58988 2011 world development report Conflict, Security, and Development 2011 world development report Conflict, Security, and Development 2011 world development report Conflict, Security, and Development © 2011 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org All rights reserved 1 2 3 4 13 12 11 10 This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- opment / The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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Softcover ISBN: 978-0-8213-8439-8 ISSN: 0163-5085 eISBN: 978-0-8213-8440-4 DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-8439-8 Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-8213-8500-5 ISSN: 0163-5085 DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-8500-5 Cover design: Heads of State Photo credits: Overview Picasso/Corbis Images; Chapter 1 Thomas Dworzak/Magnum Pho- tos; Chapter 2 Christopher Anderson/Magnum Photos; Chapter 3 Jonas Bendiksen/Magnum Photos; Chapter 4 Graeme Williams/Panos; Chapter 5 Christopher Furlong/Getty Images; Chapter 6 Gulbuddin Elham/Aina Photo; Chapter 7 Marco Vernaschi/Pulitzer Center; Chap- ter 8 Ron Haviv/VII/Corbis; Chapter 9 Werner Bischof/Magnum Photos Contents Foreword xi Acknowledgments xiii Glossary xv Methodological Note xix Abbreviations and Data Notes xxiii Overview 1 Preamble 1 Part 1: The Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence 21st-century conflict and violence are a development problem that does not fit the 20th-century mold 2 Vicious cycles of conflict: When security, justice, and employment stresses meet weak institutions 6 Part 2: A Roadmap for Breaking Cycles of Violence at the Country Level Restoring confidence and transforming the institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs 8 Practical policy and program tools for country actors 16 Part 3: Reducing the Risks of Violence—Directions for International Policy Track 1: Providing specialized assistance for prevention through citizen security, justice, and jobs 28 Track 2: Transforming procedures and risk and results management in international agencies 31 Track 3: Acting regionally and globally to reduce external stresses on fragile states 34 Track 4: Marshaling support from lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries and global and regional institutions to reflect the changing landscape of international policy and assistance 35 Notes 39 WDR Framework and Structure 45 v vi CONTENTS Part 1: The Challenge 49 1 Repeated Violence Threatens Development 51 Interstate and civil wars have declined since peaking in the early 1990s 51 Modern violence comes in various forms and repeated cycles 53 The developmental consequences of violence are severe 58 Repeated violence is a shared challenge 66 Notes 68 2 Vulnerability to Violence 73 Multiple stresses raise the risks of violence 73 The vicious cycle of weak institutional legitimacy and violence 84 Notes 93 Part 2: Lessons from National and International Responses 97 3 From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 99 Why transforming institutions is so difficult 99 Escaping violence, developing resilience 103 Do not expect too much, too soon 108 Adapt to different contexts 110 Notes 116 4 Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 119 Drawing on lessons from national reformers 119 Inclusive-enough coalitions 120 Delivering early results 128 Notes 139 5 Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 145 Pacing and sequencing institutional transformation 145 Citizen security 148 Justice 153 Jobs 157 What to do systematically but gradually 164 Institutional transformation as a continuous process 170 Notes 174 Contents vii 6 International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 181 The promise and peril of outside support 181 The evolving international architecture 181 Building confidence 185 Supporting institutional transformation 193 Dual accountability and managing the risks of action 200 Lessons of international engagement 205 Notes 208 7 International action to mitigate external stresses 217 External security stresses 218 External economic stresses 226 Resource stresses 229 Between the global and the national: Regional stresses, regional support 233 Notes 240 Part 3: Practical Options and Recommendations 245 8 Practical country directions and options 247 Principles and options, not recipes 247 Basic principles and country-specific frameworks for sustained violence prevention and recovery 247 Practical approaches to confidence-building 250 Program approaches to link early results to transforming institutions 255 External factors: Reducing external stresses and mobilizing external support 262 Notes 266 9 New directions for international support 269 Track 1: Preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs 270 Track 2: Reforming internal agency procedures 276 Track 3: Reducing external stresses: New regional and global action 281 Track 4: Marshaling support from lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries and from global and regional institutions 286 A continuing global learning platform 288 Notes 291 Bibliographical Note 295 References 297 Selected Indicators 335 Selected World Development Indicators 341 Index 365 viii CONTENTS Boxes 1.1 Interstate and civil war—1900 to the present 48 4.9 Nepal: Bringing others in—supplementing government 1.2 Instability, political violence, and drug trafficking in capacity in education 135 West Africa 56 4.10 Nigeria: Strengths and risks of nongovernment capacity in 1.3 Violent crime and insecurity exact high economic the security sector—the Bakassi Boys 136 costs 65 5.1 China’s approach to gradually piloting economic 2.1 Economic and political theories of violence and this reform 146 Report 75 5.2 It takes time to build institutions. First things first—citizen 2.2 The stress posed by transnational organized crime and security, justice, and jobs 147 drug trafficking 76 5.3 Coordinated political, security, and development responses to violence—Lessons from urban, subnational, and organized 2.3 Spillover of conflicts in Central Africa 77 criminal violence in Latin America 148 2.4 External stresses: The deportation of the maras 78 5.4 Colombia’s establishment of civilian oversight and the 2.5 Does unemployment cause violence? Arguments for and Democratic Security Policy 150 against 79 5.5 Reform of the Haiti police force, even in difficult 2.6 Do similar economic factors create risks for political conflict circumstances 153 and extreme levels of violent organized crime? 80 5.6 Innovative court solutions in Latin America 155 2.7 People expect fairness and punish inequity 82 5.7 Experiences in countering corruption 158 2.8 Human rights abuses and future conflict risk 82 5.8 Value chain development in Kosovo and Rwanda 159 2.9 Quantitative research on institutions and violence risk 85 5.9 Technically less than perfect, but robust to circumstances: 2.10 Fragility, weak institutions, governance, and violence 87 Best-fit electricity provision in Lebanon 160 3.1 Unrealistic expectations in fragile states are hurdles to 5.10 Economic empowerment of women: Women’s progress 100 Empowerment Program in Nepal 163 3.2 Premature load-bearing 101 5.11 Pacing institutional transformation 165 3.3 Violence can increase during fast institutional 5.12 Devolution and decentralization can help manage conflict, transformations 102 but are better done gradually 167 3.4 The WDR framework and theories of violence 5.13 Development approaches can empower women in the most prevention 105 fragile environments 170 3.5 “Best-fit” reforms 107 6.1 The benefits of international support: Mozambique 182 3.6 Fragile states and the long time to acquire threshold 6.2 Investing in long-term mediation as a cost-effective institutional capability 109 approach to preventing and responding to 3.7 Optimism or wishful thinking? 110 violence 187 3.8 Spectrum of situation-specific challenges and 6.3 Heading off escalation: Dialogue and compromise in Ghana opportunities 111 in 2003–04 189 3.9 Lessons of the South African transition: Restoring confidence 6.4 International-national institutional partnerships—CICIG and transforming institutions 115 in Guatemala 190 4.1 “All politics is local.” 122 6.5 Quick action? Ghana helps restore electricity in 4.2 Gang-related homicides in Los Angeles 123 Liberia 191 4.3 Signals and commitments for economic management: 6.6 The Aga Khan Development Network: Local knowledge, GEMAP in Liberia 126 longevity, realistic expectations 194 4.4 Pakistan: Using the budget to signal change 128 6.7 Stop-go aid: Volatility in selected fragile states 195 4.5 Building early confidence in Haiti—Challenges and 6.8 Publishing cost estimates as best practice? Trade-offs between reflections 129 transparency and collusion 198 4.6 Only a few visible results are needed to restore confidence: 6.9 Multidonor trust funds: Afghanistan and Southern Examples from civil war, organized criminal, and subnational Sudan 203 violence 130 6.10 Uneven international support to violence prevention and 4.7 Different sectors, core goals 132 recovery in West Africa 208 4.8 Community-driven development strengthens state-society 7.1 The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration relations in Afghanistan 133 Program: Addressing regional violence 219 Contents ix 7.2 The Kimberley Process for “conflict diamonds” 221 8.1 Confidence-building in South Africa, 1990–94, and 7.3 The economics of cocaine trafficking 222 Colombia, 2002 onward 254 7.4 Multiple interdiction efforts: Cocaine in the 8.2 Adapting community-level program design to country Americas 223 context: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, and Rwanda 261 7.5 Expert viewpoints: For and against regulated drug legalization to reduce violence 224 8.3 Anti-corruption approaches in Liberia and Mozambique 262 7.6 Partnering with client countries to curb corruption in World Bank–funded projects 227 8.4 Bilateral cooperation against corruption and money laundering in Haiti and Nigeria 264 7.7 The Australian Crime Commission’s high-risk money movement strategy 229 8.5 Phasing the transition from international humanitarian aid to local institutions: Afghanistan and Timor-Leste 266 7.8 Growing regional and global approaches to food insecurity 230 9.1 Preventing violence: Prioritizing investment in citizen security and justice reforms 273 7.9 Global approaches to land 232 9.2 Flexible peacekeeping arrangements 281 7.10 The role of regional institutions and initiatives in norm- setting and violence prevention 234 9.3 Preventing violence: Prioritizing investment in citizen security and justice reforms 282 7.11 Pooling services regionally 236 9.4 The role of regional institutions and initiatives in norm- 7.12 Early European measures to create shared economic interests setting and violence prevention 289 in peace 237 Features Overview Chapters 1 How violence is changing 3 1 The interlinked and evolving nature of modern organized 2 High stresses and weak institutions = risks of violence 9 violence 67 3 Country experiences of confidence-building and 2 Nepal: Stresses, institutions, violence, and legitimacy 90 transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and 3 Restoring security in Colombia 113 jobs 14 4 Indonesia: Restoring confidence in Aceh 137 4 Core tools 17 5 Violence in Central America—Depth of institutional 5 Adapting community-level program design to country transformation matters 172 context 24 6 A tale of two assistance programs—Liberia and Guinea- 6 Patterns of international assistance to violence-affected Bissau 206 countries 27 7 Central Asia: External pressures and external 7 Internal agency reform 32 assistance 238 8 Regional initiatives and norms and standards 38 Figures F1.1 Deaths from civil wars are declining 3 F6.2 Aid volatility increases with duration of violence 27 F1.2 Organized criminal violence threatens peace processes 4 F6.3 Stop-go aid: Volatility in selected fragile states 27 F1.3 The gap in poverty is widening between countries affected by 3.2 Combined action across the security, development, and violence and others 4 humanitarian spheres for external actors to support national F2.1 What are citizens’ views on the drivers of conflict? 9 institutional transformations 29 F2.2 What drives people to join rebel movement and gangs? 9 1.1 Gangs and trafficking are global concerns 53 2.1 Moving from fragility and violence to institutional resilience 1.2 Victims of terrorism 55 in citizen security, justice, and jobs 12 1.3 Criminal violence in Central America is on the rise despite 3.1 The dual accountability dilemma for donors engaged in political peace 58 fragile and conflict environments 26 1.4 Violence creates suffering for families in myriad ways: F6.1 Uneven international support in West Africa—Post-conflict Responses to survey on experiences of violence on immediate trumps prevention 27 family member in last three years 59 x CONTENTS 1.5 Widening gap in poverty between countries affected by 2.3 The vicious cycle of violence, elite pacts, weak institutions— violence and those not experiencing violence 60 and vulnerability to repeated violence 89 1.6 Violence is the main constraint to meeting the MDGs 62 3.1 WDR Framework: Repeated cycles of action to bolster 1.7 The widening gap in infant mortality rates between countries institutional resilience 103 affected by violence and others 63 6.1 Uneven international support in West Africa—Post-conflict 1.8 Effects of violence on growth are dramatic and long- trumps prevention 184 lasting 64 6.2 International support to nation-states—The dual 2.1 What drives people to join ideological militant accountability dilemma 201 movements 83 9.1 Adapting the modality of assistance to risk 278 2.2 Food price protests and associated violence are concentrated in fragile states 86 Maps Trafficking and violence during conflicts in West Africa, The current (fragmented) state of international cooperation 1990–2009 56 against drugs in the Americas 223 Cross-border political violence spreads across Central 7.1 Water availability, fragility, and the potential for riparian Africa 77 conflict in Africa 231 The shifting epicenter of political violence in Nepal 91 7.2 Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional infrastructure challenge in fragile states 235 Tables F1.1 Violence often recurs 3 7.1 To defeat trafficking in commodities, pay attention to 1.1 Security, economic, and political stresses 7 physical and market characteristics of the products 220 2.1 Fastest progress in institutional transformation—An estimate 7.2 Shared administration can help fragile and conflict-affected of realistic ranges 11 states provide better quality public services 236 1.1 Country case examples of multiple forms of violence 54 8.1 Situation-specific challenge and opportunities 249 1.2 Countries often relapse into conflict 58 8.2 Core tools for restoring confidence 251 1.3 The gender-disaggregated impacts of violent conflict 61 9.1 International tools to link confidence-building and institutional transformation across the political, security, 2 Officer-level entry into Nepal government service by caste/ development, and humanitarian spheres 272 ethnic group (percentages) 91 9.2 Compelling and feasible short-term indicators 279 2.1 Security, economic, and political stresses 74 3 Nepal’s multiple forms of violence, 1960–present 92 Foreword In 1944, delegates from 45 countries gathered at Bretton Woods to consider the economic causes of the World War that was then still raging, and how to secure the peace. They agreed to create the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the original institution of what has become the World Bank Group. As the delegates noted, “Programs of reconstruction and development will speed economic progress everywhere, will aid political stability and foster peace.” The IBRD approved its first loan to France in 1947 to aid in the rebuilding of that country. Over 60 years later, the “R” in IBRD has a new meaning: reconstructing Afghanistan, Bos- nia, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, and other lands of conflict or broken states. Paul Collier’s book, The Bottom Billion, highlighted the recurrent cycles of weak governance, poverty, and violence that have plagued these lands. Not one low-income coun- try coping with these problems has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. And the problems of fragile states spread easily: They drag down neighbors with violence that overflows borders, because conflicts feed on narcotics, piracy, and gender violence, and leave refugees and broken infrastructure in their wake. Their territories can become breeding grounds for far-reaching networks of violent radicals and organized crime. In 2008, I gave a speech on “Securing Development” to the International Institute for Stra- tegic Studies. I chose the forum to emphasize the interconnections among security, gover- nance, and development, and to make the point that the separate disciplines are not well integrated to address the inter-related problems. I outlined the challenge: bringing security and development together to put down roots deep enough to break the cycles of fragility and conflict. As we are now seeing again in the Middle East and North Africa, violence in the 21st cen- tury differs from 20th-century patterns of interstate conflict and methods of addressing them. Stove-piped government agencies have been ill-suited to cope, even when national interests or values prompt political leaders to act. Low incomes, poverty, unemployment, income shocks such as those sparked by volatility in food prices, rapid urbanization, and inequality between groups all increase the risks of violence. External stresses, such as trafficking and illicit finan- cial flows, can add to these risks. The 2011 World Development Report looks across disciplines and experiences drawn from around the world to offer some ideas and practical recommendations on how to move beyond conflict and fragility and secure development. The key messages are important for all coun- tries—low, middle, and high income—as well as for regional and global institutions: First, institutional legitimacy is the key to stability. When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion—the likelihood xi xii F O R E WO R D of violent conflict increases. At the earliest stages, countries often need to restore public con- fidence in basic collective action even before rudimentary institutions can be transformed. Early wins—actions that can generate quick, tangible results—are critical. Second, investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs is essential to reducing violence. But there are major structural gaps in our collective capabilities to support these areas. There are places where fragile states can seek help to build an army, but we do not yet have similar resources for building police forces or corrections systems. We need to put greater emphasis on early projects to create jobs, especially through the private sector. The Report provides insight into the importance of the involvement of women in political coalitions, security and justice reform, and economic empowerment. Third, confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change. Interna- tional agencies and partners from other countries must adapt procedures so they can respond with agility and speed, a longer-term perspective, and greater staying power. Assistance needs to be integrated and coordinated; multi-donor trust funds have proven useful in accomplish- ing these aims while lessening the burdens of new governments with thin capacity. We need a better handoff between humanitarian and development agencies. And we need to accept a higher level of risk: If legislatures and inspectors expect only the upside, and just pillory the failures, institutions will steer away from the most difficult problems and strangle themselves with procedures and committees to avoid responsibility. This Report suggests some specific actions and ways of measuring results. Fourth, we need to adopt a layered approach. Some problems can be addressed at the coun- try level, but others need to be addressed at a regional level, such as developing markets that integrate insecure areas and pooling resources for building capacity. Some actions are needed at a global level, such as building new capacities to support justice reform and the creation of jobs; forging partnerships between producer and consumer countries to stem illegal traffick- ing; and acting to reduce the stresses caused by food price volatility. Fifth, in adopting these approaches, we need to be aware that the global landscape is chang- ing. Regional institutions and middle income countries are playing a larger role. This means we should pay more attention to south-south and south-north exchanges, and to the recent transition experiences of middle income countries. The stakes are high. A civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty. Finding effective ways to help societies escape new outbursts or repeated cycles of violence is critical for global security and global development—but doing so requires a fundamental rethinking, including how we assess and manage risk. Any such changes must be based on a clear roadmap, and on strong incentives. I hope this Report will help others and ourselves in sketching such a roadmap. Robert B. Zoellick President The World Bank Group Acknowledgments This Report has been prepared by a core team led by Sarah Cliffe and Nigel Roberts and comprising Erik Alda, David Andersson, Kenneth Anye, Holly Benner, Natalia Cieslik, Ivan Crouzel, Markus Kostner, Daniel Maree, Nicholas Marwell, Gary Milante, Stephen Ndegwa, Kyle Peters, Nadia Selim, Pia Simonsen, Nicholas van Praag, Suranjan Weeraratne, and Niko- las Win Myint. Bruce Jones served as a Senior External Advisor to the team and made major contributions as did James Fearon, Jack Goldstone, and Lant Pritchett. Markus Kostner acted as Co-Director during part of the Report’s preparation. Bruce Ross-Larson was the principal editor. World Development Report 2011 is co-sponsored by Development Economics (DEC) and the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPC). The work was conducted under the gen- eral guidance of Justin Yifu Lin in DEC and Jeffrey Gutman and Joachim von Amsberg in OPC. Caroline Anstey, Paul Birmingham, Hassan Cisse, Shahrokh Fardoust, Varun Gauri, Faris Hadad-Zervos, Ann Harrison, Karla Hoff, Phillip Keefer, Anne-Marie Leroy, Rui Manuel De Almeida Coutinho, Alastair McKechnie, Vikram Raghavan, and Deborah Wetzel also pro- vided valuable guidance. The WDR team extends a special thank you to the World Bank’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group (OPCFC) and the Global Expert Team on Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries (FCS GET) for their extensive inputs and feedback throughout the WDR development process. An Advisory Council comprised of Madeleine Albright, Louise Arbour, Lakhdar Brahimi, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Paul Collier, Nitin Desai, Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Mar- tin Griffiths, Mohamed “Mo” Ibrahim, H.E. Paul Kagame, Ramtane Lamamra, Shivshankar Menon, Louis Michel, Jorge Montaño, Jay Naidoo, Kenzo Oshima, Surin Pitsuwan, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Dmitri Trenin, Wu Jianmin, and George Yeo provided extensive and excellent advice. World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick provided guidance and comments. Many others inside and outside the World Bank contributed with comments and inputs. The Development Data Group contributed to the data appendix and was responsible for the Selected World Development Indicators. The team benefitted greatly from a wide range of consultations. Meetings were held in Afghanistan, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. The team wishes to thank participants in these workshops, videoconferences, and online discussions, which included policy makers, government officials, and representatives of nongovernmental, civil society and private sector organizations. The team would like to acknowledge the generous support of the African Union, the Asso- ciation of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the Government of Australia, the xiii xiv AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S Government of Canada, the Government of China, the Government of Denmark, the Gov- ernment of Finland, the Government of Germany, the Government of Japan, the Government of Mexico, the Government of the Netherlands, the Government of Norway, the Government of Sweden, the Government of Switzerland, the Government of the United Kingdom, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations. The team also wishes to acknowledge the tireless support of the WDR Production Team: Jessica Ardinoto, Nga (Ty) Lopez, Bertha Medina, Brónagh Murphy, and Jason Victor. The resource management support of Irina Sergeeva and Sonia Joseph is also much appreci- ated as well as the excellent production, publishing, translation, and dissemination support provided by the Office of the Publisher and GSD Translation Services, with special thanks to Mary Fisk, Stephen McGroarty, Nancy Lammers, Santiago Pombo-Bejarano, Denise Bergeron, Janet Sasser, Jose de Buerba, Mario Trubiano, Alison Reeves, Mayya Revzina, Cecile Jannotin, and Hector Hernaez for their contributions. Debra Naylor and Gerry Quinn provided design and graphics expertise. We also thank Ivar Cederholm, Jean-Pierre Djomalieu, Sharon Faulkner, Vivian Hon, Gytis Kanchas, Rajvinder (Dolly) Kaur, Alex- ander Kent, Esabel Khoury, Nacer Megherbi, Thyra Nast, Jimmy Olazo, Nadia Piffaretti, Carol Pineau, Jean Gray Ponchamni, Swati Priyadarshini, Janice Rowe-Barnwell, Merrell Tuck-Primdahl, and Constance Wilhel for their kind support to the team. Many thanks as well to Jeffrey Lecksell for expert production of map graphics. We appreciate the efforts of the World Bank’s New York Office, including Dominique Bichara and Tania Meyer, as well as colleagues who assisted with WDR consultations worldwide—including those in the World Bank offices in Afghanistan, Belgium, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. Glossary Organized violence—the use or threat of physical force by groups. Includes state actions against other states or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing sides, communal conflicts based on regional, ethnic, religious or other group identities or compet- ing economic interests, gang-based violence and organized crime and international nonstate armed movements with ideological aims. While an important topic for development, we do not cover domestic or interpersonal violence. At times we refer to violence or conflict as a short-hand for organized violence, understood in these terms. Many countries address certain forms of violence, such as terrorist attacks by nonstate armed movements, as matters that are subject to their criminal laws. Repeated cycles of violence—Countries or subnational areas that have seen more than one episode of organized violence for 20–30 years. Stresses—The political, social, security, or economic risks that correlate with organized vio- lence. Violence is more likely when a combination of stresses operate in an environment characterized by weak institutions. Stresses can be internal—within the potential capacity of an individual state to control—or external, emanating from regional or global dynamics. Confidence—Trust between groups of citizens who have been divided by violence, between citizens and the state, and between the state and other stakeholders (neighbors, international partners, investors). Expectations—The way people make judgments about the future and how it will affect them, their families, and their communities. In situations where a track record of violence has cre- ated low trust, both excessively low and excessively high expectations can create problems for government policy. Elite pacts—Formal or informal agreements by the holders of political, military, or economic power. These agreements, often enforced through coercion and patronage, are typically “per- sonalized,” based on individual agreements. Throughout history the key motivating factor in forming an elite pact has been the wish to contain violence and to secure the property and economic interests and opportunities of pact members. The Report argues that elite pacts can provide short term security but that violence often recurs unless the pact broadens and is accompanied by institutional transformation. xv xvi G LO S S A RY Institutions—The formal and informal “rules of the game.” They include formal rules, written laws, organizations, informal norms of behavior and shared beliefs—and the organizational forms that exist to implement and enforce these norms (both state and nonstate organiza- tions). Institutions shape the interests, incentives, and behaviors that can facilitate violence. Unlike elite pacts, institutions are impersonal—they continue to function irrespective of the presence of particular leaders, and thus provide greater guarantees of sustained resilience to violence. Institutions operate at all levels of society—local, national, regional, and global. Fragility and fragile situations—Periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, account- ability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence. Research for the Report reinforces the close link between institutional fragility and the risk of conflict. Legitimacy—Normatively, this term denotes a broad-based belief that social, economic, or political arrangements and outcomes are proper and just. The concept is typically applied to institutions. Legitimacy is acquired by building trust and confidence among various parties. Forms of legitimacy include process legitimacy (which relates to the way in which decisions are made), performance legitimacy (which relates to action, including the delivery of public goods), and international legitimacy (which relates to the discharge of values and responsibili- ties that international law view as the responsibility of states). Capacity—The ability of institutions to carry out their core functions efficiently and effec- tively. When states lack this capacity, they cannot mitigate stresses that might induce organized violence. Accountability—The ability of institutions to be responsive to citizens, including abiding by their aggregated preferences, disclosing necessary information, permitting citizen participa- tion in decision-making, and allowing for citizen sanction of public officials on the basis of publicly recognized norms and procedures. Citizen security—Both freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence. Applied to the lives of all members of a society (whether nationals of the country or other- wise), it encompasses security at home, in the workplace, and in political, social, and economic interactions with the state and other members of society. Similar to human security, “citizen security” places people at the center of efforts to prevent and recover from violence. Justice and inclusion—The Report uses justice in two ways. The first use refers to the broadly held notion of fairness. While this varies in different societies, it is a universally identifi- able concept and carries the notion of fair process and due outcomes in the distribution of political power, resources, opportunities, and sanctions. The second use is more specific: the institutions that are central to resolving conflicts arising over alleged violations or different interpretations of the rules that societies create to govern members’ behavior; and that, as a consequence, are central to strengthening the normative framework (laws and rules) that shapes public and private actions. This includes the elements of the justice system most critical to preventing or transitioning out of violence: core criminal justice functions—the ability of the police, courts, and penal system to fairly investigate, prosecute and punish acts linked to organized violence—and institutions required to address underlying disputes that contribute to violence (for example, institutions that deal with land and property dispute resolution). Glossary xvii Transition moments—Events that make new efforts to prevent or recover from violence pos- sible. These can involve space for deep and wide-ranging change (for example, the end of a war, a deep national crisis, a change in government after one party has been in power many years) or more limited change (a new governmental reform plan or shift in key appointments, negotiations or coalition-building between different actors in society, events that spur reflec- tion in society such as riots, military defeats, natural disasters, or key political anniversaries). Collaborative, inclusive-enough coalitions—Unlike elite pacts, these coalitions involve broader segments of society—local governments, business, labor, civil society movements, in some cases opposition parties. Coalitions are “inclusive enough” when they involve the parties nec- essary to restore confidence and transform institutions and help create continued momen- tum for positive change; and when there is local legitimacy for excluding some groups—for example because of electoral gains, or because groups or individuals have been involved in abuses. Signaling—Demonstrating an intention to break with past policies—in the context of this Report, policies that have increased violent risks. Signals are designed to mobilize coalitions of support, and can be made through announcements or through actions—for example, appointments and redeployments of security forces. Commitment mechanisms—Ways to persuade stakeholders that intentions to break with past policies will not be reversed, including creating independent functions for implementing or monitoring agreements. Early results—Visible improvements to security, justice, and inclusion, economic oppor- tunities, and services, delivered in the first 100 days and the first 12 months following an announced change in policy prevent or recover from violent crises. Sequencing and prioritizing reforms—Deciding on the type and scope of changes societies will make first, those that will be addressed later, and the timeframes for achieving change. Pragmatic, best-fit approaches—Programs, institutions and reforms that are not technically the lowest-cost option for achieving outcomes, but are adapted to local political, security, and institutional realities. Transforming institutions—Developing over time “rules of the game” that increase resilience to risks of violence, including laws, organizations, norms of behavior, and shared beliefs that ensure that the benefits from individuals choosing to act peacefully and lawfully exceed the costs. Methodological Note One of the greatest challenges in researching lessons on violence prevention and recovery is the lack of available quantitative and qualitative data, due to challenges of security and access, along with low statistical capacity. Even in the World Bank’s comprehensive data sets, countries most affected by violence often register empty data columns. Polling, household surveys, and evaluations of the impacts of policies and project interventions are also limited in violence-affected countries and regions. A growing body of literature on civil war focuses more on the causes of war than on the policies to prevent or recover from violence, and less analysis is available on organized crimi- nal violence. Over the past decade, however, this Report has benefited from a growing body of multi-disciplinary research (political science, economics, sociology, psychology, security studies) and policy papers on peacebuilding, statebuilding, conflict prevention, reconstruction and stabilization operations, peacekeeping, and conflict recovery, complemented by a large data set from multiple sources (the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo, and Human Security Report Project, homicide data from national sources, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Health Organization (WHO), geospatial coding of conflict events and data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database and polling from regional barometers as well as surveys conducted by Fafo). As the topics of violence and development transcend academic and policy disciplines, it has been crucial that a common understanding of key terms be developed and used for the report (see the glossary). For this project, background papers by respected academic researchers have produced significant new econometric work on the relationship between institutions and vio- lence, further complemented by country and regional case study research and consultations. Learning from experience: Generating a global conversation The WDR team sought to complement research by generating a global conversation with national reformers, civil society and private sector leaders, as well as regional and interna- tional policymakers, grappling with violence in diverse regions worldwide. The team focused explicitly on moving this conversation beyond the ‘traditional’ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donors and multilateral partners for the World Bank, to engage with national reformers, middle income country policy makers, regional institutions and diplomatic and security partners, including: • Consultations and multi-stakeholder round-tables with government leadership, civil society, private sectors, media and international actors in some twenty low- and middle- income countries and regions that are presently affected by violent conflict, or have man- aged to escape from it in recent years. Countries and regions visited included Afghanistan, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, xix xx M E T H O D O LO G I C A L N O T E Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. • Regional discussions with policymakers and experts to explore diverse experiences and perspectives and the importance of regional action, including in two workshops in coop- eration with the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, a session hosted by ASEAN in Jakarta, a regional workshop in Mexico City, a Mid- dle East/North African regional workshop in Beirut, and sessions in Brussels in coopera- tion with the European Union. • Cooperation and exchanges with the United Nations system on the political, security, development, and humanitarian dynamics of the challenge. A number of exchanges have been held with the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN Secretariat and UN agencies, funds and programs. The team has also engaged with the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuild- ing, the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks. • Consultations in capitals to generate lessons from policymakers, experts, nongovernmental organization (NGOs) and private sector representatives, including Berlin, Beijing, Berne, Cairo, Copenhagen, Delhi, the Hague, Helsinki, Jakarta, Jeddah, London, Mexico City, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Stockholm and Tokyo. • The 2011WDR brought together an Advisory Council of high-level leaders and practitio- ners as a sounding board for emerging thinking, and to offer practical advice on the reali- ties of policy-making in countries affected by conflict (box 1). • WDR brainstorming sessions have also been held to tap the knowledge and experience of academics, policymakers and NGO Representatives, in partnership with other multilateral, think tank, academic, and regional institutions. Methodological Note xxi BOX 1 The 2011 WDR Advisory Council The 2011 WDR Advisory Council was convened at the beginning of the WDR process to exchange with the team on the Report’s emerging messages and recommendations. Membership includes a diverse cross-section of national, regional, multilateral, and civil society leaders with deep experience in conflict prevention and recovery. The Advisory Council met three times during the Report development process: September 2009 in Washington DC; February 2010 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and September 2010 in Beijing, China. AC Members also used their convening power to support WDR capital visits in regional consultations worldwide. Based on their reflections on WDR themes, the Report includes individual contributions from Advisory Council Members, which reflect their personal views. These boxes include lessons from AC Members’ own involvement in conflict settings or topical discussions based on their expertise. Advisory Council Members Madeleine Albright, Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group; former U.S. Secretary of State Louise Arbour, President, International Crisis Group; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Lakhdar Brahimi, Former United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General for Afghanistan and Iraq Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of Sates Paul Collier, Professor of Economics, Oxford University Nitin Desai, Former UN Under Secretary General for Social and Economic Affairs Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Former Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti Martin Griffiths, Former Director, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Mohamed “Mo” Ibrahim, Founder, Mo Ibrahim Foundation and Founder, Celtel H.E. Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner, Peace and Security Council, African Union Louis Michel, Member of the European Parliament Jorge Montano, Director General, Asesoría y Análisis; former Ambassador of Mexico to the U.S. Jay Naidoo, Chairman, Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition; former Chair, Development Bank of Southern Africa Kenzo Oshima, Senior Vice President of Japan International Cooperation Agency Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations Marta Lucía Ramirez de Rincón, Fundación Ciudadanía en Acción; former Minister of Defense—Colombia H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia Dmitri Trenin, Director, Moscow Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Wu Jianmin, Chairman of the Shanghai Center for International Studies H.E. George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Singapore Fostering a continuing conversation This WDR has laid a major emphasis on communication because, from the start, the aim was not just to inform but to reach out across multiple policy communities, to enhance understanding of trends in conflict, and to promote practical changes in the way we address conflict. This implied a longer term strategy than for previous reports to build momentum over time with the aim of clarifying the challenges, testing policy prescriptions and advocating concrete proposals. The extensive outreach program has both contributed to the substance of the report and initiated the communication process much earlier than previous WDRs. This WDR is also making extensive use of video, the web and social media to broaden the public discussion on fragility and conflict. An interactive website has been launched featuring data used in the report, thematic background papers, WDR conflict case studies, video material, blogs, and twitter feeds (the WDR blog at http://blogs.worldbank.org/conflict and our twitter site at http://twitter.com/wbConflict). Abbreviations and Data Notes Abbreviations AC Advisory Council, Word Development Report 2011 ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Database ADB Asian Development Bank AfDB African Development Bank AFSIS ASEAN Food Security Information System AKDN Aga Khan Development Network ANC African National Congress ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AU African Union AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) AUPSC African Union Peace and Security Council AusAID Australian Government Overseas Aid Program Austrac Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center AZAPO Azanian People’s Organisation, South Africa BRA Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh (Aceh Peace-Reintegration Board) BRAVO Birth Registration for All Versus Oblivion CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CCAI Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (Colombia) CDD community driven development CICIG Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala) CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPA Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq) CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CV coefficient of variance DAC Development Assistance Committee DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DESEPAZ Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz DfID Department for International Development, UK ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission EGSC Economic Governance Steering Committee EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ELN National Liberation Army (Colombia) xxiii xxiv A B B R E V I AT I O N S A N D DATA N O T E S ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Spain) EU European Union Fafo Institutt for Anvendte Internasjonale Studier (Institute for Labor and Social Research, Norway) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations) FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan) FATF Financial Action Task Force FDI foreign direct investment FINCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. FINTRAC Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center, Canada FIU financial intelligence unit FMLN Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) El Salvador FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front) GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) GDP gross domestic product GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program GMS Greater Mekong Sub-region GIS geographic information system GNI gross national income HNP Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d‘Haïti) IADB Inter-American Development Bank ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICRG International Country Risk Guide IDA International Development Association IDP internally displaced persons IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation IFI International Financial Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund INCAF International Network on Conflict and Fragility IRA Irish Republican Army ISAF International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan KDP Kecamatan Development Program (Indonesia) KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (province in Pakistan) MDG Millennium Development Goal MDRP Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (Africa) MDTF Multi-donor Trust Fund MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) MOU memorandum of understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCP National Conciliation Party (El Salvador) NGO nongovernmental organization NSP National Solidarity Program (Afghanistan) NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia ODA official development assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Abbreviations and Data Notes xxv ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique PAC Pan Africanist Congress (South Africa) PCNA Post Conflict Needs Assessment PFM Public Financial Management Review PRIO Peace Research Institute (Oslo) RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique) SADC Southern African Development Community SALW small arms and light weapons SOCA Serious Organized Crime Agency, U.K. SMS short message service STAR Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative START Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada) SPF Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund (World Bank) UN United Nations UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNOHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNOGBIS United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau UNPBC United Nations Peacebuilding Commission UNPBF United Nations Peacebuilding Fund UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution USAID United States Agency for International Development WDR World Development Report WFP World Food Programme WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators WHO World Health Organization Definitions and data notes The countries included in regional and income groupings in this Report are listed in the Classification of Economies table at the end of the Selected World Development Indicators. Income classifications are based on GNP per capita; thresholds for income classifications in this edition may be found in the Introduction to Selected World Development Indicators. Group averages reported in the figures and tables are unweighted averages of the countries in the group, unless noted to the contrary. The use of the countries to refer to economies implies no judgment by the World Bank about the legal or other status of territory. The term developing countries includes low- and middle-income economies and thus may include economies in transition from central plan- ning, as a matter of convenience. Dollar figures are current U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified. Billion means 1,000 mil- lion; trillion means 1,000 billion. CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO TRANSFORMI RING CON RE S FID TO TRANSFORMING E NC E RING NG CON IN RE S IT ST F I DE NC E TO UT TRANSFORMIN RING IO NS CON IN FID IT ST UT ENCE IO GI NS N IT ST UT IO NS VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Overview Preamble ing poverty in the past 60 years, areas char- acterized by repeated cycles of political and E fforts to maintain collective se- criminal violence are being left far behind, curity are at the heart of human their economic growth compromised and history: from the earliest times, their human indicators stagnant. the recognition that human safety For those who now live in more stable depends on collaboration has been a mo- neighborhoods, it may seem incomprehensi- tivating factor for the formation of village ble how prosperity in high-income countries communities, cities, and nation-states. The and a sophisticated global economy can coex- 20th century was dominated by the legacy ist with extreme violence and misery in other of devastating global wars, colonial struggles, parts of the globe. The pirates operating off and ideological conflicts, and by efforts to the coast of Somalia who prey on the ship- establish international systems that would ping through the Gulf of Aden illustrate the foster global peace and prosperity. To some paradox of the existing global system. How extent these systems were successful—wars is it that the combined prosperity and capa- between states are far less common than they bility of the world’s modern nation-states were in the past, and civil wars are declining cannot prevent a problem from antiquity? in number. How is it that, almost a decade after renewed Yet, insecurity not only remains, it has international engagement with Afghanistan, become a primary development challenge the prospects of peace seem distant? How is it of our time. One-and-a-half billion people that entire urban communities can be terror- live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or ized by drug traffickers? How is it that coun- large-scale, organized criminal violence, and tries in the Middle East and North Africa no low-income fragile or conflict-affected could face explosions of popular grievances country has yet to achieve a single United despite, in some cases, sustained high growth Nations Millennium Development Goal (UN and improvement in social indicators? MDG). New threats—organized crime and This World Development Report (WDR) trafficking, civil unrest due to global economic asks what spurs risks of violence, why con- shocks, terrorism—have supplemented con- flict prevention and recovery have proven so tinued preoccupations with conventional war difficult to address, and what can be done by between and within countries. While much of national leaders and their development, secu- the world has made rapid progress in reduc- rity, and diplomatic partners to help restore a 2 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 stable development path in the world’s most clearly defined rebel movements, are known. fragile and violence-torn areas. The central If a dispute escalates and full-scale hostilities message of the Report is that strengthening ensue, an eventual end to hostilities (either legitimate institutions and governance to through victory and defeat or through a ne- provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is gotiated settlement) is followed by a short crucial to break cycles of violence. Restor- “post-conflict” phase leading back to peace. ing confidence and transforming security, The global system is largely built around this justice, and economic institutions is possible paradigm of conflict, with clear roles for na- within a generation, even in countries that tional and international actors in development have experienced severe conflict. But that in promoting the prosperity and capability requires determined national leadership and of the nation-state (but stepping out during an international system “refitted” to address active conflict), in diplomacy in preventing 21st-century risks: refocusing assistance on and mediating disputes between states and preventing criminal and political violence, between government and rebel movements, reforming the procedures of international in peacekeeping in the aftermath of conflict, agencies, responding at a regional level, and and in humanitarianism in providing relief. renewing cooperative efforts among lower-, 21st-century violence1 does not fit the middle-, and higher-income countries. The 20th-century mold. Interstate war and civil Report envisages a layered approach to ef- war are still threats in some regions, but they fective global action, with local, national, re- have declined over the last 25 years. Deaths gional, and international roles. from civil war, while still exacting an unac- Because of the nature of the topic, this Re- ceptable toll, are one-quarter of what they port has been developed in an unusual way— were in the 1980s (Feature 1, figure F1.1).2 drawing from the beginning on the knowledge Violence and conflict have not been ban- of national reformers and working closely ished: one in four people on the planet, more with the United Nations and regional institu- than 1.5 billion, live in fragile and conflict- tions with expertise in political and security affected states or in countries with very high issues, building on the concept of human levels of criminal violence.3 But because of security. The hope is that this partnership the successes in reducing interstate war, the will spark an ongoing effort to jointly deepen remaining forms of conflict and violence do our understanding of the links between secu- not fit neatly either into “war” or “peace,” or rity and development, and will foster practical into “criminal violence” or “political violence” action on the Report’s findings. (see Feature 1, F1.1–1.2 and table F1.1). Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak gov- PART 1: THE CHALLENGE ernance, and instability. First, conflicts often are not one-off events, but are ongoing and OF REPEATED CYCLES OF repeated: 90 percent of the last decade’s civil VIOLENCE wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years.4 Second, 21st-century conflict and violence new forms of conflict and violence threaten are a development problem that development: many countries that have suc- does not fit the 20th-century mold cessfully negotiated political and peace agree- ments after violent political conflicts, such Global systems in the 20th century were as El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, designed to address interstate tensions and now face high levels of violent crime, con- one-off episodes of civil war. War between straining their development. Third, different nation-states and civil war have a given logic forms of violence are linked to each other. and sequence. The actors, sovereign states or Political movements can obtain financing Overview 3 FEATURE 1 How violence is changing FIGU RE F 1.1 Deaths from civil wars are declining As the number of civil wars declined, the total annual deaths from these conflicts (battle deaths) fell from more than 200,000 in 1988 to fewer than 50,000 in 2008. 300,000 60 250,000 50 Number of countries in civil war Battle deaths in civil wars 200,000 40 150,000 30 100,000 20 50,000 10 0 0 1960 1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 Total battle deaths per annum in all civil wars (minor and major) Total number of countries in civil war (minor and major) Sources: Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005); Gleditsch and others 2002; Sundberg 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 1999; Human Security Report Project, forthcoming. Note: Civil wars are classified by scale and type in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The minimum threshold for monitoring is a minor civil war with 25 or more battle deaths a year. Low, high, and best estimates of annual battle deaths per conflict are in Lacina and Gleditsch (2005, updated in 2009). Throughout this Report, best estimates are used, except when they are not available, in which case averages of the low and high estimates are used. T A B L E F 1.1 Violence often recurs Few countries are truly “post-conflict.” The rate of violence onset in countries with a previous conflict has been increasing since the 1960s, and every civil war that began since 2003 was in a country that had a previous civil war. Violence onsets in countries with Violence onsets in countries with Number of Decade no previous conflict (%) a previous conflict (%) onsets 1960s 57 43 35 1970s 43 57 44 1980s 38 62 39 1990s 33 67 81 2000s 10 90 39 Sources: Walter 2010; WDR team calculations. Note: Previous conflict includes any major conflict since 1945. (Feature continued on next page) 4 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 1 How violence is changing (continued) F I G U R E F 1.2 Organized criminal violence threatens peace processes Homicides have increased in every country in Central America since 1999, including those that had made great progress in addressing political conflict—and this is not unique; countries such as South Africa face similar second generation challenges. 40 Absolute change in homicide rate 30 relative to 1999 20 10 0 –10 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 El Salvador Honduras Guatemala Belize Panama Nicaragua Costa Rica Sources: WDR team calculations based on UNODC 2007; UNODC and World Bank 2007; and national sources. Note: Base year for homicide rate is 1999 = 0. How violence disrupts development F I G U R E F 1.3 The gap in poverty is widening between countries affected by violence and others New poverty data reveal that poverty is declining for much of the world, but countries affected by violence are lagging behind. For every three years a country is affected by major violence (battle deaths or excess deaths from homicides equivalent to a major war), poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points. 65 (% of population living below $1.25 a day) 60 Poverty headcount 55 50 45 40 35 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 ff ted by major violence Countries affec ff ted by minor violence Countries affec Countries with negligible or no violence Sources: WDR team calculations based on Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula 2008 poverty data (available on POVCALNET (http://iresearch.worldbank.org)). Note: Poverty is % of population living at less than US$1.25 per day. Overview 5 from criminal activities, as in the Democratic Attempts to contain violence are also Republic of Congo and Northern Ireland.5 extremely costly. For example, the naval Criminal gangs can support political violence operation to counter piracy in the Horn of during electoral periods, as in Jamaica and Africa and the Indian Ocean is estimated to Kenya.6 International ideological movements cost US$1.3–$2 billion annually, plus addi- make common cause with local grievances, as tional costs incurred by rerouting ships and in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, the large increasing insurance premiums.16 Efforts by majority of countries currently facing vio- households and firms to protect themselves lence face it in multiple forms. Fourth, griev- against long-duration violence impose heavy ances can escalate into acute demands for economic burdens: 35 percent of firms in change—and the risks of violent conflict—in Latin America, 30 percent in Africa, and 27 countries where political, social, or economic percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia change lags behind expectations, as in the identify crime as the major problem for Middle East and North Africa. their business activities. The burden is high- Repeated and interlinked, these conflicts est on those least able to bear the cost: firms have regional and global repercussions. The in Sub-Saharan Africa lose a higher percent- death, destruction, and delayed develop- age of sales to crime and spend a higher per- ment due to conflict are bad for the conflict- centage of sales on security than any other affected countries, and their impacts spill region.17 over both regionally and globally. A coun- No low-income fragile or conflict-affected try making development advances, such as country has yet achieved a single MDG. Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7 percent of People in fragile and conflict-affected states GDP every year for each neighbor in conflict.7 are more than twice as likely to be under- Refugees and internally displaced persons nourished as those in other developing coun- have increased threefold in the last 30 years.8 tries, more than three times as likely to be un- Nearly 75 percent of the world’s refugees are able to send their children to school, twice as hosted by neighboring countries.9 likely to see their children die before age five, The new forms of violence interlinking and more than twice as likely to lack clean local political conflicts, organized crime, water. On average, a country that experienced and internationalized disputes mean that major violence over the period from 1981 to violence is a problem for both the rich and 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points the poor: more than 80 percent of fatalities higher than a country that saw no violence from terrorist attacks over the last decade (Feature 1, figure F1.3).18 A similar picture were in nonwestern targets,10 but a study emerges for subnational areas affected by vi- of 18 Western European countries revealed olence in richer and more stable countries— that each additional transnational terrorist areas where development lags behind.19 incident reduced their economic growth by These repeated cycles of conflict and 0.4 of a percentage point a year.11 Attacks violence exact other human, social, and eco- in one region can impose costs all through nomic costs that last for generations. High global markets—one attack in the Niger levels of organized criminal violence hold Delta can cost global consumers of oil bil- back economic development. In Guatemala, lions in increased prices.12 In the four weeks violence cost the country more than 7 percent following the beginning of the uprising in of GDP in 2005, more than twice the damage Libya, oil prices increased by 15 percent.13 by Hurricane Stan in the same year—and The interdiction of cocaine shipments to more than twice the combined budget for Europe has increased fourfold since 2003,14 agriculture, health, and education.20 The av- with even areas such as West Africa now se- erage cost of civil war is equivalent to more riously affected by drug-related violence.15 than 30 years of GDP growth for a medium- 6 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 size developing country.21 Trade levels after Vicious cycles of conflict: When major episodes of violence take 20 years to security, justice, and employment recover.22 In other words, a major episode stresses meet weak institutions of violence, unlike natural disasters or eco- nomic cycles, can wipe out an entire genera- Internal causes of conflict arise from politi- tion of economic progress. cal, security, and economic dynamics.27 Yet it These numbers have human conse- is difficult to disentangle causes and effects quences. In highly violent societies, many of violence. Lower GDP per capita is robustly people experience the death of a son or associated with both large-scale political daughter before their time: when children are conflict and high rates of homicide.28 Youth late coming home, a parent has good reason unemployment is consistently cited in citi- to fear for their lives and physical safety. Ev- zen perception surveys as a motive for join- eryday experiences, such as going to school, ing both rebel movements and urban gangs to work, or to market, become occasions for (Feature 2, figure F2.2).29 Feeling more secure fear. People hesitate to build houses or invest and powerful is also cited as an important in small businesses because these can be de- motivator across countries, confirming exist- stroyed in a moment. The direct impact of ing research that shows that employment dy- violence falls primarily on young males—the namics have to do not only with income but majority of fighting forces and gang mem- also with respect and status, involving social bers—but women and children often suffer cohesion as well as economic opportunity. disproportionately from the indirect effects.23 Political exclusion and inequality affecting Men make up 96 percent of detainees and 90 regional, religious, or ethnic groups are asso- percent of the missing; women and children ciated with higher risks of civil war,30 (and are are close to 80 percent of refugees and those also cited in citizen surveys as a key driver of internally displaced.24 And violence begets conflict alongside poverty—see figure F2.1) violence: male children who witness abuses while inequality between richer and poorer have a higher tendency to perpetrate violence households is closely associated with higher later in life.25 risks of violent crime (table 1.1). Yet when security is reestablished and sus- External factors can heighten the risks of tained, these areas of the world can make the violence. Major external security pressures, greatest development gains. Several countries as with new patterns of drug trafficking, can emerging from long legacies of both political overwhelm institutional capacities (see Fea- and criminal violence have been among the ture 2). Income shocks can also increase risks fastest making progress on the MDGs:26 of violence. Work on rainfall shocks in Sub- Saharan Africa concludes that civil conflict • Ethiopia more than quadrupled access is more likely following years of poor rain- to improved water, from 13 percent of fall. Using rainfall variation as a proxy for the population in 1990 to 66 percent in income shocks in 41 African countries be- 2009–10. tween 1981 and 1999, Satyanath, Miguel, and • Mozambique more than tripled its primary Sergenti found that a decline in economic completion rate in just eight years, from growth of 5 percent increased the likeli- 14 percent in 1999 to 46 percent in 2007. hood of conflict by half the following year.31 Corruption—which generally has interna- • Rwanda cut the prevalence of undernutri- tional links through illicit trafficking, money tion from 56 percent of the population in laundering, and the extraction of rents from 1997 to 40 percent in 2005. sales of national resources or international • Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1995 contracts and concessions—has doubly per- and 2007, increased measles immuniza- nicious impacts on the risks of violence, by tions from 53 percent to 96 percent for fueling grievances and by undermining the children aged 12–23 months. effectiveness of national institutions and so- Overview 7 T A B L E 1.1 Security, economic, and political stresses Stresses Internal External Security • Legacies of violence and trauma • Invasion, occupation • External support for domestic rebels • Cross-border conflict spillovers • Transnational terrorism • International criminal networks Economic • Low income levels, low opportunity • Price shocks cost of rebellion • Climate change • Youth unemployment • Natural resource wealth • Severe corruption • Rapid urbanization • Ethnic, religious, or regional • Perceived global inequity and Justice competition injustice in the treatment of ethnic or • Real or perceived discrimination religious groups • Human rights abuses Source: WDR team. Note: This table, although not exhaustive, captures major factors in the academic literature on the causes and correlates of conflict and raised in the WDR consultations and surveys.33 cial norms.32 New external pressures from Institutional capacity and accountability are climate change and natural resource compe- important for both political and criminal tition could heighten all these risks.34 violence (see Feature 2).37 However, many countries face high un- • In some areas—as in the peripheral re- employment, economic inequality, or pres- gions of Colombia before the turn of the sure from organized crime networks but 21st century38 or the Democratic Republic do not repeatedly succumb to widespread of the Congo39 today—the state is all but violence, and instead contain it. The WDR absent from many parts of the country, approach emphasizes that risk of conflict and and violent armed groups dominate local violence in any society (national or regional) contests over power and resources. is the combination of the exposure to inter- • Most areas affected by violence face defi- nal and external stresses and the strength of cits in their collaborative capacities40 to the “immune system,” or the social capability mediate conflict peacefully. In some coun- for coping with stress embodied in legitimate tries, institutions do not span ethnic, re- institutions.35 Both state and nonstate institu- gional, or religious divides, and state insti- tions are important. Institutions include so- tutions have been viewed as partisan—just cial norms and behaviors—such as the ability as they were for decades prior to the peace of leaders to transcend sectarian and politi- agreement in Northern Ireland.41 In some cal differences and develop bargains, and of communities, social divisions have con- civil society to advocate for greater national strained effective collaboration between and political cohesion—as well as rules, laws, elite dominated states and poor commu- and organizations.36 Where states, markets, nities to address sources of violence. and social institutions fail to provide basic • Rapid urbanization, as occurred earlier security, justice, and economic opportunities in Latin America and today in Asia and for citizens, conflict can escalate. Africa, weakens social cohesion.42 Un- In short, countries and subnational ar- employment, structural inequalities, and eas with the weakest institutional legitimacy greater access to markets for firearms and governance are the most vulnerable to and illicit drugs break down social cohe- violence and instability and the least able sion and increase the vulnerability to to respond to internal and external stresses. criminal networks and gangs. 8 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 • Countries with weak institutional capacity conditions—the truth and reconciliation, were more likely to suffer violent social un- anti-corruption, and human rights commis- rest during the food shocks of 2008–09.43 sions that delivered so marvelously in some countries have not always worked in others. • Some states have tried to maintain stability There are gains from sharing knowledge, as through coercion and patronage networks, the Report makes clear—but only if adapted but those with high levels of corruption to local conditions. “Best-fit” institutions are and human rights abuses increase their central to the Report. risks of violence breaking out in the future (see Feature 2). Weak institutions are particularly im- PART 2: A ROADMAP portant in explaining why violence repeats FOR BREAKING CYCLES in different forms in the same countries or subnational regions. Even societies with OF VIOLENCE AT THE the weakest institutions have periodic out- COUNTRY LEVEL breaks of peace. South-central Somalia has had interludes of low conflict over the last Restoring confidence and 30 years based on agreements by small num- transforming the institutions that bers of elites.44 But temporary elite pacts, provide citizen security, justice, in Somalia and elsewhere, do not provide and jobs the grounds for sustained security and de- velopment unless they are followed by the To break cycles of insecurity and reduce the development of legitimate state and society risk of their recurrence, national reformers institutions.45 They are generally short-lived and their international partners need to build because they are too personalized and nar- the legitimate institutions that can provide a row to accommodate stresses and adjust to sustained level of citizen security, justice, and change. New internal and external stresses jobs—offering a stake in society to groups arise—a leader’s death, economic shocks, that may otherwise receive more respect and the entry of organized criminal trafficking recognition from engaging in armed violence networks, new opportunities or rents, or than in lawful activities, and punishing in- external security interference—and there fractions capably and fairly. is no sustained ability to respond.46 So the But transforming institutions—always violence recurs. tough—is particularly difficult in fragile situ- A focus on legitimate institutions does ations. First, in countries with a track record not mean converging on Western institutions. of violence and mistrust, expectations are History provides many examples of foreign either too low, so that no government prom- institutional models that have proven less ises are believed, making cooperative action than useful to national development, par- impossible—or too high, so that transitional ticularly through colonial legacies,47 because moments produce expectations of rapid they focused on form rather than function. change that cannot be delivered by existing The same is true today. In Iraq, the Coalition institutions.49 Second, many institutional Provisional Authority established commis- changes that could produce greater long- sions on every subject from tourism to the term resilience against violence frequently environment in parallel with struggling line carry short-term risks. Any important shift— ministries, and model laws were passed that holding elections, dismantling patronage net- had little relationship to national social and works, giving new roles to security services, political realities.48 Even transfers of organiza- decentralizing decision-making, empowering tional forms between countries in the South disadvantaged groups—creates both winners can be unproductive if not adapted to local and losers. Losers are often well organized Overview 9 FEATURE 2 High stresses and weak institutions = risks of violence Justice, jobs, and violence F I G U R E F 2.1 What are citizens’ views on the drivers of conflict? In surveys conducted in six countries and territories affected by violence, involving a mix of nationally representative samples and subregions, citizens raised issues linked to individual economic welfare (poverty, unemployment) and injustice (including inequality and corruption) as the primary drivers of conflict. 45 40 35 % survey respondents answering 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Poverty/ Conflict over External Ethnic conflict/ Injustice/ Other poor education resources/ aggression religion inequality/ scarce resources corruption Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. F I G U R E F 2.2 What drives people to join rebel movement and gangs? The same surveys found that the main reasons cited for why young people become rebels or gang members are very similar—unemployment predominates for both. This is not necessarily the case for militant ideological recruitment (chapter 2). 50 46% 45 40 39.5% 35 % respondents 30 25 20 15% 13% 13% 15 8% 10 5 0 Rebel participation Gang participation Unemployment/Idleness Feel more secure/Powerful Belief in the cause/Revenge/Injustice Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. 10 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT Jorge Montaño, Member, International Narcotics Control Board; former Ambassador of Mexico to the United States; WDR Advisory Council Member The role of external stresses Drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illegal exploitation of natural resources and wildlife, counterfeiting, and viola- tions of intellectual property rights are lucrative criminal activities, which facilitate the penetration by organized crime of the already vulnerable sociopolitical, judicial, and security structures in developing countries. In Central America, for example, several countries that regained political stability two decades ago are now facing the decay of the state, whose institutions lack the strength to face this onslaught. Transnational organized crime has converted some Carib- bean countries into corridors for the movement of illegal drugs and persons toward Europe and North America. Bolivia, Colom- bia, and Peru, continue to be the main global cocaine producers, while Mexico is facing an unprecedented wave of violence given its border with the largest immigrant, drug consumption, and arms producing market. West Africa has become the newest pas- sage of drugs coming from South America and destined for Europe. Several African countries suffer the illegal exploitation of their natural resources, while Asia is a hub for tons of opiates originating from Afghanistan. The unprecedented progression of organized crime could spell the collapse of many weak states as their institutions fall prey to the associated violence. The precari- ous economic development observed in many regions of the world provides a stimulus for consolidating these illegal activities, which will continue to thrive as a consequence of the impunity they encounter in developing countries. WDR Note: Weak institutions are a common factor in explaining repeated cycles of violence Building on previous work by Collier, Fearon, Goldstone, North, Wallis, and Weingast, and others, political scientists Jim Fearon and Barbara Walter used econometric techniques for the WDR to test whether general rule of law and government effective- ness, low corruption, and strong protection of human rights correlate with a lower risk of the onset and recurrence of civil war and of high homicides from criminal violence. Fearon finds that countries with above average governance indicators for their income level have a significantly lower risk of the outbreak of civil conflict within the next 5 to 10 years—between 30 to 45 per- cent lower—and that the relationship also holds true for countries with high homicides. This work confirms earlier directions in the policy community, such as the International Network on Conflict and Fragility’s emphasis on the links between peacebuild- ing and state-building. Measures of accountability are as important as measures of capacity in this calculation. Fearon finds that high levels of polit- ical terror in past periods increase the chances of current conflict. Walter finds that significant reductions in the number of political prisoners and extrajudicial killings make the renewal of civil war between two and three times less likely than in coun- tries with higher levels of human rights abuses. She notes, “A reasonable interpretation of these results is that greater repression and abuse by a government creates both grievances and signals that those governments (sic) are not dependable negotiating partners; suggesting that less coercive and more accountable approaches significantly decrease the risk of civil conflict.” Other measures of accountability also matter: measures of rule of law and corruption are as or more important than measures of bureaucratic quality. and resist change. Third, external stresses can transforming institutions accelerated consid- derail progress. erably in the late 20th century, with increases Creating the legitimate institutions that in citizen demands for good governance and can prevent repeated violence is, in plain lan- in the technologies that can help supply it. In- guage, slow. It takes a generation. Even the deed, making progress in a generation is ac- fastest-transforming countries have taken tually quite fast: progress at this speed would between 15 and 30 years to raise their institu- represent immense development gains for tional performance from that of a fragile state countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, today—Haiti, say—to that of a functioning and Timor-Leste today. institutionalized state, such as Ghana (table The basic framework of the WDR focuses 2.1).50 The good news is that this process of on what we have learned about the dynam- Overview 11 TA BLE 2.1 Fastest progress in institutional transformation—An estimate of realistic ranges The table shows the historical range of timings that the fastest reformers in the 20th century took to achieve basic governance transformations. Years to threshold at pace of: Indicator Fastest 20 Fastest over the threshold Bureaucratic quality (0–4) 20 12 Corruption (0–6) 27 14 Military in politics (0–6) 17 10 Government effectiveness 36 13 Control of corruption 27 16 Rule of law 41 17 Source: Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. ics of action to prevent repeated cycles of vi- transformation. Second is the priority of olence—both in the short term and over the transforming institutions that provide citi- time needed to reach a sustained level of resil- zen security, justice, and jobs. Third is the ience. Our knowledge of how to break these role of regional and international action to cycles is partial: the Report lays out lessons contain external stresses. Fourth is the spe- drawn from existing research, country stud- cialized nature of external support needed. ies, and consultations with national reformers. Institutional transformation and good Experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina, governance, central to these processes, work Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia, differently in fragile situations. The goal is Mozambique, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, more focused—transforming institutions South Africa, and Timor-Leste amongst others, that deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs. are drawn on frequently in the Report because, When facing the risk of conflict and violence, while all of these areas still face challenges and citizen security, justice and jobs are the key risks, these societies have achieved consider- elements of protection to achieve human se- able successes in preventing violence from curity.51 The dynamics of institutional change escalating or recovering from its aftermath. are also different. A good analogy is a finan- These and the other experiences in the Report cial crisis caused by a combination of external also span a range of high-income, middle- stresses and weaknesses in institutional checks income and lower-income countries, a range and balances. In such a situation, exceptional of threats of political and criminal violence, efforts are needed to restore confidence in and differing institutional contexts, rang- national leaders’ ability to manage the crisis— ing from situations where strong institutions through actions that signal a real break with faced legitimacy challenges due to problems the past and through locking in these actions of inclusion and accountability to situations and showing that they will not be reversed. where weak capacity was a major constraint. Confidence-building—a concept used in There are some fundamental differences political mediation and financial crises but between fragile and violent situations and rarely in development circles52—is a prelude stable developing environments. First is the to more permanent institutional change in need to restore confidence in collective ac- the face of violence. Why? Because low trust tion before embarking on wider institutional means that stakeholders who need to con- 12 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 F I G U R E 2 .1 Moving from fragility and violence to institutional resilience in citizen security, justice, and jobs CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO TRANSFORMIN RING CON RE S FID TO TRANSFORMING E NC E RING GI CON NS RE S IT F I DE NC E TO T UT TRANSFORMIN RING IO NS CON IN FID IT ST UT ENCE IO GI NS N IT ST UT IO NS VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Source: WDR team. tribute political, financial, or technical sup- nance of society.54 A repeated process enables port will not collaborate until they believe space for collaborative norms and capacities to that a positive outcome is possible.53 But develop, and for success to build on successes confidence-building is not an end in itself. in a virtuous cycle. For each loop of the spi- Just as in a financial crisis, progress will not ral, the same two phases recur: building con- be sustained unless the institutions that pro- fidence that positive chance is possible, prior vide citizen security, justice, and an economic to deepening the institutional transformation stake in society are transformed to prevent a and strengthening governance outcomes. recurrence of violence. Just as violence repeats, efforts to build Confidence-building—Inclusive- confidence and transform institutions typi- enough coalitions and early results cally follow a repeated spiral. Countries that moved away from fragility and conflict of- The state cannot restore confidence alone. ten do so not through one decisive “make or Confidence-building in situations of violence break” moment—but through many transi- and fragility requires deliberate effort to build tion moments, as the spiral path in figure inclusive-enough coalitions, as Indonesia did in 2.1 illustrates. National leaders had to build addressing violence in Aceh or Timor-Leste in confidence in the state and to transform in- its recovery after the renewed violence in 2006 stitutions over time, as with the Republic of or Chile in its political transition. Coalitions Korea’s transitions in the security, political, are “inclusive-enough” when they include the and economic spheres after the Korean War, parties necessary for implementing the initial or Ghana, Chile and Argentina’s transitions stages of confidence-building and institutional from military rule, which included repeated transformation. They need not be “all-inclu- internal contests over the norms and gover- sive.”55 Inclusive-enough coalitions work in Overview 13 two ways: (1) at a broad level, by building na- ile situations, many reforms need a build- tional support for change and bringing in the up of trust and capacity before they can be relevant stakeholders, through collaboration successfully implemented. Getting the bal- between the government and other sectors of ance right between “too fast” and “too slow” society—as well as with regional neighbors, transformative action is crucial, and some donors, or investors, and (2) at a local level, by basic lessons emerge from successful country promoting outreach to community leaders to transitions. identify priorities and deliver programs. Inclu- First, prioritizing early action to reform the sive-enough coalitions apply just as much to institutions responsible for citizen security, criminal as to political violence, through col- justice, and jobs is crucial, as in Singapore’s laboration with community leaders, business, post-independence development (see Fea- and civil society in areas affected by criminal ture 3). Stemming illegal financial flows from violence. Civil society—including women’s the public purse or from natural resource organizations—often plays important roles trafficking is important to underpin these in restoring confidence and sustaining the initiatives. Pragmatic, “best-fit” approaches momentum for recovery and transformation, adapted to local conditions will be needed. as demonstrated by the role of the Liberian For example, Lebanon restored the electricity Women’s Initiative in pressing for continued needed for economic recovery during the civil progress in the peace agreement.56 war through small private-sector networks of Persuading stakeholders to work collab- providers, albeit at high unit costs.57 Haiti’s oratively requires signals of a real break with successful police reforms in 2004 to 2009 fo- the past—for example, ending the political or cused on ousting abusers from the force and economic exclusion of marginalized groups, restoring very basic work discipline.58 corruption, or human rights abuses—as well Second, focusing on citizen security, jus- as mechanisms to “lock-in” these changes tice, and jobs means that most other reforms and show that they will not be reversed. In will need to be sequenced and paced over moments of opportunity or crisis, fast and time, including political reform, decentral- visible results also help restore confidence ization, privatization, and shifting attitudes in the government’s ability to deal with toward marginalized groups. Systematically violent threats and implement institutional implementing these reforms requires a web and social change. State-community, state- of institutions (democratization, for example, nongovernmental organization (NGO), state- requires many institutional checks and bal- international, and state-private-sector part- ances beyond elections) and changes in social nerships can extend the state’s capacity to attitudes. Several successful political transi- deliver. Actions in one domain can support tions, such as the devolution that underpins results in another. Security operations can peace in Northern Ireland and democratic facilitate safe trade and transit, and the eco- transitions in Chile, Indonesia, or Portugal, nomic activity that creates jobs. Services deliv- have taken place through a series of steps over ered to marginalized groups can support per- a decade or more. ceptions of justice. More detailed approaches There are exceptions—where the exclu- to support inclusive-enough coalitions are sion of groups from democratic participation described in the section on practical policies has been a clear overriding source of griev- and programs for country actors below. ance, rapid action on elections makes sense; and where interests that previously blocked reform have diminished, as with post-war Transforming institutions that deliver Japanese or Republic of Korea land reform,59 citizen security, justice, and jobs fast action can take advantage of a window of There is a limit to the amount of change soci- opportunity. But in most situations, system- eties can absorb at any one time, and in frag- atic and gradual action appears to work best. 14 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 3 Country experiences of confidence-building and transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs Confidence building in South Africa Jay Naidoo, Chairman of Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition; Former General Secretary, Congress of South African Trade Unions; Former Minister of Reconstruction and Development, South Africa; and Former Chairman of the Development Bank of Southern Africa; WDR Advisory Council Member (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 3) In South Africa, the “moment” of transition in 1994 was pre- In addition to successes, there were opportunities missed ceded by multiple transition points which required efforts which may be of use when other countries consider South from the protagonists to shift the debate and that gave cred- Africa’s experiences. This included too little attention to job ibility to the process. On the African National Congress (ANC) creation for youth and risks of criminal violence. It meant that Alliance side, this included the shift to a broader, more inclu- we did not fully address the critical need to ensure that the new sive approach, and the realization of the need to ensure generation who had not lived through the apartheid struggle incentives for the National Party and the white population. as adults were provided with a strong stake—and economic On the National Party side, this included the shift from think- opportunities—in the new democratic state. ing in terms of group rights and protection of minorities to There was also too much of an assumption that 1994 thinking in terms of individual rights and majority rule. Cer- marked the culmination of a process of democratization and tain signals which were perceived as irreversible (notably the reconciliation. Relatively little attention was given to what was unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the suspen- meant by the transformation to a constitutional state; the con- sion of the ANC’s armed struggle) were critical in maintain- tinued role of civil society in deepening not just democratiza- ing trust between parties. After the 1994 elections, deliver- tion and accountability but also delivery. And there was a need ing a few early results—including maternal and infant for a deeper and more thorough ongoing debate on racism, healthcare and using community structures to improve inequality, and social exclusion. water supply—were important to maintain confidence in our new government. All politics is local and early attention to security, justice, and jobs George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Singapore; WDR Advisory Council Member (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapters 4 and 5) Successful efforts must begin at the local level. Without out a practical approach, new institutions cannot take root in emphasis on local results, citizens lose confidence in their the hearts and minds of ordinary people. For Singapore in the government’s ability to provide a better life. Actions to early years, the priority was on security, law and order, and restore security, create trust, generate employment, and creating favorable conditions for investment and economic provide services in local communities lay the foundation for growth. Confidence was everything. National Service was intro- national progress. It is not enough to deliver results in big duced within a year. Secret societies and other criminal activi- cities. In cases of ethnic and religious strife, where mutual ties were suppressed. Corruption was progressively rooted out. insecurity can feed on itself, a local authority that is seen to To promote investment and job creation, labor and land acqui- be fair and impartial by all groups is absolutely essential sition laws were reformed early. Against conventional wisdom before the process of healing and recovery can take place. in many developing countries at that time, we eschewed pro- This was Singapore’s experience when we had race riots in tectionism and encouraged multinationals to invest. Managing the 1960s. A trusted leader can make a decisive difference. the politics of change was always a challenge. It takes time to build institutions. Getting the urgent The key was winning the trust of the people. Institutions things done first, especially improving security and provid- which endure are sustained by the respect and affection of the ing jobs, helps people to feel more hopeful about the future. population. It is a process which takes at least a generation. Success then creates the condition for further success. With- Overview 15 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 3 Country experiences of confidence-building and transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs (continued) Colombia’s restoration of confidence in safe transit Marta Lucía Ramirez de Rincón, Director, Fundación Ciudadanía en Acción; former Senator and Chair of Security Commission, Colombia; former Defense Minister and former Foreign Trade Minister, Colombia; WDR Advisory Council Member (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 5) The challenge we faced in 2002 was preventing Colombia Meteoro aimed at restoring control of the roads and high- from becoming a failed state. This meant shielding our citi- ways across the country back from the illegitimate hand of zens from kidnapping and terrorism. It also meant protect- armed groups that inflicted fear in the population. The govern- ing our infrastructure, roads, and democratic institutions ment invited the Colombian population to drive their cars and against attacks by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and drug travel across the country without intimidation, while at the traffickers. These groups hijacked cars and kidnapped peo- same time launching a major military, intelligence, and police ple as they travelled across the country. Since this problem operation to protect the roads and ensure the safety of the had worsened in the years ahead of the 2002 elections, the population. Through this plan, the government sought to give government set the restoration of security in roads and people back their country and to reactivate trade and tourism. highways as a key priority on their agenda. It devised the Above all, this plan, implemented at the very early stage of the Meteoro program widely known as, “Live Colombia, travel new government, brought about a breakthrough in the resto- across it” (“Vive Colombia, Viaja por ella” ). ration of trust and hope in the Colombian society. Do not confuse speed with haste in political processes Lakhdar Brahimi, former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to Iraq and Afghanistan; WDR Advisory Council Member (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 5) It is important not to confuse speed with haste in political The options are not mutually exclusive—there is great processes: too hasty approaches can precipitate the oppo- worldwide demand for more inclusive and responsive gover- site effect from the one we seek to support. The interna- nance, and elections can be a crucial means to provide this. But tional community’s high hopes for Iraq’s 2005 experiment in their timing requires careful attention. Democratic traditions proportional electoral democracy produced a contest for have developed in most countries over a considerable period. power which increased rather than allayed sectarian vio- Democratization efforts today, similarly, require attention to lence and the constitution hastily produced later is proving historical heritages and existing political cleavages, and must difficult to implement. Similarly, the 2009 election in Af- be seen as an ongoing process of social transformation and the ghanistan proved to challenge rather than bolster perceptions development of a broad range of institutions that provide of institutional legitimacy in the immediate aftermath. checks and balances rather than an identifiable “event.” Democ- ratization does not start or end with elections. Addressing external stresses and already be present and the institutions to re- mobilizing international support spond to them are generally weak. If they are not addressed, or if they increase, they can de- External stresses, such as the infiltration of rail efforts at violence prevention and recov- organized crime and trafficking networks, ery. Far more so than in stable development spillovers from neighboring conflicts, and environments, addressing external stresses economic shocks, are important factors in therefore needs to be a core part of national increasing the risk of violence. In fragile situ- strategies and international supporting ef- ations, many of these external pressures will forts for violence prevention and recovery. 16 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 International assistance needs also differ citizen security, justice, and jobs. The Report in fragile situations. The requirement to gen- first presents the basic tools and then looks at erate rapid confidence-building results puts how to differentiate strategies and program- a particular premium on speed. The focus ming to different country circumstances, us- on building collaborative, inclusive-enough ing country-specific assessments of risks and coalitions and on citizen security, justice, opportunities. and jobs draws together a wider range of international capacities that need to work Political and policy signals to build in concert—for example, for mediation, hu- collaborative, inclusive-enough man rights, and security assistance, as well as coalitions humanitarian and development aid. Where the political situation is fragile and the capac- There is a surprising commonality across ity of local systems to ensure accountability countries in the signals that most frequently is weak, international incentives—such as build confidence and collaborative coali- recognition and sanction mechanisms—also tions (see Feature 4). They can include im- play a significant role. Take one of the smaller mediate actions in credible national or local West African countries that have recently appointments, in transparency, and in some had coups d’état. Local mechanisms to re- cases, the removal of factors seen as nega- solve the situation peacefully are limited, and tive, such as discriminatory laws. Security African Union (AU) and Economic Com- forces can be redeployed as a positive signal munity of West African States (ECOWAS) of attention to insecure areas, but also as a pressure to return to a constitutional path is sign that the government recognizes where critical. So regional and global recognition particular units have a record of distrust or for responsible leadership can play a role in abuse with communities and replaces them. strengthening incentives and accountability Measures to improve transparency of infor- systems at a national level. mation and decision-making processes can be important in building confidence, as well as laying the basis for sustained institutional Practical policy and program tools transformation. for country actors Signals can also be announcements of fu- ture actions—the selection of two or three The WDR lays out a different way of thinking key early results; the focus of military and about approaches to violence prevention and police planning on citizen security goals; recovery in fragile situations. It does not aim or setting approaches and timelines toward to be a “cookbook” that prescribes recipes— political reform, decentralization, or tran- each country’s political context differs, and sitional justice. Ensuring that political and there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. While policy signals are realistic in scope and tim- the choice of confidence-building measures ing and can be delivered is important in and institution-building approaches needs managing expectations—by anchoring them to be adapted to each country, a set of basic in national planning and budget processes tools emerging from experience can be the and discussing any external support needed basis for that adaptation. These core tools in advance with international partners. include the options for signals and com- When signals relate to future action, their mitment mechanisms to build collabora- credibility will be increased by commitment tive coalitions, demonstrating a break from mechanisms that persuade stakeholders that the past and building confidence in positive they will actually be implemented and not outcomes. They also include a description of reversed. Examples are Colombia’s and Indo- the programs that can deliver quick results nesia’s independent, multisectoral executing and longer-term institutional provision of agencies and third-party monitors, such as Overview 17 Feature 4 Core Tools RESTORING CONFIDENCE CITIZEN Signals: Future Signals: Commitment Supporting SECURITY, JUSTICE, policy and priorities Immediate actions mechanisms actions AND JOBS • Citizen security goals • Participatory processes • Independence of • Risk and priority EXTERNAL STRESS • Key principles and • Local security, justice, executing agencies assessments RE S realistic timelines for and development results • Independent third-party • Communicating costs TO R political reform, • Credible appointments monitoring of inaction ING TRANSFORMING CON RE decentralization, • Transparency in • Dual-key national- • Simple plans and FID S corruption, transi- expenditures international systems progress measures on TO ENCE RING TRANSFORMING tional justice • Redeployment of • International execution 2–3 early results CON RE IN FID S • Mix of state, commu- of one or more key TO security forces • Strategic ST E NCE TU RI NG TRANSFORMING I TI CON ON S nity, NGO, and interna- functions communication FID • Removal of discrimina- IN IT E NC E ST UT IO NS IN tional capacity tory policies ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services Foundational reforms and ”best-fit” approaches CITIZEN SECURITY, Security sector reform: Justice sector reform: Multisectoral community empowerment JUSTICE, AND JOBS • Designed to deliver citizen independence and link to programs: combining citizen security, employ- EXTERNAL security benefits security reforms; strengthening ment, justice, education, and infrastructure STRESS • Capacity increases linked basic caseload processing; Employment programs: regulatory simplification to repeated realistic extending justice services, and infrastructure recovery for private-sector job performance outcomes drawing on traditional/ TRANSFORMING creation, long-term public programs, asset and justice functions community mechanisms expansion, value chain programs, informal sec- • Dismantling criminal Phasing anti-corruption tor support, labor migration, women’s economic TRANSFORMING networks through civilian measures: demonstrate empowerment, and asset expansion IN ST TU TRANSFORMING oversight, vetting and I TI ON S national resources can be Humanitarian delivery and social protection: IN IT budget expenditure ST UT IO NS used for public good before IN with planned transition from international ST TU I TI ON S transparency dismantling rent systems; VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT • Use of low-capital systems provision AND INCENTIVES control capture of rents and for rural and community use social accountability Macroeconomic policy: focus on consumer price policing mechanisms volatility and employment Gradual, systematic programs • Phased capacity and • Political and electoral reform • Structural economic reforms such as accountability in special- • Decentralization privatization ized security functions • Transitional justice • Education and health reforms • Comprehensive anti- • Inclusion of marginalized groups corruption reforms CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, NATIONAL ACTION TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL STRESS AND JOBS EXTERNAL Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services STRESS • Border cooperation • Coordinate supply and • Pooled supplementary administrative capacity • Military, police, and finan- demand-side responses • Cross-border development programming cial intelligence • Joint investigations and pros- ecutions across jurisdictions • Building links between formal/informal systems VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES FEASIBLE RESULTS INDICATORS TO DEMONSTRATE OVERALL PROGRESS Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services Short • Violent deaths • Perception surveys by groups (eth- • Perceptions of whether term • Perception survey nic, geographical, religious, class) on employment data on increases/ whether their welfare is increasing opportunities are increasing decreases in security over time and in relation to others • Price surveys (for real income • Perception survey on trust in national implications) institutions and on corruption Longer • Victim surveys • Governance indicators refocused on • Household data on term outcomes and degree of progress employment and labor force within historically realistic timeframes participation • Household survey data on vertical and horizontal inequalities and access to justice services 18 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 the joint ASEAN-EU (Association of South- National program design to restore east Asian Nations–European Union) Aceh confidence and transform institutions monitoring mission.60 Sole or “dual-key” au- thority over one or more functions involving The core program tools that emerge from international agencies—as with the jointly different country experiences are deliber- run Governance and Economic Manage- ately kept small in number to reflect country ment Assistance Program in Liberia,61 the lessons on focus and priorities. They are all International Commission Against Impunity designed to be delivered at scale, in large na- (CICIG) in Guatemala,62 or when UN peace- tional or subnational programs rather than keeping missions have executive responsi- small projects. They include multisectoral bility for policing—is also a commitment programs linking community structures with mechanism when institutional capacity and the state; security sector reform; justice re- accountability are low. form; national employment policy and pro- Strong strategic communication on these grams; associated services that support citi- signals of change are always important— zen security, justice, and job creation, such as actions and policy changes cannot influence electricity and social protection; and phased behaviors unless people know they have approaches to corruption. They also include taken place and how they fit into a broader programs that can be crucial for sustained vision. Where the risks of crisis escalation are violence prevention: political reform, decen- not fully recognized by all national leaders, tralization, transitional justice, and education providing an accurate and compelling mes- reform where systematic attention is needed sage on the consequences of inaction can once early reforms in citizen security, justice, help galvanize momentum for progress. Eco- and jobs have started to make progress. nomic and social analyses can support this The top five lessons of what works in pro- narrative—by showing how rising violence gram design are: and failing institutions are causing national • Programs that support bottom-up state- or subnational areas to lag far behind their society relations in insecure areas. These neighbors in development progress; or by include community-based programs for showing how other countries that have failed violence prevention, employment, and as- to address rising threats have faced severe and sociated service delivery, and access to local long-lasting development consequences. The justice and dispute resolution. Examples WDR analysis provides some clear messages: are community policing in a wide range of • No country or region can afford to ignore higher-, middle-, and lower-income coun- areas where repeated cycles of violence tries, the Afghanistan National Solidarity flourish and citizens are disengaged from Program, and Latin American multisec- the state. toral violence prevention programs.63 • Unemployment, corruption, and exclu- • Complementary programs for institu- sion increase the risks of violence—and tional transformation in the priority ar- legitimate institutions and governance that eas of security and justice. Early reform give everyone a stake in national prosper- programs should focus on simple basic ity are the immune system that protects functions (such as criminal caseload pro- from different types of violence. cessing, adequate basic investigation, and arrest procedures); include civilian over- • Citizen security is a preeminent goal in sight, vetting, and budget and expenditure fragile situations, underpinned by justice transparency to dismantle covert or crimi- and jobs. nal networks; and link the pace of reform • Leaders need to seize opportunities before between the police and civilian justice sys- violence escalates or recurs. tems to avoid situations where increasing Overview 19 police capacity results in prolonged deten- reduction of impunity through vetting or tions or the release of offenders back into prosecutions. What is crucial here is that early the community without due process. results generate improvements in the morale of national institutions and set the right in- • “Back to basics” job creation pro- centives for later institution-building. grams. These programs include large-scale For example, if security forces are set community-based public works, such as targets based on the number of rebel com- those India and Indonesia use throughout batants killed or captured or criminals ar- the country, including in marginalized and rested, they may rely primarily on coercive violence-affected communities; private- approaches, with no incentive to build the sector regulatory simplification and ad- longer-term trust with communities that dressing of infrastructure bottlenecks (in will prevent violence from recurring. Targets particular, electricity, which is the number based on citizen security (freedom of move- one constraint for businesses in fragile and ment and so on), in contrast, create longer- violent areas); and access to finance and term incentives for the role of the security investments to bring producers and mar- forces in underpinning national unity and kets together, as in Kosovo’s and Rwanda’s effective state-society relations. Similarly, if coffee, dairy, and tourism initiatives.64 services and public works are delivered only • The involvement of women in security, through top-down national programs, there justice, and economic empowerment pro- will be few incentives for communities to take grams, such as the Nicaragua, Liberia, and responsibility for violence prevention or for Sierra Leone reforms to introduce female national institutions to undertake responsi- staffing and gender-specific service in the bility to protect all vulnerable citizens, men police force; and economic empowerment and women. A mixture of state and nonstate, initiatives in Nepal, which addressed issues bottom-up and top-down approaches is a of gender roles that had previously been better underpinning for longer-term institu- divisive in insecure areas through the pro- tional transformation. vision of finance and business training to Phasing transitions from humanitarian women’s groups.65 aid is also an important part of transform- ing institutions. In countries where current • Focused anticorruption initiatives that stresses overwhelm national institutional ca- demonstrate that new initiatives can be pacity by a large margin, national reformers well governed. Tools have included the often draw on international humanitarian use of private-sector capacity to monitor capacity to deliver early results. These pro- functions vulnerable to grand corruption, grams can be effective in saving lives, building as with Liberia’s forestry inspection and confidence, and extending national capacity. Mozambique’s customs collection, com- But a difficult trade-off occurs in deciding bined with social accountability mecha- on the time needed to shift these functions nisms that use transparent publication of to national institutions. For food programs, expenditure and community/civil-society this generally means phasing down deliver- monitoring to ensure funds reach their ies before local harvests and moving from intended targets.66 general distribution to targeted programs, Some of the early confidence-building re- in coordination with government social pro- sults that can be targeted through these pro- tection agencies where possible. For health, grams include freedom of movement along education, water, and sanitation, it means transit routes, electricity coverage, number of reducing international roles step-by-step businesses registered and employment days over time as the capacity of national or local created, processing of judicial caseloads, and institutions increases—as in the transition 20 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 from international to national health pro- in the headquarters of multilateral agencies vision in Timor-Leste, which moved from and donor countries. Actions on these issues international execution to government con- are discussed in Part 3 under Directions for tracting of international NGOs and then to International Policy. National leaders and government management.67 their partners on the ground cannot individ- ually determine these broader changes to the international system, but they can maximize Regional and cross-border initiatives the benefits of existing support. Societies do not have the luxury of trans- It helps when national leaders and their forming their institutions in isolation—they international partners in the field lay out need at the same time to manage external clear program priorities across the security, pressures, whether from economic shocks justice, and development domains. Country or trafficking and international corruption. experiences indicate that efforts need to fo- Many of these issues are beyond the control cus on only two or three rapid results to build of each nation-state to address, and the last confidence, and on narrowly and realistically section of the Report considers international defined institution-building. Priorities are policy to diminish external stresses. National better laid out in a very limited number of leaders may play a significant role in galva- clear programs—such as community-based nizing broad regional or global cooperation interventions in insecure areas, security and on issues such as trafficking, as well as bilat- freedom of movement on key roads—as in eral cooperation. Possible initiatives include: Liberia69 after the civil war and in Colom- • Openness to discuss both security and de- bia70 in the face of criminal violence in 2002. velopment cooperation across insecure Using the national budget process to decide border regions, based on shared goals of on priority programs coordinates messages citizen security, justice, and jobs rather and develops cooperation in implementa- than purely on military operations. Cross- tion between the security and development border development programming could ministries. simply involve special arrangements to National leaders can also produce bet- share lessons. But it could also move to- ter results from external assistance by being ward formal joint arrangements to design alert to the needs of international partners and monitor development programs in to show results and manage risks. Interna- insecure border areas and move toward tional partners have their own domestic specific provisions to help insecure land- pressures—to demonstrate that assistance is locked areas gain access to markets. not misused and to attribute results to their endeavors. A frank exchange on risks and re- • Joint processes to investigate and prose- sults helps to find ways to bridge differences. cute incidents of corruption that can fuel In Indonesia in the aftermath of the Tsunami violence, as Haiti and Nigeria have done and Aceh peace agreement, for example, the (with the United States and the United government agreed with donors that incom- Kingdom) to combat corruption and ing assistance would be “jointly branded” by money-laundering.68 These can build ca- the Indonesian Reconstruction Agency and pacity in weaker jurisdictions and deliver donors, with special transparency measures results that could not be achieved by one in place to enable both sides to show visible jurisdiction alone. results and manage risks while bolstering the legitimacy of state-society relations in the aftermath of crisis. A “double compact” Mobilizing international support between governments and their citizens and Some constraints in international support between states and their international part- come from policies and systems established ners, first proposed by Ashraf Ghani and Overview 21 Clare Lockhart, is another way of managing income, fragile countries. Direct measure- different perspectives on risk, the speed of ment of security improvements can also show response, and long-term engagement with rapid progress, but while data on violent national institutions—by making dual ac- deaths are fairly easy to collect, they are not countability of donor funds explicit.71 available for the countries that would benefit most from them: low-income, fragile states. Employment data also need to be upgraded. Monitoring results To evaluate the success of programs and Differentiating strategy and programs adapt them when problems arise, national to country context reformers and their international partners in country also need information on overall re- While there is a basic set of tools emerging sults in reducing violence, and on citizen con- from experience, each country needs to assess fidence in security, justice, and employment its circumstances and adapt lessons from oth- goals at regular intervals. For most develop- ers to the local political context. Each country ing countries, the MDGs and their associ- faces different stresses, different institutional ated targets and indicators are the dominant challenges, different stakeholders who need international framework. The MDGs have to be involved to make a difference, and dif- raised the profile of broad-based human de- ferent types of transition opportunities. The velopment and remain important long-term differences are not black and white but occur goals for countries facing fragility and vio- across a spectrum—each country will have lence. But they have drawbacks in their direct different manifestations of violence, different relevance to progress in violence prevention combinations of internal or external stresses, and recovery. They do not cover citizen secu- and different institutional challenges—and rity and justice. They move slowly, so they do these factors will change over time. But all not provide national reformers or their inter- countries face some aspects of this mix. The national partners with rapid feedback loops Report covers some of the most important that can demonstrate areas of progress and differences in country circumstances through identify new or remaining risks. the simple differentiation shown below. A useful supplement to the MDGs would National reformers and their country be indicators that more directly measure counterparts need to take two types of deci- violence reduction, confidence-building and sions in each phase of confidence-building citizen security and justice (Feature 4). Citi- and institutional reform, taking into account zen polling data, glaringly absent in many the local political context. First is to decide fragile and conflict-affected countries, could the types of signals—both immediate actions help fill this role.72 Middle- and higher- and announcements on early results and income countries use polling all the time longer-term policies—that can help build to provide governments with feedback on “inclusive-enough” collaborative coalitions progress and risks, but it is little used in low- for change. Second is to decide on the design Spectra of situation-specific challenges and opportunities Types of violence: Civil and/or criminal and/or cross-border and/or sub-national and/or ideological Transition opportunity: Gradual/limited to Key stakeholders: Internal versus external immediate/major space for change stakeholders; state versus nonstate stakeholders; low-income versus middle-high income stakeholders Key stresses: Internal versus external stresses; Institutional challenges: Degree of capacity, high versus low level of divisions among groups accountability, and inclusion 22 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 of priority programs to launch for institu- tutional deficits that permit repeated cycles tional transformation. of violence—and that successful approaches In differentiating political and policy sig- to address political, communal, and crimi- nals, the type of stresses faced and the stake- nal violence have much in common. But the holders whose support is most needed for mix of different types of violence does affect effective action make a difference. Where strategy. Inequality among ethnic, religious, ethnic, geographical, or religious divides have or geographical groups is important as a been associated with conflict, and the coop- risk for civil conflict—employment programs eration of these groups is critical to progress, and services would thus target equity and the credibility of appointments may rest on bridging opportunities among these groups. whether individuals command respect across But for organized criminal violence, inequal- group divides. Where corruption has been a ity between rich and poor matters more (ir- severe stress, the credibility of key appoint- respective of ethnic or religious identities). ments may rest on individuals’ reputation for Violence with strong international links— integrity. organized crime, international recruitment The type of transition moment also makes into ideological movements—requires great- a difference. At the end of the wars in Japan er international cooperation. and the Republic of Korea, the birth of the Country circumstances also make a differ- new nation of Timor-Leste, Liberia’s first ence for program design, requiring the “best- post-war election, military victory in Nica- fit” to local political conditions. For exam- ragua, and in the aftermath of the Rwandan ple, multisectoral community approaches genocide, there was greater space for rapid can be effective in contexts as different as announcements of long-term political, so- Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, and Northern cial, and institutional change than exists to- Ireland—but more care would be needed in day for the coalition government in Kenya or Côte d’Ivoire and Northern Ireland to ensure other situations of negotiated reform. that these approaches were not seen as tar- Institutional capacity, accountability, and geted to one ethnic or religious group but, in- trust among groups also affect the choices and stead, as building bonds among groups. Both timetable of early policy announcements. In Colombia and Haiti are considering reform countries with institutions that are strong but in the justice sector, but accountability and have been viewed as illegitimate because they capacity problems are a bigger challenge in are exclusive, abusive, or unaccountable (as in Haiti, and reforms would have to be designed some transitions from authoritarian rule), ac- accordingly.75 For middle-income countries tion on transparency, participation, and jus- with strong institutions facing challenges of tice may be more important for short-term exclusion and accountability, lessons on pro- confidence-building than delivering goods gram design, successes, and missed oppor- and services. Where social cohesion is fac- tunities will come primarily from countries