DISCUSSION PAPER ROport No.:ARU 69 Fiscal and Legal Incentives with Envirormental Effects on the Brazilian Amazon by Hans P. Binswanger Research Urit Agricu4lture and Rural Development Department Operational Policy Staff World Bank May 1987 The vtevw presented hers are those of the author(a), and they should not be interpreted ai reZlecting those of the World Bank. The author -'s a staff member of the World Bank. However, the World Bank does not accept responsibility for the views expressed herein which are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank or to its affiliated organlizations. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the results of research supported in part by the Bank; they do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank. The designations employed and the presentation of matev.Lal in this document are solely for the convenience of the reader and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Bank or its affiliates concerning the legal status of any country, territory, area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its boundaries, or national aff iliation. FISCAL AND LEGAL INCENTIVES WITH ENVIRONkHETAL EFFECTS ON TEZ BRAZILIAN AHAZON Hans P. BinLuanger Su_arr and Conclusionst 1. This report provides a detailed discussion of the major economic policy distortions, tax incentives and legal rules which tend to accelerate the pace of settlement in the Amazon and lead to deforestation of land in premature, uneconomic and/or environmentally unsustainable ways.1 These incentives are as follows: 2. Brazil's income tax laws virtually exempt agriculture and convert it into a tax shelter. Brazilian investoLs already have ample reason to invest in land. Long term financial markets are poorly developed and land provides a risk diversification in the face of fluctuating inflation rates. The exemption of agriculture from-the income tax adds to this land-demand. This greater land demand is felt directly at the frontier where urban investors and corporations ccmpete aggressively for land. to-establish. livestock ranches. But the tax treatment has indirect effects as-well, by making it attractive for wealthy individuals to buy land from small-farmers in areas of well established settlement. The income tax preference for agriculture ic partly capitalized into the land price. Because small farmers or other poor individuals cannot benefit from the tax treatment, t cannot buy -de1 in areas with well integrated land markets; this is 1/ This report is an explanded version of my Back to Office Report: ^ Brazil-National Environment Project, Land Policy Issues, dated May 18, 1987. -2- because their agricultural revenue will be insufficient to pay for the capitalized value of both the agricuLtural revenue and the tax benefit stream. If they rwant to acquire land they have to join tF pool of migrants who seek farm land at the frontier of settlement. 3. The progressive land tax is intended to reduce the incentives for the accumulation of very large holdings. But the land tax also contains provisions aimed at encouraging more intensive land use on large farms which undermine its progressive nature. An additional side effect of the provisions which reward higher interest is that they encourage the conversion of forests to pasture and crop land in order to reduce the tax liability. This could lead to excessive deforestation of marginal land areas located within large farms. 4. SUDAM, IBDF, and the Grande Carajas Program can single out specific corporate enterprises to receive special tax incentives and other favorable treatment. Of all the incentives discussed in section four of thic report, the tax credit scheme provided by SUDAM (via FINAM and BASA) to corporate livt.tock-ranches in the legal Amazon has the largest effect on deforestation. An upper-bound estimate of its effect is 4 million ha of added deforestation, located mostly in the sub-humid forest-zones of Mato Grosso and,Goias. Research has shown that most of these livestock ranches have a negative economic return (Sectinn V). A similar tax credit scheme-- is provided by IBDF (via FINOR) to corporations which agree to undertake afforestation. Research on and audit reports of these tax credit schemes show that the recipients are far betcer at receiving the tax rredits than at producing beef or establishing forests. The combined effect of the incentives programs is more rapid deforc-station in the Amazon, very modest afforestation in areas of old settlement and a very large fiscal cost which exceeded $1 billion between 197' and 1986 for the livestock ranches alone. -3- Policy should focus on abolishing the tax credit programs, reviewing the other components of the special incentives packages and eligibility criteria, ard on coming up with a better way of encoUraging afforestation. S. Subsidized credit is available to SUDAM-approved ranches and private farmerei who have title or other land documents recognized by the agricultural c,redit institutions. While the amounts disbursed in the Legal Amazon pale in magnitude compared to the total agricultural credit volume, they are not aii insignificant factor accelerating deforestation. 6. The rujles used to allocate public land provide strong incentives for rapid defo-:estation to solidify claims on land and increase the size of final land allocation during the process of land adjudication (Regularisacao)--(Section IX). A rancher with a tenuous claim will be allccated between tvo to three times the amount of land cleared of forest and put under pasture. up to a ceiling of 3000 ha per-owner. Moreover, land clearing provides excellent protection against competing claims and against land-invas-ions. Several steps should be carefully considered such - as lowering' of land ceilings for both individuals and for corporations, a:nd changing the r'ales of land allocation to remove the incentives for clearing land simply for purposes of solidifying'land claims and increasing their-' size. Lower lacd ceilings would alsc have a beneficial equity impact by' making more land available for small settlers. 7. Incentives for the forest service to guard forest reserves and enforce a host of other logging restrictions must be improved. This could be done b; dividing the forestry fine revenue between the guards and the budget which the forestry service can use to hire additional guards. Similar schemes already appear to exist for the traffic police. 8. Some provisions of the income tax code appear to provide incentives to use excessive levels of agro-chemicals and mechanical inputs in agriculture (Section II). However, these provis!ons and other provisions of the income tax code are so generous that agriculture escapes income taxation even before farmers have to increase the use of inputs to distorted iev:^Is *.n order to reduce their tax liability. Therefore, these provisions are unlikely to have an undesirable environmental effect by increasing the use of aechanical land clearing techniques or of agro- chemicals. However, should the ineome tax code be revised it will be necessary to pay careful attenticn to the tax treatment of pesticides and to the depreciation allowances for machines. 