Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004329 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-53510, IDA-H6040, IDA-H4780, TF-098040, TF-016065, TF-094353) ON CREDIT 53510 IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 12.80 MILLION (US$19.6 MILLION EQUIVALENT) FROM PILOT CRISIS RESPONSE WINDOW GRANT H6040 IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.6 MILLION (US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) GRANT H4780 IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 29.5 MILLION (US$44.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND LIBERIA RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND GRANT TF-098040 IN THE AMOUNT OF US$27.0 MILLION GRANT TF-016065 IN THE AMOUNT OF US$9.4 MILLION GRANT TF-094353 IN THE AMOUNT OF US$9.2 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR THE LR-URBAN AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT ( P113099 ) December 19, 2017 Transport and ICT Global Practice Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective July 1, 2017) Currency Unit = Liberian Dollar (LRD) At Appraisal LRD 64.00 = US$1 US$1 = SDR 0.67 At ICR LRD 93.50 = US$1 US$1 = SDR 0.72 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AADT Annual Average Daily Traffic AfDB African Development Bank AfT Agenda for Transformation AF1 First Additional Financing AF2 Second Additional Financing AIDP Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project CAS Country Assistance Strategy DBT Design-Build-Transfer DBFMOT Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate-Transfer EPA Environmental Protection Agency EIP Emergency Infrastructure Project EPP Emergency Project Paper EU European Union EVD Ebola Virus Disease FCV Fragility Conflict and Violence FM Financial Management FUF Fuel Unloading Facility GDP Gross Domestic Product GOL Government of Liberia HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries IA Impact Analysis ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report ICT Information and Communication Technology IFC International Finance Corporation IIU Infrastructure Implementation Unit IRI International Roughness Index IRR Internal Rate of Return LIBRAMP Liberia Road Asset Management Project LIRP Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project LPRC Liberia Petroleum Refining Company LRTF Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOF Ministry of Finance MPW Ministry of Public Works NPA National Port Authority NPV Net Present Value OPRC Output and Performance-Based Road Contract PAP Project-Affected Person PDO Project Development Objective PFMU Project Financial Management Unit PPP Public-Private Partnership PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy RAP Resettlement Action Plan RAI Rural Accessibility Index RMF Road Maintenance Fund SCF Standard Conversion Factor SECRAMP South Eastern Corridor Road Asset Management Project SIU Special Implementation Unit SMP Stella Maris Polytechnic TA Technical Assistance TSG Technical Support Group TU Tubman University UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UL University of Liberia URIRP Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Henry G. R. Kerali Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Practice Manager: Benedictus Eijbergen Task Team Leader(s): Kulwinder Singh Rao ICR Main Contributor: Papa Mamadou Fall TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET .................................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ...................................................................6 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ................................................................................................................... 6 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ............................................. 9 II. OUTCOME ................................................................................................................................ 10 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ...................................................................................................................... 10 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ............................................................................................... 11 C. EFFICIENCY ...................................................................................................................................... 13 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ........................................................................... 15 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY).................................................................................... 15 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME............................................. 16 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ............................................................................................ 16 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ..................................................................................... 19 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ............... 21 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ................................................................... 22 B. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARD, SOCIAL SAFEGUARD, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE .................. 22 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ..................................................................................................................... 24 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ............................................................................................... 25 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 26 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................................ 28 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ...................................... 35 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................................ 37 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 38 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ................. 48 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) .................................................................................. 49 ANNEX 7. MAP ................................................................................................................................. 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name LR-URBAN AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE P113099 REHABILITATION PROJECT ( P113099 ) Country Financing Instrument Liberia Emergency Recovery Loan Original EA Category Revised EA Category Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B) Related Projects Relationship Project Approval Product Line Additional Financing P121770-Liberia - 29-Jun-2010 IBRD/IDA Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project - Additional Financing Additional Financing P144435-Liberia Urban 24-Jan-2014 IBRD/IDA Rural Infrastr. Rehab. Additional Financing Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Ministry Of Finance Infrastructure Implementation Unit Page 1 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO The project supports government's goal of improving road access in Monrovia and targeted rural areas, as well as improving institutional structure for technical management of the road sector. PDO as stated in the legal agreement The objective of the project is to support the Recipient's efforts to improve road access in the city of Monrovia and targeted rural areas, as well as to improve the institutional capacity for the management of the Recipient's roads sector. FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing 44,000,000 43,991,801 45,529,569 IDA-H4780 9,200,000 9,200,000 9,200,000 TF-94353 20,000,000 19,998,380 20,613,871 IDA-H6040 27,000,000 25,222,853 25,222,853 TF-98040 19,600,000 19,594,514 17,875,487 IDA-53510 9,400,000 8,419,780 8,419,780 TF-16065 Total 129,200,000 126,427,328 126,861,560 Non-World Bank Financing Borrower 0 0 0 Total 0 0 0 Total Project Cost 129,200,000 126,427,327 126,861,560 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 21-Apr-2009 21-Jul-2009 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2017 Page 2 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 29-Jun-2010 5.65 Additional Financing 24-Jan-2014 63.53 Additional Financing 24-Nov-2015 69.74 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Satisfactory Highly Satisfactory Substantial RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 28-Jun-2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.13 02 22-Dec-2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.67 03 10-Jun-2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.63 04 12-Mar-2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 11.40 05 29-Jan-2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 37.52 06 18-Oct-2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 50.34 07 27-Mar-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 53.08 08 20-Oct-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 63.53 09 26-Apr-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 63.53 10 13-Nov-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 61.23 11 02-Jun-2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 63.73 12 15-Oct-2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 69.13 13 24-May-2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 76.95 14 09-Nov-2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 76.57 15 26-May-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 84.02 Page 3 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Transportation 100 Urban Transport 39 Public Administration - Transportation 15 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 46 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 18 Jobs 8 Job Creation 8 Public Private Partnerships 10 Social Development and Protection 10 Fragility, Conflict and Violence 10 Conflict Prevention 5 Post-conflict reconstruction 5 Urban and Rural Development 81 Urban Development 63 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 63 Rural Development 18 Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 18 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Makhtar Diop Country Director: Ishac Diwan Henry G. R. Kerali Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Page 4 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) Practice Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Benedictus Eijbergen Task Team Leader(s): Gylfi Palsson Kulwinder Singh Rao ICR Contributing Author: Papa Mamadou Fall Page 5 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Context 1. At the time of appraisal in 2009, Liberia had a population of 3.2 million and had experienced high real gross domestic product (GDP) growth since the end of its 14-year civil war in 2003. It remained one of Africa’s poorest nations, with a GDP per capita of approximately US$190. Liberia reached Decision Point1 under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in March 2008, after clearing its arrears to IDA and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in December 2007 and the International Monetary Fund in March 2008. 2. The road infrastructure was dilapidated. Years of neglect during and after the civil war left the country's infrastructure dilapidated: the road network had severely deteriorated, and numerous bridges had collapsed because of lack of maintenance, thus limiting population movement and access to services. Significant funds2 were urgently needed to preserve the road and bridges assets of Liberia. Furthermore, inadequate governance, low implementation capacity, and highly inefficient sector management significantly hampered the road sector. 3. Initial reconstruction efforts in Liberia consisted of small community-based rebuilding projects implemented by nongovernmental organizations and by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Thus, critical infrastructure needs were yet to be addressed, and Liberia faced an acute fundamental infrastructure deficit that severely constrained economic growth and recovery. After the establishment of a democratically elected government in 2006, at a critical time when the country was ineligible for IDA credits because of its nonaccrual status, IDA contributed significantly to the reconstruction efforts of the Government of Liberia (GOL) through a series of small emergency operations aimed at reestablishing necessary infrastructure and rebuilding institutional capacity. The first World Bank Group project after the conflict, a US$30 million initial grant for the Emergency Infrastructure Project (EIP), served as the primary vehicle to work out the legal basis for assistance to a nonaccrual member. 4. In 2007, the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) established a Special Implementation Unit (SIU) to undertake infrastructure works. The newly established SIU could not undertake highly technical works on the scale necessary to rebuild the country’s primary road infrastructure. SIU, whose limited capacity was stretched very thin (cf. paragraph 70), also lacked the autonomy, flexibility, and capacity to efficiently manage the rapidly evolving program of donor projects. Furthermore, as an emergency coordinating structure, SIU did not have the mandate to conduct investment planning, which was considered a key deficiency within the MPW. 5. The European Union (EU) and several Development Partners3 established the Liberia Reconstruction Trust Fund (LRTF) in 2007 as a mechanism to pool donor funds for key infrastructure rehabilitation in Liberia. LRTF was expected to provide US$120 million during the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) period of 2008-2011, to assist the government in preparing and implementing 1 Reaching this point enables the GOL to benefit from interim relief under the HIPC Initiative. 2 The GOL estimated that US$1.6 billion was needed over 2008–2011 to restore basic infrastructure. 3 Germany, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Britain and the World Bank’s Low Income Country Under Stress (LICUS) Trust Fund. Page 6 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) infrastructure reconstruction. Projects were programmed per GOL’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) priorities and integrated into the IDA portfolio in order to exploit synergies with existing World Bank infrastructure projects. 