

**DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY  
FOR RWANDA'S VISION 2020:**

**ENHANCING HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

**September 2012**

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGI	Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative
ASI	Adam Smith International
CIP	Crop Intensification Program
CSR	Civil Service Reform
DPs	Development Partners
EWSA	Energy, Water & Sanitation Authority
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GoR	Government of Rwanda
ICT	Information Communications Technology
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
IMIHIHO	Kinyarwanda for “performance-based leadership and management” system
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIFOTRA	Ministry of Public Service and Labor
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government
MINAGRI	Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Resources
MININFRA	Ministry of Infrastructure
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
NAEB	National Agricultural Exports Board
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OCIR - Thé	Office for Rwanda Industrial Crops –Tea
PEFA	Public Expenditure Fiduciary Assessment
PMS	Performance Management System
PSCBS	Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat
PSTA	Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture
RAB	Rwanda Agricultural Board
RADA	Rwanda Agricultural Development Authority
RARDA	Rwanda Animal Resources Development Authority
RECO	Rwanda Electricity Company
RIAM	Rwanda Institute of Administration and Management
RRA	Rwanda Revenue Authority
RWASCO	Rwanda Water and Sanitation Company
RURA	Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority
SCBI	Strategic Capacity Building Initiative

## **Preface**

This study was prepared and compiled by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management team at the World Bank in partnership with the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat under the leadership of Tessa MacArthur (Task Team Leader, Senior Governance Specialist), Kithinji Kiragu (Lead Consultant and Researcher), and Cyatwa Ngarambe (Consultant). The Task Team included Loraine Ronchi (Senior Economist), Valens Mwumvaneza (Rural Development Specialist), Paul Baringanire (Senior Energy Specialist), Lewis Kabayiza Murara (Public Sector Management Specialist), Birgit Hansl (Country Economist) and Sylvie Ingabire (Team Assistant). The study also benefited from the guidance and advice provided from Anand Rajaram (Sector Manager) and Omowunmi Ladipo (Country Manager). In addition, the report benefited from peer reviewer inputs by Graham Teskey (Senior Adviser), Waleed Haider Malik (Senior Public Sector Specialist), Jeremy Armon (Senior Governance Adviser, DFID), Sanjeev Ahluwalia (Senior Public Sector Specialist), and Nick Manning (Adviser, Public Sector Management).

The staff of the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat has provided technical support and guidance for the study throughout its various stages. The World Bank team wishes in particular to acknowledge the support of the Executive Secretary of the PSCBS, Ms Stella Ford Mugabo and the Coordinator, Technical Services of the same organization, Mr Peter Malinga. The study has also benefited from inputs by staff from the two case study sector Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) and Infrastructure (MININFRA), and the team particularly acknowledges the support of Mr Ernest Ruzindaza, Permanent Secretary of MINAGRI, Mr Raphael Rurangwa, Director General, Planning and Policy, MINAGRI, Mr Yusuf Uwamahoro, former Coordinator of the Energy Sector in MININFRA, and Mr Alastair Sussock, Economist in MINAGRI. Contributions were also received from the Ministry of Public Service & Labour (MIFOTRA) and Development Partners – including the Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative, the European Commission, the Canadian International Development Agency, the UK Department for International Development, USAID and the Belgian Technical Cooperation.

## Executive Summary

This study investigates human resource management capacity in the public sector in Rwanda through the lens of the two priority sectors of energy and agriculture. It was carried out in partnership with the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat to inform the long term direction of the Government's Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (2011-2014) as it gathers momentum.

The public sector has delivered remarkable improvements in service provision in Rwanda in the relatively short period of time since the genocide in 1994. Significant public sector reforms have been carried out to rationalize and reorganize the public service and accelerate decentralization. There has been a markedly strong performance orientation in the Government with clear performance targets that have to be met through the national '*Imihigo*' performance contract system. The results have been impressive, for example according to the most recent national household survey, poverty decreased from 56.7 percent of the population in 2005/06 to 44.9 percent in 2010/11. In the same period, Gross Domestic Product per capita rose from US\$ 333 to US\$ 540 and child under-five mortality reduced from 152 to 76 per thousand live births. Agricultural production has improved with real agricultural growth averaging 4.9 percent between 2006 and 2010.

Looking forward, Rwanda nevertheless has further ambitious development goals to meet that are encapsulated in its Vision 2020. It aims to be a middle income country by this time. The recent revision to the Vision 2020 goals indicates an even higher degree of ambition than before. For example, the revised targets include: (i) average GDP growth of 11.5 percent (previously 8.3 percent); (ii) GDP per capita of \$1240 (previously \$900); and (iii) average export growth of 28 percent per annum (previously 19.2 percent). Moving to middle income status and meeting these challenging goals will require a structural shift of the economy through a greater market-orientation of agriculture and an expansion of non-agricultural sectors. Improvements in energy generation and agricultural exports will be essential, and will require higher levels of private sector investment than have been obtainable so far. The agricultural delivery model will need to become more complex, involving more aggressive export promotion and value addition in international markets.

This study suggests that enhancing human resource management in the public sector will be essential to managing this complex transition by 2020. The public sector will need to work differently, and develop a more sophisticated capacity for policy-making, cross-sector coordination, private sector negotiation and regulation. It will be even more imperative to have sufficient numbers of skilled public servants deployed in the right places with effective incentives to develop, motivate and retain them. Although major public sector reforms have been carried out since 1994, the study suggests that human resource management reforms have further to go to ensure that the public sector keeps in step with the requirements of the fast moving development path. Its people are its greatest asset.

The study assessed the human resource management context through a delivery chain approach: first (i) considering the availability and retention of skilled staff; then (ii) assessing performance management, organizational design and the nature of the institutional environment; and lastly (iii) looking at the impact on the agriculture and energy sectors' capacity to develop policy, plans and projects, and deliver frontline services. The aim was to apply a qualitative methodology and look in broad terms at how human resources are being managed and deployed in Rwanda's public service delivery model, using the two sectors as case studies.

The findings of the study are that, firstly, despite the Government's vigorous efforts to train civil servants and prioritize technocratic leadership in the public sector, there remains a significant professional and technical skills deficit in the energy and agriculture sectors. Rwanda's Higher Learning Institutions are not yet delivering the number of professionals and technicians required by the sectors, while the in-country training capability to develop public servants' core generic skills for effective working in government is weak. The skills shortages are compounded by a high turnover of professional staff, stemming in part from low and differential pay issues and in part from inadequate career progression incentives. As a result, the sectors have carried a high number of vacancies and relied heavily on short-term Technical Assistance or contractors to achieve their deliverables. This has held back a more institutionalized form of public sector capacity development and reduced the scope for professionals to develop. The problems extend to the local government level where staff turnover appears to be high and many staff are young and inexperienced.

At the same time, as a result of the public service restructuring and unbundling process, the Ministries in both sectors have become very lean in terms of their organizational structures compared to the newer Agencies and Boards, and appear squeezed in their capacity to carry out their overarching policy making and strategic coordination functions. Some staff appear to be overloaded, particularly the senior managers, given the limited delegation of decision-making authority to lower levels. The study suggests that this might be crowding out the time for strategic planning and cross-sector coordination. Downstream too, at the local level the energy and agriculture staff have large portfolios and are overstretched, with limited support structures for project delivery and oversight.

Considering the institutional environment, there are two main issues holding back human resource capacity. Firstly, the institutional structures in both sectors have by global comparisons, experienced frequent and major restructuring in recent years. At the same time, there has been little autonomy for the sectors to define their organizational structures since the approach has been to centrally prescribe a uniform structure across the public service. The institutional flux has not been conducive to attracting private finance and has presented challenges for the sectors as roles and responsibilities have not always been clear and there have been new ways of working for staff to adjust to. There is a major change management challenge presented by the new Board and Agency institutions in the energy and agriculture sectors. They will take some time to become fully staffed and embedded.

The study concludes that these Human Resource Management constraints are similar across the two sectors and have affected their capacity in four main ways: (i) weak policy and planning capability in the Ministries; (ii) weak cross-sector coordination; (iii) limited capacity to negotiate deals with the private sector; and (iv) challenges to project management capability and oversight, mainly at the Agency and District level. Taking the energy sector as an example, it suggests that low capacity, particularly in the Ministry, has acted as a binding constraint by limiting the production of high quality policy, road maps and operational plans to guide delivery, holding back progress on private sector investment, and ultimately resulting in project delays, the result of which has been that new generation and electricity projects have been lagging. Rwanda remains dependent on high cost thermal generation with electricity access at 14% of households.

The overall recommendation of the study is that in addition to the new Technical Assistance 'coaching' approach being rolled out in four priority areas and beyond through the SCBI, the Government should give more urgency to strengthening human resource management and development in the public sector. The initiatives that began in 2011 under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Service and Labour to develop a comprehensive Human Resource Management Policy, and strengthen the Job Classification and Pay and Staff Retention systems, are clearly vital

steps forward in this regard. Both sectors, at upstream and downstream levels, would benefit greatly from more strategic support on HR issues such as long term staff development and workforce planning; the recruitment and retention of skilled staff; and career progression incentives. They also need supportive organizational structures and a stable institutional environment to help them allocate and deploy their staff to greatest effect.

With reference to the agriculture and energy sectors, it recommends that the Government should prioritize seven overall actions to better develop the human resource capability in the public sector. These could apply to other sectors, given that the problems appear to be cross-cutting. They are:

- i. Provide a greater measure of institutional stability in the public service, and offer targeted support to the new institutions (e.g. EWSA, NAEB, RAB, RBS) to develop their skills, staff and systems.
- ii. Reappraise the balance of staff numbers allocated between the central Ministries, Agencies/Boards and Districts in light of Rwanda's transition to a more complex stage of development involving a higher market orientation. High priority functions under the responsibility of the Ministries such as collaborative cross-sector policy making and private sector outreach appear to be understaffed and squeezed. At the same time, the Government should be open to further reducing the uniformity in organizational charts and regulations so that 'form follows function' and meets specific sector requirements.
- iii. Within the overall public sector reform approach, give higher priority to strengthening Human Resource Management. An overall, medium term strategy to reform HRM is needed (as for example exists for Public Financial Management Reform). In priority sectors, the HR Departments need to play a more strategic role; and effective HRM systems to plan and manage long term staffing requirements and performance need to be developed.
- iv. Develop long term sector-level Skills Development Plans linked to Vision 2020 goals to enhance the national and regional supply of technical and professional skills and reduce the reliance on fly-in fly-out international consultants over the long term.
- v. Improve career development incentives for public servants to motivate performance and retain the best and brightest.
- vi. Step up the provision of high quality in-country training for civil servants to develop the core generic skills base in the public service, build middle management capacity, and support the many young and inexperienced staff. For example, Management Development and Induction Programs; and an overhaul of the training capacity of the Rwanda Institute of Administration and Management.
- vii. Enhance the incentives and resources for cross-sector horizontal collaboration by Ministries, such as performance targets, specific coordinator positions, and smarter working using ICT; and strengthen the dialogue between the sectors and the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat and Ministry of Public Service and Labour on Human Resource Development.


## Chapter 1: Introduction, Objective and Methodology

1. **The Government of Rwanda recognizes the need to strengthen public sector capacity in priority areas for economic growth and development, and has developed a Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI)**, led by the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat. The Initiative, which began in 2011, is focused on bringing in international and regional Technical Assistance practitioners where there are skills gaps. Unlike earlier initiatives, the SCBI is hoping to leverage a more lasting impact on public sector capacity by twinning international Technical Assistance experts with national counterparts and prioritizing proactive skills transfer between them. The World Bank is supporting the SCBI through its Poverty Reduction Support Grant and its Governance and Competitiveness Project. The SCBI will initially cover the four areas of crop intensification, mining, electricity and private sector investment.
2. **The SCBI operational plans in the four sectors were based on quick Capacity Needs Assessments that were carried out by PSCBS in 2010** with the support of the Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative. These studies were tightly focused, however, in that they mainly looked at the short term skills gaps in the areas of Electricity, the Crop Intensification Program, and Mining, and at the central level of government.
3. **This study seeks to inform the long term direction of the SCBI** by exploring the wider range of human resource management issues affecting two of the four priority sectors – energy and agriculture – and identifying the critical areas of constraint requiring action. The aim is to deepen the existing analysis of capacity gaps by looking in more depth at organizational and institutional level concerns and incorporating the local government as well as the central government level.
4. **It is important to be clear at the outset that the paper is intended first and foremost as a background think piece as the implementation of the SCBI gathers momentum.** It was carried out in partnership with the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat and explicitly framed within the Conceptual Framework of the SCBI. It is not framed to investigate all the capacity issues affecting delivery in the energy and agriculture sectors in the manner that a Functional Review or Sector Institutional Appraisal would do. It deliberately concentrates on human resource management capacity issues. Its recommendations are also deliberately targeted more at the Centre of Government (i.e. PSCBS, MIFOTRA, MINECOFIN, MINALOC), with its overarching policy setting and quality assurance role on public sector capacity building and human resource management, rather than at the Sectors or Districts; although the findings should still be relevant to their capacity building efforts.
5. **In terms of its methodology, the study sought to apply a service delivery chain framework to ensure that it analyzed capacity in a comprehensive and holistic way;** (i) first taking into account the overall interconnectedness of a service delivery chain (inputs-processes-outputs-outcomes) and recognizing that any deficiency in one part of the system gives rise to ultimately incomplete or unsustainable outcomes; and (ii) second recognizing that Capacity

Development is the process of capacity creation, utilization and retention at the three levels, the individual, the organizational and the institutional levels. Studies of public sector capacity issues can have a bias on analyzing inputs (number of personnel, resources for investment) or outputs (numbers trained etc.) and neglect the wider institutional environment and service delivery outcomes.

6. **Based on a generic Public Service Delivery Chain Model (see Annex 4), the study developed a specific model focused on Human Resource Management (HRM) aspects. This is set out in Figure 1.1. below.** The delivery chain begins with human resource inputs in the form of (i) the availability of skilled staff and their skills enhancement and (ii) the retention of skilled staff. It then considers how those inputs are managed looking at (iii) performance management and career incentives; (iv) organizational structures and management systems; and (v) the institutional environment and rules. It then moves to delivery and looks at how the management of human resources is impacting on sector capacity to (vi) manage policy, plans and projects and (vii) deliver frontline services.