9. From this list of incentives and the more detailed discussion in the full report, it is clear that the Bank will have to elevate these issues to a level which goes beyond the individual agencies such as SEMA and IPLAN, as many of the required changes either fall into the responsibility of the ministry of finance, or of MIRAD/lNCRA. Moreover, it, is likely that the quantitative impact of the policy distortions on the Amaz,on exceed.,any positive interventions which the Bank could achieve via- settlement projects. Indeed, given the enormous demand pressur_ in land markets originating from non-farmers, project interventions aimed at bringing order into the process may be doomed to failure from the start. -5- The objectives of this report is to describe the major fiscal and legal incentives which: (a) increase the demand for land for agricuitural uses (b) increase the rate of deforestation it the frontier of settlement (c) provide incentives to convert forest to crop land or pasture in already settled areas. (d) implicitly subsidize fertilizers and pesticides High and unstabled ratios of inflation in the Brazilian economy imply that long term capital markets are poorly developed. The financial investment options are therefore both more limited and more risky than in more stable economies. Both private and corporate investors will find land an attractive long term investment option not only for its expected return but also for reducing overall portfolio risks. Land ownership by nan- farmers is therefore much more common in Brazil than elsewhere in ihe developing or developed world. However, as discussed in this report Bra'zilian taxation, credit and land polices provide additional strong incentives for investit.: n land and for acquiring it viA deforestation. These issues are reviewed below. I. the virtual absence of taxation of aRricultural income. (a) By using a variety of special provisions of the income tax code, It is possible for individuals and corporations to exclude up to 90Z and 80X respectively of agricultural profits form their taxable income. (b) In addition, individuals who own farms can liberally treat consumption expenditures as agricultural expenses and thus shelter additional income from taxation . (However, neither -6- corporation nor individuals can offset agricultural losses against non-agricultural taxable incomes). (c) The taxable component of corporate profits arising from agriculture is taxed at a rate of only 6X. Provisions (a) and (c) combined imply that agricultural profits of corporations are subject to a t.x rate as low as 1.2Z. This compares to a tax rate between 35Z and 45! on profits from other sources. Detailed discussions of these two provisions is given in Spindola Silva. The implication of this tax treatment is that investors will undertake investment projects in agriculture which have a lower economic rate of return thaz& their non-agricultural projects, as this will equaliza financial rates of returns net of taxes. The tax treatment will increase the demand for land from individuals in high-income tax brackets and from corporations, implying a faster expansion of agriculture into frontier areas then in the absence of these tax provisions. Moreover, since the supply of land is not perfectly elastic, the income tax-references will.be par.tly capitalized-into.land values. Since poor people do not get the income stream.which arises form this tax preference, their capitalized agricultural incomne stream is louer than the land price. Therefore, if tr.'y own no land they cannot buy it, even if given credit. The primary means for p or people to acquire land is therefore via squatting on public or private land (See Section IX below.) And, if they own land they can do better by selling the land and investing the resources elsewhere. (For a detailed discussion on these issues see Bii'swanger 1985.) -7- To sum up, the income tax treatment of agriculture o tends to increase the demand for land, to speed up con7ersion of land for agricultural uses, and to raise the price of land. o it tends to increase inequality in land ownership holdings o and it increases the pace of migration of poor people to the frontier areas in search of land. II. Doep the income tax coda lead to an ewil relevant increate in the use of fertilizers and pesticides? Agricultural taxpayers can sharply reduce their agricultural tax base by a variety of means. 1. They can elect to be taxed on 1OZ of tLeir gross agricultural revenues. Fiscal incentives for agro-chemicals have no effect on these tax payers. 2. If, they elect to be taxed on the basis of agricultural profits, they can, as discussed before, reduce the taxable portion of profits sharply, because expenses on virtually all investments and modern-inputs._ can be multiplied by a factor from between 2 and 6 and subtracted in the same year from agricultur:l profits. Up to 80Z of agricultural profits.can be sheltered form taxation via this mechanism. Th4s system of 'multiplication factors' provides some incentive for over-investment and over-consumption of pesticides and fertilizers. However two factors undermine the impact of this incent've on investment and on input use: First the 'multiplication factors, are so large that undistorted input use and investments will already reduce the tax base to 202 of agricultural profits for most farmers, i.e. no additional investment or input use will be induced by them. Second, only half of the taxable agricultural income is actually included in total taxable income. This implies that, even without multiplication factors, -8- the ginal tax rate on agricultural income is only half that on other income. Thus, the additional tax incentive for using agro-chemicals is not very powerful. Therefore, it can be concludpd that the special incentives via the multiplication factor do not materially increase the environmental load of pesticides and fertilizers. III. The land tax (ITR). The Estatutn da Terra and other legislation provide for a progressive land tax. Farms smaller than 2 modulo (the size of a farm sufficient to support one family is equal to one modulo) pay no land taxes, while farmers larger than 100 mod+e1s are supposed to pay 3.5Z of the sales value of their unimproved land (Terra nuda). Apart from direct evasion, the land tax can be reduced by a 4actor of up to 90Z, depending on (1) the degree of utilization of land B and (2) depending on the productivity level of the farm. The formulas used are such that both reduction factors are directly and positively related to R (Spindola Silva p. 247). From the point of view of deforestation the key point is that forest land is considered unused. A farm containing forests is therefore taxed at higher rates than une containing only pastures or cropland. Conversion of forest to pasture on larger farms will reduce the ltid tax liabilities, and the land tax system thus provides incentives for deforestationi. The major impact of thiL legislation is likely Lo be felt in areas which have been settled for a long time and where the en'&rcement of the land tax is relatively strict. -9- nv. Capital Rains taxation and commodity taxation. (ICH). Ne'ther of these taxes appears to contain provisions which have an effect on the issues studied. A discuscion is provided for those interet.ted in detail. Others can ship to SecLion V. Real Estate sales are oubject to capital gains taxes while long term capital gains (mQre than five years) on financial assets are not. However, the real burden of the capital gains tax is low. The taxable amount of the gains is reduced by rebateD depending on the length of time tL. .