INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION
A Review of the Evidence and Emerging Lessons

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1. **Executive Summary**

In many countries today, violence seriously holds back development. The problem now extends far beyond situations of traditional, organized conflict; there were an estimated 52,000 people killed in combat in 2004, compared to 490,000 murders that same year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). In fact, some of the highest murder rates today occur in countries that have not experienced formal conflict at all, such as Jamaica, Venezuela, South Africa, Mexico and Brazil.

High levels of interpersonal violence - a category that includes harmful acts perpetrated by an individual or small group (such as a gang) against a family member (as in domestic violence), community member, or stranger – pose devastating costs to development. Chronic, high rates of such violence deter investment, erode social cohesion, limit access to employment and educational opportunities, drain state resources, and threaten governance at various levels. Violence is an important signal of fragility, because it indicates the breakdown of state capacity to provide basic security, and of societal capacity to impose social controls on violent behavior. These represent serious risks in middle- and high-income countries, but are especially debilitating in low-income and post-conflict countries, where chronic violence can pose a significant threat of the outbreak or relapse of violent conflict.

This paper aims to inform discussions of interpersonal violence as a development issue, and the design and implementation of initiatives to address it. The following sections discuss risk and protective factors for interpersonal violence, review the evidence base for effective prevention programs, and highlight some emerging lessons on good practice in interpersonal violence prevention. Within the literature on risk factors and interventions, the bulk of research has focused on problems of youth violence, and has drawn heavily from experiences in wealthier countries. This review necessarily reflects these biases, but we have endeavored to include experience from lower- and middle-income contexts and with other forms of violence where possible. The literature on relationships between forms of violence has focused much more on lower-income and post-conflict contexts; thus, Section I.4 is able to explore these contexts in more detail.

Key messages include:

- While some risk factors may be more influential than others, it is the *accumulation of risk factors* that seems to be most important in increasing the propensity for violent behavior. In particular, the combination of individual-level factors with micro- and macro-level factors seem critical in explaining why some individuals resort to violence and others do not.

- The evidence of influence of some macro-level risk factors is particularly strong - especially a *history of violent conflict, rapid urban growth, high inequality, institutional fragility and the proliferation of arms and drug trafficking*. For other macro factors, including high unemployment, there is less consensus in the literature about particular influences on violent behavior.
• **Community level factors including connection to school and family appear especially important in influencing risk.** This points to the need for a more structural view of violence that conceptualizes violent perpetrators not as individual delinquents in need of rehabilitation, but as products of their families and communities. It also underscores the importance of these institutions as entry points for prevention.

• **Different expressions of violence are related to each other in important ways.** While research and policy have traditionally treated different forms of political, criminal, and gender-based violence separately, emerging research shows these expressions are closely related. This points to the need for more integrated approaches that can address common risk factors.

• A review of the evidence base for prevention suggests that **it is important to intervene early, via multiple sectors, to prevent violence.** This is because, first, risk factors for violence fall within the areas of focus of various sectors. Second, coordinating across multiple sectors helps avoid duplication of efforts. Finally, working across sectors allows for combining long and short-term interventions: often immediate-term, quick-impact interventions such as police training can be combined with longer-term programs to change cultural norms around violence for more comprehensive results.

• **Effective interventions involve multiple levels of government:** Local governments must be the focal point for prevention programs, because they are closest to the affected neighborhoods and generally have responsibility for basic services there, including security. However, because different levels of government perform different functions, it is important to involve municipal, state and even national governments if possible. The most effective programs involve local initiatives within a broader framework for violence prevention at the municipal or regional level.
SECTION I: UNDERSTANDING INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE

2. Introduction: Violence, Fragility and Development

Violence, or the fear of violence, dominates the daily lives of millions of people across the globe. Some of this violence occurs in traditional, organized conflict, but a growing proportion of it now takes place off the battlefield: an estimated 52,000 people were killed in combat in 2004, compared to 490,000 murders that same year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). In sub-Saharan Africa, where the largest number of ongoing conflicts are located, the number of conflict-related deaths was 17,000 in 2004, compared to a staggering 180,000 deaths from interpersonal violence (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008, 72). Understanding violence and its impacts, therefore, requires going beyond the traditional conflict agenda.

High levels of interpersonal violence - a category that includes harmful acts perpetrated by an individual or small group (such as a gang) against a family member (as in domestic violence), community member, or stranger – threaten the very foundations of sustainable development. Globally, violence outside of conflict settings is estimated to cost between $95 – 163 billion a year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). The Mexican government estimated that crime and violence together cost the country $9.6 billion from lost sales, jobs and investment in 2007 alone.¹ Similarly, it is estimated that if Jamaica and Haiti reduced their crime levels to those of Costa Rica, they could increase annual GDP growth by 5.4 percent (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Bank 2007). At the local level, fear of victimization deters investment, stigmatizes neighborhoods, erodes social cohesion, and limits access to employment and educational opportunities. High levels of violence also threaten governance by limiting mobility and creating fear and distrust among community members– impacts that are especially pronounced where institutions are already fragile. Moreover, the costs of responding to violent crime drain municipal and national budgets for law enforcement, justice systems, health services and social welfare. The indirect human costs imposed on violence survivors by trauma or disability far overshadow these impacts because they drain the human capital necessary for development.

Pervasive interpersonal violence signals a fragile situation. It may indicate, first, institutional fragility - the lack of institutional capacity or willingness to provide basic services, including security. In cases of state fragility or collapse, this capacity is further eroded as citizens lose confidence in state institutions that are unable to protect them. High levels of violence also point to societal fragility, via the breakdown of informal social control over violent behavior. These conditions exist in fragile states, but also occur in middle- or high-income countries where state capacity is relatively strong. For countries struggling to rebuild after conflict, high levels of interpersonal violence represent a serious risk of relapse, because they weaken state capacity and the state-society relationship. In these contexts, chronic violence both feeds grievances against a state that cannot protect or provide services to its citizens, and weakens state capacity to respond to a resurgence of political violence.

¹ Mexican Finance Minister Augsín Carstens, quoted in El Universal, September 3, 2008, “Cuesta la inseguridad 1% del PIB: Carstens.”
Understanding these relationships reveals the potential for violence prevention to provide benefits far beyond restoring economic growth. Indeed, interpersonal violence prevention is an essential component of building confidence within society and between society and the state – a crucial foundation for sustainable development.

This paper aims to inform discussions of interpersonal violence as a development issue, and the design and implementation of initiatives to address it. The literature on interpersonal violence, particularly that on risk factors and interventions, has primarily focused on youth violence, and on experiences from developed countries. Some of this bias is inevitably reflected in the present review. To the extent possible, we have worked to include experiences from lower- and middle-income countries, and to focus on other types of interpersonal violence. The discussion of the relationships between different forms of violence in Section I.4. focuses almost entirely on lower-income and post-conflict contexts, again reflecting the focus of the literature overall.

The sections that follow first discuss some key risk and protective factors for interpersonal violence, and the relationships between different forms of violence. Section II reviews the evidence base for effective prevention programs, organized by sector in order to better aid policy discussions. Next, we describe some emerging lessons on good practice in interpersonal violence prevention. The final section concludes.

3. **Key Risk and Protective Factors for Interpersonal Violence**

Violent behavior is provoked by a complex interaction of physiological, psychological and environmental factors. There are no direct ‘causes’ of violence; rather, there are characteristics of an individual’s biology, personality and environment that impose stresses, which increase the risk that he or she will perpetrate or experience violence. The accumulation of these stresses, or "risk factors," is associated with an increased tendency of being a victim or a perpetrator of violence. **Protective factors**, on the other hand, can be understood characteristics of an individual and his/her environment that strengthen the capacity to confront stresses without the use of violence. The combination of risk and protective factors is unique to each individual. This helps explain why some people and communities survive and even thrive in high-risk environments while others do not. There is no mechanical relationship between these factors and outcomes: risk factors do not ‘cause’ violence, and protective factors do not prevent it. Rather, they influence capacity of individuals and communities to respond to stresses (World Health Organization 2008).

**Risk and protective factors discussed here apply to both the propensity to perpetrate violence and to experiencing violence. However, they may apply differently to different types of violence.** For example, living in a high-violence neighborhood increases the risk of both being involved in violence and being a victim of violence. In contrast, being female is an important individual-level risk factor for experiencing intimate partner violence, while being male is associated with increased risk of both perpetrating intimate partner or other interpersonal violence, and being a victim of interpersonal violence. The body of knowledge reflected here
refers to physical violence, with the understanding that some risk factors may be common for physical and sexual violence.²

Different frameworks are employed to understand risk and protective factors. The most common is the ecological model, employed predominantly within the public health approach (WHO 2002), which outlines factors at the individual, interpersonal, community and society levels. Development-centered approaches to violence prevention use a slightly different framework, including the individual, micro (family and community) and macro levels. In addition, while the public health approach focuses primarily on individual level factors, development approaches tend to emphasize micro and macro level risk and protective factors. The following discussion is structured around risk and protective factors at the individual, micro and macro level. A summary matrix is provided in Annex II.

A. Individual Level Risk and Protective Factors

At the individual level, gender and age are key risk factors.³ It is important to recognize that neither one’s age or gender causes violence. Rather, one’s age and gender are associated with greater or lesser propensity for involvement in violence, and with particular types of violence. For example, vulnerability to violence changes over the life cycle; youth have the highest propensity to perpetrate or be victimized by violence, but the elderly are also vulnerable to suffering violence. Young men are most vulnerable as both perpetrators and victims of common violence and political violence. Globally, male homicide rates are roughly double female rates for all age groups (WHO 2008). In Colombia, for example, the homicide rate for young men (ages 15-24) was 93 per 100,000 young men in 2007, compared to 62 per 100,000 men of all ages.⁴ Overall, Colombian men comprise 90 percent of all murders committed with firearms, and over a third of these victims are men between the ages of 20 and 29 (Small Arms Survey 2006). Globally, men also commit the majority of violent crimes as well, from domestic violence to homicide.

Young women, especially between the ages of 15-25, are more vulnerable to sexual and domestic violence. In general, vulnerability to violence tends to decrease as people age, a trend that may be related to increased ability to handle conflict, decreases in factors such as alcohol consumption, or others (WHO forthcoming).

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² For an overview of the risk factors specific to perpetration and victimization of intimate partner violence, see Bott et al 2005 and WHO forthcoming.
³ There is some debate over whether age and gender, as well as other non-changeable characteristics such as race, should be considered risk factors, or as indicators of other underlying conditions, such as being part of an excluded class or other social group. This suggests that targeting groups simply by age or gender alone may be less effective in violence prevention than targeting sub-groups experiencing the underlying conditions (Small Arms Survey 2008:259).
One of the most important protective factors at the individual level is a sense of **social connection**. Family connectedness – a feeling of closeness to one’s family, regardless of family structure or whether all members live together – is especially important. A stable relationship with at least one adult or parent has been found to be a key element in resilience to violence in contexts as diverse as the United States (Garbarino 1995, Urdy 2003), Palestine (Barber 2001) and Colombia (Baird 2009), and the Caribbean (World Bank 2003). Other social connections include peer groups and schools. In studies of the Caribbean, school connectedness (measured as school attendance rates) was found to be a key protective factor for adolescents (UNODC and World Bank 2007, World Bank 2008a). This connectedness strengthens the capacity to confront violence in their communities from a position of strength (Garbarino 2001).

### B. Micro Level Risk and Protective Factors

At the **micro level**, the family and community environment have important influences on violent behavior. Within the family, harsh parenting styles or abuse are some of the strongest risk factors for engaging in violence (Buvinic and Morrison 2000, WHO forthcoming). Living in a community where violence is prevalent, and/or where guns and drugs are easily available has also been associated with violent behavior (Tolan et al. 1996). Other studies of at-risk youth suggest that even strong family support cannot moderate the impacts of consistent exposure to community violence (witnessing, being a victim, or knowing a victim) (see for example Youngstrom et al. 2003 and Player and Eaton 2009 for evidence from the United States).

Conversely, **availability of services** in neighborhood can protect against the propensity for violence. A study of 80 neighborhoods in Chicago, USA, found that living in a neighborhood with above-average concentration of organizations and services was associated with lower levels of aggression among youth and adults (Molnar et al. 2008). Access to more and better quality services protects against violent tendencies by reducing the scope of grievances and providing alternative means for meeting basic needs. Related to this, **opportunities for participation in social and economic** life can be important protective factors (Garbarino 1995, Benard 1996), by enhancing the feelings of connectedness at the individual level.