**Figure 1.1: Service Delivery Chain focused on HRM aspects**



7. **The study used a qualitative approach of research enquiry.** The methodological approach entailed interviewing key counterparts at different levels of government, as well as development partners, and mapping and analyzing capacity across the various elements of the service delivery chain. The inception stage of the study entailed an in-depth review of the literature on public service capacity building and service delivery theory and practice, in Rwanda and elsewhere. There was also a review of available relevant documents in the agriculture and energy sectors (see Annex 1), such as the Functional Reviews of the Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) and the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) in 2008. A structured data and information entry format was used to carry out a series of interviews. The interviewees included technical and professional specialists from both ministries and local governments, as well as informed sector specialists. The team also visited three districts.

## Chapter 2: Overview of Rwanda's Public Sector Reforms

### (i) The ambitious goals and priorities of the Government of Rwanda.

8. In line with Rwanda's Vision 2020, and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS, 2008-2012), the Government has planned for the country to attain the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and to be a middle-income economy by the end of the decade. The vision is for Rwanda to be transformed from a subsistence agricultural economy to a knowledge based economy by 2020. The achievement of the vision will require an intensification and market-orientation of agriculture and a diversification of the economy through a proliferation of non-agricultural sectors.<sup>1</sup> Poverty still affects a large part of the population of 10.2 million people in Rwanda. According to the most recent national household survey, carried out in 2010/11, poverty decreased by 11.8 percentage points, from 56.7 percent of the population in 2005/06 to 44.9 percent. The Government recognizes that the achievement of its development goals is inextricably dependent on a well-functioning public service and skilled workforce. Human and institutional capacity building is thus a core aim.

### (ii) Efforts to overhaul the structures and administrative systems of government have been impressive but there remain capacity challenges.

9. Over the past decade, the Government has been implementing reforms with the aim of redressing the weak public administration system that was a legacy of the 1994 genocide. Given the pronounced lack of capacity that confronted the Government, it was particularly challenged to adopt strategies for public sector management that would: (i) **provide a pragmatic response to the extensive dearth of capacity**: especially technical management and operational capacities, by mobilizing all players; (ii) **minimize common bureaucratic pathologies** in public service delivery such as red-tape in service delivery, lack of results-orientation, and inertia; and (iii) **ensure cost-effective and efficient deployment of limited available capacities** and reduce waste.

10. In the context of the above, the transformation of the public service that the Government embarked upon during 2000 – 2010 was driven by the following policy objectives:

- **To enhance public service productivity and efficiency** by restructuring departments and functions, retrenching and redeploying staff, instilling codes of ethics and standardized recruitment procedures, improving pay, and building capacity;
- **To cut-costs and reduce state expenditure**. For example a zero-fleet policy was adopted, along with control of wage bill, telephone expenses, rent expenses, etc;
- **To enhance responsiveness** through Decentralization;

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<sup>1</sup>World Bank, Rwanda Economic Update Spring Edition, April 2011.

- **To address capacity constraints** arising from the low educational achievements and lack of skills through rightsizing the overall public service, redeployment and training.

11. **Beginning in 1998, the Government carried out a far reaching Public Service Rationalization and Reorganization.** Between 1998 and 1999 there was a large-scale downsizing of the civil service with over 6,000 workers being dismissed because they were not qualified and over 6,500 being removed from the payroll as ‘ghost workers’. Salaries increased by 40%. Then, from 2000, in tandem with Decentralization, Central Government Ministries were radically restructured and unbundled to create flatter and considerably downsized structures. Policy *implementation and delivery* roles and functions were devolved to newly created agencies and local government. Non-core functions (such as office transport, office security, cleaning) were divested or contracted out. A large number of employees were either moved to the new agencies, local government, or laid off. A Public Service Commission was established, marking a significant departure from the Francophone system to one based on Anglophone public administration practice.

12. **By 2006 there were 49 Agencies and this number had risen to 82 Agencies by 2010/11.** (There are currently 21 Central Government Ministries). The creation of executive agencies has been a key feature of the New Public Management Reforms, which have been implemented in many countries since the 1980s (e.g. the UK, Australia, Canada, France, Iceland, New Zealand, and Norway) in a wide variety of forms to improve public sector efficiency and customer orientation. The model is for devolved agencies to operate as executive units at arms’ length from national government ministries; and for them to be in charge of policy implementation, for example the payment of benefits, regulation, inspection, research, registration, licensing and so forth. The NPM argument for agencies is that service providers should concentrate on the efficient production of quality services, without the distractions of developing and evaluating alternative policies. Likewise, policy-making is considered to be more focused and rigorous if it can be made without the undertow of concern for the existing service providers. Thus the intention in Rwanda was to separate out the policy-making function (Ministries) from the implementation function (Agencies, Districts); and let the central Ministries concentrate on a narrower set of policy and strategic oversight roles.

13. **More recently, since 2008, the Government has been embarking on second generation reforms.** For example, current priorities include: the implementation of a Pay and Retention Policy (2012); the further deployment and upgrading of an Integrated Personnel & Payroll Information System; Job Grading and Career Development; Human Resource Management; and Citizen Charters. At the same time **further institutional reorganization has taken place with the creation of several new Boards** which have merged former agencies into larger organizations with broader remits (e.g. Rwanda Development Board, Rwanda Education Board, Rwanda Governance Board, Rwanda Agricultural Board, National Agriculture Export Board). The aim of this restructuring has been to increase synergies and coordination within the sectors.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Oxford Policy Management, Functional Reviews of Public Agencies and National Commissions, April 2010.

14. **From 2000 onward, significant complementary Decentralization reforms** were implemented to promote good governance, accountability, local economic development and improve service delivery. The key objective was to progressively devolve responsibilities for service delivery to local governments, including the transfer of staff to the districts. Since the National Decentralization Policy was adopted in 2000, the Government has implemented the strategy in phases. The first phase (2001-2005) aimed to establish democratic and community development structures at the District level and was accompanied by a number of legal, institutional and policy reforms, as well as democratic elections for local leaders. The second phase (2006 – 2010) was conceived after a territorial restructuring in 2005, which considerably reduced the number of administrative entities (from 11 to 4 provinces, 106 to 30 districts, 1545 to 416 sectors (sub-district), and 9165 to 2148 cells (sub-sector)). It sought to deepen service delivery progress, build capacity (human and financial) and boost local development including through the use of performance contracts – a system that is called “*Imihigo*” in Rwanda. The third phase of decentralization (2011-2015) is focusing on enhancing local economic development, downward accountability to citizens, fiscal decentralization, capacity building, and sector decentralization.

15. **By 2010/11, the local government staff establishment was almost on a par with that for central government (8,549 employees contrasted with 10,284 employees).** Financial resources to local government have increased substantially. Earmarked transfers increased from RWF 38.9 billion in 2006/07 to RWF 102.6 billion in 2010/11 while block grants increased during the same period from RWF 5 billion to RWF 20.4 billion. Given the limited tax base at the local level, intergovernmental transfers will remain the main source of funding of local government programs for the foreseeable future (approximately 27% of 2012/13 budget allocation is to districts).

16. **Alongside decentralization, the Government has outsourced a wide variety of non-state agents to deliver services in some sectors.** The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) has, for example, mobilized the ministry’s agencies and many other agents to cover gaps in the capacity of the district governments, e.g. Task Forces, project teams sponsored by development partners, private contractors, co-operatives, farmers’ associations, NGOs, faith groups, community groups, and local traders. A variety of institutions has been encouraged to intervene in service delivery (see **Annex 5** on the diversity of service providers contracted for maize and wheat farmers). The flexibility in the interventions to develop artificial insemination (AI) services in Rwanda today can be contrasted, for example, with those used in Kenya in the 1970s.<sup>3</sup> In the latter case, a monolithic and bureaucratic system was rolled-out across the country. In Rwanda, the former Rwanda Animal Resources Development Authority has been promoting flexible mechanisms, with contract providers as a major feature in pursuit of rapid development of the AI services. Likewise, MINAGRI has facilitated the Belgian Technical Cooperation to move forward with the “Farmer Field School (FFS)” extension approach reaching some 24,429 farms while allowing other conventional approaches to continue. While decentralization is a salient feature of other neighbouring countries, the Rwandan approach has arguably gone further than others in terms of its

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<sup>3</sup> Leonard, 1991

deliberate attempts to mobilize disparate agents to contribute to its service delivery goals at the local level and to compensate for public sector capacity gaps.

17. **In the area of Public Financial Management reform**, since the second half of the 1990s, fiscal stabilization measures have been successfully implemented, including establishing the Rwanda Revenue Authority and developing its capacity to pursue growth in domestic revenue mobilization. In sequel, in 2008, the Government elaborated an ambitious PFM Reform Strategy 2008-12 which has focused on the consolidation and strengthening of reforms to, inter alia, implement the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the budget monitoring system. The 2010 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability report showed a significant improvement on the 2007 PEFA report.

18. **In 2005, the Government initiated an ambitious Multi-Sector Capacity Building Program** as a home grown, long-term Strategic Framework to guide and direct the preparation and implementation of capacity building actions in Rwanda. It has targeted human resource development and the strengthening of the institutional work environment to enhance capacity in public sector institutions, the private sector and civil society organizations.

19. **These core public sector reforms have contributed to significant improvements** in the management of government affairs and in service delivery. Rwanda's performance is impressive, for example considering that the average growth rate since 2000 is estimated at 7.8% annually and the number of EDPRS indicator targets that have already been met.

20. **At the same time, nonetheless, it is clear that the reforms have further to go.** The 1994 genocide severely affected the already weak public sector management capacity that existed in Rwanda, and a legacy of an extraordinary dearth of capacity characterizes the public sector. For example:

- (i) A 2009 Skills Audit revealed that Rwanda had around **60 percent of its short-term human skills requirement** and technicians were in particularly short supply.
- (ii) There is recognition in the latest Decentralization Implementation Plan that at the local government level, capacity building initiatives need to become much more coordinated.
- (iii) **The Functional Reviews of Public Sector Institutions** carried out in 2008-2009 observed that there was an urgent need to increase public sector staffing levels in many key policy areas.<sup>4</sup> Management processes were shown to require urgent improvements in five major areas:
  - **Work Methods**; e.g. improving efficient planning processes and time management;
  - **Decentralization**; e.g. change of work systems and delegation of powers necessitated by the decentralization process;
  - **Management Systems**: e.g. organizational structures, management support, tools and human resource management systems;

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<sup>4</sup> Republic of Rwanda, Oxford Policy Management, Functional Reviews of Six Public Sector Institutions, 2008.

- **Information Systems**; largely pointing to the need to take advantage of the country's developed ICT to bring about business improvements in the management of government affairs; and
- **Management Style**; for example leadership, communication and a culture of delegation.<sup>5</sup>

## Chapter 3: The Priorities of the Agriculture and Energy Sectors

21. Before delving into the human resource management issues in the energy and agriculture sectors, this chapter briefly introduces their main sector goals to give a sense of the challenge facing government officials.

### 3.1 Agriculture Sector

22. **Agriculture is a priority sector for Rwanda's Vision 2020 and EDPRS.** In the 2011 calendar year, the agriculture sector contributed 31% of the Gross Domestic Product.<sup>6</sup> Around 80% of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood yet land availability is scarce as there is a high population density of 430.6 people per square kilometer.<sup>7</sup> The overall objective of the sector is to contribute, in a sustainable way, to poverty reduction and to support Rwanda's economic growth by increasing the productivity of production factors, diversifying lines of production, adding value to farm products, creating better market linkages, and protecting the environment and the natural resource base. The Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation in Rwanda – Phase II (PSTA II), 2009-2012, guides the agriculture sector, and is currently being updated into PSTA III. It has four programs:

Program 1: Intensification and Development of Sustainable Production. The first priority is to improve the productivity of agriculture and animal resources and the agriculture sector as a whole as it forms the starting point for intensified and sustainable production systems. Activities focus on soil conservation through the construction of radical and progressive terraces and irrigation development through *Immediate Action Government Irrigation*, increased livestock ownership through the *One Cow per Poor Family* programme, and support to the use of agricultural inputs through the *Crop Intensification Programme*.

Program 2: Support to the Professionalization of Producers. The objective of supporting the professionalization of producers is to strength the sector's social capital base; provide producers with the organizational frameworks necessary to develop commercial linkages as entrepreneurs; as well as strengthening the entities in the sector charged with the development of productive technologies, and knowledge transfer to farmers.

<sup>5</sup> Government of Rwanda, Functional Reviews – Overview Report, Adam Smith International, 2008.

<sup>6</sup> MINAGRI, Annual Report 2010/11.

<sup>7</sup> World Bank Databank. Source: WDI and GDF 2010.

Program 3: Creating an Environment for Business Development and Agribusiness Development. Effective market demand is expected to lead to an increase in the quality and quantity of supply. The proposed strategy is to support the regionalization and market orientation of crop production. Specialized support is being provided to value addition and crop transformation activities. Investments in value addition through credits for transformation units, cottage industries and rural infrastructure will continue to be supported.

Program 4: Institutional Development. The fourth priority concerns supporting the institutional development of the sector through developing policies, capacity building, planning, M&E, resource mobilization and the development of sector ICT and statistics.

**Table 1.1: The developmental objectives for 2012-2013 in terms of budgetary priority.**

Irrigation & Soil Conservation
Crop Intensification & Extension
Post Harvest Handling & Storage and Strategic Reserves
Integrated Livestock Development
Export & Value-Added Promotion for Traditional and Non-Traditional Products
Research & Dissemination

Allocations to the agricultural sector increased from 4.2 percent of the budget in 2008 to 6.6 percent in the 2010/11 budget. Together with agricultural related spending allocated to other institutions, Rwanda now complies with the 10 percent commitment made under the Africa Union’s Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Compact, of which Rwanda was the first signatory.

23. Between 2006 and 2010 the sector started to benefit from large investments in fertilizers, improved seeds and extension services through the Crop Intensification program. Real agricultural growth averaged 4.9 percent in this period.<sup>8</sup> The challenges ahead include the need to focus on: (i) reducing dependence on rain-fed agriculture through greater use of different models of irrigation; (ii) better erosion and integrated soil fertility management; (iii) diversifying agricultural production, in particular agriculture export goods; (iv) changing the skills profile of people employed in agriculture to foster the creation of increased agricultural off-farm employment such as agro-processing; and (v) developing a market-based food crop distribution system to contribute to food security. The sector also suffers from insufficient access to finance and there are risks posed by climate change.<sup>9</sup> The Vision 2020 targets were revised in May 2012 and include a more ambitious target for the sector of 8.5 percent per annum agricultural growth, compared to 5.8 percent previously.