-al estate is held. The remainder is taxed at the lover of either a 25 flat rate or ':e marginal rate of the progressive income tax of the individual concerned. I have n3t found any exemptions from this tax for individuals or enterprises located in the legal Amazon. The commodity taxation. (ICH) is like a value added tax on agricultural and non-agricultural cosmodit :3. It'is levied at 171 of the after-tax receipts (i.e. at 20.51 of total sales value) for most states. For sales to the North and the Northeast the rate is only 122. However, final sales within the Rorth or the Northeast regions restore t'x levels to 171 via a mechanism vhich I do not fully understand. Thus, the differential appears to ac.. as a transfer of tax revenue between;regions rather than ai distortionary differential affecting economic decisions. The ICM contains a potential distortion against agriculture'for commodities which are exported in raw form: while for industrial products- the full ICM is restituted upon exports, this is not the case for rew agriculture products such as soybeans. However, if soybean oil or cakes are exported the tax is refunded. The importance of the distortion is further reduced by the fact that trade in many agricultural commodities is restricted by quantitative controls so that domestic price relatives are -10- completely delinked frao international price relative. Additional work trould be required to determine whether agricultural price policies diacriminato against agriculture or not. V. Raklonal and Sectoral tax inc*ntives. Special programs for regional tax incentives exist o for the logal AmLzon (administered SUDAH and by FIDAH) o fc. the Grande Carajas area vhich contains po.rtions of the States of Ma-ranhao, Para and Goias. (Administered by the Grande Carajas Council) o for the Forestry, Fisheries, and Tourisme qector (administered by FISET) o for the northeast (administered by SUDENE and FINOR'). There are five clatsees of incentivess (a) Incoma tax holidays of up to 10 years (Grande Carajas only, see appencix 1) (b) Reinvestment tax credits which approved enterprises in the privileged sectors or regions can use for expansion or modernizat,on investments ( limited to 502 of a corporation's liabilities). (c) Generalized tax credits which any corporation in Brazil can' use to set up, invest or participate in approved enterprises in the privileged ragions/sectors (limited to 25? of h corporation's tax liabilities). (d) Ta: credits for individuals for 45Z of their investments into stocks of FIDAM, FINO& and FISET (limited to a maximum of 6Z of an individuals's tax liabilities) -11- 'e) Exemprtions from import tariffs, export taxes a.^d IC{ for imports or exports of approved enterprises under the Grande Carajas program onlv. Each of these inzentives programs is available to farms whose projects have been approved by the admiristering entity. The approval process contains a variety of safeguards some of wh.Lch are intended to protect the environment.2 The following points abou-t these preferences are important. Income tax holidays and tax credits for modernization are not relevant for agriculture and livestock corporations, as they already escape the income tax via the general provisions of agricultural taxation discussed in secticn I. It is therefore incorrect to assume that these provisions are an additional factor for speeding up deforestation at the frontier. Only to the extent that fcrest or agricultural products are utilized by non-agricultural corporations will measures (a) and (b) have an impact on deforestation. Examples are the expansions of charcoal production for a tax exempt pig iron factory or production of logs for a tax exempt lumber company. In the non-agricultural sectors income tax holidays are,,perhaps the least distortionary form of tax incentives. Unlike *tax credits they cannot induce investments into enterprisess,which are not expected to. produce a pretax profit. Tax credits (measures b, c and d) on the other hand can induce Investmer.ts with a negative expected profit. Of the three tax credits schemes, generalized tax credits avail- a to corporations all over Brazil 2/ For example, pig iron factories under the Graz. e Carajas prog'am will be required to product 25Z of the harcoal they use from forest programs which they own. -12- (measure C) iD the most important. The mechanics of the system is described clearly in Browder and in Nascimento, and will not be discussed in detail. The tax credit system allows any corporation in Brazil to use up 25Z of its tax liabilities to invest directly in approved enterprises or to acquire equity in such corporations. An approved enterprise located in the Amazon, on the other hand can finance up to 75Z of the planned investments from such tax credits furds. The balarce of 25Z of total investme:nt must come from the parent company's own resources. Investients in ap-roved enterprises can therefore occur even if they have negative rates of return to overall ir.vested resources, because investors will bp primarily concerned with this rate of return to owned funds. Attempts at policy reform should focus sharply on this set of tax credits. Reinvestment tax credits will only be relevant for non-agricultural enterprises which have positive taxable profits. Tar credits for individuals to invest in stocks of the investment funds FIDAM, FINOR and FISET (measure e) appear to be less important because few investors appear to take advantage of the personal communication of Lytha Spinola Silva. VI. The impact of the regional tax incentives on liveRtock production and deforestation in the legal Amazon. A number of authors have studied these issues and their findings are summarized here. By September 1985, .7 livestock projects had-been approved by SUDAM (Gasques and Yokomizo), repreeenting slightly less than half of the investments in dollar terms approved under the tax incentive scheme. (Nascimento, p.29). By 1983, the total investment in the SUDAM approved ranches had already reached nearly $1 billion (in 1982 $). The livestock projects are mostly located in areas of Cerrado and of semi-humid forests. The average size of the already implemented ranches is 23600 hp, i.e. the incentives program favored very -13- large enterprises. Theses enterprises occupy a total area of 8.4 mio ha of which 4.2 million ha was to be developed as pasture. This is the upper bound estimate of the deforestation caused by the incentives program ln Cerrado and semi-humid forest land (deforestation in humid forest zone must have been minimal.). Much of the pasture area created has already been abandoned and the area is reverting to a secondary forest (All data from Gasques and Yokomizo). The program has not been effective in terms of creating viable livestock enterprises in the region. Gasques and Yokomizo carried out a sample survey of enterprises and show that: o Realized livestock production is less than 16Z of anticipated proe iction. o The average rate of implementation of the projects is less than 40Z of planned implementation. o Many enterprises which have not met the program targets have received certificate of implementation allowing them continued access to tax incentives. o While actual implementations has been less than 40Z, disbursement of tax incentives has been close to IOOZ and exceeded it in many ranches. o The ranches have generated virtually no ICM revenue. The ICM revenue generated are less than 4Z of tax credit funds received in all cases studied. The reasons for the poor performance have been analyzed by Browder. based on a sample survey of ranches. Total invested resources in the ranches had a negative net present value. An analysis by Norgaard et al of cattle ranches in the Eastern Amazon (based on coefficients assembled from the literature) shows similar result: -14- o Without real appreciation of land, no form of traditional ranching has a positive real rate of return in Eastern Amazon. O Without over-grazing, real land values must appreciate at the rate of 302 before the investments become economically viable. O Even with improved pasture technologies a real appreciation of land of between 15 to 302 per year is required to make the rate of return to overall investment resources positive. o Ranches receiving the SUDAM incentives can have a positive return to private investment resources in the absence of real appreciation of land. O Investors can maximize their private returns by ucing over- grazing. They cannot inLprove their returns by investing in pasture improvement. The results are fully consistent with the .ow rate of implementation of the projects and with the high rate of abandonment of pasture within projects. Legislation has recently been passed which limits eligibility for SUDAM approval to ranches established in the Cerrado, where deforestation would be minimal. I have been assured, however, that these regulations are not fully enforced. VII. Impact of fiscal incentives to affcrectation (FISET/XBDF). Tax credit funds have also been available for afforestation from the Fundo de Investmentos Setorais (FISET). Firms