### C. Macro Level Risk and Protective Factors

At the **macro level**, several factors merit discussion. One of the most frequent risk factors for violence is a **history of violent conflict** in a given context. In some post-conflict contexts, common violence remains high or increases following the end of the formal conflict (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). This appears related to a host of factors, discussed in more detail in the following section, but that include the breakdown of cultural norms around violence, availability of weapons post-conflict, and weak state capacity in institutions charged with providing security. El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, South Africa are just a few examples of countries where homicide rates stayed high or increased in the post-war period.
Rapid, large scale urbanization also has an association with high levels of violence, although the exact nature of this relationship is not well understood. The relationship between cities and violence is more complex than often assumed. While many cities are plagued by high levels of violence that threaten development, there is nothing inevitable about violence in cities. In the first place, cities are not always more violent than rural areas. In an analysis of 50 countries using data from UNODC, the World Bank found that in 32 of the cases, the largest cities had homicide rates higher than their national average (World Bank 2009). However, in some other cities the reverse is true—the homicide rate within the city is lower than the national rate. In El Salvador, for instance, the homicide rate in the capital is less than the national rate by over 39 homicides per 100,000.

Nor are more crowded cities always more violent: cities like Santo Domingo, Guatemala City and Kathmandu, have very high murder rates in relation to their population, but other very large cities such as Dhaka, Mumbai and Cairo have homicide rates below the national average (UNODC 2007). Additionally, research suggests that some types of violence, especially domestic violence, may be more prevalent in rural areas rather than cities (WHO 2005).

What does seem to matter is the rate of growth of a city. A review of 50 countries found a strong, positive correlation between the annual rate of growth of a city and the murder rate (World Bank 2009). Today’s cities – especially those that are growing very quickly - experience a convergence of factors that put them at risk for destabilizing levels of violence if they are not appropriately addressed. On the most basic level, many city governments and labor markets are simply unable to keep pace with the growing urban population. Recent migrants to the city may find that job opportunities are scarce, or perhaps even worse than what they left behind. When these conditions combine with inadequate government capacity to provide basic services, including security, power vacuums are created that can be filled by non-state actors. As centers of power and conflict, cities are natural sites for criminal rent-seeking, or for political actors vying for the state’s attention. In countries ranging from Brazil, to Pakistan and South Africa, entire sections of cities have fallen under the control of armed groups or “violence entrepreneurs,” who mobilize groups for political or financial ends.

Other key risk factors, in urban environments in particular, have to do with the disruption of social networks that inevitably accompanies rapid urbanization. Whereas in rural areas, kinship and ethnic networks can be relied upon for support and for controlling violence, in rapidly

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5 In Guatemala, an estimated 40 percent of homicides occurred in the capital city in 2006, where only 20 percent of the population resides (Matute and García 2007). Santo Domingo, with just 10 percent of the country’s population, saw nearly 18 percent of the homicides in 2005-06, while Panama City, with just 24 percent of the country’s population, saw 68 percent of that country’s homicides. Similarly, in Nepal, 33 percent of all homicides occurred in the capital city Kathmandu, which is home to just 3 percent of the population (UNODC 2007).

6 Note that city growth rates and urbanization are different phenomena. The former refers to the change in the density of a city, while the latter describes migration from rural to urban areas.
growing urban areas these networks are more tenuous (Kurtenbach 2009). In more extreme cases, community leaders who could play this role have been killed or silenced with fear of retaliation. In turn, young parents raising children in challenging urban environments where resources are scarce, and where they are disconnected from family and other social networks that would support them, find it difficult to provide the sense of social connection their children need to develop non-violent coping skills. This is often accompanied by a process of social upheaval that disrupts traditional norms and makes violence more acceptable (Kurtenbach 2009).

**Poverty** is an important risk factor, but through indirect relationships. Violent deaths do concentrate in countries affected by poverty and low human development, and the homicide rate of countries classified as low human development countries is more than triple that of countries with medium or high levels of human development. Within countries, geographical areas where violence concentrates also happen to be the poorest (Winton 2004, Briceno-Leon and Zubillaga 2002). Cross-national studies of violence have found that areas of highest recruitment for gangs and other illegal armed groups also tend to have high poverty rates (Dowdenny 2005). This seems to be at least in part because poverty is often accompanied by insecurity, so that individuals in these environments may need to engage in violence for protection (Brett and Specht 2004).

Yet poverty alone does not account for high levels of violence. As Urdal (2004, 5) notes, “the existence of objective deprivation, the mere fact that people are poor, seldom produces strong grievances.” Surveys of first-generation members of gangs, or maras, in the region, suggest that they did not come from the poorest families, but instead were motivated by a perceived lack of opportunities and positive outlook for the future compared to other groups (Levenson-Estrada 1988). Instead, high levels of **income inequality** have been shown to be related both to higher violence and crime rates in various studies (Kelly 2000, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 2002)

**Horizontal inequalities** - social, economic and political inequalities across groups – may be even more important risk factors for violence. (Stewart 2003). In most cases, the existence of grievances, however legitimate, is insufficient to trigger violence. Yet when grievances combine with strong collective identity, the tendency for people to react violently increases. Northern Ireland provides a useful example of the effect of horizontal inequalities. There, studies of the effect of economic factors, including unemployment, on the violence found no evidence that these affect the intensity, sources of direction of the violence (White 1993, Thompson 1989). Yet when subsequent studies disaggregated unemployment rates by religion, unemployment was shown to be a leading cause of violence (Honaker 2005).

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7 UNODC estimates based on the UNDP Human Development Index reported in Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008: 72, Figure 4.2.
8 In a 1988 study of gang members in Guatemala, Levenson-Estrada found that: 90 percent of gang members were born or raised in the capital, 80 percent had a regular place to spend the night; 61 percent were in school, and 83 percent did not work but supported themselves and their families.
There is some debate about the importance of demographic characteristics as risk factors for violence, particularly having a large proportion of the population aged 15-30 and male – what is called a “youth bulge.” Historically, youth have been associated with armed conflict: over 80 percent of all armed civil conflicts since 1970 occurred in countries where more than 60 percent of the population was under 30 years old (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). Cross-national comparisons have found that urban hotspots of gang activity had higher percentages of youth and minors than among the general population (Dowdney 2005). Similar observations formed the basis for Samuel Huntington’s (1996) oft-cited claim that countries are especially prone to conflict when youth ages 15-24 account for at least 20% of the population.9

Yet by itself, a youthful society is an incomplete predictor of a country’s risk of violence. In some cases, a youthful population may provide the necessary human capital to drive development, often called a “development dividend” (Barakat and Urdal 2008, 2). Two strains of literature have emerged to identify the conditions that seem to influence whether a youthful population is a boon or a curse to a given country. In the first, youth are seen to be more prone to recruitment into violence by political interests or extra-legal groups, such as gangs, because they tend to have fewer time constraints due to jobs or family responsibilities (Goldstone 1999) and fewer opportunity costs than older age groups (Collier 2000). These dynamics can reinforce the propensity for violence if youth cohorts are particularly large and thus exert downward pressure on wages for the cohort, reducing opportunity costs (Machunovich 2000). Some demographers thus assert that the demographic dividend is more likely if large youth cohorts precede much smaller cohorts (Birdsall et al. 2001).

A second strain of literature examines the ways that youth bulges provide motives for violence, because they fuel grievances. For this reason, unemployment, especially youth unemployment, is often considered a macro-level risk factor for violence, yet there is no consensus in the literature on the nature of this relationship. One recent study of unemployment and crime in France over the 1990-2000 period found a positive, causal effect of unemployment on property crimes and drug offenses, yet no effect on rapes, homicides or other violent crimes (Fougere et al 2009).10 Other studies of crime and unemployment have generally found a positive relationship, but the effect is not always significant, and some have found a negative relationship (see review by Chirico 1987). This distinction is important, as many programs promote youth employment as a means to combat both crime and violence. However, as documented in Section II, this review found no evaluations of youth employment programs that considered the impact on violence rates.

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9 Subsequent work to test Huntington’s hypothesis for violent conflict did not support the 20% threshold, but did support the argument that youth bulges increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, especially when combined with economic stagnation (Urdal 2004). More recent comparative studies estimate that the risk associated with a youthful population alone is roughly comparable to those associated with low per capita income or high infant mortality rates (Urdal 2006).

10 These findings are in accordance with Becker’s model of crime, which assumes that the propensity to commit a crime depends on a cost-benefit comparison of expected consequences of legal and illegal activities.
It is perhaps more likely that the relationship between unemployment and violence is mediated by other factors related to the stress of earning a livelihood. For example Rossiaco et al (2010) note that unemployment can lead to boredom and depression, which are in turn connected to substance abuse and, as well, perpetration of violence.

*Education* is also asserted to have a relationship with violence, although the nature of the relationship is not well-understood. Some assert that high levels of education, particularly of youth, interact with youth bulges to reinforce frustrations because they create expectations of employment and wages that do not bear out in a developing economy. Low levels of education therefore should therefore decrease opportunity costs for violence (Collier 2000). In a study of 124 countries for the period 1970-2000, Barakat and Urdal (2008) find that youth bulges are more conducive to violence where levels of male secondary education are low, and that this interaction is more severe in low-income and middle-income countries.

Finally, *institutional fragility* is a key risk factor at the macro level. The state’s ability to provide the most basic services, especially security, is fundamental to reducing and preventing violence. If people fail to see opportunities to express grievances and make demands within existing political and social structures, because those structures are exclusive or weak, they often respond with violence. Where state service provision is weak or uneven, as is often the case in urban slums, it can fuel feelings of marginalization and exclusion that trigger violent behavior. Similarly, a weak criminal justice system fosters impunity, thereby reducing the disincentive to behave violently.

*Markets for firearms and illicit drugs* are more prominent in urban areas, adding another layer of risk for violence. The proliferation of guns in these areas increases both the possibility that they will be used, and that the resulting violence will be lethal. Firearms are responsible for an estimated 60 percent of homicides in Latin America, the Caribbean and North America, and about 30 percent of homicides in the Middle East, Western Europe and South-East Asia (Small Arms Survey 2008).

*Drugs* and violence interact in urban communities in a variety of ways, ranging from violent behavior induced by drug use or motivated by the need to buy drugs, to social cleansing of drug users by armed groups, to violent gang activity to control territory for drug sales or to settle disputes in the drug trade (Moser and McIlwaine 2004, WHO 2010). Where drug networks become institutionalized in urban neighborhoods, they make supplant the state, even to the extent of providing social services from feeding programs to basic security. The drug trade exerts other indirect effects on violence through what Gaviria has termed “criminal externalities.” These include the draining of criminal justice resources, increased supply of weapons by drug groups, and the creation of a drug culture that idealizes easy money and violence as a way of meeting needs or getting ahead socially (Gaviria 1998).
D. Accumulation of Risk Factors and Pull Factors

Most children and youth are able to cope with low levels of risk in positive ways, even while growing up in high-risk environments (O’Toole 2002, World Bank 2008a). Why, then, are some individuals able to survive and even thrive in risky environments, while others do not? The answer lies, at least in part, in the particular accumulation of different risk and protective factors. Studies in the United States (Sameroff et al. 1987, Dunst 1993) and elsewhere (Garbarino and Kostelny 1996) suggest that the accumulation of risk is more influential than the impact of any particular risk factor by itself. Conversely, protective factors accumulate to facilitate healing and decrease the propensity for violence. In other words, “risk accumulates; opportunity ameliorates” (Garbarino 2001, 362).

Recent research on violence has endeavored to understand the complex interplay between different levels of risk factors, particularly those at the individual/family and community levels (see Youngstrom et al. 2003). A child exposed to violence in his home will look first for refuge in his community. Indeed, these family experiences can often be mitigated by positive support at school, community groups, and other bodies. Studies of the US (Blum et al. 2002) and various countries across Latin America and the Caribbean (World Bank 2008a) found that the impacts of exposure to violence in the home can be mitigated by a sense of social connection to school. Other studies in the U.S. have found that a sense of social connection, including opportunities for participation in social and economic life, help protect against violent behavior (Garbarino 1995, Benard 1996).

