term loans, net disbursements 9.1 57.3 71.4 81.0 99.2 151.1 20.2 5.6 10.2 Official 4.1 20.4 23.4 25.0 44.0 54.9 17.4 8.0 10.4 Private 5.0 36.9 48.0 56.0 55.2 96.7 22.1 4.1 10.1 Total 12.8 81.2 99.5 110.4 146.9 208.2 20.3 6.1 9.9 Total (1980 prices) 32.7 81.2 99.5 102.5 82.1 116.3 9.5 0.1 3.7 Memorandum items Net exports (goods and services) -8.5 -59.1 -88.7 -75.8 -61.3 -110.0 -21.4 -0.4 -6.4 Current account balanceb -10.9 -75.0 -117.3 -109.2 -124.5 -182.7 -21.3 -5.2 -9.3 Net official development assistance 4.1 22.8 23.6 25.8 53.6 65.7 18.7 8.9 11.2 Debt outstanding and disbursed 63.7 445.2 516.6 597.6 1,287.0 1,450.0 21.5 11.2 12.5 Note: Developing countries exclude China. Excludes short-term capital and reserve changes. Excludes official transfers. Net ODA is defined as net disbursements of concessional official loans plus official transfers. 35 years. Compared with past per- Box 4.3 Prospects for ODA from DAC members formance and present potential, Over the past decade official develop- Federal Republic of Germany, and Ja- needs, and expectations, such a ment assistance (ODA) grew at 4 percent pan. For the United Kingdom and the rate is clearly inadequate, If a year in real terms, twice as fast as in United States a marginal decline in the growth is slower than projected the 1960s. This was largely due to the real level of aid flows is expected in the here, unemployment problems increased levels of aid from the oil-ex- near term. The United State contributes would mount, causing hardship porting countries, but aid from the in- less than one-fifth of the total in the DAC and exacerbating social and polit- dustrial countries also grew faster than countries and the figure is falling. Aid ical tensions that would make the GNPs of the donors. From 1977 to 1981 total ODA grew at economic management more 4.4 percent a year in real terms, and if complicated. ODA projections, 1985 this growth were to be maintained this Within the middle-income would help meet the requirements of the Millions of group, the experience of individ- current Percentage High case. Also since 1977, total ODA DAC countries dollars of GNP ual countries will obviously vary, has grown faster than nonconcessional depending on the composition and Australia 1,180 0.53 flows to countries receiving ODAa re- Austria 350 0.30 geographic distribution of their versal of the 1973-76 trend. This was Belgium 900 0.57 trade, their resource endow- largely due to the rapid growth of mul- Canada 1,870 0.49 ments, and the policies followed. tilateral ODA, in particular the disburse- Denmark 800 0.75 Finland 300 0.50 The major exporters of manufac- ment of the IMF's Trust Fund. In 1980 France 6,670 tures would continue to grow 0.68 disbursements of multilateral ODA ac- Germany, Fed. Rep. 5,750 0.47 Italy most rapidly, because they have counted for 23 percent of the total, up 2,030 0.35 from 13 percent in 1970. In 1981, how- Japan 6,420 0.36 acquired an ability to respond to ever, these disbursements fell with the Netherlands 2,340 1.00 the changing structure of world New Zealand 90 0.27 exhaustion of the Trust Fund resources. Norway 950 1.00 markets. Several countries with The prospects for growth in the re- Sweden 1,710 0.95 still low but rapidly increasing sources of the multilateral development Switzerland 540 0.35 manufacturing production and United Kingdom 2,490 0.34 institutions are uncertain, but it seems United States 8,030 0.20 exports are likely to grow faster likely that multilateral ODA will grow in Total DAC 42,410 0.37 than those which still rely heavily line with the overall growth in resources on primary commodity exports Note; This table uses the same concepts as and thus that its share of total ODA will Table 16 in the World Development Indi- other than fuel. For the latter, de- not increase further. For bilateral ODA cators. It is based on staff projections for official aid, GNP, and the relevant ex- pressed terms of trade and slow the prospects are mixed. All DAC mem- change rates; official projections are not available for all countries. The figures cover growth of export volume would bers (except the United States and Switz- erland) have committed themselves to official development assistance as defined limit imports and their ability to by the DAC. borrow. achieving the target level of multilateral and bilateral aid of 0.7 percent of GNP, Low-income countries and some have agreed to do so by 1990. flows from DAC members, excluding the Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and United States, should grow in real terms The low-income countries, con- Sweden exceeded this target several years by 4 percent a year to 1990. The flows sidered as a group, would also ago and plan to increase the level of their of ODA projected in the High case de- maintain some growth momen- assistance over the next several years. pend in particular on a determined effort tum in the 1980s, even if world Italy (Box 2.1) and France also plan sub- by the United States to reverse the de- economic conditions remain as stantial increases, and more moderate in- clining trend, and on an acceleration of unfavorable as they are now. creases are expected from Canada, the output growth in industrial countries. China's growth record has been above average for a low-income future depends very much on aid developing countries can be ex- country, and India's recent in- and trade trends, but in the longer pected to achieve a per capita creases in savings and invest- run, domestic policies are critical. growth rate of at least 2 percent ments and its improved agricul- in the 1980s. Though somewhat tural productivity should lead to Middle-income countries faster than that of North America continued increases in per capita Table 4.4 illustrates a range of and western Europe, this rate of incomes during the 1980s. But the outcomes consistent with the as- growth means that for the aver- average income per person in most sumptions described above. Even age person in middle-income other low-income countries would if growth remains slow in the in- countries, income would increase probably show negligible growth, dustrial countries, middle-income by only about 25 percent in ten especially in the Low case, a!- 36 though some, such as Pakistan, Table 4.4 Growth of GDP in developing countries, 1960-90 (average annual percentage change) may outperform the group as a whole. GNP per capita Even for China, the prospect of GDP, 1980-90 1980-90 low growth in the 1980s presents Country group 1960-70 1970-80 High Low High Low grave difficulties. Increased im- All developing countries' 5.9 5.1 5.7 4.5 3.3 2.2 ports of high-technology capital Oil importers 5.7 5.1 5.4 4.1 3.1 1.8 goods are essential to the success Low-income 4.2 3.0 4.1 3.0 1.8 0.7 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.0 2.4 3.0 1.9 0.1 - 1.0 of China's efforts to improve Asia 4.3 3.2 4.4 3.2 2.1 1.0 overall efficiency, and the coun- Middle-income 6.2 5.6 5.6 4.3 3.4 2.1 try must produce enough food for East Asia and Pacific 7.9 8.2 8.1 6.4 6.0 4.3 Latin America and its growing population to prevent Caribbean 5.3 6.0 5.6 4.6 3.2 2.3 food imports from absorbing the Middle East and North gains of its new export effort. Pro- Africa 4.1 4.9 4.1 3.2 0.9 0.0 Southern Europe 7.0 4.6 4.6 3.0 3.3 1.7 ductive employment must be cre- Sub-Saharan Africa 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.8 0.3 0.0 ated for well over 100 million peo- Oil exporters 6.5 5.2 6.5 5.4 4.0 2.9 ple who will enter the labor force a. Excludes China. over the decade. The marginal productivity of labor in agricul- ture is already low, and not much is, for the reasons spelled out in ance on oil exports is difficult and additional labor can be produc- Chapter 3, essential to sustained complex, but these countries have tively employed there. Yet efforts growth in per capita output. This enough internal resources and to modernize the techniques of would be helped by directing a borrowing potential to effect such manufacturing production will larger proportion of bilateral a change. Several members of this probably mean that in the short concessional aid to low-income group may be able to improve run new investments in this sec- countries. their performance faster than can tor will generate less employment Under the more favorable con- now be anticipated. than those undertaken hitherto. ditions of the High case, even the Indeed, this holds for all coun- India's problems are also seri- small low-income countries would try groups. The sets of circum- ous, although the trend of agri- experience some growth; in stances that make up the Low and cultural production promises self- others, including China and In- High cases are neither forecasts sufficiency in food grains and a dia, substantial income growth of what will happen nor firm gradual reduction of malnutri- would be registered and would boundaries of what is feasible. tion. More efficient use of man- allow productive employment to Recent developments, however, ufacturing, power, and transport lag less far behind the rising labor make the achievement of the High capacities should result if recent force. The fastest-growing mid- case a more distant possibility than policy changes are followed dle-income countries would ap- was expected last year. Neverthe- through. Nevertheless, since In- proach the income levels of post- less, if the low-performing coun- dian states accounting for about war western Europe and would tries were to emulate average per- a third of the country's popula- be well on their way to catching formance levels, or the average tion have recorded almost no per up with the industrial countries performers to reach those of the capita income growth over the past early in the next century. best, even the growth rates of the twenty years, one cannot con- High case could be exceeded by sider with optimism the pros- Oil exporters a wide margin. It is nonetheless pects for India's poor if world Prospects for the oil-exporting de- certain that if the Low case comes economic recovery is delayed. veloping countries look quite sim- about, the prospects for a world The prospects for sub-Saharan ilar under both scenarios. Both of growing prosperity, linked by African countries remain poor, scenarios envisage a rapid expan- efficient flows of trade, capital, and and many are in a situation even sion of productive activities other labor, will be dimmed. For the de- more desperate than a year ago. than those based on oil, and under veloping countries, particularly the In all low-income countries, sus- the High case they would enjoy poorest of them, the implications tained investment in human re- more favorable markets for their extend beyond slow growth to a sources, development institu- non-oil exports and would be able dramatic increase in poverty, un- tions, and physical infrastructure to borrow more. Reducing reli- employment, and human misery. 37 Part II Agriculture and Economic Development Great strides have been made in hundreds of years, the evidence, Second, farmers have access to an transforming the lives and the both historical and contempo- agricultural science that is a much livelihoods of tens of millions of rary, is remarkably consistent. In greater source of innovation and people in the developing world Europe, Japan, and the United a better catalyst of productivity over the past three decades. Yet States, for example, a dynamic growth than ever before. But this for close to two-thirds of these agriculture accompaniedand in is true much more for some groups countries' populationsamong some instances ledthe process of farmers than for others. whom are the vast majority of the of industrialization and growth. Agricultural development in the world's pooragriculture is still The evidence, discussed in the recent past is characterized by an the main source of income, just next chapter, is equally convinc- extraordinary diversity both within as farming is their chief occupa- ing that this is still the case among and between countries. Many still tion. contemporary developing econo- largely traditional farming sys- This part of the Report concen- mies. tems that were sustainable with trates on the policies and pro- History provides other pointers a low density of population are grams needed to sustain and in relevant to current problems. The becoming increasingly strained by, many instances to accelerate ag- key to agriculture's growth among and vulnerable to, the pressure of ricultural development, and on the present industrial economies rising population. Spectacular en- agriculture's contribution to ame- was the farmer himself, who vironmental damage exemplifies liorating the problems of poverty. sparked a stream of cost-reducing the consequences of this pressure In the 1970s, a growing concern innovations and also financed and as land-hungry cultivators push in the world community with carried out the investment in land into the tropical forests, up the problems of poverty coincided improvement needed to exploit hillsides, and across drought- with massive evidence from the new technology. The evidence prone, semi-arid savannah, Thus Green Revolution in Asia and from a wide range of developing a growing prosperity among some elsewhere that rapid growth of countries shows that farmers be- groups is contrasted with deep- production and productivity in have no differently today. The key ening poverty among others less agriculture was possible. The re- factors are still the opportunity and fortunate. sult was a variety of new pro- the incentive to improve the land Winning the race between a grams in agricultural develop- and with it the farmer's liveli- growing population and the food ment, many addressed to the hood. supplies needed to match it is a problems of the small farmer, In two respects, though, con- still formidable challenge in many supported by a large increase in ditions today are fundamentally low-income countries. So, too, is capital and technical assistance different. First, the rapid growth the task of alleviating poverty in from aid donors. This Report of population and the concomi- these largely rural societies. Tech- draws on the rapidly accumulat- tant need to expand food pro- nology and sensible policy are the ing body of experience from these duction far surpass the historical means of successfully transform- recent efforts and the lessons that experience. In the developing ing agriculture for the benefit of are emerging from it. world of the eighteenth and nine- the economy and of the people Lessons from the more distant teenth centuries, agricultural who live and work in agricul- past are also relevant. While the growth was much slower than the tureand who will eventually role of agriculture in develop- rates achieved by developing leave it. ment has been debated for countries in the past thirty years. 39 5 Agricultural development and economic growth Agriculture has been transformed sources and the extent to which nomic growth. Few countries have in the past three decades. Output their potential has already been achieved sustained economic has increased at nearly twice the developed. The second is eco- growth without first, or simulta- rate of earlier periods, fueled nomicthe problem of the radi- neously, developing their agri- partly by the developing world's cal adjustments farmers face in the culture. greatly increased capacity to pro- process of agricultural develop- As it proceeds, development duce food and partly by changes ment. While its output may con- dictates a declining role for agri- in the developed countries. Above tinue to grow, agriculture's share culture. Initially dominant, it all else, there has been unprece- of both GDP and employment in- eventually accounts for only a dented technical change in agri- variably decreases as economies small fraction of net output, em- culture throughout the world. develop and industrialize. In- ployment, and income. Success- Alongside this remarkable and deed, at later stages of develop- ful adjustment to agriculture's sometimes underestimated ment, the absolute size of the la- changing role determines not only achievement stands the "world bor force in agriculture declines, the pace and pattern of devel- food problem." Hundreds of mil- ultimately to a very small fraction opment as a whole, but also the lions of people in the developing of the total. severity of the problems rural world are still without enough In most ways, though, agricul- people face in the development food. Population growth, the ef- ture is not unique. Farmers, like process. fects of which are often exacer- other workers, respond to incen- The international economic bated by a highly unequal income tives. In buying food, consumers environmenttrade, technology, distribution, has sharply reduced are influenced by relative prices commercial capital, and devel- both the per capita benefits of in- and available income, as they are opment assistancehas contrib- creased food production and the when they buy other things. Ag- uted to major changes in world associated increases in income per riculture's success or failure agriculture. Most changes have capita. therefore owes much to factors been beneficial, but some serious This paradoxof poverty in the that influence all economic activ- problems remain: notably the ag- midst of plentyhas long plagued ity. If it lags, it is because of in- ricultural protection policies of the popular understanding of the role adequate investment, lack of in- developed countries, which limit of agriculture in economic devel- centives, and inappropriate the market access of developing- opment. On the one hand, it has policies, as well as problems of country producers, at high cost led to a sense of hopelessness technology, climate, and soil. both to governments and to con- about the world's malnourished; This chapter describes some key sumers in the developed world. on the other, to technological ov- elements in the worldwide ex- erconfidence. Overanxiety about pansion and transformation of food crises has alternated with agriculture. It discusses where The pattern of recent growth taking agriculture for granted, growth has taken place, where it even neglecting it. has not, and the problems which While the rate of growth of agri- None of these extreme reac- patterns of growth have pro- cultural output over the past three tions is appropriate or helpful. duced or failed to solve. In par- decades was about double that of Agriculture does indeed face spe- ticular it highlights the following earlier years, it was decelerating cial problems, of which two in features of agricultural develop- during the period. Worldwide, particular stand out. The first is ment: output rose at 3.1 percent a year biologicalthe close dependence Progress has been slowest in in the 1950s, 2.6 percent in the on the natural environment. This the low-income countries. These 1960s, and 2.2 percent in the 1970s. results in output levels that fluc- countries account for most of the The broad pattern was one of de- tuate unpredictably from season world's poor, the vast majority of clining growth rates in the non- to season, and growth that varies whom work on the land. market industrial economies, greatly from one region to an- There are strong links be- while rapid growth was main- other depending on natural re- tween agriculture and overall eco- tained in developing countries and 40 Table 5.1 Growth rates of agricultural and food output by major world regions (excluding China), 1960-80 Agricultural output Food output Total Per capita Total Per capita Region and country group 1960-70 1970-80 1960-70 1970-80 1960-70 1970-80 1960-70 1970-80 Developing countries 2.8 2.7 0.3 0.3 2.9 2.8 0.4 0.4 Low-income 2.5 2.1 0.2 -0.4 2.6 2.2 0.2 -0.3 Middle-income 2.9 3.1 0.4 0.7 3.2 3.3 0.7 0.9 Africa 2.7 1.3 0.2 -1.4 2.6 1.6 0.1 -1.1 Middle East 2.5 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.9 0.1 0.2 Latin America 2.9 3.0 0.1 0.6 3.6 3.3 0.1 0.6 Southeast Asia 2.9 3.8 0.3 1.4 2.8 3.8 0.3 1.4 South Asia 2.5 2.2 0.1 0.0 2.6 2.2 0.1 0.0 Southern Europe 3.1 3.5 1.8 1.9 3.2 3.5 1.8 1.9 Industrial market economies 2.1 2.0 1.1 1.2 2.3 2.0 1.3 1.1 Nonmarket industrial economies 3.2 1.7 2.2 0.9 3.2 1.7 2.2 0.9 Total world 2.6 2.2 0.7 0.4 2.7 2.3 0.8 0.5 Source: FAQ. Note: Production data are weighted by world export unit prices. Decade growth rates are based on midpoints of five-year averages, except that 1970 is the average for 1969-71. Figure 5.1 Agricultural and food output, by major world region and by country group, 1963-70 and 1970-78 Growth rate (percentage) 5 Agricultural output Food output 4 3 1963-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 63-70 70-78 Africa Middle Latin Southeast South Southern Industrial High-income Nonmarket World East America Asia Asia Europe market oil exporters industrial economies economies Note: Excludes China. Source: FAO. industrial market economies. reals, especially in North America Rapid economic growth has (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show and Australia, because changes in drawn people away from agricul- the pattern for the 1960s and animal husbandry led to heavy ture. Agriculture's share of the la- 1970s.) demand for feed grains. Today, bor force in most developed In the industrial market econo- grain fed to livestock accounts for countries is now only one-third mies agricultural growth has been 70 percent of their grain con- of what it was in 1960, averaging led by rising demand for high- sumption. Between them, live- only 6 percent in the developed value products such as meat, stock and feed grain account for market economies in 1980. As a poultry, dairy produce, fruit, and over 65 percent of gross agricul- result of a major shift toward la- vegetables. This stimulated rapid tural output (see Box 5.1 and bor-saving technology, labor pro- growth in the production of ce- Chapter 6). ductivity (output per worker) has 41 (0.3 and 0.4 percent a year) in- Box 5.1 Food versus feed? crease in agricultural and food "Sheep eat men" was the seventeenth- consequences are problematic. Most of output per capita. century slogan of English peasants dis- the world's hungry are farmers or live in As is usually the case, these ag- possessed when common land was en- farm areas where basic cereals are grown. gregates conceal substantial dif- closed for private pastures. Today, some It would be difficult if not impossible to ferences. In particular, there was 600 million tons of cereals are fed to an- inject large amounts of cereals into these an acceleration of growth of ag- imals every year. This amount could feed areas without reducing incomes and pro- ricultural output in Southeast Asia; 2.5 billion people, more than twice the duction in the very regions where in- from being near the average for number in poverty. Moreover, grain con- creased income is most needed. Direct developing countries (0.3 percent verted to meat loses 75 to 90 percent of food assistance has an important role to per capita a year) in the 1960s, it its calories and 65 to 90 percent of its play, but it needs to be carefully bal- protein. Accordingly, a lively school of rose to 1.4 percent a year in the anced with other forms of assistance that thought maintains that feeding grain to 1970s. The Latin American coun- stimulate food production and incomes. cattle, pigs, and chickens takes food away As development proceeds, the inter- tries also increased their growth from the hungry. action between livestock producers and of agricultural output per capita, The issue is not a simple one, how- grain farmers plays an increasingly im- up to 0.6 percent a year in the ever. The main use of cereals for feed portant part in sustaining agricultural 1970s from 0.1 percent in the occurs in developed countries, where over growth. The rapid growth in demand for 1960s. two-thirds of the grain consumption is feed is one factor responsible for the dra- By contrast, the yearly rate of accounted for by animals. This pattern matic increase in cereal yields in the in- growth of agricultural output in of grain use reflects the high incomes of dustrial countriesto nearly 3.5 tons a Africa declined (from 2.7 percent consumers in the developed Countries. If hectare. In the 1930s cereal yields were in the 1960s to 1.3 percent in the cereals were not fed to livestock, cereal almost identical in developed and de- production in these countries would de- 1970s)and the rate of popula- veloping countries, about 1.1 tons per cline sharply. hectare. Rapidly developing middle-in- tion growth accelerated. These A massive transfer of purchasing power come countries are already following the changes meant that output per from rich countries to poor ones would pattern established by agriculture in the capita grew at 0.2 percent a year be needed to shift consumption from an- developed world; about 25 percent of the during the 1960s, but then fell by imals to people. Even if this unlikely grain they consume is used for livestock 1.4 percent a year in the 1970s. prospect were realized, the longer-term feed. Part of the decline was associated with a slowdown in the produc- tion of nonfood crops (tropical frequently risen faster in agricul- came at a time when the demand beverages and fibers); but the ture than in other sectors. Agri- for meat and other livestock prod- growth of food output per capita culture has greatly increased its ucts was rising rapidly. Despite was also transformed from a use of other inputs such as fertil- greatly increased imports of feed modest increase in the 1960s to izer and machinery, which now grains, agriculture has been slow a decline (-1.1 percent) in the represent nearly half the value of to adapt to this changing pattern 1970s. gross output. Agricultural value of demand. Some of the reasons In South Asia, the balance be- added has therefore risen less for this failure lie in historySo- tween population growth and ag- rapidly than gross outputat less viet agriculture suffered heavily ricultural growth remained essen- than 1 percent a year during the from war and neglect for thirty- tially unchanged over the two 1970s in many countries, five years after the Revolution of decades. In spite of growth rates In the nonmarket industrial 1917while others lie in the dif- of agricultural output which av- economies of eastern Europe and ficulties of an overly centralized eraged 2.5 and 2.2 percent, re- the USSR, output grew rapidly in system. spectively, output per capita grew the 1950s and 1960s because vir- Agricultural output in the de- at only 0.1 percent in the 1960s gin land was opened up and the veloping countries considered as and about zero percent in the use of fertilizer and machinery in- a group grew at historically high 1970s. This performancedisap- creased. Between 1970 and 1980, rates, with growth of just under pointing, since South Asia had however, agricultural growth 3 percent a year during both the been one of the major benefici- slowed sharply in the two largest 1960s and the 1970s (see Table 5.1). aries of the Green Revolution and countries, the USSR (averaging 1.9 But the rate of growth of popu- of massive investments in irriga- percent a year) and Poland (1.3 lation was also unprecedentedly tion and fertilizeris a salutory percent a year). This slowdown high. The outcome was a modest reminder of the consequences of 42 high and sustained rates of pop- ing, in the use of fertilizer, and major structural transformations ulation growth. in investment in irrigation over shown in Figure 5.2, are at the Of course, these growth rates the past twenty years have re- heart of the development proc- were not uniform within each re- sulted in a tie in the race between ess. First, the pace of agricultural gion, nor were they uniform population growth and agricul- growth is limited by the growth within countries. In India, for ex- tural production in South Asia. In of demand for its output, 90 per- ample, not all regions are en- Africa, where no comparable ad- cent of which is food in all but a dowed with the fertile soil, effec- vances in agricultural technology handful of countries (see Chapter tive flood control, and irrigation have been realized, the race is at 6). In turn, the growth of demand and drainage systems that have present being lost. The challenge is limited by the tendency for the permitted some areas to show is to accelerate the pace of biolog- proportion of household spend- spectacular increases in agricul- ical innovation, to provide the ing on food to decline as incomes tural production by adopting the policy environment and the com- rise. In India, with a per capita new crop technologies. In the plementary resources that make income of $240, for example, 1960s, agricultural growth ex- the new technologies effective in households spend 60 to 70 per- ceeded 5 percent a year in about increasing output and incomes, cent of their income on food; in a third of the country's 281 dis- and to reduce the rapid rate of a $10,000 per capita economy such tricts, but output actually fell in a growth of population. as Canada, they spend less than fifth of the districts and rose at 20 percent on food and are able less than 1 percent a year in an- to enjoy variety and quality to a The role of agriculture in other fifth. development greater extent. Such regional differences in ag- This tendency, known as En- ricultural growth rates are a com- Economic growth is invariably ac- gel's Law, is observed in all mon phenomenon in most coun- companied by a declining share economies as they grow. The lim- tries, both developed and of agriculture in total output, in- its to agricultural growth imposed developing. Within each of the come, and employment. At ad- by the growth in domestic de- EEC countries, for example, there vanced stages of development, the mand can, however, be raised if are regions of increasing and de- labor force in agriculture starts to income growth is broadly dif- creasing agricultural income dur- decline absolutely. Two main fused in the economy and coun- ing the 1960-80 period. These re- forces, which together produce the tries export their surplus produc- gional disparities tend to be accentuated during early devel- opment stages, however, because Figure 5.2 Cross-country share of employment and output of the proportionately greater im- in agriculture, 1980 pact of natural conditions, the Percentage variable effect of technology, and 100 the limited capacity of govern- Nepal Employment Niger ments to support agricultural ... .: Output growth in less favored regions. In the United States, for example, which provides both national and 80 U. U Burma 1 U U 'I U U Cameroon vory Ldätt state support for agriculture, ag- ricultural output increased in every 60 .. . . Pakistan- U U . _. U state between 1930 and 1970, al- U . U U U though growth rates still varied 40 U-I _.. . - -----aNiraragua Greece significantly between 1.7 and 6 ! - . . . IU U U percent. 20 U. I U U Low or negative growth in ag- U U U. U U U U U U ricultural production per capita in U U Il U. Iu.IIil U South Asia and Africa presents a 0 U major challenge to domestic poi- 100 1,000 10,000 icymakers and the international GNP per capita (dollars) community alike, The unprece- Note: Excludes high-income oil exporters. dented advances in plant breed- 43 tion. (This option is available only in rural areasthe manufacture as 1950. Developed countries no to a limited extent, because En- of clothing, furniture, and tools; longer depend heavily on agri- gel's Law operates on a global construction of housing and other culture: it accounts for only 4 per- scale, as well as for individual buildings; transport, processing, cent of output and 6 percent of countries.) and marketing; education, medi- employment in industrial market In the case of nonfood agricul- cine, social and cultural activities. economies, and 15 and 17 per- ture, competition from industrial As development progresses, these cent, respectively, in planned substitutes grows as investment activities become differentiated economies. In low-income coun- and innovation lower the price of and separated from agriculture, tries, by contrast, agriculture still industrial goods and services rel- until only core agricultural pro- accounts for 30 to 50 percent of ative to agricultural raw mate- duction functions remain. While output and an average of 70 per- rials. Common examples are the some nonagricultural activities are cent of employment. Even in most use of synthetics instead of nat- still carried out in rural areas, middle-income countries, 10 to 20 ural fibers (cotton, wool, jute) for modern industry and services percent of output and over 40 clothing, the substitution of oil or open up new and qualitatively percent of employment are de- coal for wood, and the switch from different opportunities, many of rived from agriculture. timber to steel and cement in con- which require relatively high skills The continuing importance of struction. Substitution is seldom and education. Although this agriculture in the economies of the total, however, so demand for process is one of the most desir- developing countries is reflected natural products usually contin- able benefits of growth, it is also in the association between the ues to grow. To benefit, produc- the most difficult to handle in hu- growth of agriculture and of the ers have to concentrate on mar- man terms (see Chapter 7). economy as a whole. Among keting as well as on efficient The transfer of labor from ag- countries where the agricultural production. riculture (where the amount of share of GDP was greater than 20 With development, farmers be- capital per worker and average percent in 1970, agricultural come increasingly removed from productivity is relatively low) to growth in the 1970s exceeded 3 consumers. As subsistence farm- industry and services (where cap- percent a year in 17 of the 23 ing gives way to marketed pro- ital per worker and average pro- countries whose GDP growth was duction, the scope for specialized ductivity are relatively high) is the above 5 percent a year (Table 5.2). marketing, transport, processing, key to raising incomes and out- During the same period, 11 of the and packaging is enlarged. In the put. The higher average produc- 17 countries with GDP growth be- industrialized economies, these tivity of labor in the nonagricul- low 3 percent a year managed ag- activities produce much more tural economy is reflected in ricultural growth of only 1 per- value added and employment income differences between it and cent or less. Agricultural and GDP than does agriculture itself; the agriculture. In most countries, in- growth differed by less than two farm-gate value of food is now comes are lower in agriculture percentage points in 11 of 15 only one-third of the price con- than elsewhere, as shown by the countries experiencing moderate sumers pay for it. fact that farming's output share is growth. There have been excep- The second main force account- consistently lower than its em- tions, of course, but they prove ing for the structural change in ployment share (Figure 5.2). This the rule: fast GDP growth and agriculture is increased agricul- income difference provides the sluggish agriculture was a feature tural productivity, made possible incentive for people to move out of some of the oil- or mineral- by technological innovations and of agriculture into nonagricultural based economies such as Algeria, accumulated public and private activities in urban centers. The Ecuador, Morocco, and Nigeria investment. Employment ex- agricultural shares of output and (see Box 5.2). pands and diversifies as a con- employment are roughly equal- The parallels between agricul- sequence of the relative decline in ized only at a comparatively late tural and GDP growth suggest that the agricultural work force. In the stage of development. the factors which affect agricul- early stages of development, al- The process of change can be tural performance may be linked most everybody works in agri- very rapid in historical terms: in to economy-wide social and eco- culture. Most of the activities later Japan and the less developed parts nomic policies. In the many low- classified as "industrial" and of Europe, the agricultural labor income countries where agricul- "service" are initially carried out, force represented 40 to 50 percent ture predominates, effective poi- if not within agriculture, at least of total employment as recently icies, institutions, and investment 44 Table 5.2 Growth of agriculture and GDP in the 1970s GOP growth Agricultural growth Above 5 percent 3-5 percent Below 3 percent Above 3 percent Cameroon Malawi' Bolivia Liberia China* Malaysia Burma' Nicaragua Colombia Paraguay Mali' Senegal Dominican Rep. Philippines Somalia' Guatemala Thailand Tanzania* Indonesia Tunisia Ivory Coast Turkey Kenya Yemen Arab Rep. Korea, Rep. of 1-3 percent Costa Rica Bangladesh Burundi' Ecuador Central African Rep.* Sierra Leone' Egypt El Salvador Zaire* Lesotho Haiti' Honduras India' Pakistan' Sri Lanka' Sudan' Upper Volta' Below 1 percent Morocco Togo' Angola' Nigeria Chad' Congo, Rep. Ethiopia' Ghana Madagascar' Mauritania' Mozambique' Nepal' Niger' Uganda' 'Low-income countries. Source: World Development Indicators. programs for agriculture are vir- improvements. In most middle- shrink in absolute terms. In these tually synonymous with effective income economies, agricultural circumstances, mechanization and overall management. This is not policies are only slightly less in- other labor-saving techniques surprising since there are many fluential. Despite the similar re- (such as the use of herbicides) play important growth linkages be- sources and history of the coun- a major role in sustaining agri- tween agriculture and the rest of tries, agricultural productivity has cultural growth. Education and the economy. Expanding agricul- increased twice as fast in Came- training are needed to help peo- tural production through tech- roon and Liberia in recent years ple move into industrial and serv- nological change and trade cre- as it has in neighboring Guinea ice jobsespecially people from ates important demands for the and Ghanaand four times as fast backward areas. In some of the outputs of other sectors, notably in Tunisia and Colombia as in advanced middle-income econo- fertilizer, transportation, com- Morocco and Peru. mies, marketed farm produce is mercial services, and construc- increasing sharply, often several tion. At the same time, agricul- Managing agricultural times faster than the overall rate tural households are often the development of increase in agriculture. Heavy basic market for a wide range of investment in roads, railways, consumer goods that loom large The process of transformation is ports, and other links in the mar- in the early stages of industrial well advanced in many middle- keting chain are required, to- developmenttextiles and cloth- income countries, where agricul- gether with policies and institu- ing, processed foods, kerosene ture's contribution to output and tional arrangements to ensure and vegetable oils, aluminum employment has already declined efficient transport, processing, and holloware, radios, bicycles, and to modest levels and the agricul- storage. Similar considerations construction materials for home tural labor force is starting to apply to the timely availability, 45 variety, and cost of industrial in- ingly important; for many, farm- per capita increased by 0.7 per- puts such as chemical fertilizer. ing itself becomes a part-time oc- cent a year in middle-income Finally, farmers and traders rely cupation. Where problems do countries, while because of the more on efficient (and increas- persist, many countries have tar- poor performance of the African ingly complex) financial arrange- geted investment toward rural economies it actually declined in ments to provide credit for in- health, nutrition, and infrastruc- low-income countries by 0.4 per- vestment and working capital (see ture. cent a year. Chapter 6). Among the middle- While middle-income countries The challenges of agricultural income economies, rural poverty expanded their agricultural out- development are clearly much becomes a less severe, and hence put by 3.1 percent a year in the harder to meet in countries at ear- more manageable, problem. In 1970s, low-income countries lier stages of development, when better-off rural communities, managed only 2.1 percent. As a the economy itself is largely ag- nonfarm employment is increas- consequence, agricultural output ricultural. Agriculture merits sup- port and stimulusyet it has to provide them itself, being the only Box 5.2 Oil and agriculture: The Nigerian experience real source of income, savings, and Oil exportsabout 2 million barrels a day with local production. Higher incomes growth. At the same time, coun- in 1980have become Nigeria's major led urban Nigerians to change their eat- tries have other competing prior- foreign exchange earner. But oil has been ing habits in favor of imported foods. ities, including industrial and ur- a decidedly mixed blessing for agricul- An immense urban boom attracted ban development. Against this ture. large numbers of young Nigerians into background, two sets of policy is- In the early 1960s, agriculture was the towns. Because of rapid overall labor sues assume particular impor- thriving. Small farmers, who made up force growth, the number of farm work- tance. The first is domestic: what more than 70 percent of the Nigerian work ers may not have fallen absolutely, but incentives should be given to force, expanded their production of food the rate of increase was very slow and farmers and how should they and cash crops. Agricultural exports were the proportion of older workers in- change over time? The second set booming and small farmers produced creased sharply. about 90 percent of them. Nigeria was The considerable effort made to sus- is international: how can govern- the world's leading exporter of ground- tain agriculture through public invest- ments in the developed countries nuts, groundnut oil, palm kernels, and ment and new development schemes was assist agricultural progress in the palm oil, and the second largest cocoa greatly hampered by the dearth of trained developing countries? exporter (after Ghana). Income gener- and experienced manpower, which was Relative prices and other incen- ated in the farming sector supported the largely drawn into other, more buoyant tives are often biased against the development of many local manufactur- sectors. farmer in developing countries. ing and service industries and provided Oil clearly offers a major opportunity Overvalued exchange rates, tax- most of the foreign exchange needed to to accelerate the process of structural ation of agricultural exports, heavy build roads and other infrastructure. transformation. But the Nigerian expe- protection of fledgling industry, Progress in agriculture was cut short rience suggests lessons for other coun- by the oil boom in the mid-1960s and and inefficient parastatal process- tries in whose economies oil has a major was further disrupted by the three-year potential role. Oil revenues must be used ing and marketing agenciesall civil war, which began in 1967. As a re- to support an efficient transformation contribute to this bias. Some of sult, farming has yet to recover. Agri- process. This means that close attention the issues involved in trying to cultural growth has been close to zero must be paid to manpower constraints, measure the effects of these fac- over the twenty years from 1960 to 1980, that public sector financial discipline must tors are discussed in Box 5.4. despite economy-wide growth of 4.8 per- be tight, and that the impact of oil on The relatively low prices re- cent a year. In the 1970s, the volume of the exchange rate must be carefully mon- ceived by farmers have seriously agricultural imports quadrupled while itored. Public investment needs to focus hampered growth in many de- agricultural exports were halved. By the on expanding the economy's absorptive veloping countries. Where prices late 1970s, Nigeria was a net importer of capacityconcentrating on removing have not been kept artificially low, agricultural produce. bottlenecks in transport, power, and other Oil income has depressed agriculture infrastructure sectors. Expenditures on and where other conditions for in the following ways: education and training need to expand growth have been favorable, A substantial revaluation of the naira to meet the human resource require- farmers have responded by in- and high local inflation made exporting ments of a more advanced and diversi- creasing output. The responsive- increasingly unprofitable, while food im- fied post-oil economy. ness of farmers to incentivesin ports became increasingly competitive contrast to the outmoded and mistaken view that peasants are 46 set in traditional wayshas been duction data (see Table 5.1), in also a risky business. Between observed in societies with diverse 1979, out of ninety developing 1961 and 1978, African cocoa pro- social systems and levels of de- countries, exports accounted for ducers lost market share to Latin velopment (see Box 5.3). 50 percent or more of total agri- Americans; South Asian domi- Pricing alone is neither a com- cultural output in ten countries; nance in tea was eroded by com- plete explanation of agricultural more than 20 percent in thirty; petition with African and Chinese performance nor the sole key to and more than 10 percent in fifty. exporters and fell from 80 percent progress, however. Other areas Among countries exporting more of world exports to under 50 per- of government policy are impor- than half their total output, Jor- cent; Latin American coffee pro- tant: dan, Malaysia, Mauritius, and the ducers supplied only 51 percent Comparative advantage. Many Central American and Caribbean of the market in 1978, compared countries have traditionally en- countries figure prominently. with 62 percent in 1961; and the couraged specialization in agri- Among those exporting between small, sugar-producing islands of culture to exploit the comparative a half and one-third of total out- the Caribbean have been unable advantage given to them by na- put, nearly half are in sub-Sa- to expand into new sugar markets ture. In recent years, countries haran Africa. For developing and have lost ground to East Asian such as the Ivory Coast, Malay- countries in these two categories, and Latin American producers. sia, and the Philippines have the export market is a major fac- Specialization involves heavy achieved rapid agricultural growth tor determining agricultural investment and a commitment to by encouraging export crops while growth. Since these are often research. Brazil's exports of soy- also expanding food output. countries where agriculture is a beans are a notable recent ex- The importance of trade for the dominant sector, agricultural ex- ample of exploiting the compar- agricultural growth of developing ports are an important factor in alive advantage of a crop that was countries is evident from the share their overall economic growth as already being grown in the coun- of agricultural output which is ex- well. try (see Box 5.5). But greater dif- ported. Based on the FAQ's pro- Exporting is a rewarding but ficulties are posed for very small Box 5.3 Improving incentives in Chinese agriculture As part of a general shift toward greater 50 percent over base prices. More remarkable was the upsurge flexibility, agricultural policies in China Within the production cooperatives, among some of the other major field started changing in 1977. The system of incentives have also been sharpened. The crops. Cotton output increased 23 per- rigid production planning in collectiv- changes involve improvements to "work cent in 1979-80, and oilseeds by 92 per- ized agriculture was relaxed, and house- point" systems so that less is appor- cent from 1977 to 1980; in both cases there hold and other private agricultural activ- tioned to workers as basic rations and was a sizable expansion of cultivated area itie were encouraged. The approach still more as a return for the quality and as well as yield increases. Large in- sets local sales targets for the main crops, quantity of individual work. Various types creases are also reported for sugar, silk- but allows production teams more lati- of contractual arrangements are being worm cultivation, and jute. There is evi- tude in their decisions on crops, land, encouraged under which small groups of dence that these increases reflect and input use. Deregulation of local mar- workers manage collective land and other substantial shifts in cropping patterns kets helps promote the private sale and assets under contract to the production based on area specialization and local exchange of produce. team, with bonuses for above norm per- comparative advantage. Incentives to promote the production formance. Meat production (almost entirely of priority commodities have been in- Although it is too early to assess the pork) increased over 50 percent during creased. Between 1977 and 1979 state long-term impact of these changes, they the past three yearsa response both to purchasing prices for all the important have already resulted in a dramatic up- improved producer prices and to policies commodities were raised by 20 to 30 per- surge in agricultural output: that give livestock producers greater coot. In addition, farmers are being en- Between 1977 and 1980, the growth freedom to use grain for animal feed. couraged to sell crops and livestock of output averaged close to 7 percent a China's planners did not anticipate so products to state agencies via entitle- year. big a response. Nor did they adjust con- ments to special allocations of grain or Food-grain output increased by some sumer sales prices for the leading items; fertilizer (at relatively favorable prices) 37 million tons, with growth averaging therefore subsidies, already quite a large along with normal sales proceeds. Extra close to 5 percent a year, though in both item in the budget, have shot up to production is particularly favored: grain 1977 and particularly 1980 bad weather around $5 billion a year. sales above quota attract a premium of was responsible for poor wheat crops. 47 Box 5.4 Nominal protection and foreign exchange valuation Determining the incentives or disincen- ual crop and country data since year-to- Nominal protection coefficients (NPCs) tives farmers face in different countries year changes can be large. But the data take into account tariffs, quotas, and is a rough science. The protection meas- confirm the high level of protection in nontariff barriers that protect farmers as ures shown in the figure compare the many developed countries, where many well as the impact of export taxes or re- domestic prices that farmers are paid with producer prices are 50 to 100 percent strictions that penalize farmers. Protec- prices they could expect to face if the above world market levels, in contrast to tion is also a function of the country's country in question were freely trading the situation of most developing coun- exchange rate as it is influenced by policy. on the world market. Too much signifi- tries, where prices are often well below Protecting domestic industries, for ex- cance should not be attached to individ- the world market, ample, reduces industrial imports below Adjusted nominal agricultural protection coefficients, by country, late 1970s 3.0 BAR WHT ALF EAR U U 2.0 MET %WHT . U SOR WHT '2 1.5 RIC UMZE WlITBAR4 UU PLY U UU U U SUG U SUG . BEF . RIC USES U COT U MZE RIC MZE BEF UUU U MZE U BEF MZE MZE E-'mi, UUBEF U WHTUUU RIC U m WHT U SOR UU SNF U COC U COC 1.0 U MZE U WHI ma. WHT U i BEF UUUUU WOL U U UU RYE BAR WHT COT MZE U U BEF U o WHT C01 MZE . 0.66 U UMZE UCOT UUBEF U COT 0 URIC UWHT RIC UU BEF .9 ° 0.5 MZE' ---USOR COF UWHT U COT U FRT U 0 0.33- . -----'..-- ...,.... .... ,,,,,, ........... UHZT URIC V N C 5) 0C C 0 >, 5) .9 a C 5) 0 0 0 rO N 0 0 5) N ' ° ' - to 0 1-' H St - C U > Note ALF is alfalfa; BAR, barley; BEF, beef; BEN, beans; COC, cocoa; COF, coffee; COP, copra; COT, cotton; FRT, fruits; GRT, groundnuts; GUA, gum arabic; HZT, hazelnuts; LVK, livestock; MET, meat; MLT, millet; MZE, maize; OLO, olive oil; OLS, ollseeds; PLY, poultry; POT, potatoes; PPR, palm products; PRK, pork; RIC, rice; RUB, rubber; RYE, rye; SES, sesame; SNF, sunflower; SOR, sorghum; SUC, sugarcane; SUG, sugar; TOB, tobacco; WHT, wheat; WOL, wool. poor countriesfor example, Bu- versity in the largely agricultural tropical export crops. Some, such rundi, Gambia, Guinea, and economies, including support as cane sugar, have been through Ugandathat lack a research ca- from the international commu- several Green Revolutions over the pability and are almost totally de- nity to assist them in this difficult past century. In general, though, pendent (for 75 to 95 percent of task. research has become critical only their foreign exchange) on one or Technological progress. In the in modern times; it has been ap- a few tropical export crops. Ex- past, agricultural research rele- plied to considerable effect in ceptional efforts will be required vant to developing countries' countries such as China, India, to achieve greater stability and di- needs was confined largely to Indonesia, and the Philippines. 48 their probable level in an unprotected count for over- or undervaluation of the elusive. Research at the World Bank and market. This tends to overvalue a coun- exchange rate, elsewhere suggests, however, that the try's exchange rate. Agricultural export. The NPCs are not adjusted for one levels of traded inputs in agricultural ers then have a harder time competing other important factorthe protection outputs are relatively low in developing in the world market, since their costs are given to tradable inputs used in produc- countries, so that the qualitative results increased in local currency while their tion, chiefly fertilizer and machinery. Such of EPCs and NPCs are similar. dollar export receipts exchange for less effective protection coefficients (EPC5) are local currency than otherwise. The NPCs more difficult to compute because data shown in the figure are adjusted to ac- on input uses in agriculture are more Import-competing commodities Export-competing commodities Little trade or both imported and exported RIC 2.0 PI'R U SOC U MZE MZE SUG GRT RIC MLT RIC SOR WHT UWHT 1.0 COT MZE H H MZE NX COT OL!WHT BCOP TOB SUG UN I MZE UI UU uUu U RIC U U BEF 0 66 U URIC URIC UUSUG URIC URIC UWHT U UCOT UI U USOR UCOT COFU _---_ UU COT UUSES 0.5 SUG RIC HH H'JH RUB COF 8 8' COF TOB 8 U U U U U uU UCOC U UU URIC GUA UU 0 c .5 . . .5 c - c . C) Much remains to be done for crops in this area, especially through the works and infrastructure is widely grownin semi-arid areas and for establishment of international ag- recommended, though less often rain-fed annual crops generally ricultural research centers and systematically practiced. China is (see Chapter 6). Although re- through the financing and initial the outstanding example of what search is one of the cheaper in- staffing of national research ef- can be done to improve roads, vestments that governments can forts in poorer countries. land, and irrigation through com- make, it requires highly skilled Mobilization of rural resources. munity efforts that use little pub- people to direct it. Foreign as- Motivating and organizing farm lic money. There and in some sistance has played a major role communities to help in collective other countries, land reform has 49 provided an early stimulus for This approach has been particu- Foreign capital. Much early ag- common action. This is not sur- larly useful in areas where the po- ricultural development in, for ex- prising, since collective action and tential for rapid growth already ample, Argentina, Brazil, Malay- individual benefit become more exists, and special programs often sia, and East and West Africa was closely and more directly aligned combine several elements into a largely based on private invest- as holdings of land and other as- development package. In some ment, often involving foreign sets become more nearly equal. countriesIndonesia and the Re- management and control. Private Labor is the most plentiful and public of Korea, for examplefer- foreign investment and loans are cheapest resource available in low- tilizer subsidies have been used still important in some middle-in- income countries, while capital is to encourage growth. The effec- come economies. In the low-in- scarce and expensive. Using the tiveness of such techniques should come economies, little external rural work force for infrastructure not disguise the fact that they can private investment or lending has improvement is an important become very costly; removing recently gone into agriculture. In- means of converting labor into them once they have achieved stead, foreign aid has become the capital. Management is often the their objective can be difficult. main external source of foreign key constraint (see Chapter 7). In some cases, however, the in- exchange and technical support, Public sector investment and tervention of the public sector has particularly after 1973 (see Table support. Agriculture attracts a su- been counterproductive. In- 5.3). prisingly small share of govern- stances of ineffective parastatal In the mid-1960s, while nearly ment spendingbetween 5 and organizations involved in the a quarter of all official develop- 10 percent of most developing marketing of agricultural prod- ment assistance (ODA) was food countries' central government ucts and the supply of inputs aid ($1.4 billion out of $5.9 bil- budgets. Nevertheless, public abound. Some governments have lion), project and technical assist- sector outlays on critical bottle- taken bold steps to improve the ance for agricultural programs was necks have helped to stimulate efficiency of distribution systems small. The food crisis of the early and sustain growth by the devel- by opening up the sector to co- 1970s, coupled with a growing re- opment of large-scale irrigation, operatives and private traders (see alization that poverty and mal- research, and rural infrastructure. Box 5.6). nutrition were persistent prob- Box 5.5 Brazilian soybeans: Creating a comparative advantage Brazil's expansion of soybean production A number of factors helped to stimu- Research was a critical factor. More is a dramatic agricultural success story. late this impressive growth: than sixty soybean cultivars brought to Before 1960 production was insignifi- Rapid expansion of world demand Brazil from the United States during the cant, but by the end of the 1970s soy- for protein for human and animal con- 1960s contributed to the development beans surpassed coffee as the principal sumption; stagnation in the output of al- of domestic cultivars by the National Brazilian crop in value, covered some 17 ternative protein sources (such as the Pe- Center for Soybean Research. Of the forty- percent of the cropped area, and consti- ruvian anchovy); the fact that Brazil's eight cultivars distributed to farmers at tuted 14 percent of world soybean out- soybean crop comes to market during the end of the 1970s, twenty-six had been put Over this period Brazilian soybean the US winter, when world supplies are developed in Brazil. It has been esti- production grew at 27 percent a year in seasonably low; and the US embargo on mated by the Brazilian Agricultural Re- the 1960s entirely through expansion of its soya exports in 1973 (which stimu- search Enterprise (EMBRAPA) that two- the area planted, and in the 1970s boosted lated Japanese importers to find alter- thirds of yield increases have come from by yield improvements of more than 2 native sources). genetic improvements. The other third percent a year. Brazilian exports of soy Farmers typically double-crop soy- has come from improving soil manage- and soy products (oil, meal, and cake) beans in the summer and wheat in the ment practicesproper application of rose from $53 million in 1969 to $2.3 bil- winter. New wheat varieties that mature fertilizers, correctives, nitrogen-fixing lion in 1980, a remarkable 42 percent a earlier enabled soybean-wheat double- bacteria, and herbicidesalso derived year rate of growth. Soybeans make up cropping to expand to other areas. Cul- from intensive and continuous research. more than 10 percent of Brazil's annual tural practices for the two crops are sim- That national yields grow apace with in- exports. As soy oil was substituted for ilar, and soybeans benefited from sup- creases achieved at the research centers imported vegetable oils, domestic con- port aimed at promoting wheat attests to the successful diffusion of the sumption grew almost 28 percent a year production (for example, the fivefold real research results and their adoption by over the 1970s, and there was also grow- expansion of subsidized agricultural credit farmers. ing demand for soy meal, mainly for in the 1970s, about 20 percent of which chicken feed. was for soybeans). 