### 3.2 Energy Sector

24. **Energy is a priority sector for Rwanda’s social and economic development. It is a prerequisite for private sector development and the delivery of basic services to the population.**

<sup>8</sup> MINAGRI Annual Report 2010/11.

<sup>9</sup> World Bank, Rwanda Economic Update Spring Edition, April 2011.

The overarching EDPRS related priorities are (i) increasing electricity generation, with a highly ambitious target to increase generation capacity to 1000MW by 2017; (ii) increasing access to energy, with a target of achieving at least 350,000 connections to the grid by the end of 2013, and 70% of households over the medium term; (iii) attracting investment for energy infrastructure development; and (iv) establishing a favourable institutional, legal and regulatory framework.<sup>10</sup> During the fiscal year 2012/13, the sector will pursue the following priorities:

***Electricity Generation:***

- a) KivuWatt, a subsidiary of Contour Global (USA): the development of a 100 MW plant from which 25 MW is to be produced in the 1<sup>st</sup> Phase by end 2012, and 75 MW by 2015 for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Phase.
- b) Increase the national power generation capacity by 7MW generated from new identified micro hydro power in 99 sites.
- c) Increase the national power generation by 15 MW from the development of Peat to Power project in Bugarama, Rusizi district.
- d) Speed up the ongoing development hydropower projects and prepare new generation projects including the regional hydropower projects.
- e) Speed up the exploitation of geothermal resources.
- f) Strengthen the planning, contract management and negotiation capacity within the sector to ensure timely delivery. Close capacity gaps, recruit the required expertise.

***Increasing access to energy:***

- (a) Extend the electricity network and connect as many new customers to the network as possible with a target of increasing access to electricity in the poorest districts from 2% to 13% by 2013 and connect at least 350,000 household connections to the electricity grid.
- (b) Prepare a second phase 2013-17 of the National Electricity Access roll out.
- (c) Improve the Sector wide approach with adequate institutional and delivery capacity and reporting structures to mobilize resources required for the roll out program.

25. In terms of the forward challenge, the National Energy Policy is clear that to achieve the rapid growth in the energy sector that is required for Vision 2020, the private sector will have to play a much greater role at all levels than has been the case in the past. Access to electricity at around 14% of households is still among the lowest in the world and Rwanda is still heavily dependent on high cost thermal generation. The 2011/12 Joint Sector Review noted that the 2011/12 EDPRS Common Performance Assessment Framework (CPAF) target of increasing electricity generation to 120MW was not going to be achieved and that current installed capacity was at 100.4MW. Likewise, a 2011/12 policy action in the CPAF for a ‘revised electricity tariff structure, ensuring EWSA retail tariffs at a level necessary to ensure a positive rate of return on its assets’ was noted to be off track. The action was adopted on the premise that by the end of 2010/11, new cheaper additional generation would have been commissioned, defraying the high cost of thermal generation and thus enabling the utility to fully recover its operating costs from the tariff. However, the

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
<sup>10</sup> Joint Sector Review 2011/12 Infrastructure Sector, April 2012.

commissioning of new generation, mainly from micro hydro and methane gas remains a challenge. The sector needs to move forward a number of new generation projects including hydro, peat to power, methane gas to power, geothermal, diesel, solar, and biogas.

## Chapter 4: Human Resource Management Issues in the Service Delivery Chain

26. This section analyzes the Human Resource Management context in the public sector, looking at the energy and agriculture sectors to illustrate the issues. It looks at (i) human resource inputs, (ii) performance management, organizational structures and management systems and (iii) the degree to which the institutional environment and rules are supportive (Figure 1.2).

**Figure 1.2: Human Resource Management in the Public Service Delivery Chain**



### 4.1 Human Resource Inputs

#### 4.1.1 Availability of Appropriately Skilled Staff

27. This section looks at the extent to which the Rwandan public sector has a critical mass of appropriate skilled staff. Firstly, it must be said that Rwanda has made strong progress given the low skills base that existing following the genocide. At the end of the 1990s, the number of public servants holding a university degree represented 2.7 percent of the total public service employees and only 36% held a secondary advanced certificate. By 2005, approximately 79% of the workforce held a university degree.<sup>11</sup> Through Rwanda's national Capacity Building Fund, externally financed projects, and institution-level Training Plans, there has been a lot of effort to develop staff through Masters and Undergraduate Degrees, and other types of training and leadership development.

28. In addition, the political leadership has placed strong priority on cultivating technocratic leadership at the top of the public administration, which has bolstered capacity. For example in the agriculture sector the Minister and the Permanent Secretary are professional specialists in fields related to the sectors they lead. Similarly, in the case of energy, the Minister of

<sup>11</sup> Republic of Rwanda, 2011, Final Draft evaluation report on Public Sector Capacity Building Project.

Infrastructure has an engineering background and in the health sector, the Minister of Health has a medical background and experience working in public hospitals in Rwanda. In the comparative regional (East Africa) countries, for example, it is common that both the Minister and Permanent Secretary have no education or training in the disciplines related to their sectors.

29. **However, in spite of nearly one and a half decades of sustained and vigorous initiatives by the Government to build capacity for development, there is still a preponderance of inexperienced technical and professional staff** that appears to be comparatively more pronounced than in, for example, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The 2009 National Skill Audit concluded that Rwanda has an acute shortage of human capital, with only 60% of its short term skills requirement. The skills gap was shown to be deepest in the technician cadre where a 60 percent gap was reported. However, even in the professional cadre, the skills gap was pronounced, standing at 48 percent. The public sector was found to have a 30 percent skills deficit with the gaps concentrated in the professional cadre.<sup>12</sup>

30. **To first consider the agriculture sector,** skills remain constrained in all areas. The 2009 National Skills Audit noted that the agriculture sector alone accounts for 35 percent of the total skills shortage in the country, and that there was a skills gap of 60 percent for agricultural technicians. The sector reported that it had 43 percent of its public sector skills requirement. In the area of livestock development, a striking example is that MINAGRI had one livestock specialist until quite recently, despite this area being a major priority with a big work program. This skills gap will inevitably have a bearing on the progress towards export promotion and mechanization unless addressed more proactively (in the fiscal year 2010/11 it was reported that 7 percent of agricultural operations were mechanized against the Vision 2020 target of 50 percent). National expertise is lacking on agro-industry, for example horticulture value chain addition, and the entire agricultural research system needed some 80 doctorate level specialists as of 2011 and yet had only 6 in place. The skills audit further noted a severe shortage of agricultural scientists.

31. **Regarding the energy sector,** the 2009 skills audit reported a relatively moderate skill shortfall for the infrastructure sector, at 28.6% of the short-term requirement. The shortfall was shown to be most acute in the professional cadre, with just under half of requirement in place. The shortfall in the technician and artisanal cadres was reported at 38 percent and 24 percent of the desired requirement. Out of a total of 1,787 employees in the energy sector, only 10 so far have received education at a Masters degree level and 332 of the total have Bachelor level degrees. As many as 32 percent of staff lack secondary education or field training (see Table 1.2 below). Yet, in this sector, effective delivery is dependent on a technically strong workforce both in the public and private sectors. The Electricity Development Strategy 2011-2017 notes the weakness of available capacity in terms of skilled and well trained personnel as a key constraint.

32. **Partly as a result of the limited supply of technical and professional skills, there has been a high vacancy rate in both sectors;** for example key positions such as the Director of Legal

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<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Public Service and Labour, National Skills Audit 2009.

Affairs at MININFRA, and the Director General of Animal Resources in MINAGRI were vacant as of April 2011 (the latter now filled). **The Electricity Access Scale-Up Roll-Out Program has an approved structure of 70 staff but as of 2011 it had only been able to recruit 15 persons from Rwanda, and it has since been looking to the region to fill the gaps.** The Strategic Capacity Building Initiative has encountered difficulties in recruiting personnel with the right skills set for its identified national counterpart positions in the energy sector.

33. **The professional skills constraint issue is prominent at the district level,** where agronomists and engineers who are charged with a high level of responsibility of coordinating the sectors’ activities at the district level have often graduated with a first degree or diploma only a few years ago. There is a preponderance of young graduate staff For example, in the district of Kayonza, none of the three engineers were found to have more than a year of post-graduate experience and all were relatively new. Yet these individuals play a pivotal role in sector performance given the high degree of decentralization that exists in Rwanda.

**Table 1.2: Employees in Energy Sector public institutions by levels of education**

Education and Training level (grade)	No. of Staff-in-Post	Percentage of Total
Masters degree	10	0.65
Bachelors degree (AO)	332	18.58
Diploma (A1)	99	5.5
Certificate (A2)	642	35.9
Artisans (A3)	137	7.67
Unskilled	567	31.73
TOTAL	1,787	100%


Source: MININFRA 2010

34. **Added to the technical skills gaps, the very youthful and inexperienced staffing in the public sector represents a further challenge for Rwanda’s public sector capacity,** given the level of professional experience and skill required to develop long term policy plans and to manage staff. **It is striking that some 76 percent of civil servants have only been in government for 4 years or less.**<sup>13</sup> **This means that only about a quarter of civil servants have considerable experience serving in government.** In the former agriculture agency of RADA for example, at least 80 percent of staff were noted to have less than 3 years of experience. Moreover, **approximately 60 percent of central government staff fall within the 25 and 34 years age group,** while in Agencies some 41 percent of staff are in this age group.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> NISR, MIFOTRA, Draft Census of Public Servants, December 2010. Based on staffing in large state institutions, Provinces, Districts, Sectors, Agencies & Commissions.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

**Figure 1.3: Years of Experience in Central and Local Government**



Source: Draft Public Servant Census 2010.

### 4.1.2 Skills Enhancement and Training

35. **Part of the reason behind the skills gap is that Rwanda’s Higher Learning Institutions are still building the capacity for educating and training technical and professional specialists for the agricultural sector.** In such areas as irrigation engineering, dam engineering and applied agricultural research, the capacity is not yet in place. Similarly, national outputs of energy technical specialists remain low and there are limited training facilities for skilled personnel – such as establishing an in-house training facility in EWSA – as other utilities in the world have done. While there has been an admirable overall rise in the number of civil servants with degrees, the system is still not producing sufficient numbers of highly qualified national technical experts who can serve the priority infrastructure needs of the government.

36. **Added to this, apart from the Electricity sub-sector where there are plans for some 500 engineers to be trained by 2017 through placements in South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt, India and the USA, there does not appear to be any considerable long term skills planning by the sectors in conjunction with the Workforce Development Authority, Ministry of Public Service and Labour (MIFOTRA) and Ministry of Education (MINEDUC).** For example the result of this could be to establish a plan of action to improve the permanent national or regional supply of these much needed skills, say over a five year time horizon. However, generally, the sectors investigated in this study appear to respond in a quite reactive way to skills gaps, filling them on a case by case or project by project basis which does not result in a comprehensive or necessarily sustainable approach. A National Human Capital and Skills Strategy was initiated by the Government in 2010 but it has not yet been finalized.

37. **As a result both sectors continue to be highly dependent on costly Technical Assistance international consultants to enhance their skills sets. Yet the quality and impact can be mixed** depending on the ability of consultants to operate effectively with counterparts in the government system. As of April 2011, approximately 30 percent of staff in the Rwanda Agriculture Development Agency were contractors. In agriculture, the Mid-Term Review of the Support Project for the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (PAPSTA) indicated difficulties in embedding and sustaining the various short term consultancy inputs provided.<sup>15</sup> The ownership of

<sup>15</sup> Republic of Rwanda, PAPSTA Mid-Term Review, Annex 2: Central Level Policy and Institutional Support for the Agricultural Sector.

policies and projects is certainly diminished when they are driven by temporary staff and the institutional memory of the organization suffers. The pay differentials that can exist between temporary contractors and permanent staff can also reduce morale for those who are lower paid.


38. **The Strategic Capacity Building Initiative is promoting a more effective form of Technical Assistance** support to some parts of the energy and agriculture sectors to upgrade and enhance skills. This approach is focused on: (i) rigorous design, interviews, procurement and M&E by the organization receiving the international or regional Technical Assistance consultants; (ii) the identification or recruitment of good quality counterparts; and (iii) a high priority on mentoring and skills transfer to those counterparts. The Initiative started in 2011/12 and is encouraging a better approach to TA and skills development across the public sector. A key challenge, nonetheless, will be folding those counterparts who have been recruited under SCBI into the Ministry's pay structures after the Initiative ends.

39. **Regarding core skills for working in government, the capacity in Rwanda to grow and develop its civil servants in terms of skills in planning, policy making, leadership, project and people management, economic and statistical analysis is limited.** Most governments across the world have a provision for training their civil servants in core skills required to manage government business, for example Civil Service Colleges and standard Management Development Programs that staff have to complete. As of yet, the Rwanda Institute of Administration and Management (RIAM) is not meeting the high demand in this area given its prolonged institutional capacity constraints. Some civil servants are receiving training overseas and some leadership training has taken place for senior leaders. Added to this is the above mentioned coaching of some middle managers in a few institutions through the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative; as well as coaching at the local government level linked to the third phase of Decentralization.

40. **There nevertheless remains a large gap in the provision of formal in-country training on core government skills particularly for the professional cadre of staff** in all government institutions, both centrally and locally. For example there is not a core Management Development Program available to the professional tier of staff or a robust induction program for the many young and new public servants. This is holding back the development of the professional cadre in the public service. This cadre could really boost public service delivery in Rwanda by supporting the often overstretched senior Director Generals, Directors and Permanent Secretaries and speeding up delivery. A stronger capability at middle management level would facilitate a greater delegation of more routine approval tasks that unnecessarily overburden the in-trays of top civil servants in Rwanda. Currently, some staff attend overseas courses but there are issues of coverage with such an approach and more cost-effective training could be developed.

41. **Moreover, given how young many of the civil servants are in Rwanda, and the little experience they have of working in government, the need for formal training is all the more important – as well as more informal mentoring and coaching arrangements.** Yet, for many professional staff, at least in the agriculture and energy sectors, there are few, if any, senior

professionals with the time and experience to whom they can readily turn to for guidance or on-the-job training. In these circumstances – and given the lack of formal training mentioned above by RIAM and others – the development of staff competence is likely to take longer than need be the case. There is likely to be much learning by doing which can be error prone, and there may be cases of inertia and slow decision-making among the personnel with low confidence. This situation does not support institutional development and lay a strong foundation for accelerated service delivery in the period from 2012-2020.



