48955 State of the Cities Report 2004 1 Published by the South African Cities Network First edition 2004 ISBN: 620-31150-9 All rights reserved Acknowledgements SACN Board: Elroy Africa (DPLG), Andrew Boraine (Chairperson), Mzimasi Mangcotywa (Nelson Mandela), Mojalefa Matlole (Mangaung), Dr Wallace Mgoqi (Cape Town), David Morema (Ekurhuleni, Vice Chairperson), Blake Moseley-Lefatola (Tshwane), Monty Narsoo (Executive Director), Bheki Nene (Msunduzi), Thomas Phakathi (Johannesburg), Judy Sibisi (SALGA), Dr Michael Sutcliffe (eThekwini), Mxolisi Tsika (Buffalo City) Editor in chief: Andrew Boraine Project manager: Carien Engelbrecht Principal author: Graeme Gotz Contributing authors: Kevin Allan, Kirsten Harrison Editorial committee: Andrew Boraine, Monty Narsoo, Sithole Mbanga, Dave de Groot, Carien Engelbrecht, Sarah Hetherington, Graeme Gotz Data analysis: Dr Owen Crankshaw, Citizen Surveys, Dataworld, Global Insight Final data verification: Prof Charles Simkins Authors of box inserts: Dynamics in the informal economy: Chris Rogerson, University of the Witwatersrand Industrial & commercial property trends: Viruly Consulting SACN HIV/AIDS programme of action: International Organisation Development (SA) The energy/ecological footprint challenge: Barrie Gasson, University of Cape Town Intra-urban health differentials: Liz Thomas, Medical Research Council Municipal financial viability: Philip van Ryneveld Authors of life on the streets: Camilla Greene, Sarah Hetherington, Steve Kotze, Detlev Krige, Lochner Marais, Nalini Naidoo, Hendri Pelser, Asha Speckman, Dominique Wooldridge, Xolani Xundu Production management: String Communications Design and layout: Magenta Media The report benefited substantially from expert advice from the following: Councillors and officials of SACN cities, officials from National and Provincial Government departments, SACN Urban Indicators Working Group, SACN Transport Working Group, Lael Bethlehem, Rebecca Black, Greg Clark, Steven Friedman, Jim Hicks, Firoz Khan, Sithole Mbanga, Lyndsay Neilson, Brian O'Leary, Edgar Pieterse, Jenny Robinson, Rashid Seedat, Keith Smith, John Spiropoulos, Ivan Turok, Mirjam van Donk, Francois Viruly, and Sarah Ward. Photographs: Paul Alberts, Adil Bradlow, Cape Argus, David Goldblatt (cover), Louise Gubb, Hendri Pelser, John Robinson, Garth Stead, Lori Waselchuk, Paul Weinberg, Graeme Williams. Thanks to South and Trace Images. Administrative support: SACN secretariat Principal funder: The contribution and support of the Cities Alliance is gratefully acknowledged. 2 Contents PREFACE ..............................................................................................4 CHAPTER 1: FINDINGS ........................................................................6 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS ........................................................8 LIFE ON THE STREETS: WARWICK JUNCTION, eTHEKWINI.......19 CHAPTER 2: URBAN REALITY ...........................................................20 SOUTH AFRICA'S URBAN REALITY AND AN OVERVIEW OF ITS KEY CITIES ....................................................22 LIFE ON THE STREETS: QUARTZ STREET, JOHANNESBURG ......32 LIFE ON THE STREETS: LONGMARKET STREET, MSUNDUZI .....33 CHAPTER 3: DEMOGRAPHICS............................................................34 THE STATE OF THE URBAN POPULATION ....................................36 LIFE ON THE STREETS: NEW ROAD, MIDRAND...........................45 CHAPTER 4: PRODUCTIVE CITIES .....................................................46 URBAN ECONOMY TRENDS AND THE STATE OF THE PRODUCTIVE CITY ........................................................................48 LIFE ON THE STREETS: MELUMZI ROAD, NELSON MANDELA METROPOLE .................................................73 CHAPTER 5: INCLUSIVE CITIES ........................................................74 SOCIAL TRENDS AND THE STATE OF THE INCLUSIVE CITY .......76 LIFE ON THE STREETS: KHUMALO ROAD, EKURHULENI .........107 CHAPTER 6: SUSTAINABLE CITIES.................................................108 BUILT- AND NATURAL-ENVIRONMENT TRENDS AND THE STATE OF THE SUSTAINABLE CITY ...........................110 LIFE ON THE STREETS: VICTORIA ROAD, CAPE TOWN .............131 CHAPTER 7: WELL-GOVERNED CITIES ...........................................132 GOVERNANCE TRENDS AND THE STATE OF THE GOVERNANCE CITY ............................................................134 LIFE ON THE STREETS: THE N8, MANGAUNG ...........................163 CHAPTER 8: CHALLENGES ..............................................................164 THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE ....................................................................166 LIFE ON THE STREETS: QUMZA HIGHWAY, BUFFALO CITY .....172 CHAPTER 9: STATISTICAL ALMANAC..............................................173 THE IMPORTANCE OF INDICATORS AND BUILDING ON THE WORK ALREADY DONE................................174 STATISTICAL ALMANAC .............................................................179 TABLE OF FIGURES.....................................................................194 3 PREFACE ACE The South African Cities Network (SACN) was launched in Johannesburg in PREF October 2002. The SACN is a network of South African cities and partners that encourages the exchange of information, experience and best practices on urban development and city management. It is an initiative of the Minister for Provincial and Local Government and nine city municipalities, in partnership with the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), and national and provincial government departments. With the names of their historical urban centres, the nine cities are: Buffalo City Local Municipality (East London); City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality (Cape Town); Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Gauteng's so called East Rand), eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (Durban); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (Johannesburg); Mangaung Local Municipality (Bloemfontein); Msunduzi Local Municipality (Pietermaritzburg); Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (Port Elizabeth); and City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (Pretoria). South Africa's economy, like that of many developed and fast-developing nations, is now essentially an urban economy. This means it is ever more dependent on whether the economies of its largest cities work well. Consequently, the goals of the SACN are to: · Promote good governance and management of South African cities · Analyse strategic challenges facing South African cities, particularly in the context of global economic integration · Collect, analyse, disseminate and apply the experience of city government in a South African context · Promote a shared-learning partnership between different spheres of government to support the governance of South African cities. The activities of the SACN are designed to update city leaders and decision- makers on current and emerging changes and trends in urban policy across the world and in South Africa; promote innovation and strategic thinking between cities and other spheres of government; foster cooperation and exchange of best practice; generate options and make recommendations to members; mobilise the capacity of cities to support local government and national development; and, strengthen linkages between cities, towns and rural areas. The core programme of the SACN focuses on city development strategies. This includes building the capabilities of South African cities to analyse their comparative competitive advantages in the global economy, adopt a 15 to 20 year development plan for the city, align public sector investments, and mobilise stakeholders and resources for implementation. Within this framework, the SACN has a number of specific programmes and projects focusing on urban renewal, metropolitan economic development, transportation, HIV/Aids mitigation, and city development indicators Instruments for information exchange and networking include peer review; research; quick briefs and special reports; seminars and workshops; training and capacity building; documentation of best practices and innovations; electronic database and thematic reference groups. Further information on the work of the SACN is available at www.sacities.net. 4 PRODUCTIVE CITIES WHY THIS REPORT NOW? This is the first report to be issued by the SACN on the `State of South African Cities'. The report takes a hard look at the forces that have transformed the country's largest cities over the decade since 1994 and asks, if the current trends continue, whether cities can expect positive or negative things in the years to come. As part of the process of celebrating 10 years of democracy, the Office of the President has led a `Ten Year Review' to assess what has been achieved over the last decade, and to define the strategic challenges for the future. Substantial preliminary research and thinking was released in October 2003 in the publication Towards a Ten Year Review. This document invited other stakeholders, including other spheres of government, civil society, trade unions, universities, and the private sector, to contribute their own sector reviews during the course of 2004. It is envisaged that together these assessments will "help inform the nation's evaluation of itself in the First Decade of Freedom". This State of South African Cities Report is the South African Cities Network's contribution to the Ten Year Review. The report does three things. First, it tries to read which way the winds of city change are blowing. The report consolidates available data from many sources into a `statistical almanac' covering the nine SACN cities. Using this data it describes and analyses key trends currently affecting these centres. It looks at how these trends are likely to evolve over time and considers what strategic challenges and opportunities they are likely to bring. Second, the report assesses how city stakeholders are responding to these winds of change and acknowledges the important efforts that city leaders and decision makers are already making. Third, the report discusses the implications of current trends and responses for the future of South African cities. The report speculates on how various trends may unfold, and what the likely medium to longer-term outcome of these may be. Through description and analysis of trends it hopes to set up a strategic agenda for further research, planning and action that will decisively improve the future prospects of life in South African cities. This report makes a distinction between `municipalities' and `cities'. While it refers to the cities by means of the municipalities' names, it is not only about municipal concerns. When it describes what is going on in `Msunduzi', `Nelson Mandela' or `Tshwane' this report therefore refers not only to things happening inside council offices, but also to broader urban developments and dynamics that municipalities have traditionally not been solely, or even directly, responsible for. The best example of this is development in the urban economy. The report is also not only for municipal councillors and officials. It certainly addresses municipalities. But it also speaks to other entities responsible, in one way or another, for city development, including national and provincial government, business, communities, and a wide variety of civil society structures. I wish to express my appreciation to those who were involved in this State of the Cities report, and to all colleagues involved in working tirelessly towards making our cities better places for all our people to live, work and play. Andrew Boraine Chairperson South African Cities Network 5 FINDINGS1: CHAPTER Shaped by powerful new forces, South Africa'slargest urban centres have changed in the ten years since the birth of democracyin 1994 FINDINGS CHAPTER 1. FINDINGS FINDINGS SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS The South African Cities Network has developed a State of the Cities analytical framework which forms the basis of this report, clustering issues within the areas of productive, inclusive, sustainable and well-governed cities. In addition, demographic status and trends are of major concern to cities. Within each of these areas, the following key findings stand out. DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES The size, form and character of its population is the ultimate concern of any city. Population size is the result of three things, birth, death and movement into and out of the city. Form refers to a range of population features, including age structure, life-expectancy, family size and typical household composition. Character refers to the relationship between population and place, chiefly whether residents are historically settled and inclined to regard themselves as belonging to the city, or are mostly new in-migrants, temporary inhabitants or highly-mobile potential out-migrants who see possible futures elsewhere. The urban population challenge left by apartheid South African cities have been left specific population challenges with the demographics of South Africa's cities massively distorted by apartheid policies. Apartheid not only left its mark on the size and shape of urban populations by distorting where people lived. It also misshaped the `character' of urban inhabitants, warping attitudes to urban living by forcing millions of people into life strategies based on dual households and temporary migration from rural to urban areas and back again. The state of the urban population One of the most important strategic issues facing South African cities is `city growth'. Although the winds of change are not easy to read a number of key trends are noted in the analysis. · On average, South African cities have grown much faster than the national population since the 1970s, although the exact picture is obscured by the fact that the so-called TBVC states were never covered in South African censuses. The cities grew particularly fast after the end of apartheid with average population growth rates of approximately 4,4% between 1991 and 2001. The rate of growth was understandably highest immediately after apartheid restrictions on movement were removed. But city growth has slowed considerably in the 1996 to 2001 period, and now looks much as it did in the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn was a lot slower than in the decades before this. · Not all of the nine SACN cities are growing equally fast. In fact, according to the 1996 and 2001 censuses, four of the nine cities are growing at a rate less than that of the South African population outside the country's 21 largest urban centres, a rate of only 1,4%. Some of the fastest growth is happening in South Africa's tier of secondary cities. This grouping is 8 FINDINGS also seeing cities with hyper-fast growth of over 8% per annum, and some cities that are depopulating at ­3% per annum. · Migration accounts for the current city growth trends. There is evidence that permanent migration to cities has been relatively small, and that which has occurred is balanced by return permanent migration from urban areas to rural villages. Meanwhile the apartheid pattern of temporary or circular migration, where younger members of a rural household move to a city to find work, maintaining consistent contact with their rural home, and sending back remittances whenever they can, is continuing. A key trend here is the migration of secondary school children in the 15-19 year age group. City to city migration is also increasing. · The impact of HIV and AIDS on city populations cannot yet be seen, but cities will not escape the effects of the epidemic. In fact they may be worse affected if late stage AIDS drives migrants to seek family care and more dignified deaths back in rural areas. There is evidence that the STATE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK PRODUCTIVE CITY INCLUSIVE CITY Planning perspective: Planning perspective: Can the local economy provide a majority of residents with Do residents have the opportunities and capacities to share means to earn a reasonable living? equitably in the social benefits of city life. Post-apartheid challenge: Post-apartheid challenge: Negligible public and private sector investment in bases for Core feature of South African cities is inequality. Large industry efficiency other than cheap surplus labour. Hence an numbers of residents marginalised into under-serviced artificially small middle class and therefore weak domestic ghettos on the edges of cities, where geographically, demand; and the productive capacity of large section of the materially and psychologically distanced from the population under-valued and un-harnessed. opportunities and advantages of city life. This report looks at: This report looks at: Employment and remuneration trends and especially Progress in providing residents with access to key the relative attractiveness of cities in terms of infrastructure based service; divides in their ability to provide residents with a wealth, ability to build assets and means to earn a living; factors secure against risk; spatial illustrating and explaining the URBAN POPULATION exclusion; human strength of the urban economy; and development and quality of how cities are responding to Planning perspective: life. Also what cities are urban economy weaknesses in Urban population size, shape and well-being over the doing to address this. a globalising economy. long term, given the commitment that residents ultimately have to making their lives in the city Post-apartheid challenge: On one hand, distortions in where people lived across SA and therefore pent-up demand for urban lives denied by apartheid On the other, a highly mobile floating population, with entrenched patterns of rural to urban and return temporary migration. This report looks at: SUSTAINABLE CITY Complex city growth trends. Dynamics of migration, WELL-GOVERNED CITY disease and household formation driving Planning perspective: these. Planning perspective: How is the city impacting on the store Is the political & institutional of natural resources that sustains the context stable, open and dynamic settlement and makes it livable? enough to give a sense of security Post-apartheid challenge: that varied interests can be Apartheid spatial planning left SA cities with built accommodated? environments that were dysfunctional and, in turn, resource Post-apartheid challenge: inefficient. Reversing apartheid has unfortunately meant Bad relations between communities and municipalities, poor reinforcing and exacerbating these inefficiencies, as more and public participation, discord between and with communities, more residents claim highly resource-intensive livelihoods from and high levels of crime and violence. Also financially and which they were previously excluded. administratively weak institutions of government. This report looks at: The report looks at: The urban-environmental challenge that apartheid built- How well South African cities are governed, including: environment planning created; the trends in urban form evidence of social discord and disintegration; institutional resulting from post-apartheid settlement policies; measurable stability and efficacy, ability to govern in a complex impacts on natural resources and the consequences thereof; intergovernmental context without a clear national urban and what cities are doing to construct sustainability agendas. policy and well aligned development incentives. 9 FINDINGS epidemic may be impacting on fertility and on women between the ages of 25 and 34 in some cities. · The movement between cities and rural parts of the country, as well as between cities, is having a marked impact on the shape of cities. But just as important is population re-dispersal within cities. Whereas the population of the nine SACN cities collectively grew 14,8% between 1996 and 2001, the growth in the number of households was 27,5%. Household growth reached almost 40% in two of the nine cities. This can only be explained by households splitting. Household decomposition reflects the removal of apartheid barriers to residential location within cities, and the success of an RDP housing programme that produced many new greenfield housing estates. It signals increasing intra-urban movement of people. Across the cities 8,9% of people surveyed in the 2001 census were living elsewhere in the same city five years before. URBAN ECONOMY CHALLENGES AND THE PRODUCTIVE CITY The size, shape and character of a city population is closely entwined with local economic prospects. There are a number of dimensions to the relationship. On the one hand, big cities tend to support wealth-creating activities because they facilitate generative interactions between an ever larger number of people. They deepen market demand and stimulate new productive activity. On the other hand city economies affect population size. Well-performing cities often see population increases above the natural growth rate, as migrants are attracted by what they perceive as relatively greater economic opportunities. This is usually a good thing from the perspective of a country. It creates conditions for higher economic growth and, as the cost to benefit of having more children increases in urban areas, it drives down fertility rates. However, this positive relationship assumes that cities can offer residents a viable means to earn a living. If a city cannot, populations will `float', disinvesting from the city psychologically, materially and physically, with the young, mobile, wealthy and highly skilled leaving first. The urban economic challenge left by apartheid In various ways apartheid left cities with a very weak economic base. In most countries growth has historically been driven by the expansion of the middle classes, and the gradual deepening of its pool of wealth. Out of this strata in turn comes the nation's future entrepreneurs and business risk takers. The apartheid urban economy was based instead on the notion that a rich racial minority would drive demand for goods and services, and that a large surplus labour force, whose costs of social reproduction barely needed to be covered, would be the sustainable basis for industry efficiency. This formula worked well for white South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. But well before the end of apartheid it was obvious that the urban economy was in crisis. Complacent that cheap labour was the answer to economic efficiency, both government and industry underinvested in future economic growth drivers. Apartheid policies artificially limited the growth of the middle class. This invariably meant that domestic demand eventually reached its natural growth limits. In addition the potential productive capacity of a large section of the population went under-valued and un-harnessed. 10 FINDINGS Economic trends and the state of the productive city It is often noted that primary and secondary industry in South Africa has declined over time, and the tertiary sector has become more and more important. This is true, but other more fine-grained trends are more important. · Four economic sectors ­ government, social and community services; manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; and transport and communications ­ have continued to add significant value to the South African economy over the last 30 years. But all have failed to contribute comparable increases in jobs in the nine cities. Manufacturing in particular has seen a substantial long-term decline in employment as production processes become increasingly capital intensive and high-tech. The picture is varied by city however. For example Ekurhuleni, once South Africa's manufacturing heartland, lost significant industry employment between 1970 and 2001. But this trend may now have been reversed. It created 30 235 new manufacturing jobs between 1996 and 2001, an increase of 26,1%. The general exception to this picture of jobless growth may seem to be the financial and business sector. But since the latest census data there is evidence that the financial services sector is also losing jobs. · Following a long-term trend from primary and secondary industry into services, there has been a marked decline in employment amongst machine operators and trade workers. This is to be expected. Less expected is a decline in employment amongst professionals by 8,3% between 1996 and 2001. Although this may be driven by trends in some specific occupational sub-groups, such as teachers, it may also be that cities are losing some of those residents they consider to be their primary economic asset ­ workers in high value-adding knowledge industries. An exodus of professional skills from the country may be driving this trend. At the other end of the spectrum there was a total loss of 91 145 jobs in private households between 1996 and 2001. · Of concern is the difference between employment opportunities in the city and those available in other parts of the country - in other cities or in non- urban areas. The census data suggests the surprising finding that while unemployment in the nine cities is on average 3,31% lower than the country as a whole, some of the cities have unemployment rates far higher than even most rural areas. The implication for residents in these particular cities is that it might make more sense to seek employment in rural areas. · A similar picture emerges when levels of monthly income are compared. On average, SACN city workers earn R5 297,22 a month. This is R2 508,16 better than that earned across the country outside the nine cities. To a varying extent the pattern holds for all nine cities. But when the average monthly income earned is compared to the national average, including the nine cities, it emerges that three cities are unable to offer their employed people remuneration better than they might find in another SACN city. · The lack of skills is becoming chronic. Only 26,9% of SACN city residents had a matric certificate in 2001, and only 11,9% had any form of post- school higher education. On the plus side, crimes typically affecting businesses directly, such as burglaries at non-residential properties and fraud, have declined from high levels in the mid- to late-1990s and are now relatively static. 11 FINDINGS Many of the SACN cities have responded to their urban economy challenges in similar ways. Believing that domestic economic demand will never drive economic recovery, South African cities are doing what the economic consensus of the moment says they should do ­ go global. Most of the cities believe that foreign consumer demand for goods and services will allow them to capture sufficient foreign-earned income to slowly drive up local income and demand. There is no evidence that this growth path will not work. But yoking the city economy to global demand holds risk. There are recent signs of economic recovery in the United States of America, but the global export economy, ultimately over-reliant on the US consumer, remains structurally unbalanced and hence potentially fragile. The recent shift towards an export-orientated economy has had little discernable impact on economic performance. Some indicators suggest that urban labour markets have suffered at the same time as economic returns from export industries have improved. Some economic sectors seen by some cities as key to export-led growth have proved highly capricious. Favoured sectors of only two years ago now seem to be shedding labour. The need for more diverse approaches, which include support for higher domestic demand and latent local productive capacity, should be considered. SOCIAL CHALLENGES AND THE INCLUSIVE CITY Cities do not only need to concern themselves with whether they can provide their residents with some means to earn a living. Populations may `float' even when jobs are widely available. Either because of circumstance or choice, they may live in poor social environments that do not allow them to enjoy the benefits of urban life. Their incomes may not be sufficient for them to live better. Or they may calculate that it is better to avoid some of the higher costs of urban living in order to accumulate enough savings to invest in future lives elsewhere. Cities need to look at social development as well as urban economic development. Regardless of whether they can provide populations with adequately remunerated work opportunities, they need to ensure that their residents have the opportunities and capacities ­ both material and psychological ­ to equitably enjoy the social benefits of city life. A city where no residents are denied the benefits of urban living is an `inclusive city'. The social challenge left by apartheid Much of South Africa's population was historically excluded from the benefits of life in the country's largest cities. Black residents were marginalised into under-serviced ghettos on the edges of cities, where they were geographically, materially and psychologically distanced from the opportunities and advantages ordinarily associated with city life. By the end of apartheid the key feature of South African cities was social inequality. Social trends and the state of the inclusive city Considerable effort has been put into rectifying the imbalances of apartheid. In some respects, significant progress has indeed been made in ensuring more equitable access to the benefits of living in cities. In other respects, however, the SACN cities are more unequal today than they were ten years ago, and many social and human development challenges have consequently been compounded. 12 FINDINGS · On the plus side, the absolute numbers of households receiving an acceptable level of service have increased dramatically. This is particularly evident in some service areas, such as waste management. Between 1996 and 2001, the number of households receiving a municipal waste collection service at least weekly increased by 1 048 593. Even while the number of households forced to use their own dumping facilities increased slightly by 18 671, the proportion of households with inadequate waste services (defined as less than collection once a week) fell from 19,4% to 14,6%. · While the absolute numbers of households served has increased noticeably, increasing size of populations and other dynamics have meant that the proportion of households receiving these services has often remained static or improved only marginally. For example, households using electricity for lighting purposes increased by 928 368 between 1996 and 2001. But the number without also increased, resulting in an only modest improvement of households without electricity from 22,3% to 19% of total. This picture is varied across cities, and it does not necessarily follow that cities with the fastest population and household growth performed the poorest in meeting backlogs. · The number of households served has increased across the board. But the access to some levels of services has also declined in absolute terms. The numbers of households receiving running water on site (that is, either in yards or directly in dwelling) increased between 1996 and 2001. But this growth was almost all made up of new yard connections. In all but two of the nine cities, the number of water connections into dwellings decreased in the 1996-2001 period. Both the causes and the likely consequences of this trend need to be considered. One significant cause may be the absolute decline in the numbers of households living in backyard dwellings. The number of formal backyard dwellings declined by 16 073 between 1996 and 2001 (5,1%). The number of informal backyard dwellings declined by a huge 462 849 (65,7%). · The average household income increased from some R48 291 per annum to R71 835 per annum between 1996 and 2001. This apparently healthy increase masks increasing disparities in the distribution of income in the nine SACN cities. Evidence says that the benefits of increased income across the population, and of urban asset formation are being outstripped by deepening wealth divisions and increased social exclusion. For example there was a 179,6% increase in the number of households claiming to have zero income between 1996 and 2001. There have been increases in the number of households earning between R4 800 and R9 600. But there have been substantial declines in the number earning in the middle-range income categories above this. · Inequality is not only felt in distribution of income. Spatial analysis shows that increasing numbers of residents are taking up occupancy in informal settlements on the margins of cities, far from the work opportunities. In 2001, 36,8% of SACN city residents going to work or school made the journey on foot. By contrast only 25,4% made use of a bus or minibus taxi. · Some human development indicators, such as those for health and education, give cause for concern. In some cities, antenatal surveys commissioned by the municipality show HIV and Aids rates of 37%. Levels of education remain generally low. In all but two cities the percentage of residents with no schooling came down between 1996 and 2001. But on 13 FINDINGS average 8% of residents were without any schooling, and a remarkable 61,3% are without a matriculation or school leaving certificate. · A number of the SACN cities have done surveys of their residents' subjective sense of their quality of life. All surveys show that the perceived quality of life is declining amongst black residents, while increasing amongst white residents. This is in spite of the fact that considerable municipal capital has gone into infrastructure expansion in previously disadvantaged communities over the past decade. For example, in Buffalo City's August 2001 quality of life survey of 2 477 households, only 26% of African residents said they were satisfied with their lives, while 84% of white residents reported satisfaction. A number of measures have been introduced by cities to address weaknesses in their inclusiveness. For example, a number of cities have developed poverty strategies. But these tend to be fairly isolated and haphazard, and to focus predominantly on infrastructure provision as the key solution to social problems. BUILT AND NATURAL-ENVIRONMENT CHALLENGES AND THE STATE OF THE SUSTAINABLE CITY City populations, the urban economic activities they are involved in, and the social goods and services they access, need to be organised in space. This `organisation in space' gives rise to an `urban form' or `built environment'. Obviously, population growth, urban economic development and the social aspirations, or desperation of communities, all impact on city form. But in turn the size and shape of cities impacts on quality of life, economic growth and population stability. This is because the built environment impacts on the envelope of natural resources that sustains any settlement and makes it `liveable'. Various impacts are important, including the impact of: water and air pollution on the habitability of the spaces that people use, and in turn public health; the size of cities and the intensity of movement on the time it takes for people to travel and for goods to be moved; the extent of usage on the integrity of key infrastructures such as road networks and sewer systems and the impact of the form of housing on energy usage Because it impacts on the envelope of natural resources the built environment is either conducive or not to tolerable urban living. A city where the built environment overburdens the store of naturally available `resources' ­ space, air, energy, water, time and heritage ­ will not be a `sustainable city', since the costs of so-called `diseconomies of scale' will begin to exceed the benefits of urban life. The urban environment challenge left by apartheid Apartheid policies meant that South African cities historically have an urban form that is not resource efficient. For example, the deliberate spatial separation of residential neighbourhoods into distinct racial segments spread cities out into a low-density sprawl. SA cities therefore have a high impact on available land relative to their population size. And travel within them is costly in terms of time, energy use and pollution effects. The state of the sustainable city In some cities in the developed and developing world, urban environmental challenges resulting from poorly designed city form have been exponentially 14 FINDINGS compounded by population growth. Some now offer barely liveable habitats. Although most South African cities are far from being large enough for this issue to be immediately pressing, the question of their long term sustainability is critical. For various reasons, apartheid cities were designed in such a way that they had a disproportionately high negative impact on the urban environment. Impacts ranged from poorly serviced township areas resulting in high natural resource input costs, and poor waste and sewerage management, through to the excessive energy-use and time inefficiencies from travel in an urban road network sometimes built to impede movement: · The attempts to correct the imbalances of the apartheid era have often exacerbated the high impact of the built environment on natural resources. In particular, perverse incentives have resulted in new housing developments on the margins of cities extending the ecological footprint of the city. For example, there was a net increase of 735 627 informal dwellings not in backyards between 1996 and 2001. There was a further increase of 743 843 formal self-standing houses in this period. Part of this new household formation was driven by the net movement of 478 922 households out of backyards and into formal self-standing houses or informal dwellings. This de-densification of cities creates capacity problems for networked infrastructure, and increases the marginal cost of new service connections, possibly beyond the point where this can be carried by operating cost transfers and cross-subsidisation within a service account. · South Africa is a water stressed country. Projections for the National Spatial Development Perspective show that at least four SACN cities will place enormous pressure on available water in the next two decades, possibly leading to crises. Similarly South Africa has very little prime arable land and much of this just happens to be located proximate to the major urban growth centres of Gauteng. Sensitivity and impact analysis of what the ecological footprint of expanding cities could do to this land raises concerns. · Many of our cities' sewerage networks are now running at near full capacity, and infrastructure laid down in previous decades is reaching the end of its working life. Both unanticipated population growth and new RDP housing developments, many with forms of flush toilets, are placing increased pressure on this capacity. Some South African cities have to spend huge resources each year managing a disproportionate quantity of illegally dumped waste. For example the City of Johannesburg has to deal with 266 139 tons of illegally dumped waste each year next to Tshwane's 115 080. Recycling initiatives, in spite of their potential for job creation, remain in their infancy in most cities. · The transport routes of SACN cities are increasingly congested. This has pollution effects, but also impacts on the efficiency of the urban system that makes life in the cities bearable. The average travel time for a home to work trip in Johannesburg is now 50 minutes. This increases to 91,7 minutes for passengers needing to catch two buses to get to work, and to 120 minutes for passengers having to take a train, bus and taxi. · The ecological impact of the built environment is an increasing concern for many SACN cities. A number have conducted state of the environment reports, and one or two have done full ecological footprint analyses. Such 15 FINDINGS an exercise for Cape Town shows that although the total municipal area for Cape Town is 2 487km2, and its built up area is just 774km2, its energy usage, building materials inputs, waste outputs, and food and fresh water requirements has an effective impact on some 128 264km2, the size of the entire Western Cape province. Various measures to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts are being introduced. However in general terms the SACN cities do not fully recognise the importance of systematically managing the built environment to contain its impact on a limited store of natural resources. GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES AND THE STATE OF CITY GOVERNANCE All cities are contested spaces. Even if the SACN cities perform extremely well in the coming decades it is virtually impossible that every resident will feel that their city is perfectly productive, inclusive or sustainable. This inevitably raises the prospect of groups and movements arising to voice, or fight for, their needs and interests. In most instances this is a healthy phenomenon. Where contestation is vocal, vigorous and formally organised, it strengthens the local democratic state by alerting authorities to social grievances that would otherwise simmer beneath the surface, manifesting as destructive street-level competitive politics, community disintegration, public violence, and crime. It also structures the social body by giving formal channels for people to properly identify and express any lack of satisfaction they may have. This assumes that the population believes that the public sector is able to regulate social and political disorder by effectively anticipating and dealing with possible reasons for disharmony. When city government is manifestly ineffectual, however, the local population may disengage from the local state, and no longer look to public institutions to sort out concerns. This may trigger a downward spiral of increasing government ineffectiveness and disintegrating polities. The effectiveness and efficiency of local government, on its own account and in association with other powerful urban actors, is therefore becoming more and more important. A city where the political and institutional context is stable and dynamic enough to give everyone the security that varied interests can be formally expressed, accommodated and managed is a `well-governed city'. The governance challenge left by apartheid Apartheid left South African cities with particular governance problems. A key challenge has been a weak polity, seen in conflictual relations between communities and municipalities, poor public participation, discord between and within communities, and high levels of crime and violence. Another problem was weak institutions of government. Despite appearances municipalities were poorly structured, under-capacitated and inefficient. Many were left with a weak basis for future financial sustainability. The state of city governance South African cities have done extremely well in containing the instability that marked the first few years of the transition from apartheid. In particular, foundations for stable local democracies have been laid. But despite the positive 16 FINDINGS progress, local states still carry many of the marks of apartheid, and have faced new challenges resulting from rapid settlement and institutional restructuring: · There are generally high, but not necessarily stable, levels of satisfaction of residents with the municipality across key service sectors. These satisfaction levels differ considerably by race and settlement type. For example, only 22% of residents living in informal settlements in Johannesburg felt that the municipality was doing a good or very good job compared to 60% of residents living in wealthier, still predominantly white suburbs. · Levels of public violence and crime increased considerably in the early to mid 1990s. These have stabilised in recent years, but remain unacceptably high. The levels of crime against persons are particularly worrying in that they erode community confidence and harmony. Incidents of indecent assault across a sample of SACN cities increased by 104,2% between 1994 and 2003. And incidents of child-abuse were up 33,6%, incidents of assault up 38,2% and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm up 27,9%. · Severe capacity constraints exist amongst some municipalities, especially with regard to long-term financial stability. The meltdown of the mid- 1990s was regarded chiefly as a short-term financial management crisis. The root causes of a future potential fiscal crisis remain to be addressed. At present, with the exception of Msunduzi, between 78% and 91% of municipal debt in the cities stands at over 90 days outstanding, the cut- off after which debt has historically been understood as unrecoverable. Municipalities are doing as much as they can to gear up the necessary capacity to ensure well-governed cities. There are many experimental government programmes and institutional innovations which are worth highlighting and applauding. As important as municipal capacity to govern the city within municipal competencies, is the ability to act as `city-strategy leaders' able to align the efforts of a range of stakeholders from the public and private sectors. THE RELIABILITY OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS All the demographic and economic statistics in this report contain a degree of sampling error. Statisticians distinguish between a point estimate and a confidence interval around that point. For instance, the point estimate of the population at the time of Census 2001 was 44.8 million. The 95% confidence interval was about 1% of the population either way. This means that there is only a 5% chance that the population fell outside the range of 44.4 million to 49.2 million. It is impracticable to calculate and report confidence intervals for every estimate in this document, but interpretation should be informed by a general sense of sampling error. Of course, there can be other sources of error in these statistics as well. DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS An ideal census should have no sampling error. But there was more than 10% undercount of the population in the 1996 census and more than 16% undercount in 2001. The degree of undercount in both cases was established by a recount of the population in 800 enumerator areas in 1996 and 600 enumerator areas in 2001. The recount was compared with the original count. From this recount, adjustment factors were derived and applied to the original count across the country. In general, the relative confidence interval ­ the size of the confidence interval relative to the point estimate ­ rises as the population size decreases. This means that demographic statistics for the smaller cities are more uncertain than for the larger cities. 17 FINDINGS South Africa lacks an official demographic cohort component projection model. No plausible model can reproduce both the 1996 and 2001 census point estimates exactly, given what is known about fertility, mortality and international migration. So there is an additional source of uncertainty about demographic statistics, the size of which cannot be estimated at present. Economic statistics These divide into two categories: labour market statistics and output or value added statistics. Labour market statistics Statistics South Africa produces several estimates of labour market statistics. There are some from the census, there are firm-based surveys (of which the most important is the Survey of Employment and Earnings, which covers registered firms outside agriculture with a turnover of more than R300 000 per annum) and there are household-based surveys (the October Household Survey from 1994 to 1999 and the Labour Force Survey from 2000 onwards). The limitations of the census estimates is that it is impossible to ask within a census questionnaire the detailed questions necessary to establish the precise labour market status of each individual. The coverage of the Survey of Employment and Earnings became progressively less satisfactory during the 1990s. The basis for sampling was changed in 2001, resulting in a substantial upward jump in its estimate of formal employment. Most of this reflects improved coverage rather than real change. The October Household Survey and Labour Force Survey have asked detailed questions but they have been based on relatively small samples (usually about 30 000 households), so there is large sampling error at the individual city level (less if the nine cities are taken together). The Labour Force Survey's labour market questions differ from those of the October Household Survey, so there is a measure of discontinuity between 1999 and 2000. OUTPUT AND VALUE ADDED STATISTICS In the years immediately after 1994, Statistics South Africa gave priority to demographic and social statistics. The result was that industrial censuses became increasingly out of date and that economic statistics based on samples drawn from them became increasingly unreliable. A decision was taken in the late 1990s to replace industrial censuses with a continuously updated register of businesses, developed with co- operation from the South African Revenue Services. Estimates of gross output by industrial sector from January 2004 will be based on a sample of the new register. These estimates have not been published at the time of writing, but there may be substantial discontinuities in 2004, since the 2003 estimates were based on samples drawn from the 1988 industrial census with some adjustments in the early 1990s. It is likely that Global Insight, the company that has produced Gross Value Added statistics in this report, will need to adjust their estimates when new data are released by Statistics South Africa. Comparison of 1996 census incomes with 2001 census incomes There are two reasons why it may be very misleading to compare mean incomes and measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient between the 1996 and 2001 censuses. The first is that all households which had a missing income for any person receiving income had their household income set to missing. In this way, many households were excluded from household income tabulations, possibly seriously biasing the results. The second is that in 2001, although missing incomes for workers were imputed, it appears from the Labour Force Survey that approximately a million informal sector workers were missed in the census. It may be that some receipts of old-age pensions were missed as well. The outcome is that, nationally, 23% of households were reported as receiving zero income. While some households may be living by consuming capital, it is implausible that 23% of all households are doing so. It is more likely that many of these households are in receipt of low incomes. 18 FINDINGS LIFE ON THE STREETS WARWICK JUNCTION, eTHEKWINI Warwick Avenue is part of a junction of streets that form a thriving commercial precinct in the metropolitan landscape of Durban. With commuter traffic, formal and informal trade, it's part of the substance of the city's identity. The extremities of Warwick Avenue are defined by the movement of people. At the southern end, where Warwick joins West Street, a regional minibus taxi terminus, housed under a vast canopy of corrugated iron, serves much of rural KwaZulu- Natal. It provides commuters entering Durban with access to West Street, where they can find further transport into the commercial part of the city, or to the Russell Street ranks that take them to the residential areas. A large terminus for municipal and private buses that also serve residential areas delineates the upper end of the avenue. Collectively, these are the engines which drive the economy of Warwick Avenue junction, which has an annual turnover on par with the Pavilion shopping centre in the upmarket suburb of Westville. It is estimated that a million people a day move through these ranks, providing a market base for an extremely diverse range of products. The heart is the fruit and vegetable market. Enclosed behind tall walls, with gate-posts topped by Oriental-type decorations that reflect its status as the old `Indian' market, rows and rows of individually owned stalls sell fresh produce displayed in a rampage of colour and texture. Audibility is impaired by the low roar of incessant traffic outside and the loud murmur of crowds inside the walls, punctured by the occasional cock crowing. Here, however, is a level of interaction with vendors, other consumers, and the products that malls are bereft of. Adjacent to the market gate that opens onto Warwick Avenue are a variety of food vendors, the most celebrated of which sell inhloko, or bovine heads. Until recently, the sight of cattle skulls cleaved apart on the crowded pavement was an everyday event, the delicacies prepared and cooked on site. For sanitary reasons and to prevent fat clogging the storm-water drains, this part of the process has been moved to a site nearby. Also common is the cheapest, most rewarding meal in town ­ a mealie on the cob. A seasonal fast food that retails at R2 during the summer months, this most humble of snacks commands a respectable share of the market. Providing employment to around 400 people, the cooked mealie sector has a turnover of roughly R1 million per week. As part of an effort to regularise these unusual catering ventures, eThekwini municipality provides centralised services for hawkers to encourage registration and to help monitor conditions. Opposite the City Market, the Prince Cyril Zulu Communicable Disease Clinic is situated within easy reach for commuters. The spare, modern design of the building, including an abundance of glass and straight edges demonstrates the function of architecture in raising the aesthetic level of a streetscape. A dual aerial walkway joins Warwick Avenue and the market to the Russell Street ranks and the two sections of the walkway are very neatly defined: traditional and contemporary. The former is an uncompleted road off-ramp that has been redesigned to become the city's premier herbalist market, where flora and fauna used as imithi, or medicine, can be purchased. Several izinyanga (traditional healers) have consulting rooms at the lower end of the passage, creating a unique traditional medical centre that has become a popular tourist destination. On the sidewalk along the edge of West Street's old cemetery, in which the divisions of Islamic, Christian and Jewish burial places are visible from above, dressmakers provide prêt-a-porter couture for the masses, racks of simple wrap-around iphinifa (pinafore) frocks in blue or red isishweshwe floral prints. Road-side barbers do business in stands covered in yellow material painted with the styles available, often the distinctive handiwork of the Congolese artist Bruno. Across the road, packed blocks in the vicinity of the fading pink and purple walls of Victoria Street market, more recognisable shops emerge. Tiny trading stores supply an assortment of goods that range from imported saris and kurtas, bolts of traditional isishweshwe cloth and loose beads to shoes, knives and hardware. On the pavements, cheek by jowl with imithi stands displaying dried horse lungs and baboon heads, hawkers offer cheap plastic table cloths and plates printed with images of Batman and the Power Puff Girls. It is impossible to overstate the diversity of sensory and shopping experience available in one of Durban's oldest trading neighbourhoods. Towering over it all are two beautiful structures that dominate the area architecturally and spiritually, the Grey Street Mosque and the Emmanuel Cathedral, bringing some gravitas to the swirl of commerce beneath them. 19 REALITY URBAN2: CHAPTER Almost half of allcountries use administrativecriteria to distinguish when a settlement is urban URBAN REALITY CHAPTER 2. SOUTH AFRICA'S URBAN REALITY AND AN OVERVIEW OF ITS KEY CITIES REALITY There is no comprehensive picture of South Africa's human settlement patterns and forms. However, an overview of what is `urban' and of the nature of the URBAN South African city is key to understanding the current state of the country's major cities. THE SOUTH AFRICAN `URBAN': UNDERSTANDING THE SHAPE AND SIZE OF CITIES Definitional issues Any assessment of broader urban trends depends on the definition of `urban'. There is always a sense that one will know an urban (or rural) settlement when one sees it. But translating this `intuitive obviousness' into a formal definition that enables sensible quantitative data collection and analysis, let alone meaningful policy, is not easy. Countries use very different criteria to define urban and rural, and South Africa's own definition has changed over time. Almost half of all countries use administrative criteria to distinguish when a settlement is urban. So, for example, South Africa has historically defined any settlement covered by a local authority as an `urban area'. Many countries agree that settlements over 20 000 people, and over 1 000 persons per square kilometre in density, are urban. But some countries use much lower cut-offs. A few use economic activity to distinguish those areas where agricultural livelihoods pre-dominate as not-urban, often in combination with other criteria. South Africa is currently experimenting with a method that involves categorizing census enumerator areas on the basis of a mix of criteria, including the structure of the built environment (eg formal or informal housing), land use (eg farming) and political institutions present (eg tribal authorities). Because of the shortcomings in defining `urban', this report focuses on what is happening in South Africa's larger population centres, specifically the nine SACN cities and, where appropriate, an extended group of 12 additional `secondary cities'. The data collection and analysis is done in respect of the municipal area that defines the location of these cities. The rural in cities A key challenge is that the `cities' discussed in this report are not all entirely `urban' in settlement character. During 19992000, in preparation for the second democratic local government elections, the boundaries of municipalities were redrawn to rationalise the numbers of municipalities in South Africa's wall-to-wall local government system. Prior to 2000, `urban' municipalities were clearly identifiable. Their boundaries usually extended only to the edge of the built-up area of towns and cities. The hinterland beyond this was covered by a system of regional services councils and rural local councils with much reduced powers. Through demarcation this system was replaced with one that amalgamated not only urban councils with their rural hinterlands, but also a number of previously separate urban 22 URBAN REALITY municipalities themselves. There is now no such thing as an urban as opposed to a rural municipality. And any typical municipality may today include within its extended boundary a number of town centres, as well as areas of large commercial farms, peri-urban small-holdings, isolated traditional homesteads and/or apartheid homeland style rural `villages'. Most of the nine SACN cities are characterised by this complex settlement pattern. Displaced urbanisation Choosing to identify South Africa's key cities by the name of the municipality whose jurisdiction is then said to `be the city', and analysing `city data' at the scale of the municipal area, presents a related difficulty. A result of apartheid was the forced displacement of large numbers of African people, who might otherwise have been permanent residents of urban centres, to sites of so- called displaced urbanisation. These are densely populated areas with tightly clustered village settlements, informal settlements and micro-sized `town' centres jumbled together in an extended sprawl. These dormitory areas, some located quite close to historical large urban centres, others in isolated parts of the country, have small-city sized populations, but none of the other features typically associated with cities. Two of the nine SACN cities enclose such areas: Mangaung incorporates Botshabelo, and Tshwane now includes Winterveld. A number of other municipal areas in the country contain these kinds of settlements. These municipalities consequently have population sizes equivalent to medium-sized secondary cities. The best example is Bushbuckridge. In 2001 this area had a population of 499 697 (down from 534 697 in 2001). This means that apart from Emfuleni, (the Vereeniging- Vanderbijlpark-Vaal complex) and Polokwane (Pietersburg), Bushbuckridge has a larger population than every other municipality described in this report as a `secondary city', including easily recognisable medium-sized cities such as Mogale City (Krugersdorp) and Mbombela (Nelspruit). It has 90,3% of the population of Msunduzi, the smallest SACN city. Yet Bushbuckridge has no other feature that would ordinarily characterise it as a city. Metropolitan vs local municipalities and polycentric urban regions The South African local government system distinguishes between single- tier metropolitan municipalities and a two-tier system of local and district municipalities. A municipal area is designated metropolitan on the application of a number of criteria spelt out in the Municipal Structures Act. Amongst other things the area must be a `conurbation' having: high population density; an intense movement of people, goods, and services; extensive development; multiple business districts and industrial areas. It must also be a `centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy' and have `strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent units'. Six of the nine SACN cities have been deemed to show these characteristics. They are categorised as metropolitan municipalities. The remaining three cities ­ Buffalo City, Mangaung and Msunduzi ­ are all important population and economic centres in their own right. However they do not meet all the criteria for metropolitan municipality, or Category A, status. They are therefore local, or Category B, municipalities. And they are also covered by an upper-tier District, or Category C, municipality that spans a number of adjacent local municipalities. Metropolitan municipalities were established to deal with the problem of high externalities in extensively built-up areas. Where a number of urban cores lying contiguous to each other are managed by separate municipalities, 23 URBAN REALITY there is a high incentive for each municipality to engage in competitive and cost-shifting behaviour. This may include, for example, town planning decisions that discourage less-wealthy residents, who may seem to cost the tax base more than they contribute to it, from seeking residence in the municipal area. It may also include destructive forms of inter-locality competition to attract investment, and a lack of collaboration on key infrastructure investment and economic development that rationally should be managed at the scale of the broader metropolitan area. By and large, the demarcation of single-tier metropolitan municipalities has solved the problems that occurred in and between core urban municipalities in the pre-2000 period and in the majority of cases the administrative boundary matches that of the metropolitan economy. However, it should not be assumed from this that all metropolitan municipalities are now perfectly `bounded' to each encompass a single, self-standing and internally integrated city system. Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane have been defined as separate cities. But they form part of a much larger urban system that now spans much of Gauteng and beyond. Together with two other key centres that are not SACN cities ­ Mogale City (Krugersdorp) to the west and Emfuleni (Vereeniging- Vanderbijlpark) to the south, these three cities constitute a virtually continuous urban `extent' of some 8,6 million people. If the populations of these five cities are projected forward at their respective current annual growth rates, they will have a combined population of over 10 million people by next year. By 2015, their combined population of 14,6 million will begin to compete in size with some of the largest megacities in the world. There are many reasons why this `conurbation' should not be treated as a single city. But it is important to recognise that the Gauteng cities comprise a `polycentric urban region' presenting unique opportunities and challenges. On the opportunity side is the fact that urban regions, rather than individual cities, are increasingly being seen as the locus of strategies for promoting global competitiveness. On the risk side is the potentially crippling CITY EST POP dysfunctionality of an increasingly crowded urban region where transport, IN M 2015 environmental control, land-use planning, economic development strategies, and household infrastructure networks cannot be properly co-ordinated. 1. Tokyo 27,2 2. Dhaka 22,8 3. Mumbai 22,6 Other features of the national space economy 4. Sao Paolo 21,2 The National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP), released in March 5. Delhi 20,9 2003, took a long hard look at how population, economic activities, transport 6. Mexico City 20,4 connections and key public infrastructure investments are being organised in 7. New York 17,9 space across the country. This is a significant intervention, and begins to 8. Jakarta 17,3 9. Kolkata 16,7 analyse very important settlement dynamics. The Gauteng polycentric urban Gauteng poly- 10. Karachi 16,2 region is only one of many features of a rapidly evolving national urban centric urban 11. Lagos 16,0 region environment. It is vital that South African cities begin to develop a more 12. Los Angeles 14,5 Pop 14,6 m comprehensive understanding of this national `economy of urban space'. 13. Shanghai 13,6 14. Buenos Aires 13,2 15. Metro Manilla 12,6 16. Beijing 11,7 THE LEGACY OF THE APARTHEID CITY 17. Rio de Janeiro 11,5 18. Cairo 11,5 Many of the challenges facing cities are a legacy of apartheid, and the nature 19. Istanbul 11,4 20. Osaka 11,0 of the South African city must therefore be understood in this context. At its 21. Tianjin 10,3 heart the apartheid city was a political economy of space. This had two central features: racially based spatial planning, and a political economy that meant development for some at the expense of the majority. 24 URBAN REALITY Racially based spatial planning The apartheid city was consciously designed to separate races and classes into distinct segments of the city. The figure shows a model for a typical apartheid city that informed many urban master plans. Poor, and especially poor black residents, were pushed to the margins of the city. With rigorously enforced apartheid laws on residential location and movement, they were given no option but to live in sprawling, squalid dormitory townships of undifferentiated `matchbox' houses. In general, these were relatively poorly serviced with infrastructure and urban amenities, and were virtually devoid of work opportunities or shopping and entertainment facilities. A large part of the city was set aside for white residents. The size of this slice was generally far out of proportion to the numbers of the white population. White residentialareasweregenerallywelllaid-outandwell-servicedtree-linedsuburbs, conveniently located close to employment and major urban facilities. Indian and coloured residents were given their own slivers of city space, often bizarrely situated ghettoes adjacent to industrial zones. The components of this ensemble were kept apart with deliberately unused land forming `buffer zones', or major infrastructures such as highways and railway lines that could not easily be crossed. A political economy of systematic under-development Overlaying this physical planning model was a set of institutional arrangements that ensured that areas not designated white remained permanently under-developed. Under apartheid, the South African city was fragmented into discrete administrative jurisdictions, with areas designated `white' and `black' given institutionally separate municipal structures. White local authorities were able to forcibly relocate poor black people to the areas covered The spatial structure of the apartheid city by black local authorities, beyond their boundaries and off their budgets. They were therefore able to govern areas of concentrated economic activity and small wealthy populations. Able to defend their borders and budgets from the claims of people in poverty, relatively well-off white local authorities could quite easily raise the majority of their own income from service charges and property taxes, and kick-start and sustain a virtuous development cycle. Black local authorities, meanwhile, ended up responsible for large poor populations and, due to apartheid zoning and planning laws, were able to Urban apartheid provided a legal framework attract very few businesses to their areas. With no commercial activities to for white municipalities to effectively speak of, they had their tax bases further weakened by the inevitable seepage exclude the largely black majority of the of black household-expenditures to shops in white local authority areas. They urban poor and ensure that high-ratable therefore had virtually no resources to provide their residents with adequate commercial development fell within their infrastructure or social services. Anti-apartheid urban social movements jurisdiction. Although the consumer and labour power of township residents mobilised under the banner of `one-city-one-tax-base' in response to this contributed to the tax base of white situation. The slogan incisively summed up the nature of the apartheid city. municipalities, services in the townships were not funded from this tax base. The election of democratic local government in 1995/6, and later the re- demarcation of urban municipalities, as well as the establishment of single- Metropolitan government provides a tier metropolitan government in key areas, has given South African cities an mechanism for addressing this dynamic of opportunity to address this distorted situation. Whereas urban local inequity, and ensuring that everyone who government systems in many parts of the world are in the process of contributes to the tax base benefits from it. fragmenting, South Africa has moved in the opposite direction, consolidating (White Paper on Local Government, March 1998) separate local authorities into bigger structures able to tackle urban problems in a co-ordinated way over a larger geographical area. 25 URBAN REALITY However, the legacy of the apartheid political economy remains stamped on the face of the South African city. Many of the development challenges described in this report arise directly from this legacy. And many of the development strategies currently being led by cities are attempts to reverse or compensate for it. CONTRIBUTIONS AND CHALLENGES OF KEY CITIES Collective contributions Together, the nine member cities of the SACN play a vital role in the social and economic life of the country. They make a very substantial contribution to accommodating the South African population, funding local development needs and driving the national economy. · The nine cities are only a few of the hundreds of `settlements' that accommodate South Africans. Yet as of 2001 they were home to 16,5 million people, some 37% of the country's total population on less than 2% of its land area. · The nine cities make up a large proportion of South Africa's built environment. In 2001 they had some 4,6 million formal and informal dwellings, 41% of South Africa's total 11,2 million dwellings. Of these, 74,2% were formal dwellings. The nine cities' total number of formal dwellings, 3,4 million units, represented 44,8% of all formal dwellings across the country. · Municipalities approved R25,8 billion in new building plans in 2002. The Figure 1. The contribution of South Africa's nine cities contributed R17,7 billion of this new fixed investment ­ 68,6%. major cities. · The combined municipal budget for the nine cities stood at R50,5 billion in 2002/3 (R7,7 billion capital budget and R42,8 billion operating budget). This was 65% of the total local government budget, R77,5 billion ­ 58% of the total capital budget and 66% of the total operating budget. · The per capita local government spending power in these cities far exceeds that for the rest of the country. If 2002/3 budgets are divided by estimated populations in 2002, municipalities in the nine cities spent on average R452 per capita on infrastructure expansion and other capital items. By comparison, the average municipal capital budget for the rest of the country was only R188,8 per capita. On aggregate, municipalities for the nine cities were able to spend R2 511,3 per capita in their 2002/3 operating budgets, compared to R754,5 per capita in all other municipalities. · By 2001, the nine cities were providing water to the dwellings or yards of 3,6 million households. This was 32,5% of the total number of South African households (excluding collective living quarters), and 53% of all households in the country receiving this level of service. · In 2001 the cities gave employment to 4 866 812 people, some 50,7% of the country's total working population of 9 583 761. · The quality of work opportunity available in the cities is on average much Figure 2. Formal housing needs index higher than that in the rest of the country. In 2001, the average monthly showing number of people without adequate income for employed people in the nine cities was R5 927,22. The average services in 2001 (top); and Increase in work monthly income per worker in the rest of the country was R2 789,26. opportunities, 1990-2000 (bottom). (Red=high, light blue = low) [26] 26 URBAN REALITY Collective challenges The aggregate contribution of South Africa's major cities cannot be ignored. However, the nine cities also present huge challenges. Together they represent the greatest relative concentration of poverty in the country. · 25,8% of households in the nine cities, some 1,2 million households, continued to live in informal dwellings in 2001. This was 33,9% of all informal dwellings in the country. 20,8% of households lived in dwellings with only one room (including households that shared one room with other households). The national average was 17,6%. · Huge progress has been made over the last decade to extend infrastructure to previously disadvantaged communities in all the cities. But in 2001 some 1 020 783 households (22,1% of total), still had inadequate access to toilet facilities, and were using a ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP) or even lower level of sanitation. · Despite the jobs they provide, the nine cities continue to see high and growing levels of unemployment. Census 2001 showed that of the 7,8 million people of working age in the cities, 38,28% did not have a job. This figure grew 58,8% from the previous census of 1996, equating to a million more people without employment. In 2001, the cities contained 44,22% of South Africa's total unemployed population. It is clear that the relatively high average wealth of the cities masks Figure 3. The relative advantage and disadvantage considerable levels of urban poverty and inequality. Making sure that these of the nine SACN cities. A comparison of each cities are able to continue to contribute to the economy and address issues of city's share of the country's total employment poverty is a national priority. and unemployment in 1996 and 2001. BUFFALO CITY LOCAL MUNICIPALITY SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Population 2001: 701 890 Projected population in 2004: 713 921 Like Mangaung, the boundaries of Buffalo Number of households 2001: 191 046 City extend to encompass both an historical Projected households 2004: 198 082 large urban centre (East London), and Size of municipal area: 2 516 km² outlying formerly bantustan areas (Bisho). Average density 2001: 279 / km² Largest economic sector (by employ): Social/Gov Of the nine cities this is the least advantaged. Official unemployment rate 2002: 38,87% Between 1996 and 2001 the city grew hardly % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 37,80% at all (at just 0,6%) per annum. This reflects % hshs without on-site water: 31,17% relatively poor environmental conditions and % of population without matric: 69,28% a declining economy. 36,9% of the % population in LSM 1 to 4: 26,10% population live in informal dwellings, and Municipal category: B 41,1% have no water to dwelling or yard, the Number of staff/1 000 population 5,37 highest service backlogs across the nine Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 1 869,55 cities. The city has the lowest budgetary capacity at R1 869,55 per capita. The economy lost 21 970 jobs between 1996 and 2001. Available jobs are also relatively less well- paying than elsewhere. Buffalo City workers took home R3 694,04 per month on average, R368,70 less than the national average. Encouragingly, though, the city gained some 4 000 jobs in the finance/business sector, almost as much as the far larger Nelson LOCATION AND Mandela Metro. SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed 27 URBAN REALITY EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Population 2001: 2 480 276 Projected population in 2004: 2 799 707 Number of households 2001: 744 935 Ekurhuleni, based on what has historically Projected households 2004: 794 504 been known as the East Rand, has traditionally Size of municipal area: 1 923 km² been South Africa's manufacturing heartland. Average density 2001: 1 290 / km² Industry declined from its peak in the 1970s, Largest economic sector (by employ): Manufact and between 1980 and 1996 the city lost Official unemployment rate 2002: 31,38% 117 000 manufacturing jobs. % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 29,75% However the sector is still strong and showing % hshs without on-site water: 30,31% some signs of rebirth. Manufacturing provides % of population without matric: 62,52% 19,2% of the city's employment and grew % population in LSM 1 to 4: 26,70% 26% between 1996 and 2001, adding 30 235 Municipal category: A new jobs. Number of staff/1 000 population 4,79 This growth is bringing its own unique Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 3 131,50 challenges, as the city attracts large numbers of relatively low skill and semi-skilled job seekers. Ekurhuleni currently has the fastest population growth in the country. Its population grew 4,1% per annum in 1996­ 2001, and it saw a remarkable 39,2% increase in households, most of these into two or three room dwellings. In 1996 68,2% of households had water piped into their dwellings; in 2001 this had fallen to 42,4%. LOCATION AND SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed ETHEKWINI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Population 2001: 3 090 122 Projected population in 2004: 3 313 205 eThekwini is centred on the major port city Number of households 2001: 786 747 of Durban. Since 1960, when it was the Projected households 2004: 819 021 fourth largest city in the country, eThekwini Size of municipal area: 2 292 km² has grown rapidly to overtake Cape Town, Average density 2001: 1 348 / km² Ekurhuleni and, briefly in the 1990s, Largest economic sector (by employ): Manufact Johannesburg. It is currently the second Official unemployment rate 2002: 29,54% largest city in South Africa and growing at a % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 29,45% moderate 2,4% annually. % hshs without on-site water: 18,10% % of population without matric: 63,58% For a large urban centre, eThekwini has a % population in LSM 1 to 4: 28,90% unique settlement form: because of its Municipal category: A demarcation only 35% of the city is Number of staff/1 000 population 5,58 `predominantly urban'. 