50 Box 5.6 Private complements public: The Bangladesh experiment In the mid-1970s, Bangladesh planners the Chittagong Division, which covers mid-1980, major accomplishments of the estimated that fertilizer use had to ex- one-fourth of the area of the country and NMS included: pand by 15 percent a year to attain the accounts for a third of total fertilizer con- BADC's fertilizer points of sale were targeted 4 percent yearly agricultural sumption. It increased official dealers' reduced by 55 to 60 percent; about one- growth rate. At that time, the Bangla- margins, permitted farmers to buy from third of the original 130 warehouses were desh Agricultural Development Corpo- any trader, and made it easier to become closed. ration (BADC), a public corporation under a trader. It developed a private dealer Farmer access to fertilizer points of the Ministry of Agriculture, handled all credit system from commercial banks. sale greatly increased in the Chittagong marketing of farm supplies as well as all BADC set up a monitoring system for Division. procurement of fertilizer. It had done well, the NMS and took steps to cut down its Farmers paid less for fertilizer under but the strains had begun to tell. internal transport and storage problems. the NMS. In 1978 BADC established the New The NMS enjoyed reasonable success. A new class of entrepreneurs had Marketing System (NMS) to reduce re- Fertilizer sales increased, and forty-five emerged. strictions on private traders and thus government warehouses were put out of The net results of the program have move toward a more open system for business, leaving the government active been almost entirely positive. The pri- distributing fertilizer. BADC would mainly in remote areas which did not vate distribution system is more flexible gradually withdraw from retailing and, attract wholesalers. Retail prices dropped and can supply farmers at lower costs, except in remote areas, sell mainly to below official prices around the primary and much of BADC's managerial and la- wholesalers at "primary distribution distribution points. The new fertilizer bor force can be released for other tasks. points Private dealers and cooperatives wholesalers showed they could move The costs of constructing and maintain- would be permitted to buy from all BADC fertilizer cheaply and effectively from ing the marketing and storage infrastruc- warehouses. Private movement of fertil- surplus to deficit areas, selling to both ture have been substantially reduced. The izer would be unrestricted except in the farmers and retailers. government is now collaborating more border zones. On the basis of this pilot experience, actively with the private sector in other With bilateral assistance from the the NMS was adopted nationwide. As of areas. United States, BADC began the NMS in Table 5.3 Official assistance (commitments) to agriculture, 1973-80 (millions of dollars, constant 1979 prices) Item 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Official development assistance (ODA) DAC 1,594 2,819 2,359 2,246 3,279 3,633 4,304 3,773 Multilateral agencies 1,533 1,833 1,530 1,814 2,139 2,761 2,503 2,969 OPEC (bilateral and multilateral) 69 218 640 378 461 307 243 179 Total ODA 3,196 4,870 4,529 4,438 5,879 6,701 7,050 6,921 Percentage change +82 -6 -2 +32 +14 +5 -2 Other official flows (005) DAC' 351 275 137 395 159 403 329 222 Multilateral agencies 902 1,610 2,944 2,150 2,816 3,275 2,319 2,621 OPEC (bilateral and multilateral) 63 90 333 221 80 49 99 48 Total OOF 1,316 1,975 3,414 2,766 3,055 3,727 2,747 2,891 Percentage change +50 +60 -19 +10 +22 -26 +5 Grand total (all donors) 4,512 6,845 7,943 7,204 8,934 10,428 9,797 9,812 Percentage change +62 +16 -9 +24 +17 -6 (.) Source: OECD. a. Includes EEC. lems in large parts of the world, tilateral institutions rose to nearly years. Similarly, in India, though produced a major shift toward ag- 30 percent. large amounts of aid have been riculture. Flows of ODA and other The share of aid in agricultural received, it represents only 3 to 5 official assistance for agriculture investment varies widely from percent of total spending on ag- more than doubled in real terms country to country. In China, by riculture. Its use is concentrated between 1973 and 1980. The share far the largest country, virtually on selected areas such as irriga- of agriculture and rural develop- no external assistance was re- lion, and its effectiveness is largely ment in the lending of the mul- ceived during the past twenty-five determined by overall agricul- 51 tural investment. Elsewhere, es- therefore an important determi- mained the single most important pecially in the poorer African nant of overall economic growth. category of exports for more than countries, aid accounts for 20 per- Patterns of agricultural trade have two-thirds of the low- and mid- cent of public investment in ag- varied markedly over the past dle-income economies. riculture. There too, the effective- three decades, reflecting in part The early 1970s proved a turn- ness of aid still depends on the the growth of the world economy ing point in the agricultural trade government's interest in, and and in part the differential agri- of developing countries. Since commitment to, agriculture. cultural growth performance de- 1973, the growth of world trade The need for policy and in- scribed earlier in this chapter. has declined to 4.7 percent a year, vestment changes is not uniform During the period of fastest in line with the slowdown of the among developing countries. growth in the world economy world economy. But the growth Many have been quite successful roughly, from 1955 to 1973the of agricultural trade has acceler- in managing their agriculture and expansion of international trade ated to 4.8 percent a year, largely adapting to structural changes. was dominated by manufactured because the demand for food has They need little advice, although goods, fuel, and minerals. World increased rapidly (see Figure 5.3). they may need continued finan- trade grew at 8 percent a year, The extra purchasing power of the cial support to sustain well-de- trade in agricultural goods by less oil-exporting countries boosted signed policies and programs. than half that. By 1973, devel- their share of world food imports Others need to make major oping countries' agricultural ex- from less than 6 percent in 1973 changes. They are not alone. The ports had fallen from 60 percent to 10 percent in 1978. Over the developed countries have found of the value of their total exports same period, strong demand for it extremely difficult to manage in 1955 to only 30 percent. Never- meat and poultry in eastern Eu- the last stages of structural change theless, agricultural goods re- rope, coupled with a poor supply in agriculture; their capacity to deal response from domestic agricul- more effectively with these chal- ture, boosted the region's maize lenges will be an important factor Figure 5.3 Index and growth and wheat imports from 3 to 14 in developing countries' success rates of world exports, by volume percent of its total food imports. or failure. volume index (1972-74 av = 100) Eastern Europe now accounts for 150 about one-third of world imports The international environment of maize and wheat. China has also become a major grain im- The international environment can porter. In total, the world grain support or restrict agricultural de- trade has expanded from about 30 All goods velopment in developing coun- 100 million tons in the mid-1950s to tries in two main ways. First, average 130 million tons a year in through the mechanisms de- Agricultural the 1976-80 periodnearly one- scribed in Part I of this Report, commodities half because of rising imports by the international economy pow- developing countries (including erfully conditions the overall 50 Manufactures China) and one third because of growth prospects of developing import growth by the USSR and countries. In turn, more buoyant 1965 70 75 80 eastern Europe. overall growth simultaneously The extra demand has been met provides both strong support for Average annual growth rate (percentage) mainly by developed countries. 10 agricultural growth and the re- Manufactures The biggest relative increases in sources to permit an expansion of exports have come from the EEC, productive capacity. All goods which produced trade surpluses Second, trading opportunities 5 1963-73 1973-79 in a number of commodities as a for agricultural products permit result of continued agricultural agricultural growth beyond the growth and stagnant demand in Agricultural limits set by the expansion of do- commodities the home market. By contrast, the mestic demand alone. Agricul- 0 large rise in North American grain tural exports remain a major exports only slightly increased 1965 70 75 80 source of foreign exchange for their importance in world food Sourc': GATT. many developing countries, and trade. Overall, the net food deficit 52 of the industrial market econo- Figure 5.4 Export growth ratesi, by country group mies narrowed from 16 percent of Average annual gi'owth rate (percentage) world food trade in 1965 to less 10 than 5 percent in 1978. The oil-importing developing countries gave greater emphasis to agricultural exports during the 0 1970s. By 1978, their trade sur- plus on food amounted to $21 bil- lion, sharply up from $6 billion in 1973. Performance has varied widely by region and country. Some countries have been able to penetrate expanding markets; ex- -10 Goods and nonfactor services Food and beverages 7 amples include Brazil's successful 1965-70 70-78 65-7)) 7(1-78 65-71) 70-78 65-71) 7)1-75 65-7)) 70-78 65-71) 70-78 soybean exports and Thailand's Industrial All develop- Low-income Middle-income Middle-income Middle-income new trade in cassava chips for economies ing countries oil importers oil importers oil importers except NlCc5 oil exporters livestock feed. A number of low- a. Constant 978 prices. income countries sharply in- b, Newl iiidustrializing countries. creased their food exports to Mid- dle Eastern markets after 1973 (see Figure 5.4). These markets now Table 5.4 Oil-importing developing countries' food and beverage account for more than 20 percent trade, 1970 and 1978 of low-income countries' food ex- (billions of 1978 dollars) ports, compared with 4 percent Low-income oil importers Middle-income oil im porters in 1973. Item Exports Imports Net Exports Imports Net These were the successes. In other cases, however, especially 1978 value 5.98 3.04 2.94 38.79 20.90 17.89 1970 value 5.03 2.91 2.12 30.38 16.65 13.73 where exports were based on tra- Difference 0.95 0.13 0.82 8.41 4.25 4.16 ditional tropical crops, inelastic Value change due to: demand limited increases in for- Volume growth 2.22 0.24 1.98 16.19 6.36 9.83 eign exchange earnings. Al- Price decline -1.27 -0.11 -1.16 -7.78 -2.11 -5.67 though volume expanded in the 1970s, the terms of trade deteri- determined by fluctuations in in- markets for the agricultural ex- orated considerably. Had agricul- dustrial countries' growth and by ports of developing countries, tural prices been moving in line production changes in the devel- weakening the historical link be- with prices of manufactured oping countries. Today, devel- tween commodity trade and the goods, this higher volume of ex- oped countries remain the major growth of industrial countries. ports would have given low-in- markets for food exports, taking The trade and agricultural pol- come oil importers an additional about 70 percent of middle-in- icies of developed countries influ- $1.2 billion of foreign exchange in come countries' exports and 50 ence the options open to the de- 1978 and middle-income ones an percent of low-income countries' veloping countries in important extra $5.7 billion-enough to fi- exports. But developing coun- ways. In contrast to the situation nance 15 percent and 27 percent tries' food exports to these mar- in most developing countries, ag- of their respective current ac- kets grew much more slowly be- riculture in the developed world count deficits (see Table 5.4). tween 1965 and 1978 (1.1 percent is heavily protected and sup- Slowing demand in protected a year) than their exports to oil- ported. The aim has been to sup- developed-country markets has exporting developing countries port farm incomes in the face of altered the shape of developing (6.3 percent a year), to high-in- rapid growth of earnings else- countries' agricultural trade. When come oil exporters (8.9 percent a where in the economy. In some trade was limited to a few com- year), and to centrally planned instances, governments have also modities consumed almost exclu- economies (4.9 percent a year). sought to retain a farm economy sively in the developed world, ex- These three groups now repre- capable of supplying most of their port volume and prices were sent the most dynamic and open countries' food. Countries in the 53 EEC have protection levels be- protection is clearly negative in of progress is compounded by the tween 30 and 80 percent above several respects (see Box 5.7). De- fact that nontariff measures are the commodity prices in world veloping-country exporters have often used to exclude developing trade (see Box 5.4). The United been hard hit by this legislated countries' agricultural exports. States has less explicit protection, inability to expand into tradi- Governments in industrial but its budgetary expenditures as tional industrial-country markets. countries are sensitive to the pro- a percentage of agricultural value For example, the share of devel- tectionist demands of their own added (38 percent) are similar to oping-country sugar exports going farmers, and this factor exacer- those of the EEC (39 percent). Ja- to the developed word has fallen bates the uncertainties and risks pan has the most heavily pro- from 88 percent in 1970 to 64 per- of agricultural trade. For exam- tected farmers, largely because of cent in 1978. Although they have ple, the EEC is considering ways import restrictions (the domestic been able to expand their share to reduce the budgetary costs of price of rice, for example, is twice in other developing-country sugar the common agricultural policy its import price, and wheat and import markets, this has not been not by reducing protection, but barley are protected even more). sufficient to maintain the value of by extending tariff barriers to im- Developed countries also subsi- sugar exports in real dollar terms, ported vegetable oils. Such meas- dize their agriculture through relative to 1970. Moreover, strong ures, particularly if they lead to programs of research, technical competition from the industrial higher domestic production, as assistance, credit, and income- countries' surplus has captured they have done with sugar, are maintenance schemes. By 1980, increasingly large shares of the bound to harm efficient produc- public spending on agriculture by growing market in those devel- ers in the developing world and the EEC countries, Japan, and the oping countries that import sugar; to force consumers in developed United States was about $80 bil- 46 percent in 1978 compared with countries to pay even higher prices lion; the EEC accounts for close 24 percent in 1970. for food. to half the total. By comparison with trade in Protection also creates substan- These protectionist policies have manufactures, little progress was tial volatility in world prices. By had mixed consequences for the made in reducing agricultural insulating domestic producers and developing countries. An impor- protection in the most recent consumers from external market tant positive feature is that these (1975-78) Tokyo Round of multi- realities, governments are placing policies have stimulated research lateral trade negotiations. That lack the burden of balancing global and technical development in ag- riculture, which benefit develop- ing countries through the inter- national transfer of technology. Box 5.7 Measuring the impact of agricultural protection More controversial are the lower The International Food Policy Research tive advantage of the various develop- international prices for some Institute (IFPRI) has completed the most ing-country producers, and their export commodities associated with de- recent study of the impact of protection policies. Roughly a third of extra export veloped-country disposal of ag- on agricultural trade. Based on data of revenues would accrue to sugar produc- the mid-1970s, their study concluded that ers; beverages, tobacco, and meat prod- ricultural surplus, notably grains a 50 percent reduction in OECD devel- ucts account for another third. Close to and milk products. While clearly oped-country trade barriers (affecting 60 percent of the additional revenues benefiting importing developing some 99 agricultural commodities) would would accrue to Latin American produc- countries in the short run, in the increase agricultural exports from some ers, over 20 percent to countries in Asia, longer term the lower prices may fifty-six developing countries by about 11 and 10 percent each to sub-Saharan Af- depress farm incentives for local percent, equivalent to $3 billion of extra rica and the North Africa and Middle food production and stimulate sales at 1977 prices. Long-term benefits East region. Benefits would also be con- permanent changes in prefer- might considerably exceed these esti- siderable for smaller exporting countries ences for foods which cannot be mates, if a more liberal trade environ- not included in the sample of fifty-six locally produced. The benefits ment (that exporters had confidence (which were selected on the basis of a tend to accrue largely to a rela- would be sustained) encouraged new in- population of 4 million or more in mid- vestment and expanded specialized pro- 1975), for example, Cuba, Jamaica, and tively affluent urban minority of duction over a longer period. Mauritius (as sugar producers), Cyprus consumers, while adverse effects The distribution of benefits from trade (wine), Zimbabwe (tobacco), and Costa are felt by the poor rural majority. liberalization reflects the uneven pattern Rica (meat, coffee). For developing-country export- of protection, the patterns of conipara- ers, the impact of agricultural 54 supply and demand on a rela- tively small part of the market. Box 5.8 The "food crisis" and its food security aftermath Since it is disproportionately the Between 1972 and 1974 the world price idly. Fearing a shortage, many countries developing countries who partic- of wheat and rice roughly trebled from bought more grain than they needed, ipate in the open world market, $60 to $200 a ton and from $130 to $500 driving prices still higher. a ton, respectively; fertilizer prices shot The food crisis taught some painful but they have to bear the bulk of this up still faster from $50-$75 to $300 a ton. important lessons. A repeat of the 1972- burden. Fluctuating commodity 74 situation seems unlikely owing to the These unprecedented increases in the prices make planning more diffi- prices of the world's most basic foods following responses to it: cult and wrong investment deci- and of a critical input needed to increase Much greater emphasis has been sions more likely. One legacy of food production were dramatic manifes- given to increasing food production, the record sugar prices in 1974 was a tations of the "world food crisis." They essential long-term source of food secu- proliferation of costly import-sub- were seenalong with anxieties about rity. stituting schemes for growing land availability and reports of hunger More widely held and carefully sugar. They continue to act as a and famineas harbingers of an im- monitored stocks have been established. drain on budgets and, as heavy pending collapse of the world food sys- Grain markets are now functioning debt-service payments fall due, on tem, and of a future beset by dramati- more effectively than in the past. The foreign exchange. cally higher and more unstable food feeding of grain to livestock and deci- prices. sions to buy, to sell, to store, and to trade A considerable degree of insta- grain are more responsive to price By 1976, however, the prices of wheat, bility of agricultural commodity rice, maize, and fertilizer had fallen as changes. prices is, however, inherent in dramatically as they had risen. Wheat Countries have imposed limits on the their underlying demand and prices in particular were below their pre- amounts of grain they will export before supply relationships. Neither de- 1972 level. It was clear that a fundamen- reviewing the grain market. mand nor supply are very sensi- tal shortage of food was not in the offing. Countries are giving more thought tive to short-run price changes; Prices of cereals and most agricultural to the broader impact on food security on the other hand, the demand commodities are now not expected to be of production and acreage adjustments for agricultural raw materials in much above present levels until well into previously considered to be of purely do- particular varies significantly with the 1990s. mestic concern. fluctuations in industrial country In retrospect, the factors causing the Governments have also reached a food crisis were avoidable. Over the pe- number of international agreements that growth, and the supply of these improve world food security: riod from 1955 to 1972, large publicly held products is often quite variable grain stocks in the developed countries An International Emergency Food Re- too. It can be affected by weather and heavy food aid shipments had cre- serve of 500,000 tons was established in conditions, disease, and pests in ated an environment in which some de- 1976, and contributions of 588,000 tons major producing areas, and by the veloping countries had little incentive to were made to it in 1981. long gestation period which sep- produce food and fertilizer. At the same A new Food Aid Convention was ne- arates plantings of new tree crops time, developed-country domestic poli- gotiated in 1980 which raised the mini- from the period of maximum cies led to the atrophy of efficient grain- mum annual contribution of food aid from yield. Commodity prices there- marketing mechanisms. The sharp rise 4.2 to 7.6 million tons. fore often rise and fall dramati- in grain stocks in 1968 led to an abrupt The IMP Food Facility was established cally and impart a high degree of reduction of wheat production by the in 1981 as an extension of the IMP Coin- grain-exporting countries between 1969 pensa tory Fund Facility to provide financial instability to the economies of and 1971. In 1972, world grain produc- assistance to offset fluctuations in coun- countries heavily dependent on hon declined; simultaneously, large grain tries' food import bills either because of these commodities for their ex- purchases were made by the USSR. shortfalls in domestic production or port earnings. Domestic markets in a number of im- higher world food prices. In addition to various protec- porters, notably those in western Europe Whether these changes, together with tion measures taken by the con- and the planned economies, were insu- increases in world stocks, provide "ad- suming countries to insulate lated by governments from the effect of equate world food security" is still being themselves from price fluctua- world prices. Consequently, the burden argued; further mechanisms to promote tions, efforts to deal with un- of adjustment fell most heavily on those stability and security may emerge. But stable commodity prices have who were not protected, including many the food crisis had the additional effect developing economies and the grain-ex- of increasing awareness among planners taken the form of long-term bi- porting countries (where high grain prices and policymakers that a properly func- lateral trade agreements and mul- tioning international world food market dramatically reduced the feeding of grain tilateral commodity agreements. to livestock). Grain stocks were not suf- also contributes substantially to im- The latter have met with limited ficient to contain prices, which rose rap- proved world food security. success for a variety of reasons 55 incomplete participation by all economic management policies to tackle the roots of the problem, producing and consuming coun- reduce the internal impact of fluc- which lie in the distorted struc- tries, lack of agreement on target tuating external prices can con- ture of trade. prices, limited financial support tribute to longer-term diversifi- To sum up, the challenge for for buffer stocks, or lack of com- cation. policymakers in developing and mitment by participants to the ac- Volatile prices make govern- developed countries alike is to tions required in the face of price ments more receptive to the idea break out of the web of restrictive changes. These problems are fur- of agricultural self-sufficiency and measures that impede agriculture ther complicated by the tendency more prone to intervene in pro- in some countries and oversti- of most commodity prices to rise duction and trade. The issue of mulate it in others; to create a and fall together. Efforts to di- food security provides another trading system in which compar- versify production within tropical important example. To the extent ative advantage plays a more im- products as a means of achieving that the 1972-74 world food crisis portant role in production and greater stability have therefore not made governments more aware trade decisions; and to encourage been very successful. And only of the instability caused by insu- market mechanisms that reduce limited overall stability can be lated agricultural markets, its the risks of participating in the gained from a single commodity wider impact may have been fa- system. The restructuring of in- agreement. While more effective vorable (see Box 5.8). Generally, centive policies at home and the commodity agreements may be though, governments tend to react creation of such a trading system achieved, including a common to instability by further protecting would promote the effective long- fund to support such agreements, their own markets or by creating run deployment of the world's the long-term solutions are diver- or revamping international regu- agricultural resources and help sification into other exports, such latory mechanisms. These do in- meet the developing economies' as manufactures, and into agri- deed mitigate some of the ad- pressing short-term needs for im- cultural products (including foods) verse effects of price cycles, but proved access to overseas mar- for a more stable domestic mar- at substantial real costs, both eco- kets for their agricultural exports. ket. In the short term, domestic nomic and political. They do not 56 6 Sources of agricultural growth Farming has come a long way The reasons for this patchy Rice, which first grew on the since man learned to cultivate progress are the main focus of this water-retentive soils in the humid plants 10,000 years ago. The con- chapter. It examines the sources tropics of Asia, has been adapted straints of soil and climate have of agricultural growth, paying to fit a wide range of environ- gradually been eased. Virgin land special attention to the role of sci- ments. Farmers now grow rice in has been settled, its productivity ence and technology in discov- the river valleys and coastal plains raised. Hands have been helped ering new farming methods. The of South China, South and South- by hoes, then by plows and ani- task of adapting those discoveries east Asia, the Indonesian and the mals, and finally by sophisticated to the circumstances of particular Philippine islands, Japan, and machines. The search for new and countries and people; of dissem- Korea, as well as small areas of better farming methods contin- inating the results and encour- Latin America and East and West ues, assisted by the full weight of aging farmers to adopt them; of Africa. In many nearby high-rain- scientific research. providing the numerous back-up fall areas with more permeable Until the 1950s, agricultural services that are then needed to soils, upland rice is grown with progress in most developing turn good intentions into con- other crops. countries was slow and uneven, crete resultsthese are the themes Starchy root crops (cassava, barely keeping pace with popu- that will recur repeatedly. yams) are grown in areas of the lation growth. Although the ex- Throughout, the discussion shows humid tropics where soils are less pansion of agricultural trade had how agricultural success flows fertile and not well suited for ce- boosted tropical exports, farming from a unique combination of pri- real cultivation, such as western for food was largely neglected vate and public endeavor. Gov- and central Africa and parts of during the colonial period. In the ernment can supply some of the Oceania and Latin America. Cas- past twenty years, however, great support and incentives from which sava has also spread to northern strides have been made. Hundreds all farmers can benefit but which Thailand where it has emerged as of millions of people, from peas- none could organize independ- an important export crop. ants farming a few acres in Kenya ently. It is then for farmers to take Maize is the most important to commune members in China, the inevitable risks associated with staple in the subhumid tropics of have transformed the ways in large rewards. Latin America and Africa. The which they farm the land. They As noted in Chapter 5, agri- most common crops farmed with have been assisted by science, and cultural progress has been re- maize are cotton, groundnuts, spurred on by the prospect of markably successful in many ways soybeans, and sorghum in the higher incomes and security for during recent years, and the prime drier areas; coffee, cocoa, and their families. Their considerable source of growth has been food starchy root crops in the wetter achievements cannot obscure the production in the developing areas. size of the challenge that still lies countries. Differences in soil and Sorghum is the main food ahead, however. Many develop- climate have produced an almost grain in the wetter parts of the ing countries' populations are infinite variety of cropping sys- semi-arid tropics and millet in the growing faster than their agricul- tems in these countries. Five main drier regions. Groundnuts, cot- tural production, and many mil- crop zones can be identified, ton, cowpeas, and pigeon peas are lions of farmers have not yet however, on the basis of the sta- the most common associated shared in the progress of the past ple food crop that predominates crops. twenty years. in each (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). Wheat is the most important 57 Figure 6.1 Major crop zones in developing countries Agricultural Average yield Key Predominant Total Agricultural population of primary Arable agroclimatic population population density cereals land Crop zone condition (millions) (millions) (persons/ha.) (kg/ha.) reserves Root crop zone Humid tropical 193 120 1.6 750 Abundant Rice zone Humid tropical and Moderately humid temperate 574 358 3.5 2050 abundant Maize zone Subhumid tropical 353 161 1.1 1450 Abundant Sorghum and Semi arid tropical Moderately millet zone 86 70 1.6 670 abundant Wheat zone Temperate/Mediterranean 395 182 1.0 1850 Scarce Mixed (India) Warm temperate and arid 673 Very to humid tropical 439 2.5 1310 scarce Mixed (China) Cold temperate 977 Very to subhumid tropical 572 5.8 2700 scarce Note: Because of limited data for subdivisions of countries, the borders between crop zones have been adjusted to coincide with national boundaries. Sources: IFPRI; FAQ. grain in much of the temperate ular the increasingly limited role the important contributions made zone but is grown over an in- which settlement of new land will by irrigation, intensified farming creasing area of the cooler tropics play in agricultural expansion. The in rain-fed areas, and livestock as a winter crop in association with second section examines the al- development. Two sections fol- monsoon-grown grains or cotton. ternative to settlementintensive low on the prime forces behind The first section of this chapter agricultural developmentas a intensive development: technol- deals with land, noting in partic- source of growth and discusses ogy (machinery, pesticides, her- 58 bicides, and fertilizers) and re- Figure 6.2 Features of major crop zones, 1978 search, together with their results (the Green Revolution in cereals Agricultural population Value of production a Persons per Dollars per and progress in other tropical hectare cultivated hectare cultivated crops). The chapter concludes with Cultivated area Cultivated area 6 4 2 0 (million 1,000 800 600 400 21)0 0 (million a discussion of some of the key 50 hectares) 51) hectares) elements of ongoing support for 100 100 Root crop 150 150 agriculture: infrastructure, exten- zone sion, marketing, and credit. Rice zone Land For centuries, farmers increased their output mainly by increasing Maize the amount of land they farmed. zone This is no longer the case: in the past two decades, increased acreage has accounted for less than Sorghum one-fifth of the growth in agri- and millet zone cultural production in developing countries (see Figure 6.3), and for Wheat an even smaller fraction in de- zone veloped countries. Nonetheless, there is still a great deal of unused arable landestimates for devel- Mixed oping countries range from 500 (India) million to 1.4 billion hectares, compared with about 820 million hectares currently under cultiva- tion. These estimates can mislead, Mixed however. The unused land is not (China) where the people are who need So,,rce FAO. it most, and FAQ reckons that a. At 1974-76 world market prices. only 10 to 15 percent of unused arable land in 1980 might be cul- Figure 6.3 Area expansion and intensification, by crop zone, 1961-80 tivated by 2000. There is ample Net cultivated area Intensity Output value" cultivable land in the humid and Annual growth rate (percentage) subhumid parts of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, but re- Crop zone I) 2 3 serves in the Mediterranean area Root crop zone and most of Asia (except Indo- nesia) are extremely limited. China Rice zone has reached the limits of its arable land, and a number of other Maize zone //////////////////////////////////////////// countries are fast approaching this Sorghum and millet zone point. The imbalance between people Wheat zone and land reserves is only one fac- tor limiting the development of Mixed (India) more acreage. Disease has dis- Mixed (China) couraged permanent settlement in large parts of the tropics and Sosrc,': FAO. a. Constant 1974-76 world rimarke) prices. subtropics. The eradication of 59 malaria in the 1950s opened ex- tries where land is available. Some problem. Between 1900 and 1965 tensive new areas for cultivation, governments have sponsored set- about half the forest area in de- especially in Asia. Today, the main tlement schemes: for example in veloping countries was cleared for diseases constraining settlement Malaysia and in the outer islands agriculture. Although forests still and cultivation are river blind- of Indonesia. Generally, though, cover half the land in the humid ness (onchocerciasis) and sleep- such schemes are expensive. They and subhumid tropics, forest cover ing sickness (trypanosomiasis), typically cost $1,000 to $2,000 per has been reduced to 10 to 15 per- which occur primarily in sub-Sa- hectare for clearing land and pro- cent in the semi-arid tropics and haran Africa, viding roads, markets, schools, the temperate zone. To avoid river blindness, large and health facilities. Massive deforestation has areas have been left unfarmed in In the early stages of migration, highlighted the virtues of forests. the fertile valleys of the Volta, Ni- farmers move to the most attrac- They regulate the pace at which ger, Congo, Gambia, and Upper tive land. Later, as population rainfall runs off, prevent soil ero- Nile rivers. Efforts to eradicate this pressures force them into more sion, replenish nutrients in the disease are supported by West marginal areas, their arrival causes soil, and influence the local cli- African governments, WHO, erosion and declining soil fertil- mate. These qualities can be re- FAQ, the World Bank, and bilat- ity. Deforestation is a particular tained as long as cultivation is eral donors, but progress is slow. Trypanosomiasis, carried by the tsetse fly, is an even greater ob- stacle. Its presence prevents live- Box 6.1 Forests and fuelwood: The Sahel's stock-based farming on some 1 ecological dilemma billion hectares of high rainfall Forests play a vital role in the ecological long-term benefits of conservation con- land in Africa. Insecticides have balance as habitats for flora and fauna, flict with short-term private needs. Gov- been tried in several countries, in- anchors for soils, and tamers of climates. ernment policy, trying to balance indi- cluding Nigeria, Cameroon, and In the Sahel, however, forests are en- vidual and community interests, is dangered by a rapidly growing popula- ambivalent. Few people are interested in Botswana, but their cost and the tion's need for forest products for fuel- conservation or afforestation, and the few tsetse fly's resistance underline the wood and building material. forestry programs attempted have gen- need for more research to find ef- As a result of progressive deforesta- erally been disappointing. fective solutions. tion, rural household members have to Following the last drought in the area, Most expansion of farmland walk farther and farther to collect fuel- the World Bank and other donor agen- takes place spontaneously, as wood; in some areas, almost half a rural cies have begun to help Sahelian coun- farmers move into forests and family's working time can be spent gath- tries finance forestry projects. Most of grazing areas. Farmers are also ering supplies. Meanwhile the average these pilot and technical assistance pro- gradually switching to permanent urban household, which uses between 3 jects were initiated in the late 1970s and cultivation, especially in Africa, and 5 cubic meters of wood a year, spends are based on the use of conventional and are reducing fallow periods. an increasing part of its budget on fuel- techniques of forest management and af- wood. In some Sahelian towns, it often forestation. They do not initially focus In the rare instances of extensive "costs more to heat a pot than to fill it." on the rapid expansion of forestry. In- virgin areas with good soil If they are to maintain a bare minimum stead, they are directed toward improv- northwestern Brazil for exam- of forest cover, most Sahelian countries ing the training, planning, managerial, plemigration is taking place on will have to halve their fuelwood con- and operational capabilities of the insti- a large scale. It has significantly sumption by the turn of the century. Re- tutions that manage forests. Several pro- boosted output in Brazil, Thai- ductions can be achieved by promoting grams include components to train for- land, and the Philippines. Even efficient wood-burning stoves and the use estry extension staff and to test alternative in recent times, migration has been of substitutes for fuelwood, such as com- ways of winning the support of local the major, often the only source mercial fuels or crop and animal resi- populations for forest conservation and of agricultural growth in sub-Sa- dues. Massive afforestation is another new planting. Increasing emphasis is strategy, but the technical and sociopo- being given to planting multipurpose trees haran Africa. litical constraints are awesome. Few Sah that can provide a combination of tuel- The advantage of spontaneous elian countries can count on more than wood, building poles, and timber. Leg- settlement is that it is cheap and 800 millimeters of rainfall a year, and its uminous tree species, which fix nitrogen the costs are born by the settlers incidence is erratic. Trees are hard to es- and improve soil fertility, are favored in themselves. People do not always tablish in the arid zone and grow slowly. areas where ecological conditions are have the assets or the incentive Most forests are publicly owned, but the suitable for their growth. to move, however, even in coun- 60 shifting, rather than permanent, and if the commercial extraction Box 6.2 Downstream effects of irrigation of lumber is carefully controlled. In countries such as Brazil and The direct benefits of investment in agri- income from paddy generated demand the Philippines, serious damage culture, particularly for irrigation pro- for goods and services equivalent to 43 jects, are not hard to identify and meas- percent of total benefits of the scheme. has been caused by the failure to ure. Construction jobs are created, This demand was mainly in such sectors enforce limits on felling trees and agricultural output increases, consumers as housing and other construction, com- clearing forests. The worst dam- may benefit from lower food prices, and merce, road transport, and hotel and res- age occurs, however, in cases farm income is likely to rise. In addition, taurant servicesall of which are quite where forests are treated as un- however, such projects can have much labor-intensive activities in rural Malay- limited sources of fuelwood. Some more widely dispersed but less easily sia. Higher earnings in these sectors in four-fifths of all wood cut down measured benefits. turn multiplied jobs and incomes for in developing countries is used Careful monitoring of an irrigation workers in still other parts of the econ- for fuel. The problem is most se- project in the Muda region of Malaysia omy. vere in densely populated hill gave the World Bank a chance to look There is more to the story, however. areas (such as the Andes and the into the indirect, downstream effects of Rice needs to be milled, and mills have this $240 million program for increasing to invest in plant and equipment. The Himalayas) and in semi-arid and paddy production, which was approved Muda project induced an estimated net arid areas, where the desert creeps in 1972. Using a battery of sophisticated $56 million of private investment, which up as the forest retreats. analytical tools, the Bank asked: in turn had further multiplier effects. If the consequences of defores- Who, besides producers, benefits Who received the benefits? Research tation are serious, so are its causes. from the program? provides some answers. Participating Millions of people depend on What is the overall impact on the paddy farmers' incomes rose about 70 wood for their fuel: in sub-Sa- economy? percent, but landless farm workers' more haran Africa it provides three- What additional investments may be modest earnings rose still more (73 per- quarters of all the energy used. induced? cent). Even the incomes of nonfarmers The solutions lie partly in devel- The answers to these questions were and nonparticipating farmers in the re- impressive. For every dollar of increased gion rose (by 14 percent and 10 percent, oping new supplies of energy and paddy output, about $0.75 of income was respectively) by comparison with what partly in more effective conser- also generated in the downstream ef they would have been without the proj- vation of forests. Since farmers see fects. In other words, farmers' increased ect. no immediate advantage in such conservation, public bodies have the dominant role to play (see Box creased by nearly 3 percent a year. 6.2). These advantages need to be 6.1). These productivity gains have set against two drawbacks: ground been achieved largely by improv- and surface water for irrigation is Intensive agricultural ing the availability and reliability not available in large parts of the development of irrigation and increasing the use world, and the infrastructure is of new seeds and fertilizer (see expensive. New land has been a significant Figure 6.4); significant progress source of past growth, but its fu- has also been made in regions with ture role is plainly limited to a few Figure 6.4 Agricultural inputs dependable rainfall. in developing countries, 1960-79 countries. The alternative is to use Index (1970 = 100) existing land more efficiently. Ef- Irrigation 300 forts to do so have been highly Irrigation has made the largest successful; the average productiv- contribution to increased agricul- Fertilizer ity of cultivated land has been tural production in much of Asia, 200 growing at about 2.2 percent a year North Africa, and the Middle East. for the past twenty years (see Fig- In many areas it can double or ure 6.3). Except in the semi-arid treble yields during the main 100 sorghum and millet zone, higher growing season, can make a sec- yields account for more than half ond or even a third crop possible, the growth of output. In the mixed and can sharply reduce the risk 0 cropping zones of China, agri- of crop failure. Such programs can 1960 1970 1980 cultural acreage has actually de- also have multiple effects Souve FAQ. clined while yields have in- throughout the economy (see Box 61 Investment for irrigation has world's irrigated area (see Figure channels that bring water to farm- risen dramatically in developing 6.5). ers' fields help explain the inef- countries, to around $15 billion in Irrigation absorbs a large part ficiency of irrigation sytems. Re- 1980. The irrigated area has grown of public sector investment, es- cent studies have demonstrated, by 2.2 percent a year since 1960. pecially in low-income countries. however, that in most projects in- Some 160 million hectares, one- Frequently, low water charges and adequate design and neglect of the fifth of the harvested land in de- inadequate taxes on agricultural main canal system are the major veloping countries, is now irri- incomes have made the burden causes of inequitable and waste- gated. This land area uses about on the government's budget ful use of water in the fields. Many 60 percent of all fertilizer and pro- heavier than it needs to be. A rel- existing irrigation systems suffer duces over 40 percent of all an- atively modest (50,000-hectare) from waterlogging and salinity nual crops in the developing scheme can cost between $100 because of lack of drainage, par- world. Between 50 and 60 percent million and $200 million. To en- ticularly in northern China, Egypt, of the increase in agricultural out- sure a reasonable return on that northern India, and Pakistan. put in the past twenty years has investment, the system has to be More than half of the Indus Basin come from new or rehabilitated carefully designed and orga- Canal system in Pakistan, some 8 irrigated areas. China (with 49 nized, and then fully used. Effi- million hectares, is waterlogged million irrigated hectares) and In- ciency has become increasingly and 40 percent is saline. dia (with 39 million) account for critical, partly because of actual or Shortages of trained staff more than half the developing threatened water shortages. More partly the result of their being important, modern, high-yield- lured away by new engineering ing seeds require reliable supplies ventureshave sometimes pre- of water at specified times if they vented improvements. Once built, Figure 6.5 Irrigation in major crop zones, 1978 are to fulfill their promise. A timely irrigation schemes are often man- 150 and reliable water supply also en- aged by design and construction Percentage of cultivated engineers who have little training area under irrigation 50 100 (million hances the farmers' willingness to hectares) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Cultivated pay water charges. in water management or agricul- area In India and Sudan, both of ture. In some countries with which have extensive irrigation strong civil service demarcations, Root L- crop zone experience, large canal schemes engineers are the only people en- with storage reservoirs require an titled to work in the irrigation investment of about $2,000 a hec- service. Their expertise needs to tare. Similar schemes in East and be joined with that of others, and West Africa often cost more than farmers themselves should be in- $10,000 a hectare, the result of an volved in irrigation programs from inexperienced domestic construc- their inception. ize tion industry and dependence on In addition to large public sec- zone imported materials and equip- tor irrigation schemes, there has Sorghum ment. Such costs can be justified been a rapid expansion of private and millet zone in only a few countriesfor ex- irrigation. The development of ample, those in the Mediterra- cheap pumps and the introduc- nean basinwhere advanced tion of modern seed and fertilizer methods of water management have brought irrigation within the ensure the efficient use of the sys- means of millions of small farm- tem and market demand for the ers. In South Asia since 1960, high-value crops produced is farmers have invested about $15 strong. billion in open wells and tube- Increasing the efficiency of ex- wells irrigating 30 million hec- 1ndi isting irrigation schemes offers tares. These private schemes, considerable scope for faster supported by the public sector's growth, since yields are well be- provision of long-term credit and Mixed low their potential in many areas rural electrification, comprise as (China) and water is wasted. Poor design large an area as all public and pri- Source; FAO. and construction of the tertiary vate irrigation in North Africa, the 62 Middle East, and Latin America. Elsewhere, tubewell and pump Box 6.3 Rain-fed agriculture: The Mexican experience irrigation has grown slowly, par- In the 1950s and early 1960s, Mexican intensively. And third, guaranteed pro- ticularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Ir- agriculture had one of the highest growth ducer prices and subsidized inputs rigation is not economic in much rates in the world, averaging 4 to 7 per- needed to be offered for crops such as of sub-Saharan Africa, though it cent every year. Performance was largely maize and beans typically grown on rain- is also constrained by inadequate based on technology improvements fed farms. water surveys and the lack of a closely linked to expanding irrigation. These new approaches were embodied supporting infrastructure. In parts Between 1940 and 1965, about 90 percent in a series of programs which received of the savannah belt of northern of all public investment in agriculture was substantial World Bank assistance. In the Nigeria, for example, studies in- for irrigation. PIDER program (started in 1973) the ob- dicate that tubewell and pumping Growth slowed markedly in the 1970s. jective has been to bring an integrated schemes would be economically New irrigation became increasingly ex- package of servicesextension, re- justified. Though more expensive pensive (and old systems harder to search, credit, roads, irrigation, potable maintain); meanwhile poverty remained water supply, and educationto small, to operate and maintain than canal endemic among the 87 percent of Mex- well-defined areas of generally low-in- systems, pumps and tubewells come rural communities. As the coordi- ico's farmers who lacked irrigation. The often prove more effective, be- combination led the Mexican authorities nation of services through the federal cause they can be managed more to look for answers in rain-fed farming. government became a bottleneck, con- easily and the initial investment Fortunately, Mexico's rain-fed areas have trol of the programs was decentralized is much smaller. high potential for agricultural produc- from the federal to the state level. In tion. The Plan Puebla, the first rain-fed 1979, the government established 118 Rain-fed areas development project of its kind, started Rain-fed Districts (Distritos de Temporal) While irrigation has many advan- in 1967, had shown that farmers could throughout the country, on the pattern tages, the fact remains that rain- triple or quadruple maize yields with new of the existing Irrigation Districts. This fed areas constitute 80 percent of plant varieties and farming methods, and made it possible to have an integrated the developing world's cultivated at a lower cost than through investments approach to rain-fed land development in irrigation. Production could be diver- while at the same time taking into ac- land and support nearly two- sified into higher-value crops. Moreover, count local physical conditions, which thirds of its farmers. Yield in- much potentially arable land with ade- vary widely. creases still depend on the subtle quate rainfall was being used only for These efforts have laid a solid base for interaction between soil, water, extensive livestock grazing and could be future structural change and increased seeds, and sunlight, but the proc- put to more intensive use. and diversified production in Mexico's ess is not as well understood The new policy tilt has involved some rain-fed agriculture. Concrete results are under rain-fed conditions as it is major changes. First, it was necessary to apparent in the response to improved with irrigated land. Local condi- upgrade the efficiency of extension serv- production incentives announced two tions vary so much that finding ices and credit provision to farmers in years ago. After a decade of slow growth solutions is often costly, and they rain-fed areas, and to make access to land (2 to 3 percent a year), agricultural pro- easier by improving rural roads. Second, duction increased by 5.5 percent in 1980 can seldom be replicated else- land tenure laws had to be changed and and by 8 percent in 1981, most of it from where. Even with the current state wetland drainage installed to encourage rain-fed cultivation. of knowledge, however, there is farmers to cultivate little-used land more scope for growth. New methods of tilling, new crop rotations, in- creasing use of fertilizers and pes- subhumid tropics. Tackling them ferent challenge. There, research ticides, soil conservation and requires protecting the soil by focuses on reclamation, new crop drainageall have a part to play. continuous crop coverage and rotations, and more effective Tackling the problems of rain-fed minimum tillage, as well as drill- means of fertilizing the soil. In agriculture is an increasingly im- ing seeds and controlling weeds. areas with relatively dependable portant challenge in many coun- This kind of systematic approach rainfall and moisture-retentive tries, including some such as is being developed at IITA in Ni- soil, ICRISAT is developing new Mexico (see Box 6.3) where irri- geria. (See Glossary and Box 6.4 cultivation methods. These are gation has already been extended for names and functions of inter- based on semi-permanent as far as possible. national agricultural research cen- broadbeds and furrows that pro- Soil erosion and declining fer- ters.) In the case of some Latin vide drainage in heavy rains and tility are the main threats to rain- American countries, highly acidic, improve the soil's capacity to re- fed agriculture in the humid and infertile soils present a rather dif- tain moisture. Together with pre- 63 Box 6.4 New frontiers in agricultural science Modern plant breeding dates from the turing became commercially viable about well double the highest yields now re- mid-nineteenth century, when Mendel twenty years ago, initially for ornamen- alized. identified the laws of genetic inherit- tal plants and later for vegetables and A different area of research, and one ance. The application of Mendelian tech- fruits such as asparagus and strawber- of less immediate practical application, niques, together with the knowledge of ries. attempts to help plants meet their nitro- plant nutrition discovered by Liebig, have By the late 1970s, tissue culturing had gen requirements from the atmosphere permitted dramatic increases in the pro- been achieved with many woody spe- through nitrogen fixation. At present only ductivity of major cereal crops around cies, including temperate fruit crops such leguminous plants of the pea and bean the world. These have culminated in what as apples and pears, several of the de- family can do this. The fixation mecha- has come to be known as the Green Rev- veloping world's important perennial nism involves a mutually beneficial, or olution. The next quantum leap has taken crops (such as coffee, rubber, and oil symbiotic, relationship between the host place only recently with the discovery of palms), and a number of tropical forest plant and certain species of bacteria which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a complex tree species. It is now generally believed live in nodules that develop on the plant's chemical that is the carrier of the trans- that all plant cells are potentially "toti- roots. The bacteria, deriving shelter and mitted characteristics of all living things. potent," that is, they have the ability, other vital support from the plant, are This has opened up vast new opportu- under suitable conditions, to grow into able to take up or "fix" atmospheric ni- nities to manipulate nature. Entirely new complete plants. Tissue culture permits trogen. Some of this nitrogen is used by organisms can be created by transposing very much faster multiplication rates than the host plant; some goes to enrich the character-transmitting particles of mat- those attainable by seeding or conven- soil. ter, or genes, from one species to an- tional propagation techniques such as Increasing the efficiency of this pro- other. budding and grafting. Moreover, the ge- cess in legumes, or finding ways of in- The potential of genetic engineering is netically identical material derived from ducing the same symbiotic relationship not yet fully known. New knowledge is these cultures gives uniformity of yield, between bacteria and nonleguminous being acquired at an unprecedented rate quality, and rate of ripening. Tissue cul- plants, could revolutionize plant nutri- as a result of research around the world turing can also be used to develop dis- tion. Nitrogen, the most costly of the by academic and commercial organiza- ease resistance and adaptability to spe- major plant nutrients when supplied in tions, but this work is still in its infancy; cific habitats. the form of chemical fertilizers, would it may be decades before wholly new Not all species that can be cultured in become freely available from the atmo- species of commercial value become the laboratory can yet be propagated on sphere. available. The genetics of even single- a commercial scale. Tissue cultures could, Work on nitrogen fixation is going on celled organisms such as bacteria are not however, provide a basis for yield im- at many centers around the world. The yet fully understood. Meanwhile, how- provements in tropical perennial crops International Network of Legume Inoc- ever, immediate gains can be made by comparable with the impact of the Green ulation Trials seeks new rhizobial bac- exploiting other elements of the fund of Revolution on the cultivation of cereals. teria that are superior nitrogen fixers, and new knowledge about biological sys- Clonal oil palms are already being field- aims to propagate and disseminate them tems. tested on plantations in Malaysia. One worldwide. Farmers who are today re- Tissue culturethe multiplication of commercial company expects by the mid- mote from supplies and cannot afford to plants through in-vitro micropropaga- 1980s to be marketing clones with a buy nitrogenous fertilizers may in time tionholds special promise. Starting in proven capacity for high yields, and there be able to realize yield increases that are some cases with simple vegetative ma- is a possibility of producing several mil- currently beyond their reach. terial, a piece of leaf or an excised root lion plants a year by the end of the dec- Most of the scientists who are cur- tip, manipulation and hormonal treat- ade. Productivity is expected to be en- rently pushing back the frontiers of agri- ment produce a proliferation of callus, hanced by at least 30 percent over that cultural research are working in the de- an undifferentiated mass of cells. Further of the best seedling progenies available veloped countries. Some of the most treatment makes the callus reorganize and today. Even more exciting prospects for exciting applications of the new tech- form embryo-like structures which go on yield improvement are offered by the nology, however, are expected to be in to develop into completely new plants. possibility of clonal propagation of co- the realms of tropical agriculture. These are genetically identical in every conuts. The creation of clones from elite respect with the parent plant. Tissue cul- dwarf and tall hybrid populations could monsoon sowing, changed crop Though promising, these new be relatively slow and concen- rotations, high-yielding varieties, efforts will require extensive test- trated in regions with better rain- and fertilizer, this approach has ing on farms before they can be fall and soil. But the gains could tripled output in farm experi- widely applied. Increases in yields be considerable. If rain-fed land ments. from rain-fed land will therefore could increase its yield by 500 kil- 64 ograms per hectare, the total in- because the benefits will be shared In developed countries, strong crease in production would ex- by more than one country. demand for milk and meat, com- ceed what could be achieved by bined with well-organized mar- a rise of two tons per hectare in Livestock keting and processing industries, the yield of all irrigated land. Though of relatively small eco- has commercialized farming to a Some formidable obstacles stand nomic importance today in many high degree. Farmers usually in the way of such achievements. low-income countries, livestock specialize in one type of produc- Not least among them is flooding: farming could well expand rap- tion, whether it be beef feed-lots, in many parts of the developing idly in the future. It is already cattle ranches, or "factory farm- world, "normal" rains cause doing so in middle-income coun- ing" of milk, pork, beef, and eggs. widespread floods. Standing water tries (see Table 6.1). Since animal Animals are bred specially to fit often more than 30 centimeters products are a more expensive into these farming methods. deep makes many paddy fields of source of calories and protein than In developing countries, a Asia unsuitable for high-yielding vegetable products, poor people high proportion of farms combine Table 6.1 Changes in the structure of agricultural output by subsector and region, 1961-65 and 1976-80 (percent) Agricultural trade as percentage of production Cereals Other staples Livestock Other foods Nonfoods Exports Imports Region and 1961 1976 1961 1976- 1961 1976 1961 1976- 1961 1976- 1961 1975 1961 1975- country group 65 80 65 80 65 81 65 80 65 81 65 79 65 79 Developing regions 31 31 11 10 21 22 27 29 11 9 13 12 6 8 Africa 17 17 26 27 16 18 25 25 16 14 21 15 5 7 Middle East and North Africa 30 26 5 4 22 25 46 40 7 5 16 10 19 34 Latin America 16 17 16 8 31 33 20 31 17 11 20 20 5 7 Southeast Asia 46 44 10 10 15 12 22 26 9 8 14 17 7 9 South Asia 43 45 10 9 14 13 26 27 7 7 4 3 4 4 Chinaa (49) . . (15) . . (18) . . (13) (5) . . (2) . . (3) Southern Europe 28 27 7 5 27 31 35 33 4 4 6 8 7 8 Developed regions 23 25 9 6 46 47 19 20 3 2 10 15 15 17 Market economies 23 25 5 3 49 48 21 22 3 2 14 21 18 22 Nonmarket economies 23 26 17 12 41 44 16 15 3 3 5 4 7 8 High-income oil exporters 25 11 1 2 20 36 53 51 1 (.) 