Unfortunately, violence in the home and in the community tend to be present together. Studies of urban youth in the United States suggest that even strong family support cannot moderate the impacts of consistent exposure to community violence (witnessing, being a victim, or knowing a victim) (Youngstrom et al. 2003). Thus, for children who face violence at home and who are also growing up in areas where the social infrastructure of schools and families has broken down, and which are marginalized from the rest of society, the chances of adopting positive social behavior are slim. In these environments, youth are exposed both to the direct physical violence around them, as well as to structural violence in the form of their exclusion from opportunities and services. Many, if not most, youth facing this accumulation of risk factors show impact ranging from depression and harm directed at oneself to aggression and violence directed at others. One influential study of youth in an impoverished area of Chicago found that none of the

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11 Sameroff et al. (1987) used an index of environmental risk factors including indicators of maternal well-being (educational attainment, depression or other mental illness, substance abuse); family dysfunction (absent father, number of siblings) and socioeconomic status to estimate the effect of such factors on I.Q. scores. While the effect of one or two risk factors was minimal, adding a third or fourth risk factor showed significant effects on intellectual development. In addition, the impact of multiple factors was stronger than that of any single factor by itself. Dunst (1993) took this research further by adding protective factors to the model.
young, adolescent males in the sample who lived in high-stress family situations, and who witnessed regular violence in their communities exhibited evidence of resilience (Tolan 1996).

**Risk factors also interact with particular pull factors into violence.** The accumulation of risk and protective factors helps explain why some individuals experience an increased risk toward violent behavior. Yet for many individuals, they tell only part of the story. Risk and protective factors also interact with powerful pull factors into violence. One of the most immediate pull factors is the provision of protection by gangs. In many contexts, gangs may offer the only protection for youth caught in heavy gang territory (Kurtenbach and Hensengerth forthcoming).

Another important pull factor is the involvement of family members or peers in violent behavior, particularly violent groups including gangs. For these individuals, such groups provide the primary source of family and social connection (Brett and Specht 2004). Indeed, identity and kinship networks have long been the basis for affiliation in criminal groups, such as the Italian mafia, as well as political armed groups (Hagedorn 2008). One ILO study of youth soldiers in the DRC conflict documented that 10 percent of children recruited into armed groups had a father already involved in an armed group, whereas none of the un-recruited children did (Dumas and de Cock 2003). Some gangs require members to renounce their families of origin in order to ensure loyalty to the gang, and in turn function very much like a family. As one example, the Pagoda Boys network in Cambodia took in children living on the street after the conflict and incorporated them into the gang (Kurtenbach and Hensengerth forthcoming).

The sense of social connection provides social capital in terms of trust, solidarity, emotional and practical support (Moser and McIlwaine 2004, Winton 2005). The effect of these is especially enhanced when these supports are not available in the individual’s home or community life. Inclusion in groups such as gangs thus provides a sense of belonging, which then enables a sense of power and purpose (Dissel 1997).

Violent behavior may offer opportunities for physical, social and economic mobility. The power of these pull factors is reinforced if alternate opportunities are not provided by the state or mainstream society, which is often the case for marginalized groups. Urban gangs, for example, have been known to provide opportunities for physical, social and economic mobility to their members. These opportunities can represent simple physical mobility, as when armed groups recruit out of refugee camps (Kurtenbach 2009), but more likely come in the form of social and economic mobility through elevated social standing, and access to resources (Dowdney 2005). Gangs may offer the chance to earn money via various activities, which then buys members respect in their communities and families. This elevated status has the effect of reinforcing the justification of illicit, often violent, activities, especially when families come to depend on the income (see Willman and Marcelin 2010 forthcoming for evidence from Haiti).

Combined with this, participation in violent behavior may confer respect and a higher social standing. Research with incarcerated violent offenders in the US reveals a pattern of violence as
a tool for gaining respect, particularly when one’s status is threatened by the disrespect of another peer (Gilligan 2001).

This elevated social status if perceived to bring with it a greater voice in decisions. Levenson-Estrada (1988) has suggested that the first generation of Central American maras, in the 1980s, represented one of the few dynamic youth organizations offering support, solidarity, and a generally egalitarian decision making structure. They thus attracted youth who felt excluded from formal social and political processes. While more recent accounts indicate that the second generation maras espouse quite different qualities (see for example World Bank 2009), the pull of participating in a group is still powerful for many youth.

There is a strong gender dimension to these pull factors as well. The involvement of girls and women in armed groups, from urban gangs to military and paramilitary organizations, is not new, yet most policy and research attention has been on males. An emerging area of research on girls in armed groups suggests that young women join violent groups for different reasons than young men, play different roles than boys and men, and as a result experience this participation differently. A global literature review of girls’ involvement in urban gangs estimates there are 132,000 – 660,000 female gang members globally. While they share some motivations with boys for joining gangs (neighborhood disadvantage, having friends or family already involved in a gang), they are less likely to join for money and more likely to join to obtain protection (Small Arms Survey 2010 forthcoming).

There is some research to suggest that girls join gangs for similar reasons that they join armed political groups, although the research in this area is quite thin. In a study of female combatants in Liberia’s civil war, Specht (2006) found a range of motives for enlisting. These included more feminist motives, such as to avenge violence done against them and other women, and to protect themselves and other females from future violence. Others joined for protection, and formed relationships with male combatants. Still others were pulled by economic incentives, such as makeup and “red shoes.”

Other studies suggest that women are more often motivated to join violent movements by trauma, usually associated with the loss of a family member or partner. Badran (2009) finds that Muslim women in Asia and Africa who get involved in violent extremist movements tend to have lost a loved one in the conflict, and have strong political grievances.

For some young women, involvement in armed groups may offer opportunities for social mobility that are unavailable in peacetime or mainstream society. Some believe they can challenge patriarchal norms about women’s role in society through violent conflict. This represents a powerful pull even if the status does not play out long term: the history of civil wars in Central America during the 1980s demonstrated that while women took very active roles in guerilla movements, they were unable to translate these into high-ranking political positions post conflict (see for example Randall 2001 on Nicaragua). In a study of female suicide bombers in
Palestine, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Chechnya and Colombia, Bloom (2005) finds that women are motivated by a desire to change the patriarchal norms that limit them. The groups that recruit them, however, are less inclined toward gender equality and more toward the attention that female bombers attract (in the case of Palestine, female suicide bombers get eight times as much media coverage as males), and the opportunity to shame males into participating in suicide missions. Campbell (1984) looked at these pull factors for LatinAmerican and African-American female gang members in New York, and found that gang membership was initially ‘liberating’ as girls found some respect, sense of belonging and better social positioning. Others have argued that this initial liberation is followed by more negative experiences in the longer-term, as young women get more involved in criminal activities and/or are victimized by violence within the gang. These experiences affect both their personal prospects of for the future and those of their children (Moore 1991), thereby generating a new array of challenges for girls hoping to leave gangs (Curry 1998).

Understanding the interaction of these factors helps explain why violent behavior tends to concentrate in particular geographic areas, where risk factors and pull factors accumulate without the compensatory, support structures of community and family to counterbalance them. This, in turn, points to the urgent need for a more structural view of violence that conceptualizes violent perpetrators not as individual delinquents in need of rehabilitation, but as products of their families and communities responding to both social and economic incentives. We turn to this in Sections 5 and 6, highlighting the evidence base for using family and community institutions as key points of intervention.

4. Key Relationships between Different Forms of Violence

In its project concept note, the WDR (2011) on Securing Development astutely notes that “academic literature and policy frameworks have tended to treat civil war as a phenomenon independent from other forms of large scale violence, including gang activity, violence linked to trafficking and local, rural or urban violence.” Few projects have analyzed the different expressions of violence together, and no broad-scale statistical relationships across countries, particularly across low- and middle-income countries, have been established. As a result, the different forms of violence are often compartmentalized in policy, relegated to different agencies that often do not coordinate amongst themselves.

However a substantial amount of operational experience, qualitative research and analyses of particular case studies suggest that the different forms of violence are connected, and often reinforce each other. People living in high-violence areas make little distinction between the violence that threatens them in the street, violence for political ends, or the violence that finds its way into the home from the street or battlefield. Similarly, a single violent act can take on various meanings: a rape in a post-conflict context can be meant as a political a turf-marker for a drug gang, or the result of a domestic or community grievance. One form of violence may morph into
another, particularly where weak institutions are unable to address the underlying structural factors – such as impunity, or social norms condoning violence against certain groups.

This section summarizes what is known about these relationships. Much of this literature comes from lower- and middle-income contexts, particularly post-conflict countries, which are the focus of this discussion.

**Political/Organized Violence can create conditions for Criminal Violence to thrive.** It is commonly presumed with a peace agreement and/or formal ceasefire (or defeat of the rebel group/opposition), fighting ends and reconstruction assumes priority. In fact, until recently, violence in post-conflict societies has largely been treated as a relapse to war (Walter 2002, Darby 2006, Doyle and Sambanis 2006). However, in many cases the end of the formal conflict is not accompanied by the cultural and economic transitions that would enable a lasting peace. State institutions charged with guaranteeing security (police, rule of law institutions) may remain weak. Cultures of violence may persist, allowing criminal networks to take advantage of the void left by a fragile state. In the resulting “under-governed areas,” the state is unable to control violence, offer protection and respond to the demands of its citizens, enabling violence to thrive with impunity (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2009). As a result, post-conflict situations are often threatened by gangs, urban crime, human and drug trafficking, and youth violence. A fragile policy environment thus facilitates political violence morphing into inter-personal violence.
In some cases the link is more explicit, as when armed groups simply change status to criminal groups. Oftentimes these groups remain available for political mobilization, as in the case of Haiti (World Bank 2006c, Willman and Marcelin 2010 forthcoming). In Colombia, an inadequate DDR program is heavily criticized with opening the way for paramilitary successor groups (called Bandas Criminales Emergentes, or BACRIM) to emerge (see Box 1), not least by failing to dismantle the criminal networks established by the paramilitaries.

**Box 1: From Political to Criminal Violence: Paramilitary successor groups in Colombia**

Recent reports by human rights groups document a rise in what the Colombian government terms “Bandas Criminales Emergentes (BACRIM)” following the implementation of a DDR program between 2003 to 2006. These groups are alleged to have taken over many of the criminal operations previously run by members of the AUC, the country’s chief paramilitary group. The groups are alleged to play a strong role in troubling trends in rising violence, including a doubling of the homicide rate in Medellin in 2009, and a steep increase in the number of internally displaced people. Key links alleged between the AUC and today’s BACRIM include the following:

- The majority of BACRIM leaders are alleged to be mid-level AUC commanders who either never demobilized, or did so fraudulently.
- BACRIM adopts patterns of behavior identical to those of the AUC, including exerting control of territory through extortion, massacres, and forced displacement, and continuance of drug trafficking activities.

Some crimes committed by BACRIM have been perpetrated against victims of AUC offenses who were actively seeking compensation or prosecution for the loss of a family member or land.


*Criminal violence can also morph into political violence.* Political actors may mobilize criminal networks to serve political or financial goals. This has been the case with Haiti’s “violence entrepreneurs” (World Bank 2006c), who are used to foment instability during times of political conflict. Similarly, the Guatemalan government is widely alleged to have hired assassins from local gangs to murder dissidents (Kurtenbach and Hensengerth forthcoming). In Cambodia, gangs are more directly linked to elite patronage networks, which allows them to be mobilized for “controlled escalation of violence” when needed, and also affords them protection from the police (Kurtenbach and Hensengerth forthcoming).

*Other links between political and criminal violence are evident in the similarity of tactics often used to control them.* In Guatemala, campaigns against maras have resembled counter-insurgency campaigns undertaken during the war, including extra-judicial killings of gang
members (Kurtenbach and Hensengerth forthcoming). Similar dynamics have been

Another key point of relationship between political and criminal violence is the existence of common risk factors for both. Studies of youth recruitment into gangs and into armed conflict show similar push and pull factors at play in various contexts (see for example Hagedorn 2007, 2008, Dowdney 2005, Brett and Specht 2004, Abbink 2005). Chief among these is the exposure to violence as children, either in the home or in the community, as discussed in the prior section and further below in the relationships between gender-based violence and other forms.

Gender based violence is related to both criminal and political violence. The clearest evidence of this link is that one of the strongest risk factors for perpetrating or being victimized by violence as a youth or adult is the experience or witness of violence as a child. Various studies demonstrate that male children who witness abuse may present an increased tendency to perpetuate violence as adolescents and adults, whether in their own homes or in delinquent or gang activities (American Psychological Association 1996, Dahlberg 1998, World Bank 2008). Female children who witness or experience violence at home may be more likely to enter abusive relationships as adults (Kalmuss 1984, Seltzer and Kalmuss 1988). In a study of nine countries, women were found to be twice as likely to report suffering abuse by an intimate partner if their own mothers had been abused (Kishor and Johnson 2004). In cross-national studies of both male and female youth involvement in armed groups, whether gangs or political groups, adolescents repeatedly emphasize experiences of abuse within their families (Brett and Specht 2004, Dowdney 2005). Gang or political conflicts are thus one manifestation of continuing the cycle of violence begun in the home.