6. In 2008, the GOL made restoration of basic infrastructure, primarily roads, its priority in the context of its first PRS. At the same time, with Bank's support, the GOL prepared a National Transport Policy and Strategy including an Investment Framework worth about US$1 billion to reestablish the country’s essential roads and bridges network. The IDA Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) jointly prepared with International Finance Corporation (IFC) and AfDB dated September, 2008 (IDA/Report No.47928-LR), endorsed government’s emphasis on infrastructure and sector management. In December 2008, LRTF approved US$9.2 million cofinancing of the proposed Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (URIRP). Theory of Change (Results Chain) 7. URIRP was designed to resolve outstanding infrastructure emergencies while focusing on road sector sustainability. On one hand, URIRP was a continuation of previous efforts by GOL and development partners to restore essential transport infrastructure services, and on the other hand, to support the gradual rebuilding of institutions and human capacities to manage the road sector professionally. As part of the institution building, an Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) was to be established under Ministry of Public Works (MPW) to replace the SIU. Recognizing the need for stable supply of fuel for transport, the GOL supported the construction of a Fuel Unloading Facility (FUF) in the port of Monrovia under the project. Further, the FUF was urgently needed to ensure secure import of fuel, the absence of which was considered a risk factor of renewed insecurity and social upheaval. Hence, the FUF construction also supported the Project Development Objectives (PDO) as disruptions in fuel supply would increase transport costs and operations. 8. The underlying assumptions for realization of the project’s theory of change (figure 1) were (a) increased interest of international contractors to come to Liberia to undertake works planned under the project and (b) willingness of international consultants to provide consulting services in Liberia in support of the complex reform agenda to be implemented by the project. Furthermore, the use of accelerated and streamlined procurement procedures was expected to ensure the timely materialization of the project’s outcomes through a flexible, rapid, and effective World Bank emergency response. Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 9. The PDO as stated in the Financial Agreement was to support the Recipient’s efforts to improve road access in the city of Monrovia and targeted rural areas, as well as to improve the institutional capacity for the management of the Recipient’s road sector. Key Expected Outcomes and Indicators 10. The original PDO indicators as specified in Annex 2 of the Emergency Project Paper (EPP) were: (i) Roads in good and fair condition in Monrovia (km, percentage); (ii) Average travel time between Cotton Tree and Bokay Town (minutes); (iii) Average travel time between Pleebo and Barclayville (minutes); and (iv) Legal and administrative framework for the establishment of road authority. 11. The First Additional Financing (AF1) added the following PDO core indicators: direct project beneficiaries (number) of which female (percentage) and share of rural population with access to an all- Page 7 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) season road (proportion). Also, under AF1, the PDO indicator relative to the travel time from Cotton Tree-to Bokay Town was revised to account for the additional 66 km of road rehabilitation from Bokay Town to Buchanan. The revised indicator is average travel time between Cotton Tree and Buchanan (minutes). The Second Additional Financing (AF2) increased the target for direct project beneficiaries to account for the additional activities financed by the project as described in table 2 below. Figure 1. Theory of Change of URIRP Components 12. The project consisted of the components described in Table 1 below. All activities were clearly linked to the PDO and key indicators. Table 1. Project components Component Activities Infrastructure Investments Rehabilitation of Monrovia city streets est. cost of US$49.65 million, Rehabilitation of Cotton Tree-Bokay Town road actual cost of US$108.15 million Construction of Caldwell Bridge and approaches Page 8 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) Rehabilitation of Pleebo-Barclayville road Rural road maintenance Rehabilitation of the road intersection of Vai Town Bridge and Tucker Bridge Construction of a new FUF in the Port of Monrovia Technical assistance (TA) for the establishment of the IIU Program Management and Capacity building to MPW to enhance administrative and technical capacity Institutional Support Operating cost of Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) est. cost of US$3.55 million, TA to MPW to develop a framework to enable a roads authority actual cost of US$18.30 million Capacity building of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Project audits, and monitoring and evaluation B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 13. The objectives of the project were not revised. Two AFs were approved as per table 2 below. Revised PDO Indicators 14. Changes to PDO indicators are listed in paragraph 11. Revised Components 15. Changes to initial components are listed in table 2 below. Table 2. Project changes Changes Description of changes/new activities First Additional  Component I: Works of Cotton Tree-Bokay Town extended by an additional 66 km to Financing (AF1) Buchanan; US$47 million  Results Framework: Inclusion of core indicators; and updating of results framework to Approved June 2010 reflect the scale-up works (cf. paragraph 11).  Component I: (i) Financing of contractually obligated inflation linked contract price adjustment for the Bokay Town to Buchanan road; (ii) Additional works for Monrovia city streets (upgrading of drainage system, signage); (iii) Financing of updated estimated costs of the Caldwell Bridge; (iv) Financing of updated cost of the new FUF in the Port of Monrovia.  Component II: (i) Conceptual designs and bidding documents for Second Additional construction/rehabilitation of the Ganta-Zwedru section along the Ganta-Fishtown- Financing (AF2) Harper road corridor; (ii) Detailed feasibility study and transaction advisory services for US$29 million the development of a dry inland port; (iii) TA to the University of Liberia (UL), the Stella Approved December Maris Polytechnic (SMP), and Tubman University (TU) in support of the overall 2013 infrastructure sector institutional capacity building; (iv) Partial costs of social and environmental mitigation measures, such as the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and similar, to mitigate the delays caused by lack of timely and adequate financing from the GOL.  Results Framework: Target of rural maintenance lowered to 132 km from 641 km.  First extension of closing date by 18 months from June 30, 2014 to December 31, 2015 to allow completion of above activities.  Second extension of closing date by an additional 18 months from December 31, 2015 Restructuring to June 30, 2017 to reflect the additional time extension of works contracts on account Approved November of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak; 2015  Total cumulative extension of 36 months. Page 9 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 16. Expenditure of US$1.5 million spent on the rehabilitation of 259 km of rural roads in the Bong, Nimba, and Lofa Counties under URIRP was reposted to a European Union grant (TF96385) to allow the GOL to utilize as much of the balance of the EU grant under the Agriculture and Infrastructure Development Project (AIDP, P104716) (cf. paragraph 78). Rationale for Changes and their implications on the Original Theory of Change 17. All the changes described in table 3 below were broadly consistent with URIRP’s PDO and original theory of change. Their goal was to scale-up the impacts of the project. Table 3. Rationale for changes Changes Rationale Works of Cotton Tree-Bokay Town Ensure a seamless continuation from Monrovia to the port of extended by an additional 66 km to Buchanan, the nation’s second-largest seaport and second most Buchanan. important center of economic growth. Study for the rehabilitation of the Support to the preparation of the proposed Southeastern Corridor Ganta-Zwedru section along the Road Asset Management Project (SECRAMP - P149279), which Ganta-Fishtown-Harper road corridor. pursues the same objectives as URIRP. Feasibility study and transaction Help the movement of goods from Monrovia to the hinterland on advisory services for the development newly rehabilitated roads using bigger trucks, thus lowering unit of a dry inland port. transport costs. TA to universities in support of the Help secure necessary sustainability of the (transport) sector in the overall infrastructure sector medium- and long-term horizons through focusing on local engineers institutional capacity building. trained in Liberia who are lacking the requisite skills due to inadequate training facilities, insufficient trained staff, and lack of financial resources at the tertiary level. II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating 18. The PDOs remain highly relevant. The overall objective of improving accessibility remains a top priority for the country as outlined in GOL’s National Vision Liberia Rising 2030 adopted in 2013 and in its 2013-17 medium term strategy dubbed Agenda for Transformation (AfT). The World Bank Group’s most recent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Liberia (FY 2013-17)4 highlighted the importance of transportation infrastructure to addressing the spatial isolation that limits the economic integration of the hinterland. Further, a recently completed Bank-financed spatial analysis5 of transport connectivity concluded that improved access to ports, rural accessibility to markets, and sustained accessibility within the Monrovia region were key growth-enabling factors for Liberia. Finally, per the Governance and Public Institutions Pillar of AfT, GOL remains committed to pursuing key sector reforms such as the 4 A new CPS is under preparation. 5 Liberia Spatial Analysis of Connectivity and Growth Potential. Page 10 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) improvement of road sector management and financing through the establishment of an autonomous road agency and a road maintenance fund (RMF). 19. Considering the above, the rating for Relevance of the PDO is High. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 20. Based on the assessment of what was achieved under the project against the specific project objectives described below, this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) rates the overall achievement of the PDOs as Substantial. Objective 1: Support government’s goal of improving road access in Monrovia and targeted rural areas 21. This PDO has two parts which are listed below. Improved road access in Monrovia 22. Under URIRP, reliable road access was restored in Monrovia, where about one-third of Liberia’s population lives. The project successfully rehabilitated a total of 24 km of collapsed city roads, which were nearly impassable in all seasons. Thus, the percentage of Monrovia city roads in good and fair condition rose from a baseline of 5 percent in 2009 to 35 percent by project closing. 23. The new Caldwell Bridge and its approaches were successfully constructed, linking the suburb of Caldwell to Bushrod Island and downtown Monrovia, thus improving access to the Port of Monrovia and ensuring that 40,000 poor urban dwellers do not suffer from a substantial increase (two hours) in travel time to economic opportunities in the city center due to the inoperability of the old Caldwell Bridge. 24. The project successfully reconstructed the road intersection and convergence of the new Vai Town Bridge and Tucker Bridge. Road geometry and safety conditions at the approach of the Vai Town Bridge have significantly improved with the proper channeling of the different movements, thus increasing capacity and safety. Improved road access in targeted rural areas 25. Road access in targeted rural areas has significantly improved beyond the project’s initial target. More specifically,  Rural accessibility in the area of influence of the Cotton Tree-Buchanan road has significantly improved. The project has successfully rehabilitated 82 km of primary roads linking Monrovia to the Port of Buchanan. Because the corridor cuts through densely populated rural areas, the rehabilitation works have provided access to an estimated 215,000 rural dwellers by connecting them to the primary network. Furthermore, the works have drastically reduced travel times between Monrovia (Cotton Tree) and Buchanan from 163 minutes in 2009 to 55 minutes at project closing.  Rural accessibility has also improved significantly in the area of influence of Pleebo-Barclayville corridor. Rehabilitation of the 67 km road, improved access to an all-season road for 98,000 rural dwellers. Travel time has decreased to 45 minutes compared to 160 minutes in 2009. Page 11 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 )  According to a recent estimate,6 URIRP’s intervention significantly helped raise Liberia’s Rural Accessibility Index (RAI) from 40 percent to about 48 percent. The RAI in the project’s areas of influence is currently 94 percent compared to a target of 90 percent. Nearly 320,000 rural dwellers have gained access to an all-season road owing to URIRP’s abovementioned interventions. However, the project fell significantly short of its initial objective of maintaining (routine maintenance) rural roads along corridors between Gbanga-Mendikorma and Ganta- Zwedru. The project maintained 259 km of rural roads against the initial target of 641 km (40 percent achievement). Further to the reposting of expenditure from URIRP to the AIDP (cf. paragraph 78), a new target of 132 km was set for URIRP. The project maintained 45.5 km against the latter target (35 percent achievement) due to the cancellation of two misprocured lots of rural road maintenance works. Objective 2: Improving institutional structure for technical management of the road sector 26. First, the project has successfully transitioned the former SIU into the IIU, although the transition took longer than planned. Owing to URIRP, Liberia no longer depends on force account or by UNMIL to carry out works under the supervision of an ad hoc implementation unit (SIU). 