1 1 69 158 Total 26 27 10 8 36 36 22 24 6 5 11 14 11 14 Source: FAO. a. Estimated; excluded from totals. dwarf varieties of rice. Small-scale eat very little of them. As incomes livestock with crops. Animals flood protection and effective rise, the consumption of meat, perform a variety of roles: they drainage would enable modern milk, eggs, and poultry rises provide draft power and manure rice technology to expand into sharply. In Latin America live- for fertilizer; live off scraps and parts of Bangladesh, Burma, east- stock farming accounts for 33 per- crop residues; and produce milk, ern India, and Thailand where it cent of agricultural output; in the wool, meat, and hides for sale or currently cannot be used. Middle East and North Africa, 25 subsistence. They are bred for Large-scale drainage and flood percent; in southern Europe, 31 their durability and adaptability control programs are so expen- percent. In the oil-exporting de- to difficult conditions, rather than sive that it is often difficult to jus- veloping countries, it has jumped for rapid growth. tify them on economic grounds from 20 to 36 percent of output This situation is now starting to alone. Individual countries can over the past two decades. change. In many developing seldom afford them; in a few cases, Livestock farming varies widely countries, poultry farming and, the solution lies in joint efforts, around the world: to a lesser extent, pig production 65 have expanded rapidly over the oping world continues to face rising real wages is very selective. past fifteen years and become in- some intractable obstacles to Irrigation pumps, for example, are creasingly intensive. The tech- growth. Animals there need a used widely in Bangladesh, but nology involved is readily trans- great deal of land; in these areas tractors are virtually nonexistent; ferable, but it requires relatively it is often of poor quality and mechanical rice threshers are used large quantities of feed grain and ownership may be ill defined. In in central Thailand, where oilseed meals, which often have much of the African Sahel, for in- threshing of the first crop over- to be imported. stance, rangelands are common laps with the planting of the sec- These new enterprises are often property. Improving their quality ond, but the more labor-intensive in competition with traditional would be in the interest of all; method of buffalo-treading re- livestock farming, which may suf- actually investing to do so makes mains common in single-cropped fer in consequence. Since pro- no sense for individual farmers. areas. ductivity is much higher in inten- As a result, improvements are sive livestock farming, prices and seldom made and farmers often Pesticides and herbicides costs have fallen sharply. Poultry overgraze. Resolving this prob- Estimates of crop losses because has gone from being the most ex- lem is likely to require such meas- of insects, pests, disease, and pensive to the cheapest meat, a ures as direct public control of weeds vary widelyfrom as low major result of the 5 to 10 percent herd movements and sizes or le- as 5 to 10 percent to as high as annual growth of poultry pro- gal and institutional changes in 30 to 40 percent. There is no doubt, duction in most developing coun- the pattern of landownership. though, that the rapidly spread- tries. ing use of chemicals against in- Livestock farming in the arid Technology sects and insect-borne diseases in natural grasslands of the devel- recent years has greatly boosted The drive to improve the quality crop production. Pesticides are and productivity of farmland has often crucial for preventing losses Figure 6.6 Tractors been greatly assisted by the of high-yielding crops. At the in major crop zones, 1978 achievements and products of in- same time, their undesirable side Tractors (units per & Cultivated area dustry. Among the most impor- effects are causes of genuine con- thousand hectares) (million tant contributions have been the cern. Pesticides can change in- 10 5 0 hectares) following. sects' immunities, destroy natural 50 enemies, cause outbreaks of sec- Machinery Root crop zone ondary pests, and deposit poten- The speed at which farming be- tially harmful residues. Rice comes mechanized depends on The alternatives to pesticides zone the relative scarcities of land and also have their drawbacks. One labor, unless governments sub- promising possibility is the pro- Maize sidize mechanization. In most of motion of wider genetic resist- zone Asia and other areas with abun- ance to disease. This can be com- dant labor, machines are used first bined with crop rotations, efforts for operations where concen- to introduce natural enemies that Sorghum trated power or speed are supe- will attack predators and the and millet zone rior to human labor or animal- sources of disease, and more dis- drawn implements: examples in- criminating use of chemicals. This clude stationary threshers, mills, kind of integrated pest manage- and water pumps. Tractors are ment is complicated to adminis- used for clearing heavy land and ter, however. It requires teams of also for transport (Figure 6.6). In skilled scientists and a compre- Mixed recent years, power tillers have hensive organization for protect- (India) been used for mechanized pud- ing crops. These requirements are dling of rice fields in, for exam- far beyond the administrative ca- Mixed ple, Thailand (China) and the Philip- pacity of most countries; none- pines. theless, selected elements of this Source: FAQ. The shift to mechanical power approach can be highly effective. in response to labor shortages and Herbicides, which kill weeds, 66 Figure 6.7 Fertilizer use yielding seeds, fertilizer use rose nisms is being undertaken (see Box in major crop zones, 1978 eightfold, reaching 38 million tons 6.4), but in the short and medium t Fertilizer Cultivated area in 1979. Half the increase in grain term it is unlikely that they will (kilograms per hectare) (million yields since 1950 is a result of significantly reduce the use of fer- 100 75 50 5 hectares) 25 50 greater fertilizer use in combina- tilizer. 100 tion with irrigation and modern Mycorrhizas are fungi that live Root crop zone 150 seeds. Most regional differences in contact with plant roots and in the use of fertilizer can be ex- transmit nutrients to them. Prom- Rice plained by the amount of control ising results have been achieved zone farmers can exercise over their in laboratories, but large-scale ap- water supplies (Figure 6.7). In low- plications are still some way off. rainfall areas, only 3 kilograms per Chemical fertilizer will there- Maize hectare of fertilizer (measured in fore remain a major and expand- zone terms of plant nutrients) are ap- ing source of productivity growth plied, while high-rainfall areas in developing countries. There is Sorghum average 20 kilograms per hectare; considerable scope for more effi- and millet zone with reliable irrigation, about 110 cient usage, in part through the kilograms per hectare are used. development of new varieties of Wheat zone Farmers use little fertilizer in drier high-yielding crops that respond areas because plants that lack even more favorably to fertilizer water do not respond, and the than do present varieties; the de- Mixed risk of crop failure makes farmers velopment of rain-fed crops that (India) reluctant to use it. To some extent respond better to fertilizer is also this is also the case with some a possibility. The fertilizer indus- irrigation systems that do not en- try has responded rapidly to in- sure an adequate water supply. creased demand; despite higher Mixed Rising energy costs and in- energy costs, ample raw materials (China) creasing concern about the eco- exist for the industry's future Source FAQ logical impact of chemical fertil- growth. The most likely con- izers have encouraged a renewed straints on increased fertilizer use search for alternatives to fertilizer in the developing world are have a primarily labor-saving use: shortages of seed and irrigation, function. They are particularly Animal manure and organic and inappropriate government valuable where land is abundant wastes are important sources of distribution and pricing policies. and labor for tilling and weeding plant nutrients; they also improve is scarce enough to limit the area the structure of soil and its ability Research that can be planted. Again, ex- to retain water. There are eco- perience is showing how herbi- nomic and practical limits to ex- The emergence of genetic science cides can be used more sparingly panding their use, however. Re- in the mid-nineteenth century and and to greater effect: one example placing the chemical fertilizer now the establishment of publicly fi- is the zero-tillage system for the in use with animal manure would nanced agricultural research cen- subhumid tropics being devel- require a threefold increase in the ters have fostered the scientific oped by IITA in Nigeria. The in- world's animal population. breeding and selection of agricul- troduction of herbicides needs to Biological nitrogen fixation tural products. Plant selection and be carefully monitored for its ef- through microorganisms has tra- improvement takes place today in fect on both health and employ- ditionally been achieved by intro- hundreds of national and inter- ment. ducing legumes into crop rota- national centers forming a world- tions. Chinese and Vietnamese wide network that shares data, Fertilizer farmers have long grown the water planting materials, and results and Until the early 1960s, the use of fern Azolla in rice fields; it pro- scours the earth for wild plants fertilizer in developing countries vides a habitat for blue-green al- that might possess useful char- was limited to a few valuable ex- gae that help supply the rice with acteristics. At the frontier of ge- port crops. With the spread of ir- nitrogen. Research into these and netic research, microbiologists are rigation and the advent of high- other nitrogen-fixing microorga- applying still more advanced 67 technology to develop new or advanced more slowly. Outside a major impact on reducing pov- dramatically modified plants (Box the tropics, these cereals had been erty (see Chapter 7). In sub-Sa- 6.4). used primarily as animal feed and haran Africa, pulses, roots, and Until recently, tropical agricul- their taste was inferior; there was tubers account for 27 percent of tural research was concentrated little incentive to improve them agricultural output; by compari- on export crops such as sugar, ba- in tropical areas. Similarly, very son, cereals represent only 17 nanas, rubber, cotton, tea, coffee, little research had been done on percent of production. In South and oil palms. Major progress in pulses (such as chickpeas and and Southeast Asia and China, in cereals was confined to temperate cowpeas) and root crops such as contrast, the figures are 9 to 10 areas until the early 1960s, when cassava, because these were not percent and 40 to 50 percent, re- major breakthroughs were made grown in temperate areas. spectively. in tropical wheat and rice tech- Whether modern scientific tech- Plant breeding in the tropics is nology. International research niques and a high international complicated by wide local varia- centers played a key role in de- and national research priority can tions within seemingly homoge- veloping and disseminating this make up this lost ground remains neous natural conditions, and by new technology (Box 6.5) to be seen. the way local varieties have been Tropical research on sorghum, If the answer is positive, ad- bred to survive under those con- millet, and maize started later and vances in those crops could have ditions rather than to achieve Box 6.5 The international agricultural research centers The worldwide system of internationally guished agricultural and social scientists, varieties and farming systems for re- funded research centers grew out of a drawn about equally from developed and source-poor farmers in the rain-fed crop investment program jointly spon- developing countries. areasa group hitherto unable to benefit sored by Mexico's Department of Agri- CGIAR supports mainly research and from modern rice and wheat technolo- culture and the Rockefeller Foundation. training programs to enhance the pro- gies. Improving production in the rain- In 1943, a team of Mexican and US sci- duction and yield stability of food crops fed tropics is a slow and difficult process, entists began a systematic effort to de- cultivated throughout the developing and it is hard to predict the timing of velop improved varieties of maize and world. The group also sponsors research significant increases in yields. National wheat. Encouraged by the success of this on livestock production systems and dis- agricultural research programs are also venture, the Rockefeller and Ford Foun- eases, the conservation and utilization of often weak in these areas; the interna- dations joined forces in the first truly plant genetic resources, and food policy. tional centers thus currently provide much international agricultural research cen- Finally, CGIAR helps countries strengthen of the research momentum required to ter, the International Rice Research In- their national agricultural research sys- fill the large gaps in technology devel- stitute (IRRI), established in the Philip- tems. opment. pines in 1960. The Mexican crop programs Thirteen international centers and pro- The impact of the international agri- were reconstituted in 1966 on the IRRI grams are currently funded through cultural research system is not confined model as the Centro International de Ma- CGIAR. Among the newer centers, the to new technology. It has also provided joramiento de Maiz y Trigo (CIMMYT). International Institute of Tropical Agri- leadership in research philosophy and The Consultative Group on Interna- culture (IITA), the International Crops methodology, which is changing the way tional Research (CGIAR) was established Research Institute for the Semi-Arid research is conducted in developing in 1971 as an informal association of Tropics (ICRISAT), and the International countries and has demonstrated to pol- countries, multilateral organizations, and Center for Agricultural Research in the icymakers that investment in high-qual- private foundations. Its main purpose is Dry Areas (ICARDA) are involved in crop ity agricultural research pays off. to support and expand research which research, while the International Live- Funding for the international pro- will help solve agricultural problems stock Center for Africa (ILCA) and the grams increased sixfold between 1972 and common to many developing countries International Laboratory for Research on 1980. In the last two years donor contri- and improve food production in the de- Animal Diseases (ILRAD) concentrate on butions have grown relatively slowly, veloping world. In addition to the chair- livestock issues. All these centers devote however, to a total of US$150 million. man and secretariat, provided by the most of their resources to work on such Limited increases in funding, combined World Bank, CGIAR has an advisory important crops as sorghum, millet, cas- with exchange rate changes and high rates panel, the Technical Advisory Commit- sava, and legumes, and on improve- of inflation, have caused most centers to tee (TAC), whose secretariat is financed ments in the farming systems, including cut back their activities at a time when jointly by UNDP, the World Bank, and livestock farming, in which they are pro- the need and demand for their services FAQ. TAC is made up of thirteen distin- duced. Their intent is to develop better are increasing rapidly. 68 higher yields. To replace existing cent of the value of their agricul- This dramatic change has been seeds with higher-yielding ones, tural output on research, this rep- labeled the Green Revolution. It new varieties may need to be de- resents about four times their began in the mid-1960s with the veloped for each small region. To expenditure on extension. Given release of new varieties of wheat survive, plants also need to build the very high returns to agricul- from CIMMYT in Mexico, and of up resistance to local pests and tural research, a strong case can rice from IRRI in the Philippines. diseases. Varieties of wheat and, be made for investing more in re- The new wheat varieties were in- to a lesser extent, rice have been search in developing countries. troduced to Pakistan and India in developed that can be adapted to The role of international re- 1966. Wheat production in India many different conditions; other search centers is changing as na- had doubled by 1970-72 to 23.4 grains are less adaptable. A va- tional systems are built up and million tons. At that point, the riety of maize may produce high take over more of the task of de- plants were affected by a disease yields in one valley in the high- veloping new technology. Today, known as rust and production lands of Mexico, and only a min- special emphasis is given to train- stagnated. By the mid-1970s, In- imal harvest in a neighboring val- ing national research workers, and dian scientists had developed va- ley, and it may fail completely in the centers are increasingly func- rieties that not only resisted rust central India. tioning as clearinghouses for but also matured earlier. Seeds Most traditional cereal strains highly specialized knowledge and were also being distributed more have been adapted to soils that genetic material. The centers have widely. Production again started are short of nutrients. The stem also become more involved in de- to increase, reaching 33 million and the leaves, rather than the veloping research methodology, tons in 1978-80. From being the edible head, use most of the nu- especially for analyzing social and world's second largest cereal im- trients. When fertilized, growth is economic obstacles to progress at porter in 1966, India had become largely in the stem and may result the individual farm level. self-sufficient by the late 1970s. in "lodging" (the plant's falling Some small countries and those The new wheat varieties were over in wind and rain). Plant that lack skilled manpower and quickly adopted in many parts of breeding in the last three decades cannot afford basic research have the world. China, Pakistan, and has therefore concentrated on de- special problems. They have to Turkey, among others, achieved veloping shorter, sturdier cereal rely more heavily than others on significant increases in yields and plants whose heads make up a practices and materials developed production. Bangladesh, where higher percentage of their total by the international centers, while wheat was once almost un- weight. The resulting shorter- devoting most of their own ef- known, produced 1.2 million tons stemmed plant can support the forts to applied research at ex- by 1980-81. larger head which nutrients pro- perimental stations and on farms. The first new rice varieties grew mote. Yields are only one concern There is considerable scope for best during the dry season under of plant breeders: others include broadening regional cooperation clear skies; they were quickly growing time, resistance to pests in areas such as Central America adopted by the farmers in South and disease, flavor, and storage and sub-Saharan Africa. Unfor- and Southeast Asia who could ir- qualities. tunately, most past attempts at rigate during the dry season. A Despite the proven value of re- regional cooperation have not couple of years later, the varieties search, developing countries are been very successful. suitable for the monsoon season not yet devoting enough re- were released, but they were sources to it. A recent study adopted relatively slowly and se- showed that spending on re- The Green Revolution lectively because the semi-dwarf search in fifty-one developing Within little more than a decade, plants need reliable supplies of countries had risen significantly over half the developing world's water during the growing season, over the past decade but was still wheat acreage and one-third of its and cannot be grown in heavily equivalent to only 0.5 percent of paddy fields were converted to flooded areas. Relatively few the value of agricultural output in new high-yielding, semi-dwarf paddy farmers in Asia enjoy this 1980. This is much less than de- varieties. With good irrigation and degree of control over their water veloping countries' spending on the right amount of fertilizers and supply. Where favorable condi- agricultural extension services. By chemicals, their yields can be two tions exist, however, the short contrast, although industrial to three times those of traditional maturity time of the new varieties economies spend about I to 2 per- varieties (see Box 6.6). has permitted double- or even tn- 69 Box 6.6 The Green Revolution in Punjab, India The Indian state of Punjab, on the semi- but used almost no cash inputs except Wheat production failed to rise further arid, drought-prone Indo-Gangetic Plain, canal water. Wheat, the most important in the early 1970s, partly because of dis- emerged from the colonial era with ex- crop, was grown on 30 percent of the ease. Growth resumed after the intro- tensive irrigation infrastructure and good farmland. duction of disease-resistant varieties in transportation facilities. Its farming com- In the 1950s and early 1960s, Punjabi the mid-1970s. By then, other crops had munity was prosperous and progressive, farmers began the transformation from taken over wheat's role as growth lead- traditional to commercial agriculture. ers. Rice, potatoes, and other nontradi- They started to apply small amounts of tional crops expanded rapidly in both area Agricultural transformation fertilizer to their fields and output rose and yield. in Punjab, 1961-80 steadily. Larger farmers were the first to adopt Yield In 1966 the first high-yielding wheat the new technology, but small farmers (tons per hectare) variety, which responded well to fertil- and tenants soon took it up. Modern izer and irrigation, was released. This farming practices are now used through- innovation unleashed a chain of events out Punjab. As part of the commerciali- that transformed Punjabi agriculture. zation of agriculture, crop sharing ar- Farmers quickly realized that it could rangements for tenants are gradually double their yields. By 1969, they had being replaced by fixed cash rents. With planted more than two-thirds of their the expansion of farm income, small in- wheat fields with high-yielding varieties: dustry and service establishments have average yields rose to 2.2 tons a hectare flourished. Many landless farm workers compared with 1.4 tons in 1966. have moved into nonfarm jobs. Income 0 By 1972, just six years after the intro- per capita has been growing at an av- 1965 70 75 duction of the new variety: erage rate of 3 to 3.5 percent a year for Farm incomes had doubled, and sav- two decades. Production ings had grown still faster. A number of factors have contributed (million tons) Savings were mainly invested in to the Punjabi success. The extensive ex- productive assets. The number of private isting canal system and the good tubewells and tractors increased sixfold groundwater resources, both of which and fourfold, respectively. could be exploited at a relatively modest The new wheat proved so profitable cost, were of special importance. Prices that some lower-value crops were re- were maintained at levels that gave farm- placed. With newly available wellwater, ers ample incentives to adopt new prac- land that had previously lain fallow in tices. Government investment in roads, the dry season could be cultivated. The markets, rural electrification, and other wheat-growing area increased by 50 per- supporting infrastructure enabled farm- cent. ers to take advantage of new opportu- Fertilizer use increased sixfold. nities. Finally, local research led to con- 1965 70 75 Having done so well with wheat, tinuing improvements in varieties of Note; The points plotted are three-year moving averages centered around the year. farmers eagerly planted other high-yield- wheat, rice, potatoes, cotton, and other a. Paddy (unhulled rice). ing crop varieties and increased their use crops. of inputs in the early 1970s. pie-cropping as well as higher ites, but attempts to grow them people's reluctance to eat them. yields from each crop. in other places have not suc- Some 4.5 million hectares, one- There have been no such rev- ceeded. Improved maize varieties third of the rain-fed area, are now olutionary gains in maize and have been most widely adopted planted with these hybrids. They sorghum, though some progress in Argentina, China, Kenya, and also spread in northeastern China has been made. As noted earlier, Zimbabwe. in the mid-1960s. In Latin Amer- tropical and subtropical maize va- Hybrid sorghums for human ica, hybrid sorghum is chiefly rieties have been adapted to the consumption were first made grown for cattle feed on large particular circumstances of quite available in India in 1964, but it commercial farms. Improved mu- small regions. Many breeding sta- took twelve years to produce them lets have not been widely adopted tions have produced dramatically in bulk, to develop their resist- by farmers, and few improve- improved hybrids and compos- ance to disease, and to overcome ments have been made in le- 70 gumes although active research is for cereals, pulses, and root crops. Figure 6.8 Food grain yields under way on these crops. Developing countries account in developing countries, The results of the development for 95 to 100 percent of the output 1961-65 and 1976-80 of new grain varieties have been and export of bananas, tea, cof- Tons per hectare remarkable. In developing coun- fee, cocoa, and rubber and be- 2.5 Rice' tries, cereal yields rose by 2 per- tween 45 and 60 percent of cot- cent a year between 1961 and 1980: ton, tea, tobacco, and sugar. In 2.0 in the case of wheat varieties by the case of coconuts, over 80 per- 2.7 percent; in sorghum by 2.4 cent come from Asia. Palm oil is Maize percent; and in maize by 2 per- produced exclusively in devel- 1.5 Wheat cent (see Figure 6.8). Although rice oping countries, though the dis- yields increased by only 1.6 per- tribution of production among cent a year in developing coun- them has changed greatly. In 1965, 1.0 Sorghum tries as a whole, they rose by more 74 percent of output was in Af- iher coarse grains than 3 percent a year in the Phil- rica, 23 percent in Asia, and 3 per- 0.5 Pulses ippines and Indonesia, which cent in Latin America. By 1980, were best suited to the new va- almost 68 percent was produced rieties. in Asia, 28 percent in Africa, and 0 The Green Revolution has 4 percent in Latin America. Al- 1961-65 1976-80 transformed the lives of millions though nonfood crops account for Source: FAO of farmers. It has failed to benefit a small fraction of the agricultural a. Paddy (unhulled rice). a much larger number for some output of the developing world or all of the following reasons: as a whole, they represent as much The technology did not fit as 20 to 35 percent of production consumption are high and further their climate and soil. in some countries: examples in- income increases generate only National research systems clude Colombia, Costa Rica, limited extra demand for tree were not available to adapt the Ghana, Guatemala, Liberia, Ma- crops. Industrial substitutes also international varieties to local laysia, Mali, Nicaragua, and Sri limit market demand for some conditions. Lanka. Exceptionallyfor exam- crops such as rubber, cotton, and Adequate rainfall, irrigation, ple, in El Salvador and Ivory jute. Against these demand con- or flood control was not available. Coastthey can rise to 40 to 50 straints, sizable productivity gains Transport and marketing net- percent. have helped reduce costs and works were deficient. Unlike research on tropical food prices. The general pattern of de- Prices and other incentives crops, research on tree crops and mand appears to be improving, were inadequate. sugar has nearly as long and suc- as oil exporters and many middle- cessful a history as that of tem- income countries increase their Progress in other tropical crops perate crops, largely because of imports as incomes rise. In ad- The emphasis given to cereals in the colonial interest in them as dition, higher petroleum prices the developing countries reflects exports to developed countries. have shifted the competitive bal- the critical importance of basic In several instances, notably sugar, ance somewhat from synthetics foods. Nonetheless, tree crops and palm oil, rubber, and coconuts, back to natural fibers. nonfood crops are important ex- Green Revolutions as significant Despite the drawbacks of tree ports in many developing coun- as those in wheat and rice have crops, acreage for them can be ex- tries. Moreover, tree crops are taken place, often more than once. panded quickly and the technol- frequently grown on land not Less spectacular but significant ogy is already well established. suited for the cultivation of an- improvements in cultivation, fer- This makes them especially at- nual crops. Fruits, vegetables, and tilization, and harvesting tech- tractive in regions where progress vegetable oils are also becoming niques have also been made. on food crops is slow, particularly more significant as incomes rise. Production and productivity sub-Saharan Africa. There, the Their elasticity of demand in de- have improved much more rap- choice between food and nonfood veloping countries ranges from 0.5 idly than the growth of demand. production is not simple: both to 0.9, which means that at me- Most tree crops have been ex- need to progress. Over the longer dian income levels demand for ported mainly to the developed term, the need for local research them grows twice as fast as it does countries, where incomes and on food crop improvements is 71 clear. In developing improved ing women's role by introducing for the purchase of motorized or technologies for crops, however, new ideas, education, medical nonmotorized vehicles. In addi- choices need to be made on the care, and economic alternatives to tion, transport regulations often basis of comparative advantage. maize cultivation. In particular, hinder the development of rural women married later, had fewer transportation. Supports for agricultural growth children, and pursued more non- Improving telecommunications domestic activities. has fallen prey to the artificial bar- Land improvement, new farming Feeder roads are often ne- rier between the "modern" and methods, and more research are glected if left to national road "rural" sectors. Telecommunica- all necessary requirements for transport authorities, which gen- tions are not exclusively an urban agricultural growth, but they are erally prefer the challenge of tool. Agricultural growth can be not sufficient conditions for its at- building major highways. Feeder accelerated if farmers have accur- tainment. Numerous comple- roads may receive more attention ate market information and a fast mentary services are also needed if the responsibility for their plan- way of calling for the repair of if farmers are to translate the po- ning, construction, and mainte- equipment and delivery of sup- tential of science into the reality nance is devolved to local gov- plies. Rural industry is often an of bigger and better crops. The ernment or to area development early beneficiary of an effective final section of this chapter ex- authorities. This requires central telephone network. amines what this back-up effort government's willingness to ex- involves. pand the revenue-raising powers Extension of local government. The adoption of new technology Infrastructure Externally financed projects depends on the knowledge, skill, The existence and expansion of have been successful in demon- and motivation of farmers, to- basic infrastructure has contrib- strating that feeder roads can be gether with a host of other factors uted significantly to increased built quite cheaply. Good exam- which influence the farmers' ca- agricultural output in Asia and ples are the World Bank's first pacity to achieve output levels ap- Latin America. For example, the three rural development projects proaching those obtained on re- Philippines has allocated about 5 in the northern savannah areas of search stations (Box 6.7). The main percent of agricultural develop- Nigeria, where 1,700 kilometers task of agricultural extension is to ment spending to rural electrifi- of feeder roads were built or im- transmit knowledge of better pro- cation programs, which now serve proved between 1975 and 1980; duction methods to farmers, and about 70 percent of the popula- and the much smaller cocoa and to help them overcome difficul- tion. On a simpler level, basic coffee development project in ties in employing them. With roads are essential for getting Togo, in which 200 kilometers of some important exceptions, the agriculture moving. In many parts roads linking villages in moun- performance of extension services of Africa, farmers are more than tainous terrain were built at less has been disappointing. a day's walk from the nearest road. than half the cost tendered by pri- The existence of a profitable Measures to raise their produc- vate contractors. In both cases, lo- technology is a precondition for tion without transport and com- cal artisans were used to do much successful extension work. In sub- munications are of little use, be- of the skilled work such as bridge Saharan Africa (and indeed in cause their crops cannot reach a and culvert construction. many other rain-fed areas), farm- market and they are cut off from When rural infrastructure is ers ignore the advice of extension new technology, inputs, and being improved, giving priority workers on planting dates and ideas. to simple tracks and spot im- cropping when it does not suit Improved access usually brings provements of roads for motor- their circumstances or promises with it an expansion of nonfarm ized vehicles enlarges the per- little obvious reward. Instead, they enterprises such as shops, repair centage of rural poor offered continue to intercrop and spread services, and grain mills. It also opportunities for productive ac- out plantings to reduce risk and helps change customs, attitudes, tivities by both private and public stretch their limited resources. In and values. For example, a World construction agencies (see Chap- this and many other cases, the Bank study of the impact of rural ter 7). To derive full benefits from fault lies with a lack of applied roads in the state of Yucatan in investment in roads, improve- research that takes account of lo- Mexico found that the roads of- ments often need to be comple- cal social and economic condi- fered an opportunity for enlarg- mented by easier access to credit tions (Box 6.8). 72 Box 6.7 The yield gap and agricultural extension services Farmers in developing countries rarely achieve the record yields attained in de- Factors explaining veloped countries or in controlled re- the yield gap Yield level search. Most of this gap in yields is a Nontransferable Maximum research technology station yield result of commonsense decisions by Environmental farmers or of circumstances outside their difference control, rather than lack of skill or ini- tiative on their part. In some cases, it Market access may not pay farmers to buy inputs that Prices Technical ceiling might help improve yields. In others, the Tenure on farmers' field relationships poor quality of the land or a lack of re- sources may make it impossible for them Risk aversion Economic ceiling to use the cultivation practices that max- Availability on farmers' field imize yields. The figure illustrates some of inputs of the factors that cause yields at re- Knowledge Actual farmer search stations and in farmers' fields to achivement differ. First, the technical ceiling for on-farm yields is lower than that for research sta- 0 20 40 60 80 100 tions. The latter use technologies that are Cultivated area (percentage) not feasible at the farmers' usual scale of production. Research stations are usu- ally located on choice land and can de- Farmers may also not know about opti- solutions might include strengthening pend on irrigation if it is needed. The mal combinations of inputs or the best agricultural extension or advisory ser- farmers' environment is rarely as kindly. cultivation practices. vices, streamlining input supply and Second, the on-farm economic ceiling is The relative magnitude of each part of credit systems, or creating a crop insur- often much lower than the on-farm tech- the yield gap profoundly affects devel- ance scheme. nical ceiling. Farmers' profits are often opment strategy. Closing a large gap be- Thus, extension services can help nar- highest at input levels lower than those tween the different technical ceilings im- row the yield gap but cannot close it. necessary for maximum yields, because posed by on-farm and research Worldwide experience indicates that ag- of diminishing returns on investment in environments requires either invest- ricultural extension services are most ef- inputs. mentfor example, in flood control, land fective when: Third, farmers' actual yields are usually development, or irrigationor research They support a profitable, risk-free below even economic ceilings. This may to develop crop varieties and farming or low-risk technology that is unknown be because key inputs such as fertilizer, practices better suited to on-farm con- to farmers. water, and labor are not available when ditions. A large gap between on-farm Key inputs such as fertilizer and needed, or because volatile output prices technical and economic ceilings calls for quality seed are available at the right time. and unreliable rainfall reduce expected a review of price policies and improved Farmers have ready access to mar- returns. These factors may force the market access for farmers. If actual yields kets for their additional produce. farmer into a "safety-first' strategy. are far below even the economic ceiling, In particular, extension services except by the direct involvement growth in coverage and the ful are often biased toward work with of women in the programs. utilization of the services. Par- men and neglect the very impor- Other problems with extension tially in response to problems of tant role of women as farmers in reflect an inability of the farmers cost, and partially to provide a most parts of the world. In some to respond because input sup- supplementary communication societies women carry out all but plies, marketing systems, and channel (particularly for women), the initial land clearing and heavy other supporting elements are in- a number of countries have ex- plowing. In many still largely tra- adequate. Extension is usually plored the use of radio and other ditional farming systems women most effective when these nec- mass media to deliver extension have exclusive responsibility for essary complements are present. messages. These experiences have the cultivation of food crops. In The rising burden of the recur- demonstrated the potential for these situations, no effort to im- rent costs of extension services is carrying agricultural information prove productivity can succeed another limitation on both the inexpensively to large audiences. 73 nance, buy, sell, transport, pro- Box 6.8 Decisionmaking on the African farm cess, and store farmers' products and to distribute purchased in- Cotton planting in northern Uganda reduce the cost of growing cotton and puts at the time they are needed. should ideally start by mid-April and be secure their staple food. Gambian groundnut farmers plant There is a tendency to take these completed within two months. Test re- sults show a steep decline in yield per late so as not to compete for labor in activities for granted. In most hectare the longer planting is delayed. millet growing. Although a late crop tropical developing countries they In fact, however, farmers consistently needs more labor for weeding, there are take place under difficult physical plant three-quarters of their crop in June fewer alternative productive uses of la- conditions, especially for crop and July, and spread planting over at bor time at this relatively slack time of transport and storage, and often least four months. Similarly, groundnut year. in an adverse policy environ- growers in the Gambia ignore advice that In Nigeria, a crop mixture gave 60 ment. This makes life harder for early planting saves on weeding later. In percent higher gross returns per hectare farmers who want to enter the Nigeria (and throughout Africa) small- than pure stands. It also improved re- market. holders still intercrop, despite recom- turns on labor in peak periods by more Despite these problems, farm- mendations to plant crops in pure stands than 25 percent, despite higher overall ers in the developing world have to increase yields. labor input. These may sound like examples of African farmers in these three coun- generally responded eagerly to farmer reluctance to accept new meth- tries, despite their limited resources and market opportunities. Small- ods. Closer investigation suggests that output, make production decisions in holder farmers rapidly adopted the this is not the case. much the same way as larger operators. growing of rubber trees in Malay- Hail storms hit northern Uganda at They respond rapidly to changing re- sia and of cocoa, groundnuts, and harvesttime; growers consequently spread source availability, constraints, and in- cotton in West Africa once mar- out the planting season to reduce the risk centives and balance available resources keting channels were established of loss. Extending the season enables to meet multiple (often conflicting) ob- in the late nineteenth century. farmers to plant other cropsincluding jectives. In fact, considerations which Cocoa, a difficult plant to nur- millet, which is the preferred family food might be of only minor significance on ture, had never before been grown and is used as part payment of cotton- large farms often assume great impor- tance on small ones, owing to resource by African farmers. Yet in little workers' wages. After the millet harvest, some plots can be planted late with cot- limitations and the close interrelation- more than a half century, or only ton; time can then be saved on weeding ships between farm and household de- two generations, West Africa's and harvesting. Farmers can thus both cisions. production of cocoa beans reached over 1 million tons a year; it cap- tured 70 percent of the world The extent to which radio can in- fine their assistance and advice if market and brought farmers more duce farmers to adopt sound new farmers are to buy their products. cash per day's work than any other technical packages remains, how- The long-run interests of manu- crop ever grown there. More re- ever, to be fully assessed. facturers and dealers are best cently, in the Ivory Coast, cocoa In recent years efforts have been served by customers who come production increased from 80,000 made to improve the administra- back year after year. Realizing this to over 400,000 tons in the two tive efficiency and field-level ef- fact, companies often undertake decades since 1960, largely be- fectiveness of several extension applied research and conduct ex- cause of fair prices and market- services and to develop better periments and field demonstra- ing. linkages both to the farmers tions. Marketing has many facets, as themselves and to research. This a brief review of World Bank work is one of the key features of the Marketing reveals. In Mexico, under PIDER Training and Visit System, origi- Crop marketing activities are III, project finance is being used nally supported by the World Bank often the key to opening up sub- to organize small farmers into as- in India and adapted to condi- sistence agriculture. Supplying sociations linked to a central dis- tions in other countries. urban consumers with food, ex- tribution agency; to build local The private sector also plays an ploiting foreign trade opportuni- storage facilities; to build and im- important role in the diffusion of ties, specializing according to the prove retail stores; to develop ru- technology and advice to farmers. comparative advantage of each ral markets; and to conduct a con- Machinery manufacturers, seed region, village, and farmthese sumer information program companies, and suppliers of fer- can take place only if there are through the home extension ser- tilizer and pesticides must all re- intermediaries equipped to fi- vice. Under the Piaui project in 74 Brazil, a ten-component market- and they are not always fully nomic environment does not ing program is aimed at bringing reimbursed for losses incurred in enable them to operate effi- together poor producers and con- the process. ciently. The uncertainties associ- sumers. In Cameroon, the ZAPI In food-crop marketing, there ated with the ambiguous position project includes support for a ru- are usually parallel marketing of private trade and traders dis- ral distribution network for agri- channels; the legal and official courage full-time involvement in cultural supplies, an urban mar- marketing agency coexists with an food marketing, investment in ket to handle surplus crops from often semiclandestine private transport and storage, and a sys- rural areas, and the improvement trading sector. Some govern- tematic approach to developing of processing and marketing fa- ments do not put much trust in an adequate supply network. This cilities for the export of coffee and the private sector's ability to pro- is starting to change, as govern- cocoa. In the Philippines, the land vide stable supplies of food to ur- ments recognize the value of in- settlement program is concerned ban markets, even when private volving private traders. with developing markets for new traders handle the bulk of the State-owned agencies also fre- plantation crops. In Greece, over trade. In such cases, private in- quently monopolize the supply of 6,000 small vegetable farmers have termediaries are tolerated as in- inputs. They often fail to buy and been linked by local marketing dispensable partners, but the eco- distribute seed, fertilizer, and corporations to supermarket out- lets for their produce in western Europe, as part of a Bank-fi- nanced project supporting inten- Box 6.9 Productivity and small farms: Intensive sive production of winter vege- vegetable production in southern Greece tables (Box 6.9). As the agricultural labor force moves of adequate grading and packaging fa- Marketing can be handled by rapidly into the nonfarm economy, farm- cilities. They also tend to have inade- the public or private sector or a ing in Greece is under pressure to in- quate market representation and infor- mixture of the two, depending on crease labor productivity. Small and frag- mation, and to supply a single product the circumstances of individual mented landholdings in southern Greece only, often to a single market. limit opportunities for mechanization. Greek exporters (and the small farmers countries. Because of its political One promising alternative has been to who supply them) have thus been una- and economic sensitivity, it has develop high-value cropping systems to ble to supply the western European su- often been a public monopoly. supply European fruit and vegetable permarket business, which is highly con- Although the reasons for inter- markets. centrated and represents almost 75 per- vention were sometimes valid at Over 6,000 small vegetable farmers in cent of the fresh fruit and vegetable mar- the time public marketing agen- the region are currently participating in ket. Breaking into this market, which cies were created, often during or a program which provides them with relies on direct contracts incorporating shortly after the colonial period equipment to promote more intensive predefined quality standards and fixed in Africa and Asia, a high price cultivation, and helps them sell their out- delivery schedules, requires improve- is being paid to keep some of them put in the profitable markets of western ments in the coordination and planning in place. Serious inefficiencies Europe. The program, which is sup- of exports. ported by a World Bank loan, is expected To ensure that investment in more in- have characterized the operation eventually to raise the productivity and tensive vegetable farming equipment and of many parastatal marketing incomes of 9,000 small-farming families. methods will pay off in export sales, four agencies. Some arise from prob- The key investment is a small green- marketing companies, to be owned lems found in almost all paras- house covered with a single layer of clear mainly by farmers, cooperatives, and tatalsovermanning, inadequate plastic and equipped with irrigation and private exporters, are being established. nonsalary budgets, and the scarc- ventilation. Winter heating is expensive, The companies will coordinate small ity of good managers. Sometimes however. The new program therefore in- farmers' output under production and official producer prices and con- cludes research on heat conservation, use delivery contracts, operate grading and sumer prices for food crops are of solar energy for heating, screening of handling facilities, and provide a reliable fixed by governments with little cold-resistant vegetable varieties, and and timely supply of quality products to regard to the actual costs of col- manipulation of their planting dates. supermarket chains in Europe. In this The program is also helping to sell way, Greek vegetable farmers will ben- lection and distribution, fre- Greek vegetables more efficiently in ex- efit from expanding and assured markets quently on a uniform national ba- port markets. Traditionally, vegetable and better prices, despite the small a- sis. Then the agencies are left to exporters handle volumes of produce erage size of their holdings. buy, collect, and deliver in the which are too small to support the cost most distant and costly regions, 75 pesticides at the time farmers need bution of their products, but also Hybrid seeds need to be replaced them because funds are not yet in local adaptive research, field every year, so an active and wide- available from the national budget. trials, and demonstrations to spread distribution chain is es- For some inputs such as pesti- farmers. sential. The Kenya Seed Com- cides and herbicides more coun- The production and distribu- pany, a mixed enterprise, has sold tries could replicate the success of tion of quality seed is another field its Kitale maize hybrid through Bangladesh and the Republic of with broad possibilities for pri- village shops and has successfully Korea in getting agro-chemical vate sector participation. Seed distributed seed to farms of every manufacturing companies to par- companies in particular often work size in the Kenya Highlands. In ticipate and invest not only in the closely with government agencies ecologically similar areas of importation and wholesale distri- in distribution and marketing. neighboring countries, the ab- sence of such a marketing system has meant that the diffusion of Box 6.10 The Indian seed industry maize hybrids is minimal. India's seed program also combines the Getting quality seeds to 70 million farm- efforts of the National Seed Cor- ers on time is a challenge, but the Indian extended. Quality declined, and finan- poration, state seed companies, seed industry is rising to it. Since its in- cial losses were incurred. Private com- and private companies (Box 6.10). fancy two decades ago the industry has panies began to have serious misgivings grown enormously. It now comprises one about their future in the Indian seed in- Credit national corporation, a dozen state-owned dustry. seed corporations, and some 300 private In 1975, the state of Maharashtra au- Credit is essential for moderni- companies. The process of growth has thorized a few seed companies to pro- zation, growth, and equity. Larger been neither smooth nor easy. India's duce their own foundation seed. This de- farmers are generally able to ob- experience illustrates some problems cision has done much to ease the supply tain loans under government faced by both the private and public sec- of high-quality foundation and certified credit schemes and from agricul- tors when agriculture undergoes rapid seed, and to ensure a steady flow to tural banks, but small farmers find transformation. farmers. It has also speeded up the de- access to these institutions diffi- Before the Green Revolution, most velopment and popularization of new cult and rely mostly on informal farmers reserved part of their crop for varieties. credit sources. Because the costs the next year's seed. Occasionally they Only recently have dealers, distribu- and risks of unsecured loans to obtained new seed, grown and distrib- tors, and farmers become accustomed to the idea of seed marketed through seed small farmers are high, local mon- uted by state agricultural departments. A few private companies produced veg- companies. Initially, the companies tried eylenders often charge much etable and flower seeds. to promote their products by demon- higher interest rates than official Following the release of the first hy- strations on farms; private retailers and credit schemes, brid maize varieties in 1961, India's ag- cooperatives were encouraged through In an attempt to remedy this ricultural planners realized that the seed consignment arrangements, which left imbalance, many countries have industry needed to be strengthened. The ownership of any unsold seed with the introduced credit schemes for National Seeds Corporation was formed seed companies. small farmers. Their record is in 1963 and started to grow foundation Today, seed is being distributed in In- mixed. Credit often still goes to seed. The creation of private seed com- dia by a network of more than 10,000 large farmers or is diverted for panies was encouraged, and a number seed dealers throughout the country. nonagricultural purposes. To im- of them were given the opportunity to Farmers have become quality-conscious buy imported seed-processing equip- and have developed preferences for prove the performance of agri- ment on a hire-purchase basis. brands of demonstrated quality. cultural credit schemes, certain By the mid-1960s, hybrid and high- As private seed enterprises have pros- lessons seem clear: yielding seed varieties had been released pered, they have become committed to Early establishment of rules for a wide range of crops. Demand for genetic research and have developed their for repayment (with clearly quality seed took off. Because the private own improved hybrids of sorghum, mil- understood waivers in the event seed industry was still embryonic, public let, cotton, maize, and some vegetables. of crop failure) will not only safe- sector seed multiplication was stepped The search for new varieties has been guard the financial viability of the up through state and local governments extended to other crops such as sun- lending agency but also help spur and agricultural departments; state seed flower, safflower, and pigeon peas. The farmers to greater efficiency. corporations were established. industry is an important example of con- Improved access to credit is Swept along by fast growth, the public structive, competitive interaction be- seed production system became over- tween the public and private sectors. of more benefit to small farmers than subsidized interest rates, 76 since the latter in effect ration the overemphasized lending and ne- To promote loans and sav- amount of credit available. If more glected the provision of other fi- ings, agricultural banks could farmers are to be served, interest nancial services. Rural savings make much more use of rural rates and other charges should re- schemes are particularly useful for agencies already in the field. They flect the true costs of lending and expanding the financial base of could also develop closer links credit recovery. There is some- lending and for encouraging re- with cooperative and group- times scope for accepting assets payment. There is considerable farmer schemes, as has been done such as animals as security for evidence that small farmers do in Malawi, for example. loans. save when offered attractive sav- Formal credit agencies have ings rates. 