In addition, gender-based violence is often used as a tool for escalating the political or social conflict. Sexual and physical violence against women and children often adds fuel to the fire of existing rivalries, either between urban gangs (see Willman and Marcelin 2010 forthcoming on Haiti) or within the context of war (Barstow 2001). A rapid assessment of gender-based violence following the disputed 2007 elections in Kenya asserted that alarming increases in sexual violence were occurring not only as, “a by-product of the collapse in social order in Kenya brought on by the post-election conflicts, but it is also being used as a tool to terrorize individuals and families and precipitate their expulsion from the communities in which they live” (Myrum et al. 2008, I).

Some studies of individual countries have documented a rise in gender-based violence following formal conflict. For example, DRC, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burundi and Liberia as well as Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru all experienced increases in GBV following conflict. A recent global review of these countries identified several possible explanatory factors related to the conflict, including: rampant impunity for sexual violence committed during the conflict, poverty and lack of opportunities for sustaining livelihoods, availability of weapons, a breakdown of social norms during the conflict, post-conflict crises of masculinity, an increased number of female-headed households and a weakened rule of law (Bastick et al. 2007). In Burundi, field reports indicate that whereas during and immediately following the conflict,

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12 One example, documented in Kurtenbach and Hensengerth, shows a decrease in the number of cases presented to the Defensa Publica de Adolescentes in Guatemala over the 2005-06 period. This occurred at the same time that a review of documentation of deaths at the city’s morgues showed an increase in violent deaths.
perpetrators of gender-based violence consisted primarily of rebel fighters and military personnel, now they tend to be members of extended family, household domestic staff and teachers. This indicates a breakdown of social norms constraining the use of violence, especially against more vulnerable groups (Zicherman 2008).

In other post conflict contexts, gender-based violence appears to have held constant following the end of the conflict. In a study of Timor-Leste, Hynes et al (2004) found a reported decrease in assault by an intimate partner from 23.8 percent prior to the 1999 conflict to 24.8 percent in 2001, although this difference was not statistically significant. In contrast, sexual assault by someone outside the family declined significantly from 24.2 percent to 9.7 percent over the same period.13

Less research exists to quantify relationships between gender-based violence and criminal violence. One cross-national study found no clear pattern (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). A study of Central America likewise found no clear relationship between areas of high homicide rates generally and areas with high levels of domestic violence (World Bank 2009). However these studies relied on separate data sets for the two types of violence, and did not attempt longitudinal analysis. Thus they should be taken with caution, and as indication of the need for further research to identify any trends or patterns.

SECTION II: PREVENTING INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE

Violence has many drivers and manifestations, and therefore many potential entry points from which to address it. Despite some promising outcomes from particular interventions, much of it from developed contexts, the evidence base overall remains quite thin in terms of which interventions are effective, in what combination, and in what sequence. The evidence is particularly scarce for fragile and conflict-affected contexts, where the accumulation of risk factors and weak capacity present serious challenges to violence prevention. It is safe to say that what has been done in New York City, or Bogotá, will be beyond the current capacities of many lower-income countries. The following section therefore discusses what is known about effective interventions with a great degree of modesty and caution.

13 The literature on gender-based violence following a natural disaster is more extensive, and potentially instructive for post-conflict settings. Studies from various contexts have indicated that the stresses associated with loss of livelihood, relocation, breakdown of social support networks following a disaster are related to increases in gender-based violence (see Dobson 1994 on Australia, Delica 1998 on Philippines, Coordinadora Civil – CCER, 1999 on Nicaragua). Increases in gender-based violence are also commonly reported in refugee situations following disasters (League of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies, 1991). The trend has been so widely observed that standard practice now involves sending GBV specialists with humanitarian and reconstruction teams following a natural disaster (see for example Klein 2008). More research is needed to document these links and identify the extent to which these experiences are instructive for post-conflict or other high-violence contexts.
While initial responses to violence focused predominantly on the criminal justice sector, more governments are expanding their approach to encompass various sectors and levels of intervention. A current challenge to effective violence prevention is the wide range of groups and sectors (e.g. police, health and education) working on the problem, but not necessarily working together. Instead each of the groups working in violence prevention has their own culture, concepts, theory, language methods and priorities (Rutherford et al. 2007), which leads to each group focusing on its own aspect of the problem. This ad hoc approach leads at times to misunderstandings and misinterpretation of efforts, as well as to conflicts among groups who should be working together; exacerbates the scarcity of resources, and misses opportunities for sharing information and collaboration on violence reduction initiatives (Small Arms Survey 2008).

Generally speaking, more effective initiatives have involved multiple sectors. No one government agency, with the possible exception of police, has violence prevention as its main priority. This means that violence is only a peripheral concern for most government departments. In addition, risk and protective factors for violence cut across various sectors, from deficiencies in health care and nutrition, to issues with leaving school early, to unemployment and poor infrastructure. Taken together, the multi-dimensionality of violence and the fact that no one agency is mandated to address all of its dimensions, speaks clearly to the need for sharing responsibility for violence prevention across sectors. Because of this multi-dimensionality of drivers, interventions in one sector alone, or in various sectors done in isolation, are likely to either shift the problem elsewhere or duplicate efforts. The more effective approaches to prevention have involved coordination across multiple sectors. For example, enforcing local bylaws to restrict alcohol and gun sales, coupled with establishment of mediation centers to promote nonviolent conflict resolution, and public education on preventing crime and violence helped reduce the homicide rate by 44 percent between 2002 and 2005 in Diadema, Brazil (Duailibi et al.2007, See text box below for more details). In addition, multi-sectoral coordination offers more opportunities to combine long and short-term interventions. Often immediate-term, quick-impact interventions such as police training can be combined with longer-term programs to change cultural norms around violence for more comprehensive results.

More effective programs also involve multiple levels of government. Working at the local level is essential in violence programming, because it is closest to the affected populations and most responsive to local needs. However, because different levels of government perform different functions, it is often necessary to work across these levels to address the different dimensions of urban violence. Local efforts are more likely to be effective if supported by a regional or national framework on violence prevention.

This section first discusses direct programming by sectors, and then covers successful multi-sectoral programs. At the end of the section, it draws some key lessons learned from both sectoral and multi-sectoral approaches.
5. Sectoral Approaches

This section reviews the evidence base for prevention programming by sector, highlighting good practices where possible. We do not claim exhaustive coverage of violence prevention programming, but rather aim to emphasize programs for which the evidence base appears particularly promising.

A. Criminal Justice

The criminal justice system still plays the primary role in crime prevention. Many governments are now shifting away from tough-on-crime approaches toward more targeted policing and greater partnership with affected communities. In Central America, the mano dura approaches have given way to ‘mano amiga’ (friendly hand) interventions that address risk factors for gang violence, and provide incentives for demobilizing from gangs (for a review, see Jütersonke et al. 2009). Recognizing the importance of the community partnership, the criminal justice sector now brings interventions closer to the community. This section discusses emerging policing approaches and alternate dispute resolution mechanisms as well as the role of private security in violence prevention.

1) Policing

“Hot spots” policing, is based on the recognition that crime and violence are rarely random, but rather tend to be concentrated in particular geographic areas and occur at particular times of the day. The approach uses homicide and victimization data to locate high-crime areas and target law enforcement to these. Evaluations of the approach in different US cities have found that hot spots policing can reduce crime in the targeted areas. Several studies into whether this technique simply displaces crime and violence to other areas have not found increases in crime in nearby areas (Clarke and Weisburd 1994, Hesseling 1994), and one study found that hot spots policing actually created a “diffusion of benefits” to nearby areas (Weisburd and Mazerolle, 2000). The approach has also been applied in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, through the Fica Vivo (Stay Alive) program. This program used various data collection methods to identify homicide hotspots and aimed to control crime through a mix of police intervention and social programs, with a focus on youth (see Box 10, in the following section).
Problem oriented (result oriented) policing, focuses on service to the community and the notion of pro-active intervention, rather than a reactive response to crime. The goal is to identify problems that arise, to analyze the causes, and to tailor responses accordingly (International Center for the Prevention of Crime: ICPC 2008). An example of this is the Boston Gun Project (See Box 2). Similarly, Intelligence-led (Knowledge-led) Policing is a policing strategy based on knowledge and intelligence. The goals are: 1) to identify potential problems and threats; 2) to streamline the use of resources, which may be concentrated around “hot spots;” and 3) to develop crime analytical tools (ICPC 2008).

Community policing aims to reduce crime through community partnership, defining policing “as something not done to people but with people” (The Economist 2009). It focuses on working with and engaging the community and community structures in a partnership approach to identify, respond to, and solve crime and disorder problems that affect the local community (ICPC 2008). Several variants of community policing exist. Neighborhood policing is similar to community policing. It aims to provide a visible police force that is accountable to community members, expressing local solidarity and citizen-focused, in order to meet a community’s needs. Another interesting version of community policing are the Aboriginal Police Aides in Australia. Aboriginal Police Aides, also known as Aboriginal police/community liaison officers, have been created to support local police (ICPC 2008). They are members of the community who have local knowledge and social networks in the community.
2) Enforcing Local By-laws

Many municipal governments have had success in reducing violence by relying on police to enforce local by-laws to address drivers of violence, especially restrictions on the sale of alcohol and firearms. For example, the Development, Security and Peace Programme (DESEPAZ), in Cali, Colombia (see text box below) implemented a series of strategies to prevent violence and improve security through local bylaws. The interventions included efforts to enhance public security by enforcing existing state and city regulations and using the mayor’s office to issue new decrees and laws. For example, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Similarly, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Similarly, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Similarly, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. 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Similarly, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Similarly, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Similarl...
**Box 4: Security and Development Intervention aimed at reducing SALM, Haiti**

Viva Rio is a Brazilian organization based in Rio with 15 years of experience working in urban slums on violence prevention. The placing of the UN mission in Haiti under Brazilian supervision created a unique opportunity to set up a project in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince. Together with the National Council on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and the support of the UN Peacekeeping force (MINUSTAH), Viva Rio helped negotiate a micro peace agreement among rival gangs in 14 areas of Port-au-Prince in 2007-08. The agreement prohibits the possession and use of firearms in beneficiary communities as a first step in mobilization and peace building. Each month, the team meets with community leaders, the Brazilian military in the zone, and the Haitian National Police to review incidents of violent death in the area. For every month without a violent incident, a lottery is held to award scholarships to youth in the beneficiary communities. Every two months without an incident result in a lottery for musicians to receive scholarships.

In an impact assessment, it was found that homicides in Viva Rio’s area of intervention, Bel-Air, homicide rates reduced from 21 to 17 per 100,000 people over the three year period the organization has been active there (Moestue and Muggah 2010)

Viva Rio’s inclusive approach includes incentives for strengthening the fragile state-society relationship. Its commitment to work with a range of state institutions, some of which have been largely isolated by other donors, has facilitated project implementation and institutional strengthening. Its inclusion of former gang members in community efforts has been criticized by some observers, but credited with aiding reconciliation by others.

Finally, it is important not to discount the importance of the presence of the Brazilian military in the zones where Viva Rio works. This presence provides a degree of security that is not present in other areas, or for other actors in violence prevention, and points to the importance of a basic minimum of security in building longer-term programs to reduce violence.

Source: Moestue and Muggah (2010)

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**3) Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)**

New innovations in the justice sector also include alternative dispute resolution through various mechanisms. These aim to resolve conflicts out of court, and have been deemed promising for increasing access to justice for marginalized communities. These often fit within a broader *restorative justice approach*, which aims primarily to address the harm done to individuals or a community by a criminal action, rather than solely on punishing the offender (Bazemore and Walgrave 1999). A common element, Family Group Conferencing (FGC), convokes families of both the perpetrator and the affected person or group to discuss the impacts of the action, determine appropriate reparations, and devise a plan for the perpetrator and his/her family to ensure positive behavior in the future. In New Zealand, FGCs are mandated for juvenile offenders, and restorative principles are also available for adult offenders.
Other ADR mechanisms include **community-based mediation and arbitration centers**, aimed primarily at increasing access to justice for marginalized populations. Many Latin American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, and Costa Rica, have developed *Casas de Justicia* (House of Justice) that provide information on the law and justice system so that people have a better understanding of their rights. *Casas de Justicia* also offer conflict resolution services which involve professionals from various sectors, such as educators, psychologists, lawyers, and police officers. Colombia first launched *Casas de Justicia* in 1995. Today, there are 40 *Casas de Justicia* providing services, including conflict resolution, to the most marginalized populations. With their services, people are able to resolve their disputes peacefully. They have served over 90,000 people exceeding the original expectation. In Bolivia, *Centros Integrados de Justicia* (Integrated Justice Centers) have been established in remote regions to provide access to law and justice and other services to marginalized populations, particularly Indigenous Peoples (ICPC 2008). Honduras has developed “mobile justice of the peace courts,” consisting of buses operating as mobile judicial offices that serve marginal areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro (World Bank 2009). This community-based conflict resolution is also implemented in South Africa, and it has been replicated in more than 20 communities (see Box 5).