tionalized, time may be needed to build trust that have faced similar circumstances, such as between groups before wider reform is at- the democratic transitions in Latin America, tempted. In South Africa, for example, leaders Indonesia, Eastern Europe, or South Africa. wisely allowed time for constitutional reform So national reformers and their international and the development of trust between groups partners need to think through the political before the first post-Apartheid election.73 And economy for interventions and adapt pro- in Northern Ireland the devolution of secu- gram design to that context (Feature 5). rity and justice functions were delayed until Each country needs its own assessment trust and accountability increased.74 of risks and priorities to design the best-fit A core message is that the particular strategy and programs for its political con- manifestation of violence at any one time text. International assessment tools, such as is less important than the underlying insti- post-conflict/post-crisis needs assessments, Overview 23 can identify the risks and priorities. These as- they are held back by structures, tools, and sessments could be strengthened by: processes designed for different contexts and purposes. Specifically, while processes exist • Adapting assessments regularly and fre- to provide the kind of post-war assistance quently at different transition moments, typical of 20th-century paradigms, there including when risks are increasing, not is little attention to helping countries that only after a crisis. struggle with prevention of repeated cycles • Identifying the specific characteristics of of political and criminal violence (Feature 6, transition opportunities, stresses, institu- figure 6.1) and with the challenges involved tional challenges, stakeholders, and the in transforming institutions to provide citi- institutions that provide citizen security, zen security, justice, and jobs. Internal inter- justice, and jobs. national agency processes are too slow, too fragmented, too reliant on parallel systems, • Identifying priorities from a citizen and and too quick to exit, and there are significant stakeholder perspective through focus divisions among international actors. groups or polling surveys, as South Africa The range of preventive tools in the inter- did in developing its reconstruction priori- national system has improved, with increases ties or as Pakistan did in assessing the in global and regional mediation capacity78 sources of violence in the border regions.76 and in programs that support both local • Considering explicitly the history of past and national collaborative efforts to mediate efforts, as Colombia did in reviewing the violence. Examples include the Ghana peace strengths and weaknesses of previous ef- committees supported by the UN Devel- forts to address violence in the early opment Programme (UNDP) and the UN 2000s.77 Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA)79 and the Inter-American Development Bank • Being more realistic about the num- (IADB) community projects for citizen se- ber of priorities identified and the time- curity. Such programs do often support ac- lines, as with the changes recommended tivities relating to citizen security, justice, and to the joint United Nations–World jobs, but they are not in the mainstream of Bank–European Union post-crisis needs diplomatic, security, or development think- assessment. ing. UN, regional, and NGO-sponsored me- diation has played a significant role in a range of cases—from AU-UN-ECOWAS mediation PART 3: REDUCING THE in West Africa to UN facilitation of Afghani- RISKS OF VIOLENCE— stan’s Bonn Agreement to nongovernmental DIRECTIONS FOR efforts such as the Centre for Humanitarian INTERNATIONAL POLICY Dialogue and the Crisis Management Initia- tive in Aceh.80 International action has delivered great ben- But these programs are still not delivered efits in improved security and prosperity. to scale. It is much harder for countries to get It is difficult to imagine how committed international assistance to support develop- leaders in post–World War II Europe, In- ment of their police forces and judiciaries donesia, the Republic of Korea, Liberia, than their militaries. International economic Mozambique, Northern Ireland, or Timor- development assistance is easier to obtain for Leste would have stabilized their countries macroeconomic policy, health, or education or regions without help from abroad. Many capacities than for job creation. UN police individuals working on fragile and conflict- capacity, doctrinal development, and training affected states are dedicated professionals have increased, but are not fully linked to jus- attempting to support national efforts. But tice capacities. While some bilateral agencies 24 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 5 Adapting community-level program design to country context Countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, • In Burundi, a lack of progress in overall decentralization and Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, Rwanda difficulties in monitoring funds through community struc- tures meant responsibility for managing the funds remained T he basic elements of a post-conflict community develop- ment program are simple and can be adapted to a broad range of country contexts. All community programs under with NGO partners. • In Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, NGOs also took on the initial responsibility for managing the funds state auspices consist, essentially, of a community decision- while councils were trained in bookkeeping, but within making mechanisms to determine priorities and the provision a year block grants were being transferred directly to the of funds and technical help to implement them. Within this councils. model is a great deal of variance that can be adapted to dif- ferent types of stresses and institutional capacities as well as • In Colombia, where the primary institutional challenges to different opportunities for transition. Three important were to bring the state closer to communities and overcome sources of variance are in how community decision-making is distrust between security and civilian government agencies, done, who controls the funds, and where programs reside funds are held by individual government ministries but ap- within the government. provals for activities are made by multisectoral teams in field Different stresses and institutional capacity and account- offices. ability affect community decision-making. In many violent • In Nepal, community programs show the full range: some areas, preexisting community councils either have been de- programs give primary responsibility for fund oversight to stroyed or were already discredited. A critical first step is partner NGOs; in other programs, such as the country’s to reestablish credible participatory forms of representation. large-scale village school program, community school com- In Burundi, for example, a local NGO organized elections for mittees are the legal owners of school facilities and can use representative community development committees in the government funds to hire and train their staff. participating communes that cut across ethnic divides. Simi- larly, Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program began with The type of transition moment affects how community village-wide elections for a community development coun- decision-making structures align with the formal government cil. But Indonesia’s programs for the conflict-affected areas administration. Many countries emerging from conflict will of Aceh, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan did not hold new also undergo major constitutional and administrative reforms community elections. Community councils were largely in- just as the early response community programs are being tact, and national laws already provided for local, democratic, launched. Aligning community councils with the emergent village elections. Indonesia also experimented with separat- structures of government can be difficult. In Afghanistan’s ing grants to Muslim and Christian villages to minimize in- National Solidarity Program, for example, the Community tercommunal tensions, but eventually used common funds Development Councils, though constituted under a 2007 vice- and councils to bridge divides between these communities. presidential bylaw, are still under review for formal integra- Different institutional challenges also affect who holds the tion into the national administrative structure. In Cambodia’s funds. Programs must weigh the trade-offs between a first Seila Program, councils were launched under United Nations objective of building trust with the risks of money going miss- Development Programme (UNDP) auspices and then moved ing or the elite capture of resources, as shown in the following into the government’s newly formed commune structure. In examples: Rwanda, greater space for change after the genocide meant the councils could be integrated into the government’s decentral- • In Indonesia, where local capacity was fairly strong, subdis- ization plans from the start. trict councils established financial management units that are routinely audited but have full responsibility for all as- Source: Guggenheim 2011. pects of financial performance. Overview 25 provide specialized assistance for security and Commission survey of assistance to Cambo- justice reform, their capacities are relatively dia, more than 35 percent of all projects were new and underdeveloped in comparison with less than one year in duration, and 66 percent other areas. International financial institu- were less than three years. Despite the need tions and bilateral economic assistance tends for more consistent and sustained assistance, to focus primarily on growth rather than em- aid to fragile states is much more volatile ployment. Citizen security and justice are not than that to nonfragile states—indeed, more mentioned in the MDGs. than twice as volatile, with an estimated loss The programs described above all require in efficiency of 2.5 percent of GDP for recipi- linked action by diplomatic, security, and ent states (Feature 6, figures F6.2 and F6.3).85 development—and sometimes humanitar- Regional and global action on exter- ian—actors. Yet these actors generally assess nal stresses is a key part of risk reduction, priorities and develop their programs sepa- but assistance is still focused primarily at rately, with efforts to help national reformers the individual country level. Some innova- build unified programs the exception rather tive processes against trafficking combine than the rule. UN “integrated missions” and demand-side and supply-side incentives and various bilateral and regional “whole-of- the efforts of multiple stakeholders in de- government” and “whole-of-systems” initia- veloped and developing countries86—one is tives have emerged to address the challenge the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme of merging development, diplomatic, and to stem the sale of conflict diamonds.87 Yet a security strategies and operations.81 But dif- general principle of co-responsibility, com- ferent disciplines bring with them different bining demand-side and supply-side actions goals, planning timeframes, decision-making and cooperation between developed and de- processes, funding streams and types of risk veloping regions, is lacking. Existing efforts calculus.82 suffer from weakness and fragmentation Assistance is often slow to arrive despite in the financial systems used to “follow the efforts of the UN, the international finan- money” flowing from corrupt transactions. cial institutions, and bilateral donors to es- And they are constrained by a multiplica- tablish quick-disbursing and rapid deploy- tion of weak and overlapping multicoun- ment facilities. Aid is fragmented into small try endeavors rather than strong and well- projects, making it difficult for governments resourced regional approaches. Despite some to concentrate efforts on a few key results. exceptions—the Asian Development Bank In 11 fragile countries the Organisation and European Union long-standing regional for Economic Co-operation and Develop- programs, the UN Department of Political ment (OECD) surveyed in 2004, there was Affairs regional offices, and recent increases an average of 38 activities per donor, with in regional lending by the World Bank— each project an average size of just US$1.1 most development donors focus primarily million—too small for the most part to have on national rather than regional support. an impact on the challenges of institutional The international landscape is becoming transformation.83 Aid donors often operate more complex. The end of the Cold War had in fragile countries through systems parallel the potential to usher in a new age of consen- to national institutions—with separate proj- sus in international support to violence and ect units for development aid and with hu- conflict-affected areas. In fact, the last decade manitarian programs implemented through has seen an increase in complexity and con- international NGOs. Despite progress in ex- tinued coordination problems. The political, tending the time horizons of peacekeeping security, humanitarian, and development ac- missions and some types of donor assistance, tors present in each country situation have the system is constrained by a short-term fo- become more numerous. Legal agreements cus on post-conflict opportunities and high that set standards for responsible national volatility in assistance.84 In a recent European leadership have become more complicated 26 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 over time: the 1948 UN Convention Against corruption, and a lack of results in donor Genocide has 17 operative paragraphs; the programs. International actors need to be 2003 Convention Against Corruption has accountable to their citizens and taxpayers as 455. Within OECD countries, there are di- well as to partner country needs, and these vided views over the relative role of security expectations can be at odds (figure 3.1). and development assistance and over aid The slow progress in changing donor be- through national institutions. The increase havior comes from these underlying incen- in assistance from middle-income countries, tives. For example, undertaking small proj- with a history of solidarity support, not only ects through parallel systems, focusing on the brings valuable new energy, resources, and “form rather than function” of change (with ideas, but also new challenges in the differ- an emphasis on elections, model procurement ing views of international partners. WDR laws, and anti-corruption and human rights consultations frequently revealed divided commissions), and avoiding engagements in views among national actors, regional bod- riskier institution-building—all help donors ies, middle-income countries, and OECD to manage domestic expectations of results donors over what is realistic to expect from and criticism of failure. In today’s tight fiscal national leadership in improving governance, environment for many donors, the dilemma over what time period, and over the “forms” is becoming more prominent, not less. Do- versus the “functions” of good governance mestic pressures also contribute to divisions (elections versus broader democratic prac- among donors, since some donors face far tices and processes; minimizing corruption in more domestic pressure than others on cor- practice versus establishing procurement laws ruption, gender equity, or the need to show and anticorruption commissions). economic benefits at home from aid overseas. Dual accountability is at the heart of in- Accountability to taxpayers is a desirable facet ternational behavior. International actors of donor aid—but the challenge is to make know that faster, smarter, longer-term en- domestic expectations fit with the needs and gagement through national and regional realities of assistance on the ground. institutions is needed to help societies exit Multilateral responses are also constrained fragility. But as highlighted by the OECD by historical arrangements suited to more International Network on Conflict and Fra- stable environments. For example, the inter- gility,88 they are also acutely sensitive to the national financial institutions’ procurement risks of domestic criticism of waste, abuse, procedures were based on the assumption of FIGURE 3.1 The dual accountability dilemma for donors engaged in fragile and conflict environments Accountability National International actors actors Accountability Accountability Accountability Different perspectives of risks and results Domestic constituencies Domestic constituencies and governing boards Source: WDR team. Overview 27 FEATURE 6 Patterns of international assistance to violence-affected countries F I G U R E F 6.1 Uneven international support in West Africa—Post-conflict trumps prevention A one-off concept of progress and the difficulties of prevention have led to an excessive focus on post-conflict transitions. The amount of aid and peacekeeping assistance going to countries after civil war has ended greatly exceeds what is provided to countries struggling to prevent an escalation of conflict. 450 Total aid and peacekeeping expenditure 400 350 per capita (current US$) 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Liberia Sierra Leone Guinea Guinea-Bissau Togo T Global (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted average for period 2004 period 2000 period 2008) period 2002 period 2005 low-income to 2008) to 2003) to 2005) to 2008) countries West Africa, selected countries (2000 to 2008) Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. F I G U R E F 6.2 Aid volatility increases with duration of FIGURE F6.3 Stop-go aid: Volatility in selected fragile violence states Over the last 20 years, countries that experienced longer periods of The four countries below provide an illustration. It was not uncommon fragility, violence, or conflict experienced more volatility in their aid. for total aid to Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Figure 6.2 shows that the coefficient of variance of net official develop- and Haiti to drop by 20 or 30 percent in one year and increase by up to ment assistance (ODA), excluding debt relief, is higher for countries that 50 percent the following year (humanitarian aid and debt relief, have experienced prolonged violence since 1990. This relationship, excluded from these statistics, would further increase the volatility). reflected by the upward trend line, is statistically significant and sug- gests that, on average, a country that experienced 20 years of violence 150 Annual % change in aid per capita experienced twice the volatility in aid of a country that did not experi- ence violence. Volatility of revenues has considerable costs for all 100 governments, but particularly so in fragile situations where it may derail reform efforts and disrupt institution-building. 50 1.4 0 Coefficient of variance of net ODA, 1.2 –50 excluding debt relief 1 0.8 –100 0.6 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Burundi Central African Republic 0.4 Guinea-Bissau Haiti 0.2 Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Number of years of high homicides, conflict, and fragility Low-income countries Linear (Low-income countries) Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. 28 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 ongoing security, a reasonable level of state criminal violence require “outside the box” institutional capacity, and competitive mar- thinking, outside the traditional development kets. They thus have difficulty adapting to paradigm. Issues of citizen security and of situations where security conditions change grievances over justice and jobs are not pe- between the design and tendering of a proj- ripheral to “mainstream” development. They ect, where a small number of qualified gov- are in varying forms a problem for larger and ernment counterparts struggle to manage more prosperous countries facing subnational complex procurement documentation, and urban or rural violence, for countries emerg- where the number of qualified contractors ing from conflict and fragility that need to pre- prepared to compete and mobilize is very lim- vent recurrence, and for areas facing new or ited. Similarly, the UN Secretariat originally resurgent threats of social protest and instabil- developed procurement systems designed for ity. Strengthening the institutions that provide its function as a headquarters-based advisory citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to service and secretariat to the General Assem- prevention of violence and instability—such bly. But when peacekeeping operations were action is not a “magic bullet” that can prevent launched, these systems were extended with every episode of violence with certainty, but it relatively little adaptation, despite the differ- is crucial to changing the probabilities of vio- ence in contexts and objectives. lence, and to continuous risk reduction. To achieve real change in approaches that A key lesson of successful violence pre- can restore confidence and prevent risks from vention and recovery is that security, justice, recurring, international actors could con- and economic stresses are linked: approaches sider four tracks to improve global responses that try to solve them through military-only, for security and development as follows: justice-only, or development-only solutions will falter. A specialized suite of programs • Track 1: Provide more, and more inte- is needed in fragile environments, combin- grated, specialized assistance for citizen ing elements of security, justice, and eco- security, justice, and jobs—targeting pre- nomic transformation. But because these vention in both immediate post-conflict areas are covered by different international and rising risk situations. agencies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, • Track 2: Reform internal agency systems combined action under one overall pro- to provide rapid action to restore confi- gram framework is rare. A specialized suite dence and promote long-term institution- of combined security-justice-development building, in support of national efforts. programs needs to aim at a catalytic effect, supporting national collaborative efforts to • Track 3: Act regionally and globally on address these challenges. Changes in inter- external stresses. national agency approaches to support such • Track 4: Marshal support from lower-, programs would include (figure 3.2). middle-, and higher-income countries, • Moving from sporadic early warning to and global and regional institutions, to re- continued risk assessment wherever weak flect the changing landscape of interna- institutional legitimacy, and internal or tional policy and assistance. external stresses indicate a need for atten- tion to prevention and to capacities for peaceful reform processes. Track 1: Providing specialized assistance for prevention through • Simplifying current assessment and plan- citizen security, justice, and jobs ning mechanisms to provide countries with one process supporting national Security-development linkages apply in all planning that covers the political, justice, areas struggling to prevent large-scale po- security, humanitarian, and developmen- litical or criminal violence. Both political and tal areas. Overview 29 F I G U R E 3.2 Combined action across the security, development, and humanitarian spheres for external actors to support national institutional transformations CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO RIN G TRANSFORMIN CON FID RE S TO ENC E RI NG TRANSFOR MING CON GI RE FI D S NS TO IT E NCE R T IN G TRANSFORMING UT IO CON NS A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS FI D IN ST E NC E TU I TI ON Moving from early warning to continuous IN S ST TU I TI ON S risk assessment VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY On budget support and technical assistance EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES for citizen security and justice in joint teams Financing in support of collaborative, mediated agreements Unified planning processes diplomatic development State-community, state-NGO, state-private sector programs for service delivery and multi-sectoral security humanitarian violence prevention Humanitarian support for state protection systems Source: WDR team. • Shifting from the rhetoric of coordination local dispute resolution and justice to supporting combined programs for se- services, community policing, em- curity, justice, and local jobs and associated ployment and training, safe public and services, each within their respective man- trading spaces, and social and cultural dates and expertise. Two priorities for programs that promote tolerance. combined programs are— • Establishing facilities for mediators and ➢ Technical assistance and financing special envoys (internal and international) for security and justice reforms sup- to draw on greater seconded expertise ported by combined teams. Develop- from international agencies, both to in- ment agencies, for example, can sup- form transition arrangements and to gal- port measures to address budget and vanize resources for integrated activities expenditure processes in security and identified collaboratively by the different justice functions, while partners with parties to a conflict situation. This should security and justice expertise can con- include specific efforts to support the tribute to technical capacity-building, growing role of regional and subregional as was done in Timor-Leste in the run- institutions, such as AU and ECOWAS, by up to independence.89 providing them with specific links to de- velopment expertise. ➢ Multisectoral community programs that involve policing and justice as well • Considering when humanitarian aid as development activities, such as the can be integrated into national systems initiatives in Latin America to provide without compromising humanitarian 30 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 principles—building on existing good cies to invest in developing the requisite capac- practice by UNDP, UN Children’s Fund ity and expertise. There are areas where, at the (UNICEF), World Health Organization request of government, the World Bank and (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP), other institutional financial institutions (IFIs) and others in combining humanitarian could consider playing a greater role in sup- delivery with capacity-building, using porting the developmental underpinnings of local personnel and community struc- violence prevention within their mandates— tures, and purchasing food locally. such as the links between public financial management and security sector reform and Implementing these programs would re- quire systemic changes in international capac- institution-building, legal administration, jus- ity. Citizen security and justice require new tice systems development and multisectoral and interlinked capacities to address repeated approaches at the community level that com- waves of political and criminal violence. The bine community policing and justice services starting point for deeper capacity in this area with social cohesion, developmental and em- is government investment in standby, pre- ployment creation programs. But the IFIs are trained personnel for a range of executive and not equipped to lead specialized international advisory police, corrections, and justice func- support in these areas. A clear lead within the tions. States will need police and justice re- UN system would help this effort. serves to respond effectively to contemporary Agencies with economic expertise need violence, drawing on retired personnel, active to pay more attention to jobs. National service volunteers, and formed police units in community-based public works programs some countries. Second, these capacities must should receive greater and longer-term sup- be trained, and able to deploy, under shared port in fragile situations, in recognition of the doctrine to address the challenges of coher- time required for the private sector to absorb ence presented by different national policing youth unemployment. Other priority pro- models. Increased investment through the grams for job creation include investments in UN and regional centers in the development supporting infrastructure, in particular, elec- of joint doctrine and pretraining of govern- tricity and transit. A third program cluster is ment capacities would increase effectiveness those that invest in skills and work experience; and reduce incoherence. develop links between producers, traders, and Third, linking military and policing assis- consumers; and expand access to finance tance with justice assistance is crucial, since and assets, for example, through low-income disconnects have been a pervasive source housing. Current international financial in- of problems in fragile situations. So is link- stitutions and UN initiatives focused on em- ing criminal justice assistance with help for ployment creation should explicitly address local justice services such as land and prop- the specific needs of areas affected by fragility, erty disputes.90 Fourth, it is important that conflict, and violence, recognizing that job new capacities provide a full range of services creation in these situations may go beyond to countries facing challenges—from co- material benefits by providing a productive responsibility for policing or justice functions role and occupation for youth, and evalu- authorized by the UN Security Council or re- ating and expanding the examples of best- gional institutions, to police units and judicial fit employment policies in fragile situations personnel provided at the request of govern- presented in this Report. Global employment ments but without a corresponding intrusive work should include re-focusing on the risks mandate from global or regional institutions, posed by youth employment. to advisory, financing, and training services. These approaches would help. But there Last, ownership for justice reform work is likely to be continued pressure from large should be clarified in the international struc- youth unemployed populations unless a more ture to enable multilateral and bilateral agen- significant international effort is launched. Overview 31 A bolder approach could draw together ca- • Base fiduciary processes on the real world pacities from development agencies, the pri- in fragile and violence-affected situations: vate sector, foundations, and NGOs in a new insecurity, lack of competitive markets, global partnership to galvanize investments and weak institutions. in countries and communities where high unemployment and social disengagement • Balance the risks of action with the risks of contribute to the risks of conflict. Focusing inaction. primarily on job creation through project fi- • Expect a degree of failure in programs that nance, advisory support to small and medium require innovation and engagement with businesses, training and work placement, and weak institutions in risky environments, guarantees, the initiative could also support and adapt accordingly. social and cultural initiatives that promote good governance, collaborative capacities in Donor risk management also relies pri- communities, social tolerance, and recogni- marily on headquarters controls rather than tion of young people’s social and economic “best-fit” delivery mechanisms adapted to roles. Private-sector capacities to draw on local conditions. This approach may man- would include large companies that trade and age donor risk, but it constrains real progress invest in insecure areas (creating links with in institution-building on the ground. An local entrepreneurs), as well as technology alternative is to embrace faster engagement companies that can assist with connectivity through national institutions, but vary the and training in remote insecure areas. ways aid is delivered to manage risks and re- sults. Some donors have a higher risk toler- Track 2: Transforming procedures ance and will be able to choose modes that go and risk and results management more directly through national budgets and in international agencies institutions; others will need greater over- sight or nonstate involvement in delivery. To implement rapid, sustained, and inte- Three complementary options: grated programs for citizen security, justice, and jobs, international agencies need inter- • Vary the oversight and delivery mecha- nal reforms. For the g7+ group of leaders of nisms when engaging through national conflict-affected and fragile states who have institutions. Oversight mechanisms to begun to meet regularly as part of the In- adapt to risk include shifting from bud- ternational Dialogue on Peacebuilding and get support to “tracked” expenditure Statebuilding, reforming internal agency through government systems,92 and from procedures, particularly procurement proce- regular reporting and internal control dures, was the number one suggestion for in- mechanisms to independent financial ternational reform.91 International agencies monitoring agents, independent moni- cannot respond quickly to restore confidence toring of complaints, and independent or provide deep institutional support if their technical agents. Variations in delivery budget, staffing, approval, and contracting mechanisms include community struc- procedures take months and set unrealistic tures, civil society, the private sector, the prerequisites for recipient institutional ca- UN, and other international executing pacity. International agency systems would agencies in delivering programs jointly require fundamental changes to implement with state institutions. these programs effectively, based on the fol- • In situations of more extreme risk, where lowing four principles (how to approach im- donors would normally disengage, have plementing these is covered in Feature 7): executive capacity supplement national • Accept the links between security and de- control systems, as with “dual key” mech- velopment outcomes. anisms, where international line manage- 32 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 7 Internal agency reform Quick action? Ghana helps restore electricity in Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia; WDR Advisory Council Member After the 2005 election in Liberia, the new government provided two generators that helped restore electricity in announced a 100-day plan that included the restoration of some urban areas. electricity to certain areas of the capital to help restore The Liberian experience points to two key lessons. First is confidence in the state and jumpstart recovery in economic the need for early consultation between national governments activities and basic services. With ECOWAS support, the and international partners on realism in delivering quick results Liberian government approached various donors to help, and demonstrating progress to local populations. Second is the since the new government lacked resources and institu- challenge of rigidities in donor systems unable to provide par- tional capacity for implementation. None of the traditional ticular types of assistance fast. In fact, the EU, USAID, and the donors, which included the United Nations, the World Bank, World Bank were able to provide other types of support (fuel, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and transmission line restoration) for the electricity system within USAID, were able to provide the generators needed for this the 100 days, but none of the donors were able to cover the endeavor within the desired timeframe under their regular specific need for generators. Indeed, there is a need to rethink systems. The Liberian government was eventually success- existing policies and processes, to modify what I call procedural ful in securing help from the Government of Ghana, which conformism for countries in crisis situations. WDR Note: Options for applying the WDR principles for internal agency reform in different contexts Accepting the Economic and social interventions in situations of insecurity can justifiably be designed to contribute links between to citizen security and justice outcomes (in the Liberia electricity program above, an increase in security and citizen trust in government would have been an appropriate measure of program success, rather development than the sustainability of the electricity provision). Security programs can also be designed to outcomes contribute to development outcomes (an increase in trade, for example). This would require agencies to use outcome measure outside their traditional “technical” domains and work together within the combined program frameworks described above. Base budget When insecurity is high, both the costs and benefits of interventions may change dramatically over and fiduciary a short period. This argues for greater flexibility in administrative budget and staff planning. In processes on program budgets, it implies careful sequencing wherein some programs will be more beneficial at a the real world: later date, but also placing high weight on speed (over some cost-efficiency and quality concerns) in insecurity, lack contracting where benefits to fast action are high. Where competitive markets are very thin and not of perfectly transparent, different procurement controls—such as pre-tendering internationally under variable competitive quantity contracts, or contracting processes that allow direct negotiations with knowledge of regional markets, and markets—can be appropriate. Where institutional capacity is insufficient, procedures need to be weak institutions distilled to the simplest level of due process, together with flexible mechanisms to execute some activities on behalf of recipient institutions. Balance risks of Outside the realm of natural disasters, international actors often tend to be more sensitive to the action with risks risk that their support will backfire into criticisms of wastage or abuses than to the risk that delays in of inaction their support will increase the potential for violence or derail promising reform efforts. Decentralizing greater responsibility and accountability to international staff on the ground can increase responsiveness to the risks of inaction. Transparent publication of achievements against target timelines for donor funds release and activities—and reasons for delays—would also help. Expect a degree Because returns to successful programs are high, international assistance can afford a higher failure of failure in rate in violent situations. This is not how most assistance works, however: donors expect the same programs in risky degree of success in risky environments as in secure ones. A better approach is to adapt private-sector environments, principles for venture capital investment to support for fragile and violence-affected situations: pilot and adapt many different types of approaches to see which work best; accept a higher failure rate; evaluate accordingly rigorously and adapt quickly; and scale up approaches that are working. Overview 33 ment capacity works alongside national Nepal under the auspices of the Peacebuild- actors and agency processes governed by ing Commission.93 But the performance of joint national and international boards. multidonor trust funds is mixed, with criti- Not all governments will wish to take up cisms ranging from slowness to a lack of ex- these options. Where they do not, using pectation management and mixed success local personnel and community struc- in working through national systems.94 The tures for delivering humanitarian, eco- combined security-justice-development pro- nomic, and social programs still main- grams and internal agency reforms described tains some focus on local institutional above would help to mitigate this risk. capacity, mitigating the brain-drain of lo- International agencies need to think care- cal skills overseas. fully about how to lengthen the duration of assistance to meet the realities of institutional • Increase the contingencies in budgets, transformation over a generation without under transparent planning assumptions. raising costs. For humanitarian programs in Where governance is volatile, development prolonged crises, building on existing initia- program budgets, as well as the budgets for tives to support local staffing, local purchases, political and peacekeeping missions, would and community-based delivery can increase benefit from greater contingency measures the impact on institution-building and lower so that activities and delivery mechanisms unit costs. For peacekeeping, there is potential can be adjusted when new risks and oppor- for greater use of more flexible arrangements, tunities emerge without disrupting overall including over-the-horizon security guaran- support. The planning assumptions for tees, where external forces outside the coun- such contingencies—for example, that ad- try either supplement forces on the ground ditional oversight mechanisms will be ad- during tense periods or extend the leverage opted if certain agreed measures of gover- of external peacekeeping after missions are nance deteriorate—should be transparent drawn down—as suggested in inputs to this to both recipient governments and the gov- Report from the AU and the UN Department erning bodies of international agencies. of Peacekeeping Operations. Better resourc- To achieve results at scale, pooling funds in ing for mediation and diplomatic facilitation multidonor trust funds is also an effective op- is also an easy win, since it is low cost and can tion, since it provides recipient governments reduce the probabilities of conflict. with larger single programs and international For development agencies, reducing the partners with a way to support programs that volatility of flows to programs delivering re- greatly exceed their own national contribu- sults in citizen security, justice, and jobs—or tion. It can also be an effective way to pool simply preserving social cohesion and human risks, shifting the burden of responsibility and institutional capacity—can increase im- for risks of waste, abuse, or corruption from pact without increasing the overall cost. As al- the shoulders of each individual donor to the ready described, volatility greatly reduces aid multilateral system. Multidonor trust funds effectiveness, and it is twice as high for fragile have delivered excellent results in some situa- and conflict-affected countries as for other tions—funding, for example, a range of high- developing countries, despite their greater impact programs in Afghanistan through need for persistence in building social and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund state institutions. There are options for re- (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund ducing volatility, including providing thresh- for Afghanistan (LOTFA), supporting essen- old amounts of aid based on appropriate tial start-up and system maintenance costs modalities (as described by Advisory Council for the nascent Palestinian Authority under member Paul Collier in chapter 9), topping the Holst Fund in the mid-1990s in West up aid allocations to the most fragile states Bank Gaza, or serving as catalytic funding in when specific types of programs have demon- 34 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 strated the ability to deliver effectively and at actions alone are constrained in these cir- scale (as proposed in a recent working paper cumstances, and competition between gangs by the Centre for Global Development),95 and and cartels produces high levels of violence dedicating a target percentage of assistance in production and transit countries. Explor- to larger and longer-term programs in fragile ing the costs and benefits of different com- and conflict-affected states under the Devel- binations of demand- and supply-side mea- opment Assistance Committee framework. sures would be a first step to underpinning To close the loop on internal agency re- more decisive demand-side actions. forms, results indicators should be more Following the money—tracking illicit closely geared to priorities in fragile and financial flows—is at the heart of action violence-affected situations. The core tools against the illegal trafficking of drugs and for national actors and their international natural resources. For areas seriously affected counterparts include proposed indicators to by illegal trafficking and corruption, such better capture both short- and longer-term as Central America and West Africa, most progress, supplementing the MDGs (see Fea- countries have nothing approaching the ture 4). The use of these indicators by inter- national capacity needed to gather and pro- national agencies—across the diplomatic, cess information on sophisticated financial security, and aid divides—would increase the transactions, or to investigate and prosecute incentives for more integrated responses. offenders. Along with initiatives that help to support a global community to address cor- ruption issues, such as the International Cor- Track 3: Acting regionally and ruption Hunters Alliance and the Stolen As- globally to reduce external stresses set Recovery Initiative (StAR), the following on fragile states two key measures could help in this effort: Effective action against illegal trafficking • Strengthen the capacity to conduct strate- requires co-responsibility by producing and gic analysis of these flows in a critical mass consuming countries. To stem the far- of countries with the majority of global fi- reaching impact of illegal trafficking, it must nancial transfers. About 15 major financial be recognized that effective action by one markets and hubs play this role. Concerted country alone will simply push the problem efforts to strengthen the openness of fi- to other countries, and that regional and nancial centers and financial intelligence global approaches are needed. For traffick- unit capacities, as well as to proactively ing where the supply, processing, or retail analyze suspicious flows, and exchange in- markets are concentrated and easily moni- formation could greatly increase the global tored—such as diamond trafficking—inter- ability to detect illicit financial flows and to diction efforts combined with multistake- recover stolen assets. Global financial insti- holder producer and consumer campaigns tutions could also perform strategic analy- can be effective. In addition to the Kimber- sis and make it available to affected coun- ley Process for diamonds and the Extractive tries. To respect privacy, this could be based Industries Transparency Initiative, the new on shifts in aggregate flows rather than in- Natural Resource Charter and a recent dividual account information. World Bank/UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)/Food and Agri- • Expand commitments from developed culture Organization (FAO) initiative on states and financial centers to joint investi- standards for international land purchases gations with law enforcement authorities have similar potential. For drug trafficking, in fragile and violence-affected countries. the situation is complicated by highly frag- As part of this commitment, they could mented illegal production sites and process- also undertake capacity-building programs ing facilities. Supply-side and interdiction with law enforcement authorities in fragile Overview 35 states—as with the U.K.-Nigeria and U.S.- legitimacy of regional institutions, in com- Haiti examples above.96 bination with the technical and financial ca- pacity of global agencies. Delivered through Regional action can also target positive regional institutions in collaboration with opportunities. Donors could increase their global agencies, such an effort could adapt financial and technical support for cross- lessons from those initiatives that have al- border and regional infrastructure—and ready successfully pooled regional capacity. It various forms of regional administrative could also draw lessons from existing cross- and economic cooperation—giving priority border cooperation, such as the Greater Me- to violence-affected regions. Such support kong subregion,98 West Africa’s initiatives on could take the following forms: trafficking and economic integration,99 and • Cross-border development programming. the European Union’s programs100 for pre- International actors could support more viously conflict-affected border regions. It closely opportunities for cross-border ac- would support political initiatives of regional tivities that integrate action on citizen institutions (such as the African Union’s security, justice, and jobs. Even where Border Program101 and ASEAN’s subregional regional or cross-border political collabo- initiatives),102 with financial and technical ration is less well established, international expertise from global partners. support for cross-border programming Further research is also needed to track the may still be able to support and respond to impacts of climate change on weather, land bilateral government efforts, using devel- availability and food prices, each of which opment issues such as trade and transit can impact in turn on conflict risk. Current infrastructure or cross-border health pro- research does not suggest that climate change grams to support a gradual increase in itself will drive conflict, except perhaps where trust. Special financial provision for access rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts of fragile landlocked regions to markets, across existing tensions and weak institutions. as has recently been agreed upon by the But a series of inter-linked problems—chang- World Bank’s governing structures, is an- ing global patterns of consumption of energy other way to encourage developmental and scarce resources, increasing demand for cooperation across borders. food imports (which draw on land, water and energy inputs), and the repurposing of land • Shared regional administrative capacity. for climate adaptation—are increasing pres- Pooling subregional administrative capac- sures on fragile states. These warrant further ities can allow states to develop institu- research and policy attention. tional capabilities they could not manage on their own. There are already good ex- amples of shared courts in the Caribbean and shared central banking capacity in Track 4: Marshaling support from West Africa.97 While these initiatives take lower-, middle-, and higher-income time to establish, they supplement difficult countries and global and regional national institutional transformations and institutions, to reflect the changing merit assistance from regional and inter- landscape of international policy national development institutions. and assistance Rather than these somewhat incremen- The landscape of international assistance in tal approaches to specific cross-border ini- fragile and violence-affected countries has tiatives, international donors could take a changed in the last 20 years, with more aid larger step to finance regional approaches. and policy input from middle-income coun- The principle of such an initiative would be tries with a history of solidarity support. to build on the local political knowledge and Several regional institutions are also playing 36 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 a greater role in security and development Lomé Declaration in 2000, which established issues. Yet, discussions of global conflict and African standards and a regional response violence, the norms of responsible leadership mechanism to unconstitutional changes in to respond to it, and the shape of interna- government, has been associated with a re- tional assistance have been driven more by duction in coups d’état from 15 in the 1990s northern than southern actors. The Interna- to 5 in the 2000s;103 and, despite an increase tional Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State- in coups in the last five years, continental ac- building has been created to help address this tion to restore constitutional government has deficit. been consistently strong. The WDR team conducted wide-ranging Some modest actions could strengthen consultations with violence-affected coun- collaboration among higher-, middle-, and tries, regional policy makers, and regional lower-income countries on shared problems institutions, as well as with traditional do- of violence and development, both global nor partners. It found many areas of agree- and local, as follows: ment—such as the focus on institution- • Increase both South-South and South- building and governance and on citizen North exchanges. South-South exchanges security, justice, and jobs—but also some have enormous potential to provide rele- areas of difference. As described earlier, these vant capacity and lessons in current fragile differences included what it is realistic to and violence-affected situations.104 Low- expect in terms of responsible national lead- and middle-income countries that have ership in improving governance, and over gone through their own recent experi- what time period, and over the “forms” ver- ences of transition have much to offer to sus the “functions” of good governance. Per- their counterparts—as demonstrated in ceived double standards were also criticized this Report, where Latin American coun- by WDR interlocutors, who reflected a senti- tries offered perspectives on urban vio- ment that donor countries and organizations lence prevention and security and justice that have faced their own internal gover- reforms, China on job creation, India on nance challenges could approach shortcom- local public works and democratic prac- ings in fragile developing states with more tices, and Southeast Asian and African humility. Developed countries are not im- countries on community driven develop- mune to corruption, bribery, human rights ment in conflict areas. Yet South-North abuses, or failures to account adequately for exchanges are also important. While insti- public finances. So effective implementation tutional capacities differ, many northern of standards of good governance is also a and southern countries, provinces, and challenge in advanced countries, even more cities face some similar stresses. Program so when the international community has approaches—such as addressing traffick- played an executive government or security ing, reintegrating ex-gang members and role in violence-affected areas. disengaged young people, and fostering Lack of concerted support for the norms tolerance and social bonds among com- of responsible leadership is a concern, be- munities that are ethnically or religiously cause progress in global norms is crucial for divided—will have lessons relevant for reducing the risk of violence. Regional and others. Such exchanges would increase global standards, as well as recognition and understanding that the challenges of vio- sanction mechanisms in constitutionality, lence are not unique to developing coun- human rights, and corruption, have pro- tries and that developing countries are not vided support and incentives for national alone in struggling to find solutions. reformers, particularly where the capacity of the domestic system to provide rewards • Better align international assistance be- and accountability is weak. For example, the hind regional governance efforts. When Overview 37 regional institutions take the initiative, cial in light of recent social protests that as with the AU on constitutionality or demonstrate strong grievances and expec- ASEAN in certain conflict and natural di- tations over governance change—that were saster situations (Feature 8), they have not picked up by standard analyses of secu- great comparative advantage in traction rity and of development progress. Indicators with their member states. The potential are needed that focus on whether countries convening role of regional institutions was are on track to make institutional and gov- also widely recognized in WDR consulta- ernance improvements within the realistic tions by higher-, middle-, and lower- generational timeframes that the faster re- income country interlocutors alike. Sup- formers have achieved, and how citizens porting regional platforms to discuss the perceive trends in the legitimacy and per- application of governance norms is an ef- formance of national institutions across the fective way to increase ownership. Adopt- political security and development domains. ing clearer structures to discuss responses The indicators presented in Feature 4 would to major improvements or deteriorations be a simple way, as Louise Arbour suggests in governance (such as coups d’états) (Feature 8), to compare progress, stagna- among bilateral and multilateral actors tion or deterioration. Ensuring that such would also improve information-sharing indicators measure outcomes rather than and the potential for coordinated respons- just the form of institutions (laws passed, es, without creating unacceptable binding anti-corruption commissions formed) is obligations on international actors.105 also important to ensure that they encour- age rather than suppress innovative national • Expand initiatives to recognize responsi- action and that they foster learning among ble leadership. While there is always a role low-, middle-, and high-income country for frank and transparent criticism, ap- institutions. The UN Peacebuilding Com- proaches from the North that are seen as mission, which brings together fragile states, disproportionately focused on criticism donors, troop-contributing countries, and in fragile situations can be divisive. Initia- regional bodies, has unexploited potential tives such as the Ibrahim Prize for African to advise on better tracking of progress and leadership could be emulated to recognize risks, and realistic timelines for governance leaders in different roles (for example, transformation. ministers who have a lasting impact on At the beginning of this overview, we corruption or military leaders who im- asked how piracy in Somalia, continuing vio- plement successful security sector reform). lence in Afghanistan, new threats from drug Multistakeholder initiatives such as the trafficking in the Americas, or conflict aris- Extractive Industries Transparency Initia- ing from social protests in North Africa can tive could consider provisions to recog- happen in today’s world. The short answer nize individual leaders or leadership is that such violence cannot be contained teams who have improved the transpar- by short-term solutions that fail to generate ency of resource revenues and expendi- the institutions capable of providing people tures, whether in governments, civil soci- with a stake in security, in justice, and in eco- ety, or companies. nomic prospects. Societies cannot be trans- More focused and realistic expectations of formed from the outside, and they cannot the timetables for governance improvements be transformed overnight. But progress is would also help bridge gaps in perspectives possible with consistent and concerted effort among countries receiving international as- by national leaders and their international sistance, their middle- and higher-income partners to strengthen the local, national, international partners, and global and re- and global institutions that support citizen gional institutions. This is particularly cru- security, justice, and jobs. 38 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 8 Regional initiatives and norms and standards ASEAN experience in crisis prevention and recovery Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General ASEAN; WDR Advisory Council Member There are many conflicts simmering in the ASEAN landscape. vening role, and the technical capacities of other partners. Our But the region is not totally without its own experiences work in support of recovery after Cyclone Narghis was sup- in mediation and conflict resolution. ASEAN has played an ported by technical teams from the World Bank, and performed important role in endeavors. The ASEAN Troika in the Cam- in conjunction with the United Nations. In the Aceh Monitoring bodian conflict of 1997–99, the Timor-Leste peace-keeping Mission, we worked jointly with colleagues from the European operation of 1999 onward, the Aceh Reconciliation of 2005, Union who brought valuable technical knowledge. and the Myanmese Cyclone Nargis catastrophe of May 2008 The third is that the more operations of this type that we were cases of mediation and eventual resolution where the undertake, the more our capacity builds. In Timor-Leste, long regions and some ASEAN member states have made valu- years of joint-military training and exercises between the Phil- able contributions and learned lessons from the process. It ippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, and supported by has always been like putting pieces of a diplomatic jigsaw partners outside the region such as the US, paid off. The troops together, weaving tapestry of peace, improvising the best on the ground could communicate, cooperate, and conduct modality and pattern from the available and suitable materi- joint operations without any delay—but their experiences in als at hand. Timor-Leste also added to their capacity. In Myanmar, ASEAN’s One important lesson for us is that our ASEAN structures role meant drawing on personnel from many of our member can play an important political convening role when there states, such as Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, who have are sensitivities with member states. There was a higher level extensive experience of managing post-disaster recovery, and of mutual confidence between Indonesia and of the ASEAN also building capacity within our Secretariat. Linked to long- states participating in the Timor-Leste operation. We got term programs of capacity-building with some of our donor around the rigid principle of “non-interference” by offering partners, these experiences make us more ready to face new troops under a joint-command with an “ASEAN” military challenges in future. The cumulative results of these efforts in leader taking an active leadership role. And Indonesia made managing political conflicts and natural disaster relief have it easier for all ASEAN Partners by issuing an invitation to helped ASEAN in enhancing its capacity to coordinate our come and assist. In Myanmar, ASEAN played a central role in development cooperation strategies. We have learned to con- the dialogue with the Government after Cyclone Nargis, tain sporadic violence and tension in the region and would not helping to open up the affected areas, where over 130,000 allow them to derail our community development efforts aim- men, women and children had died and many more faced ing at common security and sustainable prosperity for our traumatic conditions, to international aid. people. A second lesson is that we can find useful combinations of capacity between our local knowledge and political con- All the recommendations of this Report collectively—and as equal partners. Real have at their heart the concept of shared global change requires a strong rationale. But a dual risk. Risks are evolving, with new threats to rationale exists: fragility and violence are stability arising from international organized major obstacles to development and are no crime and global economic instability. The longer confined to poor and remote areas landscape of international power relations or cityscapes. This past decade has seen the is also changing, as low- and middle-income increasing penetration of instability in global countries increase their share of global eco- life—in terrorism, an expanding drug trade, nomic influence and their contributions to impact on commodity prices, and the rising global policy thinking. This shift requires a numbers of internationally mobile refugees. fundamental rethink of the approaches of Breaking cycles of repeated violence is thus international actors to manage global risks a shared challenge demanding urgent action. Overview 39 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT Reaffirming consensus on international norms and standards—the role of regional organizations Louise Arbour, President, International Crisis Group; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; WDR Advisory Council Member Whether based on universal values, such as the sanctity of In the justice sector, for instance, uniformity of institutional human life, or on international legal rules, there are some models and procedures may obscure radical differences in the universally accepted norms—reflected in the Charter of the actual delivery of justice. But the adjudication of disputes United Nations and other international instruments. based on principles of fairness, impartiality, transparency, These norms are not self-implementing, and, because integrity, compassion, and, ultimately, accountability can take they include the right to cultural diversity, their interpreta- many forms. tion must reflect local, national, and regional diversity. The In their assistance to development, international actors resistance to the exportation of “Western values” might be must resist the exportation of form over substance and accept no more than the rejection of a foreign way of expressing a the regionalization of norms that enhance, rather than impede, particular norm, rather than a rejection of the norm itself. their true universal character. In the same spirit, regional actors Regional institutions can bridge the distance between must translate, in a culturally relevant way, international norms universal norms and local customs. Those customs or prac- and repudiate nonconforming practices. tices must conform, in substance, to the core international And all must concede that the standards set by universal principles from which the international community derives norms are aspirations. Measures of performance should reflect its cohesion. Otherwise cultural diversity can simply over- either progress, stagnation or regression, in a given country, ride, and undermine, the international framework. toward a common, universal ideal. Notes 1. The World Development Report 2011 defines organized violence as the use or threat of physical force by groups, including state actions against other states or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing sides, communal conflicts based on regional, ethnic, religious, or other group identities or competing economic interests, gang-based violence and organized crime, and international, nonstate, armed movements with ideological aims. Although these are also impor- tant topics for development, the WDR does not cover domestic or interpersonal violence. At times, violence or conflict are used as shorthand for organized violence, understood in these terms. Many countries address certain forms of violence, such as terrorist attacks by nonstate armed movements, as matters that are subject to their criminal laws. 2. Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005); Sundberg 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 1999; Human Security Report Project, forthcoming; Gleditsch and others 2002. 3. Countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence include those countries with: (1) homicide rates greater than 10 per 100,000 population per year; (2) major civil conflict (battle deaths greater than 1,000 per year (as defined in the from 2006 to 2009), (3) UN or regionally mandated peace- building or peacekeeping missions; and (4) low-income countries with institutional levels in 2006–09 (World Bank’s CPIA less than 3.2), correlated with high risks of violence and conflict. See Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010); UNDPKO 2010b; UNDP 2010c; World Bank 2010e. 4. For discussions of the trends in civil war onset and termination see Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010; Sambanis 2004; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Collier and others 2003. 5. Demombynes 2010; UNODC 2010a. 40 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 6. Leslie 2010; Harriott 2004, 2008; International Crisis Group 2008b; Ashforth 2009. 7. Bayer and Rupert 2004. While Baker and others 2002 found that the effect of conflict is equivalent to a 33 percent tariff barrier. For an updated discussion of the methodology for determining growth effects of conflict and theory and new analysis based on primary and secondary neighbors, see De Groot 2010; Murdoch and Sandler 2002. 8. U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2009; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008. 9. Gomez and Christensen 2010; Harild and Christensen 2010. 10. Global Terrorism Database 2010; National Counter Terrorism Center 2010; WDR team calculations. 11. Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008. 12. Davies, von Kemedi, and Drennan 2005. 13. WDR team calculations based on Europe Brent spot price FOB (dollars per barrel) reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011. 14. UNODC 2010b. 15. UNODC 2010b. 16. Hanson 2010; Bowden 2010. 17. World Bank 2010d. 18. WDR staff calculations based on Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula 2008 poverty data (available on POVCALNET, http://iresearch.worldbank.org). 19. Narayan and Petesch 2010. 20. UNDP 2006. 21. For an overview of costs of conflict and violence, see Skaperdas and others 2009. Specific estimates of the economic costs associated with conflict are found in Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Cerra and Saxena 2008; Collier, Chauvet, and Hegre 2007; Riascos and Vargas 2004; UNDP 2006. 22. Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008. 23. UNICEF 2004; UNFPA 2002; Anderlini 2010a. 24. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995; Women’s Refugee Commission 2009; UNICEF 2004. 25. American Psychological Association 1996; Dahlberg 1998; Verdú and others 2008. 26. WDR team calculations. 27. Theories of the causes of conflict are explored in chapter 2 of the main text. Of the literature dis- cussed there, selected recommended readings include: Gurr 1970; Hirshleifer 1995; Skaperdas 1996; Grossman 1991; Fearon 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Keefer 2008; Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Toft 2003; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007; Arnson and Zartman 2005. The linkages among political, security, and economic dynamics are also recognized in the policy circle. See Zoellick 2010b. 28. For relationship between income inequality and the risk of civil conflict see Fearon 2010a. For re- lationship between income inequality and criminal violence see Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman 2002a, 2002b; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002. 29. Fearon 2010b; Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010; Neumayer 2003; Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman 2002a, 2002b; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002; WDR team calculations. 30. Stewart 2010. 31. Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004. 32. For the relationship between institutional weakness and violence conflict, see Fearon 2010a, 2010b; Johnston 2010; Walter 2010. 33. In addition, there are structural and incremental factors that increase conflict risk. Among these are features of the physical terrain that make rebellion easier. These features do not cause war in the common sense of the word, they simply make it more possible. Mountainous terrain has been shown to increase risks, by increasing the feasibility of rebellion. Neighborhood matters too: there are both negative effects from proximity to other wars or countries with high rates of violent crime and illicit trafficking and positive effects from being in a neighborhood largely at peace. See Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Overview 41 Goldstone 2010. On the effects of neighborhood on civil wars, see Hegre and Sambanis 2006 and Gleditsch 2007. 34. McNeish 2010; Ross 2003. 35. This follows recent literature on statebuilding, notably North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Dobbins and others 2007; Fukuyama 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2005, 2006. This learn- ing is reflected in recent policy documents as well: OECD 2010a, 2010g, 2011. 36. Institutions are defined in the WDR as the formal and informal “rules of the game,” which include formal rules, written laws, organizations, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs—as well as the organizational forms that exist to implement and enforce these norms (both state and non- state organizations). Institutions shape the interests, incentives, and behaviors that can facilitate violence. Unlike elite pacts, institutions are impersonal—they continue to function irrespective of the presence of particular leaders, and therefore provide greater guarantees of sustained resilience to violence. Institutions operate at all levels of society—local, national, regional, and global. 37. Fearon 2010a, 2010b; Walter 2010. 38. Arboleda 2010; WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives and security personnel in Colombia, 2010. 39. Gambino 2010. 40. A 2010 meeting of Anglophone and Francophone delegates in Kenya, convened by UNDP, coined the phrase “collaborative capacities” and further defined the institutions relevant to prevention and recovery from violence as “dynamic networks of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in a society.” UN Interagency Framework for Coordination on Preventive Action 2010, 1. 41. Barron and others 2010. 42. World Bank 2010m; Buhaug and Urdal 2010. 43. See Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010. Food protests data are from news reports; governance effectiveness data are from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010a. 44. Menkhaus 2006, 2010. 45. For the role of institutions in economic growth and development, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005. Also see Zoellick 2010b. 46. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009. 47. For the impact of colonialism on the development of modern-day institutions in former colonized countries, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001. 48. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009. 49. According to Margaret Levi, “Trust is, in fact, a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest.” Furthermore, Levi notes that “At issue is a cooperative venture, which implies that the truster possesses a reasonable belief that well-placed trust will yield positive returns and is willing to act upon that belief.” Braithwaite and Levi 1998, 78. 50. Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. 51. The interlink between security and development has been debated under the notion of human security, which encompasses freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity. By putting the security and prosperity of human beings at the center, human security addresses wide range of threats, both from poverty and from violence, and their interactions. While acknowl- edging the importance of human security and its emphasis on placing people at the center of focus, this Report uses the term “citizen security” more often to sharpen our focus more on freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence. The hope is to complement the discussion on the aspect of freedom from fear in the human security concept. Building on the Commission on Human Security 2003 report, the importance of human security has been recognized in the UN General Assembly 2005 resolution adopted at the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly 2009 report, and UN General Assembly 2010 Resolution, as well as in other fora such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, G8, and World Economic Forum. See Commission on Human Security 2003; UN General Assembly 2005b, 2009b, 2010. 52. “Confidence-building” in mediation terminology means building trust between adversaries; in a financial context, the term “confidence” denotes trust by market actors that governments are adopt- 42 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 ing sound policies and will be capable of implementing them. The WDR defines the term as building trust between groups of citizens who have been divided by violence, between citizens and the state, and between the state and other key stakeholders (neighbors, international part- ners, investors) whose political, behavioral, or financial support is needed to deliver a positive outcome. 53. On building trust and changing expectations, see Hoff and Stiglitz 2008. 54. Bedeski 1994; Cumings 2005; Kang 2002; Chang and Lee 2006. 55. See Stedman 1996; Nilsson and Jarstad 2008. On elite bargains, political settlements and inclusion, see Di John and Putzel 2009. 56. Anderlini 2000. 57. World Bank 2008f, 2009d; Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Environment 1999. 58. UNDPKO 2010a. 59. For Japanese land reforms, see Kawagoe 1999; Tsunekawa and Yoshida 2010; For broader statebuild- ing experience in Japan, see Tsunekawa and Yoshida 2010; For Korean land reforms, see Shin 2006. 60. Braud and Grevi 2005. 61. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), introduced in the run-up to the 2005 elections in Liberia, provides “dual key” authority in the areas of revenue earn- ing and expenditure. Jointly managed by the government and the international community, it was designed specifically to reassure a skeptical population and donors that years of official looting and corruption were over and that services would be reliably delivered. Dwan and Bailey 2006; Govern- ment of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009. 62. To combat corruption and crime, Guatemala created the International Commission Against Im- punity, known by its Spanish acronym, CICIG, through an agreement with the UN in 2007. Its mandate is to “support, strengthen, and assist institutions of the State of Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations.” See UN 2006a. 63. For Afghanistan National Solidarity Program, see Beath and others 2010; Ashe and Parrott 2001; UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UNOHCHR 2010. For Latin American multi-sectoral violence prevention programs, see Alvarado and Abizanda 2010; Beato 2005; Fabio 2007; Interna- tional Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005; Duailibi and others 2007; Peixoto, Andrade, and Azevedo 2007; Guerrero 2006; Llorente and Rivas 2005; Formisano 2002. 64. For India, see India Ministry of Rural Development 2005, 2010. For Indonesia, see Barron 2010; Guggenheim 2011. For Kosovo, see Grygiel 2007; Institute for State Effectiveness 2007. For Rwanda, see Boudreaux 2010. 65. For Nicaragua, see Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. For Nepal, see Ashe and Parrott 2001. 66. For Liberia, see Blundell 2010. For Mozambique, see Crown Agents 2007. 67. For the Timor-Leste health programs, see Rohland and Cliffe 2002; Baird 2010. 68. Messick 2011. 69. Giovine and others 2010; 70. Guerrero 2006; Mason 2003; Presidencia República de Colombia 2010. 71. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, in Fixing Failed States, analyze the issue of establishing legitimacy and closing the sovereignty gap in fragile and conflict-affected states through the lens of “double compact.” The double compact focuses on the “network of rights and obligations underpinning the state’s claim to sovereignty . . .” and refers first to the “compact . . . between a state and its citi- zens . . . embedded in a coherent set of rules, and second, “between a state and the international community to ensure adherence to international norms and standards of accountability and trans- parency.” Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 8. 72. Agoglia, Dziedzic, and Sotirin 2008. 73. WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010. 74. Barron and others 2010. 75. WDR team consultation in Haiti, 2010; UNDPKO 2010a. 76. For South Africa, see Kambuwa and Wallis 2002; WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010. For Pakistan: World Bank and ADB 2010. Overview 43 77. WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives and security per- sonnel in Colombia 2010. 78. These tools include UNDPA’s mediation unit; AU and other regional mediation capacity; “track II mediation,” such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 79. Ojielo 2007; Odendaal 2010; UNDPA 2010a. 80. Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a Finnish independent nonprofit organization, works to re- solve conflict and to build sustainable peace. In 2005, CMI Chairman, former Finnish President Ahtisaari facilitated a peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh, Indonesia. See Crisis Management Initiative 2011. 81. For UN “integrated missions,” see Eide and others 2005. For “whole-of-government” approaches, see OECD-DAC 2006; DFID 2009, 2010. For “whole-of systems” approaches, see OECD-DAC 2007a. For regional tools, see African Union 2006, 2007b. 82. Stewart and Brown 2007. 83. OECD-DAC 2008. 84. OECD-DAC 2010a. 85. A recent study examined the cost to countries of aid volatility, which induces volatility into govern- ment revenues and development programs. The loss in efficiency from volatility of net ODA was more than twice as high for weak states than strong states, at 2.5 versus 1.2 percent of GDP (see Kharas 2008). 86. Trafficking is intrinsically regional and global in nature, with knock-on impacts between produc- ing, transit, and consuming countries. Colombia’s actions against drug cartels affect Central Amer- ica, Mexico, and even West Africa; California’s recent policy debate on legalizing drugs potentially impacts producing countries. Similar effects happen with other commodities: restraints on logging in one country can increase demand in other countries that do not have similar policies, bringing with it increased vulnerability to corruption and violence. 87. The Kimberley Process is jointly undertaken by civil society groups, industry, and governments to stem the flow of “conflict diamonds” used to fuel rebellions in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. The process has its own diamond certification scheme imposing extensive requirements on its 49 members (representing 75 countries) to ensure that the rough diamonds shipped have not funded violence. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 2010. 88. OECD-DAC 2010a. 89. WDR team consultation with country team in Timor-Leste in 2010. 90. UNOHCHR 2006. 91. The g7+ is an “independent and autonomous forum of fragile and conflict affected countries and regions that have united to form one collective voice on the global stage.” The g7+ was established in 2008 and includes: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. See International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2010. 92. A practical example of this type of shift is Ethiopia in 2005, when government and donors agreed to move from regular budget support to a program of transfers to local and municipal governments. The program included measures to ensure that all regions of the country, irrespective of how they had voted in elections, received continuing central government support. 93. See Garassi 2010. For Afghanistan, see Atos Consulting 2009. For West Bank and Gaza, see World Bank 1999a. For Nepal, see UNOHCHR 2010; Government of Nepal, UNDP, and UNDG 2010. 94. See OECD 2010i; Scanteam 2010. 95. Gelb 2010. 96. Messick 2011. 97. See Favaro 2008, 2010. 98. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries (Cambodia, China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) have implemented a wide-ranging series of regional projects covering transport, power, telecommunications, environmental management, human re- source development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and agriculture. The GMS is rec- ognized as having enhanced cross-border trade while reducing poverty levels and creating shared interests in economic stability and peace. 44 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 99. West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) is a joint program among the UNODC, UN Office for West Africa, UN Department of Political Affairs, and INTERPOL to combat problems of illicit drug traf- ficking, organized crime, and drug abuse in West Africa. The initiative comprises a comprehensive set of activities targeting capacity-building, at both national and regional level, in the areas of law enforcement, forensics, border management, anti-money-laundering, and the strengthening of criminal justice institutions, contributing to peacebuilding initiatives and security sector reforms. 100. The “Euroregion” began as an innovative form of transborder cooperation (between two or more states that share a common bordering region) in the late 1950s. With the purpose of stimulating cross border economic, sociocultural and leisure cooperation, the Euroregion model grew, and was boosted through the creation of a common European market and recent democratic transitions. There are currently more than one hundred Euroregions spread across Europe, and the model has in recent times been replicated in eastern and central European territories. Cooperation has not been without problems in areas previously affected by conflict, but there are good examples of cross-border developmental, social and security programs that involve areas where ethnic minori- ties reside across several states or in areas that have suffered the trauma of interstate and civil war in the past. See Greta and Lewandowski 2010; Otocan 2010; Council of Europe 1995; Council of Europe and Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia 2003; Bilcik and others 2000. 101. Recognizing that insecure borders have been recurrent hosts to conflict, the African Union estab- lished the African Union Border Program in 2007 to delimit and demarcate sensitive border ar- eas and promote cross-border cooperation and trade as a conflict prevention tool. The program consists of four components. First, it pursues both land and maritime border demarcation since less than a quarter of Africa’s borders have been formally marked and agreed, and disputes are likely to continue with future discoveries of oil. Second, it promotes cross-border cooperation to deal with itinerant criminal activities. Third, it supports cross-border peacebuilding programs. Fourth, it consolidates gains in the economic integration through the regional economic communities. Its first pilot project was launched in the Sikasso region in Mali and in Bobo Dioualasso in Burkina Faso—bringing together local, private, and public actors to strengthen cooperation. See African Union 2007a. 102. ASEAN has played an important role in mediation and conflict resolution in the Southeast Asia re- gion. Examples include its assistance in the Cambodian conflict of 1997–99, the Timor-Leste peace- keeping operation of 1999 onward, the Aceh Reconciliation of 2005, and the Myanmese Cyclone Nargis catastrophe of May 2008. 103. WDR team calculations based on dataset in Powell and Thyne 2011. 104. Of the different forms that South-South cooperation has taken, technical assistance has been the most common. Although many technical assistance projects focus on economic and social devel- opment, countries in the Global South have also developed specialized capacities in post-conflict peacebuilding. Examples include South Africa’s support to build structural capacities for public service through peer learning with Burundi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan. Cooperation among 45 municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras helps to manage regional public goods such as water in the Trifinio region. The African Development Bank also has a specific facility for South-South cooperation in fragile states. See also OECD 2010e. 105. In the West African countries that have recently experienced coups d’état, for example, the view of the African Union was that donor support to social and poverty reduction programs should continue in these countries, but that larger-scale support should be paced to support the return to a constitutional path. In practice, donors were divided between those that suspended assistance com- pletely and those that continued assistance with no change. WDR team consultation with officials from African Union in Addis Ababa, 2010. WDR Framework and Structure The Report argues that the risk of violence increases when stresses—both internal and exter- nal—combine with weak institutions. Given this challenge, how have countries prevented or escaped violence? The WDR framework (figure 1) suggests that there is a need to first restore confidence and then to transform institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs. The interlink between security and development has been debated under the notion of human security, which encompasses freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity.1 By putting the security and prosperity of human beings at the center, human security addresses wide range of threats, both from poverty and from violence, and their interactions. Building on the report by the Commission on Human Security in 2003, the importance of human security has been recognized in the United Nations General Asembly and other international fora. While acknowledging the importance of human security and its emphasis on placing people at the center of focus, this Report uses the term “citizen security” more often to sharpen our focus more on freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence. Our hope is to complement the discussion on the aspect of freedom from fear in the human security concept. FIGURE 1 The 2011 WDR Framework—Building resilience to violence CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO TRANSFORMIN RING CON RE S FID TO TRANSFORMI E NC E RING GI CON NS RE S IT F I DE NC E TO T UT TRANSFORMIN RING IO NG NS CON IN FID IT ST UT ENCE IO GI NS N IT ST UT IO NS VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES 1 The importance of human security has been recognized in the UN General Assembly 2005 resolution adopted at the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly 2009 report, and UN General Assembly 2010 resolu- tion, as well as in other fora such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, G8, and World Economic Forum. See the Commission on Human Security 2003; UN General Assembly 2005b, 2009b, 2010. 45 46 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 This framework is graphically represented as a spiral, because these processes repeat over time as countries go through successive transition moments. Even as one set of immediate priorities is resolved, other risks and transition moments emerge and require a repeated cycle of action to bolster institutional resilience to stress. There is no “one path”, institutions do not need to converge on Western models to create sustained security—in fact, local adaptation is best. Additionally, progress can be made within a generation, but areas that have already seen repeated cycles of organized violence cannot create sustained security overnight. The arrow below the spiral shows that external support and incentives can help this nationally led pro- cess, and the arrow above it shows that external stresses can derail it. The WDR framework provides a roadmap for the nine chapters of the WDR, summarized in table 1. TA B L E 1 Chapter structure PART 1: THE CHALLENGE Chapter 1, Repeated violence threatens development, explores the challenge: repeated cycles of organized criminal violence and civil conflict that threaten development locally and regionally and are responsible for much of the global deficit in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY Weak institutions Chapter 2, Vulnerability to violence, reviews the combination of internal and external stresses not transforming and institutional factors that lead to violence. It argues that capable, accountable, and legiti- mate institutions are the common “missing factor” explaining why some societies are more resilient to violence than others. Without attention to institutional transformation, countries Elite New pact stresses are susceptible to a vicious cycle of repeated violence. Violence PART 2: LESSONS FROM NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES Chapter 3, From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions, CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, presents the WDR framework, or “virtuous cycle.” It compiles research and case study experi- AND JOBS EXTERNAL ence to show how countries have successfully moved away from fragility and violence: by STRESS mobilizing coalitions in support of citizen security, justice, and jobs to restore confidence RE S in the short term and by transforming national institutions over time. This is a repeated TO TRANSFORMI RING process that seizes multiple transition moments and builds cumulative progress. It takes a CON RE S FID TO generation. TRANSFORMING E NC E RING NG CON IN RE S IT ST F I DE NC E TO UT TRANSFORMIN RING IO NS CON IN FID IT ST UT ENCE IO GI NS N IT ST UT IO NS VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES CITIZEN SECURITY, Chapter 4, Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink, reviews lessons from national JUSTICE, AND JOBS experience in restoring confidence by mobilizing ‘inclusive-enough’ coalitions of stake- EXTERNAL STRESS holders and by delivering results. Collaborative coalitions often combine government and RE S nongovernmental leadership to build national support for change and signal an irrevers- TO R ING TRANSFORMING ible break with the past. Restoring confidence in situations of low trust means delivering CON RE FID S some fast results, since government announcements of change will not be credible without TO ENCE R ING TRANSFORMING CON FID IN RE S tangible action. ST ENCE TU TO TRANSFORMING I R TI I NG ON CON S IN FID IT ST UT E NC E IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES Overview 47 CITIZEN Chapter 5, Transforming institutions to deliver security, justice, and jobs, reviews national SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS experience in prioritizing foundational reforms that provide citizen security, justice, and EXTERNAL STRESS jobs—and stem the illegal financing of armed groups. In moving forward institutional trans- formation in complex conflict settings, case studies emphasize that perfection should not be TRANSFORMING the enemy of progress—pragmatic, “best-fit” approaches should be used to address immedi- ate challenges. TRANSFORMING IN ST TU TRANSFORMING I TI ON S IN IT ST UT IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Chapter 6, International support to building confidence and transforming institutions, turns CITIZEN SECURITY, to lessons from international support to national processes. While registering some notable JUSTICE, AND JOBS successes, it argues that international interventions are often fragmented, slow to enter, EXTERNAL STRESS quick to exit, reliant on international technical assistance, and delivered through parallel systems. The chapter considers why international action has been slow to change. Interna- tional actors have to respond to their own domestic pressures to avoid risk and deliver fast results. Different parts of the international system—middle-income versus OECD actors, for example—face different domestic pressures, undermining cohesive support. VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES CITIZEN Chapter 7, International action to mitigate external stresses, provides lessons from inter- SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS national action to combat external security, economic, and resource stresses that increase EXTERNAL STRESS conflict risk. The stresses range from trafficking in drugs and natural resources to food insecurity and other economic shocks. The chapter also addresses lessons from regional and cross-border initiatives to manage these threats. VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES PART 3: PRACTICAL OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION Chapter 8, Practical country directions and options, provides practical options for national CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, and international reformers to take advantage of multiple transition opportunities, restore AND JOBS confidence, and transform institutions in countries facing a range of institutional challenges, EXTERNAL STRESS stresses, and forms of violence. RE S TO TRANSFORMING RING CON RE FID S TO ENCE TRANSFORMING RING CON IN RE S ST FID TU TO TRANSFORMING I R TI E NCE I NG ON CON S IN FID IT ST UT E NC E IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Chapter 9, New directions for international support, identifies four tracks for international CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, action. First, to invest in prevention through citizen security, justice and jobs. Second, internal AND JOBS agency reforms to provide faster assistance for confidence-building and longer term institu- EXTERNAL STRESS tional engagement. Third, acting at the regional level on external stresses. Fourth, marshal- ling the knowledge and resources of low-, middle-, and high-income countries. VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES 48 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 The dynamics of change are similar in countries facing violence of purely criminal origins and those facing political and civil conflict; in countries with different combinations of stresses and institutional characteristics; and in those at different incomes, including middle and high income countries facing subnational violence. This said, the Report’s framework must be applied contextually, taking into account the specific features of the case in question. This dif- ferentiation is explored throughout the Report. Lessons from country case studies in chapters 4 to 8 include, for example, brief “differentiation tables” that summarize the relevant types of violence, transition opportunities, key stakeholders, key stresses, and institutional challenges faced (table 2). These tables provide a brief assessment of the critical dynamics that, based on experience, must be taken into account when designing an appropriate strategy to prevent, mitigate, or recover from violence. TA B L E 2 Sample differentiation table Types of violence: Legacy of civil conflict, political, criminal and gang related violence, trafficking Transition opportunities: Moderate space for Key stakeholders: Government, investors, opposi- change, presidential elections, strong international tion parties, ex-combatants, victims, peacekeepers support Key stresses: Legacy of violence and trauma, Institutional challenges: Accountability and grievances and mistrust, deep-rooted corruption, capacity constraints in economic, security, political unemployment spheres PART I The Challenge T his chapter presents the development challenge of political and criminal violence. The effects can be devastating. Violence kills and displaces people, destroys human and physical capi- tal, stunts growth, and all too often spills across borders. More than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by fragility, violence, or conflict. A child living in a conflict-affected or fragile developing country is twice as likely to be undernourished as a child living in another developing country and nearly three times as likely to be out of school. No low-income fragile or conflict-affected state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG). There is hope, however. Countries that have managed to reduce violence have also produced some of the fastest development gains. CHAPTER 1 Repeated Violence Threatens VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY Development VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY decision reinforced in the Democratic Char- Interstate and civil wars have ter of 2001.4 The number of coups in Latin declined since peaking in the America fell from 30 between 1970 and 1989 early 1990s to 3 since 1990.5 New norms and associated sanctions to protect human rights have also W ars between states are now relatively rare (compared with made it possible to prosecute leaders for the large wars of the 20th cen- using extreme violence and coercion against tury). Major civil wars, after their citizens: since 1990, 67 former heads of peaking in the early 1990s, have since declined state have been prosecuted for serious human (see box 1.1). The annual number of battle rights violations or economic crimes during deaths from civil war fell from more than their tenures.6 160,000 a year in the 1980s to less than 50,000 Countries emerging from severe violence a year in the 2000s.1 Homicide rates in most have made striking development gains, often regions have also been declining, except in with strong assistance from the international Latin America and the Caribbean and possibly community. Conflict-affected states often be- Sub-Saharan Africa.2 gin their recovery from lower development The last two decades have also seen prog- levels than is “natural,” given their human ress in developing global and regional stan- and physical capital. This makes rapid strides dards to check the violent or coercive exercise in development possible, as shown in the fol- of power. In Africa, the Lomé Declaration in lowing examples:7 2000, which established standards and a re- • Ethiopia more than quadrupled access gional response mechanism to unconstitu- to improved water, from 13 percent of tional changes in government, has been asso- the population in 1990 to 66 percent in ciated with a reduction in coups d’état from 2009–10. 15 in the 1990s to 5 from 2000 to mid-2010.3 • Mozambique more than tripled its pri- And, despite an increase in coups in the last mary school completion rate in just eight five years, continental action to restore consti- tutionality has been consistently strong. In years, from 14 percent in 1999 to 46 per- 1991, the Organization of American States cent in 2007. adopted provisions supporting democratic • Rwanda cut the prevalence of undernour- and constitutional changes of government ishment from 53 percent of the popula- and laying out action in the event of a coup; a tion in 1997 to 34 percent in 2007. 52 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 1.1 Interstate and civil war—1900 to the present Interstate war has declined dramatically since the two world wars of the first half of the 20th century. Major civil conflicts (those with more than 1,000 battle deaths a year) increased during the postcolonial and Cold War era, peaking in the late 1980s and early 1990s (figure a). Since 1991–92, when there were 21 active major civil wars, the number has steadily fallen to less than 10 each year since 2002.8 F I G U R E A Civil wars peaked in the early 1990s and then declined Major civil wars increased from 1960 through the late 1980s and have decreased since the early-1990s. 30 Cumulative (stacked) number of 25 20 countries at war 15 10 5 0 1900 1906 1912 1918 1924 1930 1936 1942 1948 1954 1960 1966 1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 Countries involved in major civil war Countries involved in both major interstate and major civil war Countries involved in major interstate war Sources: Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The declines are all the more remarkable given the rising number of sovereign states—from around 50 in 1900 to more than 170 in 2008. Despite a tripling in the number of states and a doubling of population in the last 60 years, the percentage of countries involved in major con- flicts (interstate or civil) has not increased, and there has been a decline since 1992. In addition, civil wars have become less violent. Battle deaths have dropped from an average of 164,000 a year in the 1980s and 92,000 a year in the 1990s to 42,000 a year in the 2000s (figure b). This is consistent with recent evidence of declines in the number of wars, human rights abuses, and fatalities in war—and in the indirect deaths associated with wars.9 F I G U R E B Deaths from civil wars are also on the decline As the number of civil wars declined, the total annual deaths from these conflicts (battle deaths) fell from more than 200,000 in 1988 to less than 50,000 in 2008. 300,000 60 Number of countries in civil war Battle deaths in civil wars 250,000 50 200,000 40 150,000 30 100,000 20 50,000 10 0 0 1960 1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 Total battle deaths per annum in all civil wars (minor and major) Total number of countries in civil war (minor and major) Sources: Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallenstein 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005); Gleditsch and others 2002; Sundberg 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 1999; Human Security Report Project, forthcoming. Note: Civil wars are classified by scale and type in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict database (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The minimum threshold for monitoring is a minor civil war with 25 or more battle deaths a year. Low, high, and best estimates of annual battle deaths per conflict are in Lacina and Gleditsch (2005, updated in 2009). Throughout this Report, best estimates are used, except when they are not available, in which case averages of the low and high estimates are used. Repeated violence threatens development 53 F I G U R E 1.1 Gangs and trafficking are global concerns Following September 11, 2001, there was an exponential rise in media coverage of terrorism. Meanwhile, media coverage of gangs and trafficking has also been increasing. Recently, the coverage of gangs and trafficking approached that of civil war. 100,000 Articles in global media on selected topics 10,000 1,000 100 Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Terrorism Gangs Civil war Trafficking Source: Factiva. Note: Data in the figure were compiled by using all available news sources from the Factiva search engine from January 2000 to December 2009 and using the following four search terms: “terrorism,”“trafficking,”“gangs,” and “civil war” in multiple languages. Only articles where the search terms appeared in the headline and lead paragraph were counted. • Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1995 threat. And new and unpredictable risks are and 2007, increased measles immuniza- likely to emerge from a combination of dem- tions from 53 to 96 percent for children ographic pressure, climate change, and re- aged 12–23 months, and reduced infant source scarcity. mortality from 16 to 12.6 per 1,000 live births. Telephone lines per 100 people in- creased fourfold, from 7 to 28. Modern violence comes in various But global apprehension remains. Media forms and repeated cycles references to terrorism peaked after 9/11 and then gradually declined, but references to The tendency to see violence as interstate gangs and trafficking steadily increased over warfare and major civil war obscures the the last decade (figure 1.1). The Middle East variety and prevalence of organized vio- and North Africa has experienced a series of lence—and underestimates its impact on dramatic social protests and political turbu- people’s lives. The organized violence that lence, escalating into outright conflict in disrupts governance and compromises de- some countries. Violence in Afghanistan and velopment also includes local violence in- Pakistan is consuming the attention of global volving militias or between ethnic groups, policy makers. As this report goes to print, a gang violence, local resource-related violence new nation is emerging in Southern Sudan, and violence linked to trafficking (particu- with all the opportunities and risks involved larly drug trafficking), and violence associ- in that endeavor. Drug-based violence ap- ated with global ideological struggles (table pears to be on the increase in Central Amer- 1.1). This violence is often recurrent, with ica, threatening both local and national gov- many countries now experiencing repeated ernance. Global terrorism remains a serious cycles of civil conflict and criminal violence. 54 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 TA B L E 1 . 1 Country case examples of multiple forms of violence “Conventional” political Local conflicts conflict (contests for state Organized crime with transnational power or for autonomy or Widespread gang- or trafficking with ideological Country Local intergroup conflict independence) related violence accompanying violence connections Afghanistan Multiple incidents Taliban, other actors Warlordism Opium production and Al-Qaeda links with involving militias including (2002–present) (2002–present) trafficking Taliban Amanullah Khan and Abdul Rashid Dostum (2002–08) Pakistan Intratribal conflict Pakistani Taliban Drug production and Cross-border (2004–09) (2007–present); trafficking ideological Balochistan separatists militant links (2004–present) Mali Rebel infighting (1994); Rebel groups in Northern Transnational trafficking Al-Qaeda in the ethnic violence in Gao, Mali (1990–present) of illicit goods, principally Islamic Maghreb Kayes, and Kindal regions drugs and weapons (1998–99) Papua New Ethnic and tribal Secessionist movement Urban crime and Human trafficking; source Guinea conflicts in the Highlands (Bougainville Revolutionary gang violence and transit point for illicit (2001–present) Army, 1989–2001) timber trade El Salvador Rebel groups (1979–92) La Mara Salva Drug trafficking Trucha, La 18, La Mao Mao, and La Máquina Kenya Clan and ethnic group Election violence Widespread gang Drug trafficking hub, violence (2005–08) activity (1980s– particularly for heroin present) Tajikistan Democratic and Islamist Major transit country for Islamic Movement of opposition groups (1992–96); Afghan narcotics; human Uzbekistan Movement for Peace trafficking in Tajikistan (1998) Philippines Local clan conflicts Muslim separatist groups Kidnap for ransom; human Al-Qaeda and in Mindanao (Moro Islamic trafficking; methampheta- Jemaah Islamiyah Liberation Front and Moro mine source for East and links with Abu Sayyaf National Liberation Front) Southeast Asia (Mindanao) Northern Local tensions over Irish Republican Army (IRA) Splinter groups of Drug trafficking Ireland religion and economic (1971–98) IRA and Protestant (amphetamines) (United disparities underlie much of paramilitaries Kingdom) the escalated violence Sources: Lockhart and Glencorse 2010; Straus 2010; Demombynes 2010; Barron and others 2010; Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010; Europa Publications 2001; Economist Intelligence Unit 2010; Oxford Reference Online 2001; Uppsala University 2009b, 2009a; UNODC 2010b. Violence is often interlinked Illegal trafficking has been a source of fi- nance for armed groups in Afghanistan, As table 1.1 suggests, many types of violence Mindanao, and Northern Ireland.12 have direct links to each other, as illustrated in the following examples: • In countries as diverse as Côte d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Kenya, and the Solomon Islands, • Countries rich in oil and other minerals militant groups or criminal gangs have that can be illegally trafficked are much been mobilized during past political con- more likely to have a civil war,10 and a lon- tests and elections.13 ger one, with rebels financing their activ- ity through the sale of lootable resources, • In Melanesia, the ritualized community such as diamonds in Sierra Leone and conflicts of previous generations have es- coltan (the mineral columbite-tantalite) calated into urban gang violence associ- in the Democratic Republic of Congo.11 ated with particular ethnic groups.14 Repeated violence threatens development 55 • In Central America, combatants on both nationalist groups based in OECD (Organi- sides of political conflicts between the sation for Economic Co-operation and De- state and rebel movements have migrated velopment) countries (the Baader-Meinhof into organized crime.15 Group, Red Brigades, the IRA, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and groups associated In other cases, violence may be linked with the Israeli-Palestinian struggle). In con- through underlying institutional weaknesses. trast, the 1990s saw a surge in right-wing na- Yemen now faces four separate conflicts: the tionalism and anti-government libertarian Houthi rebellion in the North, the presence terrorism in the West,19 until the center of of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, griev- gravity shifted with 9/11 and the later attacks ances in the south, and the popular protests in, among other places, Jakarta, London, Ma- for change that have swept through the Arab drid, and Mumbai. This Report does not en- world. There is little direct evidence of links ter the debate on what terrorism is or is not. between these conflicts, other than through Instead, the concern with terrorism is about the weakness of national institutions to ad- the elements of movements that pose partic- dress them.16 Similarly, in Nepal, following ular threats to governance and development, a decade-long insurrection (1996–2006) a along with their ability to recruit and to Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed operate across national boundaries and the between the Maoist rebels and the govern- diverse motivations of those who join (chap- ment. But violence between political rivals, ter 2). While the preoccupation with ter- quasi-political extortion, and criminal gang rorism is high in Western countries, some activity have increased markedly since the perspective on the global phenomenon is civil war.17 necessary—fatalities have been overwhelm- The modern landscape of violence also ingly concentrated on nonwestern targets in includes terrorist attacks by movements that every year except 2001 (figure 1.2). claim ideological motives and recruit inter- nationally. Terrorism—commonly, though not universally, defined as the use of force by Organized crime and trafficking nonstate actors against civilians18—stretches are an important part of current back at least to the Middle Ages. In modern violent threats times, the tactics and organizations have mu- tated. The dominant forms and groups from Trafficking of drugs, people, and commodi- the 1960s to the early 1990s were leftist or ties has been an international concern for F I G U R E 1.2 Victims of terrorism Over the last decade, 86 percent of nearly 50,000 fatalities from terrorism occurred in attacks aimed at non-Western targets. The attacks of September 11, 2001, are the exception rather than the rule, and the phenomenon of terrorism has long affected all regions of the world. 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Fatalities in attacks aimed at Western targets Fatalities in attacks aimed at non-Western targets Fatalities in attacks aimed at unknown targets Sources: National Counter Terrorism Center 2010; Global Terrorism Database 2010; WDR team calculations. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) contains data from 1998 to 2008 and the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) from 2004 to 2009. Pie charts from 1999 to 2003 are thus based on GTD data; from 2005 to 2007 on average shares from the two datasets; and for 2009 on NCTC data. Note: From 1998 to 2009, 41,753 fatalities occurred in attacks on nonwestern targets, of a global total of 48,828. These statistics are based on the nationality of the principal target of each attack; “Western” targets are defined as all targets from OECD countries, targets in all other countries are defined as “non-Western.” So attacks on non-Western targets may occasionally include Western fatalities, and vice versa. 56 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 1.2 Instability, political violence, and drug trafficking in West Africa West Africa is one of the poorest and least stable regions in the world. All but 3 of its 16 countries are on the United Nations (UN) list of “least developed countries.” Since independence, countries in the region have experienced at least 58 coups and attempted coups and many civil wars—and rebel groups remain active. Where conflict has ended, recovery and the creation of resilient institutions take time; and the weakness of governance in post-conflict environments attracts transnational criminal networks. International drug traffickers began in 2004 to use the region as a base for shipping co- caine from South America to Europe. In 2008 an estimated 25 tons of cocaine passed through West Africa, with a transit value of about US$1 billion by the time it reached West Africa, and an ultimate value of some US$6.8 billion at its destinations in Western Europe.20 Drug traffickers use some of the profits to bribe government officials. As the UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) notes in its Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment for West Africa, “Law enforcement officials can be offered more than they could earn in a lifetime simply to look the other way.” 21 Trafficking and violence during conflicts in West Africa, 1990–2009 West Africa has experienced political, communal, and criminal violence since 1990. During conflicts, diamonds, timber, and oil were trafficked. Recently the region has become a transit route for cocaine trafficked from South America to Europe. IBRD 38458 Major cocaine seizures April 2011 (kilograms), 2005–2009: 3000 kg Former ALGERIA Spanish Sahara 1500 kg 500 kg 100 kg 630 Countries that reported MAURITANIA seizures on land 830 MALI In Sierra Leone in 1999, diamonds valued at 120 CAPE US$70 million were trafficked out of the country. VERDE NIGER 3,100 1,250 500 1,200 In Nigeria in 2009, US$1 billion SENEGAL of oil was bunkered. THE BURKINA GAMBIA 635 FASO 674 116 GUINEA GUINEA- NIGERIA BENIN BISSAU 170 TOGO 1,500 SIERRA GHANA 2,210 LEONE CÔTE D’IVOIRE 274 703 388 LIBERIA 160 360 Political violence, 1990–2009: CAMEROON 3,700 Rebel activity 1,900 588 Communal violence 2,500 840 EQ. GUINEA Riots and protests In Liberia in 2001, timber valued between Political gangs US$168–$180 million was illicitly traded. SÃO TOME AND PRÍNCIPE Sources: Conflict data are from Raleigh and others 2010 ACLED database (Armed Conflict Location and Event Database), seizure and trafficking data are from UNODC 2010a; WDR team calculations. Note: The map above depicts West African political violence 1990–2009 overlaid trafficking and seizure data. Violence data for Sierra Leone and Liberia are for 1990–2010, while violence data for all other states are for 1997–2009. decades. Criminal networks take advantage many solutions to violence require a global of communications, transport, and finan- perspective. The annual value of the global cial services—and overwhelm enforcement trade in cocaine and heroin today is esti- mechanisms that are either rooted in national mated at US$153 billion (heroin US$65 bil- jurisdictions or hampered by low coopera- lion and cocaine US$88 billion). Europe and tion and weak capacity. Drugs connect some North America consume 53 percent of the of the wealthiest and poorest areas of the heroin and 67 percent of the cocaine; how- world in mutual violence, showing that ever, the high retail prices in these markets Repeated violence threatens development 57 mean that economic share of consumption Europe since 2003. Box 1.2 shows how traf- in Europe and North America is even higher: ficking and violence coexist in the region.29 cocaine consumption in the two regions ac- Armed groups in Central Africa secure their counted for an estimated US$72 billion of funding from mining and smuggling pre- the US$88 billion in global trade.22 Drugs cious minerals such as gold. In the Demo- provide the money that enables organized cratic Republic of Congo, an estimated 40 criminals to corrupt and manipulate even tons of gold, worth US$1.24 billion, are the most powerful societies—to the ultimate smuggled out every year.30 The link between detriment of the urban poor, who provide criminal trafficking and violence is not unique most of the criminals’ foot-soldiers and who to Africa. For example, Myanmar is still a ma- find themselves trapped in environments jor source of opium, accounting for 10 per- traumatized by criminal violence.23 cent of global production, and continues to Drug trafficking organizations thus have be a major trade hub to East and Southeast resources that can dwarf those of the govern- Asia. Illegal logging remains a major chal- ments attempting to combat them.24 The val- lenge in Myanmar; although trade in timber ue-added of cocaine traveling the length of from Myanmar fell by 70 percent from 2005 Central America is equivalent to 5 percent of to 2008, illegal trade into countries in the the region’s GDP—and more than 100 times region continues. Myanmar also serves as a the US$65 million the United States allocates major conduit of wildlife trade coming from under the Mérida Initiative to assist interdic- Africa and South Asia.31 tion efforts by Mexico and Central American nations.25 Conservative estimates suggest there Today’s violence occurs in are 70,000 gang members in Central America, repeated cycles outnumbering military personnel there.26 In many countries, drug cartels exert a heavy in- There has been a tendency in the develop- fluence over provincial governance and, occa- ment community to assume that the progres- sionally, national governance (box 1.2). sion from violence to sustained security is Organized crime networks engage in a fairly linear—and that repeated violence is wide variety of illicit activities, including the exception. But recurring civil wars have trafficking drugs, people, and small arms and become a dominant form of armed conflict light weapons; financial crimes; and money in the world today. Every civil war that began laundering. These illicit activities require the since 2003 was a resumption of a previous absence of rule of law and, therefore, often civil war.32 Of all conflicts initiated in the thrive in countries affected by other forms 1960s, 57 percent were the first conflict in of violence. According to various studies, their country (many countries having been organized crime generates annual revenues newly created after the colonial era).33 First ranging from US$120 billion to as high as conflicts fell significantly in each subsequent US$330 billion,27 with drug trafficking the decade, to the point where 90 percent of con- most profitable. Other estimates suggest that flicts initiated in the 21st century were in the world’s shadow economy, including or- countries that had already had a civil war ganized crime, could be as high as 10 percent (table 1.2). Fighting has also continued after of GDP globally.28 several recent political settlements, as in Af- Countries affected by political violence ghanistan and the Democratic Republic of that have weak institutions are also suscepti- Congo. As the previous section showed, suc- ble to trafficking. Since 2003, drug trafficking cessful peace agreements can be followed by organizations have taken advantage of insti- high levels of criminal violence. tutional weaknesses in West Africa to estab- Several Central American countries that lish their operations there, resulting in a four- ended civil wars are now experiencing more fold increase in cocaine seizures heading to violent deaths from criminal activity than 58 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 TA B L E 1.2 Countries often relapse into conflict Repeated violence is common in the world today, suggesting that few countries are ever truly “post-conflict.” The rate of onset in countries with a previous conflict has been increasing since the 1960s, and every civil war that began since 2003 was in a country that had had a previous civil war. Onsets in countries with Onsets in countries with a Decade no previous conflict (%) previous conflict (%) Number of onsets 1960s 57 43 35 1970s 43 57 44 1980s 38 62 39 1990s 33 67 81 2000s 10 90 39 Sources: Walter 2010; WDR team calculations. Note: Previous conflict includes any major conflict since 1945. during their civil wars. Since 1999, homi- face levels of violent organized crime equally cide rates have increased in El Salvador disruptive to development. (+101 percent), Guatemala (+91 percent), and Honduras (+63 percent) as criminal net- works linked to drug trafficking have become The developmental consequences more active (figure 1.3). All these countries of violence are severe suffered civil wars or political instability in the 1980s and 1990s. While El Salvador and The costs of violence for citizens, communi- Guatemala signed peace accords in the 1990s ties, countries, and the world are enormous, that avoided a return to civil war, both now both in terms of human suffering and social F I G U R E 1.3 Criminal violence in Central America is on the rise despite political peace Homicides have increased in every country in Central America since 1999: in El Salvador from 30 to 61 homicides per 100,000 people and in Guatemala from 24 to 46 per 100,000. 40 Absolute change in homicide rate relative to 1999 30 20 10 0 –10 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 El Salvador Honduras Guatemala Belize Panama Nicaragua Costa Rica Sources: WDR team calculations based on UNODC 2007; UNODC and the World Bank 2007; and national sources. Note: Base year for homicide rate is 1999 = 0. Repeated violence threatens development 59 and economic consequences. The costs are volving a mix of nationally representative both direct (loss of life, disability, and destruc- samples as well as subregions affected by vio- tion) and indirect (prevention, instability, and lence.36 In the past three years, up to 26 per- displacement). While some of these losses can cent of respondents report that their imme- be directly measured and quantified in eco- diate family’s home had been looted, up to 32 nomic terms, others are not easily measured percent had been displaced, and up to 19 per- (trauma, loss of social capital and trust, pre- cent had a family member who had been tor- vention cost, and forgone investment and tured (figure 1.4). trade).34 The most vulnerable groups in society are frequently most affected by violence. Tied to their homes or places of work, the vulnerable Human costs of violence have little of the protection that money or Most fundamentally, violence compromises well-placed contacts afford. Poor child nutri- human security and dignity—and for this tion for those displaced or unable to earn in- reason, freedom from violence and fear is a comes due to violence has lasting effects, basic human right. The 2008 Geneva Decla- impairing physical and cognitive function- ration on Armed Violence and Development, ing. Violence destroys school infrastructure, endorsed by more than 90 states, argues that displaces teachers, and interrupts schooling, “living free from the threat of armed violence often for an entire generation of poor chil- is a basic human need.”35 To better under- dren. War, looting, and crime destroy the stand the impact of violence on lives and household assets of the poor, and fear of vio- livelihoods, the WDR team asked the Norwe- lent attacks prevents them from tilling their gian research institute Fafo to conduct sur- fields or traveling to schools, clinics, work- veys in seven countries and territories, in- places, and markets. For poor people in poor F I G U R E 1.4 Violence creates suffering for families in myriad ways: Responses to survey on experiences of violence on immediate family member in last three years People in conflict-affected countries experience displacement, loss of contact, imprisonment, and humiliation, which affect entire families, disrupting life and destroying social capital. In Gaza, a third of respondents reported that someone in their immediate family had been displaced in the last three years. In the West Bank, a third had experienced someone being imprisoned. In Sierra Leone, 35 percent of the respondents reported that they lost contact with a member of their immediate family in the last three years. 