77 7 Rural poverty Absolute poverty blights the lives one-fifth to one-quarter are land- Republic of Korea, Romania, Tur- of hundreds of millions in many less, and their livelihood is par- key, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. countries. They have barely ade- ticularly precarious. While often If the momentum of growth is quate (and often uncertain) diets, no poorer than the poorest farm- maintained, earnings and pro- and incomes so low that they can ers, landless laborers are more ductivity in agriculture itself spend little for clothing, fuel, likely to see their jobs disappear should accelerate. Nevertheless, shelter, and other necessities. in a crisis and are less able to fall large pockets of absolute poverty The dimensions and conse- back on reserves, including the may remain in relatively remote quences of absolute poverty have final option of mortgaging or sell- areas or where agricultural pro- been explored in previous Re- ing their land. Most landless la- duction is stagnant. ports, notably in the discussion borers live in low-income market Urban living conditionsno- of poverty and human develop- economies with high rural pop- tably the squalor of the slums in ment two years ago. The 1980 Re- ulation densities over 80 per- which most new migrants tend to port suggested that absolute pov- cent of them are in Bangladesh, clusteroften appear to chal- erty affected a total of about 780 India, and Pakistan, and the rest lenge the notion that rural-urban million people, excluding China in areas such as Java, Indonesia. migration reduces poverty. Mi- and other low-income centrally grants are indeed usually poor by planned economies such as Viet Poverty and growth urban standards, but this reflects Nam. China's nationwide food the large difference in incomes security, along with basic health Past experience clearly shows that between the cities and the coun- and education services, may blunt a combination of economy-wide tryside that encouraged them to the impact of poverty; neverthe- and agricultural growth is essen- migrate in the first place. There less, it is probable that at least 150 tial for the long-term alleviation is extensive evidence that urban million people there enjoy living of poverty. In particular, new, immigrants do improve their in- standards little better than those more productive employment op- comes, health, and education of the absolutely poor in other portunities are needed outside prospects. Moreover, the wages countries. The inclusion of China agriculture. The process of struc- they remit to those who remain thus suggests a global total of close tural transformation, which was behind are an important source to 1 billion people living in ab- discussed in Chapter 5, helps to of income for many rural areas. solute poverty. create urban industrial jobs and Studies in India, Kenya, Malawi, This chapter examines ways in to diversify the rural economy it- and Thailand suggest that remit- which agricultural policies and self. Such developments have led tances can often exceed 10 per- programs can help them. The great to spectacular changes in some cent of the total incomes of vil- majority of the absolute poor middle-income countries over the lages where families of migrants over 90 percentare rural people past twenty years. Despite the live. International remittances who work on farms, or do non- rapid growth of population and from high-wage to low-wage farm work that depends in part the labor force, agriculture's share economies can have similarand on agriculture. More than half are of total employment and the ab- sometimes even more dramatic small farmers who own or lease solute size of the agricultural la- effects. Many migrants to other their land; another 20 percent are bor force have fallen or will soon countries send back or save over members of farming collectives, begin to do so in countries such 50 percent of their incomes; in the mainly in China. The remaining as Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Yemen Arab Republic, remitt- 78 ances have formed the basis for Figure 7.1 Indian rural household income, by source and by farm size, 1970-71 community-financed village de- velopment programs for building roads, schools, and health and Cultivated Percentage Income Crop [I Ancillary Farm Nonfarm Other area of all per person farming farm wages wages water supply facilities. (hectares) households (rupees) activities The expansion of nonfarm rural income and employment is di- 0 28 540 rectly linked to agricultural growth. Estimates suggest that up to of 25 percent of the labor force 0-0.4 9 540 in rural areas may be primarily engaged in nonagricultural pur- 0.4-1 10 460 suitswhich include a range of service and repair work, food processing, handicrafts, leather, 1-2 15 570 Li textiles, and metalworking, to- gether with construction, com- 2-3 9 670 ill jI_ merce, and marketing. Almost all these activities satisfy local de- mand. Because they generally use 3-4 8 820 simple, labor-intensive tech- niques and need little in the way 4-6 8 910 of capital or skills, they can ex- pand rapidly in areas of dynamic agricultural growth (although 6-10 8 1,040 much of the expansion occurs in the market towns that serve the 10+ 4 1,410 countryside rather than in areas strictly defined as rural). In Thai- land, for example, agricultural Average 680 P output grew at over 7 percent a 0 20 40 60 80 100 year during a six-year period in Percentage of total income the 1970s; the nonfarm income of Source: National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, India. rural households is estimated to have grown nearly twice as fast, by over 12 percent a year. of those living in absolute poverty difficulties of this kind: tea or co- Nonfarm income is particularly and makes it easier to deal with coa producers in one country can important for the very poor. In those who remain. The impact of lose heavily because of technical countries as different as India, growth is uneven, however, and change occurring half a world Republic of Korea, and Sierra the prospect of eventual benefits away. Leone, landless or nearly landless is of little comfort to those who Mechanization is another factor households earn about half their suffer in the interim. Moreover, often identified as a threat to the income from nonfarm sourcesa growth itself may increase hard- livelihood of the poor, particu- proportion that falls to 10 to 20 ship for those who do not share larly the landless. Mechanization percent for households with larger in it. For example, cost-reducing generally raises both output and land holdings. (The data for India innovations will win new markets labor productivity, but the mix in Figure 7.1 show a typical pat- and raise productionquite pos- varies. Under certain conditions, tern.) Nonfarm employment is sibly at the expense of those some machines add little or noth- also an important source of sec- living in areas where natural con- ing to output while replacing a lot ondary earnings for small farmers ditions rule out similar innova- of labor; others may add a lot to and the landless in the agricul- tions. These other areas are often output and displace little labor. tural slack season. the poorest to begin with. Com- The machines most likely to Over the long run, economic modities facing inelastic world reduce farm employment are har- growth reduces the total number demand are particularly prone to vesters, threshers, tractors, and 79 milling machines. Labor-displac- percent are Chinese. Low- and programscan also help improve ing mechanization is usually trig- middle-income sub-Saharan Af- the prospects of the rural poor. gered by rising farm wages rica accounts for about 15 per- But programs dealing directly with which in turn normally reflect im- cent, as does East Asia (princi- the problems of the poor are also proved conditions and expanding pally Indonesia and Indochina). essential. Although direct meas- job markets. For example, with Latin America, North Africa, and ures are of special relevance for the growth of nonfarm employ- the Middle East account for only the low-income economies, many ment during the Green Revolu- about 3 to 4 percent each. middle-income countries (includ- tion, the labor used on land dou- Policies and programs to accel- ing some whose growth perform- ble-cropped with wheat and rice erate overall growth are clearly ance is otherwise satisfactory) in the Indian Punjab fell by 16 crucial for the long-term reduc- could also achieve still better re- percent. Over three-quarters of the tion of poverty. The special role sults if they addressed poverty fall (13 percentage points) was ac- of agriculture in strategies for objectives more directly. counted for by the use of tractors. economy-wide growth was dis- This section discusses four sets In stagnating, low-income re- cussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Many of measures to improve the pro- gions, however, labor-displacing of the policy changes advo- ductivity of the poorhuman re- mechanization is rare. Rural wage catedfor example, improved source development, small-farm rates are so low that it is not prof- producer incentives and higher programs, agrarian reform, and itable to replace human tillers and priority for agricultural research rural works. Such programs can harvesters with expensive ma- chines unless the agricultural economy is expanding rapidly. Nevertheless, the pace and pro- Box 7.1 Farmer education, farm efficiency, file of mechanization can be rad- and nutrition in Nepal ically altered by policies that seem, on the face of it, extraneous. Pol- Nepal's Terai region, in the lowlands threshold (at about six years of educa- along the Indian border, suffers many of tion), below which education's impact icies on exchange rates, foreign the interrelated manifestations of rural was insignificant. Among farmers with exchange licensing, subsidized povertylow agricultural productivity more than six years of schooling, wheat credit, and import duties have en- and income, low rates of literacy and yields were over 25 percent higher than couraged the spread of tractors in school enrollment, a high prevalence of those with less or none. Competence in Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Zaire, and malnutrition, and high rates of disease, arithmetic affected the propensity of a other countries. Where neither mortality, and population growth. The farmer to grow wheat at all. The mag- agriculture nor other parts of the 1980 World Development Report concluded nitude of this effect was sufficient to sug- economy are growing rapidly, the that this "seamless web" of factors that gest very high economic returns to ed- effects of premature mechaniza- entrap families in poverty can perhaps ucation as a factor in agricultural tion can be disastrous for those best be broken by providing primary ed- production. ucation: men and women with even a The same research project also sug- who lose their jobs. little education seem consistently better gested the potentially self-reinforcing able to improve agricultural efficiency, to character of investments that address any Initiatives to counter rural take advantage of health and nutrition of several important facets of rural pov- poverty information, and to seek methods of ertyilliteracy, malnutrition, and low family planning. To provide further em- agricultural productivity. Data on chil- Economic growth has been most pirical evidence of these linkages, the dren indicated that malnutrition was an rapid in middle-income countries World Bank gathered data from 800 farm important cause of impaired learning and in recent years, notably among households in the Terai to assess the ex- nonattendance in school; in the next gen- those with per capita incomes of tent to which education helped alleviate eration the resulting illiteracy could be $1,000 or more. Absolute poverty rural poverty. expected to impair agricultural produc- A recently introduced and particularly tivity, which would in turn exacerbate is consequently increasingly con- profitable crop in the Terai is wheat, and malnutrition, thereby completing a vi- centrated among the low-income the study found a strong link between cious circle. Nepal's policy of vigorous countries (and among middle-in- farmer education and efficiency in wheat expansion of primary education would comes countries that have expe- production, even after controlling for seem, then, to offer promise of raising rienced slow growth). Roughly 40 other factors such as the ability, size of agricultural productivity and alleviating percent of the poor are in India, holding, or family background of the several dimensions of rural poverty. Bangladesh, and other South farmer. There was definite evidence of a Asian economies. Another 20 80 bring important benefits under Mobility, whether geographical or Small-farmer programs widely differing circumstances, occupational, is generally a result Small farmers are by far the larg- but their impact tends to be felt of individuals' decisions, which est proportion of the rural poor only in the long term. Moreover, are based on informal networks and, because of their ties to the some aspects of povertyfor ex- of information and experience. land, the least mobile. There are ample, difficulties associated with Governments can promote mo- enormous variations in the large, fatherless familiesare hard bilityand help limit its poten- amount of land they farm, in their to tackle through improved pro- tially adverse side effectsin sev- status (as sharecroppers, tenants, duction opportunities alone. The eral ways. Education and training and owners), and in the kinds of final section in the chapter there- enable poor people to acquire new farming they undertake. They fore deals with government ef- skills and thereby expand their have several common character- forts to maintain food security and earnings opportunities. They are istics, however; they do most of to subsidize food for those in particularly valuable in areas their own work, have few assets, greatest need. where permanent emigration and usually consume most of what needs to be encouraged because, they produce. Absolutely poor Human resources for example, population growth farmers are concentrated in Asia, The 1980 World Development Report is running ahead of productive where rural population densities marshaled a considerable body of capacity. are especially high, and in Africa, evidence to show how programs Similarly, nonfarm rural enter- where little has been done to raise of education, health care, and nu- prise can sometimes be promoted land productivity. Figure 7.2 trition can help increase earnings by worker and management shows the size structure of farms and income among the poor. Evi- training, as well as by improving in different parts of the world. dence continues to accumulate small businesses' access to credit On the face of it, small family supporting these conclusions. to help finance expansion, and by farms may seem inefficient com- Education is especially important investment in infrastructure (such pared with large farms and plan- in enhancing mobility and mak- as rural electrification, transport, tations which use hired labor or ing farmers more receptive to new and communications). Such pro- machinery. The evidence dis- practices and market opportuni- grams can help small towns be- proves this. Where small and large ties. A recently completed World come potential growth poles in farms coexist, as in South Asia or Bank research project in Nepal rural areas. Encouraging people Latin America, research shows (Box 7.1) found strong evidence to better themselves where they that small farms usually produce that education improves a farm- live can help slow the pace of ur- more output per unit of land er's efficiency, and an earlier Bank banization and cut the cost of ex- farmed than do large ones, even study had calculated the rate of panding and upgrading urban in- when allowance is made for the return to primary education (solely frastructure and services. quality of land. Even in the de- in terms of its contribution to Women are often the least mo- veloped countries, though farm farmer efficiency) to be between bile and therefore can benefit most size has grown with mechaniza- 7 and 11 percent in the Republic from programs which foster rural tion and rural emigration, farms of Korea, between 14 and 25 per- development and employment are still typically family-based and cent in Thailand, and between 25 opportunities close to home. While hire very little labor. and 40 percent in Malaysia. These in some societies young unmar- The resilience and productivity findings from Asia complement ried women are quick to move to of small family farms throughout findings from elsewhere that con- new jobs in urban centers, mar- the world is strikingespecially sistently show education to in- ried women, those with children, in the light of characteristics which crease farmer efficiency when- and the old of both sexes are usu- might be expected to make them ever modernization and change ally closely tied to the household less competitive than large farms, in the environment require in- and farm. Attention should there- such as: novative, adaptive responses. fore be given to fostering pro- Small farmers are unable to Labor mobilityfrom one ductive on-farm and local em- exploit economies of scale. Their country to another, from rural to ployment opportunities for transaction costs are high because urban areas, and from agricul- women and to meeting their needs their marketed output, purchases tural to nonagricultural activities for education and training in pro- of inputs, and use of credit are in rural areasis often a potent grams that support migration from on a small scale. means of escaping from poverty. depressed farm areas. Lack of assets limits their 81 Figure 7.2 Number of farms vs farmed area: comparative distribution, by region and by farm size, selected countries, 1970 Percentage of total farmed area Increment = 10 percent ts4 Percentage of total farms 1,000 + 500-1,000 200-500 100-200 50-100 20-50 10-20 5-10 2-5 Holding size 1-2 (hectares) 0-1 sia/ Africa Europe Latin North America America / Source: FAQ, 1970 World Census of Agriculture. ability to borrow money; land is it necessary for workers to seek, many countries, but it is usually often rented and cannot be used and employers to be willing to more muted. as collateral. provide, more in compensation During the past ten years in Small farmers cannot afford than is needed on family farms. particular, governments, sup- to spend as much as large farmers The quality of farming is even ported by international develop- to explore and adopt new tech- more important than its cost. ment agencies, have sought to niques. Productivity gains from Farming is a complicated busi- capitalize on the virtues of small new techniques usually increase ness that requires not only hard farms and to help them overcome profits most among those who use work but also care and attention. their disadvantages. Some of this them first. The small farmer's motivation is work is complex and requires more Small farmers tend to be the usually strong, especially if he is or less simultaneous action on first to suffer during shortages of growing food to feed the family. several fronts. In other cases, fertilizer, seed, and water. They Small farmers exploit their ad- growth may be held back by a lack the influence of their larger vantages (and offset some of their single bottleneck, and a less com- neighbors, whose goodwill is more disadvantages) by putting more plex solution is then possible. For important to local suppliers. hours of work into each hectare example, the lack of roads in re- Offsetting factors are that small than large .farmers do. Although mote areas may limit or wholly farmers benefit from lower labor their capital-to-land ratio is often prevent reliable, cheap delivery costs and self-management. The higher than that of large farmers, of commercial supplies, profitable use of hired labor on large farms small farmers usually have lower penetration of markets, spe- imposes a transaction cost on both ratios of nonland capital to labor. cialized production, and effective workers and employers. The un- Table 7.1 illustrates some of these deployment of farmer services and certainties of obtaining work or tendencies in the case of Brazil. research. Throughout the world workers on any given day make The same pattern can be found in road building has been the foun- 82 dation of rural development Table 7.1 Farm structure in Northeast Brazil, 1974 schemes. Small-farm irrigation Average Average Labor Capital Capital! Gross programs, primarily to improve Farm size holding land value input input labor ratio output water availability and control, are (ha) (ha/farm) (cr/ha) (yrs/ha) (cr/ha) (cr/worker) (cr/ha) also of special importance. 0-9.9 4 1,266 0.247 1,203 4,870 769 Other programs include efforts 10-49.9 27 1,054 0.075 529 7,057 362 to direct part of the flow of farm 50-99.9 72 1,064 0.041 405 9,872 291 100-199.9 141 1,318 0.028 318 11,341 288 credit to small farmers (some- 200-499.9 299 785 0.019 243 12,792 192 times cooperative group guaran- Over 500 1,180 625 0.012 140 11,625 121 tees are used as collateralan ap- Source: Kutcher and Scandizzo (1982). proach pioneered in Malawi's Lilongwe land development pro- gram). Programs to assist small- holder production of plantation crops have involved supervised Box 7.2 The milk revolution in India credit, technical services, and as- Every day at dawn and dusk, 2 million cheese, butter, and other products. sured market access. Efforts of this Indian farmers pick up their milk cans Every member of a cooperative has ac- kind have been particularly suc- and cycle or walk to the nearest collec- cess to technical assistance. The package cessful in Kenya (tea and coffee tion center. They are part of the dairy includes emergency and weekly veteri- growers) and in Asia (rubber and cooperative movement that has swept nary services, artificial insemination, oil palm schemes in Indonesia and India since the early 1970s, enabling concentrated feeds, and seeds for high- Malaysia). owners of a few dairy cows to profit from yielding fodder crops. More complex programs are buoyant demand for their perishable Giving producers a reliable and prof- often designed for an intensive product in distant cities. itable outlet for their milk and the tech- The movement began on a small scale nical wherewithal to increase production development effort in low-in- thirty years ago, when a dairy producers' has helped raise rural income. The come areas or regions. The PIDER cooperative was established in the small movement has even benefited the land- program in Mexico is an example: town of Anand in western India. The less poor who often own one or two cows started in 1973, it channels some Anand cooperative formed the model for or buffaloes. In particular, it has en- $450 million annually to about 120 a grass-roots movement in most Indian hanced the status and well-being of carefully chosen low-income areas states. Assisted by the World Food Pro- women, who are the traditional care- estimated to include about half of gram, the EEC, FAQ, and IDA, this takers of livestock and the recipients of Mexico's 12 million rural poor. The. movement has grown into an industry income from milk sales. money finances a wide variety of comprising more than 10,000 village co- This cooperative venture has worked agricultural investments plus so- operatives that process 2.5 million liters when many others have failed. The fea- cial and economic infrastructure. of milk every day. They sell fresh milk tures which seem to have helped shape to Bombay, Delhi, and other major cities its success include the following: A national scheme of a different and supply processed dairy products Its dedicated leadership and well- type, centered on the production throughout the country. trained staff subscribe to a common prin- of one commodity, is India's dairy The cooperatives are organized in three ciple of service to rural communities. development program which uses tiers: village dairy societies, unions of the Its organizational system enforces producer cooperatives (see Box dairy societies, and a federation of the strict accountability. 7.2). unions. The whole system is owned by Its streamlined marketing system is In their early days, some mul- the primary milk producers. Two semi- suited to the commodity's perishable na- tipurpose programs tended to be autonomous government agenciesthe ture. too complicated to implement National Dairy Development Board and Economies of scale at the processing successfully, especially in coun- the India Dairy Corporationprovide stage encourage collective action. tries with limited administrative technical and financial assistance. Payments are based on fat content The cooperatives form an integrated and are received by producers within and management skills. In some system for marketing and processing. The twelve hours. cases, the necessary managerial local cooperatives buy milk on commis- A well-publicized and appropriate and financial support could be sion at the collection centers. The milk package of technical services is offered provided only with international is immediately brought by truck to the to all members. assistance; replication in other, union dairy where it is pasteurized, put International aid (including food aid) equally deserving areas proved not into insulated tankers, and shipped to has been used judiciously to help build to be possible. Inadequate prep- major cities or processed into dried milk, the dairy industry. arationa weakness not confined 83 to this type of programsome- grams are now being designed to tamed in viable units, and ac- times meant that the "package" simplify management and imple- quiring and distributing land to of improvements turned out to be mentation, especially in Africa. new owners through land re- incomplete or inappropriate for This is usually accomplished by form. Most land reform programs small farmers. concentrating on a lead cropas seek either to create many farms By no means all the difficulties in recent cotton programs in West from a few by taking title or ten- which arose were technical in na- Africaor on a small number of ancy rights and redistributing hire. Misunderstandings about the strongly complementary activi- them, or to unify ownership of social setting, for example, led to ties. The Ethiopian "minimum- many scattered holdings. Land a number of failures in programs package" program, as suggested reform has substantially im- for small-farmer credit and co- by its title, is confined to seed and proved rural income distribution operative development. Patterns fertilizer sales and extension serv- and the base for subsequent ag- of ownership, tenancy, and land ices. Zaire's Kasai Oriental maize ricultural progress in several rights can also make it difficult to program concentrates heavily on countries; examples include China, reach poor farmers; and the ben- one crop plus a few support serv- Japan, and the Republic of Korea. efits of higher production may be ices that are central to improving Several problems tend to limit diverted to relatively well-off productivity among 120,000 farm the effectiveness of land reform, landlords, merchants, and other families. however. Where the argument for middlemen. it is most compellingin densely Other programs help small Agrarian reform settled agricultural areas, where farmers overcome the hostile A critical factor in agricultural de- landlessness and rents are high physical conditions in which they velopment is the willingness and the holdings are usually already often have to work. As might be ability of farmers to improve their very small, which limits the scope expected, rural poverty tends to land by leveling, irrigating, and for land redistribution. Moreover, be particularly severe in the draining it. Farmers with secure often very large numbers of own- world's most difficult natural en- tenure have more reason to make ers would be dispossessed under vironmentsin tropical uplands, such investments than those with these conditions, since land is held in semi-arid regions, and in areas less of a stake in the land. Tenure in small amounts. Many recent with poor soil (often recently is not an issue affecting small studies suggest that in Asia most cleared forest land). In such con- farmers alone, although it tends owners are active in farm man- ditions, small-farmer develop- to bear heavily on them. Insecur- agement along with their tenants ment programs are often held back ity is caused by a variety of fac- and sharecroppers. There seem to because they lack the right tech- tors, including lack of clear title be few cases where tenants lag nical ingredients. The most com- to land, lack of assurance about behind owner-farmers in adopt- mon cropspulses, upland rice, tenancy arrangements, instability ing new techniques or using sorghum, millet, roots and tub- of land rents, andamong land- modern inputs such as fertilizer. ershave only recently begun to ownersfear of land reform By and large, studies that adjust attract research attention. There without proper compensation. for farm size usually find the same are powerful arguments for step- These questions will become more levels of output on all types of ping up this effort, given the high critical as countries run out of vir- farms. returns on past investment in re- gin land and growth comes in- Land reform has long been rec- search (see Chapter 6) and the fact creasingly to depend on making ognized as posing a formidable that numerous poor people pro- capital improvements to existing political challenge. The economic duce and consume these crops as land. challenge of maintaining and im- part of their staple diet. Changing the institutional proving farm output after land re- Despite the difficulties of as- framework to encourage land im- form is also considerable, typi- sisting small farmers, the pro- provement is generally difficult. cally requiring a more active and grams seem on the whole to have The measures involved vary diversified range of farm services been remarkably successful. In widely. They include surveying, if the reform is to be successful. many instances, farm incomes adjudicating and recognizing land In many cases, a pilot program, have been raised significantly and titles, consolidating small and designed to test different ap- benefits widely spread; hand- often widely scattered parcels of proaches, may be a sensible first some returns have accrued to the land, legislating on inheritance to step. Brazil's Northeast, long a economy as a whole. More pro- ensure that farms will be main- paradigm of tenure issues, is im- 84 plementing a World Banksup- rural infrastructure and the abun- Other drawbacks include the fact ported program of this kind in two dance of local labor in many that public works may sometimes of the poorest states, Maranhao countries, programs often seem benefit some individuals more and Piaui. surprisingly modest. This is partly than others where land is pri- But land reform is more often because they require high-caliber vately owned and that proper preached than practicedwhich management and careful design maintenance is difficult to ar- can be highly damaging since it if they are to work well. Project range once construction is com- increases insecurity rather than selection, organization of the la- pleted. reduces it. Among landlords, a bor force, design and engineering These and other problems can general fear of reform and, in par- standards, and financial control be overcome, however. The Ma- ticular, concern that compensa- can all present considerable dif- harashtra Employment Guaran- tion will be inadequate may dis- ficultiesespecially as most pro- tee Scheme (see Box 7.3) is an ex- courage them from making the grams are decentralized and ample of successful rural public most productive use of their land widely scattered. works; so too is Indonesia's Inpres by leasing small parcels to share- Sometimes, too, they are viewed program. Projects of genuine so- croppers and renters. This reluc- as "make-work" schemes; the cial and economic value are most tance is most common, and most supplies and machinery needed likely to be identified, planned, harmful, among large landown- to complement local labor may and built if rural people are able ers. Discussion of land reform therefore be inadequately funded. to play a decisive role in choosing sometimes obscures the broader issue of security of tenure and leads to inaction on all fronts. In some instances, taxing land ac- Box 7.3 Employment Guarantee Scheme, cording to its productive poten- Maharashtra, India tial, an approach which has re- Maharashtra's ten-year-old Employment EGS managed to combine employment ceived relatively little attention in Guarantee Scheme (EGS) gives unem- generation with productive capital for- recent years, may achieve eco- ployed or underemployed rural workers mation. nomic and social results similar to jobs in public works projects or pays them The table shows that over the five years those stemming from land redis- living allowances. Blueprints for projects from 1973 to 1978, Maharashtra's rural tribution. are kept ready for immediate use at times unemployment declined by 21 percent, of slack employment. Every rural adult from 1.4 million persons to 1.1 million, Rural public works is guaranteed either manual wcrk near despite a 17 percent increase in the pop- Using local resources for building home within fifteen days of registering ulation. Its overall unemployment rate and maintaining rural infrastruc- or a cash allowance of Rsl a day ($0.12) fell by 32 percent during this period to ture makes a valuable contribu- for time wasted if no job turns up. 5.2 percent of the work force, compared During the five years ended March with a 4 percent overall decrease for the tion to both development and 1979, Maharashtra spent Rs2.12 billion whole country. Because agricultural and poverty alleviation. Unskilled la- on public works. Of this total, 53 percent industrial growth remained sluggish, bor can be used to construct small was for irrigation, 27 percent for land much of the improvement in Maharash- irrigation and drainage works and improvement, 13 percent for roads, and tra's employment can be attributed to feeder roads, and to level land. 7 percent for forestry and other works. EGS. Rural public works are important Unlike many other rural work schemes, precisely because they can be or- Unemployment in Maharashtra's rural work force (ages 15-59), ganized at the community level. 1972-73 and 1977-78 On the one hand, they are sel- dom done well by central govern- Percentage Rural work force 1972-73 1977-78 change ment; on the other, they are too large to be done by individual Unemployment rate families. Even with full security Males 6.97 5.24 16.0 Females 8.34 5.20 37.6 of tenure and favorable prices, a Total 7.65 5.22 31.8 family farm usually cannot, for Unemployment (millions of persons) example, organize irrigation and Males 0.64 0.55 13.6 drainage canals for a small wa- Females 0.75 055 27.4 tershed. Total 1.40 1.10 21.1 In view of the pressing need for 85 Table 7.2 Selected government food-distribution programs: Coverage, impact, and cost Effect on income, Budget costs consumption, (percentage Program and country Commodities involved Coverage and targeting and nutrition of budget) or revenue Comments General subsidy, Egypt Open subsidy for Wheat and wheat Broad coverage, Wheat and flour As high as 15 Implicit tax of wheat, flour; distri- products, maize, particularly in ur- consumption up percent (1975); 9 about 20 percent bution through ra- beans and lentils, ban areas; untar- about 80 percent to 12 percent, on producers has tion shops for rice, dairy prod- geted (1970-80); malnu- with 5 to 7 per- acted as a disin- other goods ucts, sugar, tea, trition and infant cent for bread centive; subsidized oils, meats mortality low for (1976-81) foods constitute 22 Egypt's per capita percent of Egypt's income level import bill Subsidy and ration, Pakistan Ration books; food Wheat flour (atta), Narrow coverage; 69 percent wheat 6 to 12 percent Producer prices too distributed through rationing of sugar; about one-third of consumption of (late 1970s); 3 to low before 1977, ration shops; quo- subsidized flour the population, low-income groups 6 percent (1980s) limiting production tas vary by supply considered inferior, most urban, some from ration shops; which improved availability and lo- resulting in some rural in food-deficit 9 to 14 percent of after 23 percent cation self-targeting areas; one shop caloric consump- price rise in 1980; per 2,000 people, tion of below me- some evidence of but rural shops dian-income padded ration open infrequently households: from rolls and do not all pro- ration system vide atta; untar- (1976) geted Subsidy and ration, Kerala State, India Ration books; food Rice, wheat, cook- Broad ration shop 20 percent of ca- Central govern- System of procure- distributed through ing oil, sugar coverage in both loric consumption ment subsidy ment favoring local ration shops urban and rural from rationed rice equivalent to an farmers (varying areas; largely Un- for low-income average 17 per- by farm size) has targeted households; 56 cent of state provided price percent of total rice budget (1973-76) support and im- consumption from proved equity ration shops, 66 among Kerala pro- percent for low-in- ducers come population; rationing has been positively linked to child nutritional status them. Experience also suggests ricultural growth prospects, Ag- liorate the harshest effects of pov- that the commitment of some lo- riculture: Toward 2000, were both erty, including in particular prob- cal resources other than man- completed when the world econ- lems associated with malnutrition power fosters the positive in- omy was more buoyant than it is and food insecurity. These efforts volvement of rural communities now. Nevertheless, both con- have mainly involved food aid, in project selection, design, and cluded that neither poverty nor though they also include general execution. At the same time, the undernutrition could be elimi- food subsidies and low-cost ra- coordination and administration nated in this centuiy, even under tions. Vulnerable families and in- of programs helps develop the ef- the most favorable assumptions dividuals are also being reached, fectiveness of local government. about agricultural development usually through health programs. Good financial and technical con- and overall economic growth. The Some of these efforts are listed in trol of the works is also essential. benefits of a sound growth strat- Table 7.2. egy will flow too slowly to meet Unfortunately, food subsidies Food security, distribution, and the income needs of many of to- and ration schemes are often very subsidies day's rural poor. expensive, largely because their Governments and international coverage is very broad. The poor The 1980 World Development Report agencies have consequently are helped, but so are others who and the FAO's study of future ag- sponsored various efforts to ame- can afford their own food. Po- 86 Effect on income, Budget costs consumption, (percentage Program and country Commodities involved Coverage and targeting and nutrition of budget) or revenue Comments Subsidy and ration, Sri Lanka, pre-1979 Ration books; food Rice, wheat flour, Broad ration shop About 50 percent 15 to 24 percent Need to distribute distributed through sugar, milk foods coverage in both of total rice con- (1970s) rice under ration cooperatives for vulnerable fam- urban and rural sumption from ra- led to effective sys- ilies areas; largely un- tion shops; 20 per- tem of government targeted cent of caloric procurement, with consumption and some benefit to 14 percent of in- farmers come from rations (1970); very low malnutrition and child mortality for Sri Lanka's per capita income level Coupon system, Sri Lanka after 1979 Coupons issued on Choice of 9 major Covers roughly 30 percent of total 11 to 14 percent Shift to coupon basis of family size food commodities, lower-income half rice consumption (1980-81) system coincided and age to all with rice most impor- of population, ur- from ration shops; with move to full- income of less than tant; or coupons ban and rural; well the 1979-81 calorie cost producer pric- Rs300 can be deposited targeted; studies and income impact ing, which further as savings; kero- estimate about 10 similar to that be- increased benefits sene stamps can be percent of needy fore 1979; after to farmers; efforts used for food pur- group not covered; 1981, evidence of made to target chases about 30 percent some deterioration other welfare and covered not needy in nutrition when employment pro- coupon value was grams to needy as halved because of identified by inflation means test Coupon system, Colombia Coupons issued to Nutrition-fortified Covers half of Increased maternal Less than 1 per- Local firms contrib- vulnerable women foods: noodles, country geographi- weight in preg- cent (1980) ute resources for and children; tar- biscuits, vegetable cally; well tar- nancy and in- production of nu- geting through mixtures, textured garted; 200,000 creased birth tritious foods health system and protein foods; in- households weight geographical area clusion of less ex- reached (1980) pensive staples being considered litical support for these programs and even undermine the govern- ent target groups by using several is correspondingly broad, mak- ment's ability to maintain public criteriaincome level, special ing reductions in their scale or sector investment as a whole. needs (such as pregnancy), or scope extremely difficult. There Food subsidies can be designed family size and age composition. are other disadvantages as well. to be relatively cheap, however. The administrative costs of tar- With price regulation favoring Many governments operate tightly geting can be reduced by using consumers, farmers' incentives are structured, targeted programs automatic, self-targeting mecha- depressed. As a result, the growth with entitlements based on means nisms. In countries where the poor of domestic food output is slowed, tests or administrative proce- are concentrated geographically, imports mount, and there is wast- dures such as health screening. targeting by location can be cost- age. Food crops are so important The means test and coupon sys- effective. Subsidized food is dis- in most low-income countries that tem introducçd in Sri Lanka in tributed only to certain commu- these distortions can have mas- 1979 has reduced the number of nities or is restrictci to certain sive macroeconomic conse- participants by half and more than types of shops that are not pa- quences. Subsidies, which in some halved the costs of the govern- tronized by the relatively well-off. countries amount to as much as ment food ration. Coupon sys- Targeting by commodity, which 20 percent of the national budget, tems, such as those in Sri Lanka involves changing relative prices can dwarf agricultural investment and Colombia, can define differ- to encourage consumption of nu- 87 tritious but unpopular foods, is distribution programs in several pants' caloric intakes by 20 per- rarely used, but shows some countries. China operates the cent and their incomes by 15 per- promise. Sorghum was sold at half largest food storage and distri- cent. the price of wheat and rice in ra- bution system in the world (see Programs for the undernour- tion shops in Bangladesh in 1979. Box 7.4); it has eliminated famine, ished can also help deal with pe- The poor participants, particu- reduced chronic undernutrition, riodic fluctuations in local food larly in rural areas, bought more and lowered its child mortality rate supplies that might otherwise lead sorghum, increasing the calories to a level comparable to that of to famine. Small changes in out- in their diet. The better-off par- some developed countries. In the put, earnings, or food distribu- ticipants in the capital city, how- Indian state of Kerala, and in Sri tion and prices can have dramatic ever, preferred to pay double the Lanka, rations are available for effects on individual nutrition and sorghum price in order to have both the urban and the rural poor, on the local economy as a whole. rice or wheat. a feature unusual among food- Towns and cities may be margin- Better nutrition has been shown subsidy programs; these efforts ally affected by droughts or crop to result from food subsidy and have raised low-income partici- failures; in the countryside, the Box 7.4 Food security in rural China China's approach to food security cannot tional Food Ministry to act as a residual debt far exceeds current income. Ulti- easily be adapted to other settings be- supplier and to deal with deficit com- mately, need rather than ability to pay cause some of its features are uniquely munities as units, rather than with in- (or to repay) is the determining factor. Chinese. Most important, food security dividual members and households. The In addition to chronic problems in the is built into the collective system, which administrative savings are probably siz- low-income, food-deficit areas, disasters ensures that production teams, brigades, able. The ministry also has an overall occasionally plague China. For example, and other local groups give their mem- responsibility for state procurement, in 1980 the provinces of Hebei and Hubei bers first access to basic necessities. In processing, storage, and distribution of in eastern China were hit by heavy floods practice, therefore, although the state ul- some 50 million tons of grain every year. in some areas and persistent drought in timately guarantees food security, its di- These responsibilities are carried out others. Crop losses were close to 20 per- rect intervention is minimal. through a nationwide network of local cent at provincial levels, with much higher Within a community, basic necessities facilities (grain management stations) by rates in some areas. These disasters are assured mainly through the annual a total staffexcluding seasonal work- prompted China's first request to the UN appropriation of collective income. ersof over 2 million. Disaster Relief Organization for emer- Everybody receives a basic ration, even In a normal year, most collectives are gency aid. those who have earned a below-average required to sell grain to the Food Min- No data have yet been released on the number of "work points." But there is a istry, or pay taxes on their production. total number of people benefiting under communal obligation to work: even the If the harvest is poor, procurement quo- the Food Ministry relief programs. But elderly usually find some light work to tas and taxes may be waived or reduced; in 1979 about 12 percent of the produc- claim a share of the community income. in 1979-80 the Food Ministry reported hon teams reportedly distributed less than (In practice, provision for the elderly in tax remittances of 2.4 million tons. 150 kilograms of grain per person; a fur- rural China also seems to rely heavily on If communities are still short of food, ther 10 percent reported distribution of the age-old tradition which holds chil- the ministry gets involved directly. Its 150 to 180 kilograms per person. Most of dren responsible for the care and sup- relief operations are triggered when it the recipients, perhaps 150 million peo- port of their parents.) Households in appears that, with grain reserves and in- ple, would probably qualify br relief by temporary misfortunefor example, be- come from other crop surplus taken into Food Ministry criteria. The Food Minis- cause of illnessgo into debt to their account, the community will not be able try reported distribution of about 3 mil- collective (or, in some instances, buy ne- to sustain a distribution of at least 150 lion tons of relief grain in 1979-80. If cessities from it using income from kilograms per person a year (200 kilo- relief per person averaged 25 kilograms, household activities). All collectives are grams per person in nce-producing areas) these data would imply well over 100 obliged to maintain grain reserves at the with the grain measured in unprocessed million beneficiaries. This large number brigade and commune levels. Mans' form. of beneficiaries, juxtaposed with the communes also hold reserves on behalf Technically. communities usually bor- spartan supplement (the ration supplies of the State food agency or for livestock row to obtain relief grain when they can- about 1,400 calories a day), serves to feed, and the total is usually enough to not afford to buy it. Some of the poorest underscore the point that China today is offset a bad harvest. areas of China need relief grain most still a low-income country with a great These arrangements enable the na- years. however, and their accumulated deal of rural poverty. 88 effects can multiply quickly. As rural purchasing power declines, Box 7.5 Famine comes from income insecurity limited food supplies are ab- sorbed by areas with higher pur- Who are the victims of famines? Rarely, groups to suffer varied. In Bengal a war- chasing power. Food insecurity is it would appear from a study done for time inflation debased the real value of the International Labour Organisation, their already low wages, which bought more a function of inadequate and does famine result simply from a reduc- much less food than before. In Ethiopia, uncertain income than of food tion in food production and affect all low yields caused farmers to dismiss farm availability (see Box 7.5). Wars ac- people in the area uniformly. In 1943 in servants, not hire laborers, and reduce centuate the problem by disrupt- Bengal, in 1974 in Bangladesh, in 1973 their demand for other services. Food ing crop schedules, destroying in Ethiopia those who suffered most from prices did not rise, but the poor, losing assets, and creating transport and famine were the landlesscasual labor- their employment, lost their source of communications bottlenecks. ers employed in agriculture or providing earnings (entitlement) to buy food. Sim- Governments and international unskilled or semi-skilled servicesand ilar problems plagued the Sahel region relief agencies deal with famines pastoralists who had to trade their ema- in the early l970s. Pastoralists saw their by distributing food directly. Their ciated beasts for expensive food grain. In herds diminish while animal prices fell, recent efforts have generally been short, the vulnerable were those whose and more had to be marketed in ex- "exchange entitlements" were removed change for food grains. In Bangladesh a effective and reduced the inci- or massively devalued by the events pre- long period of flooding similarly reduced dence of famines. When famines ceding the famine. employment opportunities. Simultane- do occur, they result as much from It was not a decline in food availability ously, food prices rose and thousands failure to acknowledge and re- itself that caused the famines. In Bengal starved. spond to the situation quickly as in 1943 the food supply was lower than Famines are therefore compatible with from program inadequacies. Any in many years but higher than in 1942 adequate food supplies within a country famine is unacceptable, however, and well within a normal range of fluc- or within large regions. In Ethiopia the and capacity to deal with it before tuations. In Bangladesh per capita food national supply of food did not decrease. its effects become catastrophic is availability was, if anything, higher in But major groups of the poor, especially of paramount importance. This 1974 than in earlier years. In Ethiopia. the landless, were extremely vulnerable requires: on the other hand, a drought sharply to a sudden reduction in their earnings. decreased food supplies in a localized In such cases, and particularly if prices An effective early-warning hut by no means inaccessible area. rise suddenly, these are the people who system, together with early ac- The mechanisms that caused marginal starve. knowledgment and response. Mechanisms for emergency procurement, whether through hanced by building up a better which have been adopted have imports, food aid, or priority pur- response capability within devel- been very diverse. There is no chases of domestic supplies from oping countries themselves. Do- generally applicable blueprint. But prosperous areas within the nors are beginning to offer aid for experience shows that the ability country. more permanent food-security to learn from mistakes and to Effective transport networks systems, including improvement make appropriate adjustments are and distribution channels in the of ports and storage facilities and what distinguish successful pro- countryside. technical assistance for more ef- grams from the rest. Despite the need, many low- ficient import procurement. Such Learning from mistakes in- income countries lack both logis- improvements should help re- cludes, above all, reaching a tical and managerial capacity, and duce avoidable undernutrition in greater understanding of the do not have the food supplies future emergencies. problems of the poor. This means necessary for effective emergency Most rural poverty and food se- that programs should be de- relief. International supportfrom curity programs are relatively new signed and executed so as to en- private voluntary agencies and and reflect the rising concern with courage the fullest participation official organizations, such as the poverty in the 1970s. To deal with of local people. Local people best World Food Programhas at- the problems, existing institu- know their own needs and how tempted to complement national tions and their programs have had they can be met. Cost-effective, efforts. Given the difficult con- to be modified; in some instances sustainable programs that reach ditions under which they must new ones have had to be created. large numbers succeed by giving operate, international efforts have Although the programs are trying full rein to the considerable ener- generally been quite successful. to tackle much the same problem gies and dynamism of the poor. Their efficiency could be en- of rural proverty, the solutions 89 8 Conclusions Continuing progress in agricul- economies, but the evidence re- existent. When the results are ture is of vital importance to the viewed in Chapter 5 suggests the added up they leave no room for developing world for several rea- linkages are strong over a wide complacency, particularly when sons: range of country conditions. they are set alongside the rise in Close to two-thirds of the Among the more vivid demon- population: while agricultural population draws its livelihood strations is the experience of most output grew at just under 3 per- from agriculture as farmers and sub-Saharan African countries in cent a year in the 1960s and 1970s, farm workers. These groups in- the 1970s, where poor agricul- it barely kept ahead of population clude the vast majority of the tural performance contributed growth. Output per capita in- world's poorest people. heavily to economy-wide deteri- creased at only 0.4 percent a year. Driven by population and in- oration. That average conceals sharp dif- come growth, the demand for food There has been impressive ferences, because growth ranged in the developing economies is progress in agriculture in devel- from 1.4 percent a year in South- likely to increase by at least a third oping countries over the past three east Asia and 0.6 percent a year over the next decade. If more rapid decades. It has been supported in Latin America to little or noth- progress is made in raising the by major research efforts applied ing in the low-income countries. incomes of lower-income groups to food crops in the developing In South Asia as a whole, the and in low-income economies, the world. The results of this research growth of agricultural output just increase could be much sharper. have already moved from labo- kept pace with population; in Af- Agricultural exports ac- ratories and experimental plots to rica, output per capita grew at 0.2 counted for 30 percent of the de- millions of farms in dozens of percent a year during the 1960s, veloping countries' total mer- countries. New seeds, combined but actually declined by 1.4 per- chandise export earnings in the with irrigation water and fertil- cent a year in the 1970s. late 1970s. Agricultural exports are izer, have boosted yields and pro- still the main category of exports duction of staple foods. Dubbed Agriculture and economic for over two-thirds of these coun- the Green Revolution, this prog- growth tries. Export earnings finance im- ress is already widely known. It ports needed for faster growth, has transformed the lives and In the middle-income countries the and good export performance en- prospects of millions, and spurred structural transformation from an hances access to international new research. agrarian to an industrial economy capital markets. For all its achievements, the is well advanced. Agricultural Finally, structural interde- Green Revolution has not yet oc- progress is helping, and being pendence and complementarity curred in many parts of the world. helped by, growth in the rest of between agriculture and other Agricultural growth has varied the economy. More and more of sectors suggest that weak per- widely among the main regions these countries are about to reach formance in agriculture will be ac- of the developing world, among an important milestonethe be- companied by weak growth else- individual countries within each ginning of decline in their agri- where in the economy. This is region, and among areas within cultural labor force, which will most important in the low-in- each country. In some it has been usher in the prospect of more come, predominantly rural spectacular, in others non- rapid increase in the productivity 90 and incomes of their farmers. In their farms. They also use their tion, transport, and marketing the low-income countries, agri- own and their families' labor to networks are needed. culture is an even bigger influ- level land, grow trees, dig ditches, Where little agricultural ence on overall economic growth, and build paddy terracesactiv- progress has been made, it is because it accounts for a much ities that create capital to produce sometimes because of an adverse larger share of GNP. In these more agricultural output in the agrarian structure inherited from countries, a major challenge for future. In Pakistan, for example, the past. Northeast Brazil is only the international community and more water for irrigation comes one area where landless laborers national governments alike is to from privately installed tubewells and small farmers are underem- achieve agricultural growth rates than from publicly built reser- ployed, while extensive tracts of higher than those of the popula- voirs. land are underutilized on large tion. This holds out the best hope Small farmers can be highly farms. In several countries, land for both reducing poverty and in- productive. Typically, they pro- reform has played a valuable role creasing overall economic growth. duce more from each acre than in raising agricultural output. In For many years, the causes of large farmers do, despite the often all countries, security of tenure is agricultural growth were contro- considerable disadvantages of importantwithout this farmers versial and little understood. That their limited access to services, are reluctant to improve the land is no longer so. Evidence and ex- markets, and production inputs and to husband its long-term fer- perience now support certain key such as fertilizer. Programs and tility. propositions about the role of policies dealing with these prob- Government intervention in governments and of farmers lems thus offer substantial eco- marketing and input supply may themselves in encouraging this nomic benefits, as well as in- be essential at the early stages of growth. Starting with farmers, it crease employment and incomes development, but it has fre- can confidently be said that: among the poor. quently been counterproductive All farmerssmall, medium, Given incentives and the means when allowed to monopolize these and largerespond to economic to take advantage of them, there- functions. Experience suggests incentives. Far from being "tra- fore, farmers will expand output. that in mixed economies, the pri- dition-bound peasants," farmers That does not mean that govern- vate sector can usually be en- have shown that they share a ra- ments and other official agencies couraged to take on a major part tionality that far outweighs dif- should confine themselves solely of these activities, with govern- ferences in their social and eco- to fixing those incentives. There ment primarily exercising a reg- logical conditions. In largely are several things that farmers ulatory role. market-oriented economies such cannot do on their own and that as Brazil and Kenya, as well as in therefore require public action: Policy priorities centrally planned economies such Research and technology need as China and Hungary, farmers to be developed and adapted to The past therefore provides a clear have responded to economic in- local conditions. The lack of tech- guide for the future: the con- centives. In some instances, their nological improvements suitable straints on agricultural growth do response exceeded the expecta- for African conditions is a main not lie in the behavior of farmers; tions of policymakers. Farmers in reason for Africa's poor perform- they are not unwilling to work the irrigated areas of South Asia ance so far. hard, to adopt profitable inno- responded dramatically to the new Rural development programs vations, or to invest for the fu- incentives provided by the Green have helped overcome obstacles ture. Instead, the constraints are Revolution. In dryland areas of to increased agricultural output to be found in the environment Nigeria, farmers showed that they and have also benefited the poor. in which farmers operate: the were more aware of constraints However, rural projects need to technology available to them, their and opportunities than the pro- minimize their-demands on scarce access to land, the incentives for ject staff who were planning new administrative and managerial production and investment, the schemes for them. skills in developing countries. The availability and price of materials Farmers contribute to agri- most effective projects are likely such as fertilizer, the provision of cultural investment. All of them, to be simply designed, and to in- irrigation, and possibilities for even those farming only a few volve local farmers in their con- marketing their output. This sec- acres, save a substantial part of ception and execution. tion reviews some of the main any extra income and invest it on Major investments in irriga- policy issues in these areas. 