60 000 households live Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 2 951,76 in traditional-rural style dwellings. Despite this challenge the city is addressing its service backlogs. It saw only a 13,3% increase in non-formal dwellings in 1996­ 2001, and gave over 90 000 households in- yard water connections. Its manufacturing-led economy is sluggish, but it saw 36 782 (+38,2%) new jobs in the wholesale/retail sector between the last two censuses. LOCATION AND SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed 28 URBAN REALITY CAPE TOWN METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Population 2001: 2 893 247 SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Projected population in 2004: 3 111 039 Number of households 2001: 759 767 The City of Cape Town is now the third largest Projected households 2004: 783 688 city in the country, after Johannesburg and Size of municipal area: 2 499 km² eThekwini. Average density 2001: 1 158 / km² By a number of indicators it is the most Largest economic sector (by employ): Social/Gov advantaged of all the nine cities. It has the Official unemployment rate 2002: 19,58% lowest percentage of people without formal % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 20,04% housing (21,1%) and the lowest percentage % hshs without on-site water: 20,26% of households without water to yard or % of population without matric: 61.98% dwelling (15,58%). It also has the least % population in LSM 1 to 4: 11,30% unemployed people (census: 29,1%) and the Municipal category: A highest per capita municipal budget Number of staff/1 000 population 8,74 (R3 297,67). Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 3 297,67 This profile is gradually shifting as the city receives more jobless and homeless people, mostly from the Eastern Cape. The city saw a 46,1% increase of households in dwellings with only one room between 1996­2001. As the legislative capital of the country, its economy is dominated by the social/ government sector. However finance/ business and wholesale/retail trade have also recently shown strong growth. LOCATION AND SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed CITY OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Population 2001: 3 225 812 Projected population in 2004: 3 638 715 Johannesburg is the largest city in the country Number of households 2001: 1 006 932 at the moment, having regained this status Projected households 2004: 1 074 330 from eThekwini after very fast growth in the Size of municipal area: 1 644 km² late 1990s. Average density 2001: 1 962 / km² With Tshwane to the North and Ekurhuleni to Largest economic sector (by employ): Finance/Bus the East, as well as Emfuleni to the South and Official unemployment rate 2002: 26,35% Mogale City and other centres to the West, % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 22,20% Johannesburg forms the `heart' of a % hshs without on-site water: 15,52% polycentric urban region of `mega city' % of population without matric: 57,55% proportions, easily exceeding 10 million % population in LSM 1 to 4: 16,70% people. Municipal category: A Number of staff/1 000 population 3,18 In-migration is driving growth. Between 1996 Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 3 269,27 and 2001 the number of people in the typically migrating 15-34 age bracket grew 27,8%, and the number of households with only 1 member increased to 23,9%. This is keeping unemployment high (37,4%) even while the economy is growing steadily. Commerce dominates the economy. Between them the Finance/Business sector and the Wholesale/Retail trade sector added 100 918 jobs in 1996­2001. LOCATION AND SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed 29 URBAN REALITY MANGAUNG LOCAL MUNICIPALITY SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Population 2001: 645 441 Projected population in 2004: 671 856 The city is centred on Bloemfontein, the Number of households 2001: 185 012 capital of the Free State Province and the Projected households 2004: 192 191 judicial capital of the country, but the Size of municipal area: 6 283 km² municipal area stretches to include two major Average density 2001: 103 / km² centres of apartheid `displaced urbanisation' Largest economic sector (by employ): Social/Gov (Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu) some distance Official unemployment rate 2002: 33,17% away. It is the second smallest of the nine % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 28,84% cities in population size, yet it has by far the % hshs without on-site water: 29,97% largest municipal area, giving it a density of % of population without matric: 69,22% just 103/km². % population in LSM 1 to 4: 28,60% Municipal category: B The city has historically had the fastest Number of staff/1 000 population 6,17 annual growth rate of all the nine cities, at Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 1 982,82 over 4% per annum between 1946 and 1996. This growth slowed dramatically in 1996­ 2001. Because of its settlement form, Mangaung has extremes of wealth and poverty. 49.64% of the population uses VIP toilets or lower levels of sanitation. This is a largely static economy, based mainly on the social/community/government sector. The city shed over 10 000 jobs in the last decade. LOCATION AND SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed MSUNDUZI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Population 2001: 553 223 Projected population in 2004: 572 975 Number of households 2001: 130 387 Msunduzi, centred on Pietermaritzburg is Projected households 2004: 133 487 currently the smallest of the nine cities, both Size of municipal area: 648 km² in numbers of people and land size. Itisgrowing Average density 2001: 854 / km² relatively slowly at 1,2% per annum. Largest economic sector (by employ): Social/Gov A key feature is the number of households with Official unemployment rate 2002: 36,22% six or more members. On average 15,6% of % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 28,73% households across the nine cities have 6+ % hshs without on-site water: 20,23% members. In Msunduzi it is 23,6%, probably % of population without matric: 66,85% due to the high proportion of households living % population in LSM 1 to 4: 14,50% in traditional dwellings (18,1%). Municipal category: B This brings unique service delivery challenges. Number of staff/1 000 population 5,82 In its favour, the city has a higher than expected Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 2 102,69 per capita budget, reflecting a sizeable economy relative to its population size. Its households bring home on average R49 164 per annum, more than counterparts in the larger cities of Buffalo City or Mangaung. However, the local economy is not showing strength at the moment. The city has the highest unemployment rate at 48,2%, having lost some 9 000 jobs between 1996 and 2001. This is a largely static economy, based mainly LOCATION AND on the social/community/government sector. SETTLEMENT FORM The city shed over 10 000 jobs in the last decade. Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed 30 URBAN REALITY NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Population 2001: 1 005 778 Projected population in 2004: 1 02 8021 Nelson Mandela is a new metropolitan Number of households 2001: 260 800 municipality centred on Port Elizabeth. It is Projected households 2004: 268 633 the sixth largest of the nine cities. The city Size of municipal area: 1 952 km² saw the second lowest rate of population Average density 2001: 515 / km² growth between 1996 and 2001 (0,7% per Largest economic sector (by employ): Manufac annum). Official unemployment rate 2002: 39,34% % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 28,13% With slower than average growth the city has % hshs without on-site water: 41,11% made better headway than others in housing % of population without matric: 66,89% and serving its population. The number of % population in LSM 1 to 4: 28,20% informal households increased only 2,72% Municipal category: A in 1996­2001, while the number of formal Number of staff/1 000 population - - households grew 22%. But this reflects Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 2 460,17 people leaving the city as much as anything else. There was an actual decline in the number of people in the 20­34 age bracket in 1996­ 2001, when all other cities are seeing strong growth in this age group. Declining employment opportunity is the main cause. The key manufacturing sector held steady, but the city shed 7,4% of its jobs and unemployment climbed to 46,39%. LOCATION AND SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Population 2001: 1 985 983 SELECTED KEY FEATURES KEY INDICATORS Projected population in 2004: 2 193 596 Number of households 2001: 562 652 Tshwane is centred on Pretoria, the country's Projected households 2004: 593 962 seat of executive government. Its economy Size of municipal area: 2 198 km² is therefore dominated by the government Average density 2001: 904 / km² sector, but economic growth is being driven Largest economic sector (by employ): Social/Gov mainly by manufacturing, especially a Official unemployment rate 2002: 18,93% burgeoning automotive industry node. % hshs without formal shelter 2001: 20,77% Between 1996 and 2001 manufacturing jobs % hshs without on-site water: 15,58% grew 25%. % of population without matric: 52,34% Fast population growth is bringing challenges. % population in LSM 1 to 4: 20,50% In 1996­2001 the number of households in Municipal category: A informal dwellings grew 57,7%, and today Number of staff/1 000 population - - 24,81% of households do not have adequate Total municipal budget/capita 02/03: R 2 957,11 accommodation. In meeting these challenges Tshwane has both comparative advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side economically, a remarkable 38,8% of its population over 20 has post- school qualifications; the cities average 23%. A negative is that it is the only large city with a boundary overlapping a provincial border, raising complex governance challenges. LOCATION AND SETTLEMENT FORM Blue = formal / red = informal / green = traditional / purple = mixed 31 LIFE ON THE STREETS URBAN REALITY QUARTZ STREET, JOHANNESBURG Quartz Street runs through Hillbrow, one of Johannesburg's few inner-city residential neighbourhoods. It has always offered an entry point to the city for foreigners, and was once home to many young whites seeking an `alternative' lifestyle. There has been a dramatic change in the area's demographics over the past 20 years ­ in 1985 only 10% of Hillbrow's residents were African. By the mid-1990s this figure had risen to over 80%. The northern end of Quartz Street has been pedestrianised and converted into a linear market. The street is full of people: young women in tight jeans with bare midriffs, smooth-looking men in pressed slacks and paisley shirts (buttoned to the collar); stocky women in Pedi skirts; groups of kids in jeans. There are stalls selling cell phone accessories, bright cloths and T shirts, fruit and vegetables, floppy hats emblazoned with Reebok, Diesel, and Adidas logos, shades, socks, flip-flops, hair-care products, marie biscuits and cheap international phone calls. Some traders sell cassette tapes (including bands like `The Hard Walkers', the `Soul Brothers', and `Precious `Manyonyoba' Mduli & the Young Followers) and say that tapes by local artists are most popular, although most of their cliental are foreigners. Others have set up barber shops, and offer styles ranging from the `serious kutz' (advertised with a photo of basketball star Dennis Rodman) to `senior boy' (a neat corporate cut). Through the hum of voices and nearby traffic, one can hear the sound of Lucky Dube, played too loud for boombox speakers and distorting into occasional bursts of white noise. Beyond the Pretorius Street intersection, Quartz Street is quieter. It is narrow and paved, with slanted parking spaces on both sides. There are fewer women and children on the street, and fewer shops. Most of the street is lined by residential buildings. An occasional ornate façade or colourful awning stands out amongst the strongly geometrical modernist architecture, but generally the monolithic greyness is broken only by colourful items of clothing draped across the balconies to dry. There is a vacant lot opposite a `Revival Outreach Ministries' poster urging the faithful to "come and receive your miracle" at their next meeting. It is littered with rubbish and scrap metal. The back of the building behind the lot is derelict, and two women sit smoking high above on the fire escape. Groups of men stand in the sandy space, talking quietly. In one corner, a line of standing exhaust pipes marks the space where a mechanic has set up shop. Sitting alone, an old man shaves his face, using a shard of broken glass as a mirror. At night, this space is occupied by small groups of people gathered around fires burning in metal drums. Quartz Street is far less busy after dark ­ most blocks are desolate, although here and there people cluster near the entrance of an open bar. Over the past two or three years government has cracked down on crime in the area, closing several hotels which were notorious for drugs, prostitution and crime. Hillbrow is now quieter than it used to be, and drug dealers and sex workers are less visible. Some people walking on Quartz Street at night carry guns, there are still dealers on some corners, and every now and then an argument or fight breaks out on the pavement. But the street still seems benevolent, light and shadows play on the building facades, and muted music and voices drift from bars into the street. 32 URBAN REALITY LIFE ON THE STREETS LONGMARKET STREET, MSUNDUZI Longmarket Street, which bisects the centre of Pietermaritzburg, provides a snapshot of history from pre-colonial, Voortrekker and Victorian origins, through the apartheid era to the democratic era where the inner city is a melting pot of people and culture. In the past, black residents were unlikely to visit this part of town, put off by separate entrances for `non-whites only'. For them the city centre was an alien place in a town clearly demarcated along racial lines. The CBD belonged to the whites. For many black residents their ties to Longmarket Street ­ with its eclectic architecture and some striking Victoriana ­ were through relatives who served as waiters, cleaners, handymen or messengers. It's different now. Longmarket Street is a place where the changes brought by democracy are tangible. The local authority is the Msunduzi Metropolitan Council, but this street is home to two other structures of democracy. One is the uMgungundlovu District Council, located next to the post office. The other is the Provincial Legislature Building, with its imposing statue of Queen Victoria. When this building was opened in 1889 by the Governor it was the legislature of the Natal Colony. When the Natal government was disbanded in 1910 by the Act of Union, the building became the Provincial Council Chamber. Today it is KwaZulu-Natal's Parliament, and for the first time in its history as a legislature represents all citizens. Longmarket Street has layers of memories. The first Voortrekker settlers who lived here established the market that gives the street its name. English colonists used the street, which runs for the two kilometres from east to west, as the entrance to the garrison headquarters at Fort Napier. At the western end are buildings with names such as the Laager Centre or Tavern House reflect that when there are soldiers around, drinking holes are always close at hand. The Laager Centre is where SA Breweries first started brewing its popular brand of Castle Lager. These buildings have now been converted to shopping centres, and the changing face of the city is reflected in the number of afro-chic dress shops and hair salons that dominate the area. Moving east, the complexion of the street changes dramatically. Below Retief Street you enter what used to be described by whites as `coolie town' ­ the old Indian group area. There's a rich history here as well. The corner of Longmarket and Thomas streets was called Red Square, where the Communist Party established its own speaker's corner during the 1950s. Further down is the Lotus Hall built by the Leather Workers Union and the site, in the 1980s, of some of the largest United Democratic Front gatherings. The bottom end of the street is dominated by Indian temples, serene places of worship come alive once a year when thousands gather to participate in Kavady, the annual fire-walking ceremony. The top end of Longmarket Street is dominated by the old Governor's Mansion, where Chief Langalibalele Hadebe was tried for insurrection. According to historians, he was one of the first African activists to mount an armed struggle against the colonial authorities and to be imprisoned on Robben Island nearly a century before Nelson Mandela. The Council is considering re-naming the street Langalibalele Street. The Governor's Mansion was converted to a teacher training college, and today is used by Unisa and an NGO that offers science and mathematics classes to disadvantaged students. The changes that have taken place in Pietermaritzburg and Longmarket Street reflect the dramatic changes in the country's history. Nowhere is this more visible than at the old Voortrekker Museum, where in the apartheid days the only black people to traverse the hallowed halls were servants. Today it's used by groups of black children, nine and ten years old, their clothes splattered with paint. `Hello, we're Voortrekker children,' they say. `We have finished our painting class and we're waiting for the bus to take us home.' 33 DEMOGRAPHICS3: CHAPTER 34 There is an intricaterelationship between urbanpopulation growth and human andeconomic development 35 DEMOGRAPHICS CHAPTER 3. THE STATE OF THE URBAN POPULATION South African cities are being shaped by powerful forces. If they are to DEMOGRAPHICS contribute meaningfully to the future of cities, all spheres of government need to understand these forces and respond appropriately to them. To plan effectively for their cities municipalities need to think deeply about demographic, economic, social, built environment and institutional trends, and whether these might imply greater opportunity or adversity in future. UNDERSTANDING DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS One of these trends is the demographic shifts changing the face of South Africa's urban population. Two perceptions dominate thinking on what is happening. The first is that urban populations are growing rapidly as more and more people, previously prevented from moving from rural areas by apartheid laws, migrate to the cities. The second is that where normally a positive relationship between urbanisation and development could be expected, in a country where the urban labour market cannot absorb many new entrants, high population growth will constitute a major future challenge for cities. These ideas are generally valid, but they need to be questioned, especially for some urban centres. It is hard to predict what is going to happen to urban populations in the decades to come, because the real dynamics of migration and the ultimate impact of HIV and Aids are unknown. The intricate relationship between urban population growth and human and economic development cannot yet be modelled. Relatively `under-urbanised' and slow- growth urban populations may ultimately pose a far greater challenge to cities than rapid urbanisation, even in a context of scarce formal sector jobs. AN URBANISING SOUTH AFRICA Following a general trend The world is gradually urbanising. The developed world is already 75% urban, and this figure is still increasing, although very slowly. By contrast, the developing world is now seeing the demographic tectonic event the developed world saw in the mid-to-late 1800s as a result of the industrial revolution. Urban growth in the developing world is accelerating. Urbanisation stood at 27% in 1975 and was dramatically up to 40% in 2000. Over the next three decades, the urban population of the developing world is expected to grow at 2,4% per annum, double the average rate of population growth as a whole at 1,2%. Urban growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is even faster than this. Sometime early in the 21st century we will cross that invisible threshold when more than 50% of the global population will live in urban areas. And by 2030, some 5 billion people, 60% of the world's population, will be urban. Most will be living in large cities in the developing world. By 2015, there will be approximately 550 cities of over 1 million people and 426 of these will be in developing countries. The world is also projected to have at least 21 mega- cities of over 10 million people. All but a few of these will be in the developing world. 36 DEMOGRAPHICS South Africa is following this trend. It is already ahead of the global curve and well ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1996, 53,7% of the population was urbanised. Now this stands at 58%, compared to 34% in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is projected to rise to 64% in 2030, whereas Sub-Saharan Africa in general will be where South Africa was in 1996, at 53%. This broad urbanisation picture is an important backdrop, but it also contains some commonly held perceptions that require further examination. At first glance, the current South African city growth statistics seem to line up with the developing world trends. Between 1996 and 2001, the population of the largest 21 urban centres in South Africa rose from 18,4 million to 21,1 million ­ 14,23% over the period. This was a growth rate of 2,7% per annum on average (compared to developing world average of 2,4%). By contrast, the annual average rate of growth of South Africa's population as a whole was 2,01% (developing world 1,2%), and excluding the 21 largest urban centres, 1,41%. But to focus only on the last half decade and on average growth rates is to miss a much bigger and more nuanced picture. NINE CITIES SA POPULATION SA OUTSIDE 9 CITIES 1946 population 2 894 710 7 369 709 4 474 999 2001 population 16 581 772 44 819 778 28 238 006 Growth rate 1946-2001 3,22% 3,34% 3,41% Growth rate 1946-1960 3,56% 5,69% 6,83% Growth rate 1960-1970 3,31% 3,14% 3,06% Growth rate 1970-1980 2,71% 1,39% 0,77% Growth rate 1980-1991 2,13% 1,96% 1,88% Growth rate 1991-1996 6,05% 5,54% 5,27% (adjusted 1991-1996) (4,54%) (5,54%) (5,96%) The mass African migration to the cities Growth rate 1996-2001 2,80% 2,01% 1,55% in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s was overwhelmingly unskilled and people found work in the mines or in the production of standardised wage goods The long-term view using simple technologies. Employment was at low wages, but it grew as rapidly as Over the last 55 years, between the 1946 census and the 2001 census, the the population. Conditions at the nine SACN cities saw an average annual population growth rate of 3,22%. beginning of the twenty-first century are This was marginally slower that the average growth rate of the South African different. There is high unemployment in population outside the nine cities, at 3,41%. This has a lot to do with the the cities, especially in the African distorting effects of apartheid spatial planning, in particular the removal of townships and informal settlements. And the demand is increasingly for skilled millions of people to areas of so-called `displaced urbanisation', as well as labour, whose supply is constrained by misguided decentralisation policies during the 1980s. The table above shows the poor functioning of the educational that since the 1970s cities have been growing much faster than the national system. Migration from areas in South population, but the growth picture is distorted by the establishment of the so- Africa outside the cities cannot supply called TBVC states. These apartheid constructions were never covered by the the need; in general, the educational South African censuses. level among such migrants is lower than the inadequate urban level, not higher. In The current rate of growth in the nine SACN cities is fast, but not nearly as short, the era of mass unskilled in- fast as it was in previous periods. Two periods are important. First, not migration is over: there is no incentive on anyone's part to continue it. surprisingly, the end of apartheid saw a sudden jump in the rate of city growth. (Demographic report for iGoli 2010 and The exact picture is obscured by the fact that some of the SACN cities' new Joburg 2030, City of Joburg, 2000) boundaries now include areas that were previously part of the TBVC states, 37 DEMOGRAPHICS and so their re-incorporation in the early-to-mid 1990s looks like an abnormally large spike in population growth, both for affected cities and the South African population as a whole. However, even if this anomaly is taken into account by removing the affected cities from the picture, the average annual SACN city growth rate was still 4,5% between 1991 and 1996. The current average annual growth rate of 2,8% therefore represents a slowing down from a more rapid urbanisation trend of only a few years earlier. This is independently confirmed by data from the 1998 October Household Survey. Migration of heads of households leapt 82,2% between the periods 1985-89 and 1990-94. It fell by -5% between 1990-94 and 1995-99. Figure 4. Growth and decline. A correlation of population and employment change between Second, current city growth is much slower than it was in the first half of the 1996 and 2001 in 21 key SA cities. last century. During Johannesburg's iGoli 2010 planning process in 2000, demographic experts argued that very fast city growth now lies in South Africa's past (the 1991-96 post-apartheid settlement adjustments notwithstanding). As it turns out, the argument is less valid for the city for which it was put forward: Johannesburg grew at a rate of 4,1% per annum in 1996-2001. But the argument does seem valid in more general terms. There now appears to be a return to the general pattern of slower-than-previous city growth established in the 1970s and 1980s. Figure 5. Growth rates in the nine SACN cities and a further 12 `secondary cities'. Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo City Mangaung Msunduzi 21 city growth Growth out-side Mandela 21 cities 1996 2 639 110 2 751 193 2 56 3612 2 026 807 1 68 2701 969 771 682 287 603 704 521 805 18 464 011 22 119 559 2001 3 225 812 3 090 122 2 893 247 2 480 276 1 985 983 1 005 778 701 890 645 441 553 223 21 091 465 23 728 313 5y growth 22,23% 12,32% 12,86% 22,37% 18,02% 3,71% 2,87% 6,91% 6,02% 14,23% 7,27% Gr/annum 4,10% 2,35% 2,45% 4,12% 3,37% 0,73% 0,57% 1,35% 1,18% 2,70% 1,41% Emfuleni Polokwane Mbombela King Sabata Matjhabeng Rustenberg Newcastle Mogale City uMhlathuze Emalahleni Mafikeng Sol Plaatjie 1996 597 948 424 976 425 663 395 945 476 927 311 326 287 260 223 657 196 183 236 680 242 193 204 263 2001 658 421 508 277 474 806 415 229 408 170 395 540 332 981 289 724 289 190 276 413 259 478 201 464 5y growth 10,11% 19,60% 11,55% 4,87% -14,42% 27,05% 15,92% 29,54% 47,41% 16,79% 7,14% -1,37% Gr/annum 1,95% 3,64% 2,21% 0,96% -3,07% 4,90% 3,00% 5,31% 8,07% 3,15% 1,39% -0,28% 38 DEMOGRAPHICS Differences between cities Not all the cities are growing at the same speed. Some of the cities (Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane) are seeing strong growth, at between 3,3% and 4,1% per annum. Other cities (eThekwini and Cape Town), are more stable. They are growing, but not much faster than the natural national population growth rate of about 2% per annum. Four cities (Nelson Mandela, Buffalo City, Mangaung and Msunduzi) are growing very slowly, slower in fact than the mainly rural areas outside South Africa's largest 21 cities and towns (a rate of only 1,4% per year). On average, the nine cities in the SACN are growing faster than the next strata of `secondary cities'. But again the average may be deceiving. Some of the fastest growth is being seen in these secondary cities. The four fastest growing SACN cities (Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and Cape Town) together had a growth rate of 3,5% in 1996-2001. By contrast, the four fastest growing second-tier cities (Mogale City, Polokwane, Rustenberg and uMhlathuze) together grew at 5,1%. The nine cities show a rough correspondence between population growth and employment growth. Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane all have the fastest population growth, and also the largest increase in employed people, between 1996 and 2001. Ethekwini and Cape Town both showed growth close to the national average, and largely stable workforces. The four cities with the weakest population growth all showed declining employment. On the other hand, one or two cities are in steep decline. The most notable is Matjhabeng (Klerksdorp). This town lost a remarkable 68 757 people between 1996 and 2001, with a population decline of -3% per annum, and an even more staggering loss of 82 409 jobs, a decline of 46,3% in the employed population in the space of five years. Understanding population shifts The populations of the nine cities are changing fast. But dynamics are not easily understood simply by talking about `rapid urbanisation'. Urban population growth is happening, in some cities very quickly, but the trends suggest that it is not enough just to think about `the shift of population from rural to urban areas'. Population Figure 6. Population age and gender changes are complex and confusing, and are yet to be fully understood in city pyramids for a sample of 3 cities, one in each planning processes. Few of the SACN cities are currently able to accurately group showing `rapid growth', `stable growth' project their population movements. It is clear that and `weak growth'. deeper thinking around what is happening to the cities' populations is needed. A noted demographic CITY PLANNING 2001 CENSUS DIFFERENCE IN ESTIMATES CIRCA 2001 ACTUAL FIGURES ESTIMATED VS CENSUS expert, doing population projections for Johannesburg's iGoli 2010 planning process, says Nelson Mandela 1 500 000 1 005 778 - 494 222 it best: `A population projection is a way of Buffalo City 959 975 701 890 - 258 085 organising current information about demographic Johannesburg 2 833 226 3 225 812 + 392 586 Ekurhuleni 2 026 381 2 480 277 + 453 896 magnitudes, not an infallible method for predicting Tshwane 2 200 000 1 985 983 - 214 017 the future. Demographic conditions never unfold Cape Town own 3 121 532 2 893 246 - 228 286 exactly in accordance with a projection. But the Mangaung 739 535 645 441 - 94 094 advantage of having a projection is that the various eThekwini 3 064 624 3 090 121 + 25 497 factors bearing on population growth are brought Msunduzi 523 470 553 223 + 29 753 39 DEMOGRAPHICS into systematic relationships with one another. When outcomes vary from projections, it prompts a search for reasons why.' `The hinterland is emptying, but it is doing so in strange and disturbing ways, throwing the countryside into a painful EXPLAINING TRENDS: MIGRATION AND DISEASE interregnum... Practically every member of the last two generations of peasants and farm workers has migrated to the Temporary rural/urban migration cities in early adulthood, swearing they would rather starve than work the land. After apartheid, many observers believed that the cities would see mass However, their life stories seldom turn permanent rural to urban migration as those people who wanted to be urban, out as they had imagined. They keep but were previously barred by law from living in cities, could now settle where coming back, again and again, they wanted to. This seemed so obvious that questions around temporary or throughout their adult lives, to the circular labour migration all but disappeared from StatsSA surveys. In South heritages they have disclaimed. For the truth they soon discover is that urban SA Africa, people are moving to cities. Analysis of data from the October treats newcomers from the hinterland Household Survey in 1988 shows that 969 941 heads of households moved like dirt. In the mid-20th century, into the nine SACN cities between 1990 and 1998, compared to 760 065 industry absorbed unskilled migrants in over the entire period 1940-1989. But does this urbanisation mean that people their hundreds of thousands. Today, all are giving up rural lives to settle in cities and towns? There is some evidence but a lucky few find that they are that the movement from rural to urban areas is not always steady, one-way sentenced to live their lives on the periphery of the metropolis, their homes and permanent. tin shacks, their neighbours Various demographic studies on rural to urban migration in South Africa untrustworthy strangers, the wages they get when they find work barely better present a picture of very tentative urbanisation, despite the fast growth of than in the countryside. Many end up some cities. One very important study is a comprehensive Demographic journeying back to their ancestral homes Surveillance Survey conducted in the Agincourt village of Bushbuckridge by incessantly during the course of their the Wits School of Public Health. This interviews every household in the failed adult lives. They are drifters, not village annually, to give a changing picture of some 68 000 rural lives. The yet properly urban, no longer properly results from 2001 show that there has been some permanent migration to rural, scavenging what they can from both the cities and the rural villages.' urban areas since 1992, but a relatively small number of households are (Jonny Steinberg (author of Midlands) moving permanently out the village to cities. Of `out-migrations' from the `Rural SA still a dumping ground of the survey-district, 15% went to rural towns and only 6% went to cities. The rest unwanted', Business Day, 29 August went to other rural villages. Very significantly, migrations to towns and cities 2002) were balanced by permanent return migrations from urban areas. Census data suggests at least two trends worth watching. First, mapped population density data from the 1996 and 2001 censuses does show increases in the densities in major urban areas. But it also shows large density increases in typically rural areas and small towns. This confirms the Agincourt evidence of people migrating to other villages and rural towns, and suggests a possible future pattern of people coagulating into smaller, more diffuse settlements. Second, the apartheid migrant-labour pattern of rural youth moving to urban areas, only to return whenever urban opportunities are closed off, or when a store of capital has been built up to invest in rural homesteads, seems to be continuing. People appear to be migrating at younger ages. Hence the large increase in population in the 15-19 age group in all the cities. This could be due to the accelerated disintegration of rural families, or perhaps to youths being sent to finish schooling or start post-school training in better urban based educational institutions. Reports from the start Figure 7. Agincourt, Bushbuckridge of the 2004 school year suggested that Gauteng schools had to accommodate Demographic Surveillance Survey, migration an unexpected additional 70 000 migrant pupils from outside the province. module results for 2001. 40 DEMOGRAPHICS Regardless of this trend the data continues to tell of patterns of return later in life. We currently tend to think about our cities as being overwhelmed by rapid urbanisation, but it is possible that our cities are also being affected by what could be called `under-urbanisation', a lack of full investment by rural in-migrants in their new urban lives. Moving from city to city City-to-city migration may be increasing. The census data suggests that those cities that are currently seeing employment growth are also receiving more than their fair share of jobless migrants. In turn, those seeing very weak employment growth are losing Figure 8. From StatsSA's investigation into population, both relatively and in absolute terms, especially in the 20-24 and appropriate definitions of rural and urban 25-29 age cohorts. areas, this graph compares percentages of population living in urban areas in 1996 and The trends can be seen by comparing Cape Town and Buffalo City. Cape Town 2001 across provinces, taking into account a grew employment by 3,7% over the five years between 1996 and 2001, but its new definition of urban, and correcting for the misclassification of many small towns as unemployed population grew 76%. By contrast, even though it shed 13,1% of rural in 1996. The `trends' shown are its available jobs, Buffalo City's unemployed population grew only 55,4%. This dependent on the potentially troublesome suggests that as the unemployment rate in this city climbs to over 53,1%, the definition or `urban' discussed earlier, but do long-term and newly unemployed have started to abandon it in search of work suggest that some areas are seeing anything elsewhere. It is possible that they are migrating to rural areas, but more likely but a mass movement to towns and cities. that they are moving to other towns and cities, such as Cape Town. City-to-city migration may be more permanent than rural to urban migration. It is possible that, over time, the relative size of cities such as Cape Town may increase faster than that of Johannesburg or Ekurhuleni, cities whose current very-fast growth may be attributable more to temporary/circular rural to urban migration patterns. Intra-provincial and intra-city migration Across the nine SACN cities a remarkable 73,6% of residents were living in the same suburb in 2001 as the one that they were living in 1996. A further 8,8% moved house within the city. 9,1% of those living in the SACN cities in 2001 were new-migrants into the city. As expected, this figure drops to as low as 5,5% in Nelson Mandela, one of the four slow-growing cities, and it rises to above 10% for the three fast-growing cities in Gauteng. This figure in turn has to be qualified however. For example, 13,7% of new migrants on Johannesburg came from Ekurhuleni and Tshwane, and a further 10,4% from other parts of Gauteng. In addition, whereas Johannesburg received 88 071 of its 364 792 new migrants from the rest of Gauteng, it also lost 92 396 people to the rest of the province (47,5% of its total out migration). Figure 9 for in and out migration to and from the cities and the remainder of their provinces are shown in Appendix 1 in the Statistical Almanac. The differences in the extent of intra-city movement are worth noting. 11% of total population in Cape Town moved house between 1996 and 2001, and 10% moved in Tshwane. However, only 5,9% moved suburb in Msunduzi and 7,1% in eThekwini. It is recognised that these intra-city movements are as important in the shaping of post-apartheid cities as are inter-city and rural- urban migration, but why and how they occur remain unclear. 41 DEMOGRAPHICS Different cities are likely to see very different dynamics. For example, the movement in Cape Town may be accounted for by a more liquid property market in which predominantly white residents are trading up in homes. The relatively high level of intra-city movement in Tshwane may reflect a very different dynamic, such as the movement of peri-urban populations in the Winterveld into more conveniently located housing developments and the inner city. Chapters 6 and 7 consider one dimension of this intra-city movement, namely the shift of large numbers of households out of formal and informal dwellings in the backyards of township and suburban properties. International migration 1996 2001 Much has been made of the increasing number of foreign migrants in South African cities. Trends here are notoriously difficult to track. The census cannot Johannesburg 65 205 102 326 assure accurate statistics for people who, as a general rule, do not want their Ethekwini 20 764 21 696 presence to be officially registered. Some estimates have been made over the Cape Town 31 914 37 222 last decade, but these have tended to be more speculation than fact. Two Ekurhuleni 37 432 46 996 dynamics are important. Tshwane 16 049 23 679 First, there was a sudden increase in the number of foreign migrants in the Nelson Mandela 4 410 4 885 country illegally in search of work opportunities in the early 1990s. Some Buffalo City 2 563 2 618 cities are convinced that this number is growing all the time. The available Mangaung 2 274 4 402 evidence suggests that the numbers of people entering the country legally on Msunduzi 2 692 3 803 holiday or business visas, and then staying on illegally, have stabilised at a Total 183 303 247 627 few hundred thousand. Figure 10. Table of number of persons in each Second, there is an increasing number of migrants here legally on long-term SACN city with non-South African citizenship, study permits, work permits or as asylum seekers/refugees. The asylum seeker 1996- 2001. Graph of the gap between the trend is the most interesting. The Department of Home Affairs and United number of foreign travellers arriving in and Nations High Commission for Refugees keep records of people applying for leaving South Africa, 1970-2002. The numbers asylum at its five reception points in Johannesburg, Tshwane, eThekwini, in the graph are distorted by the inclusion of Nelson Mandela and Cape Town. In the year 2000, 2 728 people applied for various categories of travellers for the first time around 1991, notably tourists and asylum, and in 2001, 4 786. Then the country saw a huge jump in the numbers contract migrant workers from Botswana, of asylum seekers to 20 842 requests for asylum in 2002. Preliminary figures Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. The gap is for the first two quarters of 2003 are similar. what is important. Three things are driving this trend. The first is ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The second is resistance to repatriation of refugees from Angola and Africa's Great Lakes region, currently in camps in Zambia and Tanzania. Although conflict in their countries has subsided, they do not yet want to return home, and are instead are seeking to move southwards, increasing the numbers of applications in Malawi and Namibia as well as South Africa. The third is the stricter immigration provisions in the new Immigration Act, introduced early in 2002. This imposes harsh penalties on anyone giving illegal immigrants work or shelter. With their options closing because of this law, many economic migrants may be trying to legalise their presence by applying for asylum, since the Refugees Act holds that no-one who has applied for refugee status may be removed until their application has been considered, and there is a substantial backlog in the processing of applications. 42 DEMOGRAPHICS The impact of HIV and Aids Information on how the HIV and Aids epidemic is, or will be, affecting South Africa's cities is currently sketchy. What is almost certain is that there will very soon be a drop in the population of those age groups that were sexually active some 10 years ago. The Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) has developed a model of the likely progress of the disease. The results of even a reasonably conservative scenario, factoring in various preventative measures, indicate that the country's population as a whole will decline slightly after 2007 as a result of the epidemic. Other research disputes that HIV and Aids will cause a negative growth rate, but nonetheless agree that its impact on population growth will be significant. Cities are unlikely to escape this demographic event. In fact they may be more seriously affected as late-stage Aids sufferers, unable to secure meaningful care in over-crowded urban health centres, return to rural homesteads to be cared for by extended family. A close study of population curves does already show relative declines in population in the age groups 20-24, 24-29 and 30-34 between 1996 and 2001. There is also a steep decline in the numbers in the 0-4 age group, suggesting the drop in fertility that accompanies the epidemic. However, these declines are most notable in what this report has called `weak-growth' cities. They could therefore equally be explained by the out-migration of work-seekers of child-bearing age. It is interesting, though, that decline in these age-groups is much more evident on the female side of the population curve. We know that women are less likely than men to migrate, and are much more vulnerable to contracting HIV and to the repeat infections that bring the more rapid onset of Aids. The drop in the number of women could also be due to earlier than anticipated returns of the greater numbers of women migrants noted in the Agincourt study (see figure 7). Whether this is a result of the onset of Aids, or simply to early disengagement from urban contexts that are unable to provide women with meaningful opportunities, cannot be known at this stage. IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT TRENDS Perspectives on demographic trends in South Africa's major cities have been dominated by the notion that, like the rest of the developing world, and especially Sub-Saharan Africa, our population is rapidly urbanising. The trends analysis suggests that, although certainly true for some SACN cities, this broad understanding of demographic developments must be nuanced. There are a number of possible scenarios for the nine SACN cities. · Some cities may continue to see fast urbanisation. Under certain conditions, such as the failure of urban economies in other parts of the country, some may see much faster growth than currently, and a few may even follow those secondary cities that have become hyper-growth centres. In this scenario fast growth in some cities goes hand in hand with much slower growth in others, as people abandon those centres in search of urban opportunities elsewhere. · It is just as likely, however, that the current fast-growing SACN cities will drop back to `stable-growth' rates under the impact of under-urbanisation and HIV and Aids, and that the current stable and weak-growth cities will continue to develop at their current pace. 43 DEMOGRAPHICS ASSA 2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total pop 47 685 361 47 757 797 47 751 189 47 687 369 47 591 195 47 486 822 47 394 750 Aids infect 6 994 937 6 824 732 6 592 727 6 320 107 6 030 322 5 746 036 5 486 208 Aids death 563 427 628 215 676 839 705 316 712 535 700 360 672 894 · The impact of HIV and Aids and under-urbanisation may be greater than Figure 11. ASSA 2000 Aids and Demographic expected, dragging all the cities towards a weak-growth trajectory, and model, showing South African population and causing a few to fall into the malaise of population decline or even hyper- Aids mortality trends in 2006 through 2012, `Change Scenario'. decline that has affected some secondary cities. This more complex picture has important implications for how SACN cities understand and plan for their possible futures. When the primary challenge facing cities is understood as unexpected `over- population' from urbanisation, the appropriate strategic response is naturally In a country in settlement transition, a how to deal with the basic needs of huge numbers of new residents within the town that has no poor would be evidence that that town is not playing its part in limits of the municipal budget. Since jobs for newcomers cannot be guaranteed, the necessary restructuring of settlement cities fast filling up with new rural in-migrants must quickly face up to the patterns: it would be an apartheid town. prospect of deepening urban poverty, spreading slums, and increasing social So it is not the presence of poor people in welfare demands. The principal planning concern must be how to try address town that should cause concern, but the widening backlogs in the facilities needed for social reproduction. This average time taken to assimilate translates into rolling out basic-service infrastructure as quickly as possible migrants. Very broadly speaking, one of the prime functions of towns is to make to new households, and getting as many as possible involved in the economy. an increasing number of people realize But what is an appropriate strategic response if cities are instead facing the that they need to achieve a standard of living, a level of expenditure and income spectre of slower growth due to HIV and Aids and under-urbanisation? Some and a level of productivity above the municipalities may look on weaker growth with relief. But this is to miss the average of their present environment, to fact that there may be some real dangers in lower than expected growth. provide these people with incentives to move, and to help these `new poor' The key challenge may be population instability and under-investment, not assimilate rapidly into their new `over-population'. Some cities may need to be much more concerned with surroundings. `assimilation' ­ how to ensure that their floating `not yet properly urban, no (Jean-Marie Cour, paper on West-African longer properly rural' residents commit more fully to urban life. population dynamics for World Bank Workshop on Urban-Rural Linkages, On the opportunity side may be the new arrival of large numbers of 15-19 9 March 2000) year olds, either in search of a good education or a first chance at making a living. Another very significant opportunity may be the arrival of asylum seekers and economic migrants from elsewhere in the world and especially Africa. The presence of foreign nationals in South African cities is often placed on the liability side of the balance sheet by city leaders. There is a perception that immigrants `steal jobs', or put added pressure on already strained urban services. Their social and economic contribution to the country, and cities, is routinely discounted. Studies in other countries have often concluded that immigrants contribute far more to local economies and, in turn, the public purse, than they take away. Most importantly, cities with diverse, multicultural populations, with significant foreign national minorities well-networked back to home countries, have found that their cosmopolitanism is a major strength in a globalising world. On the cost side may be the need to minimise the impact of large numbers of residents shifting household expenditure into medical costs, and/or choosing to leave the city with whatever capital they have been able to accumulate. 44 DEMOGRAPHICS LIFE ON THE STREETS NEW ROAD, MIDRAND On the N1, midway between the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria, New Road is in the heart of one of the fastest-growing investment centres in Southern Africa. Built in the 1990s it was a symbol of new things to come: the energy and hope of the new South Africa and the intensity in productivity and growth that economies of agglomeration and knowledge concentration bring. Cemented on the promise of foreign direct investment after decades of sanctions and isolation, this was South Africa's dialup to the IT and telecommunications highway; an off-ramp to the new economy. New Road has made access to Midrand easier. The intersection with N1 is widely regarded as an engineering and construction feat. It's a landmark with a multiplicity of road markings and signs, two large fuel stations and a restaurant. The recent story of Midrand is one of rapid economic and social change. A decade ago this was home to few people, the majority living on plots or agricultural holdings. Around the industrial area, the remnants of this rural way of life are still visible. For the plotrotte, as residents escaping the city life were known, Midrand was a space on the margins, a safe place where they could escape the evils of city life and often the tentacles of an authoritarian state. From the 1960s, it was a haven for gay and mixed-race couples, and for artists. There was little development partly due to the agricultural zoning but also because apartheid planning designated the peri-urban area for black township development. In the last decades of the century, the landscape changed dramatically. Led by the breweries, companies started building factories and offices, as the site's potential for commercial urban development was realised. Now it's home to major players in the fields of telecommunications, IT, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, electronics, defence and aerospace, motor and security, warehousing and distribution-related businesses. Glass and concrete office buildings ­ with electric fencing and security personnel at the boomed and gated entrances ­ are a striking feature of the landscape. In the 90s Midrand was the fastest growing investment town in Africa. In 1999, R720-million worth of building plans were approved, nearly 4% of the national market share, with a growth rate in excess of 20% per year for the last couple of years. Since then, enthusiasm has cooled a little, with an oversupply of office space and some negative perceptions towards the area's inclusion in the City of Joburg. There are other changes too. Developers have responded to the growing number of people commuting to Midrand by building large town-house complexes. The majority are owned or rented by the black middle and affluent classes, with the remaining plots still home to an older white generation. However, most of Midrand's population lives in informal settlements. Ivory Park, with about 225 000 people, accounts for 80% of Midrand's entire population, and has grown steadily over the last decade, although it occupies only 7% of the land area. Most residents are poor: 70% earn less than R2 500 pm, and of these 34% have no formal employment. Change, as they say, is never total and complete. To the west, New Road quickly diminishes into a bumpy single lane, with fenced plots on both sides of the road. A mere kilometre away from one of the busiest intersections in South Africa is peri- urban countryside. To the east, New Road, where Grand Central Airport and a few light industries are scattered, is as dilapidated. Here too are those left behind in the new economy: street vendors selling fruits, cigarettes and vegetables, and unskilled workers who find no other place in this skills economy than cleaning large offices or guarding expensive cars. Walking east along New Road, or taking a taxi to an informal settlement where the roads are not quite as new, if they are there at all. 45 CITIES PRODUCTIVE4: CHAPTER 46 The morepeople that are concentrated in one place, the larger the pool ofresources, and the more intense, dynamic and generative the interactions. 47 PRODUCTIVE CITIES CHAPTER 4. URBAN ECONOMY TRENDS AND CITIES THE STATE OF THE PRODUCTIVE CITY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULATION TRAJECTORIES AND `PRODUCTIVE CITIES' PRODUCTIVE The demographic trajectories of SACN cities are linked with their economic prospects. In general there is a close positive relationship between city population size and city economic activity. The more people that are concentrated in one place, the larger the pool of resources, and the more intense, dynamic and generative the interactions. Big cities are therefore natural crucibles for new wealth-creating activities because they simultaneously concentrate market demand and stir new productive capacity. In turn, city economy has an impact on city population size. Dynamic economies attract migrants, leading to relatively faster city growth in the short to medium term. Over time, the relatively higher expense of living in cities, and the promise of a `middle class' quality of life, increases the cost-to-benefit calculation of having too many children. So urban life almost always drives down the high fertility rates that often keep poor families from accumulating capital and trap them in poverty. From a national planning perspective, therefore, a greater share of population concentrated in urban centres is a good thing. However, the positive relationship between city economies and population development does not always hold. Cities need to be careful that their relatively solid economic performance may attract new migrants faster than the city economy can absorb, creating large shiftless populations disenchanted with their inability to access the economic advantages of living in cities. All cities must provide their residents with some means of earning a living. This means two things. Residents must be given opportunities to use their skills and abilities to add value. And they must be adequately remunerated for their contribution. If cities cannot guarantee their populations a better chance to earn a living than that available elsewhere then residents will not be fully committed to life in the city. Figure 12. Both relatively solid economic In the event that cities cannot provide their residents with means to earn a performance/fast population growth and relative economic `failure'/potential living, relative economic performance may quickly turn into relative economic depopulation are seen in the nine SACN cities, `failure'. Both new migrant populations and old settled populations may with the size of bubbles representing the disinvest from the city. They may hedge their bets by investing what they can relative scale of city unemployment in 1996. in future lives and assets elsewhere. Or they may abandon the city altogether, The bubble-size shows the difference between moving to other centres or returning to rural areas, taking whatever resources the city's unemployment rate and the rate of they have with them. unemployment across the country in 1996. A large bubble means the city's unemployment A few key trends do stand out in relation to the SACN cities' ability to provide rate is far lower than the national average. residents with means to earn a living sufficient enough to secure their ongoing White bubbles are negative, which means that unemployment rates in these cities exceeded commitment. This chapter looks at the following things: the national average in 1996. The graph suggests at least some causal relationship · Gross Geographic Product and GGP per capita changes for all nine SACN between population growth rates and relative cities in general, and recent GGP trends for each economic sector; economic advantage across the cities between 1996 and 2001. 48 PRODUCTIVE CITIES · In relation to the sector economic growth trends, trends in employment and unemployment, over the last 30 years and more recently; · Disparities in income earned by those employed, in particular the still highly skewed distribution of incomes across racial groups; · Different employment and income earning opportunities available in each city relative to what can be achieved elsewhere in the country; · Some possible explanations for slow economic growth, specifically demand limitations and supply-side micro-economic efficiency constraints; · Efforts by the cities to compensate for a lack of domestic demand by accessing global markets, and to gear their local economies to global competitiveness by addressing micro-economic constraints; and · Possible limitations to these efforts, given current trends in the global economy and the low employment and income generating effects this growth path has offered thus far. GROSS GEOGRAPHIC PRODUCT, GGP PER CAPITA AND GGP GROWTH IN DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SECTORS Gross Geographic Product 1970 to 2002 Using different data sets rough pictures can be drawn of changing city economic product for the period 1970 to 2002. A single integrated Gross Geographic Product (GGP) data-set for the nine SACN cities, covering the entire period, is not available. GGP data was sourced from StatsSA for the period 1970 to 1994. 1991 was the last time StatsSA published reliable official estimates of GGP, with 1994 figures being a reasonably accurate forward projection of 1991 survey data. Gross Value Add (GVA) data was procured from the firm Global Insight for the period 1996 to 2002. GVA is similar to GGP, but it differs in that it excludes taxes and subsidies on products. It is derived from a variety of sources, including StatsSA census data on labour remuneration, Reserve Bank national income and production accounts data for each economic sector and Regional Services Council levy growth trends. It is disaggregated to Magisterial Districts matching the boundaries of the nine cities. The two sets of figures do not line up, in that the GVA data for 1996 shows an aggregate economic product for all nine cities much higher than the GGP data for just two years before. However, each data set is accurate Figure 13. GGP and GGP per capita in each of on its own terms. the SACN cities between 1970 and 1994. 49 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Figure 13 shows the Gross Geographic Product and GGP per capita of each SACN city between 1970 and the mid-1990s. In this period, GGP for all nine cities practically doubled, from R88,3 billion to R161,4 billion. In 1994, Johannesburg was the largest economy in the country, followed by Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and eThekwini, all jostling for second place. In growth terms some cities performed much better than others. Tshwane's economy grew 142,57% during this period, and Buffalo City's a remarkable 315%. Johannesburg's economy by contrast grew only 43,36%. The GGP data suggests that total economic product per person declined in all but one city over the period. The general picture is one of economic growth not keeping pace with population growth. Accelerated decline between 1991 and 1994 is due to the influx of people into the cities in the post-apartheid period (in Tshwane and Buffalo City the very steep downward curve is at least partly due to the anomaly in data resulting from the historical exclusion of TBVC states from SA census data). Figure 14 shows GVA growth and GVA per capita growth across all nine cities between 1996 and 2002. A number of the cities have seen strong growth in total economic value during this period, with Johannesburg and Tshwane showing the greatest increase. However, the share of wealth per person has not kept pace in this period either. Across the nine cities it grew just 1,15%, from R21 986 to R22 239 per capita. GVA per capita declined in five of the nine cities and showed minimal growth in two others. GVA per capita grew the most in Nelson Mandela, from R15 020 to R17 817, reflecting both relatively strong economic growth and the slight increase in population in this city over the period. Between 1996 and 2001 Tshwane grew the fastest of all the cities at 5,07% per annum on average. Johannesburg and eThekwini were close behind. Msunduzi's economy declined at -0,22% per annum in the 1996 to 2001 period, but it has seen a recent surge of new growth. The strongest economic growth has been seen in the transport, storage and communications sector, reflecting the communications revolution of the second half of the 1990s. Figure 14. Above, GVA and GVA per capita Strong growth has also been seen in the financial, insurance, real estate and percentage growth for 1996 to 2001 in each of business services sector, although this growth now seems to be flagging. Growth the nine SACN cities. Below, average annual in the manufacturing sector has been significant and appeared to accelerate percentage GVA growth per sector for 1996- in 2001-02. Detailed breakdowns of GVA are presented in separate profiles 2001 and for 2001-2002 for the nine cities. for each city in the statistical almanac. Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Mandela City growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth growth % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % annual annual annual annual annual annual annual annual annual 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 96-01annual 01-02 Total city 4,52 2,32 2,27 4,43 2,24 1,65 0,67 2,94 5,07 5,02 3,93 2,19 0,56 -1,07 1,05 0,51 -0,22 3,07 1 Agri, forestry, fishing 0,76 3,78 0,99 4,07 0,76 4,00 0,93 4,07 0,75 3,78 0,81 3,94 0,99 4,12 1,16 4,28 0,26 3,22 2 Mining and quarrying 3,87 -5,06 -4,53 -13,1 0,35 -8,49 -3,78 15,94 0,63 -5,83 2,13 -16,2 8,45 -9,67 4,45 -7,85 -5,59 -16,2 3 Manufacturing 3,60 2,27 1,46 4,43 0,07 1,59 -0,44 3,31 4,69 5,29 3,62 1,32 -1,24 -3,46 -0,93 -2,76 -2,24 3,09 4 Electricity, gas, water 4,20 0,25 2,21 1,76 -0,52 3,37 1,57 0,98 4,70 2,43 4,26 -0,82 -0,81 -6,23 -0,07 -4,95 0,00 1,00 5 Construction 2,77 0,73 -0,11 3,52 5,55 -1,00 -1,77 1,22 3,72 3,59 4,08 0,24 -0,29 -4,29 -4,69 -3,31 -3,52 1,85 6 Wholesale & retail trade 2,28 1,41 1,05 5,28 2,22 -0,03 -1,45 2,10 3,29 4,65 3,05 3,20 -0,98 -0,76 -1,08 3,06 -2,37 3,76 7 Transp, storage, comms 8,08 4,32 5,49 6,90 5,84 4,58 4,70 3,40 12,9810,22 9,02 5,52 3,29 -0,33 4,76 1,16 3,69 6,56 8 Fin, insurance, bus 7,35 2,95 5,19 5,64 3,47 2,03 2,14 3,35 7,75 5,69 7,72 2,64 4,00 -1,74 4,16 -0,96 0,74 4,24 9 Community, social, 0,28 1,11 0,28 1,11 0,28 1,11 0,28 1,11 0,28 1,11 0,28 1,11 0,29 1,11 0,28 1,11 0,29 1,11 personal 50 PRODUCTIVE CITIES EMPLOYMENT TRENDS ACROSS THE NINE CITIES Generating employment South Africa as a whole created 469 927 new jobs between 1996 and 2001. More than half of these were generated in the nine SACN cities. Employment across the nine cities increased from 4 619 136 to 4 866 808 in 1996-2001, an increase of 247 672 or 5,7%. By contrast, only 222 255 jobs were formed in the rest of South Africa outside the nine cities. Despite their aggregate contribution to employment, the creation of new jobs in the cities is nowhere near fast enough to keep pace with the increase in the numbers of people needing employment. The working population grew 16,8% across the country between 1996 and 2001. Reflecting the impact of migration, it increased by 20,94% ­ from 6 519 544 to 7 884 691 ­ in the nine cities. As a result, SACN cities' total unemployment increased by 58,80%, while growing 43,90% in the country as a whole. In 1996, the census showed unemployment (on the expanded definition of those people who could work but are not working, regardless of whether they are currently looking for work or not) averaging 29,2% in the nine SACN cities. This compared to 38.1% in the country as a whole outside the nine cities. Five years later, the gap had narrowed considerably. Unemployment had jumped to 38,3% in the cities and to 44,7% in the rest of the country. Labour Force Survey data from February 2002 (the latest available) was disaggregated to the nine SACN cities for this report. This gives a slightly different picture, as shown in figure 15. On the strict definition, 27,8% of the cities' labour force was unemployed at the start of 2002. Slightly better than the picture presented by the October 2001 census, the LFS measures expanded unemployment at a rate of 35,7%. This big picture needs to be nuanced with a number of trends. Figure 15. Unemployment rates for the nine Trends by sector SACN cities as measured by the Labour Force Survey, February 2002. The strict definition The capacity of South African cities to provide employment must be viewed excludes from the category of unemployed in a long-term perspective. As with many other countries, South Africa has (placing these into the not-economically seen a gradual process of economic restructuring. It has often been noted active category instead) those people who are that primary and secondary industry has declined over time, and the tertiary not currently and actively looking for work. sector has become more and more important. This is true, but other trends The strict definition is that used are important. internationally. However, its inadequacies are universally recognized in that it excludes from Figure 17 shows annual gross value add across the nine main Standard the count of unemployed those who would Industrial Codes (SIC) sectors between 1970 and 2002, and then compares willingly take a job if one were available, but who have become discouraged from even this to employment growth in the nine SACN cities across these sectors over looking for formal work. roughly the same period. The graphs show four economic sectors ­ government, social and community services; manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; and transport and communications ­ continuing to add significant value to the South African economy, but all on average failing to contribute comparable increases in jobs in the nine cities. This general picture of jobless growth is very nuanced. Each sector shows slightly different trends. Value growth in the government, social and community services sector (which includes such sub-sectors as public administration, health and social work, education, community 51 PRODUCTIVE CITIES organisations and, most notably, private households) was matched by employment growth until the early 1990s. The same was the case for the wholesale and retail trade sector. Job creation then stagnated in both between 1996 and 2001. Although jobs in the former increased slightly, the latter lost more than 100 000 between 1991 and 1996. The pattern in each sector then changed in the mid-1990s. The government, social and community services sector contributed only a few new jobs between 1996 and 2001. This small increase hides two divergent trends. On the one hand there was a massive fall off of employment in Figure 16. Census data on actual numbers employed private households: 91 145 household-service jobs in each SACN city between 1946 and 2001. disappeared in the five-year period between the censuses. On the other hand the government / community sub-sector saw 111 323 new jobs to make for a net sector gain of some 20 000 jobs. The wholesale and retail trade sector made up the employment losses of 1991-1996. It contributed 192 710 new jobs across the cities between 1996 and 2001 to see employment return to 1991 levels and above. This growth was relatively evenly spread across the nine SACN cities. The most significant long-term employment trend has been in manufacturing. This sector has seen a substantial long- term decline in employment as production processes go increasingly capital intensive and high tech. Census data shows that between the mid-1940s and 1980 manufacturing added some 700 000 jobs as the country's economy diversified from primary industries, notably gold mining and agriculture. However, from the early 1980s manufacturing went into decline as an employment provider. Driven by productivity gains from mechanisation, the sector continued to add value, though at a slower pace than before. But between 1980 and 1996 it lost some 200 000 jobs to return to 1970 employment levels. Figure 17. Comparison of Reserve Bank Time- Different cities have been differently affected by this general trend. Series Data on gross-value add per economic Historical manufacturing centres, notably Johannesburg, sector (1970-2001) and actual employment Ekurhuleni and Nelson Mandela, all lost a sizeable portion of growth per sector derived from five yearly industry employment between 1970 and 2001. However, other population censuses (1970-2002) for the nine cities, notably eThekwini, Cape Town and Tshwane, all saw SACN cities. respectable manufacturing jobs growth in the same period. Remarkably, the pendulum now seems to have swung back again. Employment losses occurred in the financial Whereas eThekwini and Cape Town saw manufacturing job losses intermediation and insurance services sector during between 1996 and 2001, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Nelson 2002. Bank takeover and rationalisation activities Mandela all saw job growth. For example, although its 30-year caused the banking sector to shed nearly 9 000 jobs picture is one of haemorrhaging manufacturing employment, over the past year. According to a Pricewaterhouse- industry in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality created 30 Coopers survey, major banks anticipate further cuts of up to 10% in their personnel complements by 235 new manufacturing jobs between 1996 and 2001, an increase 2006, implying that employment in the banking of 26,1%. Half of the 30-year manufacturing job growth in Tshwane sector is likely to fall from the current level of also occurred in this five-year period. around 112 000 jobs to just more than 100 000 over the next three years. The exception to the general picture of jobless growth may seem to Reserve Bank Annual Economic Report (2003) be the financial and business sector. Between 1970 and 2001 it 52 PRODUCTIVE CITIES added considerable value to the South African economy, and was the most important driver of jobs growth in the country's major cities. In the 1960s it was the second smallest sector by employment, well behind mining, construction, transport and even agriculture. In 1970 it contributed a mere 5% of total employment across the cities. Over the next 30 years it grew more than 1 600%, easily overtaking other sectors to now stand as the fourth largest by employment. The different cities today have different employment profiles. Some cities are still predominantly manufacturing centres. Other cities have large proportions of their employed population working in Figure 18. The nine SACN cities' percentage the financial and business sectors. Depending on their profile the nine cities distribution of employment across economic each carry a different measure of risk in the face of a general ongoing trend sectors in 2001, and recent evidence of hiring of jobless growth. But this risk is not easy to read. In the past, it may have trends in the finance sector. seemed obvious that those cities with the highest numbers of manufacturing jobs are most at risk of continued employment decline. But this may no longer be the case. It is not impossible that cities with a remaining manufacturing base may now start to see sustained employment increases in this area, as new manufacturing activities seek cheap industrial property or locations with historically better-skilled factory labour. The latest evidence also says that the apparently safe bet of continued employment growth in finance and business may not be so secure after all. Reserve Bank information indicates that since the last census the financial services sector has also started to lose jobs. Employment by occupations Figure 18 gives a picture of employment growth between 1996 and2001forallnineSACNcitiesacrossdifferenteconomicsectors and across occupations. The picture is potentially skewed by inaccurate census data, but it does suggest one or two key trends. First, while employment of professionals and administrative workers grew by over 300% between 1970 and 1995, and the demand for production workers and agricultural workers fell by 54% over the same period, it is not clear that this trend is continuing. The demand for clerks and technicians/associate professionals remains high, but employment of professionals actually declined between 1996 and 2001. What is driving this trend is not clear. The most likely reason is that the cities have seen a decline in the employment of teachers, a sub- category of this occupation. Another very plausible explanation is that the decline represents, not the loss of job opportunities, but the actual decline in the numbers of professionals as doctors and lawyers Figure 19. Census data on actual numbers of and scientific specialists emigrate to countries where their skills are more people employed in manufacturing between highly remunerated. The need for these jobs remains, but the departing 1970 and 2001 and between 1996 and 2001. professionals cannot be replaced quickly enough by the education system. However, it is also feasible that the decline indicates deteriorating employment opportunities for high-end knowledge workers. If this is the case it is not promising for cities that have put great store on the economic growth potential of new knowledge industries. 53 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Second, a serious concern is the decline in the numbers of people employed in private households, illustrated in the graph on sector employment growth. This decline is hidden in the fairly robust growth of service workers shown in the graph on occupations. Between 1996 and 2001 the cities saw 91 145 domestic staff lose their jobs, a tenth of all jobs in private households across the country. This loss has serious spatial implications for the cities, since at least some of these staff would have been housed in domestic worker accommodation in suburbs. The loss of jobs in this sector/ occupation category may partially account for the huge movement of people out of formal and informal backyard accommodation discussed in the next chapter. The greatest increase in employment can be seen amongst clerks and service workers, reflecting the corresponding growth in the wholesale/retail trade and financial / business sectors. Despite the more recent concern that some of this employment growth has dried up, this may be generally good news for cities trying to build the next generation of middle-class residents. It is amongst clerks, managers and technicians that one may expect to see growth of future domestic demand. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND RELATIVE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES Figure 20. Growth in employment across sectors Ability to provide residents with access to work opportunities is only one of and occupations 1996-2001. Note that the two characteristics of the `productive city'. The other is the ability to ensure growth rates across occupations are indicative that residents are adequately remunerated for the skills and abilities that only. The available 1996 census data for occupations does not line up with that for sector they do apply. This raises the question of the extent to which residents are employment, suggesting a skewed picture. able to benefit from the economic product they help create, and which residents do not share in the wealth created in our cities. Incomes GGP per capita hides the more important picture of how income from economic opportunity is distributed across the population. Reserve Bank data shows that, over the last 30 years, economic growth has had little discernable impact on household spending power. The percentage of economic value generated that ends up in the pockets of workers has declined gradually over the last 30 years. In 1990, the percentage compensation of employees to GDP at factor cost was 57,2%. In 2002 it fell to 51,4%. The cities' own data supports this picture. An analysis of RSC levy growth between 2001 and 2002 in the six metros suggests that whereas assessed company turnover increased in all cities except Johannesburg, total payroll did not increase to the same extent or actually declined. Figure 21 highlights that the trend is most apparent in Ekurhuleni. Whereas company turnover increased from R170 billion to R185 billion, assessed total remuneration fell from R27 billion to R23 billion. In 2001, the ratio of staff remuneration to Figure 21. Regional Service Council (RSC) levy total turnover was 14:86 in this city. In 2002 it was 11:89. assessments of total taxable value for company turnover and for remuneration of employees (2001 and 2002). 