### Box 5: Peace Committees in South Africa

One successful example of community dispute resolution developed in Zwelethemba, South Africa aims to empower local resources and capacities to create local institutions to provide the services which the community is not able to receive from the government (ICPC, 2008, p. 25-26). The Peace Committees, which consist of 5 to 20 local people, are created to help conflicting parties to find a solution without using violence. The committees also identify crucial problems in the communities, such as public health and education, and develop concrete projects to address these issues. A survey has found that one third of the population benefited from the community dispute resolution. The Peace Committee system does not require significant expenses, and it is adaptable to an entirely different context. This model has been replicated in more than 20 communities in South Africa to resolve disputes in the communities.

While these programs have had important successes in increasing access to justice and in resolving disputes outside of formal courtrooms, they have to date had only limited application. Their use remains constrained primarily to informal and community levels, and to nonviolent, mostly petty crimes. Notable exceptions are New Zealand, as discussed above, Costa Rica and Chile (World Bank 2009). One important limitation in application of ADR is to cases of domestic violence, where the power imbalance between victim and aggressor is often so large as

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to preclude the victim from effectively advocating for herself (see evaluation of Bogota programs in Guerrero 2006).

In many cases, violence intervention programs have had success by integrating informal institutions for resolving conflict, when those means contribute to greater peace and security. In Sierra Leone, the non-governmental organization, Timap for Justice, supported by the Open Society Institute and the World Bank, trains paralegals to assist citizens in accessing the justice sector. Because they are trained in the law, the paralegals can advocate within the formal justice system, but they often draw on traditional dispute mechanisms, such as community elders, as well. As Maru (2005) describes, “A paralegal mediating between a delinquent child and a father who has resorted to beating might, for example, begin with something from the Convention on the Rights of the Child and end with the ritual of the child placing his head on his father’s feet.”

In addition to assisting with the resolution of conflicts, or in redressing grievances of victims, the criminal justice sector can also play a proactive role in preventing violence. At the most basic level, justice institutions and legal processes are meant to provide a non-violent forum for addressing conflicts over goods and resources so that they do not progress to violent struggle. Additionally criminal justice sector interventions can strengthen different protective factors against violence. For example, projects to promote citizenship and legal recognition of excluded groups, through issuing of identity cards, laws of standing, and voter registration can improve social connections across groups, and reduce perceptions of exclusion that fuel violence. Similarly, where uneven service coverage drives grievances between groups, courts can intervene to enforce demands for more equal service provision.

The legal system can also proactively address structural inequalities through affirmative action interventions. As one example, the 2003 Black Economic Empowerment Act in South Africa was used to redress the inequalities of Apartheid by giving historically excluded groups access to economic opportunities previously denied them. The act included measures to promote skills training, preferential procurement, ownership and management.

4) Private Security

The private security industry provides another avenue to meet citizens’ demand for security and protection. In developed countries, such as United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, private security is mainly used for the security of companies and private homes, but private security is starting to broaden their jurisdiction in a partnership with police departments. According to the January 2 2007 Washington Post article, “Private-sector security is expanding into spheres – complex criminal investigations and patrols of downtown districts and residential neighborhoods – that used to be the province of law enforcement agencies alone” (Goldstein 2007)
The private security sector is also growing in developing countries. Due to the weakening of governance and the capacity of state institutions, some governments are not able to provide public security services to their citizens (Hönke 2008). Public trust and confidence in the police is low, therefore the businesses and wealthy residences seek security protection from private security companies (Shaw 2002). For example, the rise in crime and the erosion of state capacities to provide adequate protection have resulted in the expansion of private security sector in Kenya (Abrahamsen and Williams 2005). Numbers of private security companies have outnumbered the police forces in some contexts, offering services from comprehensive security solutions to manned guarding for private businesses.

The trend toward privatization of security in many countries raises several concerns. First, in many cases, there are no particular government regulations on registration or licensing and no requirements for background checks and an extensive training for employees of the private security companies. This allows for a certain degree of impunity that can contribute to human rights abuses and corruption. The lack of regulation also contributes to the spread of firearms in the general population since security guards are often armed.

Additionally, private security coverage vividly reflects the socioeconomic landscape, such that wealthier neighborhoods are characterized by state of the art technology and private guards, while poorer neighborhoods are overtaken by informal militias or vigilante groups. For more upper class areas, private security may include legally regulated companies with cutting edge technology at their disposal. In poorer neighborhoods, their nature and organization ranges from tightly organized vigilante groups, to looser bands of gangsters who coerce support through extortion of individuals and businesses. This unequal access to quality security both increases the vulnerability of the poor and decreases the incentives of higher-income groups to contribute economically to state policies that would improve the quality of policing through such measures as improved training, better equipment and higher salaries.

B. Public Health

Public health sector interventions include both services for victims of violence as well as preventative initiatives, such as treatments for drug and alcohol abuse. Some promising developments include innovations in victim identification and support, advocacy and public information campaigns, and substance abuse treatment and prevention program.

1) Victim Identification and Support

The first step in providing appropriate support to victims of violence is to correctly identify them as victims. Depending on the situation, this may be quite problematic. One issue in the field has been that often healthcare staff are insufficiently trained to recognize victims of abuse (Rönnberg
In response, screening is widely promoted within the health sector, and a variety of screening tools have been developed. They generally include a set of questions about a patient’s current relationships, and experience of different forms of violence. Employed primarily in developed countries, these have been most effective in identifying victims of intimate partner violence (Mcfarlane et al 1991, Olive 2007, Feder et al 2009). In one Canadian emergency department, the use of a screening tool was found to increase detection rates from less than 1% to 14% (Morrison and Grunfeld 2000).

However, while these tools seem to help identify victims, and in some cases spur referrals to specialized agencies, there is little evidence of their sustainability or effectiveness in reducing further exposure to violence. In addition, the potential of screening to do more harm to victims, whether through re-traumatizing or breaches in confidentiality (to an accompanying partner, for example), has been under-studied. For these reasons alone, one study argued that use of screening could not be justified (WHO 2009c). In addition, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of screening on other types of violence, such as child maltreatment and elder abuse.

Following the identification of victims, comprehensive support and care is provided to victims. In developed countries, such as Canada, England, and the United States, Sexual assault (or forensic) nurse examiner (SANE) programs provide comprehensive care and support to victims of sexual violence (Regan et al 2004, Campbell et al 2005). Their comprehensive care and support include medical evaluation, counseling, referral service to appropriate agencies and collection of forensic evidence to be provided in court. Some developing countries, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Namibia and Thailand, have established one-stop crisis centers at national level, which offer a range of integrated services to victims of child abuse, intimate partner violence and sexual violence (See Box 6). Psychosocial interventions, such as psychological debriefing and cognitive behavioral therapy, are also used to address victims’ mental health problems that include anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder and depression.
2) Substance Abuse Treatments and Programs

WHO (2009c) has noted that addressing alcohol use in problem drinkers can reduce violence. Primary care physician and other health services offer short one-on-one sessions to problem drinkers, providing information on the adverse consequences of alcohol and techniques to help moderate their consumption. In the United States, two 15-minute sessions with physicians and two follow-up phone calls by nurses helped reducing arrests for assault, battery and child abuse among participants than those receiving the standard care (Fleming et al. 1997, Flemming et al, 2002). Another effective alcohol treatment is cognitive behavioral therapy. In Australia, the study showed that cognitive behavioral therapy (e.g. goal setting, self-monitoring, problem solving) helped reducing risks of committing assault in the first six months after treatment (Sitharthan et al, 1997).

Multisystemic therapy (MST) is another effective substance abuse treatment, particularly used for youth with serious behavioral problems. MST is an intensive family and community-based treatment that addresses environmental factors contributing youth’s behavioral problems by combining both cognitive behavioral therapy and family therapy. Some studies showed effectiveness of MST on violent juvenile offenders with substance abuse problems (Randall and Cunningham 2003, Henggeler, et al. 2002). The substance abuse prevention program is also effective in reducing drug use and violent and delinquent behaviors among at-risk children and youth (See Box 7).
Impact of interventions is usually greater when the interventions target the early stages in human development. Evidence from various countries demonstrates the great impacts of early childhood development (ECD) programs on violence prevention. Early interventions focus on supporting the people and institutions that most impact the lives of children and adolescents, which include families, communities, schools, and health centers. Investing in high-quality ECD programs, which promote access to health care, good nutrition, parenting skill training, educational activities and a safe environment, yields some of the strongest impacts on risky behaviors from violence to criminal activity and substance abuse (Schweinhart et al. 2005, Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007, UNESCO 2007, World Bank 2002, 2008). Children who are benefited by ECD programs are more likely to perform better in school and work. Some have even argued that the returns to violence prevention programs decrease with age of the beneficiaries (Carneiro and Heckman 2003). This section introduces home visitation and parenting training programs and pre-school enrichment programs that are known as effective in reducing child maltreatment and preventing potential crime and violence.

Box 7: Substance Abuse Prevention Program among High-Risk Youth in USA

CASA START Program in the United States is a neighborhood-based, school-centered program aimed at preventing substance abuse and delinquency among high-risk adolescents ages 8 to 13 and reducing drug-related crime in their neighborhoods. The program provides after-school and summer recreational activities together with social support, family services, educational services, mentoring, incentives, community policing and criminal/juvenile justice interventions and other support. The program brings together different organizations including schools, law enforcement, and social service agencies for a collaborative program in which all of the children selected receive eight services: tutoring, after-school activities, mentoring, counseling, family services, community policing, juvenile justice intervention and incentives. CASA START has sites in the following cities: Los Angeles, Ca, Commerce City and Denver, Co, Bridgeport, Conn, Austin, El Paso, and San Antonio, Tex, Philadelphia, Pa, New York, N.Y. and Washington, DC.

Evaluation of the program at five sites reported that this multi-level approach through various partners brought measureable benefits, including lower engagement in violent crime, lower drug use and less association with delinquent peers.
1) Home Visitation and Parenting Training

As WHO (2009a) notes, “Safe, stable and nurturing relationship with parents and other caregivers are central to a child’s healthy development… Lack of stable nurturing relationship can have severe and long-lasting effects and is related to a variety of problems from childhood through adulthood” (p.3). Therefore, it is necessary to employ interventions that foster safe, stable and nurturing relationships between parents and children. **Home visitation programs** conducted by healthcare professionals focus on increasing parental skills and improving the relationship between parents and children. With support and information, the programs strengthen parents’ ability to adapt to the changing needs of the child, develop strategies to cope with their child’s behavior and build knowledge of child development and capabilities. One often-cited successful home visitation program is the U.S. **Nurse-Family Partnership**. This program aims to help change the lives of vulnerable first-time moms and their babies through ongoing home visits from registered nurses. This evidence-based community health program has proven results including long-term family improvements in health, education and economic self-sufficiency (ICPC 2008). **Nurse-Family Partnership** saves communities more than it costs by reducing welfare, healthcare and juvenile justice expenditures. Olds et al. (1997) has noted that 15 year follow-up study shows a 79% reduction in reporting of child abuse or neglect cases. **Triple P (Positive Parenting Program)** is another effective program, which aims to support parents by providing parental skills training in order to build a safe, stable and nurturing relationship with children (WHO 2009a).