91 Technology be subsidizedquite the con- the extra output produced by Government-supported agricul- trary. In low-income countries, subsidized farmers behind pro- tural research in the industrial especially, agriculture provides the tective barriers in industrial coun- countries began in the middle of main tax base. Farmers must tries. Too often, also, prices fluc- the nineteenth century. By con- therefore contribute to help fi- tuate more than would be trast, systematic research on food nance many government activi- expected from supply and de- crops in the developing world be- tiesnot least the investments in mand shifts, because an excessive gan only during the past three infrastructure and irrigation from share of market adjustment is decades. Apart from China, whose which they themselves benefit. For forced on the international mar- research work was indigenous, commodities such as tea, coffee, ket by national policies which in- developing countries have relied and cocoawhich are produced sulate domestic markets from it. on a mixture of international and mainly for export, and for which Removing such distortions would local efforts. That will continue to demand is more sensitive to qual- increase the incentives to farmers be the case. An appropriate strat- ity than to priceit makes sound in developing countries, It would egy involves strengthening and economic sense for governments also stimulate more rapid overall expanding the present network of to impose export taxes. economic growth, because so international research centers to Thus the issue is not whether many developing countries still cover more crops and more eco- to tax agriculture, but how and depend heavily on agricultural logical conditions. The smallest how much. There are no fixed and exports. and poorest countriesthose with simple answers to this question, As to the prices of agricultural least capacity to conduct agricul- although experience and research inputs, the bulk of experience tural researchare most depend- is starting to provide some guide- cautions against subsidies. Sub- ent on the international research lines on appropriate levels and sidized fertilizer prices may well effort. In all developing coun- forms of agricultural taxation. For encourage farmers to adopt fer- tries, national research needs to example, export taxes on tropical tilizer-using cultivation methods expand considerably. Its empha- beverages have clearly been set more rapidly than they would sis will be on adapting new va- too high in a number of African otherwise, but that is not a suf- rieties to local conditions and in- countries, where production has ficient reason for subsidies. New creasing their immunity to stagnated or even declined, and practices that offer high economic diseases and insects. market shares have been lost to returns are rapidly adopted by Many countries, especially in other exporters. farmers, even without subsidies. Africa, still lack effective research Frequently, it is macroecon- And once instituted, subsidies are institutes on the scale they need. omic policies, rather than those politically difficult to lower or re- Remedying this will require as- that apply narrowly to agricul- move. Credit also is often subsi- sistance from both multilateral and ture, that give rise to inadequate dized, in some instances at neg- bilateral donors. In addition, it is incentives. A common failing is ative real interest rates. Such a imperative that donor countries overvalued exchange rates, which policy may stimulate investment expand their support for the Con- reduce the prices that farmers re- in agriculture, but it is all too often sultative Group for International ceive for exported crops and, at of the wrong kind: subsidized in- Agricultural Research (CGIAR). the same time, make it cheaper terest rates lower the effective cost The CGIAR's progress has re- to import agricultural products. of capital goods and lead to labor- cently been slowed down by the The exchange rates thus exert displacing investments that are not unwillingness of donors to in- pervasive downward pressure on warranted where labor is plenti- crease their contributions. the prices received by farmers. ful and capital scarce. In any case, Bringing exchange rates into line subsidized credit seldom reaches Incentives to producers with actual conditions in markets small farmers, since it is generally It is primarily the responsibility is critical for appropriate agricul- preempted by the larger and more of governments to ensure that the tural pricing. influential ones. prices of agricultural products and Though they can influence or supplies are not distorted in a way determine domestic prices, gov- Agricultural investment that inhibits the growth of output ernments of developing countries Continued agricultural progress and incomes. This is not to say have little or no control over in- depends in part on additional that agriculture should not be ternational prices. Too often these public sector investment in agri- taxed or that its supplies should are set artificially low because of cultural development programs. 92 Their economic returns are high, only about 5 to 10 percent of their Prospects though they could still be in- government budgets to agricul- creased. For example, there is ture in recent years. Even sub- The coming increase in demand considerable evidence that water Saharan African countries mostly for food has profound implica- is wasted because irrigation fall in this range, in spite of the tions that go well beyond agri- schemes are badly designed and importance of agriculture in their culture itself. Currently only about poorly managed. These weak- economies. In these countries, 8 percent of the food eaten in de- nesses were discussed in Chapter however, larger expenditures on veloping countries, and 9 percent 6; putting them right is largely the education have been necessary to of all agricultural products avail- responsibility of national govern- make up for the past and to keep able in those countries, is sup- ments. pace with the rapid growth in the plied by imports. Few countries New transport facilities that number of children. could see these ratios increase reach down to the village level rapidly without encountering se- Little analysis has been done of vere balance of payments prob- open new markets to farmers and the aggregate economic returns to give them access to modern in- lems. To meet the growth in de- government expenditures in ag- mand for food, they will need to puts at lower costs. Improved riculture. Project experience in- transport has a direct effect: it in- supply the bulk of it themselves. dicates, however, that returns to Whether they can meet this creases the farm-gate prices of agriculture are, by and large, as crops and reduces those of inputs challenge is a critical question for high as in other sectors. In some the future of hundreds of millions because transport costs are re- countries, indeed, they are sub- duced. It also has an indirect ef- of people. If the past is any guide, stantially higher. It is hard to avoid policy improvements could fect: more traders visit accessible the conclusion that the relative villages than remote ones; thus achieve dramatic results. The rise priorities of the different sectors in agricultural output over the past the influence of local monopolies need to be reconsidered in low- is reduced and farmers' prices are two decades has confounded the income countries, if their growth predictions of widespread famine improved. in agricultural output is to be im- Transport infrastructure can be which were common in the 1950s proved. and 1960s. It has also disproved constructed and maintained in a variety of ways. Some require Industrial countries also have a the Malthusian notion that agri- large infusions of expensive for- big contribution to make to agri- cultural growth is subject to iron eign equipment, others utilize cultural investment in developing laws beyond the control of peo- abundant local labor. China is countries. In real terms, official ple. If agricultural technologies can noted for its success in mobilizing assistance to agriculture more than be improved, additional re- local labor for creating rural pub- doubled from 1973 to 1978, when sources mobilized, and appropri- lic works, but lesser-known, ef- it reached about $10.4 billion (in ate policies adopted in industrial ficient examples come from such 1979 prices). Since then, it has de- and developing countries, then diverse cultures as Indonesia, In- clined to slightly below $10 billion faster agricultural growth will be dia, the Republic of Korea, and in 1979 and 1980. Donor govern- achieved. Economic develop- Sri Lanka. ments are conscious that their ment, particularly of the poorer While many countries have public spending options are lim- countries, will speed up. And proclaimed agriculture and rural ited. Aid to their domestic agri- poverty will be reduced. development to be the corner- culture, however, is typically stone of national development eight- to tenfold greater than their plans, it is striking that most de- agricultural development assist- veloping countries have allocated a nce. 93 Bibliographical note This Report has drawn on a wide agencies including the IMF, The close parallelism between range of World Bank work as well OECD, GATT, and United Na- sectoral growth rates in agricul- as on external research. Selected tions organizations. Work on the ture, industry, and total GDP sources used in each chapter are transitional state of the world emerges from an analysis of in- briefly noted below, and then economy by Hardy and Kharas dividual country performance listed alphabetically by author. The complements the detailed analy- during 1960-80 for all developing World Bank sources include sec- sis in last year's Report. The in- countries for which adequate data tor policy papers, ongoing eco- ternational product comparisons were available. The analysis of the nomic analysis and research, and by Kravis, Heston, and Summers changing role of agriculture in de- project sector and economic work are used in the analysis of the velopmentthe growth of out- on individual countries. In addi- changing pattern of global eco- put, the changing pattern of pro- tion, a set of background papers nomic activity. Work done for the duction and consumption, and the is commissioned for each Report; 1980 World Development Report is relative decline of the sector in their primary purpose is to syn- the basis for the discussion of hu- employment and incomeis thesize the relevant literature and man resource development and based on country experience dur- Bank work. (Thus the sources cited long-term growth. Prospects for ing those two decades, earlier de- in these papers are not listed sep- the 1980s build on component velopment experience (Lewis, arately.) Many of the background analyses by Swamy (remittances), Rostow, Kuznets, Bairoch, and papers are issued as World Bank Frank, Havrylyshyn, and Hughes Hayami and Ruttan), and studies Staff Working Papers, which are and Waelbroeck (trade) and on of structural transformation (Che- available from the Bank's Publi- modeling work following Chee- nery, Clark, Kuznets, and John- cations Unit. The views they ex- tham and others and Waelbroeck son and Kilby). The development press are not, however, necessar- and associates. of agricultural trade, particularly ily those of the World Bank or of the emergence of new markets for this Report. Chapter 5 developing-country agricultural The analysis of recent agricultural exports in planned economies and Selected sources, by chapter growth is based on country food the oil-exporting countries, is and agricultural production data based on GAIT and FAQ trade Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provided by the Food and Agri- tapes, World Bank data, and culture Organization of the UN Kharas. These chapters reflect in large part (FAO)FAO Production Yearbooks, The costs of agricultural sup- an updating of the extensive dis- Agriculture: Toward 2000, and port and protection were derived cussion of the international econ- background, data developed for from national sources of the omy of last year's World Develop- these studiesand on World Bank countries and country groups nent Report. Thus, many of the data for total and sectoral GDP cited; for example, the Commis- references cited there are also rel- growth rates. Tables 5.1 and 6.1 sion of the European Communi- evant for this year's analysis. are derived from these sources, ties and US Departments of Ag- Chapters 2 and 3 draw heavily on with country data arranged to riculture and Commerce. The the Bank's data files and on pub- conform to World Bank regional adjusted nominal protection coef- lished statistics from other official groupings. ficients in Box 5.3 are derived from 94 World Bank studies of nominal edited by Carruthers give an up- and others, and the discussion on protection coefficients, adjusted to-date picture of agricultural re- mobility, from Lipton, Lloyd, by the World Bank's estimated search in developing countries. Penman, and Mohan. Important equilibrium exchange rate for each Barker and others review the contributions on the landless and country. evolution of irrigation in Asia, and rural nonfarm employment were Bottrall evaluates the perfor- made by Singh, Binswanger, Kifle, Chapter 6 mance of selected irrigation proj- Anderson and Leiserson, Chuta The World Bank has financed ects from all parts of the devel- and Liedholm, and associated some 800 agricultural and rural oping world. Benor and Harrison Michigan State University stud- development projects in 70 coun- give an overview of the principles ies. The box on the Maharashtra tries. The discussion in Chapter of agricultural extension with Employment Guarantee Scheme 6 represents a synthesis of the special emphasis on the Training is based on work by Raj Krishna. Bank's extensive development ex- and Visit System. Excellent overviews on nutri- perience. Although most of the tional problems and the role of background material is unpub- Chapter 7 food subsidy programs are found lished, the Bank's Sector Policy Like Chapter 6, this chapter de- in World Food Council Reports, Papers dealing with agriculture rives far more from Bank opera- Reutlinger and Selowsky, Davis, and rural development and the tional experience than from pub- Rogers and others, and Berg. In- Proceedings from the Agricul- lished research. The enumeration formation on specific subsidy tural Sector Symposia give broad of the world's rural poor builds programs is drawn also from nu- overviews of most of the topics on the work of the 1980 World De- merous economic studies, includ- dealt with in the chapter. velopment Report, incorporating, for ing those of the Bank, and Scobie; The delineation of crop zones the first time, estimates on Asian Taylor, Horton, and Raff; Kumar; is based on work initially carried centrally planned economies, George; Gavan and Chandrase- out by IFPRI for a limited number based mainly on the Bank's eco- kara; Isenman (Sri Lanka); Lev- of countries. The coverage was nomic work in China. inson; and Karim and Levinson. extended to all developing coun- Material on small-farmer strat- Understanding of causes of fa- tries primarily with the use of the egies and on agrarian reform stems mine and local food insecurity FAO's Report on the Agro-Ecolog- preponderantly from Bank oper- draws on Sen. Dando, and Franke. ical Zones Project. ational experience, supplemented Discussion of programs to alle- The annual reports of CGIAR by Bank-sponsored research in viate these problems draws on and the various international re- Northeast Brazil (Kutcher and Clay and others, Valdez, Currey, search centers, the World Bank's Scandizzo) and worldwide (Berry and reports of the World Food Policy Paper on Agricultural Re- and Cline). Rural public works Program and FAO. search, and the working paper discussions are drawn from Burki Selected Sources Ahmed, Raisuddin. "Foodgrain Supply, Distribution, and Consumption Policies within a Dual Pricing Mechanism: A Case Study of Bangladesh." IFPRI Research Report no. 8. Washington, D.C., May 1979. "Agricultural Price Policies under Complex Socioeconomic and Natural Constraints: The Case of Bangladesh." IFPRI Research Report no. 27. Washington, D.C., October 1981. Anderson, Dennis, and Mark Leiserson. "Rural Nonfarm Employment in the Developing Countries." Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 28, no. 2. (January 1980), pp. 227-48. Bairoch, Paul. The Economic Development of the Third World since 1900. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. Barker, Randolph, and Ronnie Coffman. Research and Technology Development for Problem Environments of Asia. World Bank Staff Working Paper.* Forthcoming. Barker, Randolph, Gilbert Levine, Walter Coward, and L. E. Small. Irrigation in South and East Asia. World Bank Staff Working Paper.* Forthcoming. Benor, Daniel, and James Q. Harrison. Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1977. Berg, Alan. Malnourished People: A Policy View. Poverty and Basic Needs Series. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 1981. Berry, Robert A., and W. R. Cline. Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. 95 Binswanger, Hans P. The Economics of Tractors in South Asia: An Analytical Review. New York: Agricultural Development Council; Hyderabad: ICRISAT, 1978. "The Nonfarm Components of Rural Development." World Bank Staff Working Paper. Forthcoming. Bottrall, Anthony. Comparative Study of the Management and Organization of Irrigation Projects. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 458. Washington, D.C., 1981. Burki, Shahid Javed, C. D. Davies, R. H. Hook, and J. W. Thomas. Public Works Programs in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 224. Washington, D.C., 1976. Burniaux, J. M. "First Experiments with a World Agricultural Model in a General Equilibrium Framework." Discussion Paper 8205. CEME, Free University of Brussels, 1982. Carruthers, Ian, ed. New Directions for Agricultural Research in Developing Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper. Forthcoming. Carruthers, Ian, and Roy Stoner. Economic Aspects and Policy Issues in Groundwater Development. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 496. Washington, D.C., 1981. Cheetham, Russell J., Syamaprasad Gupta, and Antoine Schwartz. The Global Framework. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 355. Washington, D.C., 1979. Chenery, Hollis. Structural Change and Development Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. "Restructuring the World Economy: Round II." Foreign Affairs, vol. 59, no. 5 (Summer 1981), pp. 1102-20. Chenery, Hollis, and Moises Syrquin. Patterns of Development, 1950-1970. London: Oxford University Press, 1975. Chuta, Enyinna, and Carl Liedholm. Rural Nonfarm Employment: A Review of the Art. Rural Development Paper no. 4. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1979. Clay, Edward, and others. Food Policy Issues in Low-income Countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 473. Washington, D.C., 1981. Commission of the European Communities. The Agricultural Situation in the Community 1980 Report. Brussels-Luxembourg, December 1980. Currey, Bruce. "Fourteen Fallacies about Famine." Ceres, No. 80, vol. 14, no. 2 (March-April 1981). Dando, William A. The Geography of Famine. New York: Wiley, 1980. Davis, Jeffrey M. "The Fiscal Role of Food Subsidy Programs." IMF Staff Papers, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 1977), pp. 100-27. Day, Richard H., and Inderjit Singh. Economic Development as an Adaptive Process: The Green Revolution in the Indian Punjab. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Feder, Gershon. Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in Developing Countries: A Survey. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 444. Washington, D.C., 1981. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAQ). Agriculture: Toward 2000. Rome, 1980. FAQ Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. Rome, 1960-82. Production Yearbook. Rome, 1950-81. Report on the Agro-Ecological Zones Project. Vols. 1-4. Rome, 1978-80. The State of Food and Agriculture. Rome, 1981. Frank, Isaiah. "Trade Policy Issues for the Developing Countries in the 1980s." World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 478. Washington, D.C., 1981. Gafsi, Salem. Green Revolution: The Tunisian Experience. Mexico City: CIMMYT, 1976. Gavan, James D., and Indrani Sri Chandrasekera. "The Impact of Public Foodgrain Distribution on Food Consumption and Welfare in Sri Lanka." IFPRI Research Report no. 13. Washington, D.C., December 1979. George, P. S. "Public Distribution of Foodgrains in Kerala-Income Distribution Implications and Effectiveness." IFPRI Research Report no. 7. Washington, D.C., March 1979. Gerhart, John. The Diffusion of Hybrid Maize in Western Kenya. Mexico City: CIMMYT, 1975. Hardy, Chandra, and Homi Kharas. The World Economy in Transition. World Bank Staff Working Paper.* Forthcoming. Havrylyshyn, Oh, and Martin Wolf. Trade among Developing Countries: Theory, Policy Issues, and Principal Trends. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 479. Washington, D.C., 1981. Hughes, Helen, and Jean Waelbroeck. Trade and Protection in the 1970s: Can the Growth of Developing Countries Continue in the 1980s? 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World Bank, Economic Analysis and Projections Department. Development in a Changing Environment. World Bank Staff Working Paper.* Forthcoming. World Food Council. "Toward the Eradication of Hunger: Food Subsidy and Direct Distribution Programs." Report by the Executive Director, WFC/1980/3, February 25, 1980. "Assessment of Selected Food Subsidy and Direct Distribution Programmes." Report by the Executive Director, WFC/1980/2/Add.l, February 1980. *An asterisk after a dtation indicates papers prepared as part of the background work for this Report. 98 World Development Indicators Contents Key 102 Introduction 103 Maps 104 Table 1. Basic indicators 110 Population LI Area LI GNP per capita LI Inflation LI Adult literacy LI Life expectancy LI Food production per capita Table 2. Growth of production 112 GDP 0 Agriculture LI Industry LI Manufacturing 0 Services Table 3. Structure of production 114 GDP LI Agriculture LI Industry 0 Manufacturing 0 Services Table 4. Growth of consumption and investment 116 Public consumption LI Private consumption LI Gross domestic investment Table 5. Structure of demand 118 Public consumption LI Private consumption U Gross domestic investment LI Gross domestic saving LI Exports of goods and nonfactor services LI Resource balance Table 6. Industrialization 120 Share of value added in food and agriculture LI in textiles and clothing LI in machinery and transport equipment LI in chemicals LI in other manufacturing LI Value added in manufacturing LI Gross manufacturing output per capita Table 7. Commercial energy 122 Growth of energy production Growth of energy consumption Energy LI LI consumption per capita LI Energy imports as percentage of merchandise exports Table 8. Growth of merchandise trade 124 Export values LI Import values U Growth of exports LI Growth of imports LI Terms of trade Table 9. Structure of merchandise exports 126 Fuels, minerals, and metals LI Other primary commodities LI Textiles and clothing LI Machinery and transport equipment LI Other manufactures Table 10. Structure of merchandise imports 128 Food LI Fuels LI Other primary commodities U Machinery and transport equipment LI Other manufactures Table 11. Origin and destination of merchandise exports 130 Industrial market economies Nonmarket industrial economies LI LI High- income oil exporters LI Developing economies Table 12. Origin and destination of manufactured exports 132 To industrial market economies LI To nonmarket industrial economies LI To high-income oil exporters LI To developing economies LI Value of manufactured exports 100 Table 13. Balance of payments and debt service ratios 134 Current account balance 0 Interest payments on external public debt 0 Debt service as percentage of GNP 0 as percentage of exports of goods and services Table 14. Flow of external capital 136 Gross inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans 0 Repayment of principal 0 Net inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans U Net direct private investment Table 15. External public debt and international reserves 138 External public debt outstanding and disbursed 0 as percentage of GNP U Gross international reserves 0 in months of import coverage Table 16. Official development assistance from OECD and OPEC members 140 Amount in dollars 0 as percentage of donor GNP U in national currencies U Net bilateral flow to low-income countries Table 17. Population growth, past and projected, and hypothetical stationary population 142 Past growth of population U Projected population U Hypothetical size of stationary population 0 Assumed year of reaching net reproduction rate of 1 0 Year of reaching stationary population Table 18. Demographic and fertility-related indicators 144 Crude birth rate U Crude death rate U Total fertility rate 0 Percentage of married women using contraceptives Table 19. Labor force 146 Population of working age U Labor force in agriculture U in industry U in services 0 Growth of labor force, past and projected Table 20. Urbanization 148 Urban population as percentage of total population U Growth of urban population U Percentage in largest city U in cities of over 500,000 persons 0 Number of cities of over 500,000 persons Table 21. Indicators related to life expectancy 150 Life expectancy 0 Infant mortality rate U Child death rate Table 22. Health-related indicators 152 Population per physician U per nursing person U Percentage of population with access to safe water U Daily calorie supply per capita Table 23. Education 154 Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group 0 in secondary school 0 in higher education U Adult literacy Table 24. Defense and social expenditure 156 Defense expenditure as percentage of GNP U as percentage of central government expenditure 0 Per capita central government expenditure on defense 0 on education U on health Table 25. Income distribution 158 Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of households Technical notes 161 Bibliography of data sources 172 101 Key Figures in the colored bands are sum- Not available. In each table, countries are listed in their mary measures for groups of countries. (.) Less than half the unit shown. group in ascending order of income per The letter w after a summary measure capita. The reference numbers indicating indicates that it is a weighted average; All growth rates are in real terms. that order are shown in the alphabetical the letter m, that it is a median value; Figures in italics are for years or periods list of countries below. the letter t, that it is a total. other than those specified. Afghanistan 10 Hong Kong 92 Peru 59 Albania 58 Hungary 122 Philippines 52 Algeria 79 India 19 Poland 120 Angola 42 Indonesia 38 Portugal 85 Argentina 86 Iran 89 Romania 84 Australia 107 Iraq 90 Rwanda 14 Austria 110 Ireland 101 Saudi Arabia 98 Bangladesh 5 Israel 96 Senegal 41 Belgium 114 Italy 103 Sierra Leone 22 Benin 29 Ivory Coast 63 Singapore 95 Bhutan 3 Jamaica 61 Somalia 8 Bolivia 46 Japan 108 South Africa 83 Brazil 80 Jordan 71 Spain 102 Bulgaria 121 Kampuchea, Democratic 1 Sri Lanka 21 Burma 9 Kenya 35 Sudan 32 Burundi 13 Korea, Democratic Republic of 69 Sweden 117 Cameroon 50 Korea, Republic of 75 Switzerland 119 Canada 109 Kuwait 99 Syrian Arab Republic 70 Central African Republic 26 Lao People's Democratic Republic 2 Tanzania 23 Chad 4 Lebanon 72 Thailand 51 Chile 82 Lesotho 36 Togo 33 China 24 Liberia 43 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Colombia 65 Libya 97 Tunisia 68 Congo, People's Republic of 55 Madagascar 31 Turkey 73 Costa Rica 77 Malawi 17 Uganda 28 Cuba 74 Malaysia 76 Union of Soviet Socialist Czechoslovakia 124 Mali 12 Republics 123 Denmark 116 Mauritania 40 United Arab Emirates 100 Dominican Republic 64 Mexico 81 United Kingdom 105 Ecuador 66 Mongolia 57 United States 111 Egypt, Arab Republic of 47 Morocco 56 Upper Volta 15 El Salvador 49 Mozambique 18 Uruguay 88 Ethiopia 6 Nepal 7 Venezuela 91 Finland 106 Netherlands 112 Viet Nam, Socialist France 113 New Zealand 104 Republic of 11 German Democratic Republic 125 Nicaragua 53 Yemen Arab Republic 39 Germany, Federal Republic of 118 Niger 30 Yemen, People's Democratic Ghana 34 Nigeria 60 Republic of 37 Greece 94 Norway 115 Yugoslavia 87 Guatemala 62 Pakistan 27 Zaire 16 Guinea 25 Panama 78 Zambia 45 Haiti 20 Papua New Guinea 54 Zimbabwe 48 Honduras 44 Paraguay 67 102 Introduction The World Development Indica- The indicators in Table 1 give a but also revisions to historical se- tors provide information on the summary profile of economies. ries. They also reflect revisions to main features of social and eco- The data in other tables fall into the estimates of population on the nomic development. Over time, the following broad areas: na- basis of new information from re- the World Bank has developed tional accounts, industrialization, cent surveys and the 1980 round standard data formats for opera- energy, external trade, aid flows, of censuses. tional use, and its data bank has demography, labor force, urban- The economies included in the become increasingly geared to the ization, social indicators, defense World Development Indicators are provision of statistical input for and social expenditure, and in- classified by GNP per capita. This internal information and decision come distribution. The informa- classification is useful in distin- papers. The broad range of inter- tion used in computing these in- guishing economies at different nationally comparable statistical dicators was drawn from the data stages of development. Many of information is intended to be suit- files and publications of the World the economies included are also able for cross-country analysis. Bank, the International Monetary classified by dominant character- Most of the data collected by Fund, and the United Nations and isticsto distinguish oil im- the World Bank are on its devel- specialized agencies, supple- porters and exporters and to oping member countries. Because mented by information from na- distinguish market and nonmar- comparable data for developed tional and other sources. This in- ket industrial economies. The market economies are readily formation reflects the most recent groups used in the tables are 33 available, these are also included data available in the spring of 1982. low-income developing econo- in the indicators. Data for non- For ease of reference, ratios and mies with a per capita income of market economies, few of which rates of growth are shown; ab- $410 or less in 1980; 63 middle- are members of the World Bank, solute values are reported only in income developing economies are included if available in a com- a few instances. Most growth rates with a per capita income of more parable form. were calculated for two periods: than $410; 4 high-income oil ex- Every effort has been made to 1960-70 and 1970-80, or 1970-79 porters; 19 industrial market standardize concepts, definitions, if data for 1980 were not available. economies; and 6 nonmarket in- coverage, timing, and the evalu- All growth rates are in real terms dustrial economies. ation of the basic data to ensure and were computed, unless noted The format of this edition gen- the greatest possible degree of otherwise, by using the least- erally follows that used in pre- comparability. Since the pub- squares method. Because this vious years, but some of the lication of the first World De- method takes all observations in economies have been reclassified velopment Indicators in 1978, a period into account, the result- to reflect changes in their income considerable progress has been ing growth rates reflect trends that levels. Within each group, econo- made, through the use of more are not unduly influenced by ex- mies are listed in ascending order uniform definitions and concepts, ceptional values. Table entries in of income per capita, and that or- toward making the data more in- italics indicate that they are for der is used in all tables. Econo- ternationally comparable. Al- years or periods other than those mies for which 1980 GNP data though the number of indicators specified. All dollar figures are US were not available have been included in this edition is greater dollars. placed on the basis of estimates. than in the first edition, it is be- Some of the differences be- The alphabetical list on the op- lieved that the quality of the data tween figures shown this year and posite page shows the reference has been substantially improved. last year reflect not only updating number of each economy. Coun- 103 tries with populations of less than measures are also shown for China value of a set ranked in order of a million are not reported in the and India together and for other magnitude. Because the coverage tables, largely for lack of compre- low-income economies. And be- of economies is not uniform for hensive data. The technical notes cause trade in oil affects the eco- all indicators and because the var- for Table 1 show some basic in- nomic characteristics and per- iation around central tendencies dicators for 34 small countries that formance of middle-income can be large, readers should ex- are members of the United Na- economies, summary measures ercise caution in comparing the tions, the World Bank, or both. are also shown for oil importers summary measures for different Summary measurestotals, and for oil exporters. indicators, groups, and years or median values, or weighted av- The weights used in computing periods. erageswere calculated for the the summary measures are de- Readers should also exercise country groups only if data were scribed in the technical notes. The caution in comparing indicators adequate and meaningful statis- letter w after a summary measure across economies. Although the tics could be obtained. Because indicates that it is a weighted av- statistics presented are drawn China and India heavily influence erage; the letter m, that it is a me- from sources generally consid- the summary measures for all low- dian value; the letter t, that it is ered the most authoritative and income economies, summary a total. The median is the middle reliable, some of them, particu- Groups of economies [ow-income economies Middle-income oil importers Middle-income au exporters ugh-income au exporters Industrial market economies Nonmarket industrial economies uah Baluze - ia H - utas Not included in the Indicators El Salsador -- Ni aragsa Costa Rica ans -rtch Gus uninme Tokelau )NZ) Brazil Western Waits and Fotuna Samoa Fr) American Samoa (US) French Polynesia Niue)NZ) Dominican Tongs (Fr) Rubtic Puelo Rica (US) St. KiSs-Nesus UK) /A,tgua Virgin Islands (US) , and Barbsda .C-Montserrat (UK) U' Goadelaspe (Fr) 5Dominica Netherlands Antilles Martunuque (Fr) (Neth) St. Lucia ,Barbados USt Vincent and the Grenada,.- Grenadines Trunudad and Tobsgo -- 104 larly those describing social fea- contain comprehensive defini- shape, distance, and direction. The tures and income distribution, are tions and descriptions of concepts maps have been prepared exclu- subject to considerable margins of used. sively for the convenience of the error. In addition, variations in Introduced in this year's edi- readers of this book; the denom- national practices mean that the tion are five world maps. The first inations used, and the bound- data in certain instances are not map shows country names and aries shown, do not imply on the strictly comparable. The data the groups in which economies part of the World Bank and the should thus be construed only as have been placed. The maps on International Finance Corpora- indicating trends and character- the following pages show adult tion any judgment on the legal izing major differences between literacy, life expectancy at birth, status of any territory or any en- economies, GNP per capita, and the share of dorsement or acceptance of such The technical notes should be agriculture in gross domestic boundaries. referred to in any use of the data. product (GDP). For these maps The World Development Indi- These notes outline the methods, the Eckert IV projection has been cators are prepared in the Eco- concepts, definitions, and data used because it maintains correct nomic Analysis and Projections sources. The bibliography gives areas for all countries, though at Department under the supervi- details of the data sources, which the cost of some distortions in sion of Ramesh Chander. V Finlani Faeroe lsIands N,rwau Saneden Union of Soviet Saceazt Republics (Den) Z Denmark Isle of (UK) helJ saia Mongolia Porn, a na Fed Rep. of Gerrirarny Peo.ples' Switzerland Jaoan Span '.01 Korea PatIo Gibrallai China K. re (UK) Atghanislan M Pakistan Rhutan Algeria Nepal Libya Former Spanish Sah na tab Bangladesh India Burma HongKong (UK) Mauritania Macac )Foq) Cape Verde Mali Niger Gem. Rep. Lao People's Chad of Yemen ear Rep. Philippines Set hailand Sudan Arab Rep. et Rum Guam (US) The Gambia Gem I . Kamp bee Guinea-Bissau Trust Territory 01 the Sri Lenka PeciSc Islands Sierra Leone Ethiopia (US) Central Atrican Rep. Bruinei (UK) Libe rid Carnnnoon ha Meldives MaIayai)... Ghana Uganda Kiribati Toga Kenya Sq Benin - Rwanda Papua Equatorial Guinna Zaire New Goinea Sao Tome and Principe Peoples Rep of the Congo Seychelles '. Solomon ',tslands Tuvalu' Comoros Angola alawi Zambia Vanuatu' Fyi Moza, .ique ham ibia Zimbabwe Mauritiuo Madag Botswana Reunion New Culedonia (Fr) Australia (Fr) waziland South rho Africa New Zealand 105 GNP per capita, 1980 Data not available Key $0 $420- $1,420- $4,510- 410 1,410 4,500 26,850 Country group Range of GNP per capita (thousands of dollars) o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Weighted average Low-income economies Middle-income oil importers Middle-income oil exporters High-income oil exporters Industrial market economies Nonmarket industrial economies 106 Adult literacy, 1977 Data not available Key 0-24 percent 25-49 percent 50-74 percent 75-100 percent Cou ntry group Range of adult literacy (percent) 0 20 40 60 80 100 4 Weighted average Low-income economies 4 Middle-income oil importers Middle-income , oil exporters 4 High-income oil exporters 4 Industrial market economies Nonmarket , industrial economies 107 Life expectancy, 1980 Data not available Key 0-49 years 50-59 years 60-69 years 70-76 years Coun try group Range of life expectancy (years) 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 Weighted average Low-income economies Mid dle-income oil i mporters Middle-income oil exporters High-income oil exporters Industrial market economies Nonmarket industrial economies 108 Share of agriculture in GDP, 1980 Data not available Key 0-9 10-19 20-39 40-66 percent percent percent percent Cou ntry group Range of agriculture's share in GDP (percent) 0 15 30 45 60 75 + Weighted average Low-income economies Mid die-income oil i nporters Middle-income oil exporters High-income oil exporters I Industrial market economies Nonmarket industrial economies 109 Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per capita Average index Area Average Life of food Average annual Popula- (thou- annual Adult expectancy production rate of inflation tion sands growth (percent) literacy at birth per capita (millions) of square Dollars (percent) (percent) (years) (1969-71 = 100) Mid-1980 kilometers) 1980 1960_80a 1969-70b 1970_80c 1977d 1980 1978-80 Low-Income economies 2,160.9t 30,714t 260w 1.2w 3.2ni 11.2m 50w 57 w 106 w China and India 1,649.9t 12,819t 270w 54w 59 w 110w Other low-income 511.Ot 17,895t 230w 1.0w 3.lm 11.2rn 34w 48 w 95 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 69 181 .. . 3.8 . . .. . 41 2 Lao PDR 3.4 237 . . . . . 41 43 100 3 Bhutan 1.3 47 80 -0.1 . . . . . . 44 105 4 Chad 4.5 1,284 120 -1.8 4.6 7.8 15 41 91 5 Bangladesh 88.5 144 130 (.) 3.7 16.9 26 46 94 6 Ethiopia 31.1 1,222 140 1.4 2.1 4.2 15 40 83 7 Nepal 14.6 141 140 0.2 7.7 8.6 19 44 88 8 Somalia 3.9 638 . . . . 4.5 12.4 60 44 84 9 Burma 34.8 677 170 1.2 2.7 11 2 70 54 99 10 Afghanistan 15.9 648 . . , . 11.9 . . 12 37 95 11 Viet Nam 54.2 330 . . . , . . . . 87 63 107 12 Mali 7.0 1,240 190 1.4 5.0 10.1 9 43 88 13 Burundi 4.1 28 200 2.5 2.8 11.8 23 42 99 14 Rwanda 5.2 26 200 1.5 13.1 14.2 50 45 106 15 Upper Volta 6.1 274 210 0.1 1.3 10.1 5 39 95 16 Zaire 28.3 2,345 220 0.2 29.9 32.2 58 47 88 17 Malawi 6.1 118 230 29 2.4 9.8 25 44 99 18 Mozambique 12.1 802 230 -0.1 2.8 11.2 28 47 75 19 India 673.2 3,288 240 1.4 7.1 8.5 36 52 101 20 Haiti 50 28 270 0.5 4.0 9.4 23 53 92 21 Sri Lanka 14.7 66 270 2.4 1.8 12.6 85 66 121 22 Sierra Leone 3.5 72 280 (.) 2.7 11.6 . . 47 86 23 Tanzania 18.7 945 280 1.9 1.8 11.9 66 52 92 24 China 9767 9,561 290 . . 66 64 116 25 Guinea 5.4 246 290 03 15 4.4 20 45 86 26 Central African Rep. 2.3 623 300 0.9 4.1 9.7 39 44 101 27 Pakistan 82.2 804 300 2.8 3.3 13.5 24 50 101 28 Uganda 126 236 300 -0.7 3.0 304 48 54 89 29 Benin 3.4 113 310 0.4 1.9 9.1 25 47 99 30 Niger 5.3 1,267 330 -1.6 21 12.2 5 43 93 31 Madagascar 8.7 587 350 -0.5 3.2 10.3 50 47 95 32 Sudan 18.7 2,506 410 -0.2 3.7 15.8 20 46 102 33 Togo 2.5 56 410 30 1.3 9.8 18 47 81 Middle-income economies 1,138.8 t 41,614 1,400w 3.8w 2.7 m 13.2 m 65 w 60 w 108 w Oil exporters 496.8 t 16,135 1,160w 3.3 w 2.6 m 14.4 rn 57 w 56 w 101 w Oil importers 642.Ot 25,479t 1,580w 4.1 w 2.9 m 12.5 m 73 w 63 w 113w 34 Ghana 11.7 239 420 -1.0 7.6 34.8 . . 49 82 35 Kenya 15.9 583 420 2.7 1.5 11.0 50 55 86 36 Lesotho 1.3 30 420 6.1 2.7 11.6 52 51 91 37 Yemen, PDR 19 333 420 12.1 . . , . 40 45 103 38 Indonesia 146.6 1,919 430 4.0 . . 20.5 62 53 110 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 7.0 195 430 4.5 . . 16.1 21 42 94 40 Mauritania 1.5 1,031 440 1.6 1.6 9.6 17 43 76 41 Senegal 5.7 196 450 -0.3 1.7 7.6 10 43 89 42 Angola 7.1 1,247 470 -2.3 3.3 21.0 . . 42 82 43 Liberia 1.9 111 530 1.5 1.9 9.6 25 54 98 44 Honduras 3.7 112 560 1.1 2.9 8.9 60 58 82 45 Zambia 5.8 753 560 0.2 7.6 8.1 44 49 95 46 Bolivia 5.6 1,099 570 2.1 3.5 22.3 63 50 106 47 Egypt 39.8 1,001 580 3.4 2.6 11.5 44 57 93 48 Zimbabwe 74 391 630 0.7 13 88 74 55 97 49 El Salvador 4.5 21 660 1.6 05 11.3 62 63 119 50 Cameroon 8.4 475 670 2.6 4.2 102 . . 47 109 51 Thailand 47.0 514 670 4.7 1.8 9.9 84 63 128 52 Philippines 490 300 690 2.8 5.8 13.2 75 64 114 53 Nicaragua 2.6 130 740 0.9 1.8 13.1 90 56 95 54 Papua New Guinea 30 462 780 2.8 3.6 88 32 51 106 55 Congo, People's Rep. 1.6 342 900 0.8 5.4 10.9 . . 59 79 56 Morocco 20.2 447 900 2.5 2.0 8.1 28 56 87 57 Mongolia 1.7 1,565 . . . , , . . . . . 64 97 58 Albania 2.7 29 . . . , . . . . . 70 104 59 Peru 17.4 1,285 930 1.1 10.4 307 80 58 83 60 Nigeria 84.7 924 1,010 4.1 2.6 18.2 30 49 87 61 Jamaica 2.2 11 1,040 06 4.0 17.0 90 71 96 62 Guatemala 7.3 109 1.080 2.8 0.3 10.4 . . 59 112 63 Ivory Coast 8.3 322 1.150 2.5 2.8 13.2 41 47 107 64 Dominican Rep. 5.4 49 1,160 3,4 2.1 9.0 67 61 94 65 Colombia 26.7 1,139 1,180 3.0 11.9 22.0 . 63 122 66 Ecuador 8.0 284 1,270 4.5 . . 14.4 81 61 95 110 GNP per capita Average index Area Average Average annual Life of food Popula- (thou- annual Adult expectancy production rate of inflation tion sands growth (percent) literacy at birth per capita (millions) of square Dollars (percent) (percent) (years) (1969-71 = 100) Mid-1980 kilometers) 1980 1960_80a 1960_70b 1970_SOC 1977i 1980 1978-80 67 Paraguay 3.2 407 1300 3.2 3.1 12.4 84 65 111 68 Tunisia 6.4 164 1,310 4.8 3,6 7.7 62 60 120 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. 18.3 121 . . . . . . . . . 65 133 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 9.0 185 1,340 3.7 2.6 11.4 58 65 157 71 Jordan 3.2 98 1,420 5.7 . . . . 70 61 89 72 Lebanon 2.7 10 . . . 1.4 . . 66 83 73 Turkey 44.9 781 1,470 3.6 5.6 29.7 60 62 111 74 Cuba 9.7 115 . . , , . . . . 96 73 105 75 Korea, Rep. of 38.2 98 1,520 7.0 17.4 19.8 93 65 130 76 Malaysia 13.9 330 1,620 4.3 -0.3 7.5 . . 64 116 77 Costa Rica 2.2 51 1,730 3.2 1.9 15.2 90 70 112 78 Panama 1.8 77 1,730 3.3 1.6 7.4 . 70 102 79 Algeria 18.9 2,382 1,870 3.2 2.7 13.3 35 56 80 80 Brazil 118.7 8,512 2,050 5.1 46.1 36.7 76 63 117 81 Mexico 69.8 1,973 2,090 2.6 36 19.3 81 65 103 82 Chile 11.1 757 2,150 1.6 33.2 185.6 . . 67 93 83 South Africa 29.3 1,221 2,300 2.3 . . 12.5 . . 61 102 84 Romania 22.2 238 2,340 8.6 -0.2 . . 98 71 145 85 Portugal 9.8 92 2,370 5.0 3.0 16.6 . . 71 78 86 Argentina 27.7 2,767 2,390 2.2 21.7 1308 93 70 122 87 Yugoslavia 22.3 256 2,620 5.4 12.6 17.7 85 70 115 88 Uruguay 2.9 176 2,810 1.4 51.1 62.3 94 71 97 89 Iran 38.8 1,648 . . . . -0.5 20.1 50 59 112 90 Iraq 13.1 435 3,020 5.3 1.7 14.1 . . 56 90 91 Venezuela 14.9 912 3,630 2.6 1.3 12.1 82 67 102 92 Hong Kong 5.1 1 4,240 6.8 2.4 8.2 90 74 53 93 Trinidad and Tobago 1.2 5 4,370 3.0 3.2 18.5 95 72 85 94 Greece 9.6 132 4,380 5.8 3.2 14.4 . . 74 122 95 Singapore 2.4 1 4,430 7.5 1.1 5.1 . 72 147 96 Israel 3.9 21 4,500 3.8 6.2 39.7 . . 72 106 High-income oil exporters 14.4 I 4,0121 12,630 c' 6.3w . . 18.4 25 w 57 w 97 Libya 30 1,760 8,640 5.2 5.2 18.4 . . 56 139 98 Saudi Arabia 90 2,150 11,260 8.1 24.3 16 54 69 99 Kuwait 1.4 18 19,830 - 1.1 . . 18.4 60 70 100 United Arab Emirates 1.0 84 26,850 4.3 . . 56 63 Industrial market economies 714.4 1 30,935 I 10.32011' 3.6w 4.3 in 9.7 in 99 74 w 111 iv 101 Ireland 3.3 70 4,880 3.1 5.2 14.5 98 73 124 102 Spain 37.4 505 5,400 4.5 8.2 15.9 . . 73 127 103 Italy 56.9 301 6,480 3.6 4.4 15.3 98 73 111 104 New Zealand 3.3 269 7,090 1.8 3.3 12.5 99 73 105 105 United Kingdom 55.9 245 7,920 2.2 4.1 14.4 99 73 118 106 Finland 4.9 337 9,720 4.0 5.6 12.3 100 73 105 107 Australia 14.5 7,687 9,820 27 3.1 11.5 100 74 123 108 Japan 116.8 372 9,890 7.1 4.9 7.5 99 76 93 109 Canada 23.9 9,976 10,130 3.3 3.1 93 99 74 109 110 Austria 7.5 84 10,230 4.1 3.7 6.3 99 72 110 111 United States 227.7 9,363 11,360 2.3 2.8 7.1 99 74 115 112 Netherlands 14.1 41 11,470 3.2 5.4 8.4 99 75 127 113 France 53.5 547 11,730 3.9 4.2 9.7 99 74 115 114 Belgium 9.8 31 12,180 38 3.6 7.6 99 73 107 115 Norway 4.1 324 12,650 3.5 4.3 8.4 99 75 114 116 Denmark 5.1 43 12,950 3.3 5.5 9.7 99 75 110 117 Sweden 8.3 450 13,520 23 4.4 10.2 99 75 116 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 60.9 249 13,590 3.3 3.2 5.1 99 73 110 119 Switzerland 6.5 41 16,440 1.9 4.4 5.0 99 75 115 Nonmarket industrial economies 353.31 23,1551 4,640w 4.2w 100w 71w 109w 120 Poland 35.8 313 3,900 5.3 . . . . 98 72 102 121 Bulgaria 9.0 111 4,150 5.6 . , . . . . 73 114 122 Hungary 10.8 93 4,180 4.5 . . . . 99 71 130 123 USSR 265.5 22,402 4,550 40 . . . . 100 71 108 124 Czechoslovakia 15.3 128 5,820 4.0 . . . . . . 71 115 125 German Oem. Rep. 16.9 108 7,180 4.7 . . . . . . 72 126 a. Because data for the early 1960s are not available, figures in italics are for periods other than that specified. b. Figures in italics are for 1961-70, not 1960- 70. c. Figures in italics are for 1970-79, not 1970-80. d. Figures in italics are for years other than that specified. See the technical notes. e. See the technical notes. 111 Table 2. Growth of production Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1960_70a 1970b 1960_70a 1g70b 196O_7Oa 1g70b 1960_70a 1g70b 1960_70a 1g750b Low-income economies 4.4w 4.6 w 2.2 in 2.2 in 7.0 in 3.6 in 6.3 in 3.7 m 4.2 in 4.5 in China and India 4.5w 4.9w 1.8 in 2.6 in 8.3 in 6.6 in . . . 3.9 in 4.5 m Other low-income 4.4w 3.5w 2.5 in 2.2 in 7.0 in 3.2 in 6.5 in 3.6 in 4.2 in 4.5 in 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 3.1 2 Lao PDR 3 Bhutan 4 Chad 0.5 -02 -03 11 08 -08 5 Bangladesh 3.7 3.9 27 2.2 80 9.5 6.6 11.8 4.2 4.9 6 Ethiopia 4.4 2.0 2.2 0.7 7.4 1.4 8.0 24 7.8 4.2 7 Nepal 2.5 2.5 0.5 .. , . 8 Somalia 1.0 3.4 -0.6 3.0 3.4 -2.6 4.0 -3.8 4.2 6.9 9 Burma 27 4.6 41 4.3 3.1 5.2 3.7 44 1.5 4.7 10 Afghanistan 2.0 45 11 VietNam .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12 Mali 33 4.9 . . 44 . . 3.0 . . . . . 6.0 13 Burundi 44 2.8 . . 1.8 . . 7.8 5.3 . . 3.0 14 Rwanda 2.7 4.1 . . . . , . . . . . , . , 15 Upper Volta 3.0 3.5 . . 1.2 . . 3.2 . . 3.7 . . 5.7 16 Zaire 3.4 0.1 . . 1.2 . . -1.1 . . -1.5 . . 0.7 17 Malawi 4.9 6.3 . . 4.1 . . 7.0 . . 6.7 . . 9.1 18 Mozambique 4.6 -2.9 2.1 -1 8 9.5 -5.6 6.6 -5.8 6.4 -3.0 19 India 3.4 3.6 1.9 1.9 5.4 4.5 47 5.0 4.6 5.2 20 Haiti -0.2 4.0 -0.6 2.2 0.1 8.3 -0.1 7.1 0.4 3.7 21 Sri Lanka 46 4.1 30 2.8 6.6 40 63 1.9 4.6 4.8 22 Sierra Leone 4.3 1.6 . . 2.2 . . -3.8 . . 3.8 . . 4.2 23 Tanzania 6.0 4.9 . . 4.9 . . 1.9 . . 3.6 . . 5.9 24 China 5.2 5.8 1.6 3.2 11.2 8.7 . . . . 3.1 3.7 25 Guinea 3.5 33 . . . . . . . . . 26 Central African Rep. 19 30 08 2.3 54 5.1 . . 1,8 3.0 27 Pakstan 6.7 47 4.9 23 100 5.2 9.4 4.0 7.0 6.2 28 Uganda 5.6 -1 7 . . -0.9 . . -9.6 . . -9.1 . . -0.8 29 Benin 2.6 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Niger 2.9 2.7 33 -3.7 13.9 11.3 . . . (.) 6.9 31 Madagascar 2.9 0.3 . . 0.1 . . 1.0 . . . . . . 0.1 32 Sudan 1.3 4.4 . . 2.6 . . 3.1 . . 1.3 . . 6.4 33 Togo 8.5 3.4 . . 0.8 . . 6.6 . . . . . 3.9 Middle-income economies 5.9w 5.6 w 3.5 in 2.9 in 7.4 in 6.6 in 6.8 in 6.4 in 5.4 in 5.9 in Oil exporters 6.2w 5.5w 3.0 in 2.9 in 6.2 in 7.4 in 6.8 in 8.0 in 5.1 in 7.2 in Oil importers 5.8 w 5.6w 3.5 in 2.8 m 7.8 in 6.6 in 7.5 in 6.2 in 5.7 in 5.7 in 34 Ghana 2.1 -0.1 . . -1.2 . . -1.2 . . -2.9 . . 1.0 35 Kenya 6.0 65 . . 5.4 . . 10.2 . . 11.4 . . 5.8 36 Lesotho 5.2 7.9 . . 2.9 . . 8.2 9.0 . . 104 37 Yemen, PDR .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 Indonesia 39 7.6 2.7 38 52 111 3.3 128 48 9.2 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . . 9.2 . . 3.7 . . 14.7 . . 12.2 . . 12.5 40 Mauritania . . 1.7 . . -1.1 . . (.) . . 0.2 . . 6.8 41 Senegal 2.5 2.5 2.9 3.7 4.4 3.7 6.2 3.8 1.7 1.5 42 Angola 4.8 -9.2 4.0 -10.2 11.0 -3.9 7.2 -12.0 4.2 -10.9 43 Liberia 5.1 1.7 . 4.7 . . -02 . . 8.0 . . 1.9 44 Honduras 5.3 3.6 5.7 1.5 5.4 4.9 4.5 5.4 4.8 4.5 45 Zambia 5.0 0.7 . . 1.8 . . 0.1 . . 0.4 . . 1.2 46 Bolivia 5.2 4.8 3.0 3.1 62 4.3 5.4 6.0 5.4 5.7 47 Egypt 43 7.4 29 2.7 5.4 6.8 4.8 8.0 4.7 11.0 48 Zimbabwe 4.3 1.6 -05 . . 1.8 . . 2.8 . 2.1 49 El Salvador 5.9 41 3.0 2.8 8.5 50 8.8 41 65 4.3 50 Cameroon 3.7 5.6 . . 3.8 . . 8.6 . . 5.2 . . 5.7 51 Thailand 8.4 7.2 5.6 4.7 11.9 10.0 11.4 10.6 9.1 7.3 52 Philippines 5.1 6.3 4.3 4.9 6.0 8.7 6.7 7.2 5.2 5.4 53 Nicaragua 7.3 09 7.8 31 10.4 2.2 11.4 2.9 5.8 -0.9 54 Papua New Guinea 6.5 2.3 55 Congo, Peoples Rep. 2.7 31 1.0 1.7 7.0 4.0 6.8 2.1 3.1 56 Morocco 4.4 5.6 4.7 08 42 66 4.2 58 4.4 6.6 57 Mongolia 58 Albania 59 Peru 4.9 3.0 37 (.) 5.0 37 5.7 3.2 5.3 3.5 60 Nigeria 3.1 6.5 -0.4 0.8 12.0 8.1 9.1 12.0 4.9 9.7 61 Jamaica 4.4 - 1.1 1.5 07 4.8 -3.5 57 -2.2 4.7 0.1 62 Guatemala 5.6 5.7 4.3 4.6 7.8 76 8.2 6.2 5.5 5.6 63 Ivory Coast 8.0 6.7 42 34 11 5 10.5 11.6 7.2 9.7 7.0 64 Dominican Rep. 4.5 66 2.1 3.1 6.0 8.3 5.0 6.4 5.0 7.0 65 Colomba 5.1 59 35 4.9 6.0 4.9 5.7 6.3 5.7 7.0 66 Ecuador 8.8 2.4 . . 12.1 . . 98 . . 9.4 112 Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1 96O_7Oa 1 970_80b 1 960_70a 1 g7$0b 1 96O_7Oa 1 970b 1 960_70a 1 970_80b 1 960_708 970b 67 Paraguay 4.2 8.6 . . 6.9 . 10.6 . . 7.9 . . 8.9 68 Tunisia 4.7 7.5 2.0 4.9 8.2 9.0 7.8 11.2 4.5 7.8 69 Korea, Oem. Rep. .. . . , , . . .. . , . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 4.6 10.0 . . 8.2 . . 9.6 . . 7.9 10.8 71 Jordan . . , . . , . . , . . 72 Lebanon 4.9 . . 6.3 . . 4.5 . . 5.0 . . 4.8 73 Turkey 6.0 5.9 2,5 3.4 9.6 6.6 10.9 6.1 6.9 6.8 74 Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 75 Korea, Rep. of 8.6 9.5 4.4 3.2 17.2 15.4 17.6 16.6 8.9 8.5 76 Malaysia 6.5 7.8 . . 5.1 . . 9.7 . , 11.8 . . 8.2 77 Costa Rica 6.5 5.8 5.7 2.5 9.4 8.3 10.6 7.9 5.7 5.9 78 Panama 7.8 4.0 5.7 1.9 10.1 1.9 10.5 0.8 7.6 5.6 79 Algeria 4.3 7.0 0.1 3.1 11.6 7.9 7.8 11.4 -1.0 6.3 80 Brazil 5.4 8.4 . . 4.9 . . 9.3 . . 10.3 . . 8.4 81 Mexico 7.2 5.2 3.8 2.3 9.1 6.6 9.0 5.9 6.9 4.9 82 Chile 4.5 2.4 2.6 2.3 4.8 0.2 5.5 -0.5 4.6 4.1 83 South Africa 6.3 3.6 . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Rornania 8.6 8.6 1.7 5.7 12.8 9.7 . . . . . 85 Portugal 6.2 4.6 1.3 -0.9 8.8 4.5 8.9 4.5 5.9 6.2 86 Argentina 4.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 5.9 1.8 5.7 1.0 3.4 2.6 87 Yugoslavia 5.8 5.8 3.3 2.8 6.2 7.1 5.7 7.3 6.9 5.5 88 Uruguay 1.2 3.5 1.9 0.2 1.1 5.2 1.5 4.1 1.0 3.6 89 Iran 11.3 2.5 4.4 . . 13.4 12.0 10.0 90 Iraq 6.1 12.1 5.7 . . 4.7 . . 5.9 . . 8.3 91 Venezuela 6.0 5.0 5.8 3.8 4.6 3.0 6.4 5.7 7.3 6.5 92 Hong Kong 10.0 9.3 . . -4.6 . . . . 9.3 93 Trinidad and Tobago 4.0 5.1 . . . . . , , . . . . . . 94 Greece 6.9 4.9 3.5 1.7 9.4 5.3 10.2 6.4 7.1 5.7 95 Singapore 8.8 8.5 5.0 1.8 12.5 8.8 13.0 9.6 7.7 8.5 96 Israel 8.1 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . High-income oil exporters 5.3 w . . 7.4 m . . 1.8 in 9.2 in . . 12.2 in 97 Libya 24.4 2.2 11.1 . . -2.3 18.9 17.2 98 Saudi Arabia . . 10.6 . . 5.3 . . 10.2 6.5 12.2 99 Kuwait 5.7 2.5 .. 7.4 .. -1.8 9.2 .. 10.0 100 United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . Industrial market economies 5,2w 3.2 w 1.4 in 1.4 tn 5.9 iii 3.1 in 5.9 in 3.2 in 4.8 in 3.5 in 101 Ireland 4.2 3.5 0.9 . . 6.1 . . . . 4.3 102 Spain 7.1 4.0 . . 2.5 . . 3.9 . 6.0 . . 4.5 103 Italy 5.3 3.0 2.8 1.5 6.2 1.5 7.1 3.8 5.1 2.3 104 New Zealand 3.9 2.3 . . . . , . . . . . . . . 105 United Kingdom 2.9 1.9 2.3 1.4 3.2 0.7 3.3 0.1 3.6 2.4 106 Finland 4.8 3.1 0.6 -0.5 6.3 3.3 6.2 3.3 5.3 3.5 107 Australia 5.6 3.0 2.7 . , 4.6 . . 5.6 . . 4.0 108 Japan 10.9 5.0 4.0 1.1 10.9 5.5 11.0 6.4 11.7 5.5 109 Canada 5.6 3.9 2.5 2.8 6.3 3.4 6.7 3.6 5.5 4,3 110 Austria 4.5 3.7 1.3 2.1 4.9 3.3 4.8 3.5 4.5 4.2 111 United States 4.3 3.0 0.3 1.2 4.9 1.2 5.3 2.9 4.2 3.2 112 Netherlands 5.2 2.9 2.8 3.7 6.8 1.2 6.6 2.7 5.1 3.3 113 France 5.5 3.5 1.8 1.4 6.4 3.1 6.6 3.6 5.7 4.0 114 Belgium 4.7 3.0 -0.5 -0.2 5.5 3.0 6.2 2.8 4.6 3.3 115 Norway 4.4 4.8 0.1 1.7 5.5 5.4 5.3 1.2 5.0 4.7 116 Denmark 5.4 2.5 0.2 . . 5.5 . . 5.4 . . 4.9 117 Sweden 4.4 1.7 0.8 -1.4 6.2 0.9 5.9 0.8 3.9 2.3 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 4.4 2.6 1.5 1.4 5.2 5.4 2.1 4.1 119 Switzerland 4.3 0.4 . . - . . . . . . . Nonmarket industrial economiesc .. 6.4 w 120 Poland 8.9 121 Bulgaria 7.1 122 Hungary 5.4 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 5.1 125 German Oem. Rep. 4.8 a. Figures in italics are for 1961-70, not 1960-70. b. Figures in italics are for 1970-79, not 1970-80. c. Based on net material product. 113 Table 3. Structure of production Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) GOP (millions of dollars) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturing)a Services 1960' 198CC 19b 1980C 1960b 1980C 1960b 1980C 1960b 198CC Low-income economies 50w 36w 18w 35w 12w 15w 32w 29w China and India 33w 39w .. 28w Other low-Income 49w 45w 12w 17w 8w lOw 39w 38w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. S S 2 LaoPDR .. ., 3 Bhutan .. .. .. 4 Chad 180 500 52 57 12 5 4 4 36 38 5 Bangladesh 3,170 11,140 58 54 7 13 5 7 35 33 6 Ethiopia 900 3690 65 51 12 16 6 11 23 33 7 Nepal 410 1,860 57 13 4 30 8 Somalia 160 1,130 71 60 8 11 3 7 21 29 9 Burma 1,280 5,550 33 46 12 13 8 10 55 41 10 Afghanistan 1,190 S 11 VietNam 12 Mali 270 1,410 55 42 10 10 5 6 35 48 13 Burundi 190 790 55 16 9 29 14 Rwanda 120 1,120 81 48 7 22 1 16 12 30 15 Upper Volta 200 980 62 40 14 18 8 13 24 42 16 Zaire 130 6,160 30 32 27 23 13 4 43 45 17 Malawi 170 1,420 58 43 11 20 6 13 31 37 18 Mozambique 830 2,360 55 44 9 16 8 9 36 40 19 India 29,550 142010 50 37 20 26 14 18 30 37 20 Haiti 270 1,410 S 21 Sri Lanka 1,500 3760 32 28 20 30 15 18 48 42 22 Sierra Leone 930 36 20 5 44 23 Tanzania 550 4,350 57 54 11 13 5 9 32 33 24 China 252,230 31 47 22 25 Guinea 370 1,670 37 33 4 30 26 Central African Rep. 110 780 51 37 10 15 4 7 39 48 27 Pakistan 3,500 21,460 46 31 16 25 12 16 38 44 28 Uganda 540 12,790 52 76 12 6 9 6 36 18 29 Benin 160 950 55 43 8 12 3 7 37 45 30 Niger 250 1,890 69 33 9 34 4 8 22 33 31 Madagascar 540 3,260 37 36 10 18 4 53 46 32 Sudan 1,160 7190 . 38 14 . . 6 . 48 33 Togo 120 1,060 55 26 16 20 8 7 29 54 Middle-income economies 24 w 15w 30 w 40 w 20 w 19w 46 w 45 w Oil exporters 28w 14w 24 w 43 w 13w 16w 48 w 43 w Oil importers 23 w 15w 32 w 37 w 23 w 23 w 45 w 48 w 34 Ghana 1,220 15,390 . 66 21 . . . . 13 35 Kenya 730 5,990 38 34 18 21 9 13 44 45 36 Lesotho 30 250 31 . 21 5 . 48 37 Yemen, PDR 540 . 13 28 14 . 59 38 Indonesia 8,670 69,800 54 26 14 42 8 9 32 32 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . 2,610 . . 29 . . 16 . 6 . 55 40 Mauritania 70 490 59 26 24 33 3 8 17 41 41 Senegal 610 2,650 24 29 17 24 12 19 59 47 42 Angola 690 2,500 50 48 8 23 4 3 42 29 43 Liberia 220 1,040 . 36 . 31 9 . . 33 44 Honduras 300 2,230 37 31 19 25 13 17 44 44 45 Zambia 680 3,790 11 15 63 39 4 17 26 46 46 Bolivia 460 6,100 26 18 25 29 15 14 49 53 47 Egypt 3,880 22,970 30 23 24 35 20 28 46 42 48 Zimbabwe 780 3,640 18 12 35 39 17 25 47 49 49 El Salvador 570 3,390 32 27 19 21 15 15 49 52 50 Cameroon 550 6,010 . 32 . 22 . . 9 . . 46 51 Thailand 2,550 33,450 40 25 19 29 13 20 41 46 52 Philippines 6,960 35,490 26 23 28 37 20 26 46 40 53 Nicaragua 340 2,120 24 23 21 31 16 25 55 46 54 Papua New Guinea 250 2,490 53 34 11 30 3 8 36 37 55 Congo. People's Rep. 130 1,750 23 12 17 45 10 6 60 43 56 Morocco 2,040 17,940 23 18 27 32 16 1.7 50 50 57 Mongolia . . 58 Albania . . . .. . . 59 Peru 2,410 19,240 18 8 33 45 24 27 49 47 60 Nigeria 3,150 91,130 63 20 11 42 5 6 26 38 61 Jamaica 700 2,660 10 8 36 37 15 15 54 55 62 Guatemala 1,040 7.850 . . . . S S 63 Ivory Coast 570 7,030 43 34 14 22 7 11 43 44 64 Dominican Rep. 720 7,120 27 18 23 27 17 15 50 55 65 Colombia 4,010 29.570 34 28 26 30 17 22 40 42 66 Ecuador 960 11,380 29 13 19 38 13 8 48 49 114 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) GOP (millions of dollars) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturing)0 Services 1960b 1980' 1960b 1980C 1960b 1980C 1960b 1980 1960b 1980C 67 Paraguay 300 4,450 36 30 20 25 17 17 44 45 68 Tunisia 770 7,300 24 17 18 35 8 13 58 48 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. . . . .. . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 890 12900 20 27 . . 21 . 53 71 Jordan . . 2,190 8 . 32 . 16 . 60 72 Lebanon 830 12 . 20 13 68 73 Turkey 8,820 53,820 41 23 21 30 13 21 38 47 74 Cuba .. .. . . .. 75 Korea, Rep. of 3,810 58,250 37 16 20 41 14 28 43 43 76 Malaysia 2,290 23,600 37 24 18 37 9 23 45 39 77 Costa Rica 510 4,850 26 17 20 29 14 20 54 54 78 Panama 420 3,390 23 . . 21 13 . . 56 79 Algeria 2,740 39,870 16 6 35 57 6 14 49 37 80 Brazil 24,080 237,930 16 10 35 37 26 . . 49 53 81 Mexico 12,040 166,700 16 10 29 38 19 24 55 52 82 Chile 3,730 28,080 10 7 51 37 29 21 39 56 83 South Africa 6,980 74,660 12 7 40 53 21 23 48 40 84 Romania . 57,650 , 11 . 64 , , . , 25 85 Portugal 2,340 21,930 25 13 36 46 29 36 39 41 86 Argentina 11,080 130,920 16 . 38 . . 32 . 46 87 Yugoslavia 9,860 62,150 24 12 45 43 36 30 31 45 88 Uruguay 1,110 8,430 19 10 28 33 21 25 53 57 89 Iran 4,120 . 29 , . 33 . , 11 , . 38 90 Iraq 1,580 35,810 17 7 52 73 10 6 31 19 91 Venezuela 7,570 60,030 6 6 22 47 16 72 47 92 Hong Kong 950 20,230 4 1 39 26 27 57 93 Trinidad and Tobago 470 5,310 8 . , 46 , 24 . , 46 94 Greece 3,110 35,650 23 16 26 16 19 51 52 95 Singapore 700 10,480 4 1 18 37 12 28 78 62 96 Israel 2,030 15,340 11 5 32 36 23 24 57 59 High-income oil exporters 1w .. 77w 4w .. 22w 97 Libya 310 32,090 . 2 . . 72 . . 4 . . 26 98 Saudi Arabia . . 115,430 . . 1 . . 78 . . 4 . . 21 99 Kuwait . . 27,290 . . (.) . 79 . . 6 . . 21 100 United Arab Emirates . . 30,020 . . 1 . . 77 4 . . 22 Industrial market economies 6w 4w 40 w 37 w 30 w 27 w 54 w 62 w 101 Ireland 1,770 17,800 22 . 26 . . . . . 52 102 Spain 10,350 198,320 . . 8 . . 37 . . . . . 55 103 Italy 37,190 393,950 13 6 41 43 31 . , 46 51 104 New Zealand 3,760 23,300 . . 13 . . 32 . . 23 . . 55 105 United Kingdom 71,380 522,850 4 2 43 35 32 22 53 63 106 Finland 4,940 49,900 18 8 35 35 24 26 47 57 107 Australia 16,310 148,060 12 . 37 . 26 . . 51 108 Japan 43,060 1.039,980 13 4 45 41 34 29 42 55 109 Canada 39,940 253,350 6 4 34 33 23 19 60 63 110 Austria 6,280 76,980 11 4 49 41 38 29 40 55 111 United States 506,700 2,587,100 4 3 38 34 29 24 58 63 112 Netherlands 11,010 167,630 9 4 46 37 34 29 45 59 113 France 60,060 651,890 10 4 38 36 29 27 52 60 114 Belgium 11,280 116,480 6 2 41 37 30 25 53 62 115 Norway 4,640 57,290 9 5 33 41 21 16 58 54 116 Denmark 5,900 66,380 11 . , 32 . 22 57 117 Sweden 13,950 122,750 7 3 40 32 27 23 53 65 118 Germany, Fed, Rep. 72,100 819,140 6 2 53 , 40 37 41 119 Switzerland 8,550 101,470 . . , . . . . . . . . Nonmarket industrial economiesd 21w 15w 62w 63w 52w 17w 22w 120 Poland , . . 26 15 57 64 47 . . 17 21 121 Bulgaria , , . . 32 17 53 58 46 . 15 25 122 Hungary . 24 14 69 59 59 7 27 123 USSR , . 21 16 62 62 52 . . 17 22 124 Czechoslovakia . , 16 8 73 75 63 . . 11 125 German Oem. Rep. , , . . . 9 . . 70 . . 21 a. Manufacturing is a part of the industrial sector, but its share ot GDP is also shown separately because it typically is the most dynamic part ot the industrial sector. b. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960 c. Figures in italics are for 1979, not 1980. d. Based on net material product 115 Table 4. Growth of consumption and investment Average annual growth rate (percent) Public Private Gross consumption consumption domestic investment 1960_70a 1g70b 1g6O7Oa 1970b 1960_70a 197b Low-income economies 4.5 ni 3.1 in 3.3 m 3.6 m 5.1 ni 4.8 in China and India 3.3 in 4.8 in 7.6 m 5.8 m Other low-income 4.6 in 3.0 in 3.2 ni 3.4 in 4.6 in 4.8 rn 1 Kanipuchea, Oem. 2.6 . . 32 . . 0.3 2 LaoPDR .. . 3 Bhutan . , . . , , . . . 4 Chad 44 -17 -0.7 03 23 -05 5 Bangladesh C C 34 4.0 11.2 1.8 6 Ethiopia 4.7 3.2 47 32 5.7 -1.2 7 Nepal . . , , . , . 11.7 8 Somalia 3.7 10.8 0.4 4.0 4.3 7.5 9 Burma C C 29 40 28 80 10 Atghanistan C . . 25 . - 1.0 11 Viet Nam 12 Mali 6.2 7.5 28 53 4.9 3,3 13 Burundi 19.2 3.6 32 36 4,3 15.8 14 Rwanda 11 14.0 4.2 1.6 3,5 189 15 Upper Volta 73 34 48 16 Zaire 8.5 -2.2 3.5 - 1.3 9.6 11 17 Malawi 4.6 2.5 4.1 64 15.4 2.6 18 Mozambique 6.8 -4.0 4.4 -2.3 8.3 -8.4 19 India -02 42 3.7 3.2 53 48 20 Haiti c c -1.0 3.5 1.7 11.1 21 Sri Lanka c c 21 2.7 6.6 9.8 22 Sierra Leone . 43 . . 10 . -0 2 23 Tanzania c c 5.2 6.0 9.8 3.0 24 China c c 2.7 5.4 9.8 6.8 25 Guinea , , , , , , , , . 