54 PRODUCTIVE CITIES The extent to which city populations as a whole benefit adequately from economic activity is important. But in the South African context the more pertinent issue is whether all sections of the population share equitably in the economic value generated, in particular whether any inroads have been made into the extremely skewed distribution of incomes between different racial groups. Figure 22 presents two graphs of the scale of monthly income earned by employed residents from the white, African, coloured and Indian `population groups' in Tshwane. One compares the number of households, from each racial group, falling within certain income brackets. It illustrates that the vast majority of black employed residents earn between R801 and R1 600 per month, and the majority of white employees earn in the R3 201 to R6 400 and R6 401 to R12 800 ranges. The other graph, even more starkly, shows the actual value of income earned in each bracket by racial group. Just as important as the amount of income different sections of the population take home, is the issue of the relative value of that `take home' in the light of the differential costs of urban living borne by these population groups. One key cost is the expense, in time and money, of actually getting to places where work can be found and a living earned. A person who is forced to live on the edge of the city, far from places where employment Figure 22. Distribution of income earned by opportunities are concentrated, may officially have the same salary as another population group and income category, 2001 census data for Tshwane. The graph on the top living closer. But her greater travelling costs will mean that the value of shows the number of people with monthly income she is able to retain at the end of the day is far less. income in each income bracket. The graph above shows total monthly income earned by The issue of `locational disadvantage', including the question of the `spatial each population group in each income bracket. mismatch between the poor and jobs', is covered in more detail in the review of social trends in Chapter 5. AVERAGE MONTHLY DIFFERENCE IN AMI DIFF IN AMI FOR EACH INCOME PER FOR EACH CITY & CITY & NATIONAL EMPLOYED PERSON NATIONAL AMI: AMI EXCLUDING (AMI): 2001 2001 CITIES: 2001 Johannesburg R6 408,63 R2 345,89 R3 619,57 Ethekwini R4 226,88 R164,13 R1 437,82 Cape Town R5 186,44 R1 123,70 R2 397,38 Ekurhuleni R5 085,60 R1 022,85 R2 296,54 Tshwane R6 483,81 R2 421,07 R3 694,75 Nelson Mandela R4 298,54 R235,79 R1 509,48 Buffalo City R3 694,04 - R368,70 R904,98 Mangaung R3 561,97 - R500,77 R772,91 Msunduzi R3 985,00 - R77,74 R1 195,94 Figure 23. Difference between census and Total R5 297,22 R1 234,47 R2 508,16 LFS unemployment rates in each of the nine cities and that elsewhere in the country (graph on right); and difference between the average monthly income per employed worker in each city, compared to that for the country as a whole and settlements outside the nine cities (table on left). 55 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Relative differences Of greatest concern to some SACN cities must be the relative difference between employment opportunities and remuneration available in these cities and that available in other parts of the country, either in other cities or even in non-urban areas. The census data suggests the surprising finding that while unemployment in the nine cities is on average 3,3% lower than that in the country as a whole, some of the cities have unemployment rates far higher than even that in most rural areas. Figure 23 shows the differential between unemployment rates in the nine cities and that in the rest in the country. City unemployment rates are compared to that in the country as a whole as per the 1996 census, 2001 census and February 2002 Labour Force Survey. They are also compared to the average unemployment rate for the SACN cities in 2001. Although the LFS survey data paints a slightly more rosy picture, it supports the census in suggesting that, with their unemployment rates running substantially higher than elsewhere, at least three of the SACN cities may offer work-seeking residents little incentive to stay. Except for Tshwane, which has improved further in relative attractiveness, all the cities have seen an erosion in their position between 1996 and 2001. As would be expected, the `quality of work opportunity' in the nine SACN cities is better than elsewhere. When total income earned by individuals is divided by the total employed population in 2001, it would appear that SACN city workers earn R5 297,22 a month on average. This is R2 508,16 better than that earned across the country outside the nine cities. The pattern holds for all nine cities. But when the average monthly income earned is compared to the national average, including the nine cities, it would seem that at least three cities are unable to offer their employed people a better deal than they might be able to find in another SACN city. Two others have only a marginal advantage over the national average. EXPLAINING THE STRENGTH OF THE URBAN ECONOMY The increase in productivity has allowed many employers to cut payrolls or workers' hours. Why pay six people to assemble 90 The capacity of cities to provide their residents with means to earn a living, toaster ovens an hour when only four and, more importantly, means to earn a living better than that they may find workers are needed to assemble the 60 elsewhere, is a reflection of the strength of the urban economy. The strength ovens that can be sold? Better yet, why not speed up the line and cut the four of the urban economy is in turn a reflection of strongly growing demand for workers to three, each one forced to work a city's goods and services and, matching this, growing productive capacity faster? But that leaves three workers to meet this demand. The relatively poor performance of South African cities unemployed, without income and unlikely on various indicators of employment and incomes therefore begs the question to buy toaster ovens ­ or much else ­ of what has happened to demand for goods and services, and to productive until they get work again. Gradually, the capacity, in recent years. demand for toaster ovens falls to 50, then 40, and another worker is laid off, or everyone's hours and pay are cut. And DEMAND LIMITATIONS demand falls even more, producing its own negative dynamic. `I hesitate to say that high productivity is bad,' said William C. National level data Dudley, director of domestic economic research at Goldman Sachs. `But if it is There is little economic information disaggregated to municipal level, and so high, then you need more demand to it is not possible to draw a very clear picture of demand trends in the cities. generate employment, and if you don't get However, the SACN cities do make up a very large proportion of the economy it, then the economy stalls.' of South Africa as a whole. It is estimated that the economies of eThekwini, (`Good economy, bad job market, huh?' Johannesburg and Cape Town alone make up some 50% of GDP. So it can be New York Times, 14 September 2003) 56 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Reasons for under-utilisation Total Total Shortage Shortage Shortage of Insufficient Other Utilisation under- of raw of skilled semi-skilled demand utilisation materials labour labour TOTAL MANUFACTURING 2001 79,7 20,3 1,7 0,3 0,0 15,6 2,7 2002 80,7 19,3 2,2 0,6 0,1 14,2 2,2 2003 (May) 78,8 21,2 2,3 1,0 0,2 14,9 2,8 Beverages 2001 75,3 24,7 1,0 0,6 0,0 20,8 2,3 2002 72,3 27,7 1,5 1,0 0,3 21,8 3,1 2003 (May) 70,8 29,2 1,4 1,4 0,5 22,8 3,1 Furniture 2001 80,5 19,5 3,4 0,1 0,0 13,6 2,4 2002 81,5 18,5 2,6 0,1 0,3 13,9 1,6 2003 (May) 79,3 20,7 3,1 0,9 0,1 14,6 2,0 Other chemicals 2001 79,8 20,2 1,8 0,1 0,0 15,8 2,5 2002 80,0 20,0 1,8 0,2 0,1 15,2 2,7 2003 (May) 77,9 22,1 1,1 1,0 0,1 16,2 3,7 Radio, tel, comms apparatus 2001 67,4 32,6 1,7 0,0 0,0 30,5 0,4 2002 67,2 32,8 3,3 0,4 0,0 28,3 0,4 2003 (May) 60,2 39,8 2,9 0,6 0,1 35,1 1,1 to 1995 GDPto prices) GDPto (% formation exports non-factor (Index constant prices) and gold adjusted) (1995 R)of employeesof currentat GDPto capital prices) (% consumption households prices) savings fixed merchandise currentat real exportsof by excluding Seasonally (% servicesof millionsin cost currentat finalof grossof prices) grossof (% 100. Ratio GDP Volume services = Export prices Compensation factorat currentat Ratio expenditure (% Ratio currentat Ratio GDPto 1970 7,12 29,64 13 013 58,77 60,48 20,42 24,35 1971 7,95 34,31 13 229 60,13 61,31 23,15 25,71 1972 9,87 41,60 12 360 59,41 60,67 24,92 26,38 1973 8,59 39,47 13 114 56,02 57,40 24,45 24,93 1974 8,45 41,56 12 624 54,41 54,86 25,73 24,69 1975 8,49 43,79 13 185 57,14 56,33 24,24 28,98 1976 9,09 46,06 12 890 58,79 56,63 22,84 29,68 1977 10,12 49,77 12 950 58,52 56,50 27,56 27,57 1978 10,28 52,18 13 137 56,40 54,82 27,56 25,94 1979 10,51 54,87 13 047 54,98 53,34 31,46 25,83 1980 10,18 56,33 12 522 50,60 50,68 33,94 25,90 1981 9,05 53,56 12 009 55,48 54,45 27,17 27,45 1982 8,88 52,30 12 169 59,29 56,46 20,55 27,50 1983 8,96 50,91 10 409 58,05 57,55 24,29 26,05 1984 8,52 51,82 11 911 58,84 57,18 22,51 23,98 1985 10,20 59,79 12 439 57,12 54,92 24,64 22,81 1986 10,16 58,84 11 829 56,63 55,93 23,33 19,65 1987 10,04 58,90 10 675 56,76 57,42 21,75 17,85 1988 11,04 66,20 11 088 55,96 58,23 22,66 19,42 1989 11,52 72,26 13 512 56,31 57,73 22,44 20,21 1990 12,06 75,11 12 809 57,23 60,99 19,11 19,14 1991 12,21 73,41 12 164 57,14 61,64 18,57 17,16 1992 12,88 75,07 12 144 57,48 62,91 16,25 15,65 1993 13,62 80,10 12 701 56,62 61,82 16,44 14,69 1994 14,14 86,77 14 549 55,91 61,85 16,88 15,15 Figure 24a. Utilisation and underutilisation of 1995 15,80 100,00 16 751 55,81 62,59 16,52 15,88 manufacturing capacity, and primary reasons 1996 16,74 112,33 20 266 55,36 62,24 16,12 16,28 for this across all manufacturing and a sample 1997 17,21 118,51 21 462 55,26 62,91 15,11 16,51 of SIC codes. The values for the reasons given 1998 17,64 123,46 23 715 56,32 63,14 14,85 16,96 are the share of percentage underutilisation 1999 17,91 127,18 23 835 55,80 62,98 15,40 15,41 2000 19,27 140,07 24 671 53,93 62,68 15,16 14,85 attributable to each reason. Figure 24b. 2001 19,16 144,93 26 727 52,66 61,92 14,81 14,69 Reserve Bank Time-Series Data for various 2002 17,87 142,85 29 479 51,38 62,11 16,13 15,14 indicators, 1970­2002. 57 PRODUCTIVE CITIES assumed that information available for the country as a whole speaks to dynamics in the local urban economies of the nine cities. Key economic indicators that reflect on the demand, and hence on the ability of the economy to fully utilise, paint a picture of stagnation. Regular surveys by StatsSA show that current manufacturing capacity is some 20% underutilised, and that approximately 75% of the reason for this is insufficient demand (see figure 24a). Demand weaknesses vary between sectors. For example, under-deployment of manufacturing capacity for various kinds of telecommunications apparatus reached almost 40% in May of 2003. Almost 90% of the reason for this under-utilisation was attributable to insufficient demand. For the furniture industry underutilisation was half this at 20,7%, and reasons other than insufficient demand, such as a shortage of raw materials, are more important. But regardless of these differences the general trend suggests that demand is not strengthening and in most sectors is becoming more and more severe. Figure 24b tabulates Reserve Bank data on key economic indicators for the last 30 years. On various indicators the figures suggest that value from exports has increased over the last decade, albeit not as dramatically as one would have expected. This implies that international demand for South Africa's goods and services has sustained some industry growth over the last period. Although it would be too crude to argue that the lure of returns from international competitiveness has given South African industry a reason to continue with a tried and tested growth formula, it is noteworthy that growth in export value has gone hand in hand with the deterioration of other possible foundations for economic growth. The decline in compensation for employees shown by this data set has already been noted above. This clearly impacts on the ability of domestic consumers to sustain expansion of industry at a rate required to absorb larger numbers of job-seekers. Household growth All the SACN cities have seen household growth far in excess of population growth. This suggests that people are not simply moving into SACN cities from rural areas and small towns, but that households already resident within the cities are splitting. In Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni household growth was a phenomenal annual 6,88% and 6,84% respectively. The 10-Year Review highlights household growth as one of the key challenges for development. Indeed, from the point of view of meeting targets for addressing infrastructure backlogs, household growth in excess of population growth is a problem. But from an economic perspective, household splitting is normally considered as a major economic opportunity. Generally speaking, families cluster together into large household structures in times of extreme poverty. By implication, the rise in nuclear households speaks to the growing capacity of younger and older members of families to live separately from primary breadwinners. In South Africa incentives other than new capacity to separately bear living costs are likely to be driving household growth. These may include the availability of housing subsidies. More importantly, however, is that household splitting creates positive conditions for deepening domestic demand, since splitting multiplies the base number of separate units needing household white-goods, foodstuffs and other consumables and, in the long run, building materials for home upgrading. Assuming the presence of a liquid residential property market, it also expands 58 PRODUCTIVE CITIES the total asset base of residents, the property rates base of municipalities, and the lender base of banking institutions. Informal economy Alongside household growth is anecdotal evidence of a rise in the number of people engaged in informal sector activities. Like household growth, informal economies are often viewed as a challenge. Informal sector businesses are regarded as symptomatic of the failure of the formal sector to provide sustainable jobs, and since they are generally untaxed, as a drain on public sector resources rather than a contributor to it. For these reasons the informal sector is often seen as something to be discouraged. But the informal sector is not simply a temporary safety net for people who cannot find formal employment. It is a major generator of economic value, and a primary provider of livelihoods. As such, it both feeds domestic demand for goods and services and as it expands creates demand for goods and services. The burgeoning informal sector is connecting to the formal business sector in ever more intricate ways. The box below reviews key trends in the informal sector in Johannesburg, and suggests how it should properly be regarded. DYNAMICS IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY The informal economy is the largest component and, in many respects, the most neglected element of what is officially termed `the small, medium and micro-enterprise' (SMME) economy of South Africa. Since 1994, the development and promotion of the SMME economy has been one of the national government's core policy objectives (RSA, 1995). The SMME economy has been viewed as a critical element for achieving several of the goals for post-apartheid reconstruction and development. In particular, the promotion and support of the SMME economy has been a critically important vehicle for job creation and poverty alleviation in South Africa's cities, particularly in the context of the slow growth of new employment opportunities taking place in large formal enterprises. Structurally, the SMME economy is highly diverse and encompasses an array of different enterprises and ownership types across a range of sectors. A major distinction is drawn between, on the one hand, a small segment of more established formal small and medium-sized enterprises (primarily under white ownership), and on the other hand, of the so-called emerging SMME economy comprising micro-enterprises and informal enterprises which are mainly operated by historically disadvantaged communities. This latter group of micro and informal enterprises is currently the fastest growing component of the SMME economy. For South African women, the country's youth and rural communities, in particular, the economic (and social) importance of these enterprises is especially critical as an access route to economic opportunities, not least in the country's rapidly growing urban centres. The overall role played by SMMEs ­ including informal enterprise ­ in the national economy is recorded by the Annual Review of the State of Small Business in South Africa. This shows that SMMEs, as a whole, represent 97,5% of the total number of business firms in South Africa, contribute 34,8% to Gross Domestic Product, employ 55% of the national labour force and contribute 42% to total remuneration (Ntsika, 2002). The accuracy of this official data on the SMME economy, including the informal economy, however, must be questioned. Major discrepancies between existing data sets can only be described as remarkable. At national level, Ntsika figures suggest a national total of approximately 1,1 to 1,2 million SMMEs. By contrast, recent StatsSA estimates are that `approximately 2,3 million people in March 2001 were owners of at least one non-VAT-registered business' (Lehohla, 2002: 4). At sub-national levels ­ including city scale ­ reliable data to track the shifting dynamics over time of the informal economy is not readily available. The dynamics of the urban informal economy in South Africa therefore can best be approached by narrowing the focus of discussion to one city ­ namely Johannesburg ­ where there have been a number of research initiatives which provide some counter-balance to the poor state of official data. General agreement exists that Gauteng ­ and, more specifically, metropolitan Johannesburg ­ hosts the highest national rate of enterprise density (Rogerson, 1998). But there is little official certainty on the precise sizing and changing dynamics of the informal economy as part of the wider SMME economy. The confusing state of data concerning the small enterprise economy is illustrated by two official estimates for 59 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Gauteng, both for 2001. According to one estimate there exists a total of 414 000 small, medium and micro-enterprises. Another study places the numbers of non-VAT registered enterprises almost 50% higher with 616 000 enterprises in total (see Ntsika, 2002 and Lehohla, 2002). Several research investigations corroborate that a rapid rate of expansion of informal enterprise activity is taking place across many economic sectors in Johannesburg (Rogerson and Rogerson, 1997; Rogerson, 1998, 2000). A World Bank study disclosed that most of the employment growth taking place within Johannesburg's SMME cluster is anchored upon new enterprise births especially in the informal and micro-enterprise economy (Chandra et al, 2001). Although the strongest growth is evident across retailing enterprise, the importance of new growth that is taking place in production-based micro-enterprise, in informal urban agriculture and even small tourism enterprises should not be overlooked (Rogerson, 2000, 2002). Indeed, one of the most striking new developments is the growth of a segment of informal tourism enterprises linked to new initiatives for township tourism. The marked influence of informal enterprises in the re-making of the landscape of urban South Africa is demonstrated by the emergence of a cluster of almost 1 000 clothing micro-enterprises which constitute the basis of what is now to be planned as inner-city Johannesburg's new garment or fashion district (Cachalia et al, 2004). Undoubtedly, the most rapidly growing component of Johannesburg's small enterprise economy is represented by the category of the emerging SMME economy, which is dominated by African-owned micro-enterprise and informal enterprise. Another increasingly important element in the mix of this emergent economy is enterprises established since 1994 which are operated by non-South African entrepreneurs. Immigrant entrepreneurs ­ especially from Sub-Saharan Africa ­ represent a significant component in Johannesburg's changing small enterprise and informal economy with a special concentration of these entrepreneurs in cross-border and informal street trading, the manufacture of clothing and in motor vehicle repairs (Peberdy and Rogerson, 2003). Across this emerging micro-enterprise and informal enterprise economy there are a host of constraints that impinge upon business expansion and ultimate graduation to the category of successful small enterprise (Kamaha, 2004). From a range of empirical investigations into the workings and business development trajectories of such enterprises, several key groups of problems are observed. The first set of issues relates to the question of education and training for entrepreneurship. In an era of heightened competition and globalisation it is essential that these small entrepreneurs be `smart' and have the capacity to adapt to changing market conditions for `learning-led competitiveness' (King et al, 2002). Significant differences are observed in the human capital strengths of groups of South African and immigrant entrepreneurs with the latter usually showing much higher levels of education and skills training. Access to training opportunities is thus a key element in closing this gap. A second generic set of issues concern entrepreneurs' limited awareness of, and access to, existing government programmes for financial support, especially for access to micro-credit. Third, are fundamental issues that need to be addressed concerning the market power enjoyed by larger enterprises. The economic domination of most sectors by larger (white-owned) enterprises results in only limited opportunities for emerging entrepreneurs. This problem is being addressed by interventions such as affirmative government procurement ­ including local government procurement ­ for targeted emerging entrepreneurs and through the expansion of outsourcing and private sector subcontracting from larger, more established enterprises, to smaller and informal enterprise (Rogerson, 2000). The position of the small enterprise and informal enterprise economy within the broader restructuring that is taking place in Johannesburg is ambiguous. Undoubtedly, the key explanatory factor behind the establishment of most informal economic enterprise is supply-push rather than demand-pull considerations (Rogerson, 2000). The slow labour absorption of the formal economy, associated high unemployment levels, and pressures for basic survival mean that the bulk of informal entrepreneurs operate out of necessity rather than choice (Chandra et al, 2001). Recessionary economic circumstances and the slow pace of employment expansion in the formal economy account for the surge of survivalist enterprises within Johannesburg in often already overtraded income niches, such as home-based spaza retailing, street trading or informal urban cultivation on vacant land. Most research suggests that the growth in the size of Johannesburg's emergent SMME economy has been led by the replication of informal businesses, a pattern of involution, rather than the evolutionary expansion of existing enterprises which would result in the increase in the number of employees. Another key factor affecting the growth of Johannesburg's small enterprise and informal economy relates to the development and intensification of business linkages between larger formal enterprise and micro-enterprise (Rogerson, 2000). It has been argued that competitive pressures ­ including from globalization ­ are unleashing a process of the informalization of formal enterprise in South Africa's cities. Overall, this phenomenon creates a set of potential new opportunities through subcontracted work for the expansion of growing microenterprise (especially in the industrial and construction sphere) albeit it also holds the danger that the most prevalent outcome of informalization might be heightened levels of exploitation and poverty-level working environments for (informal) employees. Overall, a critical factor determining the positive contribution that might be made to cities by the SMME economy, especially of micro and informal enterprise, is the policy and support environment offered by local as well as national governments. Regrettably, national programmes post-1994 have delivered little in the way of positive support for most informal enterprises. Accordingly, for most groups of informal 60 PRODUCTIVE CITIES enterprise the most effective level of policy intervention and support is at the local level rather than the national scale of government (Rogerson 1999). One good example of local level interventions and planning to support the informal economy is provided by Johannesburg's inner-city garment district. The making of the Johannesburg garment district is a classic example of a pro-poor local economic development initiative and is supported by the Johannesburg Development Agency, which views the fashion district as a project in line with the city's long-term economic development strategy. Within this initiative there are a number of sub-projects which are designed to enhance the overall performance of this cluster of almost 1000 clothing micro-enterprises. Among these are, initiatives to improve the skills base of entrepreneurs, to link these emergent entrepreneurs to more established businesses outside of the cluster, to promote joint action or cooperation among South African clothing entrepreneurs and to seek to promote synergistic networks of opportunity which also begin to tap the strengths of immigrant entrepreneurs (Cachalia et al, 2004). MICRO-ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR AND CONSTRAINTS ON PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY Urban economic growth is dampened not only by weak domestic demand but also by supply-side constraints. National data shows substantial declines in the rates of savings and investments over the long term. This limits the country's ability to invest in future productive capacity. There is little that can be done at city level about this. More important from the vantage point of the cities are various weaknesses in efficient economic production because of what are called `micro-economic constraints'. These refer to factors that impact on the ability to produce innovative new economic offerings, the costs of production at the firm level, and the ability to efficiently move or exchange products and services. This in turn impacts negatively on the capacity of the economy to construct demand, both locally and abroad. City business surveys to determine constraints A number of the SACN cities have very recently seen extensive surveys of what their business communities believe to be some of the primary constraints on their own expansion and broader urban economy growth. These surveys have either been commissioned by the municipality, or conducted by independent agents. A full review of these is not possible here. But figure 25 below indicates some of the factors. By way of illustration, 53% of firms in eThekwini believe it is moderately hard to recruit either technicians/associate professionals or senior officials/managers with the necessary skills. Professionals are slightly easier to recruit, perhaps reflecting the loss of jobs in this occupation group noted above. Businesses assessment of some of the major constraints to growth shows sensitivity to a complex amalgam of factors. On the one hand, the survey supports similar findings in Johannesburg that crime and theft, and the general uncertainties associated with it, are major growth inhibitors. This factor has everything to do with the way cities work. On the other hand, businesses indicate that their expansion is at the mercy of international currency fluctuations, over which Figure 25. Results from a study of constraint on cities have zero control. growth and employment in eThekwini, September 2003. 61 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Logistics pathways Something often identified as a major constraint on efficient business activity is the ability to move products quickly, easily and cost-effectively both within the city and through cities en route elsewhere. Where transport networks for goods and people are inadequate or over-stretched this may severely impact on the ability of industry to reliably supply customers. Where the costs of utilising transport networks are prohibitive, or where firms have to make special transport arrangements to compensate for inadequacies in the system as a whole, these costs are invariably factored into the price. This affects demand. There is limited data on the efficiency of transport networks for economic goods and services. That which is available gives a mixed picture. Figure 26 shows National Department of Transport data on the intensity of movement of goods and people through major transport interchanges. On the two indicators of goods passing through ports, and airport travel, the nine SACN cities show mixed progress since 1996. Growth in the total tonnage of goods handled by South African ports was unspectacular between 1996 and 2001, and the total number of vessels handled dropped significantly in three of South Africa's major port cities. However, whether this reflects on the poor quality of port infrastructure in these cities, forcing shipping lines to reroute through other ports such as Maputo or Richards Bay, or whether it reflects persistently weak connection of the national economy with the global economy, is not clear. Both reasons are serious. By contrast, there has been considerable growth in the number of international and local passengers passing through airports in the nine cities. This suggests a burgeoning tourist industry and more densely networked city-to-city business linkages. It speaks well to the ability of the cities to connect to the rest of the national economy, and the world. This is positive for economic activities such as finance, where the movement of manufactured goods is not a major consideration. Knowledge concentration The knowledge and skills base of cities is increasingly being seen as a major factor impacting on growth. The survey data suggests that this is a key weakness of South African cities. There is a relatively poor education base in the cities generally. Only 26,9% of SACN city residents had a matric certificate in 2001, and only 11,9% had any form of post-school higher education. There is also an increasing tendency for skills supply to be mismatched to demand for key competencies in formal sector Figure 26. Movement of goods and people employment. Middle-level scientific and technical skills are in through airports and ports. increasingly short supply. 62 PRODUCTIVE CITIES City of eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo City Manguang Msunduzi Joburg Mandela Total number of 12 021 13 983 -- 13 026 -- -- 3 363 5 096 932 applications in 2002/03 Total estimated 3 567 715 2 517 168 4 122 588 2 073 921 -- -- 385 812 361 097 465 977 value of applications? (R `000) Average processing time (in days) for a pplications on: Minor Building Works 5 4 -- 5 -- -- 10 2 1 Dwellings 10 20 -- 15 -- -- 10 15 1 Industrial / 27 38 -- 35 -- -- 10 25 5 M.B.W. or dwelling 27 20 -- NA -- -- 10 4 1 Figure 27. Length of time taken to process with circ to ext dept planning applications. Local government institutional efficiency Some economic activity is extremely sensitive to the broader functionality or efficiency of the urban environment. For example, much just-in-time production depends on consistently reliable supplies of water and electricity, and on a transport infrastructure that enables the smooth mobility of inputs and outputs across the city. One key indicator of urban efficiency is how efficient local government is in enabling businesses to operate. Figure 27 compares the average number of days it takes each municipality to process various kinds of planning applications. Safety and security According to a survey conducted by the World Bank for Johannesburg in 2001, perceptions, and the associated real costs, of crime seriously undermine established businesses confidence in South African cities. It therefore undermines their propensity to invest. Furthermore, crime impacts seriously on the costs of doing business locally, both directly through stock and finance loss, and indirectly through higher insurance premiums and the costs of securing buildings and goods in transit. Lastly, crime diminishes the quality of life of residents, and throws them into a perpetual state of insecurity. This limits their development and creative application of latent productive capacity. Chapter 9 of this report looks at crime levels in detail, but it is worth highlighting here the levels of crime that typically impact on business. Figure 28 shows that levels of crime that increased in the late 1990s has now stabilised. Some crimes such as burglaries at non-residential properties have reduced fairly substantially. However, they are all still very high. Theft of and from motor vehicles remains the largest problem Investments in property Shifts in the property market give some clues as to the strength of the urban economy. A flourishing industrial and commercial property market reflects positively on the number of firms operating and the expansion of business activities. In turn, property is an important factor in Figure 28. Levels of crime typically affecting production. Renewal of commercial and industrial property obviously business directly 1994-2003. facilitates more efficient business operations. 63 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Municipalities may facilitate industrial and commercial property renewal through urban renewal initiatives. Urban renewal typically involves the use of targeted interventions by government to resuscitate declining urban areas. However, much depends on the clarity of purpose with which these interventions are made. A recent study into urban renewal programmes in South Africa found that a coherent understanding of the policy objectives of urban renewal is lacking, with officials in different sectoral departments of cities defining urban renewal narrowly in terms of their sector. For example, officials located in economic development units tend to perceive urban renewal as the redevelopment of economic nodes while officials in housing departments most often understand urban renewal as an inner-city housing Figure 29. Value of industrial and commercial intervention. building plans passed in 2002. Figure 29 compares the total value of industrial and commercial building plans passed in each of the nine SACN cities in 2002. Some of the levels of new investment are unsurprising. But it is worth noting that Ekurhuleni has the second highest investment in new industrial space after Johannesburg, and that Tshwane is seeing quite strong growth in its commercial sector. Most interesting is R159 million of new industrial investment in a city that has never been a strong manufacturing centre, Msunduzi. The box below analyses the changing strength of the commercial and industrial property sectors over the last decade. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES To many, a city is defined by its built environment. Office blocks, shopping centres and factories are visible and tangible, and often symbolic of a particular place. But, like the wider urban economy, the property market shifts and changes, and South African cities have been no exception to this rule. In 2004, there will be a sharper focus on residential investment and development, while the office sector remains quieter after several years of excess supply. A few new regional shopping centres are on the cards, like the Clearwater Mall in western Johannesburg, and industrial developments move closer in type to the low-bulk office parks that have emerged in the past decade. To a greater or a lesser extent, the trends and dynamics of the commercial and industrial property market are repeated throughout South Africa's urban areas. There's a point about the property market that's often misunderstood. The demand for property is a derived demand, driven by activity in different sectors of the urban economy, combined with the significant change in expectations of space. The heavy, smokestack factories of a decade ago have been replaced with the clean, landscaped industrial estates of today. Linbro Park Business Estate in north-eastern Johannesburg is one example. There are even cases of industrial parks with clubhouses, jogging tracks and trout fishing dams. As demand for high-rise office buildings has declined, for a plethora of different reasons, companies have opted increasingly for low-density office complexes with gyms, restaurants and crèches. In fact, the popularity of the so-called home/work/play model is on the rise ­ think Melrose Arch in Johannesburg's northern suburbs, or Century City outside Cape Town. Retailing remains a specialised field in its own right, but as a sector it has outperformed the overall market during the last eight years. Regional centres and convenience centres remain the most successful investments, pointing to the attractive force of critical mass, and `quick shopping', respectively. Another trend that looks set to emerge is that of re-developing and re-positioning centres, but in a far more dramatic way than the straightforward `seven-year' refurbishment. The transformation of the Randburg Waterfront into the Brightwater Commons is one such example. Drivers include stricter environmental legislation and higher levels of traffic congestion. The following table illustrates the total returns, by sector, for property investments over the past eight years. Note specifically the rapid drop in office returns in the late nineties, underpinned by a strong suburbanisation trend in corporate headquarters, and the consistent success of the retail sector overall. 64 PRODUCTIVE CITIES TOTAL RETURNS BY SECTOR% PER YEAR, STANDING INVESTMENTS ONLY 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Retail 16,9 17,2 23,0 9,1 17,9 10,4 13,4 11,0 Office 14,8 10,1 12,8 1,6 9,5 12,7 7,8 5,1 Industrial 13,5 17,9 16,8 2,1 8,3 7,1 7,5 8,8 Other 15,2 16,9 18,1 5,1 24,9 16,6 10,0 20,5 All property 15,3 14,1 17,5 5,1 13,7 11,2 10,6 9,5 There are broad risks that affect all sectors of property in South Africa, country-wide. First, is the lack of reliable and comprehensive data. Although great strides have been taken in recent years ­ the launch of the Investment Property Databank report in 1998 being one ­ the sector faces a dearth of investment information compared with other asset classes. There is furthermore an urgent need for scenario planning and forecasting for the industry as a whole, something that is currently not happening. Second, there is the more cyclical problem of over-supply, which has been particularly noticeable in the office market since 1999. Ongoing decentralisation and urban decay have played a role, but so has over-enthusiastic lending and development, perhaps related to insufficient research. Over- supply spins off into lower rentals, shorter leases, tougher tenant negotiations and higher vacancies. In Johannesburg's decentralised office sector, typical vacancies have steadily increased from around 5% in the mid-nineties, to a prevailing average of about 15%. Third, although lower interest rates could signal new development, lower inflation often means lower net lease and operating cost escalation rates, and low economic growth may put a dampener on demand levels. International experience shows that, over time, property does adjust to a lower-inflation environment. Fourth, the legal environment surrounding property has seen some significant changes over the past year, with certain pieces of legislation creating a furore in the sector. Monitoring of legal considerations has become all the more critical, with landlords citing the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, the Rental Housing Act of 1999, and the proposed Property Rates Bill as cases in point. Indeed, the point is that property operates in a challenging environment and more sophisticated risk assessment is a necessity. Fifth, is the changing nature of demand. Traditionally, large property owners have looked for blue-chip tenants on a long- term lease of at least five years. Today, lease terms are coming down and three-years is more typical, although there is demand for 12-month, or even month-by-month leases. The need to accommodate smaller, entrepreneurial and start- up businesses has become more acute, and successful landlords are those that can offer flexibility and personally attention to their tenants. The residential marketplace has, for the first time in many years, attracted a significant amount of attention from investors and developers over the past three years. What may have started as a reaction to commercial property saturation, seems to have developed a momentum of its own, with even some institutional investors shifting into the residential sector. 65 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Many developers have changed gear and moved from the office sector, into residential development ­ focusing on the perennially-popular golf estates, apartment blocks in prime areas like central Sandton, and even the conversion of downtown office buildings into upmarket residential spaces ­ in both Cape Town and Johannesburg city centres. It seems that 2004 will see this trend continue almost unchecked, although there is a growing view that the much-touted `buy-to-let' market has peaked, and that some sense will return to house prices in the next 12 months. For cities in general, the management of land and the built environment is crucial. Given the long-term nature of the property market, investors and developers alike seek out cities with clear economic and town planning, competent metropolitan officials and consistent application of policy. The role of catalytic government initiatives like the provincial government precinct in downtown Johannesburg, and the Blue IQ mega- projects in Gauteng, or the impact of the Cape Town Central City partnership, has become more evident. The focus provided by, say, the 30-year economic strategy for Johannesburg, Joburg 2030, has been invaluable. The key to attracting property activity is certainty, combined with an increasing need for space in the specific sectors of the built environment. Perhaps most importantly, the market will guard against "bricks and mortar" projects that don't address demand or the needs of end-users; an empty, derelict building makes no positive contribution to the urban economy. HOW CITIES ARE RESPONDING TO WEAK DEMAND AND MICRO-ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ON PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY No city in the world has quite enough demand or productive capacity, or indeed has these in perfect balance. However, there is a growing recognition that if South African cities are to grow their economies at a pace able to provide all their residents with the means to earn a living, productive capacity and demand will have to increase exponentially. How are cities responding to this challenge? THE NEW PHILOSOPHY: GEAR INTO EXPORTS AND FIX MICRO-ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ON COMPETITIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE GLOBAL ECONOMY There is growing consensus on how cities should go about deepening demand, and thereby spurring the growth of productive capacity. The current wisdom says that weak local demand need not necessarily be a major problem. In today's nationally and globally networked economy it is possible to compensate for a lack of domestic demand by growing off the demand of others elsewhere. Cities that serve as national economic hubs, or that have emerging export-driven economies, can depend on incomes being earned in other parts of the country or the world by exporting goods and services. By capturing shares of national or global markets, they can drive up earnings across the local population. This in turn boosts local demand for other city products and services, and kick-starts a virtuous upward cycle of investment (both domestic and foreign), increasing demand, further investment, and so on. The new consensus also says that the key to this economic growth path is promoting productive capacity that is suited to export economies. This means addressing those factors that limit the capacity of local economies to feed, and feed off, global demand. South Africa has done just about as much as it can over the last decade to stabilise its macro-economic environment. It has managed its fiscus prudently and controlled money supply well, bringing public sector debt under control and driving inflation down from double figures to an acceptable band around 6%. Interest rates have been high compared to 66 PRODUCTIVE CITIES those in other parts of the world, but these were necessary to encourage capital inflows, and are now coming down. This stable macro-economic The fact that Johannesburg's economic activity is in line with international trends environment is a necessary condition for economic growth. But it is not a is extremely significant as it has been sufficient one. demonstrated that local demand, which has all but stagnated, is unable to provide The added ingredient must be micro-economic reforms to make local sufficient local demand to enable the City economies more competitive. Cities have a key role here. Through a range of to grow at a required rate of approximately interventions they can address constraints on the productive capacity of a 6 percent per annum. As such local economy. One example is the importance of knowledge generation and Johannesburg's economy will need to rely retention. It creates a basis for entrepreneurial behaviour that underpins the strongly on external demand from foreign countries. export of high-value added soft products such as business services and systems. (Joburg 2030, Foundation Report February Cities may intervene to widen and deepen the pool of skills, or encourage the 2002) agglomeration of knowledge-based industries that may benefit from co- location and sector collaboration. Durban has a profile of economic activity that remains outdated in terms of global There are, of course, other possible growth paths that do not rely on the trends for more mature economic motor of foreign demand. For example, a deliberate policy of promoting environments to shift to service and domestic demand by boosting household buying power may stimulate certain knowledge-based activities. It is critical for kinds of industry. As profits begin to accumulate and circulate, this may in Durban to extend its profile in these areas, as they will offer the foundation for future turn lead to a sustainable increase in market depth and sophistication across growth and are already highly sought after a wider range of economic sectors. Scandinavian economies are today amongst in terms of existing economic sectors. the world's most competitive through this approach. It is also possible to use (eThekwini IDP, 2003-2007) new productive capacity itself as the basis for an economic growth path. Massive investments in public infrastructure, coupled with a corporate Cape Town's future growth will depend on: spending increase, both carrying the risk of debts incurred today being · Global economic growth of our main trade partners; repayable tomorrow, may create enough jobs and new-generation products · National and local policy and services to, in effect, construct new demand. The American IT and implementation to address telecommunications revolution of the 1990s was essentially this. competitiveness factors, for example, investor perceptions, crime levels and Both growth paths are constrained in the South African context. The first skills constraints; relies on a large-scale `wealth distribution' through taxation and welfare. It · Cape Town's ability to market and may stimulate a local economy, but it could just as easily emasculate it by build on its numerous strengths, eg its causing hyper-inflation and capital flight. The second relies on the evaporation natural environment, trade of both national government fiscal prudence and business uncertainty. This is infrastructure, relatively skilled labour forces and world class tertiary unlikely in the short term. And in the long run the approach may also collapse institutions, and strengthening of local economies under the combined weight of inflation, high interest rates, globally competitive sectors; unproductive spending on `white-elephant' capacity, and, as the sum of all · Private and Public sector this, public and private sector debt. Both of these growth paths also look prioritisation of investments in human risky in the face of the AIDS epidemic's likely impact on household spending resource development, information patterns. And, in any event, cities have very little influence over the national technologies, and the exploration of new global market opportunities. economic policy-making processes required to shift gear into these approaches. (City of Cape Town's Economy: current There is growing agreement that export led economic growth, driven by global trends and future prospects, 2001) demand, and facilitated by addressing those micro-economic constraints on The City economy can be strengthened by capacity for production of high-value adding goods and services, is the strategy developing and promoting global and to adopt. Many of the SACN cities are consciously or unconsciously following regional competitiveness in niche clusters this economic growth path. and sectors present in Tshwane. (City of Tshwane, Restructuring Grant Application, July 2003) EXPORT-ORIENTATED STRATEGIES AND SECTOR SUPPORT The economic development plans, IDPs or broader restructuring plans of the municipalities in a number of South African cities indicate a new focus on positioning the city in the global economy. This usually involves picking a number of winning sectors or sub-sectors that the municipality believes, through targeted support, may become their city's competitive advantage in the global economy. 67 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Examples of cities' export-orientated thinking A look at city economic development strategies and IDPs gives some idea of what cities have in mind. The City of Johannesburg has introduced a 30-year economic development strategy called Joburg 2030. This identifies a number of `preferred economic sectors' ­ financial and business services, transport and communications, manufacture of professional equipment and other chemicals, etc ­ targeted support for which may position the city better as a node in the global economy. Graphing economic sectors on the axes of attractiveness (contribution to GDP growth, contribution to employment creation, multiplier effects etc) and competitiveness (export potential and productivity), Joburg 2030 sees particular hope for financial and business services: `opportunities exist for the sector not only to become more productive, but also to reach across the border and export its services to a greater degree than at present'. As for transport and communications: `while this sector contributes less than financial services and business services in terms of GGP growth and employment, it is more export orientated and hence has the potential to migrate further up the attractiveness scale'. The eThekwini IDP has a balanced set of objectives. But amongst other initiatives it emphasises the importance of an `accelerated programme to deliver on medium term growth opportunities' specifically to `reinforce its position as a key location in global manufacturing processes'. It also stresses the need to `realign its competitiveness platform' by `facilitating the emergence and development of new growth sectors' and the `development of new logistics and trade platforms'. Key actions in support of these goals include efforts to: `Seed fund and facilitate partnership initiatives with educational institutions and other stakeholders with an emphasis on co-operative ventures to extend and deepen IT, financial services, biotech, organic and indigenous medicine capabilities'; `work with government and private sector partners to secure next generation port facilities'; and `invest in development of local technological and skills development capabilities'. The City of Tshwane recently submitted a Restructuring Grant Application to the National Treasury. A component of this is an outline City Development Strategy. One of its key focus areas is `strengthening key economic clusters to gain leverage from growth trends in manufacturing, government and business services'. Actions include: `City support for the automotive, defence and metal industries clusters, all of which have the potential for further growth and increased global competitiveness, including potentially forming a `super cluster' with mutually reinforcing initiatives'. Investment attraction and local investment promotion Recent studies have found that investors primarily seek stability in their investment destinations in terms of broad variables (such as taxation rates) that secure the certainty of returns. This means that investment decision making is more sensitive to macro-economic policy, political stability and the security provided by aspects of operating environments such as reliable power supply and an established body of contract law, than to special local incentives such as tax holidays or rebates. It has also been demonstrated that fiscal incentives may risk attracting `footloose' investors who leave investment destinations as soon as a better offer arises (Buffalo City recently lost the interest of Malaysian investor Ramatex after Namibia provided a more attractive rates rebate package, for example). These kinds of investors often end up costing the rates base more than they benefit it. 68 PRODUCTIVE CITIES Nevertheless it is a victory for a city to lure major new investment. It signals the increased connection between the city and the world economy, and it BUFFALO CITY/ EAST LONDON IDZ holds out the promise of a thickening of these connections over time. So Buffalo City's West Bank is the site of one investment attraction still holds appeal. SACN cities have started to use of South Africa's first Industrial more sophisticated strategies to attract industries to the city. For example, Development Zones (IDZs), as a focused Cape Town has given special attention to locking investment into its growing local response to investor demands within film industry, and both Cape Town and Johannesburg have targeted the national trade and industrial policy. Unlike attraction of high employment generating call-centres. Johannesburg, conventional Export Processing Zones (EPZs), pioneered in countries like eThekwini and Cape Town have started to use their conferencing facilities to host Mauritius and Taiwan, IDZs do not seek to major events that may bring spill-over investments. compete on fiscal incentive but rather on the efficiency of a locality, based on existing or upgraded infrastructure (or INTERVENING TO IMPROVE SKILLS BASES AND KNOWLEDGE CONCENTRATIONS physical attributes such as the deep water potential at Coega), cluster projects, sector Closely tied to interventions to facilitate clustering are efforts to promote the training and streamlined bureaucratic knowledge base that underpins so called agglomeration economies. Some processes, with a focus on export led SACN cities have seen the development of intellectual capital as one of the growth. key strategies to build urban economies well-networked into a global economy The East London IDZ is intended to further on terms that benefit South Africa. They regard the skills base, concentrations develop the manufacturing and agro- of knowledge-based industries, and clustered centres of innovation and R&D industries of the Eastern Cape, leveraging as fundamental pillars of a productive city. of the regional automotive industry, and access to a dedicated motor export Education and training is not a local government competence. However, some terminal at Buffalo City's port (which is to municipalities have begun trying to leverage commitment and contributions be expanded), as well as the airport. The from a wide range of city stakeholders who do carry skills development IDZ's first major (R400 million) investments were by Condomi SA and Weisengold during responsibilities. For example, the Johannesburg City Skills Project has tried 2002. The IDZ's Customs Secured Area to address the perceived mismatch between the city's demand and supply of (CSA) amounts to 250 hectares with a total key technical and professional skills. The Joburg 2030 identified 40% annual of 1 500 hectares available for new demand growth for skills in `super-growth' occupations: computer scientists, industry, of which 570 hectares is owned by computer systems analysts, chartered accountants and computers the Buffalo City Municipality. programmers. It also identified 15­40% growth in demand for skills in various economic and financial occupations: for accountants, actuaries, engineers (electrical and chemical) and mathematicians. They have entered into local partnerships with various education service providers to concentrate on the production of these sorely lacking skills sets. IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY AND THE EFFICIENCY OF THE URBAN FORM Municipalities in the nine SACN cities have recognised the very important role they play in managing the costs associated with economies of urbanisation. This specifically entails: · Reducing the costs of doing business in a city by: mitigating and managing the impact of pollution and development on productivity; reducing business costsbyimprovingutilityinfrastructureinordertoensureminimaldisruptions in water and electricity supply; and streamlining planning approval; · Strengthening the relationship between infrastructure investment and economic growth by improving a city's logistical pathways so that goods can be moved efficiently (especially in the instance of major ports that act as gateways). eThekwini's spatial planning is a useful example of this. The municipality has tried to help improve the port infrastructure through various spatial interventions that better link the port with lagging industrial and employment nodes; 69 PRODUCTIVE CITIES · Reducing the costs of living in a city so residents can allocate income to savingsandinvestment.Thisrequiresintegrationbetweeneconomicandsocial objectives, with planning priorities and infrastructure spending specifically devoted to reducing urban living costs on consumers and small business. `The share of total remuneration of SAFETY AND SECURITY employees in total factor income declined from an average of 56,5% in the 1990s to According to surveys such as those conducted by the World Bank for 54% in 2000. This ratio came down to 50,5% in the fourth quarter of 2002 before Johannesburg, perceptions, and the associated real costs, of crime seriously it edged higher to an average of 52% in the undermine established businesses confidence in South African cities. It first half of 2003. The decline in the share therefore undermines their propensity to invest. In addition, crime diminishes of the compensation of employees relative the quality of life of residents, and throws them into a perpetual state of to total factor income was the mirror image insecurity. This limits their development and creative application of latent of marked increases in the gross operating productive capacity. surpluses of business enterprises, mainly reflecting the good performance in nominal Cities have tackled crime in various ways, ranging from innovative city-based value added by the goods-producing initiatives such as the installation of closed circuit television (CCTV) in city industries since 2000. This could, among other things, be attributed to the paring of centres, to closer collaboration with national police services in executing labour resources, moderate wage growth, strategies. For example most South African cities are presently engaged in impressive productivity growth and the the roll-out of this infrastructure, and integrating CCTV infrastructure with general increase in realised product prices, private and public response systems. especially in the export-oriented sub- sectors, resulting from the depreciation in the value of the rand over the medium to URBAN RENEWAL: IMPACTING ON ECONOMIES BY RESHAPING THE USE OF SPACE long term.' `When the exchange rate of the rand Many municipalities are undertaking urban renewal interventions as part of depreciated, the initial benefit was in the city economic development strategies. Many of these interventions continue support which it rendered to exports as to focus on property development and the physical environment upgrading in South African goods became internationally inner city areas. Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), often linked with more competitive. In addition to that, the such interventions as CCTV, are typical. Limited attention is being given to weaker rand led to increased production renewal of areas of the city where small and large industry is located. due to import substitution. These benefits started petering out in the second half of 2002. Growth in the real value added by the THE RISKS IN THE STRATEGY: UNDERSTANDING AND manufacturing sector amounted to an annualised rate of 5% in the first half of MANAGING POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF 2002, but slowed down to 3,5% in the second half of 2002. Following a solid CURRENT TRENDS performance in 2001 and 2002, real manufacturing output stagnated in the first half of 2003. This can be ascribed to The SACN cities have embarked on a number of economic development faltering world demand and the slower strategies. Although varied, many implicitly assume that the key to unlocking momentum in the growth of domestic urban economic growth is to address those factors that constrain businesses demand. Stagnant output was spread from expanding (ideally to international markets) or that discourage throughout the major manufacturing sub- sectors. It was particularly pronounced in international investors from putting their capital here. Current trends suggest the chemicals and chemical products, basic that these approaches may hold risks for cities whose primary concern must metals, transport equipment, clothing and always remain the ability of its residents to earn a living. textiles, as well as electrical machinery sub- sectors.' (Various extracts, Reserve Bank Annual MANAGING RISKS IN EXPORT ORIENTATED GROWTH PATHS Economic Report 2003) Limited growth from export orientated strategies There has been some growth in the export economy over the last decade, but nowhere near as large as one might have expected. Cities saw significant jumps in the volume of exports in 1994/5, what economists sometimes call the `democracy dividend', and again in 1999/2000. But these volumes are 70 PRODUCTIVE CITIES certainly not racing up and in fact saw a decline in 2001/2002. The value of exported services has understandably tracked currency fluctuations. It increased significantly in 1996 when the Rand dropped sharply against the dollar, and again in 2001/02. However, as the recent appreciation of the Rand against the dollar has proven once again, it is easy to mistake short term export gains from an undervalued currency as a real improvement in the performance of export sectors. Value added in this sector between 1997 and 2000, when the Rand was declining but at a slower pace than in 1996 and 2001/02, was fairly negligible. Difficult choices Cities face difficult choices over what kind of economic future to promote, and how to best allocate limited capacity and resources in support of this. The choices are all the more difficult where an export-orientated strategy is being led, because in an unforgiving global economy decisions may carry costly unintended consequences. New opportunities for growth and wealth- creation are certainly available in a globalising economy. Cities that can position themselves as key nodes in international business circuits will almost certainly grow from strength to strength. But choosing an economic strategy that helps city industry `go global' also has large risks. First, it is quite possible that a city's export orientated industry does not really need any help to thrive. Public sector support may end up simply subsidising existing lucrative business that already adds considerable value under its own steam. Second, public-sector support may sometimes be counter-productive. It may help firms enter global markers in the short term, but excuse them from making the investments and hard decisions needed to stay competitive over OPPORTUNITIES FROM BIG time. If support is eventually withdrawn or diverted, firms that seemed EVENTS AND CONFERENCES competitive may suddenly be exposed as too costly or not sufficiently flexible and dynamic. In many parts of the world this has trapped governments As eThekwini's International Convention politically into having to continue to subsidise unviable enterprise. Centre (ICC) has demonstrated, there are tremendous and ongoing benefits to be Third, supporting those industries geared towards global market access may had from hosting major international and just expose the local economy more to the whims of a global economy, and regional conferences ­ to the extent that end up worsening poverty and inequality. For instance, cities may want to use the eThekwini Municipality is contributing to further upgrading of the ICC facilities local comparative advantages to lure international investors. But this strategy in its latest budget. Similar approaches may very easily squeeze new local market-entrants, trying to get access to have been followed with the development emerging opportunities, out of lucrative niche-market shares and see locally of the Sandton Convention Centre in earned profits exported. Similarly, cities may want to promote the `export Johannesburg and the new Cape Town competitiveness' of local business, but this may depend on many firms pruning International Convention Centre. These back jobs or labour benefits to increase relative `productivity'. are also a good illustration of the potential for private sector led investment Fourth, promotion of globally competitive industry may result in undesirable and growth in cities. consequences in the urban form. For example it may lead to the `hyper- Cities are also able to take advantage of concentration' of high-value commercial activity in certain parts of the city, other large scale events such as the such as new `edge city' developments. These are usually close to the residential recent successfully hosted Cricket World neighbourhoods of wealthier, more highly skilled residents, and far from Cup and, potentially, the 2010 Soccer working class areas. As opportunities in traditional manufacturing decline, a World Cup. However, these large-scale mass of unemployed people may grow on the periphery of the city. Here they once-off opportunities can also entail end up with the additional burden of needing to travel further to find any new risks. The reason for this primarily is that the benefits and costs do not accrue work opportunities the city has to offer, and working harder to get into circuits equally to the public and private sectors, where viable new business ventures can be put together. Their poor location especially where cities must invest exacerbates their lack of economic access. Ironically, this increasing spatial significantly in new infrastructure. and economic disparity may be detrimental to the economic prospects of a 71 PRODUCTIVE CITIES globally oriented city. Large and obvious divides between wealth and poverty suggest to any astute international business partner the possibility of future social and political instability. With reliability such a vital component in today's fast paced, often `just-in-time', international trade system, the mere possibility of disruption may be enough to see international investors and foreign consumers look elsewhere. DIVERSIFYING GROWTH PATHS? The future of the global economy cannot be accurately predicted. However, recent uneven global economic performance, and the lack of positive impact that even a surging global economy of a few years ago had on the ability of cities to provide residents with a means to earn a living, do raise the issue of whether cities should put all their eggs in one basket. For example, the recent SACN report on urban renewal noted that city interventions which focus on the development of skills, support for entrepreneurs and job creation, are all clustered at the lower end of the frequency scale. This is surprising, considering the possibility that the recent huge growth in households, as well as a vibrant informal sector, may provide the anchor points for diversified city growth paths. At the very least the appropriateness of more balanced approaches, that aim to harness global economic growth where appropriate, but which also see value in supporting higher domestic demand and the unlocking of latent local productive capacity, warrants more discussion. Figure 30. Frequency of urban renewal initiatives focused on economic development, from SACN Urban Renewal investigation, August 2003. 72 PRODUCTIVE CITIES LIFE ON THE STREETS MELUMZI ROAD, NELSON MANDELA METROPOLE About 18 km along the R75 highway to the north of Port Elizabeth, Joe Slovo Village informal settlement rises from the hills. On the city planning maps, Joe Slovo Village looks well organised. In theory the main street, Melumzi Road, passes neatly the settlement. In reality, the village grew, largely unplanned, as people moved into the area. What would have been the main road is now a winding single-lane dirt track with shacks built haphazardly in the road's proposed path. Without even a sign to distinguish it, people have dubbed it `the road without a name'. It starts as an open piece of land next to the R75 with a small graffiti-covered post office and community centre, but then quickly disappears between the shacks. Stones and boulders make it impossible to drive on as most of the topsoil has been eroded. Slovo Village was the site of an organised land invasion in July 1996. Homeless and poor people from the surrounding areas moved on to the vacant land. Despite being evicted twice, a Communal Property Association was formed and the Department of Land Affairs bought the land for the community. Since then, the Association has helped 350 of its members to build formal homes through private loans subsidised by the uTshani fund, a brainchild of the Homeless People's Federation. The scheme allows community members to build their own houses, paying back the money how and when they can. A dreadlocked Rastafarian in faded army cargo pants and a thick brown corduroy jacket that barely reaches his wrists, Noble Majeke moved here in 1996. His home is one of the many that has blocked the road. `Rasta' as he is known to the community, has been a part of the Communal Property Association, even chairing it for a while. He says that the community was well organised when they were given the land, but now fighting between different factions has reached new levels. `As time goes, things have changed ­ people are against what we are doing. I have had enough. I have decided to just plough my garden,' he says. `We even have problems amongst members. Pensioners say they can't pay back loans. You can't force somebody to pay if you don't know the problems in their home,' he laments. Those with formal houses, mostly in Phase 1, receive municipal services such as sewage, refuse removal and water from the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Council. Those with informal houses want to remain part of the Communal Property Association because they will still have a say in how the land is distributed and used. `We are still proud of this land ­ we can do development on our own,' he says proudly. His tone suggests that this recent rift in the community runs deep. They have been divided between the have-nots and the have-not-so-much. `We did not want to become political, we just wanted the land.' When new people move into the area, they are told that they can build a shack wherever they find an open space of land. But they are also told that when a formal house is to be built on that site, they must be willing to move. This has lead to a situation where every available inch of land has been claimed. In an effort to make some money, some residents have started a choir ­ the Mighty Angel of God choir. They will sing anywhere and for anyone, says choirmaster Simphiwe Vubela. Unemployment is common with only about 60% of the community in full-time jobs. Of these, 70% earn less than R700 a month. There are some exceptions, like Simphiwe who earns R2 200 per month as a health worker. This does not mean that he lives the high life: `I have to support seven of my family members. I am the eighth one. I have to make sure that my family is catered for and my choir is functioning,' he says standing in front of his one-room home. A poster of Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk stares from the wall, as he fingers silent notes on an old electronic keyboard. His shack has no electricity. Rasta leaves Simphiwe to his music: he has to waterhisgarden.Mielies,spinach,carrotsand cabbages stand tall in the neat green patch. He collects water for his garden and family twice a day from one of only four communal taps in Phase 2. For some of his neighbours, the municipality is a source of hope for future. `The municipality will make things better,' says Milton Vabha. `They will give us houses and water. They will make this place tidy again.' 73 CITIES INCLUSIVE5: CHAPTER 74 The strength of the urban economy is a key determinant of how residents feel about the city, and theirwillingness to commit to it as the place to build theirfutures 75 INCLUSIVE CITIES CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL TRENDS AND THE STATE CITIES OF THE INCLUSIVE CITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION STABILITY INCLUSIVE The strength of the urban economy is a key determinant of how residents feel about the city, and their willingness to commit to it as the place to build their It appears that when unemployment is high enough to force households to turn futures. But it is not the only factor. The National Spatial Development to other ways of accessing basic needs, a Perspective observes that while people are still moving into metropolitan number of different livelihood-related centres where they perceive levels of income and employment to be higher, factors involved with basic needs and with `there are also significant movements into areas with weak, declining or non- household investment strategies come to existent economic activity (especially smaller towns and/or dense peri-urban the front alongside jobs. These factors are or rural settlements).' likely to be as important or more important in driving migration than an The key reason for this is that unemployment in many urban centres is now as elusive urban labour market. With high general unemployment, migration may high, if not higher, than it is in smaller and more rural settlements. As the become a process of moving toward differential economic attractiveness of cities, relative to other parts of the second-best incentives ­ those that help country, declines pull factors other than urban employment and urban income the household to fill in livelihoods when levels become more and more important in driving migration. Reporting on wage income or remittances are no longer research that modelled South African migration patterns for the NSDP, accessible. Catherine Cross concludes, That is, the kind of migration found in the South African urban and rural unemployment have reached levels where coastal provinces is often towards a there may be little advantage for the rural unemployed in moving to the default option ­ not necessarily toward the urban job market as was assumed to city to look for work. To an important extent, public goods that provide be the case in the past. The cluster of basic needs like water and energy have become a second-best substitute secondary or default factors which goal, which has risen in importance as jobs have become relatively influence migration decisions includes unavailable while services have become easier to find. access to sites to live on and to land for cultivation, security of tenure, business The fact that potential migrants are more and more sensitive to non-economic opportunities, access to transport and factors is a very important issue for the SACN cities. It implies that even if services infrastructure including schools they do not manage to provide residents with means to earn a living, they and clinics, access to basic needs may still attract migrants from other parts of the country and internationally. infrastructure including water and electricity, access to natural resources This may seem like a further challenge at first glance. But for cities with free of charge, and personal safety. Of either strong or flagging population growth, it is an opportunity. By ensuring these, results for KwaZulu Natal and the that all residents are able to share in the social benefits of urban life, city Western Cape suggest that infrastructure leaders can help to structure residents' material, psychological and financial delivery as a package ­ here defined as commitment to the city, and thereby help stabilise their populations. Those water, electricity, telecoms and mass cities facing fast-growing populations may thereby anticipate, or at least transport access ­ is perhaps the most important in influencing migration deflect, heightened expectations that may ultimately turn into social tensions decisions. and political conflict. Those cities concerned with slow growth, and possibly (Catherine Cross, Spatial implications of even depopulation, may thereby counter out-migration when there seems little population migration for South Africa's hope of kick-starting local economies in the short term. development & infrastructure programmes, NSDP, January 2000) Strategising about social development Social development is an important strategic pillar for cities concerned with unstable populations. But cities need to think quite broadly about what to do within the area of social development. First and foremost, city leaders ought to think about social development as more than just infrastructure development. Infrastructure that provides basic needs such as water and electricity is critical. But at the end of the day these are actually only a part of the social benefits of city life that residents value. 