approved by IBDF are eligible to receive tax credit funds for afforestation similar to those granted to firms approved by SUDAM. FISEv's pe-formance, as well as that of FINAM and FINOR arc discussea in detail ..n the DIARIO OFFICIAL of Jan. 12, 1987, Section 1. (see attachment 2). Here it is shown that the FISET program suffers from severe implementation difficulties as well. -15- The main point about fiscal incentives for the cattle ranches and for the afforestation is that both programs are not cost-effective in achieving their stated goals of increasing livestock productidn on the one hand and increasing of afforestation on the other. It is likely tait the subsidy program for ranches via FIDAM has reduced forest area by far more than has been created by the FISET incentives. ViII. Credit system. Just like the income tax preferences for agriculture, subsidized rural credit will tend to increase the demand for land, leading to a more rapid expansion of crop snd pasture land. And the subsidies will be partly capitalized into land values, reinforcing the regressive impact of the income tax system analyzed in section 1. In addition, as discussed in Binswanger 1985, subsidized credit probably reduces employment and te-ancy opportunities in agriculture via its impact on accelerating mechanization. Thus, the system clearly increases the supply of potential settlers to frontier areas. The direct impact of the credits given in the Amazon region itself is hard to estimate. Central Bank data on disbursements of credit does hot- show data separately for the Legal Amazon. The North region, comprising the Legal Amazon less Goias, Maranhao.and Mato Grosso receive less-than 3Z of rural credit. However, this under-estimates the relevant-credit volume as settlement has been particularly active in Goias and Hato Grosso. Nationally livestock borrowers received about 20Z of the credit disbursed. The SUDAM approved ranches are all eligible for subsidized credit. Undoubtedly therefore the credit subsidies have accelerated the deforestation process. As abolishing credit subsidies is a central (but very elusive) goal of the policy dialogue with Brazil, additional study uf -16- the issue in not required. But the policy dialoSuc needs to c,isure that special provisions for the legal Amazons do not survive, even though quantitatively the credit volume going to the reginn-is relatively small. IX. Rules of land allocation and settlement patterns. The rules for allocating public land (terra devoluta) controlled by states an( by the Federal Government vary somewhat. Only those of the federal government are reviewed here. It is a mistake to assume that there are larger areas of unclaimed land readily available for settlement in the Amazon. By the time roads are constructed, most federal or state land is claimed by some individual or corporation, however doubtful the claim may be. These claims are bought and sold. Claims can be converted into legal titles by individual-- specific legal procedures. For example, projects approved by SUDAM or the Grande Carajas program are given special preferences and priorities in land titling. On the other hand land titles mviy be conferred to all holders of strong claims in a sub-region by the process of regularization.' How can individuals acquire and solidify rights which have a high chance of later being regularized? The right known as direito de posse statesethat a squatter or posseiro who lives on unclaimed public land (terra devoluta) and has used it effectively for at least one year and ox- day has the right to acquire a usufruct right over that land wit;. size of one rural modulo (100 ha in Amazonia). If the posseiro fulfills the condition of effectively using the land and living on it (cultura efetiva e morada habituel) for more than 10 years (recently shortened to 5 years) he has the right to acquire title. Land rights can arise also from squatting in privaLe land for a sufficiently long time without being challenged by -17- the owner (follow up on details of length of time and other conditions). Direito de posse has been formally recognized since 1850, law 6C1, but goes back to criteria of settling land disputes in colonial times. (Nascimento, p.278). These rights may appear to favor the establishment of relatively small farms. However in lands under federal control claims up to 3000 ha can be solidified by these provisions and the attendant administrative procedures. In the Grande Carajas area which I visited, GETAT (now merged with INCRA), uses the following rules: A claimant who lives on an area of land get5 first preference to obtain title for between three times the area which he or she has cleared of forests. The claimant does not get the title atutomatica..y but has to buy tbe title in a public auction. but claimants are apparently never challenged in that bidding and the minimum price set by GETAT is nothing but a nominal fee. In Kato Groaro, Goyas, Para and Maranhao these or similar rules have resulted in the majority-of public land being allocated to either individually owned ranches or to large corporations. Small farmers have difficulties in finding land for squatting. This is because corporationst and large ranches have a major advantage over poor individuals in the rush for landt they have the capital to build their own access roads into the forest. This enables them to lay claim on land much farther away from. major state or national highways than small settlers. The latter can typically not lay claim to land more than a few kilometers from public roads, as they could neither market products nor have access to health or education facilities. -18- In Rondonia the situation is somewhat different in those areas allocated by INCRA to land settlement projects, as all agricultural land is divided up into small plots. Nevertheless for the entire legal Amazon area the bulk of deforestation is accounted for by large private and corporate ranches. The rules of land allocation encourage rapid deforestation on individually owned ranches, as the final amount of land which is given title in regularization is a multiple of the area of forest converted to pasture. In addition, clearing land provides protection against small squatters and land invasions, as these groups simply do not invade land already converted to pasture. Some informants alleged that it maybe sufficient to clear land of the original forest, only to let secondary forest grow back, as irrevocable user certificates are issued after one yea-r of occupation. I have not been able to judge the importance of this phenomenon, however. Deforestation often occurs so rapidly, and in advance of provision of adequate infrastructure, that the existing stock of high quality timber is simply destroyed, rather than being conserved for later logging operations. In other regions, where better infrastructure leads to higher stumpage prices, loggers may contribute to the deforestation. For exaisple, it is possible for a cash-constrained land-owner' to trade the standing t!mber to a logging company In exchange for ldnd clearing services paid for- by the logger. Small scale squatters are frequently accused of contributing in a major way to the deforestation, While this may be of local importance in several regions, it is probably less of a problem than the ranchers. If small farmers want to claim 1 modulo of land, they have no legal or procedural -19- incentive to clear land beyond the area needed for their shifting cultivation operation. However, within the allocated modulos, the shifting cultivation system will reduce forest area rapidly. It is easily shown that shifting cultivation is the least-cost wAy of producing ones subsistence requirement, whether cost is measured in terms of labor, in terms on purchased inputs or in terms of total cost. Primary forests will be destroyed in the process, and replaced by pasture or secondary forest. Phystcal degradation problems are minimal because soils are covered