26 Central African Rep 2.2 -2.6 3.0 5.8 1.3 -10.6 27 Pakistan 7.3 43 7.1 49 6.9 2.4 28 Uganda c c 56 -09 7.5 -164 29 Benin 17 20 49 35 4.2 7.2 30 Niger 20 30 3.9 1.4 3.0 7.6 31 Madagascar 2.7 02 20 -06 54 -1.8 32 Sudan 121 -4.2 -1.6 6.6 -1.3 6.7 33 Togo 67 10.1 76 5.7 11.1 10.5 Middle-Income economies 6.3 in 7.1 in 5.1 iii 5.2 in 7.5 in 7.8 in Oil exporters 7.3 in 9.9 iii 4.2 iii 6.9 in 4.6 in 11.0 in Oil importers 6.1 iii 6.4 iii 5.5 in 5.1 iii 7.9 in 6.6 in 34 Ghana 61 0.8 20 -0.1 -3.2 -62 35 Kenya 100 90 46 69 7.0 1.2 36 Lesotho (.) 152 65 11.9 20.7 22 0 37 Yemen, POR 38 Indonesia 0.9 12.9 41 81 4.6 14.4 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . . 10.8 . 100 . 24.6 40 Mauritania 1.0 15.1 17.2 0.5 -2.1 4.9 41 Senegal -02 3.0 3.2 2.7 1.1 2.4 42 Angola 9.1 30 40 -79 9.7 -9.0 43 Liberia 5.6 28 07 51 -3.9 5.8 44 Honduras 5.3 7.6 48 4.1 10.2 9.6 45 Zambia 11.0 1.4 6.8 1.5 10.6 -10.9 46 Bolivia 8.9 7.3 4.1 64 9.6 2.9 47 Egypt c c 67 51 3.1 16.5 48 Zimbabwe . . 49 El Salvador 64 6.1 6.1 53 35 5.2 50 Cameroon 6.1 58 27 50 9.3 8.5 51 Thailand 97 92 70 6.3 15.8 7,7 52 Philippines 50 72 4,7 50 82 10.5 53 Nicaragua 2.2 9,7 76 06 10.9 2.5 54 Papua New Guinea 65 -0.6 61 23 21.1 -59 55 Congo, Peoples Rep. 54 -03 2.9 27 56 Morocco 4,4 14.7 4.1 4.2 8.8 92 57 Mongolia 58 Albania 59 Peru 63 62 71 3.0 10 2.3 60 Nigeria 100 113 1.1 6.6 7.4 15.8 61 Jamaica 8.6 6.7 30 -1.0 7.8 - 9,5 62 Guatemala 4,7 6.4 47 53 79 7,9 63 Ivory Coast 11.8 81 80 76 12.7 13.2 64 Dominican Rep. 1.9 2.2 6.3 60 11.4 9.6 65 Colombia 5.5 49 5.5 5.8 4.5 54 66 Ecuador 13.5 98 8.8 116 Average annual growth rate (percent) Public Private Gross consumption consumption domestic investment 1960_70a 19708Or 1960_70a 1g70b 1960_70a 67 Paraguay 6.9 5.6 5.3 7.7 68 18.7 68 Tunisia 5.2 9.5 3.2 8.1 4.2 11.0 69 Korea, Oem. Rep. 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 16.1 11.9 16.7 71 Jordan 72 Lebanon 5.9 4.4 . . 6.2 73 Turkey 6.7 6.4 5.1 4.2 8.8 9.4 74 Cuba 75 Korea, Rep. of 5.5 8.3 7.0 715 23.6 13.4 76 Malaysia 7.5 9.9 4.2 7.2 7.5 10.3 77 Costa Rica 8.0 5.9 6.0 52 7.1 8.8 78 Panama 7,0 58 67 3.0 12.4 1.1 79 Algeria 1.5 10.8 2.3 9.3 -0.1 13.2 80 Brazil 35 81 5.1 8.5 7.0 9.7 81 Mexico 95 9.9 6.6 4.0 9.6 7.4 82 Chile 4.7 0.9 4.9 2.6 4.2 -1.8 83 South Africa 70 4.9 5.7 20 94 2.7 84 Romania 112 9.9 85 Portugal 7.7 8.7 5.5 3.8 77 1.6 86 Argentina 1.2 12.1 4.1 -2.0 4.1 2.9 87 Yugoslavia 0.6 46 9.5 6.1 4.7 6.5 88 Uruguay 4,4 3.6 0.7 0.9 -1.8 9.3 89 Iran 16.0 100 12.2 90 Iraq 8.1 C 49 17.0 3.0 27.2 91 Venezuela 6.3 5.0 . 7.6 92 Hong Kong 86 94 86 95 6.9 127 93 Trinidad and Tobago 7.1 . . 3.9 . . -2.3 94 Greece 66 6.9 7.1 4.5 104 2.0 95 Singapore 126 6.4 5.4 68 20.5 6.7 96 Israel 13.8 3.3 74 5.2 5.7 0.1 High-income oil exporters 18.7 rn 26.1 ru 97 Libya . . 21.6 . . 18.7 16.3 10.6 98 Saudi Arabia . . C . . 18.8 42.6 99 Kuwait . . 12.8 . . 10.1 26.1 100 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 4.5 m 3.7 4.5 m 3.4 in 5.9m 1.6rn 101 Ireland 39 51 3.7 3.2 8.9 3.1 102 Spain 3.8 5.4 7.0 4.1 11.4 2.2 103 Italy 4.0 3.1 6.2 2.7 3.7 0.5 104 New Zealand . . . . 105 United Kingdom 2.2 2.5 2.4 1.5 50 . j 106 Finland 5.5 5.3 4.9 2.8 3.9 02 107 Australia 7.0 5.5 4.9 3.3 6.6 1.4 108 Japan 6.1 4.7 9.4 5.1 14.6 3.2 109 Canada 6.2 26 4.9 4.8 5.8 4.2 110 Austria 3.2 3.6 4.4 3.7 6.3 3.7 111 United States 4.1 1.8 4,4 3.4 4.8 1.6 112 Netherlands 28 2.7 6.1 36 7.1 0.1 113 France 40 3.3 5.3 4.2 7.7 1.9 114 Belgium 57 44 38 3.7 60 1.5 115 Norway 63 5.3 3.8 3.5 52 2.9 116 Denmark 7.0 37 4.4 25 7.9 06 117 Sweden 5.6 3.3 3,7 1.8 5.1 0.5 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 4.1 3.7 4.6 2.8 4.1 1.6 119 Switzerland 4.8 1.8. 4,3 1.5 3,9 1.9 Nonmarket industrial economies 120 Poland 121 Bulgaria 122 Hungary 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Oem. Rep. a. Figures in italics are for 1961-70, not 1960-70. b Figures in italics are for 1970-79, not 1970-80. c. Separate figures are not available for public consumption, which is therefore included in private consumption. 117 Table 5. Structure of demand Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of goods Public Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resource consumption consumption investment saving services balance 19600 1980b 1960a 1g80b 1960 1980b 19600 1980D 1980b 19600 1980b 196O Low-income economies 8w 11w 79w 68w 19w 25w 17w 22w 7w 9w 2w 3w China and India 11w 77w 63w 21w 28w 19w 26w 5w 1w 2w Other low-income lOw 12w 83w 84w 11w 15w 9w 7w 15w 14w 2w 8w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 LaoPDR .. .. .. 3 Bhutan 4 Chad 5 Bangladesh 13 6 S 18 7 82 86 96 91 11 7 13 17 5 8 14 2 23 10 33 8 6 27 15 1 6 Ethiopia 7 Nepal 8 15 81 80 12 10 11 5 9 15 5 1 5 7 8 Somalia 8 19 C 96 86 93 78 10 9 14 16 4 6 7 3 13 12 15 4 13 1 6 9 Burma 10 Afghanistan 11 VietNam c c c c 89 87 82 89 12 16 24 14 11 13 18 11 20 4 II 8 33 12 Mali 13 Burundi 12 3 22 12 79 92 81 88 14 6 15 14 9 5 3 (.) 12 13 19 8 5 12 1 14 14 Rwanda 10 12 82 85 6 16 8 12 13 15 Upper Volta 16 Zaire 10 16 94 93 10 18 4 9 3 9 14 14 14 2 27 18 12 61 75 12 13 55 29 9 2 17 Malawi 11 421 14 12 18 Mozambique 16 11 10 15 88 81 80 85 10 10 22 10 8 10 (.) 21 14 22 13 2 10 3 3 19 India 20 Haiti 21 Sri Lanka 13 7 c 10 8 c 79 93 78 70 91 78 17 9 14 23 18 36 14 7 9 20 9 14 5 20 44 19 2 9 5 22 22 Sierra Leone 23 Tanzania 9 17 14 72 77 78 14 15 22 19 6 8 31 31 23 14 5 9 14 24 China C 11 77 59 23 31 23 30 4 6 (.) 25 Guinea 19 67 11 14 34 3 26 Central Atrican Rep. 72 20 1 11 19 27 Pakistan 28 Uganda 19 11 11 C 84 101 83 12 10 18 9 5 6 23 8 29 13 7 13 1 29 Benin 30 Niger 9 16 9 15 C 9 75 75 79 98 80 70 11 15 13 24 29 3 16 9 12 2 5 21 26 12 9 28 25 4 6 1 19 5 8 31 Madagascar 32 Sudan 20 8 17 12 75 74 11 21 5 9 12 15 6 12 9 33 Togo 8 16 80 88 85 70 12 11 12 26 12 4 3 14 16 19 10 41 7 12 (.) Middle-income economies Oil exporters 11 w 11 w 14 w 13 w 70 w 70 iv 64 w 58 w 20 w 18 w 27 27 w 19 w 25 w 16w 25 w 1 w 2 iv 19 iL 30 iv 21 w 29 iv 1 iv 3w Oil importers 12w 14w 69w 68w 21 a' 27w 19w 21 14w 22w 2w 6 zv 34 Ghana 35 Kenya 10 11 20 9 73 72 86 65 24 20 22 5 17 17 5 15 28 31 12 26 7 3 7(.) 36 Lesotho 17 20 108 158 2 30 25 78 12 18 27 108 37 Yemen, PDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Indonesia 12 13 80 57 8 22 8 30 13 31 (.) 8 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 18 102 44 20 7 64 3 40 37 . 40 Mauritania 47 37 41 Senegal 42 Angola 24 17 9 39 14 25 79 68 77 88 56 16 12 51 15 9 15 14 214 19 18 40 20 38 31 43 1 17 2 10 43 Liberia 44 Honduras 45 Zambia 7 11 16 13 28 58 77 48 55 67 54 28 14 25 29 28 23 35 12 41 29 20 18 39 22 56 53 37 38 28 5 7 (.) 46 Bolivia 47 Egypt 11 17 7 10 19 86 75 65 14 13 13 31 7 12 15 16 13 20 17 32 16 7 1 15 2 1 2 71 48 Zimbabwe 49 El Salvador 11 10 21 15 67 79 63 75 23 16 18 12 22 11 16 10 20 31 . 52 2 50 Cameroon 51 Thailand 10 5 11 12 76 66 66 16 25 27 14 23 22 17 29 25 25 5 52 Philippines 53 Nicaragua 9 8 21 8 76 79 67 80 16 15 30 20 16 12 1 25 11 24 20 24 3 21 (.) 54 Papua New Guinea 55 Congo, Peoples Rep. 26 23 26 13 71 98 59 50 15 45 27 37 21 3 15 37 17 21 42 12 12 66 . (.) 10 . 56 Morocco 12 22 77 67 10 21 11 11 24 18 1 57 Mongolia .. .. .. .. .. 58 Albania .. .. . .. . .. 59 Peru 64 68 25 16 27 19 20 24 60 Nigeria 9 6 13 10 87 62 13 24 7 28 15 26 6 44 2 3 4 61 Jamaica 62 Guatemala 63 Ivory Coast 7 8 10 21 8 18 67 84 73 67 79 59 30 10 15 16 16 28 26 8 17 12 13 23 34 13 37 50 22 33 23 52 64 Dominican Rep. 13 8 68 78 12 24 19 14 24 17 7 10 65 Colombia 73 67 25 25 16 66 Ecuador 6 10 8 14 75 63 21 15 25 21 15 23 18 17 24 (.) (.) 2 (.) 118 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of goods Public Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resource consumption consumption investment saving services balance 196O 1980b 1960 1g80b 1960a 1980b 1960 1980b 1960 1g80b 196O 1980b 67 Paraguay 68 Tunisia 8 17 6 15 76 76 74 60 17 17 29 28 16 7 20 25 18 20 10 41 10 9 3 69 Korea, Dem, Rep. 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 23 67 25 . . 10 . . 18 15 71 Jordan 33 94 46 . . 27 . . 48 75 72 Lebanon 10 85 16 27 11 73 Turkey 74 Cuba 11 13 76 69 16 27 13 5 18 3 7 3 75 Korea, Rep. of 76 Malaysia 15 11 13 17 84 62 64 51 11 14 31 29 27 23 32 54 3 37 60 10 13 83 5 77 Costa Rica 78 Panama 79 Algeria 80 Brazil 10 11 15 12 18 15 14 C 77 78 60 67 67 60 44 80 18 16 42 22 25 27 41 22 13 11 25 21 15 25 42 20 21 31 31 5 26 48 35 9 5 1 2 I 10 2 2 81 Mexico 82 Chile 83 South Africa 6 12 9 12 12 13 76 63 64 62 72 50 20 27 22 28 18 29 18 25 27 26 16 37 10 17 30 14 21 36 225 8 84 Romania 85 Portugal 77 74 19 34 25 12 11 17 21 28 7 3 14 1 86 Argentina 87 Yugoslavia 88 Uruguay 9 19 9 . 17 14 . 70 49 79 51 74 22 37 18 35 19 21 32 12 32 12 10 14 14 20 9 63 5 7 89 Iran 10 69 17 21 19 4 90 Iraq 18 C 48 41 20 33 34 59 42 63 14 26 91 Venezuela 14 13 53 55 21 25 33 32 32 33 12 7 92 Hong Kong 7 7 87 69 18 29 6 24 82 111 12 5 93 Trinidad and Tobago 94 Greece 95 Singapore 9 12 8 17 16 11 61 77 95 42 64 59 28 19 11 28 28 43 3 30 11 41 20 30 37 9 163 45 19 882 14 13 13 96 Israel 18 35 68 57 27 22 14 8 14 44 13 14 High-income oil exporters 19w . . 23w . . 24w 62w . . 72w 38 w 97 Libya C 41 25 59 74 34 98 Saudi Arabia 23 18 26 59 68 33 99 Kuwait 11 26 11 63 84 52 100 United Arab Emirates 10 17 30 73 77 43 Industrial market economies 15w 17w 63w 60w 21w 23w 22w 22w 12w 20w 1w 1w 101 Ireland 102 Spain 12 9 21 12 77 69 64 70 16 19 28 21 11 22 15 18 31 55 16 5 13 3 3 103 Italy 104 New Zealand 13 13 16 17 62 65 62 25 24 25 23 25 22 22 22 11 14 23 25 30 2(,) 3 1 105 United Kingdom 17 21 66 61 60 19 16 17 19 21 28 2 3 106 Finland 107 Australia 108 Japan 13 10 18 17 58 65 57 55 61 59 30 29 34 28 24 32 29 25 34 27 22 31 23 15 34 19 32 1 1 -1 109 Canada 110 Austria 9 14 13 10 20 18 65 60 56 55 23 28 22 29 21 27 24 27 11 18 24 14 29 39 2(.) 2 2 111 United States 17 18 64 65 18 18 19 17 5 10 1 1 1 112 Netherlands 14 18 57 61 27 22 29 21 50 53 113 France 114 Belgium 13 13 15 18 62 69 64 64 23 19 23 21 25 18 21 18 15 33 22 63 1 2 2 2 3 115 Norway 12 19 60 47 30 28 28 34 41 48 2 6 116 Denmark 12 27 66 56 23 18 22 17 34 33 1 1 117 Sweden 118 Germany, Fed Rep. 16 14 29 20 60 57 52 55 25 27 21 25 24 29 19 25 23 19 30 28 1 2 119 Switzerland 9 13 62 64 29 27 29 23 29 37 2 (.) 4(.) Nonmarket industrial economies' 3w 11 w 70 w 73 w 25 o' 24 zr' 27 w 25 w 2w 1w 120 Poland 121 Bulgaria 8 3 14 68 69 73 24 27 19 24 28 13 (,) 5 122 Hungary 123 USSR 7 2 9 c 72 70 69 74 24 26 23 24 21 28 22 26 3 2 1 2 124 Czechoslovakia 6 7 75 66 17 25 19 27 2 2 125 German Dern. Rep a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960 b Figures in italics are tor 1979, not 1980 c Separate figures are not available for public consumption, which is therefore included in private consumption d. Based on net material product 119 Table 6. Industrialization Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent; 1975 prices) Gross Value added in manufacturing Machinery manufacturing output Textiles and (millions of per capita Food and and transport Other 1975 dollars) (1975 dollars) agriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1979 1979 1979 1979 1979 1970 1979 1970 1978b Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Kampuchea, Oem. 2 LaoPDR .. .. .. .. 3 Bhutan S .. .. .. 4Chad .. .. .. .. 37 30 5 Bangladesh 28 42 3 13 14 647 1,195 22 37 6 Ethiopia . S . . . 236 314 19 19 7 Nepal .. .. .. .. . 8 Somalia S . 42 32 22 22 9 Burma 36 14 1 4 45 287 395 10 Afghanistan . . . . S . . . S 11 VietNam . . . .. . . 12 Mali .. .. .. .. 44 56 13 Burundi S . . . . . . 23 37 14 Rwanda . . . . . . . 113 97 75 22 15 Upper Volta 74 11 6 9 63 82 16 Zaire 44 20 . . 10 26 186 164 . 17 Malawi . . . . . . . 56 99 43 18 Mozambique . . . . . 246 224 66 19 India 13 18 19 13 37 10,202 15,595 73 113 20 Haiti . . . . . . . 21 Sri Lanka 39 15 . 3 43 556 673 . 22 Sierra Leone . . . S S . 25 35 23 Tanzania S . . S . 190 273 44 24 China . . . . . . 214 25 Guinea . . S 55 26 Central African Rep. 62 18 1 3 16 54 40 27 Pakistan 42 15 8 15 20 1492 2,056 60 28 Uganda S . . . . 222 87 . 29 Benin . . . . . . 38 30 Niger . . . . . . 54 158 31 Madagascar 27 41 2 10 20 298 362 101 32 Sudan 49 31 . . 2 18 266 274 54 33 Togo Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers 34 Ghana . S S . 601 758 138 35 Kenya 32 11 12 8 37 199 570 63 191 36Lesotho .. .. .. . 5 9 37 Yemen, PDR .. . . . . . . . . . 38 Indonesia S S . . . 1,517 4,136 50 92 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . S . . . 25 72 . 40 Mauritania . . S S S S S 5 30 30 41 Senegal 52 15 . . 7 26 276 377 42 Angola . S S S . . 158 82 . 43 Liberia . . . . . S 25 52 . . 44 Honduras 43 15 1 6 35 137 226 . . 45 Zambia 41 13 6 11 29 275 324 163 46 Bolivia . . 238 395 148 47 Egypt 21 28 12 8 31 1,835 3,597 208 48 Zimbabwe 22 18 9 10 41 519 749 248 250 49 El Salvador . S . . . . . 252 337 . . 50 Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . 201 318 . 51 Thailand 37 24 10 3 26 1,675 4,154 210 52 Philippines 40 9 7 12 32 2,816 5,339 193 53 Nicaragua . S . . . 262 287 54 Papua New Guinea S . . . . . . . S S 55 Congo, People's Rep. 31 6 . . 7 56 57 72 107 56 Morocco 32 13 9 9 37 1,138 1,872 . . 57 Mongolia . . S . . . . 58 Albania . . . . . . . . . 59 Peru . . . . . . . . 2911 3,830 525 60 Nigeria 24 14 12 15 35 1,199 2,890 39 61 Jamaica 50 8 6 8 28 428 388 674 . 62 Guatemala . S . . . . . S 63 Ivory Coast . . . . . . S . . . 398 776 . 314 64 Dominican Rep. 72 4 1 5 18 483 886 234 477 65 Colombia 30 17 12 12 29 1,784 3,217 198 261 66 Ecuador 30 13 9 7 41 351 765 153 . 120 Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent; 1975 prices) Gross Value added in manufacturing Machinery manufacturing output Textiles and (millions of rer ca ita Food and and transport Other 1975 dollars) (1975 dollars) agriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1979 1979 1979 1979 1979 1970 1979 1970 1978b 67 Paraguay 33 13 8 5 41 182 354 68 Tunisia 24 14 10 16 36 222 617 174 330 69 Korea, Dem, Rep. . . . . . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 29 36 3 3 29 575 1,118 282 421 71 Jordan . . . . . . 181 . . 120 72 Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Turkey 25 13 13 11 38 3,678 6,386 202 401 74 Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. 75 Korea, Rep. of 20 19 19 11 31 2,346 9,955 182 621 76 Malaysia 22 8 17 6 47 946 2,597 311 77 Costa Rica . . . . . . . . 261 530 78 Panama 52 11 2 5 30 252 307 419 497 79 Algeria . . . . . . . 967 2,538 . 80 Brazil 14 9 28 11 38 17,852 40,327 410 81 Mexico 20 9 18 12 41 13801 23,429 82 Chile 15 6 14 10 55 1,814 1,967 323 310 83 South Africa 15 11 17 10 47 . . 84 Romania 12 14 32 12 30 . . . . 85 Portugal 13 20 20 10 37 3,496 5,565 . 1,623 86 Argentina 20 11 22 13 34 9,174 11,192 87 Yugoslavia 15 14 21 8 42 6,579 12,816 837 1,686 88 Uruguay 26 24 9 9 32 725 1,008 . . 829 89 Iran 13 14 11 6 56 2,601 . . 243 90 Iraq . . . . . . 522 1,442 124 91 Venezuela 18 9 7 7 59 3,419 5,491 . 92 Hong Kong . . 1,620 3,596 . . 1,920 93 Trinidad and Tobago 13 4 10 7 66 328 . . . 94 Greece 20 26 8 8 38 2,540 4,588 770 1,346 95 Singapore 6 4 48 4 38 827 2,080 1,628 3,064 96 Israel 13 12 25 8 42 . . 33,629 High-income oil exporters 97 Libya 154 677 165 98 Saudi Arabia 1,726 3,058 . . 99 Kuwait 367 852 685 966 100 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 101 Ireland 25 13 11 15 36 . . . . 102 Spain 12 19 17 10 42 18,331 33,629 1,704 2,690 103 Italy 10 15 26 9 40 51,192 71,231 2,204 2,982 104 New Zealand 26 11 15 5 43 . . 105 United Kingdom 12 8 33 10 37 56,215 59,550 2,442 2,667 106 Finland 12 8 22 8 50 5,636 8,088 3,449 4,091 107 Australia 17 8 21 8 46 15,895 . . 3,202 108 Japan 9 6 34 10 41 115,497 207,566 2,867 4,556 109 Canada 13 8 23 7 49 26,023 38,271 3,016 4,321 110 Austria 14 8 22 9 47 9,402 13,409 3,292 4,818 111 United States 11 6 33 11 39 331,522 448,167 3,401 4,616 112 Netherlands 19 4 24 15 38 19,114 25,024 4,443 4,055 113 France 16 8 32 9 35 75,800 109,085 . . 4,606 114 Belgium 17 8 28 13 34 14,403 19,415 . . 115 Norway 15 4 26 7 48 5,322 6,155 3,500 4,894 116 Denmark 22 7 25 7 39 6,345 . . 3,038 117 Sweden 10 3 34 6 47 17,038 18,939 4,640 4,834 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 9 6 36 10 39 149,071 184,140 4,297 5,619 119 Switzerland 18 8 23 12 39 . . . , . Nonmarket industrial economies 120 Poland 5 19 32 8 36 121 Bulgaria 27 16 15 5 37 122 Hungary 10 10 29 10 41 123 USSR 12 11 28 6 43 124 Czechoslovakia 8 9 35 9 39 125 German Dem. Rep. 18 11 32 9 30 a. Figures in italics are for 1978, not 1979. b. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. 121 Table 7. Commercial energy Average annual growth rate (percent) Energy consumption Energy imports Energy Energy per capita (kilograms as a percentage of production consumption of coal equivalent) merchandise exports 1 960_74a 1974-79 1960-74 1974-79 1960 1979 1960b 1979C Low-income economies 4.7 w 8.3w 4.4 w 7.7w 331 w 421 w 11w 29w China and India 4.6 w 8.3w 4.3w 8.0 w 384 w 514 w Other low-income 10.1 U 10.0w 6.1 w 3.4w 62 w 87 w i'd w U 1 Kampuchea, Dem. -0.7 -38.9 29 2 9 2 Lao PDR 16.1 13.8 13.8 16 98 3 Bhutan 4 Chad 7.6 4.6 8 22 23 5 Bangadesh 10.1 6.6 40 27 6 Ethiopia 14.1 23 13.6 - 5,3 9 20 11 26 7 Nepa 26.8 4.6 12.6 2.4 4 13 24 8 SomaIia 87 13.1 16 74 4 9 Burma 56 12.4 3.7 5.8 55 67 4 10 Afghanistan 38 8 -28 10.3 6.6 23 88 12 11 Viet Nam 76 98 138 12 Mali 8.3 5,7 5.3 14 28 13 13 Burundi 22 0 70 17 14 14 Rwanda 35 102 28 15 Upper Volta 78 10.2 5 26 38 45 16 Zaire 30 17.9 3.8 0.3 96 100 3 17 Malawi 6.9 56 67 27 18 Mozambique 32 60.0 5.1 10 lii 121 11 19 India 4.9 5,4 50 5.0 111 194 11 32 20 Haiti 13.7 1.5 20.8 34 63 15 21 Sri Lanka 10.1 8.2 3.8 38 110 135 8 26 22 Sierra Leone 9.0 - 1.1 29 84 11 23 Tanzania 106 10.4 9.4 -2.8 41 51 30 24 China 4.5 8.7 4.2 8.5 560 734 25 Guinea 16.0 (,) 32 1.6 64 83 7 26 Central African Rep. 14 1 4.1 76 8.5 30 46 12 2 27 Pakistan 9.4 6.6 5,3 4.4 132 209 17 34 28 Uganda 52 -4,4 9.1 -8.1 39 39 5 29 Benin 9.6 -0.5 37 65 16 30 Niger 14.8 12.9 5 46 6 31 Madagascar 67 41 90 39 39 89 9 10 32 Sudan 13.7 13 1 -0.9 52 133 8 3 33 Togo 22 3 12.8 11.9 22 112 10 32 Middle-income economies 7.7w 2.0 w 7.7w 6.1 w 418w 965 w 9w 16w Oil exporters 8.2 w 1.4w 7.8w 6.5 w 274 w 658 w 5w 5w Oil importers 6.0 w 4.1 w 7.6w 6.0 w 425 w 1,204 w 13w 25 w 34 Ghana 2.6 12.5 23 100 258 7 14 35 Kenya 9.6 17.6 3.3 3.6 144 172 18 38 36 Lesotho 37 Yemen, PDA 87 7.1 210 509 38 lndonesa 85 6.6 3,7 10.3 125 225 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 129 16.0 7 58 40 Mauritania 21.3 5,5 18 196 39 41 Senegal 4.7 12.5 116 253 8 29 42 Angola 35,4 -2.4 10.4 1.1 86 200 6 43 Liberia 31.8 - 1.3 19.0 -09 83 425 3 19 44 Honduras 29.4 6.4 7,7 1.7 149 238 10 13 45 Zambia 5.6 5.6 832 13 46 Bolivia 17.1 -30 6.8 9.2 177 447 4 1 47 Egypt 94 27.0 3.6 105 283 539 12 2 48 Zimbabwe 2.5 -3.1 24 -0.4 1,333 783 49 El Salvador 5.1 24 3 7.7 8.4 143 338 6 9 50 Cameroon 1.1 45.0 38 76 85 143 7 12 51 Thailand 283 -0.2 16.2 7.4 60 353 12 31 52 PhHippines 30 24 4 84 5.6 147 329 9 32 53 Nicaragua 26 4 -163 10.4 2.7 176 446 12 14 54 Papua New Guinea 51 299 7 55 Congo, People's Rep 158 5.1 5.4 6.9 120 195 25 3 56 Morocco 2.0 4.7 6.4 6.3 163 302 9 36 57 Mongolia 104 12.2 7.4 11.5 537 1,483 58 Albania 97 5.3 11.3 9.2 318 1,118 59 Peru 3.6 18.5 65 28 417 716 4 60 Nigeria 36 6 1.0 93 1.5 28 80 7 2 61 Jamaica -0.7 -2.0 110 -54 424 1,326 11 39 62 Guatemala 9.9 2.4 62 1.6 167 229 12 12 63 Ivory Coast 9.7 -122 143 5.5 71 230 5 11 64 Dominican Rep. 1.8 -5.1 14.4 -1.1 156 490 37 65 Colombia 3.5 20 5.7 7.1 494 914 10 66 Ecuador 19.4 5.0 8.7 14.8 196 640 122 Average annual growth rate (percent) Energy consumption Energy imports Energy Energy per capita (kilograms as a percentage of production consumption of coal equivalent) merchandise exports 1 960_74a 1974-79 1960-74 1974-79 1960 1979 1 960b 1 979C 67 Paraguay . . 6.7 8.3 10.7 80 234 41 68 Tunisia 71.9 55 8.8 107 165 590 15 28 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. 9.4 2.9 9.3 3.6 1,189 2,775 . 70 Syrian Arab Rep 86.0 7.5 7.5 15.4 306 925 16 50 71 Jordan 5.9 13.3 186 522 79 90 72 Lebanon 12.7 0.5 8.6 -3.7 537 1028 68 73 Turkey 7.5 25 9.7 6.8 250 771 16 78 74 Cuba 21.2 56 4.5 6.0 849 1,358 . 75 Korea, Rep of 63 4.6 13.9 120 208 1,473 70 25 76 Malaysia 36.8 25.9 11.4 4.1 239 713 2 9 77 Costa Rica 9.5 35 10.1 7.5 304 812 7 20 78 Panama 14.7 35.9 8.8 4.8 415 895 . . 116 79 Algeria 11.1 6.4 7.1 12.2 249 645 14 2 80 Brazil 8.3 7.3 8.2 7.6 375 1,018 21 48 81 Mexico 58 15.7 7.7 7.8 713 1,535 3 3 82 Chile 3.9 0.1 6.1 0.7 797 1,153 10 24 83 South Africa 36 7.3 49 3.9 2,062 2,895 9 (.) 84 Romania 5.9 2.8 8.2 6.6 1445 4,659 . 85 Portugal 4.4 11.7 7.3 6.1 460 1443 17 38 86 Argentina 6.5 37 55 3.2 1,057 1,965 14 14 87 Yugoslavia 4.3 4,5 6.6 5.4 932 2,415 8 33 88 Uruguay 3.7 8.5 2.8 3.4 851 1,219 35 36 89 Iran 14.6 -9.1 15.7 1.3 257 1,141 1 90 Iraq 50 9.2 5.9 2.6 473 664 (.) (.) 91 Venezuela 1.1 -3.3 7.1 5.5 1,521 2,944 1 1 92 Hong Kong , . . . 9.5 9.6 450 1,481 5 9 93 Trinidad and Tobago 2.8 39 10.5 6.2 1,619 4,872 35 23 94 Greece 14.3 9.2 12.8 6.4 407 2,164 26 53 95 Singapore . . . . 13 1 17.1 498 5,784 17 31 96 Israel 41.8 -62.2 11.7 4.7 1,204 3,513 17 29 High-income oil exporters 9.8w 3.2w 8.1 w 15.6w 1,015w 2,609 w (.)w 97 Libya 29.1 69 167 27.6 238 2,254 83 (.) 98 Saudi Arabia 14.0 3.5 8.3 15.9 674 1,984 . (.) 99 Kuwait 4.5 -0.2 39 9.3 10,083 6,159 . (.) 100 United Arab Emirates . . 2.7 57.2 15.1 98 4451 . Industrial market economies 3.3w 2.1 w 5.0w 2.2w 4,257w 7,293w 12w 24w 101 Ireland 0.1 -1.2 4.7 4.3 1,892 3,687 17 17 102 Spain 3.0 68 92 4.1 791 2,698 22 42 103 Italy 2.3 0.8 7.7 1.4 1,273 3,312 18 25 104 New Zealand 5.7 4.9 6.0 1.5 2,637 4,706 7 16 105 United Kingdom -1.0 128 2.0 0.5 4,364 5,272 14 13 106 Finland 3.3 2.9 8.7 2.4 1,833 6,001 11 27 107 Australia 11.0 4.6 5.6 2.5 3,741 6,539 12 9 108 Japan -1.4 3.6 9.8 3.1 1,246 4.048 18 44 109 Canada 87 1.7 6.2 3.1 6,900 13,164 9 9 110 Austria 1.4 0.6 5.0 28 2,439 5,087 12 16 111 United States 3.4 07 4.4 2.0 7,981 11,681 8 37 112 Netherlands 16.1 03 9.3 2.6 2,397 6,597 15 21 113 France -1.2 3.2 5.5 2.4 2,552 4,810 16 23 114 Belgium -7.2 5.9 4.5 2.1 3,571 6,513 11 15 115 Norway 6.8 221 57 5.0 4.875 11.749 15 15 116 Denmark -19.8 39.5 8.1 0.8 2,650 5,726 15 25 117 Sweden 3.6 6.0 4.7 2.6 4,442 8,258 16 23 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. -0.6 0.1 42 2.0 3,701 6,264 7 18 119 Switzerland 4.2 27 5.4 2.0 2,709 5,002 10 13 Nonmarket industrial economies 5.1 u' 4.7w 4.8w 3.8w 2,913w 5,822w 120 Poland 3.9 4.1 4.4 2.5 3,102 5,752 121 Bulgaria 3.3 4.5 9.5 50 1,345 5,487 7 122 Hungary 2.8 3.1 48 46 1,626 3,797 13 17 123 USSR 5.9 5.0 5.2 4.1 2,816 5,793 4 124 Czechoslovakia 1.2 2.2 3.3 3.6 3,773 6,656 . . 20 125 German Dem. Rep. 0.6 1.4 18 1.8 4,581 7,136 . . a. Figures in italics are for 1961-74, not 1960-74 b. Figures in italics are for 1961. not 1960 c. Figures in italics are for 1978, not 1979. 123 Table 8. Growth of merchandise trade Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (millions of dollars) (percent) Terms of trade Exports Imports (1975 = 100) Exports Imports 1980k' 1960b 1960-70 1970_80c 1960-70 1970-80 1960 1980b Low-income economies 37,837 54,024 5.0 in -0.4 in 5.4 m 3.1 iii him 89mm, China and India 24,965 32,408 I Other low-income 12,8721 21.6161 5.0 in -1.1 iii 5.7 in 3.4 in 111mm, 9Omn 1 Kampuchea, Dem. . . . . . . . 2 Lao PDR 21 114 . . . . . . . 3 Bhutan , . . . . . . . . 4 Chad 65 160 5.9 -4.0 5.0 -2.2 98 96 5 Bangladesh 761 2,438 6.5 -1 9 7.0 3.5 201 84 6 Ethiopia 350 537 36 -1 7 6.2 -0.2 143 97 7 Nepal 97 345 , . . 105 8 Somalia 141 240 2.3 5.5 2.6 7.2 145 88 9 Burma 471 353 -11.6 0.4 -5.7 -4.1 115 110 10 Afghanistan 551 750 2.5 3.7 0.7 8.1 82 106 11 VietNam .. ., . 12 Mali 200 290 3.0 9.4 -0.4 3.4 107 91 13 Burundi 65 168 . . , . , . 14 Rwanda 140 220 15.8 3.5 8.1 11.6 111 157 15 Upper Volta 45 330 15.9 20 77 79 88 89 16 Zaire 1.639 725 -1.8 22 54 -120 122 79 17 Malawi 317 439 11.6 5.7 7.6 3.5 115 76 18 Mozambique 180 270 6.0 -15.1 7.9 17.1 90 69 19 India 6,694 12,858 30 37 -0.9 2.8 134 71 20 Haiti 601 364 . . . . . . 21 Sri Lanka 924 2,029 4.7 -2.4 -02 11 203 93 22 Sierra Leone 240 420 0.3 -4.8 1.9 -3.0 111 84 23 Tanzania 508 1,258 34 -7.3 60 -03 98 100 24 China 18,271 19,550 . . , 25 Guinea 421 375 . . . . 26 Central African Rep 90 95 8.1 -1.1 4.5 -2.4 109 120 27 Pakistan 2,588 5,350 8.2 1.2 5.3 4.3 102 74 28 Uganda 450 340 5.0 -8.5 6.2 -9.8 123 130 29 Benin 54 360 5.0 -7.6 7.4 4.8 114 82 30 Niger 290 630 6.0 12.8 11.9 15.8 98 80 31 Madagascar 480 770 5.3 -1 2 41 -08 136 94 32 Sudan 543 1,616 0.1 -57 1.2 3.5 57 86 33 Togo 640 630 10.5 16 8.6 12.4 56 74 Middle-income economies 370.046 I 376,373 I 5.4 in 3.9 in 6.4 in 4.2 in 100 ii, 94 in Oil exporters 169,5871 121.3361 4.5 in 2.6 in 3.2 mm, 8.9 mu 69 in 135 in Oil importers 200.459 I 255,037 I 7.1 in 4.1 in 7.3 in 3.8 ii 109 in 83 in 34 Ghana 960 900 0.2 -8.4 -15 -3.3 111 110 35 Kenya 1.299 2,305 7.2 -1.0 6.6 -1.0 133 94 36 Lesotho , . , . , . , , . . . . . 37 Yemen, PDR 44 434 . , , , , . , . 38 Indonesia 21,909 10,834 40 8.7 2.0 11.9 98 135 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 14 1,492 . . . . . . , 40 Mauritania 194 255 50.7 -11 4.5 5.6 149 77 41 Senegal 520 1,200 1.2 1.2 2.3 4.1 71 63 42 Angola 1,000 1.250 9.0 -13.4 11.5 -1.4 60 140 43 Liberia 601 640 184 1.0 2.9 1.2 255 71 44 Honduras 806 1,019 11.1 4.4 11.6 1.0 119 83 45 Zambia 1,700 1.000 2.2 12 9.7 -7.3 115 82 46 Bolivia 1,033 833 9.8 -16 82 8.9 56 159 47 Egypt 3,046 4,860 3.2 -07 -11 88 92 79 48 Zimbabwe 1,415 1.287 . . . . . . , 49 El Salvador 966 966 5.4 1.5 6.3 3.8 109 110 50 Cameroon 1,383 1.602 71 25 92 7.2 106 123 51 Thailand 6,505 9,212 5.2 11.8 11.2 54 121 63 52 Philippines 5,977 7,727 22 7.0 7.1 3.4 112 75 53 Nicaragua 550 660 97 2.3 10.5 -2.6 112 92 54 Papua New Guinea 1,031 788 . . , . . . , 55 Congo, People's Rep. 400 400 5.1 89 -1 0 50 87 99 56 Morocco 2,403 4.185 2.5 2.1 3.4 8.5 75 57 57 Mongolia , . . . . 58 Albania . . . . . , . . . . 59 Peru 3,364 2,541 2.0 3.9 36 0.2 89 87 60 Nigeria 26,000 15.000 6.6 2.6 1.6 20.0 39 173 61 Jamaica 942 1.178 4.7 -6.8 8.1 -7.0 85 83 62 Guatemala 1.521 1,528 91 4.3 7.1 5.2 126 113 63 IvoryCoast 2,700 2,650 88 4.6 9.7 8.1 113 102 64 Dominican Rep. 962 1,436 -23 46 9.9 27 47 40 65 Colombia 3,925 4,495 2.2 1.9 2.5 5.7 96 132 66 Ecuador 2,400 2,248 29 7.5 11.5 9.9 89 147 124 Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (millions of dollars) (percent) Ternis of trade Exports Imports (1975 = 100) Exports Imports igB0 1980b 1960-70 1 970_80c 1980b 1960-70 1 970-80 1960 67 Paraguay 313 517 5.4 7.1 7.3 74 116 76 68 Tunisia 2201 3,536 4.2 4.8 1.9 10.6 64 99 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. . . . . .. .. . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 2,108 4,124 3.4 6.8 4.0 13.0 69 120 71 Jordan 578 2,395 10.1 18.4 3.5 13.5 78 59 72 Lebanon 700 3,300 14.2 07 51 24 87 84 73 Turkey 2,910 7,667 . . 1.7 . 3.3 . . 91 74 Cuba 5,800 6,000 4.0 2.7 55 3.3 58 71 75 Korea, Rep. of 17,548 22,292 34.1 23.0 20.5 11.8 99 75 76 Malaysia 13,780 10,600 5.8 7.4 2.3 7.0 150 109 77 Costa Rica 963 1,528 9.6 3.5 9.9 3.8 132 107 78 Panama 349 1,149 10.5 -0.2 10.5 -4.1 117 77 79 Algeria 12,409 9,600 4.5 2.2 -0.9 12.7 48 177 80 Brazil 20,131 25,000 5.1 7.5 49 4.2 114 72 81 Mexico 15,308 19,517 2.8 13.4 6.4 7.0 97 94 82 Chile 4,818 5,720 0.6 10.9 4.7 2.8 126 73 83 South Africa 26,130 18,838 5.4 7.2 8.2 -1.4 108 81 84 Romania 12,230 13,201 94 47 88 61 98 85 Portugal 4,628 9,410 9.6 -03 142 3.3 97 95 86 Argentina 8,020 10,555 3.4 9,3 0.3 2.1 109 73 87 Yugoslavia 8,367 14,029 7.7 39 88 3.9 100 99 88 Uruguay 1,059 1,615 2.2 4.8 -2.9 3.8 132 92 89 Iran 13,523 12,247 12.6 -9.7 11.4 12.3 27 192 90 Iraq 26,429 10,500 54 22 14 205 25 170 91 Venezuela 20,600 10,068 16 -6.7 42 -10.9 46 160 92 Hong Kong 19,713 22,413 12.7 9.4 9.2 11.7 94 103 93 Trinidad and Tobago 4,077 3,178 49 -2.8 3.2 -5,5 100 99 94 Greece 5,143 10,531 10.8 11.8 10.8 5.3 109 93 95 Singapore 19,376 24,008 4.2 12.0 5.9 9.9 100 99 96 Israel 5,265 7,910 11.0 9.6 8.7 3.3 103 73 High-income oil exporters 172,3501 60,3281 10.9 iii -0.6 ni 10.9 in 22.3 in 27 in 168 in 97 Libya 22,795 10,000 67.5 -6.5 15.4 168 31 183 98 Saudi Arabia 109,111 30,209 10.9 54 109 35.2 27 165 99 Kuwait 19,812 11,367 5.2 -8.5 106 16.3 23 171 100 United Arab Emirates 20,632 8752 . 61 . 27.7 . 162 Industrial market economies 1,229,1531 1,362,4791 8.5 in 5.8 in 9.5 iii 4.4 ni 98 in 94 in 101 Ireland 8,489 11,159 7.1 8.6 83 6.8 96 93 102 Spain 20,721 34,080 11.5 11.2 18.5 3.7 124 103 103 Italy 77,667 99,452 13.6 6.7 97 37 130 94 104 New Zealand 5,418 5,468 4.6 3.8 29 16 135 109 105 United Kingdom 115,350 120,095 4.8 75 50 4.1 112 106 106 Finland 14.155 15.580 6.8 45 7.0 23 95 85 107 Australia 22,048 20,332 6.5 36 72 44 98 86 108 Japan 129,248 140,520 17.2 89 137 44 150 77 109 Canada 64,252 58,545 10.0 4.4 9.1 6.0 92 99 110 Austria 17,508 24.495 9.6 7.1 96 7.1 94 93 111 United States 216,668 255,657 6.0 69 9.8 4.8 115 82 112 Netherlands 73,871 76,881 9.9 53 9.5 4.0 111 96 113 France 111,251 134,912 8.2 6.8 11.0 6.9 93 94 114 Belgium 64,066 71,185 10.9 4.9 10.3 5.5 102 94 115 Norway 18,478 16,957 9.1 7.3 9.7 4.5 89 117 116 Denmark 16,485 19,363 71 47 8.2 3.1 105 90 117 Sweden 30,914 33,441 7.7 2.4 7.2 23 97 90 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 192,930 188,001 10.1 5.8 10.0 59 90 89 119 Switzerland 29,634 36.356 8.5 4.1 9.0 44 85 97 Nonmarket industrial economies 144,6981 140,727 I 9.0 in 7.1 iii 7.9 in 6.6 in 120 Poland 16,997 19,089 -0.3 67 -0.4 60 121 Bulgaria 10,372 9,650 14.4 117 129 87 122 Hungary 8,677 9,235 9.7 82 91 61 123 USSR 76,449 68,523 9-7 56 7.1 8.3 124 Czechoslovakia 14,891 15,148 67 65 70 5.7 125 German Oem. Rep 17,312 19,082 83 75 86 70 a. See the technical notes. b. Figures in italics are br 1979. not 1980 c. Figures in talics are for 1970-79. not 1970-80 125 Table 9. Structure of merchandise exports Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Fuels, Other and minerals, primary Textiles transport Other and metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures 1960 1g79b 1960 1979b 1960 197gb 1960 1g7gb 1960 1979b Low-income economies 9w 14 iv 70 iv 42 iv 15 w 19 iv C) ii' 3 iv 6 iv 20 iv China and India 11w 36w 23w 5 iv 26 w Other low-income 8w 18 ii' 83w 53w 4w 13w (.) w 1w ii' 8 iv 1 Kampuchea, Dem 0 0 100 83 0 4 0 1 0 12 2 Lao POR 18 64 0 1 17 3 Bhutan 4 Chad 3 0 94 96 0 1 0 0 3 3 5 Bangladesh C) 34 49 1 16 6 Ethiopia 0 5 100 95 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 () 7 Nepal 0 72 22 0 6 8 Somalia 0 () 88 99 0 () 8 (.) 4 1 9 Burma 4 4 95 93 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 Afghanistan () 17 82 70 14 11 3 0 1 2 11 Viet Nam 6 32 38 (.) 24 12 Mali 0 (.) 96 99 1 (.) I (.) 2 1 13 Burundi () 99 C) C) 1 14 Rwanda I 99 0 (.) (.) 15 Upper Volta 0 1 100 87 0 3 0 3 () 6 16 Zaire 42 56 57 37 0 (.) 0 1 1 6 17 Malawi (.) 96 3 () 1 18 Mozambique 0 12 100 86 0 2 0 0 0 (.) 19 India 10 8 45 31 35 20 1 8 9 33 20 Haiti 0 11 100 50 0 7 0 5 0 27 21 Sri Lanka (.) 14 99 74 0 7 0 (.) 1 5 22 Sierra Leone 15 8 20 48 0 0 0 0 65 44 23 Tanzania (.) 4 87 79 0 8 0 (.) 13 9 24 China 13 38 24 3 22 25 Guinea 42 98 58 2 0 0 0 (.) 0 0 26 Central African Rep. 12 0 86 56 (.) () 1 (.) 1 44 27 Pakistan 0 7 73 37 23 40 1 2 3 14 28 Uganda 8 3 92 96 0 (.) 0 (.) 1) (.) 29 Benin 10 2 80 90 7 3 () 2 3 3 30 Niger 40 100 25 0 1 0 0 0 34 31 Madagascar 4 10 90 82 1 3 1 2 4 3 32 Sudan 0 4 100 96 0 (.) 0 0 0 () 33 Togo 3 62 89 31 3 3 0 3 5 1 Middle-income economies 15 ii' 11 ii' 9 iv 15w' 13 iv 7w 28 w 34 w 35 iv 33 w Oil exporters 19 ii' 14w 7 iv 5 iv 8 iv 5 iv 27 iv 42 w 39 iv 34 iv Oil importers 14w' lOw' lOiv 20 w' 16w' 8 iv 29 iv 29 iv 31 iv 33 w 34 Ghana 7 16 83 83 0 () 0 (.) 10 1 35 Kenya 1 21 87 65 0 1 0 (.) 12 13 36 Lesotho 56 4 0 0 40 37 Yemen, FOR 75 25 (.) C) C) 38 Indonesia 33 69 67 28 0 1 () 1 () 1 39 Yemen Arab Rep (.) 74 2 6 18 40 Mauritania 4 89 69 11 1 (.) 20 (.) 6 (.) 41 Senegal 3 29 94 63 1 1 1 1 1 6 42 Angola 64 28 0 1 7 43 Liberia 45 39 55 35 0 C) 0 1 0 25 44 Honduras 5 5 93 85 0 1 0 (.) 2 9 45 Zambia 97 2 0 (.) 1 46 Bolivia 86 11 (.) 1 2 47 Egypt 4 47 84 33 9 15 C) C) 3 5 48 Zimbabwe 71 25 25 62 1 10 (.) 3 3 0 49 El Salvador 0 2 94 74 3 8 (.) 2 3 14 50 Cameroon 19 29 77 65 0 1 2 1 2 4 51 Thailand 7 12 91 63 0 10 0 4 2 11 52 Philippines 10 18 86 47 1 6 0 2 3 27 53 Nicaragua 3 1 95 87 0 2 0 1 2 9 54 Papua New Guinea 0 46 92 52 0 0 0 0 8 2 55 Congo, Peoples Rep. 7 86 84 7 (.) (.) 5 (.) 4 7 56 Morocco 38 44 54 33 1 11 1 (.) 6 12 57 Mongolia 8 81 7 (.) 4 58 Albania 49 33 6 1 11 59 Peru 49 46 50 43 0 3 0 1 1 7 60 Nigeria 8 91 89 8 0 () 0 (.) 3 1 61 Jamaica 50 31 45 17 2 1 0 1 3 50 62 Guatemala 2 2 95 75 1 6 0 2 2 15 63 Ivory Coast 1 5 98 87 0 2 () 2 1 4 64 Dominican Rep. 6 3 92 71 0 () 0 2 2 24 65 Colombia 19 4 79 74 0 7 (.) 2 2 13 66 Ecuador 0 46 99 51 0 1 0 1 1 1 126 Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Fuels, Other and minerals, primary Textiles transport Other and metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures 1960° 1g79b 1960° 197gb 1979b 1960° 1g7gb 1979b 1960° 1960° 67 Paraguay 0 1 100 88 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 11 68 Tunisia 24 52 66 14 1 18 1 3 8 13 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. 31 29 . 5 5 30 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 0 74 81 18 2 4 0 2 17 2 71 Jordan 0 33 96 32 0 4 0 2 4 29 72 Lebanon 4 32 .. 10 17 . 37 73 Turkey 8 6 89 66 0 19 0 2 3 7 74 Cuba 2 5 93 94 1 0 (.) (.) 4 1 75 Korea, Rep. of 30 1 56 10 8 31 (.) 20 6 38 76 Malaysia 20 29 74 53 (.) 2 (.) 11 6 5 77 Costa Rica 0 (.) 95 75 0 4 0 4 5 17 78 Panama 26 64 3 (.) 7 79 Algeria 12 98 81 1 0 (.) 1 (.) 6 1 80 Brazil 8 11 89 50 0 5 (.) 16 3 18 81 Mexico 24 39 64 22 4 3 1 19 7 17 82 Chile 92 59 4 21 0 () 0 1 4 19 83 South Africa 29 23 42 23 2 1 4 5 23 48 84 Roniania 12 18 10 24 36 85 Portugal 8 2 37 22 18 31 3 12 34 33 86 Argentina 1 2 95 74 0 3 (.) 6 4 15 87 Yugoslavia 18 1 45 18 4 8 15 30 18 34 88 Uruguay 71 51 21 19 5 8 24 89 Iran 88 95 9 2 0 2 0 (.) 3 90 Iraq 97 99 3 1 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 () 91 Venezuela 74 98 26 1 0 (.) 0 (.) (.) 92 Hong Kong 5 1 15 2 45 43 4 16 31 38 93 Trinidad and Tobago 82 91 14 3 0 (.) 0 1 4 5 94 Greece 9 21 81 33 1 17 1 4 8 25 95 Singapore 1 27 73 22 5 5 7 26 14 20 96 Israel 4 2 35 18 8 7 2 12 51 61 High-income oil exporters 99 w (.)w (.)w (.)w 1w 97 Libya 100 100 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 () 0 (.) 98 Saudi Arabia 95 100 5 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 99 Kuwait 94 (.) 2 3 100 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 11 ii lOw 23w 15w 7w 5w 29 w 36 iv 30 iv 34 w 101 Ireland 5 3 67 40 6 9 4 16 18 32 102 Spain 21 5 57 22 7 5 2 26 13 42 103 Italy 8 8 19 9 17 12 29 30 27 41 104 New Zealand (.) 5 97 76 0 2 () 4 3 13 105 United Kingdom 7 14 9 9 8 5 44 35 32 37 106 Finland 3 7 50 22 13 20 33 45 107 Australia 13 27 79 47 () 3 5 5 20 108 Japan 11 2 10 2 28 23 54 28 38 109 Canada 33 25 37 24 8 30 21 20 110 Austria 26 5 22 12 10 9 16 27 26 47 111 United States 10 7 27 25 3 2 35 41 25 25 112 Netherlands 15 22 34 24 8 5 18 17 25 32 113 France 9 7 18 18 10 5 25 36 38 34 114 Belgium 15 12 9 11 12 7 13 23 51 47 115 Norway 22 48 34 12 2 10 17 32 22 116 Denmark 2 6 63 39 5 19 24 13 26 117 Sweden 10 8 29 13 2 31 41 29 36 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 9 6 4 7 4 5 44 45 39 37 119 Switzerland 2 4 8 5 12 6 30 33 48 52 Nonmarket industrial economies 18w 26w 33 iv 11 iv 3w 3w 34 w 33 iv 21 iv 27 ii' 120 Poland 20 11 7 41 21 121 Bulgaria 3 2 75 32 12 4 6 42 4 20 122 Hungary 6 8 28 23 7 7 38 34 21 28 123 USSR 24 42 28 9 1 (.) 21 20 26 29 124 Czechoslovakia 20 7 11 6 (,) 6 45 51 25 30 125 German Dem, Rep. 3 3 5 61 28 a Figures in italics are for 1961, not 196O b Figures in italics are for 1978, not 1979 127 Table 10. Structure of merchandise imports Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures 196O 1979b 196O 1g79b 196O 1g79b 196O 1979b 196O 1979b Low-income economies 22 w 17 w 7 u' 10 w 18 w 18 w 26 w 25 w 27 w 30 w China and India 16 w 9w 27 w 22 w 26 w Other low-income 24w 18w 8w 13w 4w 4 u' 21 w 28w 43w 37w 1 Kampuchea, Oem. 2LaoPDR .. ., 3 Bhutan 4 Chad 19 12 4 19 46 5 Bangladesh 25 12 8 24 31 6 Ethiopia 7 20 3 34 36 7 Nepal 3 14 4 27 52 8 Somalia 27 21 4 7 0 4 18 31 51 37 9 Burma 14 9 4 3 9 2 17 40 56 46 10 Afghanistan 14 15 7 9 4 1 14 11 61 64 11 VietNam . 12 Mali 20 13 5 18 4 2 18 30 53 37 13 Burundi . 13 9 . . 3 . 22 53 14 Rwanda 19 . . 8 8 . 26 . . 39 15 Upper Volta 21 22 4 11 1 3 24 29 50 35 16 Zaire 21 . 7 . 4 . 32 . 36 17 Malawi 6 . . 15 2 . . 31 . . 46 18 Mozambique 19 India 21 14 6 26 28 11 30 19 15 30 20 Haiti 26 . 11 5 20 38 21 Sri Lanka 39 23 7 18 5 4 15 25 34 30 22 Sierra Leone 23 21 12 12 5 1 15 24 45 42 23 Tanzania . 5 . . 14 3 48 30 24 China 17 0 . . 35 . 24 24 25 Guinea .. .. .. 26 Central African Rep. 15 16 9 2 2 2 26 41 48 39 27 Pakistan 22 20 10 17 2 6 27 24 39 33 28 Uganda 6 8 8 30 8 2 25 27 53 33 29 Benin 17 15 10 15 1 2 18 22 54 46 30 Niger 24 . . 5 . 4 . . 18 . . 49 31 Madagascar 17 19 6 7 3 4 23 30 51 40 32 Sudan 17 19 8 2 3 1 14 38 58 40 33 Togo 16 19 6 7 3 1 32 31 43 42 Middle-income economies 15w 11 U' 911' 15 13 ii' 70' 28 it' 34 U' 35 U' 33 it' Oil exporters 19w 14 w 7w 5 U' 8w 5 U' 27 U' 42 it' 39 ii' 34 w Oil importers 14 iL lOu' lOw 20 ii' 16 u' 80' 29 w 29 ii' 31 w 33 w 34 Ghana 19 11 5 14 4 4 26 33 46 38 35 Kenya 12 6 11 24 8 3 27 34 42 33 36 Lesotho . . 23 . . 8 . . 6 . 14 . . 49 37 Yemen, PDR . . 17 . . 47 1 . . 23 . 12 38 Indonesia 23 16 5 11 10 6 17 32 45 35 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . 26 . . 2 . 1 . 34 . S 3. 40 Mauritania 5 24 3 7 3 2 39 38 50 29 41 Senegal 30 24 5 17 2 2 19 25 44 32 42 Angola . . . . . . . . . 43 Liberia 16 18 4 20 7 1 34 34 39 27 44 Honduras 13 9 9 11 3 2 24 34 51 44 45 Zambia 8 18 2 . 36 . . 36 46 Bolivia . 10 1 1 . . 44 . 44 47 Egypt 23 26 11 1 16 7 25 34 25 32 48 Zimbabwe . . 2 30 . . 5 34 29 49 El Salvador 17 13 6 10 6 4 26 24 45 49 50 Cameroon 20 10 8 11 3 2 17 34 52 43 51 Thailand 10 4 11 23 11 10 25 26 43 37 52 Philippines 15 7 10 22 5 6 36 28 34 37 53 Nicaragua 9 14 10 21 5 2 22 14 54 49 54 Papua New Guinea 30 . . 5 . 4 . . 23 38 55 Congo, People's Rep. 18 27 6 7 1 1 31 26 44 39 56 Morocco 27 19 8 19 7 9 19 25 39 28 57 Mongolia . . . . 58 Albania 17 . . 2 . 3 . . 45 . 33 59 Peru 16 16 5 19 5 4 37 33 37 28 60 Nigeria 14 14 5 2 6 2 24 44 51 38 61 Jamaca 22 17 8 32 9 4 24 14 37 33 62 Guatemala 12 7 10 11 7 3 26 31 45 48 63 IvoryCoast 18 15 6 11 2 3 27 35 47 36 64 Dominican Rep . . 17 . . 27 . . 4 . 19 . . 33 65 Colombia 8 10 3 10 15 7 43 37 31 36 66 Ecuador 13 8 3 1 9 4 33 51 42 37 128 Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures igeoa 1g7gb 1960 197gb 1960 1979b 1960 197gb 196O 1979b 67 Paraguay . . 13 . 24 . . 1 . . 36 . . 26 68 Tunisia 20 15 9 18 4 6 23 27 44 34 69 Korea, Oem. Rep. . . . . .. . . . . . . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 24 14 8 25 5 4 15 23 48 34 71 Jordan . . 20 . 13 . . 3 26 . . 38 72 Lebanon .. . .. .. .. . 73 Turkey 7 2 11 36 16 5 42 28 24 29 74 Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 75 Korea, Rep. of 10 9 7 19 25 17 12 30 46 25 76 Malaysia 29 14 16 12 13 7 14 37 28 30 77 Costa Rica 13 7 6 13 6 3 26 31 49 46 78 Panama 15 10 10 28 1 1 22 21 52 40 79 Algeria 26 18 4 2 2 4 14 41 54 35 80 Brazil 14 12 19 37 13 7 36 21 18 23 81 Mexico 4 8 2 2 10 7 52 50 32 33 82 Chile . . 14 . 21 . 4 . . 27 . . 34 83 South Africa 6 5 7 1 9 6 37 52 41 36 84 Romania . . .. . . . . . . . . . 85 Portugal 15 17 10 20 28 11 26 25 21 27 86 Argentina 3 7 13 17 11 9 44 33 29 34 87 Yugoslavia 11 8 5 16 25 10 37 36 22 30 88 Uruguay 5 10 24 24 46 9 17 26 8 31 89 Iran 14 13 1 (.) 1 5 23 44 61 38 90 Iraq . . 12 . . (.) . 3 . . 54 . 31 91 Venezuela 18 12 1 1 10 5 36 46 35 36 92 Hong Kong 27 13 3 6 16 6 10 21 44 54 93 Trinidad and Tobago 16 13 34 29 7 2 18 29 25 27 94 Greece 11 10 8 21 16 7 44 38 21 24 95 Singapore 21 10 15 25 38 9 7 29 19 27 96 Israel 20 11 7 18 18 7 28 26 27 38 High-income oil exporters . . 14w 1w . . 2w 41w .. 42w 97 Libya 13 17 5 1 10 2 40 42 32 38 98 Saudi Arabia . . 13 1 . 2 . . 41 . 43 99 Kuwait . . 16 1 . 3 . 35 . . 45 100 United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . Industrial market economies 22 w 12 w 11 w 22 w 24 w 10 w 16 w 23 w 27 w 33 w 101 Ireland 18 12 12 12 11 5 21 29 38 42 102 Spain 16 15 22 30 25 13 22 19 15 23 103 Italy 20 16 14 24 31 15 13 19 22 26 104 New Zealand 8 6 8 16 16 6 29 30 39 42 105 United Kingdom 36 15 11 12 27 10 8 26 18 37 106 Finland 13 7 10 27 20 8 33 27 24 31 107 Australia 6 5 10 11 16 5 31 38 37 41 108 Japan 17 15 17 41 49 21 9 7 8 16 109 Canada 12 7 9 9 12 6 36 49 31 29 110 Austria 16 7 10 12 20 9 29 30 25 42 111 United States 24 9 10 29 25 8 10 26 31 28 112 Netherlands 18 15 13 20 14 7 22 22 33 36 113 France 25 12 17 22 25 9 14 22 19 35 114 Belgium 15 12 10 14 26 10 21 25 28 39 115 Norway 12 8 9 15 13 7 36 32 30 38 116 Denmark 18 11 12 20 11 8 23 23 36 38 117 Sweden 13 8 14 22 13 7 26 27 34 36 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 26 13 8 20 28 10 10 19 28 38 119 Switzerland 18 9 8 12 13 6 21 25 40 48 Nonmarket industrial economies 120 Poland .. .. .. .. .. ,. .. .. 121 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Hungary 8 8 12 16 28 12 28 32 24 32 123 USSR 12 . . 4 . 18 . 30 . . 36 . 124 Czechoslovakia . . 11 . . 18 14 . . 36 . . 21 125 German Dem. Rep. .. . . . . . . a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. b. Figures in italics are for 1978, not 1979. 129 Table 11. Origin and destination of merchandise exports Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) Industrial Nonmarket market industrial High-income Developing economies economies oil exporters economies Origin 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 Low-income economies 51w 51 w 21 w 4w 1w 5w 27 w 40 iv China and India 39 w 49 w 36 w 5w (.)w 5 U, 25 iv 41w Other low-income 66 w 56 w 3w 4w 2 iv 5 U' 29 w 35 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. .. 2 Lao PDR 41 0 10 49 3 Bhutan 4 Chad 73 32 0 0 0 5 27 63 5 Bangladesh 48 10 1 41 6 Ethiopia 69 64 1 10 6 2 24 24 7 Nepal 32 0 0 68 8 Somalia 85 17 0 0 (.) 68 15 15 9 Burma 23 31 3 1 (.) 1 74 67 10 Afghanistan 48 42 28 21 0 2 24 35 11 VietNam S S 12 Mali 93 68 0 1 (.) (.) 7 31 13 Burundi 85 2 (5) 13 14 Rwanda 93 S 0 (5) S 7 15 Upper Volta 4 86 0 0 0 0 96 14 16 Zaire 89 45 (.) (.) (,) (.) 11 55 17 Malawi 82 0 0 18 18 Mozambique 29 49 (.) (.) (.) 8 71 43 19 India 66 53 7 17 2 9 25 21 20 Haiti 98 97 (.) 0 0 0 2 3 21 Sri Lanka 75 46 3 5 0 8 22 41 22 Sierra Leone 99 100 0 0 0 0 1 (.) 23 Tanzania 74 62 1 2 0 1 25 35 24 China 14 47 61 0 (.) 3 25 50 25 Guinea 63 80 18 0 () 2 19 18 26 Central African Rep. 83 90 0 0 0 0 17 10 27 Pakistan 56 36 4 3 2 14 38 47 28 Uganda 62 78 0 0 0 2 38 20 29 Benin 90 87 2 0 0 0 8 13 30 Niger 74 96 0 0 0 1 26 3 31 Madagascar 79 78 1 4 (.) 0 20 18 32 Sudan 59 42 8 9 4 12 29 37 33 Togo 74 68 0 7 0 0 26 25 Middle-income economies 68 U' 64 U' 7 iv 4w (.) iv 2 iv 25 w 30 w Oil exporters 68 w 74 w 4w 1w (.)w (.)w 28 w 25 u' Oil importers 68 iv 57 U' 9w 6 iv (.)w 3w 23 iv 34 iv 34 Ghana 88 70 7 15 (.) (.) 5 15 35 Kenya 77 51 0 1 (.) 2 23 46 36 Lesotho . . 37 Yemen, PDR 42 61 (.) (.) 2 8 56 31 38 Indonesia 54 80 11 1 (.) (.) 42 19 39 Yemen Arab Rep 46 36 18 2 (.) 13 36 49 40 Mauritania 89 94 0 0 0 1 11 5 41 Senegal 89 70 0 0 0 (.) 11 30 42 Angola 64 51 2 0 0 1 34 48 43 Liberia 100 90 0 (.) 0 (.) (.) 10 44 Honduras 77 85 0 0 0 (.) 23 15 45 Zambia 5 79 . 1 . (5) . . 20 46 Bolivia 88 55 0 0 0 (.) 12 45 47 Egypt 26 73 33 7 2 1 39 19 48 Zimbabwe S . . 49 El Salvador 88 70 0 (.) 0 0 12 30 50 Cameroon 93 92 1 1 (.) (.) 6 7 51 Thailand 47 58 2 2 3 4 48 36 52 Philippines 94 76 0 4 (.) 1 6 19 53 Nicaragua 91 66 () 1 0 (.) 9 33 54 Papua New Guinea . 92 . 1 . . 7 55 Congo, People's Rep, 93 72 0 0 0 (.) 7 28 56 Morocco 74 70 3 8 (.) 2 23 20 57 Mongolia S S S 58 Albania 1 . . 93 0 . 6 59 Peru 84 72 (.) 3 0 (.) 16 25 60 Nigeria 95 95 1 (.) 0 (.) 4 5 61 Jamaica 96 82 0 4 0 (.) 4 14 62 Guatemala 94 63 0 0 0 1 6 36 63 Ivory Coast 84 81 0 3 0 (.) 16 16 64 Dominican Rep. 92 90 0 (.) 1 0 7 10 65 Colombia 94 81 1 4 0 (.) 5 15 66 Ecuador 91 64 1 2 0 0 8 34 130 Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) Industrial Nonmarket market industrial High-income Developing economies economies oil exporters economies Origin 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 67 Paraguay 61 54 0 0 0 0 39 46 68 Tunisia 76 69 3 1 2 3 19 27 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. .. . . .. .. . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 39 30 19 15 11 7 31 48 71 Jordan 1 11 11 3 26 23 62 63 72 Lebanon 21 15 8 9 32 47 39 29 73 Turkey 71 60 12 15 (.) 4 17 21 74 Cuba 72 . 19 . . (.) 9 75 Korea, Rep. of 89 67 0 (.) 0 9 11 23 76 Malaysia 58 61 7 3 0 1 35 35 77 Costa Rica 93 63 (.) 1 (.) (.) 7 36 78 Panama 99 75 0 (.) 0 (.) 1 25 79 Algeria 93 96 0 1 (.) (.) 7 3 80 Brazil 81 65 6 6 (.) 1 13 28 81 Mexico 93 85 (.) (.) 0 (.) 7 15 82 Chile 91 67 (.) (.) (.) 2 9 31 83 South Africa 71 81 1 0 (.) 0 28 19 84 Romania 20 27 66 42 (.) 4 14 27 85 Portugal 56 82 2 2 (.) (.) 42 16 86 Argentina 75 44 5 17 (.) 1 20 38 87 Yugoslavia 48 34 31 43 1 3 20 20 88 Uruguay 82 48 7 4 0 1 11 47 89 Iran 62 69 3 0 1 1 34 30 90 Iraq 85 61 1 (.) (.) (.) 14 39 91 Venezuela 62 64 0 (.) 0 0 38 36 92 Hong Kong 54 65 (.) (.) 1 3 45 32 93 Trinidad and Tobago 80 77 0 0 (.) 0 20 23 94 Greece 65 59 21 7 1 11 13 23 95 Singapore 38 41 4 2 1 4 57 53 96 Israel 76 80 1 (.) 0 0 23 20 High-income oil exporters 83w 78w (.)w Ow 1w 17w 21w 97 Libya 67 84 7 (.) 0 (.) 26 16 98 Saudi Arabia 74 78 0 0 0 (.) 26 22 99 Kuwait 91 78 0 0 0 4 9 18 100 United Arab Emirates . 78 . . (.) 2 . . 20 Industrial market economies 67w 69w 3w 3w (.)w 4w 30w 24w 101 Ireland 96 88 (.) 1 () 2 4 9 102 Spain 80 62 2 2 (.) 5 18 31 103 Italy 65 67 4 3 2 7 29 23 104 New Zealand 95 67 1 5 (.) 1 4 27 105 United Kingdom 57 71 3 2 2 5 38 22 106 Finland 69 68 19 20 (.) 1 12 11 107 Australia 75 61 3 6 1 3 21 30 108 Japan 45 48 2 3 2 7 51 42 109 Canada 90 85 1 3 (.) 1 9 11 110 Austria 69 71 13 11 (.) 2 18 16 111 United States 61 58 1 2 1 4 37 36 112 Netherlands 78 85 1 2 1 2 20 11 113 France 53 68 3 4 (.) 3 44 25 114 Belgium 79 85 2 2 1 1 18 12 115 Norway 80 88 4 1 (.) 1 16 10 116 Denmark 83 83 4 2 (.) 2 13 13 117 Sweden 79 79 4 4 (.) 2 17 15 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 70 75 4 4 1 3 25 18 119 Switzerland 72 72 3 3 1 3 24 22 Nonmarket industrial economies 19w .. 59w (.)w .. 22w 120 Poland 29 54 . (.) . . 17 121 Bulgaria 13 . . 80 (.) . 7 122 Hungary 22 . 61 . (.) . . 17 123 USSR 18 . . 51 . (.) . 31 124 Czechoslovakia 16 . . 67 . . (.) 17 125 German Dem, Rep. 19 . 68 . (.) . 13 131 Table 12. Origin and destination of manufactured exports Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) Value of manufactured Industrial Nonmarket exports market industrial High-income Developing (millions economies economies oil exporters economies of dollars) 1962 1979b 1962 1979b 1962 197gb 1962 1g79b 1962 1979b Origin Low-income economies 58 w 43 w 4w 7w 2w 3w 36 w 47 w China and India 40 w 6w 2w 52 w Other low-income 63 w 55 w 1w 12 w 1w 3w 35 u. 30 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem 30 21 1 0 0 0 69 79 1 2 2 Lao PDR 35 88 0 0 0 0 65 12 (.) 3 3 Bhutan S 4 Chad 19 31 0 0 6 0 75 69 1 3 5 Bangladesh 49 13 (.) 38 437 6 Ethiopia 47 74 1 2 1 2 51 22 2 2 7 Nepal 68 0 0 32 28 8 Somalia 60 78 0 3 4 0 36 19 (.) 1 9 Burma 58 82 (.) 0 0 0 42 18 3 28 10 Afghanistan 96 82 1 7 0 1 3 10 9 43 11 Viet Nam 9 3 0 58 0 1 91 38 1 297 12 Mali 34 29 (.) 0 0 0 66 71 (.) 2 13 Burundi 94 0 0 6 1 14 Rwanda 79 0 0 21 (.) (.) 15 Upper Volta 19 23 0 0 0 0 81 77 1 10 16 Zaire 93 79 0 (.) 0 0 7 21 12 63 17 Malawi 43 0 0 57 8 18 Mozambique 67 0 6 27 3 19 India 56 58 5 10 2 6 37 26 630 3729 20 Haiti 96 0 0 4 62 21 Sri Lanka 63 87 2 (.) (.) 4 35 9 6 122 22 Sierra Leone 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 72 23 Tanzania 85 68 0 0 () 0 15 32 20 86 24 China . 27 . 3 . (.) . 70 5311 25 Guinea . . 27 0 . . 0 . 73 . 55 26 Central African Rep 74 74 2 0 0 0 24 26 3 35 27 Pakistan 45 57 1 7 2 6 52 30 97 1140 28 Uganda 100 . 0 . 0 0 2 29 Benin 19 88 3 0 0 0 78 12 1 2 30 Niger 8 89 0 0 0 0 93 11 1 76 31 Madagascar 80 75 0 5 0 0 20 20 5 29 32 Sudan 35 65 0 30 11 0 54 5 (.) 3 33 Togo 44 41 0 1 0 (.) 56 58 1 17 Middle-income economies 50 u' 63 4 U' 5 U' 1 U' 3w 45 w 29 a' Oil exporters 70w 70 w (.) U' 3w 2w 2w 28 zt' 25 a' Oil importers 46 O 62 w 511' 5w 1w 3w 48 u' 30 w 34 Ghana 38 59 11 (.) 1 0 50 41 12 12 35 Kenya . . 12 . . 1 . . 1 86 12 142 36 Lesotho . . . 37 Yemen, PDR .. 64 0 . 0 36 2 38 Indonesia 52 30 1 (.) 1 5 46 65 2 488 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . I . 0 .. 45 .. 54 . 2 40 Mauritania 77 84 0 0 0 0 23 16 2 4 41 Senegal 76 31 0 0 0 0 24 69 5 41 42 Angola . . 80 . . 0 . . (.) . . 20 . . 60 43 Liberia 100 98 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 139 44 Honduras 3 30 0 0 0 0 97 70 2 60 45 Zambia 5 9 . 0 . 0 . . 91 7 46 Bolivia 82 80 0 0 0 0 18 20 4 23 47 Egypt . 36 . . 48 . . 4 . . 12 88 373 48 Zimbabwe . S S S S S . . 16 49 El Salvador 1 5 0 0 0 0 99 95 18 251 50 Cameroon 25 63 0 0 0 0 75 37 4 67 51 Thailand 51 65 (.) (.) (.) 3 49 32 21 1,327 52 Philippines 91 80 0 (.) (.) 1 9 19 26 1596 53 Nicaragua . 2 . . 0 . . 0 . 98 . . 64 54 Papua New Guinea 86 .. 2 .. 0 .. 12 2 17 55 Congo, Peoples Rep. 85 90 0 0 0 0 15 10 14 39 56 Morocco 49 67 2 4 (.) 4 49 25 28 460 57 Mongolia S 5 () 5 5 54 . 0 . . 46 . . 33 58 Albania 5 5 33 . . 0 . . 0 . . 67 . . 44 59 Peru 53 42 0 2 0 (.) 47 56 5 205 60 Nigeria 91 94 0 (.) 0 0 9 6 34 148 61 Jamaica 72 74 0 0 0 (.) 28 26 20 422 62 Guatemala . 6 . . 0 . . 0 . . 94 . 268 63 Ivory Coast 58 41 0 0 0 (.) 42 59 2 212 64 Dominican Rep. . 95 . 0 0 . . 5 . . 194 65 Columbia 57 35 0 1 0 (.) 43 64 16 715 66 Ecuador 46 23 0 0 0 0 54 77 2 39 132 Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) Value of manufactured Industrial Nonmarket exports market industnal High-income Developing (millions economies economies oil exporters economies of dollars) Origin 1962 1979b 1962 1g79b 1962 1979b 1962 197gb 1g62a 1g79b 67 Paraguay 83 36 0 0 0 0 17 64 4 34 68 Tunisia 59 82 0 1 8 4 33 13 10 605 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. 5 45 9 . 41 242 70 Syrian Arab Rep. . . 13 . . 17 31 . . 39 21 125 71 Jordan . (.) . . 0 . 48 . . 52 1 97 72 Lebanon . . 9 . (.) 59 . . 32 8 402 73 Turkey 73 71 17 4 (.) 3 10 22 4 620 74 Cuba . 39 . . 12 . 0 . . 49 . 39 75 Korea, Rep. of 83 73 0 (.) (.) 7 17 20 10 13299 76 Malaysia 11 68 0 (.) (.) 1 89 31 58 1966 77 Costa Rica . . 13 . . 0 . . (.) . . 87 228 78 Panama 24 15 0 0 0 1 76 84 1 26 79 Algeria . . 71 . 26 . . (.) . 3 . . 39 80 Brazil 54 49 2 1 0 1 44 49 39 5876 81 Mexico 71 80 0 1 0 (.) 29 19 122 3389 82 Chile 44 32 0 1 0 (.) 56 67 20 759 83 South Africa . . 82 . . (.) , (.) . . 18 318 5,166 84 Rornania . . 36 . . 11 . . 1 52 . . 5,712 85 Portugal 53 82 (.) 3 1 (.) 46 15 205 2529 86 Argentina 61 39 3 6 (.) 1 36 54 39 1888 87 Yugoslavia 31 34 28 44 1 3 40 19 344 4,841 88 Uruguay . . 56 .. 1 0 . . 43 . . 375 89 Iran 64 82 1 6 7 5 28 7 33 597 90 Iraq (.) I (.) (.) 79 9 21 90 5 53 91 Venezuela 93 67 0 0 0 0 7 33 158 238 92 Hong Kong 62 83 0 () 1 2 37 15 642 10,804 93 Trinidad and Tobago 34 91 0 0 0 (.) 66 9 13 157 94 Greece 52 66 4 4 3 14 41 16 27 1,773 95 Singapore 5 48 0 1 (.) 3 95 48 328 7,372 96 Israel 66 78 2 1 0 0 32 21 184 3,654 High-income oil exporters 13 w . . (.) a' . 31 a' . . 56 a' 97 Libya 68 62 0 1 0 0 32 37 (.) 69 98 Saudi Arabia . . 19 . (.) . 6 . . 75 465 99 Kuwait . . 6 . 0 . 45 . . 49 , 975 100 United Arab Emirates , . , . . . , , . Industrial market economies 62 a' 67 a' 3 a' 4 a' 2 a' 4 a' 33 a' 25 a' 101 Ireland 76 92 0 1 (.) 1 24 6 134 4,080 102 Spain 57 59 1 3 1 4 41 34 205 13,347 103 Italy 64 68 5 4 2 6 29 22 3,490 60.125 104 New Zealand 90 80 0 (.) 0 0 10 20 23 871 105 United Kingdom 57 69 3 2 2 4 38 25 8,947 69884 106 Finland 55 69 31 20 1 1 13 10 608 8034 107 Australia 61 52 (.) (.) (.) 1 39 47 263 4759 108 Japan 44 49 4 4 2 6 50 41 4.340 98964 109 Canada 89 89 (.) 1 () 1 11 9 1,959 28119 110 Austria 65 69 16 14 1 1 17 16 931 12,928 111 United States 47 59 (.) 1 2 5 51 35 13,957 118.774 112 Netherlands 76 81 2 3 2 2 20 14 2,443 33849 113 France 58 65 4 5 () 3 38 27 5,317 74,222 114 Belgium 82 85 2 2 1 1 15 12 3,257 43.357 115 Norway 79 72 2 3 (.) 1 19 24 442 5,428 116 Denmark 75 82 7 3 1 1 17 14 627 7,874 117 Sweden 76 77 5 4 (.) 3 19 16 1,958 22.016 118 Germany, Fed Rep. 73 72 3 5 1 3 23 20 11,623 149.844 119 Switzerland 72 69 2 4 1 3 25 24 2,005 24,163 Nonmarket industrial economies 14w . . 53a' 1w .. 32w 120 Poland . 19 . 42 1 . 38 9,836 121 Bulgaria . . 5 . 57 . 3 . 35 .. 4,926 122 Hungary . 23 . 58 1 18 5,441 123 USSR . .. . .. 25,456 124 Czecholovaka . 14 . 71 1 .. 14 . 11,378 125 German Dem. Rep 9 . 41 . I 49 11,412 a. Figures in italics are for 963. not 1962 b Figures in italics are for 1978. not 1979 133 Table 13. Balance of payments and debt service ratios Debt service as percentage of: Interest payments Current account on external public Exports of balance debt goods and (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) GNP services 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 Low-income economies 1.1 w 1.1 w 13.8w 9.2w China and India . 0 Other low-income 1.5 w 1.9 w 9.9 w 9.5 w 1 Kampuchea Dem. . . . 2 LaoPDR .. .. .. 3 Bhutan . . . . . . . 4 Chad 2 . (.) 4 1.0 3.1 39 5 Bangladesh -60 -755 . 37 . . 0.7 . 5.6 6 Ethiopia -32 -228 6 19 1.2 1.1 11.4 7.6 7 Nepal -53 (.) 2 0.3 0.2 . 1.5 8 Somalia -5 -136 (.) 2 0.3 0.5 2.1 3.5 9 Burma -64 -325 3 45 0.9 1.9 15.8 222 10 Afghanistan . 9 23 2.5 . . . 11 VietNam .. .. . 12 Mali -2 -99 (.) 4 0.2 0.8 1.2 3.6 13 Burundi 2 . . (.) 2 0.3 0.6 14 Rwanda 6 -68 (.) 1 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.1 15 Upper Volta 9 . . (.) 7 0.6 1.2 4.0 16 Zaire -64 . . 9 153 2.1 5.8 4.4 17 Malawi -35 -139 3 32 1.9 4.5 7.0 18.4 18 Mozambique , . , . . . , , 19 India -394 -3,163 189 362 0.9 0.6 20.9 89 20 Haiti 2 -77 () 5 1.0 1.1 5,8 4.2 21 Sri Lanka -59 -664 12 32 2.0 20 103 6.0 22 Sierra Leone -16 -168 2 8 2.9 4.2 10.1 18.4 23 Tanzania -35 -548 6 31 1.2 1.0 8.2 7.3 24 China . , . . . . . . . , . 25 Guinea , . . , 4 23 2.4 6.1 . 26 Central African Rep -11 7 (.) 2 1.1 1.0 3.3 4.5 27 Pakistan -667 -928 76 242 19 24 23.6 11 3 28 Uganda 20 -18 4 3 0.6 0.3 3.4 11.9 29 Benin -1 . . () 2 07 0.6 2.2 30 Niger (.) . . 1 16 06 2.2 3.8 2.3 31 Madagascar 10 -433 2 26 0.8 1.8 3.5 7.4 32 Sudan -42 -196 13 16 1.7 1.8 10.7 14.4 33 Togo 3 . . 1 54 0.9 14.4 3.0 Middle-income economies 1.6w 2.9 w 9.9 w 13.0w Oil exporters 1.8w 3.8 10.5w 14.5w Oil importers 1.4 w 2.4 u' 9.6 w 11.9w 34 Ghana -68 -91 12 28 1.1 0.6 5.2 6.0 35 Kenya -39 -985 11 100 17 2.6 5.3 88 36 Lesotho , (.) 1 04 0.8 37 Yemen. PDR -4 -35 . , 7 . . 1.5 . . 1.5 38 Indonesia -310 2,872 24 824 09 2.7 69 80 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . . -478 . . 5 . . 0.6 . 1.1 40 Mauritania -5 -116 (.) 13 2.0 5.9 3.2 32.9 41 Senegal -16 2 57 0.8 69 2.7 42 Angola . . . , . , , . . , 43 Liberia , . . 6 27 55 4.2 . . 44 Honduras -64 -321 3 55 08 39 2.8 9.9 45 Zambia 108 -508 23 98 3.2 9.5 5.6 24.4 46 Bolivia -22 -115 6 157 2.3 4.7 11.0 25.9 47 Egypt -154 -489 38 490 41 69 287 189 48 Zimbabwe - 13 -255 5 10 0.6 09 . 2.6 49 El Salvador 8 -86 4 24 0.9 1.2 3.6 3.5 50 Cameroon -30 - 129 4 103 0.8 3.1 32 7.7 51 Thailand -250 -2,280 16 267 0.6 1.3 3.4 5.2 52 Philippines -48 -2,046 25 342 1.4 1.6 7.5 7.0 53 Nicaragua -39 160 7 38 3.2 3.7 11.1 14.5 54 Papua New Guinea . -267 1 30 0.1 2.6 . . 59 55 Congo, People's Rep -65 - 172 3 39 3.3 61 8.9 9.3 56 Morocco -124 -1,416 23 618 1.5 6.5 7.7 27.5 57 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Albania . . , . . . , . . , . 59 Peru 240 618 44 547 2.1 81 11.6 313 60 Nigena -368 2,915 20 394 0.7 0.5 4.2 1.9 61 Jamaica -153 -174 8 107 1.1 7.9 2.5 12.8 62 Guatemala -8 -163 6 31 1.4 0.8 74 35 63 Ivory Coast -37 1,742 11 296 2.8 8.2 6.8 23.9 64 Dominican Rep. -102 -341 4 97 0.8 2.3 4.5 21.5 65 Colombia 293 -25 44 282 1.7 1.7 11.6 9.6 66 Ecuador -113 -575 7 230 1.5 3.8 9.1 140 134 Debt service as percentage of: Interest payments Current account on external public Exports of balance debt goods and (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) GNP services 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 67 Paraguay -17 -282 4 35 1.8 1.8 11.8 11.3 68 Tunisia -53 -324 18 191 4.5 4.7 18.5 12.2 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. . . . .. .. . . . . . . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. -69 -640 6 95 2.0 3.2 11.0 14,5 71 Jordan -17 374 2 58 . . 3.9 3.6 5.4 72 Lebanon , . . 1 6 02 .. . . 73 Turkey -70 -2,762 42 589 1.3 1.7 16.3 15.8 74 Cuba . .. .. .. .. .. 75 Korea, Rep. of -623 -5326 70 1,310 3.1 4.9 19.4 12.2 76 Malaysia 8 -470 21 208 1.7 1.4 3.6 2.3 77 Costa Rica -74 -655 7 125 2.9 4.3 9.9 16.4 78 Panama -64 -288 7 253 3.0 14.3 7.7 18.4 79 Algeria -126 239 10 .305 0.9 9.5 3.2 24.9 80 Brazil -837 -12,871 133 4,142 0.9 3.4 12.5 34.0 81 Mexico 1,060 -7,466 216 3,844 2.1 4.9 24.1 31.9 82 Chile -91 -1,784 78 494 3.1 52 18.9 22.9 83 South Africa -1,215 3,519 . . . . . . . . . . 84 Romania . -2,420 . . . . . , . . . . 85 Portugal 70 -1,076 29 445 1.4 4.1 . . 10.1 86 Argentina -158 -4,700 121 827 1.9 1.4 21.5 16.6 87 Yugoslavia -348 -2,292 72 248 1.8 0.9 8.3 3.4 88 Uruguay -45 -709 16 98 2.6 1.9 253 118 89 Iran -507 85 . . 30 . . 12.2 90 Iraq 101 9 , . 0.9 . . 2.2 91 Venezuela -104 4.240 40 1,229 0.7 4.9 2.9 13.2 92 Hong Kong . . . . . , 29 . 0.3 . . 93 Trinidad and Tobago -80 -39 6 45 1.9 1.5 4.4 2.2 94 Greece -405 -2,218 41 408 1.0 2.1 7.1 9.4 95 Singapore -572 -1,577 6 105 0.6 2.5 0.6 1.1 96 Israel -613 -876 13 562 0.7 5.9 26 11.8 High-income oil exporters 97 Libya 645 7364 98 Saudi Arabia 71 39,799 99 Kuwait 15799 100 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economiesb 101 Ireland -189 -1,311 102 Spain 79 -4,635 103 Italy 902 9,958 104 New Zealand -29 -678 105 United Kingdom 1,881 6,088 106 Finland -239 -1,399 107 AustraHa -832 -4273 108 Japan 1,980 -10737 109 Canada 1,078 -1,639 110 Austria -23 -3,619 111 United States 2,357 3,722 112 Netherlands -520 -2,760 113 France 72 -7,786 114 Belgium 715 -5,868 115 Norway -242 1,009 116 Denmark -544 -2,524 117 Sweden -266 -5,242 118 Germany, Fed. Rep 850 -15,800 119 Switzerland 70 -552 Nonmarket industrial economie&' 120 Poland 121 Bulgaria 122 Hungary 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Dem. Rep. a. Figures in italics are for 1979, not 1980. b. See the technical notes 135 Table 14. Flow of external capital Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans Net direct (millions of dollars) private investment Repayment (millions of Gross inflow of principal Net inflow dollars) 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 l980 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 LaoPDR .. .. 3 Bhutan 4Chad 5 Bangladesh 6 597 9 2 12 40 4 3 557 6 Ethiopia 27 132 15 16 12 116 4 7 Nepal 1 55 2 2 1 53 8 Somalia 4 114 109 9 Burma 10 Afghanistan 16 31 281 113 (.) 18 15 64 157 5 216 4 217 44 5 11 VietNam 12 Mali 21 85 (.) 7 21 78 4 13 Burundi 1 43 (.) 4 1 39 14 Rwanda (.) 34 (.) 1 (.) 33 (.) 20 15 Upper Volta 2 79 2 9 (,) 70 1 16 Zaire 31 198 28 155 3 43 42 17 Malawi 38 160 3 35 35 125 9 6 18 Mozambique 19 India 890 2477 307 636 583 1841 6 20 Haiti 4 55 4 11 () 44 3 13 21 Sri Lanka 61 296 27 49 34 247 43 22 Sierra Leone 23 Tanzania 50 8 88 210 10 10 34 20 2 40 54 190 (,) 8 12 24 China . . . . . S 25 Guinea 90 122 10 72 80 50 26 Central African Rep. 2 43 2 6 (.) 37 1 21 27 Pakistan 484 1199 114 363 370 832 31 57 28 Uganda 26 169 4 37 22 132 4 3 29 Benin 2 84 1 4 1 80 7 30 Niger 12 177 1 23 11 154 6 1 31 Madagascar 10 438 5 34 5 404 10 32 Sudan 54 749 22 132 32 617 33 Togo 5 222 2 97 3 125 Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers 34 Ghana 40 129 12 48 28 81 8 10 35 Kenya 30 414 15 79 15 335 14 61 36 Lesotho (.) 22 (.) 3 (.) 19 37 Yemen, PDR 1 101 . 6 1 95 38 Indonesia 441 2592 59 953 382 1639 83 184 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 399 . . 13 386 . 142 40 Mauritania 4 153 3 17 1 136 1 84 41 Senegal 15 283 5 123 10 160 5 42 Angola 43 Liberia . 7 . 90 . . . 12 . 16 . 5 . . . 74 . 44 Honduras 29 180 3 39 26 141 8 5 45 Zambia 351 517 32 237 319 280 . 46 Bolivia 54 439 17 117 37 322 76 42 47 Egypt 302 2982 247 1,246 55 1,736 48 Zimbabwe (.) 130 5 34 5 96 . . . . 541 2 49 El Salvador 8 124 6 17 2 107 4 6 50 Cameroon 28 571 4 79 24 492 16 65 51 Thailand 55 1,329 23 168 32 1162 43 186 52 Philippines 132 1,390 73 220 59 1,170 29 40 53 Nicaragua 44 269 17 39 27 230 15 3 54 Papua New Guinea 25 134 (.) 35 25 99 . . 60 55 Congo, People's Rep. 35 230 6 58 29 172 . 46 56 Morocco 163 1,567 36 573 127 994 20 90 57 Mongolia . S . . . . 58 Albania . . . . . . . . . 59 Peru 148 1,231 101 954 47 277 70 70 60 Nigeria 62 1,526 36 84 26 1,442 205 595 61 Jamaica 15 200 6 82 9 118 161 12 62 Guatemala 37 93 20 33 17 60 29 111 63 Ivory Coast 77 1.426 27 534 50 892 31 109 64 Dominican Rep. 38 382 7 61 31 321 72 13 65 Colombia 235 1,005 75 264 160 741 39 233 66 Ecuador 42 749 16 179 26 570 89 81 136 Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans Net direct (millions of dollars) private investment Repayment (millions of Gross inflow of principal Net inflow dollars) 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 67 Paraguay 15 158 7 44 8 114 4 31 68 Tunisia 87 431 45 222 42 209 16 234 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. , . . . . . , . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 59 509 30 297 29 212 71 Jordan 14 307 3 76 11 231 . . 31 72 Lebanon 12 109 2 7 10 102 . 73 Turkey 328 2,222 128 399 200 1823 58 89 74 Cuba .. .. .. .. ,. 