40 35 30 % “yes” responses 25 20 15 10 5 0 Displacement Imprisonment Torture Humiliation Loss of contact Homes looted Death Congo, Dem. Rep. Côte d’Ivoire Mali Sierra Leone Gaza West Bank Colombia Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. Note: Surveys were undertaken in early 2010 for seven countries, territories, or subnational areas. The samples were selected from multiple regions to cover countries varying geographically, at different stages of development and facing or recovering from differing types of violence. Country representative samples were used for Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Colombia. The surveys were undertaken in selected regions of Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. Independent representative samples were used in Gaza and the West Bank. 60 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 countries, extended families are often their detainee population and 90 percent of the only insurance, and deaths in the family of- missing,40 women and children comprise ten leave them alone and unprotected.37 close to 80 percent of refugees and those in- ternally displaced.41 And violence begets vio- lence: children who witness abuses have a Development impacts of violence higher tendency to perpetrate violence later Poverty reduction in countries affected by in life.42 major violence is on average nearly a per- Sexual and gender-based violence remains centage point slower per year than in coun- a major problem, particularly in fragile and tries not affected by violence.38 After a few conflict-affected countries.43 Most contem- years of major violence, the contrast can be porary armed conflicts are “low-intensity” quite stark: countries affected by violence civil wars fought by small, poorly trained, throughout the 1980s lagged in poverty re- and lightly armed forces that avoid major duction by 8 percentage points, and those military engagements—but that frequently that had experienced major violence through- target civilians with great brutality.44 A global out the 1980s and 1990s lagged by 16 per- review of 50 countries finds significant in- centage points. On average, a country experi- creases in gender-based violence following a encing major violence over the entire period major war.45 In some cases, it occurs due to a (1981–2005) had a poverty rate 21 percent- breakdown of social and moral order and to age points higher than a country that saw no increased impunity, but the threat and per- violence (figure 1.5). The disruptive effect of petration of sexual and physical violence violence on development and the widening against women and children can also be a gap between countries affected by violence systematic weapon of war—to dominate, to and those not affected are deeply troubling. terrorize, to humiliate. Mass rapes have oc- The direct impact of violence falls primar- curred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, ily on young males, the majority of fighting Peru, and Uganda.46 In Rwanda’s 1994 geno- forces, but women and children often suffer cide alone, an estimated 250,000 rapes took disproportionately from indirect effects (see place.47 Although those suffering rape and table 1.3).39 Men make up 96 percent of the sexual abuse are overwhelmingly young F I G U R E 1.5 Widening gap in poverty between countries affected by violence and those not experiencing violence Poverty is on the decline for much of the world, but countries affected by violence are lagging behind. For every three years that a country is affected by major violence (battle deaths or excess deaths from homicides equivalent to a major war), poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points. For some countries affected by violence, poverty has actually increased. 65 (% of population living below US$1.25 a day) 60 Poverty headcount 55 50 45 40 35 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 Countries affected by major violence Countries affected by minor violence Countries with negligible or no violence Source: WDR team calculations based on Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula 2008 poverty data (available at POVCALNET, HTTP://iresearch. worldbank.org.) Repeated violence threatens development 61 TA B L E 1.3 The gender-disaggregated impacts of violent conflict Direct impacts Indirect impacts Higher rates of morbidity and mortality from battle deaths Risk of ex-combatants’ involvement in criminal or illegal activities and difficulties in finding livelihoods Higher likelihood to be detained or missing Increased prevalence of other forms of violence—particularly Men Sexual and gender-based violence: sex-selective massacres; forcibly domestic violence conscripted or recruited; subjected to torture, rape, and mutilation; forced to commit sexual violence upon others Higher rates of disability from injury Higher likelihood to be internally displaced persons and refugees Reproductive health problems Sexual and gender-based violence: being subjected to rape, Women’s reproductive and care-giving roles under stress trafficking, and prostitution; forced pregnancies and marriages Changed labor market participation from death of family members and “added worker effect” Women Higher incidence of domestic violence Possibility for greater political participation Women’s increased economic participation due to changing gender roles during conflict Depression, trauma, and emotional distress Asset and income loss Tendency toward increased migration Disrupted patterns of marriage and fertility Common Loss of family and social networks, including insurance mechanisms Interrupted education Eroded well-being, particularly poor health and disability from poverty and malnutrition Sources: Anderlini 2010a; multiple sources described in endnote.48 women,49 men can also be subject to sexual cratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan, un- victimization and violence, or be forced to dermine recovery from violence and inter- perpetrate sexual violence against others, rupt human development.51 even their family members.50 The suffering of displaced populations is A major human consequence of violence often protracted. Camps in Chad, Jordan, is the displacement of people from their Lebanon, and Sudan have become homes for homes. At the end of 2009 some 42 million many IDPs, not just for months or years, but people around the world had been forced to often for decades. Most forced displacements leave or flee their homes due to conflict, in the 2000s were caused by internal armed violence, and human rights violations—15 conflicts rather than international conflicts. million refugees outside their country of Population movements into urban centers nationality and habitual residence, and 27 have increased the potential for crime, social million internally displaced persons (IDPs). tension, communal violence, and political in- And developing countries are also hosts to stability.52 Meanwhile, the large-scale repatri- the vast majority of refugees, putting ad- ation movements of the past have diminished, ditional strains on their local and national with return figures dropping since 2004.53 capacities. In 2009 developing countries For all these reasons, areas affected by hosted 10.2 million refugees, or nearly 70 violence pose a major challenge to meeting percent of the global total. The rising num- MDGs. The arrested social development in bers of IDP populations, which include sub- countries affected by violence is evident in stantial new displacements in 2009 and 2010 the poor showing in human development in countries such as Pakistan, the Demo- indicators (figure 1.6). Development in these 62 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 F I G U R E 1.6 Violence is the main constraint to meeting the MDGs a. Incidence ratio of undernourishment, poverty and other ills for fragile, recovering, and non-fragile developing countries (non-FCS) A child in a fragile or conflict-affected state is twice as likely to be undernourished as a child in another developing country—and nearly three times as likely to be out of primary school. 3.5 Incidence ratio as compared to countries that are not affected by violence 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Undernourished Impoverished Primary— Secondary— Infant deaths Under 5 Births HIV/AIDS Access to Access to not enrolled not enrolled deaths unattended improved improved water sanitation Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) Recovering from fragility Non-FCS (including BRIC) Sources: World Bank 2010n; WDR team calculations based on Gates and others 2010. Note: Figure 1.6a shows the incidence of each of the ills associated with unmet MDGs for fragile, conflict-affected, and recovering countries in relation to the incidence for all other developing countries. The ratio is weighted by the affected population, so each bar can be read as the odds-ratio of a person being affected relative to a person in a non-fragile or conflict-affected state: for example, children of primary school age are three times as likely to be out of school in fragile and conflict-affected states as those in other developing countries. b. Countries affected by violence account for: Fragile and conflict-affected states and those recovering from conflict and fragility, account for 47 percent of the population considered here, but they account for 70 percent of infant deaths, 65 percent of people without access to safe water, and 77 of percent of children missing from primary school. 60% of undernourished 61% of impoverished 77% of children not in primary school 59% of children not in secondary school 70% of infant deaths 71% of child (under 5) deaths 64% of unattended births 43% of persons living with HIV/AIDS 65% of people without access to safe water 54% of people without access to improved sanitation Sources: World Bank 2010n; WDR team calculations based on Gates and others 2010. Note: Current fragile and conflict-affected states account for 33 percent of the population of the countries considered here. States recovering from fragility and conflict account for an additional 14 percent of the population. So, if the MDG deficit were borne evenly, these countries would account for 47 percent of each of the ills described. The red to orange people-figures represent the percentage of the deficit for each MDG in fragile, conflict-affected, and recovering countries. The blue figures represent the persons afflicted in other developing countries. Excluded here are Brazil, China, India, and Russian Federation, all significantly ahead of or on par with other developing countries on the MDGs (see panel a). Due to their size, including them in the calculations would skew any discussion involving the global population. Repeated violence threatens development 63 countries is lagging on nearly every indica- FIGURE 1.7 The widening gap in infant mortality rates between tor associated with the MDGs. The devel- countries affected by violence and others opment deficit is concentrated in fragile Of countries where more than 1 in 10 infants died in the first year of life and conflict-affected and recovering states,54 in 1990, those affected by violence are lagging behind in reducing infant which account for 77 percent of school-age mortality. The gap between these two sets of countries has doubled children not enrolled in primary school, 61 since 1990. percent of the poverty, and 70 percent of in- 130 fant mortality.55 People in fragile and conflict-affected Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 120 states are more likely to be impoverished, to miss out on schooling, and to lack access to 110 basic health services. Children born in a frag- 100 ile or conflict-affected state are twice as likely to be undernourished and nearly twice as 90 likely to lack access to improved water; those of primary-school age are three times as 80 likely not to be enrolled in school; and they 70 are nearly twice as likely to die before their 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 fifth birthday. As the world takes stock of Fragile and/or conflict-affected 1990 to present progress on the MDGs, it is apparent that the Not fragile or conflict-affected gap between violence-prone countries and other developing countries is widening.56 Sources: World Bank 2010n; WDR team calculations. No low-income, fragile state has achieved a Note: Due to limited data, the most recent available data in the preceding five-year period were used for the point estimates. The sample consists of all countries with single MDG, and few are expected to meet infant mortality higher than 100 per 1,000 live births. Low-income countries that targets by 2015.57 Because most fragile and were never fragile or conflict-affected from 1990 to 2008 are in the “non-fragile” cohort, and countries affected by conflict or fragile throughout the period are in the conflict-affected states have made slower “fragile and/or conflict-affected” cohort. progress in the last 10 years, the gap is widen- ing. For example, over the last two decades, infant mortality has been falling in nearly all donesian province of Aceh, the economic countries,58 but the reduction in infant mor- cost of the conflict was estimated at US$10.7 tality in fragile and conflict-affected coun- billion, more than 60 percent of it through tries has lagged behind (figure 1.7). Of the the damage and destruction of agriculture, countries with infant mortality greater than livestock, enterprises, and fisheries. And dur- 100 per 1,000 in 1990, those not affected by ing conflict, Aceh’s infant mortality and pov- conflict have reduced infant mortality by 31 erty were 50 percent higher than the national percent—while fragile and conflict-affected average.60 states reduced it by only 19 percent. If these The effects of violence are long-lasting. fragile and conflict-affected states had made For countries that have gone through civil the same rate of progress on infant mortality war, recovering to original growth paths as other developing countries, almost a mil- takes an average of 14 years of peace.61 Until lion more children in these countries each 1990, Burkina Faso and Burundi had similar year would survive their first year of life. incomes and growth paths. With the onset Subnational violence can have severe of civil war in Burundi, real incomes de- socioeconomic consequences in middle- clined to 1970 levels.62 With no major con- income countries. In countries with stronger flicts, Burkina Faso now has an income more economies and institutions, impacts tend to than two-and-a-half times that of Burundi be relatively localized, but they still hold (figure 1.8). This effect was confirmed locally back key segments of human development in the Moving Out of Poverty study, which and reduce the flow of foreign direct invest- found that conflict-affected villages that feared ment (FDI) into affected areas.59 In the In- renewed violence for two to three years out 64 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 F I G U R E 1 .8 Effects of violence on growth are dramatic and long-lasting Until the early 1990s, per capita incomes and growth in Burkina Faso and Burundi were similar. Following massive violence in Burundi, their growth paths diverged. In real terms, Burundi has lost nearly two decades of income growth, with incomes set back to 1970 levels. 300 1,600 1,400 250 GDP per capita (2005 US$) 1,200 Battle deaths per year 200 1,000 150 800 600 100 400 50 200 0 0 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 Battle deaths in Burundi Battle deaths in Burkina Faso Burundi GDP per capita Burkina Faso GDP per capita Sources: World Bank 2010n; Gleditsch and others 2002; Gates and others 2010; Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005); WDR team calculations. of the past decade stalled economically, while years after the onset of conflict. While effects non-conflict-affected communities experi- are smaller for less severe conflicts, it still enced only two to four weeks of apprehension takes on average 20 years for trade to recover over renewed violence and did not experience to pre-conflict levels. economic slowdown.63 Violence also has a lasting effect on human One reason for the persistence of low rights. The Physical Rights Integrity Index,66 a growth in conflict-affected countries may be measure of respect for human rights, drops the difficulty of reassuring investors, both on average by 3.6 points over the course of a domestic and foreign. A civil war reduces a major civil war (on a scale of 0–8, with a score country’s average rating on the International of 0 indicating no government respect for hu- Country Risk Guide by about 7.7 points (on man rights). That human rights abuses in- a 100-point scale); the effect is similar for crease sharply during episodes of violence is criminal violence.64 For the first three years to be expected. Less expected, however, is that after conflict subsides, countries have a rating after a conflict ends, the average society takes 3.5 points below similar non-conflict coun- more than 10 years to return to the level of tries. Although there is often a postviolence human rights observance before the conflict.67 surge of economic activity, it is unlikely to The unraveling of trust citizens have in one be investment-based activity that reflects re- another and in the state due to violence is dis- newed investor confidence. Trade can take cussed in chapter 2.68 many years to recover as a result of investor In addition to the human suffering, orga- perceptions of risk. It can drop between 12 nized violence poses social and economic and 25 percent in the first year of a civil war, costs that can dwarf the impact of other and for the most severe civil wars (those with events of concern to development practition- a cumulative death toll greater than 50,000) ers, such as economic shocks and natural di- the loss of trade is around 40 percent.65And sasters. While all the costs cannot be quanti- the interruption in trade can persist even 25 fied, conservative estimates of the economic Repeated violence threatens development 65 costs of lost production range from 2 to 3 percent of GDP both for civil war and for B OX 1 . 3 Violent crime and insecurity exact high very high levels of violent crime (box 1.3).69 economic costs This does not include the destruction or loss of assets, which can also be considerable. For example, the material costs of crime in Latin Indirect costs—associated with stress and trauma, time off work due to violent America and the Caribbean are estimated to incidents, and lower productivity from injury or mental illness—far overshadow direct costs. In Brazil in 2004, the direct medical costs of all interpersonal violence be nearly twice those of the United States, as were estimated at US$235 million and the indirect medical costs at US$9.2 billion. a percentage of GDP.70 Other indirect costs Comparable figures, respectively, for Jamaica are US$29.5 million and US$385 may not always be reflected by measures of million, and for Thailand US$40.3 million and US$432 million. Emerging findings productivity, as when military spending in- from Kenya estimate total costs of violence at 1.2 percent of GDP. In the United Kingdom, the direct costs of domestic violence are estimated at £5.7 creases and commensurately reduces invest- billion annually. ments in development and human capital. When other indirect costs are added, such as those for policing, health care, Military spending typically increases by 2.2 private security, and reduced investment, the figures are even more staggering. percent during civil war and remains 1.7 per- In Guatemala, criminal violence cost an estimated US$2.4 billion, or 7.3 percent of GDP, in 2005—more than twice the damage caused by Hurricane Stan the same cent higher than prewar levels after conflict.71 year, and more than twice the budget for the ministries of agriculture, health, and As noted at the beginning of this chapter, education for 2006. In El Salvador, criminal violence in 2003 cost about US$1.7 bil- these estimates do not include the human lion, or 11.5 percent of GDP. The Mexican government estimates that crime and costs of conflict, including deaths, injury, violence cost the country 1 percent of GDP from lost sales, jobs, and investment in 2007 alone. Estimates suggest that if Haiti and Jamaica reduced their crime lev- trauma, and stress. els to those of Costa Rica, they could increase annual GDP growth by 5.4 percent- age points. These costs are comparable to estimates of the cost of civil war. Based on growth base lines for cross-country panel date in the last 50 years, researchers Spillover effects of violence estimate the costs of civil wars to range from 1.6 percentage to 2.3 percentage of The development consequences of violence, GDP per year of violence. For the average country affected by violence, these effects, compounded over time, can cost the equivalent of up to 30 years of miss- like its origins, spill across borders, with im- ing GDP growth. plications for neighbors, for the region, and Insecurity takes a significant toll on the private sector, in direct costs of crimi- globally. Violence in one country can create a nal acts (theft, arson, or other victimization) and in investments in security sys- “bad neighborhood.” For example, the mani- tems. Cross-country surveys found that these costs represented 1–3 percent of sales in Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, and 6 percent in Kenya. In festations of conflict in Liberia under Presi- nearly all cases, the bulk of these costs were for security technology and ser vices. dent Charles Taylor during the late 1990s These estimates are conservative: other studies estimate the costs of crime to (people trained in violence, proliferation of range from 3.1 percent to 7.8 percent of GDP. small arms, and illicit trade in timber and Sources: Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Butchart and others 2008; Walby 2004; Geneva diamonds) hurt Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Declaration 2008; UNDP 2005c, 2006; UNODC and World Bank 2007; Skaperdas and Sierra Leone.72 Bad neighborhoods affect others 2009; Willman and Makisaka 2010; Farrell and Clark 2004; Altbeker 2005; Alda and Cuesta 2010; Kenya Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation 2007; World economic prospects: estimates suggest that Bank 2010d. countries lose 0.7 percent of their annual GDP for each neighbor involved in civil war.73 And a doubling of terrorist incidents in counter piracy in the Horn of Africa and the a country is estimated to reduce bilateral Indian Ocean, more than 27 countries de- trade with each trading partner by some 4 ployed naval forces in anti-piracy missions, percent.74 As terrorism taps into illicit global with a range of costs estimated at US$1.3–2.0 markets, violent extremists can finance their billion annually.77 At a global level, efforts activities through smuggling, evading taxes, aimed at containing and deterring maritime trafficking drugs and counterfeit money, and piracy are estimated to range between US$1.7 trading foreign currency on illegal exchanges and US$4.5 billion in 2010.78 All told, mari- in Europe.75 time piracy is estimated to have direct eco- Piracy also reduces regional trade and nomic costs of between US$5.7 billion and economic activity, as, for example, Somali US$11.2 billion, once ransoms, insurance, pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden.76 To and rerouting of ships are included.79 66 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 The spillover effects of violence are not Royal Dutch Shell in the oil-rich Niger Delta just economic. As described above, nearly 75 in June 2009, oil prices rose US$2.33 a barrel percent of the world’s refugees are hosted by (3.4 percent) on the New York Mercantile neighboring countries.80 Refugees from Li- Exchange.85 In the four weeks following the beria and Togo have sought shelter in Ghana beginning of the uprising in Libya, oil prices for extended periods, straining the state’s increased by 15 percent.86 ability to deliver services and opening ten- sions with the local population.81 The mas- sive influx of Kosovo Albanians into Mace- Repeated violence is a shared donia in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict challenge heightened tensions between the Slavic ma- jority and the Albanian minority.82 Infec- Political and criminal violence both disrupt tious disease can also be traced to disrupted development—and occur in repeated cycles. health care associated with violence or areas It is essential to look across that spectrum without public services. For every 1,000 ref- and to consider local conflicts, social protest, ugees entering an African country, for ex- gang violence, organized crime, and trans- ample, the host state acquires 1,400 new ma- national terrorism alongside the major civil laria cases.83 wars that have been the focus of most aca- Spillovers of violence and instability are demic research. This interlocking landscape felt globally. Even for parts of the world fairly raises questions about the coherence of the immune to insecurity, thanks to wealth and approaches to deal with these various forms distance, the costs of global insecurity are of violence—approaches often divorced from both psychological (in the preoccupation one another—as well as the treatment of with threats of gangs, trafficking, and terror- “post-conflict” reconstruction and “preven- ism) and very practical, through the increased tion” as separate problems. The risks of vio- costs of security measures. A study of 18 lence and the responses to it are shared by Western European countries from 1971 to countries across divides of income, national 2004 revealed that each additional trans- identity, religion, and ideology. One of the national terrorist incident per million people key messages of this Report is the shared reduced economic growth by 0.4 percentage interest in global and regional peace and points, and each additional domestic terror- prosperity—and the potential for greater ex- ist incident reduced it by 0.2.84 And after in- changes between countries on how to address surgents struck an export terminal owned by the common challenges. Repeated Repeated violence threatens violence threatens development development 67 67 FEATURE 1 The interlinked and evolving nature of modern organized violence T he Caribbean has known political and criminal violence for decades. Except for Cuba, every large island coun- try and many smaller ones—the Bahamas, the Cayman Is- In Nigeria, a largely subnational struggle in the oil-rich Ni- ger Delta has given way to organized criminal syndicates that deal in oil, arms, and kidnapped foreign workers. An estimated lands, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and 250,000–300,000 barrels, valued at more than US$3.8 billion, Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and are stolen each year through “oil bunkering” (the theft of oil Tobago—have homicide levels above 10 per 100,000. In some from pipelines or storage facilities).97 Local gangs and political of them, criminal gang activity has spilled over into politi- groups can also be drawn into ethnic violence; in the 2007 cal violence, with mutually reinforcing dynamics. Since 1970, election aftermath in Kenya, gangs and politically motivated most of Haiti’s elections have been marked by violence— groups engaged in ethnically aligned violence.98 with 34 deaths in 1987 and 89 in 2004—and the country In Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the tribal areas on their bor- experienced political violence in 2010. The relationship can ders, violence from the headline conflict in the region—be- be reversed as well; in some countries, drug trafficking has tween the government and international forces and the Taliban exacerbated local organized violence.87 and other armed groups—is linked to drug trafficking and The Western Balkans are known for the civil wars that dis- criminal violence, as well as kidnapping, extortion, and smug- solved Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the chaotic aftermath of the gling of a range of natural resources. New tensions and the wars, many turned to trafficking in drugs, people, human or- presence of foreign fighters exacerbate long-standing conflicts gans, and weapons, such that organized crime perpetrated the between capitals and peripheral regions over power, gover- most widespread and destabilizing violence.88 Crime has grad- nance, and resources. ually declined in recent years, but organized crime remains for- Tensions and violence between ethnic groups can quickly midable.89 Some 32 percent of human trafficking victims come transform into political violence where elections and other po- from or through the Balkans, and the Balkan route is the main litical contests affect the distribution of power and resources. trafficking corridor for more than US$20 billion in heroin from In the Solomon Islands in the late 1990s, skirmishes between Afghanistan to Western Europe a year.90 Gang-related violence armed militias from the two main islands of Guadalcanal and targeted political figures. The Zemun gang, with close connec- Malaita, which displaced some 35,000 Malaitan settlers, culmi- tions to heroin trafficking, assassinated Serbian Prime Minister nated in the emergence of a Malaitan militia group, which—in Zoran Djindjic in 2003.91 response to the government’s failure to curb Guadalcanal mil- In West Africa, the conventional political conflict that began itancy—forced the resignation of the prime minister. In Papua in Liberia and spread to Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, later New Guinea, longstanding ethnic and tribal conflicts in the gave way to more organized crime across the region, as warring Highlands—caused by a mix of traditional animosities, com- factions pillaged natural resources, drug trafficking networks petition for resources, and land disputes—morphed into entered the region, and the rule of law weakened. What had “raskol” gang activities in Port Moresby and other urban ar- begun as a means of financing war became a successful busi- eas.99 The advent of international operations to exploit timber ness model for trafficking diamonds, timber, arms, and hu- and minerals has added fuel to preexisting ethnic contests over mans.92 Charles Taylor, the leader of one of the factions and natural resources. later president of Liberia, is accused in his indictment by the Cross-border violence goes beyond the destabilization from Special Court of Sierra Leone of “a joint criminal enterprise . . . sanctuaries in neighboring countries, as in West Africa and the [to exercise] control over the territory of Sierra Leone . . . and Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance the population . . . [through] unlawful killings, abductions, Army has spread far beyond its original geographical origins to forced labor, physical and sexual violence, use of child sol- operate across a wide number of countries and borders—again diers . . . .”93 It is estimated that Taylor amassed US$105–450 drawing on criminal trafficking for its financing. And Somali million through this criminal enterprise.94 At the height of the pirates hijacked more than 125 merchant ships passing through conflict in Sierra Leone, illegal exports accounted for more the Gulf of Aden in 2009. than 90 percent of its diamond trade,95 or more than US$200 Many religious and ideological grievances in one part of the million in 2002.96 world are grafted onto a local conflict in some faraway place. 68 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 At the height of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the the popular protests for change that have swept through the 1990s, Islamic groups from outside the region joined the fight Arab world. There is little direct evidence of links between alongside Bosnian Muslims.100 Likewise, foreign fighters and these conflicts, other than through the weakness of national ideological links between armed groups dominate interna- institutions to address them.101 tional press coverage of Afghanistan and Iraq, though spill- overs of international ideological groups into the Sahel, affect- ing countries as isolated and historically peaceful as Mali, get Sources: Harriott 2004; Curtis and Karacan 2002; Shanty and Mishra 2008; less attention. Andreas 2004; International Crisis Group 2003; UNODC 2008, 2010a; An- In other cases, violence may be linked through underlying astasijevic 2006; Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor 2007; Lipman 2009; Coalition for International Justice 2005; Duffield institutional weaknesses. Yemen now faces four separate con- 2000; Gberie 2003a; Even-Zohar 2003; Davies, von Kemedi, and Drennan flicts: the Houthi rebellion in the North, the presence of Al- 2005; International Crisis Group 2008b; Ashforth 2009; Porter, Andrews, Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, grievances in the south, and and Wescott 2010; Kohlmann 2004. Notes 1. These numbers include best estimates of battle deaths from Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). 2. For details on regional trends in homicide, see the background paper on homicides prepared for this Report by Fearon 2010b and the 2008 Global Burden of Armed Violence report (Geneva Dec- laration 2008). Homicide rates decreased for nearly every region of the world, except Latin America and the Caribbean; however, insufficient data are available on current and past homicide rates in Sub-Saharan Africa to establish a regional trend. 3. WDR team calculations based on Powell and Thyne 2011. 4. OAS 2001. 5. The number of coup attempts also decreased, from 22 in the 1990s to 12 from 2000 through 2009. The average success rate of a coup attempt in the 1990s was 40 percent, compared to 29 percent in the period 2000–09 (see Powell and Thyne 2011). 6. Lutz and Reiger 2009. 7. WDR team calculation based on World Bank 2010n. 8. Throughout this Report, countries affected by fragility, violence, and conflict include (1) countries affected by high levels of criminal violence—countries with homicide rates greater than 10 per 100,000 population, (2) conflict-affected countries—countries with major civil conflict (battle deaths greater than 1,000 per annum as defined in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) from 2006 to 2009, (3) countries with UN or regionally mandated peacebuilding or peacekeeping, non-border missions, (4) fragile coun- tries—low-income countries with institutional levels (World Bank’s CPIA less than 3.2) in 2006–09 (see World Bank 2010e). “Low income fragile and conflict-affected countries” are low-income coun- tries that meet any of the last three criteria (homicide data are not consistently available for many low-income countries). Following World Bank definitions, “developing countries” includes both low- and middle-income countries. 9. Human Security Report Project, forthcoming. 10. Ross 2003; McNeish 2010. 11. Ross 2003. 12. Demombynes 2010; UNODC 2010a. 13. Harriott 2004; Shanty and Mishra 2008; UNODC 2010a; Duffield 2000; Gberie 2003a; Interna- tional Crisis Group 2008b; Ashforth 2009; Porter, Andrews, and Wescott 2010. 14. Constraints tended to operate in ritualized warfare in Melanesia that, for example, served to limit the number of people killed or restrict the parties against whom violence could be used. The Interna- Repeated violence threatens development 69 tional Committee of the Red Cross compares these “traditional” constraints on the use of violence to those pertaining in modern international humanitarian law. See Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010. 15. Brands 2009; Parson 2010. 16. International Crisis Group 2009c. 17. Thapa 2010. 18. The UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change defined terror- ism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (UN 2004a, 52). Earlier debates focused on whether definitions should be based only on nonstate actors; the High-level Panel pointed out that issues of state use of force against civilians are covered in the in- ternational laws of war, international criminal law, and international humanitarian law. See also Geneva Conventions 1949; UN 1998. 19. Most notably, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building by terror- ists affiliated with the U.S. Militia Movement, in which 168 people died: the most destructive attack on U.S. soil prior to September 11, 2001. See Foxnews.com 2001. 20. UNODC 2010a. 21. UNODC 2010a, 235–36. 22. UNODC 2010b. 23. Jordan 1999; Lupsha 1991. 24. See Demombynes 2010. 25. Demombynes 2010. 26. Estimate of number of gang members from Comisión de Jefes y Jefas de Policía de Centroamérica y El Caribe in World Bank 2010c. In terms of military forces, Nicaragua and Honduras have armies of about 12,000 soldiers each, El Salvador has 13,000 soldiers, and Guatemala has 27,000 (see Rod- gers, Muggah, and Stevenson 2009). 27. UNODC 2010a. This figure only accounts for illicit flows of criminal activities, namely drug, arms, trafficking people, smuggling, counterfeit currency and goods, and racketeering. Including corrup- tion and fraudulent commercial activities, the value of illicit flows increase to as high as US$1.1 trillion annually. See also Baker 2005. 28. Van der Elst and Davis 2011; Glenny 2008; Garzón 2008; Naim 2006; Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010. 29. UNODC 2010b. 30. UNODC 2010b. 31. UNODC 2010b. 32. See Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). For discussions of the trends in civil war onset and termination see Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010; Sambanis 2004; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Collier and others 2003. 33. The statistics in table 1.2 are based on the incidence of civil war after World War II, thus countries with previous conflicts in the 1960s are those that had conflicts between 1945 and 1959, and those with conflicts in the 1970s had conflict between 1945 and 1969, and so on. 34. See Skaperdas and others 2009 and Geneva Declaration 2008 for a deeper exploration of these costs and of the methods for measuring them. See also Human Security Report Project, forthcoming, for a discussion of measuring direct and indirect deaths associated with civil wars and other conflict. 35. Geneva Declaration 2008, 1. 36. Country representative samples were used for Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Colombia. The sur- veys were undertaken in regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. Independent representative samples were used in Gaza and the West Bank. The original country sample included Haiti; however, the survey could not be undertaken following the earthquake of January 2010. 37. See Justino and Verwimp 2008; Blattman, forthcoming. See also papers published through the Households in Conflict Network (http://www.hicn.org) for broader analysis of micro-level conflict effects on households and individuals. 38. These results are based on country year fixed effect Generalized Least Squares regressions for a panel of developing countries from 1981 to 2005, based on poverty data from Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula 2008 (available on POVCALNET (http://iresearch.worldbank.org)) and the WDR data- base. Countries with three years of major violence (major civil war or violent deaths above 10 per 70 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 100,000, equivalent to a major civil war) lagged behind other countries by 2.7 percentage points on poverty headcount. Those with minor civil war (or equivalent homicides) lagged behind countries without violence by 1.29 percentage points. These results were statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level and robust to period effects and time trends. 39. Anderlini 2010a. 40. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995; Women’s Refugee Commission 2009; UNICEF 2004. 41. UNFPA 2002; Plümper and Neumayer 2006; Murray and others 2002; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007; El Jack 2003. 42. American Psychological Association 1996; Dahlberg 1998; Verdú and others 2008. 43. UN 2000, 2011. 44. Human Security Centre 2005. 45. Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. 46. See UNDP 2005b; Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003. 47. Bijleveld, Morssinkhof, and Smeulers 2009. 48. Effects in this table drawn from multiple sources: Amnesty International 2005; Brück and Schin- dler 2008; Carpenter 2006; Chamarbagwala and Morán 2011; Bijleveld, Morssinkhof, and Smeul- ers 2009; Chun and Skjelsbæk 2010; El Jack 2003; Falch 2010; Finegan and Margo 1994; Guerrero- Serdán 2009; Heuveline and Poch 2007; Ibáñez and Moya 2006; ICRC 2001; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2007; International Alert and Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women 2007; ILO 2009; Jayaraman, Gebreselassie, and Chandrasekhar 2009; Kelly 2010; Lamb and Dye 2009; Lewis 2009; Menon and Rodgers 2010; Peltz 2006; Murray and others 2002; Ndulo 2009; Plümper and Neumayer 2006; Prieto-Rodríguez and Rodríguez- Gutiérrez 2003; Li and Wen 2005; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002; Shemyakina 2006; Torres 2002; UNFPA 2007; UN 2002, 2006b; Verwimp and Van Bavel 2005; Verpoorten 2003; Ward and Marsh 2006; Willman and Makisaka 2010; Women’s Refugee Commission 2008; Verdú and others 2008; WHO 2010. 49. Ward and Marsh 2006. 50. Lewis 2009; Willman and Makisaka 2010; Anderlini 2010a; Carpenter 2006. 51. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2010. 52. UNHCR 2009. 53. Gomez and Christensen 2010; Harild and Christensen 2010. 54. “Recovering countries” are those affected by fragility, conflict, or violence in the previous 10 years. 55. Similar effects are found in Bowman and others 2008. 56. See also Geneva Declaration 2010. 57. In 2010, after 10 years, fragile and conflict-affected states had closed only 20 percent of the gap in reaching the MDGs, while low-income countries not affected by violence had closed 40–70 percent of their MDG gap (see World Bank 2010e). Current data compiled for the MDG Summit in 2010 show that no low-income fragile or conflict-affected state has met the targets for a single MDG. Some countries are close and have made dramatic gains in recent years and it is possible that they could meet targets. For more information, see World Bank 2010n; UNSTAT 2010; UN 2007. 58. Progress in basic health services has advanced even in war zones; see the Human Security Report Project, forthcoming, for a description of global trends. 59. Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett 2006. 60. RAND Corporation 2009. 61. Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010. 62. Note that civil war coding in the Armed Conflict Database does not include all political violence. As evidenced by the experience of Burundi, while the onset of political violence resulted in battle deaths coded as civil war in Burundi in 1991, there was one-sided violence in the 1960s through 1980s in Burundi. See the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). 63. Narayan and Petesch 2010, 12. 64. Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010. 65. Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008. 66. For more details on the Index see Cingranelli and Richards 1999. 67. Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010. 68. Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010. Repeated violence threatens development 71 69. For an overview of costs of conflict and violence, see Skaperdas and others 2009. Specific estimates of the economic costs associated with conflict are found in Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010; Imai and Weinstein 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Stewart, Huang, and Wang 2001; Cerra and Saxena 2008; Collier, Chauvet, and Hegre 2007. An overview for the estimates of the cost of crime is found in Skaperdas and others 2009, with specific estimates in Riascos and Vargas 2004; UNDP 2006. 70. Skaperdas and others 2009 survey the recent literature on costs of crime. Material costs of crime, including injuries, property damage, and theft, were estimated as 3.6 percent of GDP for the Latin American and Caribbean countries and 2.1 percent of GDP for the United States. 71. Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010. 72. Patrick 2006. 73. Bayer and Rupert 2004, while Baker and others 2002 found that the effect of conflict is equivalent to a 33 percent tariff barrier. For an updated discussion of the methodology for determining growth effects of conflict and theory and new analysis based on primary and secondary neighbors, see De Groot 2010; Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Bayer and Rupert 2004. The effects of conflict on trade are reviewed in Glick and Taylor 2005. 74. The study investigated bilateral trade flows in more than 200 countries from 1960–93 (see Nitsch and Schumacher 2004). 75. Europol 2007. 76. See Gilpin 2009. 77. For methodology, see Bowden 2010; for cost to the U.S. Navy, see U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010a. For additional information, see European Affairs 2010 and Hanson 2010. 78. This figure includes ranges for the costs of deterrent security equipment, cost of naval forces, cost of piracy prosecutions, and operating cost of anti-piracy organizations (see Bowden 2010). 79. Included in this figure are the costs of ransoms, insurance premium, rerouting, deterrent security equipment, naval forces, piracy prosecutions, and anti-piracy organizations (see Bowden 2010; Chalk 2008). 80. Gomez and Christensen 2010; Harild and Christensen 2010. 81. Out of 13,658 refugees in Ghana at the end of 2009, nearly 11,500 were from Liberia (84 percent) with a further 1,600 from Togo (12 percent) (UNHCR 2010). 82. See International Crisis Group 1999; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006. 83. See Patrick 2006. Also see Collier and others 2003; Garrett 2005; National Intelligence Council 2000, 37. 84. Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008. 85. Mufson 2009. 86. WDR team calculations based on Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (dollars per barrel) reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011. 87. Harriott 2004. 88. See Curtis and Karacan 2002; Shanty and Mishra 2008; Andreas 2004; International Crisis Group 2003. 89. UNODC 2008. 90. UNODC 2010a. 91. Anastasijevic 2006. 92. UNODC 2010a; Harwell 2010. 93. Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor 2007, 5. 94. Lipman 2009; Coalition for International Justice 2005; Duffield 2000. 95. Gberie 2003a. 96. Even-Zohar 2003. 97. Davies, von Kemedi, and Drennan 2005. 98. International Crisis Group 2008b; Ashforth 2009. 99. Porter, Andrews, and Wescott 2010. 100. Kohlmann 2004. 101. International Crisis Group 2009c. T hroughout history, agreement between powerful leaders has been the most common strategy to prevent large-scale vio- lence. This type of agreement, which we call an “elite pact,” does impose security for periods, but violence generally recurs. The immediate cause of the violence varies greatly by country, with many countries experiencing a combination of security, economic, and political stresses. These stresses may be internal (including low in- come or high inequality between groups) or they may be external (including global economic shocks, international drug trafficking, or the infiltration of foreign forces). This Report argues that in these environments, institutions and governance serve as an “immune system” and defense against stresses. When these stresses occur in societies with weak institutions and governance, violence often occurs. Reform is often difficult or impossible where violence is pres- ent. As a result, countries that fail to build legitimate institutions risk entering a vicious cycle of repeated violence and weak institutions. This chapter spells out what we know about this vicious cycle and why some countries are more vulnerable to violence than others. CHAPTER 2 Weak institutions not transforming New New pact stresses Vulnerability to Violence VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY Multiple stresses raise the risks chapter 3, the framework demonstrates how of violence countries can build institutions that are resil- ient to these stresses to prevent organized E conomic, political, and security violence, moving the discussion beyond the factors can all exacerbate the risks base causes of “greed and grievance” and of violence. Some of these factors showing how justice and jobs can work to- are domestic, such as low incomes, gether to promote confidence and help to high unemployment, and inequality of dif- deliver citizen security. ferent sorts. Some factors may originate out- Where possible, quantitative and econo- side the state, such as external economic metric work has been used to assess the im- shocks or the infiltration of international portance of the stress factors listed, but there drug cartels or foreign fighters. This Report are data constraints. Data on civil wars at the refers to these triggers of violence as “security, national level are fairly comprehensive, but economic, and justice stresses” (see table 2.1). data on extreme criminal violence, normally Often related, they rarely exist in isolation. measured by homicides, are incomplete for This Report summarizes what is known many developing countries, let alone parts of about the factors associated with organized these countries. Cross-country data are fairly violence and development. It draws on re- good for economic factors, such as incomes search from a variety of fields, particularly and growth rates, but the comparability of research on the risk of civil war, largely be- data on unemployment is poor. Data are rea- cause it is further advanced than research on sonably reliable for income inequality within violent organized crime, trafficking, gang ac- countries, but less so for inequality among tivity, or terrorism (box 2.1). geographical areas and among ethnic or reli- Our approach is multidisciplinary and gious groups, and for political exclusion or draws on both quantitative and qualitative injustice. Therefore, new survey data, coun- evidence. Box 2.1 reviews the literature from try case studies, and country consultations various disciplines on causes of conflict. complement the analysis here. Often this debate has been characterized as “greed versus grievance.”1 This chapter de- Security stresses scribes how the stresses in table 2.1 can pre- cipitate organized violence through a vicious Internal security stresses can arise when cycle of vulnerability to violence. Later, in particular elites or groups feel threatened— 74 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 TA B L E 2.1 Security, economic, and political stresses This table is not exhaustive, but reflects major factors identified in the academic literature and raised in WDR consultations on the causes of violence.2 The complex relationship between factors that can trigger violence and the onset of violence is similar to the relationship between health threats and risk factors at individual, relationship, community, and societal levels found in the public health/ecological framework developed by the World Health Organization.3 Stresses Internal External Security • Legacies of violence and trauma • Invasion, occupation • External support for domestic rebels • Cross-border conflict spillovers • Transnational terrorism • International criminal networks Economic • Low income levels, low opportunity cost of • Price shocks rebellion • Climate change • Youth unemployment • Natural resource wealth • Severe corruption • Rapid urbanization Justice • Ethnic, religious, or regional competition • Perceived global inequity and injustice in the • Real or perceived discrimination treatment of ethnic or religious groups • Human rights abuses Source: Compiled by the WDR team from the literature cited in box 2.1 and from WDR team consultations. often as a result of past oppression—and torted and fearsome terms.7 Security dilem- organize to defend themselves. In interstate mas and defensive arming are also prevalent war, a preemptive move based on percep- among criminal groups. The illicit nature of tions of the other state’s intentions is called drug markets means that traffickers often re- a “security dilemma.” If one state believes sort to violence to settle disputes both within another is preparing to attack, it may de- and between trafficking organizations, since cide to strike first to give itself a decisive they do not have access to the formal legal advantage. Understood as a trigger for war system to adjudicate disputes and constrain from the time of the Greeks, preemption fea- the misuse of group funds or property. For tured strongly in Cold War strategic thinking these groups, violence becomes the first re- and follows from the realist approaches to course for enforcing contracts.8 international relations, though opinions are External threats to security can heighten mixed about its validity under international internal pressures. Many states face pressure law.4 In the late 1990s, researchers asked or incursions from outside state and nonstate whether security dilemmas were causing civil actors. That external actors could at any time wars as well.5 If one group believes that an- intervene in a country makes it particularly other clan, ethnic, or religious group is pre- difficult for internal actors to make credible paring to attack, it may choose to make the commitments with each other—as in the first move. How often this occurs is debat- “internationalized” civil conflicts in Afghani- able, but this risk is now accepted.6 stan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Manipulating fears of oppression has been International trafficking networks can also a factor causing civil conflicts as distinct as place heavy pressures on local institutions the Rwandese genocide and the Balkan wars (see box 2.2). Outside resources and armed of the 1990s. And it can be an obstacle to intervention may tip the scales in favor of ending violence—once conflicts break out, one actor, allowing it to renege on agree- perceptions of the enemy harden and socie- ments with other actors. This can come in ties tend to portray their opponents in dis- the form of attacks from “safe havens” in Vulnerability to violence 75 B OX 2.1 Economic and political theories of violence and this Report Violent conflict has been the subject of large and long-standing literatures in many academic disciplines, and this report draws from many strands of that literature. Rapid change and rising expectations One common perspective has been the importance of drivers such as rapid economic and social change. Drawing on research by psy- chologists and sociologists, Gurr argued that social and political conflict arises when groups experience feelings of “relative depriva- tion” and the frustration of expectations for deserved or anticipated economic or social status. Huntington agreed that economic mod- ernization raises expectations and mobilizes members of traditional societies toward national politics, contending that conflict occurs when political institutions lack the capacity to accommodate and manage rapidly rising demands. Failing to credibly agree to abstain from violence Many economists and political scientists see violence as originating from “commitment problems”—situations where organized groups have opposing interests but cannot credibly agree to abstain from violence for a variety of reasons. The focus in these theories is on the difficulty of groups or individuals in some settings to commit themselves to not using force when it would be advantageous to do so. This thinking can be traced back as far as Hobbes, who contended that violent civil conflict is a consequence of low state capacity to deter challengers and manage conflict among groups in society. Recent theories on opportunistic arming and consequent violence can be found in Hirshleifer, Skaperdas, Grossman, and Fearon. Becker developed a rational actor model of crime. Thinking on the “secu- rity dilemma”—that arming for defense can also be used to attack, leading to violence—can be traced to Schelling, Posen, Snyder and Jervis, and de Figueiredo and Weingast. Greed or grievance These contending theories have led to debates over the relative importance of normative and economic motives for violence, which has recently led to debates on whether economic incentives or broader social and political motives drive societies to violence. This question was formulated as “Greed and Grievance” by Collier and Hoeffler, who suggested that primary commodities, diasporas, low earnings, human capital, and dispersed populations were positively correlated to the outbreak of civil conflict, suggesting support for the “greed” hypothesis. Further exploration, review and critique of these issues can be found in Nathan and Sambanis, as well as Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti and Blattman and Miguel.9 Horizontal inequality and identity Significant contributions to this debate include recent theories of polarization and horizontal inequality and analysis of violence based solely on identity, such as nationalism and ethnicity. Theories of horizontal inequality as developed by Stewart, and polarization pro- posed by Esteban and Ray argue that inequality alone does not predict civil war—violence may be driven by relationships between inequality and identity that contribute to the onset of civil violence.10 In addition, national or ethnic identity may lead to a violent response to oppression or marginalization and need not include any equity concerns, but may be motivated instead by a disposition for self-government.11 Ethnic divides and commitment problems Bridging the arguments on grievance and rational choice motives for conflict, Fearon contends that ethnic polarization is most likely to precipitate conflict when ethnic groups cannot make credible commitments to abstain from violence. This is consistent with the phi- losophy in this Report: both political and economic dynamics are often at play, and neither greed nor grievance alone is sufficient to explain the incidence of violence. Avenues for peaceful contests The question remains: why do some societies avoid violence when others do not? To answer this question, we build on the hypotheses put forward by North, Wallis, and Weingast, who focus on impersonal institutions with open access to political and economic opportu- nities, creating avenues for peaceful and credible contestation.12 Besley and Persson contend that investments in legal systems and state capacity can reduce the incidence of violence. Keefer argues that violence occurs when societies cannot collectively punish leaders who engage in predatory behavior or collectively build a capable counterinsurgency force, suggesting that institutionalized political parties serve as a bulwark against conflict by resolving these problems of collective action and credibility. Recent empirical quantitative evidence supports these hypotheses—Goldstone and others find that the quality of political institutions is an order of magnitude more important than other factors in determining risks of political crises and civil wars, while Brückner and Ciccone suggest that institutions are necessary to accommodate shocks in prices to avoid violence. More work is needed to confirm these findings thus to better understand the channels through which institutions contribute to resilience to violence. (box continues on next page) 76 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 2.1 Economic and political theories of violence and this Report (continued) Institutions matter in preventing violence This chapter draws on existing research on the risk factors of violence across the political science, social science, and economic disciplines and extends understanding of violent conflict in two ways: • It presents the risk factors associated with violence, organized into security, economic, and political factors. This adds to existing work on drivers of conflict, with an emphasis on the role of external stresses—those outside a country’s control. Examples are international organized crime and trafficking, infiltration of foreign fighters, and economic shocks. • It then presents empirical findings that support arguments by theorists (such as North, Wallis, and Weingast) that institutions mat- ter for violence prevention. It concludes by hypothesizing why and how the failure to develop legitimate, capable, and accountable institutions causes repeated cycles of violence. Sources: Gurr 1970; Hobbes 1651; Hirshleifer 1995; Skaperdas 1996; Grossman 1991; Fearon 1995, 2004; Schelling 1960; Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Nathan 2005; Sambanis 2004; Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Esteban and Ray 2008; Stewart 2005, 2010; Keefer 2008, forthcoming; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Huntington 1968; Goldstone and others 2010; Becker 1968; Brückner and Ciccone 2010. REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 2 . 2 The stress posed by transnational organized crime and drug trafficking Jorge Montaño, Member, International Narcotics Control Board; former Ambassador of Mexico to the United States; WDR Advisory Council Member The diversification and sophistication that characterizes the Europe. Several African countries suffer the illegal exploitation challenge of transnational organized crime demands coor- of their natural resources, while Asia is a hub for tons of opiates dinated global action. Drug and human trafficking, money originating from Afghanistan. It is evident that there is a lack laundering, illegal exploitation of natural resources and of a coordinated multilateral strategy against a phenomenon wildlife, counterfeiting and violations of intellectual prop- that cannot be dealt with in a fragmented way. erty rights are lucrative criminal activities which facilitate In industrialized countries, organized crime syndicates the penetration by organized crime of the already vulnera- operate with minimal use of violence, thus assuring that the ble sociopolitical, judicial, and security structures in devel- heavy hand of the law does not interfere in their activities, oping countries. both in the banking system as well as satisfying the insatiable In Central America, for example, several countries that market for illegal drugs. In developing countries, on the other regained political stability two decades ago are now facing hand, organized criminal groups take advantage of apparent the decay of the state, whose institutions lack the strength impunity to acquire access to a limitless supply of arms, with to face this onslaught. Transnational organized crime has which they destabilize national and local institutions. converted some Caribbean countries into corridors for the The unprecedented progression of organized crime could movement of illegal drugs and persons to Europe and North spell the collapse of many weak states as their institutions fall America. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru continue to be the prey to the associated violence. The precarious economic main global cocaine producers, while Mexico is presently development observed in many regions of the world provides facing an unprecedented wave of violence given its border a stimulus for consolidating these illegal activities, which will with the largest immigrant, drug consumption, and arms continue to thrive as a consequence of the impunity they producing market. West Africa has become the newest pas- encounter in developing countries. sageway for drugs coming from South America destined for neighboring countries (for example, Hutu terrorists (such as “Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb” rebels crossing into Rwanda from the Demo- activity in northern Mali).14 Some coun- cratic Republic of Congo).13 It can also come tries—Afghanistan and Somalia—have had from the activities of drug traffickers (much the misfortune of experiencing all these of Central America today) or transnational forms of external security stress, in addition Vulnerability to violence 77 B OX 2.3 Spillover of conflicts in Central Africa The countries of Central Africa have been engaged for decades and Uganda, and increasingly in the later period, in the Central in a variety of conflicts that often spill across borders. The African Republic and Chad, these maps show how violent maps here show the locations of major conflict events involv- groups can disperse and commingle in areas of weak gover- ing rebel groups that operate across borders for two periods: nance. These groups make common cause when it suits them 1997 to 2000 and 2006 to 2009. Each colored circle indicates a to do so and shift their bases of operations to conform to local geospatial information system-coded conflict event involving political opportunities. Much of their raison d’être has become groups originating from a given country, identified in the leg- profit, plunder, or simple subsistence, with political goals at end (usually a battle, though establishing a headquarters and times stronger, at times weaker. Such groups as the Lord’s recruitment campaigns are also included). Many conflict events Resistance Army no longer have a strong domestic base, involve groups active across borders. so they continue moving opportunistically among areas of Highlighting the spillover of conflict across borders in instability. Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, M A P A Cross-border political violence spreads across Central Africa Violence is not easily contained. The colored circles represent conflict events by those militant and rebel groups that are active across borders. Recent violence has spilled across many borders in Central Africa, most notably those of the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. a. January 1997–March 2000 b. October 2006–December 2009 IBRD 38416 Country of orgin for violent groups active March 2011 across borders in Central Africa, 1997–2000: D. R. of Congo Rwanda Burundi Uganda Sudan Chad CHAD CHAD SUDAN SUDAN MAP HERE MAP HERE CENTRAL AFRICAN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC REPUBLIC UGANDA UGANDA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC DEMOCRATIC OF CONGO RWANDA RWANDA REPUBLIC BURUNDI OF CONGO BURUNDI Country of orgin for violent groups active across borders in Central Africa, 2006–2009: D. R. of Congo Rwanda Burundi IBRD 38415 March 2011 Uganda Sudan Chad Central African Republic Source: Raleigh and others 2010; Raleigh 2010. to internal stresses.15 Areas with cross-border described in chapter 1, the “neighborhood ef- ethnic links and low civilian government fect” can both increase the risk of civil war in presence have long been subject to insecu- countries with neighbors at war and have det- rity—and remain so today (box 2.3). rimental development effects over borders.16 External security threats can also develop The movement of persons trained in violence, out of violence in neighboring countries. As the displacement of persons who may cross 78 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 borders and become refugees, the disruption Economic stresses of trade, the expansion of criminal networks Low incomes reduce the opportunity cost of through globalization or trafficking, and the engaging in violence. From an economic per- safe haven that rebels often seek by crossing spective, it is important to understand the borders suggest that violence cannot be easily cost-benefit calculus for decisions by those contained, especially when institutions in who become involved in violence, as the lit- neighboring countries are weak (box 2.4).17 erature on criminal motives has traditionally These spillovers effects can also derive highlighted.18 Much recent research on civil from interstate conflicts in a region. The in- war has focused on economic motives, with vasion of Kuwait in 1990, the occupation of rebellion perceived to offer economic rents to Iraq in 2003, and the military operations in rebel leaders and a viable living to followers the West Bank and Gaza are, in historical who have no other source of livelihood. Cap- terms, less common than invasion and occu- turing this perspective, the leader of the Su- pation were earlier in the 20th century—but dan People’s Liberation Movement, John Ga- had profound effects on neighbors. rang, said, “Under these circumstances the External movements that have common marginal cost of rebellion in the South be- cause with local groups and internal poltical came very small, zero, or negative; that is, in movements can act as stresses. While motives the South it pays to rebel.”19 In a low-income for individuals to join ideology-based groups environment the opportunity costs of engag- may be linked to beliefs in larger causes, the ing in violence may be small. ability of these groups to garner local sup- Slow-developing low-income economies port depends on relating these larger narra- largely dependent on natural resources are 10 tives to local claims of injustice. A more ma- times more likely than others to experience terial ethos prevails in the business alliances civil war.20 Reviewing these results for this between local gangs and transnational drug Report, Fearon again finds a strong relation- cartels in Latin America. ship between income and the risk of civil conflict.21 Of course, low per capita income is also highly correlated with low institutional BOX 2.4 External stresses: The deportation of the maras capabilities, as evidenced by the Worldwide One notable external stress for Central America was the U.S. deportation of Governance Indicators and International maras in the 1990s. One of the main gangs (maras) to be deported, La Mara Sal- vatrucha, was established in Los Angeles in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Country Risk Guide indicators.22 More re- mainly Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees and immigrants to the United cent work by Keefer and by Fearon for this States. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Report indicates that the income links with Immigrant Responsibility Act, whereby non-U.S. citizens sentenced to one year violence may be the joint product of other or more in prison were to be repatriated to their countries of origin. Between underlying factors.23 Thus, countries have 1998 and 2005, the United States deported nearly 46,000 convicted felons to Central America, in addition to another 160,000 illegal immigrants. political and institutional characteristics that El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras received more than 90 percent of the determine both their capability to address deportees, many of them members of the maras who had arrived in the United violence and the level of governance neces- States as children. On being sent back to countries they barely knew, they repro- sary for economic growth. duced the structures and behaviors that had given them support and security in the United States, founding gangs that quickly attracted local youth. High unemployment, particularly youth This deportation did not affect all countries in Central America equally. unemployment, appears to increase the risk Nicaragua, for example, has a comparatively low deportation rate from the of violence. The World Development Report United States—with fewer than 3 percent of all Central American deportees. 2007: Development and the Next Generation The difference in settlement and deportation may be one factor explaining why gangs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are more violent than those in points to how young people’s initial failures in Nicaragua. finding a job can lead to persistent joblessness, a loss of interest in further schooling, delayed Sources: Rodgers, Muggah, and Stevenson 2009; WDR regional consultation in Mexico City with government officials, academics, and development practitioners from Latin family formation, mental distress, and “nega- America. tive manifestations of citizenship.”24 Findings from the Voices of the Poor Project affirm Vulnerability to violence 79 this: presence of unemployed and frustrated young men in post-conflict situations is often B OX 2 . 5 Does unemployment cause violence? Arguments linked to higher levels of violence, substance for and against abuse, and gang activities.25 In surveys for this The proposition that unemployment can lead to involvement in violence is often Report in areas affected by violence, unem- traced to Becker, who applied an “economic calculus” to criminology, with the ployment and idleness was cited as the most aim of improving policies toward crime. In such an opportunity-cost argument, important factor motivating young people scholars like Cincotta, Engelman, and Anastasion and Grossman consider unem- to join rebel movements. The issue was also ployment a cause of violence and conflict. Urdal argues that the risk of violent raised as important in every WDR consulta- conflict can be correlated with a high population proportion of young adults and poor economic performance. tion: Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf More recently, simplistic cost-benefit approaches have been questioned by summarizes, “[Without] jobs for our very Berman and others on the motives of groups claiming ideological inspiration: young population, we run the risk of having Most aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political their vulnerabilities exposed and the risk of order is based on an opportunity-cost theory of distracting potential them once again being recruited into con- recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to flict, undermining all the progress we have participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between made.”26 But econometric work has consis- unemployment and violence in places with active insurgencies. We test tently failed to find any correlation between that prediction on insurgencies in Iraq and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly available measures of insurgency: unemployment and violence, perhaps be- attacks against government and allied forces and violence that kills civil- cause data are poor or because the link is in- ians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, we find a robust negative direct rather than direct (box 2.5).27 correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and Exploitative employment is also a risk allied forces and no significant relationship between unemployment and factor in violence. The relationship between the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians.32 unemployment and violence often involves Other research suggests that unemployment and violence may be related social identity and exclusion. Several qualita- through respect, social justice, and social identity dynamics rather than pure tive studies on Latin America and African cost-benefit motives. Contemporary case studies emphasize how employment, gangs and rebel movement recruitment point identity, and perceptions of social justice are intertwined. Padilla’s work on Puerto Rican drug gangs in Chicago stresses the insecure and demeaning nature to links between employment, respect, and of legal work opportunities compared with gang membership—which offered identity (box 2.5). This mirrors a larger liter- not only income but social respect and a sense of belonging. Similar motives are ature on unemployment and domestic vio- echoed by those joining gangs in Guatemala, who “did so because they were lence, showing how power relations and per- searching for the support, trust, and cohesion—social capital—that they main- ceptions of “dignity” can be more important tained their families did not provide, as well as because of the lack of opportuni- than simple pecuniary motives as drivers of ties in the local context.”33 violence.28 This is consistent with employ- Evidence on recruitment into the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) suggests that many recruits, employed before joining, were moti- ment being more than a purely financial vated by status and the excitement of the rebel life in comparison with the transaction. It is also a social interaction car- drudgery of agricultural wage labor. Gutierréz Sanín quotes a rancher kidnapped rying aspects of personal status and expecta- by the FARC: “The guerrilleros say: we, work with a machete? Never! Then they tions of how one should be treated.29 In other say: Peasants speak with us because of this. And they kiss their weapon! And words, the nature of work relationships on they say that women love arms [sic]: the police, the army, the guerrilla.” Ethno- offer matters a great deal. As with the causes graphic work on militias in rural Sierra Leone and insurgents in El Salvador34 suggests that oppressive work relations can be a key motive for rebellion. of rebel movements, unemployment and a Another understudied element of these dynamics is the time necessary for sense of low status also emerge as risk factors such interventions to be effective. A WDR study in southern China tests how for recruitment into gangs (box 2.6). long it takes migrant workers to develop social networks, finding that broad Research has found a strong relationship social networks are developed only after five years of secure employment. between income inequality and criminal vio- Further research is needed to test the links between unemployment, idle- lence, measured by homicide rates.30 Many ness, the temporal effects of unemployment, the differing forms of employment, and recruitment into violence. scholars have investigated whether income inequality and civil war are related and found Sources: Urdal 2004; Berman and others 2009; Padilla 1992; Moser 2009; Gutiérrez no statistically significant relationship.31 Sanín 2008; Becker 1968; Cincotta, Engelman, and Anastasion 2003; Grossman 1991; However, there is evidence that horizontal in- Wood 2003; Richards 1996; Chauveau and Richards 2008; Cramer 2010; Huang 2010. equalities (between regional, ethnic, or reli- 80 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 2.6 Do similar economic factors create risks for political conflict and extreme levels of violent organized crime? The most reliable indicator to compare violence across countries is the homicide rate, which has risen markedly in Latin American and Caribbean countries since the early 1990s—from 12.6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants to almost 20 homicides in recent years. Analysis of global data confirms earlier work by Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman on homicide rates in Latin America, revealing that: • Institutional capacity and accountability is associated with lower risks of civil war and homicide rates. • Higher country GDP, like civil wars, is associated with lower homicide rates, even comparing periods within countries. • Democratic collapses, as with civil wars, are associated with increasing homicides. • Oil production, associated with civil war risk, does not predict higher homicide rates. • Countries with higher income inequality tend to have more homicides, a pattern that holds when comparing countries in the same region. These findings are the principal factor that distinguishes criminal violence from civil wars, which are not found to be corre- lated with income inequality, but exhibit some relation to horizontal inequalities across ethnicity or other identity groups. In qualitative studies, unemployment and idleness also feature as risk factors that spur recruitment into both rebel movements and gangs. Surveys showed remarkably similar perceptions about motives for participation in gangs and in rebel movements (see figure). In both cases, unemployment and idleness were cited as the primary reasons for young people to join gangs or rebel move- ments, reinforcing the links between social inequality and violence. Rebel movements and gangs attract people with similar motives Surveys found that the main motivations young people cited for becoming rebels or gang members are very similar— unemployment, idleness, respect, and self-protection, all well ahead of revenge, injustice, or belief in the cause. 50 46% 45 40 39.5% 35 % of respondents 30 25 20 15% 13% 13% 15 8% 10 5 0 Rebel participation Gang participation Unemployment/Idleness Feel more secure/Powerful Belief in the cause/Revenge/Injustice Sources: Fearon 2010b; Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010; Neumayer 2003; Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman 2002a, 2002b; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002; WDR team calculations. Notes: Figure shows aggregates of the most common responses for the questions, “What is the main reason why young people join rebel groups?” and “What is the main reason why young people join gangs?” for surveys conducted in Colombia; the Democratic Republic of Congo; Côte d’Ivoire; Gaza; Mali; Sierra Leone; and West Bank. Survey methodology described in Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. gious identity groups) lead to political vio- also possible that demographic shifts create lence (discussed further in the section on stresses on societies that are not prepared for political stresses below). The structure of the change—rapid urbanization, as earlier in inequality and the manifestation of violence Latin America and today in Asia and Africa, may be linked, but the results are hardly con- is associated with weakened social cohesion clusive; more research on this is needed. It is and increased risks of violence.35 Vulnerability to violence 81 Countries with significant natural re- Economic factors are important—but do source wealth may face armed attempts to not tell the full story. Many developing coun- capture the benefits. Because control of the tries face multiple economic challenges, with state or specific areas is needed to benefit low or stagnant growth, high exposure to from revenues from the sale of oil, timber, global commodity price trends, and rapid or minerals, countries with significant natu- population growth. Potent as these factors ral wealth are particularly vulnerable to are, explanations for conflict based purely on conflict.36 This is demonstrated by the pro- economic motives are inadequate—to avoid longed struggles between rival militias in the violence, societies must do more than just Democratic Republic of Congo, from the create growth. The attention in recent years civil war period of the 1990s37 to present-day to quantitative correlations between eco- rebel “taxation” of artisanal mining of col- nomic factors and conflict has led some to tan, tin, and gold deposits in the eastern part argue that economics is all that counts. Not of the country. Subnational contests over re- only is this facile—it misrepresents the state sources are important in country cases, al- of the research. It is much more difficult to though cross-country data are not available. test the importance of identity, ideology, in- Once again, the key is the cost-benefit calcu- justice, and political motivations using statis- lus associated with engaging in trafficking tical methods, but current research suggests and the violence that can accompany it. In that these are very important in explaining addition, leaders of countries with signifi- violence and conflict.43 cant natural resources may be reluctant to invest in the institutions to mediate or sup- press violence, since these same institutions Justice can challenge their regime and reduce their Humans value justice and fairness, the most share of the rents.38 For example, a strong obvious example being political inclusion of military in a country with weak civilian all citizens. When fairness is absent, injustice oversight is associated with the capture of and exclusion can act as stresses. Justice and natural resource rents by military leaders.39 fairness are difficult concepts to measure, Economic shocks can also arise from fac- though psychological experiments show that tors beyond the control of the state—and they can have value beyond pure material food and energy price shocks can increase self-interest (see box 2.7). the risk of conflict. Work on rainfall shocks One aspect of injustice and unfairness is in Sub-Saharan Africa concludes that civil pure political exclusion of particular groups conflict is more likely to occur following based on race, ethnicity, religion, or geo- years of poor rainfall. Using rainfall variation graphical location and origin. Political exclu- as a proxy for income shocks in 41 African sion was clearly an important motive for countries between 1981 and 1999, Satyanath, armed resistance in the anti-colonial wars Miguel, and Sergenti found that a 5 percent and the anti-apartheid struggle. Today, few decline in economic growth increased the areas of the world have systems of political likelihood of conflict by half in the following representation so obviously inequitable. But year.40 A majority of fragile states are food recent research by Cederman, Wimmer, and importers—and average household expendi- Min and Goldstone and others suggests that countries with high political exclusion or ture on food is higher in fragile developing ethnic exclusion are more likely to experience countries (57.5 percent) than in other devel- violent upheaval.44 oping countries (49.4 percent).41 Sharp food Economic and social inequality and per- price increases, in particular, have a long as- ceived injustice matter. Security and eco- sociation with urban instability. But there is nomic stresses may be amplified by the way less risk of violence where institutions pro- people perceive their identity—and their tect exporters and consumers against these treatment by others may be based on that economic shocks.42 identity. Data are incomplete on horizontal 82 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 illustrates the connection, where decades of BOX 2.7 People expect fairness and punish inequity socioeconomic inequalities persisted between north and south. After President Houphouët- Using the Ultimatum Game, a two-player experimental psychology game con- ducted under laboratory conditions, economists have demonstrated that many Boigny’s death in December 1993, a conflu- people from a wide variety of cultures are willing to punish others at a cost to ence of economic and political factors even- themselves in order to sanction unfair behavior. In this game, one bargainer tually led to civil war.48 The rebels’ Charte du makes a proposal on how to divide a sum of money with another bargainer— Nord clearly expressed the economic griev- who has the opportunity to accept or reject the proposed division. ances of northerners as well as their resent- The first bargainer is called the proposer, the second the responder. If the responder accepts the proposed division, each bargainer earns the amount pro- ment over insufficient state recognition of posed; but if the responder rejects it, each bargainer earns nothing. If the only the Muslim religion. To portray identity as consideration is material interest, responders could be expected to accept quite driven by economic considerations alone is a low percentage of the “pie” since this will still result in a net gain to them. to ignore the consistency with which the The Ultimatum Game has been run hundreds of times in diverse cultures around the world and the results have been surprisingly consistent, which sug- qualitative literature identifies such features gests widespread consensus on interpretations of fairness and equity. From as humiliation, pride, and desire for affilia- semisedentary Dolgan/Nganasan hunters, to wage laborers of Siberia, to seden- tion as motivators for action.49 tary Sanquianga fishermen of the Colombian Pacific coast, to Hadzan nomads in State oppression and human rights abuses Tanzania—and from sedentary laborers in rural Missouri to urban wage workers in Accra—the offer from the proposer consistently averages 26 to 48 percent, often accompany authoritarian approaches while the responder is willing to punish if the offer is less than 12 to 17 percent.45 to prevent violence fueled by injustice. Are The responders would rather have both players get nothing than accept a such tactics sustainable? Surprisingly little small share while the proposer gets a much larger one. The results suggest that quantitative research has been done on the many individuals react strongly to what they perceive to be unjust—and are willing to forgo material benefit to punish behavior they perceive as unfair. links between human rights abuses and po- litical violence. A review of evidence suggests Sources: Hoff 2010; Henrich and others 2010. a strong correlation between past human rights abuses and current risks of conflict (box 2.8). Additional quantitative work is inequalities (for example, inequalities be- needed to determine the direction of causal- tween identity groups based on religion, ity and control for possibly omitted variables, caste, ethnicity, or region).46 But analysis while further qualitative work would be across 55 countries for 1986–2003 reveals a needed to understand the links between significant rise in the probability of conflict abuses and risks of violence. It is not clear in countries with severe horizontal inequali- whether human rights abuses affect the mo- ties, both economic and social.47 Côte d’Ivoire tives of those who engage in armed opposi- B OX 2 .8 Human rights abuses and future conflict risk Are improvements in human rights correlated with lower risks of conflict? Countries with recent human rights abuses are far more likely to experience conflict than countries with a strong his- tory of respect for human rights. Each one-step deterioration on the Political Terror Scale— which measures arbitrary detention for nonviolent political activity, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings—resulted in a more than twofold increase in the risk of civil war in the sub- sequent year. Holding large numbers of political prisoners makes a renewal of civil war twice as likely, while significant numbers of extrajudicial killings make it three times more likely.50 This is best summed up by Walter: “A reasonable interpretation of these results is that greater repression and abuse by a government creates both grievances and signals that those governments are not dependable negotiating partners; suggesting that less coercive and more accountable approaches significantly decrease the risk of civil conflict.”51 Sources: Fearon 2010a; Walter 2010. Vulnerability to violence 83 tion, whether there is a wider effect in spur- FIGURE 2.1 What drives people to join ideological militant ring indirect popular support for armed movements? opposition movements, or whether oppres- Respondents in Mali and the West Bank cited revenge, injustice, and belief sive state tactics can under certain circum- in a cause as reasons for participating in ideologically based militant move- stances cause disaffection among groups ments. These results contrast with the results for gang and rebel group par- within the military or political and economic ticipation (box 2.5), which showed unemployment and idleness as leading circles of power. Whatever the specific mech- reasons for participation. anisms at work, the results suggest that im- 50 46% 46% provements in human rights often accom- 45 pany a reduced risk of violence.52 40 The combination of political and socio- 35 economic exclusion, especially when per- % respondents 30 ceived to be government policy, can be used 25 to support narratives of social injustice. In 21% 20 19% Côte d’Ivoire an explosive mixture of socio- 16% economic and political inequalities appears 15 to have contributed to the outbreak of civil 10 war.53 In Sri Lanka, some historians have ar- 5 1% gued that political and social exclusion of the 0 Tamil minority through the 1956 Official Mali West Bank Languages Act (which declared Sinhalese the Unemployment/Idleness Feel more secure/Powerful only official language of Sri Lanka) and the Belief in the cause/Revenge/Injustice 1972 constitution (which gave Buddhism “foremost status” in the country) contributed Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. to early Tamil demands for greater autonomy Notes: Figure shows percentage of responses for the question, “What drives people to join ideological movements?” for surveys conducted in Mali and West and to later support for Tamil militancy.54 Bank. Survey methodology described in Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. Perceived injustice in access to political power and economic opportunities between Pro- testants and Catholics played a role in the Northern Ireland secessionist conflict.55 Ac- On the contrary, some research finds that per- tual or perceived exclusion can be a powerful petrators of terrorist attacks are more likely to motivator of violence, creating pools of hos- be well-off, with advanced education.61 tility for rebel leaders to draw on.56 For ex- While the motives for individuals to join treme levels of violent crime, inequality be- ideology-based groups may be linked to be- tween classes—which may also carry aspects liefs in larger causes, the ability of these of exclusion and perceived injustice—ap- groups to garner local support also depends pears to matter more that inequality between on relating these larger narratives to local ethnic, geographical, or religious groups. 57 claims of injustice.62 The Taliban gained sup- Injustice and inequity are often cited as port in Pakistan’s Swat valley in part by build- motivations for terrorism. Invasion, occupa- ing on a variety of local grievances, including tion, political repression, and the curtailment weaknesses in local law enforcement and jus- of human rights and civil liberties form much tice institutions.63 Leaders of militant ideo- of the rationale that terrorist organizations logical groups often espouse narratives of in- give for their attacks. Much of the empirical justice or exclusion, and this appears to have literature validates the relevance of these popular resonance. Mali and the West Bank factors.58 Some scholars posit a relationship cited “belief in the cause and injustice” as far between poverty and terrorism,59 but many more important for recruitment into militant others find no direct evidence that poverty religious groups than for recruitment into (or a lack of education) leads to terrorism.60 gangs or rebel movements (figure 2.1). 84 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Thus, stresses related to security, eco- results described above on human rights, nomics, and politics can increase the risk of corruption, and the presence of a written violence, and they tend to combine and pre- constitution—appear to matter as much as cipitate actual violence. But the actual combi- their capacity. Both capacity and account- nations of stresses and the pathways to vio- ability are applicable to security, political, lent conflict are highly specific to country and economic systems: political scientists circumstances. As discussed earlier, recent re- typically use the term “accountability” to re- search, while in its infancy, points to the im- fer to processes or political representation, portance of institutions in mediating disputes for example, while economists more often and reducing violence. Where societies fail to use the term to refer to responsible use of reform institutions and insulate themselves public funds and responsiveness to citizen from stresses associated with violence, they needs and complaints. For this Report, “le- risk repeated cycles of violence. gitimacy” refers to the responsiveness of in- stitutions and is used as shorthand for capac- ity, inclusion, and accountability. Several The vicious cycle of weak sources of legitimacy have been identified in institutional legitimacy and the state-building literature.67 The most im- violence portant are as follows: Much good work has been done on concep- tualizing the relationship between institu- • Political legitimacy (accountability) and tions and violence, both historically (North, inclusion, or the use of credible political Wallis, and Weingast and many others); in processes to make decisions that reflect contemporary analysis of the coercive capac- shared values and preferences, provide the ities of the state (Fearon and Laitin); and in voice for all citizens equally and account relation to processes of democratization for these decisions. This includes providing (Goldstone and others).64 The policy world information to citizens and mechanisms has also focused on the relationship between for legal recourse to resolve disputes and state-building and peacebuilding, including complaints, including complaints against work by the Organisation for Economic Co- the state. This can also be considered to in- operation and Development (OECD) In- clude international legitimacy: the state’s ternational Network on Conflict and Fragil- exercise of responsible sovereignty as laid ity, as well as other bilateral, regional, and out under international law. multilateral institutions. New research for • Performance legitimacy (capacity), this Report from Fearon, Walter, and Hoef- earned by the effective discharge by the fler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz explores how the state of its agreed duties, particularly the characteristics of state-society institutions provision of security, economic oversight and governance outcomes are associated with and services, and justice. risk of violence (box 2.9).65 Meanwhile, re- cent research supports the finding that states Recent events demonstrate how different with weak institutions run the greatest risk of aspects of institutional legitimacy can relate the onset and recurrence of civil war, and to conflict and violence. The Middle East and of extreme levels of criminal violence.66 These North African countries generally possess rel- studies should be further expanded and atively strong institutional capacity, but their tested, but, taken together, they provide com- systems have historically scored low on indi- pelling early evidence that institutions are cators of accountability. In some countries, indeed critical for avoiding violence. such as Libya, institutions have remained more The capacity and accountability of insti- personalized than in neighboring states such tutions both matter. The accountability of as Egypt and Tunisia, and perceived tensions institutions—expressed, for example, in the between regional, ethnic, or tribal groups are Vulnerability to violence 85 B OX 2.9 Quantitative research on institutions and violence risk For this Report, Fearon and Walter tested whether the rule of law, government effectiveness, low corruption, and strong protection of human rights, as measured by the Worldwide Gover- nance Indicators (WGI), correlate with a lower risk of onset and recurrence of civil conflict. This test involved a more detailed statistical examination of these governance indicators than undertaken before. Because countries with high incomes generally have stronger governance indicators, it has been difficult for previous researchers to distinguish the effect of institutional weakness from the effect of low income. Fearon approached this problem by controlling the sample for national incomes, and then identifying “surprisingly good” governance—when a country has higher governance ratings than other countries at the same per capita income. The attempt to identify the impact of governance on the risk of violence then comes from seeing whether sur- prisingly good or bad governance in one period is associated with the onset or recurrence of conflict later. Fearon finds that a country with “surprisingly good” governance indicators has a 30–45 per- cent lower risk of civil war in the next 5–10 years than its peers with more modestly rated gov- ernance. Once institutions are added to the analysis, they become a more important factor than income as a correlate of civil war. Similarly, he finds that institutions are highly related to the risk of extreme levels of criminal violence, proxied by homicides, with countries that had measures of better governance in 1996–98 experiencing lower homicide rates in 2000–05, even when controlling for income. Walter finds a similar governance impact on the risk of recurring civil war. A formal constitu- tion—a simple measure of the rule of law and the expression of societal values through formal institutions—reduces the odds of renewed conflict by 64 percent. Measures of accountability are as important as measures of capacity in this calculation: as described earlier, past human rights abuses have a particularly strong impact on the risk of future conflict, and measures of rule of law and corruption are as important as, or more important than, those of bureaucratic efficiency. Sources: Fearon 2010a, 2010b; Walter 2010. higher. This may help explain why initial de- definitions of state fragility. The World Bank, mands for change in Egypt and Tunisia were for example, uses indicators of institutional managed largely peacefully, whereas protests strength to identify fragile situations. And in Libya escalated into civil conflict. the last decade has seen a sharper interna- Fragile institutions and poor governance tional focus on the developmental and secu- help explain why similar external shocks can rity implications of “fragile situations,” and produce violence in one country but not in a focus on the links between state-building another. Consider external economic stress and peacebuilding.68 and the long association of sharp food price increases with urban instability. In mapping Why does the lack of legitimate food protests during the 2006–08 period of institutions open the risk of price spikes against government effectiveness recurring violence? data, the occurrence of violence was much higher in developing countries with less ca- All societies face stresses, but only some suc- pable governance (figure 2.2). cumb to repeated violence. Unemployment, The essential links between institutional income shocks, rising inequalities between weakness, governance, and violence are cap- social groups, external security threats, and tured in the concept of “fragility” (box 2.10). international organized crime—all of these Weak capacity, accountability, and legiti- have plausible causal relationships with vio- macy of institutions are the basis of many lence. The analytical problem in identifying 86 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 F I G U R E 2.2 Food price protests and associated violence are may vary, but the underlying reason for soci- concentrated in fragile states eties’ inability to resist stresses is that their institutions are too weak to mediate them Developing countries with low government effectiveness experienced more peacefully. Durable solutions to violence, food price protests during the food crisis (2007–08) than countries with high government effectiveness. More than half of those protests turned violent. therefore, require more than addressing each In states in the bottom half of the governance spectrum, the incidence of individual stress—they require action to ad- violent protests was three times higher than in the top half. dress the underlying weaknesses in institu- 18 tional legitimacy. Solutions that do not involve transform- 15 ing institutions may postpone rather than 9 9 2 solve problems. Throughout history, agree- Number of countries 12 3 ments between powerful leaders have been 9 the most common strategy to prevent large- 12 scale violence—“I’ll prevent my armed men 6 from attacking your territory if you prevent 10 8 8 yours from attacking mine, so that we can all 3 profit from trade or selling natural resources.” 0 As North, Wallis, and Weingast suggest, if 0–25th 25–50th 50–75th 75–100th these arrangements create sufficient incen- Increasing government effectiveness (percentile ranking) tives for powerful leaders and organizations, they can contain violence.69 Violent Nonviolent Such arrangements, however, lead to a po- Sources: Compiled by Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010; food protest data litical system that manipulates the economy, are from news reports; government effectiveness data are from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010a. so that economic rents are an essential com- Notes: Food protests are defined as strikes, protests, or riots on food- or agriculture- ponent of the stability. Unfortunately, such related issues in 2007 and 2008. A violent food protest is defined as one that arrangements are personal and rarely lead to involves the use of physical force, results in casualties, or both. the development of impersonal institutions that can act irrespective of whether a particu- the causes of violence is that many countries lar leader is still in power, or to wider gover- face these stresses, but not all of them actu- nance improvements that protect citizens’ ally experience outright violence, while oth- interests. These “elite pacts” can establish ers contain it to small geographical areas or limits on violence, but this type of agreement short periods of time. As described earlier, is subject to constant renegotiation as cir- a common, underexplored condition across cumstances change, and the threat of vio- countries facing violence, particularly re- lence remains. peated violence, is their weak institutions and Does violence recur because, without im- governance. personal institutions, elite pacts have diffi- The causal relationship between weak in- culty in adapting to change? This Report’s stitutional legitimacy and violence may be work on institutional correlations is new, and compared to the relationship between the more research is needed on why countries human body’s immune system and disease. with weak formal institutions experience re- Weak institutions make a country vulnerable peated bouts of violence. One hypothesis is to violence, just as a weak immune system that these systems have difficulty in adapting makes a body vulnerable to disease. To re- to change—because agreements are personal store a body to health means not only treat- and need to be renegotiated when leaders die ing the disease but also restoring the body’s or lose power, or when new internal and ex- ability to fight off disease. Similarly with ternal pressures force a change in the division weak institutional legitimacy and gover- of economic or political benefits. A further nance. The cause of each outbreak of violence consideration is that these systems may lead Vulnerability to violence 87 B OX 2.10 Fragility, weak institutions, governance, and violence To capture state fragility, the World Bank and other multilateral development banks have used measures of institutional weakness, such as their Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) frameworks. The CPIA indicators attempt to measure, however imperfectly, the quality and influence of key state and society institutions and the policies they implement. Low- income countries with scores below a composite 3.2 in the CPIA are coded as fragile. Nothing in the indicators themselves directly measures the levels of political or criminal violence. The figure illustrates that countries lacking the institutional capacity and accountability to absorb systemic stress are more likely to experience violence—and less able to extract themselves from it or to contain its effects. Of 17 countries that remained fragile between 1990 and 2008, 14 experienced major civil war violence in the same period and 2 experienced minor civil wars, as shown in the figure.70 In other words, nearly every country with prolonged periods of weak institutional capacity experienced organized political violence. Of course, this violence is in turn likely to compro- mise development and further erode institutional capacity (similarly to the “conflict trap” identified by Collier and others (2003)). Even though the CPIA indicators do not include direct measurement of political and security institutions and policies, there is a striking correlation between “fragility” as defined in the CPIA scores, and the incidence of major episodes of orga- nized violence. By measuring institutional fragility, the CPIA is in effect measuring the presence or risk of organized violence. 71 Source: Mata and Ziaja 2009. Countries that remained fragile were very likely to experience civil war f 17 countries that were fragile five or more years Of between 1977 and 1989 and remained fragile until 2009 1 remained fragile with no conflict 2 remained fragile and experienced minor civil war (battle deaths exceeded 25 per annum) 14 remained fragile and experienced major civil war (battle deaths exceeded 1,000 per annum) Source: WDR team calculations. Note: Throughout this report, major civil war includes conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths per annum and minor civil war includes conflicts with more than 25 battle deaths per annum. A fragile country has a CPIA of less than 3.2. *Correlation statistically significant at p < 0.01. to the buildup of grievances over time—pos- ens, the vulnerability to external shocks in- sibly because corruption and coercion attract creases, and the tolerance of corruption and external condemnation and domestic pro- coercion diminishes. tests. These factors are surely becoming more Institutional economics offers a wide body important as the global pace of change quick- of theory and evidence on how institutions 88 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 (formal and informal rules) facilitate and access to infrastructure, or business op- constrain the behavior of economic and po- portunities), that person will have less to litical actors (individuals, groups, and firms).72 lose by resorting to rebellion or crime. Ac- In relation to violence, this Report offers three countable and inclusive political, social, key hypotheses for institutions to matter in and economic institutions can mediate shaping the incentives for violence: contests between different classes or eth- nic, religious, or regional groups peace- • Institutional capacity. Strong policing fully—ensuring that each party feels and defense capacities give states the power adequately represented in decision mak- to overcome armed threats from rebel or ing, that demands are heard, and that organized criminal groups. If an individ- rights are protected. But inclusion is less ual is contemplating political or criminal likely for groups that are fragmented and violence, the knowledge that the country’s unorganized—indeed, their very frag- security forces have weak intelligence and mentation could explain the ease with coercive capacity will make that person which the political system abuses them. more likely to pursue violent options. Conversely, if the country’s formal institu- • Active abuse and institutional account- tions do not deliver local justice, educa- ability. If a person or a family member is tion, or employment, an individual has a tortured or arbitrarily imprisoned or greater incentive to turn toward nonstate preyed upon by corrupt officials, that per- groups that can deliver, even if the groups son may have little to lose by risking in- are violent. Social and family cohesion can jury or further imprisonment by taking also be a critical national capacity: if an up a life of crime or rebellion. Account- individual feels no sense of national pride, able security forces and government agen- or if the family and community place no cies avoid the human rights abuses and value on abiding by national laws, there is corruption that can fuel grievances and less to constrain that person from taking create incentives for violent opposition. up arms against the state or engaging in Societies that rely on elite pacts, coercion, criminal activities. But increasing the ca- and patronage to control violence risk re- pacity of the state is fraught with risks: peating a vicious cycle. Where agreements particularly when some leaders perceive among elites to end fighting do not result in a threat to their own interests from well- a transformation in state-society institutions organized security forces and economic and better governance outcomes, they re- institutions, and where citizens are frag- main vulnerable to the same stresses that mented and unorganized, unable to insist precipitated fighting in the first place. In that economic, justice, and security ser- these circumstances, any stresses that shift vices be provided equitably to all citizens. the balance of power—such as the death of a • Inclusion. Government capacity alone is leader, external security threats, or economic not enough, however: many of the stresses and demographic pressures—risk further described in this chapter relate to the fail- violence. At some point this violence will be ure of institutions to make all ethnic, reli- ended through another elite pact, but with- gious, or social groups feel equally served out broader and deeper institutional trans- by the actions of the state. If the geo- formation, the cycle will repeat (figure 2.3). graphic, ethnic, or religious community The vicious cycle can become more difficult an individual belongs to is excluded from to escape over time, as each successive bout political or economic opportunities (for of violence further weakens institutions and example, from taking part in political de- destroys social capital. In countries where cision making, civil service appointments, children have been brutalized as victims or education, health care, social protection, witnesses of violence, or, worse yet, as perpe- Vulnerability to violence 89 F I G U R E 2.3 The vicious cycle of violence, elite pacts, weak institutions—and vulnerability to repeated violence Weak institutions not transforming New New pact stresses VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY Source: WDR team. trators by being coerced to be child combat- Historically, large-scale episodes of violence ants, the lasting trauma and lost human and have been a feature of all human societies. social capital become an impediment to fu- This cycle is doomed to repeat until societies ture social progress.73 find collective institutions to mediate and The challenge for these societies is escap- control violence. Escaping this vicious cycle ing this vicious cycle of repeated violence. is the focus of the rest of this Report. 90 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 2 Nepal: Stresses, institutions, violence, and legitimacy C hapter 2 argued that organized violence is likely to occur when internal and external stresses are not countered by capable, legitimate institutions. Despite an evolution in the faced, the weaknesses and exclusion in Nepal’s institutions leave the country continually vulnerable to renewed risk of conflict, as shown in table 1. nature of violence and the intensity and variety of stresses TA B L E 1 Interlinked stresses in Nepal Stresses Internal External Security • Mistrust of security forces • Cross-border criminality in the Tarai • Culture of impunity region • Legacy of violence and trauma • Refugees • Lack of legitimate security presence and public security crisis Economic • Low incomes, joblessness • Floods and other natural disasters • Electricity, food, and fuel shortages • Price shocks • Corruption and extortion • Illegal trade in natural resources Political • Ethnic, gender, caste-based, regional exclusion • Regional or international • Discrimination in access to opportunity and in involvement in internal affairs representation in institutions • Human rights abuses Sources: Thapa 2010; Sharma 2008; Jha 2010. Political stresses and the continuation ruling elite—one religion (Hinduism), one language (Nepali), of elite politics and the authoritarian Panchayat system kept dissent in check. This political settlement withstood pressures for democra- Feudalism is a system of governance designed to restrict power tization until 1990. In that year, the first Jana Andolan (People’s and wealth to a very small minority. Conflict in Nepal is rooted Movement), led by a coalition of leftist and democratic parties in struggles to depart from the country’s feudal past and move and endorsed by the international community, forced King Bi- to a more inclusive and open society. Nepal is home to more rendra to reinstitute open national elections and to accept a than 100 ethnic groups, speaking 92 languages, and a caste sys- severe curtailment of royal power. A series of governments led tem dictating group-based opportunity and achievement. The by the Congress Party and coalitions of leftist parties followed, groups most marginalized constitute the majority of Nepal’s all committed to modernization, equitable economic growth, population—nearly 70 percent.74 and broader social justice. Yet the political parties that came to Nepal’s recent history can be described as a protracted power in the wake of this movement failed to sustain public struggle between the country’s elites and the groups, classes, confidence—instead relying on a small group of political party and ethnicities that believe they have been excluded from the elites to draft the new constitution and retain the preeminence national patrimony and institutions. The modern era in Nepal of the Hindu religion and an army under the continued con- began in 1950, with the overthrow of the autocratic Rana re- trol of the king (see table 2). gime by a coalition of political parties supported by newly in- As the high expectations for meaningful change turned dependent India. This action restored the authority of the Nep- to disenchantment, the Communist Party of Nepal Maoist75 alese monarchy within a constitutional framework, and ushered launched its People’s War in February 1996 to bring about the in a period of democratic politics. The distribution of power country’s “social and economic transformation.” The Maoists between Parliament and the Palace remained contested, how- drew their supporters from marginalized groups in the coun- ever, and in 1960, King Mahendra dismissed the parliament, tryside, long left out of Nepal’s political structures and lacking assumed full executive powers, and instituted the “party-less” socioeconomic opportunity. In 2006, the Maoist movement Panchayat system. Nepali nationalism was modeled after the joined with political parties to overthrow the king and create a Vulnerability to violence 91 TA B L E 2 Officer-level entry into Nepal government Security stresses and weaknesses in security service by caste/ethnic group (percentages) and justice institutions Caste/ethnicity 1984–85 1988–89 1992–93 1996–97 The Maoist movement raised a new consciousness in Nepal. Bahun-Chhetri 69.3 69.9 80.5 83.1 But the movement’s tactics—coercion, intimidation, extor- Newar 18.6 18.8 10.7 9.4 tion—left Nepali society deeply bruised. Across the country- Non-Newar Janajati a 3.0 1.6 2.5 1.7 side, Maoists set up parallel security and judicial structures, Madhesi 8.5 9.0 5.3 5.5 such as people’s courts and the People’s Liberation Army. The failure to address the crimes and human rights abuses by both Muslim 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2 sides during Nepal’s 10-year civil war (1996–2006) has resulted Dalit 0 0.5 0.4 0.1 in citizen distrust of the police, armed police, and army by sig- Source: Thapa 2010. a. Pre-Hindu conquest ethnic groupings. nificant groups in society, compounded by a lack of represen- tation of marginalized groups in leadership positions in the security forces. Nepal’s political establishment has also had to “New Nepal.” With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace manage its external relations very delicately, given its strategic Agreement in November 2006, the Maoists and the political location. The multitude of actors, competing interests, and de- parties committed themselves to a democratic transition and mands, as well as the long, porous borders between Nepal and the reform of Nepal’s traditional structures. Yet, in the years its neighbors, add to the complexity. since the signing, the elected Constituent Assembly made little Against this backdrop, insecurity in Nepal has evolved from progress, and minority groups became increasingly frustrated a Maoist insurgency to opportunistic violence and criminality. with the continuation of Kathmandu’s elite-driven politics. This sense of lawlessness is most clearly manifest in the south- In 2007, Madhesi groups across the southern Tarai belt of ern Tarai region, where the government has identified more Nepal began calling for regional autonomy through a federal than 100 violent groups and criminal gangs (the map shows Nepal, a notion that has since then gained traction. But ques- how the epicenter of violence shifted from the middle hills tions remain about the impact of ethnic federalism on national during the Maoist insurgency to criminality in the southern unity, minority protection, and administrative functioning. Tarai). M A P A The shifting epicenter of political violence in Nepal a. Violent events, 1996–99 b. Violent events, 2006–07 Percentage of the Percentage of the population living population living below poverty line: below poverty line CHINA CHINA 0–10% 0–10% Dandeldhura Dandeldhura Jumla 10–20% Jumla 10–20% Dhangarhi 20–50% Dhangarhi 20–50% > 50% Sallyan > 50% Sallyan Pokhara Pokhara Baglung Baglung Nepalganj Nepalganj KATHMANDU KATHMANDU Bhimphedi Bhairawa Bhimphedi Bhairawa Ramechhap Ramechhap Ilam Ilam Biratnagar Rajbiraj Biratnagar ACLED Data, 1996–1999 Rajbiraj ACLED Data, 2006–2007 INDIA INDIA IBRD 38417 March 2011 IBRD 38418 March 2011 Source: Raleigh and others 2010. Note: ACLED = Armed Conflict Location and Event Database. 92 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 2 Nepal: Stresses, institutions, violence, and legitimacy (continued) Economic hardship and exclusion where. Kathmandu, with an influx of rural migrants and rising energy demands, also has frequent rolling blackouts, disrupt- Nepal remains the poorest country in South Asia, with the ing economic activity. In 2008, the government had to declare exception of Afghanistan. In the mid-1990s, after decades of a nationwide power crisis, with blackouts lasting up to 16 “development,” 42 percent of Nepal’s population still lived hours a day.76 below the internationally established absolute poverty line. But this figure declined to 31 percent by 2003–04. The main driver: remittances from young men working in the Gulf, Continuing vulnerability to violence India, and Malaysia, which account for about a half of Ne- pal’s strong recent GNI growth (5.3 percent in fiscal year Despite some progress in institutional development and 2008 and 4.7 percent in fiscal year 2009). Ironically, this in- peacebuilding, Nepal remains vulnerable to different mani- crease was spurred in part by flight from the violence of the festations of violence and fragility. Table 1.1 in chapter 1 civil war. showed how multiple forms of violence co-exist in many More recently, political insecurity and extortion have fragile states. Reproducing it for Nepal reveals the following caused disinvestment in the Tarai and investor hesitancy else- (table 3). TA B L E 3 Nepal’s multiple forms of violence, 1960–present “Conventional” political violence (contests for state Transnational crime Local conflicts with Localized or subnational power or for autonomy or Localized criminal or or trafficking with transnational ideological intergroup violence independence) gang-related violence accompanying violence connections “Repressed” intergroup Clandestine opposition to the Gang-based extortion, Human trafficking Revolutionary left cross- conflicts over land, access to Panchayat regime; reactive theft, smuggling in (prostitution) from the 1960s fertilization with ”Maoists” political power imprisonment, denial of Tarai, major increase in from the 1960s Heroin transshipment from human and political rights levels of violence after Caste and ethnic exclusion the 1960s 2006 underpinning People’s War Jana Andolan I 1990 Illegal trade in timber, opium (civil war) of 1996–2006 People’s War of 1996–2006 cultivation post-2006 Regionalism and Tarai Jana Andolan II 2006 Andolan of 2007 Party-related extortion, intimidation post-2006 (activities of the Young Communist League) Source: Compiled by the WDR team. Exiting the vicious cycle elite competition that has dominated the country’s history. While there has been undeniable progress from a series of Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a broad-based more-or-less exclusive elite pacts toward a more permeable constitutional assembly was created, which has been trying to and inclusive approach to statehood, curtailing today’s lawless- create a new settlement that will divide political and economic ness and preventing further episodes of political violence re- power more equitably between Nepal’s many ethnic and caste quires the creation of broader based coalitions, transformation groups. This process represents a major attempt to broaden the of national institutions, and a process that delivers improved nature of Nepal’s polity and move it beyond the high-caste political, security, and economic outcomes to all citizens. Sources: Thapa 2010; Sharma 2008; Jha 2010. Vulnerability to violence 93 Notes 1. Ballentine and Nitzschke 2006; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007. 2. In addition, for example, there are structural factors that increase conflict risk, which include features of the physical terrain that make rebellion easier. These features do not cause war in the common sense of that word, but simply make it more possible. Mountainous terrain has been shown to in- crease risks by increasing the feasibility of rebellion. See Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006. See also Murdoch and Sandler 2004. On terrain and neigh- borhood effects, see Fearon 2010a; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Goldstone and others 2010. On the effects of neighborhood on civil wars, see Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Gleditsch 2007. 