2) Pre-School Enrichment Programs

Some pre-school enrichment programs are known to improve children’s academic achievement as well as reduce violence and other risky behaviors later in life. **The Perry Preschool Study** was carried out by the High/Scope Educational Research Foundation from 1962 to 1967 in the United States, provided high-quality preschool education to 3 and 4-year-old disadvantaged children and followed these children for over 40 years. The study found that these individuals who received the high-quality preschool education had committed fewer crimes, earned higher wages, had fewer unplanned pregnancies and had been arrested fewer times (Schweinhart et al. 2005). Another program, called **Child-Parent Center**, which provides comprehensive education, health and family support to economically disadvantaged children from preschool to third grade in the central-city of Chicago (see Box 8). The federally funded Chicago Longitudinal Study demonstrated that **Child-Parent Center** program participants had significantly higher rates of educational attainment and lower rates of juvenile arrest (Reynolds, Ou and Topitzes, 2004, Reynolds, Chang and Temple, 1998). Similar results have been documented for pre-school enrichment programs in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, and Mexico (World Bank 2002, 2005b, Cunningham et al. 2008).
 Feeling a sense of connectedness to one’s school has been shown to be one of the most important protective factors against violent behavior and other risky behaviors (Cunningham et al. 2008), making schools a key site for intervention to reduce violence. Interventions in the education sector range from implementing strict practices, such as zero tolerance policies to exclude misbehaved students from school, to fostering life skills (soft skills) to improve the relationships. Programs to improve the school enrollment and reduce dropouts are also other key interventions to reduce violence among youth.

1) Zero Tolerance and Police Interventions at School

There seems to be a trend that some governments apply stricter and harsher violence prevention policies, such as “zero tolerance” policies in which schools practice removing and excluding

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**Box 8: Pre-School Enrichment Program in USA**

The Child-Parent Center (CPC) Program in Chicago, USA is an early intervention program that provides comprehensive educational and family-support services to economically disadvantaged children from preschool to early elementary school. Established in 1967, the CPC program is the second oldest (after Head Start) federally funded preschool program in the U. S. The program was initially implemented in four sites and later expanded to 25. The program aims to promote children’s academic success and to facilitate parent involvement in children's education.

Recognizing the importance of parent’s involvement in children's socialization and their development, the centers try to make substantial efforts to involve parents in the education of their children. Parents are encouraged to volunteer in children's classrooms, go on class field trips, helping to prepare breakfasts and lunches, and engaging in children’s education and training activities. Parent involvement is expected to improve parent-child relationship, parent and child connectedness to school, social support among parents, and thus promote children's school readiness and social adjustment.

The evaluation of the program indicated that the program participants had a 29% higher rate of high school completion, a 33% lower rate of juvenile arrest, a 42% reduction in arrest for a violent offense, compared to the control group. Results of the cost-benefit analysis also demonstrated that the ratio of benefits to costs for government savings was $2.88 per dollar invested.

Source: Reynolds et al. 2002
students from school for misbehavior (ICPC 2008, 97). For example, the Government of Norway has implemented the first Manifesto against Bullying in 2002. The policy aims to achieve zero tolerance for bullying in schools, assigning leadership the highest priority. Under the Education Act, all schools are obliged to provide explicit rules for desired behavior at school and consequences of violations (OECD 2005). As of 2004, almost 800 schools have adopted either the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program or the Center for Behavioral Research’s anti-bullying program, ZERO. The Manifesto primarily focused on the responsibility of adults in schools, such as teachers, parents and other adults in kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, and actively involved children and youth in the process. The evaluation of the first Manifest against Bullying (2002-2004) has reported that after a long period of an upward trend, the frequency of bullying has either halted or reduced in most groups; the program is most effective in reducing the frequency of bullying when schools use the program systematically (Tikkanen 2005).

Some schools try to strengthen the security of school by increasing the presence of police officers at school. Some examples of police programs in the school system include school resource officers, police educators, and police liaison officers (ICPC 2008, 183). School resource officers provide information about law and order and advice schools about certain practices. Police educators teach youth on highway safety, drugs, gang related risks, etc. Police liaison officers aim to develop partnership with the community and improve their relationship with youth. Only a few of police programs have been evaluated, and the results show the limited effectiveness among these programs. Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) is the most widely implemented school-based drug prevention curriculum for grade K-12 in the United States. A 5-year evaluation has found that the program is not effective in reducing drug use but has positive effects in increasing the knowledge about substance abuse and the capacity to resist peer pressure (Clayton et al. 1996).

2) Life Skills and School Mediation

Other school-based interventions focus on fostering life skills to improve relationships and teach skills for healthy management of stress and conflict. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) categorizes various life skills into three categories: 1) communication and interpersonal skills (including negotiation, empathy, cooperation and advocacy skills), 2) decision-making and critical thinking skills (including problem solving skills), and 3) coping and self-management skills (including stress and feelings management skills). Life skills development programs, such as Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) in the United States, promote pro-social behaviors and aim to prevent aggressive behaviors by using the curriculum to foster anger management and self-control skills, moral and empathy development, cognitive problem-solving, conflict resolution, and healthy relationship building (WHO 2009d). Evaluations of PATHS prove the improved outcomes for the young people in the

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14 http://www.unicef.org/lifeskills/index_whichskills.html
program compared with those in a control group (Cunningham et al. 2008, Howel 1995, Sherman et al 1997). Youth in the program have shown progress in self-control, greater understanding and recognition of emotions, effective use of conflict resolution skills. Thus the program was viewed to be effective not only in increasing the employability and educational outcomes of at-risk youth, but in reducing the likelihood that they will engage in high-risk behaviors, including violence (World Bank 2008a).

School-based mediation and conflict resolution are also increasingly employed to prevent violence among youth. In Argentina, the government passed a provincial law on school mediation in 2003, establishing school mediation programs in 42 municipalities (ICPC 2008). In the Chaco province of Argentina, school mediation trainings are given to teachers so that they can apply conflict resolution techniques in school conflicts.15 In Chile, Colegio Mayor of the Municipality of Pente Alto, Santiago has implemented school mediation program targeting preschool children age up to five years old. As experiences during the first five years of life strongly influence social and psychological behavior later in life, the program teaches small children about conflict resolution techniques through socialization in the school environment. During the first year after implementing the program, disagreements between children in the school reduced by 50%, and physical aggression between children also dropped by more than 60% (ICPC 2008).

3) Improving School Enrollment and Reducing Dropout Rates

Leaving school early is recognized as an important risk factor for youth violence, among other risky behaviors. To address this connection, some governments have implemented conditional cash transfer programs to provide incentives for students to stay in school. An assessment of Mexico’s Oportunidades program documented an increase in secondary school enrollment by 8 percent for girls and 5 percent for boys and grade completion by 10 percent; similarly, Brazil’s Bolsa Escola program reported lower drop-out rates (0.4 percent) for participants compared to non-participants (5.6 percent) (Guarcello et al. 2006). Other policy changes that have been shown to affect dropout rates are eliminating expulsion requirements for pregnancy or loosening them for behavioral problems (Cunningham et al. 2008). Programs, such as First Things First and Skills, Opportunity and Recognition in the United States, which train teachers and parents to engage children with their schools also have shown increase in students’ school attendance and reduce antisocial behavior and delinquency (Cunningham et al. 2008).

Second chance programs target youth who have dropped out of school and help them earn formal equivalency of degrees. For example, YouthBuild16 in Washington DC provides education programs to attain GEDs or high school diplomas for unemployed young men and women ages from 16 to 24, most of whom have dropped out of high school. The young adults who participate in this program come from low-income families and have had experiences with

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16 http://www.youthbuild.org/site/c.htlRI3PIKoG/b.1223921/k.BD3C/Home.htm
foster care, juvenile justice, welfare, and homelessness. Approximately 40% of YouthBuild students had previously been court-involved, but during their participation in the program, recidivism rates dramatically lowered comparing to the court-involved young adults who didn’t participate in the program. In Dominican Republic, the Ministry of Education also provides the continuing education programs to young people and adults who are not able to complete their formal education (Cunningham et al. 2008). The programs offer flexible class schedules at night and on the weekends for students to earn diplomas upon completion, and dropout rates are very low.

4) After-School Programs

According to the National Youth Violence Prevention Resource Center, youth often engage in risky behaviors, such as alcohol and drug use, during the after-school hours. After-school programs offer a mixture of academic, cultural and recreational activities for young people in a supervised environment. They create alternatives for youth, serving as effective youth violence intervention strategies. Instead of engaging with risky behaviors, youth can improve their academic achievement, and develop teamwork skills and positive relationships with their peers through playing sports and other recreational activities. After-school programs are offered by schools, community-based nonprofit organizations, faith-based organizations, youth groups, local governments.

After-school programs typically include academic assistance (e.g. tutoring, homework assistance, language classes), drug and alcohol prevention, leadership building, volunteer and community service opportunities, cultural activities (arts and music), life skills training, computer training, mentoring, and counseling (Reno and Riley 2000). Providing structured activities and offering multiple learning opportunities help ensure children’s continued growth and development. Quality and adequate staffing and involving families in the program are also key components to having successful after-school programs. A good example of after school program is Brazil’s Open Schools (Abrindo Espaços) launched by UNESCO in partnership with

17 http://www.safeyouth.org/scripts/facts/afterschool.asp#1

Box 9: After-School Program in Brazil

The Open Schools (Abrindo Espaços) Program was launched by UNESCO in 2001 and adopted by the Brazilian Ministry of Education in 2004 as a public policy entitled Open School: education, culture, sport, and work for youth program. The program offers sports, cultural, arts and leisure activities and initial work training for youth on weekends. The evaluations have shown its success with relation to a reduction in the levels of violence registered in schools and their surroundings. In São Paulo, the Open Schools Program, known locally as the Family School, was implemented in 5,306 schools between 2003 and 2006, and criminal acts were reduced by 45.5%.

the Brazilian Ministry of Education (See Box 9).

**E. Urban Development**

The primary objectives of urban development and revitalization policy are to secure public spaces without controlling and to promote social inclusion and community participation (ICPC 2008). The Broken Windows approach and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) stem from the philosophy that keeping order in public spaces reduces opportunities for crime and violence. Another important aspect of violence prevention strategies in urban planning is to create an environment to build community solidarity.

1) **Broken Windows**

The *Broken Windows* theory suggests that physical disarray can have an effect on behaviors such as crime (Kelling and Wilson 1982, Kelling and Coles 1996). The lack of maintenance in a public space may encourage minor delinquency, which lead to the progressive abandonment of a space and misconduct behaviors by other citizens (ICPC 2008). Factors like broken windows, garbage in the streets, graffiti on the walls, abandoned buildings, and lack of street lighting create an environment that promotes crime and delinquency, thus impact on citizens’ feeling of safety. The Broken Window theory indicates that stopping minor offenses and restoring community order can prevent serious crime. This theory was applied in practice in New York City as the “zero tolerance” policy during 1980s and 1990s, focusing more on making misdemeanor arrests than cleaning up the physical environment.

2) **Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)**

CPTED is another approach focusing on reducing opportunities for crime and violence through the physical environmental change. CPTED is guided by three founding principles: 1) natural surveillance, 2) the control of natural access points to public spaces, and 3) natural territorial reinforcement (ICPC 2008). Enhancing visibility in public spaces where neighbors can “keep an eye” on each other encourages the legitimate users to interact and ensure their mutual safety. CPTED can be applied in building open stairways into housing projects or building open patio areas with benches where neighbors can gather (See Figure 1). Designing public spaces to attract people of different generations and backgrounds invites potential users and increases the sense of belonging and ownership. An example is to build a park to include sports areas as well as play areas for smaller children and benches for senior residents. Once they have the sense of ownership, they are more likely to defend their environment against unwanted behaviors and activities. CPTED interventions are promising in that they reduce opportunities for crime as well as citizen’s fear of crime. For example, in South Africa, the environmental designs including the improvement of lighting in public transportation, reorganization of bus terminals, and reducing the distance between services alleviate the feeling of safety among citizens (ICPC 2008).
UN Habitat also employed CPTED in their urban renewal projects, called *Safer Cities Program*. The Program encourages the adoption of safety conscious planning and the implementation of safer urban design through citywide partnerships that include local government, the police, the private sector and civil society (UN-HABITAT 2007b). The program focuses on public urban space where activities take place such as street trading and markets, parking areas, public transportation, street lights, recreational areas and parks. It also involves community members to conduct a strategic analysis, called “safety audits,” of a given area to identify opportunities for criminal behavior as well as groups and situations at risk. The safety audits also include “women’s safety audits” that consist of exploratory walks by small groups of women (also children and elderly) to detect what corrective actions need to be taken in the urban environment to make it safer for everyone. This program was implemented in several countries in Africa, and a few countries in Asia and Latin America; however, the evaluation of *Safer Cities Programs* has not been reported yet.

3) **Involving Communities in City Management**

Community is where violence occurs every day, thus empowering the community is a key strategy to improve public safety. The United Nations recognizes the community as an essential part of effective crime prevention in its guidelines: “Communities, in particular, should play an
important part in identifying crime prevention priorities, in implementation and evaluation, and in helping to identify a sustainable resource base” (Bodson, et al. 2008, 215).