75 Korea, Rep. of 440 3,548 198 1,452 242 2,096 66 -5 76 Malaysia 43 358 45 118 -2 240 94 928 77 Costa Rica 30 398 21 75 9 323 26 13 78 Panama 67 387 24 210 43 177 33 40 79 Algeria 292 3401 33 2405 259 996 45 315 80 Brazil 883 6,039 255 3,769 628 2,270 407 1,568 81 Mexico 772 8,551 476 4,048 296 4,503 323 1,852 82 Chile 397 869 163 915 234 -46 -79 194 83 South Africa , . . . . . . . . . . 145 -494 84 Romania , . . . . . . . 85 Portugal 18 1,371 63 538 -45 833 50 102 86 Argentina 487 2,805 342 1,160 145 1,645 11 741 87 Yugoslavia 180 1,334 168 367 12 967 . . 88 Uruguay 38 224 47 90 -9 134 . . 289 89 Iran 940 . . 235 . 705 . . 25 90 Iraq 63 . . 18 , . 45 . . 24 91 Venezuela 224 2,856 42 1,733 182 1,123 -23 55 92 Hong Kong (.) 131 (.) 36 (.) 95 . , 93 Trinidad and Tobago 8 106 10 35 -2 71 83 94 94 Greece 164 1,587 61 483 103 1,104 50 74 95 Singapore 58 190 6 160 52 30 93 1,454 96 Israel 410 3,106 25 631 385 2,475 40 -85 High-income oil exporters 97 Libya 139 -319 98 Saudi Arabia 20 -3,367 99 Kuwait -436 100 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies" 101 Ireland 32 337 102 Spain 179 1.182 103 Italy 496 - 160 104 New Zealand 22 77 105 United Kingdom -440 -1,221 106 Finland 34 -102 107 Australia 787 1,641 108 Japan -261 -2,121 109 Canada 566 -2,373 110 Austria 84 139 111 United States -6,130 -7,757 112 Netherlands -14 -1,447 113 France 248 226 114 Belgium -290 -3,410 115 Norway 32 -194 116 Denmark 75 89 117 Sweden -105 -368 118 Germany, Fed. Rep -290 -3.410 119 Switzerland Nonmarket industrial economie&' 120 Poland 121 Bulgaria 122 Hungary 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Dem. Rep. a. Figures in italics are for 1979, not 1980. b See the technical notes 137 Table 15. External public debt and international reserves External public debt Gross international reserves outstanding and disbursed As percentage In months Millions of dollars of GNP Millions of dollars of import coverage 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1980 Low-income economies 15.6w 19.2w 5.3 w China and India 7.2 w Other low-income 16.5w 31.4w 2.1 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. . . . . . . . . 2La0PDR .. .. 3 Bhutan . . .. . . . .. . 4 Chad 32 159 11.8 31.7 2 11 5 Bangladesh . 3,495 . . 30.8 . 329 1.4 6 Ethiopia 169 728 9.5 17.8 72 263 3.6 7 Nepal 3 177 0.3 8.7 95 277 7.8 8 Somalia 77 688 24.4 45.3 21 27 0.6 9 Burma 101 1,517 4.7 26.1 98 408 5.4 10 Afghanistan 454 1094 48.2 . . 50 943 11 VietNam . . . . . , .. . . 12 Mali 238 621 88.1 43.8 1 26 0.4 13 Burundi 7 137 3.1 15.6 15 105 14 Rwanda 2 158 0.9 15.1 8 186 5.8 15 Upper Volta 21 323 6.3 24.4 36 73 16 Zaire 311 4,190 17.6 78.5 189 381 17 Malawi 122 634 39.1 42.6 29 75 1.6 18 Mozambique . . .. . . .. . . . 19 India 7,936 17,358 14.9 10.0 1,023 12,007 8,3 20 Haiti 40 258 10.3 18.5 4 28 0.7 21 Sri Lanka 317 1,337 16.1 32.5 43 282 1.5 22 Sierra Leone 59 344 14.3 34.3 39 31 1.3 23 Tanzania 248 1,360 19.4 27.6 65 20 0.2 24 China , , . . . , , , . . 10,144 6.2 25 Guinea 314 1,074 51.7 68.6 , . , 26 Central African Rep. 19 155 11.2 21.3 1 61 2.5 27 Pakistan 3,059 8,775 30.5 34.7 194 1569 2.8 28 Uganda 128 669 9.8 4.8 57 17 0.5 29 Benin 41 262 16.0 23.4 16 14 30. Niger 32 399 8.7 22.1 19 132 2.1 31 Madagascar 93 1,035 10.8 31.6 37 5 0.1 32 Sudan 308 3,097 15.3 37.2 22 48 0.4 33 Togo 40 907 16.0 86.7 35 84 Middle-income economies 11.8 w 17.4w 4.1 w Oil exporters 14.0w 21.3w 4.6 w Oil importers 10.7w 15.4 iv 3.8 iv 34 Ghana 489 1,011 22.6 8.0 58 344 2.9 35 Kenya 313 1,745 20.3 25.5 220 539 2.1 36 Lesotho 8 71 7.8 11.1 . . 37 Yemen, PDR 1 499 . , 58.6 60 257 5.6 38 Indonesia 2,443 14,940 27.1 22.5 160 6,800 4.2 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . . 836 . . 27.1 . . 1,289 6.8 40 Mauritania 27 714 16.8 139.7 3 146 3.2 41 Senegal 98 906 11.6 34.9 22 25 42 Angola . . . . . . . , .. . 43 Liberia 158 537 49.6 52.8 . . 4 44 Honduras 90 892 12.8 36.9 20 161 1.5 45 Zambia 581 1,815 34.6 51.2 515 207 1.3 46 Bolivia 479 2,124 47.1 36.4 46 554 5.4 47 Egypt 1,644 13,054 23.8 51.7 165 2,478 3.0 48 Zimbabwe 233 698 15.8 13.8 59 373 2.4 49 El Salvador 88 509 8.6 15.3 63 384 3.6 50 Cameroon 131 2,002 12.1 34.0 81 206 0.9 51 Thailand 328 4,063 5.0 12.4 911 3,028 3.3 52 Philippines 633 6,402 9.0 18.2 255 3,977 4.6 53 Nicaragua 155 1,698 20.7 83.0 50 . . 54 Papua New Guinea 36 507 5.8 20.3 . 459 3.6 55 Congo, People's Rep. 143 898 54.4 77.4 9 91 0.9 56 Morocco 711 7,098 18.0 38.6 141 811 1.7 57 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . , , . 58 Albania . . . , . . . . . , 59 Peru 856 6,204 12.6 33.7 338 2,805 6.9 60 Nigeria 478 4,997 6.4 5.5 223 10,642 5.8 61 Jamaica 154 1,299 11.5 54.1 139 105 0.7 62 Guatemala 106 541 5.7 6.9 80 752 4.3 63 Ivory Coast 256 4,265 18.3 41.9 119 43 0.4 64 Dominican Rep. 212 1,186 14.5 17.5 32 278 2.2 65 Colombia 1,249 4,090 18.1 12.6 207 6,476 13.7 66 Ecuador 217 2,655 13.5 24.4 85 1,254 4.3 138 External public debt Gross international reserves outstanding and disbursed In months As percentage Miilions of dollars of Import Millions of dollars of GNP coverage 1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1980 67 Paraguay 112 634 19.1 14.5 18 785 9.6 68 Tunisia 541 2,955 382 339 60 703 2.2 69 Korea, Oem. Rep. . S 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 232 2,493 12.8 20 1 57 826 2.0 71 Jordan 118 1,266 . . 37.4 258 1,744 6.1 72 Lebanon 64 194 4.2 . . 405 7,023 73 Turkey 1,854 13,216 14.4 22.4 440 3,497 4.6 74 Cuba .. .. .. .. 75 Korea, Rep. of 1,797 16,274 20.9 28.8 610 3,101 1.3 76 Malaysia 390 3,103 10.0 13.7 667 5,755 4,7 77 Costa Rica 134 1,585 13.8 34.3 16 198 1.3 78 Panama 194 2,276 19.0 70.1 16 117 0.6 79 Algeria 937 15,073 19.3 38.7 352 7,050 5.7 80 Brazil 3,232 37,824 7.2 16.4 1,190 6,877 1.9 81 Mexico 3,206 33,490 9.7 206 756 4,046 1.5 82 Chile 2,066 4,885 26.2 180 392 4,126 6.2 83 South Africa . . . . . . . . 1,057 7,888 3.7 84 Romania . . . . . . . 2,510 85 Portugal 485 5,610 7.2 23.6 1,565 13,865 15.2 86 Argentina 1,878 10,285 7.6 7.2 682 9,295 6.7 87 Yugoslavia 1198 4,541 8.8 6.6 144 2,480 1.4 88 Uruguay 269 1,040 11.1 10.7 186 2,796 14.5 89 Iran 2,193 . 20.8 . 217 17205 90 Iraq 274 , , 8.8 . 472 . 91 Venezuela 728 10,867 6.6 18.0 1,047 13,360 8.9 92 Hong Kong 2 436 0.1 1.9 . , 93 Trinidad and Tobago 101 492 125 9.0 43 2,810 11.6 94 Greece 905 4,541 89 109 318 3,394 3.5 95 Singapore 152 1,369 7.9 12.8 1,012 6,567 3.0 96 Israel 2,274 12,633 41.3 62.2 451 4,053 3.5 High-income oil exporters . . , 5.8 w 97 Libya , . . . . . . . 1,596 14,906 10.2 98 Saudi Arabia , . . . . , . 670 26,131 4.8 99 Kuwait . . . . . , . . 209 5,426 6.1 100 United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . 2,357 Industrial market economie&' 4.8 w 101 Ireland 698 3,073 3.0 102 Spain 1,851 20,475 6.0 103 Italy 5,547 62,443 65 104 New Zealand 258 365 0.6 105 United Kingdom 2,918 31,758 2.5 106 Finland 456 2,453 1.6 107 Australia 1,709 6,365 2.6 108 Japan 4,876 38,921 2.8 109 Canada 4,732 15,461 2.3 110 Austria 1,806 17725 6.5 111 United States 15,237 171,414 6.2 112 Netherlands 3,362 37,548 4.6 113 France 5,199 75,592 5,4 114 Belgium 2,947 27,836 3.5 115 Norway 813 6,744 3.0 116 Denmark 488 4,347 2.0 117 Sweden 775 6,996 2.0 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 13,879 104,120 5.1 119 Switzerland 5,317 64,750 18.3 Nonmarket industrial economie&' 120 Poland 121 Bulgaria 122 Hungary 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Oem. Rep. a. Figures in italics are for 1979, not 1980. b. See the technical notes. 139 Table 16. Official development assistance from OECD and OPEC members Amount 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 OECD Millions of US dollars 103 Italy 77 60 147 182 226 198 376 273 683 670 104 New Zealand 14 66 53 53 55 67 72 67 105 United Kingdom 407 472 500 904 885 1114 1465 2,105 1,851 2194 106 Finland 2 7 48 51 49 55 86 110 135 107 Australia 59 119 212 552 377 400 588 620 667 649 108 Japan 105 244 458 1,148 1,105 1,424 2,215 2,637 3,353 3,170 109 Canada 75 96 337 880 887 991 1,060 1,026 1,075 1,187 110 Austria 10 11 79 50 108 154 127 178 317 111 United States 2,702 4,023 3,153 4,161 4,360 4,682 5,663 4,684 7,138 5,760 112 Netherlands 35 70 196 608 728 908 1,074 1,404 1,630 1,510 113 France 823 752 971 2,093 2,146 2,267 2,705 3,370 4,162 4,022 114 Belgium 101 102 120 378 340 371 536 631 595 574 115 Norway 5 11 37 184 218 295 355 429 486 467 116 Denmark 5 13 59 205 214 258 388 448 474 405 117 Sweden 7 38 117 566 608 779 783 956 962 916 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 223 456 599 1,689 1,593 1,717 2,347 3,350 3,567 3,182 119 Switzerland 4 12 30 104 112 119 173 207 253 236 Total 4,628 6,478 6,967 i347 13,953 15,733 19,992 22,420 27,256 25,461 OECD As percentage of donor GNP 103 Italy 22 .10 .16 .11 .13 .10 .14 .08 .17 .19 104 New Zealand . . . .23 .52 .41 .39 .34 .33 .33 .29 105 Ulnited Kingdom .56 .47 41 .39 .39 .45 .46 .51 .35 .43 106 Finland 02 06 18 .17 16 .16 .21 .23 .28 107 Australia .37 .53 .59 65 .41 .42 .55 .52 .48 .41 108 Japan .24 .27 23 .23 .20 .21 .23 .26 32 .28 109 Canada 19 .19 .41 .54 .46 .50 .52 .46 .43 .43 110 Austria . . .11 .07 .21 .12 .22 .27 .19 .23 .48 111 United States .53 .58 32 .27 .26 .25 .27 20 .27 .20 112 Netherlands .31 .36 .61 .75 .83 .86 82 .93 1.03 1.08 113 France 1.35 .76 .66 .62 .62 60 57 .59 .64 .71 114 Belgium .88 .60 .46 .59 .51 .46 .55 .56 .50 .59 115 Norway 11 16 .32 66 .70 83 90 .93 85 .82 116 Denmark .09 .13 .38 .58 .56 .60 .75 .75 .73 .73 117 Sweden .05 19 .38 .82 82 99 .90 .94 79 .83 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. .31 .40 .32 .40 .36 .33 .37 .44 .43 .46 119 Switzerland .04 .09 .15 .19 .19 .19 .20 .21 .24 .24 OECD National currencies 103 Italy (billions of lire) 48 38 92 119 188 175 319 227 575 762 104 New Zealand (millions of dollars) . . . . 13 54 53 55 53 65 74 77 105 United Kingdom (millions ot pounds) 145 168 208 407 490 638 763 992 796 1,082 106 Finland (millions of markkaa) . 6 29 177 197 197 226 335 410 583 107 Australia (millions of dollars) 53 106 189 421 308 361 514 555 585 565 108 Japan (billions of yen) 38 88 165 341 328 382 466 578 760 699 109 Canada (millions of dollars) 73 104 353 895 875 1,054 1,209 1,202 1,257 1,423 110 Austria (millions of schillings) . . 260 286 1,376 897 1,785 2,236 1,698 2,303 5,050 111 United States (millions of dollars) 2,702 4,023 3,153 4,161 4,360 4,682 5,663 4,684 7,138 5,760 112 Netherlands (millions of guilders) 133 253 710 1,538 1,925 2,229 2,324 2,816 3,241 3,768 113 France (millions of francs) 4,063 3,713 5,393 8,971 10,257 11,139 12,207 14,338 17,589 21,858 114 Belgium (millions of francs) 5,050 5,100 6,000 13,903 13,126 13,298 16,880 18,500 17,440 21,313 115 Norway (millions of kroner) 36 78 264 962 1,190 1,570 1,861 2,172 2,400 2,680 116 Denmark (millions of kroner) 35 90 443 1,178 1,294 1,549 2,140 2,357 2,671 2,885 117 Sweden (millions of kronor) 36 196 05 2,350 2,648 3,491 3,538 4,098 4,069 4,638 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. (millions of deutsche marks) 937 1,824 2,192 4,155 4,011 3,987 4,714 6,140 6,484 7,195 119 Switzerland (millions of francs) 17 52 131 268 280 286 309 344 412 463 Summary ODA (billions of US dollars, nominal prices) 4.6 6.5 7,0 13.8 14.0 15.7 200 22.4 27.3 25.5 ODA as percentage of GNP .51 .49 34 .36 .33 .33 35 .35 .38 .35 ODA (billions of US dollars, constant 1978 prices) 13.1 167 149 17.9 17.4 180 200 204 227 21.2 GNP (trillions of US dollars, nominal prices) .9 1.3 2.0 3.9 4.2 4.7 5.7 65 72 7.2 ODA deflatorb 35 .39 .47 .77 .80 .87 1.00 1.10 1.20 1 20 140 Amount 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980c OPEC Millions of US dollars 60 Nigeria 14 83 65 38 30 42 79 Algeria 41 54 47 44 272 83 89 Iran 593 753 221 278 25 3 90 Iraq 218 232 61 172 847 829 91 Venezuela 31 103 52 109 83 130 97 Libya 261 94 115 160 105 281 98 Saudi Arabia 1997 2415 2410 1,719 2,298 3,040 99 Kuwait 976 621 1,517 1,270 1,055 1,188 100 United Arab Emirates 1,046 1,059 1,238 717 1,115 1,062 Qatar 339 195 197 106 277 319 Total OAPECd 4,878 4,670 5,585 4,186 5,968 6,803 Total OPEC 5,516 5,609 5,923 4,611 6,106 6,978 OPEC As percentage of donor GNP 60 Nigeria .04 19 .13 07 .04 .05 79 Algeria .28 .37 .29 22 1.08 .27 89 Iran 1.12 1.16 .29 .37 .03 .00 90 Iraq 1.65 1.45 .33 .76 2.53 2.12 91 Venezuela .11 .33 .14 .27 .17 .22 97 Libya 2,31 63 .65 .93 .45 .92 98 Saudi Arabia 5.62 5.15 4.10 2.64 3.01 2.60 99 Kuwait 8.11 4.56 10.02 7.37 4.09 3.88 100 United Arab Emirates 11.68 9.21 8.49 5.05 5.87 3.96 Qatar 15.62 7.95 7.91 3.57 5.89 4.80 Total OAPECd 4,99 3.89 3.88 2.64 2.90 2.83 Total OPEC 2.59 216 1.94 1.39 1.51 1.47 Net bilateral flow to low-income countries 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 OECD As percentage of donor GNP 103 Italy 03 04 .06 .01 .01 .02 .01 .01 .01 104 New Zealand . . . . . 14 .06 04 .03 .02 .02 105 United Kingdom .22 .23 15 .11 .14 .11 .15 .16 .11 106 Finland . . , . . . .06 .07 .06 .04 .06 .08 107 Australia , .08 .09 .10 .07 .07 08 09 .07 108 Japan .12 .13 .11 .08 08 .06 .07 .11 .11 109 Canada .11 .10 .22 .24 .14 .13 .17 .13 .11 110 Austria , .06 .05 02 02 .01 .01 .02 .11 111 United States .22 26 .14 .08 .05 .03 .04 .03 03 112 Netherlands .19 .08 .24 .24 .26 .33 .34 .30 .35 113 France .01 12 .09 10 10 .07 .08 .08 09 114 Belgium .27 .56 .30 .31 .26 .24 .23 .28 .26 115 Norway .02 .04 .12 .25 .22 .30 .39 .34 .28 116 Denmark . .02 .10 .20 .21 .24 .21 .26 .27 117 Sweden 01 07 .12 .41 .40 .44 .37 .40 .33 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. .13 .14 .10 .12 .09 .07 .10 .10 .09 119 Switzerland , . .02 .05 .10 07 .05 .08 .06 .08 Total 18 20 13 11 .09 .07 .09 .09 .09 a Preliminary estimates. b. See the technical notes C. Provisional. d. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. 141 Table 17. Population growth, past and projected, and hypothetical stationary population' Average annual Hypothetical Assumed growth of Projected population population size of year of Year (percent) (millions) stationary reaching of reaching population reproduction stationary 1960-70 1970-80 1980-2000 1990 2000 (millions) rate of 1 population Low-income economies 2.1 w 2.1 w 1.8 iv 2,607 I 3,090 China and India 2.1 w 1.911' 1.5 iv 1,943 I 2,239 Other low-income 2.4 w 2.6 u' 2.6 a' 664 1 851 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2.6 -0.2 1.9 9 10 21 2045 2130 2 LaoPDR 19 1.8 2.0 4 5 13 2045 2135 3 Bhutan 18 2.0 1.8 2 2 4 2040 2135 4 Chad 18 2.0 2.3 6 7 21 2045 2140 5 Bangladesh 24 2.6 2.3 113 141 321 2035 2125 6 Ethiopia 2.4 20 2.8 41 54 160 2045 2135 7 Nepal 1.8 2.5 2.1 18 22 54 2045 2135 8 Somalia 2.4 23 2.6 5 7 19 2040 2130 9 Burma 2.3 24 2.2 44 54 109 2030 2090 10 Afghanistan 2.2 25 2.0 19 24 58 2045 2160 11 VietNam 31 28 2.4 71 88 153 2015 2075 12 Mali 24 2.7 3.0 9 13 41 2040 2135 13 Burundi 1.6 2.0 2.5 5 7 18 2040 2130 14 Rwanda 2.6 3.4 3.5 7 10 38 2045 2110 15 Upper Volta 20 1.8 2.6 8 10 29 2040 2140 16 Zaire 20 2.7 2.9 38 51 156 2040 2110 17 Malawi 28 2.9 34 8 12 43 2040 2130 18 Mozambique 2,1 40 29 16 22 66 2040 2130 19 India 23 21 1.9 833 994 1,694 2020 2115 20 Haiti 15 17 2.0 6 7 14 2030 2090 21 Sri Lanka 2.4 16 18 18 21 31 2010 2070 22 Sierra Leone 2.2 26 2.9 5 6 19 2040 2110 23 Tanzania 2.7 34 3.3 26 36 111 2035 2100 24 China 1.9 1.8 12 1,110 1,245 1,570 2005 2070 25 Guinea 28 29 28 7 9 28 2040 2130 26 Central African Rep 1.9 2.1 27 3 4 11 2040 2130 27 Pakistan 2.8 3.1 2.5 107 134 308 2035 2125 28 Uganda 2.9 2.6 33 17 24 73 2035 2100 29 Benin 2.5 2.6 3.1 5 6 21 2040 2110 30 Niger 3.3 2.8 32 7 10 34 2040 2130 31 Madagascar 2.1 2.5 3.1 12 16 51 2040 2110 32 Sudan 21 3.0 3.0 25 34 101 2040 2105 33 Togo 27 2.5 31 3 5 15 2040 2110 Middle-income economies 2.5w 2.4 u' 2.3 w 1,4411 1,7891 Oil exporters 2.5w 2.6 ti 2.5w 6421 8151 Oil importers 2.4 w 2.3 a' 2.1 ii' 7991 9741 34 Ghana 2.4 30 3.4 16 23 70 2035 2105 35 Kenya 3.2 3.4 41 24 36 128 2035 2100 36 Lesotho 20 23 28 2 2 6 2035 2105 37 Yemen PDR 21 24 2.5 2 3 8 2040 2130 38 Indonesia 20 23 20 180 216 376 2020 2110 39 Yemen Arab Rep 2.3 29 2.2 9 11 26 2040 2130 40 Mauritania 2.5 25 3.1 2 3 10 2045 2135 41 Senegal 3.3 28 2.9 8 10 34 2045 2135 42 Angola 1.5 2.4 2.7 9 12 40 2045 2135 43 Liberia 3.1 3.4 37 3 4 13 2035 2100 44 Honduras 31 34 30 5 7 16 2030 2090 45 Zambia 28 3.1 34 8 11 36 2035 2105 46 Bolivia 2.3 2.5 2.4 7 9 20 2035 2095 47 Egypt 2.2 21 2.1 50 60 104 2020 2080 48 Zimbabwe 3.9 3.3 4.3 11 17 64 2035 2100 49 El Salvador 2.9 2.9 2.7 6 8 15 2020 2080 50 Cameroon 18 2.2 2.6 11 14 41 2040 2110 51 Thailand 3.0 2.5 1.9 58 68 100 2005 2070 52 Philippines 3.0 27 23 63 77 127 2015 2075 53 Nicaragua 26 3.4 2.9 4 5 11 2030 2090 54 Papua New Guinea 2.1 23 2.0 4 5 9 2035 2125 55 Congo, Peoples Rep. 24 28 3.4 2 3 10 2040 2100 56 Morocco 25 3.0 2.8 27 36 81 2030 2090 57 Mongolia 2.9 2.9 24 2 3 5 2020 2080 58 Albania 2.8 2.5 1.9 3 4 6 2005 2060 59 Peru 28 2.6 23 22 27 49 2020 2080 60 Nigeria 25 2.5 34 119 169 528 2035 2105 61 Jamaica 1.4 1.5 20 3 3 5 2005 2065 62 Guatemala 3.0 30 2.6 10 12 24 2025 2085 63 Ivory Coast 3.7 50 2.9 11 15 47 2040 2110 64 Dominican Rep. 2.7 3.0 2.5 7 9 17 2015 2075 65 Colombia 3.0 2.3 2.0 33 39 60 2010 2070 66 Ecuador 3.0 3.0 2.7 11 14 27 2025 2085 42 Average annual growth of Projected Hypothetical Assumed population population size of year of Year, (percent) (millions) stationary reaching of reaching population reproduction stationary 1960-70 1970-80 1980-2000 1990 2000 (millions) rate of 1 population 67 Paraguay 2.5 3.2 2.4 4 5 9 2015 2075 68 Tunisia 1.9 2.1 19 8 10 18 2020 2080 69 Korea, Dem Rep. 29 2.6 22 23 28 45 2015 2075 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 32 3.6 3.0 12 16 33 2020 2080 71 Jordan 3.0 3.4 2.9 4 6 13 2025 2085 72 Lebanon 2.8 0.7 2.0 3 4 6 2010 2070 73 Turkey 25 24 2.0 56 67 108 2015 2075 74 Cuba 2.0 13 1.2 11 12 15 2000 2045 75 Korea, Rep. of 25 17 1.6 45 52 70 2005 2065 76 Malaysia 2.8 2.4 20 17 21 32 2005 2120 77 Cosla Rica 34 2.5 20 3 3 5 2005 2065 78 Panama 2.9 23 2.1 2 3 4 2010 2070 79 Algeria 2.4 3.2 2.9 26 34 79 2030 2090 80 Brazil 2.9 2.2 2.0 147 177 281 2015 2075 81 Mexico 33 3.1 2.5 92 115 203 2015 2075 82 Chile 21 17 1.4 13 15 19 2005 2070 83 Soulh Africa 2.6 27 2.9 39 52 118 2025 2090 84 Romania 10 0.9 07 24 25 29 2000 2075 85 Portugal -0.2 13 0.8 11 11 14 2000 2070 86 Argentina 1.4 1.6 1.1 31 34 43 2010 2075 87 Yugoslavia 10 0.9 0.7 24 26 29 2005 2065 88 Uruguay 11 0.3 1.0 3 4 4 2010 2075 89 Iran 29 3.1 2.3 51 61 119 2025 2080 90 Iraq 31 33 2.8 18 23 52 2030 2090 91 Venezuea 3.4 3.3 23 19 24 39 2010 2070 92 Hong Kong 2.6 2.5 12 6 6 7 2000 2030 93 Trinidad and Tobago 2.0 13 1.5 1 2 2 2000 2065 94 Greece 05 09 0.5 10 11 11 2000 2065 95 Singapore 24 15 13 3 3 4 2000 2030 96 Israel 34 26 15 5 5 7 2010 2080 High-income oil exporters 4.1 zo 5.0w 2.6w 191 231 97 Libya 3.8 4.1 2.8 4 5 12 2030 2090 98 Saudi Arabia 3.4 4.4 2.6 12 15 37 2035 2095 99 Kuwait 9.8 6.0 2.7 2 2 4 2015 2075 100 United Arab Emirates 10.8 13.2 1.7 1 1 2 2020 2080 Industrial market economies 1.0w 0.8w 0.5w 755 1 787 I 101 Ireland 04 1.1 10 4 4 5 2000 2060 102 Spain 1.1 1.0 07 41 43 50 2000 2065 103 Italy 0.6 0.6 0.3 59 61 63 2000 2030 104 New Zealand 1.7 1.5 0.9 4 4 5 2000 2070 105 United Kingdom 0.5 0.1 0.2 57 58 60 2000 2025 106 Finland 0.4 0.5 0.4 5 5 5 2000 2020 107 Australia 2.0 14 08 16 17 19 2000 2055 108 Japan 1.0 11 06 124 130 134 2000 2015 109 Canada 1.8 1.1 08 26 28 31 2000 2030 110 Austria 0.6 00 0.2 8 8 9 2000 2025 111 United States 1.3 1.0 0.7 245 259 284 2000 2030 112 Netherlands 1.3 0.8 05 15 16 16 2000 2025 113 France 1.0 05 04 56 56 61 2000 2030 114 Belgium 05 02 02 10 10 10 2000 2025 115 Norway 08 0.5 03 4 4 5 2000 2030 116 Denmark 0.7 04 0.2 5 5 5 2000 2020 117 Sweden 0.7 03 (.) 8 8 8 2000 2000 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 0.9 () 0.1 61 62 62 2000 2000 119 Switzerland 1.6 0.3 02 7 7 7 2000 2005 Nonmarket industrial economies 1.0w 0.8w 0.7w 383 1 409 I 120 Poland 1.0 0.9 0.7 39 42 47 2000 2060 121 Bulgaria 08 06 0.4 9 10 10 2000 2055 122 Hungary 0.4 0.4 0.2 11 11 12 2000 2030 123 USSR 1.2 0.9 08 291 312 353 2000 2060 124 Czechoslovakia 05 07 05 16 17 19 2000 2085 125 German Dem. Rep. -01 -0.1 02 17 17 18 2000 2015 TotaI' 5,025 6,098 a. For the assumptions used in the projections, see the technical notes b Excludes countries with populations of less than one million. 143 Table 18. Demographic and fertility-related indicators Crude Crude Percentage birth death change in: Percentage of rate per rate per married women thousand thousand Crude Crude Total using contra- population population birth death fertility ceptives rate rate rate 1960 1980 1960 1980 1g60b 1960_80b 1980 1970 1979 Low-income economies 43w 31 w 18w 12w 28.3w -36.0w 4,2w China and India 42w 27w 17w lOw 34.9w 39.6w 3.7w Other low-income 49 w 45 w 25 w 18 " 8.2 iv 28.2w 6.1 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem 45 19 2 Lao PDR 42 42 19 21 -10 8.9 61 3 Bhutan 43 39 26 19 98 -24.9 55 4 Chad 45 44 29 23 -24 19.6 59 5 Bangladesh 54 45 28 18 -153 -352 60 6 Ethiopia 51 49 28 24 -28 -148 67 7 Nepa 44 42 27 20 -3.4 -25.3 61 8 Somaia 47 46 28 20 -13 -271 6.1 9 Burma 43 37 21 14 -128 -357 53 10 Afghanistan 50 47 31 26 -65 160 6.6 11 Viet Nam 47 36 21 9 21 9 -594 5.2 12 Mali 50 50 27 21 08 -201 6.7 13 Burundi 47 46 27 22 -3.0 -169 6.4 14 Rwanda 51 53 27 20 41 -26.1 83 15 Upper Volta 49 48 27 24 -1 2 -9.7 6.5 16 Zaire 48 46 24 18 -46 -26.3 61 17 Malawi 53 56 27 22 5.8 -17.6 7.8 18 Mozambique 46 45 26 18 -2 0 -304 61 19 India 44 36 22 14 -185 376 49 12 23 20 Haiti 39 36 20 14 -85 -29.2 48 21 Sri Lanka 36 28 9 7 -227 -196 3.6 8 41 22 Sierra Leone 47 46 27 18 -30 -31 6 6.1 23 Tanzania 47 46 22 15 -06 -326 6.5 24 China 40 21 14 8 -474 -42.6 2.9 25 Guinea 47 46 30 20 -2.1 -34.0 62 26 Central African Rep 43 44 28 21 42 25.2 59 27 Pakistan 51 44 24 16 -15.0 -34.2 6.1 28 Uganda 45 45 20 14 -09 325 61 29 Benin 51 49 27 18 -3.8 -31.7 67 30 Niger 52 52 27 22 -06 -19.4 71 31 Madagascar 47 47 27 18 -0.2 -32.7 65 32 Sudan 47 47 25 19 0.9 -23.3 6.7 33 Togo 51 48 27 18 -5.5 -325 65 Middle-income economies 43 w 35 w 17w 11 w -18.3 w -36.4w 4.8w Oil exporters 47 ii' 40w 20w 12w 15.7w 39.4w 5.4w Oil importers 40 :v 31 iv 14iv 10w 20.9w 33.5w 4.3w 34 Ghana 49 48 24 17 -10 -310 6.7 2 4 35 Kenya 52 51 24 13 -0.8 -43.6 78 1 7 36 Lesotho 41 43 23 16 4.9 -31.2 5.8 37 Yemen. PDR 50 46 29 20 -85 -313 6.7 38 Indonesia 46 35 23 13 -227 -40.9 45 (.) 27 39 Yemen Arab Rep 50 47 29 23 -60 -211 65 40 Mauritania 51 50 27 22 -0.8 -20.7 69 41 Senega 48 48 27 21 -0.2 -19.6 6.5 42 Ango a 50 48 31 22 -4.0 -28.3 64 43 Liberia 50 49 21 14 2.6 34.0 69 44 Honduras 51 45 19 11 -11.5 -410 6.8 45 Zambia 51 49 24 17 -30 -324 6.9 46 Bolivia 46 43 22 16 73 26.7 6.1 47 Egypt 44 37 19 12 -15.9 -36.3 49 9 17 48 Zimbabwe 55 54 17 13 -22 -212 8.0 . 14 49 El Salvador 49 41 17 9 -166 -476 57 50 Cameroon 43 42 27 19 -1.4 -31.4 5.7 51 Thailand 44 30 15 8 -312 -470 40 8 39 52 Phil ppines 46 34 15 7 -25 1 -500 46 2 37 53 Nicaragua 51 45 19 12 -112 -386 63 54 Papua New Guinea 44 37 23 15 -164 -349 52 55 Congo, Peoples Rep 40 42 18 10 55 -42.9 60 56 Morocco 52 44 23 13 153 457 65 57 Mongolia 41 35 15 B -14.8 487 52 58 Albania 41 30 11 6 -27.7 -455 39 59 Peru 47 36 20 11 228 455 5.0 60 Nigeria 52 50 25 17 -44 32.8 6.9 61 Jamaica 39 29 10 6 -27.2 -32.6 3.9 62 Guatemala 48 40 19 11 -178 -43.2 5.4 63 Ivory Coasl 50 47 26 18 -73 -33.2 6.7 64 Dominican Rep 50 36 16 9 -282 -46.6 4.8 31 65 Colombia 46 30 14 8 -344 -41.9 3.8 46 66 Ecuador 47 40 17 10 -139 -410 60 144 Crude Crude Percentage birth death change in: Percentage of rate per rate per married women thousand thousand Crude Crude Total using contra- birth death fertility population population ceptives' rate rate rate 19600 1980 19600 1980 1g60b 1960b 1980 1970 1979 67 Paraguay 43 36 13 7 -17.2 -42.5 4.9 . 16 68 Tunisia 49 35 21 9 -286 -562 5.4 10 21 69 Korea, Dem Rep. 42 31 13 7 -25.7 -48.4 4.3 . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 47 45 18 8 -5.1 -53.1 7.0 . . (.) 71 Jordan 47 44 20 10 -6.3 -51.3 6.9 . 72 Lebanon 43 30 14 8 -306 -420 4.1 73 Turkey 43 32 16 10 -24.5 -38.5 44 3 74 Cuba 32 18 9 6 -438 -337 22 75 Korea, Rep of 43 24 13 7 -44.0 -47.0 3.0 32 49 76 Malaysia 45 31 16 7 -30.6 -52.9 4.2 7 36 77 Costa Rica 47 29 10 5 -37.6 -42.5 3.4 . . 64 78 Panama 41 31 10 6 -252 -44.1 39 . 79 Algeria 50 46 23 13 -93 -41.5 6.9 . . 80 Brazil 43 30 13 9 -30.8 -33.6 4.1 . 81 Mexico 45 37 12 7 -18.1 -368 5.1 . . 40 82 Chile 37 22 12 7 -407 -42 7 2.8 83 South Africa 39 38 15 10 -2.8 -34.0 51 . 84 Romania 20 18 9 10 -8.1 33 25 85 Portugal 24 18 8 10 -24.5 28.0 2.4 . . S 86 Argentina 24 21 9 8 -12.7 -2.3 2.8 87 Yugoslavia 24 17 10 9 -27.7 -10.0 2.2 59 88 Uruguay 22 20 9 10 -16.2 14.0 2.8 . 89 Iran 46 41 17 11 -10.8 -374 5.8 3 23 90 Iraq 49 45 20 12 -91 -387 6.6 . 23 91 Venezuela 46 35 11 6 -22.3 -46.4 4.5 92 Hong Kong 35 17 8 5 -51.3 -329 2.2 50 79 93 Trinidad and Tobago 38 23 9 5 -33.2 -29.4 2.6 44 94 Greece 19 16 8 10 -166 316 2.3 95 Singapore 38 17 8 5 -54.2 -342 1.8 45 71 96 Israel 27 24 6 7 -97 14.8 3.4 High-income oil exporters 49w 42w 21 a' 12w -12.9 a' 43.8w 6.8w 97 Libya 49 45 19 12 -8.2 -38.3 7.0 98 Saudi Arabia 49 44 23 14 -110 -40 6.9 99 Kuwait 44 39 10 5 -11.3 -53.1 6.1 100 United Arab Emirates 46 28 19 7 -37.9 -62.1 64 Industrial market economies 20w 15w lOw 9w -27.9w -4.1 w 1.9w 101 Ireland 22 22 12 10 -2.8 -17.6 3.3 102 Spain 21 15 9 8 -294 -15.4 2.5 . 103 Italy 18 14 10 10 -26.6 52 1.9 104 New Zealand 26 18 9 8 -310 -122 2.2 105 United Kingdom 17 14 12 12 -220 0.0 18 72 106 Finland 19 14 9 9 -27.4 3,3 1.7 77 107 Australia 22 17 9 8 -25.1 -11.4 2.1 66 108 Japan 18 14 8 6 -226 -17.3 1.8 109 Canada 27 17 8 7 -37.2 -5.1 1.9 110 Austria 18 12 13 13 -305 08 1.7 . 111 United States 24 16 9 9 -33.3 -7.4 1.9 65 112 Netherlands 21 13 8 8 -39.3 5.2 1.6 59 113 France 18 14 12 11 -22.5 -6.1 1.9 64 79 114 Belgium 17 13 12 12 -257 -41 1.8 115 Norway 18 13 9 10 -29.8 8.7 1.9 116 Denmark 17 13 9 11 -24.3 149 1.8 67 117 Sweden 15 12 10 11 -19.3 12.2 1.7 . 118 Germany, Fed Rep. 17 11 11 12 -38.7 9.7 1.5 119 Switzerland 18 12 10 9 -35.6 -4.1 16 Nonmarket industrial economies 23w 18w 8w 11w -20.5 a' -29.6w 2.3 w 120 Poland 24 20 8 10 -17.7 18.1 2.3 121 Bulgaria 18 16 9 10 -11.8 16.3 2.2 122 Hungary 16 15 10 12 -25 167 2.1 73 123 USSR 24 18 8 10 -23.1 38.7 2.3 124 Czechoslovakia 17 18 10 11 06 13.5 2.3 66 125 German Oem. Rep. 17 14 13 13 -19.0 0.0 18 a Figures in italics are for 1957, not 1960 b Figures in italics are for 1957-80, not 1960-80. c Figures in italics are for years other than those specified See the technical notes. 145 Table 19. Labor force Percentage of population of Percentage of labor force in: Average annual growth working age of labor force (15-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services (percent) 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-80 1980-2000 Low-income economies 54w 59w 77w 71 w 10w 15w 14w 15w 1.6w 2.2w 1.9w China and India . . 61 w . 7011' . . 1611' . 14w . . 2.1 w 1.7w Other low-income 54 u' 53w 81 u' 73 w 8w 11 w 12w 19 u' 1.8 w 2.3w 2.7 u' 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 53 . . 82 4 . . 14 . . 2.1 . 2 Lao PDR 56 51 83 75 4 6 13 19 1.4 0.3 2.0 3 Bhutan 56 55 95 93 2 2 3 5 1.7 2.0 1.9 4 Chad 57 54 95 85 2 7 3 8 1.5 2.0 2.3 5 Bangladesh 53 55 87 74 3 11 10 15 2.1 2.4 2.7 6 Ethiopia 54 52 88 80 5 7 7 13 20 1.8 2.2 7 Nepal 57 55 95 93 2 2 3 5 1.5 2.0 2.1 8 Somalia 54 54 88 82 4 8 8 10 1.7 2.3 2.4 9 Burma 59 55 . . 67 10 . . 23 1.1 1.5 2.0 10 Afghanistan 55 52 85 79 6 8 9 13 2.0 1.8 2.5 11 Viel Nam . 54 . . 71 . 10 14 19 . . 1.9 2.6 12 Mali 54 52 94 73 3 12 3 15 2.0 2.2 2.5 13 Burundi 55 53 90 84 3 5 7 11 1.2 1.6 2.3 14 Rwanda 53 51 95 91 1 2 4 7 24 2.5 2.8 15 Upper Volta 54 53 92 82 5 13 3 5 1.2 1.4 2.3 16 Zaire 53 53 83 75 9 13 8 12 1.4 2.1 2.4 17 Malawi 52 49 92 86 3 5 5 9 2.3 2.4 2.8 18 Mozambique 56 53 81 66 8 18 11 16 19 1.7 2.2 19 India 55 57 74 69 11 13 15 18 1.5 1.7 2.0 20 Haiti 55 53 80 74 6 7 14 19 0.7 1.4 2.4 21 Sri Lanka 54 60 56 54 14 14 30 32 2.1 2.1 2.1 22 Sierra Leone 55 53 78 65 12 19 10 16 1.5 1.8 2.3 23 Tanzania 54 51 89 83 4 6 7 11 2.1 2.3 2.7 24 China . 64 . . 71 . . 17 . . 12 1.9 1.4 25 Guinea 55 53 88 82 6 11 6 7 2.5 2.2 2.1 26 Central African Rep 58 55 94 88 2 4 4 8 17 1,6 2.3 27 Pakistan 52 51 61 57 18 20 21 23 1.9 2.5 2.9 28 Uganda 54 52 89 83 4 6 7 11 3.3 2.5 2.5 29 Benin 53 51 54 46 9 16 37 38 2.1 2.2 2.1 30 Niger 53 51 95 91 1 3 4 6 3.0 2.6 2.9 31 Madagascar 55 53 93 90 2 3 5 7 1.7 2.0 2.3 32 Sudan 53 53 86 72 6 10 8 18 2.2 2.3 2.7 33 Togo 53 51 80 67 8 15 12 18 2.2 2.1 2.6 Middle-income economies 55 w 55 w 61 w 44 u' 15 11' 22 u' 24 w 34 w 2.0 w 2.3 w 2.6 w Oil exporters 54w 54w 65w 47 w 13 u' 21 w 22w 32w 2.0w 2.5w 2.9w Oil importers 5611 57w 59w 42w 16 w 22w 25w 36w 2.011' 2.2w 2.4w 34 Ghana 53 51 64 53 14 20 22 27 1.6 2.4 2.9 35 Kenya 50 48 86 78 5 10 9 12 27 28 3.3 36 Lesotho 57 55 93 87 2 4 5 9 1.6 1.9 2.1 37 Yemen, PDR 52 51 70 45 15 15 15 40 1.4 1.3 2.8 38 Indonesia 56 57 75 58 8 12 17 30 17 2.1 1.8 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 54 52 83 75 7 11 10 14 1.1 1.4 2.3 40 Mauritania 53 52 91 85 3 5 6 10 2.2 2.3 2.7 41 Senegal 54 53 84 76 5 10 11 14 1.9 1.9 2.2 42 Angola 55 53 69 59 12 16 19 25 10 1.9 2.4 43 Liberia 52 50 80 70 10 14 10 16 24 2.6 2.9 44 Honduras 52 50 70 63 11 15 19 22 2.5 3.0 3.3 45 Zambia 53 50 79 67 7 11 14 22 2.3 2.4 2.8 46 Bolivia 55 53 61 50 18 24 21 26 1.7 2.4 2.9 47 Egypt 55 57 58 50 12 30 30 20 19 2.2 2.3 48 Zimbabwe 52 50 69 60 11 15 20 25 3.2 26 3.0 49 El Salvador 52 51 62 50 17 22 21 27 2.6 2.8 3.3 50 Cameroon 57 54 87 83 5 7 8 10 13 1.3 1.7 51 Thailand 53 55 84 76 4 9 12 15 2.0 2.9 2.3 52 Philippines 52 53 61 46 15 17 24 37 2.2 2.4 2.7 53 Nicaragua 50 50 62 39 16 14 22 47 2.6 3.3 3.6 54 Papua New Guinea 57 55 89 82 4 8 7 10 1.6 1.9 2.0 55 Congo, People's Rep. 56 53 52 34 17 26 31 40 1.5 2.0 2.7 56 Morocco 53 51 62 52 14 21 24 27 1.6 2.9 3.3 57 Mongolia 54 53 70 55 13 22 17 23 2.1 2.4 2.7 58 Albania 54 57 71 61 18 25 11 14 23 2.7 2.4 59 Peru 52 54 52 40 20 19 28 41 2.0 3.0 3.1 60 Nigeria 52 50 71 54 10 19 19 27 1.8 2.0 2.9 61 Jamaica 54 53 39 21 25 25 36 54 04 2.4 3.3 62 Guatemala 51 54 67 55 14 21 19 24 2.5 3.0 2.8 63 Ivory Coast 54 53 89 79 2 4 9 17 3.6 4.5 2.4 64 Dominican Rep. 49 52 67 49 12 18 21 33 2.3 3.4 3.3 65 Colombia 50 60 51 26 19 21 30 53 3.0 3.2 2.6 66 Ecuador 52 52 58 52 19 17 23 31 3.0 3.2 3.2 146 Percentage of population of Percentage of labor force in: Average annual growth working age of labor force (15-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services (percent) 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-80 1980-2000 67 Paraguay 51 52 56 49 19 19 25 32 2.4 31 3.4 68 Tunisia 53 55 56 34 18 33 26 33 0.7 2.9 2.6 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. 53 56 62 49 23 33 15 18 23 29 2.7 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 52 48 54 33 19 31 27 36 2.1 2.9 3.5 71 Jordan 52 51 44 20 26 20 30 60 2.8 2.9 3.2 72 Lebanon 53 55 38 11 23 27 39 62 2.1 30 2.8 73 Turkey 55 56 78 54 11 13 11 33 1.4 2.2 2.1 74 Cuba 61 60 39 23 22 31 39 46 0.8 2.0 20 75 Korea, Rep. of 54 62 66 34 9 29 25 37 3.0 2.8 2.0 76 Malaysia 51 56 63 50 12 16 25 34 2.8 3.0 2.8 77 Costa Rica 50 58 51 29 19 23 30 48 3.5 36 2.7 78 Panama 52 56 51 27 14 18 35 55 3.4 2.8 2.6 79 Algeria 52 49 67 25 12 25 21 50 1.0 35 3.5 80 Brazil 54 57 52 30 15 24 33 46 2.5 39 2.5 81 Mexico 51 51 55 36 20 26 25 38 2.8 3.3 35 82 Chile 57 62 30 19 20 19 50 62 1.4 2.6 2.1 83 South Africa 55 54 32 30 30 29 38 41 3.2 2.6 3.0 84 Romania 64 64 65 29 15 36 20 35 0.9 0.6 0.7 85 Portugal 63 63 44 24 29 36 27 40 (.) 0.8 0.9 86 Argentina 64 63 20 13 36 28 44 59 13 1.2 1.2 87 Yugoslavia 63 67 63 29 18 35 19 36 0.6 1.1 0.7 88 Uruguay 64 63 21 11 29 32 50 57 0.9 0.2 1.1 89 Iran 51 52 54 39 23 34 23 27 2.5 26 2.9 90 Iraq 51 51 53 42 18 26 29 32 29 2.9 3.2 91 Venezuela 51 55 35 18 22 27 43 55 28 3.9 3.2 92 Hong King 56 66 8 3 52 57 40 40 3.2 3.0 1.3 93 Trinidad and Tobago 53 62 22 16 34 36 44 48 2.4 2.6 2.2 94 Greece 65 64 56 37 20 28 24 35 (.) 0.6 0.5 95 Singapore 55 66 8 2 23 39 69 59 2.8 2.7 1.4 96 Israel 59 59 14 7 35 36 51 57 3.6 2.4 2.1 High-income oil exporters 54w 52w 63w 46w 13w 19w 24w 35w 2.4w 3.5w 3.6w 97 Libya 53 51 53 19 17 28 30 53 3.6 3.5 3.0 98 Saudi Arabia 54 52 71 61 10 14 19 25 3.1 3.5 2.7 99 Kuwait 63 52 1 2 34 34 65 64 7.5 4.1 3.1 100 United Arab Emirates 53 . . . . , . , . . . . , Industrial market economies 63 u' 66 w 18 to 6 u' 38 w 38 u' 44 w 56w 1.2 to 1.3 w 0.7w 101 Ireland 58 58 36 19 25 37 39 44 (.) 1.0 1.6 102 Spain 64 63 42 15 31 40 27 45 02 1.2 0.9 103 Italy 66 65 31 11 40 45 29 44 -0.1 0.7 0.4 104 New Zealand 59 63 15 9 37 35 48 56 2.2 2.1 12 105 United Kingdom 65 64 4 2 48 42 48 56 0.6 03 0.4 106 Finland 62 68 36 11 31 35 33 54 0.4 0.1 0.4 107 Australia 61 65 11 6 40 33 49 61 2.6 18 0.9 108 Japan 64 68 33 12 30 39 37 49 19 13 07 109 Canada 59 67 13 5 35 29 52 66 2.6 2.0 0.9 110 Austria 66 64 24 9 46 37 30 54 0.6 0.8 0.4 111 United States 60 66 7 2 36 32 57 66 18 1.5 0.9 112 Netherlands 61 66 11 6 42 45 47 49 16 1.3 0.5 113 France 62 64 22 8 39 39 39 53 0.6 1.1 0.6 114 Belgium 65 65 8 3 48 41 44 56 0.3 0.7 0.3 115 Norway 63 63 20 7 37 37 43 56 05 0.7 0.6 116 Denmark 64 65 18 7 37 35 45 58 1.1 0.6 0.4 117 Sweden 66 64 14 5 45 34 41 61 10 0.3 0.2 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 68 66 14 4 48 46 38 50 0.2 0.7 (.) 119 Switzerland 66 67 11 5 50 46 39 49 20 0.4 0.2 Nonmarket industrial economies 63w 66 to 41 to 16 to 31 to 45 to 28w 39 to 0.7 to 1.2 to 0.6w 120 Poland 61 66 48 31 29 39 23 30 1.8 14 0.8 121 Bulgaria 66 66 57 37 25 39 18 24 0.7 03 03 122 Hungary 66 66 38 15 35 53 27 32 0.5 04 0.2 123 USSR 63 66 42 14 29 45 29 41 07 1.2 07 124 Czechoslovakia 64 64 26 11 46 48 28 41 0.9 0.8 0.7 125 German Dem. Rep. 65 64 18 10 48 50 34 40 -02 0.5 0.3 147 Table 20. Urbanization Percentage of urban population Urban population Number of In cities cities As percentage Average annual In of over of over of total growth rate largest 500000 500,000 population (percent) city persons persons 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-80 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 Low-Income economies 13w 17w 3.8 w 4.1 w 10 w 12w 31w 41w 55 135 China and India 13w 17w 3.3 w 3.3w 7w 6w 33 w 42 w 49 106 Other low-income 11w 19w 5.0 w 5.40' 25w 28 w 19w 40 w 6t 29 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 11 3.5 . . . . . . . 2 Lao PDR 8 14 3.8 5.2 69 48 0 0 0 0 3 Bhutan 3 4 4.0 4.4 . . 0 0 0 0 4 Chad 7 18 67 6.5 . . 39 0 0 0 0 5 Bangladesh 5 11 6.3 6.5 20 30 20 51 1 3 6 Ethiopia 6 14 6.5 5.4 30 37 0 37 0 1 7 Nepal 3 5 4.2 4.9 41 27 0 0 0 0 8 Somalia 17 30 5.3 5.0 . . 34 0 0 0 0 9 Burma 19 27 4.0 4.2 23 23 23 23 1 2 10 Afghanistan 8 15 5.4 5.8 33 17 0 17 0 1 11 Viet Nam 15 19 5.3 3.3 32 21 32 50 1 4 12 Mali 11 20 5.4 5.6 32 34 0 0 0 0 13 Burundi 2 2 1.6 2.5 . . . 0 0 0 0 14 Rwanda 2 4 5.4 6.3 . . . 0 0 0 0 15 Upper Volta 5 10 5.7 5.9 . . 41 0 0 0 0 16 Zaire 16 34 5.2 7.2 14 28 14 38 1 2 17 Malawi 4 10 6.6 7.0 . . 19 0 0 0 0 18 Mozambique 4 9 6.5 8.3 75 83 0 83 0 1 19 India 18 22 3.3 3.3 7 6 26 39 11 36 20 Haiti 16 28 4.0 4.9 42 56 0 56 0 1 21 Sri Lanka 18 27 4.3 3.6 28 16 0 16 0 1 22 Sierra Leone 13 22 55 4.3 37 47 0 0 0 0 23 Tanzania 5 12 6.3 8.7 34 50 0 50 0 1 24 China . . 13 . . . . 6 6 42 45 38 70 25 Guinea 10 19 6.2 6.1 37 80 0 80 0 1 26 Central African Rep. 23 41 5.1 4.8 40 36 0 0 0 0 27 Pakistan 22 28 4.0 4.3 20 21 33 51 2 7 28 Uganda 5 9 7.1 3.4 38 52 0 52 0 1 29 Benin 10 14 5,3 3.7 . . 63 0 63 0 1 30 Niger 6 13 7.0 6.8 . . 31 0 0 0 0 31 Madagascar 11 18 5.4 4.3 44 36 0 36 0 1 32 Sudan 10 25 6.7 7.1 30 31 0 31 0 1 33 Togo 10 20 5.6 6.7 . . 60 0 0 0 0 Middle-income economies 33 ?' 45 w 4.3 w 4.0w 28 w 29 w 35 w 48 w 55 131 Oil exporters 27 w 39 w 4.5 w 4.4 w 27 w 30 w 32 w 48 w 17 51 Oil importers 37 w 50 w 4.2 w 3.8 w 28 w 28 w 36 w 48 w 38 80 34 Ghana 23 36 4.6 5.1 25 35 0 48 0 2 35 Kenya 7 14 6.4 6.8 40 57 0 57 0 1 36 Lesotho 2 12 7.5 17.0 . . . . 0 0 0 0 37 Yemen, PDR 28 37 3.5 3.8 61 49 0 0 0 0 38 Indonesia 15 20 3.6 4.0 20 23 34 50 3 9 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 3 10 8.0 8.3 . . 25 0 0 0 0 40 Mauritania 3 23 15.8 8.4 . 39 0 0 0 0 41 Senegal 23 25 3.7 3.5 53 65 0 65 0 1 42 Angola 10 21 5.1 5.7 44 64 0 64 0 1 43 Liberia 20 33 5.6 5.7 . . . . 0 0 0 0 44 Honduras 23 36 5.4 5.5 31 33 0 0 0 0 45 Zambia 23 43 5.4 6.7 . . 35 0 35 0 1 46 Bolivia 24 33 3.9 4.1 47 44 0 44 0 1 47 Egypt 38 45 3.3 2.8 38 39 53 53 2 2 48 Zimbabwe 13 23 6.8 6.4 40 50 0 50 0 1 49 El Salvador 38 41 3.2 3.3 26 22 0 0 0 0 50 Cameroon 14 35 5.6 7.5 26 21 0 21 0 1 51 Thailand 13 14 3.5 3.4 65 69 65 69 1 1 52 Philippines 30 36 3.8 3.6 27 30 27 34 1 2 53 Nicaragua 41 53 40 4.7 41 47 0 47 0 1 54 Papua New Guinea 3 18 15.1 8.3 . 25 0 0 0 0 55 Congo, People's Rep. 30 45 5.0 4.5 77 56 0 0 0 0 56 Morocco 29 41 4.2 4.6 16 26 16 50 1 4 57 Mongolia 36 51 5.2 4.1 53 52 0 0 0 0 58 Albania 31 37 3.7 3.4 27 25 0 0 0 0 59 Peru 46 67 4.9 4.2 38 39 38 44 1 2 60 Nigeria 13 20 4.7 4.7 13 17 22 58 2 9 61 Jamaica 34 41 2.4 2.5 77 66 0 66 0 1 62 Guatemala 33 39 3.8 3.9 41 36 41 36 1 1 63 Ivory Coast 19 40 7.3 8.6 27 34 0 34 0 1 64 Dominican Rep. 30 51 5,6 5.4 50 54 0 54 0 1 65 Colombia 48 70 5.2 3.9 17 26 28 51 3 4 66 Ecuador 34 45 4.4 4.2 31 29 0 51 0 2 148 Percentage of urban population Urban population Number of In cities cities As percentage Average annual In of over of over of total growth rate largest 500000 500000 population (percent) city persons persons 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-80 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 67 Paraguay 36 39 2.9 3.8 44 44 0 44 0 1 68 Tunisia 36 52 38 3.9 40 30 40 30 1 1 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. 40 60 51 44 15 12 15 19 1 2 70 Syrian Arab Rep 37 50 48 5.1 35 33 35 55 1 2 71 Jordan 43 56 45 4.7 31 37 0 37 0 1 72 Lebanon 44 76 62 2.8 64 79 64 79 1 1 73 Turkey 30 47 5.1 4,5 18 24 32 42 3 4 74 Cuba 55 65 2.9 2.1 38 32 38 32 1 1 75 Korea, Rep. of 28 55 6.4 4.7 35 41 61 77 3 7 76 Malaysia 25 29 3.5 3.3 19 27 0 27 0 1 77 Costa Rica 37 43 4.2 3.3 67 64 0 64 0 1 78 Panama 41 54 44 36 61 66 0 66 0 1 79 Algeria 30 44 3.5 5.7 27 12 27 12 1 1 80 Brazil 46 68 4.8 41 14 16 35 52 6 14 81 Mexico 51 67 4.8 43 28 32 36 48 3 7 82 Chile 68 80 3.1 2.3 38 44 38 44 1 1 83 South Africa 47 50 28 3.1 16 13 44 53 4 7 84 Romania 32 50 3.4 2.9 22 17 22 17 1 1 85 Portugal 23 31 1.3 2.9 47 44 47 44 1 1 86 Argentina 74 82 20 2.1 46 45 54 60 3 5 87 Yugoslavia 28 42 32 2.9 11 10 11 23 1 3 88 Uruguay 80 84 1.3 06 56 52 56 52 1 1 89 Iran 34 50 4.9 50 26 28 26 47 1 6 90 Iraq 43 72 6.2 5.4 35 55 35 70 1 3 91 Venezuela 67 83 47 4.2 26 26 26 44 1 4 92 Hong Kong 89 90 2.6 25 100 100 100 100 1 1 93 Trinidad and Tobago 22 21 1.7 1.2 . . . 0 0 0 0 94 Greece 43 62 2.6 2.6 51 57 51 70 1 2 95 Singapore 100 100 24 15 100 100 100 100 1 1 96 Israel 77 89 4.3 3.2 46 35 46 35 1 1 High-income oil exporters 30 w 66 ZL' 9.1 w 8.5 w 29 w 28 w 0w 34 w 0t 3 97 Libya 23 52 8.0 83 57 64 0 64 0 1 98 Saudi Arabia 30 67 8.4 7.6 15 18 0 33 0 2 99 Kuwait 72 88 10.4 74 75 30 0 0 0 0 100 United Arab Emirates 40 72 14.4 15.5 . . . . . . , . , Industrial market economies 68 o' 78 w 1.8 u' 1.4 u' 18 w 18 w 48 w 55 w 104 1 152 101 Ireland 46 58 16 22 51 48 51 48 1 1 102 Spain 57 74 2.6 2.2 13 17 37 44 5 6 103 Italy 59 69 1.5 1.3 13 17 46 52 7 9 104 New Zealand 76 85 2.4 1.9 25 30 0 30 0 1 105 United Kingdom 86 91 0.9 0.3 24 20 61 55 15 17 106 Finland 38 62 3.2 27 28 27 0 27 0 1 107 Australia 81 89 2.5 19 26 24 62 68 4 5 108 Japan 62 78 2.4 21 18 22 35 42 5 9 109 Canada 69 80 2.7 1.7 14 18 31 62 2 9 110 Austria 50 54 0.9 0.5 51 39 51 39 1 1 111 United States 70 77 1.8 15 13 12 61 77 40 65 112 Netherlands 80 76 1.0 06 9 9 27 24 3 3 113 France 62 78 2.4 1.4 25 23 34 34 4 6 114 Belgium 66 72 1.2 0.4 17 14 28 24 2 2 115 Norway 32 53 35 2.8 50 32 50 32 1 1 116 Denmark 74 84 1.5 0.9 40 32 40 32 1 1 117 Sweden 73 87 1,8 1.0 15 15 15 35 1 3 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 77 85 14 0.4 20 18 48 45 11 11 119 Switzerland 51 58 2.2 1.0 19 22 19 22 1 1 Nonmarket industrial economies 49 u' 62 U 2.4 w 1.8 u' 9w 7w 23 w 32 w 35 I 64 120 Poland 48 57 1.8 17 17 15 41 47 5 8 121 Bulgaria 39 64 3.8 26 23 18 23 18 1 1 122 Hungary 40 54 1.7 2.1 45 37 45 37 1 1 123 USSR 49 62 2.7 1.8 6 4 21 33 25 50 124 Czechoslovakia 47 63 2.1 2.0 17 12 17 12 1 1 125 German Oem Rep. 72 77 0.1 0.3 9 9 14 17 2 3 149 Table 21. Indicators related to life expectancy Life expectancy Infant at birth mortality rate Child death rate (years) (aged 0-1) (aged 1-4) 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 Low-income economies 42w 57w 165w 94w 28 w 12 w China and India 59 w 84w 10 w Other low-income 40w 48w 164w 130w w 22 w 1 Kampuchea, Oem. 46 .. 146 22 2 Lao PDR 44 43 155 129 24 19 3 Bhutan 38 44 195 150 33 23 4 Chad 35 41 195 149 46 32 5 Bangladesh 37 46 159 136 25 20 6 Ethiopia 36 40 175 146 40 32 7 Nepal 38 44 195 150 33 23 8 Somalia 36 44 175 146 40 32 9 Burma 44 54 158 101 25 13 10 Afghanistan 33 37 233 205 41 35 11 Viet Nam 43 63 157 62 25 6 12 Mali 37 43 195 154 46 34 13 Burundi 37 42 150 122 33 25 14 Rwanda 37 45 147 137 32 29 15 Upper Volta 36 39 252 211 63 51 16 Zaire 40 47 150 112 33 22 17 Malawi 37 44 207 172 49 39 18 Mozambique 37 47 160 115 36 23 19 India 43 52 165 123 26 17 20 Haiti 44 53 182 115 47 18 21 Sri Lanka 62 66 71 44 7 3 22 Sierra Leone 37 47 234 208 57 50 23 Tanzania 42 52 152 103 33 19 24China .. 64 56 .. 5 25 Guinea 35 45 208 165 50 37 26 Central African Rep. 36 44 195 149 46 32 27 Pakistan 43 50 162 126 25 18 28 Uganda 44 54 139 97 29 18 29 Benin 37 47 206 154 49 34 30 Niger 37 43 191 146 45 31 31 Madagascar 37 47 109 71 21 11 32 Sudan 40 46 168 124 40 22 33 Togo 37 47 182 109 42 21 Middle-income economies 51 ci 60 w 125 w 80 a' 23 a' 11w Oil exporters 46 w 56 w 145 w 94 w 27 w 14w Oil importers 54 w 63 w 111 a' 69 a' 19 a' 911' 34 Ghana 40 49 143 103 31 19 35 Kenya 41 55 138 87 29 15 36 Lesotho 42 51 144 115 31 23 37 Yemen, PDR 36 45 209 146 59 31 38 Indonesia 41 53 150 93 23 11 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 36 42 212 190 60 50 40 Mauritania 37 43 185 143 43 31 41 Senegal 37 43 182 147 42 32 42 Angola 33 42 208 154 50 34 43 Liberia 44 54 194 154 46 34 44 Honduras 46 58 145 88 30 10 45 Zambia 40 49 151 106 33 20 46 Bolivia 43 50 167 131 40 25 47 Egypt 46 57 128 103 34 14 48 Zimbabwe 49 55 118 74 23 12 49 El Salvador 51 63 136 78 26 7 50 Cameroon 37 47 162 109 36 21 51 Thailand 52 63 103 55 13 4 52 Philippines 53 64 106 55 14 4 53 Nicaragua 47 56 144 91 30 10 54 Papua New Guinea 41 51 165 105 26 14 55 Congo, People's Rep. 48 59 171 129 39 27 56 Morocco 47 56 161 107 37 15 57 Mongolia 52 64 109 55 14 4 58 Albania 62 70 83 48 10 4 59 Peru 47 58 163 88 38 9 60 Nigeria 39 49 183 135 42 28 61 Jamaica 64 71 52 16 3 (.) 62 Guatemala 47 59 92 70 10 6 63 Ivory Coast 37 47 173 127 39 26 64 Oominican Rep. 51 61 119 68 20 6 65 Colombia 53 63 93 56 11 4 66 Ecuador 51 61 140 82 28 8 150 Life expectancy Infant at birth mortality rate Child death rate (years) (aged 0-1) (aged 1-4) 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 67 Paraguay 56 65 86 47 9 3 68 Tunisia 48 60 159 90 36 10 69 Korea, Oem. Rep. 54 65 78 34 9 2 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 50 65 132 62 25 5 71 Jordan 47 61 136 69 26 6 72 Lebanon 58 66 68 41 5 2 73 Turkey 51 62 190 123 50 21 74 Cuba 63 73 66 21 5 1 75 Korea, Rep. of 54 65 78 34 9 2 76 Malaysia 53 64 72 31 7 2 77 Costa Rica 62 70 71 24 6 1 78 Panama 62 70 68 22 5 1 79 Algeria 47 56 165 118 39 19 80 Brazil 55 63 118 77 19 7 81 Mexico 58 65 91 56 10 4 82 Chile 57 67 114 43 18 2 83 South Africa 53 61 135 96 28 18 84 Romania 65 71 69 29 7 2 85 Portugal 63 71 81 35 9 2 86 Argentina 65 70 61 45 4 2 87 Yugoslavia 63 70 92 33 11 2 88 Uruguay 68 71 50 40 3 2 89 Iran 50 59 163 108 26 14 90 Iraq 46 56 139 78 28 7 91 Venezuela 57 67 85 42 9 2 92 Hong Kong 67 74 42 13 3 (.) 93 Trinidad and Tobago 64 72 45 24 2 1 94 Greece 69 74 40 19 3 1 95 Singapore 64 72 36 12 2 1 96 Israel 69 72 32 14 1 (.) High-income oil exporters 45w 57w 173w 99w 43w 14w 97 Libya 47 56 158 100 36 13 98 Saudi Arabia 43 54 185 114 48 18 99 Kuwait 60 70 89 34 10 1 100 United Arab Emirates 47 63 135 53 26 3 Industrial market economies 70 w 74 w 30 w 11 w 2w 1w 101 Ireland 70 73 29 2 2 (.) 102 Spain 69 73 46 1 3 (.) 103 Italy 69 73 44 4 3 1 104 New Zealand 72 73 23 3 1 1 105 United Kingdom 71 73 23 2 1 1 106 Finland 68 73 21 8 1 (.) 107 Australia 71 74 20 1 1 (.) 108 Japan 68 76 31 7 2 (.) 109 Canada 71 74 27 1 1 (.) 110 Austria 69 72 38 4 2 1 111 United States 70 74 26 13 1 1 112 Netherlands 73 75 18 9 1 (.) 113 France 70 74 27 10 1 (.) 114 Belgium 70 73 31 11 2 (.) 115 Norway 73 75 19 9 1 (.) 116 Denmark 72 75 22 9 1 (.) 117 Sweden 73 75 17 7 1 (.) 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 70 73 34 14 2 1 119 Switzerland 71 75 21 9 1 (.) Nonmarket industrial economies 68w 71 w 36 w 25 w 2 U' 1 u' 120 Poland 67 72 56 21 2 1 121 Bulgaria 68 73 45 20 3 1 122 Hungary 68 71 48 23 4 1 123 USSR 68 71 35 27 2 1 124 Czechoslovakia 70 71 24 17 1 1 125 German Dem. Rep. 69 72 39 12 3 (.) 151 Table 22. Health-related indicators Daily per capita Percentage of calorie supply Population per: population with Physiciana Nursing persona access to safe As percentage watera Total of requirement 1960 1977 1960 1977 1975 1977 1977 Low-income economies 8,960w 5,810w 6,650 w 4,840w 31w 2,238 w 97 w China and India 3,730 w 2,130 w 6,040w 2,610w 2,270 w 97 w Other low-income 34,880w 19,460w 9,850w 13,200w 29 w 2,113w 94 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 35,440 4,010 1,926 78 2 Lao PDR 53,520 20,060 4,950 3,040 2,082 94 3 Bhutan 2,028 90 4 Chad 72,190 41,940 5,780 3,820 26 1,762 72 5 Bangladesh 12,690 40,490 53 6 Ethiopia 100,470 74,910 14,920 5,320 6 1,754 78 7 Nepal 73,800 35,900 . 13,510 9 2,002 89 8 Somalia 36,570 18,480 4,810 . . 33 2,033 88 9 Burma 15,560 5,260 8,550 4,400 17 2,286 103 10 Afghanistan 28,700 20,550 19,590 25,920 6 2,695 107 11 Viet Nam . 5,620 . . 2,470 1,801 96 12 Mali 67,050 25,560 4,920 2,380 9 2,117 83 13 Burundi 96,570 45,020 4,530 6,180 . . 2,254 99 14 Rwanda 143,290 38,790 11,620 10,460 35 2,264 94 15 Upper Volta 81,650 50,000 4,090 3,650 25 1,875 93 16 Zaire 37,620 15,530 3,510 1,620 16 2,271 102 17 Malawi 35,250 41,010 12,920 3,830 33 2,066 97 18 Mozambique 20,390 35,820 4,720 4,290 1,906 78 19 India 4,850 3,630 10,980 5,700 33 2,021 89 20 Haiti 9,230 5,940 4,020 2,940 14 2,100 92 21 Sri Lanka 4,490 6,700 4,170 2,040 20 2,126 97 22 Sierra Leone 20,420 . 2,960 . . . 2,150 85 23 Tanzania 18,220 17,550 11,890 2,390 39 2,063 87 24 China 3,010 1,100 2,850 480 . . 2,441 103 25 Guinea 26,900 16,630 3,260 2,490 10 1,943 78 26 Central African Rep. 49,610 20,280 3,280 1,540 16 2,242 92 27 Pakistan 5,400 3,780 16,960 10,030 29 2,281 99 28 Uganda 15,050 26,810 10,030 4,180 35 2,110 93 29 Benin 23,030 26,570 2,690 2,360 21 2,249 100 30 Niger 82,170 42,720 8,460 2,380 27 2,139 91 31 Madagascar 8,900 10,240 3,110 2,300 25 2,486 111 32 Sudan 33,420 8,780 3,030 850 46 2,184 96 33 logo 35,760 18,160 5,340 1,740 16 2,069 92 Middle-income economies 16,920w 5,840w 3,440w 2,510 w 50 w 2,561 w 107w Oil exporters 29,650w 8,020w 4,110w 3,950w 42 w 2,444 w 103 w Oil importers 6,500w 4,010 w 2,870 w 1,210w 57 w 2,653 w 110 a' 34 Ghana 21,600 9,920 5,430 610 35 1,983 85 35 Kenya 10,690 11,630 2,270 1,090 17 2,032 96 36 Lesotho 23,490 18,640 . . 14,900 17 2,245 95 37 Yemen, PDR 13,290 5,970 . . 1,330 24 1,945 81 38 Indonesia 46,780 13,670 4,520 8,870 12 2,272 102 39 Yemen Arab Rep, 130,010 11,670 . . 4,580 4 2,192 82 40 Mauritania 37,040 13,700 4,990 1,980 . . 1,976 94 41 Senegal 21,970 15,710 2,840 1,390 37 2,261 95 42 Angola 14,910 . . 6,570 . . . . 2,133 93 43 Liberia 12,600 9,280 1,410 1,810 20 2,404 101 44 Honduras 12,610 3,290 . . 870 46 2,015 93 45 Zambia 9,540 10,410 9,920 1,970 42 2,002 90 46 Bolivia 3,830 1,850 . . 3,070 34 1,974 87 47 Egypt 2,560 1,050 1,930 1,100 66 2,760 118 48 Zimbabwe 4,790 7,030 1,010 1,170 . 2,576 109 49 El Sal0ador 5,260 3,600 . . 950 53 2,051 94 50 Cameroon 48,110 16,500 3,280 1,150 26 2,069 106 51 Thailand 7,950 8,220 4,860 1,170 22 1,929 97 52 Philippines . . 2,810 . . 3,170 43 2,189 107 53 Nicaragua 2,690 1,590 1,250 800 70 2,446 116 54 Papua New Guinea 14,390 14,040 2,450 1,590 20 2,268 87 55 Congo, People's Rep. 16,100 7,470 1,300 600 17 2,284 99 56 Morocco 9,410 11,040 . . 1,830 . . 2,534 107 57 Mongolia 1,070 480 300 250 . . 2,523 106 58 Albania 3,630 960 530 320 . 2,730 113 59 Peru 2,010 1,530 2,210 680 48 2,274 98 60 Nigeria 73,710 15,740 4,040 2,880 . . 1,951 83 61 Jamaica 2,590 3,520 1,990 550 86 2,660 118 62 Guatemala 4,420 2,560 9,040 . . 40 2,156 92 63 Ivory Coast 29,190 21,040 2,920 1,590 19 2,517 107 64 Dominican Republic 8,220 . . . . . 55 2,094 102 65 Colombia 2,640 1,970 4,220 1,250 64 2,364 98 66 Ecuador 2,670 1,570 2,360 . . 42 2,104 90 152 Daily per capita Percentage of calorie supply Population per: population with Physiciana Nursing persona access to safe As percentage watera Total of requirement 1960 1977 1960 1977 1975 1977 1977 67 Paraguay 1,810 2,190 . . 2,290 13 2,824 19 68 Tunisia 10,030 3,580 . 1,070 70 2,674 15 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. . . . . . . . . .. 2,837 19 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 4,630 2,570 6,660 3,900 75 2,684 04 71 Jordan 5,800 1,960 1,930 820 61 2,107 62 72 Lebanon 1,210 2,080 . . . . 2,495 12 73 Turkey 3,000 1,760 . . 920 75 2,907 16 74 Cuba 1,060 1,100 950 . . . . 2,720 18 75 Korea, Rep. of 3,540 1,980 3,250 490 71 2,785 17 76 Malaysia 7,020 7,640 1,790 870 62 2,610 16 77 Costa Rica 2,700 1,390 710 450 77 2,550 113 78 Panama 2,730 1,220 3,460 1,410 79 2,341 104 79 Algeria 5,530 5,330 . 1,480 77 2,372 97 80 Brazil 2,560 1,700 2,770 822 77 2,562 111 81 Mexico 1,820 1,260 3,630 1,420 62 2,654 113 82 Chile 1,780 1,930 640 420 84 2,656 110 83 South Africa 2,180 . . 480 . . . 2,831 116 84 Romania 790 740 620 470 . . 3,444 130 85 Portugal 1,250 700 1,420 470 65 3,076 127 86 Argentina 740 530 750 . . 66 3,347 124 87 Yugoslavia 1,620 760 630 360 3,445 136 88 Uruguay 970 540 . . 3,700 84 3,036 105 89 Iran 4,060 2,560 8,090 1,900 51 3,138 122 90 Iraq 5,270 2,190 3,030 1,890 62 2,134 90 91 Venezuela 1,510 930 2,840 370 . . 2,435 102 92 Hong Kong 3,060 1,180 2,880 430 2,883 119 93 Trinidad and Tobago 2,390 1,970 750 580 2,694 103 94 Greece 800 460 800 600 3,400 135 95 Singapore 2,360 1,250 650 380 100 3,074 135 96 Israel 400 310 360 3,141 123 High-income oil exporters 13,310w 1,380w 4,500 a' 3,010w 88 a 97 Libya 6,580 900 1,320 350 100 2,985 122 98 Saudi Arabia 16,370 1,700 5,850 860 84 2,624 87 99 Kuwait 1,150 790 260 230 89 . 100 United Arab Emirates . . 780 430 . . . Industrial market economies 820 a' 620w 470w 250w 3,377w 131 w 101 Ireland 950 830 190 200 3,541 141 102 Spain 850 560 1290 900 3,149 127 103 Italy 640 490 1,330 330 3,428 136 104 New Zealand 850 740 . 170 3,345 124 105 United Kingdom 1,020 750 210 230 3,336 133 106 Finland 1,570 630 170 110 3,100 116 107 Australia 760 650 . . 120 3,428 127 108 Japan 930 850 310 290 2,949 126 109 Canada 910 560 290 130 3,374 127 110 Austria 550 430 440 250 3,535 135 111 United States 750 580 340 150 3,576 133 112 Netherlands 900 580 . . 270 3,338 125 113 France 930 610 530 170 3,434 136 114 Belgium 780 440 450 . . 3,583 141 115 Norway 850 540 330 100 3,175 119 116 Denmark 810 510 220 150 3,418 127 117 Sweden 1,050 560 100 130 3,221 120 118 Germany, Fed. Rep, 670 490 370 260 3,381 127 119 Switzerland 740 510 -340 210 3,485 127 Nonmarket industrial economies 660 a' 340w 350 w 200 c 3,489 a 137 w 120 Poland 1,070 610 460 230 . . 3,656 140 121 Bulgaria 710 440 550 190 . . 3,611 143 122 Hungary 720 430 330 190 . 3,521 133 123 USSR 560 290 340 210 . . 3,460 136 124 Czechoslovakia 620 390 230 150 . . 3,340 139 125 German Oem. Rep. 1,180 530 , , . . , . 3,641 139 a. Rgures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 153 Table 23. Educationa Number Number enrolled in enrolled in Number enrolled in primary school secondary higher education Adult as percentage of age group school as as percentage literacy percentage of of population rate Total Male Female age group aged 20-24 (percent) 1960 1979 1960 1979 1960 1979 1960 1979 1960 1978 1960 1977 Low-income economies 76 iv 94 iv 68 iv 98 iv 34 iv 84 iv 15 iv 49 iv 2 iv 3 iv 26 iv 50 iv China and India 86 iv 102 iv 103w 93 w 58 iv 4 iv 54 iv Other low-income 37 iv 64 iv 50 iv 77 iv 24 iv 47 iv 6w 17 iv 1 iv 2w 23 iv 34 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 64 82 46 3 (.) 36 2 Lao PDR 25 93 34 101 16 85 1 16 (.) 28 41 3 Bhutan 3 11 5 15 () 7 1 (.) 4 Chad 17 35 29 51 4 19 (.) 3 (.) 6 15 5 Bangladesh 47 65 66 79 26 49 8 25 1 2 22 26 6 Ethiopia 7 36 11 48 3 24 (.) 9 (.) (.) 15 7 Nepal 10 88 19 124 1 49 6 19 1 3 9 19 8 Somalia 9 50 13 64 5 36 1 7 (.) 1 2 60 9 Burma 56 84 61 87 52 81 10 20 1 4 60 70 10 Afghanistan 9 22 15 36 2 7 1 7 (.) 1 8 12 11 VietNam 120 . 124 . 115 . 56 . . 3 . 87 12 Mali 10 28 14 36 6 20 1 9 . 1 3 9 13 Burundi 18 23 27 28 9 18 1 2 (.) 1 14 23 14 Rwanda 49 70 68 74 30 67 2 2 . (.) 16 50 15 Upper Volta 8 21 12 26 5 15 (.) 3 (.) 2 5 16 Zaire 60 90 88 103 32 77 3 19 () 1 31 58 17 Malawi 59 70 . 48 1 4 . (.) . . 25 18 Mozambique 48 107 60 125 36 90 2 9 (.) 11 28 19 India 61 78 80 92 40 63 20 27 3 8 28 36 20 Haiti 46 62 50 . 42 . 4 15 (.) 1 15 23 21 Sri Lanka 95 98 100 90 . 27 53 1 1 75 85 22 Sierra Leone 23 37 30 45 15 30 2 12 (,) 1 7 23 Tanzania 25 104 33 113 18 94 2 4 . (.) 10 66 24 China 102 118 . 111 . . 114 79 . . 1 66 25 Guinea 30 34 44 45 16 24 2 15 . . 5 7 20 26 Central African Rep. 32 77 53 100 12 54 1 10 . 1 7 39 27 Pakistan 30 56 46 81 13 31 11 16 1 2 15 24 28 Uganda 49 50 65 58 32 42 3 5 (.) 1 35 48 29 Benin 27 60 38 78 15 42 2 12 . . 1 5 25 30 Niger 5 23 7 29 3 17 () 4 . . (.) 1 5 31 Madagascar 52 100 58 100 45 87 4 12 (.) 3 . . 50 32 Sudan 25 51 35 60 14 43 3 16 (.) 2 13 20 33 Togo 44 110 63 136 24 85 2 32 . . 2 10 18 Middle-income economies 76 iv 97 iv' 84 iv 104 iv 68 iv 93 iv 15 iv 39 iv 4 iv 11 iv 49 iv 65 iv Oil exporters 63 iv 97 iv 75 iv 109 iv 52 iv 93 iv 9 iv 32 iv 3 ii' 8 iv 36 iv 57 w Oil Importers 85 iv 96 iv 91 iv 100 iv 80 iv 92 iv 18 iv 44 iv 5 iv 13 iv 60 iv 73 iv 34 Ghana 38 71 52 80 25 62 5 36 (.) . . 27 35 Kenya 47 99 64 105 30 94 2 18 (.) 1 20 50 36 Lesotho 83 104 63 84 102 123 3 17 (.) 2 . . 52 37 Yemen, PDR 13 70 20 99 5 42 5 31 . . 2 . 40 38 Indonesia 71 94 86 100 58 89 6 22 1 3 39 62 39 Yemen Arab Rep. 8 34 14 59 (.) 9 .) 4 2 3 21 40 Mauritania 8 28 13 36 3 20 () 6 . . (.) 5 17 41 Senegal 27 42 36 51 17 34 3 10 1 2 6 10 42 Angola 21 . 28 . 13 . . 2 . . (.) . 43 Liberia 31 67 45 83 18 51 2 22 (.) . . 9 25 44 Honduras 67 89 68 92 67 85 8 21 1 8 45 60 45 Zambia 42 95 51 101 34 89 2 17 . . 2 29 44 46 Bolivia 64 82 78 87 50 76 12 35 4 13 39 63 47 Egypt 66 75 80 88 52 61 16 48 5 15 26 44 48 Zimbabwe 96 104 107 110 86 96 6 15 (.) . 39 74 49 El Salvador 80 82 82 83 77 81 13 26 1 8 49 62 50 Cameroon 65 103 87 113 43 93 2 17 . 1 19 51 Thailand 83 82 88 85 79 78 13 29 2 7 68 84 52 Philippines 95 98 98 . . 93 . . 26 63 13 27 72 75 53 Nicaragua 66 85 65 83 66 88 7 27 1 . 90 54 Papua New Guinea 32 64 59 73 7 55 1 12 . . . 29 32 55 Congo, People's Rep. 78 156 103 163 53 148 4 69 1 4 16 56 Morocco 47 75 67 93 27 56 5 22 1 4 14 28 57 Mongolia 79 108 79 111 78 105 51 81 8 58 Albania 94 . . 102 . . 86 . . 20 . . 5 . . 59 Peru 83 112 95 115 71 108 15 50 4 17 61 80 60 Nigeria 36 79 46 . . 27 4 10 (.) 1 15 30 61 Jamaica 92 99 92 99 93 100 45 58 2 . . 82 90 62 Guatemala 45 69 50 74 39 63 7 15 2 6 32 . 63 IvoryCoast 46 74 68 91 24 58 2 15 () 2 5 41 64 Dominican Rep 98 96 99 95 98 96 7 28 1 65 67 65 Colombia 77 128 77 127 77 129 12 46 2 10 63 . 66 Ecuador 83 107 87 109 79 105 12 49 3 35 68 81 154 Number Number enrolled in enrolled in Number enrolled in primary school secondary higher education Adult as percentage of age group school as as percentage literacy percentage of of population rate Total Male Female age group aged 20-24 (percent) 1960 1979 1960 1979 1960 1979 1960 1979 1960 1978 1960 1977 67 Paraguay 98 102 105 106 90 98 11 25 2 8 75 84 68 Tunisia 66 102 88 119 43 85 12 25 1 5 16 62 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. . 113 115 112 . . . . . . . . . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 65 96 89 107 39 84 16 47 4 18 30 58 71 Jordan 77 102 94 106 59 99 25 74 1 . 32 70 72 Lebanon 102 97 105 99 . 19 50 6 28 73 Turkey 75 105 90 115 58 96 14 34 3 8 38 60 74 Cuba 109 112 109 116 109 108 14 71 3 19 . . 96 75 Korea, Rep. of 94 111 99 112 89 111 27 76 5 12 71 93 76 Malaysia 96 93 108 94 83 92 19 52 1 3 53 77 Costa Rica 96 107 97 108 95 106 21 48 5 24 . . 90 78 Panama 96 115 98 118 94 113 29 66 5 20 73 79 Algeria 46 98 55 113 37 83 8 31 (.) 4 10 35 80 Brazil 95 89 97 90 93 87 11 32 2 11 61 76 81 Mexico 80 124 82 127 77 122 11 45 3 12 65 81 82 Chile 109 119 111 120 107 118 24 55 4 12 84 83 South Africa 89 . 94 . 85 . 15 3 57 84 Romania 98 98 101 98 95 98 24 83 5 11 89 98 85 Portugal . 117 119 115 . 55 4 11 62 86 Argentina 98 110 98 110 99 111 23 56 11 22 91 93 87 Yugoslavia 111 99 113 99 108 98 58 82 9 23 77 85 88 Uruguay 111 105 111 107 111 102 37 59 8 18 94 89 Iran 41 101 56 121 27 80 12 44 1 5 16 50 90 Iraq 65 120 94 129 36 110 19 56 2 9 18 91 Venezuela 100 110 100 110 100 110 21 40 4 21 63 82 92 Hong Kong 87 109 93 110 79 108 20 63 4 11 70 90 93 Trinidad and Tobago 88 96 89 96 87 97 24 56 1 . . 93 95 94 Greece 102 103 104 104 101 103 37 81 4 18 81 95 Singapore 111 107 121 109 101 106 32 59 6 9 96 Israel 98 96 99 95 97 97 48 68 10 26 84 High-income oil exporters 28w 81 w 44w 92w 12w 70w 5w 44w 7w 9w 25w 97 Libya 59 123 92 128 24 119 9 67 1 6 22 98 Saudi Arabia 12 64 22 78 2 49 2 31 (.) 7 3 16 99 Kuwait 117 99 131 102 102 96 37 74 . . 12 47 60 100 United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Industrial market economies 114w 102w 107w 104w 112w 104w 64w 88w 17w 37w . . 99w 101 Ireland 110 105 107 105 112 104 35 92 9 19 . . 98 102 Spain 110 109 106 110 116 109 23 78 4 24 87 103 Italy 111 102 112 103 109 102 34 73 7 27 91 98 104 New Zealand 108 107 110 108 106 106 73 81 13 29 99 105 United Kingdom 92 105 92 104 92 105 66 83 9 20 99 106 Finland 97 85 100 85 95 85 74 90 7 21 99 100 107 Australia 103 111 103 111 103 111 51 86 13 26 . . 100 108 Japan 103 101 103 101 102 101 74 90 10 29 98 99 109 Canada 107 102 108 102 105 101 46 89 16 37 . 99 110 Austria 105 99 106 99 104 98 50 72 8 22 99 99 111 United States 118 98 . . . . . 86 97 32 56 98 99 112 Netherlands 105 101 105 100 104 102 58 93 13 28 . . 99 113 France 144 112 144 113 143 111 46 84 10 24 . 99 114 Belgium 109 101 111 101 108 101 69 86 9 26 99 115 Norway 100 100 100 99 100 100 57 94 7 25 99 116 Denmark 103 98 103 103 . . 65 83 10 29 . 99 117 Sweden 96 98 95 98 96 98 55 86 9 37 . . 99 118 Germany. Fed. Rep. 133 . . 132 . 134 53 6 26 . . 99 119 Switzerland 118 86 118 86 118 87 26 55 7 17 . . 99 Nonmarket industrial economies 101w 100w 101w 95w 101w 96w 48w 93w 11w 20w 98w 100w 120 Poland 109 99 110 . . 107 50 54 9 18 95 98 121 Bulgaria 93 96 94 97 92 95 55 87 11 18 91 . 122 Hungary 101 96 103 96 100 96 46 69 7 12 97 99 123 USSR 100 101 100 . . 100 . 49 104 11 21 99 100 124 Czechoslovakia 93 92 93 92 93 93 25 43 11 16 95 . 125 German Oem. Rep. 112 97 111 95 113 98 39 88 16 29 . . a. Hgures n tacs are for years other than those specfed. See the techwca notes 155 Table 24. Defense and social expenditure Defense expenditure as percentage of: Central government expenditure per capita (1975 dollars) Central government GNP expenditure Defense Education Health 1972 197gb 1972 1979b 1972 1979b 1972 1979b 1972 1g79b Low-income economies 3.8w 4.5w 19.0w 18.1w 6w 9w 3w 4w 2w 1w China and India . 4.4w . , 17.7w 9w 7w 4w Other low-income 3.8 w 5.0w 19.0 w 19.2 w 6w 7w 3w 3w 2w 1w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 LaoPDR . .. . ., .. .. 3 Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 Chad 4.5 . . 24.6 6 . 3 . . 1 5 Bangladesh 0.5 . 5,1 . . (.) . . 1 . (.) 6 Ethiopia 20 143 2 . . 2 . . 1 7 Nepal 06 0.9 7.1 6.6 1 1 1 2 (.) 8 Somalia 6.2 6.8 23.3 25.0 7 16 2 5 2 2 9 Burma 6.3 3.7 31.6 24.2 7 5 3 2 1 10 Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . 11 Viet Nam 12 Mali 29 .. 17.2 .. 4 5 1 13 Burundi 2.0 . . 103 . . 2 . 6 1 14 Rwanda 30 1.5 25.6 12.4 4 2 3 3 1 1 15 Upper Volta 1.3 32 11.5 16.9 1 4 3 3 1 1 16 Zaire 17 Malawi 0.6 38 312 13.9 1 5 4 3 1 2 18 Mozambique 19 India 28 181 4 () () 20 Haiti 21 Sri Lanka 1.3 0.7 4.1 1.9 4 2 12 8 6 5 22 Sierra Leone 1.7 . . 78 . . 3 . . 5 , 3 23 Tanzania 2.3 9.4 11.9 23.7 4 15 5 7 2 3 24 China 5.7 . . 17.5 . . 12 . . 7 . 25 Guinea 26 Central African Rep. , , . . . . 27 Pakistan 6.6 5.0 39.9 28.8 10 (.) 28 Uganda . . . . . . . 29 Benin . . . . 30 Niger . . 31 Madagascar 0.8 . , 36 . . 2 5 . . 2 32 Sudan 3.5 2.6 23.0 13.6 8 10 3 4 2 33 Togo . . . . . . . . . Middle-income economies 2.9 3.3 w 13.611' 13.0w 26 u' 39 w 21w 35 w 9w 15w Oil exporters 3.0 w 4.1 u' 16.4w 14.711 31w 48 u' 25 w 49 11' lOw 16w Oil importers 2.8w 3.0 w 12.7w 12.3w 24 w 35 w 19w 29 u' 9w 14w 34 Ghana 16 0.7 80 4.4 8 3 20 10 6 4 35 Kenya 13 4.8 6.0 17.7 3 13 11 13 4 5 36 Lesotho ,. . .. .. .. 5 .. 2 37 Yemen, PDR . . . . , . . . . .. . . . . . 38 Indonesia , , . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . . . . . . , . . . . 40 Mauritania . . 14.4 . . 29.4 . . 35 . . 12 41 Senegal . . . . , , . . , . . 42 Angola . , . . . . . , . . .. .. 43 Liberia 1.0 . , 2.7 . . 3 . . 13 44 Honduras 1.9 2.4 12.4 11.4 7 9 13 15 6 7 45 Zambia . , . . . . . . , . . . 33 24 13 11 46 Bolivia 1.5 2.0 16.1 16.6 7 10 13 19 4 5 47 Egypt . 3.3 . . 82 . , 17 . . 24 . . 8 48 Zimbabwe . . .. , . . . , . . . , , . 49 El Salvador 0.8 1.4 66 93 4 6 11 13 6 6 50 Cameroon . . 