27. Second, the project has provided the building blocks for road agency reform. Owing to URIRP’s capacity building, the IIU now functions as a capable road administration within the MPW in an environment where the client and supplier functions are clearly delineated (figure 2). The MPW has devolved all operational roles to the IIU and is increasingly focusing on policy, albeit with some challenges related to its insufficient policy setting capacity. Thus, compared to the previous SIU, the IIU is a leaner and more efficient unit with a clear mandate to conduct network planning, procurement, and contract management. Furthermore, as initially planned, the project successfully prepared legislation for establishment of a fully-fledged road authority in replacement of the IIU. The bill is expected to be submitted to the Legislature shortly after installation of the new government following the October 2017 presidential elections. The road authority’s mandate will include management of funds from the RMF. 28. Third, the project has successfully supported the establishment of a second-generation RMF. URIRP has defined and implemented an action plan for the creation of a RMF. The Road Fund Act was enacted in 2016 and, although the RMF entity is not yet fully operational, the RMF is already collecting a fuel levy of US$0.25 per gallon. The process of operationalizing the RMF has started and its board has been appointed. The recruitment of the fund’s manager is expected to be completed by the end of 2017. 29. Fourth, the project helped improve operational efficiency of the road sector. Efficiency improvements in the institutional reforms supported by the project have yielded substantial gains in procedural, process, and service efficiency. Creation of the IIU and capacity building support has led to improved efficiency in the award, supervision, and payment of road contracts and in the production of technical and financial audits. 30. Further, URIRP was an incubator for adopting more fit-for-purpose procurement strategies in Liberia. It was in the interest of efficiency to place the design and construction risks of the FUF, Monrovia city streets, and the Cotton Tree-Buchanan road rehabilitation on contracting entities through 6 Liberia Spatial Analysis of Connectivity and Growth Potential. Page 12 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) a Design-Build-Transfer (DBT) model, given the previous failures in delivering the same works under traditional International Federation of Consulting Engineers contracting. Further to the successful implementation of the DBT contracts, LIBRAMP is currently implementing a full Output and Performance-Based Road Contract (OPRC) under which all phases of the life cycle, that is, rehabilitation, routine, and periodic maintenance are paid on a lump-sum performance basis. 31. Finally, support to the universities under URIRP will indirectly contribute to realizing the project outcomes and enhance the overall sustainability of the postwar investments in infrastructure. Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 32. Efficacy is rated Substantial for the reasons stated below. 33. All PDO indicators have been fully achieved or exceeded as shown in table 2. Table 3. Achievement of PDO Indicators PDO Indicators Baseline Target Status 744,980 1,194,729 Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (%) 0 (49.1%) (49.1%) Share of rural population with access to an all-season road (%) 0 90 94 City street in good and fair condition (%) - Monrovia 5 35 35 Average travel time between Cotton Tree and Buchanan (min) 163 71 55 Average travel time between Pleebo and Barclayville (min) 160 73 45 Legal and administrative framework for the establishment of road No Yes Yes authority 34. The project has exceeded urban and rural accessibility outcomes, except for the Gbanga- Mendikorma and Ganta-Zwedru areas where the initially planned routine maintenance of rural roads did not fully materialize. All major road works under URIRP continue to be in good condition and are performing as designed. Furthermore, the IIU, which has seen consistent improvement in its capacity over time, is effectively a proxy for a road authority, as anticipated at appraisal. 35. Finally, the new FUF at the Port of Monrovia was successfully built. It is not yet operational as works are still ongoing to connect it to LPRC’s tank farm and LPRC is in the process of procuring generators to power the facility. It is expected that the FUF will be commissioned by end of 2017, thus ensuring continuity of cost-efficient fuel import. C. EFFICIENCY Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 36. At the time of appraisal, an atypical approach to investment prioritization was necessary because Liberia’s infrastructure was severely dilapidated and virtually collapsing. Furthermore, basic data required for traditional economic analyses were not available and may still not be available for some project activities. The risk associated with inaction was the parameter for selecting project investments. Key/lifeline infrastructure that, if not attended to, risked collapsing or falling into an unusable state of disrepair was given top priority. 37. Nonetheless, this ICR has conducted an ex post economic analysis of Monrovia city street works, Caldwell Bridge, and the Cotton Tree-Bokay Town-Buchanan road. For the latter, an economic analysis Page 13 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) was conducted during project implementation as part of the works’ technical studies. The results of the ex post analysis are summarized as follows:  Monrovia city streets. The current net present value (NPV) of the investment is US$9.1 million, the NPV/capital cost ratio is 0.622, and the internal rate of return (IRR) is 17.9 percent, which is higher than the discount rate of 12 percent.  Cotton Tree-Buchanan road. The current NPV of the investment is US$80.1 million, the NPV/capital cost ratio is 2.2 and the IRR is 29.8 percent, which is higher than the discount rate of 12 percent. Furthermore, the IRR and NPV are significantly higher than the feasibility stage IRR of 18 percent and NPV of US$19.8 million.  Caldwell Bridge. The current NPV of the investment is US$3.7 million, the NPV/capital cost ratio is 0.534, and the IRR is 20.8 percent. 38. The substantial additional cost of the infrastructure investment component (US$58.5 million) was largely attributable to additional works aimed at scaling up the project’s impact. An additional 66 km of roads was rehabilitated resulting in a significant increase in project outcomes compared to the baseline situation (cf. table 2). Also, works on Monrovia city streets were expanded to address drainage and sidewalk improvements not included in the original emergency package. Table 4. Results of the Economic Analysis of Road Works Monrovia City Cotton Tree- Indicator Caldwell Bridge Streets Buchanan Road ex ante ex post ex ante ex post ex ante ex post IRR n.a. 17.90% 18% 29.80% n.a. 20.8% NPV (US$, millions) n.a. 9.1 19.8 80.1 n.a. 3.7 7 Project cost (US$, millions) 17.6 19.61 57.8 60.64 7.0 8.28 39. Efficiency of the FUF construction was affected by the substantial delay (more than two years) to initiate the project and the lack of interest of the few specialized international contractors that do this type of work. Due to the perceived high risk of operating in Liberia and the limited size of the market, detailed estimates and bid offers substantially exceeded the original cost estimation. The cost of original DBT contract was US$5 million greater than anticipated. Furthermore, the FUF design was improved to meet state-of-the-art standards in terms of safety and security. A permanent access road was added to the initial scope of works and poor bed rock conditions required a 50 percent increase in pile depth. Although these changes added significantly to the cost of the FUF works, which increased from US$10.8 million to US$15.4 million, the final contract price was still lower than the second lowest bidder at the time of allotment. 40. The economic and financial benefits of a new FUF are difficult to assess as they accrue to the population at large with considerable unquantifiable impacts in terms of stability and reduced risk of social unrest and conflict. Therefore, this ICR did not attempt an ex post analysis of the investment. 41. Considering the above, efficiency is rated Substantial. 7 Includes cost of scaled-up project extending rehabilitation from Bokay Town to Buchanan. Page 14 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 42. Based on the ratings for relevance, efficacy and efficiency, and given the uncertain Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) environment and the difficult post-war political economy, the project’s overall outcome is rated Satisfactory. The project came at heels of the end of a long civil war which destroyed not only infrastructure but also undermined the capacity of public and private sector institutions. E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) Gender 43. Although 49 percent (about 580,000 people) of the project’s direct beneficiaries were women, there is little evidence of URIRP’s impact in terms of gender. That is because URIRP did not perform detailed assessment of second order outcomes beyond the indicators of its Results Framework. Institutional Strengthening 44. Focusing on building local human resources proved to be a successful strategy. Because the recruitment of international staffs for key positions within the IIU did not materialize as initially planned (cf. paragraph 68), the project instead financed training of local engineers to enable them to take on key roles in the sector. The IIU was staffed with engineers fresh out of college whose capacity was developed through extensive training and interaction with internationally recruited experts. Owing to URIRP, the IIU has a pool of 20 civil engineers who have the knowledge and management capacity to reasonably manage the current workload of the sector. The procurement and contract management functions of the IIU have been significantly strengthened. 45. Beyond the critical policy, operational, and managerial functions of the road sector, the project successfully supported higher-level educational institutions entrusted with training the country’s engineering workforce. Local university professors were provided state-of-the-art training in key civil engineering subjects, while 37 engineering students gained hands-on experience in road infrastructure construction and management through project-financed internships on URIRP activities. The main engineering universities of Liberia were provided with laboratory equipment to enhance their curriculum and enable students to engage in hands-on learning. Finally, the civil engineering society of Liberia was equipped with geotechnical laboratory equipment, providing Liberia with a national civil engineering laboratory. 46. Establishment and capacity building of the IIU into a proxy road agency is a considerable improvement from the vacuum in road sector management at appraisal, and is likely to be sustained over the long-term. Although not currently a formal road agency, the IIU is likely to be sustained either as a road administration within MPW or an autonomous road authority. All IIU staff and management have performance indicators in their contracts and are subjected to periodic evaluations in view of contract renewal. Salaries and benefits of IIU staff have been set at a level commensurate with GOL’s standards to enable their eventual transfer to government entities. 47. URIRP successfully supported key institutional reforms to modernize transport sector management. The MPW no longer functions through force account as works are systematically outsourced and managed by the IIU. Further, with help from an URIRP-financed internationally recruited institutional reform expert, the MPW has made significant progress towards focusing on its new roles of policy setting and oversight. A new draft Road Act is undergoing legal scrutiny in MPW and will classify Page 15 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) the road network, assign responsibility for the classes of road, and identify how roads should be used. The restructuring of MPW’s workforce has materialized through the GOL’s austerity initiative of public sector downsizing. 48. Ratification of the Road Authority Act, Road Act, and the MPW Act will further streamline the legal and institutional aspects of the road sector. Thus, it will further improve technical and managerial capacities of the road sector. Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 49. URIRP improved the prospects of mobilizing international consultants and contractors to provide services in Liberia by adopting more fit-for-purpose procurement strategies (cf. paragraph 30) and improving procurement and contract management capacity. Attracting private entities in postwar Liberia to provide infrastructure services and perform works was extremely difficult given the absence of public sector capacity and the high perceived risk of insecurity. Initial reconstruction works had to be performed through force account or by the UNMIL. 50. URIRP laid the foundation for future public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the transport sector. URIRP has introduced the concept of risk sharing between the public and private sectors through the successful DBT contracts of Caldwell Bridge and Cotton Tree-Buchanan road. Also, URIRP supported several initiatives aimed at promoting private participation such as the feasibility study of a dry port, including transaction advisory services, and the studies for the 15-year Design-Build-Finance-Maintain- Operate-Transfer (DBFMOT) contract for the Ganta-Zwedru road. The latter is expected to mobilize private financing through a proposed payment guarantee mechanism to be provided by IDA. Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 51. The regions where the project was executed were overwhelmingly poor and hence the primary beneficiaries were low income rural and urban dwellers. Given the context where it was executed and the socio-economic background of project beneficiaries, the project should be characterized categorically as pro-poor. 52. Although not well documented, the development of a thriving market at Lloydsville is an example of a positive impact emerging from the Bokay Town-Buchanan rehabilitation works. The borrow pit in operation during construction was levelled and a new market was constructed on the site. Unfortunately, the actual impact of such markets was not assessed by the project. Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 53. Not applicable. III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 54. URIRP’s design was simple but ambitious and bold as it sought to disrupt a static situation of extremely low implementation capacity while addressing collapsing lifeline infrastructure in a very fragile environment. 55. The project’s reform objectives were realistic. Project preparation had a thorough understanding of Liberia’s political economy context, which made it impossible to fully achieve complex reforms such as the commercialization of road management within a single operation. URIRP adopted a Page 16 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) more realistic objective of providing the basic building blocks of reform; neither establishment of a road authority nor the creation of an RMF were specific objectives of URIRP. As documented in the EPP, URIRP pursued the objective of the progressive divestiture of operational functions of road management from the MPW to the IIU and the definition of the legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that would lead to permanent institutional arrangements. 56. Further to a series of consultations with the GOL, the URIRP preparation team came up with a proposal to create a new unit that would replace SIU. In the short to medium term, the proposed IIU was to be responsible for donor’s project implementation on the one hand and for planning and developing the roads sector at large with significant autonomy and well-defined oversight mechanisms on the other. Ultimately, the IIU was to be merged into the GOL’s structure as an autonomous road authority. 57. Project design inherited a backlog of emergency works unsuccessfully attempted by other IDA projects. At the time of URIRP’s preparation, three infrastructure projects8 cofinanced by IDA and the LRTF were being implemented by SIU as a comprehensive program under coordinated management and close supervision by the World Bank, in support of the GOL’s efforts to restore basic infrastructure. The initial basis of identification of the emergency works was the Joint Needs Exercise undertaken by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme in 2003. While the works selected were relevant, detailed cost estimates were difficult to generate in the absence of an active construction market and therefore costs were based on rough orders of magnitude. Furthermore, because of the inadequate capacity in the field and the depressed civil works market, works were delayed with significant cost overruns. Consequently, at the joint midterm review in 2008, several activities were dropped from the projects while the scope of roadworks had to be significantly reduced. 58. The following collapsing infrastructure needed immediate attention:  A total of 82 km of the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor was left unrehabilitated further to a reduction in scope of the EIP leaving more than 300,000 people without access to an all-season road.  Reconstruction of 18 km of dilapidated Monrovia city streets, dropped from the EIP, was urgent to ensure all-weather access within the city.  Rehabilitation of the existing FUF at the Port of Monrovia was dropped because of budget constraints9 and rolled over to the AIDP. Under the AIDP, the FUF was significantly delayed due to the inability to attract qualified international consultants to complete the studies. Even when studies were completed, the AIDP failed to recruit a contractor and that activity was consequently dropped10 from the project. 8 EIP, Liberia Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (LIRP), and AIDP. 9 The significantly higher-than-expected costs of dredging works under the LIRP resulted in the need to drop the FUF works and other activities. 10 By then, it was apparent that the activity could not be funded under the project due to lack of funds arising from cost overruns on other subcomponents. 10 The LRTF has provided nearly US$150 million for improvement of the transport sector including the rehabilitation of Monrovia to Ganta road and Buchanan corridor. Page 17 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 )  Rural roads rehabilitated under World Bank/donor financing (LIRP, EIP, and AIDP) had no firm maintenance financing after their defect liability period. Their sustainability was therefore at stake. 59. A simple and credible project design was adopted to resolve pending emergencies. The abovementioned emergencies became legacy issues that threatened to undermine the GOL’s and donor’s credibility and disappoint previously raised expectations of improved infrastructure service delivery. Consequently, URIRP was designed to address them using a pragmatic strategy based on more flexible and relevant procurement arrangements, including (a) the use of rapid procurement methods (direct contracting, shopping, and so on), (b) the extension of contracts issued under existing projects for similar activities, and (c) the application of World Bank provisions on the use of bid securing declarations and the waiving of bid securities for small contracts. However, the implementation arrangements of the FUF could have been streamlined to avoid downstream delivery issues (cf. paragraphs 76, 77). 60. The coordination mechanism established by donors through the LRTF11 proved very practical and drew lessons from previous engagements in fragile countries in terms of the need to stay engaged in a sector on a long-term basis to achieve sustainable results and the necessity to be more flexible in project design to accommodate the GOL’s pressing needs. The programmatic nature of the World Bank and donors’ engagement was very relevant as it allowed the GOL the flexibility to shift interventions from one operation to another to ensure timely completion of all outstanding emergency activities, especially those that involved the greatest risk of collapsing lifeline infrastructure. Table 5. Legacy Issues Rolled over to URIRP from Previous Projects 2006-10 2006-12 2007-15 2008-17 Activities/ Emergency situations LIRP EIP AIDP URIRP Fully operational SIU PC PC PC FC SIU into IIU (Proxy of road authority) PC FC IIU into a Road Authority PC Rehabilitation of 24 km of Monrovia city roads D FC Rehabilitate 137 km Monrovia-Buchanan corridor PC PC FC Rehabilitation of 6 major bridges and repair of a further 65 D PC FC Maintenance of rehabilitated roads D PC Study for the Rehabilitation of Ganta-Zwedru section FC New/rehabilitated Fuel Unloading Facility D D FC FC: Fully completed; PC: Partially completed; D: Dropped from project 61. Relevant lessons were drawn from failed attempts at restoring basic infrastructure. URIRP’s preparation drew lessons from previous and ongoing emergency projects, especially regarding the factors (cf. paragraph 57) that led to the failures in rehabilitating key collapsing infrastructure. Although there was an improvement in the country’s overall environment, project preparation rightly recognized that the human, institutional, and socio-political situation of the country remained severely constrained and capacity in the field was extremely limited. Thus, the World Bank’s decision to process URIRP under OP/BP 8.00 was sound. Page 18 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 62. Drawing lessons from failed attempts to procure civil works under previous projects, URIRP’s design made careful considerations of the mode of contracting to ensure feasibility in the Liberian context characterized by a depressed civil works market. Works of Monrovia city streets and Cotton Tree-Bokay Town (later extended to Buchanan) were to be tendered using a DBT model (turnkey) based on the simplified World Bank OPRC sample bidding document. 63. At that time, it was rightly deemed too risky to implement a full-fledged 10-year OPRC along the Monrovia-Buchanan corridor because of the following external factors: (a) the lack of sufficient competition in the market, which would lower the contract price, while ensuring output quality and (b) the high perceived risk of the operating environment, which discouraged contractors from participating in bidding, leading to low competition hence a high contract price, potentially compromising quality of the final product. Consequently, the Government was expected to carry out routine and periodic maintenance to preserve the long-term value of assets and to meet required minimum service levels, which would have been done by the contracting entity in the case of a 10-year OPRC. 64. The project had a robust risk mitigation matrix, with the risks and mitigation clearly identified during the preparation phase. URIRP was considered a substantial risk operation. As governance and corruption continued to be a substantial risk, implementation capacity was inadequate and the GOL had difficulty, at times, getting the necessary legislation passed to move forward on reforms. Nevertheless, the risk of not achieving the core PDOs was deemed moderate as the project would still be able to significantly contribute to the abatement of the emergency situation even if some activities did not materialize. 65. Readiness for implementation was acceptable given that URIRP was an emergency operation. Procurement for nearly 60 percent of the project’s budget was under way or completed by the time the project was approved. Cost estimates of investments were largely subjective and based on rough orders of magnitude because there was no active construction market that could provide reliable unit cost data. Finally, the road map for transitioning into an improved infrastructure unit was well defined and was expected to be implemented in a relatively seamless manner. B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 66. Implementation was affected by the following key factors: (a) the global financial crisis of 2009, (b) the slow transition from SIU to the IIU and the heavy workload of the IIU, (c) initial inadequate procurement and contract management capacity of the newly created IIU, (d) frequent changes in leadership at the MPW, (e) the increased scope of works, (f) the 2014 outbreak of EVD, and (g) lack of ownership of the FU. With the intense implementation support of the World Bank and the help of a Technical Support Group (TSG) recruited under a framework contract, URIRP succeeded in resolving most of the implementation issues. 67. The 2009 global financial crisis affected the GOL’s ability to finance RAP implementation. Shortly after project approval, Liberia’s economic growth was severely curtailed by the global financial crisis. The adverse impacts of the crisis were felt on foreign investments, exports, employment, and consequently, domestic demand. Growth slowed to an estimated 4.6 percent in 2009, after the economy grew by 7.1 percent in 2008. Furthermore, a decline in global commodity prices imposed sobering fiscal constraints upon the GOL. Thus, the GOL was unable to provide the entire funding of the project’s RAP and requested a contribution from IDA. Page 19 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 68. The project achieved the transition from the SIU to the IIU by focusing on local human resources. Transition from SIU to the IIU was initially delayed by a year and was not seamless as initially anticipated by the World Bank. Although a Program Manager was successfully hired in 2009, other key positions remained unfilled for more than a year due to poor responses to service requests. Although the road map to transition to the IIU was well defined, the government faced difficulty attracting the necessary technical expertise to operationalize the newly created entity. A few international consultants were hired to assume key roles within the IIU; however, this option proved to be extremely costly. Furthermore, impacts were short-lived because of the poor knowledge transfer and the scarcity of local professionals to take on the responsibilities left vacant when the consultants left. 69. In the interest of sustainability, the World Bank advised the GOL to build the required capacity based on existing but untrained human resources rather than continuing the recruitment of costly international consultants that failed to foster capacity gains. Cohorts of young engineers were recruited and this local capacity was fostered through significant training including specialized master’s degree programs in engineering, management, and procurement fields. The hired young professionals were given essential roles within the IIU and supported through a framework TA contract that allowed them to mobilize specific international expertise as needed. 70. The IIU’s heavy workload initially affected its ability to manage the project. URIRP was one of four infrastructure projects simultaneously managed by SIU/IIU. Furthermore, a year into URIRP implementation, the preparation of LIBRAMP, a more complex operation involving a full-fledged OPRC, was initiated under IIU management and coordination. Consequently, the limited capacity of the IIU was stretched thin, adding to the existing problems of planning and coordinating infrastructure investments. 71. Inadequate procurement capacity initially hampered project implementation. URIRP inherited a context of extremely inadequate procurement capacity. SIU was inadequately staffed and the procurement capacity assessment conducted during preparation identified the urgent need to recruit a TA consultant into SIU by May 2009 to facilitate realization of its objectives and mitigate the substantial procurement risk of URIRP. It took almost two years to recruit the necessary human resources, who had to be trained to perform their duties. 72. Contract management was a major challenge during the early years of implementation for the following reasons: (a) processing of contract amendments by the IIU was significantly delayed and often lacked proper analysis and justification, (b) backlogs of variation orders were left unresolved for several months, (c) liquidated damages applicable to contracts in case of default were not systematically imposed, and (d) claims submitted by contractors were left unaddressed for long periods of time, thus slowing the pace of works. 