### 4.1.3 Retention of Skilled Personnel

42. **The skills gaps in the two sectors are compounded by a high turnover of staff**, which is an issue affecting the public sector as a whole. The turnover rate stands at around 18.5 percent for central government (2009) which may be among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>16</sup> There are often important staffing gaps in both sectors as a result. For example, in 2006 overall turnover in the Ministry of Agriculture was 29% and for professionals over 33%. In 2010 alone, RADA lost 6 key staff from various parts of the organization (Soil & Water Management Unit, Post Harvest, Rice, Seeds and Finance). The former Agricultural Research Institute, ISAR, has likewise lost a number of its most qualified researchers in the last 3 years. Already, since its creation in 2011, the new Rwanda Agriculture Board has seen a change in the Director General.

43. **Although formal data on turnover in the two sectors is lacking, (an area that requires some attention), the fieldwork carried out for this study indicated that in agriculture and energy, the turnover problems go right down to the local level and result in significant staffing gaps.** To take one example, between 2005 and 2010, engineers recruited by Gakenke District stayed in post for relatively short amounts of time: the first for 1 year and 8 months; the second for 7 months; the third for 1 year and 2 months; the fourth for 4 months and the fifth for 3 months. Given the difficulty of retaining engineers, the current post holder’s duties have been extended to Musanze and Nyabihu Districts which stretches his workload. The churn in the system at the local level will

<sup>16</sup> MIFOTRA, Draft Pay and Retention Policy, 2011.

impact on delivery looking ahead to Vision 2020 and increase the time spent on staff recruitment. It needs to be addressed through the Decentralization Program and Public Service Reform.

44. **The high turnover rate is partly caused by the current public sector pay structure which has very differential pay levels** depending on which part of the government you work in. In other words it is not only caused by public sector staff leaving for more attractive pay in the private sector.<sup>17</sup> The pay gap is particularly wide between central Ministries and the high index public Agencies. Since 2006, there has been a considerable rise in the number of Agencies paying a 500 index value from 12 percent to 37 percent (Table 1.4).<sup>18</sup> The index values were set by Cabinet in 2006 (Table 1.3). **As a result in 2010, the Agencies represented 14% of public sector employment but 45% of the wage bill.** In the same period between 2006 and 2010, the wage bill share of all districts combined declined significantly.<sup>19</sup>

**Table 1.3: Index Values according to Cabinet decision of 19/05/2006**

<b>Index 250</b>	<b>Value</b>	– Applicable Central Government, Health Sector and Administrative Staff at Universities, Institutes of Higher Learning, Public Research Agencies, Public Agencies and Commissions that receive their funding from the national budget
<b>Index 270</b>	<b>Value</b>	– Applicable to Academicians and Researchers at Universities, Institutes of Higher Learning and Public Research Agencies
<b>Index 400</b>	<b>Value</b>	– Applicable to National Commissions and Other Agencies such as National Tender Board, National Institute of Statistics, RITA, RADA and RAARDA
<b>Index 500</b>	<b>Value</b>	– Applicable to public agencies that are in production or commercial enterprise and do not take salary from the national budget, all Task Forces, Special Agencies such as OAG, Office of Ombudsman, RRA, National Security, BNR, RIEPA AND ORTPN

45. **The variations in pay scales appears to have contributed to an internal brain drain of the more experienced senior staff from the Ministries to the Agencies or to donor supported projects, which pay more.** The compensation regimes in the former RECO and RWASCO have been much more attractive than what has been available to non-contract staff in MININFRA, for example. While Agencies have been able to strengthen their staff capacity, there has been a hollowing out of the capacity in the ‘policy brain’ function of the Ministries as senior staff have moved and more of the junior inexperienced staff have been left there. This is suggested by the fact that 60 percent of central and local government staff fall within the 25 and 34 years age group, while in Agencies only some 41 percent of staff are in this age group. This hollowing out was certainly not the intention of the unbundling process that begun in 2000 since the aim was to strengthen the overall efficiency of the public administration including of the Ministries.

<sup>17</sup> The MIFOTRA, Comparative Pay Study, 2008 concluded that gross salary levels (with some exceptions in specific areas such as engineering and finance) were more or less on the same levels in both the public and private sectors. The greatest difference lay in the amount of non-salary benefits offered. These were higher in the private sector.

<sup>18</sup> Ministry of Public Service & Labour, Pay and Retention Policy Draft Report, June 2011.

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Public Service & Labour, Pay and Retention Policy, Situation Analysis, January 2012, p.22.

**Table 1.4: Public agencies size, employment and wage bill shares, 2006 and 2010**

Year	Number of Public Agencies	Number in Agencies with 500 Index Value	Number of Employees	Employment Share	Wage Bill Share
2006	49	6	5,500	12%	39%
2010	82	30	8,252	14%	45%

46. **Retention difficulties have also been compounded by low pay.** Real pay for many public servants has eroded, by as much as 31 percent in real purchasing power, over the past four years (Figure 1.4). This is in spite of the fact that the total public sector wage bill increased rapidly and far in excess of the Consumer Price Index over the same period. The wage bill to GDP ratio grew steadily over the period from 3.30% in 2006/07 to 4.78% in 2010/11.<sup>20</sup> Further to this, the wage bill to Gross Domestic Revenue ratio grew from 26.7% to 38.3% between 2006/07 and 2009/10.

47. **A focus group for the 2011 Pay and Retention Policy, which the Ministry of Public Service & Labour led on to address these challenges, found that 58 percent of staff were not very satisfied with their salary** but that 77 percent saw it as an extremely important factor. Some 63 percent reported that they would leave the public service if another position became available in the private sector that paid more.<sup>21</sup> Virtually all the young engineers interviewed as part of this study were considering alternative employment at some stage. In Kayonza District for example, it was noted that the previous engineers had resigned because of low salary. Last year, five employees in the energy sector completed Masters degrees in gas and petroleum engineering in Trinidad and Tobago but only one returned to the public service in RURA. The risk is that national staff who are being trained overseas may not return to government after their placements because of low pay.

48. **The Ministry of Public Service and Labour has developed a new Pay and Retention Policy which was approved by Cabinet in January 2012. This is a significant development since it plans to address the pay inequalities cited above by narrowing the gap between agency and ministry index levels during the 2012-2017 period while improving real pay for public servants and particularly teachers.** It includes a number of actions on non-pay incentives for retention such as a management development program and career development. The implementation of this ambitious policy agenda will require considerable capacity and coordination between the Ministry of Public Service and Labour and the Ministry of Economic Finance and Planning.


49. **In the short term, as with the skills deficit, the option of hiring technical and professional staff and placing them on comparatively higher pay through Technical Assistance contracts, or funding them through Development Partner projects, remains a key mechanism**

<sup>20</sup> The Pay and Retention policy compared Rwanda with 8 countries in the region. Two countries (Botswana and Ghana) stand out for having WB/GDP ratios above 10%. Two other countries, Mozambique and Zambia, have ratios above 8%, which is much higher than the average for SSA as a whole at about 6.2%. Rwanda, along with Uganda, has the lowest WB/GDP among the comparator countries, at 4.7%.

<sup>21</sup> *ibid*

**for dealing with the turnover problems.** For example Director Generals in the agriculture sector are paid under projects and 48 contractors had been recruited by the Irrigation and Mechanization Task Force in 2011. In Nyamagabe District, it was noted for example that private contracts had been used to get around low staff pay and that this maintained good performance. It is quite striking that TA personnel absorb 11 percent of the total wage bill of Rwanda (Table 1.5).<sup>22</sup> However there are challenges with such an approach for the long term institutionalization of the civil service. Outputs are not always sustained if local counterparts move on as is frequently so in Rwanda, and second, the selection of individual consultants on the basis of CVs alone has not always delivered high quality outcomes due to inadequacies in interpersonal skills. Poorer districts may lack the resources to finance contract staff.

**Figure 1.4: Real Public Service Pay Indices 2006/07 – 2010/11**



Source: MIFOTRA<sup>23</sup>


**Table 1.5: Various Components of the Wage Bill in Nominal Amounts, as Percentage of 2010/11 Total Wage Bill and Total Government Revenue**

Wage Bill Component	Nominal Amount (in Billions of RwF)	As % of the Total WB	As % of GDR
<b>Total Wage Bill</b>	<b>167.55</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>35.52%</b>
Technical Assistance	18.44	11.01%	3.91%
Total Wage Bill	149.11	88.99%	31.61%
Wage Bill for Military +Police Personnel	38.29	22.85%	8.12%
Total Non-Security Personnel Wage Bill	110.82	66.14%	23.49%

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ministry of Public Service & Labour, Pay & Retention Policy: Situational Analysis, June 2011.

## 4.2 Organizational Level Human Resource Management Issues



### 4.2.1 Performance Management

#### (i) Performance Orientation of Rwanda's Public Sector

50. Given the skills gaps and retention constraints described above, it is all the more imperative to have strong performance management to maximize the impact of government employees. A key feature of the Rwandan public service delivery system is the strong priority that it places on clear performance targets stemming from national plans. The leadership takes extraordinary measures to ensure that the goals, priorities and targets for various sectors are effectively communicated to all levels of government, as well as to other non-state players and external partners in the sector. For example, this is done through a National Dialogue process as well as through a Sector Working Group structure linked to the EDPRS. In the case of agriculture and energy, the SWG functions effectively as a convening forum. The Common Performance Assessment Framework for budget support sets out indicators and policy actions for all the sectors in the EDPRS, including agriculture and energy. Twice a year the 14 Sector Working Groups report on progress against the CPAF to the Joint Budget Support Review.

51. Beyond the policies and targets set out in the EDPRS and the sector plans, the annual **National Leadership Retreat** further reviews and sets clear priorities and targets for the year, convening all major Government and external stakeholders together. Thereafter, the respective ministers are encouraged to champion these targets to the districts. For example, in 2010, the Minister for Agriculture convened forums in the Provinces where discussions were held with district officials on how each district should plan to make its due contribution to the national targets. In addition, through the Joint Action Development Forums (JADFs) convened by MINALOC for district leaders and representatives of other agencies, active players in the sector are encouraged to come together at the district level to agree on delivery of the targets.

52. In addition to the clear performance targets for every sector, the central leadership and management in Rwanda (from the President down to the Ministers, PS and Director Generals)

**prioritizes the effective coordination and oversight of the sectoral interventions taking place.** In a nut-shell, this is enacted through a regimentation of the leadership and management system. As observed in the agriculture sector, the Minister and senior officials, for example, keep informed of all the interventions down to the district and sector levels by remaining in contact with local leaders and managers through regular meetings at Ministries' headquarters, field visits and the district Joint Action Development Forums. Generally, in Rwanda, Cabinet Ministers have been allocated responsibilities to monitor developments in specific districts, and within MINAGRI, staff are assigned as focal points for each district. In Agriculture, the Ministry also convenes regular senior management meetings usually chaired by the Minister. The Director Generals or Chief Executives of all Agencies and Boards in the sector, including non-state agencies, are encouraged to participate and the meetings usually take place on a weekly basis.

53. **Performance is managed through definite rewards for performance and sanctions for non-performance.** The national *Imihigo* institution in Rwanda is probably the overarching and most important element of the rewards and sanctions framework for the Rwanda public sector delivery system. It is prominent in the agriculture sector and especially in such popular programs as the "One-Cow / *Girinka*" and the Crop Intensification Program. It is also a feature of the rural electrification program. Through the *Imihigo*, whereby the Districts' political leaders (Mayors) enter into performance contracts with the President, the top leadership of the country is able to effectively monitor and evaluate leadership and management at lower levels of government. The contracts are signed publicly and performance is judged annually, in public, typically by the Prime Minister. Accountability for delivery is strictly upheld with non-performers being promptly replaced. The system cascades right down to the lowest levels of government. It includes contracts between line Ministries and the Centre of Government.


54. **Individual performance contracts are also required for public servants following the Prime Minister's Order of September 2010 establishing the Procedure of Performance Appraisal and Promotion of public servants.** This new regulation aimed to strengthen the public service through enhanced performance management and performance-related pay. It introduced a bonus system linked to annual performance reports, covering all public servants from the Permanent Secretary to support staff. The Order made it obligatory for every Authority and Public Servant to sign a performance contract at the beginning of each fiscal year.

55. **Rwanda's public sector delivery system thus demonstrates what might be described as a hyper performance orientation. This has clearly played an important part in Rwanda's remarkable progress on growth and service delivery.** In addition to the mechanisms described above, motivation is kept high in the public sector because civil servants are individually committed to contribute to national development and to rebuild the country following the war and genocide. The study observed that many officials work tirelessly and commit long hours. Senior staff can work a long 7am – 10pm day. They set a strong example. There is an asset declaration process for public officials to promote integrity and guard against corruption. Other performance incentives are provided, for example civil servants in Rwanda receive assistance with medical insurance as well as


loans for housing and cars. In MINAGRI, the study team observed creativity in incentives by management in terms of, for example: availing gym facilities to staff, holding parties, and recognition for good performance.

The diagrams below illustrate these specific accountability relationships and coordination structures in the agriculture and energy sectors (Figures 1.5 and 1.6).

**Figure 1.5: The Evolving Agriculture Sector Delivery System**



**Figure 1.6: The Evolving Energy Sector Delivery System**



## (ii) Career Development Incentives

56. **On the other hand, in spite of these factors, there does remain an issue of staff retention in the public sector going down to the local level, which poses risks for performance because of gaps in capacity. One of the key issues, which the Ministry of Public Service and Labour is seeking to address, is the need for a more motivational career path since the current situation and flat structure can be de-motivating for staff.** High performing professionals in MININFRA and EWSA, for example, do not have a clear career path at the moment (i.e. progression in 5 years time). The Government's Comparative Pay Study of 2008 indicated that the primary reasons for leaving the civil service were: (i) salary and benefit levels – 50 percent; (ii) *management problems generally* (45 percent); and c) *lack of career prospects and possibilities for promotion* – 40 percent.<sup>24</sup> Top positions (PS level for example) are filled through Cabinet decision appointments and many senior managers are quite young. This means they might have a long tenure, which limits the seeming opportunities for junior staff to progress upward.

57. **As of April 2011, the Pay and Retention policy situation analysis indicated that staff were not progressing through the system as provided for in law and receiving in-grade pay progression to enhance motivation.** Most staff were remaining on grade 2 out of the 7 horizontal levels.<sup>25</sup> The 2010 Prime Minister's Order on Performance Appraisal and Promotion provides the basis for public servants to progress to the next salary level depending on their performance over a three year period. It will be important for improving retention if well implemented. Vertical progression remains less clear. Young professional staff are keen to progress upward and they need clear career progression objectives to motivate them to stay in the public service and perform well.