1.6 . . 9.2 . . 7 . . 10 . . 3 51 Thailand 3.5 3.5 19.5 194 11 5 11 16 2 3 52 Philippines 1.5 2.2 10.1 18.7 5 9 7 8 1 2 53 Nicaragua 1.9 . . 12.3 . 12 . . 16 . 4 54 Papua New Guinea . . 1.4 . . 4.3 . . 7 . . 27 . . 13 55 Congo, People's Rep. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 56 Morocco 2.8 5.8 123 160 13 35 21 39 5 7 57 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Peru 2.5 1.9 14.8 12.3 23 17 35 19 10 60 Nigeria 5.2 . . 40.2 . 20 . . 2 . . 2 61 Jamaica .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 62 Guatemala 11 1.2 11.0 10.8 3 8 5 10 2 63 Ivory Coast . , . . . . . , . . . , . . . . . 64 Dominican Rep. 1.5 . . 8.5 . . 11 . 18 . . 15 65 Colombia . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . 66 Ecuador 2.0 2.1 169 18.8 11 14 20 21 3 156 Defense expenditure as percentage of: Central government expenditure per capita (1975 dollars) Central government GNP expenditure Defense Education Health 1972 1g7gb 19728 1979b 19728 1g79b 19728 1979b 19728 197gb 67 Paraguay 1.8 1.2 13.8 11.7 9 9 8 10 2 3 68 Tunisia 1.1 1.5 4.8 4.3 7 13 46 63 11 22 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 10.9 14.4 37.2 34.9 64 115 19 21 2 3 71 Jordan . . 14.2 . . 27.9 . . 78 . . 30 . . 13 72 Lebanon . . . . S S S . S 0 73 Turkey 3.4 3.3 15.4 12.0 27 31 32 49 6 8 74 Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 75 Korea, Rep. of 4.9 5.5 25.8 30.6 22 44 14 24 1 2 76 Malaysia 5.1 4.0 18.5 16.4 33 38 42 50 12 15 77 Costa Rica 0.5 07 2.6 2.7 5 8 48 70 6 7 78 Panama .. . . . S . S 60 . . 58 79 Algeria .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . 80 Brazil 1.4 0.8 8.3 4.3 13 11 11 15 10 21 81 Mexico 0.6 0.5 4.9 2.9 8 8 27 50 8 10 82 Chile 2.6 4.2 6.1 12.0 4 37 9 40 5 20 83 South Africa . . . . . S S S S S 84 Romania . . 2.0 6.2 3.7 . . . . S . . . 85 Portugal . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. S 86 Argentina 1.0 2.5 9.0 14.0 18 37 19 22 7 5 87 Yugoslavia 4.1 4.3 20.5 19.3 54 77 . . . . 66 101 88 Uruguay 1.4 2.5 5.6 11.7 16 37 28 30 5 15 89 Iran 7.4 11.2 24.1 25.9 104 169 45 80 16 23 90 Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 91 Venezuela 2.1 2.3 9.7 7.8 41 55 73 101 27 35 92 Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Trinidad and Tobago . . 0.9 . . 2.5 . 24 . . 111 . . 60 94 Greece 7.8 6.2 14.6 19.9 90 167 54 88 44 76 95 Singapore 6.0 5.1 35.3 24.4 126 164 56 100 28 47 96 Israel 17.6 29.8 39.8 39.2 620 1,083 141 246 55 141 High-income oil exporters 97 Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 98 Saudi Arabia . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . S 99 Kuwait 2.7 3.4 8.4 13.8 314 432 559 311 206 196 100 United Arab Emirates . . . . 24.5 55.1 . . . . . . . . . Industrial market economies 5.1 w 3.8w 21.6w 13.5w 301 w 283w 80w 109w 152w 235w 101 Ireland . . . S . , . . . . . , . . 102 Spain 1.3 1.3 65 5.2 34 42 43 65 5 7 103 Italy 2.0 . . 6.3 70 . . 178 . . 150 104 NewZealand 1.7 1.7 5.8 46 70 72 203 216 180 241 105 United Kingdom 5.5 5.4 16.7 14.5 217 249 34 45 158 219 106 Finland 1,5 1.5 6.1 4.9 80 92 203 281 140 197 107 Australia 2.8 2.3 14.5 8.9 188 164 55 164 108 187 108 Japan . . . S . . . , S 109 Canada . . 1.7 . . 7.9 . . 131 . . 72 . . 126 110 Austria 1.0 1.2 3.0 3.2 47 71 160 223 156 290 111 United States 6.3 4.6 32.2 21.5 453 376 45 51 120 183 112 Netherlands , , 3.5 . . 6.4 . . 234 . . 540 . . 19 113 France . . 2.6 . . 6.9 . 190 . 255 . . 406 114 Belgium 2.6 3.0 6.6 5.8 157 212 364 527 34 65 115 Norway 3.4 9.4 . . 201 . . 206 . . 255 116 Denmark 23 . 7.0 . 169 . 377 . . 231 . 117 Sweden 3.6 34 12.2 7.7 283 292 335 412 81 92 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 3.0 2.8 124 9.6 200 222 24 21 281 437 119 Switzerland 2.0 2.1 15.1 10.3 184 187 51 65 122 208 Nonmarket industrial economies 120 Poland 121 Bulgaria 122 Hungary 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Oem. Rep. a. Figures n italics are for 1973, not 1972. b. Figures in italics are for 1978, not 1979. 157 Table 25. Income distribution Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of househoidsa Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest Year 20 percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 10 percent Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Kampuchea, Dem. . . . . . 2LaoPDR .. 3 Bhutan . . . . . 4Chad .. .. .. 5 Bangladesh 1973-74 6.9 11.3 16.1 23.5 42.2 27.4 6 Ethiopia . . .. .. . . 7 Nepal 1976-77 4.6 8.0 11.7 16.5 59.2 46.5 8 Somalia . . 9 Burma .. . . . . 10 Afghanistan . . . . . 11 VietNam 12 Mali 13 Burundi 14 Rwanda 15 Upper Volta 16 Zaire . 0 .. . . 17 Malawi 1967-68 10.4 11.1 13.1 14.8 50.6 40.1 18 Mozambique . . . .. .. . 19 India 1975-76 7.0 9.2 13.9 20.5 49.4 33.6 20 Haiti .. . 0 . . . 0 21 Sri Lanka 1969-70 7.5 11.7 15.7 21.7 43.4 28.2 22 Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . 23 lanzania 1969 5.8 10.2 13.9 19.7 50.4 35.6 24 China . . .. . . . 25 Guinea . . . . . 0 . 26 Central African Rep. 27 Pakistan 28 Uganda 29 Benin 30 Niger 31 Madagascar 32 Sudan 33 logo Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers 34 Ghana . . .. .. . . . . 35 Kenya 1974 2.6 6.3 11.5 19.2 60.4 45.8 36 Lesotho . . 37 Yemen, PDR . . . . . . . . . . 38 Indonesia 1976 6.6 7.8 12.6 23.6 49.4 34.0 39 Yemen Arab Rep. . . . 40 Mauritania . . . 0 41 Senegal .. .. . 0 42 Angola .. 0 43 Liberia . . .. 0 00 44 Honduras 45 Zambia 46 Bolivia 47 Egypt 48 Zimbabwe 49 El Salvador . . . . . . . 0 50 Cameroon . . . 0 51 Thailand . . . . . 0 . 0 52 Philippines 1970-71 5.2 9.0 12.8 19.0 54.0 38.5 53 Nicaragua . 0 . . . . . 0 54 Papua New Guinea 55 Congo, People's Rep. 56 Morocco 57 Mongolia 58 Albania .,59 Peru 1972 1.9 5.1 11.0 21.0 61.0 42.9 60 Nigeria .. 61 Jamaica . . .. .. . . 0 62 Guatemala .. 63 Ivory Coast . . . . . . . 64 Dominican Rep. 65 Colombia 66 Ecuador 158 Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of househoidsa Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest Year 20 percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 10 percent 67 Paraguay 68 Tunisia 69 Korea, Dem. Rep. 70 Syrian Arab Rep. 71 Jordan 72 Lebanon .. . . .. . . . 73 Turkey 1973 3.5 8.0 12.5 19.5 56.5 40.7 74 Cuba . . .. .. . 75 Korea, Rep. of 1976 5.7 11.2 15.4 22.4 45.3 27.5 76 Malaysia 1973 3.5 7.7 12.4 20.3 56.1 39.8 77 Costa Rica 1971 3.3 8.7 13.3 19.9 54.8 39.5 78 Panama 1970 2.0 5.2 11.0 20.0 61.8 44.2 79 Algeria . . .. .. . . . 80 Brazil 1972 2.0 5.0 9.4 17.0 66.6 50.6 81 Mexico 1977 2.9 7.0 12.0 20.4 57.7 40.6 82 Chile 1968 4.4 9.0 13.8 21.4 51.4 34.8 83 South Africa . . . . . 84 Romania 85 Portugal . . . , . . . . . 86 Argentina 1970 4.4 9.7 14.1 21.5 50.3 35.2 87 Yugoslavia 1978 6.6 12.1 18.7 23.9 38.7 22.9 88 Uruguay . . . . . . . 89 Iran .. . . . . . 90 Iraq . . . . . . . . 91 Venezuela 1970 3.0 7.3 12.9 22.8 54.0 35.7 92 Hong Kong 1980 5.4 10.8 15.2 21.6 47.0 31.3 93 Trinidad and Tobago 1975-76 4.2 9.1 13.9 22.8 50.0 31.8 94 Greece .. . . . . . . . 95 Singapore . . . . . . . 96 Israel . , . . . . . , High-income oil exporters 97 Libya 98 Saudi Arabia 99 Kuwait 100 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 101 Ireland . . . . . . . 102 Spain 1974 6.0 11.8 16.9 23.1 42.2 26.7 103 Italy 1977 6.2 11.3 15.9 22.7 43.9 28.1 104 New Zealand . . .. . . .. . 105 United Kingdom 1979 7.3 12.4 17.7 23.4 39.2 23.8 106 Finland 1977 6.8 12.8 18.7 24.9 26.8 21.2 107 Australia 1966-67 6.6 13.5 17.8 23.4 38.8 23.7 108 Japan 1969 7.9 13.1 16.8 21.2 41.0 27.2 109 Canada 1977 3.8 10.7 17.9 25.6 42.0 26.9 110, Austria . . . . . . . . 111 United States 1972 4.5 10.7 17.3 24.7 42.8 26.6 112 Netherlands 1977 8.1 13.7 17.9 23.3 37.0 22,1 113 France 1975 5.3 11.1 16.0 21.8 45.8 30.5 114 Belgium . . . . . . . . . . 115 Norway 1970 6.3 12.9 18.8 24.7 37.3 22.2 116 Denmark 1976 7.4 12.6 18.3 24.2 37.5 22.4 117 Sweden 1979 7.2 12.8 17.4 25.4 37.2 21.2 118 Germany, Fed. Rep. 1974 6.9 11.0 15.4 21.9 44.8 28.8 119 Switzerland Nonmarket industrial economies 120 Poland 121 Bulgaria 122 Hungary 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Oem. Rep. a. These estimates should be treated with caution. See the technical notes. 159 Technical notes This edition of the World Devel- the results of recent population is the ratio of the sum of GNP in opment Indicators provides eco- censuses. The data on area are current prices to the sum of the nomic data for periods of years from the FAO Production Yearbook, GNP divided by the annual av- and social data for selected years 1979. erage exchange rate in national in a form suitable for comparing Gross national product (GNP) currency per US dollar for 1978, economies and groups of econo- measures the total domestic and 1979, and 1980. The third step is mies. Although the statistics and foreign output claimed by resi- to convert the series measured in measures have been carefully se- dents. It comprises gross domes- constant average 1978-80 US dol- lected to provide a comprehen- tic product (see the technical notes lars to one measured in current sive picture of development, for Table 2) and factor incomes US dollars by multiplying that se- readers are urged to exercise care (such as investment receipts and ries by the implicit US GNP de- in interpreting them. This is par- workers' remittances) accruing to flator for 1978-80. This procedure ticularly true of comparing indi- residents from abroad, less the in- was followed for most econo- cators across economies, because come earned in the domestic mies. statistical methods, coverage, economy accruing to persons The GNP per capita figures were practices, and definitions differ abroad. It is calculated without obtained by dividing GNP at mar- widely. The statistical systems in making deductions for deprecia- ket prices in US dollars by the many developing economies still tion. For some economies the es- population in mid-1980. The use are weak, and this affects the timates of GNP are adjusted from of the three-year base period is availability and reliability of data. data on net material product. intended to smooth the impact of All growth rates shown are in The GNP per capita figures were fluctuations in prices and ex- real terms and, unless otherwise calculated according to the World change rates. Because the base noted, have been computed by Bank Atlas method, under which period is changed every year, the using the least-squares method. the conversion of GNP proceeds data presented in the various edi- The least-squares growth rate, r, in the following manner. The first tions of the World Development is calculated by regressing the an- step is to convert the GNP series Indicators are not comparable. nual values of the variable in the in constant market prices and na- The figures on GNP and GNP relevant period using the loga- tional currency units to one meas- per capita for six nonmarket in- rithmic form: log X = a + bt + ured in constant average 1978-80 dustrial economiesBulgaria, e, where X is the variable, t is prices. This is done by multiply- Czechoslovakia, German Demo- time, e is the error term, and b is ing the original constant price se- cratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, the slope coefficient. Then r is ries by the weighted-average do- and USSRhave been derived equal to [antilog b] - 1, the least- mestic GNP deflator for the base from official data on net material squares estimate of the growth period (that is, by the ratio of total product (NMP). Two relation- rate. GNP in current prices to total GNP ships were estimated by using the in constant prices for the 1978-80 national accounts data of 12 West- period). The second step is to ern European countries: the first convert the series measured in between NMP per capita and GNP Table 1. Basic indicators constant average 1978-80 prices per capita for the benchmark year in national currency to one in US 1970; the second between the av- The estimates of population for mid- dollars by dividing that series by erage annual growth rates of NMP 1980 are primarily from the UN the weighted-average exchange per capita and of GNP per capita. Population Division. In many rate for the base period. The For each of the six nonmarket in- cases the data take into account weighted-average exchange rate dustrial economies, the GNP per 161 capita for 1970 was obtained by verted to current dollars by mul- economies. This different treat- entering its NMP per capita for tiplying them by the US implicit ment, and the known differences 1970 (converted to US dollars by GNP deflator for 1970. between the concepts used for the noncommercial exchange rate) The estimates of GNP per cap- national accounts of market and in the first equation. The 1970 ita and of GNP per capita growth nonmarket economies, limit the benchmark GNP per capita ob- rates for the nonmarket industrial comparability of the data pre- tained from the first equation was economies must thus be treated sented for the two sets of econo- then extrapolated to 1980 by us- as tentative. Furthermore, be- mies. For example, the figures ing the growth rates estimated cause these estimates are not shown in Table 1 for nonmarket from the second equation. The based on average exchange rates industrial economies differ con- 1980 estimates of GNP per capita for 1978-80, they are not com- siderably from other estimates in 1970 US dollars were then con- parable with estimates for market derived from official GDP esti- Gross product per capita computed conventionally and computed by using the ICP mates converted at the annual av- method, selected countries, 1975 erage official exchange rates: Index of GDP per capita compare $2,300 for Bulgaria in (United States = 100) GOP per capita at 1978, $2,060 for Hungary in 1980, International dollars purchasing.powerparity and $2,150 for Poland in 1979. The converted at purchasing. exchange rate as US dollars converted at power-parity exchange percentage of that at World Bank is undertaking re- Country official exchange rate rates official rate search to develop more compa- Africa rable estimates of GNP per capita Kenya 3.4 6.6 195 for nonmarket industrial econo- Malawi 1.9 4.9 255 Zambia 6.9 10.3 mies. 149 The use of official exchange rates Asia to convert national currency fig- India 2.0 6.6 322 Iran 22.1 37.7 171 ures to US dollars does not ac- Japan 62.3 68.4 110 curately measure the relative pur- Korea, Rep. of 8.1 20.7 254 chasing power of currencies. In Malaysia 10.9 21.5 198 particular, the differences in the Pakistan 2.6 8.2 312 real income between developing Philippines 5.2 13.2 251 Sri Lanka 2.6 9.3 and industrial economies are likely 365 Syrian Arab Rep. 10.0 25.0 250 to be exaggerated. The reason is Thailand 5.0 13.0 261 that exchange rates are based on Europe prices of internationally traded Austria 69.8 69.6 100 goods and services and may bear Belgium 87.8 77.7 88 little relation to the prices of goods Denmark 104.5 82.4 79 and services that do not enter in- France 89.6 81.9 91 ternational trade but that make up Germany, Fed. Rep. 94.7 83.0 88 Hungary 29.6 49.6 168 the bulk of the national product Ireland 37.2 42.5 114 of most developing economies. Italy 47.9 53.8 112 Exchange-rate-based GNP fig- Luxembourg 90.2 82.0 91 ures are inadequate measures of Netherlands 84.5 75.2 89 relative well-being. This has been Poland 36.0 50.1 139 Romania 24.3 33.3 137 demonstrated by the UN Inter- Spain 41.0 55.9 136 national Comparison Project, United Kingdom 57.6 63.9 111 which has developed reliable Yugoslavia 23.2 36.1 156 measures of real GNP on an in- Latin America and Caribbean ternationally comparable scale (see Brazil 16.0 25.2 158 Irving Kravis and others, A Sys- Colombia 7.9 22.4 283 tem of International Comparisons of Jamaica 19.6 24.0 123 Gross Product and Purchasing Power Mexico 20.4 34.7 170 Uruguay 18.2 39.6 217 [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1975]; Kravis and a. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over total GDP as a US dollar. Source: Kravis and others, "World Product and Income: Internatio,tal Comparisons of Real Gross Product others, International Comparisons of (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). Real Product and Purchasing Power 162 [1978]; and Kravis and others, Economic Commission for Latin The table on the preceding page World Product and Income: Interna- America are engaged in research gives examples of the differences tional Comparisons of Real GDP on appropriate ways of extending between gross product per capita [1982]). This project has already purchasing power comparisons to as conventionally computed and covered 34 countries and in the all the countries of the world. Un- as computed using the ICP next phase will cover about 75. til such coverage is complete, method. The World Bank, the United Na- however, exchange rates remain The average annual rate of infla- tions, and such other interna- the only available means of con- tion was calculated from the im- tional agencies as the European verting GNP from national cur- plicit gross domestic product Economic Community and the rencies to US dollars. (GDP) deflator, which is calcu- Basic indicators for UN/World Bank members with a population of less than 1 million GNP per capita Average index Area Average Average annual Adult Life ex- of food (thousands annual rate of inflation literacy pectancy production Population of square growth (percent) rate at birth per capita (millions) kilo- Dollars (percent) (percent) (years) (1969-71 = 100) IN/World Bank member Mid-1980 meters) 1980 1960-80 1960-70 1970...g0b 1977' 1980' 1978-80 Guinea-Bissau 0.8 36 160 7.5 28 42 91 Gambia, The 0.6 11 250 1.7 2.2 11.0 15 42 71 Maid ives 0.2 (.) 260 1.3 82 47 Cape Verde 0.3 4 300 10.6 61 Comoros 0.4 2 300 -0.1 47 Equatorial Guinea 0.3 28 3.7 11.6 47 Western Samoa 0.2 3 . 68 Solomon Islands 0.2 28 460 1.0 3.0 8.5 126 Djibouti 0.4 22 480 -5.3 14 45 Sao Tome and Principe 0.1 1 490 0.3 22.1 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.1 (.) 520 0.2 Vanuatu 0.1 15 530 2.1 99 Dominica 0.1 1 620 -0.6 Swaziland 0.6 17 680 6.2 2.2 10.8 65 47 114 Grenada 0.1 (.) 690 1.6 69 Guyana 0.8 215 690 0.9 2.3 10.8 70 94 St. Lucia 0.1 1 900 3.4 Botswana 0.8 600 910 9.2 2.4 10.5 Mauritius 0.9 2 1,060 2.3 2.2 15.4 85 65 91 Belize 0.1 23 1,080 3.1 9.4 Antigua and Barbuda 0.1 (.) 1,270 -0.4 Seychelles 0.1 (.) 1,770 3.1 66 Fiji 0.6 18 1,850 3.3 2.5 12.7 75 72 99 Suriname 0.4 163 2,840 4.9 . . 10.0 65 68 182 Barbados 0.2 (.) 3,040 4.5 2.3 13.9 99 71 84 Malta 0.3 (.) 3,470 8.2 1.5 4.1 72 133 Cyprus 0.6 9 3,560 1.3 5.2 89 73 99 Bahamas 0.2 14 3,790 -0.8 . 93 69 Oman 0.9 300 4,380 -8.8 2.4 27.9 48 Gabon 0.7 268 4,440 5.5 5.4 19.6 45 97 Bahrain 0.4 5,560 67 Iceland 0.2 103 11,330 3.2 12.2 35.4 76 109 Luxembourg 0.4 3 14,510 -8.0 3.6 6.8 100 72 107 Qatar 0.2 11 26,080 2.7 2.6 58 a. Because data for the early 1960s are not available, figures in italics are for periods other than that specified. b. Figures in italics are for 1970- 79, not 1970-80. c. Figures in italics are for years other than that specified. See the technical notes. 163 lated by dividing, for each year animal feed, seeds for use in ag- prises mining, manufacturing, of the period, the value of GDP riculture, and food lost in pro- construction, and electricity, in current market prices by the cessing and distribution. water, and gas. All other branches value of GDP in constant market The table on the preceding page of economic activity are catego- prices, both in national currency. shows basic indicators for 34 rized as services. This measure of inflation has countries that have a population National accounts series in do- limitations, especially for the oil- of less than a million and are mestic currency units were used producing countries in the light members of the United Nations, to compute the indicators in these of sharp increases in oil prices. the World Bank, or both. For most tables. Whereas the growth rates The adult literacy rate is the per- of these countries, comprehen- in Table 2 were calculated from centage of persons aged 15 and sive data are not available. The constant price series, the shares over who can read and write. table in this year's edition never- of GDP in Table 3 were calculated These rates are based primarily theless contains three more indi- from current price series. on information from the UN Ed- cators: adult literacy, the rate of The average growth rates for the ucational, Scientific, and Cultural inflation, and the growth of GNP summary measures in Table 2 are Organization (UNESCO), supple- per capita. weighted by GDP in 1970 in dol- mented by World Bank data. Be- The weighted averages in Table lars. The average sectoral shares cause such data are normally 1 are weighted by population. in Table 3 are weighted by GDP gathered in large-scale demo- in current dollars for the years in graphic surveys and censuses, Tables 2 and 3. Growth and question. they often are not available for structure of production the most recent year. For some countries the estimates are for Most of the definitions used are years other than, but generally not those of the UN System of National Tables 4 and 5. Growth of more than two years distant from, consumption and investment; Accounts. structure of demand those specified. Thus the series Gross domestic product (GDP) are not comparable for all coun- measures the total final output of GDP is defined in the technical tries. goods and services produced by notes for Table 2. Life expectancy at birth indicates an economythat is, by residents Public consumption (or general the number of years newborn and nonresidents, regardless of government consumption) in- children would live if subject to the allocation to domestic and cludes all current expenditure for the mortality risks prevailing for foreign claims. It is calculated purchases of goods and services the cross-section of population at without making deductions for by all levels of government. Cap- the time of their birth. Data are depreciation. For most countries, ital expenditure on national de- from the UN Population Division, GDP by industrial origin is meas- fense and security is regarded as supplemented by World Bank es- ured at factor cost, but for some consumption expenditure. timates. countries without complete na- Private consumption is the mar- The index of food production per tional accounts series at factor cost, ket value of all goods and services capita shows the average annual market price series were used. purchased or received as income quantity of food produced per GDP at factor cost is equal to GDP in kind by households and non- capita in 1978-80 in relation to that at market prices, less indirect taxes profit institutions. It includes im- in 1969-71. The estimates were net of subsidies. The figures for puted rent for owner-occupied derived from those of the Food GDP are dollar values converted dwellings. and Agriculture Organization from domestic currency by using Gross domestic investment con- (FAO), which are calculated by the average annual exchange rate sists of the outlays for additions dividing indices of the quantity of for the year in question: that is, to the fixed assets of the econ- food production by indices of to- they were not calculated by using omy, plus changes in the net value tal population. Food is defined as the World Bank Atlas method de- of inventories. comprising cereals, starchy roots, scribed in the technical notes for Gross domestic saving shows the sugar cane, sugar beet, pulses, Table 1 and thus are not compa- amount of gross domestic in- edible oils, nuts, fruits, vegeta- rable with the figures in that table. vestment financed from domestic bles, livestock, and livestock The agricultural sector comprises output. Comprising public and products. Quantities of food pro- agriculture, forestry, hunting, and private saving, it is gross domes- duction are measured net of fishing. The industrial sector com- tic investment plus the net ex- 164 ports of goods and nonfactor national currencies, converted to may be overestimates of the de- services. 1975 dollars. pendence on imported energy. Exports of goods and nonfactor To calculate gross manufacturing services represent the value of all output per capita, ratios of gross goods and nonfactor services sold output to value added in manu- Table 8. Growth of merchandise to the rest of the world; they facturing, derived from various trade include merchandise, freight, in- issues of the UN Yearbook of In- surance, travel, and other non- dustrial Statistics, were applied to The statistics on merchandise factor services. The value of factor the World Bank's data on value trade are from UN publications services, such as investment re- added in manufacturing. Per cap- and the UN trade data system, ceipts and workers' remittances ita values were then calculated by supplemented by statistics from from abroad, is excluded. using midyear estimates of pop- the UN Conference on Trade and The resource balance is the dif- ulation. Development (UNCTAD), the In- ference between exports and im- ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), ports of goods and nonfactor and in a few cases World Bank services. country documentation. National accounts series in do- Table 7. Commercial energy Merchandise exports and imports mestic currency units were used cover, with some exceptions, all to compute the indicators in these The data on energy generally are international changes in owner- tables. Whereas the growth rates from UN sources. They refer to ship of merchandise passing in Table 4 were calculated from commercial forms of primary en- across customs borders. Exports constant price series, the shares ergy: coal and lignite, petroleum, are valued f.o.b. (free on board), of GDP in Table 5 were calculated natural gas and natural gas liq- imports c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and from current price series. uids, and hydroelectric and nu- freight), unless otherwise speci- The summary measures in Table clear powerall converted into fied in the foregoing sources. 5 are weighted by GDP in current coal equivalents. The use of fire- These values are in current dol- dollars for the years in question. wood and other traditional fuels, lars. though substantial in some de- The growth rates of merchandise veloping countries, is not taken exports and imports are in real terms into account because reliable and and calculated from quantum Table 6. Industrialization comprehensive data are not avail- (volume) indices of exports and able. imports. For most developing The percentage distribution of value The summary measures of economies these indices are from added among manufacturing in- growth rates of energy production the UNCTAD Handbook of Inter- dustries was calculated from data are weighted by volumes of pro- national Trade and Development obtained from the UN Indus- duction in 1974; those of growth Statistics and supplementary data trial Development Organization rates of energy consumption, by that show revisions. For indus- (UNIDO), with the base values volumes of consumption in 1974; trial economies the indices are expressed in 1975 dollars. those of energy consumption per from the UN Yearbook of Interna- The classification of manufac- capita, by population. tional Trade Statistics and the UN turing industries is in accord with Energy imports refer to the dol- Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. the UN International Standard In- lar value of energy importsRe- The terms of trade, or the net dustrial Classification of All Eco- vised Standard International Trade barter terms of trade, are calcu- nomic Activities (ISIC). Food and Classification (SITC) Section 3 lated as the ratio of a country's agriculture comprise ISIC Major and are expressed as a percentage index of export unit values to that Groups 311, 313, and 314; textiles of earnings from merchandise ex- of import unit values. The terms- and clothing 321-24; machinery and ports. The summary measures are of-trade index numbers shown for transport equipment 382-84; and weighted by merchandise exports 1960 and 1980, with 1975 = 100, chemicals 351 and 352. Other man- in current dollars. thus indicate changes in export ufactu ring comprises ISIC Major Because data on energy im- prices in relation to import prices. Division 3, less all of the above. ports do not permit a distinction The unit value indices are from The figures for value added in between petroleum imports for the same sources cited above for manufacturing are from the World fuel and for use in the petrochem- the growth rates of exports and Bank's national accounts series in icals industry, these percentages imports. 165 Tables 9 and 10. Structure of sidual from the total value of Table 13. Balance of payments merchandise trade manufactured imports, represent and debt service ratios SITC Sections 5 to 9 less Section The shares in these tables are de- 7 and Division 68. The current account balance is the rived from trade values in current The summary measures in Table difference between (i) exports of dollars reported in UN trade tapes 9 are weighted by merchandise goods and services plus inflows and the UN Yearbook of International exports in current dollars; those of unrequited official and private Trade Statistics, supplemented by in Table 10, by merchandise im- transfers and (ii) imports of goods regular statistical publications of the ports in current dollars. and services plus unrequited UN and the IMF. transfers to the rest of the world. Merchandise exports and imports Interest payments on external public are defined in the technical notes and publicly guaranteed debt are those for Table 8. on the disbursed portion of out- Table 11. Origin and destination In the categorization of exports of merchandise exports standing public and publicly in Table 9, fuels, minerals, and met- guaranteed medium- and long- als are the commodities in SITC Merchandise exports are defined in term debt plus commitment (Revised) Section 3, Divisions 27 the technical notes for Table 8. All charges on undisbursed debt. The and 28, and the nonferrous met- trade shares in this table are based current account estimates are from als of Division 68. Other primary on statistics on the value of trade IMF data files; estimates of inter- corn mod ities comprise SITC Sec- in current dollars from the UN est payments are from the World tions 0, 1, 2, and 4 (food and live and the IMF. Unallocated exports Bank Debt Reporting System. animals, beverages and tobacco, are distributed among the econ- Debt service is the sum of inter- inedible crude materials, oils, fats, omy groups in proportion to their est payments and repayments of and waxes) less Divisions 27 and respective shares of allocable principal on external public and 28 (minerals, crude fertilizer, and trade. Industrial market economies publicly guaranteed medium- and metalliferous ores). Textiles and also include Gibraltar, Iceland, and long-term debt. Debt service data clothing represent SITC Divisions Luxembourg; high-income oil ex- are from the World Bank Debt Re- 65 and 84 (textiles, yarns, fabrics, porters also include Qatar. porting System. The ratio of debt and clothing). Machinery and The summary measures are service to exports of goods and transport equipment are the com- weighted by merchandise exports services is one of several rules of modities in SITC Section 7. Other in current dollars. thumb commonly used to assess manufactures, calculated as the re- the ability to service debt. The debt sidual from the total value of service ratios in the table do not manufactured exports, represent cover unguaranteed private debt, SITC Sections 5 to 9 less Sec- Table 12. Origin and destination which for some borrowers is sub- tion 7 and Divisions 65, 68, and of manufactured exports stantial; the debt contracted for 84. purchases of military equipment In the categorization of imports The data in this table are from the is also excluded because it usually in Table 10, food commodities are United Nations and are among is not reported. The average ra- those in SITC (Revised) Sections those used to compute special tios of debt service to GNP for the 0, 1, and 4 and in Division 22 (food Table B in the UN Yearbook of In- economy groups are weighted by and live animals, beverages and ternational Trade Statistics. Manu- GNP in current dollars. The av- tobacco, oils, and fats). Fuels are factured goods are the commodities erage ratios of debt service to ex- the commodities in SITC Section in SITC (Revised) Sections 5 ports of goods and services are 3 (mineral fuels, lubricants, and through 9 (chemicals and related weighted by exports of goods and related materials). Other primary products, manufactured articles, services in current dollars. commodities comprise SITC Sec- machinery, and transport equip- The World Bank Debt Report- tion 2 (crude materials excluding ment) excluding Division 68 (non- ing System is concerned solely fuels), less Division 22 (oilseeds ferrous metals). with developing economies and and nuts) plus Division 68 (non- The economy groups are the does not collect data on external ferrous metals). Machinery and same as those in Table 11. The debt for other groups of borrow- transport equipment are the com- summary measures are weighted ers. Nor are comprehensive com- modities in SITC Section 7. Other by manufactured exports in cur- parable data available from other manufactures, calculated as the re- rent dollars. sources. 166 Table 14. Flow of external ounce in 1970 and $589.50 an the summary for ODA from capital ounce in 1980. The data on hold- OECD countries were converted ings of international reserves are to 1978 prices using the dollar GNP Data on the gross inflow and re- from IMF data files. The reserve deflator. This deflator is based on payment of principal (amortization) levels for 1970 and 1980 refer to price increases in OECD coun- of public and publicly guaranteed the end of the year indicated and tries (excluding Greece, Portugal, medium- and long-term loans are are in current dollars. The reserve Spain, and Turkey) measured in from the World Bank Debt Re- holdings at the end of 1980 are dollars. It takes into account the porting System. The net inflow is also expressed in the number of parity changes between the dollar the gross inflow less the repay- months of imports of goods and and national currencies. For ex- ment of principal. services they could pay for, with ample, when the dollar depre- Net direct private investment is the imports at the average level for ciates, price increases measured net amount invested or rein- 1979 or 1980. The summary meas- in national currencies have to be vested by nonresidents in enter- ures are weighted by imports of adjusted upward by the amount prises in which they or other goods and services in current of the depreciation to obtain price nonresidents exercise significant dollars. increases in dollars. managerial control. These net fig- The table, in addition to show- ures also take into account the ing totals for OPEC, shows totals value of direct investment abroad Table 16. Official development for the Organization of Arab Pe- by residents. IMF data files were assistance from OECD and troleum Exporting Countries used in compiling these esti- OPEC members (OAPEC). The donor members of mates. OAPEC are Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Official development assistance (ODA) Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and consists of net disbursements of United Arab Emirates. ODA data Table 15. External public debt loans and grants made at conces- for OPEC and OAPEC were also and international reserves sional financial terms by official obtained from the OECD. agencies of the members of the External public debt outstanding rep- Development Assistance Com- resents the amount of public and mittee (DAC) of the Organisation Table 17. Population growth, publicly guaranteed loans that past and projected, and for Economic Co-operation and hypothetical stationary have been disbursed, net of can- Development (OECD) and mem- population celed loan commitments and re- bers of the Organization of Petro- payments of principal. The data leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) The growth rates of population are refer to the end of the year indi- with the objective of promoting period averages calculated from cated and are from the World Bank economic development and wel- midyear populations. The sum- Debt Reporting System. In esti- fare. It includes the value of tech- mary measures are weighted by mating external public debt as a nical cooperation and assistance. population in 1970. percentage of GNP, GNP was All data shown were supplied by The projections of population for converted from national curren- the OECD. 1990 and 2000, and to the year in cies to dollars at the average of- Amounts shown are net dis- which it will eventually become ficial exchange rate for the year bursements to developing coun- stationary, were made for each in question. The summary meas- tries and multilateral institutions. economy separately. Starting with ures are weighted by GNP in The disbursements to multilateral information on total population current dollars. institutions are now reported for by age and sex, fertility rates, and Gross international reserves com- all DAC members on the basis of mortality rates in the base year prise holdings of gold, special the date of issues of notes; some 1980, these parameters were pro- drawing rights (SDRs), the re- DAC members previously re- jected at five-year intervals on the serve position of IMF members in ported on the basis of the date of basis of generalized assumptions the Fund, and holdings of foreign encashment. Net bilateral flows to until the population became sta- exchange under the control of low-income countries exclude un- tionary. The base-year estimates monetary authorities. The gold allocated bilateral flows and all are from updated computer print- component of these reserves is disbursements to multilateral in- outs of UN, World Population Trends valued throughout at year-end stitutions. and Prospects by Country, 1950-2025, London prices: that is, $37.37 an The nominal values shown in and from the World Bank, the 167 Population Council, the US Bu- rollment ratio for females was For all the projections, it was reau of the Census, and recent above or below 70 percent. In each assumed that international migra- national censuses. group a set of annual increments tion would have no effect. The net reproduction rate (NRR) in female life expectancy was as- The estimates of the hypo- indicates the number of daugh- sumed, depending on the female thetical size of the stationary pop- ters that a newborn girl will bear life expectancy in 1975-80. For a ulation, the assumed year of during her lifetime, assuming fixed given life expectancy at birth, the reaching replacement-level fertil- age-specific fertility rates and a annual increments during the ity, and the year of reaching a fixed set of mortality rates. projection period are larger in stationary population are specu- The NRR thus measures the ex- economies having a higher pri- lative. They should not be regarded tent to which a cohort of newborn mary-school enrollment ratio in as predictions. They are included girls will reproduce themselves 1975-80 and a life expectancy of to provide a summary indication under given schedules of fertility up to 60 years. At higher life ex- of the long-run implications of re- and mortality. An NRR of 1 in- pectancies, the increments are the cent trends on the basis of highly dicates that fertility is at replace- same. stylized assumptions. A fuller de- ment level: at this rate child- To project the fertility rates, the scription of the methods and as- bearing women, on the average, first step was to estimate the year sumptions used to calculate the bear only enough daughters to re- in which fertility would reach re- estimates is available from the place themselves in the popula- placement level. These estimates Population, Health, and Nutri- tion. A population continues to are speculative and are based on tion Department of the World grow after replacement-level fer- information on trends in crude Bank. tility has been reached because its birth rates (defined in the notes past higher birth rates will have for Table 18), total fertility rates produced an age distribution with (also defined in the notes for Table Table 18. Demographic and a relatively high proportion of 18), female life expectancy at birth, fertility-related indicators women in, or still to enter, the and the performance of family reproductive ages. The time taken planning programs. For most The crude birth and death rates in- for a country's population to be- economies it was assumed that the dicate the number of live births come stationary after reaching re- total fertility rate would decline and deaths per thousand popu- placement-level fertility thus de- between 1980 and the year of lation in a year. They are from the pends on its age structure and reaching a net reproduction rate same sources mentioned in the previous fertility patterns. of 1, after which fertility would technical notes for Table 17. Per- A stationary population is one in remain at replacement level. For centage changes are computed which age- and sex-specific mor- Sub-Saharan Africa, total fertility from unrounded data. tality rates have not changed over rates were assumed to remain The total fertility rate represents a long period, while age-specific constant until 1990-95 and then the number of children that would fertility rates have simultaneously to decline until replacement level be born per woman, if she were remained at replacement level was reached. In several industrial to live to the end of her child- (NRR = 1). In such a population, economies, fertility is already be- bearing years and bear children the birth rate is constant and equal low replacement level. Because a at each age in accord with pre- to the death rate, the age struc- population will not remain sta- vailing age-specific fertility rates. ture also is constant, and the tionary if its net reproduction rate The rates given are from the same growth rate is zero. is other than 1, it was necessary sources mentioned in the tech- To make the projections, as- to assume that fertility rates in nical notes for Table 17. sumptions about future mortality these economies would regain re- The percentage of married women rates were made in terms of female placement levels in order to make using contraceptives refers only to life expectancy at birth (that is, estimates nf the hypothetical sta- married women of child-bearing about the number of years a new- tionary population for them. For age (15-44 years). These data are born girl would live if subject to the sake of consistency with the mainly derived from Dorothy the mortality risks prevailing for other estimates, the total fertility Nortman and Ellen Hofstatter, the cross-section of population at rates in the industrial economies Population and Family Planning Pro- the time of her birth). Economies were assumed to increase to re- grams: A Factbook (New York: Pop- were first divided according to placement level by 2000 and then ulation Council, various issues); whether their primary-school en- to remain constant. Dorothy Nortman, "Changing 168 Contraceptive Patterns: A Global lation estimates may be inappro- sues of the UN Demographic Year- Perspective," Population Bulletin, priate for some economies in book and UN, "Infant Mortality: vol. 32, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: which there have been important World Estimates and Projections, Population Reference Bureau, changes in unemployment and 1950-2025," Population Bulletin of August 1977); and Office of Pop- underemployment, in interna- the United Nations, no. 14 (forth- ulation, Family Planning Service tional and internal migration, or coming 1982)and from the World Statistics, Annual Report 1976 in both. The labor force projec- Bank. (Washington, D.C.: US Agency tions for 1980-2000 should thus The child death rate is the num- for International Development). be treated with caution. ber of deaths of children aged The data refer to a variety of years, 1-4 per 1,000 children in the same generally not more than two years age group in a given year. Esti- distant from those specified. Table 20. Urbanization mates were based on the data on All summary measures are infant mortality and on the rela- weighted by population. The data on urban population as a tion between the infant mortality percentage of total population are from rate and the child death rate im- the UN ( Patterns of Urban and Ru- plicit in the appropriate Coale- Table 19. Labor force ral Population Growth, Population Demeny Model life tables; see Studies, no. 68, 1980), supple- Ansley J. Coale and Paul The population of working age refers mented by data from the World Demeny, Regional Model Life Tables to the population aged 15-64. The Bank and from various issues of and Stable Populations (Princeton, estimates are based on the pop- the UN Demographic Yearbook. N.J.: Princeton University Press, ulation estimates of the World The growth rates of urban popu- 1966). Bank for 1980 and previous years. lation were calculated from the The summary measures in this The summary measures are World Bank's population esti- table are weighted by population. weighted by population. mates; the estimates of urban The labor force comprises eco- population shares were calcu- nomically active persons, includ- lated from the sources cited above. Table 22. Health-related ing the armed forces and the Data on urban agglomeration indicators unemployed, but excluding are also from the United Nations. housewives, students, and other Because the estimates in this The estimates of population per economically inactive groups. Ag- table are based on different na- physician and nursing person were riculture, industry, and services are tional definitions of what is "ur- derived from World Health Or- defined in the same manner as in ban," cross-country comparisons ganization (WHO) data, some of Table 2. The estimates of the sec- should be interpreted with cau- which have been revised to reflect toral distribution of the labor force tion. new information. They also take in 1960 are from International La- The summary measures for ur- into account revised estimates of bour Office (ILO), Labour Force Es- ban population as a percentage of population. Nursing persons in- timates and Projections, 1950-2000; total population are weighted by clude graduate, practical, assist- most of those for 1980 are geo- total population; the other sum- ant, and auxiliary nurses; this is metric extrapolations of ILO es- mary measures in this table are the first year auxiliary nurses have timates for 1960 and 1970 in the weighted by urban population. been included, thus better esti- same source. The summary meas- mating the availability of nursing ures are weighted by labor force. care. Because definitions of nurs- The labor force growth rates were Table 21. Indicators related to ing personnel varyand because derived from the Bank's popula- life expectancy the data shown are for a variety tion projections and ILO data on of years, generally not more than activity rates, again from the Life expectancy.at birth is defined in two years distant from those source cited above. The summary the technical notes for Table 1. specifiedthe data for these two measures for 1960-70 and 1970- The infant mortality rate is the indicators are not strictly com- 80 are weighted by labor force in number of infants who die before parable. 1970; those for 1980-2000, by pro- reaching one year of age, per 1,000 The percentage of total population jections of labor force in 1980. live births in a given year. The with access to safe water, estimated The application of ILO activity data are from a variety of by the WHO, is the proportion of rates to the Bank's latest popu- sourcesincluding different is- persons with reasonable access to 169 safe water, which is defined as ceed 100 percent because some struction, recruiting, and train- including treated surface water pupils may be below or above the ing. Also falling under this and such untreated but uncon- official primary-school age. category is expenditure for taminated water as that from The data on number enrolled strengthening the public services boreholes, springs, and sanitary in secondary school were calculated to meet wartime emergencies, for wells. in the same manner, with sec- training civil defense personnel, The daily calorie supply per capita ondary-school age generally con- and for foreign military aid and was calculated by dividing the sidered to be 12-17 years. contributions to military organi- calorie equivalent of the food sup- The data on number enrolled in zations and alliances. plies in an economy by the pop- higher education are from UNESCO. Education expenditure com- ulation. Food supplies comprise The adult literacy rate is defined prises expenditure for the provi- domestic production, imports less in the technical notes for Table 1. sion, management, inspection, exports, and changes in stocks; The summary measures in this and support of preprimary, pri- they exclude animal feed, seeds table are weighted by population. mary, and secondary schools; of for use in agriculture, and food universities and colleges; and of lost in processing and distribu- vocational, technical, and other tion. The daily calorie requirement Table 24. Defense and social training institutions by central per capita refers to the calories expenditure governments. Also included is needed to sustain a person at nor- expenditure on the general admin- mal levels of activity and health, All data on central government istration and regulation of the taking into account age and sex transactions are from the IMF education system; on research into distributions, average body Government Finance Statistics Year- its objectives, organization, ad- weights, and environmental tem- book and IMF data files. These ministration; and methods; and peratures. Both sets of estimates transactions include current and on such subsidiary services as are from the Food and Agricul- capital (development) expendi- transport, school meals, and med- ture Organization. ture. The inadequate statistical ical and dental services in schools. The summary measures in this coverage of state, provincial, and Health expenditure covers pub- table are weighted by population. local governments and the non- lic expenditure on hospitals, availability of data for these lower medical and dental centers, and levels of government has dictated clinics with a major medical com- Table 23. Education the use of only central govern- ponent; on national health and ment data. This may seriously medical insurance schemes; and The data in this table refer to a understate or distort the statisti- on family planning and pre- variety of years, generally not cal portrayal of the allocation of ventive care. Also included is ex- more than two years distant from resources for various purposes, penditure on the general admin- those specified, and are mostly especially in large countries where istration and regulation of relevant from UNESCO. lower levels of government have government departments, hospi- The data on nuinlk'r enrolled in considerable autonomy and are tals and clinics, health and sani- priPnary school refer to estimates of responsible for a large number of tation, and national health and total, male, and female enroll- social functions. medical insurance schemes. ment of students of all ages in Central government expenditure It must be emphasized that the primary school; they are ex- covers that by all government de- data presented, especially those pressed as percentages of the to- partments, offices, establish- for education and health, are not tal, male, or female populations ments, and other bodies that are comparable for a number of rea- of primary-school age to give gross agencies or instruments of the sons. In many economies private primary enrollment ratios. Al- central authority of a country. It health and education services are though primary-school age is does not necessarily comprise all substantial; in others public serv- generally considered to be 6li public expenditure. ices represent the major compo- years, the differences in country Defense expenditure covers all nent of total expenditure but may practices in the ages and duration expenditure, whether by defense be financed by lower levels of of schooling are reflected in the or other departments, for the government. Great caution should ratios given. For countries with maintenance of military forces, therefore be exercised in using the universal primary education, the including the purchase of military data for cross-economy compari- gross enrollment ratios may cx- supplies and equipment, con- sons. 170 The summary measures for de- of a joint project of the World Bank come. These surveys use a variety fense expenditure as a percentage and the Economic and Social of income concepts and sample of GNP are weighted by GNP in Commission for Asia and the Pa- designs. Furthermore, the cover- current dollars; those for defense cific. The estimates for Latin age of many of these surveys is expenditure as a percentage of American countries other than too limited to provide reliable central government expenditure, Mexico come from the results of nationwide estimates of income by central government expendi- two joint projects of the World distribution. Thus, although the ture in current dollars. The other Bank, one with the ILO, the other estimates shown are considered summary measures in this table with the Economic Commission the best available, they do not are weighted by population. for Latin America. Those for Mex- avoid all these problems and ico are the results from the 1977 should be interpreted with ex- Household Budget Survey. treme caution. Data for industrial market The scope of the indicator is Table 25. Income distribution economies other than the Neth- similarly limited. Because house- erlands are from Malcolm Saw- holds vary in size, a distribution The data in this table refer to the yer, Income Distribution in OECD in which households are ranked distribution of total disposable Countries (OECD Occasional according to per capita household household income accruing to Studies, July 1976); the joint proj- income, not according to their to- percentile groups of households ect of the ILO and the World Bank; tal household income, is superior ranked by total household in- and the UN Statistical Office, A for many purposes. The dis- come. The distributions cover ru- Survey of National Sources of Income tinction is important because ral and urban areas and refer to Distribution Statistics (Statistical households with low per capita different years between 1966 and Papers, Series M, no. 72, 1981). incomes frequently are large 1980. Data for the Netherlands are from households, whose total income The estimates for developing that country's statistical office. may be relatively high. Informa- economies in Asia and Africa are Because the collection of data tion on the distribution of per from the results of a joint project on income distribution has not capita household income exists, of the World Bank and the Inter- been systematically organized and however, for only a few countries. national Labour Office (ILO). integrated with the official statis- The World Bank has launched the Those for Turkey, Hong Kong, tical system in many countries, Living Standards Measurement Malaysia, and the Republic of Ko- estimates were typically derived Study to develop procedures and rea are from data gathered by the from surveys designed for other applications that can assist coun- World Bank from national sources purposes, most often consumer tries in improving their collection but not adjusted. The estimates expenditure surveys, which also and analysis of data on income dis- for Sri Lanka are from the results collect some information on in- tribution. 171 Bibliography of data sources National A System of National Accounts. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social accounts and Affairs, 1968. economic Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. New York: UN Department of International Economic indicators and Social Affairs, various issues. Statistical Yearbook. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. Production Yearbook. Rome: FAO, various issues. World Bank Atlas, 1981. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982. World Bank data files. Energy World Energy Supplies, 1950-74, 1972 -76, and 1973-78. UN Statistical Papers, Series J, nos. 19, 21, and 22. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1974, 1978, and 1979. Yearbook of World Energy Statistics, 1979. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1981. Trade Direction of Trade. Washington, D.C.: IMF, various issues. International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C.: IMF, various issues. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. New York: UN Conference on Trade and Development, various issues. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. United Nations trade tapes. Balance of Balance of Payments Manual. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1977. payments, International Monetary Fund balance-of-payments data files. capital flows, Development Co-operation. Paris: OECD, various annual issues. and debt World Bank Debt Reporting System. Population World Population Trends and Prospects by Country, 1950-2025: Summary Report of the 1980 Assessment. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1980. Demographic Yearbook. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. United Nations population tapes. World Population: 1979. Washington, D.C.: US Bureau of the Census, International Demographic Data Center, 1980. World Bank Atlas, 1981. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1982. World Bank data files. Labor force Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000. 2nd ed. Geneva: ILO, 1977. International Labour Office tapes. World Bank data files. Social Demographic Yearbook. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, indicators various issues. Statistical Yearbook. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. Compendium of Social Statistics: 1977. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1980. Statistical Yearbook. Paris: UNESCO, various issues. World Health Statistics Annual. Geneva: WHO, various issues. World Health Statistics Report. Special Issue on Water and Sanitation, vol. 29, no. 10. Geneva: WHO, 1976. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 1981. Vol. V. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1981. World Bank data files. 172 The World Bank World Development Report has been published annually by The World Bank since 1978. Part I of World Development Report 1982 reviews development prospects in the international economy and supplements the extensive discussion of adjustment issues in the 1981 Report. It finds that, although international prospects have worsened over the past year, during the remainder of the decade the middle-income countries should be able to continue narrowing the income gap between themselves and the industrial countries. The prospects for many of the low-income countries, however, remain a matter of grave concern. Part 11 of the 1982 Report concentrates on agriculture, which remains the chief source of income for close to two-thirds of the population in developing countries and for the vast majority of the world's poor. Informing the discussion is the experience gained by The World Bank in helping to finance some 800 agicultural and rural developmnt projects in more than 70 countresexperience supported by its broad, intensive programs of economic, scientific, and social research. Numerous tables and multicolor maps and graphics supplement the main body of the Report; case studies are interspersed to provide analyses directly related to the substance of the text. The final portion of the Report comprises "World Development Indicators," 25 two-page tables containing economic and social profiles of more than 120 countries. Commentary on earlier editions "[A] most remarkable publication. lt is the nearest thing to having an annual report on the present st.te of the r1met and the people who live on it....It is going to b. the escential almanac for monitoring the way we are going, and where we are going."The Guardian "The sooner such changes [as the Report recommends} are initiated by policymakers, the brighter will be the prospect of alle;iation of poverty in the developing countries of the world." The Bangladesh Observer "An authoritative and deeply illuminatLig summary of worldwide progress against poverty, and of the intricate relationshipsnot all of them economicon which it depends."The Washing/on Post "Essential reading for any individual or organization interested in or involved with developing countries. "The Sidan Progress "[An] annual contribution to the debate on man's economic future....A sober and balanced presentatiei."The Financial Times (London) "[The] report dives an historical perspective to the past decade and draws lessons applicable to the coming years. "Financial Gazette (Zimbabwe) ISBN 0-19-503224-i ISSN 0163-5085