by vegetation for all but short periods during the first few growing seasons, and because initially the highest quality soils are chosen. However, as under all shifting cultivation systems, soil fertility deciines, and weed infestations become a serious problem after the first one or two seasons. The small farmer then shifts to clear another plot of land. It is unrealistic to assume that small farmers can be induced to keep a small proportion of their land under permanent agriculture, while leaving the remainder under forest. The only way to reduce forest destruction is to reduce plot sizes allocated to small farmers and set lUnd,aside elsewhere in large and well guarded forest reserves. The World Bank projects in Rondonia now attempt to do this by creating small reserves in proximity of the settlers. But small local forest reserves will be invaded by other shifting cultivators, and are hard to guard by the forest service. The major changes in allocation rules which require further study are as follows: 1. Lowering the ceiling of land which can be allocated to a single owner during regularization from 3000 ha to no more than perhaps 300 ha of total land owned anywhere. This will still enable families to establish larger ranches by distributing ownership among several members. -20- 2. Introduce a land ceiling on corporate land holdings or reduce it where it already exists. 3. Change the definition of cultura efetiva which is used to regularize land to include forms of managed forest exploitation. X. Inprovi - incentives for forest guards. Forest guardo of IBDF are small in numbers, poorly paid and have to do risky jobs in guarding forest reserves or in enforcing regulations limiting logging of, for example, the Brazil Nut tree. The enormous distances and low population densities impose additional difficulties. It is not surprising, therefore, that forest laws and regulations are easily escaped, in the large by applying political pressure to the sbrvice, and in the small by bribing the forest guards. However it would be easy to provide both the forest service and the guards with improved incentives to enforce the rules by giving them a financial stake in the fines levied on violators of the rules. For example, letting the guards keep 30X of the fines, with the remainder adding to the budget of the forest service rather than the general revenue, would provide positive rather than perverse incentives. Traffic police already operate in a similar way, so a precedent exists. - 21 - THE GREATER CARAJAS PROGRAP I . HMiat o I 1t? The GFotOat CaorJas PFograQE is a VQdOp1 Go?er%oont 1ttutiouii creaDOd by low and hood- qm8ptorod In grasSllo9 017O anndig os PooPRiblO fOP cOeM1na8t U13D ferthIQr1n and 1i3plooentiig thbso ia8soroz rGqP8Uod for tho int%oaoted dovelojont of anPQoo 09 G; th4gSafd !t22 icated btQ.. 'ho boUindaoPO of' the Dutn1Cp81%t1o0 cut by the parollel 89 South, tho PaPn&abo, Xingu and Aoozon RiVQer and tho Atlantic Ocoon0 110 ObJoct1ivos A) Support and oncourago privato ini1t1itive; B) Contributo to the infdustrial decontraliza- tion of the country; C) RQducl rgional d1spor1t1ios; 0) Coordinato and furthor tho act1v1itis of the different orlanizations and instltu- tions charged with the development of the region; E) Encourage those investments considered to have comparative advantages in terms of the social cost-benefit relationship; F) Encourage the generation oF new employment opportunities; G) Further improved income distribution; - 22 - I) Furthor 1oprdvQd utilization Of humanRn natural resourcos ; I) Provoke agricultural dovQlopmanto with particular oBphasi on small scalo faroQrs; J) Encoarego studios and. survoys of natural rosourcos and the onvironaont; and K) Encourage tho dovolopnant of appropriato tochnolog1os. 1II. L%r !nent Undertakings: Undartakings (implebantation, modernization and Qxpansion) in the following areas are qualifiQd as con- ponznt parts of the Greator Carajis Program: A) Transportation (railroads, waterways, roads, bridges, ports, etc.); B) Basic sanitation; C) Utilization of hydric resources; D) Mineral research, prospecting, extraction, processing, primary elaboration and industria- l izat ion; El Crop and livestock farming, fishery and in- dus try; F) Utilization of energy sources; GI Implementation of infrastructural projects and services; and HI Other economic activities considered pertinent to the development vf the region. - 23- IV. Incentives That Can be Granted: 11 Qualification of the undertaking as a com.- ponont of the Greater Carajis Program will make the project in question eligible for preferential treatment and, tberefore, apt to obtain Incentives and recoive third party investments produced by fiscal incen- tives. This preferential treatmant will be guarantied by Federal uovernment organiza- tions for the purposes of: Al Licensing, leasing and granting title to public lands, normalization and speci- fication of unoccupied lands or, when necessary, expropriatloii of those private lands required for project execution; B) Licensing or granting of concessions for the construction and'operation of port facilities; C) Contracts involving the supply of electri- cal energy and river transportation; 0) Granting or,leasing of rights to mineral or forestry extraction; E) Authorization, issuing of licenses and grant- ing of export financing; F) Ajthorization and issuing of licenses for - 24 - 1nports oP offchinory, oqutpcient and instru- mants, as wall as ktts, parts, soares and accessories to be used in tho iMpieMentation, expansion, oodornization or re-equipping of, coupanies, includtng those based on dtrect foreign 1nvestmQnts in th forfo of goods or services; GI Authorizatton for and reglstrat1Qn of ex- ternal loans. including for purposr- of effecting paynent abroad for goods or sar- vices; Ui Granting of tho endorseaont or guaranty of the 3tational Treasury or public financial Institutions to external loans; 11 Authorization for tho functioning of mining companies; Ji Participation In tle capital stock of project proprietor companies,:in thh form;of public resources; K) Approval of-contracts involving technology transfers and technical assistance or con- sulting services applied to the implementat.on and operation of projects; and L) Any other acts, formalities or measures re- quired for the approval and execution of undertakings in the Greater Caraj^s Program; - 25 - 2) Exemption frcr the income tax and nonrefun- dable additional tax for a period of 10 years, benefitting those undertakings that instal, invest or modernize in the area of the Greater Carajis Program by 12.31.90. The amount that, as a result of the exemption, is not paid will constitute a capital reserve 'f the legal en- tity and is 'o be utilized for investment in the under:.king itself or In any other com- ponent projects of the Program. 31 Exemption fro3= the income tax and the nonrefun- dable additional tax on earnings resulting from activities involving the rendering of services, ixecution of implementation, ex- pansion or modernization of infrastructural projects in the area of the Program. HaLf of the tax rot paid is to be invested in under- takings that are component parts of the Greater Carajis Program, independently of whether such undertakings are or. are not in the name of the beneficiary, together with nmatching funds invested by the beneficiary and equivalent to not less than 25Z of the ir,vestment. Ttie other h... .s to be invested in econom:. and social infristructural under- takinas thst ir.ay also act as stimuli to small and mediul businesses. - 26 - 41 Examptton from or reduction of the import tax and tho corrosponding Industrialized products tax on machinery, equipment and so forth, when there are no sloila' nationally produced goods, and -hen such imports are effected by the com- pany holding title to the component undertaking of the Program. The fiscal benefit nay be granted to the goods Imported by companies contracted by the company holding title to the cotuponent undertaking of tho Greater Carajis :Program for execution of works or the rendering of servtces, in those cases in which the value of the benefit Is to be transferred to the final cost of the works and services. 