73. Changes in leadership affected the pace of reforms and slowed project implementation. The frequent changes in the leadership of the MPW have significantly delayed the institutional reforms attempted by URIRP as well as overall implementation progress because of the MPW’s reversal in commitment to support the IIU. Incoming officials were slow to endorse strategic decisions such as the decision to establish a road agency, the realigning of the ministry’s prerogatives, or the validation of studies. In 2013, the incoming leadership of the MPW questioned the role of the IIU within the road sector and considered returning project initiation and implementation functions of the (then) IIU to MPW. The 2014 incoming leadership adopted a more favorable view on sector reforms although they remained skeptical about the implementation of an institutional framework based on the ‘policy model’, which devolves operational aspects of the MPW to a road agency. Page 20 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 74. Increases in the cost of works were attributable to contract-obligated price adjustments and increases in scope to improve functionality of infrastructure. The cost of Cotton Tree-Buchanan road works increased by US$2.4 million for contractually obligated price fluctuation of materials and labor over three years. Monrovia city streets works costs increased by US$3.2 million to include sidewalks, drainage works, and additional city streets. The cost of FUF works rose US$4.59 million due to (a) major design changes because of adverse bed rock conditions and (b) change in the original site of the jetty, which necessitated the construction of a 375 m long access road, including a bridge, as a permanent facility for the benefit of all users. 75. The outbreak of EVD12 significantly affected the GOL’s ability to deliver basic services and led to a sharp decline of the economy. Most ongoing infrastructure works under URIRP were affected by demobilization of contractors. The Caldwell Bridge works suffered a four-month delay and FUF works were suspended for seven months due to force majeure, but the impact of EVD on URIRP was limited because most works packages were relatively small and remobilization costs were limited. 76. Construction of the FUF was delayed by almost three years, largely due to overlapping mandates within the GOL and poor contractor performance. In addition to the contracting entity and the monitoring consultant, each of the following actors held some authority in the FUF: (a) National Port Authority (NPA) as owner of the infrastructure, (b) Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC) as a user, (c) the MPW through the IIU as the implementing agency, (d) the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and (e) the Program Delivery Unit of the president. Consequently, decision making was scattered into several entities with different interests and priorities. For instance, the NPA initially objected to the positioning of the FUF in the port claiming that it could have adverse impacts on safe navigation. The LPRC, which was responsible for the connection of the FUF to its tank farm, was slow to award the contract for the construction of the needed pipeline. Furthermore, it took several months for the LPRC to acknowledge the need to procure generators because of its inability to adequately power the new FUF using its existing facilities. 77. The abovementioned lack of coordination was compounded by several contract-related challenges. As the contract was structured as a DBT, the contractor was responsible for the FUF’s detailed design, which it failed to deliver in required quality: the original designs of the pumping facility and the electric and the slope systems were rejected. Furthermore, the significantly adverse ground conditions triggered major foundation design changes. Given the diffused implementation responsibility, the review of the design issues was extremely slow and several contractual issues were left pending for months. 78. URIRP enabled the GOL to utilize US$1.5 million that was to be cancelled under an EU trust fund (TF96385) linked to the AIDP. The GOL was unable to expend all funds under AIDP Grant TF96385 due to implementation delays, but the grant could not be extended because the European Development Fund was scheduled to close December 31, 2012. To utilize the EU funds, IDA and the EU agreed to repost US$1.5 million spent on rehabilitation of 259 km of rural roads in the Bong, Nimba, and Lofa Counties under URIRP to the AIDP Grant. IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 12 Lasted nearly 16 months and resulted in about 4,000 deaths in Liberia. Page 21 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 79. The M&E design included six key performance indicators, which were relevant and directly attributable to what the project could realistically achieve. M&E Implementation 80. Indicator data was collected on a regular basis by the IIU as the implementation of the project activities progressed, and was disseminated in quarterly progress reports. However, there is no mechanism for continuous monitoring of the project outcomes beyond the completion of project activities. M&E Utilization 81. Works were simple to monitor as they were linked to specific outputs and generally required rudimentary monitoring mechanisms. The core indicator of rural accessibility, that is, ‘share of population with access to an all-season road’, which was added by AF1, presented some challenges because of the lack of baseline data. 82. The IIU piloted an information and communication technology (ICT) platform for enhanced monitoring of road infrastructure projects, known as Taarifa. The Taarifa platform is a smartphone- based application that aims to enhance the M&E capacity of the IIU and the GOL, and eventually to encourage citizen’s participation in the monitoring of completed assets. It was tested under URIRP by IIU staff and consultants monitoring construction of the FUF and Caldwell Bridge. The tool is still being developed and its rollout is expected by the end of 2018. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 83. Overall quality of M&E under URIRP is considered Substantial. The project’s Results Framework was well-designed and significant efforts were committed to measure indicators. However, the project, which included several transformational activities, missed the opportunity to measure its second order outcomes beyond the indicators of the results framework. B. ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARD, SOCIAL SAFEGUARD, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE 84. Environment. The Environment Category was rated ‘B’ at appraisal because the project financed only maintenance and rehabilitation of existing roads and facilities. OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) was triggered. Environmental impact of works was systematically mitigated as per the standards and guidelines included in all contracts under the project. Environmental staff of the IIU and monitoring consultants monitored mitigation activities. 85. Despite the assistance provided by the project, the EPA did not play an important part in the project. The EPA’s involvement in the supervision of environmental aspects of works was very limited, and monthly reports lacked EPA input. The support provided by the project in terms of training and equipment is not sufficient to enable the EPA to exert its prerogative of holding parties accountable for environmental matters. Page 22 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 86. Social safeguards. RAP implementation under was negatively affected by the insufficient funding from the GOL13 (cf. paragraph 67) to compensate the PAPs, especially for the works of the Cotton Tree-Buchanan road and Caldwell Bridge. In addition, the GOL was caught off guard as the unexpectedly rapid progress of civil works required significant cashflows for right of way clearing. For works of Caldwell bridge, late payments of PAPs led to delayed site handover and a compensation of US$315,000 by the GOL to the contractor. 87. In response to the above-mentioned situation, the Bank agreed to allocate US$ 8.0 million of IDA funds under the URIRP AF2 to cover RAP payments under both URIRP and LIBRAMP. With the benefit of hindsight, the Bank made the right decision as defaults in payment of PAPs threatened to significantly delay works, and consequently creating financial liabilities to GOL resulting from contractual claims. Furthermore, given the fragile context and the sensitivity of land issues, the Bank’s RAP funding may have pre-empted significant local tension and conflict risks in the project area. 88. Social safeguards were managed relatively well by IIU. However, frequent delays in actual disbursement of payments to PAPs were recorded due to a lack of coordination between the GOL entities involved in RAP implementation. Furthermore, the implementation of the RAP for Monrovia – Buchanan road was impeded by the inadequacy of information dissemination, the lack of community level grievance redress mechanism, and disagreements over the assessment of compensation. Thanks to intense safeguard support of the Bank, all RAP issues were successfully addressed and documented by the end of the project. 89. The implementation of the RAP for LIBRAMP was successfully completed without any significant issue. 90. Financial management (FM). The PFMU, under the MOF, was responsible for URIRP’s FM. This arrangement under a separate ministry was chosen to minimize the FM risks of infrastructure projects financed by the World Bank and the LRTF. 91. In 2016, five compensation checks totaling US$11,348 were stolen from the PFMU office and illegally cashed. The GOL refunded the stolen funds to the Bank and PFMU implemented strict measures to lower the risk of reoccurrence, including installing cameras to monitor the movements of staff and clients. Notwithstanding the above incident, the PFMU handled most aspects of Financial Management efficiently. The quarterly financial monitoring reports were received regularly and were fully compliant with the agreed format. 92. Procurement. Overall procurement performance under the project was Moderately Unsatisfactory. The inadequate procurement capacity at the start of the project contributed to the initial delays in execution of works. Several lapses in following procurement procedures have occurred and procurement documents had to be revised several times to address the World Bank’s comments. Furthermore, there was a significant case of misprocurement14 for rural road contracts for which the GOL had to reimburse US$3.0 million to IDA through the project’s special account. Also, initial inadequate contract management capacity hampered project implementation (cf. paragraph 72). 13 The World Bank had to provide additional funds for URIRP’s RAP as well as the RAP of Lot 1 and 2 of LIBRAMP. 14 Two direct contracts were awarded without the World Bank’s prior approval. The contracts were not listed in the Procurement Plan and were not included in the project. Page 23 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 93. However, strengthening the capacity of IIU staff, through intensive training programs for works and consultant services, and contract management helped raise procurement performance significantly by the time of project closing. Furthermore, the IIU’s capacity to undertake procurement of performance-based contracts improved significantly. C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry 94. The project was well anchored in the GOL’s reconstruction strategy, was consistent with World Bank’s CAS, and drew lessons of previous attempts to rehabilitate emergency infrastructure in Liberia. The project was also seen as the last emergency operation in the road sector and was expected to address all outstanding emergency rehabilitation needs. It was realistically ambitious as it envisioned the establishment of a road agency in the longer term but endeavored to provide its necessary building blocks. 95. URIRP was prepared and appraised quickly (six months), in a challenging FCV context, given the postwar environment and the urgency to intervene on dilapidated infrastructure. Quality of Supervision 96. The World Bank committed significant internal (World Bank budget of US$1.52 million) and external (IDA) resources to support project implementation. Regular and intensive missions were fielded at least every quarter, which included the right skill mix to provide the necessary guidance to IIU staff and management. Missions visited all project sites to monitor execution of works and followed each visit with detailed action plans that flagged actions for follow-up. In addition, supervision was supplemented through intensive sector focused missions by specialists. Bank safeguards specialists held training events for safeguards staff of GOL to build their capacity for preparation and implementation of RAPs. Even during the EVD outbreak when it was not possible to visit Liberia, the Bank team held regular audio conferences with the project teams to help sort out variation orders and other urgent contract issues. Finally, Road sector reforms successfully initiated under the project benefitted from credible insights and best practice advise from the Bank team. 97. The World Bank supervision team made great efforts to understand and address the challenges of the road sector in Liberia. Beyond the initial scope of the project, the team strived to understand and sense new opportunities that could bring about transformative change in the sector, and recognized that a trend of overdependence on foreign capacity was unsustainable. The holistic approach promoted by the Bank to strengthen sector capacity relied on two pillars of hands-on training and addressing the entire staff/human resource development chain. This approach has been sustained and yielded very positive outcomes (cf. paragraphs 44 and 68). The support provided to local universities identified in the context of AF2 (cf. Table 3) is part of this holistic approach. 