58. **In Autumn 2011, MIFOTRA embarked on a new initiative to enhance Career Development in the public service.** This involves reviewing and reforming the existing 2007 Job Classification system and devising new career progression paths in pilot institutions. **The 2007 Job Classification system, which evaluated jobs and rationalized the job grading system, has not been fully implemented.** Therefore new jobs in the public service (e.g. in new agencies) have not always been classified in the *right grade band*. This has created problems of *job value and pay equity* that reduce morale.<sup>26</sup> Many staff know of colleagues with the same qualifications and equal or lower responsibilities who enjoy higher pay levels. Many staff in the two sectors also lack clear job descriptions. This undermines the effectiveness of the performance appraisal system which in turn affects morale and career progression.

59. **A number of staff interviewed at both the Centre and the local level also indicated that they suffered from work overload** because; (i) job tasks can be heavy and stressful; and (ii) they do not have colleagues or subordinates to provide cover while on training or leave – or indeed to delegate to generally. The pressure appears to be exacerbated by the fact that the support structures

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<sup>24</sup> Republic of Rwanda, Comparative Study for Salaries in the Public and Private Sector, p. 17.

<sup>25</sup> GoR Pay and Retention Draft Situational Analysis Report. April 2011.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid*

for top management staff (Minister, PS, Chief Executives, Director Generals) are already relatively thin, e.g. to assist with diary and correspondence management, minute taking, briefing<sup>27</sup>. The frequent restructuring that has taken place in the Rwanda public sector has also imposed stress on individuals who may be uncertain about their career prospects and who are required to manage and adapt to change very rapidly in order to deliver well in the performance oriented work culture. The Functional Reviews of Public Agencies of 2010 observed that there was a need for more communication to staff about the change processes taking place. These workload and stress issues can be detrimental to staff performance, health and long term organizational capacity.


### **(iii) Support and Guidance on Human Resource Management Issues**

60. **A key challenge for the sectors is that they lack strategic support from HR Managers on these sorts of career development and workload issues. Human resources are managed on the basis of the policies and regulations led by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour, and to some extent the Ministry of Local Government in the case of local governments.** However, besides the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information system that is being rolled out, these policies, tools and systems are underdeveloped and in need of strengthening. For example MINAGRI and MININFRA do not have strong Human Resource Management Departments and procedures to guide the sectors on issues related to career development, job grading, and workload management, in spite of their challenges of developing and retaining skilled staff. The guidance and training even on routine issues, such as the 2010 standard performance appraisal process, is limited. Equally, induction processes need considerable strengthening, particularly given how many officials are moving between institutions or starting fresh in the public service. Mechanisms for succession planning and talent management would be valuable given high staff turnover and to nurture the best performers.

61. **The Ministry of Public Service & Labour developed a new draft Human Resource Management Policy and Procedures in December 2011, which it plans to put to Cabinet for approval to strengthen Human Resource Management on a number of fronts.** If the Rwandan public service could develop a stronger cadre of well trained, professionally qualified HR experts, supported by stronger HRM systems, they could provide valuable advice to senior management on various aspects of staff development and performance management. Currently, at least in the case of the energy and agriculture sectors, the HR Management function is weakly staffed compared to, for example, the planning and financial management ones. HR Managers need to be much more involved in senior management decisions and help the sectors to plan ahead so they attract, grow, and retain high performing people to deliver their plans. A key issue is that medium and long term forecasting on staffing needs is not carried out by the sectors although this would greatly assist them to plan ahead and mitigate potential gaps.

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<sup>27</sup> For example, the Private Secretary role in the UK Civil Service model.



## 4.2.2 Organizational Structures and Systems

### (i) Staffing Constraints in Ministries and Districts

62. **At the organizational level, a challenge for the two sectors is related to the leanness of their approved structures.** As mentioned in Chapter 2, beginning in about 2000, the Government adopted a policy to unbundle functions and operations, enhance cost-efficiency, and downsize the central government ministries by devolving mandates, roles, and resources to agencies and local government (districts and the sub-district ‘sector’ level). While other countries in the region have in both policy and principle undertaken decentralization and downsizing of ministries, none has come close to the scope and depth with which it has been undertaken in Rwanda, and the public service delivery model in Rwanda is to some extent unique in this sense.

63. **The structures of the ministries resulting from the unbundling and downsizing, as well as the introduction of a uniform structure, as observed in MININFRA and MINAGRI, are lean and flat.** Below the Permanent Secretary, there are just four directorates/departments, and there are only three main tiers of staff (i.e. director general/director, professionals and support staff). The number of staff in central government ministries reduced from 8,500 in 2002 to about 500 in 2008 and the establishment size stood at 1,794 in 2010/11. Until the beginning of 2011, for several years, the total regular staffs of MININFRA serving three major priority areas of transport, water and energy was about 20, supplemented by some 80 technical and professional staff on contract. The staffing in the Ministry of Agriculture reduced from 145 staff in 2003 to 31 staff in 2006 and in 2010 stood at around 36 staff, of which some 12 posts were at one point vacant. Even the Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, which is one of the largest ministries in the government, is very small by international standards with a total approved establishment in 2010 of 124 staff (now 145). Indeed, it may be one of the smallest in the world.<sup>28</sup>

64. **Over time, it has been recognized by the Government that the downsizing process has posed some challenges for realizing optimal capacity and performance. Although the**

<sup>28</sup> World Bank. Central Finance Agencies Regional Study, 2011.

**institutional relationship between the agencies and their parent Ministries was observed by the Functional Reviews to be well-conceived and appropriately operated,** they also concluded that the rather flat and uniform organizational structure had placed an unmanageable and unrealistic burden on the senior staff in every Ministry. They noted that often one lone professional was responsible for the oversight of a whole facet of national policy.<sup>29</sup>

65. **The Government has approved some public sector employment growth since 2008. In particular Agency staffing increased quite considerably from 5,500 to 8,252 staff** between 2006 and 2010, when it represented 14% of total public service employment. Then in March 2011 with the aim of redressing the balance between contractors and permanent staff and addressing some gaps, **the Government adjusted upwards the total number of employees in central ministries from 1,794 staff in 2010/11 to 2,267 staff in 2010/12.** The total number of local government staff was also increased from 8,549 to 10,492 in the same period. Following these increases, the overall public service establishment is then projected to remain constant through to 2017 with only social sector employment rising (see Table 1.6).

66. **As a result, the establishment of MININFRA was raised from 20 to 65 staff and that of MINAGRI from 43 to 62 staff.**<sup>30</sup> The Government authorized the expansion of the district establishments for agricultural personnel, to include an additional agricultural technician at Cell level (the lowest administrative unit). Furthermore, additional staff from the new Agriculture Boards will be placed at the Zonal / Province level (above the District) which will provide more support to District and Sector staff. These staff could play an important role if of enough calibre.

**Table 1.6: Medium Term Employment Projections for Public Sector Employment**

Sector	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Agencies & Commissions	8,490	8,490	8,490	8,490	8,490	8,490	8,490	8,490
Central Ministries and Higher Learning Institutions	1,794	2,267	2,267	2,267	2,267	2,267	2,267	2,267
Local Government	8,549	10,492	10,492	10,492	10,492	10,492	10,492	10,492
Education	51,802	57,802	63,802	69,802	74,601	76,560	78,594	80,707
Health Workers	14,437	15,948	16,053	16,576	19,000	19,900	20,905	21,004
Total Public Sector	85,071	94,999	101,104	107,627	114,850	117,799	120,748	122,960

Source: MIFOTRA

<sup>29</sup> Republic of Rwanda, Oxford Policy Management, Functional Reviews of Six Public Sector Institutions, 2008 and Functional Reviews of Public Agencies and Commissions, April 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Government of Rwanda, Pay and Retention Policy Strategic Implementation, Final Report, June 22 2011.

67. **The challenge of staffing constraints does not therefore affect the Agencies or Boards as much as the Districts and Ministries. It particularly affects the Ministries where the approved increase was more marginal and will then remain static until 2017.** A serious potential HRM bottleneck in the delivery chain, then, looking forward to 2017, is that large spending sectors such as agriculture and energy will still have small ministries serving them. Although they indeed have a lot of staff in their agencies or related Boards to support them with implementation (e.g. approximately 1500 in EWSA), the core functions of policy, M&E and overall oversight of the sector still rest with the Ministries which will have a small core of staff in place.

68. **To take MININFRA as one example, it has a tiny permanent approved staff contingent working on energy (approximately <10 full-time) compared to EWSA. There is a Director General position covering both energy and water, a small Policy and Planning Unit covering roads, water and energy jointly, as well as only 2 other full-time personnel serving the energy sector, one of whom works on M&E.**<sup>31</sup> This places a lot of burden on EWSA as well as surely diminishing the effectiveness of the Ministry in policy making (e.g. updates to the Energy Policy) and monitoring, which is hardly resourced. The organizational chart appears to provide for more permanent staff in the ICT unit (5) than in the Department of Policy and Planning (4). The constrained staffing situation extends to other functions, for example in MININFRA, the Procurement Department had only two staff at one stage to manage the various contracts on energy. Procurement has since been devolved to EWSA but capacity still needs strengthening since projects have been delayed.

69. **The Ministerial structure, whereby the large portfolios of roads, water and energy continue to be served by one infrastructure ministry, MININFRA, does not appear to be an optimal organizational design arrangement.** Few countries combine energy with transport and water in one ministry and it is a particularly big agenda for one Ministry to cope with. For example, the Government of Australia has a Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport but energy and water are covered by other Ministries. The Government of South Africa has a specific Department of Energy, Department of Transport, and Department of Water Affairs. MININFRA's Planning and Policy Unit has been constrained in its ability to serve the energy sector given its triple mandate (see Section 5.1 below) and there is overload on the Permanent Secretary who covers all three portfolios.

70. **The issue of lean structures has been constraining the agriculture and energy sectors at the district level.** The one agronomist in post in the District (sitting in the Department of Planning and Economic Affairs reporting to the District) lacks the supporting systems to operationalize the key implementation modalities – such as planning, sub-contracting, the enabling environment for the private sector, and managing and coordinating other players. The agronomist at the Sector level of administration is the representative for economic affairs and infrastructure and thus has an even wider portfolio to manage e.g. forestry, rural infrastructure, and can be even more time pressed. Interviewees identified a need for two people in charge of agriculture at the Sector level. In the case of energy, the District Infrastructure officer / Engineer equally has a broad mandate which limits

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<sup>31</sup> As of June 2012.

his/her potential to deliver results for the sector. At the Sector level of administration, there is no one specifically charged with infrastructure since this is combined with the sector agronomist role, which adds considerably to the work burden.

71. **Major adjustments to the public sector establishment (e.g. to increase district staffing on energy and agriculture) may not be viable** taking into account fiscal constraints to the wage bill (the medium term Pay and Retention Policy has been approved by Cabinet with the current establishment figures set) and the priority given to EDPRS expenditures. In time, the new zonal and cell level staff may exert a positive impact on local level staffing capacity in the agriculture sector. **However, some reconfiguration in the balance between Ministry and Agency/Board numbers could be considered and appraised** given the ambition of Vision 2020 and the importance of effective policy making and strategic coordination at the central Ministerial level. For example, contrasting Rwanda with the UK, the percentage of all civil servants serving in central ministries is 21 percent in Rwanda compared to some 41 percent in the UK (Table 1.7). There is also a greater percentage of the population engaged in the public sector employment in the UK (0.1 percent) compared to Rwanda (0.01 percent).

**Table 1.7: Contrasting Public Sector Employment in Other Countries**

Sector	Rwanda 2011/12		Vietnam 1996-2000 <sup>32</sup>		UK 2011 (Q2) <sup>33</sup>	
Agencies & Commissions	8,490	10,757	201,000	Executive Agencies, Commissions	287,570	488,750
Central Ministries and Higher Institutions	2,267			Central Ministries	201,180	
Local Government	10,492		1,077,000	Local Govt Public Sector	2,767,000	
Education	57,802		741,000	Education	1,606,000	
Health Workers	15,948		168,000	NHS	1,565,000	
<b>Total Public Sector (approx)</b>	101,104		2,187,000	<b>Total Public Sector (incl corporations)</b>	6,037,000	
<b>Total Public Sector as % age of Population (approx)</b>	0.009		0.02	<b>Total Public Sector as % age of Population (approx)</b>	0.097	

<sup>32</sup> World Bank: Public Sector Employment and Wages, Vietnam. It is not clear if includes higher learning institutions as in Rwanda data. Population of Rwanda assumed as 10.2 million (WB Rwanda at a Glance Annex 5).

<sup>33</sup> UK Office of National Statistics – Public Sector Employment Q2 – 2011 and UK population in 2010.

## (ii) Management Systems and Work Tools

72. **There is limited delegated decision-making in the management systems, which on top of the lean structures, adds to the heavy work burden on senior staff as discussed in the section above. However, importantly, it may also be crowding out the space for more strategic tasks with more routine approvals and meetings that could be handled by subordinates.** A more open and less hierarchical form of management and decision-making could have a great impact on the morale of more junior staff and contribute to improved civil service efficiency. The Functional Reviews of 2008-09 raised the need to strengthen management systems and delegation.

73. **The Ministry of Public Service commissioned a study on Power and Delegation in 2010 and has subsequently started to design measures to address some of the issues.** Clearly, more attention is needed in this area given the potential efficiency gains for government. The study observed that many of the best staff in the Ministries get overloaded with day to day pressures “firefighting” and their capacity to engage on the most complex strategic forward looking issues for the sector appears to be getting squeezed out. The situation risks becoming a vicious circle whereby the less work that is delegated to middle and junior officials, the less they are able to learn and develop and take on such work in the future.


74. **The capacity and performance of many staff in the agriculture and energy sectors is also constrained by the lack of adequate work tools, facilities and ICT. These issues** were raised in the 2008-09 Functional Reviews some years ago but clearly still need attention. Smarter working in the public service could be enhanced through:

- (a) **Staff guidelines and handbooks** need to be improved in several areas, not least human resource management, performance appraisal, job description and grading.
- (b) Secondly, **Information, Communication and Technology (ICT): where to step up government efficiency there is a need for investment in shared servers, hardware maintenance and common filing applications.** Filing procedures are still paper-based and inefficiencies were noted. Most importantly, knowledge management is being hampered by the lack of electronic filing systems and shared servers. Given the degree of flux and institutional restructuring that the agriculture and energy sectors have experienced and their high turnover of staff, ICT solutions to improve information management would make a big difference to performance. They would support the institutional memory of the sectors. Training on ICT is also lacking.
- (c) **In the districts, the availability of transport** such as motorbikes would improve such services as artificial insemination and other extension activities, and **laboratory services** need to be strengthened.