51 Exemption from the Industrialized products tax and maintenance of the credit of this same tax as applied to raw materials, intermediate products and packaging material, in operations involving acqiuisitions ofi natlonally manufactured machinery and equipment. - 27 - V. How to Participate: Comparias Interested in participating In the Program should present a letter of consultation (printid model) to the Exacutivo Secretariat, either directly or through one of the regional offices of the Program. Companies involved in the rendering of ser- vices en1jor qxecution of infrastructural works and which desire to incorporate their activities into the Program for the purpose of obtaining tht 3forementioned incentives, should prosent a petition (printed modol) in this regard. Other information and clarifications may be obtained at the offices of tho Program (se:e listing: Staff - Addresses - Information, item VII below). VI. Legislation and Norms 1) Executive Act 1,813 (published 11.25.80): institutes the special system of incentives for component undertakings of the Greater Carajis:Program and t,akes other measures. 21 Oecree 85,387 (Idem): defines the composition, authority and operation of the Interministerial Council of the Greater Carajas Program and takes other, measures. - 28 - 3) Executive Act 1,825/80 (published 12.23.80): exempts coiponent undwrtaktngO of tho Greater Carajis Pro- gram from the income tax and takes other measures. 41 Decree 86,157/81 (publiShGd 0630.81): regulites the paragraph of arkicl 1st of ExecutiVe Act 1,813/80. 5) Exacutive Act 1,904/81 (publisb" ?.24.81): altars the text of article 1st of Executive Act 1,813 cited above. 6) Executive Act 1,956/82 (published 08.31.82): authorizes the IntQrministerial Courcil of the Greater Carajis Program to grant exemptions from or reductions of the import tax and industrialized products tax. 7) Decree f17,640/82 (published 09.22. 80): defines the composition of the Interministerial Cuuncil of the Great- er Carajis Program and alters article 1st of Decree 85,387. 8) Executive Act 2,152/84 (published 07.19.34): extends the deadline defined in Executive Act 1,825, whIch exempts component undertakings or the Greater Carajas Pro- gram from the income tax. 9) Decree 91,418/85 (published 07.11.85): defines the composition of the Interministerial Council of the Great- er Carajis Program and alters article 1st of Decree 85,387. 10) Resolutions 01, 02, 04, 05, 07, 08, 09, 11, 12, - 29 - 13, 14 and 15 Cpublitshed 08.10.81, 01.10.81, 12.09.81, 05.11.82, 09.24.82, 09.24.82, 01.16.86, 01.16.86, 01.16.86, 04.18.86 and 12.23.86, respect'velyl. VII. Staff - Addresses - Information PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC - Secretariat of Planning Intervin,sterial Council of the Greater Carajas Program Executive Secretariat SOS. Edif. Venincio It, 29 andar - Zip Code 70302 BrasIlia, OF Telex: L0611 1146 Executiye Secretary: FRANCISCO DE SALLES BAPTISTA FERREIRA Deputy Executive Secretary: NERINO ANTONIO DIONELLO PIOTTO Tel. (061) 225-4127 and 225-4377 Coordinator of Planning: JOO URBANO CAGNIN Coordinator for Special Affairs and Incentives: RAIIIUNDO NONATO DE AZEYEDO PINHEIRO Coordinator of Projects and Information Technology: EDUARDO AUGUSTO ROXO PEREIRA Tel. tOGI) 223-6682, 225-8780, 215-4373 and 215-4390 Chief of the Niucleus of Support and General Services: FEiRNANDO LOPES DE IIESQUITA Tel. (0611 225-8780, 215-4373 and 215-4390 Chief of the Representative Office ,in Sio Luis: GASTAO DIAS VIEIRA Av. Santos Ournont, 18 - Bloco 03 - Ed. INCRA - Bairro Anil Zip Code 65000 Sao Luis, MA - 30 - Tolox: (0981 2507 Tel. (0981 225-2832 and 225-2850 Chief of the Representative Office In Bolem: ANTONIO NAHILTON BENTES Av. Almirante Barroso, 1839 - Terr2o - Ed. DNPH Zip Code 66000 Beliu, PA Telex: (091) 1427 Tel. C0911 228-2880 and 228-2986 : , I; l i;2 mE, ! i , ji , 0 , Li Im E; i,"s ajgS 1 , ,,, 9 .2 . | 3! {g ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~z i;' Z X '3 ilas '"i- : eni~iii: 1ij l iR! e r % 1i as i 11i Ds3{s--tt X*W{f 1 0w;S aI.e'UrO' -- * . ci . , ~~~~44I0 ~ ~ 0I @ a, a, o.,0 4.. -01 03 o~~~o ~ 004.0.0 1 114 -o -~~~~~~ .....0 I aoIL . . I'.444 34 Za O - .. a..4,DI "v'4-O' .4 44 *44 - w -- .40 a _0Z 400 *4 ,c .4,0 a :i. .:~~~~~~: *~~~~. 0 -* **0CZ'I,. UI . 4.S- 5 *.a -- 0 * .4.313.40 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ .. at~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~014 a0t0401 .4 .* loo 4-* 4 4 -a ON 0~~~~~~. 0 4 * 0. * 4 0 .- I3 , Jr 0 .. 0.4- - 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .- -. *44~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 =5~~~~~~~~~~1 ~~ .~~~. * -e~~~~~~: ..~~~~ .~~~ ~~ ~~: .:~~~~'A~. 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In - I 444. 44 . . . . . I . v- .0~~~~~~ .044,4 0. 0. 0. v. I . . . I . . .0S. .0. 0c *.J4 10 )~~4 0ZbE O Z 2 4 t 4 . ~ n. - 440. 0. ., 4. u. 4444*1444 * 0 F 0 0.00 0 '4-0. I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,0 Z.. c.4 *4Z 3 *0404a _4* Z0Z - - - 3- 441. 4. o *0 * (34 44..*4~ 4404 I04 -4. C.4Z4 3.'. a3..44, 4 . . 44 444.00C03..4-DS@.304 ... . PO . c - I,: . a O.. . O ~ 4... 2 ~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~-. O, ' aO U. - .04 424-. 00 4.. 4 I~~~~~ ~ . 44 4.0 CIV: n .0 00 a C.I V tz!:. a .0 a, 'IO r 0 0 o C t o VO Z C Z t. C Xt ui tn 44 3 4 I. 0 I u 0 0 .1 a q ir 'o o .0 0 . .. . .. I 0 2 C 4 01 S 0. 1. I Z 010 C 0 ul 1 .1 10 -1 o IL v 0 Z; T U, Al cn v O cit ..ft C I t .0 I 0 v V, 1.0 0 ..O C. . ov o o L .0 1. . i 10 0. 2 0 . OC O 0 I -0 I Z OU 0 0 . 'k-'- C 1. ol . C.. 0O'C' I4 v O o o ' . :t C a o7S o j .1 o ;: %I a I 0 z v . Z.-ft . . . . . . 2-2 .1 o o I o 1 S.: & U o. u ol -o I co I c L Z o I :.:-2 g too.: oz: o c 6-1. 11*4H i 1. I ;,Z 1. lo 1. 1. lo lo I-x I c .1- 111; - 38 - Brcando. A-dp. l98. -0 Proco De Tcrra PNo Braatla VseLilcacao De ALqumas Hipoteses. - EEealcc etudY o. 79. Rio de Janoirros Fundcao (3etulio Varoaau. Brazil. 6tvornmecrt o4. 19.* Inseoctlon Rooorts of FISET. FRNOR and FI1W. Dicrl@ Offidcia. 8acaa 1. Soqunda-Feira. (Jcanury 12). I?air1l - F1nisttv o4 A@rarinE Refor amid Do'veloomnt(PIRAD) and S3tl1au3 In2tituto fzr ttlo.ct and Aoraran R04orm(INCRA) 1WM. Tho Mfrw Rooublic's First Natlonal frarian R6otr Plant 1963-9.P. Rra,illa. (Octocr). I>o=dsr. J.0. 1956. "Loi3lna tho Rain4avats A Political Econ=av of Timber EMtr.ction enad Uneouc Exchanao in tho Brazilian Az32on." Ph.D Di osertat ion. Unlvzrsity c4 Pannevnlvania, ._ 1987. FPublic Policy and Doforoctation In tho Brazilian Amazon." in Pubilic PuliciAs and the Meuse of Fareet RWccurceO. M. Gillis and R. Reoatto (ads.). Lcondons Cambridoe Univar¶sity Prors. ('5orthacoinQ). Coctro de Rozendo. 0. 198z. "A Aoricultura a a R*4orma do Crodito Rural." R. Bras. Econ. 37(2)z 183206. - uflt91(ld, C. 1987. "Amazon 2ain4orost Project Hurtles Towards Diaoetor." Now 9cientist. 26a 24-25. Ccvchra,6e, T.T. and P.A. Sanchez. 1982. "Land Resources. Sol% and their Manaqemurt In the Amazon Rocions A Stato of Knowlcbdge Rooort." in Anoaoniao Aoriculturs and Land 'Yea Research. S. Hecht and othors t-ds.). Call. Colomliaf .Contro International de Auricultura Troolcal. C,hon. R. 1986. "Comment on Smallholder Settlxment of Tro'xcal South ime'xca: The Social Cau%es of Ecolocical Disaster. Human Oranization. 43(4) 59-60. Co; lins. J.L. 1986. "Smallholder Sottlement of TrooD.:al South Am.trica: The Social Causes of Ecoloaical Destruct.on." Human Oroanization. 45(t): 1-10. 1986. "Replv to Cohen." Huran OrGanization. 45(4): -_6()-76 Davis. S.H. Victims of tCh Miracle. Camnbridoet Camtridoe University Fress. Foarnsido. P.M. 1986. Huaan Carryino ,anacitv of the Brazilian Rainforast. New Yor" Columbia Universitv Press. 1 - 39 - __=,________. 