76 INCLUSIVE CITIES In theory, living in a city promises more social goods and opportunities than life in small towns and rural areas can offer. These obviously include greater work and income opportunities. But over and above this are: · Improved social amenities such as health services, sports and recreation facilities, and culture and entertainment; · Better access to social welfare services; · A wider pool of better-quality education facilities as well as an environment that encourages and enables broader knowledge generation and exchange; · In general, better human development on such indicators as gender equality and life expectancy; · Greater mobility to see and do more things both within the settlement and beyond; and · The ability to secure against risk and insecurity through access to finance and insurance, the build-up of saleable assets, and the nurturing of social capital networks. Secondly, city leaders need to think more broadly about social development by seeing themselves as responsible for it. This is not always easy. Social development is still mostly seen as a welfare function within a provincial government competency. And fiscally pressed municipalities would usually far rather give resources to economic development than social development because this directly builds the local tax base. The appropriate allocation of limited public and private resources is a vital debate. However, new evidence emerges all the time to suggest that giving attention to citizens' `social needs' does not take resources and energies away from building the economy and stabilising the tax base. On the contrary, there is a close positive relationship between social and economic development and between social development and municipal financial viability. Many countries, and cities, now recognise that they build tomorrow's entrepreneurship and middle-class buying power with the social policies of today. Various forms of social exclusion ­ lack of access to infrastructure, health and education opportunities; weak families; disintegrating communities; spatial disadvantage and therefore a lack of participation in urban life; the denial of aspirations, leading to the erosion of confidence and disinvestment from the challenges of modern life ­ all limit the development of the next generation of producers and consumers. To address these things is to build a more stable future economic base, and in turn a more substantial municipal rates base. In addition, South African municipalities that have done the investigations, such as Cape Town, know that integrated and well-functioning communities and families are more inclined to pay their rates and service charges, regardless of their wealth. Put in another way, social policy is a policy of economic development and fiscal stabilisation, with a slightly longer time-horizon for meaningful outcomes. The challenge South African cities have been left with a serious social challenge by apartheid. It was the systemic function of apartheid cities to ensure that white residents had all the social benefits of living in the city, and to deny black residents equal access to urban social goods and opportunities. The result is cities where very large proportions of the population are not included ­ materially 77 INCLUSIVE CITIES or psychologically ­ in urban life. This profoundly impacts on the baseline conditions for future economic growth and municipal fiscal security. This section examines how well South Africa's key cities have done, and are doing, at reversing `apartheid', and creating more inclusive social contexts. It looks at five factors: · How well SACN cities have done in addressing the social circumstances in which their residents are forced to live, in particular racial disparities in access to urban services and shelter; · Continued differentials in wealth and poverty that lead to sections of the population bearing relatively higher costs of living in the city, and being unable to adequately secure against risk and tragedy; · Progressinamelioratingformsofspatialexclusion,especiallythefragmentation of the city into enclaves of wealth on the one hand and ghettos and slums, frequently located on the far edges of the city, on the other; · How cities are doing at improving human development on such measures as gender equality, life expectancy, education and health; · How well cities are performing at promoting a general sense of quality of life, and whether they are enabling city residents to aspire and meaningfully realise their aspirations for advancement in social status. On the basis of this the report asks whether cities have been able to ensure that more and more people, of whatever race, class and gender, are willing and able to regard themselves as city `residents' and `ratepayers'. SHELTER, INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICE DELIVERY Extending network infrastructure and household services to previously disadvantaged communities has been the principal social development strategy of the municipalities democratically elected in 1995/1996. `Addressing backlogs'; `meeting basic needs'; and `equitable service delivery' was seen as the most important way that municipalities could incorporate residents historically excluded by apartheid policies. The nine SACN cities have seen mixed success in meeting the infrastructure, shelter and community service needs of their residents. On the one hand, many more people now have access to these goods as a result of municipal efforts. On the other, backlogs and the racial disparities remain. THE CHALLENGE OF KEEPING PACE On the plus side, the absolute numbers of households receiving an acceptable level of service have increased dramatically. This is particularly evident in some service areas, such as waste management. Between 1996 and 2001, the number of households receiving a municipal waste collection service at least weekly increased by 1 048 593. However, in spite of this clear evidence of progress, the challenges of assimilating people by providing them with a measure of basic urban services remain. While the absolute numbers of households served has increased, the numbers without many basic services has also increased. As a result the proportion of households receiving these services has often remained static or has improved 78 INCLUSIVE CITIES only marginally. For example, households using electricity for lighting purposes (the best indicator we have of an electricity connection) increased by 928 368 between 1996 and 2001. But the number without electricity also increased, resulting in only a modest improvement of households without electricity from 22,3% to 18,9% of total. In some cities and in some service areas the numbers of households without services has increased at a rate equivalent to, or even faster rate than, the increases in households served. The proportion of households without access to basic services has even declined slightly, even in the face of absolute increases in numbers of households served. For example, 712 249 more households enjoyed water on site (either piped to the stand or inside the dwelling) in 2001 than in 1996. But between the two census years the proportion of households forced to use public stands, boreholes, rivers or water vendors increased from 19,7% to 21,4%. In general terms this means that the nine SACN cities are keeping pace with some of the needs of residents, but they are not yet eroding many of the backlogs they inherited. Variations across cities and service sectors The picture is highly variable across cities and across services. The graphs in figure 31 compare the numbers of households without specific infrastructure services in 2001 to those in 1996. They show that some cities are doing relatively well at meeting some needs, but not others. For example, eThekwini reduced the number of households not receiving electricity from 164 518 to 159 442 between 1996 and 2001, and almost halved the number of households without adequate refuse removal from 198 047 to 114 719. However, this city also saw the number of households without water on site climb from 186 855 to 238 472. In general, those cities with the fastest growth in population and growth in the numbers of households were less able than others to keep pace with growing needs. But this does not always the case. For example, Ekurhuleni, which saw numbers of households grow 39,2% between 1996 and 2001, still did better than Mangaung (with 21,1% household growth) at keeping down the numbers of households without adequate refuse removal services. Mangaung did better on other services. Nuances in success by service levels Although the number of households served has increased across the board, the total access to some levels of services has declined in absolute terms. Most worrying are trends in the water services sector. The numbers of households receiving piped running water on site (that is, either to their yards Figure 31. Comparison in numbers of or directly in dwelling) increased between 1996 and 2001 from 5 468 083 to households without access to specific services: 6 871 464. This was a growth of 25,7%. Although there was a slight decline 1996­2001. in the percentage of households served with water on site ­ from 80,3% to 78,6% ­ this was nevertheless an important accomplishment. However, this growth was almost all made up of new yard connections. 833 814 more households had yard connections in 1996 than in 2001. But in all but two of the nine cities, the actual number of households with water connections in their dwellings declined. The total decline across the cities was a remarkable 121 565 households between 1996 and 2001. In 1996, 66,2% of households in the nine cities had water in their dwellings: in 2001 only 49,5% enjoyed this convenience. Figure 31 gives various perspectives on this trend. 79 INCLUSIVE CITIES Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total of 9 Mandela City Cities Number hsh with water in dwelling 2001 499 469 397 617 526 866 315 704 272 805 121 818 60 104 46 805 48 627 2 289 815 Number hsh with water to yard 2001 351 223 150 658 114 551 294 383 175 995 86 148 52407 80 535 42 681 1 348 581 % hsh with water in dwelling 1996 65,90% 62,51% 79,28% 68,21% 69,48% 64,04% 47,99% 45,72% 48,74% 66,16% % hsh with water in dwelling 2001 49,60% 50,54% 69,35% 42,38% 48,49% 46,71% 31,46% 25,30% 37,29% 49,47% % hsh with water on site 1996 86,48% 84,35% 79,51% 70,96% 60,37% 89,84% 84,29% 61,75% 65,70% 80,29% % hsh with water on site 2001 84,48% 81,90% 79,77% 69,69% 70,03% 84,42% 79,74% 58,89% 68,83% 78,61% % hsh with no water on site 1996 13,52% 29,04% 10,16% 15,65% 20,49% 15,71% 38,25% 34,30% 39,63% 19,71% % hsh with no water on site 2001 15,52% 30,31% 15,58% 18,10% 20,23% 20,26% 41,11% 31,17% 29,97% 21,39% % change in hsh with no water on site 58,71% 27,62% 79,03% 59,58% 29,47% 49,51% 28,79% 9,95% -14,94% 37,76% % change in hsh with water on site 35,06% 20,07% 9,72% 34,00% 31,52% 9,69% 14,27% 26,72% 30,46% 24,34% % change in hsh with water in dwelling 4,07% -1,15% 2,14% -14,26% -8,52% -15,43% -21,45% -33,06% -13,94% -5,04% % change in hsh with water to yard 134,25% 176,94% 66,66% 238,00% 308,83% 89,09% 138,78% 163,48% 216,53% 161,98% Actual change hsh with water in dwelling 19 542 -4 610 11 025 -52 495 -25 400 -22 218 -16 410 -23 121 -7 878 -121 565 Actual change hsh with water to yard 201 288 96 258 45 819 207 288 132 947 40 589 30 459 49 969 29 197 833 814 Both the causes and the likely consequences and Piped water Piped water in dwelling to yard implications of this trend need to be considered. One cause is obviously the service delivery choices made under Formal Dwelling (1996) 2 050 231 181 449 provincial housing development processes as well as by Formal Dwelling (2001) 2 109 300 804 328 municipalities. Many municipalities now prefer yard-based Formal Backyard Dwelling (1996) 165 719 72 845 pre-paid water meter systems to curb problems with non- Formal Backyard Dwelling (2001) 99 220 126 991 payment. But behind this lies more interesting and Informal Backyard Dwelling (1996) 57 627 81 971 Informal Backyard Dwelling (2001) significant trends in where people are living in the cities. 23 132 160 996 Informal Dwelling (1996) 62 461 146 326 Informal Dwelling (2001) 54 156 251 625 SHELTER TRENDS Other (caravan, tent, etc) (1996) 3 592 2,265 Other (caravan, tent, etc) (2001) 4 007 4,639 Total (1996) 2 339 630 484 856 Out of backyards Total (2001) 2 289 815 1 348 579 The greatest decline in the numbers of dwellings with piped water has occurred in formal and informal backyard dwellings. There clearly has been some switchover of service levels in these housing categories (the number of households living in formal backyard dwellings and served with water in-dwelling dropped by 66 499, while the number served with water in- yard increased by 54 146). But the more important trend here is an absolute decline in the numbers of households living in backyard dwellings. Across the nine SACN cities the number of formal backyard dwellings declined by 16 073 between 1996 and 2001 (5,1%). The number of informal backyard dwellings declined by a huge 462 849 (65,7%). The graph at the bottom right of figure x suggests some correlation between the extent of movement out of backyards, and the decline in the numbers of households served with water inside their dwellings (although some cities, such as Cape Town, buck this trend). The movement of residents out of backyards is one of the most important trends shaping South African cities. Between 1996 and 2001 there was a net movement of 478 922 households out of backyards in the nine SACN cities. 80 INCLUSIVE CITIES Different cities have different legacies with regard to backyard shacks, and different degrees of movement out. Figure 33 compares Johannesburg and eThekwini on the percentage of total households living in informal and formal backyard dwellings in 1996, and again in 2001. In 1996, 99 024, or 13,8% of Johannesburg's total households, stayed in formal backyard dwellings. In 2001, the total number had increased to 105 193, but this now represented only 10,5% of total. By contrast, eThekwini saw numbers of households living in formal Figure 32. Changes in access to household backyard dwellings decline from 55 735 to 39 862, and percentages of total water services in the nine SACN cities, 1996 to from 8.7% to 5.1%. For Johannesburg a similar trend was seen in informal 2001. Note that the category `on-site' is a backyard shacks. composite category referring to piped water either to yard or into dwelling. The graph However there is a difference with eThekwini's informal backyard dwellings. bottom right compares the % changes in First, a remarkable 24,6% of all households lived in informal backyard households with water piped into dwelling to structures in 1996 (next to Johannesburg's 13,93%). Second, in the five % changes in number of households and years to 2001 a phenomenal 129 447 households moved out of these housing number in backyard. circumstances, driving the percentage of households living in backyard shacks down from 24,6% to 3,5% Residents moving out of backyards might be doing so for a number of reasons, and may be moving to a number of other shelter types. One possible reason is the large decline in employment in private households, discussed in Chapter 3. Many domestic workers may have had live-in accommodation in the backyards of suburban properties. The 91 145 decline in private household jobs across the nine SACN cities may at least partially account for the movement out. It is noteworthy that eThekwini saw a far greater relative loss of jobs in this sector than Johannesburg. 19 851 private households jobs were shed in Figure 33. Graph on left below: comparison between SACN cities on (a) annual percentage eThekwini between 1996 and 2001, a decline of 22,5% of total, whereas increases in the number of households; (b) Johannesburg saw a loss of 15 802 domestic worker jobs, 12,2% of total. households without formal shelter, and (c) households with formal shelter. Graph on right below: comparison of percentage of total households living in informal and formal backyard dwellings: 1996 and 2001 in Joburg and eThekwini. 81 INCLUSIVE CITIES Into other kinds of housing The most likely explanation, however, is that households are voluntarily leaving backyards for other housing opportunities. Some might be moving into apartments in inner-city buildings converted informally from commercial office use, or even into derelict factory space close to city centres. For example, across the cities the number of households occupying one-room flats increased from 32 378 to 50 752. But the majority are moving into formal self-standing houses or informal dwellings not in backyards. They are moving into formal houses in response to the availability of housing subsidies, an incentive that may also be driving the decomposition of larger households and therefore the phenomenal growth of households in most of the cities. And they are very likely moving into informal dwellings to escape mounting costs of living in the city. There was a net increase of 735 627 informal dwellings not in backyards between 1996 and 2001, signalling a substantial growth in the total number of informal settlements. Furthermore, there was an increase of 743 843 formal self-standing houses in this period, with the greatest increases being in the number of one-room formal houses (a 226,9% increase from 81 940 to 267 834) and two-four-room room formal houses (a 41,9% increase from 833 732 to 1183 418). Of course, not all of this growth is attributable to residents moving out of backyard accommodation. Some will obviously be due to new migrants moving into the city. And there may be even more complex patterns. Qualitative research and field observations by housing officials suggest that large numbers of people may be moving out of backyards to take occupancy in new subsidy- built housing, only to move out again to an informal settlement shortly thereafter. They are keeping their homes, but renting them out in an attempt to realise some form of steady cash flow. Changing proportions of formal and informal dwellings The percentage of households living in informal dwellings remained constant at some 25% between 1996 and 2001. In the face of greater total numbers of households, and an increasing number of households in informal shelter, cities did well to ensure that many more residents enjoyed acceptable shelter in the 1996-2001 period. However, as with many services, cities are running to stand still here. The absolute number of households without formal shelter increased by 264 649 between 1996 and 2001. This was an increase of 28,5% across the cities. Across the cities there remained 1 191 905 households without adequate housing in 2001. Sharing rooms A disturbing trend is the increase in the numbers of households sharing a single room in the SACN cities. In 1996 8,7% of all households shared a single room across the nine cities. By 2001 this had doubled to 16% of all households. The greatest increases were in Johannesburg, eThekwini and Cape Town. 82 INCLUSIVE CITIES City of eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Manguang Msunduzi Joburg Mandela City Clinics 0,30 0,84 0,36 0,73 0,32 0,39 Libraries 0,24 0,24 0,35 0,20 0,11 0,16 Swimming pools 0,18 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,15 0,13 Parks 0,17 2,66 1,82 0,09 Public toilets 0,49 0,36 0,43 0,24 0,63 Sports fields 0,69 0,05 0,23 0,17 0,69 0,75 Community halls & recreation facilities 0,29 0,62 0,37 0,31 0,02 Nursery schools 0,28 0,03 0,05 Child care facilities 0,28 0,04 Welfare facilities 0,01 Retirement homes 0,08 0,01 Total rates per capita 2002/03 R653,97 R655,21 R640,24 R444,60 R588,42 R367,56 R289,00 R278,23 R405,55 % CapX spent on comm, projects 02/03 7,83% 2,64% 3,72% 2,79% 3,92% 8,28% 3,47% 2,00% 11,41% CapX / p on community projects 02/03 R29,10 R14,96 R24,01 R7,86 R16,97 R35,78 R16,06 R5,78 R37,61 Establishment Of Parks And Gardens R7,74 R3,21 R0,15 R2,83 R8,29 R1,30 R1,22 R5,19 Sports Fields R8,92 R6,58 R2,94 R0,49 R10,96 R1,15 R0,73 R5,63 Community Halls R5,87 R0,75 R2,09 R3,78 R0,49 R1,98 R0,76 R4,76 Libraries R1,65 R0,54 R0,24 R2,72 R0,39 R0,01 R0,00 R11,35 Recreation Facilities R0,60 R3,83 R0,92 R2,17 R2,52 R0,30 R1,00 R1,84 Clinics R2,23 R4,02 R0,55 R2,37 R2,17 R0,00 R2,07 R0,58 Museums and Art Galleries R0,91 R2,36 R0,97 R0,01 R7,50 R0,00 R0,00 R0,00 Other R1,19 R2,73 R0,00 R2,62 R3,45 R11,31 R0,00 R8,25 Figure 34. Social services and amenities run by SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES the municipality of each SACN city (number of facilities per 10 000 people), compared to total Household infrastructure services and shelter are not the only concerns of rates per capita and capital expenditure on residents. As important, but often overlooked, is the extent to which residents community projects per person in 2002/03. The number of facilities is based on 2003 data, and are able to share in the benefits of higher levels of social services and `amenities' divided by 2002 population to achieve relative that urban economies of scale enable. consistency with the budget data. Data on development of community facilities and amenities is unfortunately not complete. Nor is it possible to compare development of this social infrastructure over time. But that which is available shows interesting contrasts across the cities. For example, while the City of Joburg administered 100 clinics for its population, eThekwini was able to offer almost three times this number, 266, to its slightly smaller population (these numbers exclude provincial health facilities). In its turn Johannesburg maintains 233 sports fields, compared with eThekwini's 13. Interestingly, Msunduzi has the largest number of sports fields relative to population: it has 0,8 fields for every 10 000 residents, whereas Johannesburg has 0,7. Cape Town has by far the largest number of libraries in absolute terms, and relative to population served. The available data for number of facilities per 10 000 people is shown in figure x. This comparison needs to take into account the different socio-economic and spatial contexts of each city. For example, the re-demarcation of eThekwini in 2000 saw the city take in a large rural area where the density of social facilities was likely to have been relatively low. Benchmarking also needs to recognise varying municipal tax capacity. Since the operation of such facilities is financed out of the rates account, municipalities with relatively high per capita rates income are more likely than others to be able to maintain higher numbers of facilities. The relatively high proportion of some community facilities in Msunduzi clearly reflects this. 83 INCLUSIVE CITIES However, it is also clear that different municipalities are giving different Figure 35. A comparison of the geographic distribution of health facilities and the spatial levels of priority to amenities. National Treasury budget data for 2002/03 location of households by population group of suggests that whereas both eThekwini and Cape Town both have equivalent head in Johannesburg. In the racial distribution rates income to, and far larger capital budgets than Johannesburg ­ map, orange represents white-headed R1,8 billion and R1,2 billion in comparison to Johannesburg's R1,2 billion ­ households as dominant; dark brown they devote far less of it to `community projects'. Currently, 2,6% of represents African-headed households; light eThekwini's capital budget and 3,7% of Cape Town's goes to community yellow is Indian; dark-yellow is coloured and purple is mixed. projects, compared with Johannesburg's 7,8%. On a Rand-per-capita basis, Johannesburg spent R29 on community projects in 2002/03, double that of eThekwini. Of the cities, Nelson Mandela and Msunduzi spent the most on new community capital projects in 2002/03. Nelson Mandela spent R11 on sports fields and Msunduzi spent R11,35 on libraries, almost as much per capita as nearby eThekwini spent on its entire community projects capital budget. RACIAL AND SPATIAL DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO SERVICES Progress in eroding the backlog of household infrastructure services, adequate shelter and community facilities needs to be assessed first and foremost in terms of absolute numbers of new households served and the proportion of households still unserved. However, as important as overall numbers and percentages, are the communities in the city which are still not adequately provided for. The essence of apartheid cities was the exclusion of geographically segregated racial groups from the social benefits of a tax base they contributed to building. To what extent have the SACN cities addressed the social injustice of black, coloured and Indian residents, overwhelmingly located in apartheid- demarcated neighbourhoods, not being able to enjoy equal access to the benefits of urban life? The evidence shows that racially based disparity in access to services, shelter and social facilities is still a predominant feature of SACN cities. Whereas 66,7% of white-headed households occupied a house on a separate stand in 2001, and a 84 INCLUSIVE CITIES Disparities in shelter Access to waste collection services Access to sanitation services Access to water services further 28,7% were otherwise adequately accommodated in an apartment block Figure 36. Graphs illustrating the proportion of households, headed by different population or townhouse/cluster complex, only 47,9% of African-headed households lived in groups, with access to various levels of a house, and only another 7% lived in a flat or cluster. Across the nine SACN services and shelter. cities 32,6% of African-headed households lived in informal dwellings either in informal settlements or backyards. By comparison, a tiny fraction of white households ­ 0,5% ­ were in similar circumstances in 2001. Similar disparities can be seen for all the major municipal services ­ water, sanitation, power and waste collection, as shown in the graphs in figure 36. The most startling inequality is evident in relation to water services. In 2001, a mere 29,84% of African-headed households had water piped directly into their dwelling, compared to 79,8%, 88,9% and 89,4% of coloured, Indian and white heads of households respectively. True, a further 403% of African- headed households had water piped to their yards, and another 13% had RDP level services of a community-standpipe within 200m of their homes. But only 7,6% of white-headed households had to accept these lower levels of service. A similar picture of disparity can be drawn for community services. An analysis of the spatial distribution of provincial and municipal health facilities in Johannesburg shows that these are still overwhelmingly concentrated near the city centre and in areas that continue to be dominated by white residents. The facilities concentrated in the inner city are obviously now available to a much larger portion of the population than previously. However, most telling is the fact that the far south and far north of the city have relatively few facilities. These are parts of the city where the largest 85 INCLUSIVE CITIES number of African-headed households are concentrated. Some of these parts are obviously less densely populated than those nearer the city centre, which may mean that the same `density' of health facilities is neither appropriate nor viable. However these are also the fastest-growing areas of the city. WEALTH DISTRIBUTION, ASSET FORMATION, SECURITY AGAINST RISK Basic services infrastructure, shelter and community facilities are essential to life in the city. But they are not the only social benefits that people look to share in when coming to a city. Nor are they sufficient to guarantee that people will wish to stay and commit to building lives and futures in the city. Perhaps more important than these public goods are opportunities to `secure' livelihoods. This means a fair distribution of income sufficient for all households to both cover the cost of urban living and build up assets over time. It also means the capacity of all households to secure against unexpected risks and uncertain futures so that they can manage crises that may otherwise tip them over into chronic poverty. The movement of households out of backyards discussed above gives an interesting perspective on whether an ever- greater proportion of households are able to access wealth, buildassetsandinsureagainstrisk.Assuggestedthemovement out of backyards may be driven by either of two things. On the one hand is perhaps the aspiration of people to move to formal houses that they own themselves. This suggests that apartheid divisions of wealth and poverty are being addressed, as previously excluded residents begin to acquire important urban assets of their own. On the other hand is perhaps the desperation of those obliged to move to less formal circumstances with lower levels of services. This speaks to the deepening of apartheid disparities, as income-poverty increases and more and more people are excluded from the benefits of urban living. Various sets of data suggest that both things are happening. But the evidence says that the benefits of urban asset formation are being outstripped by deepening wealth divisions and increased dependency, increased cost of living in the city, and a lack of access to instruments that secure against long-term risk. Figure 37. Three graphs showing census data on household income distribution. The top WEALTH DIVISIONS AND DEPENDENCY shows the number of households earning within each income bracket in 1996 and 2001. The middle shows total income earned within Income distribution each income bracket in 1996 and 2001. The The average household income across the cities increased from R48 291 per bottom shows the proportion of total income annum to R71 835 per annum between 1996 and 2001. Across the cities earned in each income bracket in 1996 and 2001. The data is for all nine cities combined. there have been increases in the numbers of households earning in all income 86 INCLUSIVE CITIES brackets as shown in the graph at top of figure 37. This apparently healthy increase masks increasing disparities in the distribution of income in the nine SACN cities. In total, a far greater amount of total household income was earned in the higher-income brackets (above the midpoint bracket of R76 801 per annum) in 2001 than in 1996. In effect this means a significant shrinkage of the proportion of total income flowing to lower- and middle- income bracket households. True, there have been increases in the proportion of households earning between R4 800 and R9 600. But there have been substantial declines in the proportion earning in the middle-range income categories above this. At the top end of the earning scale there are today a far greater proportion of households earning over R300 000 per annum. (See figure 38 bottom right). Methods typically used to show income disparity reflect this trend. In 1996, 58,6% of all households fell in the middle-income range of R4 801-R38 400, and collectively earned 35,7% of all income. In 2001, the proportion of households in this middle range had fallen to 43,7%, and collectively captured a mere 19,9% of total income. In 2001, the poorest 36,4% of households (those in the bottom 25% income brackets) captured a mere 1,4% of total income, while the top 1,3% claimed a staggering 26,7% of all income earned. The gini coefficient for the nine SACN cities combined is 0,76 on average. Figure 38. Indictors of income distribution across the SACN cities. The graph bottom right Zero-income households, household size, dependency shows census data indicating the proportion of There was a 179,6% increase in the number of households claiming to have households earning within each income zero income between 1996 and 2001. In 1996, 10,9% of households had category between 1996 and 2001. The graph bottom right presents the same data from the zero income; in 2001 the number had reached 19,6% of total households. In 2002b AMPS survey, revealing a similar curve total, 943 095 households said they had no income at all in the 2001 census. for each city. 1996 1996 1996 2001 2001 2001 Growth Gini Average hsh Average hsh hsh: 0 total % of total hsh: 0 Total % of total in 0 inc Coefficient income income income hshs income hshs hshs 2001 1996 2001 Buffalo City 20 915 150 155 13,93% 55 253 194 063 28,47% 164,2% Buffalo City 0,79 R30 745 35 R39 389 45 Cape Town 38 436 565 826 6,79% 101 928 777 391 13,11% 165,2% Cape Town own 0,69 R56 543 51 R87 810 85 Ekurhuleni 55 101 447 639 12,31% 174 936 776 554 22,53% 217,5% Ekurhuleni 0,77 R45 269 42 R65 317 92 eThekwini 73 812 569 584 12,96% 186 664 823 702 22,66% 152,9% eThekwini 0,75 R43 629 44 R61 579 18 Joburg 60 718 602 657 10,08% 196 722 1049 676 18,74% 224,0% Joburg 0,78 R52 747 17 R86 104 93 Tshwane 28 906 381 357 7,58% 98 704 597 876 16,51% 241,5% Tshwane 0,75 R59 913 82 R91 395 04 Nelson Mandela 27 415 200 242 13,69% 57 270 265 104 21,60% 108,9% Nelson Mandela 0,75 R39 142 79 R53 227 08 Msunduzi 16 233 99 021 16,39% 28 500 135 195 21,08% 75,6% Msinduzi 0,76 R36 560 40 R49 164 98 Mangaung 15 728 142 593 11,03% 43 118 188 653 22,86% 174,1% Mangaung 0,78 R33 209 73 R42 397 64 Totals 337 264 3 159 074 10,68% 943 095 4 808 214 19,61% 179,6% SACN Cities 0,76 R48 291 40 R71 835 82 87 INCLUSIVE CITIES These figures are not easy to interpret. It is hard to understand how a household with no income at all can survive as a separate household. Some analysts have suggested that the figure may be a census error ­ enumerators may have used the zero-income category to record non-responses by households reluctant to reveal income. However, this difficulty would also have been valid in the 1996 census. One possible reason for the increase in numbers of households with zero income is that housing subsidies have led to the decomposition of larger households into two or even more separate households, without a corresponding increase in the number of actual `breadwinners'. The census did ask household members to report income from regular remittances and ad hoc financial support from extended family members. However, it is possible that this information was not gathered. So there may be more households functioning as separate units, but still depending for their survival on cash and kind contributions from a breadwinner of an original larger household, now split. Another possible reason is that many more households may be surviving on welfare grants and that this was not accurately reflected. Dependency As employment levels shrink in real terms in a number of SACN cities, and shrink relative to growing populations, the ratio of people depending on those bringing in income is growing. The dependency ratio (that is, the ratio of total population ­ both those formally unemployed and those falling outside the workforce ­ to employed people) was 3,1 in 1996. As shown in figure 39 it rose in every SACN cities between 1996 and 2001 to average 3,4 across the cities. Buffalo City saw the greatest increase in dependency, with a growth from 4,3 to 5,1 between the two census periods. The numbers of income earners to dependents need to be nuanced with a perspective on household living patterns in the city. Degrees of dependency may reflect in the average number of people per household, although this is obviously contingent on the typical household structures prevailing. Some of the cities see far larger proportions of their population living in households with six and more people. Figure 39 shows the highest rates in eThekwini, Buffalo City and Msunduzi. On the other side of the spectrum are cities with a significant proportion of residents living in households with only one member. This suggests conditions of relatively greater vulnerability, rather than excess dependency, because single-person households can access less family support in moments of crisis. The trend towards more households with smaller numbers, happening at the same time as a trend towards higher levels of dependency and larger numbers of households with zero income, is very concerning. If households are decomposing into smaller units, with many living in new subsidy-built housing, while remaining effectively dependent on an income earner in another household, it implies an ever-greater burden on lower and middle-income breadwinners. These now need to support two separately functioning households instead of one. The real burden of dependency is therefore aggravated by household structure, as breadwinners now need to bear double some of the costs of urban living. 88 INCLUSIVE CITIES COSTS OF URBAN LIVING Infrastructure and shelter provision have been amongst the key social development policies sponsored by government since the end of apartheid. Efficiently run networked services guaranteeing reliable supply of water, electricity and waste collection contribute significantly to ensuring that residents feel part of the city. The same can be said of suitable housing that enables people to leave informal settlements and backyard shacks. However, in a context of increasing wealth divides and greater dependency, household services and formal housing can ironically also increase insecurity. A full analysis of urban living costs, and how these might be disproportionately borne by the poor, is not possible here. Two sets of data are worth noting however. Costs of services First, there is increasing evidence that the costs of shelter and services for which local government is at least partially responsible are increasing at a rate which is becoming less and less affordable. Figure 40 shows Reserve Bank data on the metropolitan price of services over a 30-year period. It suggests that whereas the costs of housing, transport and other services increased relatively slowly between 1970 and the mid 1980s, they rose dramatically after this and have continued to grow relatively fast since 1990. The cost-of-housing trend line shows interesting fluctuations, most notably an actual dip between 1997 and 2000. After this the cost of housing shot up again. This is most probably explained by the roll-out of housing subsidies. The cost of transport had already started to rise in the late 1980s, but it continued its steep upward trend throughout the early 1990s until starting to level off in 1996. Most concerning is the rapid rise in costs of other services after 1990. Whereas the cost of transport doubled between 1990 and 2002, the cost of typical household services multiplied almost four times from 30,6 to 113,9 (on a normalised cost scale indexed to 100 in the year 2000). The fast increase in the cost of other metropolitan services probably reflects the erosion of indirect subsidisation of white property owners that took place under apartheid, as well as the increase in metropolitan property values. In many SACN cities the rate in the Rand was equalised across the previously separate components of the metropolitan areas. Fast-rising house prices have pushed up the monthly rates bill of property owners. The cost of service charges Figure 39. Measures of dependency. The graph has similarly increased. Whereas wealthier white residents probably bore the on the left shows numbers of people per household. The graph on the right shows ratio brunt of service cost increases, the trend has very likely also affected households of dependents to those employed, 1996-2001. in the lower- to lower-middle income brackets. 89 INCLUSIVE CITIES Municipalities have introduced free basic services to enable many poorer households to access a level of municipal services. This has been financed out of the equitable share of nationally raised revenue and cross-subsidisation within services. Various other indigent policies have accompanied this, such as a full rebate on rates for properties valued below a certain price. These measures are very significant. However, it is also important to consider the affordability of services above this level for households who are not strictly speaking in poverty, but whose social position is tenuous. If their cash flow is cramped by increasing costs of maintaining property they may have to trade down to lower-cost property, or they may be forced to leave the city Figure 40. Reserve Bank data for `price of core for less expensive locations. It goes without saying that those households metropolitan services', 1970-2002. who were in poverty, who have just managed to get a foothold on the class ladder and who have bought property, are likely to face a flood of new costs they may not be able to manage. At best these costs block advancement. At worst they push new ratepayers back down into poverty. In the light of this, free basic service measures are sometimes blunt instruments. Free basic services assume that water, sanitation, and electricity consumption can quite easily be kept within set limits, and that residents will know how to contain their consumption to avoid paying for say, the seventh kiloliter of water consumed. This is much easier said than done in households with more than the average number of residents, which have members suffering poor health, especially from HIV and Aids, and whose survival depends on the meagre income that can be secured from a home business. Similarly, an indigent policy that gives rebates on property taxes assumes that residents with properties valued at R51 000 somehow do have the cash flow that those with properties valued at R49 000 lack. on on on on expenditure city cityin expenditure expenditure expenditure related expenditure monthly across % accounts item moving& % and % item Average on Average each Average% living Average housing Average municipal Rates 203,98 7,16% 7,16% 7,16% 7,16% Water and Electricity 225,77 7,93% 7,93% 7,93% 7,93% Housing (rental or bond) 505,01 17,74% 17,74% 17,74% Transport 235,49 8,27% 8,27% Education 240,31 8,44% Loan 70,43 2,47% Health care 148,62 5,22% Drinking 24,998 0,88% Smoking 77,31 2,72% Food 584,01 20,51% Clothing 198,5 6,97% Figure 41. Table of average monthly Telephone (Telkom) 88,7 3,12% expenditure on various household items, Cell Phone 60,08 2,11% including rates and service charges, in Support of family outside city 49,65 1,74% eThekwini. This is drawn from the eThekwini Support of another family in city 22,65 0,80% Quality of Life Survey 2002/03. Note that the Entertainment 52,43 1,84% average monthly expenditure on rates and Gambling 15,55 0,55% services is a little less that the R455,70 Other important expenses 43,99 1,54% average specified by the National Treasury. TOTAL R2 847,47 100,00% 41,10% 32,83% 15,09% This is probably because the average here is based on a survey of actual payments. 90 INCLUSIVE CITIES Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Mandela City Total average monthly account for small households (2002/03) R 313,24 R 455,70 -- R 399,73 R 409,60 R 396,96 R 428,93 R 344,96 R 510,14 Annual hsh income R 1­R 4 800 (mean = R267/m) 117,47% 170,89% -- 149,90% 153,60% 148,86% 160,85% 129,36% 191,30% Annual hsh income R 4 801­R 9 600 (mean = R600/m) 52,21% 75,95% -- 66,62% 68,27% 66,16% 71,49% 57,49% 85,02% Annual hsh income R 9 601­R 19 200 (mean = R1131/m) 27,69% 40,28% -- 35,33% 36,21% 35,09% 37,91% 30,49% 45,09% Annual hsh income R 19 201­R 38 400 (mean = R2263/m) 13,84% 20,14% -- 17,67% 18,10% 17,54% 18,96% 15,25% 22,55% Annual hsh income R 38 401­R 76 800 (mean = R4526/m) 6,92% 10,07% -- 8,83% 9,05% 8,77% 9,48% 7,62% 11,27% Annual hsh income R 76 801­R 153 600 (mean = R9051/m) 3,46% 5,03% -- 4,42% 4,53% 4,39% 4,74% 3,81% 5,64% Figure 42 compares the average household bill for smaller properties across Figure 42. Approximate percentage household income payable on average municipal the nine SACN cities, and then illustrates the percentage of monthly income accounts for smaller properties (assuming that households across a number of lower household income brackets will 300m2 land/plot, 48m2 improvements, 498 likely have to pay. In effect this means that 52,3% of all households in the units electricity and 25kl water). Free basic SACN cities are unlikely to be able to afford to live in properties drawing services are taken into account. The estimated average municipal accounts for small households. This corresponds reasonably monthly household accounts are from the well with figures for household expenditure independently generated by the National Treasury's, Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, 2003. The income means are those 2002/03 eThekwini Quality of Life Survey. It shows that on average, for advised by StatsSA to calculate a proxy value those households with an average total monthly expenditure of R2 847,50 for households falling within income brackets. (the average across the survey), 15,1% was spent on rates and service charges. It is based on a logarithmic mean method, This is likely the affordability limit of eThekwini households. rather than a simple midpoint average. It is possible that roughly half of all SACN city residents cannot afford to live in accommodation that attracts even low levels of rental/bond repayments, rates and service charges. Unless of course they escape costs by simply not paying rates and service charges owing. Municipalities have felt the effects of this affordability limit on their bank balances. Non-payment of services contributed to a financial crisis for many municipalities. At the time, low levels of payment were attributed to a culture of non-payment carried over from apartheid-era rent and service charge boycotts. However, over time it has become clearer that inability to pay, rather than an unwillingness to pay, lies behind poor payment compliance. Following their experience in the mid- 1990s many municipalities have improved their financial management systems and enforcement procedures considerably. Information from Tshwane shows that 53 448 households had water services limited in 2002/03 for non- payment. Only 14 379 has the service restored to full levels. There are other indicators of the same thing. For example, Ekurhuleni reports that some 5 493 households were evicted from their homes over the last three years. However there is a growing recognition that the remaining mountains of unpaid debt speak not of poor financial management but of a sustained and growing fiscal crisis. Purchasing urban goods, services and assets The ability of residents to generate enough household income to access good accommodation and pay for the rates and service charges that come with this is an all-important indicator of whether they are sharing in the benefits of the 91 INCLUSIVE CITIES Figure 43. Reserve Bank data comparing final consumption expenditure of households on housing and utilities and per capita disposable city. Even more important is evidence that they are able to free up enough household income. The consumption household expenditure over and above this to procure household goods, access expenditure is divided by four on the rough assumption of four persons per household. urban amenities, and also secure assets that may either be used immediately Please note that this comparison is indicative to generate wealth, or may accumulate value over time. only, and not an accurate picture. The graph on the right shows fluctuating CPIX for 1998 to One of the core assumptions of urban apartheid was that the costs of social March 2004. reproduction of the majority of residents could be kept artificially low. Furthermore their aspiration to consume urban products could be systematically scaled down. On this basis an unnaturally low cost of labour could be justified. This `logic' worked in the 1960s and 1970s, but by the 1980s it becomes more apparent that costs of living in the city could not be kept low, and that these were outstripping incomes for those earning in the lower-income brackets. It was also clear that an economic growth path that prioritised cheap input costs over expanding domestic demand had a very real ceiling. Lack of business growth further dampened incomes. By the 1990s, there was less income to free up for the purchase of urban goods and productive assets. Figure 43 gives a rough indication of this. It presents Reserve Bank data showing disposable income per capita remaining relatively static for the last 30 years. This is compared to a steeply climbing curve for final consumption expenditure by households on housing, water and power. The data suggests that the average monthly cost of these services began to exceed average incomes in the early 1990s. With high interest rates and occasional surges in a volatile inflation rate, this has choked demand for urban goods and assets. Various hidden transaction costs, that bear disproportionately on those in poverty and the working poor, exacerbate the problem. Figure 44 shows total percentage ownership of various urban goods and services across the nine SACN cities. The table shows that many residents are able to own goods and access services, but there are still surprising proportions who cannot. Figure 44 also clearly shows the extent to which access is still skewed along racial lines. A minute 3,3% of African-headed households have a computer, next to 50,8% of white households. Figure 44. 2001 census data on percentages of households with access to typical household goods, broken down by population group of head of household (all nine SACN cities). 92 INCLUSIVE CITIES The box over-page presents survey data from a Township Residential Property Markets research project conducted by Shisaka Development Management Services in four SACN cities: Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Cape Town and Durban. It gives some indication of the capacity of lower-income households to enter, maintain a presence in, and move up within an emerging township housing market. VULNERABILITY AND SECURING AGAINST RISK Banks are making millions off the poor from Residents of the nine SACN cities face increasing vulnerability, especially in dubious penalty charges. Take a look at any of the major banks' financial statements the face of greater joblessness, widening disparities in income and increasing and you will notice that over 50% of their urban costs. income stems from non-interest income. Non-interest income of course, is basically One of the advantages of life in cities is supposedly greater access to a set of a euphemism for fees. facilities that insure against risk, and help negotiate insecurity. However, evidence suggests that very few SACN city residents are able to incur the Fees for opening an account, for issuing a upfront costs in order to access available securities. cheque book, for facilitating transactions ­ the list goes on. These fees, whilst The table below compares the results from AMPS 2002B surveys in the nine seemingly excessive are reasonably cities on what risk cover residents enjoyed. Less than 20% of residents typically transparent. Of more concern are some had access to some kind of risk insurance. Only 26,1% of residents had access dubious bank practices involving charges of to some kind of medical aid. which few of us are aware. The same AMPS survey indicates that 43,1% of residents across the cities Willem van Emmenis, CEO of the Rural have no access to banking facilities of any kind. Some middle-class families Housing Loan Fund, an agency which specialises in housing lending to the rural typically access relatively cheap money from their bonds during times of working poor, highlights a lesser-known financial crisis: however the survey shows that only 5,5% have access to a inequitable practice of the banks. They home loan. charge rural households R100 every time there are insufficient funds to meet a debit A very telling indicator of vulnerability comes from the 2002/03 eThekwini order. Quality of Life Survey. 81,8% of residents were able to save no money at all after their average monthly household expenses. 4,7% were able to save up The worst thing is that a person may leave, to R100. say R200, in a bank account to meet a debit order. The bank then repudiates the debit This vulnerability is exacerbated by new trends. The most notable is HIV and order for insufficient funds ­ not because Aids. The disease typically carries no additional costs in the first seven to the R200 is not there but because the customer is obliged to keep a minimum eight years of infection. But evidence is showing that late-stage Aids is balance of R50 in the account. devastating to household finances. Those infected face the double blow of not being able to work, and seeing medical and household service costs skyrocket. Then, the bank charges its customers R100 Households are being forced to compensate by cutting expenditure on food for its refusal to meet the debit order. So and education, seriously impacting on human development. Early death also even if the customer hastily deposits brings the added costs of funerals, which can be exorbitant. another R50 in her account to meet the minimum balance requirement, all that is Even accounting for sampling bias towards better-off areas in the city, the left in the bank is R150 ­ less than before AMPS surveys show surprisingly few people with either funeral insurance or even though the original creditor has still not been paid. regular attendance at stokvel community-savings groups. The shame is that those most affected by Another trend is crime, discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. There is a these penalties are the poor. These fees popular perception that richer suburbs bear the brunt of crime. In fact, crime that are deducted coldly and automatically on property and social crime is overwhelmingly suffered in poorer by computer could be anything from five neighbourhoods. There is even anecdotal evidence that in some informal to10% of their net income. settlements a family cannot all leave their shack at the same time because (Moneyweb. 5 December 2003) the dwelling will automatically be ransacked. In addition, crime hits poorer communities, and poorer households much harder than it does wealthier ones, even when the total value of the loss in Rand terms may be less. Whereas richer households typically have household insurance, 93 INCLUSIVE CITIES Johannesburg Durban Cape Town East Rand Pretoria Port Elizabeth East London Pietermaritzburg Bloemfontein Total cities % of survey population who ... Own their own home 64,43 72,28 74,39 69,44 72,59 88,39 80,35 74,30 62,71 72,01 Own, use or maintain a vehicle 57,39 55,70 59,60 64,47 67,42 55,88 41,81 73,02 52,29 59,61 Have at least 1 domestic worker in hsh 21,25 18,65 13,94 13,40 22,30 12,21 14,61 16,29 17,63 17,15 Have an electric stove in home 77,86 70,59 83,83 65,20 74,57 70,96 66,56 64,89 82,01 74,09 Have a fridge or fridge freezer in home 87,26 80,35 90,44 80,62 82,76 75,69 78,55 83,59 90,89 83,87 Have a dishwasher in home 5,24 4,23 5,66 3,42 6,64 3,31 2,02 4,81 2,09 4,65 Have a vacuum cleaner in home 31,35 29,46 50,19 30,81 33,81 28,39 25,22 35,80 24,27 34,15 Have a television in home 89,53 81,86 93,16 84,62 85,93 85,41 84,71 85,16 93,16 87,17 Have a hi-fi or music centre in home 73,61 62,95 76,33 70,83 62,11 65,50 63,88 65,87 83,16 69,57 Have a personal computer in home 17,86 17,65 27,30 11,11 18,99 12,43 10,02 14,94 14,18 17,70 % of survey pop who in last 4 weeks ... Attended a gymnasium or health club 8,56 4,75 4,76 6,50 4,22 3,91 3,52 5,92 1,91 5,56 Eaten in restaurant / steakhouse 44,10 37,39 44,02 25,18 43,27 27,76 18,44 30,60 21,98 36,56 Bought take-away food from an outlet 55,26 44,62 58,99 36,71 41,86 34,42 35,11 38,34 41,14 46,32 Ordered takeaways delivered to house 10,41 13,25 13,23 5,11 6,18 6,54 8,78 8,84 17,26 9,84 Hired a videotape or DVD 13,65 16,65 24,21 10,00 13,18 13,86 9,49 11,32 16,66 15,32 Visited a casino 7,22 5,26 7,54 7,78 4,65 7,07 11,01 4,19 8,01 6,81 Bought lottery ticket(s) 62,36 53,69 47,77 54,86 59,83 49,07 43,39 65,40 53,85 54,82 Bought scratch card(s) 10,41 4,70 5,75 6,53 5,01 10,42 5,51 20,89 3,62 7,24 % of survey pop who have in last year ... Bought furniture 6,50 7,02 10,17 2,16 9,01 7,48 5,74 13,80 7,70 7,14 Spent money on part time education 5,69 4,58 4,96 2,31 5,07 3,25 3,26 4,26 3,05 4,36 Moved into another house or flat 10,68 12,93 11,36 6,28 12,83 9,42 8,51 8,32 9,36 10,44 Johannesburg Durban Cape Town East Rand Pretoria Port Elizabeth East London Pietermaritzburg Bloemfontein Total cities % of survey pop who make use of ... Cheque account 13,50 10,84 15,94 7,10 18,26 9,77 7,23 13,71 7,98 12,36 Savings account 54,93 44,98 57,26 43,68 42,87 39,71 47,99 53,63 44,78 48,68 Transmission account 5,39 6,92 6,50 6,45 3,05 5,58 2,80 4,65 17,43 5,99 Investment/paid-up shares 3,02 4,97 6,37 3,13 4,90 3,31 0,93 4,47 4,20 4,22 Credit card 9,53 9,95 12,66 3,39 9,36 7,18 2,52 10,04 6,13 8,63 Petrol/garage card 3,95 3,68 4,56 1,18 4,98 2,76 1,42 3,48 1,74 3,43 ATM card 42,90 41,48 57,75 39,77 50,03 35,50 31,26 42,76 38,59 44,59 Home loan/mortgage bond 3,09 6,47 8,85 4,16 4,34 6,88 3,33 5,80 4,62 5,45 Other loan 1,25 2,48 2,34 0,31 0,78 1,93 0,68 2,42 2,77 1,56 None of these 38,47 46,28 34,22 52,58 40,43 50,07 49,64 39,33 48,23 43,13 % of survey pop who have ... Cover policy 17,34 14,03 21,11 12,47 15,13 10,37 10,33 15,11 14,15 15,47 Endowment/savings/invest policy 8,87 10,82 14,88 6,51 10,60 9,75 7,56 9,11 13,24 10,27 Retirement annuity 12,30 8,48 13,71 4,32 9,83 10,88 8,19 9,16 15,22 10,06 Funeral insurance 13,25 10,77 30,20 11,11 15,19 18,15 13,47 12,90 30,58 16,68 Medical insurance 8,26 3,51 6,72 1,69 3,05 5,70 7,62 0,91 7,37 5,04 Short-term insurance 4,96 5,76 12,94 3,89 11,04 5,96 2,78 7,22 9,81 7,31 Other 0,15 0,32 0,91 0,18 0,01 0,18 0,23 0,17 0,07 0,31 None of above 68,62 73,02 50,08 78,04 70,11 68,33 78,11 68,21 60,01 67,75 % of survey pop who ... Attended stokvel meeting last 4 wks 6,14 2,50 1,04 2,95 2,89 1,38 1,45 3,88 3,14 3,00 Is a member of medical aid scheme 22,58 24,61 34,25 22,25 29,43 25,94 17,88 22,35 28,30 26,05 Figure 45. Table top: All Media Purpose Survey (AMPS) 2002b comparison across cities of ownership and access to goods and services. Note that the AMPS survey sample is slanted towards the traditional urban centres of the nine SACN cities, hence the use of the town centre names rather than municipal names. Table above: All Media Purpose Survey (AMPS) 2002b comparison across SACN cities of access to banking facilities, insurance, and related cover against risk. 94 INCLUSIVE CITIES poorer households without such cover often cannot re-stock their assets. When the lost asset is critical for sustaining livelihoods ­ such as a vehicle ­ a poor household may not be able to recover from the loss at all. The death or injury or a breadwinner, or even the trauma of a rape suffered by a schoolgirl with promising prospects, may have a similar impact. Both property and social crimes may therefore easily tip poorer households over into chronic poverty. CITY RESPONSES TO VULNERABILITY It is not always easy for municipalities and their partners in national and provincial government to act directly on the distribution of wealth in South African society. However, they can help to ameliorate the cost burden shouldered by those who face increasing vulnerability. Two very important strategic responses led by municipalities have been in the areas of social crime prevention and HIV and Aids mitigation. Social crime prevention strategies Recognising the challenges resulting from crime and violence, several SACN city municipalities have developed social crime prevention projects to fight exclusion. One such initiative is the Safer Cities Project in eThekwini. This is a partnership between the United Nations Council for Human Settlements (UN-Habitat), the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, the National Department of Safety and Security and the South African Police Services (SAPS). The partnership also extends to key local actors in the civil society, and business domains. The project targets crime in the city using various techniques. One component is a social crime prevention project focused specifically on street children. Street children are an excluded social group. They are both victims and perpetrators of crime. The programme attempts to capture information on all street children in the city in order to assist the police and welfare organisations in attempts to reunite them with their families. The Safer Cities Project is aligned with urban renewal strategies such as the Cato Manor Housing Project and Warwick Junction Project. HIV and Aids strategies The key challenge to inclusive cities in the next decade will undoubtedly be the HIV and Aids epidemic. South African cities are gearing up as best they can to deal with the social implications of the disease. Mindful of the need for the provision of services to ensure that unhygienic living conditions are avoided, the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality has begun to plan for `metro houses' available to people living with HIV and Aids. These houses are fitted with installations to assist people in the late stage of the illness. Tshwane has begun to rethink the spatial design of new housing development to accommodate the fact that every fifth house will likely be headed by Aids orphans. Instead of streets being laid out on a simply straight-line grid pattern, small side-streets will lead to a circular cluster of five houses around a common parking area/courtyard. It is hoped that the micro-communities formed in each cluster will care for and support the Aids- orphaned child-headed households in their midst. Msunduzi Local Municipality has led a dynamic social mobilisation process amongst civil society organisations to fight HIV and Aids. An HIV and Aids 95 INCLUSIVE CITIES partnership was initiated under the political leadership of the deputy mayor. Together, the Council and Health Department undertook a situation analysis to ascertain what existing resources there were in the city. After locating all service organisations dealing with HIV and Aids, an information-sharing workshop was held where each organisation presented the resources they had to offer. On the basis of this, a 60-organisation partnership was formed. Together the organisations worked out and implemented a multi-pronged strategy. The following actions have been undertaken: · An Aids Referral Network has been developed as a comprehensive system linking all partner organisations. Through the Referral Network all people testing positive at clinics and community health centres can access a network of supporting services hosted in over 140 different NGO and government departments. · Fully trained Lifeline Counsellors have been placed in every municipal clinic to support a Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) programme The personnel also provide counselling on family violence, rape, abuse etc. They are linked by the Referral Network to the full range of support services. · Comprehensive plans are being developed with NGOs around emergency food relief, nutrition education and food production to support people with HIV. This makes use of the Msunduzi Local Municipality's Geographic Information System. Funding has been received for a project to rationalise and coordinate urban food production initiatives in the city in partnership with a local University Institute and the CINDI NGO Network. · The use of indigenous plants for symptomatic relief has been investigated and supported by the Parks Department. · Council buildings have been donated for child-care facilities, home-based care training centres, hospices and drop-in centres. · The Thapelo project provides for the systematic distribution of home-based care supplies to an NGO network. Distribution is carefully monitored. · Funding has been sourced to evaluate and improve nurses' diagnosis and treatment of Aids-related conditions in clinics, and their implementation of prophylactic treatment programmes. The SACN network has completed a full assessment of what each city is doing to address the affects of HIV and Aids. Some of the primary lessons from this exercise are captured here. 96 INCLUSIVE CITIES SACN HIV AND AIDS PROGRAMME OF ACTION International Organisation Development (SA) There have been a number of initiatives launched to support local government in developing a response to HIV and Aids. However, to date there has been limited attempt to take stock of the challenges facing South African cities in crafting and implementing mitigation strategies. In an effort to fulfil its mandate `to encourage best practices in urban development and city management,' SACN commissioned research to examine current HIV and Aids responses at a city level. The purpose of the research was to identify emerging and innovative practices adopted by its member cities in the fight against the pandemic. The main finding of the two-month study conducted in the nine member municipalities is that South African municipalities are engaged and committed partners in the battle against HIV and Aids. Across the board municipalities are grappling with newly mandated responsibilities and a developmental agenda that includes HIV and Aids. However, the research also revealed that there are a number of barriers to the formulation and the implementation of a comprehensive response to HIV and Aids. Key Challenges There is a recognition that municipalities must be at the forefront of city-level responses to HIV and Aids. But there are challenges with this. Firstly, although municipalities have instituted HIV and Aids programmes these have often been driven by individuals and departments. The resources of the municipality alone are insufficient to manage the impact of the epidemic on communities. A city-level response which engages all stakeholders, including other spheres of government, the private sector, community and faith-based organisations would strengthen and leverage limited resources to increase the impact of mitigation programmes. Municipalities must create an environment in which constructive partnerships with the private sector and other civil society organisations (CSO) can be developed. Secondly, an HIV and Aids strategy must be contextualised within and balanced with other strategies to deliver services to households and industries. To date, the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) has not been used effectively to plan and implement a response to HIV and Aids. In some cases mention of the HIV and Aids in the IDP appears to be an add-on. IDPs do not yet reflect the strategic planning needed to sustain or adapt service delivery to meet the changing circumstances created by the epidemic. Third, urbanisation and temporary migration is fuelling the epidemic as a highly mobile population migrates into cities in search of employment opportunities, moves back to rural areas, or relocates to other cities. Newcomers to cities may find themselves in transitory environments without strong social networks and with limited access to health services. Susceptibility to the virus is increased by limited access to: treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), HIV prevention media and health education, condoms, VCT (voluntary counselling and testing) and antiretroviral therapy and other treatment for opportunistic infections. All of these are significantly less accessible in newly or informally established communities. Way Forward Having recognised these challenges SACN members committed themselves in 2003 to developing comprehensive HIV and Aids mitigation strategies. The pillars of this mitigation strategy are the following: · Visible Leadership. A significant factor in the progress and success of municipal HIV and Aids programmes is the active involvement of a political champion from the municipality. In the case of Msunduzi Municipality, the collaboration between the Deputy Mayor and the Medical Officer of Health effectively transformed HIV and Aids from a `health' issue to a governance issue that concerns political, business and community leaders. · Community mobilisation. Without broad-based participation, HIV and Aids mitigation strategies initiated by municipalities will not meet the needs of the community. The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality has effectively capitalised on existing momentum at grassroots level. Using the established ward committee system, the municipality works with community activists to ensure that HIV and Aids is addressed through AIDS forums. Within these forums community members come together to find collective solutions to the problems created by the epidemic. The ward-based system also ensures that community members have direct access to their ward councillors and municipal officials. · Multi-sectoral focus. Lack of acknowledgement by all sectors of the community of the impact of HIV and Aids remains a barrier to mainstreaming and managing the pandemic. Municipalities are positioned to transform this discussion by working internally to ensure that at a local level policy is generated with the question in mind, `how does HIV impact service delivery across sectors?' Externally, the 97 INCLUSIVE CITIES municipality can influence its clients by actively promoting HIV and Aids awareness as well as its vendors by requiring inclusion of HIV and Aids policies and programmes as part of tenders, thereby challenge all sectors to become active in the fight HIV and Aids. · Partnerships with non-municipal stakeholders. The interdependent nature of society necessitates the establishment of formal partnerships between local authorities and civil society organisations that operate within the municipality. The international and local formal business sectors, individuals, informal traders, and social welfare organisations religious communities are all affected by and seeking ways to manage HIV and Aids. By creating relationships with other stakeholders, experience and resources can be pooled and leverage for far greater impact. Msunduzi Municipality has forged partnerships with the local chamber of commerce, religious leaders and various HIV and Aids service organisations to reach more members of the community. · Coordination. Duplication of services is just one negative consequence of a lack of coordination. In the fight against HIV and Aids, poverty and poor access to health services further compound the problem. Municipalities are in a unique position to ensure that through coordination, services are adequately serviced, to identify gaps in delivery and initiate appropriate solutions within their boundaries. The City of Johannesburg has implemented a coordination system that includes the placement of an HIV and Aids coordinator in each of the city's 11 regions. The coordinator serves as a community liaison and helps to ensure that gaps in service delivery are met from a strategic and grassroots level. Uncoordinated work slows down the goal of mitigating HIV and Aids. · Integration. Integration is the stage beyond coordination in that steps are taken to ensure alignment and synergy between initiatives and policies implemented and driven by different stakeholders. The work of the South African National AIDS Council and the South African Business Coalition Against HIV and Aids, as well as that of community groups, needs to reinforce the objective of mitigating HIV and Aids. Without coordination and integration the goal of successfully managing HIV and Aids will remain elusive. · Resource mobilisation. The nature of the HIV and Aids epidemic requires that municipalities find creative and flexible approaches to meeting the changing requirements of service delivery. The City of Cape Town has been able to tap into local, national and international funding bases as well as technical skills in order to increase access to HIV and Aids services for its residents. By forming partnerships with international NGOS and working closely with provincial counterparts, the City of Cape Town has been instrumental in expanding treatment to residents in resource-pour settings, notably in Khayelitsha through a pilot anti-retroviral therapy programme run by Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). · Effective use of information. One issue that hampers the capacity of municipalities to formulate an appropriate policy to mitigate HIV and Aids is lack of information. At the same time, the costly and time-consuming trend of intensive data collection as a prerequisite for action has resulted in further inaction. The City of Cape Town, Mangaung Local Municipality and Msunduzi Municipality have been strategic in sourcing available information from reliable research institutions and using available data to formulate policy can be implemented. Progress to date in SACN cities shows the most effective city-level HIV and Aids programmes have been those that transcended the gap between policy development and consistent implementation. Until the above elements are factored into the creation of a multi-sectoral and broad-based city response, mainstreaming HIV and Aids will remain an elusive goal. The acknowledgement that HIV and Aids is a universal problem in that all communities are affected is not enough. All stakeholders must fundamentally understand how HIV and Aids does and will continue to impact the functioning of their organisations and communities. With this information, an appropriate and sustainable approach to production and service delivery can be crafted and implemented. In the absence of a long-term vision of cities in the midst of HIV and Aids, politicians, officials and city residents cannot hope for a future in which cities thrive and prosper. The challenges will be heightened as the National Department of Health develops a programme for the rollout of anti-retroviral therapy in 2004. Local government is well positioned to play a central role adapting nationally mandated programmes for their communities. Municipalities can: · Take stock of current HIV and Aids programmes that are functioning within the municipality. This means learning what stakeholders in other sectors are doing to mobilise funding, human resources and public support in their activities and look for linkages with municipal programming, or ways in which the municipality can assist these programmes to reach larger areas of the community. · Link HIV and Aids programming to other developmental issues, such as poverty alleviation. · Develop clear guidelines for mainstreaming such that it becomes an activity that all municipal departments can identify and prioritise activities directly related to their functions that can be included in an overall mainstreaming policy. · Develop stronger intergovernmental relations with provincial and national government across sectors in the implementation of national Aids strategy. The SACN will use these recommendations to strengthen its programme of support to member cities through the following activities: · Promoting a shared-learning partnership between different spheres of government to support the governance of South African cities; · Collecting, analysing and disseminating the experience of large city government in a South African context; · Promoting innovation and strategic thinking between cities and other spheres of government; and · Fostering cooperation and exchange of best practice. 98 INCLUSIVE CITIES Figure 46. Four maps showing the effects of SPATIAL EXCLUSION spatial disadvantage in Ekurhuleni. The bottom left map shows dominant population group with dark brown being black residents. Top left LOCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE shows dominant dwelling type with red being informal. The top right shows unemployment levels with dark green being high Inequality is not only felt in skewed distribution of income, relatively higher unemployment. The bottom right shows the urban costs and disproportionate vulnerability. A key feature of all South geographic spread of residents with no African cities is their spatial division into rich and poor areas along racial schooling over the age of 20. The implication lines. African, Indian and coloured residents ­ sections of the population on of these maps is that there is an increasing average much poorer than whites ­ were forced to live in locations demarcated number of black residents, unemployed and with poor schooling, forced to live in informal by apartheid planning laws. Here they were far from both opportunities and settlements on the far edges of the urban facilities that enabled them to earn greater income. Their costs, both in actual centres of Gauteng. travel expenses and in the opportunity costs of time that could have been spent more productively, were relatively much higher than those of white residents living centrally. The spatial structure of the apartheid city therefore further impoverished people already made poor by inequitable income opportunities. The `apartheid nature' of the nine SACN cities remains. And research shows that therace/spacedividesthatmarkourcitiesarenotbeingaddressedrapidlyenough. Spatial analysis shows that increasing numbers of residents are taking up occupancy in new housing developments and informal settlements on the margins of cities. In these settlements unemployment typically climbs to well over 40%. The spatial mismatch between where poor people live and available work opportunities in areas zoned industrial and commercial also represents a serious locational disadvantage for poorer residents of the city. This is made worse where SACN cities have seen the flight of firms from central business districts. Schools are typically concentrated in old neighbourhoods. The travel times of children living in marginal settlements to centres of learning costs extremely poor families more money. It also exposes children to greater dangers such as crime. 99 INCLUSIVE CITIES In 2001, 36,8% of SACN city residents going to work or school made the journey on foot. 25,4% made use of a bus or minibus taxi. Some of the residents who made their journey on foot are close to work and school opportunities. Others are what the City of Joburg Integrated Transport Plan calls `striders' ­ people who, regardless of income bracket, prefer to walk or cycle even if it takes them longer than 30 minutes. But some of those who walk do so because they are `stranded', trip-makers with an income of less than R4 000 per month who walk longer than 30 minutes to work. The Joburg ITP also identifies some commuters as `survivalist' ­ those earning less than R2 000 per month who are obliged to use cheaper forms of public transport. In 1995, 0,8% of all commuters were stranded, and 10,2% were survivalist. In 2002, 1,6% were stranded and 15,2% were survivalist. The racial split in who walks, who uses public transport, and who drives is shown in figure x. In 2001, 2 546 837 black South Africans walked to school or work in the nine SACN cities. By contrast only 152 813 white commuters did so. 53% of white commuters went to school or work as drivers in their own car. Only 4,83% of black residents did so. The tables in figure x give some indication of travel times and costs for people using a sample of different modes of transport in Johannesburg, as well as the Figure 47. Indicators of mode of transport, average percentage of trips represented by the transport mode. It is noteworthy transport costs and travel times. The graph top that the average cost of travel for commuters in relatively more wealthy Region left shows modes of travel by population group 3 (Sandton/Rosebank) is lower than that for commuters from Region 11, Orange across the nine SACN cities. The table top right Farm. 63% of commuters from Orange Farm spent more than 10% of their shows average costs and travel times for the personal income getting to work. This was double to that in Region 3. top 10 most-used travel mode combinations in the City of Johannesburg (2003). The table The spatial dislocation of cities is compensated somewhat by the greater bottom shows average monthly expenditure on transport and average travel times for `connectivity' of residents, especially as a result of the cellphone revolution. commuters from each of the 11 Administrative In 1996 the use of cellphones was so poorly spread that the option did not Regions in Johannesburg. % of all Average Average trips travel cost time in mins One taxi all the way 24,36% 48,7 R3,11 Taxi ­ taxi 8,88% 77,5 R6,06 One train all the way 3,76% 73,1 R2,23 One bus all the way 3,70% 55,5 R4,06 Taxi - train 1,63% 83,8 R4,40 Train ­ taxi 0,66% 98,7 R5,04 Taxi ­ taxi ­ taxi 0,57% 98,8 R8,33 Train ­ train 0,47% 101,2 R2,81 Taxi ­ bus 0,36% 84,9 R6,48 Bus ­ bus 0,30% 85,4 R6,45 Taxi ­ train ­ taxi 0,28% 114,9 R8,24 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7 Region 8 Region 9 Region 10 Region 11 All areas Average travel time (work in minutes) 53 48 28 34 38 66 44 38 35 56 58 50 Average travel time (education in minutes) 29 27 21 21 18 34 30 23 20 30 27 28 Average travel cost (work R/month) R130 R162 R190 R165 R146 R185 R212 R196 R176 R177 R218 R186 Average travel cost (education R/month) R114 R160 R202 R144 R155 R144 R151 R146 R154 R162 R163 R151 Commuters spending +10% of personal 30% 50% 33% 31% 32% 49% 55% 49% 34% 48% 63% 48% income on work trip 100 INCLUSIVE CITIES feature in the census questionnaire. By 2001, 898 023 households had a cellphone in their dwelling, and 1 054 675 more had a cellphone and telephone. As a result the proportion of households without easy access to a phone declined from 55,28% to 43,32%. However, 2 005 142 households still do not have any kind of telephone in their homes, with 77,87% of these making use of public telephones. AREA-BASED STRATEGIES TO COUNTER EXCLUSION Recognising the spatial dimensions of poverty in the South African city many SACN municipalities have introduced area-based strategies to address locational disadvantage. The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, in line with the objectives of its Spatial Development Framework, has developed the concept of the Sustainable Community Unit (SCU). An SCU is understood as a self-contained neighbourhood where employment, services and education, and so on, are easily accessible to residents. In planning for SCUs the NMMM aims to ensure that residents have access to major public transport routes, have an equitable level of service, and are socially and functionally integrated into the city through proximity to work opportunities and amenities. The NMMM explains the project as follows: `The intention within an SCU is to achieve a more balanced structure of the city in order to reduce discrepancies in terms of service provision and standards, promote integration in socio- economic and functional terms and provide for economic activities and employment opportunities'. The first phase of the SCU project has been started. It involves clarifying exactly what areas the project should cover and how the project should be implemented. What is clear from the preliminary exercise is that the project will comprise a spatial model as well as programmes for implementing the spatial model. Physical, social, economic and environmental sustainability have all been identified as key outcomes. Pilot areas are being selected on the basis of existing programmes in the area, extent of poverty and marginalisation, as well as availability of information relating to the area. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Poverty and inequality have a very serious impact on human development. A quick survey of some of the measures classically used to indicate levels of human development gives the following picture. MORTALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY Few of the cities readily available indictors of life expectancy. Provincial life- expectancy is available from the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA) modelling of the impact of HIV and Aids. According to this model the average life expectancy across the country is 50 years, with a high of 62 in the Western Cape and a low of 45 in KwaZulu Natal. Johannesburg relies on the South African Health Review to peg the life expectancy of its residents at 54, slightly above the ASSA's estimate of 52. eThekwini gives its own estimation at 48, and Msunduzi 43. 101 INCLUSIVE CITIES The age profile of a city is a proxy indicator of life expectancy. It also indicates the likely health challenge facing the city, on the general assumption that populations with larger numbers of older residents will present greater health and welfare challenges. It can also be assumed that cities with faster growth rates will become younger over time, because of the tendency for younger people to migrate to cities in search of work opportunities. Therefore cities with faster growth rates will be better off in terms of basic human development indicators such as mortality and life expectancy, and will also be generally healthier. However these assumptions are not necessarily valid in cities with complex migratory patterns, and severely affected by Figure 48. Population over age 65 in the nine HIV and Aids. cities, 1996 vs 2001. Graph x suggests that it is broadly true that cities with faster growth rates have younger populations. Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane, and to a lesser extent Cape Town, all saw a decrease in the percentage of population over 65% between 1996 and 2001. The other cities all saw an increase, most likely as a result of out-migration of working-age residents to other centres. However, if the pace of return migration of older residents to rural areas accelerates in slower-growth cities, and if many of the youth being received by fast-growth cities are HIV and Aids infected, the age profiles of these two groups of cities may change dramatically in the next decade. The cities record some dramatically different infant mortality rates. Johannesburg, again from the South African Health Review data, gives its rate The Cape Town Equity Gauge project has as 54,8/1 000 live births. Manguang shows a similar rate at 55,5/1 000. found a recurrent geographical pattern of However, Msunduzi gives very much better human development figures on inequity in health status and the underlying this indicator, at a 21,7 infant deaths per 1 000 live births. determinants of health across the sub- district data, using a wide range of data sources. This geographical pattern of HEALTH health inequity is again apparent in the burden of disease data. Khayelitsha and Nyanga consistently emerge as the areas Some of the cities have undertaken their own HIV and Aids prevalence surveys carrying the highest total burden of disease or are able to disaggregate data from provincial surveys. Whereas Gauteng's and the highest burden of group I (HIV and Annual Antenatal HIV/Syphillis Survey showed a prevalence rate of 31,6% Aids, TB and malnutrition-related) and III across the province in 2002, the City of Joburg's rate was 32,0% in 2001. (physical injury) causes. The only exception Tshwane showed similar rates. Its surveys indicate that the HIV prevalence to this is the pattern of Group II diseases (various non-communicable diseases such rate for women aged 20-24 years in antenatal studies is 29,1% and the rate as cancer, diabetes etc) although even for women aged 25-29 was 30,6%. In 2001, the Institute for Pathology at here Khayelitsha and Nyanga show a higher the University of Pretoria found that 37% of all blood specimens tested for that average burden. Of particular concern HIV in the city were positive. Correlating with national pictures of the is the inequity in premature mortality, progression of the disease across various provinces, eThekwini showed the which is disproportionately higher in highest prevalence rates amongst the cities that currently have city-specific Khayelitsha and Nyanga. The social and economic consequence of the loss of data. Prevalence here was 36% in antenatal surveys. young lives is great. It undermines the Province's hope of creating prosperity for GENDER EQUALITY all and restoring human dignity and the Unicity's vision of becoming prosperous, safe and secure. The Province and the City The level of gender equality is often taken as a measure of human development. will do well to invest in securing a healthy Figure 49 shows that the cities do still have a way to go to ensure complete work force, able to contribute to the wealth equality. A higher percentage of women than men over the age of 20 have of Cape Town and care for its families. completed primary school and some secondary education as their highest (Cape Town Mortality: an equity lens ­ lessons and challenges 2001) level of education. However 27,6% of men over 20 years had completed 102 INCLUSIVE CITIES matric in 2001 compared to 26,3% of women. A greater proportion of men Figure 49. Some indicators of gender equality. than women also had a higher degree. The graph on the left compares the highest level of education completed for men and The graph on the right shows women's involvement in the labour market in women over 20 years age in all nine SACN Johannesburg. There were 100 000 less women than men in formal paid cities. The graph on the right compares male and female participation in the Johannesburg employment in the city in 2001. And there were half as many self-employed labour force. Both from census 2001 data. women and employers who were woman than there were men. By contrast, 2 254 women were in unpaid family labour, compared with 1 592 men. QUALITY OF LIFE Good access to high-level and high-quality services, as well as reasonably equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity, are necessary conditions for residents to be committed to life in the city. But they are not sufficient. Less easy to measure, but arguably as important, is residents' perception of themselves in their place of residence. It is entirely conceivable that a resident may have access to full infrastructure services and a good job, and still not feel that they `have a future in this city'. Residents' subjective sense of who they are, how well they are doing and what their future potential is, in relation to the place where they live, is a key determinant of their willingness to stay and invest. Quality of life The concepts `satisfaction with quality of life' and `sense of well-being' go some way towards capturing what this self-perception / attitude to place means. There are many possible factors underpinning residents' perception of their quality of life. These include their sense of: · Personal dignity, especially in relation to their access to socio-economic rights; · Security, both in terms of threats to safety and property and degree of social insurance against risk; · Convenience, relative to costs, of living in the city; · Belonging in the city and connectedness to a neighbourhood or local community; and · Voice and degree of influence over social processes that impact on life. 103 INCLUSIVE CITIES A feeling on the part of residents that they have a good quality of life is an end in itself, but there are also other positive results that flow from high levels of satisfaction with quality of life. The most important is what some urban theorists call the `capacity to aspire'. This is the willingness and the ability of residents to see themselves achieving an even better quality of life if they act in ways that will bring this about. This translates into the confidence and entrepreneurial behaviour necessary to drive local economies; the willingness to put time and energy into social networks that create the basis for social capital and informal social safety nets; and the desire to invest in urban assets, most importantly residential property and service payments, on which municipal revenues ultimately depend. Figure 50. Levels of satisfaction with standard of living across population groups. eThekwini A number of the SACN cities have done surveys of their residents' subjective Quality of Life survey, 2002/03. sense of their quality of life. The different SACN cities use different methods and questions in their surveys, so it is not possible to compare results directly. But in all the surveys there is evidence of some important trends. One trend is that the perceived quality of life is declining amongst black residents, while increasing amongst white residents. This is in spite of the fact that considerable municipal capital has gone into infrastructure expansion in previously disadvantaged communities over the past decade. For example, in Buffalo City's August 2001 quality of life survey of 2 477 households, only 26% of African residents said they were satisfied with their lives, while 84% of white residents reported satisfaction. Similar results were found in eThekwini's extensive 2002/03 quality of life survey. Just 33,3% of African residents surveyed said they were satisfied or very satisfied. By contrast 79,4% of white residents indicated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their lives. Similar results were obtained when respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with their standard of living, as illustrated in figure x. Whereas 35,1% of African residents, and a remarkable 58,6% of coloured residents were very dissatisfied with their standard of living, no white residents surveyed were very dissatisfied. Dwelling Type Plans for improving dwelling? yes no House or formal structure on a separate stand 37,2 62,8 Traditional dwelling-hut-structure made of traditional matter 76,7 23,3 Flat in a block of flats 5,0 95,0 Town-cluster-semi-detached house (simplex-duplex or triplex) 51,2 48,8 Unit in retirement village 80,0 20,0 House-flat-room, in backyard 22,5 77,5 Informal dwelling-shack, NOT in backyard, in an informal settlement 38,2 61,8 Informal dwelling-shack, IN the backyard of a formal house 40,6 59,4 Figure 51. Responses to question: Do you have Room-flatlet in main dwelling 12,6 87,4 any further plans for improving your dwelling? Other 31,0 69,0 (eThekwini Quality of Life Survey, 2002/03). 104 INCLUSIVE CITIES CLASS ADVANCEMENT Subjective impressions of quality of life reflect how residents feel about themselves in their current place at this moment of time. Just as important, however, is how residents perceive their personal prospects for the future, as well as whether the city is in fact both appropriately shaping their aspirations and enabling them to meet their aspirations. Two issues are worth noting. First, it would be wrong to under-estimate the spirit of entrepreneurship that prevails amongst poorer sections of the population. There is ample anecdotal evidence that many residents of the nine cities are not languishing in poverty. They are actively engaged in improving their lives in whatever way they can. They are consolidating houses, proactively looking for work, and compensating for the lack of formal job opportunities by entering into partnerships with one other and making a living through informal economic activity. Second, not all people are in cities because they naturally have aspirations towards middle-class families and homes. There are South Non-South many reasons that people may have chosen to live in South African African African cities. That they all wish to be climbing the same class ladder Do you think your life will be better cannot be assumed. or worse than your parents lives? My life will be better 66,8% 78,1% The Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme survey of My life will be the same 10,1% 7,3% Johannesburg inner city residents asked respondents whether they My life will be worse 19,8% 7,3% felt part of South African society. 51,2% of South Africans Don't know / refused answer 3,4% 7,3% strongly agreed that they were, and a further 19,7% said they agreed somewhat. But as many as 10,1% said that they strongly Do you think your children's lives disagreed, and a further 12% were either ambivalent or disagreed will be better or worse than your own life? somewhat. This lack of feeling part is noteworthy. Even more Their lives will be better 73,2% 89,2% worrying is the pessimism expressed in response to questions on Their lives will be the same 6,4% 2,3% how both South Africans and refugees perceive their own lives in Their lives will be worse 10,6% 2,3% relation to their parents, and those of their children in relation to Don't know / refused answer 9,8% 6,1% their own. Although most respondents saw a life cycle of betterment, Surveyed number 388 343 some 20% of South Africans believed that their own lives would be worse than their parents, and 10% believed their children's Perception of lives and children's lives, from lives would be worse. Unpublished dataset from survey conducted in March-April 2003 as part of `Johannesburg in the 21st Century: Forced Migration, UNDERSTANDING and MANAGING POSSIBLE FUTURE Survival, and the Socio-Politics of Urban Space. Johannesburg: University of the IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT TRENDS Witwatersrand's Forced Migration Studies Programme. Apartheid social divides persist despite the extension of infrastructure and services The focus of city leaders over the last few years has very much been on trying to address apartheid-created backlogs. This has been understood as providing residents with infrastructure and housing. As a result of this, considerable progress has indeed been made in providing all residents with the shelter and services they were denied in the past. But disparity in access to services was not the only social effect of apartheid. Much more serious was profound income and asset poverty and inequality, as the apartheid political economy worked to drive the unusually rapid class 105 INCLUSIVE CITIES mobility of a small racial minority. This was at the cost of equitable incomes, asset accumulation, security against risk, real human development, quality Instead of taking what people are actually of life and social status progress for the majority. doing ­ their initiatives, desires, and ways of organising themselves ­ as the These more fundamental social challenges remain in all SACN cities today. materials through which urban life is to Apartheid's effects on wealth and poverty distribution have not yet been be developed, there is a static sense of what the city `needs'. For example, make a undone, indeed in some cases they have been sharpened. SACN cities still public park here ... an office building function mainly in a way that enables a small minority to get richer. And they here ... IDPs still fall far short of a do not yet work as they should as a middle-class building machine for everyone, meaningful engagement with the multiple structuring aspirations and gradually transforming poor new migrants into rationalities that are shaping our cities, residents and ratepayers. towns and rural areas. IDPs are good instruments for directing annual and There is evidence that an ever-greater proportion of wealth has flowed to medium-term budgeting, and for residents at the top brackets on the income scale. New subsidised housing is identifying projects, and are potentially important mechanisms for inter-sectoral supported by welfare payments and by breadwinners in households elsewhere, integration, but they have yet to prove or abandoned for informal settlements and rented out to realise a small cash their worth in the making and remaking of flow. Households' ability to weather risk and uncertainty remains minimal, space and territory. They have yet to and new threats such as HIV and Aids may easily tip many more into poverty. direct us towards futures that are Human development on a number of indicators shows minimal progress. different from the present. (Maliq Simone, Address at Planning Africa Conference, 2002) Long-term implications of not acting Social development, as a process of incorporating or including residents by enabling them to share materially and psychologically in the benefits of living in cities, has not been a municipal priority. There are practical reasons for this. First, the municipalities primarily responsible for governing cities have some responsibilities over, for example, early childhood development and care. But provincial governments, not municipalities, have the large welfare functions and resources required to make a real difference to areas still affected by apartheid exclusions. Second, the tendency to transfer responsibility for social development is exacerbated by critical financial conditions in many municipalities. It does not appear to make budgetary sense to devote scarce resources to social development programmes, when in the short term money spent on both infrastructure and economic development will bring obvious financial returns. Third, it seems rational to believe that the social problems left over by apartheid can be addressed through economic development. Municipalities are often reluctant to focus on welfarist measures when economic development initiatives will bring the jobs needed to lift people out of poverty. However, the costs of not focusing on broader social development challenges and sticking only to infrastructure development and shelter as the key to social development are potentially enormous. At best, cities may not be seen as anything but places where people have an excess of a bundle of fixed needs. The real significance of cities, as sites of social transformation, in which individuals, families and communities transit, through a generation of life cycles, into more empowered people, better social classes and good neighbourhoods, may go unrecognised and unutilised. At worst the social disparities that were the hallmark of the apartheid city may remain in perpetuity. And poor social circumstances for the majority may translate directly into a lack of commitment to city life. 106 INCLUSIVE CITIES LIFE ON THE STREETS KHUMALO ROAD, EKURHULENI THERE is something sinister about the famous Khumalo Road in Thokoza, East Rand. Something that strikes fear in the hearts of ordinary people. Thousands of people died here, from the elderly to their grandchildren, when the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party locked horns over territory in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The names of those who fell are inscribed in a memorial stone erected in their remembrance and unveiled by President Thabo Mbeki and IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi before the 2000 local government elections. During those bloody clashes in Katlehong, Thokoza and Voslorus ­ collectively known as Kathorus ­ the street became an unofficial border between ANC and IFP-controlled areas. Almost 10 years since the guns fell silent, the 3kms still has an eerie and disconcerting feeling with the bloody battles fought on it still a recent memory. Back then the battle lines were simple: township folks (ANC) who lived in houses versus hostel dwellers (IFP). The main battleground was around the KwaMadala, Khuthuza and Mshayazafe hostels on Khumalo Street. Some sections in this area, such as Phenduka, were dominated by the IFP. It was in Phenduka where ANC supporters were forced to flee their homes. Ntabansimbi, Everest, Extension 2 and Thokoza Gardens were dominated by the ANC and were no-go areas for anybody thought to be an IFP supporter. `The only thing that has changed in this street is that you can drive through it without being shot at,' says a resident. This used to be sniper territory but now peace between the warring factions has returned. While the street has become well known, the man after whom it was named has faded into obscurity. Jackson Khumalo was a businessman who owned a grocery shop and butchery in Alberton. He died in the 1960s. These days, Khumalo Street looks like any other street in any South African township. On an early weekday morning, people walk up and down ­ most are schoolchildren and those fortunate enough to have work. There are also those who seem permanently to hang onto the fences of their houses, while groups of young men gather on street corners, a sign of unemployment in these hard times. Schoolchildren, who should be using the demarcated pedestrian crossings, choose instead to cross the busy road anywhere, posing a danger to themselves and motorists. Economic activity in the street centres around minibus taxis, the Phuthaditjaba bakery, the three or so petrol stations, a dozen shops, the vendors who sell everything from cigarettes to snacks and Thandabantu Beer Hall, which sells umqombothi (African beer). A major supermarket will soon be opening here in what appears to be the first sign of investment. The conflict left many homes destroyed ­ gutted by fire and riddled with bullets. Signifying the return to normality, these buildings have been repaired, thanks to a massive rebuilding exercise undertaken by government in the mid-1990s. The hostels, by contrast, still bear the scars and are a reminder of those horrible years. Dilapidated and with broken windows, they don't look fit for human habitation. There was a time when government sought to convert these dwellings into family units, but hostel dwellers resisted, wary of the ANC government's motives. Further along Khumalo Road there are signs of new life. A block of flats has been erected at the corner of Khumalo and Thuli streets for young, upwardly mobile people who don't fancy life in the more expensive suburbs, but don't want to live at home with parents and family. Crime is still a problem, especially around the hostels at night. The area is badly lit, according to residents, and people stay away from this haven for criminals. At the far end of the street there's another hub of economic activity. At the taxi rank, run by the Alberton Long-distance Association, you can buy tripe, pap, meat and just about anything else. The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council is planning to turn Khumalo Road into a tourist attraction, like the Hector Peterson memorial in Soweto. Posters on street poles proclaim Ekurhuleni Council as a `partnership that works' and peace truly reigns. 107 CITIES SUSTAINABLE6: CHAPTER 108 In some cities in thedeveloped and developing world, urban builtenvironments have not been able to adequately accommodate the sheersize of populations. 109 SUSTAINABLE CITIES CHAPTER 6. BUILT- AND NATURAL- CITIES ENVIRONMENT TRENDS AND THE STATE OF THE SUSTAINABLE CITY THE URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE SUSTAINABLE In some cities in the developed and developing world, urban built environments have not been able to adequately accommodate the sheer size of populations, the concentrations of business activity, or the way people choose or are forced to live. In these cities, population density, congestion from the movement of people and goods, the waste and pollution by-products from industry and household consumption, the unhealthy conditions in burgeoning slums, poorly serviced waste collection, sewerage removal, wastewater drainage and clean energy all severely compromise the quality of the urban environment. Large, densely populated and sprawling cities with increasingly poor urban environments have raised two critical issues. First, how does the movement of more and more people into cities across the world, often with the explicit intention of seeking the development benefits of urban lives, impact on the environment of the planet? In recent years, in virtually every corner of the globe, climates have changed dramatically. It has become ever-more difficult to ignore the fact that human production and consumption patterns, driven primarily by the desire for urban middle-class livelihoods, are behind these changes. In the past, the `threat of global warming' was the cry of a few `green-activists'. Today, it is accepted wisdom that the world will almost certainly see wild unpredictable swings in temperature and weather patterns in the coming decades. This may have disastrous consequences in some places. Managing the broader ecological `footprint' of life in all cities has become a global priority. Second, how does the built environment of each city impact on the natural resource envelope that makes life in that city bearable? And, therefore, what is the limit of city size and form that a store of natural resources may safely carry? Put differently, is there an optimal city size and form for the continued What constitutes urban form liveability of a city? And is there a point on the growth curve of cities beyond Urban form has a number of dimensions. which, given the limits of current urban environmental management technologies It concerns the size, shape and density of and techniques, they simply become unsustainable? This is a local rather than cities, the characteristics of the transport global ecological perspective on the urban environmental challenge. and infrastructure networks, the configuration of land use patterns, the Work has been done to model the point where the size and shape of a city design of subdivisions, and the form and raises urban living and business costs ­ so-called `diseconomies of scale' ­ to orientation of buildings. the point where these exceed the benefits of collective habitation of people and co-location of industry. It has been recognised that cities can do a lot to Urban form may be considered at the macro level of a city and its region, at an extend the point at which costs might begin to exceed benefits. Cities can intermediate level of a town or suburb, or at grow larger if they carefully manage the pressures that the built environment the micro level of a subdivision or group of imposes on the natural environment. In contrast, those that do not manage buildings. their environmental impact, regardless of their absolute size, quickly reach (Dr Alan Perkins, `How significant an the point where the store of naturally available resources is no longer sufficient influence is urban form on city energy to sustain acceptable urban life and dynamic economic activity. Residents consumption for housing and transport?' State of Australian Cities, National begin to find that city life becomes progressively less tolerable, and businesses Conference, November 2003) find that they are less and less efficient. Both then start to disinvest from the city. 110 SUSTAINABLE CITIES Both these issues are important, but it is in the second area that local government can have a real impact. Health and Pollution When compared to large cities like Mexico City, Cairo, New York, Mumbai, Around the world, atmospheric pollution Shanghai or Tokyo, the average South African city may seem a very long way afflicts more than 1,1 billion people, mostly from the point where diseconomies of scale may exceed the economic and in cities. Another 2,5 billion are at risk from high levels of indoor air pollution. Indoor social benefits of being in cities. But the sustainability of cities is an important and outdoor air pollution together kill long-term concern that must be tackled now. This is especially true because nearly 3 million people every year ­ about South African cities have some built environment features resulting from 6% of all deaths annually... As cities apartheid that have a relatively greater impact on naturally available resources expand, urban air pollution worsens. In than many similarly sized cities in other parts of the world. In addition, if most big cities vehicle exhaust levels are so some South African cities continue to grow at their current pace the issue of severe that pollution-related ailments cost huge amounts for medical care & in worker their sustainability may become critical sooner rather than later. absenteeism. Both water scarcity and water A number of key trends do stand out that raise concern for the continued pollution are serious urban problems. Dirty water is by far the largest environmental sustainability of South Africa's cities. The first thing to understand is the killer around the world, claiming some 5 to nature of the built environment in many SACN cities. Both the urban form typical 12 million lives a year, depending on the of the apartheid city, and the efforts in the post-apartheid period to correct for definition of water-related disease. aspects of this urban form, are important. The second is how this particular built According to the WHO, the majority of urban environment impacts negatively on the envelope of natural resources. populations in developing countries do not have access to proper sanitation facilities ­ a flush toilet, sanitary latrine, or a pit KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND that can be covered over ­ and about half lack a regular supply of potable water. URBAN FORM Environmental Impact of Cities Two things have shaped, and are shaping, the form of South African cities. Cities have a huge impact on the natural The first is the enduring impact of apartheid spatial planning and its present- environment. As cities grow ever larger, day consequences. The second is the intended and unintended results of post- they consume more and more natural resources to meet the rising demand for apartheid settlement development meant to provide previously disadvantaged food, water, energy, and goods and residents with access to formal shelter and household services. services, both from people and industry. Cities generate close to 80% of all carbon dioxide emissions and account for three- APARTHEID SPATIAL PLANNING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES quarters of industrial wood use. Some 60% of all freshwater withdrawn for human use Some of the effects of urban planning under apartheid have already been ends up in urban areas ­ either directly for highlighted in Chapter 5. They are noted again here from the different use in factories and for drinking and sanitation, or indirectly through the perspective of their impact on sustainability. consumption of irrigated crops. The Because of apartheid planning South African cities currently have the following economic and environmental reach of the city goes far beyond the city limits. Modern built environment features that strain the envelope of natural resources: high-density settlements now appropriate the ecological output and life-support Undersized, but sprawling cities functions of distant regions through trade South African cities were designed with a specific population size in mind, and commerce, the generation and disposal of wastes, and the alteration of nature's and with a view to limiting growth. Although this does not apply equally to all cycles. As cities continue to attract more cities, various African townships were designed with a fixed population size people and produce and consume more, in mind, and, correspondingly, were located in parts of the city where they they become `black holes' that soak up the were naturally bounded by watercourses, major infrastructure lines, or buffer ecological output of entire regions. zones not suited for development. When they could no longer expand, these areas densified, with large numbers of informal structures built in the backyards of formally constructed houses. When densification reached its limit in these neighbourhoods, the only possible expansion point was outward. Large informal settlements springing up on poorly located land on the periphery of cities has been the inevitable result. Apartheid cities have unusual spatial contradictions. On the one hand they are very spread out, with levels of density too low to sustain viable public 111 SUSTAINABLE CITIES Figure 52. Density and population group transport systems. This encourages high levels of car use, which ironically concentration in Tshwane. then encourages further sprawl. Low-density suburbs are built on the principle of one family, one plot of land. This has been demonstrated to be extremely inefficient from the point of view of managing networked energy, water and sanitation systems. On the other hand, apartheid cities are too dense in certain parts, which invariably results in less-healthy living conditions. These are usually the parts inhabited by poorer residents who have lived in the city for some time. Marginalising cities South African cities have been designed to marginalise. The geographic separateness of the largest segment of the population is the classic feature of the apartheid city. Hundreds of thousands of people were forcibly relocated from where it made sense for them to live to a sprawl of dormitory townships on the edges of cities. Where urban settlements are located far from employment centres, long distances need to be travelled to reach the workplace. Public transport systems to adequately serve this need have either never been developed, or have deteriorated over time under the pressure of increasing use. People on the margins of cities have been forced to compensate. The result has been a booming mini-bus taxi industry. This has put thousands more vehicles than planned for on the roads of many SACN cities. What Can Be Done? Cities designed to impede movement Alarmed by massive population growth, As a mechanism of social and political policing, South African cities were worsening living conditions, and environmental degradation, some experts designed with a view to impeding, not facilitating movement. worry that cities in developing countries have become unmanageable. Others are In the attempt to geographically separate classes within racial groups, more optimistic, observing that with good apartheid planners often designed suburbs adjacent to each other on a different management cities can grow even larger size of grid block. This means that the roads often do not line-up in suburban without making residents worse off and areas, forcing a time-consuming zigzag route on any form of transport. without ruining the surrounding environment. While many city governments More significantly, many townships were built as a locus of control, with only face unprecedented challenges, a number one or two streets connecting the road complex inside the township to the rest of steps can make cities more liveable and of the city. It was reasoned that if political unrest was to spark inside the protect the environment. These include township area, public-order policing had only to seal off the one or two key better urban planning, more public transportation, better sanitation and access roads in order to stop the trouble from affecting the rest of the city. rational water-use policies, energy This means that virtually all traffic still squeezes through one or two conservation, urban farming, and waste interchanges in many South African township areas. The time available to recycling. residents, and usually poorer African residents, is seriously constrained by (Cities at the forefront Johns Hopkins this reality. School of Public Health) 112 SUSTAINABLE CITIES Decentralising cities Urban efficiency South African cities were designed to encourage decentralisation for its own sake. In the late 1970s, planners concerned with the over-concentration of By design, metropolitan Pretoria evolved key business and financial institutions in the central business district core into a model apartheid city characterised started to encourage decentralisation of office development. Various measures by fragmented and divided urban were taken including, for example, limiting the number of parking spaces in development that limited access for the the inner city, and failing to compensate with adequate public transport, on majority of people to urban opportunities. This history of political exclusion has the logic that this would incentivise new office developments in the suburbs. produced a city that is spatially sprawling, Other stimulants such as unusually generous rates rebates at the decentralised with low average population densities, and points were introduced in the 1980s. The result was business flight from the that is marked by great municipal service central city. This soon took on its own logic. By the mid-1990s edge-city unevenness and inequality. The basic developments had started to spatially fragment a number of key SACN cities. infrastructure footprint that Tshwane inherited after a century of sunk- investment is thus highly inefficient by Under-serviced cities international standards, suggesting a Last, South African cities were designed without consideration for the need relatively high future recurrent cost of poor populations for an acceptable level of service. Water and sewer system structure of municipal service delivery. breakdowns because of poor load design, dust from dirt roads in the middle of While the general population distribution is fairly low by international standards, the city, poor storm-water drainage, leading to periodic flooding of population densities are the highest in neighbourhoods, mark many of today's township areas. They bring with them areas that need services the most, as well a host of environmental health problems. as in areas mostly populated by black people. (Tshwane Mayoral Mid-Term Report, POST-APARTHEID SETTLEMENT PLANNING December 2000-June 2003) Post apartheid settlement planning has moved to try rectify the imbalances resulting from apartheid. In some instances it has ended up reinforcing them. Housing-driven settlement planning One of the key political promises of the new democratically elected government in 1994 was that a million houses would be built in five years. It was hoped Figure 53. De-densification of office nodes in that this would help to accommodate the many people forced by apartheid Johannesburg, 1960-2001. 113 SUSTAINABLE CITIES laws to either double-up in small `matchbox'-style formal structures in townships, live in backyard structures, or set up temporary shelter in Tshwane's settlement burgeoning informal settlements. Housing delivery was driven by the provision structure is spatially of nationally funded and provincially administered housing subsidies. Especially characterised as follows: where very large housing backlogs were faced, many municipalities also made Spatially fragmented structure contributions from their own budget. This was often devoted to topping up Developed around a traditionally strong the level of internal community services possible to build with the subsidy. central core, the city has over the last two decades become multi-nodal, with a ring of A million housing subsidies were indeed released in the mid-to-late 1990s. satellite nodes at 10-12 km from the centre, But this extremely ambitious, hard-driving housing programme, in which mostly within high income neighbourhoods there had been precious little time to consider all the options before building, adjacent to highways. The residential pattern and even less time to reflect on emerging experience, has had unintended is characterised by separation of income consequences. groups and races with buffer strips, roads, railway lines and industrial areas forming It is being recognised that settlement planning in the post-apartheid era has barriers between the various race groups. been driven by developer-led delivery and the provision of reasonably The most favourably located black residential areas are 10-12km from the inexpensive household infrastructure. In many cases the subsidy available traditionally strong central area, in the did not enable developers to purchase relatively higher-cost land close to city opposite direction from high-income centres. In others the developer already owned large tracts of land and targeted residential areas, but many are located as this, regardless of suitability, in an effort to evade a key input cost. This far as 25-40km away. The distance and problem was compounded by the fact that when lower-cost RDP housing was inaccessible locality of poor neighbourhoods planned for areas where there were already fairly well-established suburban highlights their dislocation and marginalisation since they have the lowest settlements nearby, development objections from residents concerned with provision of social facilities, the longest the impact on their property values could delay building for months. This had travelling times and the highest population serious time costs for developers. They circumvented the problem by targeting density. These are also the areas that are relatively isolated land. In the drive to meet the targets for new houses, the growing at the fastest rate. In addition, the fact that most new housing was being developed on the edges of cities went present situation can only be maintained unnoticed. The South African city has spread out considerably since 1994. with high government subsidies for public transport and is therefore unsustainable. De-densification Low density sprawl Other processes consolidated the trend. Many old city residents forced for Extensive low-density sprawl, which is based years to occupy backyard dwellings, as well as newcomers to the city, targeted on an anti-urban ethic of the free-standing land for land invasions. Seeing where housing was likely to be built, and with house on a plot, is evidenced by: · High and middle-income suburbanisation a sensitivity to where the political pressure for relocation would be greatest, in, predominantly in the south-eastern land invaders targeted areas on the margins of cities. Land invasions were sector of the city; informal, but were often well organised. Plots of land were demarcated and · Exclusive residential estates, clusters and allocated before the invasion took place. This informal town planning almost security villages; invariably demarcated the new settlement on a grid pattern with large plots, · State-sponsored low-cost housing mirroring the layout of typical wealthy suburbs, and echoing its aspirations projects on the periphery, in the opposite direction of high income sprawl (to the for large and spacious self-standing homes, soon to be subsidised. north and west where the value of land is low and little public opposition can be The movement of people out of backyard shacks and into formal housing or expected); new informal settlements has already been discussed in Chapter 6. On the Most households live in single storey and one hand, it is clearly to be welcomed. But it does have implications for the detached houses, which is wasteful of urban spatial structure of the SACN cities. There are two implications of this land and forces large numbers of people to movement. First, even if the numbers of people moving to cities slows down, live too far from established economic cities may still face growing service delivery pressures from households opportunities and facilities. currently living in backyards where they are already served, to new formal Separation of land use and informal dwellings requiring new connections. In 2001 there were still Separation of land uses generates 544 667 households living in formal or informal backyard dwellings across considerable movement. Almost all new the nine cities. The de-densification of cities runs contrary to the goal of the development is private transport oriented compact city. It creates capacity problems for networked infrastructure, and with the result that city living has become increases the marginal cost of new service connections, possibly beyond the over dependant on this mode of transport. ... (In turn), Public transport is inefficient point where this can be carried by operating cost transfers and cross- mostly due to too low densities. subsidisation within a service account. (Tshwane 2020 IDP, Chapter 2) 114 SUSTAINABLE CITIES Ongoing decentralisation Although part of the problem of dispersed As restrictions on movements and residence came down, an increasing number settlements lies with the developer-driven of people moved out of crowded townships moved into inner cities. Demand model used to deliver the bulk of housing for well-located inner-city space drove a process of informally converting subsidies, since developers have been underutilised commercial and retail space into small back-office manufacturing taking advantage of available land and storage space, and residential accommodation. Traditional business areas holdings to keep down costs, the other in a number of SACN cities changed overnight. The spectre of `crime and part of the problem arises because the current subsidies (housing and CMIP) are grime' from increasing numbers of people living in and using the central generally inadequate to cover the costs of cities gave further impetus to business flight. New office developments were well-located land in many of the major constructed near wealthy residential neighbourhoods, often bypassing even urban centres (Bierman). Since the new decentralised nodes. This spreading out of the city adds to its ecological Government currently spends more than footprint, and presents traffic planners with huge difficulties in anticipating R2 billion on road and bus subsidies to the ever-changing flows of traffic. address these spatial disjunctures in the major cities, the opportunity exists to redirect some of these funds to acquiring `Worsening' service levels in sprawling new informal settlements better-located land. In many cases it was impossible for authorities to develop land illegally occupied by newcomers to the city. Land invasions were firmly dealt with in However, dispersed settlement is unlikely to be addressed unless government plays a some cities. In many cases the land invaders were forcibly removed to `holding more proactive role in controlling the areas' where they were placed on the housing waiting list. These were always decentralisation of high-income on the far edges of the city. With many more people coming into some of the residential, commercial and industrial SACN cities in the mid-to-late 1990s it was impossible to keep pace. The developments. temporary settlements where those waiting for housing were being held (National Spatial Development burgeoned in size. They also took on an air of permanence. But since they have Perspective) been conceived as temporary they have been provided with only very low, `emergency' levels of services. This has led to very unhealthy conditions in some. Understanding the impact How has this historical and evolving post-apartheid built environment impacted on the envelope of natural resources? Data sets for the environmental impact of settlement developments are not comprehensive enough to do the kind of longitudinal trends analysis possible with census data. Few cities collect information in a consistent and regular enough manner to allow for the tracking of trends over time. At best a partial comparative analysis of the state of the urban environment across the cities is possible. And in most case it is only feasible to provide an indicative analysis by highlighting information from individual cities. Using data collected from cities specifically for this report, and with information from environmental reports compiled by some of the cities on their own behalf, urban environmental impact can be seen in a number of areas. First is the impact that the built environment is having on space, and also on air and water quality. Further effects can be seen in the areas of urban environmental health, intra-city mobility and energy sustainability. IMPACT ON SPACE IMPACTS ON SPACE AND HIGH POTENTIAL ARABLE LAND Open space is essential to sustainable urban life. Where this space is developed in the form of parks and botanical gardens, or semi-developed in the form of nature reserves, it can add significantly to the perceived quality of life, and 115 SUSTAINABLE CITIES compensate for high diseconomies of scale factors ­ such as pollution and traffic congestion ­ that detract from liveability. Even where this space is undeveloped it provides a so-called green lung for cities, since plant life absorbs carbon dioxide and releases oxygen. Poorly laid out, low-density and further de-densifying urban forms have a very severe impact on available open space. Different cities have historically invested differently in open space. Some cities have many parks and considerable undeveloped open space near the city centre, others do not. In a survey of SACN city municipalities conducted for this report in late 2003, Mangaung reported that it had 119 developed parks compared with Tshwane's 546. This means that Tshwane had 4,5 times the number of parks as Mangaung, for three times its population. By contrast, eThekwini reported only 53 parks and Msunduzi five. Cities may be using different definitions of parks in their reporting here. A more appropriate indicator would be hectares of space: hence the City of Joburg reports that it has 6 144 hectares of developed parks, 4 443 hectares of undeveloped parks, and 984 hectares of nature reserves. It manages approximately 1,2 million trees that make the northern suburbs of Johannesburg a natural forest. The extent of open space sometimes reflects geographic limitations, but it also speaks to the extent to which planning departments place value on these amenities. Various cities are now investing in Open Space Management Systems (see box below). Impacts on arable land Research for the National Spatial Development Perspective shows that some Not only has decentralisation created of the most important arable land in the country is located to the east of unsustainable urban forms, but in some Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane. Some of this land has already been areas such settlements are encroaching on intruded on by the displaced urbanisation around former Kwandebele. These high-value agriculture land and scenic settlements are still expanding today and are still sustained by expensive locations that have tourism potential, transport subsidies that allow a daily commute for workers from these areas thereby undermining the longer-term economic potential of these areas. into Tshwane. Although this also raises the positive prospect of development (National Spatial Development Perspective) of urban agricultural economies, a rapid-growth scenario for Gauteng cities raises concern over whether its ecological footprint is sustainable in the long run. The land under threat is extremely valuable. A fast-growing urban region that does not preserve it will have a lower level of food security in the future. Some SACN cities have a policy that new housing developments should happen far from the crowded areas of the city in areas usually categorised as peri- urban. This policy may make sense in the light of the habitability of land closer to the city centre. But the policy may be at the cost of viable specialist agriculture in the future. Waste management Cities add significantly to the country's waste stream. Waste spoils land, whether it is illegally dumped or collected into ever-expanding landfills. The table does not have complete data for the nine cities, but it indicates both the amount of waste that municipalities have to deal with as well as some of the ways that waste is disposed of. Some cities clearly have a far-larger burden of waste generation than others, even when they are not the largest. Although it is not clear how much additional waste is collected by private contractors in each city, the data suggests that the challenge of Tshwane's domestic waste is far larger than that of Johannesburg. 116 SUSTAINABLE CITIES City of Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Mandela Buffalo City Manguang Msunduzi GENERAL WASTE DATA::: Domestic tonnage 393 226 500 000 -- -- 854 880 -- -- 30 -- Domestic % 32 -- 59 -- 52 -- -- -- -- Commercial/Industrial 274 804 -- -- -- 361 680 -- -- 25 -- Comm / Industrail % 23 -- 38 -- 22 -- -- -- -- Illegal Dumping ton 266 139 -- -- -- 115 080 -- -- -- -- Illegal Dumping % 22 -- 3 -- 7 -- -- -- -- AMOUNT IN TONNES AND % SOLID WASTE: Disposed sanitary landfill 1 419 725 1 600 000 1 644 000 300 Landfill % 91 100 Incinerated 287 Incinerated % 0 0 Disposed to open dump 0 Open dump % 0 0 Recycled 7 190 82 200 30 Recycled % 20 8 5 10 Burned openly 0 180 Burned % 0 0 60 Organic material 393 226 48 000 427 440 180 Organic % 28 40 26 60 Other 1 026 499 1 052 000 1 216 560 120 Other refuse % 72 74 30 Figure 54a. The waste challenge in SACN cities The majority of waste is dumped to sanitary landfills. Noticeably small as recorded from a survey of municipalities in percentages go for incineration and recycling. Illegal dumping remains a late 2003. huge problem in some cities. CITY STRATEGIES TO MANAGE ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE OPEN SPACE Waste management programmes Various municipalities have developed programmes to deal directly with the issue of waste management through engagement with local residents. Some of these programmes are aimed at ensuring that less waste is generated by city residents. The City of Cape Town initiated its Waste Wise Campaign on the basis of the principles advocated in the White Paper on Integrated Pollution and Waste Management. A scheme was created to ensure that less waste was produced at source in the domestic, industrial and commercial sectors. Furthermore, the programme advocates the three Rs ­ reduce, reuse and recycle. Cape Town also confronted the problem of high volumes of industrial waste by launching an Integrated Waste Exchange. This project facilitates the exchange of the waste products from one company to another company, where the second may find the first's waste products a useful input into its production processes. This helps remove these products from the waste stream. Open space management systems The box overleaf gives some sense of how cities are developing better tools for space management. 117 SUSTAINABLE CITIES OPEN SPACE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: EXAMPLES FROM TWO CITIES SACN cities are already thinking creatively about how to manage the impact of the built environment on valuable open space. A number have developed Open Space Management Systems as part of their Spatial Development Frameworks. OSMSs give municipalities a clear framework in which to balance the pressure to develop new land with the imperative to maintain environmentally sensitive land for the benefit of future generations. The extracts below are write-ups on OSMSs from two SACN municipalities. In the case of Ekurhuleni, it is clear that OSMSs can be thought of in the same way as a City Development Strategy, with a long-term perspective, and with an explicit focus on partnerships with other spheres of government. The Nelson Mandela Metropole MOSS Project The Nelson Mandela Metropole, in the south-eastern corner of the Cape Floristic Region (CFR), boasts some of the greatest biome-level diversity in the world. The Metropole is home to five of South Africa's seven biomes, and two fynbos types of the highest conservation value in the CFR. In light of the immense conservation importance of the area an ambitious project was initiated in 2001 in an attempt to secure the long-term protection of its biodiversity. The Planning Phase of the NM MOSS (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Open Space System) Project, which was launched in September 2001, sought to develop a scientifically rigorous and defensible fine-scale systematic conservation plan for the Nelson Mandela Metropole, Cape Floristic Region, as part of the Metro's Open Space System. The NM MOSS Project is a partnership between the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA), the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, the Terrestrial Ecology Research Unit (UPE), the Table Mountain Fund (WWF-SA), the Mazda Wildlife Fund, and Conservation International (Southern African Hotspots Programme). The project used an approach that required GIS-based data layers that spatially depicted the distribution of biodiversity pattern and ecological processes, as well as current and future land-use pressures. Targets were set for each of the biodiversity features, and a decision-support system used to identify priority areas for the expansion of the city's conservation network. The development and recreational requirements of the metro are now to be incorporated, and a holistic open-space plan produced. In an urban area, any Metropolitan Open Space System (MOSS) is a compromise between conservation and town-planning development needs. The aim is to systematically design a system that most effectively combines and addresses these requirements. The most valuable aspect of the plan is that it will be dynamic. Being computer-based it will allow for predictive decision making, which will provide greatly increased guidance to town planners, conservation managers and municipality councillors than in the past. Stakeholders, including councillors and officials, academics, land-use planners and decision-makers, conservation area managers, civil society organisations and the general public, participated in the development and implementation of the plan. Regular meetings and workshops were held to inform them of project progress and to obtain their input into specific aspects of the MOSS Project. Implementation began in March 2003 and includes the development of site-specific plans for community conservation projects, private landowner conservation initiatives, and the rezoning of municipally owned-properties to afford priority sites with formal conservation protection. The incorporation of the outcomes of the NM MOSS Project into the Metro's Spatial Development Framework (SDF) and Integrated Development Plan (IDP) were finalised. The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality Environmental Management Framework for the Northern Service Delivery Region The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (EMM) is committed to sound environmental management principles and set itself the goal of sustainable development, which balances the protection of the environment with improving the socio-economic well being of the inhabitants of the area. Due to the development pressure and the value of land in the Northern Service Delivery Region (NSDR), the EMM and the Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs (DACEL) decided to develop an Environmental Management Framework (EMF) to aid decision-making processes in respect to new development activities in the area. The purpose of the EMF is to provide the EMM and the DACEL with a decision support system that will help these authorities to act in a coordinated, objective and efficient manner. It is important to note that the EMF will not be a `blueprint' land-use plan for the area but a decision support mechanism that takes environmental as well as socio-economic factors into account for each decision that has to be made. The EMF can, however, as a secondary function, provide valuable inputs into local land-use plans. The main products of the study will include: · a status quo report; · a strategic environmental management plan; 118 SUSTAINABLE CITIES · a resource economics report; · the EMF report and interactive GIS (main project product); · review of existing plans; · actions plans for the implementation of the EMF; and · a summary report. The study area is the NSDR, which is situated in the eastern part of Gauteng. It includes the Johannesburg International Airport and three major freeways, namely the R21, R24 and N12. The R21 freeway, which links Kempton Park, Boksburg and the Johannesburg International Airport with Pretoria, passes through the area and divides it into two parts namely: · The area located to the west of the R21 freeway, which includes Kempton Park, a part of Boksburg (Jet Park), Kempton Park Agricultural Holdings and Witfontein. · The area to the south and East of the R21 freeway, which includes Nortons Home Estate, Putfontein Farm as well as the agricultural holding of Pomona, Bredell, Brentwood Park, Benoni, Marister and Rynfield. An integrated GIS will be developed as the main structural element in the study around which the various inputs and outputs will be centred. The GIS will also take the results of the project into the future and will have to be updated periodically in order to deliver an ongoing up to date input into the environmental management of the area. Land use zones will be a key element of the EMF. The purpose of land use zones is not to fix specific land uses to specific areas of land but rather to indicate which land uses can generally be allowed in which areas under the following conditions: · without further environmental assessment; · land uses that require some degree of further environmental assessment to ensure that the basic conditions of the EMF is met; and · land uses (generally undesirable in the area from an environmental or developmental perspective) which would require in depth motivation and environmental assessment to ensure that they do not result in unacceptable impacts. The zoning will be based on environmental sensitivity, the views of the public and stakeholders as well as land use imperatives. It will set out a risk-averse framework for decision-making that protects sensitive environmental and socio-economic aspects while it allows for appropriate and responsible development of the area. Control zones will be established as the main administrative instrument in the EMF. The purpose of control zones is to focus the attention of the authorities on the important areas and to try and streamline applications for proposed activities in less-sensitive areas. These zones will be based on the following: · The relative sensitivity or importance of the environment or an element in the environment; · the norms and values of the community in respect to the sense of place or character of the area; · the need to protect high quality open space and ecologically sensitive areas against inappropriate development; and · existing and approved planned land use. (Extracted from: `Background information document: The development of an environmental management framework for the Northern Service Delivery Region of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, March 2004') 119 SUSTAINABLE CITIES IMPACT ON WATER, AIR QUALITY AND ENERGY IMPACT ON AND LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER SOURCES South Africa is a water stressed country. Modelling done for the National Spatial Development Perspective indicates that while there is a current surplus in available water stores in key locations likely to see further urban expansion, future coverage cannot be guaranteed. Under a high-growth scenario this surplus will turn into a very serious deficit by 2025. Parts of Gauteng cities, eThekwini and Msunduzi and Cape Town face the risk of severe water shortages in the decades to come. Figure 54 shows the results of this modelling. This is particularly true if cities social and economic development strategies pay off. Affluent city residents use greater volumes of water than poor residents so the more developed cities become, the more environmentally stressed they are likely to be, unless dramatic steps are taken to reduce wastage and inefficiency. For example, although consistent figures for unaccounted water are not available, quantitative analysis shows that it may reach 40% in some areas. In the case of the City of Cape Town, 70% of urban water is used for sanitation and sullage, garden irrigation and leaks. Figure 55 gives a comparison of water-consumption data received from municipalities in a survey conducted late 2003. The data is not directly comparable, with each municipality having provided information in different formats. Water quality and waste-water treatment Figure 55 also gives comparisons of non-compliance with specified water- quality standards across the municipalities. The first shows relatively low levels of non-compliance with specified E-Coli standards in random water samples taken across the municipal area. However, DWAF has also expressed concerns that municipalities do not take as many samples as they should, and that levels of E-Coli are actually much higher than acceptable in certain key places where departmental officials have taken their own samples. The second table compares the extent to which various municipalities efficiently treated waste water. Some cities generate a relatively high quantity of waste Figure 54b. NSDP modeling of areas likely to water per day, and utilisation of available capacity to manage this appears face severe water shortages in 2025. Red relatively high. In other cities indicates problem areas. effluent quality compliance is relatively low. IMPACT ON AIR QUALITY A range of factors particular to the urban form of South African cities impacts on air quality. Development in most South African cities has been `car- driven' for some decades. The availability of good roads and the poor standards of public transport have encouraged high 120 SUSTAINABLE CITIES City of Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Mandela Buffalo City Mangaung Msunduzi Annual water demand 425 220 1 220 133 83 16 800 000 (kls per capita per day) Average consumption of water in litres per day Domestic 575 140 380 000 878 84 931 65 65 56 Commercial/Industrial 135 90 000 8 595 41 096 89 35 44 Estimated Water Loss 158 24 18 18 23 25 37 30 Percentage of water samples 0,5-non- 0,05% 0 2,05 0 0 that did not comply with DWAF compliance mainly water water quality guidelines over the of E,Coli quality of last year standard to private water SABS 241 tanks Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Nelson Mandela Mangaung Volume of waste water treated (in-house) Ml/day 839 485 529 132,3 90 Production per person per day l per person / day 255 162,5 175 41,25 28,125 Required effluent standard Special Standard Standard Standard Special Capacity utilisation % treatment capacity 95,02% 67,36% 85,32% 70,90% 87,38% Final effluent quality compliance % samples (flow weighted) 95,00% 94,00% 35,00% 87,71% 99,00% Wastewater discharge not treated % ww produced -5,39% 6,73% 5,54% -0,23% 0,00% Sludge produced not meeting standard % of dry tons produced 0,00% 5,00% 0,00% 0,00% Waste water recycling/reclamation % ww produced 6,13% 6,73% 8,50% 4,70% 3,00% Value of sale of by-products % income 0,00% 0,00% 17,81% 2,81% Figure 55. Table top shows water and water quality indicators from survey of levels of private car use. This has allowed more and more people to locate in municipalities conducted late 2003. Please quiet suburbs with large plots far from the city centre. More and more land note that this information is presented as it development on the edges of the cities has in turn encouraged the use of more was received by municipalities. However, the different municipalities understood the cars, which then in turn has made public transport systems less financially indicator differently and have provided viable. This self-re-enforcing spiral has seen increasing numbers of vehicles, information that is not directly comparable. many with only one occupant, on city roads. The second table gives waste water efficiency indicators from research conducted by Palmer A different, but equivalent distortion of urban form in poorer African areas Development Group for five of the nine SACN has led to the same result. The forced relocation of large numbers of African cities in 2003. residents to dormitory townships, coupled with under-investment in an adequate public transport system to cater for this settlement pattern, has led to a large private minibus taxi industry. Thousands of cars and taxis have serious pollution effects. Petrol and diesel vehicles are known to emit the highest percentage of South Africa's atmospheric emissions, creating environmental health problems in the city centre, in poor neighbourhoods often located adjacent to motorways, and near key transport interchanges. The under-electrification of township areas, and the relatively high cost of electricity for cooking and heating, has led to many households continuing to use coal or paraffin burners to heat food and homes. This seriously affects air quality in township areas. Poor regulation of industry emissions further exacerbates the problem. 121 SUSTAINABLE CITIES Figure 56. A map of air pollution and air Air quality measurements pollution related diseases in Johannesburg, Very few South African cities take systematic measurements of air quality showing strong correlation in some of the poorer areas of the city. across the municipal area. There are some measuring stations in areas that are known to be badly affected. But on the whole only about 15% of South African cities are covered by emissions-monitoring equipment. Where cities are able to monitor air quality, the results suggest that this is an area that will need to be watched in future. Figure 57 shows relatively similar quantity of air emissions for similarly sized cities Figure 56 gives a sense of the impact of high levels of air pollution on health in South African cities. Although TB is a reflection of many things besides pollution ­ including the prevalence of HIV and Aids ­ it is strongly affected by it. The map shows air pollution strongly concentrated in and around Soweto and the inner city of Johannesburg, and instances of diseases related to air pollution concentrated in the same place. ENERGY Cities consume huge amounts of energy. Most city dwellers simply take for granted that energy ­ to feed them, propel their cars, light their homes and underpin all aspects of production ­ will always be there. But energy is a natural resource in the same way as air and water. Even when it is processed, in the form of food, or generated in the form of electricity, it is still reliant on an original store of natural resources. And even when it does not seem to come from the immediate vicinity of the city, in the same way as air and water must be directly accessible inside the urban limits, it is still part of the 122 SUSTAINABLE CITIES City of Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Tshwane Manguang Msunduzi Tuberculosis (TB) Incidence Rate (% of population) 414/100000 0 1 251/100000 668/100000 1470/100000 Annual number of air pollution events (days guidelines exceeded) 45 What standards is the municipality adhering to DEAT Percentage of the municipal area monitored 15% 15 (soon to 50%) Emissions (for the entire municipal area) per capita 2 2 Tonnage of emissions by the municipality 1 061 085 1 061 085 1 360 341 Figure 57. Air-pollution indicators from a total envelope of natural resources that sustains a city. The burden of large survey of cities conducted late 2003. cities may be too heavy for energy sources to bear. Energy limits may be seen both in both sudden, unanticipated energy crises, and the slow imperceptible spreading of cities' environmental footprint. Widening ecological footprints An ecological footprint is the `ecological impact that human activities within cities have beyond their boundaries'. An ecological footprint study is one way to determine the likely future sustainability of a city. An important part of it is an analysis of the energy footprint. Ecological footprint studies typically analyse the environmental status quo within a city itself and highlight the potential outcomes of not formulating policy according to a sustainability agenda. It discusses the potential ecological fall-out from urban development and possible urban expansion beyond the boundaries of the city; the implications of not balancing the need for land development with the preservation of natural resources; and the consequences of not securing the future of ecologically sensitive areas, green open spaces, coastal resources, and energy availability. An ecological footprint analysis of Cape Town highlights the impact on available energy sources (see figure 58). 123 SUSTAINABLE CITIES THE ENERGY / ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT CHALLENGE FACING SA CITIES Why an energy / ecological footprint analysis is important for South African cities A recently developed tool for measuring ecological sustainability is Ecological Footprint analysis. It is based on the fact that the earth is a closed system in which all material inputs required by humanity (air and water, food and fibre, energy and minerals) are supplied by a finite area of productive land and water. Equally, all waste outputs have to be absorbed by natural systems. Nature, functioning as a system of sources and sinks, is therefore our ecological life-support system. EF analysis calculates the total resource consumption and waste generation of a person, city, or nation (eg. in tons) and, using productivity/ absorption factors (eg. output in tons/ha) converts this into the corresponding area needed to produce the resources and consume the wastes. This `areal' figure, in ha/person, is the ecological footprint of the individual, city or nation. It can be compared with the `fair Earthshare' in 1999 of 1,9 ha/person (the amount of productive land on the planet available to supply each person's inputs and absorb their outputs) to assess whether or not patterns of resource consumption and waste generation are sustainable and not overshooting the planet's carrying capacity. (WWF, 2002). Cities, the flywheels of modern economies, now occupy a central position in the pattern of resource-waste flows. Globally they account for the consumption of over 75% of all materials and the emission of over 75% of all wastes. (Girardet, 1999). These percentages will rise in coming decades, tracking the rising levels of urbanisation (currently around 50%) and affluence, and technological change. It is evident that cities are one of the keys to the ecological sustainability of the planet. In this context, EF analysis of individual cities can provide an indication of their contribution to the problem and where action might be taken so that they become part of the solution. Summary picture of Cape Town's energy / ecological footprint Cape Town's ecological footprint has been derived by converting the resource-waste flows (measured in tons) through its urban-industrial metabolism into related areal units using reputable conversion factors (Gasson 2002 & 2003). These are presented below with the energy component highlighted. Metabolic inputs TONS/YR AREAL CONVERSION FACTORS Land area in sq km Fresh water 1 327 500 000 Reservoir catchment areas 6 1 430 Energy 2 100GJ = 1.25ha all fossil fuels 7 Coal 378 732 1t = 28 Giga Joules 8 1 326 Oil 1 138 097 1t = 44,7GJ 6 359 Gas 21 816 1t = 35GJ 95 Wood 108 492 1t = 1,4m3; growth 2,3m3/ha/yr 7 660 Materials 3 Building materials 5 994 113 Local mining area 9 31 Timber 69 844 1t = 1,4m3; growth 2,3m3/ha/yr 7 425 Paper 395 000 1t = 1,8m3 wood; 2,3m3/ha/yr 7 3 091 Food 4 1 327 301 Yields in tons/ha various foods10 112 349 Metabolic ouptputs5 Liquid wastes 200 300 000 Area of WWTWs 11 13 Solid wastes 2 050 800 Area of SW sites 11 4,9 Gaseous wastes CO2 5 209 200 Carbon fixation 21 t/ha/yr 8 2 480 Total City EF 128 264 km2 City Energy EF 10 920km2 W Cape Province Area12 129 370km2 City Jurisdictional Area13 2 487km2 City Built-up area 14 774km2 Sources : 1 : DWAF, 1998; 2 : Wicking-Baird et al, 1997; 3 : Dept of Mineral & Energy Affairs, 1994; Corobrick; WP Masonary Manufacturers; PPC Ltd; Mondi; 4 : These figures are based either on national average per capita consumption figures multiplied by the metropolitan population, or on a pro rata metropolitan share of national consumption; 5 : CMC, 1998; Prof A.M. Stephen, 1998; Wicking-Baird et al, 1997; Wright-Pierce, 1999; 6 : Midgley et al, 1994; 7 : Wackernagel & Rees, 1996; 8 : Prof. W. Stock, UCT; 9 : CCT, 2000; 10 : Wackernagel et al, 1994; 11 : CCT pers. comm.; 12 : SA Statistics, 1997; 13 : CCT, 2001a; 14 : Gasson, 2000. Figure 58. Cape Town's ecological footprint, highlighting the position of energy (Gasson 2002 & 2003). 