



<b>1. Project Data:</b>		<b>Date Posted :</b> 06/11/2002	
<b>PROJ ID:</b> P048522		<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Project Name:</b> Emergency Flood Rehabilitation Project	<b>Project Costs (US\$M)</b>	35.00	31.59
<b>Country:</b> Yemen	<b>Loan/Credit (US\$M)</b>	27.84	27.44
<b>Sector(s):</b> Board: RDV - Irrigation and drainage (24%), Flood protection (24%), Water supply (24%), Roads and highways (24%), Central government administration (4%)	<b>Cofinancing (US\$M)</b>		
<b>L/C Number:</b> C2932; CQ016			
	<b>Board Approval (FY)</b>		97
<b>Partners involved :</b> UNDP	<b>Closing Date</b>	07/31/2000	12/31/2001
<b>Prepared by :</b>	<b>Reviewed by :</b>	<b>Group Manager :</b>	<b>Group:</b>
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<b>2. Project Objectives and Components</b>			
<b>a. Objectives</b>			
The objectives of the project were: (i) to help restore the countries essential economic infrastructure (roads, agriculture, rural water supply) and domestic food production capability damaged by the heavy rains and flooding and to facilitate access to production centers, markets and social services; (ii) to strengthen Yemen's institutional capacity to manage disaster recovery programs and develop programs to mitigate the country's vulnerability to flood damage; and (iii) to serve as a catalyst for donor financing and coordination of the reconstruction effort .			
<b>b. Components</b>			
Investments were directed towards the most affected areas including Shabwa, Marib, Hadramaut, Al -Jafw, and Abyan. Main components were: (a) agricultural infrastructure including rehabilitation of embankments, irrigation systems, service roads, and installation of secondary canals, wells, bunds, and weirs (base costs: US\$13 million); (b) transport infrastructure, including rehabilitation of main roads and associated structures (US\$13 million); (c) water supply infrastructure, including rehabilitation of urban and rural water supply facilities through the supply of equipment such as pumps, generators, chlorinators, and pipes (US\$1.1 million); (d) consulting services and studies, including assistance in the design and implementation of civil works, contract management and construction supervision, and preparation of studies, including a flood preparedness and mitigation study (US\$2.2 million).			
<b>c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates</b>			
The project closed 18 months later than the original schedule with close to 100 percent of funds disbursed . This project funding followed closely behind the reallocation from existing credits of US\$ 14.5 million to finance initial rehabilitation. The failure of a parallel financier, UNDP, to implement a US\$ 1 million dollar component for a flood preparedness and mitigation component impacted on the implementation of the overall program and is likely to have some impact on sustainability.			
<b>3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:</b>			
<i>With respect to objective (i)</i> , related to agricultural infrastructure, this was substantially achieved with particular success in wadi rehabilitation achieving well beyond the appraisal targets . The reconstruction of a diversion weir and wadi course rehabilitation protected the historical city of Shibam . Ten major Irish crossings/roads and four major bridges damaged by floods on major road arteries were reconstructed . <i>With respect to objective (ii)</i> , related to strengthening Yemen's institutional capacity to manage disaster recovery, the impact is reported to have been significant apart from the failure by a cofinancier to carry out the anticipated flood preparedness and mitigation component, which affected the achievement of this objective . First, the project succeeded in building local contractor capacity in building bridges to high standards of construction . Second, the project provided an opportunity for a large number of new small contractors to emerge and to acquire experience with small works . Third, the project's use of community participation developed ownership and maintenance capacity for the works as well as creating substantial employment. <i>With respect to objective (iii)</i> , related to catalyzing donor financing and coordination of the			

reconstruction effort, the evidence in the ICR is less clear and success appears to have been mixed . The failure of the UNDP-funded component impacted negatively on this objective . However, the generally effective performance of the PIUs probably had a positive impact on coordination .

**4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:**

Apart from the Marib subcomponent, the project substantially achieved the infrastructure outputs . The targets for the transport infrastructure component are reported to have been fully achieved, and, in some cases, exceeded . There appears to be some evidence that unit costs in the transport infrastructure component were close to or, in some cases, better than those projected at appraisal . The building of both large and small contractor capacity is a significant outcome with likely positive benefits in the longer -term. The introduction of new flood protection technologies in some areas will also have positive longer -term benefits. The early establishment of the interministerial Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning appears to have provided strong political and implementation support . The direction of project support not simply to affected areas but to those affected areas with receptive communities appears to have had a positive impact on outcomes and efficiency and probably future sustainability . Whether it had a positive impact on poverty and equity is unclear from the evidence.

**5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):**

An 18 month delay in completion of what was planned as a project of just over three years is a significant delay especially in an emergency project. Other significant shortcomings include : the failure to carry out the preparedness and mitigation component and startup delay in works for the rehabilitation of the Marib Irrigation Scheme .

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
<b>Outcome :</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	But it is not entirely clear how satisfactory the achievement of objective (iii) was.
<b>Institutional Dev .:</b>	Substantial	Substantial	
<b>Sustainability :</b>	Likely	Likely	But, depending on how frequently such events are likely to occur, this is a marginal call given the failure to complete the preparedness component during the life of the project.
<b>Bank Performance :</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Partly supported by the fact that the project quality at entry was rated Satisfactory by QAG.
<b>Borrower Perf .:</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
<b>Quality of ICR :</b>		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '\*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

**7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:**

1. Emergency projects, in particular, require strong political commitment and high -level oversight and coordination . 2. Selectivity is important in emergency projects, and although directing support to affected areas is necessary, community receptivity is also important for rapid implementation and sustainability .

**8. Assessment Recommended?**  Yes  No

**9. Comments on Quality of ICR:**

A satisfactory ICR with no major shortcomings and sound lessons . The achievements of objective (iii), related to catalyzing donor funding and coordinating reconstruction were not sufficiently addressed in the ICR . The argument that, because no ERR is estimated ex ante in an emergency project - due to the time constraint, there is no case for an ERR analysis ex post - when there is no time constraint, is one that is often used but is not convincing . An ERR analysis could still have been attempted, perhaps on a sample basis . But it would probably have shown high ERRs given the rehabilitation nature of the investment .