1987. "Rethinkino Continuous Cultivat!on In P-&zon1&." 3toa0iwnce. 37(3)e 209-213. &saues,' .A. nd C. Yokodi o. 1985. QAvalicao /dos Incantivog Fiscalo Na Aaazonla.l Unoubl1shud Paper. Brazill Irntituto De PlanoSaento Econoaico E Social. (Daceebar). (D31..nd. R. 1983. "Bra^xl's Environeq-tal ProQress in faxDonDan Develooswnt," in ChaZ8D 14 the Aamo ^ s"gin J, inq (id.). Enala,eds Manchoster Univrsity Preen. 6oodlamid. R.J.A. and H.S. Irwin. 1975. 'Asmon Junqles drsen Hall to Rea Daut. Dovelomentgt in Land,caoo K4nawont and Urbbn Planninq 1. AoterCdam. the Ne*therl ardsa E2sm-1 r Scient1ifi: Fubilshinq C.aaany. Hecht. S. 19M.. 'Csttlo Ranchina In the Eastern Amazona Environmwrital and Soc'-1 Imalicationst" in Ths i1g o4 AswaznI Develonemnt. E.F. eran (ad.). Boulder. CGClor&dot Westyiaw Press. po. 155-199. . and onhers (ads.). 1782. AmoZnlas Agriculture and LAnd Use Rwu.rch. C,&i,t Colo.v.'jiug Centro International De Aoricultura Trooic41. Nocomb,e. S.D.r F. Vita* and J.N. Landers. 1987. "Brazils Nc.thw.st r. II and lIl Techincal Review - Final Rcocrt. " 'AO/World Bank: Coooerativ. Pr.ocranp. - Investment Contr4. Ram's Food and AcRr: culturs Oroanization of the United Nations. (Januarv 19) . Es5,E Staff. 1986. "Bafra Mina_,ada.." ULTOF 30(4)s 18-20. Ktuck. P. 1979. "Sma!l Farmers and A'ricultural Develoment Policv: A Look &t Brazil 's Land Re&form Statut*. " HUFA; Oraanization. '8Us): 44-51. Ledec. G. 1985. "The Env)-onmental Imolxcations of AOr1CUaltral Crudit Procrams: PrelLm1nary Findinas tor Brazil.." Pcoer oreoared for' Political. Sci.erce" -87. UniverSitY of California. Berkelev. (Decuimber). Mlahar. D.V. and Cthews. 1981. "Bra:ilt 'riteOrated Devailooment of t.he r!orthw.st Frontier." A World Bank Country Study. W&shirnaton. D.C.: Th World Bank. (June). tlartine. G. 1907. 'M1aracac E Absorcao PODulaci'nal No rrooicO Umido." Paoer oresented at "Seminario sobre Technoloailas oara oq A;sentamontos Humanos no Tropico Umido". Manaus: IF'EA'CE?AL. (Aoril t 7-rI)). Nascimento. J.R. 1983. "Brazilian Amazon Develooment and the Forest-Based Sector.,, Ph.D Dissertation. Minnesota: Universitv of Minnesota. (May. 2 - 40 - Nqhieo, L.Te 198I . "The Land Rotation Farmino gvst.e in Northern7 Br&ail. Conditions for Its Continuation and Transition to the S&d*ntiry CultivAtion GVstw.-" IDCJ Workinq Paper No. :4. Jaoant International Devulooment Cnter d Jaoan. Norasard. R.B.i 9 . Possia *nd S. Hecht. 193. Tho Economics of Cattle Ranchino In Eautern Asazonia. Unpublished Pacer. Santos. R. 1984. "Las and Social Chanos The Problea o4 Land in the Brazilian Amazo.," in Frantior Exoansion llb Ammonia. Pt. Schnink and C.H. Wox-d (*du.). 3ain.svillos Universitv of Florida Press. DD.439-462. Sawyer. D.R. 1982. lnduiutrialization of Brazilian Acwiculture and Dobilitation of thv Amwaon Frontie."r Pao.r orecented at a Workina Group on &i-veloo.nt of L&nd %4*e in the Trooics held in Bolo Horizonte. Minas Gerais. Brazil. (uAqust G-13). Silva. L.S. 19,86, "CooolexidadQ E Ine-iciancias A Tributacio Da Rond& Aoricola Na Brasil-" Mf.A. Thesis. Dvazils Universitv of Brazil. . 1987. 4o Imoasse De Tributacao Da Rend& Aqricola." Uncublished Pamor. Brazil. Souza Martins. J. de. 1984. "The State and the Militarization of the Agrarian Question in Brazil." in Frontier Expansion in Aiazonia. M. Schmink and C.H. Wood (ads.). Gainesville: University of Florida. oo.463-49O. Veia Staff. 1981. "A Posso dos Pobrcs." VeJa. 2(Dezembra): 74- 78. Wilson. J.F. 19 . "Paulo Noroeste: Who Was That Man Behina rhose Foster Grants'- Unoutlished Paoer. Florida: Center for f;merxcan Studies. Deat.. of .nthroooloov. University of Florida. Wilson. M. 1965. "Reooort on Ilew Settlements: Cujuoim. Uruoa. and Machadinho." Consultar.t reoort for the Wcorld Bank. (OCtOber). W,-ld Bank. 1981. "Brazil: Northwest Rea2on Oevelooment Prooram-First Fhase of the Aaricultural Deyelooment and Environmental Frotect2on Prcject." Staff Aooraisal Reoort No. 3Zi2b-BR. lIAC Frojects Deoartmont. (October 3'). 1981. "Peoort and R?commendation of the Presil t of IBRD to the Executive Direct:ors on d Prooosed Loan tco t.e Federal Reoublic of Brazil for a Northwest H:ahwav Project." Reoort No. P-3138-BR. (November S). - 41 - _________ . 1981. R"ooort and recorumendation o4 the Pregident of IDP.D to the Ex cutivo Directors on a Prooo.ed Loan to the Federal Repoublic o4 Brazil for * Northwest Recion Health Project.. aort 14. PFS-3139- (Nov,eber 9). , _. 1982. Brazill Northwest Raiorn Deve-ooment ProqraAe- Phase It(Mato Grosso Rural Develooment project).' Staff Apraiul _ort No. . (larch 4). * 19V2. "Brazilg Caaj^as Iron Ore Project." staff Aporaisal Rat M. 3921-BR. W4ashinQaton,' D.C.sIndustry Deoart.ent and the Latin Aerica & the Caribbean ProJects Deoartoent. (July 4). - _ 19853 "Brazil: Novthw.st R*Qion Develoomwnt Proqra - Phase 1I2New S.xttl.eents Project)." Staff APprWIsal RDot No* 4424-Dt. tAucust 2b). ,_ 1985. "Brazil-Northwast Proaram-St.otus Regort." WashinQton. D.C.: The World Bank. (October). - 6.2 - DISCUSSIOI PAPERS AGRt/usearcb Utit Report Na.: ARU I Agricultural Machanization: A Comparative Historical Perspectlve by Hans P. Blinewanger, October 30, 1982. Report io.: ARU 2 The Acquisition of Information and the Adoption of Now Technology by Gerohon Fader and Roger Slade, September 1982. Report No.: ARU 3 Selecting Contact Farmers for Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System '4 Haryana, lndia By Gershon Feder and Roger Slade, August 1982. Report No.: ARU 4 The Impact of Attitudes Toward Risk on Agricultural Decisions in Rural India by Hans P. Binswanger, Dayanatha Jha, T. Balarauaiah and Donald A. Sillers, May 1982. Repor No.: ARU 5 Behavior and Material Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture by Hans P. 8inswanger and Mark R. Rosensweig. June 1982 (Revised July 22. 1985). R.evised December 1985. Report No.: ARU 6 The Demand for Food and Foodgrain Quality in India by Hans P. Binswanger, Jaime B. Quibon and Curushri Swamy, November 1982. Report No.: ARU 7 Policy~tmplications of Research on Energy Intake and Activity-Levels with Reference to the Debate of the Energy Adequacy of Existing Diets in Developing Countries by Shlomo Reutlinger, May 1983. Report No.: ARU 8 More Effective Aid to tha World's Poor and Hungry: A Fresh Look at United States Public Law 480, Title It Food Aid by Shlomo Reutlinger, Juna 1983. Report No.: ARU 9 Factor Gains and Losses in the Indian Semi-Arid Tropics: A Didactic Approach to Modeling the AgriculturAl Sector by Jaima B. Quizon and Hann P. Binswavtar, Scptarber 1983 (Revised Kay 1984). Report No.: ARU 10 The Distribution of Income in India's Northern Wheat Rejion By Jaime B. Quizon, Hane P. Binswanger and Dtvendra G-uptA, August 1983 (Revised June 1984). - 43 - Discussion Paers (continued) Report 8o.: ARU It PopulatiOa DeasOty, Farming Intenstty, Patterna of Lab4r-Use and Mechanization by Prabhu L. Pingali and Hans P. Binswanger, September 1983. Report No.: AU 12 The Nuritional fmpact of Food Aid: Critria for tho Selection of Coot- Effective boods by Shloso L4utlingor and Judith Katoca-Apto, Saptewber 1983. Report No.: ADZ 13 Project Food &14 and Zquitabla Growtht Incon=-Tranafer Efficioncy Firs:! by .Shlomo Rautlinger, Augu5t 1983. Report No.: ADD 14 lutritional Impact of Agricultural Prujects: A Conceptual Fra=xvork for Modifying the Design and Implem3ncation of Projecta by Shl-- Routlinger, August 2, 1983. Report No.: AiD 15 Patterns of Agricultural Projection by Hans P. Binsvang.r and Peoqualo L.. Sc&ndizzo, November 15, 1983. RopOrt No.: ADU 16 Factor Costs, 1ncom3 and Supply Shares in Indian Agriculturo by Rarnjan Pal and Jaei= Quizon, Dccember 1983. Report No.: ARU 17 Behavioral and Material Daterminantfs of Production Relations in Land Abundant Tropical Agriculture by Hans P. BLnewanger and John McIntire, January 1984. Report No.: ARV 18 The Relation Between Farm 3ize and Farm Productivity: The Role of Vamity- by Gershon Feder, December 1983. Report No.: ARU .9 A Comparative Analysis of Soma Aspects