75. **Generally, the situation is explained in terms of inadequate budgetary allocations for the procurement of the work tools and facilities.** However, there is no time in the short to medium term when a scarcity of budgetary resources will not be an issue and it will therefore be important to

consider the appropriate balance between staff costs and complementary investments in the services and tools that enable them to perform well.

### 4.3 Institutional Environment and Rules



#### 4.3.1 Frequent Institutional Restructuring

76. **There are two main issues at the institutional level that are holding back human resource capacity. Firstly, the institutional structures in both the agriculture and energy sectors have by global comparisons, experienced relatively frequent major restructuring and other organizational changes in recent years.** This reflects the high degree of institutional restructuring that has taken place across the entire Rwanda public sector over the past sixteen years. In energy, the integration of the Rwanda Electricity Corporation (RECO) and the Rwanda Water and Sanitation Corporation (RWASCO) into the new Energy, Water and Sanitation Authority presents a major challenge and follows fast on the heels of the restructuring of Electrogaz into RECO and RWASCO back in 2008. Whereas RECO focused on electricity alone, EWSA will cover all energy generation (formerly in the Ministry) and distribution and extend to other issues including new technologies. The organizationally demanding change process also contrasts with other countries in the region which are moving in the direction of unbundling similar agencies (e.g. Kenya). During the last three years there have been three different Ministers of Infrastructure and three different Ministers of State for Energy, and these changes have not been in sync with the institutional changes. This has only added to the institutional turbulence.

77. **For agriculture, the latest restructuring to create the new Rwanda Agriculture Board (RAB) and the National Agriculture Export Development Board (NAEB) is the third over the past decade** and a half. This suggests major organizational overhaul every five or so years. The merit of these changes is clear: they aim to enhance technical coordination in service delivery and implementation of priority sector programs. For example the RAB will help to link extension and research together (former agencies of RADA, RARDA and ISAR) and devolve more staff to zonal offices that are close to research centres. Locating the Chief Budget Management Officer role in the Boards will further enable the Ministry to focus on its policy setting role.

78. **Nonetheless, institutional stability enables the development of an organizational culture, and systems that sustain capacity and performance in any organization.** The loss of institutional memory due to frequent restructuring and staff changes has presented a clear challenge to public sector capacity. In the case of energy generation and the challenge ahead to galvanize private sector investment, such instability has made it harder to progress on electricity generation and other generation projects. Roles and responsibilities have not always been clear between MININFRA, EWSA and the Rwanda Development Board. While the merging of RECO and RWASCO into EWSA was approved in law no. 43/2000 of December 2010, other aspects of the legal framework have not been finalized. For example, the legislation to regulate the electricity and gas sub-sectors was not in place at the time of carrying out the field work for this study, and specific legislation to encourage the development of renewable energy and particularly geothermal needs was also yet to be developed. Even within EWSA, coordination between the Utility and the Projects Development Division needs strengthening and has been flagged as an organisational and change development challenge affecting performance.

79. **Given the capital intensive nature of the energy sector and future reliance on private sector deals, another key institution building challenge that pertains to the energy sector is the capacity development of the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority.** This body has responsibility for a very broad range of sectors including telecommunications, aviation, electricity, water and gas. Its efficiency to regulate such a wide portfolio is therefore challenged. It needs a stronger internal capacity to manage Public-Private Partnerships in energy and monitor the performance of deals. Private sector engagement in energy generation will only be sustained on the basis of the performance of the initial deals, especially in terms of the respect of agreements made.

80. **The Rwanda Bureau of Standards is also a relatively new agency facing capacity challenges yet it needs to play a significant role in both sectors** in terms of setting technical standards and supporting certification issues in agriculture, a crucial prerequisite for export promotion. The institutional development of the two sectors cannot therefore neglect the capacity strengthening and human resource development of these two regulatory bodies

81. **As was the case with the Rwanda Development Board, it is likely to take some time for the new institutions of RAB, NAEB, EWSA and RBS to become fully embedded and staffed up.** In the interim they are being challenged to manage a major change process while delivering against ambitious targets and keeping staff morale high. For EWSA, it will be combining commercial and public sector investment objectives. For the new Agriculture Boards, it may be challenging in practice to devolve as planned a proportion of staff from to the Provincial Zonal offices according to the set timetable, and there will be new relations between the Zonal offices, the Districts and Centre to build and strengthen. There is also a challenge to integrate relatively new Task Forces for top priority areas such as Irrigation & Mechanization, and Post-Harvest Management and their staff into the permanent institutional structures and pay arrangements of the sector. To ensure delivery, many of the Task Force staff are temporary contractors, working outside the formal establishment limits.

82. **In sum, a public service that is in constant flux in terms of its institutional arrangements is unlikely to maximize its staff performance and thus enhance government efficiency in service delivery.** Clearly, the fast implementation of such major restructuring is commendable in Rwanda, and it has been important to reconfigure certain arrangements, seek greater cost-effectiveness, and separate the responsibility for policy in Ministries from delivery in Agencies and Local Government. As the Agency Functional Reviews observed in 2010, in general terms the relationship between the Ministries and Agencies is functioning well. However, the Government can now move forward. It should now establish greater institutional stability in the energy and agriculture sectors and focus on second generation reforms around systems capacity and the skills development of its permanent staff. This will help to ensure that staffing and systems bed down, vacancies are minimized, roles and responsibilities are clearer, and officials can get on with the core business of government.

### 4.3.2 Uniform models and regulations

83. **While some aspects of the incentive framework are flexible, for example in regard to staff salary and other employment benefits, the Centre of Government (e.g. MIFOTRA) commonly applies uniform models and regulations in order to enforce controls and standards** across the public service in Rwanda. Thus, as noted in the 2008 Functional Reviews for example, in the downsizing of government, MIFOTRA prescribed close to a single structure for every ministry (40 staff). The Reviews concluded that this standard structure proved to be poorly adapted to Ministries' functional needs in many cases.

84. **Although the uniform structure has been marginally modified in recent years, generally these models are inconsistent with the decentralized service delivery model and ethos.** This would suggest that the exact nature of the organizational structures are driven predominantly by the specific nature and scope of services to be delivered and the functions to be performed. The standard models and controls have been observed to constrain capacity building and performance by, for example, insisting on excessively lean and flat organizational structures for the central ministries; and being too rigid to allow for modification when circumstances change, new job profiles are required, or dysfunctional aspects become apparent in the agencies.<sup>34</sup>


85. **There is no indication that the institutions at the Centre of Government will significantly relax their controls on the management systems** within which ministries and their devolved agencies operate. Therefore, the managerial autonomy of these institutions will remain limited. In future, there may need to be more flexibility to ensure that form follows function, rather than vice versa. The policy making and regulatory capacity of a complex sector such as energy, which requires interaction with the international private sector, may require a more muscular ministerial structure than say, education. Devolved Boards and Agencies need to have more autonomy, not only to suggest their own organizational structures, but to enhance their HRM and

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<sup>34</sup> OPM, Functional Reviews of Public Agencies, April 2010.

career development schemes, yet these are also excessively standardized. **Below in Figure 1.7 is a summary of the constraints identified in this Chapter along the delivery chain.**

**Figure 1.7: Summary of HRM Constraints in the Service Delivery Chain**



## **Chapter 5: How are the Constraints in Human Resource Management impacting on Sector Capacity and Service Delivery?**

### **5.1 Some conclusions can be drawn about the impact of these constraints on the sectors' capacity**

- **Weak Policy and Planning Capacity in the Ministries**

86. **Firstly, the institutionalized policy and planning capacity of the Ministries is weak;** and the capacity deficit extends to the devolved Agency and Board institutions in the case of planning. There is the drive to develop and update policy but both the energy and agriculture sectors rely heavily on external inputs and technical assistance in these areas, for example through Development Partner projects, or the ODI fellowship scheme. So far, this approach has circumvented the development of a critical mass of permanent staff in the Ministries who have the skills and technical knowledge to lead strategy and policy development. In the energy sector, there has been a tendency for a project by project approach to decision-making rather than a long term programmatic perspective. Specific sub-sector operational plans at the level below the overarching National Energy Policy have not been developed by EWSA, for example on peat, solar, methane and hydro; yet they are greatly needed to improve generation. The road map to guide EWSA on how to meet its ambitious energy goals is also lacking and holding back its progress. The current update to the National Energy Policy is being supported by the SCBI. There is a need to provide more underpinnings to sector policy in the form of demand projections and economic analysis. EWSA has had to engage in policy development to compensate for the limited capacity in MININFRA.

87. **In Agriculture, while the Strategic Plan for Agriculture provides a solid overarching policy framework, the planning capability has been weaker. The planning department in MINAGRI was thinly staffed at the time of carrying out the field work for this study in 2011** for example, prior to support arriving from the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative. This was noted to have had ramifications for the capacity to take forward policy thinking on areas such as climate change and agro-ecology, and to horizon scan. Staff capacity on post-harvest management in MINAGRI was not put in place *until after* the major increase in yields associated with the Crop Intensification Program, and it is still in the form of a temporary Task Force. This hampered the Ministry's initial management of the bumper harvests because it had not made plans on post-harvest management. Since this time, MINAGRI has established three new General Directorates one for crop production, one for livestock and one for inspection and certification and staffed them with experienced people (former RARDA and RADA DGs). This has certainly boosted capacity since they act as extended arms of the former planning department. Nonetheless, there are still gaps. The capacity to take forward the PSTA priority on agro-processing and export promotion for example remains quite weak. The 2006 horticulture policy is outdated and in need of development, and there are skills gaps in the planning department in the National Agriculture Export Board. These challenges in the planning capability in the sector could be acting as a brake on its ability to move to the next stage with an enhanced market orientation and private sector focus.

- **Weak Horizontal Cross-Sector Coordination between Ministries**

88. **Second, related to policy and planning capacity, the horizontal cross-government coordination on sector issues is in great need of strengthening.** The situation is perhaps surprising given that the tight coordination of the different institutions involved in sector delivery to deliver on central performance targets appears to be a strong priority in the Rwandan public service model with its emphasis on performance management. Looking at the case of agriculture, for example, the coordination between the Centre and Districts has been growing; and coordination between MINAGRI and its former Agencies and new Boards has been strong. There is also a Sector Wide Approach and a Sector Working Group to coordinate between Government and external partners.

89. **However, the lack of staff in the central ministries may be placing limits on the time that senior staff have to coordinate outside their sectors across government.** There are important cross-sector areas of work that require much stronger cross-Departmental collaboration if more continued progress on energy and agriculture is to be made. For example: (i) Improved links between MINAGRI, MININFRA, MIFOTRA, RDB, WDA and MINEDUC on skills development could help to improve the long term supply of technical skills to the sectors. Generally, sector Ministries could play a stronger role in designing the curriculum of national technical schools under MINEDUC's authority, perhaps by sitting on the boards of the various training schools; (ii) on Demand forecasting for energy, it is vital for MININFRA/EWSA to have accurate forecast data from MINAGRI on agribusiness needs as this affects generation targets, as well as data from a range of other sectors.

90. **On private sector financing in energy, Rwanda needs a stronger cross-government collaboration than has yet been in place between MININFRA, the Ministry of Natural Resources (MINIRENA), the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), and the Ministry of Trade and Commerce (MINICOM) and the Rwanda Development Board.** The petroleum sector is still regulated by the Ministry of Trade and Commerce while some aspects of the sector are handled by the Ministry of Natural Resources. Coordination with MINIRENA has tended to be weak yet it needs to have a role in new energy projects and deals given the natural resource impacts.

91. **Lastly, those institutions at the Centre of Government that are by their nature cross-cutting with a mandate to strengthen human resource management across the public service need to enhance their dialogue and coordination** (Ministry of Public Service & Labour, Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government). Being cross-cutting is a great challenge and will require more dedicated staff resource, such as designated focal points in these institutions, and smarter ways of working using ICT tools. In particular there needs to be:

(i) **A stronger liaison between MINALOC, Rwanda Governance Board, MIFOTRA, PSCBS and priority sector ministries such as MINAGRI, MININFRA** because service delivery

is decentralized yet there remain great challenges of human resource development and capacity building at the Local Government level. As noted at the 2011 National Leadership Retreat, there is also scope to improve the connection between sector level and district plans.

(ii) **Sector institutions such as MININFRA, MINAGRI, NAEB, RAB and EWSA need to benefit more from the policy initiatives being led by PSCBS and MIFOTRA on Human Resource Management.** For example, the Capacity Needs Assessment process and the Pay and Retention Policy. The PSCBS has appointed Cluster Specialists to enhance liaison with sector institutions for example. Experience suggests that the capacity to roll out and implement new public service reform policies has not always been there and that more staff resource is required.

- **Limited Capacity to Negotiate Deals with Private Sector – Ministry & Agency level**

92. **In the capital intensive energy sector,** there is a major recognized challenge of moving faster on private sector investment. In the recent Joint Sector Review of April 2012, the sector noted the large funding gap (RWF 87.5 billion in 2012/13). Clearly, there are many factors at play in shaping the investment climate beyond public sector capacity issues, not least is the limited capacity of the private sector in Rwanda. Analytical pieces on the private sector including the Investment Climate Assessment of 2008 and the Diagnostic Trade Integrated Study of 2011 emphasize several constraints such as the: (i) lack of access to electricity; (ii) taxes (lack of an independent and objective tax appeals mechanism for small taxpayers); (iii) access to serviced land for investors; (iv) access to finance (less than 20% of Rwandans have access); (v) transportation (the ratio of transportation and insurance costs to the value of exports is roughly three times higher in Rwanda than it is in neighbouring coastal countries such as Kenya and Tanzania); and (vi) the skills base (only 10% of the working age population has post primary education). The excellent progress in the Doing Business rankings over the years is an indicator of the concerted attention that the Government of Rwanda has paid to strengthening the investment climate.

93. **Nevertheless, it is clear that a strong capability to negotiate deals with the private sector to attract vital resources for generation has not been there in MININFRA and in the sector more widely; and that this must have had an impact on the gap in financing.** The Ministry receives many unsolicited proposals from the private sector and has not yet had the staff technical capacity and institutional stability to share information and liaise with it proactively. There has not been an effective overall framework and capacity to establish relations with the private sector on energy projects. **The commissioning of new generation, mainly from micro hydro and methane gas has not progressed.** Being very capital intensive, a number of projects need to be moved forward by MININFRA and EWSA including hydro, peat to power, methane gas to power, geothermal, diesel, solar, biogas and waste to energy projects. In the interim, the Government is continuing to provide subsidies to cover part of the high fuel supply costs of thermal generation. **Overall generation capacity is low and Rwanda is still heavily dependent on high cost thermal generation.** Access to electricity has improved since 2004 but there remains an enormous challenge ahead with only 14% of households connected (among the lowest in the world).