3. See Dahlberg and Krug 2002. 4. See Strassler 1996; Herz 1950; Jervis 1978. 5. Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999; Walter 1999; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999. 6. Stedman 1996; Jones 1999; Posen 1993. 7. Brown 1996; Stedman 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Horowitz 2000. On the shifting nature of na- tional identity, see Laitin 1998. 8. Kumar and Skaperdas 2009. 9. Much of this response has taken the form of critical discussion; see, for example, Nathan 2005. A particularly useful “study of studies” is Sambanis 2004, which finds that GDP per capita and political instability are the only variables that consistently predict civil war onset. Researchers looking at natu- ral resources have found mixed results—oil being most consistently associated with civil war out- break. Recent work by Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004 tied rainfall and agricultural shocks to the onset of civil war, while Besley and Persson 2009 explore the effect of international price shocks on the onset of conflict. Arnson and Zartman 2005 cover much of the core arguments in the greed versus grievance debate. 10. On horizontal inequality, see Stewart 2005; Østby 2008; and Stewart 2010. On polarization, see Este- ban and Ray 2008; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005. 11. Thinking on this topic can be traced back to Gellner 1983; recent responses to the debate include Toft 2003; Laitin 2007. 12. Brückner and Ciccone 2010 are also noteworthy in highlighting that institutions help societies to weather natural resource price shocks to avoid violence. 13. Clark and Kaufman 2011; IRIN 2010; Gettleman 2009. 14. Rubin 2002; Straus 2010. 15. See, for example, Menkhaus 2007; Lockhart and Glencorse 2010. 16. Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006. See also Mur- doch and Sandler 2004; Fearon 2010a; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Gleditsch 2007. 17. The presence of weak neighbors, rival neighbors, and refugee diasporas can play a crucial role in the emergence of transnational rebel (TNR) organizations, bargaining failure, and civil conflict; see Sale- hyan 2007. 18. See Becker 1968. 19. See Collier and Sambanis 2005, 193. Also see Garang 1987. 20. See Collier and others 2003. 21. Fearon 2010a. 22. Fearon 2010a. 23. Keefer 2008; Fearon 2010a. 24. World Bank 2006f, 10. 25. Narayan and Petesch 2010. 26. Sirleaf 2007a, 4. 27. Labor market data in developing countries are irregular and unreliable. For example, very few Sub- Saharan African countries have carried out labor force surveys. Population censuses (an important source for claims about labor force participation and unemployment rates) are commonly out of date, and often unreliable even when recent. Further, wage employment in agriculture in poor coun- tries is “invisible” in most conventional databases. See Cramer 2010. 28. Macmillan and Gartner 1999; Panda and Agarwal 2005; Jeyaseelan and others 2007; Krishnan and others 2010; Silberschmidt 1999, 2001; see Cramer 2010. 29. This is consistent with Relative Deprivation theory; see also Solow 1990; Argandoña 2001. 30. See Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman 2002a, 2002b; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002. 31. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Anyanwu 2004. 94 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 32. Berman and others 2009, 1. 33. Moser 2009, 240. 34. Gutiérrez-Sanín 2008, 22. 35. World Bank 2010m; Willmann 2010. 36. Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2002; Anyanwu 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; de Soysa 2002; Bannon and Collier 2003; McNeish 2010. 37. Ross 2003. 38. See Keefer, forthcoming. 39. Fearon 2005 argues that oil predicts civil war risk not because of its role as a source of start-up finance for rebels but, instead, because producers demonstrate relatively low state capabilities given the level of per capita income. 40. Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004. 41. Brinkman and Hendrix 2010. 42. See Besley and Persson 2010. 43. Furthermore, there is a complex relationship between motivations for and incidence of violence, as noted in Fearon and Laitin 2003. 44. Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Goldstone and others 2010. 45. These results are from the second comparison study collected by Henrich and others 2010. 46. The difficulty of studying this phenomenon is compounded by the fact that our understanding of and data sets on identity are weak; as Hegre and Sambanis have shown, slight changes in how differ- ent features of ethnicity—language groupings, affiliation measures, and so on—are operationalized in studies have major effects on findings about causality and the direction of causality (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). On how identity affiliations form, see Fearon 2006; Berman and Iannaccone 2006. 47. See Østby 2008 who defines groups alternatively by ethnicity, religion, and region, and finds a sig- nificant relation between horizontal inequalities (HIs) and the onset of violent conflict for each definition. Economic HIs are measured by average household assets and social HIs by average years of education. The effect of HIs is quite high: the probability of conflict increases threefold when comparing the expected conflict onset when all variables have average values, compared to a situa- tion where the extent of horizontal inequality of assets among ethnic groups is at the 95th percentile. In the case of inter-regional HIs, the probability of conflict increases 2.5 times as HIs rise from the mean value to the 95th percentile value. See also Stewart 2010. 48. Stewart 2010. 49. Gurr 1968; Herbst 2000; Stewart 2010; Strom and MacDonald 2007. 50. The data on political prisoners and extra-judicial killings were obtained from the Cignarelli and Richards Human Rights data set (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). Each indicator is coded from 0 to 2, with 0 denoting large/significant degrees of human rights abuses and 2 denoting no abuses. 51. Walter 2010, 21. 52. See Gurr 1968; Herbst 2000; Stewart 2010; Strom and MacDonald 2007; Brown 1996; Stedman 1996. On recent quantitative literature on this topic, see Bhavnani and Miodownik 2009. See also Abbink and Herrmann 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Sambanis 2001. 53. Langer 2005; Stewart 2010. 54. De Silva 2005. 55. Barron and others 2010. 56. Qualitative and case study literature as well as WDR input from national officials and leaders consis- tently highlight political injustice, social exclusion, and inequity between social groups as key corre- lates of conflict. Among the many qualitative and case-based studies, see, for example, Heraclides 1990; Murshed and Gates 2006; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006. On measurement difficulties, see Laitin 2000; Cramer 2002; Posner 2004. 57. See Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman 2002a, 2002b; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002. 58. Pape 2003; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Abadie 2006. 59. Stern 2003. 60. Atran 2003; Berrebi 2007. 61. Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Hassan 2001; Kimhi and Even 2004. 62. Smith 2004; Wright-Neville 2004. 63. World Bank and ADB 2010; also WDR team consultations with government officials and representa- tives from donor community, multilateral organizations, and civil society in Pakistan, 2010. See also Abbas 2008, 2010. 64. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Goldstone and others 2010. Vulnerability to violence 95 65. See Fearon 2010a; Walter 2010; Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010. A range of indicators can be used to measure governance and institutional capacity. The Users’ Guide on Measuring Fragility pro- vides an excellent contemporary stocktaking of the literature and concepts (Mata and Ziaja 2009). The World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores are prepared internally and are publicly available for International Development Association (IDA) countries for the years 2005 to present. The World Bank has recently undertaken an annual harmonizing exercise to align the definitions of fragility with regional development banks (the Asian Development Bank and the African Development Bank). Other well-known measures of governance and quality of institutions include the Worldwide Governance Indicators measures of government and the International Coun- try Risk Guide (ICRG) measures compiled by the PRS Group. The Worldwide Governance Indica- tors are an index comprising multiple sources, whereas the ICRG measures are expert assessments on multiple dimensions of political, economic, and financial risk. It locates three common attributes of states, “legitimacy, authority, and effectiveness,” among a variety of indexes and definitions of fragil- ity and compares the results across indices. See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010b. There is a blurred line in the indicators between the measurement of governance outcomes (actual levels of representation and participation, accountability for decisions and for illegal actions, and corruption and human rights abuses) and institutional characteristics (whether there are systems and capacities that regulate state-society relations within the rule of law, provide for prosecution of abuses, and so forth). Most governance indicators actually measure both: whether a system is in place (for example, a constitution or anti-corruption law, government policy on equitable service provision) as well as some measurement, often imperfect, of whether these systems deliver good governance outcomes in practice (low corruption levels, free and fair elections, avoidance of impunity for human rights abuses, and so on). 66. See Stedman 1996; Brown 1996; Posen 1993; Snyder 2000; Goldstone and Ulfelder 2004; Goldstone and others 2010; Besley and Persson 2009, 2010. 67. State legitimacy is tied to agreed rules and processes that promote accountability to its citizens, whether through participation or through patronage. Patronage is particularly pervasive in fragile situations where state capacity is weak; yet, it can also weaken state legitimacy if seen as unfair and reinforcing horizontal inequalities (OECD 2010g, 2011). Shared beliefs are essential to link the state and its society in constructive ways (Bellina and others 2009); for example, elections only become more than a formal tool to collect opinion when there is a common and entrenched belief that they express the “will of the people.” Together with collective identities and religion, “tradition” is a very important way to “ground” state legitimacy (Clements 2010). These sources of legitimacy do not exist in isolation: improving service delivery does not necessarily increase state legitimacy if the other elements are missing. State legitimacy results from a combination of these sources and may take various forms, depending on context. 68. The development community’s focus on fragility is related to pioneering work undertaken by Paul Collier and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala under the Low Income Countries Under Stress initiative. The pol- icy implications of this original work were extensively elaborated by INCAF, an organization within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD, as well as by the UN and various bilaterals, most notably the U.K.’s DFID (Department for International Development). INCAF has produced innovative thinking on security system reform, service delivery in fragile situations, the legitimacy of the state, and the role of donors. The United Nations identified the need for institution-building for a more secure and developed world at an early stage, particularly in the fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. New thinking on fragility and state-building has received significant support from research funded by DFID over the past 10 years; for a synthesis, see Garassi 2010. 69. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009. 70. The current CPIA cutoff was normalized by year to account for the changing methodology in CPIA over time. 71. For further discussion on measurements of governance, institutions, and fragility, see Mata and Ziaja 2009. 72. See North 1990; Williamson 1985; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004. 73. Maynard 1997. 74. The high-class group of Bahun-Chhetri constitutes 28 percent of Nepal’s population. 75. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was renamed Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or UCPN (Maoist), following its merger in January 2009 with the Communist Party of Nepal–Unity Centre (Masal). 76. Sharma 2008. PART 2 Lessons from National and International Responses T his chapter sets out the Report’s framework for how countries escape the vicious cycle of fragility and move toward a virtu- ous cycle of confidence-building and institutional transfor- mation, especially in the areas of citizen security, justice, and jobs. The framework is presented as an expanding spiral because these processes repeat over time as countries enter and exit multiple transition moments. Even as one set of immediate priorities is resolved, other risks emerge and require a repeated cycle of action to bolster institutional resilience. This process takes at least a generation. Societies undertaking this endeavor face a legacy of pervasive and enduring mistrust, which makes collective action to address challenges or provide public goods so difficult. Outsiders cannot restore confidence and transform institutions for countries because these processes are domestic and must be nationally led. But to help countries restore peace and reduce regional and global instability, international actors can provide external support and incentives and help reduce external stresses. EXTERNAL STRESS RE S CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS CHAPTER 3 TO TRANSFORMING RING CON RE FID S TO ENCE TRANSFORMIN RING CON IN RE S ST FID TU TO TRANSFORMING I R TI E NCE I NG ON GI CON S NS FID IT T UT E NC E IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions Why transforming institutions war, not internal violence. Today’s middle- is so difficult and low-income countries affected by in- ternal violence face greater challenges—for C hanges in power relations and three key reasons. First, launching an initial contests around them are a con- agreement on change is hard because elites stant feature of all societies. There do not trust each other and few people trust is nothing unusual about intense the state. Second, maintaining an agreement social confrontation during the transforma- is difficult because institutional change can tion of institutions, which normally involves increase the risks of violence in the short changes in the distribution of power and term, due to political backlash from groups wealth. Such contests do not end at some that lose power or economic benefits. Third, point in a society’s development. U.S. gov- countries do not exist in isolation: during ernment support for private banks and fragile periods of institutional transforma- greater state involvement in health care pro- tion, they may face external security threats vision have stirred fierce controversy, as have or economic shocks that can overwhelm the recent transformations in public sector progress. These challenges are difficult to functions caused by the impact of the finan- overcome when physical, institutional, and cial crisis in Europe. In other words, change is human capital is relatively low. contested and painful in all circumstances. But some societies can accomplish change in The challenge of low trust and rising the national interest, even when this involves expectations temporary losses for some groups. Other so- cieties find this more difficult. Launching an initial transition in fragile sit- What makes institutional transformation uations is difficult because of low trust and particularly difficult for states affected by vi- low capacity to deliver on promises.1 Mis- olence? Many countries that recovered from trust is much more pervasive in violence- war in the mid-20th century, including most affected countries than in those with a long of Europe and Japan, transformed their insti- history of a reasonably stable social compact tutions quickly and smoothly. But they had a between state and citizen. This makes many long history of national institutional devel- forms of cooperation difficult, including opment and high levels of physical and hu- measures to address the stresses triggering man capital—and they had faced an external violence in the first place. When there is 100 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 3.1 Unrealistic expectations in fragile states are hurdles to progress The impact of a legacy of mistrust in violence-affected countries A legacy of mistrust can mean that key actors do not respond as hoped to new political signals or new public programs. Consider Afghanistan, where citizens need to calculate the risks of siding either with the Taliban or with the government and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)—or with neither. In making these decisions, individuals consider what they think others are likely to do. The thinking process might go like this: “The consequences of my decision to provide the authorities with information on the Taliban depend on what others around me are going to do. If my neighbors won’t cooperate, the authorities are going to lose control, and I’d be crazy to help them. So, even though I do not support the Taliban, I’m better off helping them.” The same could apply to providing information on drug traffickers.2 All institutional change requires the coordinated actions of many people. That is why small events that change the beliefs about what others will do can evoke big changes in the choices each individual makes. A single, but widely publicized, government humilia- tion in combat operations, for example, can translate into a major loss of popular support. A single, but widely publicized, incident of corruption can evoke big changes in expectations and in political and economic behavior. Expectations and trust in fragile states and in non-fragile states Analysis of 280 country surveys in Latin America and Africa shows a significant difference in citizen trust in fragile and non-fragile states. The results reveal that countries that are not fragile or affected by conflict have significantly higher levels of trust in the police, the justice system, and the parliament. This is consistent with recent research that explores cross-country differences in trusting neigh- bors and governments. In simple terms, people’s expectations are often wrong about the future in fragile states. A simple cross-country regression using data on expectations of economic improvements and actual economic growth suggests that, in non-fragile states, peoples’ expecta- tions of the direction the economy will take in the next 12 months has a significant correlation with actual outcomes.3 But in fragile states, there is no such correlation: responses to the survey question, “will economic prospects improve in the next 12 months?” bear no relationship to what subsequently happens in the economy. This is important, because all rational expectations theory in econom- ics and political science—and the policy decisions linked to it—assume that people have a reasonably informed ability to make judg- ments about the future. The low trust in government institutions in fragile and conflict-affected countries poses a formidable constraint to leaders trying to launch positive change. To further complicate the situation, operational experience and input from national policymakers highlight a second, quite different version of the expectations problem, that is, the excessively high popular expectations that arise in moments of political hope and transition. Governments repeatedly encounter this: signing a peace agreement or a donor pledge conference can create a wave of enthusiasm and the expectation that rapid change will follow. When the bubble bursts, as it usually does, govern- ments can experience a rapid loss of credibility. If policy makers understand these dynamics, they can harness public enthusiasm for change to their advantage by crafting signals in ways that conform to expectations (chapter 4). Where mistrust is high, they have to take actions that send very strong signals—sig- nals that are self-evidently costly, such as integrating former rebels into the national army structure, as in Burundi, or guaranteeing long-term employment to former adversaries, as in South Africa through the “sunset clause” offered to white civil servants. They also have to find ways to make promises binding, often using third parties as guarantors. Sources: Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Hoff and Stiglitz 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Schelling 1971, 1978; Axelrod 1984; Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, forthcoming. Note: Differences in trust and expectations between fragile and non-fragile states reported here were statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These differences were significant whether non-fragile was defined as CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) greater than 3.2 or CPIA greater than 3.8. no convincing track record of progress and require strong signals of real change. Yet the information is poor, individuals can easily capacity to deliver change is weak in most so- have expectations that are either too low cieties that score low on governance indica- (they are unresponsive to positive signals of tors.4 A further reason for failure in reform is change)—or too high (they hold unrealistic the “premature load-bearing” of institutions: expectations and are easily disappointed) too many demands and expectations are (see box 3.1). placed on them in a short period. When they Low institutional capacity to deliver fur- do not deliver, there is a loss of confidence ther reduces trust. Low-trust environments and legitimacy (see box 3.2). From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 101 The process of reform itself may carry short-term security risks. Research suggests B OX 3 . 2 Premature load-bearing that a shift from authoritarian rule toward Public policy (or program) implementation involves agents taking action with a democracy is associated with a higher risk particular set of standards. Tax implementation, for example, involves the collec- of civil war and an increase in criminal vio- tion of taxes (sales, income, dutiable import, property valuation, and so on) lence.5 Taking on too many reforms too fast— according to rules for assessing the amount due. Procurement involves assessing such as decentralizing services and combating bids according to stipulated procedures, followed by contract awards. Premature load-bearing can occur during a reform process when there is a large divergence insurgents or traffickers—can risk backlash between what is in the agents’ best interest and what they are supposed to do. and institutional loss of credibility. Rapid re- For example, in implementing a revised customs code, if the tariff is very forms make it difficult for actors in the post- high, the importer may offer the customs officer a side payment to avoid (or conflict society to make credible commit- reduce) what is owed. Higher tariffs entail greater pressure on the system: but so do complex tariff codes with exemptions based on intended use. In Kenya and ments with each other, since they do not know Pakistan the collected tariff rate increased with the official tariff (not one for one, how the reforms will affect the “balance of but it did increase) up to around 60 percent, after which the collected rate power.” Elections, often seen as “winner takes stopped increasing. After that point, further increases in the tariff just increased all” events in fragile states, can evoke powerful the discrepancy between the official rate and the collected rate. As the tariff rate increases, the amount importers would pay to evade the tariff increases too, so reactions from those who lose.6 And if disad- the temptation for customs officers to deviate also increases. In other words, vantaged groups or regions are empowered complexity and its ambiguity make collusion with importers easier. In this case a by reform, existing power-holders must lose low and uniform tax would create less organizational stress. some power as a result. Economic restructur- These same considerations apply across the range of state activities, from ing changes the balance of economic access policing to justice and to public financial management and education. Different tasks create different organizational load-bearing pressures and different and opportunity. Anti-corruption efforts at- inducements to deviate from organizational standards. When those pressures tack entrenched interests, sometimes very overwhelm capacity and incentives are not aligned, systems fail. powerful ones. The point here is not that it is Systems often fail when stress is placed on individual components. Pressure wrong to attempt such reform: instead it is to can sometimes cause a nonlinear degradation in performance. In many organi- zational situations where one agent’s performance depends on many other be aware of the risks—and to adapt the de- agents around them, modest amounts of stress can bring about total collapse. sign of reforms accordingly, to ensure that the An example is the Chad College, established to enhance government account- state can deliver on promises.7 ability in the use of proceeds from newly discovered oil. The mechanism relied A history of recent violence sharpens this heavily on local civil society to secure, evaluate, and provide opinions on gov- ernment funding allocations out of the oil revenues—a formula that works well dilemma. In societies that lack effective secu- in environments where civil society has high capacity, and where a tradition of rity and rule of law, potential reformers may government openness and accountability to citizens has been established. well perceive that reforms will put their lives Under stress, however, the civil society groups could not hold government to at risk and cause them to postpone or avoid account, and the mechanism collapsed. change. In the 1983–93 “narco-terrorist” Sources: Pritchett and de Weijer 2010; Kaplan 2008; Lund 2010. period in Colombia, the Cali and Medellín drug cartels ordered an estimated 3,500 as- sassinations of presidential candidates, poli- ticians, judicial officers, and government of- The challenge of vulnerability to ficials seen to oppose them.8 For those who external stress need protection, legacies of violence can un- dermine their belief in the efficacy of the state Countries with weak institutions are dispro- and weaken their willingness to support re- portionately vulnerable to external shocks. form. For those considering violence, the Severe external shocks can overwhelm even possibility of impunity can reinforce their fairly strong institutions: witness the incipi- willingness to use violent means.9 A potent ent social unrest in 2010 in many parts of Eu- illustration of how reforms can evoke vio- rope as a result of austerity measures to con- lence is the transitional experience of the tain the global financial crisis, or the assaults former Soviet Union, where homicide rates on governance from shifting patterns in soared as the state undertook wide-ranging global drug trafficking. When institutions are reforms (see box 3.3). both well-developed and reasonably static— 102 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 3 .3 Violence can increase during fast institutional transformations The late 1980s witnessed major economic reform in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika initiatives. Among the consequences were severe unemployment, the virtual collapse of a previously comprehensive social welfare regime, and a sharp contraction of many public services. This was followed by the breakup of the Soviet Union into independent republics and the introduction of multiparty politics. A rise in homicides accompanied this period of turbulence, peaking in 1993 at 18 per 100,000 population and again in 2001 at 20 per 100,000 (see figure). With reforms beginning to pay dividends by the 2000s, social instability subsided and homicides began to fall. Homicides in turbulent times: The Soviet Union Homicide rates increased in Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rapid reforms during the 1990s. This phenomenon was not unique to Russia: nearly every former Soviet country had homicides increase in the early 1990s. a. Homicide rates in Russia, 1986–2008 25 Homicides (per 100,000 population) 20 15 10 5 0 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Period of reform Lowest smoothed curved for homicides b. Homicide rates in former Soviet republics, 1990–2000 25 Homicides (per 100,000 population) 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Armenia Kyrgyz Republic Ukraine Azerbaijan Lithuania Uzbekistan Belarus Latvia f all Average for Estonia Moldova former Soviet republics Georgia T istan Tajik (excludes Russia) Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Most former Soviet republics experienced a spike in homicides following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with notable peaks in Estonia (20 in 1994), Georgia (17 in 1993), Kazakhstan (17 in 1996), and Tajiki- stan (21 in 1993). In every country except Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, homicides increased between 1990 and 1994, followed by a decline, though the average homicide rate in 2000 remained above the level of 1990, and only a few countries had lower homicide rates at the end of the decade. Sources: The PRS Group 2010; World Bank 2010n; WDR team calculations. From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 103 as in the OECD (Oranisation for Economic researched, and this Report has only some of Co-operation and Development) countries— the answers. The framework below suggests external shocks can be absorbed, but even some fundamental differences between fragile then, they will affect reform plans. Chapter 2 and violent situations and stable developing showed that fragile countries experienced environments.12 The first is the need to re- more food protests, and more violence dur- store confidence in collective action before ing food protests, than non-fragile countries embarking on wider institutional transforma- during recent food price crises. Likewise, re- tion. Second is the priority of transforming cent research suggests that the impact of nat- institutions that provide citizen security,13 ural disasters is more pronounced in fragile justice, and jobs. Third is the role of regional states.10 Not only are fragile countries more and international action to reduce external vulnerable to the effects of disasters, but di- stresses. Fourth is the specialized nature of sasters and external shocks can interrupt in- external support needed (figure 3.1). stitutional transformation, as was the case in The framework is not meant to be a promising sectors after Haiti’s devastating “grand theory” of violence, nor is it the only earthquake in early 2010.11 way to understand violence prevention. It builds, however, from the research described in chapters 1 and 2 and a review of country Escaping violence, developing experience, and provides a useful organizing resilience framework for action. First, it provides a sys- tematic way of thinking about what can be Given the difficulties, how have countries es- done to prevent violence—and the recur- caped from violence and achieved institu- rence of violence over time. Indeed, the ques- tional resilience? These pathways are under- tion of most relevance to national reformers F I G U R E 3.1 WDR Framework: Repeated cycles of action to bolster institutional resilience The WDR framework is presented as an ever-expanding spiral because these processes repeat over time as countries go through multiple transitions. Even as one set of immediate priorities is resolved, other risks and transition moments emerge and require a repeated cycle of action to bolster institutional resiliency. The arrow below the spiral illustrates that external support and incentives can help this nationally led process, and the arrow above it illustrates how external stresses can derail it. CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO TRANSFORMING RING CON RE FID S TO ENCE TRANSFORMIN RING CON IN RE S ST FID TU TO TRANSFORMING I R TI E NCE I NG ON GI CON S NS FID IT T UT E NC E IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Source: WDR team. 104 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 and international agencies—and the one that collaborate until they believe that a positive an institutional emphasis puts front and cen- outcome is possible. Chapter 4 examines ter—is in practical terms, “what can we do to country-level experiences of three mecha- prevent violence?” Second, the framework is nisms to restore the confidence of key stake- compatible with the theories of violence in holders in fragile and violent situations: different disciplines (box 3.4). Third, by fo- • Developing collaborative, “inclusive cusing on the challenges in moving from cri- enough” coalitions. To bridge problems sis management to security, justice, and eco- of low trust between societal groups and nomic institutional transformation, it brings between the state and society, we examine together the thinking of local, national, and the role that coalitions involving a broad international actors as well as political, secu- range of stakeholders have played in rity, and development agencies. successful exits from violence—whether The framework suggests that institutional government-led alliances in support of se- transformation and good governance, which curity and development actions or negoti- are important in development generally, ated agreements between parties to a con- work differently in fragile situations. The flict. Inclusion can embed strong political goal is more focused—transforming institu- economy incentives. It brings benefits to tions that are directly important to the pre- leaders—by providing support and re- vention of repeated cycles of violence. The sources from key stakeholder groups and dynamics of institutional change are also ensuring that individual leaders or parties different. A good analogy is a financial crisis do not take all the blame for unpopular de- caused by a combination of external stresses cisions.15 It can also signal change and pro- and historic weaknesses in institutional vide incentives for reform if parties respon- checks and balances. In such a situation, ex- sible for abuses are excluded. An inclusive ceptional efforts are needed to restore confi- approach can also carry longer-term politi- dence in national leaders’ ability to manage cal economy benefits, by creating pressure the crisis—through actions that signal a real break with the past, and through locking in for continuing change, avoiding narrow these actions and showing that they will not and persistent elite captures of the state. be reversed. To prevent the crisis recurring, • Using signals and commitment mecha- concerted action will also be needed to ad- nisms to build support. Without strong dress the underlying institutional and gover- signals of a break with the past and ways nance weaknesses that precipitated it—but to reassure stakeholders that the new di- without a restoration of confidence among rection will be sustained, developing co- both national and international stakeholders, alitions of support for change can be dif- ficult. Leaders need ways to find the right these reforms will not be possible. signals to galvanize support—signals that have been successful in different country Restoring confidence and transforming contexts are examined. When trust in institutions announcements on future policy is low, leaders also need mechanisms to lock The framework therefore argues that confi- promises in and persuade people that they dence-building—a concept used in political will not be reversed—called “commit- mediation and financial crises but rarely in ment mechanisms” by economists and development circles14—is a prelude to more political scientists. We consider the type permanent institutional change in the face of of commitment mechanisms that have violence. Why apply this to the challenges of been useful in the face of risks of repeated fragility and violence? Because the low trust cycles of violence. caused by repeated cycles of violence means • Delivering early results. Expectations that stakeholders who need to contribute po- from government policy announcements litical, financial, or technical support will not alone will likely be insufficient to persuade From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 105 B OX 3.4 The WDR framework and theories of violence prevention Paul Collier in Breaking the Conflict Trap and The Bottom Billion, and Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast in Violence and Social Orders have been among the most influential theorists of the links among conflict, violence, and development. North, Wallis, and Weingast describe three “doorstep conditions” for fragile countries to move toward long-term institutional violence prevention: • Ensuring the rule of law, particularly over property issues, for elites • Creating a “perpetual state” in the constitutionality of transfer of power and the ability of state commit- ments to bind successor leaders • Consolidating control over the military. Their framework provides a perceptive analysis of national development dynamics but does not explicitly address international stresses on states, international assistance, or the influence of international norms and standards. Collier’s work, by contrast, focuses less on domestic political dynamics and more on low income, cor- ruption, and natural resource rents. He explicitly considers external security guarantees and international standards for resource extraction. This Report brings together these strands of thinking and adds analysis that both supports earlier hypotheses and provides new questions for further research. It uses quantitative techniques to confirm that institutions matter for violence prevention. It brings this together with other work from economics, political, and social science on how institutional transformations take place. And it adds some concepts and examples from country case studies and regional and country consultations to flesh out understand- ing of these transitions. Chapter 2 provided empirical analysis of the importance of institutions for long-term violence preven- tion. It supports the theories of economists and political scientists who have focused on institutions, such as Collier; Fearon and Laitin; and North, Wallis, and Weingast. Interestingly, it provides some initial evi- dence not only that very highly developed countries defined by North and colleagues as “open access orders” have lower rates of violence, but also that institutions and good governance outcomes matter at much lower levels of development. Institutions matter for preventing criminal violence and organized crime as well as for preventing political conflict. This chapter focuses on practical lessons that can be applied in extreme conditions of insecurity and weak institutions. It expands on existing work in three ways: • Why institutional reforms are so difficult. The chapter draws upon scholars such as Acemoglu and Robinson, Fearon, and Laitin; Keefer, Weingast and others who have studied early transition periods to describe why the political economy of institutional reform in insecure environments is so difficult, and why so many reform efforts therefore fail. • What it takes to make institutional reforms happen. The chapter uses country case studies and inputs from national reformers to look at how countries in outright crises have restored confidence, and how countries with ongoing insecurity and weak legitimacy, capacity, and accountability have transformed their institutions in the longer term. This work builds on North and colleagues’ analysis of the pathways to move to broader institutional transformation, prevent violence from recurring, and lay the basis for longer-term development—but it focuses on earlier periods of transition in very insecure environ- ments. In so doing, it moves beyond most existing theories by explicitly considering how external stresses and external assistance can affect these processes. • Understanding that transformations take time and adopting appropriate institutional models is critical. The chapter adds empirical measures of how long these transformations take, even for the countries that made the fastest transitions in the late 20th century, and considers what can accelerate them. It also adds an important qualifier to “institutions matter for violence prevention” by arguing that this does not mean convergence toward Western institutional models. Societies that prevent violence from recurring have designed solutions based on their own history and context—and have created or adapted rather than simply copied institutions from other countries. The rest of this chapter elaborates the arguments in each of these areas. Chapters 4–9 then show how countries can restore confidence and transform institutions—and how international support can help them do so. Sources: Collier and others 2003; Collier 2007; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Weingast 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Keefer 2008. 106 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 stakeholders that a positive outcome is form efforts, there is a tendency to tackle possible due to credibility issues described everything at once, and immediately. We above. Delivering early tangible results in explore early efforts that have proven suc- areas that reflect the priorities of key cessful in reforming institutions that stakeholder groups and the broader citi- directly address the correlates of vio- zenry is vital. We look at the mecha- lence—security, justice, and economic nisms countries have used to deliver early, stresses—and which reform areas have confidence-building results, including generally been addressed more gradually. results that span the security, justice, and economic domains, and the use of com- • Using and exiting “best-fit” reform ap- bined state, community, private sector, proaches. The record of backlash against and civil society capacities to deliver. change described above argues that re- forms of institutions in fragile contexts Confidence-building is not an end in itself. need to be adapted to the political context Institutional reforms to deliver security and rather than be technically perfect. We ex- check the power of those in government are plore the extent to which countries that necessary to prevent a reversion to the vicious have become resilient to violence have cycle of narrow elite pacts and recurring vio- often used unorthodox, “best-fit” reform lence (chapter 2). For this to happen, person- approaches that allow for flexibility and alized leadership has to shift toward more innovation—public support for employ- permanent, depersonalized institutional ca- ment; non-electoral consultative mecha- pacity and accountability. Unless confidence- nisms; combinations of state, private building signals and early results are linked sector, faith-based, traditional, and com- to the development of more legitimate, ac- munity structures for service delivery, for countable, and capable institutions, coun- example (see box 3.5). tries remain acutely vulnerable to violence. In chapter 5, we explore two mechanisms for Marshaling external support and sustained institutional transformation: resisting external stresses • Devoting early attention to the reform of Building resilience to violence and fragility institutions that provide citizen security, is a nationally owned process, but external justice, and jobs. The interlink between se- support and incentives and external stresses curity and development has been debated can contribute to progress or to backsliding. under the notion of human security, which Outsiders cannot restore confidence and encompasses freedom from fear, freedom transform institutions—these processes are from want, and freedom to live in dignity. domestic and have to be nationally led. But to By putting the security and prosperity of help countries restore normalcy and reduce human beings at the center, human secu- regional and global instability, international rity addresses a wide range of threats, both actors can offer the following: from poverty and from violence, and their interactions. While acknowledging the im- • Providing effective external support and portance of human security and its em- incentives. Some countries have restored phasis on placing people at the center of confidence and transformed institutions focus, this Report uses the term “citizen se- using only their own financial and tech- curity” more often to sharpen our focus nical resources, but most have drawn on more on freedom from physical violence diplomatic, security, and development and freedom from fear of violence. The assistance from outside. External action hope is to complement the discussion on can help by building trust through exter- the aspect of freedom from fear in the hu- nal commitment mechanisms; delivering man security concept.16 In institutional re- quick results that reinforce government From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 107 B OX 3.5 “Best-fit” reforms What do we mean by “best-fit” reforms? Because of the risks of political backlash and premature overload- ing described earlier, in conditions of imperfect security and weak institutions, “best-practice” technocratic reform options may not work. Less orthodox approaches that are best-fit in the context of imperfect secu- rity, institutional capacity, and competitive markets can work better—but may have “second best” implica- tions that need to be managed.17 Consider the following five examples: • A country wants to legitimize the formation of a government and a new reform direction through an election, but insecurity still rages over most of the territory, many voters cannot get to the polls, and polling and vote-counting cannot be monitored. Non-electoral representative mechanisms, where per- ceived by citizens to provide genuine voice and accountability, can be used in the short term, but in the medium term, they will require renewed legitimization. • A country has 20–30 percent unemployment, criminal gangs recruiting from its youth population, and an economy structurally underinvested in areas of its comparative advantage. In the short term, pub- licly subsidized employment may be the best-fit option, but in the longer term, an exit pathway to for- mal employment in the private sector will be needed. • A country needs electricity for the economy to recover, but insurgents have the capability to attack large generation and distribution facilities. Medium-size generators may cost more but may be the best- fit option in the short term. In the longer term, the country may need to exit to a lower-cost solution. • A country wants to divert public spending to education and infrastructure, but has a large standing army and a rebel army in place. In the short term, integrating these forces and paying their salary costs may be the best-fit option, but in the longer term, the force may need to be downsized and professionalized. • A country has tens of thousands of people accused of past human rights violations, but its formal jus- tice system can process only 200 cases a year. A community-based process may be the best-fit option, but the formal justice system will still need to be built, with redress for families inadequately dealt with in the initial process. Source: WDR team. legitimacy; supporting institutional trans- one country does not simply push prob- formation with flexible approaches that lems to neighboring countries. respect best-fit reform options; applying realistic timelines for institutional prog- Doing it again—and again, and in ress; and providing incentives to reward different types of transition responsible governance and to sanction failing leadership. Just as violence repeats, efforts to build con- fidence and transform institutions typi- • Diminishing external stresses on fragile cally follow a repeated spiral. Countries that states. Reducing external stress includes action to contain the adverse impact of moved away from fragility and conflict often illegal trafficking, international corrup- did so not through one decisive “make or tion, and money laundering—and pro- break” moment—but through many transi- tecting countries against economic shocks. tion moments, as the spiral path in figure 3.1 Some of these challenges are beyond the illustrates. National leaders had to build con- control of individual states. Analyzing the fidence in the state and to transform institu- strengths and weakness of regional and tions over time, as with the Republic of Ko- global initiatives can ensure that national rea’s transitions in the security, political, and reform efforts are not overwhelmed by economic spheres, which included repeated new pressures and that successful action in internal contests over the norms and gover- 108 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 nance of postwar society.18 A repeated pro- Do not expect too much, too soon cess enables space for collaborative norms and capacities to develop, and for success The passage of time permits the development to build on successes in a virtuous cycle. of an institution’s identity and the shared val- For each loop of the spiral the same two ues that support it. And repeated successes in phases recur: building confidence that posi- delivery by an institution both reinforce in- tive chance is possible, prior to deepening the ternal morale and build credibility in the eyes institutional transformation and strengthen- of the public. To make reasoned judgments ing governance outcomes. about time frames, it is important to have Transitions out of fragility and repeated historical reference points. One approach is cycles of violence occur through preventive to ask how long it took today’s high- or actions as well as post-conflict recovery. The middle-income societies to achieve current South African transition was not a classic institutional attainment levels. A comparison post–civil war transition: while low-level civil between the most and the least developed and political violence existed, leaders took societies is unhelpful: in 1700, for example, preventive action before the country suc- the Netherlands already had a real per capita cumbed to outright civil war (feature 3). This GDP higher than that of the poorest 45 coun- is not unusual: two-thirds of the societies tries today.22 A more useful approach is to exiting fragility in the last 20 years did so with- compare current rates of institutional devel- out a major civil war.19 Some opportunities opment among today’s fragile states against arose when incumbent leaders recognized the rates of more recent “transformers.” need for change and created the conditions to Historically, the fastest transformations make change happen—as in Ghana in 2003, have taken a generation. Well-known institu- where a potential conflict over succession tional indices are relevant to reducing the rights between two clans in the north was risk of violence—the rule of law, corruption, avoided.20 Other opportunities arose from human rights, democratic governance, bu- mass protests or social action, as in Benin in reaucratic quality, oversight of the security 1990, where a popular movement precipitated sectors, and equity for the disadvantaged.23 a national conference that led to a new consti- How much time has it taken to move from tution, multiparty elections, and the end of 17 current average levels in fragile states around years of autocratic rule.21 Multiple transi- the world to a threshold of “good enough tions have also been the general pattern in governance”? The results are striking. It took middle-income countries emerging from au- the 20 fastest-moving countries an average of thoritarian rule, such as Argentina and Chile. 17 years to get the military out of politics, 20 Even the worst natural disasters can pro- years to achieve functioning bureaucratic vide opportunities for transitions from con- quality, and 27 years to bring corruption un- flict and fragility: although movements to der reasonable control (box 3.6). This did negotiate a settlement between the Indone- not mean perfection, but rather adequacy. sian government and the Free Aceh Move- Nor should these targets be considered easy ment (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) began just benchmarks for most of today’s fragile and before the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean violence-affected countries, since the “fast- tsunami, the resulting humanitarian crisis est transformers” described above often had and massive reconstruction effort created more favorable starting conditions than to- common ground, as both sides turned to day’s fragile states. Portugal and the Republic helping survivors and rebuilding Aceh. While of Korea are among the fastest institutional countries can remain in a vicious cycle of se- transformers of the 20th century, but both vere violence for long periods, there are many started their transformations with a founda- opportunities for key participants to recog- tion of extensive state institutional experi- nize that change is in their self-interest. ence, and with literacy rates far higher than From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 109 B OX 3.6 Fastest progress in institutional transformation—An estimate of realistic ranges The table shows the historical range of timings that the fastest reformers in the 20th century took to achieve basic governance transformations. Scenarios for dimensions of “state capability” Years to threshold at pace of: Indicator Fastest 20 Fastest over the threshold Bureaucratic quality (0–4) 20 12 Corruption (0–6) 27 14 Military in politics (0–6) 17 10 Government effectiveness 36 13 Control of corruption 27 16 Rule of law 41 17 Source: Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. Note: Calculations are based on International Country Risk Guide indicators that ranked countries on a 0–4 scale over the period 1985–2009. The column “fastest 20” shows the average number of years the fastest 20 performers have taken to reach the threshold, and the second column shows the time it took the fastest ever country to achieve a threshold indicator score. those in, say, the Democratic Republic of regional norms are dealt with in more de- Congo or Haiti today.24 tail in chapter 6.25 The track record of institutional transfor- • Second, new technologies support grow- mations indicates that they have been getting ing demands for good governance. People faster over time: modern transformations today have much easier access to infor- can be contrasted with the 100+ years com- mation on what others think (including mon in previous centuries. Three interna- others across the world), and this makes tional trends may plausibly support a “virtu- it far harder for governments to ignore ous spiral” for faster transformations: the interests of their broad masses.26 Vid- • First, states do not operate in isolation eos of events at the end of the Soviet era from each other or the global system. showed citizen movements from Nepal to Modern states are part of an international Romania what could be achieved through system that confers certain benefits and mass protest, while recent revolutions27 requires specific behaviors. Today these have exploited the newer personal com- behaviors include helping to maintain in- munication technologies, such as the so- terstate security (by not threatening other called Twitter revolution in Moldova, and states, for example, and by observing the role of social media in the Middle “rules of warfare”), upholding interna- East and North Africa.28 States do some- tional law, and abiding by treaty obliga- times reject citizen demands, but the tions—and behaving at home in ways price they pay today tends to be higher, consistent with international norms (by measured in repression, economic stag- protecting human rights and eschewing nation, and international isolation. The corruption or unconstitutional changes spread of new technologies reinforces in government, for instance). Global and the circulation of international principles 110 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 and the benchmarking of government macy. In the Democratic Republic of performance by citizens and civil society Congo, transitional payments were made organizations. This, and the organiza- to over 100,000 ex-combatants via cell tional capabilities embodied in new tech- phone since 2004, and citizen surveys have nology, has a huge impact on people’s been conducted using SMS (short message ability to put pressure on their state in- service).31 Such services would have been stitutions (as in the Islamic Republic of costly and inefficient across a vast territory Iran in 2009).29 But the expansion of with little infrastructure before the advent communications channels can cut either of technological change. way. For example, in early 2008 in Kenya, Wishful thinking on timing pervades de- following the contested December 2007 velopment assistance when it comes to gov- elections, mobile phones played a dual ernance and institution building. In part it role of encouraging violence and pre- derives from the desire to meet international venting its spread.30 norms quickly, which is understandable: hu- • Third, new technologies also create possi- man rights abuses and gross corruption are bilities for improving service delivery, even abhorrent. But goals are then set that require in the most fragile situations. Technolo- state capability, sometimes without consider- gies that enable communication between ing whether the capability exists, and some- citizen groups within and across countries times under the presumption that it can be can help governments accelerate the type created quickly (given resources and “politi- of institutional transformation that im- cal will”). This is mistaken. Even the Republic proves performance and process legiti- of Korea, which had the resources and politi- cal will (and a higher level of human capital than many fragile states today), took a gen- BOX 3.7 Optimism or wishful thinking? eration to make these changes.32 No country today is likely to be able to make it in three to Haiti at the end of 2009 had made considerable advances in restoring security five years, the typical timeline of national and better governance in the wake of the 2004 crisis following the removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Security had been restored in urban areas. leadership and the international community Trust in government institutions, including the police, had risen. Basic public (box 3.7). finance functions were functioning. And considerable humanitarian and com- munity services and small reconstruction projects had been launched. Before the earthquake struck Haiti in 2010, the government was in discus- Adapt to different contexts sions with various parts of the international community—diplomatic, peace- keeping, and development—on pressing institutional transformations. These The process necessary to restore confidence included fundamental economic restructuring needed to create jobs in agricul- ture and textiles; the appointment of personnel in both the Supreme Court and and transform institutions are similar in the lower courts to restore better basic functioning to the justice sector; consti- countries that have different combinations tutional changes to, among other things, reduce the frequency of elections; of stresses and institutional characteristics; increased decentralization in the administration; rapid expansion of the police between low- and middle-income countries, force; anti-corruption measures to avoid diversions of aid funds; revenue reform to increase the tax base; and action against drug traffickers to address shifts in and even high-income countries facing sub- transit patterns into the Caribbean. All these actions were to take place over 18 national violence; and between countries months when Haiti also had two elections scheduled. facing violence of purely criminal origins The tragedy that overtook the country in January 2010 makes it impossible and those facing political and civil conflict. to know whether these reforms would have been completed. The link between violence and institutions, and of historical state-building experiences elsewhere, While the dynamics of change may be simi- does show that these changes would make Haitian society more resilient to lar, the framework must be applied differen- renewed violence—but that no country has ever successfully completed this tially, depending on the specific features of level of change in 18 months. the case in question. Sources: WDR consultation with government officials, United Nations and donor In some countries, stresses from interna- representatives, local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and community-based tional trafficking in natural resources or infil- organization representatives in Haiti, 2010. tration of armed groups from abroad are im- portant, while in others, trafficking of drugs From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 111 B OX 3.8 Spectrum of situation-specific challenges and opportunities Types of violence: Civil, criminal, cross-border, subnational, ideological, or any combination of these Transition opportunity: Gradual/limited to Key stakeholders: Internal vs. external immediate/major space for change stakeholders; state vs. nonstate stakeholders; low-income vs. middle-high-income stakeholders Key stresses: Internal vs. external stresses; Institutional challenges: Low capacity economic vs. political stresses; high vs. low constraints vs. high capacity; low level of divisions among groups accountability vs. high accountability; exclusion vs. inclusion Source: WDR team. may be the principal external stress. Internal tory of recent deterioration may mean that stresses stemming from actual or perceived upcoming transition moments present an inequalities between groups may take the opportunity to reverse deterioration in the form of urban-rural divides in some coun- situation, but may not yet present a real op- tries, ethnic or geographical in others, or reli- portunity to deliver decisive improvements. gious in still others. Economic shocks or high The types of transition moment that offer an unemployment may be important in some opportunity for change of course vary enor- countries but not in others. mously—from elections to external crises to Institutional challenges in dealing with new government reform plans to anniversa- these stresses also vary (box 3.8). Some coun- ries that are important in the country’s na- tries have to deal with weak capacity in both tional psyche. state and civil society institutions, combined Thus, differentiated application of the with weak accountability; others may possess framework is essential. In applying the