98. The Bank successfully introduced innovative approaches in a challenging FCV context. The sector had previously struggled with implementation of works, and the Bank introduced new approaches, including performance Based Contracting (cf. paragraphs 8 and 30), mobilization of private sector financing for roads (cf. paragraphs 49-50), citizen engagement using ICT platforms (cf. paragraph 82), and the internally-focused capacity building strategy (cf. paragraph 44). The team made realistic assessments of the applicability of these initiatives in the Liberian context, and backed these efforts with intensive support. Page 24 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 99. The Bank’s working relations with donors was very effective. The LRTF donor group held regular oversight committee meetings to ensure that URIRP was on track to achieve its objectives. Further, the LRTF and IDA provided supplemental funding to scale-up its impacts through additional roadworks and TA. 100. The Bank was diligent and proactive in the mobilization of an additional US$76 million, most of which was used to scale-up the impacts of the project. The two AFs were prepared on very short notice and their overall design held very well. The choices and opportunities seized by the GOL that contributed to scaling-up the project’s impacts resulted from advice and guidance provided by the World Bank team. Furthermore, the World Bank was proactive in advising the GOL and the EU to repost US$1.5 million expenditure from URIRP to the AIDP to maximize the GOL’s utilization of EU grant money under AIDP. Proactive Bank supervision also enabled identification and rectification of misprocurement of post review contracts under the project (cf. paragraph 92). 101. Bank support resulted in more rapid implementation and disbursement in a challenging FCV environment and given extremely weak procurement capacity (cf. paragraphs 70-71). The Bank regularly monitored implementation progress, identified problems, and resolved them in a timely manner. The team effectively raised issues affecting the project to management’s attention and management responded actively and speedily to issues raised. 102. The supervision team successfully augmented and improved upon an extremely inadequate procurement and contract management capacity through intense hands-on support to newly recruited IIU staff. 103. To the extent possible, the World Bank has made the necessary arrangements to pursue URIRP’s objectives beyond its closing date. Ongoing and planned operations will closely monitor and support the institutional achievements of URIRP, while the rehabilitated road corridors are being maintained using financing from other donors and LIBRAMP financing includes a small envelope of resources to support testing of the FUF and the development of the Dry Port, initiated under URIRP. 104. Finally, through a letter from the President of Liberia, addressed to the Bank, the GOL has expressed its satisfaction with the quality of Bank transport team’s support to the sector in Liberia, including its support during the period of URIRP implementation. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 105. Based on the above, World Bank Performance is rated Highly Satisfactory. D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 106. The risk to development outcome is rated Substantial. 107. Sector financing is a major risk to URIRP’s development outcomes. It is estimated15 that 42 percent of GDP will be required to rehabilitate Liberia’s dilapidated road network to bring it to maintainable condition. Given the limited fiscal space, PPPs for roads will be essential to scale-up the project’s outcome. The SECRAMP under preparation will provide an innovative way of financing (cf. paragraph 50) that is expected to be expanded to other key corridors in the country. 15 2013 Liberia Public Expenditure Review. Page 25 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 108. The corridor from Cotton Tree to Buchanan that improved under URIRP is likely to remain in good condition in the medium term. That is, because its routine maintenance is provided for the next five years through a maintenance contract financed by the EU. Consequently, pavement deterioration is predicted to be very slow over the next 10 years as shown in figure 1 of annex 4. 109. Monrovia city streets will eventually deteriorate unless a sustainable financing mechanism is adopted to fund the maintenance of urban roads in Monrovia. Contingent upon the expansion of its resource base, the RMF could contribute to some extent; however, significant financing must be allocated by the municipality if city roads are to be maintained. Annex 4 (figure 4) summarizes the predicted costs and timing of necessary improvements and maintenance of the city streets rehabilitated under URIRP. 110. Deteriorating road safety outcomes offset the benefits of investments to improve access and traffic operation. Per police records, there has been a phenomenal surge in fatal crashes in Liberia in less than a decade, from 80 fatalities (2009) to 1,448 (2013). This is likely a conservative estimate as some of the crashes go unreported. Sustainability of interventions in the road sector will therefore require Liberia quickly define and implement a strategy to tackle road fatalities more cohesively. A systemic approach around the 4Es of road safety—Engineering (safer infrastructure), Enforcement (stricter enforcement and adjudication), Education (stronger education efforts), and efficient Emergency medical services—is urgently needed. 111. The FUF is constructed with very high standards and a guaranteed design life of 50 years provided basic routine maintenance is performed on a regular basis. An operation and maintenance manual has been prepared. However, the following security and safety issues near the facility threaten its sustainability: (a) fishermen operating with explosives is an evident danger to facility operations, (b) fuel theft currently happening on the old oil jetty could remain as a safety risk of the new FUF, and (c) failure to dismantle the old oil jetty would obstruct operations at the new FUF. V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 112. Complex sector reforms can be successfully conducted in FCV context provided a programmatic gradual approach is adopted that spreads the expected reform targets over several operations or programs, while each individual project adopts a clear but very realistic reform objective. The World Bank’s successful involvement in the road sector in Liberia as evidenced by URIRP’s achievements is the proof that, beyond basic emergency needs, more sustainable sector gains can be achieved within a relatively short time frame (10 years) if the following conditions are met: (a) a long- term programmatic commitment exists beyond the span of a single project, (b) significant financial resources are invested to build institutional capacity using the country’s available human resources and based on a holistic approach that extends beyond the Government to include the whole sector ecosystem, especially the institutions of higher learning, and (c) there is frequent, intense, and sustained World Bank supervision and hands-on support by experienced international consultants to buttress the capacity-building efforts. 113. In a fragile context characterized by depressed civil works markets, private sector participation in infrastructure should be promoted gradually by increasing the level of complexity of transactions as the public sector gains capacity and the private sector becomes more confident in the country’s procurement system. The World Bank successfully helped the GOL’s transition from works conducted through force account, to DBT, then Design-Build-Maintain-Operate-Transfer, and finally Page 26 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) DBFMOT, in a relatively short timeframe. The concept of risk sharing in the road sector was gradually introduced and is now fully grasped by the IIU. The increasing complexity in project structuring is a response to current market signals further to the success of design-maintain-operate-transfer schemes financed under LIBRAMP. 114. In a low capacity context, it may be more beneficial and sustainable in the long term, as was done under URIRP, to build the capacity of existing staffs and young university graduates to take on key sector and industry roles. However, such an approach requires an experienced World Bank Staff with the necessary technical depth to engage in hands-on capacity building of the client’s staff. Owing to URIRP, Liberia has at least 20 well-trained professionals who have been exposed to state-of-the-art road asset management. Such capacity will remain in-country as the demand for qualified human resources is very high because of the large reconstruction needs. 115. In a fragile context, such as Liberia, it is important to simplify implementation arrangements to ensure that a minimum number of entities are involved in the delivery of infrastructure. Multiple stakeholders often involve conflicting interests and diverging views. Because of the low capacity of most stakeholders in fragile settings, decision making is likely to be hampered by unsubstantiated objections or unrealistic demands from stakeholders. Therefore, full responsibility and decision-making power for infrastructure delivery should rest with one main entity while keeping all other stakeholders informed. Ownership of the FUF was lacking because of the multitude of low-capacity stakeholders entrusted with various decisions regarding the FUF. 116. In a post-conflict environment, such as Liberia, it is crucial to assess the impacts of interventions to the extent feasible, because the feedback would help improve the quality and targeting of future interventions. There are several options for assessing project second-order outcomes. Impact Assessment (IA) is one of them. IAs may not be feasible in fragile contexts due to the lack of data and resources. Furthermore, multiple confounding factors may not allow to obtain minimum detectable effects of a project on higher level outcomes. Therefore, projects like URIRP should focus on simpler participative methodologies such as focus group discussions and key informant interviews, as they are likely to provide interesting insights that sophisticated methodologies may not. . Page 27 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improved road access in Monrovia and targeted rural areas. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 0.00 744980.00 1194729.00 01-Jul-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2017 Female beneficiaries Percentage 0.00 0.00 49.10 49.10 01-Jul-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved and exceeded Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Share of rural population Percentage 0.00 0.00 90.00 94.00 with access to an all-season road 01-Jul-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved and exceeded Page 28 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion City Street in good and fair Percentage 5.00 0.00 35.00 35.00 condition-Monrovia 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved in June 2011 Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Average travel time between Minutes 163.00 0.00 71.00 55.00 Cotton Tree and Buchanan 30-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved and exceeded Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Average travel time between Minutes 160.00 0.00 73.00 45.00 Pleebo and Barclayville 23-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved and exceeded Objective/Outcome: Improved institutional structure for technical management of the road sector Page 29 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Legal and administrative Yes/No N Y Y Y framework for the establishment of road 23-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 30-Jun-2017 26-Sep-2017 authority Comments (achievements against targets): Legal and administrative framework has been prepared and the Draft Road Authority Act will be submitted to the Legislature after the elections. A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Component I - Infrastructure Investments Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roads Rehabilitated, non Kilometers 0.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 rural-Monrovia 30-Apr-2009 01-Feb-2011 01-Feb-2011 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): 100% achievement Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Construction of new Caldwell Text Old structure - No 1 bridge constructed - 1 bridge constructed - 1 Bridge Constructed - Bridge Yes Yes Yes Page 30 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) 23-Jun-2009 31-Dec-2013 31-Dec-2014 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): 100% achievement Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roads rehabilitated, rural Kilometers 0.00 82.00 148.50 148.50 (Pleebo-Barclayville - Cotton Tree - Buchanan) 30-Apr-2009 30-Jun-2011 30-Jun-2015 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): 100% achievement Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Maintain 131.6 km of Text 0 Km - No 641 km - Yes 131.6 km - Yes 45.5km-No previously repaired rural roads for 2 years 23-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The project maintained 259 km of rural roads against the initial target of 641 km (40 percent achievement). Further to the reposting of corresponding expenditure from URIRP to AIDP, a new target of 131.6 km was set for additional rural road maintenance under URIRP. The project has maintained 45.5 km against the latter target (35 percent achievement). Therefore, URIRP maintained about 305 km of rural roads. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion New fuel unloading facility Text Old structure - No Yes Yes Yes Page 31 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) construction (yes/no) 23-Jun-2009 31-Dec-2011 30-Jun-2017 10-Nov-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): The new FUF at the Port of Monrovia was successfully built. However, it is not yet operational as works are still ongoing to connect it to LRPC’s tank farm. Furthermore, LRPC is in the process of procuring generators to power the facility. It is expected that the FUF will be commissioned by end of 2017. Component: Component II - Program Management and Institutional Support Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion IIU has organization structure Text No An organization An organization Yes and mandate as per agreed structure in place - Yes structure in place - Yes framework (yes/no) 23-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Dec-2015 15-Nov-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): IIU is acting as a proxy of a road agency and has the responsibility of planning and implementing works on behalf of MPW. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Action Plan for the Text No An Action Plan An Action Plan Yes Implementation Policy implemented. implemented. agreed, approved and implemented for sustainable 23-Jun-2009 30-Jun-2015 31-Jul-2017 15-Nov-2017 financing of the road sector (yes/no) Page 32 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) Comments (achievements against targets): A second-generation RF has been established. Fuel levy is collected at US$0.25 per liter. B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective/Outcome 1: Support government’s goal of improving road access in Monrovia and targeted rural areas. Outcome Indicators 1. Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (%) 2. Share of rural population with access to an all-season road (%) 3. City street in good and fair condition - Monrovia (%) 4. Average travel time between Cotton Tree and Buchanan (min) 5. Average Travel time between Pleebo and Barclayville (min) Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Roads rehabilitated, non-rural-Monrovia 2. Construction of new Caldwell Bridge 3. Roads rehabilitated, rural (Pleebo-Barclayville - Cotton Tree-Buchanan) 4. Maintain 131.6 km of previously repaired rural roads for 2 years 5. New fuel unloading facility construction (yes/no) Key Outputs by Component 1. 15 km Cotton Tree-Bokay Town road rehabilitated (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) 2. 66 km Bokay Town-Buchanan road rehabilitated 3. 80 km on Monrovia-Buchanan corridor maintained for five years (EU) 4. 70 km Pleebo-Barclayville road rehabilitated 5. 24 km of Monrovia city streets rehabilitated 6. New Caldwell Bridge and its approaches constructed 7. Road intersection and convergence of the new Vai Town; bridge and Tucker Bridge reconstructed; 8. 44 km of previously repaired rural roads maintained 9. A new FUF is constructed Objective/Outcome 2: Improving institutional structure for technical management of the road sector Outcome Indicators Legal and administrative framework for the establishment of road authority Intermediate Results Indicators 1. IIU has organization structure and mandate as per agreed framework Page 33 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) (yes/no) 2. Action Plan for the implementation policy agreed, approved, and implemented for sustainable financing of the road sector (yes/no) Key Outputs by Component 1. Capacity building of the IIU including short-term technical training, (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2) procurement training, and courses on FM 2. Training of the IIU in road asset management 3. Draft legislation for the establishment of an autonomous road authority is completed 4. A second-generation RMF is established 5. MPW’s capacity to focus on policy role was enhanced 6. ICT platform for enhanced monitoring of road projects ( Taarifa) 6. Assistance for educational and professional bodies in Liberia: U L, SMP, TU, and the Engineering Society of Liberia. Provision of laboratory equipment, surveying equipment, technical books, information technology. 7. Support to the preparation of future investments: Ganta-Zwedru corridor and LIBRAMP AF including the implementation of RAPs. Page 34 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Anne Njuguna Project Program Assistant Anthony Mensa-Bonsu Procurement Specialist Consultant Antoine Lema Senior Social Development Specialist Callista Chen Transport Consultant Chris Jackson Economist Agriculture Chukwudi Okafor Senior Social Development Specialist Cornelis Kruk Lead Port Specialist Consultant David Hope Kanu Financial Analyst Errol George Graham Senior Economist Fang Xu Economist Florence Geegbae Dukuly Project Team Assistant Gylfi Palsson Senior Transport Specialist / Team Leader Jonathan Pavluk Senior Counsel Patrick Okecho Counsel Eduardo Brito Senior Counsel Kremena Ionkova Urban Specialist Rajiv Sondhi Senior Finance Officer Robert Wallace DeGraft-Hanson Financial Management Specialist Anne Njuguna Project Program Assistant Anthony Mensa-Bonsu Procurement Specialist Consultant Antoine Lema Senior Social Development Specialist Thomas Walton Environmental Specialist Consultant Yitzhak Kamhi Senior Transport Engineer Victoria Gyllerup Operations Officer Supervision/ICR Kulwinder Singh Rao Task Team Leader(s) Papa Mamadou Fall ICR Author Komana Rejoice Lubinda Procurement Specialist(s) Saidu Dani Goje FM Specialist Luis M. Schwarz Team Member Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza Counsel Johanna van Tilburg Safeguards Advisor Seifu S. Mehari Social Safeguards Specialist Cornelis Kruk Team Member Damon C. Luciano Team Member Yeyea Gloria Kehleay Nasser Team Member John Kobina Richardson Team Member Edda Mwakaselo Ivan Smith Social Safeguards Specialist Sekou Abou Kamara Environmental Safeguards Specialist Page 35 of 50 The World Bank LR-Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project ( P113099 ) B. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY09 23.017 148,116.31 FY10 0 0.00 Total 23.02 148,116.31 Supervision/ICR FY10 37.953 295,025.03 FY11 14.198 161,605.10 FY12 18.125 120,928.79 FY13 14.500 78,167.46 FY14 6.950 76,706.81 FY15 7.263 71,393.55 FY16 22.983 181,021.55 FY17 21.059 126,350.26 FY18 7.615 48,904.18 Total 150.65 1,160,102.73 Page 36 of 50 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Amount at Actual at Project Percentage of Approval Components Approval (US$, Closing (US$, (%) millions) millions) Component 1: Infrastructure Investment 49.65 108.15 218 Component 2: Project Management and 3.55 18.30 515 Institutional Support Total 53.20 126.45 238 Page 37 of 50 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS Summary of Economic Analysis 1. Traditional economic approach of screening the projects and subjecting them to detailed cost-benefit analysis was not deemed viable for Appraisal of URIRP. A different approach to prioritization was deemed necessary because Liberia’s infrastructure was severely dilapidated and virtually collapsing. Furthermore, basic data required for traditional economic analysis were not available for some project activities. Consequently, URIRP used the risk of not implementing a particular measure as a guideline for prioritizing the emergency works. Key/lifeline infrastructure that, if not attended to, risked collapsing or falling into an unusable state of disrepair was given top priority. 2. Nevertheless, during project implementation, economic evaluation was carried out at the feasibility phase for the Cotton Tree-Bokay Town-Buchanan road. The analysis indicated that the project was economically viable with an IRR of 18 percent and an NPV of US$19.8 million. 3. Ex ante economic analysis was not conducted for Monrovia city streets, Caldwell Bridge, and the Pleebo-Barclayville road. Summary of Ex Post Analysis of Cotton Tree-Bokay Town-Buchanan road Methodology 4. For this study, Highway Development and Management-4 (HDM-4) Version 2 was used as the analytical tool. The HDM-4 analytical framework (HDM-4 Documentation Volume 4, 2000) is based on the concept of pavement life cycle analysis, which is typically 15 to 40 years. This is applied to predict road deterioration, road works effects, road user effects, and socioeconomic and environmental effects. Economic benefits were calculated as the difference between the ‘without investment’ option and the three investment options. The HDM-4 model was used to simulate future changes to the study sections from current conditions. Estimates of benefits included disbenefits during the construction period and the direct impact on all users of the proposed facility. 5. The analysis used a 12 percent discount rate and a 20-year was used. The base year for the analysis is 2009. By the end of the design life of the road, most of the components would have low residual value. Components such as earthworks (for example, fills and cuts), culverts, and footpaths, would have significant percentages of their values remaining. Salvage value estimated for the road was 15 percent of the investment capital. To convert financial costs into economic costs, a standard conversion factor (SCF) of 0.85 was used in this study. The SCF is consistent with the ratio used for economic evaluation of other projects in Liberia. 6. For the investment options, road work standards were defined in such a way that the objective of each option can be achieved. A work standard comprises one or more works item (for example, overlay, reseal, and patching), defined intervention criteria to determine the timing, design characteristics, the unit costs, and the after works effects. The work standards used during feasibility phase are still valid. Tables 4.3 to 4.4 present the work standards defined for this study. Table 4.1. Homogeneous Road Sections, Traffic, and IRI Length Carriageway AADT IRI (m/km) Section Description Surface Type (km) Width (m) 2009 2017 2009 2017 Cotton Tree-Bokay Town (0-24.94 km) Bituminous 24.94 7 1,367 6,986 7.7 1.9 Page 38 of 50 Bokay Town-Buchanan (24.94-80.8 km) Bituminous 55.86 7 642 11,620 13.0 1.9 Note: AADT = Annual Average Daily Traffic; IRI = International Roughness Index. Table 4.2. Investment Alternatives Alternative Description With Investment This alternative includes rehabilitating of the existing road to paved standard. Following completion of the upgrading works, periodic maintenance will be implemented when roughness exceeds 4 IRI. Routine maintenance works will be carried out annually. Without Investment (Base Case) This alternative comprises routine maintenance only on the existing road (before rehabilitation) Table 4.3. Paved Road Maintenance Standard Work Types Intervention Criteria After Works Effects Overlay 50 mm Roughness ≥ 4 IRI Roughness = 1.8 IRI Patching Potholes Potholing ≥ 10 per km Repair to 100% of potholes, TLF = 2 months 2 Edge Break Repair Edge break ≥ 5 m /km Repair to 100% of edge breaks Crack Sealing Wide Structural ≥ 1% Repair to 100% of wide structural cracks Cracking ≤ 25% Miscellaneous Works Interval ≥ 1 year n.a. Table 4.4. Summary of Improvement Standard New Pavement Improvement Type Intervention Criteria After Works Effects Type Rehabilitation to Asphalt Asphalt mix on Construction commenced Roughness = 1.8 IRI (m/km) Standard granular base in 2009 Speed limit = 80 km/h Duration of construction Equivalent number of lanes = was four years 2 Summary of results 7. Estimated economic indicators by project alternatives are summarized in table 4.5. The net economic benefit is the difference between savings in road user costs and increase in road agency costs. The NPV for the ‘With Investment’ alternative is US$ 80.1 million, the NPV/capital cost ratio is 2.2, and the IRR is 29.8 percent, which is higher than the discount rate of 12 percent. Table 4.5. Key Economic Indicators for Project Options Weighted Average NPV (US$, NPV/Capital Project Alternatives Roughness (IRI, IRR (%) millions) Cost Ratio m/km) Without Investment 14.9 0.0 0.000 0.0 With Investment 2.6 80.1 2.175 29.8 8. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to test the effect of variations in key parameters that may arise due to unforeseen events. The parameters tested are traffic growth rate, construction costs, and analysis period. The percentage variations were taken as ±20 percent for normal traffic growth Page 39 of 50 rate, ±20 percent for construction costs. The results are shown in table 4.6. NPVs remain positive for the changes in traffic growth rate, construction costs, and analysis period. Table 4.6. NPV Values as a Result of Changes in Parameter Values Economic Base Traffic Growth Rate Construction Costs Alternative Indicator 0% (−20%) (+20%) (−20%) (+20%) NPV 80.11 56.38 110.60 87.00 73.22 With Investment IRR 29.80 26.30 33.30 34.20 26.50 9. The percentage change in each of the parameters required to independently change the NPV from positive to negative (switching value) for ‘With Investment’ alternative is shown in table 4.7. It should be noted that relatively high changes are required to render the project nonviable. Table 4.7. Switching Values Project Alternative Construction Costs Normal Traffic Growth Rate With Investment > +150% < −100% 10. Based on economic indicators such as NPV, NPV/capital cost ratio, and IRR and the results of sensitivity and switching values analysis, the road remains strongly economically viable. For instance, the IRR has increased to 29.8 percent up from an IRR of 18 percent at feasibility stage. Figure 1. Cotton Tree-Buchanan Average Road Condition Trends with and without the Project (2009–2028) 16 14 12 10 IRI (m/km) 8 6 4 2 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 ALT1 - Without Project ALT2 - With Project Source: IIU, TSG, 2017. Summary of Ex Post Analysis of Monrovia City Streets Methodology 11. HDM-4 Version 2 was used as the analytical tool. The HDM-4 analytical framework is based on the concept of pavement life cycle analysis, which is typically 15 to 40 years. 12. The traffic data used in this study include normal AADT and composition by vehicle types for each road section, axle loading, and average traffic growth rate. A classified traffic survey (manual counts) was carried out on the project roads. The findings are summarized in table 4.8. The figures shown have been discounted to the base year using a discount rate of 6 percent, which is consistent with the traffic growth rates used in recent feasibility studies for projects in Monrovia. Normal traffic growth rates of 6 percent for years 1 to 13 and 5 percent thereafter were used for all vehicle types. The growth rates are consistent with growth rates used in similar projects in Liberia. Page 40 of 50 Table 4.8. Homogeneous Road Sections AADT Surface Length Carriageway Width IRI Section Description (2008 Type (km) (m) (m/km) ) Center Street Bituminous 0.867 10.0 6,017 8.7 Carey Street Bituminous 1.393 10.0 3,460 5.4 Lynch St (UN Drive-Ashmun St) Bituminous 0.925 7.5 6,017 9.3 McDonald Street Bituminous 0.193 7.5 6,017 6.7 Camp Johnson Road Bituminous 1.622 10.0 6,017 4.3 Clay Street Bituminous 0.653 7.5 6,017 6.7 Mechlin Street Bituminous 0.507 7.5 6,017 8.0 Ashmun Street Bituminous 1.060 10.0 8,426 6.4 Broad Street Bituminous 2.644 7.3 6,702 7.3 Benson Street Bituminous 1.800 10.0 6,702 6.7 Randall Street Bituminous 1.069 10.0 4,977 5.7 UN Drive (Gurley ST-Randall ST) Bituminous 0.025 10.0 6,017 4.3 Gurley St (UN Drive-Ashmun St) Bituminous 0.296 10.0 6,017 8.0 Newport Street Bituminous 0.745 7.5 8,577 6.7 Horton Drive Bituminous 0.204 7.5 6,017 6.7 Roberts Street Bituminous 0.192 7.5 6,017 6.7 Nelson Street Bituminous 0.312 7.5 6,017 6.7 UN Drive (Randall St-Vai Town) Bituminous 1.595 7.5 6,017 6.7 Sekou Toure Avenue Bituminous 0.784 10.0 6,017 4.8 King Sao Boso Bituminous 0.932 10.0 6,017 5.3 Warren Street Bituminous 0.265 7.5 6,017 6.7 Johnson Street Bituminous 0.182 7.5 6,017 9.8 Buchanan Street Bituminous 0.300 10.0 6,702 6.3 Cadwell Jct.