124 SUSTAINABLE CITIES The calculation indicates that Cape Town depends upon an area of about 128 300km2 for the supply of its resources and the absorption of its wastes. This is equal to about 10% of the total surface area of South Africa (1 225 815km2), or roughly the area of the Western Cape Province (129 370km2). With a population of approximately three million, this translates into an EF of 4,28 ha/person, slightly larger than South Africa's per capita EF of 4,02 ha ­ which is the largest of any country in Africa. These figures mean that the average Capetonian and the average South African are consuming more than twice their `fair Earthshare'. This is not an ecologically sustainable situation. The energy footprint, in particular, is 10 920km2, and constitutes 8,5% of Cape Town's overall ecological footprint. It includes the area needed to supply its fossil fuel inputs (8 440km2) and the area of forest needed to absorb its CO2 emissions. The per capita energy footprint of 0,36 ha is quite small because the calculation assumes that Cape Town derives its electricity from the nearby nuclear power station, when this station, in fact, feeds its electricity into the coal-based national grid from which Cape Town draws its electricity. Many studies on city EFs are underway, mostly in developed countries, and the results show that all of them are exceeding the `fair Earthshare'. Some are exceptionally high ­ Hong Kong 7,1 ha/person, Kuwait 10,3 ha/person, Singapore 12,4 ha/person (WWF, 2000). A key factor behind the high EFs is excessive consumption associated with the levels of affluence and energy intensive types of technologies. Impact of energy consumption on Cape Town's environment The conversion of raw energy into electricity, motion and heat releases gaseous by-products, particulate matter, and heat into the atmospheric sink. The largest single contributor to atmospheric emissions is transportation (52,3%) ­ petrol and diesel vehicles. It is also the dominant contributor to oxides of nitrogen (NOx), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and particulate matter (PM10 and PM2.5). Commerce and industry produce 25% of NOx, and 80% of sulphur dioxide (SO2), the chief sources of which are the Caltex refinery and a variety of industrial establishments burning coal and heavy fuel oil. Caltex also contributes significantly to VOCs. Vehicle numbers are expected to rise at a rate of 3-5%/year during the current decade and brown haze, a photochemical product of gaseous emissions combined with particulates, may increase by 48% and PM2.5 health standards will probably be exceeded with increasing frequency. (Wicking-Baird et al, 1997). The increasing quantity of high-level radioactive nuclear waste stored at Koeberg remains an unresolved problem for there is no disposal plan in place. The absence of a plan means that the issue of safe disposal is being passed on to future generations. This is in conflict with one of the principles of sustainable development and the Constitution of the Republic. Implications of not understanding and investing in stable and sustainable energy sources Cape Town's industrial-urban metabolism depends on flows of exhaustible fossil energy (40%), and controversial nuclear-electrical energy (58%). The fossil fuel supply lines are exceptionally long and render the local economy vulnerable to disruptions in supply. For example, oil is shipped mainly from the Middle East 10 000 km away, while coal is railed from national sources 1 500km away in Mpumalanga Province. Furthermore, global oil reserves are expected to run out some time during this century, though coal reserves could last for some centuries. Nuclear energy will remain an ecologically unsustainable option unless fail-safe ways can be found to deal with the high level radioactive wastes ­ and no country has yet done so. Arguably, therefore, if the sustainability objectives of inexhaustibility, invulnerability, environmental quality, and self-reliance are to be realised then concerted steps must be taken now to harness and develop renewable energy sources. In the Cape the obvious possibilities are solar and wind energies, but these have been scarcely developed. CITY ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES All the municipalities in the nine SACN cities have some form of environmental management plans and frameworks in place, either as part of the IDP or as a self-standing plan to address pollution effects. Four South African city municipalities, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria, have taken the next step and prepared a State of the Environment Report, and some have gone even further to extract from these audits clear, long-term sustainability policies and strategies. 125 SUSTAINABLE CITIES eThekwini The core message of (the) `sustainable The eThekwini municipality is taking proactive steps towards building a cities' literature is that as cities grow, they `sustainable city'. The city has developed a comprehensive strategy highlighting create unprecedented demands for inputs six areas of intervention: from the natural system (water, energy, food, land, etc) and unprecedented · An environmental management system through which the city will develop quantities of waste outputs that the natural environmental impact assessment indicators for metro services; system is somehow expected to absorb. They · A development and planning component which includes initiatives such as also create enormously complex throughput systems that convert inputs into outputs in the Department of Housing focus on greening new settlements, where there relatively more or less efficient ways, and are initiatives to deal with solid waste minimisation; on relatively more or less equitable terms · A human health and safety section with projects working on an air quality depending on the socio-economic and ecological context of each city. ... There is management strategy and a Durban solid-waste management strategy; increasing consensus that a sustainable city · A pollution and waste-management strategy working for an integrated is one that reduces it's total consumption of pollution and waste policy, solid waste management strategy, reviewing inputs, increases the efficiency of it's throughputs, and transforms all it's waste effluent management system, air quality programmes, minimising noise outputs into productive inputs ... pollution and toxic use reduction programme; (Mark Swilling, Rethinking the sustainability · Environmental resource management including integrated resource of the South African city) management programme, integrated energy planning, sustainable use of coastal resources, metropolitan open space systems, protect and promote cultural resources; and · Education training and awareness including building partnerships, building public awareness, building awareness amongst political decision makers. City of Cape Town The City of Cape Town has recently conducted a comprehensive ecological footprint review. It highlights that: · Cape Town uses high levels of non-renewable fossil fuels and nuclear power generation and does not use renewable solar and wind energy efficiently; · The city uses long-distance supply lines for water and oil supplies and does not use local groundwater supplies; · Affluent groups consume the majority of resources and are most responsible for the ecological footprint, while poorer groups lack access to basic services; · Water and energy re-usage and the recycling of waste is low; and · Soil, fresh and coastal water systems are becoming increasingly polluted. The City of Cape Town launched an Integrated Metropolitan Environment Policy in March 2003. Other cities The Cities for Climate Change project initiated by the Department of Environment and Tourism, with assistance from USAID, has eight participating cities including Johannesburg, Cape Town, Tshwane, eThekwini and Buffalo City. The objective of this project is to assist municipalities in implementing greenhouse gas mitigation projects, such as promoting energy efficiency, sustainable transportation, methane recovery, renewable energy, waste reduction and urban greening. Since the launch of this initiative, numerous sustainability projects have been undertaken. In the City of Tshwane for example, energy-efficient lighting was re-installed in Ga-Rankuwa, saving Tshwane R196 000 in energy costs per annum and 1 187 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. 126 SUSTAINABLE CITIES THE HEALTH CHALLENGE The geographic correlation between air pollution and air pollution-related diseases raises the broader issue of the impact of poor environmental health on the sustainability of cities. This health burden is overwhelmingly borne by the poorer sections of the population. Qualitative and quantitative work in some South African cities has shown marked intra-urban health differentials between sections of the populations. The case study below summarises the results of a study conducted in Port Elizabeth in the mid-1990s. The analysis reflects on the spatial distribution of poverty across the municipal area, and shows clearly that disadvantaged residents in relatively poor neighbourhoods bear a much heavier burden in health costs than wealthier counterparts. Unhealthy environments are unsustainable environments. Environments that cause the consistent recurrence of preventable breakdowns in public health raise the cost of living in the city. This cost is borne both by those who suffer the illness, and those whose activities are affected by poor public health. In particular, poor public health impacts severely on business efficiency. When the costs of poor public health are raised too high, all those affected begin to do cost benefit analyses of whether it is worth living and locating economic activities in a city. INTRA-URBAN HEALTH DIFFERENTIALS: A TOOL TO TRACK URBAN INEQUALITIES The health of individuals is understood to be impacted on by their soci-economic status and among other things, the local environmental conditions. Annual global reports such as the World Health Report prepared by the World Health Orgnisations and the World Development Report (World Bank) provide indicators showing the difference between countries. These include infant and child mortality rates. These rates are typically used as indicators of the national level of development. While interesting for broad comparative purposes, what is more interesting for health and development planning is how the rates of, say, infant mortality differ between urban and rural areas and within urban areas. For many years, health research in urban areas focused on specific communities in need, such as informal settlements. While it is important to have data to identify areas of specific need, this type of research was community specific. A new trend in urban health research has emerged to identify how communities in a city differ from one another. This is referred to as intra-urban health differentials. In the past in South Africa, racial classification was used to identify how groups differed from one another using key indicators such as the rate and the causes of infant mortality. Studies using intra-urban health differentials allow planners and decision makers to understand better the relationship between wealth, environment and health outcomes across the city and to develop targeted strategies. It also allows for ongoing monitoring of changes over time. A study was undertaken by the in Port Elizabeth in 1996/1997 to explore wealth, environmental conditions and health across the city. (It was one of a series of very similar studies undertaken in Jakarta, Accra and Sao Paulo funded by the Stockholm Environment Institute). The Port Elizabeth study used a sample of 1 000 households randomly selected across the city to represent the city as a whole. Each household was asked questions about the assets they owned (fridges, radios, TVs, etc), so that a wealth index could be prepared. Five wealth categories (quintiles) were identified. Based on the value of the assets, each sampled household was identified as belonging to one of the (5) wealth quintiles. The study then assessed the relationship between the wealth category and the health of the mother and children of the household. In addition, the environmental conditions were also studied in relation to the wealth and health indicators. A number of focus groups explored issues that emerged from the statistical results. A project steering committee involving members of the local civics, NGOs and local authority helped in guiding the researchers, as well as holding workshops to disseminate the results. The findings show wide disparities in access to services across the wealth spectrum. While this is typical of cities in developing countries, the data also highlight the relatively poor access to services by groups disadvantaged by apartheid policies. The use of wealth quintiles also allows for the disaggregation of data previously clustered by racial group to identify the poorest of the poor. Unequal access to education, and therefore opportunities, for income generation in the past is evident in the high rate of functional illiteracy (in the potentially economically active age group) in the lower wealth group (26%) compared to less than 1% in the wealthiest group. 127 SUSTAINABLE CITIES A range of health risks were found in the housing of the lower wealth groups. Although the majority of homes in Port Elizabeth were constructed of brick, more than half of those in the lower two wealth groups lived in informal housing. Wood and corrugated iron sheeting were the predominant building materials for homes in the lowest two wealth groups (76% and 54%). For those living in informal housing, damp, thermal inefficiency, poor ventilation, overcrowding and the poor siting of houses were some of the main housing problems identified. Besides the discomfort of living in these housing conditions, there are also health consequences. Acute respiratory infections are a major health consequence of some of these environmental factors. Acute respiratory infections (ARI) are the most important cause of death of children under five in developing countries, according to the World Health Organisation, accounting for 27% of deaths in under-fives. Acute respiratory infections in young children impact on the child's health but also on their long-term respiratory health as adults. Children in the lower wealth groups were found to be much more likely to have ARIs. Damp living conditions and overcrowding were found to be statistically associated with acute respiratory problems in the children aged five years and younger. This finding has implications for the housing policy and the importance of providing guidance to those living in informal housing regarding how to minimise the environmental conditions which result in poor respiratory health of children. A map of health facilities in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, generated from the Medical Research Council's on-line interactive health GIS mapping facility, compared to a StatsSA census 2001 map showing concentration of informal settlements in the city. Hospitals = red crosses; Municipal clinics = blue crosses; mobile facilities = green circles Diarrhoea has been linked to the death of 25% of children under five internationally. Children living in the lower wealth groups were much more likely to have had diarrhoea. These children lived in households where they shared a toilet with more than five households and where there were puddles in the vicinity of the toilets. Adults, sharing a communal tap with more than 20 other households and storing water in containers, were much more likely to have had diarrhoea. The study clearly showed how those in the wealthier groups were protected from a number of health problems due to the good access they had to basic services. In contrast, those in the lower wealth groups were exposed to a number of health problems as a result of the poor access to basic services. A number of policy implications were drawn out from the study. This included the importance of those working in the built environment to better understand the health implications of development policies and service delivery strategies. It is proposed that the Port Elizabeth intra-urban health differentials study be repeated in 2006, a decade after the initial study. The repeat of the study will be able to assess the extent to which the wealth, health and environmental conditions have changed since democracy. This is particularity important since the shift to non-racially based health and development strategies. The repetition of the study will also be useful to be able to guide in the allocation of resources and to identify the extent to which the health and environmental conditions of the lower wealth groups have improved. Report of the findings: Household Environment and Health in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, by Thomas, E.P., Seager, J.S., Viljoen, E. et. al., http://www.mrc.ac.za/researchreports/pe.htm. 128 SUSTAINABLE CITIES IMPACT ON TIME Urban sprawl particularly affecting lower income communities dependent on public Poorly designed and dysfunctional built environments do not only impact on transport is largely a legacy of apartheid. land availability and air and water quality. They also impact on time. Like Nationally, average travel distances increased from 23km in 1979 to 37km in good health, time is one of those intangible qualities that mean that life in 1990 (South Africa: Department of cities is liveable. And although intangible, time is a real resource, with Transport 1999). The average public significant cost implications if it is wasted. transport trip in the eThekwini Municipal area is 20km (Traffic and Transportation Weak city form can begin to severely constrain available time. The impact of Department 2000) compared to an locational disadvantage on the urban living costs of the poor has already been international norm in developing countries discussed, including the time it takes people to move around the city using of 9km (South Africa: Department of various modes of transport. The issue is not only a problem for building more Transport 1999). Urban sprawl results in inclusive cities, it is a general concern regarding the sustainability of cities. increased cost, non-productive or time consuming commuting with less time for The problem is self-reinforcing. For example, as Central Business Districts family and social activities ... In the past become more crowded, the natural inclination of many businesses is to move there has been limited planning of integration between land-use and out to locations closer to the homes of economic decision makers in wealthier transport systems and consequently the suburbs. This brings businesses short-term relief, but it may also compound negative impacts of one system on the thedifficultyforotherstryingtomovearoundthecityifplannedtransportnetworks other is evident in many urban areas. This and road grids cannot be adjusted fast enough. This leads to other businesses is particularly evident in transport making short-sighted location decisions that further fragment the city. corridors where ineffective land use management limits the efficiency of public Figure 59 gives a sense of the ever-worsening problem. It shows the number transport operations. of vehicles moving into and out of Johannesburg from municipalities to the (Towards a Strategic Transport Plan for East, South, North and West. The situation has deteriorated considerably in South African Cities, Situational Analysis prepared by the SACN Transport Working the space of two years. Group, September 2002) UNDERSTANDING and MANAGING IMPLICATIONS Vital new access road for Tembisa The South African cities are less integrated today then they were 10 years The new K105 Tembisa link road will provide greatly improved access for ago, as a result of the multiple thrusts of office decentralisation, housing Tembisa residents to the industrial area of development on the edge of the city, public transport infrastructure Clayville as well as to Pretoria and the R21 deterioration, compensation for this through an explosion of taxis and cars motorway, Councillor Louis Sibeko, Mayoral on the roads, and pressure on network infrastructure that was not anticipated Committee Member for Public Transport, in bulk infrastructure installations a decade or two ago. Many of the costs of Roads and Works, said at the official deteriorating urban environments are borne disproportionately by poor people. opening of the road on 3 February 2004. And businesses and wealthier residents have a tendency to react in ways that Cllr Sibeko said although the Pretoria- give them short-term relief, but ultimately exacerbate the problem Johannesburg railway line was of great exponentially. benefit to Tembisa, it also created a barrier preventing access from Tembisa to the east ­ and especially the R21. `The K105 road, together with the previously completed link at Kaalfontein, have largely addressed this problem. The K105, which created numerous jobs during its construction, will also make the Oakmoor Station and the Oakmoor taxi rank more effective in future.' (News on Ekurhuleni website, 17 February 2004) Figure 59. Cars moving into and out of Johannesburg, 2001 and 2003 129 SUSTAINABLE CITIES The diseconomies of scale of South African cities are multiplying. They are not yet at the point where they exceed the theoretical benefits of living and working in the city, but they need to be managed now. There is a real temptation to regard sustainability concerns as the problem to be faced by the children of current city dwellers. And there is therefore a tendency to therefore regard them as inter-generational issues of less concern than pressing service delivery extension challenges. But the slow decline of liveability is felt by every one today. And if not anticipated, energy crises and environmental health disasters may cripple a city tomorrow. Both may cause the departure of people from the city. Sustainability issues do need to be faced as soon as possible by city leaders and actors trying to ensure the commitment of residents. They cannot be left for tomorrow. 130 SUSTAINABLE CITIES LIFE ON THE STREETS VICTORIA ROAD, CAPE TOWN It's the good life on a grand scale on Cape Town's Atlantic Seaboard, where Victoria Road runs though some of the most enviable property in the world. From blocks of stately apartments and multi-tiered modernist constructions hugging the slopes under Lion's Head in Bantry Bay, winding on high above Clifton's famous four beaches, through Camps Bay, Victoria Road divides virgin mountain slope from crashing surf to end at Llandudno, a cove that's become a haven for the rich and famous. This strip of coast has everything ­ soaring mountains, pale sandy beaches, superb restaurants, spectacular sunsets and homes to rival those on magazine pages across the world. With property values soaring ­ achieving between R16 000 and R20 000 a square metre, this golden strip is a cash-cow for a municipality facing a major developmental crisis. The rates base in excess of R1billion, yields about R1,5 cents in the rand in annual property rates and a sanitation levy based on 50% of the improved market value. Homes in Clifton are on offer from R6,4 million for a modest bungalow to R17,5 million for a cliff-side mansion with gym, a pool that seems to empty into the sea on the horizon and a private cinema. Set aside in World War 1 as a potential harbour, in the 1920s the Clifton coves were leased by the Council for temporary housing. In the 1980s the Council offered the land for sale to the residents of the wooden bungalows and, recently, the last Council-owned site with a derelict bungalow was sold for a record R4,5 million to a London-based developer. For the City of Cape Town, the phenomenal rise in the value of areas such as those along Victoria Road means a hefty contribution to the coffers in a city where one in five people lives in an informal settlement and poverty is rife. After the new metro's first general valuation of property ­ rating those along the Atlantic Seaboard for the first time in over 20 years ­ the cost of this glorious lifestyle rose considerably. For many of the original homeowners, who bought when Victoria Road was the quiet preserve of white locals, the reality is that in a booming property market fuelled by eager foreign buyers, the costs of living here may become unaffordable. There's scant sympathy from those who argue that for the majority of Capetonians the Group Areas Act and economic disparities prevented them from gaining a foothold in this gold mine. Things are changing along Victoria Road, and in the eyes of some residents it's not for the better. In summer cabriolets and minibus taxis vie for ownership of the narrow road, where finding a parking space is almost impossible. Beach volleyball and sandcastle building contests draw crowds to the beaches, increasing traffic congestion. And, emulating American teen movies, thousands of matrics from all over Cape Town gather to party the night away on the beach before exams begin ­ to the annoyance of local restaurateurs and residents quick to call the police. On New Year's Eve and New Year's Day, taxis bring hundreds of families from the townships to enjoy what is now available to all. On a still summer's day, when the notorious southeaster isn't blowing, it's arguably one of the finest settings anywhere. As night falls, tourists sip cocktails and eat seafood on the balconies of the hotels and restaurants in Camps Bay, watching as the sun slips into the sea and sets the mountains aglow. Groups of people relax on the warm sands of Clifton beach with picnics, drinking sparkling wine, technically illegally since the by-laws forbid alcohol or glass on the beaches. No wonder this strip of coastline been discovered by the world. There's tremendous development pressure ­ for more apartments, bigger renovations and the demolition of older homes. The City is also fighting to prevent the owners of large tracts of mountainside under the Twelve Apostles from developing in terms of rights granted decades ago. They argue that the rights are no longer valid, that times have changed and that the land is too valuable as a conservation area to develop into another extension of Camps Bay. For the Muslim community the presence of kramats, burial sites, on the slopes means this is holy ground. The scenic beauty of this area ­ and its proximity to the National Park comprising Table Mountain and the Peninsula mountain chain to Cape Point ­ helps draw thousands of tourists, the lifeblood of the local economy. Victoria Road earns its keep in many ways, not the least of which is as a location for dozens of film shoots every year. The palm trees on Camps Bay beachfront are a familiar sight. Like tourism, the revenue from the film industry is a significant contributor to city's economy with the potential for enormous growth and job creation. 131 CITIES WELL-GOVERNED7: CHAPTER 132 If municipalities are notefficient in how they use tax-resources, nor effective at addressing theconcerns residents, of populations may be inclined to disengage 133 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES CHAPTER 7. GOVERNANCE TRENDS AND THE CITIES STATE OF THE GOVERNANCE CITY THE CHALLENGE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE Cities are complex entities that cannot be reduced to the municipal entity, or even to the sum total of public sector interventions within a city. For this reason, the term `governance' is commonly used to describe the way in which WELL-GOVERNED cities are run. As UN-Habitat's 2002 State of the Cities Report makes clear, `Governance is more than government. At the city level, it can be defined as the sum of the ways through which individuals and institutions (public and private) plan and manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process that may either lead to conflict or a mutually beneficial cooperative action. It includes formal institutions and informal arrangements, as well as the social capital of citizens.' The state of governance in SACN cities is not easy to gauge. The focus of the past ten years has been on the massive local government transition and transformation process, which has simultaneously involved decentralisation of powers and functions and consolidation of the number of local authorities. More recently, attention has focused on defining a system of intergovernmental relations. This means that governance indicators are still in their infancy, particularly with regard to relationships at city level between the three spheres of government, state-owned enterprises, the private sector, civil society organisations, communities and citizens. Because of its impact on cities, this chapter describes the local government transition process in some detail, and attempts to evaluate some of its outcomes in the following areas: institutional capacity; service delivery performance; financial stability and spending efficacy; political efficacy; institutional experimentation; corruption and maladministration; citizen satisfaction and political participation; and engagement and disengagement. The government of cities is assessed with reference to the internal performance of local government institutions and to the wider network of co-operative arrangements that municipalities have been able to configure. Governance of cities is assessed with reference to the surveyed level of satisfaction in the municipality, degrees of meaningful participation in the municipal processes, evidence of community harmony or disintegration, levels of crime and violence, and indications of movement towards private forms of government. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRANSITION: GEARING UP APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONS, ADMINISTRATIONS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS The efficacy of local government is a very important determinant of whether the relations between residents and government are positive and constructive. If municipalities are not efficient in how they utilise tax-resources, nor effective at addressing the concerns of residents, populations may be inclined to disengage. 134 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES Local government in South Africa has seen the most remarkable transition during the past 10 years. From the racially divided and spatially fragmented arrangements inherited, local government has progressed to structures and systems much more capable of managing increasingly challenging urban environments in a coherent manner. This is a general picture of local government transition in terms of how it has affected the nine cities collectively. In 1993 an overarching plan for the transformation of local government was set out in the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) (Act 209 of 1993). This act outlined a three-phase transition for local government. The first phase, a pre-interim phase, was the period lasting from the publication of the LGTA to the elections for transitional councils. The second phase, an interim phase, was defined as the period lasting from the date of elections of transitional councils until the legislation and implementation of `final arrangements' for local government. The LGTA did not explicitly define a final phase, but implicitly envisaged a further period of change as municipalities were re- established and restructured in accordance with the final legislative arrangements. PRE-INTERIM PHASE In the pre-interim phase negotiations were conducted between representatives of existing statutory bodies (including municipalities and the provincial administrations) and a non-statutory component of delegates from community organisations and the ANC. Some of the nine SACN cities were ahead of others in this process. For example, a form of negotiations between statutory and non-statutory groupings had started as early as 1990 in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Chamber. The LGTA simply formalised the process here and provided a national framework within which local negotiation could take place. The negotiations led to the establishment of pre-interim councils. These pre- interim councils took the stop-gap decisions necessary to sustain governance and service delivery. More importantly, they laid a foundation for the first local elections by agreeing on areas which would be included in the new transitional local councils. Although the pre-interim phase paved the way to further transformation, and created conditions for the amalgamation of white and black local authorities, real change in local government was extremely limited. This phase was more about democratisation of local government than about its transformation. INTERIM PHASE In the interim phase three important developments shaped the transformation of local government. Testing interim arrangements First, the form and structure of the new system of democratically elected transitional councils was tested in practice. Across the country the new structures included: · New Transitional Metropolitan and Metropolitan Local Councils in six of the largest metropolitan regions in the country. 135 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES · Transitional Local Councils covering newly integrated urban areas in the larger cities and smaller towns. · Transitional Representative Councils and Transitional Rural Councils with limited powers in most rural areas (excluding KwaZulu-Natal and parts of the North West). These structures were required to represent the development interests of rural residents to the District Councils. · District Councils, also called Services Councils in Gauteng and Regional Councils in KwaZulu Natal. These were indirectly elected, and given their powers and functions by provincial proclamation. They covered all parts of the country. Municipalities in the nine SACN cities were differently affected by the shortcomings of the interim-phase system. For example, those municipalities that were two-tier Metros struggled with the fact that both upper-tier Metros and lower-tier Metropolitan Local Councils were given original powers. This meant that each could pass its own budgets, and were employer bodies in their own right. Each set about developing its own full complement of senior officials, even when spare capacity was available elsewhere in the Metro. This resulted in significant over-investment of staff capacity across metropolitan areas, relative to what was required. In addition, the operating budgets of the Metros and individual MLCs had to balance collectively, not individually. In some cities this meant that MLCs could safely assume that their shortfall would be covered elsewhere, meaning there was little incentive to contain expenditure. This resulted in extremely poor financial control. A new policy: towards developmental local government The second major development in the interim phase was the design of a new policy framework for local government. This policy process was initiated by the 1996 Constitution, which redefined local government as a sphere of government distinctive from, yet interdependent and inter-related with, provincial and national government. The Constitution also gave local government a new development mandate. It provided that a municipality must `structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community and to promote the social and economic development of the community'. The Constitution also defined five objects for local government: a) To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; b) To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; c) To promote social and economic development; d) To promote a safe and healthy environment; and e) To encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government. This mandate was more clearly defined in the White Paper on Local Government. This was published in March 1998 after a year of research and consultation on the purpose and structure of South African local government. The central policy pillar in the White Paper was a vision for `developmental local government'. Developmental local government, as outlined in the White Paper, must work with citizens and groups in the community to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives. The White Paper interpreted this to mean a number of specific things. 136 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES One, the White Paper proposed that municipalities must begin to focus their energies on a clear set of developmental outcomes that meaningfully address the impact apartheid has had on South Africa's human settlements. These outcomes were defined as: provision of household infrastructure and services; creation of liveable, integrated cities, towns and rural areas; local economic development; and community empowerment and redistribution. Two, the White Paper proposed some of the new administrative systems that municipalities need to adopt to build a developmental approach. They include: integrated development planning; performance measurement and management; structures and systems to enable the active involvement of citizens and communities in the affairs of municipalities. Three, the White Paper recommended a complete overhaul of institutional arrangements and re-orientation of the ethos of local government. One of its most important policy proposals was that South Africa move away from two- tier metropolitan arrangements and have a single-tier, integrated `unicity' arrangement for metropolitan areas. This would complete the realisation of the one-city-one-tax base vision that originally drove the transition. New legislation, re-demarcation and municipal level innovation Following from the White Paper, the third interim-phase development was the passing of new laws, and the re-demarcation of local government boundaries, to achieve a final form of local government. Most notably, the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998, and amended in 1999 and 2000) and the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) defined new institutional arrangements and new administrative systems to constitute developmental local government. The Municipal Demarcation Board reasoned that developmental local government could not be realised within the often fragmented boundaries drawn for the previous local government elections, and rationalised 843 municipalities into 274 more functional and viable jurisdictions. A number of SACN cities did not wait for the finalisation of policy and legislation in the second half of the 1990s. Building on their own experience, Overview of the local government transition they responded proactively to the financial and institutional difficulties they process. 137 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES were facing, even while national policy, legal and boundary demarcation Date Efficiency processes continued. For example, in Cape Town a Unicity Commission was of Call Centre established a year before the 2000 municipal elections to look at a range of institutional, organisational and service delivery management options. The February-02 18,25 March-02 17,43 Johannesburg Metropolitan Council embarked on a fundamental institutional April-02 16,26 restructuring under a change-management process called iGoli 2002. It May-02 16,02 initiated a number of institutional arrangements that pre-empted key features June-02 16,03 of the legislation. July-02 14,25 August-02 13,33 September-02 13,34 October-02 11,36 THE FINAL PHASE November-02 10,76 December-02 11,4 The interim phase was characterised by the testing of transitional January-03 7,97 arrangements, by careful policy development which took account of the February-03 8,93 weaknesses in these arrangements, and finally by the re-establishment of March-03 7,32 April-03 6,38 local government in new structures and boundaries drawn in line with this May-03 5,68 policy. In the final phase of the transition, further local government change is being promoted by helping municipalities to transform themselves within new This table shows changing efficiency on a boundaries, and assisting them to fulfil their developmental mandate. measure of efficient call-centre response to customer queries, from the National Treasury's There is no doubt that the local government transition process has ensured mid-term review of Johannesburg's Res- that all the cities are now governed by more appropriate institutional tructuring Grant. The values are given by the arrangements. However, local government efficiency and efficacy will remain formula: [(A-B)/A] x C a challenge for some time to come. Where: A is the number of calls taken in each month LOCAL-GOVERNMENT EFFICACY TODAY B is the number of calls resolved in each month, regardless of which month the call was taken INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY C is the average time taken to resolve a query. The average (in days) time is based on all resolved calls, regardless of which Because they are the largest municipalities in the country with the biggest month the call was taken. budgets and staff complements, there is sometimes a perception that the nine SACN cities have the most capacity in the country. However, capacity is The fewer calls received, the more queries always relative to context. Many of the municipalities face particular resolved, and the less the time taken to challenges, typical of large cities, that a smaller urban area would not be resolve the query, the lower the efficiency faced with. Two of the metropolitan municipalities ­ Ekurhuleni and Nelson measure. The results therefore show clear efficacy gains over the period. Mandela ­ are new metros that have amalgamated a number of previously separate institutions. They have had to put huge energy into a comprehensive change management process. A number of the municipal areas now include extensive rural areas. Urban management expertise sometimes proves insufficient in the rural parts of eThekwini, Tshwane and Buffalo City. Tshwane faces unique intergovernmental relations challenges in being a cross-boundary municipality. SERVICE DELIVERY PERFORMANCE A critical issue for any municipality is service delivery performance. This has two efficiency components: `operational efficiency' and `allocative efficiency'. Operational efficiency This is a measure of whether residents receive quality services at the right price. Any resident paying rates or service fees is necessarily concerned about 138 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES Joburg eThekwini Cape Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Town Mandela City Water Dept staff per 1 000 water 1,63 1,50 3,58 1,95 2,35 3,00 1,96 3,78 connections Electricity Dept staff per 1 000 6,75 3,22 9,05 2,17 2,52 electricity connections Sanitation Dept staff per 1 000 2,2 2,09 1,99 1,61 2,23 3,00 2,16 sewer connections JOBURG ETHEKWINI CAPE NELSON MANGAUNG MSUNDUZI TOWN MANDELA OPERATING BENCHMARKS Number of water connections n 519 621 480 000 663 000 173 400 83 570 58 516 Length of water network Km 9 758 11 800 8 616 3 000 3 292 1 980 Length of network per km / employee 10,3 17,7 11,8 11,7 13,1 9,9 employee Staff (distribution) / 1000 n / 1000 1,8 1,4 1,1 1,5 3,0 3,4 connections connections Network density (inverse) m / connection 18,8 24,6 13,0 17,3 39,4 33,8 Metering efficiency metered / supplied (%) 66% 74% 88% 80% 85% 70% Bursts / leaks frequency n/100 km of pipe / year 327 309 272 210 65 101 Operating cost R/connection pm 24,30 35,36 49,84 45,97 53,55 (excl raw/bulk/pur/I/D) Salaries and wages R/connection pm 14,43 19,97 12,40 15,10 39,59 Maintenance R/connection pm 6,90 12,85 14,80 5,19 13,81 Energy R/connection pm 0,72 1,22 1,59 0,34 0,14 General R/connection pm 2,25 1,34 21,05 25,34 - Operating cost R/km per annum 15 526 17 263 34 567 14 004 18 990 Operating cost c/kl 33 73 162 81 88 Operating cost (% breakdown) Salaries and wages % 59% 56% 25% 33% 74% Maintenance % 28% 36% 30% 11% 26% Energy % 3% 3% 3% 1% 0% General % 9% 4% 42% 55% 0% FINANCE BENCHMARKS Average water revenue R/kl water distributed 3,16 3,88 3,48 3,03 3,23 Average water revenue R / connection pm 202,39 168,92 94,63 170,77 168,05 Salaries expenses % of water expenditure 7,40% 10,62% 17,01% 8,82% 19,33% Maintenance expenses % of water expenditure 2,54% 6,83% 18,31% 2,70% 6,75% Interest expenses % of water expenditure 6,44% 9,60% 1,33% 5,55% 9,18% Debtor days for water Days 437,31 154,55 75,99 325,25 90,01 Collection efficiency for water % Collections / billed 76,55 100,00 66,23 100,00 90,00 Capital expenditure % annual revenue 12,98 19,14 11,72 26,54 6,75 Bulk water capital expenditure Rm per Ml/d 0,09 0,02 Retail water capital expenditure R / connection 100,07 350,00 40,37 291,55 177,73 Figure 60a top and 60b: City of Johannesburg financial management targets set by National Treasury as conditions for its Restructuring Grant, and performance against these targets 139 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES JOBURG ETHEKWINI CAPE NELSON MANGAUNG MSUNDUZI TOWN MANDELA BUSINESS BENCHMARKS Overtime worked % std time 10% 13% 8% 0% 0% Disabling Injury Incidence Rate DIIR 1,9 3,6 2,2 Overhead costs as % "pure" opex 21% 0% 0% 0% 0% Meter reading cost R / meter read 4,39 2,08 5,40 1,82 10,99 Billing cost R / bill sent 8,69 0,48 7,88 2,92 2,53 Billing frequency (water) Days 76 46 41 29 30 Proportion bills estimated (water) % of bills sent 26% 8% 6% 10% 100% Consumer queries/complaints: n/1000 water 14 4 41 Written consumers Consumer queries/complaints: n/1000 water 75 1,521 110 20 133 Telephone consumers CUSTOMER RESPONSE TIMES From metering to billing 15 days (% compliance) 100 99 95 95 100 To answer calls 30 secs (% compliance) 91 95 50 80 75 To reply to written account 72 hours (% compliance) 90 90 60 75 30 queries To water bursts/leaks (mains) 48 hours (% compliance) 72 100 95 90 25 To water bursts/leaks 4 days (% compliance) 82 100 80 80 20 (connections) To sewer blockages 24 hours (% compliance) 73 90 95 95 95 To water connection request 15 days (% compliance) 79 65 95 99 85 Benchmarking of water and wastewater services in six SACN cities conducted by Palmer Development Group (2003) Figure 60b con't. City of Johannesburg financial whether they are getting the `biggest bang for their buck', and so municipalities management targets set by National Treasury as must be concerned about the cost per unit of delivering any particular service. conditions for its Restructuring Grant, and It is important for political stability that municipalities avoid this by ensuring performance against these targets. that residents don't feel that Rands spent are being wasted on less-than- efficient municipal operations. A solid benchmark-based comparison of service delivery efficiency is not available across the municipalities in the nine cities. However, the information that is available does indicate widely disparate performance on some key service processes, and very different costs per service delivery unit across the municipalities. Figure 60a compares the number of staff per water and electricity connections in each municipality. And figure 60b gives a more detailed comparison of water service efficiency measures across six of the nine SACN city municipalities. They show very different cost structures. The figures obviously need to take into account complexities in the areas served, and the administrative structures that have been set up to manage the service in all its dimensions. For example, there are economies-of-scale-benefits at the managerial level the larger the serviced population is: smaller municipalities will invariably tend to have larger staff numbers per 1 000 connections. Some areas are also larger and may have less-dense settlement patterns, which may require a larger number of staff to ensure rapid response to service breakdowns. In addition, not all the municipalities have fully `ring-fenced' 140 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES their service. This may mean that some corporate-services staff, whose time is spread across a number of functional areas, may not be included in the staff count for a particular service. It is important to recognise that such benchmark comparisons, as with any performance indicator `league table', is never useful by itself. By signalling major cost discrepancies they should prompt relatively poorly performing municipalities to do a closer investigation of what lies behind a particular cost structure. There may be efficiency gains to be realised. But there may also be good and unavoidable reasons why the efficiency level is as it is. Allocative efficiency Whereas operational efficiency is concerned with inputs and outputs, allocative efficiency is concerned with whether public resources are being channelled to the right things. A municipality can claim allocative efficiency when it is spending in line with its development priorities, and, over and above this, when the outcomes of spending justify the spending choices of municipalities. Allocative efficiency is becoming an ever-greater concern of municipalities, as it becomes clear that operating budgets, unlike capital budgets, are very hard to shift. This means three things. First, the cost of some services may remain relatively high, even when a municipality has recognised that the expense relative to the benefit is not warranted. This is because of historically inherited cost structures that are very difficult to unwind. Second, a greater share of council resources may still be going into those areas previously advantaged by apartheid. A municipality may want to improve delivery in an area, but it may be very difficult to shift staff because of the inflexibility of conditions of service ­ where job descriptions say staff should report to work each morning, and so on. It is sometimes extremely difficult for a municipality to keep track of how much money is being spent where. Expenditure items in global allocations to departments are not always Figure 61a. Revenue Management, Johannesburg. 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 Dec 02 Target Debt Management Indicators Total debt / annual income 50% 42% 27,1% 32,5% 31,4% 38% Capital charges / total operating expenditure 17% 14,6% 8,5% 7,3% 7,2% 15% External Interest / Total operating expenditure 7% 4,8% 4,7% 7% 7,5% 7% Total overdraft and call bonds (R'm) (R189) R0,3 R24 R92 R0 R0 Revenue Management Annual Debtors collection rate 86% 86% 87% 89,6% 88,3% 94,5% Net Debtors / annual income 30% 30% 37% 34,4% 37,3% 12,5% Capital expenditure Net annual increase in debt / Total annual CapX 0 0 0,02 1,41 0,26 0,75 Nominal capital expenditure (R'm) R309 R295 R632 R1 105 R1 248 R1 200 Personnel cost Personnel cost / operating expenditure 27,8% 27,3% 26% 26,1% 28% 25% Cash flow management Creditors days 118 118 32 31 60 60 Operating surplus / deficit (R'm) (R82) R153 R48 R187 R0 R0 141 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES automatically tagged for a particular area in budget and accounting systems. However, some municipalities, such as Cape Town, have started to develop systems that will be able to more accurately identify where operating budgets are being spent, on what and why. Third, municipalities face an ever-more sophisticated set of cost-benefit calculations. For example, the City of Johannesburg's low level of expenditure on maintenance may be due in part to relatively high bulk-water charges. But it may also be due to a clear choice to protect short-term financial stability by budgeting more for Special Funds and Working Capital. Joburg allocated over R1 billion to these items in 2002/03, whereas the contribution of other similarly sized municipalities was negligible. This is understandable given the very severe financial crisis the city went through in the mid to late 1990s. But the benefit of short-term stability comes with the long term cost of mounting deferred maintenance. The city therefore plays a careful balancing game between allocating resources in order to weather future fiscal shocks, and allocating in the interests of preventing future service breakdowns. FINANCIAL STABILITY AND SPENDING EFFICACY Many South African municipalities went through very severe financial crises in the mid-1990s. This includes those municipalities that were disestablished to form the municipalities in the nine SACN cities. There were many lessons learnt. These municipalities now function within new jurisdictions, and one of the key aims of the demarcation process was to ensure that all municipalities have a more stable tax base and are better able to meet the expectations of residents. In spite of this, the nine SACN city municipalities have not been freed from financial pressure. Two concerns remain. First is financial management. Many of the nine SACN municipalities have invested in making sure that their budgeting, accounting, borrowings, expenditure control, and billings and revenue collection systems work well. Many meaningful improvements have been realised over the last few years, to the extent that it is now even possible for them to seriously consider re- launching a municipal bond market as the City of Johannesburg has recently Figure 61b. % of municipal debt over days done. However, even with the greatest discipline and drive to improve systems, outstanding, and the effects of margin squeeze good financial management can remain elusive. in the City of Johannesburg. Joburg eThekwini Cape Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Town Mandela City % of municipal debt < 30 days 2 5 NA 5 8 35 % of municipal debt 30-60 days 5 2 17 4 4 4 % of municipal debt 60-90 days 3 2 6 4 3 4 % of municipal debt over 90 days 89 91 78 86 86 57 1998/9 1999/0 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 CPIX (annual % increase) 6,9 7,8 6,6 9,5 11,5 8 Tariffs (annual % increase) 6,1 9 5,4 6,3 7,4 12,5 Margin squeeze -0,8 1,2 -1,2 -3,2 -4,1 4,5 142 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES Figure 61a gives a sense of this. It shows the City of Joburg's efforts to reach efficiency targets set by the National Treasury as conditions for its Restructuring Grant. Some targets were met within the timeframes. Others remained out of reach. Most notable was the clear inability to achieve revenue management targets, even though the 94,5% target was itself revised downwards from an earlier hurdle of 97,5%. The second is the fiscal capacity of municipalities relative to their growing responsibilities. With considerable political will, financial discipline and institutional innovation, municipalities survived the financial crises of the mid to late 1990s. But in truth this was a financial management crisis, brought on by uncontrolled expenditure in the face of insecure revenue streams in a new and dysfunctional institutional setting. The underlying fiscal weakness could not have been addressed by more realistic budgets and tighter expenditure management. Even with the best financial management systems possible, there is little that municipalities can do when less than half of their population can realistically afford the bills that a small household would normally attract. If they budget for it, the SACN municipalities can continue to write off debt. But if they are to effectively serve South Africa's major cities they cannot defer major new infrastructure investments and maintenance expenditures forever. A full analysis of the fiscal conditions facing the nine SACN cities cannot be done here. But some of the difficulties that municipalities are under are illustrated in figure 61b. The first table shows that for most of the SACN municipalities between 80% and 90% of the debt owed by consumers of services is over 90 days overdue. This is effectively unrecoverable. Figure 61c shows the effects of `margin squeeze' in Johannesburg, where efforts to keep the cost of a package of services in line with or even below inflation has meant that revenue growth has simply not kept pace with rising input costs, squeezing operating margins. This can only be managed by implementing occasional large, unanticipated and politically unpalatable hikes in rates and service charges. The box that follows gives some sense of some of the future financial challenges still to be faced. POLITICAL EFFICACY As important as financial stability and service delivery is the effectiveness of political governance arrangements of municipalities. There are various concerns, ranging from the kind of political system that has been established to the efficiency of decision-making arrangements and the extent to which the channels of communication exist between councillors who work with communities and officials who manage resources on behalf of those communities. Political systems The municipalities in the nine SACN cities have established different political systems in terms of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). The City of Joburg has an Executive Mayor and wards; Cape Town has an Executive Mayor with sub-councils; eThekwini has an Executive Committee instead of an executive mayor. Even between municipalities with the same `type', there are important differences in structure, understanding and day-to-day practice. For example, two municipalities will have different configurations of Council and Mayoral committees and different processes for ushering a recommendation through the decision-making system. 143 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL VIABILITY None of the municipal governments of the nine cities of the network can afford to be relaxed about their financial condition. Even in the better-off cities, levels of poverty amongst significant sections of the citizenry mean that financial pressure on municipalities remains relentless. Cities are, however, adjusting to the new financial environment. Senior political and administrative leadership is more aware of the possibility of financial failure and the need to avoid it. Thus cities are more readily prepared than before to limit expenditure in the face of revenue constraints. The kind of crisis that faced Johannesburg in the late 1990s has largely been avoided elsewhere. In some cases, the financial pressure is forcing creative innovation as it becomes clear that old approaches are unsustainable. The new institutional initiatives undertaken by Johannesburg are probably the most powerful example of this, where bold new action was taken to break out of financial crisis and improve service delivery. There is a danger, however, that expenditure constraints are being managed in ways that could lead to further problems in future. A build-up of maintenance backlogs and a failure to replace departing staff members in critical areas are not uncommon. Inflexibility in the human resources environment, in particular, often make it difficult to address these problems directly and quickly, with the result that understaffing and under-skilling can occur in critical areas even while overstaffing exists elsewhere. Personnel costs as a percentage of total operating expenditure vary amongst the nine cities, ranging from about 25% to in excess of 35%1. Above-inflation wage settlements for unskilled employees since the late 1980s have resulted in fairly high remuneration for these workers, relative to most of the private sector. Thus labour-intensive approaches to the provision of services have become increasingly unaffordable. In some of the cities, overstaffing at senior and middle levels arising from the amalgamation of former municipalities remains a financial drain, while inherited service conditions mean that the costs of addressing this other than through natural attrition remain prohibitive. Maintenance as a proportion of operating expenditure amongst the nine cities ranges between about 4% and 11% against a recommended benchmark of about 10% to 12%. Given that the nine city governments are responsible for collecting the bulk of their income, effective revenue collection is the single most important key to financial sustainability in the short to medium term and a pre-requisite to financial health in the longer term, too. Innovation and modernisation in this area has not been as deep or widespread as might have been expected; although this has begun to change. Currently in the nine cities, collections as a percentage of amounts billed tends to range from the mid 80s to low 90s, against a desired benchmark of around 95% to 97%. The introduction of Regional Electricity Distributors could present a very considerable threat to municipal revenue. Focus tends to be placed on the potential loss of the surpluses that municipalities currently generate from distributing electricity, and which they use to help fund other services. The loss of surpluses would undoubtedly need to be compensated for; however, this could be done relatively simply through imposing a levy on electricity consumed, to be paid over to the municipality. Far more serious is the fact that the billing and collection of electricity revenue is a key pillar of most municipal revenue systems. Not only do electricity billings represent over 40% of turnover, but most municipalities use their control over electricity billing in a variety of ways to enforce payment discipline in respect of other services. This ranges from piggy-backing billings for other services onto electricity pre- payment systems, to limiting the amount of electricity sold to those in arrears.2 A further threat to financial sustainability amongst the nine cities lies in possible changes to Regional Services Council (RSC) levies currently payable to metropolitan and district councils. These levies on turnover and remuneration, while small in relation to other taxes, bring in significant income to the cities. In Johannesburg, RSC levy income brings in more than half the amount collected in property taxes. While the current system has weaknesses, amongst its strengths is that it generates income in proportion to economic activity, allowing the cities to provide services to underpin and grow that activity. Replacing it with a formula-based grant from the centre could shift the basis of distribution to a less growth enhancing one, and if not managed well could reduce the income of the bigger cities significantly. 1 Note that the figures are not always comparable since different municipalities have tended to use somewhat different definitions and accounting approaches; this will change with greater standardisation flowing from the introduction of Generally Accepted Municipal Accounting Practice from the 2003/04 year. In this article the statistics are intended to provide a broad indication of trends only. 2 These measures are deemed to be more acceptable than cutting water supply, or possessing properties for non-payment of rates. 144 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES Adequate revenue streams are a pre-requisite to financial health. Over the longer term, however, unless scarce resources are wisely spent, economic stagnation will result in revenue streams not being maintained. Where more than a third of the city population lives in poverty and is largely excluded from the formal economy, creative approaches are required in respect of the nature of services provided, and how they are provided. Such approaches must be based on workable strategies for ensuring sustainable livelihoods for the poor in the face of current and future global economic conditions. Long-term financial sustainability will depend on cities developing a deeper understanding of these issues and how they could best be addressed. Apart from establishing democracy, the constitutional and related changes have created scope for significant improvements in the overall management of city finances. Establishing single municipalities for metropolitan areas and cities has undoubtedly facilitated a more rational approach to municipal revenue and expenditure, and helped manage severe inequality. At the same time, competition between cities and reasonably effective structures for holding municipalities accountable has limited the potential for monopolistic abuse that some initially feared. At an administrative level the new economies of scale are facilitating the implementation of powerful, modern financial management and related systems. Cape Town has already implemented a fully integrated Enterprise Resource Planning system, and Tshwane has decided to do the same. The new Municipal Financial Management Act and related legislation will greatly facilitate the further streamlining and modernisation of municipal financial management, through establishing clearer accountability and setting common reporting and other standards. The introduction of Generally Acceptable Municipal Accounting Practice will bring South African municipal accounting in line with global best practice and enable much better identification and control of financial risk. Financial sustainability and institutional strength are inseparable. With good leadership, the new system of municipal government creates scope for both to strengthen and thrive in South Africa's major cities. There are also different schools of thought emerging over what executive decision making means. Some municipalities understand it to mean that the Mayoral Committee provides strong strategic oversight, with Members of Mayoral Committee (MMCs) having broad outcomes-defined portfolios such as `economic development' or `infrastructure'. In this system the Municipal Manager and Heads of Department are delegated responsibility to make day- to-day judgement calls on policy interpretation, strategy implementation and resource allocation. Others have preferred to follow a model tried and tested in provincial government. This sees MMCs working like provincial Members of the Executive Committee (MECs). They are given functionally defined portfolios that align with the allocated responsibilities of departments; and then each is located in a department and delegated authority to be strongly involved in leading its day-to-day management decision-making processes. Efficiency of decision-making Closely related to the structure and approach to political systems is the question of how efficient decision making in the municipality is. The executive system of government was introduced to ensure that critical decisions do not have to wait for full meetings of council, and to ensure that there is someone who can be held accountable if poor decisions are made or are not implemented effectively. However, there is no guarantee that the new systems will deliver fast and effective decisions. Information on the length of time it takes for a recommendation from an official to move through the decision-making system is not available. Nor is data on the number of matters that end up at the Mayoral or Executive Committee meeting and the effect this has on the quality of consideration given to each. However, anecdotal evidence says that decisions still take far 145 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES too long to pass through the system and that Mayoral Committee and EXCO agendas are over long. Communication between ward councillors, communities and the administration Data on follow up of community concerns and feedback is not available across the SACN municipalities. However, there is evidence that relations between communities and municipalities are sometimes strained by the poor linkages into and out of local government offices. It is vital that ward councillors are able to feed community concerns through to the administration in a way that ensures they will be heard and taken seriously. It is also critical that there is an effective line of communication back to ward councillors to ensure that they can keep constituents informed about council policies, programmes and actions. Unfortunately, these lines of communication are not always strong. INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTATION In this final phase, the municipalities in the nine SACN cities have moved fast to establish new institutional and administrative arrangements. Each municipality has taken a different approach to the design of their administration. In the process they have generated a good deal of home- grown institutional innovation. As a result the municipalities have taken divergent approaches to the same institutional design matter. For example, Joburg, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini and Cape Town have all established some or other form of regional administration. However, each has taken a slightly different view of the purpose of these. Joburg has given its Regional Administrations responsibility for social and community development services such as health, library services, building control and people's centres. eThekwini views its regional structures as agile units operating between the bureaucracies of different departments to facilitate and co-ordinate coherent area-based urban development programmes. In an effort to improve governance in each city, the SACN municipalities have also launched a process of peer reviews. Peer reviews for Joburg and Buffalo City have been conducted to date. These give the reviewed municipality an objective assessment of how it is doing, and the reviewing municipalities key insights into institutional `experiments' in companion cities. The case study that follows highlights one set of innovations, that which has occurred in the City of Joburg under the banner of iGoli 2002, and points to some key lessons that have come out of a recent self-review. 146 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN THE SACN CITIES: IGOLI 2002 The iGoli 2002 change process was launched in early 1999, two years before the final phase of the transition. It was Johannesburg's own institutional solution to a deep financial crisis that almost crippled the municipality in 1997/8 and 1998/9. As Johannesburg's political leadership and management understood it, one of the key underlying reasons for the financial crisis was a failure of accountability. Political authority was divided across the metropolitan area between the Metropolitan Council and MLCs. There was poor division of responsibilities across departments, and tension between councillors and officials, which meant there was often a tendency to shift blame when things went wrong. In addition, there was little discipline over resource allocation and expenditure control inside the administration. iGoli 2002 did a number of things to fix this. First it introduced the idea of an institutional split between policy formulation/regulation and implementation. On one side of the line, a `client' stayed responsible for planning, contract administration, corporate services like finance, planning and communication, and central policy direction in areas like housing, health and social development. On the other side, a number of operational entities were established to serve as `contractors'. These were: (i) 11 new regional administrations for libraries, health and sports and recreation facilities, etc; (ii) a number of `central distribution departments' such as Arts, Culture and Heritage, the Metropolitan Police Department and Emergency Management Services; and (iii) a number of financially ring-fenced, semi-independent, single-purpose entities to overhaul larger municipal services. This last set of operational entities, collectively called UACs, was the major innovation of iGoli 2002. Three Utilities were established for user- charge based services ­ water & sanitation, electricity and waste management. Two Agencies were established ­ for parks and cemeteries, roads and storm-water ­ where expenditure would still largely have to be covered by rates income. And smaller Corporatised Units were set up for facilities like the zoo, bus services and the civic theatre. All were established as new companies, with Council as sole shareholder, but with boards of directors made up of outside specialists. The key to the arrangement was the establishment of a Contract Management Unit (CMU). This is meant to regulate the UACs through a range of new instruments, including licensing agreements and annual Service Level Agreements. Johannesburg conducted a comprehensive review of implementation of iGoli 2002 from February to May 2003. The review concluded that on the whole the iGoli 2002 had been implemented according to plan and had already achieved many of the results intended. However, it also noted that there had been key departures from the original model that may become challenges over time. The review drew out a number of key lessons. Two of the most important were: · Accountability had been improved through the new institutional arrangements, but a new institutional architecture could not have addressed the quality of management and organisational culture throughout the organisation. These still need to be improved if the municipality is to govern more effectively and efficiently. · The new institutional arrangements assume that the management of UACs will be allowed the freedom to manage without micro-political control. But this in turn assumes that Council will retain strong substantive control by firmly establishing policy and strategy, and rigorously monitoring performance against clear output and outcome targets. This has not been possible because the practice of economic regulation is still being established. The review concluded that unless the municipality is able to do effective economic regulation ­ where the performance commitments of the UACs, and the resource envelope they have to work is clearly defined, agreed, and monitored ­ the UACs will try to escape obligations and the political leadership will respond through ad hoc interventions, over-bearing managerial instructions and claw-back of decentralised responsibilities. This in turn will lead to a tendency for UACs to shift blame for non-performance, getting Johannesburg back where it started. The descriptions and diagrams provide an overview of the architecture of the City of Joburg's institutions, and some of its institutional innovations. KEY FEATURES OF THE ROADS AGENCY iGoli 2002 established utilities for services that could operate on a cost recovery (and ideally profit margin) basis because they generated revenue from user charges. It established agencies for services that cannot collect user-fees, which are funded out of the rates account, but where improved business practices can still be applied. The Johannesburg Roads Agency (JRA) was established in November 2000 as a self-contained company owned by the City. It is responsible for planning, design, construction, operation, control, rehabilitation and maintenance of Johannesburg's road and storm-water infrastructure. Duties also include maintenance of the traffic signal system, road signs and road markings. 147 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES The JRA has a board of directors (8 members including specialists from the legal and civil engineering sectors) and a managing director. In the case of Utilities Council transferred all assets related to the services to the new companies, which means that in theory they can raise their own finance. In the case of agencies Council continues to own all assets. The JRA charges Council an annual fee for services rendered. Income is guaranteed for five years, but the JRA is expected to look for alternative income sources. The JRA is divided into 2 divisions: `planning' and `contracts'. The planning division maintains a comprehensive roads maintenance system and has an `internal contract' with the contracts division to perform all operational work. The planning division agrees an SLA with the CMU which outlines relevant performance benchmarks. The contracts division is required to compete against these benchmarks (failure to perform may result in services being contracted out). Benchmarks include: 90% of potholes repaired within three working days of logging; not more than 10% of traffic signals inoperative at any time; safety index score on all bridges 148 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES CORRUPTION AND MALADMINISTRATION Local government The Municipal Systems Act introduced explicit provisions to deal with corruption and maladministration. These cover the actions of local government officials and councillors. Seven of the nine municipalities surveyed in late 2003 said they had established some kind of office to investigate corruption in the municipality. Five of the municipalities indicated that they had established a functioning ombudsman's office to respond to citizen complaints. Other government entities Although the extent of corruption and maladministration within municipalities is of primary importance in shaping residents' perceptions of whether the local state as stable and effective, the behaviour in other spheres of government is also very important. Corrupt practices at the national and provincial government-resident interface may taint residents' perceptions of the local state as a whole, regardless of how scrupulous municipalities are. The Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme survey asked respondents whether they had ever had their identity documents taken away or destroyed by government officials in South Africa. 7,6% of non-South Africans and 2,8% of South Africans said they had experienced this. Municipalities may not be responsible for this, but their legitimacy is indirectly affected by it. SATISFACTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Figure 62a top and 62b below. A comparison of The relations between residents and municipalities in the nine cities (and levels of resident satisfaction with various therefore the potential for these residents to engage with or disengage from services across three municipalities. the local state) is indicated by assessed `levels of satisfaction' in municipal performance and also by `willingness to participate in municipal affairs'. RESIDENT SATISFACTION SURVEYS Almost all the municipalities in the nine cities have established one or other form of customer-care service. This may be in the form of an integrated call centre to receive and respond to residents' queries and complaints; a back-office `customer- Which of the following Joburg eThekwini Cape Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi organisations were used Town Mandela City in your last IDP/Budget consultation process with your citizens? Community/Civic Organisations Yes Yes Yes -- Yes -- Yes Yes Yes Ward Committees Yes Yes No -- Yes -- Yes Yes Yes City-wide Consultative Forum Yes Yes No -- Yes -- Yes Yes No 149 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES care centre' to look into and deal with more complex resident concerns; or a `customer service excellence campaign' to publicise standards of professional treatment to be adhered to by staff and expected by residents. In addition to these measures, a number of municipalities have recently undertaken `citizen satisfaction surveys' to determine the extent to which residents are happy with the performance of the municipality as a whole, and with specific services. These are slightly different from the quality of life surveys discussed in Chapter 5. Quality of life surveys ask residents whether they are happy with their lives. Satisfaction surveys ask whether residents are satisfied with government Figure 63. City of Joburg Residents Satisfaction performance specifically. However, quality of life surveys frequently include Survey, September 2003, with results questions on happiness with government and government-provided services. disaggregated by race and settlement type. Comparable results? The results from three surveys (conducted at different timesbetween2002and2003)foreThekwini,Ekurhuleni and the City of Joburg are shown in figure 62a. The results are largely consistent with a comparative analysis of service delivery in each city, both in terms of current proportions of households served and performance between the two censuses. However, some of the results are a little surprising. For example, eThekwini is one of the best performers in ensuring that its population is adequately housed. Between 1996 and 2001 it was able to reduce its proportion of households living in non-formal circumstances from 29,5% to 27,2%. Yet Ekurhuleni scored much higher than eThekwini when residents were asked to rate satisfaction with housing services, despite an increase in the percentage of non-formal dwellings. Differences by race and settlement circumstances As with the quality of life surveys, all the municipalities that conducted resident satisfaction surveys have noted that satisfaction is far lower in African areas than it is in white areas. The most telling survey results are from Joburg. According to its survey of 3 328 residents responsible for paying for services, Figure 64. Mechanisms to facilitate conducted in May 2003, some 27% of residents believe that the City of Joburg participation across 9 SACN city is doing poorly or very poorly. However, this figure is lower for white residents municipalities; and City of Joburg Residents Satisfaction Survey results on perceived `civic and higher for African and coloured residents. Some 29% of African residents empowerment'. and over 30% of coloured residents believed that the municipality was doing a poor or very poor job. Only some 18% of white residents felt this way. The results are even more striking when broken down by settlement type. Only 22% of residents living in informal settlements felt that the municipality was doing a good or very good job. On average, 60% of residents living in still predominantly white suburbs saw the council doing good or very good work. 150 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES PARTICIPATION The Municipal Systems Act requires that municipalities establish systems of participatory governance to complement their systems of representative democracy. The Act specifies in some detail when and how municipalities must communicate and consult with residents and involve them in various structures and processes. The extent to which residents participate in the affairs of municipalities is a far better indicator of the strength of municipality-resident relations than satisfaction levels. However, it is also a complex indicator. Residents often do not participate in government processes when they are entirely happy that government is performing well on its responsibilities. Low participation rates can be an indicator of resident happiness with, and confidence in, a municipality. However, experience from all over the world shows that low participation rates may also result from deep dissatisfaction. Residents may feel so negative about government that they no longer believe that government can attend to their needs and concerns and they may see no point in Petitions are an important part of the participating. democratic life of our communities and represent the ability of members of Two issues are important here: first whether residents are provided with means communities to freely come together to to participate in the affairs of the municipality; and second whether residents articulate their needs for that community. do in fact actively participate through these mechanisms. In 2002, at the time this report was developed, a total of 149 petitions had Means to participate been formally received by the City of Johannesburg. A survey of all nine SACN cities late in 2003 showed that most had some means of involving their residents in critical decision-making processes, To meet the requirements of any petition although different kinds of mechanisms were available. However, a more often requires operational budget and/or interesting story is told by resident satisfaction surveys from each city. Asked capital expenditure that have not been anticipated. Improvements in the active whether they were given sufficient information and opportunity to influence participation in the local integrated the running of the City of Joburg in its May 2003 survey, only 24,1% gave a development planning process and definitive yes. associated budget will reduce the frustrations felt by the short term The results varied widely by race and settlement type. Approximately 26% of structural financial inability of council to Africans felt they were given sufficient information and opportunity to respond appropriately to petitions, participate as opposed to 19% of white residents. 