94. **At the Energy Forum in Kigali convening government and private sector stakeholders in February 2012**, it was made clear by the participants that there was a great need for capacity strengthening including:

- (i) Better dissemination of information on project development opportunities, and support to be provided by the Government;
- (ii) Information on the business process for developing projects and any financing and risk mitigation support to be provided by the Government or its partners; and
- (iii) Information on the policy and institutional framework for developing energy projects.

95. Recent brainstorming in the sector identified a need for more action to be taken on attracting private finance in several areas; for example: improving guidance on tax and other financial incentives; developing clear policies on the use and maintenance of Rwanda's natural resources, and generally being more proactive in deciding which projects should be funded privately, ensuring that all the prerequisites that investors want to see are available; and promoting these projects and establishing a clear process for investment. The bulk of this work would be carried out by EWSA. Up until now, the staff capacity to take forward these areas has been lacking.

- **Challenges on Project Management Capability and Oversight**

96. **In addition to the challenges of getting new projects off the ground, the energy sector is experiencing delays to existing projects.**<sup>35</sup> This appears to partly stem from the limited human resource capacity in the sector to manage projects and contracts. First, at the level of central government, the Projects Development Division of EWSA has limited staff capacity to oversee existing projects and to reach out to the private sector on new ones. The procurement department lacks experienced and skilled staff. The problem is that the institution of EWSA is still relatively new and so the Projects Development Division is still establishing itself having inherited 'new generation' issues from the Ministry. At the same time, MININFRA only has one person charged with M&E for the sector which limits its ability to oversee project progress. Then, at the local government level, this study's fieldwork indicated that the rate of exit for District Engineers is very high which is likely to be impacting on project delivery. Meetings between MININFRA and district staff occur particularly rarely and may not take place for a year. The district engineers report to the District Executive Secretary but do have a formal feedback loop to MININFRA.

97. **In agriculture, a particular challenge is the variety of different actors engaged in service delivery which makes the capacity for M&E and oversight by the government all the more important. The diversity of providers can camouflage gaps in private sector capacity;** and private sector organizations face many of the same capacity challenges as those in the public sector, for example skills deficits. There has been considerable effort to improve M&E reporting in MINAGRI with the National Institute of Statistics since 2011. Underdeveloped M&E was noted as a constraint in the PSTA II. **The new Single Project Implementation Unit** in MINAGRI represents an important step forward because the aim is that certain skills such as M&E, procurement and

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
<sup>35</sup> Energy Sector Joint Sector Review, April 2012.

financial management will stay in place beyond specific project life cycles. However, at the local level, it still remains the case that the overstretched District or Sector agronomist may lack the time or capacity to fully manage contracts executed by non-governmental service providers and to report up to the centre on project performance. This situation poses risks to sector performance.

## 5.2 Illustrating the binding constraints


98. This diagram below (Figure 1.8) illustrates how weaknesses in Human Resource Management in the Rwandan public sector are affecting the sectors' capabilities.

**Figure 1.8: How HRM Constraints Impact on Sector Policy, Planning and Projects**



99. The next diagram (Figure 1.9) zooms out to the wider sector delivery model to show how these challenges, particularly low capacity in the Ministry, could be acting as binding constraints to energy sector performance. It is based on Figure 1.6 (page 26).

**Figure 1.9: Illustrating how the HRM constraints may be binding constraints to energy performance**



### 5.3 Impacts on Frontline Service Delivery and Vision 2020

100. It is beyond the remit of this small study to draw precise attribution between the human resource management challenges set out above and service delivery performance. However, a number of reasonable assumptions can be suggested in conclusion.

101. **First, that the way that human resources have been managed and configured in the energy sector has made it more difficult to move the key generation projects and private sector financing forward. This has in turn impacted on the overall performance of the sector** and the lagging progress on generation described above. As illustrated in the diagram above, the small permanent staff in MININFRA, the high turnover of those staff, the constant flux in terms of the institutional arrangements which has made roles and responsibilities unclear and led to gaps while the new institutions have come up to speed has had the effect of weakening the Ministry's role in the delivery chain and holding back capacity at the Agency level as well. This has impacted on the policies and plans guiding EWSA while also weakening the feedback loop to the Districts, whose delivery is affected by the same staffing constraints and turnover problems linked to pay and incentive problems.

102. **Second, that regardless of the extent to which some features of the Rwandan public service delivery model may have hitherto compensated for these problems – e.g. the proactive outsourcing to fill district capacity gaps, strategic use of externally funded TA, and the hyper performance orientation – the challenges ahead for the energy and agriculture sectors looking ahead to 2020 are more complex** and will require a more sophisticated regulatory, policy making and negotiation capacity. This may be difficult in time with the current model where the Ministries are relatively small, propped up by short term experts, and lacking an institutionalised capacity. The space for creative forward strategizing and cross-sectoral policy making in the two sectors appears to be getting crowded out. The model appears to be one of a capacity 'bulge' at the delivery level in the better staffed and incentivized Agencies and Boards, with thinner capacity above in the Ministry and at the downstream level in the Districts. It is of concern that virtually all the young engineers interviewed in this study were looking out for more attractive alternative employment. Their current rate of exit appears to be very high. Moreover there are long term sustainability concerns posed by the heavy reliance on external Technical Assistance or temporary contractors in the Ministries since capacity is not always institutionalized and left behind.

103. **Clearly, there has hitherto been a strong performance ethos in the public sector** that has gone a long way to mitigate for skills and staffing gaps by motivating those staff in post to deliver at all costs. The system of *Imihigo* performance contracts, the National Dialogue, the Joint Action Development Forums, and the National Leadership Retreat have all helped to coordinate diverse agents around centrally defined delivery targets. There has been a strong willingness to undertake major reforms. In the agriculture sector, these arrangements have been conducive to service delivery performance to the extent that it has made excellent progress in improving agricultural production with greatly increased yields of farm consumed and marketable crops (see Table 1.8).

104. **However, now, the agriculture sector is at an important juncture. Its very success in addressing food security and food production means that it can move faster to the next stage which involves more aggressive export promotion, mechanization and value to farm addition.** It is this transition that will help Rwanda to deliver on its National Export Strategy, move to middle income status by 2020 and meet the ambitious revised Vision 2020 targets of 8.5 percent per annum agricultural growth and average export growth of 28 percent per annum.<sup>36</sup>

**Table 1.8: Agriculture Sector Performance against Vision 2020 Targets**

Revised Selected Vision 2020 Indicators	2000 (calendar)	2011 (calendar)	2020 <sup>37</sup> (calendar)
Agricultural GDP growth (%)	9	5%	8.5%
Agriculture as % of GDP	45	32%	25
Fertilizer application (kg/ha/annum)	0.5	30 kg	50kg
% of Agriculture Operations Mechanized	n.a.	7%	50%
Soil erosion protection (% total land)	20	87.3%	90

105. **To date, less progress has been made in this direction, however. While there has been some promotion of non-traditional export crops in order to stimulate growth and increase foreign exchange earnings, the heavy reliance on coffee and tea remains.** In the area of horticulture, for example, as set out in the National Export Strategy, Rwanda has the potential to develop a vibrant industry with high value export crops such as passion fruit, birds eye chillies and Japanese plums. Yet so far there has been limited private sector investment and the production of horticulture crops remains low as it is done by groups of small scale producers. The sector, in common with energy, needs to facilitate much more private sector investment and skills development in order to diversify; but this is a transition that will require government officials to engage in more complex negotiations and policy development so as to establish a propitious enabling environment for the private sector. The delivery chain will become more complicated as it will involve the private sector to a larger extent and engaging international and regional markets.

106. **The findings of this study suggest that even in agriculture therefore, the current human resource capacity in the sector is not fit for purpose in terms of moving it forward to the next complex stage of development. The willingness and commitment to drive through bold reforms and scale up is there, as well as accountability systems and technocratic leadership to incentivize performance.** However, the current gaps in technical and professional skills in the sector; the reliance on contractors and TA for policy and planning work; the high turnover and limited experience of staff at the district level, and the fact that the new Boards are still coming up to strength present considerable challenges for its institutional capacity to diversify and scale up

<sup>36</sup> EDPRS2 Briefing for Co-Chairs, June 2012.

<sup>37</sup> Revised Vision 2020 Targets on Agricultural GDP growth and Agriculture as % of GDP, May 2012.

exports. Human resource management and development support in the sector is lacking, even in such basic areas as performance appraisal but more importantly in strategic areas such as long terms staff development and forecasting. Furthermore, in the long run the sector's performance will be dependent on there being stronger human capacity in *other related sectors*, such as roads and energy.

107. **Moreover, the agriculture sector relies on a plurality of delivery agents including the private sector to provide inputs and cover the gaps in district government capacity. As it scales up exports it will need to develop a stronger regulatory capacity than currently exists to develop the opportunities entailed in such an approach, while minimizing the risks.** For example, when private sector actors are contracted to promote a product in some districts, some districts may not receive *coverage* until these actors are ready to expand their programs which could result in major gaps in service delivery. Second, private owners may not always continue the *extension services* that the government had been providing to farmers such as feeder roads maintenance. This has been the case in tea. Third, private sector organizations in Rwanda face many of the same *capacity challenges* as those in the public sector, for example skills deficits, and need *concerted capacity building themselves*. Fourth, many of the service providers are not under the formal control of the Government agencies. Most are cooperating partners who may not be bound by any legal, institutional or administrative rules. Others are bound by contracts for a season or a year. Therefore, there is *comparative ease of withdrawal* from service provision which poses the risk of disruptions in service delivery to farmers.

108. **It is outside the remit of this study to posit whether these Human Resource Management constraints are the same for other priority sectors in Rwanda, for example in the social sectors.** What does seem to be clear from the research is that very common problems of HRM affect the two sectors of agriculture and energy at the central and local level. There are important differences between the sectors, for example the degree and nature of private sector involvement, yet they both have similar issues to contend with in terms of the attraction and retention of skilled staff, challenges with their career and organizational structures, and the complex demands and uncertainties of frequent institutional reconfiguration. In both sectors, there are many young, inexperienced civil servants and temporary staff who need to rapidly develop their skills and understanding. The impacts on sector capacity also appear to be similar for the two sectors: for example the weak policy and planning capacity in the parent Ministries, the challenges of horizontal coordination, and the need to make faster progress on private sector investment. Therefore, it is plausible that these are widespread issues and further research should be carried out to assess this.

## Chapter 6: Recommendations

109. **As said at the outset, this study was framed to support and inform the Government's Strategic Capacity Building Initiative** being led by the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat, by looking at capacity gaps. Its findings suggest that Human Resources could be managed more effectively in the public service to ensure that Rwanda delivers on its ambitious Vision 2020. People are the greatest asset of the public service and yet the agriculture and energy sectors face a number of challenges in terms of developing a critical mass of experienced and able permanent public servants, and having a stable institutional environment with appropriate organizational structures in which they can thrive. Staff in the Ministries and Local Governments appear to be overstretched. The overall Human Resource Management systems to help them improve their staff capacity, and deploy and manage their staff to greatest effect are underdeveloped and in great need of strengthening.

110. **The Human Resource Management problems in the agriculture and energy sectors appear to be stemming from systemic issues** related to inadequate pay and career structures; and organizational design problems resulting from frequent restructuring, uniform models, and lean structures below and above the delivery Agencies. It is not clear how long the existing model of Human Resource Management can stay relevant for, as 2020 draws nearer and the need grows in Rwanda for more complex service delivery, regulatory skills, and cross-sector working in the public administration. The willingness to scale up service delivery is there, and performance incentives are in place through the *Imihigo*, but low human resource capacity may hold back progress.

111. **The Technical Assistance personnel being provided under the SCBI** will clearly be important for addressing human resource gaps in the energy and agriculture sectors; given that national skills are in short supply. The priority that the SCBI assigns to maximizing the effectiveness of TA through skills transfer to national counterpart public servants will help to encourage a smarter and more transformational capacity development approach than has sometimes been the case with short-term consultancy inputs. The approach should be rolled out more widely.

112. **Nevertheless, there are inevitably limits to how much Technical Assistance practitioners can deliver in terms of institutional level capacity development results in any country context**, even with proactive coaching, given the complex long term national processes involved. For example the SCBI cannot substitute for the development of Rwanda's technical skills through its Higher Learning Institutions. It may find it difficult to sustain the capacity gains if national counterparts cannot be absorbed into the permanent structures when the project ends because pay and non-pay disincentives such as career progression have not been addressed in the public sector.

113. **As it scales up, this study recommends that the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative should therefore tackle a wider range of Human Resource Development reforms to take Rwanda's public sector capacity to the next level.**

114. **The initiatives that began in 2011 under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Service and Labour** to develop a comprehensive Human Resource Management Policy and reform the Job Classification and Pay and Retention systems are clearly vital steps forward in this regard.

115. **With reference to the agriculture and energy sectors – and possibly other sectors given that the issues appear to be cross-cutting – this study recommends** that the Government should prioritize seven overall actions to better develop the human resource capability in the public sector. These are:

- i. Provide a greater measure of institutional stability in the public service, and offer targeted support to the new institutions (e.g. EWSA, NAEB, RAB, RBS) to develop their skills, staff and systems.
- ii. Reappraise the balance of staff numbers allocated between the central Ministries, Agencies/Boards and Districts in light of Rwanda’s transition to a more complex stage of development involving a higher market orientation. High priority functions under the responsibility of the Ministries such as collaborative cross-sector policy making and private sector outreach appear to be understaffed and squeezed. At the same time, the Government should be open to further reducing the uniformity in organizational charts and regulations so that ‘form follows function’ and meets specific sector requirements.
- iii. Within the overall public sector reform approach, give higher priority to strengthening Human Resource Management. An overall, medium term strategy to reform HRM is needed (as for example exists for Public Financial Management Reform). In priority sectors, the HR Departments need to play a more strategic role; and effective HRM systems to plan and manage long term staffing requirements and performance need to be developed.
- iv. Develop long term sector-level Skills Development Plans linked to Vision 2020 goals to enhance the national and regional supply of technical and professional skills and reduce the reliance on ‘fly-in fly-out’ international consultants over the long term.
- v. Improve career development incentives for public servants to motivate performance and retain the best and brightest.
- vi. Step up the provision of high quality in-country training for civil servants to develop the core generic skills base in the public service, build middle management capacity, and support the many young and inexperienced staff. For example, Management Development and Induction Programs; and an overhaul of RIAM’s training capacity.
- vii. Enhance the incentives and resources for cross-sector horizontal collaboration by Ministries, such as performance targets, specific coordinator positions, and smarter working using ICT; and strengthen the dialogue between the sectors and the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat and Ministry of Public Service and Labour on Human Resource Development.