of the Training and'Visit Syscem of Agricultural Extension in tndia by Cershon Feder and Roger Slade, February 1984. Report No.: ARU 20 Distributional Consequences of Alternative Food Policies in India by Hans P. 3lna.anger and Jalie S. Quizon, August 31, 1984. Roport No.: ARU 21 Incomo Distribution in India: The Impact of Policias and Crowth in the Agricultural Sector by Jaime B. Quizon and Hans P. Binevanger, November 1984 (Ravised October 1985). - 44 - Discussion Papers (continued) Repart No.: ARU 22 Population Density and Agricultural Intensification: A Study of the Evolution of Technologies in Tropical Agriculture by Prabhu L. Pingali and Hans P. Binswanger, October 17, 1984. Report No.: ARU 23 The Evolution of Farming Systems in Agricultural Technology in Sub-Saharan Africs by Hans F. Binevanger and Prabhu L. Pingali, October 1964. Report No.: ARU 24 Population Density and Farming System - The Changing Locts of Innovatioas and Technical C ange by Prahbu L. ?ingali and Rar-. P. Sinawanger, October 1984. Report No.: ARU 25 Th2 Training and Visit Extension System: An Analysis of 0perations and Effects by G. Fader, R. H. Slade and A. K. Sundaram, November i984. Report No.: ARU 26 The Role of Public Policy in the Diffusion of New Agricultural Technology by Garshon Feder and Roger Slade, October 1984. Report No.: ARU 27 Fertilizer Subsidies: A Review of Policy Issues vith Special Emphasis on Western Africa by Hain Shalit and Hans P. Binsvanger, November 1984 (Revised November 1985). Report No.: ARU 23 From Land-Abundance to Land Scarcity: The Effects of Population Growth on Production Relations in Agrarian Economies by,Mark R. Rosonzveig, Hans P. 3Sinswanger and John McIntire,> November 1984. Report No.: ARU 29 The Impact of Rural Electrification and Infrastructure on Agricultural Changes in India, 1966-1980 by Dougla F. Barnes and Hans P. Binowanger, Decemb:r 1984. Report No.: ARU 30 Public Tractor Hire and Equipenot Hire Schemao in Developiag Countries (with special emphasis on Africa). A study prepared by the Overseas Division, National Institute of Agricultural Engineering (OD/NIAE) by P. J. Seager and R. S. Fioldion, November 1984. Report No.: ARU 31 Evaluating Research System Performance and Targeting Research in Land Abundant Areas of Sub-Saharan Africa by Hans P. Binsvanger, January 1985. - 45 - Discussion Papers (concinued) Report No.: ANU 32 On the Provision of Extension Services in Third World Agriculture by Alastair J. Fischer (Consultant), Januarv 1985. Report No,f ARU 33 An Economic Appraisal of Withdrawing Fertilizer Subsidies in India by Jaime S. Quizon, April 1985 (Revised Aaust 1985). Report No.: AID 34- The Impact of Agricultural Ertenasont A Cas" Study of the Training and Visit Method (T4V) in Haryana by GCrshou Feder, Larrence J. Lau and Roger R. Slad*, March 1985. Report No.: ARD 35 Managing Water Managers: Deterring Expropriation, or Equity ass Control Mechanism by Robert Wade, Apr1i 1985 Report No.: ARD-36 Coon Property Resource Man.gemnt in South Indian Villages by Robert Wade, April 1985. Report No.: ARU 37 On the Sociology of Irrigation: How do we Know the Truth about Canal Performance? by Robert Wade, Kay 1985. Report No.: ARU 38 Some Organizations Concerned vith Animal Traction Research and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa by Paul Starkey, April 1985. Report No.: ARU 39 The Economic Consequences of an Open Trade Policy for Rice in Indii by Jaime B. Quizon and James BarbLeri, June 1985. Report No.: ARU 40 Agricultural Mochanizution and the Evolution of Farming Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa by Prabhu L. Pingali, Yves Bigot and Hans P. Binswanger, May 1985. Roport No.: ARU 41 ast-lasian Financiar System as a Challange to Econoalcs: The Adventures of -Rigidity,0 with particular reference to Taiwan by Rober Wade, June 1985. Report No.: AMD 42 EducatLon, Experience and Imperfect Processing of Information in the Adoption of Innovations by Alastair J. Fischer, June 1985. Report No.: ARU 43 A Raview of the Literatu:e on Land Tenura Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa by Raymond Noronha, July 1985. Discussion Paners (continued) Report No.:. ARU 44 Policy Options for food Security. by Shlomo Reutlinger, July 1985. Report No.: ARU 45 Credit Markets in Rural South India: Theoretical Issues and EmpIrical Analysis. by H. Binswanger, T. Balarasaiah, V. Bashkar Rao, M.J. Bhende and K.V. Kashirsagar, July 1985. Report No.: ARU 46 The Impact of Agricultural Extension: The Training and Visit System in India. by Garshon Fader and Roger 3lade, June 1985. Report No.: ARU 47 Methodological Issues in the Evaluation of Extansion Impact. by Cershon Fader and Roger Slade, July 1985. Report No.: ARtU 48 Estimation of Aggregate Agricultural Supply Response. by Hans Binswangar, Yair Hundlak, Maw-Cheng Yang and Alan Bovers August 1985 (Revisad October 1985). Report No.: ARU 49 Land Values and Land Title Security in Rural Thailand. by Yongyuth Chalawvong and G*rshon Feder, June 1985 (Revised October 1985). Report No.: ARU 50 Lar, Ownership Security and Capital Formation in Rural Thailand. larshon Fader and Tongroj Onchan, December 1985 (Revised February 1). Report No.: ARU 51 Land Ownership Sacurity and Farm Productivity in Rural Thailand. by Garshon Fader, April 1986. Reiort No.: ARU 52 Social and Cultural Aspects of Land Inheritance and Transactions in Rural Thailand. by Charles B. Mall, June 1986. - 47 - Discussion Papa:$ (concinued) xaporc no.. ART 53 Land Ovnership Stcurl.y and Access to Credit ti Rural Thailand. bry Grshon Feder, Tongroj Onchan and T.Jaawt Raparla, April l986. Rtporr No.: ARU 54 rhe XManagemenc f Conon Property Rsourcas: Coll4ccive Action as an Alternstive co Privacizac±on or Stac4 l.gulation. by Robert Wads, Vay 1986. Report No.: ARU 55 Land Poicieas and Parm Productivity in Thailand's Forest Raserve Areas by Gershon Feader, Tongroj Onchan and Yongyuth Cha&l Sg, August 1986. Report No.: ARU 56 an the Determinants of Cross-Country Aggregate Agricultural Supply by Hans Binavenger, Yair ?Lndlak, Xav-Chneg Yang and Alan Bovers, September 1986. Report lo.. ARU 57 Whac Can Agriculture Do for the Poorest Bural Groups? by Hans P. Birswanger, and Jaime B. Quizon, September 1986. Report No.: ARU 58 Population Density, Market Access and Farmer-Generated Technical Chatige in Sub-Saharan Africa by Prabhu L. Pingali and Hans P. Binawanger, September 1986. Report No.: ARU 59 Credit Markets, Wealth and Endowments in Rural South lndia.by Hans P. Bin3wanger and Mark R. Rosenzweig, December 1-5. 1986. Report No.: ARU 60 Resource Endowments, Farming Syscems;and Technology Priorities foe Sub-Saharan Africa by Hans P. 3in'swanger and Prabhu P'ngali, fove-ber 1986. Report 'lo.; ARS 61 Rural Faccor Markets in China After the HOusehold Responsibility Sysrem Report by Justin Yifu Lin, November 1986. Report No.: ARU 62 Determinatns of Women's Time Allocation in Rural Bangladesh by Shahidur R. Khandker, Febriary 1987. Report No.: ARS 63 Management Probl.es in Irrigated Java : Beyond Rice Self-Sufficiency by Andrew Stone, March 1987. - 48 - (cintinuod) h: Dort %~o. A 1R$ 61* Land L4Lhto SyyttA and Agricultural DevQlopant in Sub-Saharan Africa by Gorohon ?cde and Raymond Noronha, February 1987. Raport No.: ARD 65 Land Bo8iotration and Titling from an ZconoaiSt'a Porapoctivo: A Caoe Study in Rural Thailand by Garohon Fodor, Pabruary 1987. Roeort No.: ARU 66 Land OCnmrchip Socurity, Farm Productivity, and Land Policleo in Thailand by Gershon Fedor, Tougroj Onchan, Yongyuth Chalanwona, and Chira Hongladaroa. April 1987. Report No.: ARU 67 Farm/Non-Farm Linkagso in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implicationa by Steve Eagablade, Peter Hazoll and James Brown, May 20, 1987. Report No.: ARU 68 Urban Malnutrition and Food Interventions by Shlomo Reutlinger, March 1987. Report No.: ARU 69 Fiscal and Legal Incentives with Environmental Effects on the Brazilian Amazon by Hans P. Binswanger, May 1987.