As to develop inclusive policies, some municipality governments use community councils to promote citizens’ participation in public safety and political process. Community councils are not only to deal with the public safety issues but also to enhance social capital and ensure safe environment for all community members. For example, Fica Vivo (Stay Alive) program in Belo Horizonte, Brazil set up a community forum to hold monthly community meetings to discuss issues including crime prevention, unemployment and education (Beato 2005). The forum aimed to reduce the fears of residents and to develop solutions to the local problems (see Box 10). DESEPAZ Program in Cali, Colombia also created Community Security Councils and Community Government Councils in each community (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2001). The Councils held periodic public meetings to promote transparency of the city government and community participation in resolving public security and other issues in the community.
Interventions to prevent and respond to gender-based violence come in many forms. It is crucial to understand the social and cultural context, traditional gender roles and power dynamic between men and women when interventions are implemented. Various interventions have developed to reduce gender-based violence, and the evidence from these interventions shows that the programs are more effective if the programs engage men and boys in their activities.

1) School-Based Interventions

Targeting youth and young adults, school-based interventions aim to address gender-based violence in classroom settings. In some countries, gender-based violence and dating violence are discussed in the reproductive health class, incorporated with other health risks, such as...
reproductive health, sexual transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. Most of the interventions target both male and female participants.

Earlier programs in the United States indicated the importance of including male students in interventions that address sexual abuse, dating violence and other forms of gender-based violence in order to change male norms and behaviors (Bott, Morrison and Ellsberg 2005). Dating programs in the United States now target both male and female students have reported some positive results (WHO 2009b). Participants from the Safe Dates program in the United States reported “less psychological abuse and sexual and physical violence against their current dating partner one month after the program ended and four years later” (WHO 2009b, 5). The evidence showed that programs presented to the all-male groups were more effective in changing attitudes than the mixed male and female groups (Brecklin and Forde 2001). The Safe Dates program is also adopted in South Africa but has not been evaluated yet.

Some interventions, which only target male youth, have also shown effectiveness in changing attitude towards sexual violence. The Men’s Program is a one-hour all-male peer education program designed to educate young men in high school and college about preventing rape and supporting rape victims (Foubert and Newberry 2006). In the Men’s Program, male peer educators show a video, which describes a male-on-male rape experience to teach young men how it might feel to be raped and later makes connections with male-on-female rape experience. Both rape cases demonstrate that perpetrators use rape and battery to exercise their power and control over another male and female. Participants are also taught about how to support a rape survivor and how to define consent and also confront peers who joke about rape, disrespect women, or brag about abusing women. A focus group study has found lasting attitude and behavioral change resulting from this program among fraternity students and student athletes (Foubert and Cowell 2004, Foubert and Newberry 2006).

2) Community-Based Interventions

Community-based interventions to reduce gender-based violence and gender inequality usually aim to empower women by strengthening their economic position and their participation in the community decision-making process. However, the evidence shows that it is important to engage men and boys in interventions to eradicate violence against women. Some microfinance programs that intend to empower women’s economic power and social status may increase violence against women by their partners. The success of these programs is depended on whether or not the activities are accepted by the community norms (Bott, Morrison and Ellsberg 2005).

One of the successful microfinance programs is the Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE) in Limpopo Province, South Africa. This project targeted the poorest women in rural villages and combined two components, microfinance and education on gender and HIV/AIDS. For the microfinance component, South Africa’s Small Enterprise Foundation
provided loans for these women to establish income generating businesses. For the education component, a participatory learning and action curriculum, called “Sisters for Life,” developed by the Rural AIDS and Development Action Research Program (RADAR) was implemented. During the phase one, women attended 10 one-hour sessions to learn and discuss gender-roles, norms, cultural beliefs, women’s body and sexuality, domestic violence, and HIV/AIDS. During the phase two, the key women selected during the phase one had a further training in leadership and community mobilization, and they encouraged wider community mobilization to engage both men and youth in the community interventions. Over a two year period, the impact evaluation showed that the level of intimate partner violence experienced by women who participated in the project was reduced by 55% (Pronyk, et al. 2006, Kim, et al. 2007).

Community-based intervention programs focusing on male peer groups, such as Men As Partners in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the United States and Program H in Brazil and India, also have shown some promising results in changing men’s attitudes towards traditional gender roles and violent behavior but these programs require further impact evaluations (WHO 2009b).

3) Media Interventions

Media interventions use television, radio, the Internet and other traditional printed publications, such as newspapers, magazines and brochures to raise awareness about violence and its impacts. They are aimed at increasing people’s knowledge about violence and its consequences as well as challenging people’s attitudes and values that tolerate violence and providing information about services to vulnerable groups. Some media interventions have proven successful in increasing knowledge of intimate-partner violence and gender equality, such as Soul City in South Africa and Somos Diferentes, Somos Iguates (We are different, We are equal) in Nicaragua. They have used a series of radio and television episodes to address intimate partner violence and gender equality. Both programs were successful in creating a positive change in attitudes towards intimate partner violence and gender equality, however, the studies for these programs were not able to measure the impact on violent behavior towards women (Usdina, et al. 2005, Solórzano, et al. 2008).

Other violence prevention program also incorporate media campaign as a part of their prevention component. For example, the International Rescue Committee used the radio campaign to raise awareness about the gender-based violence and distribute the information about services available to the survivors in Côte d'Ivoire (see Box 11).
Multi-sectoral approaches

Multi-sectoral interventions to reduce armed violence are those that span the different sectoral areas described above, to involve multiple sectors and often multiple levels of government as well.

Citizen security is one multi-sectoral approach that involves building partnerships among police, government and communities to reduce violence and strengthen institutions. This can involve community outreach by police and justice institutions to target drivers of crime, or to help with reintegration of perpetrators after serving jail time. It can also involve community policing, where community members meet regularly with police to discuss the problems affecting the community and decide how to address them. This type of initiative was found to be quite effective in Kenya, in improving police-community relations and developing consensus on
how to address the problem of violence (Saferworld 2008). In Timor-Leste, agencies including UNPOL, and the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal have conducted community policing pilots, and preliminary results are promising.

Multi-sectoral strategies tend to be based on consolidated systems for data collection on violence and crime. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Municipal Crime and Violence Observatories have emerged as sources for collecting data on the people, perpetrators, instruments and institutional responses to violence in urban areas. Informed by the public health approach to prevention, observatories typically involve partnerships across the health, criminal justice and other sectors, who agree to share data on violence that can inform comprehensive prevention strategies. Violence data can be drawn from a variety of sources, including death certificates, vital statistics records, hospital records, police crime statistics, court records, and population surveys. The establishment of these observatories in various cities in Colombia is credited with helping design community programs that observed dramatic reductions in homicide rates.

There are some successful multi-sectoral programs in middle-income countries. The city of Bogotá in Colombia has become the model case of crime and violence reduction in urban environments in Latin America. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Bogotá experienced the steadily increase of crime and violence, with a growing sense of insecurity among citizens. The high level of crime and violence and citizens’ sense of insecurity were often resulted from a culture of violence, high level of intra-family violence, high consumption of alcohol, easy access to firearms, impunity, lack of institutional credibility of justice and police, and deteriorated urban environments (Llorente and Rivas 2005). Box 12 introduces Bogotá’s comprehensive program combining various approaches including criminal justice (crime control), public health (epidemiological and analytical approach), urban upgrading (interventions in deteriorating urban environments), and social capital (building social capital through informal and formal social institutions).
Box 12: Multi-Sectoral Program in Colombia

The key interventions implemented in Bogotá, Colombia include:

1) **Observatory:** The observatory of violence and crime was established to collect reliable information about the violence and crime situation in the city. It involved people from the police, the health sector, forensics, and others. The local university consultants conducted a research on risk factors. All the information was put on the website so that people could see what is going in the city.

2) **Risk factor control (firearms and alcohol):** Under the Mayor’s leadership, the Bogotá government conducted campaigns to promote voluntary disarmament and to restrict alcohol consumption. Through voluntary disarmament campaigns, such as “Gifts for Guns” that encouraged citizen to hand over their guns in return for gift vouchers, helped, 6,500 firearms were voluntarily returned to the police by 2001. The restriction of firearm possession during weekends and public holidays was also enforced. In parallel, an alcohol consumption control policy was implemented, and this policy limited alcohol sales until 1AM initially and later extended until 3AM on weekends in order to reduce the number of homicides.

3) **Police reform:** The police force was reformed emphasizing results-based performance. The police adapted an epidemiological approach to monitor crime and violence and implement crime prevention actions. The government made significant investments in the police mainly due to improve the police’s infrastructure, to establish more police posts and attention centers, and to upgrade communication system.

4) **Community policing:** The city of Bogotá set up local security councils to collaborate between the police officers and local residents. By 2003, there were approximately 6,600 councils in Bogota, reporting abnormal or suspicious circumstances to the police. It helped to mend the mistrust of police among the residents and increased the collaborative effort in crime prevention.

5) **Family police stations:** The family police stations were created so that families are informed about conflict resolution, domestic violence prevention and child abuse issues. An interdisciplinary team, which consisted of a lawyer, a psychologist, a doctor, and a social worker, provided comprehensive services.

6) **Access to justice:** Casas de Justicia (House of Justice) were established in the communities to resolve everyday conflicts, such as agreement and rights violations and alimony issues. Lawyers, social workers and psychologists contributed their time in the mediation process. The community residents found the mechanism effective to resolve conflicts.

7) **Urban renewal program:** Bogotá invested in renewing urban and transportation infrastructure in the most violent areas in the city. For example, Avenida Caracas, one of the most dangerous in the capital due to the high rates of mugging, was completely rebuilt as one of the main routes of a public transportation system, called Transmilenio. Another example is the case of El Cartucho with a critical situation of social deterioration characterized by a large concentration of paper gatherers, homeless people, drug addicts and illegal sale of drugs, guns and stolen merchandise. The program demolished the entire area to build a park and implemented a social management plan that assisted over 14,000 people.

8) **Employment program:** The program offered civic guide positions to about 4,000 people. Civic guides were hired to regulate citizens’ activities in areas such as traffic, security, community organization and waste recycling.

9) **Civic campaigns:** Civic campaigns were introduced to change the behaviors of Bogotá’s citizens through education and communication. Vaccination days against violence were established to raise awareness about the violence especially with regards to domestic violence and child abuse.

Sources: Guerrero 2006, Llorente and Rivas 2005
Bogota has achieved reducing its homicide rate from 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1993 to 22 in 2004 (Guerrero 2006). It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of each intervention to see which interventions in the program actually have worked to reduce the level of crime and violence in Bogotá because of the uncontrolled setting and the absence of basic guidelines to develop adequate indicators over time (Llorente and Rivas 2005).

Despite the limitations, a government financed study found that gun and alcohol consumption measures reduced homicides in Bogotá by 14% in the case of the gun control interventions and 8% in the case of the control of alcohol consumption. Another study which looked at the impact of gun possession restrictions concluded that the homicide rate during restriction time in Bogotá was reduced by 13%.

Some studies showed the changes in citizens’ attitude about firearms and alcohol through educational and communication campaigns. The survey conducted by the Instituto Distrital de Cultura y Turismo illustrated that the number of citizens who thought it was best to have a gun for protection reduced from 24.8% in 2001 to 11.4% in 2003. Regarding the alcohol consumption control, even though the study did not address the total population but it showed significant impact among youth’s attitude towards alcohol. According to the survey taken by over 3,500 children (10-11 years old) who participated in an educational course on alcohol risks, nearly 80% reported being more aware of the risks of alcohol and about 60% of participants said they had changed their behavior towards alcohol consumption.

After implementing urban renewal program in the most dangerous public areas in Bogotá, the records indicated that certain crimes in some areas had been decreased significantly. In Avenida Caracas, there was a 60% reduction in the homicide rate and almost a 100% reduction in the street assaults rates between 1999 to 2003. In El Cartucho, the homicide and assaults rates fell more than 70% between 2000 and 2003.

Regarding the family police stations, the studies, which interviewed and surveyed staff, women who solicited protection, male aggressors, recognized the effectiveness of handling the domestic violence cases. However, it concluded that conciliations were not as effective to stop violence as protection measures particularly for the cases of repeated offenses.

Llorente and Rivas (2005) emphasized the importance of policy evaluation mechanisms, particularly when interventions were carried out with several policy approaches. Beyond evaluation measurements that might indicate which actions were more or less effective, Bogotá would not be able to carry out these policy measures if there was no fundamental discourse in place regarding the protection of life that called upon and brought together the citizenry.