29,3% of residents in formal The important role of petitions will not be townships felt they were sufficiently empowered, compared with around 20% diminished and the volume of petitions is for informal settlements and suburbs. Figure 63 shows the variation across anticipated to increase as communities rightfully articulate their needs and the the city's 11 regions. Positive results were noticeably lower in the regions petition process is an important dominated by large informal settlements such as Diepsloot, Orange Farm and complimentary mechanism to increase Ivory Park. The inner city and Sandton were also low. participation of communities in local government. Some cities have gone beyond the legal requirements to become truly innovative in providing mechanisms for communities to participate. Residents' perception Feedback to petitioners and communities of whether they were given opportunity to participate does not always do by the relevant business unit with council justice to these innovations. Mangaung's community-based ward planning is a cause for concern and there is a need for improved petition management and process was a pioneering attempt at participatory planning in all of its 43 tracking systems to ensure resolution wards. This initiative took place between September 2001 and February 2002 within the shortest possible period. in a bid to decentralise decision making. It provided a way for citizens to (City of Joburg, Public Participation Report engage directly in planning processes. The process took 3­4 days in each ward to Executive Mayor, May 2003) and included a vision-based methodology. Mangaung also provided R50 000 funding for each ward to facilitate participation in the process. The outcome of the process was the very real influence of local citizens on the Integrated Development Plan. 151 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES Actual levels of participation Manguang estimates that 1,5% of its total population was involved in its community-based ward planning process. Some municipalities keep a partial record of the numbers of community organisations that regularly get involved in municipality-organised forums such as ward meetings. However, these indicators are unreliable and results cannot easily be compared across the cities. Information on actual levels of public participation is scarce. ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT The extent to which residents have engaged with or disengaged from the local state over the last decade is illustrated by a number of things: the extent of public violence and vigilantism; crime levels; the fragmentation of the city into privately governed enclaves, going hand in hand with a shrinkage of public space; the involvement of residents in well-structured and sustainable community organisations; and, closely related to this, evidence of destructive and competitive street politics. PUBLIC VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM Public violence was endemic in many South African cities in the highly contested period leading up to the 1994 elections. For example in parts of the City of Joburg and what is now Ekurhuleni, the early 1990s saw protracted street wars between supporters of different political movements. This level of open political conflict has not been a feature of the post-apartheid city. Figure 65 below shows instances of public violence each year across a sample of police commissioner areas that can roughly be matched to SACN cities. It shows that in total the number of instances of public violence has remained relatively static across all cities between April 1994 and April 2003. The results are similar for the country as a whole. However, public violence has risen markedly in some areas in some years. It is noticeable that the incidents of public violence are high in East London and Port Elizabeth, relative to other centres, in the light of their much smaller populations. Figure 65. Incidents of public violence in SACN cities in 1994-2003. to to to to to to to to to 1994 1995 1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 Public violence April March April March April March April March April March April March April March April March April March East Rand 66 121 28 75 44 82 64 20 33 Johannesburg 21 41 44 72 53 55 40 13 35 Soweto 45 32 17 22 19 22 20 12 26 Pretoria 10 25 41 47 39 56 45 27 27 Durban North 26 26 24 15 24 22 28 28 23 Durban South 9 12 16 25 23 15 13 8 20 Cape Western Metropole 93 38 61 70 75 73 105 86 77 Cape Eastern Metropole 75 65 54 49 66 48 65 42 92 East London 12 14 14 23 33 32 20 28 70 Port Elizabeth 63 36 48 18 50 28 16 22 28 Total 420 410 347 416 426 433 416 286 431 152 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES The Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme survey of South African citizens and foreign migrants in central Johannesburg, conducted March- April 2003, asked respondents what they would do if someone broke into their home and stole money or goods from them. 84,9% of South Africans indicated that they would go to the police, and 75,8% of foreign migrants said they would. However, only 63,3% of South Africans and a mere 40,1% of migrants thought going to police would do any good. Both groups cited reasons such as the need to pay police to investigate, and that police themselves were involved in crime, over and above explanations such as an under- resourced, sluggish and lenient criminal justice system. CRIME Crime as a governance challenge Crime is an important indicator of governance. Levels of crime speak to whether residents are willing or unwilling to trust that the local state can continue to ensure their well-being. High crime levels signify a psychological disengagement ­ an opting out ­ by larger numbers of residents who are no longer prepared to invest their faith in the order and stability supposedly represented by government. Crime also has a potential knock-on effect on governance. The threat is that victims of and witnesses to crime, not just perpetrators, may disengage when they see the local state as unable to guarantee their security. Furthermore, crime may have serious consequences for community coherence. Crime has become a very serious challenge in South Africa's key cities. In Johannesburg's May 2003 Resident Satisfaction Survey, crime was the number one development challenge identified by residents. It was judged as more serious than employment, health care, HIV and Aids and housing, the next four priorities in sequence, and well ahead of access to basic services as the ninth most important development priority. The prioritisation of crime held across all settlement types except informal settlements, which saw unemployment as the most serious challenge. Varied levels across and within cities The levels of crime vary considerably across cities, and the perceived lack of security also varies across parts of each city. In the Buffalo City Quality of Figure 66. Crimes against person statistics for police commissioner areas roughly corresponding to some SACN cities: 2002/03. East Rand Johannesburg Soweto Pretoria Durban Durban Cape West Cape East East Port North South Metropole Metropole London Elizabeth Murder 941 971 614 627 1 093 1 070 1 258 1 361 589 602 Attempted murder 1 637 1 619 990 1 805 1 455 1 883 2 007 1 887 926 812 Culpable homicide 432 412 202 517 457 433 368 451 216 171 Rape 1 978 1 612 1 779 2 427 1 946 1 919 1 760 2 049 1 212 1,463 Indecent assault 312 316 157 451 378 388 743 917 149 301 Crimen Injuria 1 515 1 729 1 353 3 689 3 112 1 520 3 208 3 818 1 385 1,614 Child abuse 194 205 248 156 149 117 321 420 73 131 Kidnapping 148 162 242 117 192 201 176 168 31 58 Abduction 269 274 186 268 161 114 261 243 66 100 Assault with GBH 8 757 8 927 8 376 10 396 5 619 6 703 7 231 10 575 7 660 6,791 Common assault 12 359 11 089 8 972 17 098 10 050 7 914 12 656 15 399 4 588 7,773 153 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES Life Survey conducted in August 2001, 30% of residents said they had been a victim of a crime against property and 14% said they had been a victim of Programmes in Tshwane a violent crime. Percentages of residents who said they felt unsafe at night · Tshwane Community Safety Forum varied by areas of different housing type, as follows: formal African 24%; established to coordinate policing efforts · Crime Prevention Strategy with a focal formal coloured 31%; formal white 46%; formal Asian 52%; traditional cluster approach. These are: African 43%; and informal African 17%. - Policing: Crime prevention based on information and intelligence Similar feelings were expressed in the eThekwini Quality of Life Survey 2002/ - Environmental design: Managing the 03. 32,2% of all residents said they felt very unsafe or a bit unsafe. Asked to environment to minimise the rate their perceived levels of safety from crime in their own community, opportunities for crime eThekwini residents responded as follows: very good 13,8%; good 19%; neutral - Social crime prevention: Identifying 16,7%; bad 27,3%; and very bad 23,2%. The most unsafe communities were and addressing the causes of crime · Metro policing services in eight regions ­ perceived to be informal settlements. Different racial groups in eThekwini core functions being road policing, by-law were more likely to be victims of crime than others. Figure 67 compares policing and crime prevention percentages of different population groups who were victims of crime in the · Public-private partnership for speed law year before the 2002/03 survey was conducted. enforcement · Innovative social crime prevention In the Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme survey, 42,9% of South projects to minimise involvement of Africans living in suburbs in or near to the Johannesburg city centre said street people in crime ­ provision of food they or someone they lived with had been a victim of crime. 71,5% of non- in structured way; database to register South Africans surveyed were victims of crime. informal job seekers · The Tshwane Tshwaraganang programme Figure 66 compares reported crimes against persons across police focussing on youth and school projects commissioner areas for 2002/03. It is not possible to do a meaningful per to combat crime · Evaluation plan to monitor the capita comparison because the total population of each area is not known. effectiveness of the Crime Prevention However, some areas seem to have relatively high levels of some crime given Strategy. their likely populations. The high levels of assault and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm in the Cape metropolitan area are noteworthy. Programmes in Ekurhuleni · The establishment of Ekurhuleni Municipal responses Metropolitan Police Department to ensure zero tolerance in the area Many of the municipalities in the nine SACN cities have re-established their · 150 new EMPD members recruited traffic departments as `metropolitan police services'. These now divide their · Training and education campaigns on time between traffic control, by-law enforcement and crime prevention or crime awareness and anti-hijacking crime response working in conjunction with the SAPS. A range of other safety conducted with the community, at and security initiatives have been launched, (see box right). schools, churches, retirement homes and businesses · `Vuka Campaign' carried out with the taxi industry to improve taxi conflict URBAN FRAGMENTATION resolution. This included vehicle legalisation, pro-active attention to the The institutional developments over the last 10 years have resulted in the democratisation of the industry with elections concluded at both association political and administrative re-integration of South African cities. By and and regional levels, the hosting of a large, the one-city-one-tax-base principle that rallied many anti-apartheid successful Bosberaad with taxi leadership urban social movements and NGOs is now a reality. But this does not mean in March 203, and the establishment of a that the impulse towards spatial and institutional separation is no longer a regional taxi office in Kempton Park feature of the SACN cities. · Key safety and security projects aimed at crime prevention and management ­ the installation of surveillance cameras Cluster developments (CCTV) in three municipalities, as well as In recent years South African cities have seen some new trends towards spatial the provision of street lighting. Plans to and institutional fragmentation. One trend is the shift in residential living install this system in other strategic patterns in wealthier suburbs to supposedly more secure townhouse and cluster areas. · Campaigns such as Arrive Alive, in complexes, golf-estates or equivalents, and walled and gated suburbs. Various consultation with GAUTRANS forms can be seen, from the subdivision of larger suburban properties into (Consolidated mid-term report of between four and six self-standing units, through to the exclusive and municipalities in Gauteng, Gauteng controlled-access golf-estate or mock-game-park/eco-park lifestyle community Department of Development Planning & developments on the peri-urban edge. Some lifestyle communities are almost Local Government, November 2003) 154 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES entirely self-contained `new towns' designed to include schools, shopping, centres, office parks Victim of Crime African Asian Coloured White and recreation facilities. Rape 3,3 5,5 In some SACN cities these developments now Assault 8,3 1,7 11 3,4 account for a third of all new residential property Robbery or mugging 12,5 11,4 9,1 12 Hijacking 2,3 6,1 2,3 value, as illustrated in figure 67a. In 2002, 19,6% Burglary 17,1 13,4 11 19,9 of the value of new residential building plans was Theft 11,8 12,1 5,5 19,7 passed for townhouse developments. This figure Car theft 3,2 4,0 3,6 16,0 was much higher for specific cities, notably Theft out of a car 1,5 15,2 21,5 Johannesburg at 28,5% and Tshwane at 35,8%. Stock theft 0,8 5.6 By contrast, only 13,3% was for residential Fraud 0,8 0,7 5,5 accommodation in new homes less than 80m2, although this value was as high as 39,4% in Nelson Mandela and 43,8% in Figure 67 top. Percentages of different Buffalo City. population groups in eThekwini who have been victims of specific crimes in the year before This form of development may go hand in hand with kinds of private the 2002/03 Quality of Life Survey. government. Cluster homes and golf estates often have body corporate Figure 67a below. arrangements that impose their own fee structures for the maintenance of the common property, and administer their own sets of regulations on the Total value % of townhouse conduct of property owners. of townhouse building plan building plans value to total passed in 2002 residential Private government is not an automatic result from cluster living. Nor are (R `000) building rules to manage the upkeep of property within agreed standards or to moderate plan value the interactions between residents who share a place necessarily inconsistent with the governance of society more generally. But if taken to extremes, the Joburg 552 244 28,52% trend in favour of clusters and golf estates may have negative effects. It may politically and administratively fragment the city into, on the one hand, publicly eThekwini 176 015 15,67% governed space and, on the other, exclusive territories whose residents mistrust Cape Town 215 795 7,36% the local state to such an extent that they would prefer to retain resources to manage their own shared space and individual household service arrangements, Ekurhuleni 160 563 16,39% usually at standards well above that which is sustainable across the entire city. Tshwane 692 624 35,75% Gated / enclosed communities Nelson 39 929 10,26% A further, related trend is the fencing off of access roads to some wealthier Mandela neighbourhoods that have experienced high levels of crime. Access is controlled through a single boomed or gated road staffed by security personnel. These Buffalo City 1 432 0,68% gated communities give residents a sense of security, but they also have negative effects. They may restrict mobility of residents from other neighbourhoods Mangaung 85 300 33,90% who may have used the roads within the gated communities to get to work. In Msunduzi 4 832 7,44% some cases, this severely impacts traffic flow as fewer roads are used by more people. They may also jeopardise the speedy reaction of emergency services Total of 1 928 734 19,63% to calls from parts of the city now turned into a maze of blocked routes. Nine Cities Some municipalities are attempting to manage the trend towards gated communities more systematically. For example, Tshwane has developed an enclosed-communities policy that carefully weighs the right to security of residents within the communities against other rights, notably city `legibility', mobility and broader safety. The policy then sets out a clear application procedure. Other municipalities have taken the view that gated communities will not be a feature of their cities. They have simply torn down those gates for which residents associations have not applied for or received planning permission. 155 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND STREET POLITICS When Californians talk seriously about the future, they inevitably focus on Blade Social formations Runner, the 1982 cult movie that made a Social movements focused on service delivery and urban environment star of its director Ridley Scott. It depicts the future of the Golden State as a civil concerns, independent community-wide development associations, rate-payers liberties catastrophe. (In the film) the associations, community-based organisations (CBOs), not-for-profit non- pollution is horrendous. The rich have governmental organisations, ad-hoc special-interest groups and campaigns, withdrawn into fortress-style towers. The and other civil society formations are all extremely healthy features of the avenues teem with unruly, eccentrically political life of cities. This is true even when they protest against the state or dressed immigrants who speak a rough challenge the political authority of democratically elected parties within their street language instead of English. Fear of Blade Runnerisation and the belief own constituencies. that the affluent should spend their tax dollars only on themselves have generated Social formations do two things. They stabilise the social body by channelling a pattern of civic secession. Wealthy and expectations and potential grievances into structured processes and forums middle-class Californians have that contain and organise what citizens are thinking and feeling. They also increasingly withdrawn into gated alert government to issues bubbling up from below that they would have no communities that thrive while the older, other way of knowing about. Local states that do not have strong civil society poorer counties they have fled struggle formations run the risk that residents will have no clear way to ensure that along on a diminished tax base. The people in the new, homogenous communities tend their ever-changing concerns are heard and taken seriously. They face the to be extreme localists who drop out of the prospect of sudden anticipated outbreaks of violence, as concerns become broader civic life. When they do engage serious grievances with no outlet but public displays of dissatisfaction. statewide politics, they tend to do it with ballot initiatives that slash tax revenues, The breadth and depth of civil society in the nine cities is not easy to measure hamstring the legislature and generally cut or analyse. However, anecdotal evidence suggests a significant depletion of the civic ties that bind citizens in one civil society in the mid-to-late 1990s. Although unique characteristics specific place to those at the far end of the state. to inner-city neighbourhoods skew these results, the Wits Forced Migration California's response to the pessimistic Studies Programme survey of Johannesburg inner-city residents in May 2003 future in Blade Runner is a clear indication of what Californians fear and suggested that very few were members of any organisation at all. what might be in store for the rest of us if Just as noteworthy is the political reaction of governments to the presence of the appetite for secession spreads across the country. Bear in mind, however, that civil society formations. Not all cities seem equally tolerant of interest groups. the breakaway communities in California Councils sometimes view civil society formations as a political challenge to have deepened the civic problems they their legitimacy and authority within communities. Their long-term hoped to flee. The barriers they erect contribution to politically stable societies is not often recognised. destroy the ebb and flow through which newcomers have historically become part Street politics of the mainstream and moved into the middle class. The fortress-style villages ­ The fact that there are not strong and vocal civil society formations does not with affluent whites shut up inside and mean that a city's population is politically undifferentiated. An important immigrants outside the gates ­ are feature of many developing world cities is a trend towards highly unstable hastening the development of the science- forms of self-interested `voluntary action'. Much of this involves the fiction scenario that terrified Californians in the first place. disconnected attempts of small groups of individuals to establish a `presence' (New York Times, 10 November 2003, on the street or in the community. These collaborations are not civil society in Viewing California Politics through the Lens of a Science-Fiction Movie) `No' to question of membership of: South African Non-South African Political organisation or party 81,7% 95,0% Police or security committee 90,7% 94,2% Figure 68. Inner city residents' membership of Cultural organisation 83,9% 85,4% organisations. From unpublished dataset from Religious organisation 52,2% 43,4% survey conducted in March-April 2003 as part of Sports club 77,3% 80,8% `Johannesburg in the 21st Century: Forced Savings club or rotating credit association 82,0% 86,0% Migration, Survival, and the Socio-Politics of Student organisation 88,7% 89,5% Urban Space. Johannesburg: University of the Co-operative 93,3% 93,0% Witwatersrand's Forced Migration Studies Any other organisation 95,0% 91,6% Programme. 156 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES the ordinary sense. They do not represent interests or try to engage government around a definable issue. Instead they are highly fragmented and transitory clan or gang-based formations, subject to intense internal political contestation and geared primarily towards competition for space and resources (which may be anything from community status to control of the informal trade sector) with identified economic and social competitors. When these kinds of formations multiply, cities may become very complicated places for ordinary people. Survival may depend on a person `knowing' the politics of a street or community: which block of flats belongs to whom; what household goods and resources it is appropriate to ask from and share with neighbours; what will get one labelled as `rude' or `disruptive' if asked for; and how much `rent' one needs to pay to walk where in order to avoid being robbed or assaulted. Statistics cannot identify or explain street politics. But it is nevertheless an important feature of all South African cities. When it proliferates it marks a worrying trend towards disengagement. It signals that individuals and communities no longer trust government to effectively regulate public life, and/or that they believe that government codes can be bypassed with impunity. URBAN POLICY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-ORDINATION AND STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATION The municipal area is not the exclusive territory of the municipality. Local government delivers on its constitutional mandate within the municipal area while national and provincial government, working at a scale which stretches across any one municipality, provides for a different set of functions in the same area. This means that municipalities do not govern cities alone. In the same way as residents' perceptions of SACN municipalities are affected by corruption and maladministration in other spheres, the governance of cities is therefore contingent on all spheres of government performing efficiently and effectively. This in turn raises the question of whether the SACN municipalities are able to shape inter-governmental collaborations that are mutually supportive, and that work in harmony towards common city development goals. The intergovernmental regime has evolved considerably over the last decade: · Huge changes have been made in the intergovernmental fiscal arena ­ from the replacement of intergovernmental grants administered by provincial government with direct transfers of local government's `equitable share of nationally raised revenue', all the way through to the proposed restructuring of the Electricity Distribution Industry. · The architecture of intergovernmental decision-making structures has been overhauled, following the launch of SALGA and the introduction of various structures, such as the President's Co-ordinating Council (PCC) and the Budget Forum in which SALGA represents local government interests. · The intergovernmental planning system is taking shape, especially with Integrated Development Plans accorded new legal status. · The national and provincial legislative framework defining the functioning of local government ­ in areas of concern as diverse as requirements for 157 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES administrative justice, water resource management and water quality control, and establishing a public private partnership - has been completely changed and is still changing; · The distribution of powers and functions between national, provincial and local government is being re-examined to address overlap and confusion and to mitigate the effects of unfunded mandates; and · The conditions and procedures for provincial interventions in the affairs of local government have been defined in law, and continue to be clarified in practice. All of these intergovernmental-relations developments have impacted on governance in the nine SACN cities in the last 10 years. Two key trends are worth highlighting. URBAN POLICY At root a national urban policy must be about two things. First, it is agreement around where and how to allocate scarce public sector resources, on the basis of a clear understanding of how country-wide settlement patterns are naturally evolving, and how they should be encouraged to evolve given what will enable the most rational allocation of resources in the future. Second, it provides for a set of institutional arrangements that allow all actors with responsibility for managing urban growth and change to perform their mandates well, both separately and collectively. Neither aspect of urban policy is easy to achieve. And both have proven elusive in South Africa. Urban policy after 1994 The post-apartheid era has been marked by fragmented attempts to come to grips with what is and should be happening to the country's distorted settlements. Some of the initiatives over the last 10 years include: · Under the auspices of the RDP office an Urban Development Task Team (UDTT) was established. This was chaired by the national Department of Housing and involved representatives from State Expenditure, and the Department of Constitutional Development. The UDTT was mandated to: set a framework urban development that would steer RDP funds to address urban backlogs and promote the development of the urban economy; ensure co-ordination of urban development projects and programmes driven by line departments; initiate lead/presidential and Special Integrated Projects (SIPS) that would catalyse sustained urban development. Its various programmes of work laid a basis for the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF), the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) and the National Urban Development Framework. · The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF) built on earlier work conducted by the World Bank in the early 1990s as well as DBSA models coming out of its 20 Towns Study. It pegged average costs for a basket of services (water, electricity, sanitation, roads and waste) at various levels of supply (basic, intermediate and high) in both rural and urban areas. It then projected a total capital and operating cost of infrastructure to eliminate backlogs across the country. The MIIF 158 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES established in principle that the country was unlikely to be able to afford more than a basic level of infrastructure in many places. It informed various capital grant programmes such as the CMIP and the Department of Water Affair's Community Water and Sanitation Services (CWSS) programme. · The UDTT led the production of an Urban Development Framework. This was then transferred to the National Department of Housing where it was simplified in redrafting and formally issued. Unfortunately it had little impact on the planning of settlement-related infrastructure. · Before the RDP Office was closed in 1996, it worked with the Forum for Effective Planning and Development (FEPD) to develop a National Spatial Development Framework. The FEPD brought together the national Ministers of Land Affairs, RDP and Housing with provincial MECs for Development Planning. The RDP office and FEPD helped provincial governments think through the spatial implications of their Growth and Development Strategies. They also initiated the work in CSIR on a national spatial Geographic Information System (GIS) that would eventually inform the NSDP. Later, in late 1996, FEPD also launched a Development Planning Commission that systematically reviewed the countries planning legislation. · The Green Paper on Local Government developed a settlement typology and considered whether the final categories and types of local government, defined in outline form by the Constitution, could be directly informed by the spatial character of settlements being governed. The logic was not carried through into the final White Paper. · Provincial Departments responsible for housing and or local government have developed their own urban policies and frameworks. One example was Gauteng's Vusani Amadhloba framework. This tried to identify key development nodes in the province. It also led to the establishment of a fund, which for a brief period financed creative development programmes and projects proposed by Gauteng municipalities. · More recently, the Department of Provincial and Local Government has drafted an Urban Development Strategy. The draft re-establishes the importance of investing in urban development, and proposes a number of focused institutional initiatives to strengthen the hand of municipalities in managing rapidly changing urban environment. The most important recent urban policy initiative has been the development of the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP). Cabinet adopted the NSDP as an indicative framework in 2003. The aims of the NSDP are ambitious. It aims to address distortions arising from the inherited apartheid-space economy by developing a framework that would guide all forms of planning for infrastructure investment and development spending. The NSDP takes the view that it is ultimately impossible to map exactly where people will be moving. Hence, the focus of government expenditure should be on people, not places. The potential of people should be developed irrespective of where they are located. As a result, investment promotion should focus on human resource development, labour market intelligence and social transfers in order to empower citizens. However, the NSDP also affirms the idea that social objectives can best be achieved by focusing on economic growth. Hence, where lump fixed investments are made these should be steered towards areas of the greatest potential for sustainable 159 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES economic development and the potential to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth. Areas of limited potential still need to get a level of basic Incentives to boost inner city growth services, but prioritisation should favour those areas with the largest economic footprints. These areas are invariably the countries major urban centres. From July, developers who invest in the Joburg inner city will get a special tax The NSDP is an important intervention. But it is only really meaningful to incentive as part of government's new the extent that it influences choices. The NSDP work could easily be taken intervention to regenerate inner cities forward into stronger guidance to departments and spheres of government across the country. about what its principles mean in practice. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. The Accelerated Depreciation Allowance that will give businesses This is in terms of the new Revenue Laws investing in inner-city Urban Development Zones across the country a key Amendment Act promulgated in December, which provides for developers tax incentive, implicitly follows the NSDP. But it is not yet clear that the who refurbish existing buildings in Perspective has had a real impact on emerging infrastructure policy. designated areas to receive a 20% depreciation allowance over a period of For example, implicit in the approach motivated by the NSDP is the idea five years. In terms of the Act, developers that there needs to be high level strategic assessments as to where who construct new buildings are to get a infrastructure should be placed. Yet the new Municipal Infrastructure Grant 20% tax write-off in the first year (MIG) is premised on the idea that we need to move away from national followed by a 5% annual write-off over a departments strategically planning for municipal infrastructure. Instead a 16-year period. The Act requires formula-driven municipal infrastructure grant dispersal system, wherein municipalities to speed up the processing of planning approval applications. allocations will be made per municipality on the basis of assessed backlogs, In its February sitting, the city council will dictate the geographic spread of funds. This is not to suggest that the resolved to endorse the inner city of MIG runs against the NSDP. It deals with basic infrastructure after all, and Johannesburg as its urban development the NSDP is clear that everyone should get basic infrastructure wherever zone in line with the Act. The City had they live. But there is a difference of principle and approach that may need to initially earmarked four areas to benefit be re-examined in future. from the plan: the inner city, and the business districts of Roodepoort, Lenasia and Randburg, with the inner city being given priority. However, the National INTERGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION Treasury limited the extent of the incentive. This means the inner city is now Johannesburg's designated urban A single overarching urban policy orientates all stakeholders to the same development zone. long term strategic goals. It therefore helps local government work with (Jonews, 17 March 2004) other spheres of government to meet shared urban challenges. However it can never anticipate all urban management demands. Urban development is an open-ended bargaining game. What is critical is that all stakeholders can come together to first contest and then collectively agree shared goals, and to figure out ways for each to contribute individually and collectively to the realisation of these. This in turn requires clear rules of the game for how this bargaining will take place, and how accountability to the agreed outcomes and actions will be enforced. This is an area that has seen mixed success. Local, provincial and national government do work together on a daily basis in a myriad ways. However, key opportunities to structure collaborative cross-government development partnerships have also been missed. In the process a practice has evolved of each sphere of government, and departments, guarding the territory of their specific competence, and shifting responsibility for complex development and urban management challenges that cannot be managed by one agency alone. Hence, intergovernmental forums at provincial level have often become mere talk-shops where information is shared. There is little involvement of national or provincial departments in the development of key municipal plans such as IDPs. And key national policies and strategies, such as a micro-economic reform strategy, are launched and implemented without consideration of how city-level actors can play a role. 160 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES The Intergovernmental Relation Bill is currently before parliament. It provides for the signing of protocols between spheres of government around issues of common concern. If these protocols are seen as flexible instruments that spheres of government can use to figure out, agree, and hold each other accountable on shared strategies, they may be a very important innovation in the governance of cities. CORPORATISM In a well-known political science textbook ­ Who Governs? ­ often prescribed to first-year students, Robert Dahl showed how an American city was `really governed' by a complex web of informal interactions between elites in both government and business. This analysis is now taken for granted in many cities around the world. But it cannot be assumed for South African cities. Most local government leaders and senior officials come from an anti-apartheid struggle background. They have no natural connections with the still overwhelmingly white business elite that control wealth in the cities. Although this is an important development in the shift away from apartheid governance, it also has drawbacks and costs. Most large-scale city development strategies and concrete programmes cannot be run with public money alone. The buy-in of the private sector, and the contribution of private sector resources, is essential if success in many initiatives ­ the rejuvenation of inner cities, the spatial re-integration of a divided city form, the mitigation of high urban living costs on the poorest of the poor, etc ­ are to be successful. At the moment municipalities have little leverage with the private sector to mobilise these resources. Worse, relations between municipalities and key private sector actors are often characterised by mutual mistrust. The burden of good governance of South Africa's key cities cannot rest on public sector shoulders alone. It is important that municipal leaders in the nine SACN cities look towards establishing new formal relations with the private sector. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT TRENDS Of all the progress made in transforming South Africa's apartheid cities the most significant has been in relation to the institutional arrangements required for good governance. Monumental effort has been put into configuring appropriate institutions and administrations to manage South African cities, and to reincorporating citizens who had never been allowed to participate, and who had actively disengaged, into normal political life. This road has not been easy. Policy debates and institutional change initiatives have been complex, sometimes abortive. At times citizens have taken up their rights but not their obligations; in particular failing to meet their service payment obligations to the state. Poor reading of underlying fiscal conditions and poor financial decisions and oversight have led some of the cities into dire financial crises that have limited their capacity to see through development programmes. In spite of all this good progress has been made. On the whole, South African cities today have stable local states, where most citizens still 161 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES look to government to see their needs and aspirations realised, and where all spheres of government work effectively and efficiently to serve residents. However, this does not mean that this dimension of the urban challenge does not need further attention in future. All cities are invariable contested places. It cannot be guaranteed that residents will continue to see competing interests mediated through the efforts of government to build cities for all. If government efficiency and effectiveness wanes disengagement from the local state may follow as it has in many other parts of the world where governance relations remain fragile. There is evidence to suggest that the risk may be more immediate than some would care to admit. Low levels of satisfaction, weak participation, levels of crime and violence, urban fragmentation into enclaves of wealth with forms of private government, an enervated civil society, and a city underbelly where an inscrutable street politics structures public interactions all suggest the potential for disengagement. In addition government capacity, efficiency, financial stability and ability to co-ordinate effective cross-department and multi-stakeholder responses to urban challenges all still need further attention if South African cities are to continue to be well-governed. 162 WELL-GOVERNED CITIES LIFE ON THE STREETS THE N8, MANGAUNG Roads are usually built and used to link different areas. Although, functionally, the N8 between Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu fulfilled this aim, historically it was used to separate white and black people. Apartheid's macro-political goal was to ensure that whites were in the majority in so-called white South Africa. New black urban spaces into which black urbanisation could be channelled were created far enough not to be part of white South Africa, but close enough to allow workers to commute to the economic heartland on a daily basis. In 1969 the boundaries of Mangaung ­ the `Place of Cheetahs' as the former black township in Bloemfontein was known ­ were frozen. Subsequently, black urbanisation was channelled to Thaba Nchu, `Black Mountain', but when this was declared an independent state for Tswanas in 1977, Sotho- speaking people began to be urbanised in Botshabelo ­ the `Place of Refugees'. The lifeline that connected these two ethnic entities with Bloemfontein was a single road, the N8. This road was particularly important for the dormitory township of Botshabelo and in 1987, 55% of its inhabitants worked outside the area. To make this spatial distortion viable and ensure that poor black people were kept at a distance, a highly subsidised commuting bus system was introduced between Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu. As volumes of traffic grew, so did the accident rate and the N8 became notorious for road deaths. Historically, the road also linked the white population of Bloemfontein with the casino at Thaba Nchu, contributing to a bizarre two-way traffic. In the daytime poor black people commuted to Bloemfontein to sell their labour, while at night well- to-do white people travelled from the city to the Thaba Nchu Sun to gamble away their money. Traffic reached a peak in 1987 when 14 500 people were travelling daily to Bloemfontein by bus. By April 1990 this figure had decreased to 10 500, while only about 8 500 people commuted in 1996. Although there is evidence that the number of taxi commuters is increasing as buses compete with the taxi industry, it is also clear that large numbers of ex-Botshabelo residents have settled in and around Bloemfontein. Research cites the desire to avoid long hours of travelling as the main reason for settling in Bloemfontein on a more permanent basis ­ or at least during the week. The N8 also played an important role with regard to industrial development. In 1982 Botshabelo was declared an industrial development point, while a so-called border industry was created halfway between Bloemfontein and Botshabelo next to the N8 (called Bloemdustria). Industrialists travelled on a daily basis from Bloemfontein to Botshabelo, but this area still relied on the airport and main rail links in Bloemfontein, and the N8 provided the link between the industrial areas and the national rail, road and air network. Along the road, industrial areas and an elite suburb developed in Botshabelo, known as Block H, formed a buffer between the N8 and the poverty-stricken areas of Botshabelo further south ­ in effect a `curtain' to make the area's intense poverty less visible from the N8. Today, there is change along this corridor. Parts of Bloemdustria are being transformed into a middle-class suburban development, which is, to some extent, integrating the Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu regions. Although some spatial integration has taken place since the democratic transition and the birth of modern Mangaung, state subsidies and commuting between Bloemfontein, Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu remain a reality, a consequence of apartheid planning that will remain for decades to come. 163 CHALLENGES8: CHAPTER 164 In many caseschallenges are the same as those left byapartheid. In some cases these have either intensified or taken on newforms. 165 CHALLENGES CHAPTER 8. THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE CHALLENGES THE URBAN CHALLENGE IN 2004 Significant change ... It is now 10 years after the first democratic elections. In this time a great deal has been accomplished in the transformation of South African cities. This report has highlighted many of the successes realised to date. Achievements include the fact that: · Apartheid barriers on movement have come down, allowing all South Africans free movement into cities and the right to live where they want in cities. Many more are better located and better housed today as a result of this; · The institutions of local government have been completely reconfigured, which means all city residents can now look to the same political and administrative structures to meet their needs. Huge effort has been put into making sure that the local state is stable, and responsive, so that residents and stakeholders do invest their expectations in it; · The new local government structures have made good progress in meeting service delivery and community development needs. In particular they have successfully rolled out service infrastructure to many of the communities that were under-serviced under apartheid. Many more people today have decent infrastructure than 10 years ago; and · Assisted by municipalities and their partners where possible, local economies have grown. And they have provided the greater part of the country's net increase in formal jobs and other opportunities to earn a living. .... but still apartheid-style cities However, despite the significant progress, this State of the South African Cities Report has also shown that many challenges still remain. In many cases these challenges are the same as those left by apartheid. In some cases these have either intensified or taken on new forms. THE CHALLENGE IN PRACTICE: WHAT THINGS CAN BE DONE This State of the Cities Report will lead to a series of other documents, discussions and SACN programmes of action. These will generate more concrete ideas for how municipalities should understand the current South African urban challenge in practical terms. The following are some preliminary suggestions. They include initial ideas for how development partnerships, led by different parts of government prepared to think outside the box of traditional mandates, and CDS type approaches, may enable cities to address their challenges. 166 CHALLENGES CHALLENGE 1: MANAGING URBAN POPULATIONS The challenges are different for fast and slow-growing cities. Fast-growing cities are most likely to continue to grow fast for the foreseeable future. These cities must develop long-term strategies to manage the inevitable consequences of growth. They will have to deal with the increasing demand for services, the need to facilitate expanding work opportunities, and the need to manage growth in the number and density of informal settlements. The key challenge for these cities is to receive new residents, and in particular young people, in a manner that quickly assimilates them, thereby stabilising the urban environment and maintaining financial viability. Managing fast growth necessarily involves collaboration between municipalities and other parts of government focused on infrastructure planning, housing, transport and economic development. In particular, a coherent response to the potentially very fast growth in Gauteng is essential. The Gauteng Provincial Government has already started processes to anticipate, take advantage of, and mitigate the effects of the fact that a continuous polycentric urban region in the province will soon be equivalent to some of the largest cities in the world. A longer-term strategic plan focused on 2014 will be one of the outcomes of this process. The Gauteng SACN municipalities will need to engage closely with this process. Slow-growing or declining cities do not face the challenge of increasingly severe service backlogs. But this does not mean they can relax. They must manage the potentially negative consequences of stagnation and decline. These include the abandonment of cities by more mobile, often wealthier, residents in favour of faster-growing areas; under-investment by residents in urban assets leading to lower rates-returns; lower demand for goods and services leading to more sluggish economic growth; leakages of financial resources; weakened social capital; and a tendency for residents to use city facilities and amenities, but not care for their upkeep. For these cities the key challenge is to stabilise their existing populations, and attract newcomers, through measures aimed at improving the quality of life. CHALLENGE 2: TOWARDS MORE PRODUCTIVE CITIES First, cities need to develop long-term, strategic, city-level economic development perspectives that give certainty to all players and stakeholders. Within this, municipalities in the nine SACN cities need to develop a more nuanced understanding of their role in promoting economic development. Local government is seldom able to directly influence economic fundamentals such as labour market efficiency or key macro-economic policy choices. However, municipalities do have a key role in addressing micro-economic constraints on the economy in their ability to direct the nature and responsiveness of city services, prioritise city infrastructure and lead economic development partnerships. Concretely, cities can implement strategies that: · Enhance local business competitiveness. This includes: helping to optimise logistic pathways (transportation, ports and harbours, airports etc) through strategic infrastructure investments; developing skills partnerships to focus human development on key sectors; promoting sector and supply-chain agglomerations and maintaining/enhancing public infrastructure. 167 CHALLENGES · Improve local government efficiency to address constraints on the business environment. This includes speeding up the processing of business-related applications; ensuring municipal service continuity and quality, especially of services such as transport and electricity supply that business functioning is particularly sensitive too; and creating targeted incentives for sectors/ locations; · Address market failures and enhance the capacity for new market entrants to set up and sustain new businesses. Municipalities and their partners may help to stabilise the property markets and promote redevelopment in areas facing decline through focused urban renewal. This has positive effects across the local economy, but it often helps new small business get access to decent business space. Cities may address the demand for job creation through direct support for labour-intensive public works, targeting the most impoverished sections of the city. · Last, although LED initiatives have often been too small scale and ad hoc to make any difference at all, it is still important to directly assist in capacitating new market entrants. Supporting the informal economy by reducing their transaction costs, rather than hampering their expansion with restrictive trading laws, and stimulating local demand through procurement reform, are elements of more meaningful LED initiatives. CHALLENGE 3: BUILDING A MORE INCLUSIVE CITY Poverty reduction strategies are a key tool for the assimilation and stabilisation of urban populations. It is vital that cities develop a solid understanding of the extent, structure and location of urban poverty. Based upon this understanding they need to work very closely with other spheres of government to: develop social safety nets that: give immediate relief and protection to people in chronic poverty; help people out of poverty and prevent people from falling back into poverty; and assist the working poor negotiated periods of vulnerability. Service delivery will always remain a key component of cities social assistance package. It is likely that service delivery backlogs will remain and even intensify in many cities. A key challenge is to address these service delivery backlogs in a systematic manner that reflects both household affordability levels, and maintains the financial sustainability of cities. This will require the development of innovative, scaleable and incremental service infrastructure models. It will also require a continuous assessment of existing subsidy mechanisms, including the adequacy of fiscal transfers and mechanisms for their effective targeting. However, municipalities in the nine SACN cities must also think beyond infrastructure as their key social development strategy. Social development is still being understood too narrowly. Many other interventions are conceivable, both within local government's existing powers and functions, and through creative inter-governmental partnerships and alliances across sectors. These range from simple measures such as supporting social development NGOs with targeted rates rebates and other grants in aid, and facilitating their collaboration around common programmes of action, through to more complex multifaceted strategies that aim to reduce the high urban cost of living borne disproportionately by poorer people. This last is where municipalities and their partners are likely to make the greatest impact in 168 CHALLENGES the short to medium term. It involves both helping to mitigate the household cost effects of new challenges such as HIV and Aids and addressing relatively high urban costs of such things as housing location and transport. In the longer run, all city actors also need to develop a deeper understanding of how cities also function to define and help people realise personal growth aspirations. There are blockages to social mobility in the way the city functions, ranging from who gets access to banking facilities and various forms of risk insurance; through to how housing markets work to expand or limit access. Poor functioning needs to be addressed through carefully calculated multi- stakeholder initiatives. CHALLENGE 4: TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE CITY The dearth of information on the state of the environment in SACN cities suggests that environmental considerations remain at the periphery of local government decision making. Cities need to become more conscious of the mounting costs that not managing the urban environment proactively will impose on the envelope of natural resources that sustains the city. All cities have sustainability limits, and South African cities need a much clearer sense of what their limits are. This effort starts with investing in information that can help define the state of the urban environment. Following this, clear long-term strategies are needed to shape appropriately located development, improve public transport, mitigate environmental health risks, anticipate possible disasters, and invest in bulk infrastructure capacity. Above all cities must address urban dysfunctionality through integrated spatial, transportation and environmental planning, followed by more decisive interventions. For example: · Key infrastructure delivery programmes, (including municipal engineering infrastructure, housing delivery and the upgrading of informal settlements), currently managed by many different parts of government, can be better co- ordinated at the local level. The logic of settlement development programmes also needs to be changed. For example, through key revisions in the current location-supplied housing subsidy system, housing delivery could be made more responsive to household location choices and demand-side pressures which factor location costs into allocation and purchase decisions. · Some cities have tried to consolidate the city through such measures as urban-edge boundaries. These may have perverse effects. The unanticipated consequences of interventions in land markets need to be watched very carefully. Some cities are already considering the advantages of engaging with key public sector players, such as parastatals, that hold huge portfolios of strategically located land close to the city centre. Expropriation of this public land is within the legal power of local government. · Cities could be doing much more to manage the burden of settlements on the environment. All stakeholders could be more rigorous about managing building energy usage and waste. Partnerships could help mitigate the effects of air and water pollution and help build more liveable greener cities. Multi-stakeholder strategies could quite easily contribute to better public transport systems and healthier communities. 169 CHALLENGES CHALLENGE 5: DEEPENING GOVERNANCE Great effort has been put into configuring appropriate institutions and administrations to manage South African cities. Cities need to continue the institutional development work of the past decade, ensuring that the new institutions become more stable, but also more dynamic and flexible. Whereas establishment and stability have been the watchwords in the last 10 years, innovation and learning are the watchwords of the next. Municipalities need to do more to benchmark themselves against others, compare what they are doing and how they are doing it, and learn together about what works and what does not. A great deal of attention has also been given to reincorporating citizens who had never been allowed to participate, and who had actively disengaged, into normal political life. It is essential that municipalities and their partners build on this by engaging more meaningfully with their citizens. Cities must maintain an ongoing dialogue to deepen awareness of the citizen needs, to enhance citizen-participation in prioritisation decisions and to enhance city responsiveness to these problems. City actors could do much more to encourage and assist in the redevelopment of organized civil society, and to respond actively to what is heard from these formations. This is not a nostalgic nicety owed because of strong organisations in the past. Vibrant social formations are critical to stabilising the social body and improving perceived quality of life. Cities need to be more aware of trends that may enervate and fragment the local state in the long run, leading to potential conflict and a new era of disengagement. City partners are already doing a lot to address some of the more obvious problems, such as public violence and crime. But much more could be done, especially where crime is tearing apart poor communities. The difficulties still inherent in cross-sphere and inter-municipal co-operative governance, as well as the current weaknesses in public-private sector co- operation, need to be cracked. The first requires clear rules of the game to enable open-ended bargaining processes, the outcome of which all stakeholders can be held accountable to. The latter requires that the public sector reach out to the private sector. Simple strategies such as briefing sessions and quarterly `planning' forums with key business leaders could contribute much for little effort. CHALLENGE 6: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER The apartheid city was defined by a political economy of space that supported a few, well-located and increasingly wealthy white residents at the expense of the excluded, spatially marginalised and increasingly poor majority. Over the last 10 years, municipalities and the partners have done a huge amount to unwind this inherited reality. But the apartheid city remains today, with many core features intact. The next decade of democracy must see a systematic strategy of city transformation. This will take clear vision, careful planning and sustained effort. When and where necessary, decisive actions ­ such as bold interventions in relation to publicly owned land ­ may be essential in unlocking a host of further development possibilities. But mostly it will take a new willingness for all stakeholders to enter developmental partnerships in which they are each prepared to think outside the box of their traditional powers and functions, and work collectively to accomplish agreed city 170 CHALLENGES strategies. City Development Strategies are the key. They need to hold in view the totality of city challenges, plan for the long term over the life-cycle of cities, and then commit all signatories to clear short-to-medium-term actions that will have the biggest impact for the effort and available resources. This principle, `from municipal transformation to city transformation', is the bedrock concept for a new approach to city development. The challenges discussed in this report suggest that this new approach demands three things. · First, since municipal resources are extremely limited on their own, a new generation of developmental partnerships between municipalities, national and provincial government, the private sector, communities and other actors will be needed to drive the transformation of cities. This will require a change of attitude and approach on the part of all players. In particular, national and provincial government as well as business stakeholders will need to take cities and municipal government more seriously. For their part, municipalities will need to make a serious effort to engage those partners whose resources they need to drive more ambitious city transformation initiatives. · Second, city development partnerships do not simply happen by themselves. They need to be defined, configured and driven by a lead partner. In most, but not all, cases this lead partner will need to be the municipality. In order to lead partnerships a change of mindset is needed within local government. All too often, especially as budget pressures bite and the list of residents' demands grow longer, there is a tendency for councillors and A CDS typically is highly focused on key officials to reassure themselves that their mandate stops with the list of points of leverage where impact is powers and functions defined in the Constitution, and the executive maximised ­ the 20% effort giving 80% obligations placed on them by law. They may too quickly conclude that impact. It is not a comprehensive plan that seeks to encompass all the functions they are not responsible for a complex challenge because the definition of of local government, other spheres of the challenge seems to involve the competencies of another sphere. These government and private and non- provisions do define the broad ambit of local government, but not its governmental agencies. In cities with limits. A power of general competence, and an injunction to ensure the significant inequality and poverty, CDS social and economic development of municipal areas in the broader sense, processes often involve a search for the has not been taken seriously. And the country cannot afford to build a `deal-breaker' issue or `transformation triggers' that unblock the major obstacles system of co-operative governance that is only about making sure that to reducing poverty while enhancing the each sphere keeps off the others' turf. It also needs to be about spheres of growth prospects for the city. government actively co-operating with one another when a challenge Curitiba, a medium-sized city in Brazil, demands their joint contribution. The further transformation of the which enjoys global recognition as a hub apartheid city is just such a challenge! of urban management innovation and good practice commenced its `miracle' with a SACN municipalities need to think outside the box of their current `powers concerted five-year focus on transforming and functions' if they are to proactively lead city development initiatives its transport infrastructure. While this that many different stakeholders can buy into and contribute. This does focus was narrow, it had a massive and wide impact that changed the spatial, not mean opening the door to unfunded mandates. Meaningful collaborative economic and social character of the city action, in which each partner contributes their own capacity, can be in a profound manner. This was then configured through simple memorandums of understanding. The conclusion followed by a further five-year to Chapter 7 on well-governed cities identified new opportunities for environmental focus that consolidated its formalising these agreements provided by the IGR bill. position as a dynamic and visionary city. The first Hong Kong CDS similarly was · Lastly, city development partnerships, led by municipalities thinking beyond tightly focused on the development of a their traditional mandate, need to be guided by clearly defined and well long-haul airport as a means to justified outcomes shared by all partners. City Development Strategies consolidate its position as the `Gateway to China'. (CDSs), promoted by the South African Cities Network over the last two (City Development Strategy Framework and years, are the key instruments to define and structure commitment to Process Plan for SACN, 2003) these outcomes. 171 LIFE ON THE STREETS PRODUCTIVE CITIES QUMZA HIGHWAY, BUFFALO CITY The tinny sound of hip-hop signals the approach of any one of the many minibus taxis streaming down the road, crescendo followed by the deep thud of bass. Mostly red or white with tinted windows, some bear colourful AIDS awareness slogans along their sides `too smart for any body' ­ and back windscreens sport the ubiquitous Nike tick or fiercely promise `no mercy'. Drivers hoot and flash their lights intermittently, halting violently and without warning as they spot a pedestrian. There is a constant stream of people climbing in and out of the taxis, while others stand and stare. This is Qumza highway, the only major road and main taxi route through the sprawling Mdantsane township outside East London, approximately nine kilometres from start to finish. Initially a single carriageway, the volume of traffic prompted the widening of the road to a dual-lane highway, and in 2000 the Buffalo City Municipality allocated R6,7 million for an upgrade. This busy road is named after Gordon Qumza, the first mayor of Mdantsane and a sports reporter for the local Daily Dispatch newspaper. Previously it was known as `the black road' because of the carnage that occurred as workers travelled over the border from their homes in the `black' Ciskei to their places of work in `white' East London. Now it costs R7,70 one-way in a taxi. In 1963, under the Urban Removals Act, Mdantsane was identified as a relocation site for residents of Duncan Village. The land, previously called Potsdam and inhabited by farmers of German origin, was chosen primarily because of the railway and existing road link to East London. The highway dips and rises as one travels east. The view reveals uniform rows of low-cost houses with other dwellings crouched on slopes deemed too steep for development. These are the shacks of poorer residents, for whom the pavements alongside the highway are more important than the road itself. They do not have money for taxi fare. In 2001, President Thabo Mbeki identified Mdantsane as one of eight national development nodes for urban renewal with the aim of investing in economic and social infrastructure, alleviating poverty and enhancing enterprise development. Since then, the Qumza highway has been widened from Extension 1 to Extension 6, which is the busiest section, and the rest has been resurfaced. Pavements and traffic circles have been constructed, creating a safer environment for the many pedestrians. The yellow stripes decorating the miniature humps at the edge of these circles are still new and bright. Alongside the road, just before Qumza meets Billie Road, a mother moves her children away from the entrance of her home, marked `1308' in old English lettering. There is a tyre on top of the asbestos roof. Her face is painted white in the traditional Xhosa manner and a baby is tied to her back. She wanders across to her washing hanging on the fence and gently pats a pair of pink slacks, children tug at her dress. For her and many other residents, life is improving. Most houses now have running water and sanitation, although some residents still collect water from communal taps. Most residents have electricity, and streetlights have helped reduce the violent crime that was common after dark. Many of the houses bordering the highway have vegetable gardens with cabbage and spinach leaves the only note of greenery in the area. There is no vehicle access from the highway to these houses. An expanse of open veld is scattered with flattened plastic bottles and broken glass. It's a well-used route to a trading store, adjacent to one of the many petrol stations in the area. Surprisingly not many of these are on the many traffic routes. The owner of the store is dressed in a safari suit and wears a beige hat embroidered with pink daisies and butterflies. A car pulls in, without a grill and seemingly devoid of a radiator, its fan exposed, its headrests covered in the American flag and an exhaust pipe spewing a train of white smoke. It's one of the few private vehicles on the road. The people of Mdantsane rely mostly on public transport. The taxi rank in Zone 3 has been upgraded and the link from the rank to the highway straightened to ease the traffic flow. People throng the area, buying goods at the side of the road for supper, as taxis cram the rank. The smooth tarred highway is the artery and lifeblood of Mdantsane, its connection to the economic mainstream and central to the life of residents. 