116. **In addition, it is recommended that the Government should:**

- Ensure there is sufficient coordination and capacity to roll out the Pay and Retention Policy that was approved by Cabinet in January 2012 at the national and local level, given the destabilizing impacts of high staff turnover on organizational performance, caused in part by variable pay structures and index values within the public sector.
- Appraise the scope for more delegated management authority in the public administration to increase efficiencies and job satisfaction.
- In the short term, consider quick wins such as contracting a training provider to support the sectors on skills development and Human Resource Management issues.

117. **Given the need to prioritize and sequence activities**, table 1.9 below considers these various priorities according to the different stages of the delivery chain. It differentiates them according to the short and medium term.

118. **The diagonal arrow suggests that the level of difficulty will increase as the action becomes more long term and institutional in nature, but equally may carry higher structural pay-offs.** The actions would need to be carried out collaboratively between the Centre of Government and the Agriculture and Energy Sectors, although some could also be taken forward by the Sectors themselves, for example HRM trainings and long term skills development plans.

**Table 1.9: Actions to enhance the Agriculture and Energy Sectors' Human Resource Capacity**

	Availability and Retention of Skilled Staff	Performance Management and	Organizational Design	Institutional
				
<b>Short term priority</b>	<p>Develop long term sector skills plans to fill gaps with a 5 year road map. This might consider private sector gaps.</p> <p>Contract a provider to implement Management Development Program for middle managers and an induction course for new starts, starting in selected sectors.</p> <p>Consider other quick wins e.g. twinning arrangement for EWSA, in-house training facility, on-the-job mentoring of junior staff.</p>	<p>Design career development plans, beginning in high priority sectors and cadres to improve career progression opportunities.</p> <p>Appraise and enhance the sector's HRM Department– e.g. are there enough skills and staff, is the HR Manager senior enough, access to guidance and good practices?</p> <p>Series of Workshops, trainings and coaching for HR Managers on specific HRM issues such as staff and succession planning, career development and performance management.</p>		<p>Prioritize institutional stability and clarify outstanding mandate and legal and institutional framework issues, e.g. Agriculture Task Forces.</p> <p>Provide targeted support to new institutions on change management based on new capacity needs assessment process to address gaps.</p>
<b>Medium term</b>	<p>MINEDUC, MINEAC, MIFOTRA, WDA and Priority Sectors to work collaboratively on long term national and regional technical skills supply.</p> <p>Develop Medium term strategy on strengthening national training provision on core generic skills for effective working in government (e.g. reform RIAM or another).</p>	<p>Reform Job Grading system and Job Descriptions to improve job and pay equity and career progression.</p> <p>Develop a comprehensive medium term HRM Reform Strategy to deepen the systems and management of human resources across the public sector, similar to that for PFM Reform 2008-12.</p> <p>Appraise scope for more delegated authority in the public administration to increase efficiency.</p> <p>Roll out ICT enhancements particularly records management, shared servers.</p>		<p>Re-appraise staffing numbers in Ministries, Agencies and Districts and consider rebalancing to remain fit for changing development path.</p> <p>Allow for more flexibility in organizational charts so that form follows function and sector specificities.</p> <p>Implement Pay and Retention Policy.</p> <p>Develop better incentives for cross-sector horizontal coordination.</p>

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**Annex 2: Development Partner Support to Civil Service Reform and Capacity Building (2011)**



Development Partner	Program / Project / Technical Assistance	Time frame and Budget	Current Studies 2010/11
World Bank	Public Sector Capacity Building Project – PFM, Civil Service Reform and support to Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat. <a href="http://main.pscbs.gov.rw/node/8">http://main.pscbs.gov.rw/node/8</a>  Support to the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative through IDA16 Poverty Reduction Support Financing Budget Support.	2005 – Dec 2011 \$20m	Sector Value Chain Analysis in Agriculture and Energy sectors to identify institutional and organizational level capacity issues constraining service delivery (FY 2011)
DFID	Civil Service Reform Programme  Support to Education Capacity Pooled Fund and TA to MINEDUC for Capacity Building.  Support to Capacity Development Pooled Fund in Health Sector.	2005 - Sept 2010 £4.5m 2006-  £3m 2008-2010	
UNDP	Support to Civil Service Reform  Support to PSCBS on Capacity Building	Ended 2011  2010.	
Belgium	BTC Support to Capacity Development Project <a href="http://main.pscbs.gov.rw/node/16">http://main.pscbs.gov.rw/node/16</a> (e.g. Technical Assistance, Support to PSCBS, Capacity Needs Assessment tools, New 4 year Rwanda country program under development by Belgium. Support to Capacity Development Pooled Fund in Health.	2008-2012 €5m  2011--  €0.5m 2010	
USAID	New capacity development program beginning focused on selected sectors and civil society.	2012-	
African Development Bank	Support to the Strategic Capacity Building Initiative through its budget support financing.	2011 -	

Africa Capacity Building Foundation	Support to Multi-Sector Capacity Building Project (including support to private sector capacity building). <a href="http://main.pscbs.gov.rw/node/9">http://main.pscbs.gov.rw/node/9</a>	2004-\$4m	
JICA	Training Programs (in Japan or in third countries) for 85 public servants, covering ICT, Rural Development, SMEs, Teacher training courses, Water management, Environment and Climate Change.  Technical Cooperation Projects with experts building capacity of the local counterparts.	2009-2010	
Germany	Support to Capacity Development Pooled Fund in Health Sector	€0.5m 2010	
Switzerland	Support to Capacity Development Pooled Fund in Health Sector	2.4m CHF	
Canada (CIDA)	Support to Education Capacity Building Pooled Fund	2009-	
UNICEF	Support to Education Capacity Building Pooled Fund	2006-	


## Annex 3: Rwanda at a Glance

2/25/11

Key Development Indicators (2009)	Rwanda	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income
	Population, mid-year (millions)	10.0	819
Surface area (thousand sq. km)	26	24,242	17,838
Population growth (%)	2.8	2.5	2.2
Urban population (% of total population)	19	36	28
GNI (Atlas method, US\$ billions)	4.9	897	389
GNI per capita (Atlas method, US\$)	490	1,095	470
GNI per capita (PPP, international \$)	1,060	1,981	1,131
GDP growth (%)	4.1	5.2	6.2
GDP per capita growth (%)	12	2.7	3.9
<b>(most recent estimate, 2003–2008)</b>			
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP, %)	77	51	..
Poverty headcount ratio at \$2.00 a day (PPP, %)	90	73	..
Life expectancy at birth (years)	50	52	57
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)	70	83	77
Child malnutrition (% of children under 5)	18	25	28
Adult literacy, male (% of ages 15 and older)	75	72	73
Adult literacy, female (% of ages 15 and older)	66	54	59
Gross primary enrollment, male (% of age group)	150	105	107
Gross primary enrollment, female (% of age group)	152	95	100
Access to an improved water source (% of population)	65	60	64
Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population)	54	31	35



Net Aid Flows	1980	1990	2000	2009 <sup>a</sup>
<i>(US\$ millions)</i>				
Net ODA and official aid	154	288	321	931
<i>Top 3 donors (in 2007):</i>				
United States	7	13	23	117
European Commission	21	36	49	103
United Kingdom	0	1	53	100
Aid (% of GNI)	13.2	11.2	18.7	20.0
Aid per capita (US\$)	30	40	40	96
<b>Long-Term Economic Trends</b>				
Consumer prices (annual % change)	7.2	4.2	3.9	12.0
GDP implicit deflator (annual % change)	3.1	13.5	-3.0	11.0
Exchange rate (annual average, local per US\$)	92.8	82.6	389.7	568.3
Terms of trade index (2000 = 100)	..	78	100	77
Population, mid-year (millions)	5.2	7.2	8.0	10.0
GDP (US\$ millions)	1,163	2,584	1,735	5,216
<i>(% of GDP)</i>				
Agriculture	45.8	32.5	37.2	34.2
Industry	21.5	24.6	13.6	14.5
Manufacturing	15.3	18.3	7.0	6.4
Services	32.6	42.8	49.2	51.3
Household final consumption expenditure	83.3	83.7	87.7	81.1
General gov't final consumption expenditure	12.5	10.1	11.0	14.6
Gross capital formation	16.1	14.6	18.3	21.8
Exports of goods and services	14.4	5.6	8.7	11.7
Imports of goods and services	26.4	14.1	25.7	29.2
Gross savings	13.3	11.3	12.9	11.8



**1980–90 1990–2000 2000–09**  
(average annual growth %)

3.2 1.1 2.5  
2.2 -0.2 7.6

0.5 2.5 ..  
2.5 -3.8 ..  
2.6 -5.8 ..  
3.6 -0.9 ..

12 0.4 ..  
5.2 -2.6 ..  
4.3 0.4 ..

3.4 -6.4 ..  
2.6 6.1 ..

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 2009 data are preliminary. .. indicates data are not available.  
a. Aid data are for 2008.

Development Economics, Development Data Group (DECDG).

**Balance of Payments and Trade**

	2000	2009
<i>(US\$ millions)</i>		
Total merchandise exports (fob)	90	198
Total merchandise imports (cif)	328	831
Net trade in goods and services	-291	-946

Current account balance as a % of GDP	-90	-379
	-5.2	-7.3

Workers' remittances and compensation of employees (receipts)	7	93
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Reserves, including gold	191	558
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**Central Government Finance**

<i>(% of GDP)</i>		
Current revenue (including grants)	20.2	24.5
Tax revenue	9.7	12.2
Current expenditure	13.2	14.3

Overall surplus/deficit	0.8	-0.9
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
Highest marginal tax rate (%)		
Individual	..	..
Corporate	..	..

**External Debt and Resource Flows**

<i>(US\$ millions)</i>		
Total debt outstanding and disbursed	1270	747
Total debt service	36	26
Debt relief (HIPC, MDR)	963	234

Total debt (% of GDP)	73.2	14.3
Total debt service (% of exports)	21.8	4.9


Foreign direct investment (net inflows)	8	19
Portfolio equity (net inflows)	0	0

**Composition of total external debt, 2009****Private Sector Development**

	2000	2009
Time required to start a business (days)	-	3
Cost to start a business (% of GNI per capita)	-	10.1
Time required to register property (days)	-	60

Ranked as a major constraint to business (% of managers surveyed who agreed)		
	2000	2009
Electricity	..	31.8
Tax rates	..	26.9

Stock market capitalization (% of GDP)	..	..
Bank capital to asset ratio (%)	8.1	12.3

**Governance indicators, 2000 and 2009**

Source: Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi, World Bank

**Technology and Infrastructure**

	2000	2008
Paved roads (% of total)	..	19.0
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 100 people)	1	14
High technology exports (% of manufactured exports)	0.6	7.1

**Environment**

Agricultural land (% of land area)	68	78
Forest area (% of land area)	13.9	21.7
Terrestrial protected areas (% of surface area)	..	7.6

Freshwater resources per capita (cu. meters)	1,113	977
Freshwater withdrawal (billion cubic meters)	0.2	..

CO2 emissions per capita (mt)	0.09	0.08
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GDP per unit of energy use (2005 PPP \$ per kg of oil equivalent)	..	..
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Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent)	..	..
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**World Bank Group portfolio***(US\$ millions)*

	2000	2009
<b>IBRD</b>		
Total debt outstanding and disbursed	0	0
Disbursements	0	0
Principal repayments	0	0
Interest payments	0	0

<b>IDA</b>		
	2000	2009
Total debt outstanding and disbursed	692	254
Disbursements	37	10
Total debt service	11	2


<b>IFC (fiscal year)</b>		
	2000	2009
Total disbursed and outstanding portfolio of which IFC own account	2	12
Disbursements for IFC own account	0	4
Portfolio sales, prepayments and repayments for IFC own account	0	0

<b>MIGA</b>		
	2000	2009
Gross exposure	0	11
New guarantees	0	0

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 2009 data are preliminary.  
.. indicates data are not available. - indicates observation is not applicable.

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#### Annex 4: Generic Public Service Delivery Chain Model



#### Annex 5: Diversity of Service Providers to Maize and Wheat farmers Contracted by RADA across the Country, 2010

Service Provider	Nature of the Organization	District of Assignment	Target Performance (Maize and wheat cropped area in Ha)
ENAS	Local commercial company	Kirehe	25,000 maize
UNATEK	University	Ngoma	10,000 maize
RWARRI	Local NGO	Kayonza	8,000 maize
		Gatsibo	12,000 maize
RDO	Local NGO	Nyagatare	15,000 maize
ARDR	Local NGO	Rwamagana	10,000 maize
APEPARWA	Local NGO	Bugesera	7,000 maize
IBAKWE/UMUHUZA	Farmers Association	Kamonyi	1,500 maize
		Ruhango	1,500 maize

<b>Service Provider</b>	<b>Nature of the Organization</b>	<b>District of Assignment</b>	<b>Target Performance ( Maize and wheat cropped area in Ha)</b>
		Muhanga	1,500 maize
		Nyanza	1,500 maize
ARDI	Local NGO	Gisagara	1,000 maize
MIG	Local NGO	Huye	1,200 maize
UNICOOPAGI	Farmers Cooperative	Nyaruguru	1,800 maize
		Nyamagabe	1,500 maize
TUBURA	Local NGO	Nyamasheke	1,300 maize
		Karongi	1,500 maize
		Rusizi	7,000 maize
ALUPA	Local NGO	Rutsiro	7,000 maize + 1,000 wheat
OTP	Local NGO	Rubavu	10,000 maize
		Ngororero	5,000 maize + 1,500 wheat
ISAE	Farmers Cooperative	Nyabihu	10,000 maize + 3,500 wheat
IMBARAGA	University	Musanze	8,000 maize + 1,500 wheat
		Burera	6,000 maize + 2,168 wheat
		Gakenke	5,000 maize + 500 wheat
		Rulindo	5,000 maize + 2,000 wheat
CARITAS	International NGO	Gicumbi	750 maize + 2,500 wheat
RADA STAFF	Staff teams	Nyarugenge	350 maize
		Kicukiro	500 maize
		Gasabo	750 maize