7. Emerging Lessons

Designing effective violence prevention programs is a highly complex task, because violence is intensely context-specific. What proves successful in one context may bring totally opposite effects in another. There are, however, some broad orientations that can guide program design.
A. Adopt realistic expectations

One of the most common mistakes in designing violence prevention programs is a simple lack of modesty. Particularly in crisis situations, governments and their partners may be under intense pressure to deliver visible, easily measurable and timely results. Yet, experience shows that sustainable reductions in violence take years, if not generations. More than anything, designing an effective approach requires time – time to understand the context, identify appropriate partners, understand what kinds of mechanisms and institutions are already ‘working’ to prevent violence, and develop ways to support these. This is usually too much to expect to tackle in a two or even three-year project cycle.

B. Engage Communities in Design and Implementation

High-violence situations present tough challenges for encouraging participation in decision-making. High costs, security concerns, tight timelines and fear of being perceived as “taking sides” often hinder donors from fully engaging communities in planning. Yet, few efforts are likely to be sustainable without including the voices of local communities. These ‘insiders’ are vital sources of cultural intelligence and internal divisions that affect programming. More and more donors are incorporating mechanisms that empower communities to decide on their development goals, define the type of projects they want to see, and develop a process for implementation. Experience is showing that these mechanisms pay off in the longer term.

Engaging communities creates a sense of ownership among community members that in turn fosters respect, natural surveillance, management of public spaces, and it also help improving the level of safety (ICPC 2008). Some of the successful examples of these have been in community policing (discussed earlier). Others aim to create public spaces accessible to all citizens and organize events that gather people and build solidarity. For example, neighborhood parties were first launched in France in 1999 in order to bring together neighbors with food and entertainment and to foster community cohesion (ICPC 2008). Supported by the European Federation of Local Solidarity, this initiative became European Neighbor’s Day,18 which takes place on every last Tuesday of May. An evaluation done by the Observatoire de la sécurité de la Ville de Lausanne in 2007 has shown that such events like neighborhood parties enhance neighborhood friendliness and the general quality of life. They also help reduce a sense of insecurity among community members.

Other interventions have engaged communities in mediation. For example, programs in Australia, France, Holland and Norway utilize volunteers from community to conduct community patrols at night (ICPC 2008). Volunteers often work with local social welfare, police, educational authorities, and businesses to prevent violence in the community. They

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mediate conflicts as they arose. In Norway, approximately 300,000 volunteers had participated in the night community patrol program.


There is often intense pressure to produce quick results to problems of high violence. In resource-strapped environments, these efforts may go toward mitigation of violence, focusing on perpetrators through stricter law enforcement. Even when political will exists to invest in longer-term prevention, it is often hard to justify these expenses since, by its nature, a dollar invested in prevention today must yield more than a dollar’s worth of return in the future if it is to be cost-effective. Some of the more successful cases of violence reduction have addressed these tradeoffs by combining short-term, quick-win programs such as more targeted policing or urban upgrading, with longer-term interventions such as media campaigns to change cultural norms that support violence. In other contexts, policymakers have combined mitigation with prevention, for example by investing in rehabilitation of violent perpetrators and their reintegration into their communities.

Where capacity is limited, governments and their partners will need to prioritize interventions that can address the proximate drivers of violence, and thus have a quick impact on security, while also tackling underlying structural factors. For example, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, the UN Peacekeeping Mission (MINUSTAH) combines targeted police patrols of high-violence neighborhoods with longer-term investments in community development in the same areas. The approach focuses on deterring violence by youth gangs, responsible for the majority of violent crime in urban Haiti, and in undermining their recruitment base by providing alternatives to youth, such as employment training or short-term jobs.

D. Base interventions on solid, and continuing assessments of the situation

Violence prevention programming is most effective when it draws on a solid evidence base, including rigorous diagnostics of when, where, why and by whom violence is perpetrated. In higher-capacity contexts, this evidence comes from triangulating different sources of data, for example in violence observatories. In resource-poor contexts, conditions for large-scale data collection rarely exist, and donors usually do not have time to build this capacity before developing programs. The challenge is to draw on available information to assess the context, the problems, and local capacity to deal with them, in order to act promptly. This rarely takes place in a linear process, where donors have time to fully assess the situation before planning interventions. Rather, donors are continuously assessing and reassessing, while planning and refining programs. The key is to act cautiously, based on the information available, and to continually assess the situation to learn and incorporate lessons.

Assessments can be done using simpler tools, such as rapid assessments, small-scale hospital surveys, small victimization surveys or even baseline surveys (see text box). These exercises
provide an important space for practitioners to refine their analysis of the situation (drivers and impacts) and the impacts of different programs on that situation. Smaller-scale assessments are also easier and more cost-effective to conduct on a regular basis, as is needed in fragile situations where the context can change periodically. Where possible, joint assessments with other agencies can maximize the use of resources, including human resources of local leaders whose energy is often stretched thin by the challenges of providing information to various donor agencies at once.

In higher-capacity contexts, these data can be obtained from police reports, vital records, hospital records (e.g. emergency injury records and inpatient records), rehabilitation centers, registries, population-based surveys, and other sources. Data can show types, trends and frequency of violence, where it occurs, and identify the victims and perpetrators. Injury surveillance systems and household surveys are two widely used methods to collect data.

Some countries have developed injury surveillance systems, using hospital based data to investigate the extent and nature of injuries and to monitor trends over time. The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed the Injury Surveillance Guidelines, and many countries have followed the guidelines to set up injury information system. WHO (2007) notes that “in Paraguay, for example, the information system includes both private and public health facilities. South Africa has developed a fatal injury surveillance system, and Oman has an injury surveillance system including not only data from health facilities but also insurance company and police data” (16).

Since a large part of interpersonal violence is unreported, household surveys are used to collect information from those who do not report to the criminal justice system or seek care from the health facilities. Victims of sexual violence and domestic violence often do not seek for any help because they are afraid of stigma and retaliation from abusers for revealing the abuse. Some countries that include Cambodia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Peru and Zambia have included a module on violence against women in their national health surveys (WHO 2007). Disparities across data sources are often dealt with by triangulating various sources to minimize the shortcomings of each. By comparing data from administrative sources, victimization surveys, as well as rapid assessment tools, media analysis, and others, a composite picture of the context of violence can emerge.

Crime and Violence Observatories are being established in many countries to collect and share data across different sectors for evidence-based programming. Violence data can be drawn from a variety of sources, including deaths certificates, vital statistics records, hospital records, police crime statistics, court records, and population surveys.
Box 13: An Example of Municipal Crime Observatories and Community Response Strategies in Colombia

Since 2002, the Institute for Peace Promotion and Injury/Violence Prevention in Cali and the Colombia Program at Georgetown University have implemented 21 observatories in seven cities. Collaborating with municipal, sub-regional and departmental levels, the observatories aim to collect information on violence and unintentional injury in order to utilize the information for the future prevention strategies. Based on the information collected at the Observatories, cities implemented prevention strategies including collaboration between different sectors, mobile police controls, firearm disarmament, restrictions on alcohol sales and consumption. Table 1 shows the number of homicides for selected municipalities for the year 2002, when the crime observatories were implemented, and the two following years. The homicide rates have decreased significantly between 2002 and 2003.

Table 1: Homicide and Community Response Strategies in selected cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Total Homicides</th>
<th>Community Response Strategies</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turbo</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Apartado</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chigorodó</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Popayan</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Santander de Quilichao</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pitalito</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>120</td>
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</table>

Sources: WHO (2008, 18)
E. Recognize that any assessment is incomplete, and avoid substituting assumptions for incomplete information

In high-violence situations, donors never have a full picture of the situation at their disposal. The tendency is often to make assumptions missing information, in order to plan actions. Yet experience shows it is better to recognize that some information is unknown, and perhaps can’t be known, than to base planning on assumptions. For example, many humanitarian interventions in post-conflict contexts where violence remains high have targeted aid toward those most in need, under the assumption that serving the neediest will stem further violence. Yet, more often than not, those most in need are those who “lost” the conflict, so that aiding them is interpreted by the other side as a political act to strengthen the “enemy.” Because it was based on assumptions about needs, the aid targeted at Hutu refugees following the Rwandan genocide created greater resentment among Tutsi and moderate Hutus who stayed in Rwanda, and who saw these interventions as rewarding those who had committed genocide (Anderson 1999).

8. Conclusions

In this paper, we have reviewed the available evidence for risk factors for violence, effective interventions to prevent violence, and emerging lessons for programming. While the field has certainly made important progress in identifying risk factors and developing appropriate responses, much remains to be done. The emerging evidence demonstrates that effective prevention requires a multi-level, multi-sector response that engages a variety of stakeholders, and remains consistent over the long term. The implications for donors are that a long-term attention span is needed, and at various levels, if prevention is to be sustained. Such investments have important benefits not only for improving security, but for more effectively securing the fundamental conditions for sustainable development.
Annex I. Defining Violence

Violence is itself an intensely contested concept, and various competing definitions and frameworks have been proposed to understand it. Galtung (1996) broadly defined violence as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is,” (emphasis in the original). Violence can take three forms: direct, structural and cultural. Direct violence, also called “secondary violence” (Schirch 2004) includes the more common understandings of violence – the direct inflicting of physical or psychological harm on a person. Structural violence manifests in the ways that institutions, laws and social systems meet the needs of some at the expense of others, creating the conditions that facilitate direct violence occurring. Cultural violence, also termed “symbolic violence,” is inflicted via the cultural and symbolic spheres, - such as religion, art or ideology – and serves to justify or legitimise structural violence by making it “look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong” (Galtung 1996, 196). The three forms are interrelated and often reinforce each other.

Most policy approaches to violence focus on controlling and preventing direct violence, with less attention paid to the ways in which violence is rooted within the specific socioeconomic and cultural conditions of communities. This often results in interventions that target individual and familial factors without sufficiently addressing the environmental and structural factors that are equally implicated in producing negative outcomes. The diagram below highlights the relationships between structural violence and different forms of direct violence. As shown below, structural violence helps perpetuate the conditions that facilitate direct violence. Structural violence may provoke direct violence as a response to (real or perceived) exclusion from social, political or economic systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The systems and institutions that produce disparities across groups which meet some people’s needs at the expense of others, and often pave the way for direct violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Inflicted Violence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-harming violence including suicide, substance misuse and other self-abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpersonal Violence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence perpetrated by an individual or small group (such as a gang) against a family member (as in domestic violence), community member, or stranger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Violence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence committed to advance a political, financial or social agenda, by organized groups (e.g. organized crime, war, terrorism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are many frameworks for understanding direct violence. Most follow the framework set forth by WHO (2002), which includes three categories: self-inflicted, interpersonal, and collective violence (WHO 2002). Self-inflicted violence involves harm perpetrated against oneself, the most extreme example being suicide. Collective violence is that perpetrated by an organized group driven by a particular agenda. Interpersonal violence encompasses the broadest group of behaviors, ranging from domestic violence within the family to stranger assault or small-group violence within the community.

The three categories are interrelated, yet they are often analyzed separately in practice. Many institutions that collect data on one type of violence, for example collective violence, rarely collect information on domestic violence as well. Similarly, while the rise in interpersonal violence following conflict has been observed in many contexts, few sources analyze the two together. These professional silos have prevented a deeper understanding of the ways different types of violence relate to and even reinforce one another, and have hindered the design of policies that can address common driving factors.
## Annex II. Matrix of Risk and Protective Factors for Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Risk Factors</th>
<th>Protective Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Good nutrition, health care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>School attendance and connectedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low social status related to class, race, ethnicity</td>
<td>Sense of family connectedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor nutrition/prenatal and health care</td>
<td>Level and coverage of services in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological Health (mental disorders, learning disabilities/low self-esteem)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement in risky behaviors (alcohol/drug misuse, high-risk sexual behavior)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro</strong></td>
<td><strong>Family</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family violence, harsh, authoritarian parenting or neglect</td>
<td>Connected, consistent families/households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor parental mental health</td>
<td>Opportunities for participation in social, political, economic life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family/Community attitudes condoning violence</td>
<td>Availability of service organizations, neighborhood support groups in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High levels of neighborhood crime and violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low access to quality education, training opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Easy availability of drugs, alcohol, firearms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro/Structural</strong></td>
<td>History of conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of strong drug or arms trafficking networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural factors (inequality, unemployment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid urbanization, migration (both rural-urban and external)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demographic factors (youth bulge)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social norms condoning inequality or violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discriminatory legal frameworks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional Fragility (poor or uneven provision of services, weak criminal justice system, weak governance, weak control of arms and drug trade)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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