172 ALMANAC STATISTICAL9: CHAPTER Indicators are critical to effectiveplanning and management in increasingly complex urban contexts 173 STATISTICAL ALMANAC CHAPTER 9. STATISTICAL ALMANAC ALMANAC THE IMPORTANCE OF INDICATORS AND BUILDING ON THE WORK ALREADY DONE The importance of indicators Indicators are critical to effective planning and management in increasingly STATISTICAL complex urban contexts, organising information sets into simple, easy to grasp and easy to compare `measures' of what is happening. Good indicator sets allow for comparison between cities, giving each city a basis by which to benchmark their current conditions or performance. They also allow for comparison over time, enabling cities to see whether or not they are achieving their objectives. The South African Cities Network has done considerable work in constructing a City Development Index (CDI). This measures city performance across five diverse areas, all indicative in one way or another of the city's total state of development. The five areas making up the composite index are education, health, waste, infrastructure, and city-level gross geographic product. Over the last year the SACN Urban Indicators Working Group has also developed a core set of indictors to measure development progress in each of the four planning quadrants: productive cities, inclusive cities, sustainable cities and well-governed cities This State of the South African Cities Report has a further level of indicators, compiled in them in this consolidated statistical almanac. This data set forms the basis of much of the analysis presented in this report. Main data sources In the course of writing this report, data has been collected through four processes. · First, census information for 1996 and 2001 has been compiled using the base data available from the Municipal Demarcation Board. This was in turn compiled for the Demarcation Board by Dataworld using raw data available from StatsSA. The `fitting' of census data from 1996 to new municipal boundaries drawn in 2000, so that it can be compared to 2001 census figures, involves a process of interpretation. It involves attributing 1996 census Enumerator Areas, which may cross the new municipal boundaries, to the new municipal areas. Different methods can be used for this. All 2001 enumerator areas fell inside new municipal boundaries. The process of `fitting' census data to new municipal boundaries, to arrive at a statistical shape-file, was undertaken by Dataworld. Their work has been approved by StatsSA. Using the shape-files available from StatsSA for 1996 and 2001 sometimes generates minutely different data results than that available on the Demarcation Board website for public access. The Demarcation Board results have been used in this report. Census results are only as good as the census process that generated them. For example, census results for the query `number of homeless' in the nine 174 STATISTICAL ALMANAC SACN cities give numbers far too small to be accurate. This clearly reflects the inability of census enumerators to capture this grouping of city dwellers. The limitations of census data need to be recognised, but limitations do not give licence to simply reject any figure as `wrong'. In reality, given the nature of cities, there can never be a perfect data set. Barring over-counts and under-counts, which are identified by StatsSA, the census results need to be taken as being as close to `the truth' as we are ever likely to get. Census results, and calculations based on them, were double checked and verified by a demographic specialist from the University of the Witwatersrand. The SACN municipalities were also given an opportunity to check that the information reflected for their cities was correct. · National and provincially held data on the nine Cities was compiled in a separate process by Research Surveys. Research Surveys also collected and disaggregated to the nine cities results from the bi-annual All Media and Products Survey (AMPS) commissioned by the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF). · A survey of the nine SACN city municipalities was conducted specifically for this report by Dataworld, on a range on indicators agreed by the Urban Indicators Working Group. Both Dataworld and Research Surveys worked under the direction of Dr Owen Crankshaw of the Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town. · Through the broader research process for report other datasets were found by the writing team. The combined results make up the almanac. However, in the interests of utility and brevity not every indicator collected has been included. A living resource This statistical almanac represents work in progress. First careful consultation has established that all the proposed indicators are feasible. But not all currently have available data that would make them useful. Second, on some indicators information is available for some SACN cities, but not for all. Third, it is hoped that the almanac will be actively used in the years to come by SACN city councillors and officials, government and business stakeholders, community organisations and urban researchers. In the process of use, it is inevitable that some indicators will be identified as not useful, and will fall away to be replaced by others. Corresponding with the release of this report the latest statistical almanac has been posted on the website of the South African Cities Network where it will be a living resource. As new information becomes available, and indicators are replaced, updated issues of the almanac will be posted (old versions will be available for comparative purposes). Accompanying the almanac on the website is a complete set of `source notes'. These fully explain the indicators and the basis for compiling the data, which could not be included here for reasons of space. STRUCTURE AND APPROACH The almanac provides five sets of indicators. These correspond to the key chapters in this report, and are: Urban Population Indicators; Productive 175 STATISTICAL ALMANAC City Indicators; Inclusive City Indicators; Sustainable City Indicators; and Well-Governed City Indicators. Outcome indicators, asset indicators and general indicators The last four indicator sets are each broken into three components. Borrowing from a state of the cities report on English cities, a distinction is made between a limited set of core `outcome indicators', and a more extended set of indicators showing what `assets' a city has that underpin (and therefore explain) the outcomes being seen. The outcome indicators show the final `results' cities would typically want to see if they were concerned with being more `productive', `inclusive', `sustainable' and `well-governed'. The asset indicators illustrate how well the cities are doing at building the conditions necessary for improved outcomes in the four areas. Some of these asset indicators could serve equally well as outcome indicators, but they have been carefully selected to illustrate things that city stakeholders, led by a municipality, may have a direct or indirect influence over. In addition to the outcome and asset indicators are a much more extended set of general indicators. These speak very broadly to how well SACN cities are doing in each of the four areas of planning concern. Indicator choice and relationship between indicators The indicators in the outcomes and assets sets have been carefully selected. It is hoped that whereas general indicators may change, there will be reasonable stability in these banks of indicators so that results can be tracked over time. The indicators will be much more meaningful in years to come, as it becomes possible to correlate relations between changing results. The indicators in the outcomes sets have been selected with a view to getting a balanced perspective on those results that cities will likely want in each planning area. The indicators in the assets sets have been selected with a view to identifying those things that might explain the outcomes. Quite obviously there are therefore implicit understandings of `relationships' between indicators, and in turn real-world dynamics, embedded in the selections. For example it is assumed that the `Value of building plans passed annually', a productive city indicator reflecting the amount of urban fixed investment going into a city, and therefore in turn expanding economic activity, can be explained by urban efficiency factors as such as the `Average processing time (in days) for industrial and commercial planning applications' and the `Hours of electricity blackouts per year in commercial and industrial'. Similarly it is assumed that assets such as the number of burglaries per year, or the average level of education in the population will have effects on the growth of new businesses, measured by the indicator `Net new RSC business registrations as % of total'. These assumed relationships are based on a wide reading of the urban development literature. They reflect current common sense on what causes urban economies to grow. It is acknowledged, however, that they are assumptions, and are obviously open to competing interpretations. Future research, debate, and regression analysis may well prove them false. But even if this is the case, some important conclusions about what does and does not encourage or inhibit urban economic growth will nonetheless have been reached. Drawing composite indices that can be related It is hoped that over time, as cities collect information for these indicator sets, it will be possible to construct composite indices for `productive cities', 176 STATISTICAL ALMANAC `inclusive cities', `sustainable cities' and `well governed cities'. A distinction between an `outcomes index' and an `assets index' is also possible within this framework. In the State of English Cities Report 2000, this division was used to map which cities were performing up to economic expectations given their economic asset base, which were performing better than might be expected, and which were underperforming. Being able to correlate outcomes to assets should give cities an extremely useful planning tool, by helping to explain relatively good or bad performance in each of the four SACN planning quadrants. The method will also enable cities to compare how well they are doing across perspectives, and over time. This will allow cities to see, for example, whether good or bad economic performance may also be explicable in terms of improving or worsening outcomes or assets in the `inclusive city' or `well-governed city' areas of planning and action. In time this will give South African cities powerful insight into what is driving city development in its various dimensions. DATA LIMITATIONS AND THE NEED TO INVEST IN INFORMATION The usefulness of the Statistical Almanac depends on cities buying in to a bank of common indicators that can be used to collectively measure comparative progress over the long term. It is also conditional on a systematic investment in indicator setting and data collection and processing capability by all cities in network. Inadequate data One of the key challenges in drafting this report was with finding appropriate data. There is a very serious dearth of readily accessible data on the SACN cities. This needs to be addressed. The most important source of information for cities concerned with city development is the national five-yearly census conducted by StatsSA, which also has quarterly and annual `surveys' on a range of matters important to understanding city development. While vitally important, there are weaknesses in StatsSA being cities' primary source of development information. First, five-yearly censuses are too far apart for cities to keep proper track of fast changing circumstances, especially in population size, dynamic and well-being. Second, many of the other surveys conducted by StatsSA do not provide data disaggregated to the municipal level. And even when the do they are not always as user-friendly as they could be from a municipal perspective. If cities ought not to rely solely on current StatsSA releases for their development information, what should they do instead? There are various options. The first is to more actively engage with StatsSA around city-level development information requirements. This is already happening through the SACN Indicators Working Group. Over time it should be possible to encourage StatsSA to collect and release information more in line with cities' data needs. Second, a number of the cities in the SACN are already collecting their own information. Some cities have much more capability than others. Where some cities do not have the requisite capacity, the Indicators Working Group will be exploring options for mutual support and shared learning to help relatively under-resourced partners. Furthermore, even the most capacitated cities in the network could be doing more of their own data collection. For example, 177 STATISTICAL ALMANAC though clearly very time consuming and expensive, there is no reason why some SACN cities could not be doing the sorts of comprehensive area-based demographic surveillance systems surveys, done each year in Agincourt, Bushbuckridge, as described in Chapter 3. Such surveys could provide cities with the very finely grained data needed to better understanding settlement dynamics in key areas that could be considered as indicative of city functioning, transformation and progress. Last, stakeholders other than municipalities hold city level development information. Research institutes, universities, NGOs, individual firms and business associations, provincial and national government, and donors, all collect information for their own purposes. A CDS is about mobilising the resources and energies of city stakeholders towards common goals. There is no reason why this effort cannot start with trying to structure information banking and sharing networks. The need to further develop analytical skills Cities do not only lack information, they also could do with better capacity to process, makes sense of and make practical use of the information at their disposal. Skills for analysing international and local market shifts and opportunities, sector business environment and logistics requirements, infrastructure cost-benefit profiles, land and property market developments, human development trends and community dynamics are not present in municipalities and often not in private sector either. There is a need for a long-term plan for skills development in city development analysis. 178 STATISTICAL ALMANAC STATISTICAL ALMANAC POPULATION INDICATORS INDICATOR Data date Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or Mandela City average Population, population growth and density Current rank in 2001 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 population size Census population 2001 3 225 812 3 090 122 2 893 247 2 480 276 1 985 983 1 005 778 701 890 645 441 553 223 16 581 772 Census population 1996 2 639 110 2 751 193 2 563 612 2 026 807 1 682 701 969 771 682 287 603 704 521 805 14 440 990 Five year 1996-2001 22,23% 12,32% 12,86% 22,37% 18,02% 3,71% 2,87% 6,91% 6,02% 14,82% population growth Average annual 1996-2001 4,10% 2,35% 2,45% 4,12% 3,37% 0,73% 0,57% 1,35% 1,18% 2,80% population growth Average annual 1970-1996 2,04% 3,62% 2,97% 2,90% 3,78% 2,78% 3,79% 4,63% 4,59% 3,09% population growth Average annual 1946-1970 2,67% 4,41% 3,70% 2,74% 4,15% 3,86% 4,11% 4,49% 3,18% 3,45% population growth Size in land area 2001 1 644 km² 2 292 km² 2 499 km² 1 923 km² 2 198 km² 1 952 km² 2 516 km² 6 283 km² 648 km² 21 955 km² Average density 2001 1 962 / km² 1 348 / km² 1 158 / km² 1 290 / km² 904 / km² 515 / km² 279 / km² 103 / km² 854 / km² 755 / km² % of total 2001 7,20% 6,89% 6,46% 5,53% 4,43% 2,24% 1,57% 1,44% 1,23% 37,00% national population % of total 1996 6,50% 6,78% 6,32% 4,99% 4,15% 2,39% 1,68% 1,49% 1,29% 35,58% national population Birth, age and life expectancy Crude birth rate 2001 19,34 18,08 18,81 19,37 17,28 15,09 15,02 18,74 17,47 18,25 (per 1000 of pop) ASSA estimated province 2000 52 45 62 52 52 52 52 49 45 50 life expectancy at 2003 ASSA estimated province 2000 42 37 57 42 42 40 40 39 37 41 life expectancy at 1010 % of city's population 2001 8,24% 8,50% 8,32% 8,75% 7,77% 7,31% 7,15% 8,23% 8,43% 8,22% aged 0-4 % of city's population 1996 8,81% 9,23% 9,05% 9,75% 9,04% 8,30% 8,40% 8,84% 8,85% 9,04% aged 0-4 % of city's population 2001 40,85% 39,02% 38,03% 39,99% 39,69% 36,63% 37,77% 37,86% 38,26% 39,14% aged 15-34 % of city's population 1996 39,42% 39,12% 37,50% 39,14% 38,40% 37,46% 37,35% 38,78% 39,67% 38,61% aged 15-34 % of city's population 2001 31,42% 29,22% 30,54% 30,56% 30,67% 32,24% 30,26% 29,11% 28,33% 30,44% aged 35-64 % of city's population 1996 29,48% 27,45% 28,52% 28,30% 28,21% 28,85% 27,69% 26,72% 26,11% 28,23% aged 35-64 % of city's population 2001 4,95% 5,06% 5,81% 4,29% 5,35% 6,21% 6,21% 6,14% 5,99% 5,29% aged >65 % of city's population 1996 5,23% 4,82% 5,87% 4,38% 5,52% 5,72% 5,74% 5,70% 5,49% 5,27% aged >65 Household growth and composition Number of households 2001 1 006 932 786 747 759 767 744 935 562 652 260 800 191 046 185 012 130 387 4 628 278 Number of households 1996 728 304 643 482 650 678 539 796 429 187 224 932 159 440 152 945 115 933 3 644 697 Five year 1996-2001 38,26% 22,26% 16,77% 38,00% 31,10% 15,95% 19,82% 20,97% 12,47% 26,99% household growth Avergage annual 1996-2001 6,69% 4,10% 3,15% 6,65% 5,56% 3,00% 3,68% 3,88% 2,38% 4,89% household growth % households with 2001 23,68% 21,29% 16,05% 21,20% 20,43% 15,31% 20,33% 18,49% 17,75% 20,24% 1 person % households with 2001 64,31% 58,66% 67,51% 65,86% 65,16% 66,13% 61,59% 67,12% 58,64% 64,17% 2-5 persons % households with 2001 12,00% 20,05% 16,44% 12,94% 14,41% 18,56% 18,09% 14,39% 23,61% 15,59% 6+ persons Average number of 2001 3,20 3,93 3,81 3,33 3,53 3,86 3,67 3,49 4,24 3,58 people per household Average number of 1996 3,66 4,27 3,95 3,79 3,95 4,32 4,27 3,95 4,47 3,98 people per household 179 STATISTICAL ALMANAC PRODUCTIVE CITIES KEY URBAN ECONOMY INDICATORS INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Core productive city indicators Core indicators: Productive city outcomes Gross Value Add 2002 30 129 15 987 27 389 17 216 30 313 17 817 10 944 13 461 9 023 22 239 per capita 2002 (Rand) Annual GVA growth 2001-2 2,3 4,4 1,6 2,9 5,0 2,2 -1,1 0,5 3,1 2,3 over the last year (%) Net new RSC business registrations as % of total Labour Force Survey (LFS) Feb-02 31,95% 37,39% 27,10% 42,47% 28,90% 45,59% 42,93% 38,42% 47,60% 35,72% expanded unemployment rate Value of building plans 2002 R3 882 000 R2 263 000 R4 189 000 R 2,394,000 R3 059 000 R802 000 R403 000 R434 000 R338 000 R17 765 000 passed annually (`000) Ratio RSC remuneration to 2003 13:87 12:88 14:86 13:87 16:84 13:87 14:86 turnover levy assessments Core indicators: Productive city assets Average length of road 2003 4,57 / km per square kilometre Av process time (days) for 2002/03 27 38 35 10 25 5 indust & com plan applications Hours of electricty blackouts per yr (comm, & Ind areas) Av % operating cost of property of rates & services Total property tax 2001/02 R607,41 R605,28 R666,55 R409,53 R559,72 R337,86 R260,17 R248,24 R381,24 R534,56 revenue per capita % over-20's with post- 2001 24,80% 18,92% 19,93% 19,07% 38,76% 19,34% 15,61% 24,97% 16,16% 22,59% school education % 15-24's enrolled in 2001 27,57% 18,23% 23,81% 20,46% 33,52% 16,26% 17,37% 16,83% 16,37% 22,98% post-school study AMPS: % who accessed 2002B 8,00% 11,04% 11,69% 3,29% 11,22% 7,29% 6,80% 7,55% 11,87% internet last 4 weeks Burglaries (non-residential) 2002/03 16 062 10 761 13 518 6 912 8 494 3 710 2 671 + fraud + bus robbery General economic indicators Gross Value Add GVA in 1996 (R Million) 1996 79 261 43 278 71 497 41 759 46 276 14 566 7 595 8 314 4 955 317 501 GVA per capita 1996 1996 30 033 15 731 27 889 20 603 27 501 15 020 11 132 13 772 9 495 21 986 (Rand) GVA in 2002 (R Million) 2002 101 172 50 562 81 183 44 459 62 231 18 052 7 725 8 805 5 050 379 239 2002 GVA as % of 2002 16,4 8,1 13,2 7,0 10,0 2,9 1,3 1,4 0,8 62,6 National Total Average annual GVA 1996- 4,2 2,6 2,1 1,0 5,1 3,6 0,3 1,0 0,3 2,2 growth since 1996 (%) 2002 GVA in 1996 (R Million) 1996 79 261 43 278 71 497 41 759 46 276 14 566 7 595 8 314 4 955 317 501 Employment & income Census number of 2001 647 039 591 026 386 781 516 011 306 034 196 112 157 526 104 935 112 419 3 017 883 unemployed Census number of 1996 392 777 382 182 219 842 319 517 186 321 138 498 101 349 75 290 84 632 1 900 408 unemployed Five year % change in 1996-2001 64,73% 54,65% 75,94% 61,50% 64,25% 41,60% 55,43% 39,37% 32,83% 58,80% number unemployed Census % unemployed 2001 37,35% 43,02% 29,16% 40,41% 31,86% 46,39% 53,11% 40,09% 48,20% 38,28% Census % unemployed 1996 29,15% 32,37% 19,55% 32,11% 24,19% 36,15% 38,76% 30,97% 39,48% 29,15% Census number of employed 2001 1 085 546 782 934 939 440 761 048 654 484 226 617 139 088 156 829 120 822 4 866 808 180 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Census number of 1996 954 605 798 396 904 471 675 544 583 814 244 612 160 156 167 798 129 740 4 619 136 employed Five year % change in 1996-2001 13,72% -1,94% 3,87% 12,66% 12,10% -7,36% -13,15% -6,54% -6,87% 5,36% number of people employed Census % employed 2001 62,65% 56,98% 70,84% 59,59% 68,14% 53,61% 46,89% 59,91% 51,80% 61,72% Census % employed 1996 70,85% 67,63% 80,45% 67,89% 75,81% 63,85% 61,24% 69,03% 60,52% 70,85% % of total national 2001 11,33% 8,17% 9,80% 7,94% 6,83% 2,36% 1,45% 1,64% 1,26% 50,78% employment provided % of total national 1996 10,26% 8,58% 9,72% 7,26% 6,27% 2,63% 1,72% 1,80% 1,39% 49,63% employment provided % of total national 2001 9,48% 8,66% 5,67% 7,56% 4,48% 2,87% 2,31% 1,54% 1,65% 44,22% unemployment % of total national 1996 8,28% 8,06% 4,64% 6,74% 3,93% 2,92% 2,14% 1,59% 1,78% 40,08% unemployment Average monthly 2001 R6 408,63 R4 226,88 R5 186,44 R5 085,60 R6 483,81 R4 298,54 R3 694,04 R3 561,97 R3 985,00 R5 297,22 income peRemployed person (AMI) Difference in city 2001 R2 345,89 R164,13 R1 123,70 R1 022,85 R2 421,07 R235,79 - R368,70 - R500,77 - R77,74 R1 234,47 AMI & national AMI Diff in city AMI & national 2001 R3 619,57 R1 437,82 R2 397,38 R2 296,54 R3 694,75 R1 509,48 R904,98 R772,91 R1 195,94 R2 508,16 AMI excluding 9 SACN cities % change in community 1996-2001 22,76% 14,82% 4,44% 24,26% 13,07% 5,74% 0,10% 1,69% 18,83% 13,18% /government employment % change in wholesale/ 1996-2001 33,01% 38,21% 23,95% 38,71% 22,95% 26,80% 11,85% 12,01% 30,36% 29,76% retail employment % change in finance/ 1996-2001 34,86% 33,02% 18,80% 23,21% 19,72% 34,66% 44,02% 24,75% 11,14% 26,81% business employment % change in manufacturing 1996-2001 17,17% -3,23% -11,91% 26,12% 25,00% 1,06% -15,19% 7,21% 1,77% 4,79% employment % change in private 1996-2001 -12,15% -22,54% -9,58% -17,14% -15,15% -35,11% -26,86% -24,57% -24,18% -17,54% household employment % change in transport/ 1996-2001 -0,69% -3,40% -4,04% -0,55% -0,73% -5,71% -26,66% -24,29% -24,23% -4,00% communications employment % change in construction 1996-2001 -3,02% -14,41% 0,73% 0,78% 4,49% -12,93% -26,83% -24,89% -12,87% -4,63% employment % change in agriculture 1996-2001 92,94% 54,30% 33,11% 95,98% 78,48% 24,65% -7,65% -11,59% 51,21% 45,88% employment % change in electricity/ 1996-2001 -48,91% -35,37% -41,68% -49,38% -45,53% -68,92% -39,86% -53,01% -33,56% -45,90% gas/water employment % change in mining 1996-2001 -41,14% -24,36% -21,41% -27,77% -20,99% -54,92% -74,39% -58,84% 31,67% -32,89% employment % change in people 1996-2001 53,11% 56,04% 12,32% 61,10% 45,98% -3,47% 0,33% 7,33% 53,98% 38,02% employed as managers etc % change in people 1996-2001 15,87% -21,52% -12,28% -3,03% 0,43% -28,66% -40,72% -36,28% -34,50% -8,25% employed as professionals % change in people 1996-2001 34,45% 45,84% 23,55% 50,99% 44,78% 31,26% 41,08% 49,27% 66,98% 38,78% employed as technicians etc % change in people 1996-2001 -16,21% -5,51% -4,56% -5,92% -6,45% 3,59% -23,34% -25,47% -14,35% -9,08% employed as craft/ trade workers % change in people 1996-2001 3,74% 6,03% -0,59% 2,20% 14,70% -2,21% 4,50% 19,92% 0,86% 4,01% employed as machine operators % change in people 1996-2001 46,28% 53,46% 26,13% 51,77% 38,91% 34,19% 34,93% 18,37% 36,10% 40,56% employed as clerks % change in people 1996-2001 28,45% 27,06% 23,05% 24,69% 19,61% 15,62% -1,20% -1,87% 18,06% 22,39% employed as service workers % change in people 1996-2001 15,26% 0,39% 0,60% 13,95% 12,19% -12,84% -18,30% -4,22% -1,41% 4,92% employed as elementary workers 181 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average RSC levy growth RSC-levy assessment of 2003 R R R R R R R total company turnover (R m) 813 472 977 255 063 359 235 429 490 280 685 328 236 205 619 93 175 529 NA NA NA 1 914 034 305 RSC-levy assessment of 2002 R R R R R R R total company turnover (R m) 450 619 264 234 747 438 208 644 613 184 601 831 213 941 298 85 190 392 NA NA NA 1 377 744 836 RSC-levy assessment of 2001 R R R R R R R total company turnover (R m) 483 130 000 190 237 000 200 181 000 169 798 000 186 702 000 74 309 000 NA NA NA 1 304 357 000 RSC-levy assess of total 2003 R R R R R R R employee remuneration (R m) 125 013 451 35 345 422 38 801 540 41 292 068 45 784 011 13 605 241 NA NA NA 299 841 733 RSC-levy assess of total R R R R R R R employee remuneration (R m) 2002 64 524 411 30 489 537 32 860 695 22 813 399 42 473 640 10 634 106 NA NA NA 203 795 788 RSC-levy assess of total 2001 R R R R R R R employee remuneration (R m) 67 311 000 29 214 000 31 970 000 27 390 000 37 065 000 12 061 000 NA NA NA 205 011 000 Ratio RSC remuneration to 2002 13:87 11:89 14:86 11:89 17:83 11:89 NA NA NA 13:87 turnover levy assessments Ratio RSC remuneration to 2001 12:88 13:87 14:86 14:86 17:83 14:86 NA NA NA 14:86 turnover levy assessments Property investments Total number of planning 2002/03 12 021 13 983 13 026 3 363 5 096 932 applications received Total estimated value of 2002/03 R3 567 715 R2 517 168 R4 122 588 R2 073 921 R385 812 R361 097 R465 977 applications (`000) Value of industrial building 2002 R248 056 R126 843 R191 250 R216 345 R176 001 R55 665 R32 656 R13 481 R159 420 R1 219 717 plans passed (`000) Value of commercial building 2002 R474 864 R181 825 R221 041 R101 195 R225 244 R53 245 R12 197 R30 402 R15 023 R1 315 036 plans passed (`000) Decentralised (suburb) A grade 2003 12,54% 5,92% 9,37% 5,61% office space % vacancy Decentralised (suburb) A grade 2003 R70,07 R70,33 R73,40 R63,16 max gross asking rental Centralised (CBD) A grade 2003 14,27% 12,76% 11,87% 7,48% office space % vacancy Centralised (CBD) A grade max 2003 R40,00 R60,00 R58,00 R75,00 gross asking rental Mobility & logistics capability/efficiency Municipal electricity 2001 25 303 39 978 19 742 23 242 14 558 8 637 5 242 4 400 NA customers excluding domestic Metric tons of cargo 2000 NA 32 743 7 597 NA NA 6 676 581 NA NA handled by port (000) Metric tons of cargo 1996 NA 31 511 6 768 NA NA 5 300 1 271 NA NA handled by port (000) Vessels handled by port 2000 NA 3 713 3 737 NA NA 1 243 273 NA NA Vessels handled by port 1996 NA 5 690 3 730 NA NA 1 935 347 NA NA Number of airport passengers 2000 2 539 613 29 755 502 657 See Joburg See Joburg NA NA NA NA flying international Number of airport passengers 1996 1 729 218 89 438 162 627 See Joburg See Joburg NA NA NA NA flying international Number of airport passengers 2000 2 974 990 1 231 745 1 686 993 See Joburg See Joburg 425 826 172 521 107 854 NA flying domestic Number of airport passengers 1996 2 408 820 1 028 231 446 875 See Joburg See Joburg 384 484 No data No data NA flying domestic AMPS: % of population flying 2002b 2,01% 3,46% 2,57% 1,02% 3,07% 0,64% 1,33% 0,87% 2,02% internationally in last year AMPS: Total number of local 2002b 34 932 38 003 58 267 16 219 28 795 16 879 6 827 4 028 2 724 206 674 business flights AMPS: % of pop flying on local 2002b 10,38% 9,56% 8,93% 11,10% 8,92% 10,70% 9,72% 8,24% 4,78% 9,44% business trip last year 182 STATISTICAL ALMANAC EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR (SHARE OF EACH CITY'S TOTAL EMPLOYMENT) 183 STATISTICAL ALMANAC EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATIONS (SHARE OF EACH CITY'S TOTAL EMPLOYMENT) 184 STATISTICAL ALMANAC COMPARISON OF 1996 AND 2001 % OF TOTAL NATIONAL POPULATION, % OF TOTAL NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND % OF TOTAL NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT PER CITY INCLUSIVE CITIES KEY SOCIAL TRENDS INDICATORS INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Core inclusive city indicators Core indicators: Inclusive city outcomes % of residents satisfied 2002-3 41,00% 35,00% with quality of life % of households without 2001 22,54% 27,20% 21,06% 30,01% 24,81% 24,79% 36,95% 28,29% 30,89% 25,75% formal shelter Household gini co-efficient 2001 0,78 0,75 0,69 0,77 0,75 0,75 0,79 0,78 0,76 0,76 (PDG method) Dependency ratio (dependents 2001 2,97 3,95 3,08 3,26 3,03 4,44 5,05 4,12 4,58 3,41 to each employed person) Infant mortality rate 2003 54,8 55,5 21,7 (per 1000 live births) % of 10-14yr olds not attending 2001 4,7% 4,8% 3,9% 4,4% 3,7% 4,6% 3,9% 3,7% 4,9% 4,3% school Core indicators: inclusive city assets Value of residential building 2002 R115 287 R49 750 R459 312 R153 744 R210 904 R153 193 R91 570 R54 550 R21 668 R1 309 978 plans <80m2 (`000) % of hsh without water on site 2001 15,52% 30,31% 15,58% 18,10% 20,23% 20,26% 41,11% 31,17% 29,97% 21,39% (ie in dwelling or yard) % of households with VIP toilet or less 2001 13,44% 31,11% 12,57% 16,95% 28,00% 20,45% 32,47% 49,64% 41,48% 22,06% 185 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average % of households without 2001 42,35% 46,10% 31,40% 47,61% 37,64% 48,10% 59,33% 57,52% 50,39% 43,32% telephone in home % of households not using 2001 14,98% 20,10% 11,15% 25,00% 19,30% 24,92% 36,91% 14,90% 14,22% 18,80% electricity for lighting % of households without weekly 2001 8,75% 14,58% 5,62% 12,03% 21,76% 13,91% 28,65% 40,19% 40,94% 14,61% refuse collection Average travel cost to work 2003 R186,00 per month % of commuters spending 2003 46,00% >10% of income on transport % of residents walking to school 2001 17,32% 19,27% 19,03% 17,14% 19,49% 22,68% 28,81% 29,04% 23,82% 19,70% or work % hsh income on muni account 2002 13,84% 20,14% 17,67% 18,10% 17,54% 18,96% 15,25% 22,55% for hsh earning R2 263/m Annual grants in aid (incl social rates rebates) General access, poverty and exclusion indicators Access to shelter Number of households 2001 212 408 150 390 142 983 213 091 129 688 59 795 54 647 43 811 16 321 1 023 134 without formal shelter Number of households 1996 155 459 139 801 125 233 156 283 82 582 60 673 42 063 34 747 10 102 806 943 without formal shelter % of households without 1996 22,20% 29,45% 20,04% 29,75% 20,77% 28,13% 37,80% 28,84% 28,73% 25,59% formal shelter % change in households 1996-2001 41,55% 13,33% 23,50% 40,07% 57,74% 2,72% 17,22% 19,16% 20,61% 28,54% without formal shelter Number of households 2001 780 017 572 746 599 745 521 385 423 086 196 148 120 464 132 668 90 110 3 436 369 with formal shelter Number of households 1996 561 856 452 339 516 867 376 893 337 609 160 784 99 074 108 405 82 849 2 696 676 with formal shelter % Households with formal shelter 2001 77,46% 72,80% 78,94% 69,99% 75,19% 75,21% 63,05% 71,71% 69,11% 74,25% % Households with formal shelter 1996 77,80% 70,55% 79,96% 70,25% 79,23% 71,87% 62,20% 71,16% 71,27% 74,41% Change HsH with formal shelter 1996-2001 38,83% 26,62% 16,03% 38,34% 25,32% 21,99% 21,59% 22,38% 8,76% 27,43% % of households sharing a 2001 15,96% 18,88% 15,91% 14,26% 17,31% 13,09% 9,39% 18,44% 20,42% 16,04% single room % of households sharing a 1996 8,62% 7,67% 8,85% 10,18% 11,50% 7,03% 4,88% 8,38% 8,03% 8,74% single room % change in households 1996-2001 165,33% 216,94% 163,14% 89,25% 122,46% 125,18% 97,74% 171,19% 147,02% 147,28% sharing a single room 96-01 Number households in informal 2001 145 401 183 280 124 952 171 157 113 973 55 972 59 308 43 801 37 077 934 921 dwellings not in backyard Number households in informal 1996 57 335 28 349 21 688 38 358 19 469 9 229 11 600 11 668 1 598 199 294 dwellings not in backyard % of households in informal 2001 14,48% 23,40% 16,50% 23,05% 20,32% 21,53% 31,12% 23,74% 28,52% 20,26% dwellings not in backyard % of households in informal 1996 8,03% 4,46% 3,37% 7,23% 4,66% 4,15% 7,56% 7,69% 1,39% 5,56% dwellings not in backyard % change in hsh in informal 1996-2001 153,60% 546,51% 476,13% 346,21% 485,41% 506,48% 411,28% 275,39% 2220,21% 369,12% dwellings not in backyard Income distribution Average annual household income 2001 R86 105 R61 579 R87 811 R65 318 R91 395 R53 227 R39 389 R42 398 R49 165 R71 836 Number of households with 2001 196 722 186 664 101 928 174 936 98 704 57 270 55 253 43 118 28 500 943 095 0 income Number of households with 0 income 1996 60 718 73 812 38 436 55 101 28 906 27 415 20 915 15 728 16 233 337 264 % of households with 2001 18,74% 22,66% 13,11% 22,53% 16,51% 21,60% 28,47% 22,86% 21,08% 19,61% 0 income % of households with 0 income 1996 10,08% 12,96% 6,79% 12,31% 7,58% 13,69% 13,93% 11,03% 16,39% 10,68% % change in households 1996-2001 223,99% 152,89% 165,19% 217,48% 241,47% 108,90% 164,18% 174,15% 75,57% 179,63% with 0 income Income share of highest 2001 33,82% 41,35% 24,54% 38,80% 31,45% 42,25% 54,04% 50,13% 45,16% 36,36% quartile (households in q) Income share of 2nd highest 2001 45,12% 42,58% 48,36% 43,07% 43,40% 41,62% 35,03% 38,35% 40,81% 43,68% quartile (households in q) 186 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Income share of 3rd highest 2001 19,12% 15,33% 25,77% 17,08% 23,41% 15,44% 10,32% 10,88% 13,30% 18,70% quartile (households in q) Income share of lowest 2001 1,95% 0,74% 1,33% 1,05% 1,75% 0,69% 0,61% 0,64% 0,73% 1,26% quartile (households in q) Income share of highest 2001 1,03% 1,97% 0,78% 1,45% 0,97% 2,37% 3,86% 3,61% 2,80% 1,37% quartile (income earned in q) Income share of 2nd highest 2001 15,98% 24,92% 19,15% 20,03% 15,41% 24,59% 26,05% 26,42% 26,03% 19,28% quartile (income earned in q) Income share of 3rd highest 2001 49,74% 52,25% 56,96% 53,36% 53,99% 52,78% 47,08% 46,21% 48,19% 52,65% quartile (income earned in q) Income share of lowest 2001 33,24% 20,86% 23,11% 25,16% 29,63% 20,26% 23,01% 23,76% 22,98% 26,70% quartile (income earned in q) Income share of highest 1996 22,08% 27,23% 14,90% 24,37% 18,34% 29,99% 36,60% 34,67% 35,43% 23,77% quartile (households in q) Income share of 2nd highest 1996 59,14% 57,11% 63,67% 59,27% 58,05% 56,22% 53,87% 54,49% 51,61% 58,59% quartile (households in q) Income share of 3rd highest 1996 18,78% 15,66% 21,43% 16,36% 23,61% 13,79% 9,53% 10,84% 12,97% 17,64% quartile (households in q) Income share of lowest 1996 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% quartile (households in q) Income share of highest 1996 1,37% 1,95% 0,88% 1,59% 1,09% 2,60% 4,41% 4,14% 3,04% 1,63% quartile (income earned in q) Income share of 2nd highest 1996 31,63% 38,75% 36,26% 36,99% 29,69% 41,40% 45,69% 43,53% 40,48% 35,69% quartile (income earned in q) Income share of 3rd highest 1996 67,00% 59,30% 62,86% 61,42% 69,22% 56,01% 49,90% 52,34% 56,49% 62,68% quartile (income earned in q) Income share of lowest 1996 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% quartile (income earned in q) Access to infrastructure and services Number of households with water 2001 499 469 397 617 526 866 315 704 272 805 121 818 60 104 46 805 48 627 2 289 815 in dwelling Number of households with water 1996 479 927 402 227 515 841 368 199 298 205 144 036 76 514 69 926 56 505 2 411 380 in dwelling % of households with water 2001 49,60% 50,54% 69,35% 42,38% 48,49% 46,71% 31,46% 25,30% 37,29% 49,47% in dwelling % of households with water 1996 65,90% 62,51% 79,28% 68,21% 69,48% 64,04% 47,99% 45,72% 48,74% 66,16% in dwelling % change in number of hsh 1996-2001 4,07% -1,15% 2,14% -14,26% -8,52% -15,43% -21,45% -33,06% -13,94% -5,04% with water in dwelling Number of households 2001 156 240 238 472 118 350 134 848 113 852 52 834 78 535 57 672 39 079 989 882 without water on site Number of households without 1996 98 442 186 855 66 105 84 502 87 934 35 337 60 978 52 453 45 944 718 550 water on site % of households without 1996 13,52% 29,04% 10,16% 15,65% 20,49% 15,71% 38,25% 34,30% 39,63% 19,71% water on site % change in households 1996-2001 58,71% 27,62% 79,03% 59,58% 29,47% 49,51% 28,79% 9,95% -14,94% 37,76% without water on site Number of households 2001 426 465 362 706 238 596 354 677 211 793 125 435 113 343 106 425 65 702 2 005 142 without telephone in home Number of households 1996 385 060 354 297 250 210 319 709 209 000 124 298 113 496 107 637 74 002 1 937 709 without telephone in home % of households without 1996 53,00% 55,14% 38,52% 59,33% 48,81% 55,33% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 55,28% telephone in home % change in households 1996-2001 10,75% 2,37% -4,64% 10,94% 1,34% 0,91% -0,13% -1,13% -11,22% 3,48% without telephone in home Number of households without 2001 152 176 159 442 85 255 187 335 109 413 65 180 70 713 27 793 18 731 876 038 electricity for lighting Number of households without 1996 102 526 164 518 82 831 132 171 92 737 64 590 84 071 58 649 30 330 812 423 electricity for lighting % of households without 1996 14,12% 25,62% 12,75% 24,58% 21,66% 28,75% 52,81% 38,42% 26,20% 22,34% electricty for lighting % change in households without 1996-2001 48,43% -3,09% 2,93% 41,74% 17,98% 0,91% -15,89% -52,61% -38,24% 7,83% electricty for lighting Number of households without 2001 88 140 114 719 42 736 89 627 122 415 36 278 54 730 74 353 53 381 676 379 weekly refuse collection Number of households without 1996 82 088 198 047 65 476 71 337 102 924 16 570 64 077 44 940 52 354 697 813 weekly refuse collection % of households without weekly 1996 11,45% 31,31% 10,16% 13,34% 24,18% 7,44% 40,58% 29,61% 45,63% 19,38% refuse collection 187 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average % change in households without 1996-2001 7,37% -42,07% -34,73% 25,64% 18,94% 118,94% -14,59% 65,45% 1,96% -3,07% weekly refuse collection % of commuters walking/using 2001 32,90% 38,78% 34,38% 33,57% 34,63% 46,79% 56,87% 55,24% 47,76% 37,61% bicycle to school or work % of comms using public transport 2001 33,42% 32,75% 30,38% 32,96% 32,11% 25,87% 22,86% 26,02% 26,85% 31,16% (Bus, train, minibus) % of commuters using other 2001 0,69% 0,80% 0,96% 0,69% 0,64% 0,52% 0,44% 0,32% 0,52% 0,71% Number of households with VIP 2001 135 373 244 779 95 524 126 243 157 552 53 334 62 042 91 846 54 090 1 020 783 or less Access to muni community & social facilities/amenities Clinics per 10 000 people 2003 0,30 0,84 0,36 0,73 0,32 0,39 Libraries per 10 000 people 2003 0,24 0,24 0,35 0,20 0,11 0,16 Swimming pools per 10 000 people 2003 0,18 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,15 0,13 Parks per 10 000 people 2003 0,17 2,66 1,82 0,09 Public toilets per 10 000 people 2003 0,49 0,36 0,43 0,24 0,63 Sports fields per 10 000 people 2003 0,69 0,05 0,23 0,17 0,69 0,75 Community halls & recreation 2003 0,29 0,62 0,37 0,31 0,02 facilities per 10 000 people Nursery schools per 10 000 people 2003 0,28 0,03 0,05 Child care facilities per 10 000 people 2003 0,28 0,04 Retirement homes per 10 000 people 2003 0,08 0,01 Rand/capita of CapX spent on new 2002/03 R 7,74 R3,21 R0,15 R2,83 R8,29 R1,30 R1,22 R5,19 parks & gardens Rand/capita of CapX spent on 2002/03 R8,92 R6,58 R2,94 R0,49 R10,96 R1,15 R0,73 R5,63 sports fields Rand/capita of CapX spent on 2002/03 R5,87 R0,75 R2,09 R3,78 R0,49 R1,98 R0,76 R4,76 community halls Rand/capita of CapX spent on 2002/03 R1,65 R0,54 R0,24 R2,72 R0,39 R0,01 R0,00 R11,35 libraries Rand/capita of CapX spent on 2002/03 R0,60 R3,83 R0,92 R2,17 R2,52 R0,30 R1,00 R1,84 recreation facilities Rand/capita of CapX spent on clinics 2002/03 R2,23 R4,02 R0,55 R2,37 R2,17 R0,00 R2,07 R0,58 Rand/capita of CapX spent on 2002/03 R0,91 R2,36 R0,97 R0,01 R7,50 R0,00 R0,00 R0,00 museums and art galleries Rand/capita of CapX spent on other 2002/03 R1,19 R2,73 R0,00 R2,62 R3,45 R11,31 R0,00 R8,25 % of total CapX spent on new parks 2002/03 2,08% 0,50% 0,05% 0,65% 1,92% 0,29% 0,40% 1,58% & gardens % of total CapX spent on sports fields 2002/03 2,40% 1,02% 1,05% 0,11% 2,54% 0,26% 0,24% 1,71% % of total CapX spent on community 2002/03 1,58% 0,12% 0,74% 0,87% 0,11% 0,44% 0,25% 1,45% halls % of total CapX spent on libraries 2002/03 0,44% 0,08% 0,09% 0,63% 0,09% 0,00% 0,00% 3,45% % of total CapX spent on recreation 2002/03 0,16% 0,59% 0,33% 0,50% 0,58% 0,07% 0,33% 0,56% facilities % of total CapX spent on clinics 2002/03 0,60% 0,62% 0,20% 0,55% 0,50% 0,00% 0,68% 0,18% % of total CapX spent on museums 2002/03 0,24% 0,37% 0,34% 0,00% 1,74% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% and art galleries % of total CapX spent on other 2002/03 0,32% 0,42% 0,00% 0,60% 0,80% 2,52% 0,00% 2,51% General Human Development Indicators Number of residents over 20 years 2001 161 507 190 909 77 190 153 650 109 329 42 809 47 241 42 833 35 472 860 940 old with no schooling Number of residents over 20 years 1996 130 664 174 404 68 111 124 504 97 650 37 394 49 235 35 562 36 502 754 026 old with no schooling % of residents over 20 years old with 2001 7,25% 9,98% 4,21% 9,25% 8,32% 6,73% 10,98% 10,90% 10,73% 8,01% no schooling % of residents over 20 years old with 1996 8,06% 10,97% 4,52% 10,23% 9,79% 6,60% 12,75% 10,30% 12,37% 8,85% no schooling % change in residents over 20 years 1996-2001 23,60% 9,46% 13,33% 23,41% 11,96% 14,48% -4,05% 20,45% -2,82% 14,18% with no schooling Asylum applicants per UNHCR 2002 11 240 1 922 5 594 NA 1 370 716 NA NA NA 20 842 Refugee Reception Centre Asylum applications approved by RRC 2002 61 148 909 NA 629 248 NA NA NA 1 995 Asylum applications rejected by RRC 2002 12 74 64 NA 274 113 NA NA NA 537 AMPS: % of survey pop who make use of ... Cheque account 2002b 13,5 10,84 15,94 7,1 18,26 9,77 7,23 13,71 7,98 12,36 Savings account 2002b 54,93 44,98 57,26 43,68 42,87 39,71 47,99 53,63 44,78 48,68 Transmission account 2002b 5,39 6,92 6,5 6,45 3,05 5,58 2,8 4,65 17,43 5,99 188 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Investment/paid-up shares 2002b 3,02 4,97 6,37 3,13 4,9 3,31 0,93 4,47 4,2 4,22 Credit Card 2002b 9,53 9,95 12,66 3,39 9,36 7,18 2,52 10,04 6,13 8,63 Petrol/garage card 2002b 3,95 3,68 4,56 1,18 4,98 2,76 1,42 3,48 1,74 3,43 ATM Card 2002b 42,9 41,48 57,75 39,77 50,03 35,5 31,26 42,76 38,59 44,59 Home loan/mortgage bond 2002b 3,09 6,47 8,85 4,16 4,34 6,88 3,33 5,8 4,62 5,45 Other loan 2002b 1,25 2,48 2,34 0,31 0,78 1,93 0,68 2,42 2,77 1,56 None of these 38,47 46,28 34,22 52,58 40,43 50,07 49,64 39,33 48,23 43,13 AMPS: % of survey pop who have ... Cover Policy 2002b 17,34 14,03 21,11 12,47 15,13 10,37 10,33 15,11 14,15 15,47 Endowment/savings/invest policy 2002b 8,87 10,82 14,88 6,51 10,6 9,75 7,56 9,11 13,24 10,27 Retirement annuity 2002b 12,3 8,48 13,71 4,32 9,83 10,88 8,19 9,16 15,22 10,06 Funeral insurance 2002b 13,25 10,77 30,2 11,11 15,19 18,15 13,47 12,9 30,58 16,68 Medical insurance 2002b 8,26 3,51 6,72 1,69 3,05 5,7 7,62 0,91 7,37 5,04 Short term insurance 2002b 4,96 5,76 12,94 3,89 11,04 5,96 2,78 7,22 9,81 7,31 Other 2002b 0,15 0,32 0,91 0,18 0,01 0,18 0,23 0,17 0,07 0,31 None of above 2002b 68,62 73,02 50,08 78,04 70,11 68,33 78,11 68,21 60,01 67,75 Membership of medical aid scheme 2002b 22,58 24,61 34,25 22,25 29,43 25,94 17,88 22,35 28,3 26,05 Attended stokvel meeting last 4 wks 2002b 6,14 2,5 1,04 2,95 2,89 1,38 1,45 3,88 3,14 3 % of survey pop food & groceries shopping pattern: Bulk shop once a month with fill-ups 2002b 60,12 58,61 35,01 57,93 66,16 62,51 66,65 69,98 70,67 56,88 Shop twice a month/every 2 weeks 2002b 17,99 10,58 8,43 17,21 7,77 7,73 15,49 6,06 7,33 12,22 Shop weekly or almost weekly 2002b 13,13 17,35 35,03 14,32 17,05 17,93 9,67 15,24 12,34 18,60 Shop twice a week or almost daily 2002b 3,49 6,06 7,08 4,20 4,66 2,96 6,77 4,42 2,99 4,90 Shop other 2002b 0,04 0,03 0,13 0,02 0,18 0,12 0,00 0,92 0,00 0,10 AMPS: % of survey population who ... Own their own home 2002b 64,43 72,28 74,39 69,44 72,59 88,39 80,35 74,30 62,71 72,01 Own, use or maintain a vehicle 2002b 57,39 55,70 59,60 64,47 67,42 55,88 41,81 73,02 52,29 59,61 Have at least one domestic worker 2002b 21,25 18,65 13,94 13,40 22,30 12,21 14,61 16,29 17,63 17,15 in household Have and electric stove in home 2002b 77,86 70,59 83,83 65,20 74,57 70,96 66,56 64,89 82,01 74,09 Have a fridge or combined fridge 2002b 87,26 80,35 90,44 80,62 82,76 75,69 78,55 83,59 90,89 83,87 freezer in home Have a dishwasher in home 2002b 5,24 4,23 5,66 3,42 6,64 3,31 2,02 4,81 2,09 4,65 Have a vacuum cleaner in home 2002b 31,35 29,46 50,19 30,81 33,81 28,39 25,22 35,80 24,27 34,15 Have a television in home 2002b 89,53 81,86 93,16 84,62 85,93 85,41 84,71 85,16 93,16 87,17 Have a hi-fi or music centre in home 2002b 73,61 62,95 76,33 70,83 62,11 65,50 63,88 65,87 83,16 69,57 Have a personal computer in home 2002b 17,86 17,65 27,30 11,11 18,99 12,43 10,02 14,94 14,18 17,70 AMPS: % of survey pop who have in last 4 weeks ... Attended a gymnasium or health club 2002b 8,56 4,75 4,76 6,50 4,22 3,91 3,52 5,92 1,91 5,56 Eaten in restaurant / steakhouse 2002b 44,10 37,39 44,02 25,18 43,27 27,76 18,44 30,60 21,98 36,56 Bought take-away food from a 2002b 55,26 44,62 58,99 36,71 41,86 34,42 35,11 38,34 41,14 46,32 permanent outlet Ordered take-away food delivered 2002b 10,41 13,25 13,23 5,11 6,18 6,54 8,78 8,84 17,26 9,84 to house/work Hired a videotape or DVD for home 2002b 13,65 16,65 24,21 10,00 13,18 13,86 9,49 11,32 16,66 15,32 viewing Visited a casino 2002b 7,22 5,26 7,54 7,78 4,65 7,07 11,01 4,19 8,01 6,81 Bought lottery ticket(s) 2002b 62,36 53,69 47,77 54,86 59,83 49,07 43,39 65,40 53,85 54,82 Bought scratch card(s) 2002b 10,41 4,70 5,75 6,53 5,01 10,42 5,51 20,89 3,62 7,24 AMPS: % of survey population who have in last year ... Bought furniture 2002b 6,50 7,02 10,17 2,16 9,01 7,48 5,74 13,80 7,70 7,14 Spent money on part time education 2002b 5,69 4,58 4,96 2,31 5,07 3,25 3,26 4,26 3,05 4,36 Moved into another house or flat 2002b 10,68 12,93 11,36 6,28 12,83 9,42 8,51 8,32 9,36 10,44 189 STATISTICAL ALMANAC AMPS SURVEY LIVING STANDARDS MEASURE (LSM) LSM DESCRIPTION OF CATEGORY LSM 1 Female; 16-24 and 50+; up to some primary education; rural; traditional hut; R804/m; minimal access to services; minimal ownership of durables LSM 2 16-24; up to primary complete; rural; R962/m; water on plot; minimal ownership of durables except radios & stoves LSM 3 16-49; up to some high school; rural; R1 188/m; electricity & water on plot; minimal ownership except radios and stove LSM 4 16-34; up to some high school; urban; R1 570/m; electricity, water on plot and flush toilet; ownership of TV sets, hi-fi, stove, fridge LSM 5 16­34; some high school and to matric; urban; R2 230/m; electricity, water and flush toilet; TV sets, hi-fi, stove, fridge; activities include exercise LSM 6 16-34; up to post matric but not university; urban; R3 619/m; electricity, hot running water & flush toilet; owns various durables & cell phone; cinema LSM 7 Male; 35+; matric and higher; urban; R5 675/m; full access to services; increased ownership of durables plus motor vehicle; accesses internet LSM 8 35+; matric and higher; urban; R7 587/m; full access to services; full ownership of durables incl PC and satellite dish LSM 9 Male; 35+; matric and higher; urban; R10 245/m; full access to services; full ownership of durables incl PC/satellite; increased participation in activities LSM 10 35+; matric and higher; urban; R15 076/m; full access to services; full ownership of durables incl PC/satellite; increased participation in activities CITY OF ETHEKWINI CAPE EKURHULENI TSHWANE NELSON BUFFALO MANGAUNG MSUNDUZI JOBURG TOWN MANDELA CITY LSM 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% LSM 2 1,3% 6,2% 0,2% 1,4% 2,7% 5,0% 1,0% 0,5% 0,2% LSM 3 3,8% 11,8% 1,9% 7,5% 6,2% 9,3% 9,2% 7,7% 5,9% LSM 4 11,6% 10,9% 9,2% 17,8% 11,6% 13,9% 15,9% 20,4% 8,4% LSM 5 19,0% 11,3% 11,7% 17,4% 15,3% 19,4% 21,4% 19,6% 26,2% LSM 6 27,0% 19,3% 20,7% 18,3% 22,9% 21,7% 28,3% 17,6% 22,6% LSM 7 12,1% 11,0% 14,6% 9,1% 8,7% 10,2% 10,6% 8,8% 12,1% LSM 8 9,3% 9,7% 13,7% 11,4% 8,6% 7,6% 5,5% 8,4% 10,4% LSM 9 9,0% 10,8% 14,8% 9,7% 11,1% 6,6% 5,0% 9,5% 8,6% LSM 10 7,0% 9,0% 11,2% 7,4% 12,9% 6,3% 3,2% 7,5% 5,8% Population 1 722 261 1 703 823 1 353 592 1 636 139 1 210 563 767 668 388 865 286 766 296 412 SUSTAINABLE CITIES INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Core sustainable cities indicators Core indicators: Sustainable cities outcomes Total city ecological footprint in sq km 2004 128,264 Annual number of air pollution events 2003 45 Water demand (kl per capita / day) 2003 425 220 1220 133 83 30 Tuberculosis rate presenting in PHC 2003 414/100000 251/100000 668/100000 1470/100000 clinics Average travel time to work in minutes 2003 50 Core indicators: Sustainable city assets Total tonnage of Carbon dioxide 2003 1 061 085 1 061 085 1 360 341 emissions % of wastewater discharge not treated 2003 -5,39% 6,73% 5,54% -0,23% 0,00% Annual tonnes waste disposed to 2003 0,42 0,51 0,64 land-fills per capita 190 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average % of solid waste recycled 2003 20,00% 8,00% 5,00% 10,00% % unnacounted for water in last 2003 fiscal year Number environmental staff / 2003 1000 population % of municipal area actually 2003 50,00% 15,00% monitored fpr air quality % of final effluent quality 2003 95,00% 94,00% 35,00% 87,71% 99,00% compliance (flow weighted) Sewer blockages per 100km of 2003 399 586 1,044 476 1,073 130 pipe per year % of built-up municipal area 2003 developed as parks % increase in 1 room formal 1996-2001 262,23% 202,25% 364,64% 319,31% 224,96% 182,60% 61,71% 95,90% 67,65% 226,87% houses last 5 yrs General environmental and liveability indicators Waste management Domestic waste total tonnage 2003 393 226 500 000 854 880 30 % of total waste that is domestic 2003 32,00% 59,00% 52,00% Commercial/Industrial waste total 2003 274 804 361 680 25 tonnage % of total waste that is comm / 2003 23,00% 38,00% 22,00% Industrial Illegal Dumping total tonnage 2003 266,139 115,080 % of total waste that is dumped 2003 22,00% 3,00% 7,00% illegally % of solid waste disposed to sanitary landfill % of solid waste incinerated (c) % of solid waste disposed to open dump % of solid waste burned openly % of solid waste to compost Urban sprawl and transport pressures Number of households in formal 2001 105 193 39 862 25 312 68 705 32 291 9 760 6 348 7 777 7 192 302 440 backyard dwellings Number of households in formal 1996 99 024 55 735 31 989 60 235 34 604 8 892 7 602 9 227 11 205 318 513 backyard dwellings % of households in formal 2001 10,48% 5,09% 3,34% 9,25% 5,76% 3,75% 3,33% 4,22% 5,53% 6,56% backyard dwellings % of households in formal 1996 13,87% 8,76% 4,97% 11,35% 8,29% 3,99% 4,96% 6,08% 9,73% 8,89% backyard dwellings % change in number of formal 1996-2001 6,23% -28,48% -20,87% 14,06% -6,68% 9,76% -16,50% -15,71% -35,81% -5,05% backyard dwellings Number of households in informal 2001 78 716 27 292 32 804 50 002 23 915 7 894 10 788 8 010 2 806 242 227 backyard dwellings Number of households in informal 1996 99 676 156 739 106 151 119 160 63 102 52 999 44 285 31 894 31 070 705 076 backyard dwellings % of households in informal 2001 7,84% 3,48% 4,33% 6,73% 4,26% 3,04% 5,66% 4,34% 2,16% 5,25% backyard dwellings % of households in informal 1996 13,96% 24,65% 16,50% 22,46% 15,12% 23,81% 28,88% 21,02% 26,97% 19,67% backyard dwellings % change in number of informal 1996-2001 -21,03% -82,59% -69,10% -58,04% -62,10% -85,11% -75,64% -74,89% -90,97% -65,65% backyard dwellings Number households in 1 room 2001 154 030 107 609 69 303 106 876 53 217 17 592 32 278 37 660 14 006 592 571 dwellings not in backyard Number households in 1 room 1996 71 003 32 412 18 475 40 667 19 955 5 630 13 488 12 759 5 268 219 657 dwellings not in backyard % of households in 1 room 2001 15,34% 13,74% 9,15% 14,39% 9,49% 6,77% 16,94% 20,41% 10,77% 12,84% dwellings not in backyard % of households in 1 room 1996 9,95% 5,10% 2,87% 7,66% 4,78% 2,53% 8,80% 8,41% 4,57% 6,13% dwellings not in backyard % change in 1 room dwellings 1996-2001 116,93% 232,00% 275,12% 162,81% 166,69% 212,47% 139,31% 195,16% 165,87% 169,77% not in backyard % of commuter using Car/ 2001 32,99% 27,67% 34,28% 32,78% 32,63% 26,82% 19,82% 18,43% 24,87% 30,52% motorcycle driver or passenger 191 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Wastewater treatment Volume of wastewater treated 2003 839,00 485,00 529,00 132,30 90,00 (in-house) (Ml/Day) Production per person per day 2003 255,00 162,50 175,00 41,25 28,13 % of treatment capacity utilisation 2003 95,02% 67,36% 85,32% 70,90% 87,38% % of dry tons sludge produced not 2003 0,00% 5,00% 0,00% 0,00% meeting standard % of wastewater produced that is 2003 6,13% 6,73% 8,50% 4,70% 3,00% recycled/reclaimed % of income from sale of by-products 2003 0,00% 0,00% 17,81% 2,81% Network density in terms of m of 2003 18,2 14,0 11,9 17,8 23,3 25,9 pipe per connection Energy usage Total city energy ecological footprint 2004 10 920 in sq km Consumption of electricty per 2003 capita per day WELL-GOVERNED CITIES INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Core well-governed cities indicators Core indicators: Well governed cities % residents satisfied with municipality 2003 % of total eligible voters registered 2004 to vote % revenue collected vs revenue billed 2002/3 88% 89% 93% 97% 83% 92% 88% Number of incidents of public violence 2002/03 61 43 169 33 27 28 70 Number of legal claims against municipality per year Value townhouse plans passed as 2002 28,52% 15,67% 7,36% 16,39% 35,75% 10,26% 0,68% 33,90% 7,44% 19,63% % total residential Core indicators: Good governance assets Number formal muni partnerships with NGOs / CBOs Total comm orgs attending general ward meets Total municipal revenue per capita 2002/03 R3 269,27 R2 951,76 R3 297,67 R3 131,50 R2 957 11 R2 460,17 R1 869,55 R1 982,82 R2 102,69 R2 963,23 Percentage of capital charges 2001/02 13,24% 17,04% 16,60% 9,82% 13,51% 11,83% 17,06% 10,71% 13,90% to total Opx Ratio of CapX to OpX 2002/03 11:89 19:81 20:80 9:91 15:85 18:82 24:76 15:85 16:84 15:85 % of total OpX spent on maintenance 2002/03 1,93% 10,74% 4,22% 8,61% 13,11% 7,37% 5,70% 8,66% 3,96% 6,88% % of total OpX spent on salaries 2002/03 29,19% 31,80% 22,66% 29,49% 31,39% 28,41% 42,34% 29,69% 28,90% 28,54% Number of municipal employees per 1000 pop Electricity reconnections minus 2002/03 -523 -40 816 -53 194 -3 845 -2 315 disconnections in year Number of formal IGR agreements in terms of IGR act General government efficiency & effectiveness indicators General governance Municipal Category 2004 A A A A A A B B B Political systems type: executive 2004 Exec Mayor EXCO Exec Mayor Exec Mayor Exec Mayor Exec Mayor Exec Mayor Exec Mayor EXCO Political systems type: participatory 2004 Ward Sub-Council Ward Ward Ward Ward Ward 192 STATISTICAL ALMANAC INDICATOR Data Joburg eThekwini Cape Town Ekurhuleni Tshwane Nelson Buffalo Mangaung Msunduzi Total or date Mandela City average Financial capacity, stability and efficacy Capital budget 2002/3 R1 248m R1 792m R1 913m R727m R888m R437m R317m R199m R184m R7 707m Operating budget 2002/3 R9 730m R7 544m R7 861m R7 360m R5 182m R2 055m R1 002m R1 097m R993m R42 825m Capital budget peRcapita 2002/3 R371,62 R566,59 R645,49 R281,37 R432,68 R431,91 R449,66 R305,53 R329,01 R451,95 Operating budget peRcapita 2002/3 R2 897,65 R2 385,18 R2 652,17 R2 850,12 R2 524,43 R2 028,26 R1 419,89 R1 677,29 R1 773,69 R2 511,29 Municipal credit rating 2002/3 LT:A; ST:F2 AA ST:A1, ST:A1; ST:A3; ST: A1; ST:A2; LT:+A LT:A+ LT:BBB LT:BBB Agency from which credit rating 2002/3 Fitch Global Global Global Global Global Global secured Ibca Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit Credit % of municipal debt < 30 days end 2003 2 5 NA 5 8 35 % of municipal debt 30-60 days end 2003 5 2 17 4 4 4 % of municipal debt 60-90 days end 2003 3 2 6 4 3 4 % of municipal debt over 90 days end 2003 89 91 78 86 86 57 % of total OpX spent on bulk 2002/03 18,78% 18,15% 11,68% 23,14% 15,42% 18,31% 22,21% 20,92% 21,62% 17,26% electricty purchases % of total OpX spent on bulk water 2002/03 11,11% 7,45% 3,71% 11,75% 6,68% 0,00% 5,48% 10,69% 8,29% 7,39% purchases % of total OpX contributed to 2002/03 6,36% 0,00% 0,00% 0,66% 5,17% 7,27% 1,18% 2,59% 6,20% 2,62% special funds % of total OpX set aside for 2002/03 5,37% 0,94% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 5,56% 0,80% 0,00% 0,68% 1,56% working capital Administrative efficiency benchmarks Number of permanent staff employed 2003 11 562 18 500 27 200 13 420 3 831 4 146 3 332 Water Dept staff per 1000 water 2003 1,63 1,50 3,58 1,95 2,35 3,00 1,96 3,78 connections Electricity Dept staff per 1000 2003 6,75 3,22 9,05 2,17 2,52 electricty connections Sanitation Dept staff per 1000 2003 2,22 2,09 1,99 1,61 2,23 3,00 2,16 sewer connections Av processing time (days) for 2002/03 5 4 5 10 2 1 applications: Minor building Av processing time (days) for 2002/03 10 20 15 10 15 1 applications: Dwellings Av processing time (days) for 2002/03 27 20 10 4 1 applications: MBW & circ Water reconnections minus 2002/03 -626 -39 069 -20 164 disconnections/restrictions Number of water meters read in 2002/03 2 505 572 3 850 000 1 530 312 1 035 120 702 192 the year Number of water bills sent in the year 2002/03 4 489 716 4 200 000 1 512 396 1 002 840 702 192 Number of estimated water bills 2002/03 1 157 305 350 000 88 576 100 284 sent in year Written queries/complaints received 2002/03 7 112 2 000 7 090 2 001 25 (re billing) Telephone queries/complaints 2002/03 38 867 730 000 19 025 1 679 7 800 received (re billing) 193 STATISTICAL ALMANAC TABLE OF FIGURES 1 Contribution of major cities 39. Measures of dependency 1996-2001 2. Formal housing needs index 40. Reserve Bank data for price of metropolitan services 3. Relative advantage and disadvantage of SACN cities 1970-2002 4. Growth and decline: population and employment 41. Average monthly expenditure on household items, eThekwini 5. Growth rates in SACN cities and 12 secondary cities 42. Percentage of income payable on municipal service 6. Population age and gender pyramids for 3 cities accounts per city 7. Bushbuckridge Demographic Surveillance Survey 43. Per capita disposable income and expenditure on housing 8. Population living in urban areas and utilities 9. Census 2001 date on migration and intra-city movement 44. Percentages of households with access to typical 10. Persons with non-South African citizenship household goods 2001 11. Population and AIDS mortality trends 45. Ownership and access to goods and services per city 12. Population growth and economic development (AMPS 2002) 13. GGP and GGP per capita in SACN cities 1970-1994 46. Spatial disadvantage in Ekurhuleni 14a. GVA and GVA per capita growth in SACN cities 1996- 47. Modes of transport, costs and travel time 2001 48. Population over age 65 per city 1996 vs 2001 14b. Annual GVA growth per sector 1996-2001 and 2001- 49. Indicators of gender equality 2002 50. Satisfaction with standards of living across population 15. Unemployment rates per city groups, eThekwini 16. Numbers employed per city 1946-2001 51. Plans for improving dwellings, eThekwini 17. Gross value add per sector 1970-2001 and actual 52. Density and population group concentration, Tshwane employment growth 53. De-densification of office nodes in Johannesburg 1960- 18. Percentage employment across sectors in 2001 2001 19. Numbers employed in manufacturing 54a. Waste challenge in SACN cities, 2003 20. Employment growth across sectors and occupations 54b. Areas likely to face severe water shortages in 2025 1996-2001 55. Water and water quality indicators, 2003 21. RSC levy assessments 2001-2002 56. Air pollution and related diseases in Johannesburg 22. Income earned by population group and income category 57. Air pollution indicators for cities, 2003 in Tshwane 58. Cape Town's ecological footprint 23. Difference between Census and LFS unemployment rates 59. Cars moving in and out of Johannesburg, 2001 and 2003 per city 60. Financial management targets, City of Johannesburg 24a. Utilisation of manufacturing capacity 61a. Revenue management figures, Johannesburg 24b. Reserve bank Time-series Data 1970-2002 61b. Municipal debt and margin squeeze, Johannesburg 25. Constraints on growth and employment in eThekwini 62. Levels of satisfaction with services across cities 26. Movement of people and goods through airports and ports 63. Residents satisfaction levels, Johannesburg 2003 27. Length of time taken to process planning applications 64. Participation in SACN cities 28. Levels of crime affecting business directly 1994-2003 65. Incidents of public violence per city 1994-2003 29. Value of industrial and commercial building plans passed in 2002 66. Crimes against person statistics in cities, 2002-2003 30. Frequency of urban renewal initiatives 67. Crime statistics per population group, eThekwini 31. Comparison of numbers in households without access to 68. Inner-city membership of organizations, Johannesburg services 2003 32. Changes in access to household water services per city APPENDIX 1 Movement of people across cities 1996-2001 Gross Value Add per city 33. Comparison of cities, formal and informal housing 34. Social services and amenities per city per 10 000 people 35. Geographic distribution of health facilities in Johannesburg 36. Proportion of households with access to levels of services and shelter 37. Census data on household income distribution 38. Income distribution across the SACN cities 194 nwonk toN 23245 30279 4308 5611 6274 3566 17205 24304 55135 City andelaM gruboJ Buffalo 18926 18928 1608 2298 1573 1413 9314 42548 gruboJ 14014 10121 4105 4420 3077 3073 25983 36087 Town Nelson Cape ineluhrukE 12206 6575 892 1358 734 300 3953 36087 ineluhrukE 8689 4549 1917 2152 2110 1192 11438 42548 angaungM 2001­ iniwkehTe 8096 10336 1372 1699 807 7001 11438 25983 iniwkehTe 2580 4239 1752 1412 900 7007 3953 9314 Tshwane 1996 izudnusM 1212 1271 362 145 133 7007 1192 3073 izudnusM 322 560 368 273 76 7001 300 1413 Msundizi out-migrants in-migrants gnuagnaM 3209 3473 200 648 76 900 2110 3077 gnuagnaM 953 1636 390 642 133 807 734 1573 CITIES Ratio Ratio Johannesburg Ethekwini alednaM alednaM Ekurhuleni nosleN 2487 8169 2721 642 273 1412 2152 4420 nosleN 1421 3919 5737 648 145 1699 1358 2298 NINE City andelaM ytiC ytiC cities) olaffuB 1528 702 200 362 892 Buffalo THE 10038 5737 390 368 1752 1917 4105 cities) olaffuB 2089 2721 1372 1608 Town Nelson SACN nwoT SACN Cape OF nwoT epaC 7361 2089 3919 1636 560 4239 4549 10121 epaC 7006 10038 8169 3473 1271 10336 6575 18928 angaungM OUT exclude exclude enawhsT 7006 702 1421 953 322 2580 8689 14014 enawhsT 7361 1528 2487 3209 1212 8096 12206 18926 figures figures Tshwane AND opopmiL 61557 3106 200 596 1145 620 1493 46008 54637 opopmiL 12487 1157 653 354 787 126 3049 9042 12946 Msundizi (province (province out-migrants in-migrants agnalmpM 314 728 734 564 985 636 574 WITHIN 33381 2648 2872 27648 16575 agnalmpM 11541 1530 1169 4398 8548 8967 Total Total column column Johannesburg Ethekwini Ekurhuleni gnetuaG 12974 8720 879 1440 1578 730 4990 20073 37970 gnetuaG 11857 1683 1049 806 2010 373 3697 10399 30922 INTO, leftmost leftmost the tseW the tseW in- in htroN 849 283 41699 3745 491 569 3098 623 1505 7981 24117 in htroN 15310 1865 1346 2808 2543 5999 13423 out- to In: 72: 80: 51: 59: 57: 64: 59: 70: 65: 67: of city city lataN lataN migration Out 28 20 49 41 43 36 41 30 35 33 the Ratio -uluZawK 7020 5849 1306 1203 1273 the 710 677 migration 22199 81147 27321 32589 -uluZawK 2421 1907 1272 7217 28936 4442 9137 into from etatS etatS in has who POPULATION 626 838 410 664 830 309 cities eerF 6539 4417 or moved 8.02% 9.31% 7.87% 5.93% 7.09% 7.54% 9.78% 21773 2318 11211 12370 eerF 2121 1827 cities 11217 2082 3941 5838 % 10.02% 11.03% 10.02% stayed between OF years5 SACN epaC epaC 95 either nrehtroN 3692 374 278 634 842 10878 1018 3199 249 861 2346 3738 SACN nrehtroN 1913 5018 2329 1368 2850 last has other the home other municipality 2001- Moved 198,550 318,196 56,187 93,076 51,259 32,600 219,668 187,125 314,871 198,550 that or epaC or epaC over the 1996 nretsaE 7925 783 82446 27683 25494 3950 3253 24963 22166 24478 nretsaE 1498 12891 11021 8773 1378 4812 4438 7366 place within in population place province epaC epaC same 544,474 774,088 492,425 425,900 MOVEMENT province Stayed 1,373,874 2,057,405 2,435,259 1,816,548 2,277,933 1,373,874 nretseW 3182 500 290 moved same 40630 2347 789 382 1272 1821 2303 to nretseW 5045 3539 1916 4412 1868 2732 3162 6547 2001 the 1: from years % years 2001 that newly 12.93% 8.96% 6.66% 5.71% 7.78% 7.80% 5.48% 10.70% 11.33% 9.13% Total of pop is migrant five Total five 256239 258514 46627 57069 50681 42909 169783 265474 364792 Total out- 99880 65891 45019 40280 37936 24445 in-migrants migrants 119823 113444 194604 last last in in City Mandela APPENDIX Town CITIES City Town Mndela City Mandela Town Tshwane Cape Buffalo Nelson Mangaung Msunduzi eThekwini Ekurhuleni Johannesburg ALL In-migration Tshwane Cape Buffalo Nelson Mangaung Msunduzi eThekwini Ekurhuleni Johannesburg Out-migration Tshwane Cape Buffalo Nelson Mangaung Msunduzi eThekwini Ekurhuleni Johannesburg GROSS VALUE ADD: JOHANNESBURG A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 79,261 98,875 101,172 2.32% 15.19% 126,214 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 182 189 196 3.78% 0.76% 225 2 Mining and quarrying 407 492 467 -5.06% 1.08% 457 3 Manufacturing 13,558 16,180 16,548 2.27% 12.59% 20,574 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 2,028 2,491 2,497 0.25% 10.52% 3,127 5 Construction 2,744 3,145 3,168 0.73% 17.05% 3,796 6 Wholesale and retail trade 14,953 16,734 16,970 1.41% 20.10% 20,069 7 Transport, storage and communication 8,467 12,489 13,029 4.32% 17.94% 16,536 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 23,609 33,651 34,644 2.95% 26.95% 44,766 9 Community, social and personal services 13,313 13,503 13,653 1.11% 12.03% 16,665 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 13,558 16,548 3 3 -0.87% 2.27% 7 4 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 1,793 2,004 5 5 -1.09% -4.93% 6 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 542 550 8 9 -0.10% 4.15% 4 4 32 Wood paper and printing 2,062 2,332 4 4 -0.26% 2.10% 5 6 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 2,133 2,819 3 2 -2.38% 4.77% 8 2 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 593 651 7 8 -4.84% 1.53% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 2,467 3,182 1 1 0.63% 5.27% 3 1 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 533 685 9 7 6.57% 1.34% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 414 451 10 10 4.93% 4.64% 2 3 38 Transport equipment 887 1,286 6 6 -6.12% -0.33% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 2,135 2,588 2 3 -1.41% 3.17% 7 5 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 9. Community, 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. social and 1. Agriculture, TOTAL CITY personal services hunting, forestry 8. Financial, 13% and fishing insurance, real 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 0% estate & business service 2. Mining and quarrying 2. Mining and 35% quarrying 0% 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 3. Manufacturing 16% 5. Construction 4. Electricity, gas 6. Wholesale and retail trade 7. Transport, and water supply storage and 2% 7. Transport, storage and communication communication 13% 5. Construction 3% 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business 6. Wholesale and retail trade 9. Community, social & personal services 18% GROSS VALUE ADD: ETHEKWINI A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 43,278 48,417 50,562 4.43% 8.30% 60,807 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 695 730 760 4.07% 2.89% 873 2 Mining and quarrying 29 23 20 -13.07% 0.07% 21 3 Manufacturing 13,132 14,118 14,743 4.43% 12.25% 17,660 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 1,267 1,413 1,438 1.76% 6.58% 1,724 5 Construction 1,621 1,612 1,668 3.52% 10.07% 1,889 6 Wholesale and retail trade 6,631 6,988 7,357 5.28% 8.90% 8,489 7 Transport, storage and communication 5,023 6,561 7,014 6.90% 10.67% 8,613 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 6,873 8,852 9,351 5.64% 7.87% 11,523 9 Community, social and personal services 8,007 8,120 8,211 1.11% 7.23% 10,015 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 13,132 14,743 1 1 2.57% 4.43% 4 4 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 2,393 2,422 1 2 2.67% -2.48% 6 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 1,638 1,621 3 5 3.90% 7.52% 4 2 32 Wood paper and printing 1,430 1,541 6 7 3.72% 5.15% 5 6 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 2,262 2,707 2 1 1.43% 7.45% 8 3 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 294 303 9 9 -0.84% 4.34% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 1,562 1,823 5 4 4.56% 7.97% 3 1 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 463 530 8 8 10.31% 4.02% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 131 126 10 10 8.77% 7.17% 2 4 38 Transport equipment 1,623 2,113 4 3 -2.35% 1.87% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 1,336 1,557 7 6 2.53% 6.53% 7 5 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 1. Agriculture, 00% 9. Community, 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. hunting, forestry social and and fishing TOTAL CITY personal services 2% 16% 2. Mining and quarrying 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 8. Financial, 0% insurance, real 2. Mining and quarrying estate & business service 3. Manufacturing 18% 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 29% 5. Construction 7. Transport, storage and communication 6. Wholesale and retail trade 14% 7. Transport, storage and communication 4. Electricity, gas 6. Wholesale and and water supply 5. Construction 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business retail trade 3% 15% 3% 9. Community, social & personal services GROSS VALUE ADD: CAPE TOWN A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 71,497 79,868 81,183 1.65% 13.64% 96,763 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 935 971 1,010 4.00% 4.04% 1,160 2 Mining and quarrying 564 574 525 -8.49% 1.21% 537 3 Manufacturing 14,354 14,404 14,633 1.59% 13.39% 17,050 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 1,504 1,465 1,514 3.37% 7.79% 1,744 5 Construction 2,180 2,856 2,827 -1.00% 13.55% 3,544 6 Wholesale and retail trade 11,441 12,769 12,765 -0.03% 15.37% 14,866 7 Transport, storage and communication 7,437 9,879 10,332 4.58% 15.79% 12,441 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 19,787 23,465 23,942 2.03% 22.23% 28,790 9 Community, social and personal services 13,295 13,485 13,634 1.11% 12.01% 16,632 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 14,354 14,633 2 2 5.03% 1.59% 5 5 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 2,101 1,946 2 5 4.63% -5.77% 7 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 2,025 1,868 4 6 6.12% 4.06% 4 2 32 Wood paper and printing 2,088 2,128 3 2 5.78% 1.90% 5 6 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 2,344 2,611 1 1 3.69% 3.63% 8 3 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 572 503 8 8 -0.16% 1.42% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 1,951 2,044 5 3 6.23% 4.36% 3 1 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 455 487 9 9 12.99% 0.07% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 241 209 10 10 11.03% 2.94% 2 4 38 Transport equipment 660 798 7 7 -0.49% -0.81% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 1,917 2,039 6 4 4.73% 2.61% 6 5 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 00% 00% 00% 9. Community, 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% social and 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. personal services 1. Agriculture, 17% hunting, forestry TOTAL CITY and fishing 1% 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 8. Financial, insurance, real 2. Mining and 2. Mining and quarrying estate & business quarrying service 1% 3. Manufacturing 29% 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 18% 5. Construction 4. Electricity, gas 6. Wholesale and retail trade and water supply 7. Transport, 2% storage and 7. Transport, storage and communication communication 5. Construction 13% 3% 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business 6. Wholesale and retail trade 9. Community, social & personal services 16% GROSS VALUE ADD: EKURHULENI A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 41,759 43,187 44,459 2.94% 7.98% 51,355 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 254 266 277 4.07% 1.06% 318 2 Mining and quarrying 816 673 781 15.94% 2.38% 726 3 Manufacturing 12,683 12,408 12,819 3.31% 11.72% 14,537 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 939 1,015 1,025 0.98% 4.87% 1,216 5 Construction 1,588 1,452 1,470 1.22% 9.87% 1,601 6 Wholesale and retail trade 6,300 5,855 5,978 2.10% 8.46% 6,529 7 Transport, storage and communication 5,250 6,604 6,829 3.40% 10.91% 8,089 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 8,086 8,988 9,289 3.35% 9.41% 11,022 9 Community, social and personal services 5,842 5,925 5,991 1.11% 5.28% 7,316 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 12,683 12,819 1 1 1.85% 3.31% 3 5 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 1,482 1,340 3 3 2.00% -4.85% 6 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 141 125 10 9 2.07% 6.20% 5 1 32 Wood paper and printing 932 886 5 6 2.33% 4.02% 4 5 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 2,370 2,586 2 2 1.22% 4.72% 8 4 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 797 726 7 7 -2.22% 2.98% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 4,316 4,384 1 1 3.11% 5.86% 3 2 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 424 415 8 8 8.98% 1.27% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 147 124 9 10 7.88% 4.89% 2 3 38 Transport equipment 859 1,012 6 5 -3.66% 0.29% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 1,213 1,221 4 4 1.37% 3.74% 7 6 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 1. Agriculture, 00% 9. Community, 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. hunting, forestry social and and fishing personal services TOTAL CITY 1% 13% 2. Mining and 8. Financial, quarrying 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing insurance, real 2% estate & business 2. Mining and quarrying service 21% 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 3. Manufacturing 30% 5. Construction 7. Transport, storage and 6. Wholesale and retail trade communication 15% 7. Transport, storage and communication 4. Electricity, gas 6. Wholesale and and water supply retail trade 5. Construction 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business 2% 13% 3% 9. Community, social & personal services GROSS VALUE ADD: TSHWANE A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 46,276 59,256 62,231 5.02% 8.96% 79,089 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 264 274 284 3.78% 1.11% 326 2 Mining and quarrying 63 65 61 -5.83% 0.15% 68 3 Manufacturing 7,072 8,892 9,362 5.29% 6.52% 11,755 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 1,282 1,613 1,652 2.43% 6.65% 2,092 5 Construction 1,468 1,762 1,826 3.59% 9.12% 2,239 6 Wholesale and retail trade 6,573 7,728 8,088 4.65% 8.83% 9,777 7 Transport, storage and communication 5,833 10,737 11,834 10.22% 12.29% 15,938 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 9,415 13,676 14,454 5.69% 10.83% 19,043 9 Community, social and personal services 14,306 14,510 14,671 1.11% 12.93% 17,851 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 7,072 9,362 3 4 1.29% 5.29% 5 3 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 838 976 4 4 1.88% -2.05% 6 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 187 203 8 9 2.76% 8.81% 5 1 32 Wood paper and printing 507 632 6 6 3.03% 5.51% 4 6 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 573 789 5 5 0.38% 7.93% 8 3 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 356 414 7 7 -0.76% 5.49% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 2,047 2,779 1 1 4.43% 8.16% 3 2 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 160 209 9 8 9.20% 4.21% 2 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 113 128 10 10 9.78% 7.00% 1 5 38 Transport equipment 1,395 2,068 2 2 -5.24% 2.94% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 897 1,165 3 3 1.33% 7.02% 7 4 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 9. Community, 00% social and 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. personal services 1. Agriculture, TOTAL CITY 24% hunting, forestry and fishing 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 8. Financial, 0% insurance, real 2. Mining and 2. Mining and quarrying estate & business quarrying service 0% 3. Manufacturing 23% 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 3. Manufacturing 15% 5. Construction 4. Electricity, gas 6. Wholesale and retail trade 7. Transport, and water supply storage and 3% 7. Transport, storage and communication communication 5. Construction 19% 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business 6. Wholesale and 3% retail trade 9. Community, social & personal services 13% GROSS VALUE ADD: NELSON MANDELA A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 14,566 17,665 18,052 2.19% 2.80% 22,098 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 121 126 130 3.94% 0.52% 150 2 Mining and quarrying 9 10 9 -16.20% 0.02% 9 3 Manufacturing 4,870 5,817 5,894 1.32% 4.53% 7,160 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 289 356 353 -0.82% 1.50% 438 5 Construction 402 491 492 0.24% 2.50% 598 6 Wholesale and retail trade 1,958 2,275 2,348 3.20% 2.63% 2,814 7 Transport, storage and communication 1,459 2,247 2,371 5.52% 3.09% 2,995 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 1,853 2,688 2,759 2.64% 2.10% 3,432 9 Community, social and personal services 3,604 3,655 3,696 1.11% 3.26% 4,503 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 4,870 5,894 1 1 2.07% 1.32% 4 5 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 461 483 3 3 3.84% -5.32% 6 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 283 288 6 7 5.05% 4.36% 5 3 32 Wood paper and printing 200 224 8 8 5.15% 2.00% 4 6 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 1,029 1,265 2 2 2.37% 4.45% 8 2 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 176 189 9 9 0.36% 1.36% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 375 451 4 4 5.66% 4.84% 3 1 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 277 326 7 6 11.80% 0.73% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 40 40 10 10 10.36% 3.78% 2 4 38 Transport equipment 1,678 2,211 1 1 -2.26% -0.27% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 350 415 5 5 3.76% 3.14% 7 5 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 1. Agriculture, 00% 9. Community, 80.- 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. hunting, forestry social and and fishing TOTAL CITY personal services 1% 20% 2. Mining and quarrying 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 0% 8. Financial, 2. Mining and quarrying insurance, real estate & business service 3. Manufacturing 15% 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 3. Manufacturing 7. Transport, 33% 5. Construction storage and communication 6. Wholesale and retail trade 13% 7. Transport, storage and communication 6. Wholesale and retail trade 4. Electricity, gas 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business 13% and water supply 5. Construction 2% 3% 9. Community, social & personal services GROSS VALUE ADD: BUFFALO CITY A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 7,595 7,809 7,725 -1.07% 1.47% 8,836 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 119 125 130 4.12% 0.49% 150 2 Mining and quarrying 2 3 3 -9.67% 0.01% 3 3 Manufacturing 1,854 1,742 1,681 -3.46% 1.73% 1,857 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 126 121 114 -6.23% 0.65% 125 5 Construction 276 272 260 -4.29% 1.71% 285 6 Wholesale and retail trade 1,189 1,132 1,124 -0.76% 1.60% 1,226 7 Transport, storage and communication 580 682 680 -0.33% 1.23% 763 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 1,148 1,397 1,373 -1.74% 1.30% 1,551 9 Community, social and personal services 2,301 2,334 2,360 1.11% 2.08% 2,875 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 1,854 1,681 2 2 3.36% -3.46% 5 6 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 367 292 2 2 3.80% -9.83% 7 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 294 255 3 3 5.20% 1.32% 4 2 32 Wood paper and printing 100 85 7 7 4.90% -2.69% 5 7 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 170 159 6 6 2.58% -0.73% 8 3 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 50 43 9 9 0.27% -2.60% 9 6 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 213 213 4 4 5.87% 1.34% 3 1 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 61 55 8 8 11.68% -3.89% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 27 20 10 10 10.05% -1.15% 2 4 38 Transport equipment 391 398 1 1 -1.42% -5.69% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 182 162 5 5 3.82% -2.09% 6 5 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 1. Agriculture, 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% hunting, forestry 00% 9. Community, 100.- 80.- 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. and fishing social and 2% personal services TOTAL CITY 30% 2. Mining and 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing quarrying 0% 2. Mining and quarrying 8. Financial, 3. Manufacturing insurance, real 3. Manufacturing estate & business 22% 4. Electricity, gas and water supply service 18% 5. Construction 4. Electricity, gas 6. Wholesale and retail trade 7. Transport, and water supply storage and 1% 7. Transport, storage and communication communication 9% 5. Construction 6. Wholesale and 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business 3% retail trade 15% 9. Community, social & personal services GROSS VALUE ADD: MANGAUNG A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 8,314 8,760 8,805 0.51% 1.60% 10,174 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 353 374 390 4.28% 1.45% 447 2 Mining and quarrying 37 46 42 -7.85% 0.08% 44 3 Manufacturing 724 691 672 -2.76% 0.67% 748 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 306 305 290 -4.95% 1.59% 325 5 Construction 267 210 203 -3.31% 1.66% 204 6 Wholesale and retail trade 1,462 1,385 1,428 3.06% 1.96% 1,567 7 Transport, storage and communication 952 1,201 1,215 1.16% 2.02% 1,398 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 1,302 1,596 1,580 -0.96% 1.47% 1,804 9 Community, social and personal services 2,911 2,952 2,985 1.11% 2.63% 3,637 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 724 672 5 5 3.21% -2.76% 5 6 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 195 165 1 1 2.67% -8.61% 7 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 67 56 4 6 4.89% 1.92% 3 1 32 Wood paper and printing 56 50 6 8 3.89% -1.22% 5 6 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 71 71 3 3 1.50% 0.75% 8 3 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 16 14 9 9 -0.86% -2.19% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 60 59 5 5 4.78% 1.30% 4 2 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 53 50 8 7 10.44% -2.78% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 7 6 10 10 8.80% 0.15% 2 4 38 Transport equipment 55 61 7 4 -2.56% -4.31% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 145 140 2 2 2.80% -0.57% 6 5 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 9. Community, 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% social and 80.- 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. personal services 1. Agriculture, 35% TOTAL CITY hunting, forestry and fishing 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 4% 2. Mining and quarrying 2. Mining and quarrying 0% 8. Financial, 3. Manufacturing insurance, real estate & business 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas and water supply service 8% 18% 4. Electricity, gas 5. Construction and water supply 3% 6. Wholesale and retail trade 7. Transport, 5. Construction storage and 7. Transport, storage and communication 2% communication 14% 6. Wholesale and 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business retail trade 16% 9. Community, social & personal services GROSS VALUE ADD: MSUNDUZI A. TOTAL PRODUCT AND KEY ECONOMIC SECTORS yti 09 A* 96 01 lato Crof 20 in 19 20 A* GV Rate in in GV 2 h Tfo 002)2( A* A** * * e GV owt 2002 GVA GVA Gr arhS GVlan Sector 2001/200 % or ojected Natio Pr R Million R Million R Million % % R Million TOTAL CITY PRODUCT 4,955 4,900 5,050 3.07% 0.95% 5,805 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 156 158 163 3.22% 0.67% 188 2 Mining and quarrying 12 9 7 -16.18% 0.03% 8 3 Manufacturing 1,028 918 946 3.09% 0.96% 1,052 4 Electricity, gas and water supply 180 180 181 1.00% 0.93% 208 5 Construction 183 153 156 1.85% 1.14% 164 6 Wholesale and retail trade 629 558 579 3.76% 0.84% 619 7 Transport, storage and communication 538 645 687 6.56% 1.14% 790 8 Financial, insurance, real estate & business service 774 803 837 4.24% 0.88% 958 9 Community, social and personal services 1,455 1,476 1,492 1.11% 1.31% 1,818 B. MANUFACTURING SUB-SECTORS zeiS A A A* 96 19 A* yb zeiS GV GV yb A* Rate GV Rate yb Rate yb Rate in GV * 1996 kna GV h 2 h kna h kna h in R owt owt R owt R owt 2002 GVA kna 1996 Gr Gr Gr Gr 2002 2001/200 R 1996 2002 R R Position Position % % Position Position Million Million MANUFACTURING 1,028 946 2 2 0.18% 3.09% 6 5 30 Food, beverages and tobacco products 219 185 1 2 -0.47% -3.80% 7 10 31 Textiles, clothing and leather goods 127 105 5 5 0.73% 6.01% 4 2 32 Wood paper and printing 137 123 3 4 0.56% 3.76% 5 6 33 Fuel, petroleum, chemical and rubber products 129 129 4 3 -1.64% 5.99% 8 3 34 Other non-metallic mineral products 19 17 9 9 -3.91% 3.04% 9 7 35 Metal products, machinery, household appliances 197 192 2 1 1.41% 6.45% 3 1 36 Electrical machinery and apparatus 56 54 7 7 7.08% 2.38% 1 8 37 Electronic, sound/vision, medical & other appli 4 3 10 10 5.53% 5.58% 2 4 38 Transport equipment 46 50 8 8 -5.46% 0.83% 10 9 39 Furniture and other items NEC and recycling 93 89 6 6 -0.45% 4.74% 6 5 C. SECTOR SHARE OF TOTAL GVA (2002) AND GVA GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1996- 2001) GVA growth Employment growth 00% 00% 00% 00% 9. Community, 00% 00% 00% 00% 00% social and 1. Agriculture, 60.- 40.- 20.- 0. 20. 40. 60. 80. 100. personal services hunting, forestry 29% and fishing TOTAL CITY 3% 2. Mining and 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing quarrying 0% 8. Financial, 2. Mining and quarrying insurance, real estate & business 3. Manufacturing service 17% 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas and water supply 19% 5. Construction 6. Wholesale and retail trade 7. Transport, storage and 4. Electricity, gas communication and water supply 7. Transport, storage and communication 14% 4% 6. Wholesale and 5. Construction 8. Finance, insurance, real estate, business retail trade 3% 11% 9. Community, social & personal services