-St Paul Bridge Bituminous 3.100 10.0 6,702 3.4 UN Drive (Fouani Bros cmp-Vai Bituminous 1.200 8.0 6,702 6.7 Town) Water Street Bituminous 0.700 7.5 6,702 8.8 13. A works standard comprises one or more works items (for example, overlay, reseal, patching).Work standards fall into one of two categories: maintenance standards and improvement standards. The unit cost of works was based on rates used in the feasibility study phase. Recent experience suggests the unit rates used are appropriate. Table 4.9 gives the maintenance cost details. The improvement works in this analysis together with the unit costs are presented in table 4.10. Table 4.9. Asphalt Paved Road Maintenance Works and Unit Costs Financial Economic Work Item Description Costs Units Costs (US$) (US$) 2 Patching Potholes Repair of surface distresses such as potholing, wide 31.16 26.50 m structural cracking, and ravelling 2 Edge Break Repair Patching edge failures on paved roads 31.16 26.50 m 2 Crack Sealing Treatment of wide structural cracking on paved 8.00 6.80 m roads Miscellaneous Works Includes drainage works, shoulder repairs, 1,272.00 1,081.20 Per km vegetation control, road sign repairs and per replacement, line marking, guardrail repair and year Page 41 of 50 Financial Economic Work Item Description Costs Units Costs (US$) (US$) replacement, and so on 2 Overlay 50 mm 50 mm overlay to existing paved road. 20.78 17.66 m Table 4.10. Upgrading of Existing Road and Associated Unit Costs Financial Economic Work Item Design and Details Costs (US$ Costs (US$ 2 2 per m ) per m ) Rehabilitation of  New pavement type is asphalt mix on granular base 79.39 93.40 existing paved  Pavement layers and thickness where 50 mm asphalt road surfacing over crushed stone base and stabilized gravel sub-base.  Works commenced in 2008 and construction was completed over four years 14. The economic analysis compared the alternative of rehabilitating the project roads to paved standard ‘With Investment’ alternative and to the base alternative of maintaining the existing paved road referred to as the ‘Without Investment’ alternative. Table 4.11 gives the definition of the two investment alternatives. 15. For the investment options, road work standards were defined in such a way that the objective of each option can be achieved. A work standard comprises one or more works item (for example, overlay, reseal, and patching), defined intervention criteria to determine the timing, design characteristics, the unit costs, and the after works effects. The work standards used during feasibility phase are still valid. Tables 4.12 and 4.13 present the work standards defined for this study. 16. The discount rate used for the analysis is 12 percent and analysis period of 20 years was used. The base year for the analysis is 2008. By the end of the design life of the road most of the components would have low residual value. Components such as earthworks (for example, fills and cuts), culverts, and footpaths, would have significant percentages of their values remaining. Salvage value estimated for the road was 10 percent of the investment capital. To convert financial costs into economic costs an SCF of 0.85 was used in this study. The SCF is consistent with the ratio used for economic evaluation of other projects in Liberia. Table 4.11. Investment Alternatives Alternative Description With Investment This alternative includes rehabilitating of the existing road to paved standard. Following completion of the upgrading works, periodic maintenance will be implemented when roughness exceeds 4 IRI. Routine maintenance works will be carried out annually. Without Investment (Base case) This alternative comprises routine maintenance only on the existing road (before rehabilitation) Table 4.12. Paved Road Maintenance Standard Work Types Intervention Criteria After Works Effects Page 42 of 50 Overlay 50 mm Roughness ≥ 4 IRI Roughness =1.8 IRI Patching Potholes Potholing ≥ 10 per km Repair to 100% of potholes, TLF = 2 months 2 Edge Break Repair Edge break ≥ 5m /km Repair to 100% of edge breaks Crack Sealing Wide Structural ≥ 1% Repair to 100% of wide Cracking ≤ 25% structural cracks Miscellaneous Works Interval ≥ 1 year n.a. Table 4.13. Summary of Improvement Standard Improvement Type New Pavement Type Intervention Criteria After Works Effects Pavement Reconstruction Asphalt mix on Construction Roughness = 1.8 IRI (m/km) granular base commenced in 2008 Speed limit = 50 km/h Duration of Equivalent number of lanes = construction was 2 four years Summary of results 17. Estimated economic indicators by project alternatives are summarized in table 4.14. The net economic benefit is the difference between savings in road user costs and increase in road agency costs. The NPV for the ‘With Investment’ alternative is US$9.1 million, the NPV/capital cost ratio is 0.622 and the IRR is 17.9 percent, which is higher than the discount rate of 12 percent. Table 4.14. Key Economic Indicators for Project Options Weighted Average NPV (US$, NPV/Capital Project Alternatives Roughness (IRI IRR (%) millions) Cost Ratio m/km) Without Investment 14.9 0.0 0.000 0.0 With Investment 2.6 9.1 0.622 17.9 18. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to test the effect of variations in key parameters that may arise due to unforeseen events. The parameters tested are traffic growth rate, construction costs, and analysis period. The percentage variations were taken as ±20 percent for normal traffic growth rate, ±20 percent for construction costs. The results are shown in table 4.15. NPVs remain positive for the changes in traffic growth rate, construction costs, and analysis period. Table 4.15. NPV Values As a Result of Changes in Parameter Values Economic Base Traffic Growth Rate Construction Costs Alternative Indicator 0% (−20%) (+20%) (−20%) (+20%) With NPV 9.06 5.17 14.02 11.92 6.20 Investment IRR 17.90 15.80 20.10 20.90 15.60 19. The percentage change required in each of the parameters independently to change the NPV from positive to negative (switching value) for ‘With Investment’ alternative is shown in table 4.16. It should be noted that relatively high changes are required to render the project nonviable. Table 4.16. Switching Values Project Alternative Construction Costs Normal Traffic Growth Rate Page 43 of 50 With Investment > +64% < −51% 20. The estimated economic indicators including NPV and IRR suggest the project is economically viable. Figure 2. Monrovia City Streets Works Costs Profile (Undiscounted) 7.00 Millions 6.00 5.00 Works Costs (US$) 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Years Routine Improvement Periodic Source: IIU, TSG 2017. Summary of Ex post Analysis of Caldwell Bridge Methodology 21. The modelling of delays associated with using the old bridge necessitated special use of HDM-4 to study the related impacts. The old bridge crossing was modelled using dummy road sections with adjusted characteristics to simulate the delays experienced by heavy and light vehicles. Figure 4.1 illustrates the representation of the dummy links and the traffic characteristics associated with each dummy link labelled A and B. Figure 4.1. Original Bridge Crossing Model 22. The vehicles using link A are light vehicles comprising cars, taxi, pickups, small truck, and medium truck (less than 5 tons). The vehicles using link B are heavy vehicles greater than 5 tons including heavy and articulated trucks. The assumptions of delays on each dummy link is presented in table 4.17. Table 4.17. Bridge Crossing Delays Dummy Link Vehicle Types Travel Direction Delay (in hours) A Cars, taxi, pickups, small truck, To Monrovia 1 medium truck, small bus, medium To Caldwell 1 Page 44 of 50 bus, motorcycles B Heavy trucks, articulated trucks To Monrovia 2 To Caldwell 2 Source: Road user opinion. 23. In modelling using HDM-4, the total cost of delays attributed to old bridge operation is calculated from the sum of the following costs components: value of goods delayed, additional vehicle crew cost, additional overhead costs, and passenger time value. 24. The traffic data used in this study include normal AADT and composition by vehicle types for each road section, axle loading, and average traffic growth rate. A classified traffic survey (manual counts) was carried out on the project roads before and after the new Caldwell Bridge was constructed. The findings are summarized in table 4.18. Normal traffic growth rates of 6 percent for years 1 to 13 and 5 percent thereafter were used for all vehicle types. The growth rates are consistent with growth rates used in similar projects in Liberia. Estimated traffic that diverted to using the new bridge crossing is presented in table 4.19. 25. The unit costs of works were based on rates used at feasibility study phase. Recent experience suggests the unit rates used are appropriate. Table 4.20 gives the maintenance cost details. Table 4.18. Traffic Composition Link A AADT Link B AADT Vehicle Types (Light Vehicles) (Heavy Vehicles) Car 1,569 0 Taxi 926 0 Pickups 1,136 0 Small Truck (2 axle <3.5 tons) 257 0 Medium Truck (2 axle >3.5 tons) 76 0 Heavy Truck (multi axle) 0 69 Articulated (4, 5, >5 axle) 0 7 Small Bus 0 0 Medium/Heavy Bus 149 0 Motorcycles 21,363 0 Total 25,476 76 Table 4.19. Diverted Traffic Vehicle Types AADT Car 0 Taxi 0 Pickups 511 Small Truck (2 axle <3.5 tons) 0 Medium Truck (2 axle >3.5 tons) 76 Heavy Truck (multi axle) 0 Articulated (4, 5, >5 axle) 0 Small Bus 0 Medium/Heavy Bus 36 Motorcycles 2,159 Table 4.20. Asphalt Paved Road Maintenance Works and Unit Costs Financial Economic Work Item Description Units Costs (US$) Costs (US$) Page 45 of 50 Financial Economic Work Item Description Units Costs (US$) Costs (US$) Routine Works Includes bridge routine works, drainage works, 1,272.00 1,081.20 Per km shoulder repairs, vegetation control, road sign repairs per and replacement, line marking, guardrail repair and year replacement, pavement repairs 2 Overlay 50 mm 50 mm overlay to existing paved road 20.78 17.66 m Bridge Periodic Structural repairs or strengthening to bridge 115,200.00 97,929.00 Per Maintenance components bridge 26. The improvement works in this analysis together with the unit costs are presented in table 4.21. Table 4.21. Upgrading of Existing Road and Associated Unit Costs Financial Economic Work Item Design and Details Costs (US$ Costs (US$ per km) per km) Reconstruction of  Construction of new bridge including realignment of 6,179,104 5,252,239 Caldwell Bridge approaches. Total length of 670 m.  Pavement layers and thickness for approaches to bridge were 50 mm asphalt surfacing over crushed stone base and stabilized gravel sub-base.  Works commenced in 2013 and construction was completed in 2014  A salvage value of 15% is assumed. 27. The discount rate used for the analysis is 12 percent and analysis period of 25 years was used. The base year for the analysis is 2013. 28. By the end of the design life of the road most of the components would have low residual value. Components such as earthworks (for example, fills and cuts), culverts, footpaths, would have significant percentages of their values remaining. Salvage values estimated for the road was 15 percent of the investment capital. 29. To convert financial costs into economic costs an SCF of 0.85 was used in this study. The SCF is consistent with the ratio used for economic evaluation of other projects in Liberia. Summary of results 30. The NPV for the ‘With Investment’ alternative is US$3.7 million and the IRR is 20.8 percent, which is higher than the discount rate of 12 percent. Table 4.22. Key Economic Indicators for Project Options NPV/Capital Project Alternatives NPV (US$, millions) IRR (%) Cost Ratio Without Investment 0.00 0.000 0.0 With Investment 3.74 0.534 20.8 31. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to test the effect of variations in key parameters that may arise due to unforeseen events. The parameters tested are traffic growth rate, construction costs, and analysis period. The percentage variations were taken as ±20 percent for normal traffic growth Page 46 of 50 rate, ±20 percent for construction costs. The results are shown in table 4.23. NPVs remain positive for the changes in traffic growth rate, construction costs, and analysis period. Table 4.23. NPV Values As a Result of Changes in Parameter Values Economic Base Traffic Growth Rate Construction Costs Alternative Indicator 0% (−20%) (+20%) (−20%) (+20%) With NPV 3.74 4.68 2.72 5.14 2.35 Investment IRR 20.8 21.9 19.2 26.8 16.6 32. Results in table 4.24 shows that economic indicators appear to decrease with increase in traffic growth. This is possible because the traffic flow capacity of the bridge gets exhausted with increase in traffic resulting in higher delays to vehicles. 33. The percentage change required in each of the parameters independently to change the NPV from positive to negative (switching value) for ‘With Investment’ alternative is shown in table 4.24. It should be noted that relatively high changes are required to render the project nonviable. Table 4.24. Switching Values Project Alternative Construction Costs Normal Traffic Growth Rate With Investment +55% +66% Page 47 of 50 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS 1. Borrower’s comments: The Report is generally well-written and the contents conveyed a consistent account of the project implementation record. 2. Comments received from the EU: The lack of EU visibility persists. All other LRTF donors are mentioned in point 5 but not the EU, which at over 40% (47% of the still active donors) is the largest donor. For the rest the report is professional and OK. Page 48 of 50 ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) Page 49 of 50 ANNEX 7. MAP Page 50 of 50