reasonably strong capacity and resources, but framework, the choice of different types of face challenges in state legitimacy because the “inclusive-enough” coalitions and priori- state is perceived to lack accountability in po- ties for early results, the sequencing of in- litical representation, in its management of stitutional transformation efforts, and the public resources, or in its respect for human development of politically innovative insti- rights—or is perceived to represent the inter- tutions all depend on country-specific cir- ests of only one section of the population, to cumstances. Equally, external support and the exclusion of others. In some countries, incentives and international actions to ad- the challenge is national: all areas of the dress external stresses need to be designed country are affected. In others, it is contained to fit the specifics of each country situation. but still significant: subnational areas exhibit Throughout this Report, a differentiated po- characteristics of fragility, with risks of actual litical economy framework is used to ask the or potential violence. following questions: Stresses and institutional characteristics also change over time, with new stresses aris- • What stresses does the country face that ing and new capabilities being developed. increase the risks of violence occurring or In addition, the trajectory of change is im- reoccurring? Areas to explore include the portant. In some countries, events may pro- infiltration of external armed groups and vide an opportunity for major political, trafficking networks; potential corruption social, and economic change. In others, a his- pressures from natural resources or other 112 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 forms of trafficking; political, social, or * * * economic inequalities and tensions be- Institutions matter, doubly so for coun- tween groups; high or rising unemploy- tries affected by violence. It is well known ment and income shocks; and stresses that in the economic literature that institutions arise in terms of ex-combatant or gang- matter for economic development.33 The member activity and circulation of arms. emerging econometric evidence suggests • What institutional characteristics are par- that countries are doubly affected by very amount: capacity, including in different weak institutions—because the lack of in- state and nonstate institutions; account- stitutions slows development, but also be- ability, including for different aspects— cause weak institutions make them more political representation, corruption, re- vulnerable to violence, which, itself, reverses spect for human rights; inclusion of development. They find themselves in a different groups, ethnic, religious, class, trap: the institutional reforms they need to geographical? What risks do these institu- exit the vicious cycle of violence and tem- tional characteristics present for national porary elite pacts are difficult to achieve, actors and international actors? precisely because the threat of violence remains very real.34 As a result, the virtuous • Which stakeholder groups are crucial to spiral of restoring confidence and trans- building confidence and transforming in- forming institutions cannot expand—since stitutions, and what signals, commitment credibility is missing where violence (in- mechanisms, and results are most impor- cluding the legacy of violence or the threat tant to these groups? This may include of violence) is present, leaders must first en- different groupings among political ac- gage in confidence-building through inclu- tors, security force leadership, excluded sive enough pacts and early results for their citizens, business, labor, faith-based in- commitments to be credible. stitutions, or other influential civil soci- Only after actors have built trust and es- ety groups, and external actors such as tablished their commitment to peaceful de- neighboring governments, donors, and velopment through confidence-building can investors. they then credibly undertake the institutional • What types of transition moments are reforms necessary to escape the vicious cycle. coming up, and what opportunities do The repeated expansion of the WDR frame- they present? This needs to include not work spiral is important because transfor- only a creative assessment of opportuni- mation takes time. Leaders, stakeholders, and ties for change, but also a realistic assess- the international community must remem- ment of what these opportunities can and ber that societies will go through multiple cannot achieve—for example, some up- cycles of confidence-building and institu- coming transition moments may offer an tional reform before they can achieve the re- opportunity to reverse deteriorations, but silience to violence necessary for “develop- not yet consolidate all the dimensions of ment as usual.” change needed for long-term resilience to violence. From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 113 FEATURE 3 Restoring security in Colombia Types of violence: Trafficking, criminal and gang violence, civil conflict Transition opportunity: Preventive action in the face of rising Key stakeholders: Government, armed groups, citizens, civil society, criminality and failed peace talks regional, international partners, criminal networks Key stresses: Legacies of violence, presence of international trafficking Institutional challenges: Absence in parts of the country of state and criminal networks, social and economic inequity institutions; legacy of capacity, inclusion, and accountability challenges C olombia, a middle-income country, has experienced peace for only 47 of its first 200 years of independence. Until the turn of the 21st century, large parts of the territory were ning in 2002, the new administration decided not to continue with the previous government’s four-year negotiation with the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN). It focused in- marked by the absence of state institutions, and a long se- stead on consolidating state control throughout Colombia, quence of amnesties and negotiations with armed groups protecting the population and fighting the illicit drug trade— merely recycled, but did not resolve, incentives for violence. aims subsequently formalized in the government’s “democratic Over the past two decades, a number of new initiatives were security” policy. Based on an integrated approach to restoring taken to restore confidence and security. These have been led confidence through security, private-sector job creation, and by both local and national governments and have had a sig- social cohesion, the new policy aimed at “institucionalidad,” or nificant impact in recent years. building and transforming institutions. DESEPAZ—an acronym for Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz, From 2002 to 2008, this approach had considerable success: or development, security, and peace—started in Cali in 1992, the armed forces were expanded from about 300,000 in 2002 to based on epidemiological studies of the violence that afflicted more than 400,000 in 2007,35 and state presence throughout the the city (murder rates had climbed from 23 per 100,000 inhab- country reduced violence, particularly in rural areas. National itants to 93 from 1983 to 1992). Contributing to significant homicide rates were halved, from 70 per 100,000 people to 36,36 reductions in violence, its programs included mulitsectoral households forcefully displaced fell by 60 percent, and kidnap- coordination of arms control, policing and justice, education, pings fell by 83 percent.37 To increase the transparent function- housing, and recreation activities. ing of government, Colombia improved on measures of cor- With homicide rates very high, Bogotá, like Cali, imple- ruption (from –0.44 to 0.24), the rule of law (from –0.92 to mented a multisectoral approach in the 1990s that included –0.50), government effectiveness (from –0.40 to 0.13), and ac- cooperation between community police and local residents, countability (from –0.50 to –0.26).38 The reduction in violence and initiatives to stimulate the local economy. These and other helped sustain rapid economic growth—at an average of 4.9 interventions reduced homicide rates in Bogotá from 80 per percent a year between 2002 and 2008, almost three times the 100,000 people to 28 between 1993 and 2004, and increased rate in the previous seven years.39 These impressive security arrest rates by a factor of four. achievements did not come without costs, however: more than More recently, Medellín also experienced a dramatic reduc- 300,000 people were newly displaced in 2008. Crime and inse- tion in levels of criminal violence. As a city directly affected by curity have also begun to rise again in some urban areas, such as rebel groups and the violence of the drug cartels, Medellín be- Medellín (an increase in the homicide rate from 33.8 to 94.5 per came in 1991 the most violent city in the world, with a homi- 100,000 in 2007–09),40 as new forms of organized crime have cide rate of 381 per 100,000. The impact of national and local emerged. Nor has the FARC insurgency been decisively ended. security policies combined with social development strategies Several key lessons follow: helped reduce this to 29 per 100,000 people in 2007. Serious efforts to negotiate with rebel groups began in the • The government used an “inclusive-enough” approach, 1990s and included the creation in 1998 of a neutral zone un- building broad national support for security goals when der the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- ceasing negotiations with the FARC. After an in-depth dia- bia (FARC). The failure of these efforts was blamed by many logue with business groups, a “wealth tax” paid by the coun- on the FARC, and this helped build popular support for a shift try’s richest taxpayers was introduced in 2002, earmarked in strategy that branded the FARC as a criminal group. Begin- for the security effort. Social network campaigns were 114 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 3 Restoring security in Colombia (continued) mounted against kidnapping and later against FARC’s use coordinate military, police, and civilian developmental ef- of violence. forts in the least secure areas. The multidisciplinary teams of the Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI), • Early confidence-building measures were crucial. The gov- worked in the same offices and developed joint plans to ernment deployed military resources to protect the main guide their actions. Common concepts—“democratic se- road network, sponsoring convoys of private vehicles that curity” and the restoration of “institutionality” to areas allowed many Colombians to travel between major cities in where the state had been absent—were important for close safety for the first time in years. Mobility increased mark- collaboration between military and civilian actors. edly: the number of vehicles passing through toll stations rose from about 60,000 vehicles in 2003 to close to 150,000 WDR consultations underlined two big challenges going forward. The first is to match the success in restoring confi- vehicles in 2009. dence and security with longer-term institutional transforma- • Combining political, security, and economic development tion. Surveys of popular perceptions show an enormous in- measures was central to the approach. The government es- crease in confidence in both the security situation and in the tablished a national agency, reporting to the presidency, to delivery of education services, as well as in overall trust in the a. Popular confidence dramatically improved in services and security 100 86.1 86.1 90 % respondents answering “yes” 80 66.6 70 60 50 50 40 30 20 11 10 0 Improvement in the delivery Improvement in the Increased trust in Improvement in the delivery Improvement in transparency of education services perception of security state institutions of health services and accountability of government Source: WDR team calculations based on results from Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010 for representative surveys conducted in early 2010. state (see figure a). However, Amnesty International gave Co- Colombia’s success in attacking the larger drug cartels also lombia its lowest rating in 2008, and Freedom House main- had unintended effects on its neighbors. The area under coca tained a rating of 4 (on a scale of 7) between 2002 and 2008. cultivation has increased in Bolivia and Peru. Along with in- A second challenge relates to security and justice institutions. creases in productivity, this boosted South America’s potential The justice system, while preserving its independence, was not cocaine production to 865 metric tons in 2008, up from 800 reformed at the same pace as the military and police, and had metric tons in 2002. difficulty keeping pace with the caseloads emerging from more effective policing. A culture of impunity persisted, and threat- ened progress made in security sector reform. National institu- tions also faced a credibility test in relation to so-called false- Sources: Arboleda 2010; UNODC 2010b; World Bank 2010n; Guerrero 1999; Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral 2010; WDR team con- positive deaths: ongoing investigations and prosecutions are sultations with government officials, civil society representatives, and se- looking into evidence that innocent poor young men were killed curity personnel in Colombia, 2010; WDR interview with former Presi- and falsely portrayed as rebels killed in military operations. dent Álvaro Uribe, 2010; WDR team calculations. From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 115 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 3 . 9 Lessons of the South African transition: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions Jay Naidoo, Chairman of Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition; Former General Secretary, Congress of South African Trade Unions; Minister of Reconstruction and Development, South Africa; and Former Chairman of the Development Bank of Southern Africa; WDR Advisory Council Member Based on discussions with Mac Maharaj, Sydney Mufamadi, Roelf After the 1994 elections, delivering a few early results—in- Meyer, Leon Wessels, Fanie van der Merwe, and Jayendra Naidoo. cluding maternal and infant healthcare and using community structures to improve water supply—were important to main- In May 2010, as part of the World Development Report 2011 pro- tain confidence in our new government. cess, I was part of a discussion with key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and National Party in which we reflected on the Transforming institutions lessons that could be learnt from the political transition to de- Unorthodox, locally adapted reforms. Participants agreed that mocracy in 1994. We were all agreed that a prerequisite for much of the global communication on South Africa’s transition successful political transitions had to be strong national own- has been on the specific organizational form of the institutions ership and that the peace process underpinning it had to be used (for example, Truth and Reconciliation Committees, na- embedded at a local level and deliver a peace dividend that tional peace committees); and that in fact it may be more useful benefitted local communities. The following points are what I to consider the underlying principles and approaches (including extracted from South Africa’s experiences: those described above), on the basis that each country needs to There were multiple transition points which required ef- design their own institutional forms if they are to have full own- forts from the protagonists to shift the debate, rather than ership of political processes. only one “moment” of transition in 1994. These included citi- zen protests and strikes; legalization of unionism for black Challenges in prioritizing and sequencing. In addition to some workers; the start of undercover contacts in the late 1980s; the of the key principles emerging from South Africa’s successful release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and transition, participants reflected on mistakes made or opportu- political parties in February 1990; the National Peace Accord in nities missed which may be of use when other countries con- 1991; CODESA in 1992; the Transitional Executive Council and sider these experiences. Four elements were highlighted as par- associated bodies in 1993–94; the Reconstruction and Devel- ticularly important: opment Program in 1993–94; the Growth, Employment and • Very little of the discussions leading up to 1994 considered Redistribution Program in 1996; and the local government preparation for delivery through the civil service. Problems democratic transition which only culminated in 2000. which later emerged as a result include lack of preparation in setting up the provinces and defining local government de- Restoring confidence livery responsibilities. We should have anticipated the capac- South Africa’s transition steps in the early 1990s were preceded ity constraints as we increased the number of provinces and by a much longer period of change in mentality, or paradigm set up new institutions. shift, amongst the protagonists that gave credibility to the • Too little attention to job creation for youth and risks of crim- process: inal violence meant that we did not fully address the critical • On the ANC Alliance side, this included the shift to a need to ensure that the new generation who had not lived broader, more inclusive approach, and the realization of through the apartheid struggle as adults were provided with a strong stake—and economic opportunities—in the new the need to ensure incentives for the National Party and democratic state. the white population. • There was a need for tradeoffs on timing and the mainte- • On the National Party side, this included the shift from nance of social consensus to manage the mismatch between thinking in terms of group rights and protection of minori- the aspirational goals of the Reconstruction and Develop- ties to thinking in terms of individual rights and majority ment Program, the macro and fiscal framework to pay for rule. them, and the institutional capacity to implement them. • Certain signals which were perceived as irreversible (nota- • There was too much of an assumption that 1994 marked the bly the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the culmination of a process of democratization and reconcilia- suspension of the ANC’s armed struggle) were critical in tion. Relatively little attention was given to what was meant maintaining trust between parties. by the transformation to a constitutional state; the contin- • Leaders on both sides had to move quickly to avoid getting ued role of civil society in deepening not just democratiza- bogged down by narrow interests in their own constituen- tion and accountability, but also delivery; and there was a cies, in particular in periods of devastating crisis such as the need for a deeper and more thorough ongoing debate on rac- political assassination of Chris Hani. ism, inequality, and social exclusion. 116 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Notes 1. According to Margaret Levi, “Trust is, in fact, a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest.” Furthermore, Levi notes that “At issue is a co- operative venture, which implies that the truster possesses a reasonable belief that well-placed trust will yield positive returns and is willing to act upon that belief” (Braithwaite and Levi 1998, 78). 2. Similar problems arise in the transition from communism to a rule-of-law state. The thought pro- cess might be as follows: “If I build value in a new firm rather than stripping the assets of the state, I will gain only if rule of law is established. That will happen only if others demand rule of law, too. If others don’t believe rule of law will be established, they will prefer to strip assets rather than build value, so they will be unlikely to demand rule of law, and in that case, I’d be crazy to build value in a new firm. Thus, even though most people would be better off building value under rule of law than stripping assets in a lawless state, given my expectations of political development, I’m better off strip- ping assets.” 3. A 30 percent increase in people who believe that growth will improve in the next 12 months is associ- ated with a 1 percent increase in actual growth rates in the subsequent year, significant at the 5 per- cent level. 4. A few societies have very strong state capacity, but score low on governance indicators because they are highly exclusionary—South Africa under apartheid is an example. These countries will have less difficulty in implementing promises because their military and civilian organizations are capable. But it is possible that, even in these cases, institutional weaknesses in shared values and cohesion make it difficult to deliver on change. Indeed, in South Africa change has not been a simple process. 5. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008; Fearon 2010a; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006. 6. Goldstone 2010. 7. de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005. 8. Rich 2010. 9. Economic theory helps us understand the consequences of a perception of impunity that increases willingness to use violent means. Chapter 2 referred to the way in which insecurity dynamics produce “prisoner’s dilemmas,” where lack of trust between two actors undermines their ability to cooperate to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. Economic theory shows that if the actors in question be- lieve they will encounter the same dilemma again in the future, their calculation may differ—they might recognize that taking a risk by trusting their counterpart in the present can produce important payoffs in the future. So-called iterated prisoner’s dilemmas make cooperation possible, though not guaranteed. If a society is confronted by a situation where many actors believe that others within society may use violence to resist change, their willingness to bet on future cooperation is dimin- ished. Where insecurity is not an immediate issue, betting on future payoffs makes sense; where the future is highly uncertain, logic dictates placing an excessive premium on protecting existing privi- leges and resources, not risking them for collective gains. See Axelrod 1984. 10. See Keefer, Neumayer, and Plümper 2010. 11. See UN Security Council 2010a, WDR consultation with government officials, UN donor represen- tatives, local nongovernmental organizations, and community-based organizations in Haiti, 2010. 12. An alternative perspective to the intertwined relationship between institutions and violence can be found in Cramer 2006. 13. The WDR defines “citizen security” as both freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence. Applied to the lives of all members of a society (whether nationals of the country or otherwise), it encompasses security at home; in the workplace; and in political, social, and economic interactions with the state and other members of society. Similar to human security, “citizen security” places people at the center of efforts to prevent and recover from violence. Also see Frühling, Tulchin, and Golding 2003. 14. Confidence-building in mediation means building trust between adversaries; in financial crises, trust in markets means that governments are adopting sound policies and will be capable of implementing them. The WDR defines the term as building trust between groups of citizens who have been divided by violence, between citizens and the state, and between the state and other key stakeholders (neigh- bors, international partners, investors) whose political, behavioral, or financial support is needed to deliver a positive outcome. 15. These incentives are not always enough. Chapter 4 discusses cases where leaders are unwilling to recognize an impending crisis or take action, and the approaches used to resolve these situations. 16. Building on the Commission on Human Security 2003 report, the importance of human security has From violence to resilience: Restoring confidence and transforming institutions 117 been recognized in the UN General Assembly 2005b resolution adopted at the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly 2009b report, and UN General Assembly 2010 Resolution, as well as in other fora, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, G8, and World Economic Forum. 17. Throughout this report, the term “best-fit” describes solutions that are fitted to context of the society at the moment and may not be the first best solutions by other metrics. Thus, these solutions invoke the concept of the “second best” as used in economic theory—reforms may only be optimal once all distortions and considerations are taken into account. In this way, best-fit solutions may be optimal given all of the economic, political, physical, and institutional constraints and conditions. 18. Bedeski 1994; Cumings 2005; Chang and Lee 2006. 19. Based on historic CPIA scores, 40 countries would have been classified as fragile for five or more years between 1977 and 1989. Box 2.10 showed that 17 of these countries remained fragile until 2009 and that 16 of those experienced minor or major civil war. Of the 23 that “escaped” fragility, 15 had no war, 4 had minor civil war and 4 had major civil war between 1990 and 2009. WDR team calcula- tion. Also see Mata and Ziaja 2009. 20. Odendaal 2010; Ojielo 2007; UNDPA 2010a. 21. Encyclopedia of the Nations 2010. 22. Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. 23. The indices are the Quality of Government Institute’s “quality of government” indicator (derived from International Country Risk Guide data; the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi indicator of “gov- ernment effectiveness”; the Failed State Index’s “progressive deterioration of public services” indica- tor, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s “resource efficiency” indicator). See Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. 24. Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. 25. Global and regional norms play an essential part in preventing violence by constraining leadership abuses of power, and in supporting local institutional transformations by helping maintain a focus on goals and functions rather than particular institutional forms. These norms can take the form of formal international agreements and can also manifest as social movements, such as the Otpor movement. 26. For example, while both Myanmar and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have—to varying degrees of success—used communication and travel bans to limit access to information and main- tain control domestically, their ability to restrict information has declined dramatically in recent years, as Internet access in Myanmar, and satellite television in both countries, convey images of the world outside. See Horsey and Win Myint 2010. 27. Color revolutions refer to a series of spontaneous movements that arose in succession in several former Soviet republics and one Balkan state during the early 2000s. These were mainly nonviolent protests advocating for democracy against governments seen as corrupt and/or authoritarian. Start- ing as small spontaneous actions, they evolved within days or weeks into mass movements that top- pled governments and instituted new democratic regimes. Each movement adopted a specific color or flower as its symbol, and at the center of these movements were nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and particularly student activists. These movements were successful in Serbia (2000), Geor- gia (Rose Revolution 2003), Ukraine (Orange Revolution 2004), and the Kyrgyz Republic (Tulip Revolution 2005). See Kuzio 2006; D’Anieri 2006; Michalcik and Riggs 2007. 28. See Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu 2009. 29. See, for example, Afshari and Underwood 2009. 30. Goldstein and Rotich 2008. 31. MDRP 2006. 32. Bedeski 1994; Cumings 2005; Chang and Lee 2006. 33. North 1989, 1995; Rodrik 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005. 34. There is an important difference between what this report argues and the “conflict trap” described by Collier and others 2003. In a “conflict trap,” low incomes lead to conflict, and conflict leads to low incomes, creating a low-level equilibrium. The WDR focuses on the institutional deficit: the institu- tions that enable the peaceful resolution of contests are missing from fragile environments. With actors lacking the means to make credible commitments to reform, societies are unable to break free from the threat of violence. A low-level equilibrium of dysfunctional institutions and recurrent vio- lence is thereby created. 35. See Arboleda 2010. 36. WDR team calculations. 37. See Arboleda 2010. 38. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010a. 39. WDR team calculations, based on World Bank 2010n. 40. Municipio de Medellín 2010. C hapter 4 analyzes country lessons on building confidence through coalitions and early results. Most states moving back from the brink of violence have developed “inclusive- enough” coalitions for action, with different forms suiting their circumstances. In forming such coalitions, leaders took action to build trust by signaling that new policies would be different from the past and would not be reversed. They built confidence by achieving a few concrete results as a prelude to wider institutional transformation. States that have succeeded in early confidence- building measures have often done so through a pragmatic blending of policy tools and by calling on non-state capacity, both civic and international. EXTERNAL STRESS RE S CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS CHAPTER 4 TO R ING TRANSFORMIN CON RE FID S TO ENCE RING TRANSFORMING CON GI FID NS RE S ENCE TU TI TO TRANSFORMING R TI I NG ON CON S IN FID IT ST UT E NC E IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink Drawing on lessons from In both elements, successful transitions national reformers made astute use of supplemental capacity beyond government: from the private sec- L eadership actions to restore confi- tor, from traditional institutions, and from dence of stakeholders and citizens nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). in collective capacities for change This chapter considers what makes coali- are a crucial first step in moving tions “inclusive-enough” and the signals, away from the brink of violence. As chapters commitment mechanisms, and early results 2 and 3 described, the trust that the popu- that can help achieve momentum for later lation and stakeholders have in state institu- institutional transformation.3 tions to deal with violence can become shaky These pathways away from violence have when insecurity is rising, or in the aftermath been analyzed in the literature. Stedman and of repeated bouts of conflict. Knowledge Nilsson suggest that pacts to end violence about effective ways to restore confidence need not be all-inclusive—they can promote in countries affected by violence is limited. peace if they are minimally inclusive at the be- This chapter thus expands ideas explored ginning.4 Fearon, Keefer, Azam and Mesnard in the policy and academic worlds, with les- examine why some conflicts may be more sons drawn from the WDR background pa- intractable because of distrust and how com- pers and country consultations, including mitment mechanisms (ways to ensure that the views of national reformers involved in promises will be difficult to reverse) can be efforts to lead their countries away from the designed to solve those problems; examples brink.1 include peace agreements, power-sharing ar- Analysis of country cases reveals a variety rangements, and security sector reform.5 of pathways away from the brink—but also Societies use these and other commit- suggests two common elements. The first ment mechanisms to suit conditions on the lesson is the importance of building inclu- ground. More important than the form of sive-enough coalitions and identifying the these mechanisms is their adaptability to signals and commitment mechanisms2 that changing conditions over the course of mul- can galvanize support for change. Second, tiple transitions. The lessons explored in this national reformers have delivered results on chapter build on this research through prac- the ground to build confidence in citizen tical country examples and cross-country security, justice, and economic prospects. lessons. 120 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Inclusive-enough coalitions leadership developed during decades of re- sistance in the African National Congress, the This section looks at country experiences in Communist Party, and the civil society orga- building “inclusive-enough” pacts for change; nizations of the United Democratic Front. different approaches to coalition-building at Transition opportunities have led to more national, subnational, and local levels; and decisive action where leaders have built co- the guiding principles that emerge on what alitions for change.9 Inclusive-enough ap- is “inclusive-enough.” It considers the type proaches may be formal power-sharing ar- of immediate actions and signals on future rangements, as with the government of the policy that have built support for change. Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland.10 Most frequently, the co- alitions are informal, as with the Colombia How inclusive is inclusive enough? and Timor-Leste approaches described below. Action by national leaders during transi- Some successful experiences and challenges tional moments can be decisive in preventing in coalition-building in situations of political violence. Two contrasting cases illustrate this and civil conflict include the following: point. In Kenya, warnings of election-related • Inclusive rather than exclusive approaches violence in 2007 led Kenyan groups and sev- can be important in preventing a recur- eral foreign governments to offer support to rence of violence. Timor-Leste leadership peace committees and other forms of me- reached out in 2007 to other political par- diation or violence prevention; leaders of the ties and to entrepreneurs to help in recon- various political factions refused them. 6 The struction, involving independent figures predicted violence following the announce- and those from other parties in govern- ment of the election results led to nearly ment, and providing for local business in- 1,000 deaths and the displacement of 300,000 volvement. This approach contrasted with people. By contrast, the Ghanaian govern- that taken in the period between indepen- ment took decisive action in 2003 to forestall dence in 2002 and renewed violence in a potentially serious dispute over succession 2006, when the ruling party engaged rela- rights between rival Dagomba clans in the tively little with civil society, the church, or north. After national efforts failed to find other domestic actors to build support for compromise between the feuding groups, the its program.11 government requested United Nations (UN) assistance in designing confidence-building • In some situations, specific focus on build- interventions, including the facilitation of ing national and provincial support for government and civil society dialogue and change simultaneously can be important. negotiations.7 That action defused the po- In Aceh, Indonesia, which had experienced a long and costly civil conflict, a careful tential for violence, and the country avoided process of mediation involving the Free a major conflict that could have undermined Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka the 2004 national elections. or GAM)—a rebel movement—and lead- Leadership is sometimes shared, and ership and government leaders from the sometimes dominated by individuals. That province and from Jakarta secured a peace was the case with Mali’s General Amadou agreement in 2005 that mobilized a broad Toumani Touré, whose willingness to deal range of stakeholder support, as well as in- differently with the Tuareg rebellion launched ternational engagement (feature 4). a sustained tradition of democratic resolu- tion.8 South Africa benefited both from the • Inclusion strategies can change over time. exceptional personal leadership of President In Sierra Leone, the initial inclusion of the Nelson Mandela and the depth of collective Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 121 1999 Lomé Agreement was subsequently and civil society actors in 2003 to support repudiated in 2000 as conditions changed its democratic security policy. This process and following repeated abuses. Although excluded the FARC (Revolutionary Armed initial arrangements did not succeed, they Forces of Colombia), whose breaches of were nonetheless necessary to encourage the peace talk provisions from the late the RUF leaders to cease fighting. Having 1990s to 2002 created nationwide demand the leaders in the capital also helped in for action against the kidnappings and vi- monitoring their activities once the ar- olence. Government communication and rangements collapsed.12 outreach bolstered popular confidence for difficult military and police actions and • Conversely, in Sudan, peace talks between civil service reforms.15 2000 and 2005 were held between a nar- row group of leaders on both sides, with • The Consultative Assembly (CA), estab- both North and South continuing to face lished to draft a new constitution, was internal divisions that were not managed the basis of Ghana’s inclusive-enough through a broadening of the coalition after coalition-building process during the the peace agreement was signed in January transition to multiparty democracy. The 2005.13 260-member Consultative Assembly was made up of 117 representatives from the Inclusive-enough coalition-building has District and Metropolitan Assemblies, 121 also been important in successful non-post- representatives of various “established or- conflict political transitions, as the following ganizations” (that is, corporate groups) examples demonstrate: and associations, and 22 government ap- • The political transition in Chile in 1990 pointees. The Assembly, which contained and onward involved heavily institutional- many opposition sympathizers, displayed ized political mechanisms to reach agree- independence and drafted a constitution ment in policy among the five political that was approved in a referendum that parties of the “concertación democratica”; set the stage for an orderly nonviolent outreach to labor and civil society; and transition.16 clear signals to business that responsible economic management would be part of In diverse circumstances of negotiated the new direction. In Chile, as in other peace settlements, military victories, and po- middle-income country political transi- litical crises, leaders have often used broad- tions such as Indonesia, a delicate balanc- based governments to send a positive signal ing approach was used to undertake secu- on inclusion—but it is no simple matter. rity and justice reforms while maintaining Cabinets in developed countries not affected support from the military for change.14 by violence, where efficiency is a primary concern, generally range from 15 to 20 ap- • In South Africa, inclusive-enough coali- pointments in each administration. But when tion-building in the run-up to the 1994 stability, rather than efficiency, drives the com- election meant involving all political par- position, cabinets are often larger, as in Kenya ties and civil society in discussions over and Zimbabwe.17 When fragmented decision- the country’s future, although the African making is exacerbated by internal divisions, National Congress (ANC) maintained a the efficiency costs can be considerable. hierarchy where it led decision-making The stresses that spur violence can be among other ANC Alliance and Demo- rooted in provincial or local as well as na- cratic Front members. tional dynamics, and local coalitions can • The Colombian government mobilized be crucial in preventing violence. The links the military, civil service, business groups, made between central and provincial govern- 122 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 4 .1 “All politics is local.” George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Singapore; WDR Advisory Council Member Successful efforts must begin at the local level. Without cities. In cases of ethnic and religious strife, where mutual inse- emphasis on local results, citizens lose confidence in their curity can feed on itself, a local authority that is seen to be fair government’s ability to provide a better life. Actions to and impartial by all groups is absolutely essential before the restore security, create trust, generate employment, and process of healing and recovery can take place. This was Singa- provide services in local communities lay the foundation for pore’s experience when we had racial riots in the 1960s. A national progress. It is not enough to deliver results in big trusted leader can make a decisive difference. ments in Aceh (see feature 4) are one exam- lence. While in the short run, recovery from ple, as are the conflict prevention approaches violence can be supported by external assis- in Ghana described above and attention to tance or natural resource revenues, the path the impartiality of local administration in to longer-term development is dependent Singapore (box 4.1). Country lessons also on a healthy private sector. Private sector ac- raise two developmental mechanisms to sup- tivity often cuts across ethnic and religious port local coalition building and strengthen lines, where rules-based competition is the relations between the state and citizens at cornerstone. Violence shortens the time ho- the local level: first, where government pro- rizons of consumers, producers, traders, and vides resources directly to communities to policy makers. Outreach to the private sec- carry out development activities (through tor can help build a sense of the long term, community-driven development, or CDD), which is critical for planning, investment in and second, where communities do not nec- the future, and sustainable growth.18 In the essarily control funds, but are active partners Colombia, Chile, and Timor-Leste examples in actions undertaken by others (local ad- above, reaching out to the private sector was ministrations, nongovernmental organiza- a crucial part of coalition building.19 tions (NGOs), international partners) that The ability of leaders to govern and to are implemented for their benefit. effect change also depends on a network Building coalitions at the local level— of civil society and informal institutions where the state works with community lead- and actors—and the interaction between ers to combat violence—can be an important the state and informal institutions takes on part of responses to criminal violence as well even greater significance in societies ravaged as political violence. Across Latin America, by violence.20 Many nongovernment initia- approaches that work with local community tives have helped contain or stop violence.21 leaders and combine security and devel- The inclusion of civil society, informal, and opment initiatives have replaced the older, traditional institutions in inclusive-enough security-only “mano duro” (iron fist) ap- coalitions helps in acquiring broader soci- proaches. Higher-income countries have etal legitimacy and in ensuring that citizen used similar approaches, from community security, justice, and jobs reach all segments policing in the United Kingdom or France of society. Community, traditional, and civil to building local alliances to combat drug- society structures can also be crucial part- trafficking and gang activity in Los Angeles ners for the delivery of early results where (see box 4.2). state reach and trust with violence-affected The private sector is also crucial for coun- communities is low. By drawing on nonstate tries coping with and emerging from vio- capacity, governments can “stretch” their Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 123 B OX 4.2 Gang-related homicides in Los Angeles In Los Angeles, gang and drug-related violence accounts for a large percentage of crime (nearly 50 percent of homicides) and negatively affects education, health, business and jobs, housing prices, and the ability for families to enjoy parks and other leisure activities. While gangs are not new to Los Angeles County, gang membership ballooned from negligible in 1970 to 70,000 to 100,000 30 years later. Almost 6,000 people died from gang violence between 1995 and 2006, comparable to the civil war in Uganda over the same period, where estimates of battle deaths between 1995 to 2006 range from 3,300 to 16,000, with a best estimate of 7,500 (Uganda has more than twice the population of the Los Angeles metropolitan area).22 After years of struggling to deal with gang-related violence, a team of experts recently wrote, “In short, Los Angeles needs a Marshall Plan to end gang violence” (Advancement Project 2007, 1). New initiatives aim to prevent violence before it escalates by funding and training outreach workers who can mediate disputes, stop rumors, and engage with those who cause violence (“shotcallers”). The strategy involves regular confidence-building initiatives through frequent consultations among key stakeholders, which can include reformed gang members and community leaders. This outreach approach also involves multisectoral coordi- nation (law enforcement officers conduct community visits accompanied by parole officers, educators, child services, and representatives from other city departments as well as civil soci- ety) to develop relationships and trust between the community and law enforcement. Sources: WDR team consultations with law enforcement and civil society and Brian Center (Executive Director, A Better LA) in Los Angeles, August 2010; Advancement Project 2009; Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010); Los Angeles Almanac (Thornton and others 2011). Note: The challenges of measuring progress in these environments and scaling up successes are not dissimilar from those discussed in the rest of this Report. So-called outreach models are in their early stages of implementation in Los Angeles and have not been fully integrated into Los Angeles Police Department or County Sheriff practice. ability to deliver public goods and signal an of Charles Taylor and rebel groups in 2003 inclusive partnership between the state and were under way, the Liberian Women’s Mass other parts of society. Action for Peace movement mobilized thou- Informal patronage networks also medi- sands of supporters in Liberia and Ghana, ate the effects of attempts to prevent violence where the talks were being held, and barri- in many fragile situations: these networks can caded delegates in meeting rooms, prompting undermine the institutional change needed international mediators to set deadlines and to develop resilience to violence in the long secure agreements.23 In Papua New Guinea/ run, but in the short term there is often little Bougainville, women’s delegations consulted to replace them. Country lessons indicate with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army to a balance between the credibility of initial end the war, held initiatives to create peace coalition-building efforts—which the in- areas, and convened and led peace talks.24 volvement of individuals and groups known Southern Sudanese women in the New Sudan to be corrupt can undermine—and the need Council of Churches organized the Wunlit to dismantle patronage systems over time as tribal summit in 1999 to bring an end to hos- institutional strength builds. Chapter 5 dis- tilities between the Dinka and Nuer peoples. cusses lessons on sequencing anti-corruption The Wunlit Covenant resulted in an agree- efforts in fragile situations. ment to share rights to water, fishing, and The participation of women in political grazing land, which had been key points of reform can help to broaden initial coalitions disagreement.25 In Latin America, women’s to serve wider groups of citizens. As peace ne- groups have been active on human rights gotiations between the Liberian government abuses; one of the most well known is Las 124 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Madres de la Plaza—a group of mothers recover from violence have built alliances. who began nonviolent demonstrations in But as illustrated above, they have not neces- 1977, demanding information from the Ar- sarily included all groups within society. gentinean government on the whereabouts of Four key lessons on what makes for their “disappeared” children during the years inclusive-enough coalitions are as follows: known as the Dirty War (1976–83).26 • Groups may legitimately be excluded An essential, yet often underrated, ingre- where there is an evolving belief among the dient in successful transitions from violence population that they have sacrificed their is proactive communication by the govern- right to participate due to past abuses. ment to build public understanding and support. Successful coalitions have usually • Including groups that bring political managed to “capture the narrative”—that legitimacy and financial and technical re- is, to articulate a compelling vision of hope, sources and will continue to press for develop a sense of shared identity, generate deeper institutional transformation—such broad popular buy-in, and mobilize citizens as business, labor, women’s, or other civil even when the vision entails some short- society groups—is valuable, but there may term sacrifices for their supporters. Com- be a hierarchy of decision making at the mon to successful leadership, whether indi- beginning, with parties present at the table vidual or collective, is this ability to redefine but deferring on some decisions to politi- citizen and elite expectations, to move them cal leadership. beyond negative frames of reference, and to • There can be trade-offs between wide transform public policies and institutions in inclusiveness and the efficiency of sub- ways that will enable the state to address im- sequent state decision-making, as when mediate and long-term sources of discord. governments with very large numbers of Citizens who lack credible informa- ministries are created. tion about progress made and challenges ahead will likely attribute the lack of vis- • Inclusion strategies can change over time ible improvements to a lack of political will, as it becomes possible to marginalize con- and they can lose trust in—and even turn sistently abusive groups. against—those they believed or elected.27 An inclusive public dialogue requires capacity Signals and commitment mechanisms and resources, not just of state institutions or of civil society, but also of the media, which In the early stages of transition, gaining can play an important role in ensuring public the confidence of these stakeholder groups accountability and act as a citizen voice. Ex- often requires policies that signal a break perience indicates this capacity needs to be from the past and instill trust that the new developed in a coordinated manner—media directions will not be reversed. Signaling a development should focus not only on basic break from the past can include immediate skills and journalistic training but also on actions or announcement of future actions. establishing of professional standards and Committing to the future requires assuring an enabling regulatory environment for the stakeholders—who may be skeptical on the media. Governments, meanwhile, need to basis of broken promises in the past—that be endowed with appropriate outreach and changes will be difficult to reverse. The sig- communication capacity. nals used by countries that successfully made How inclusive is inclusive-enough? It may the initial transition away from the brink in- seem that conflict can only be prevented volved combined actions across the security- when all parts of society work together to set economic or political-economic domains. the country on a new path. This is correct in The most powerful signals show that lead- one sense: successful efforts to prevent and ers are not prisoners of anti-reform, anti- Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 125 compromise forces among their own sup- and local action to maintain security during porters. Strategic appointments can be a vital the political process through the National signal of future intent. The first president Peace Accords (box 3.9). Where elections elected after the Nicaraguan peace agree- will take place quickly, indicating that these ment retained the chief of staff of the army are not an end but a step toward institutional in his position. That sent a strong reassur- transformation (as described in the inputs ing signal to the defeated opposition that she by Lakhdar Brahimi and Nitin Desai in box would not use an electoral victory to resume 5.11) is important. The creation of commit- military campaigns.28 In Mozambique, the ment mechanisms to ensure that announce- former RENAMO (Mozambican National ments on political reforms will be honored Resistance, the former rebel movement that in their implementation—such as robustly is now an opposition party) supreme com- independent electoral commissions, supple- mander was appointed deputy chief-of-staff mented where useful by regional or interna- of the Mozambican Defense Force, and seven tional technical and monitoring capacity— RENAMO members were appointed to the can help to build trust. national electoral commission (alongside 10 Signaling early intent to redress human government representatives).29 rights violations is also possible even when In the security sector, signals from gov- the processes take time. Countries emerg- ernments or opposition armed movements ing from severe violence often carry lega- have demonstrated what the security forces cies of human rights violations and trauma will not do—as much as what they will do. that shatter social norms or break the social The Mozambique government unilaterally contract between state and citizen.33 Often announced the start of troop confinement poor and marginalized communities bear as part of the demobilization. This created the brunt of predatory actions by state and enough trust for RENAMO to announce its nonstate actors, and tackling such evident own steps toward demobilization.30 injustices can be a high priority in a govern- In Iraq, the “surge” to restore order in ment attempt to break with the past, while 2006–07 was preceded by a decision to with- starting to rebuild the institutions of the for- draw the police, who were accused of taking mal justice system. factional sides in the violence, from insecure With trust so important for stabilization urban areas and to deploy the army instead. and recovery, some societies have signaled While this created longer-term challenges early commitments to transitional justice. of returning the army to its typical role and These efforts include steps leading to truth building up the civilian police, it did restore commissions, reparations programs for vic- civilian confidence. 31 Strong signals can also tims, and counter-impunity initiatives that be sent by rebel movements: the decision by may involve prosecuting the worst abusers Xanana Gusmão in 1999 to confine to bar- and vetting security forces.34 Such initiatives racks the Timorese resistance troops, Falintil, send powerful signals about the commit- even in the face of widespread destruction in ment of the new government to the rule of the country, avoided a repeat of the 1975 de- law. Even if institutional or political factors scent into civil war.32 do not allow for full redress, early gathering Signals on political reform are crucial of evidence of human rights violations and where political exclusion was a central factor assisting victims can signal serious intent to in motivating violence or civil protests. These overcome legacies of impunity and rights may include rapid action toward elections or violations at both the community and na- lay out a series of preparatory steps—as with tional level. These approaches have also been the transitional executive bodies and consti- tried with some success in middle-income tutional reform processes in South Africa, countries making a transition from military supported by civic education and national rule. The state governments in Brazil pro- 126 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 vided early economic compensation to some dressed for the new political arrangements to victims of political violence during the coun- have credibility. In Liberia, government cor- try’s military dictatorship, prompting a pro- ruption was widely viewed as a major moti- cess of truth-telling and public discussion of vator for the rebellion of 1980, launching past crimes.35 Liberia’s long-running sequence of internal Given the link between corruption and wars, temporary transitional governments, violence, judicious, rapid transparency and coups, and further wars. One of President anti-corruption measures can help to restore Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s first and most popular stakeholder and citizen confidence. In some actions was to fire two prominent figures on countries, legacies of corruption leave heavy corruption charges and maintain tight con- resentment and mistrust, which must be ad- trols over corruption (box 4.3). The power BOX 4.3 Signals and commitments for economic management: GEMAP in Liberia Types of violence: Civil conflict, political violence, criminal and gang-related violence, trafficking Transition opportunity: Moderate space for change, presiden- Key stakeholders: Government needed to restore confidence tial elections, strong international support of opposition parties and civil society, neighboring countries and regional institutions, donors and investors Key stresses: Long history of violence, trauma, grievances and Institutional challenges: Extreme corruption and low domestic mistrust, corruption, youth unemployment revenues, undermining political governance and constraining efforts to increase government capacity Following the end of the 14-year Liberian civil war in 2003, the international community became increasingly concerned about the mismanagement and corruption under the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). Corruption was not just an economic concern: political and army reactions to the extensive corruption of the Tolbert government have been widely cited as a trigger for the coup that sparked Liberia’s first civil war in 1989, and the theft of national resources continued to finance violent groups. The extreme corruption prevented improvements in government capacity by constraining national revenues and diverting external resources. After intense negotiations, diplomatic pressure, and the threat of an embargo on external assistance, the NTGL and Liberia’s inter- national partners agreed to the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP). The AU (African Union) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) led discussions with the NTGL, and the UN Security Council welcomed GEMAP in Resolution 1626 of September 19, 2005. GEMAP’s aim was to improve revenue collection, budgeting, and expenditure management; upgrade procurement practices; strengthen transparency over concessions of national resources; control corruption; and build govern- ment capacity. A defining feature of GEMAP is the use of international experts with co-signatory authority in the operations of ministries and state-owned enterprises, the review of concessions and contracts (including timber and diamonds), and the establishment of an oversight mechanism, the Economic Governance Steering Committee (EGSC), to guide and monitor GEMAP implementation. The EGSC is a mechanism of shared accountability, chaired by President Johnson Sirleaf and the American Ambassador as the deputy chair. GEMAP has helped bring some rapid improvements and was an appropriate response to Liberia’s particular mix of stresses, stake- holders, and institutional challenges at the time. Revenues increased from US$84.5 million in 2005–06 to a projected US$347 million in 2010–11, and Liberia’s ranking on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index climbed from 150 to 97 between 2007 and 2009. GEMAP, however, has also ignited debate over the management role of expatriates. President Johnson Sirleaf told the UN Security Council that “a major deficiency still exists as with other technical assistance programs—the lack of capacity development for sustain- ability. This fault has contributed to tensions between foreign and local experts, thereby raising issues of ownership and sovereignty.”36 A lesson from GEMAP is to look closely at phasing the handover of responsibilities over time and manage local understanding and support. Sources: AllAfrica 2009; Andersen 2010; Atkinson 2008; Bøås 2009; Dwan and Bailey 2006; Jahr 2010; Government of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009. Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 127 and enduring effect of such a signal rests on natural resource control. The arrangements informing citizens that the leader can reject for sharing oil revenues in Sudan are an es- supporters who might prefer to renege on sential aspect of the Comprehensive Peace commitments to citizens or the opposition. Agreement of 2005 (an Agreement on Wealth (Chapters 6 addresses temporary external Sharing, Chapter III of the CPA, was signed in support to justice systems, especially for re- early 2004). In Pakistan the government used dressing crimes committed during episodes a budgetary provision to signal greater atten- of violence.) tion to areas of growing insecurity (box 4.4). Successful early stabilization efforts Commitments were built into these agree- have often featured greater transparency in ments by passing them into law—and, in Su- decision-making and budgeting to improve dan, through limited third-party monitoring. trust between citizens and the state. The new Social cohesion policies are another strong government of Timor-Leste broke with tradi- signal that helps create a sense of fairness and tion in 2008 when it broadcast the budget de- social justice across population groups. Such bate in its entirety on radio and television.37 policies foster the participation of hitherto Open consultations over policy in Chile and excluded groups or areas in economic and public inputs to appointment confirmation political decision-making, enabling them processes in Argentina created confidence to benefit from development assistance and that new directions would not be reversed. ensuring that civil service recruitment is Other governments have pursued greater nondiscriminatory. To signify the state’s con- transparency at the grassroots. In the early cern for the victims of violence or those pre- 1990s in Uganda, concerns arose over the viously excluded from state services, Rwanda apparent disparity between budget allo- provided housing support and Timor-Leste cations and actual spending on education. cash transfer payments for internally dis- This served as an impetus for the first placed persons. Public Expenditure Tracking Survey. The Signals can involve removing or amend- initial survey of 250 government-run pri- ing laws perceived as unjust and discrimina- mary schools in 1991–95 revealed that only tory—such as abolishing apartheid laws in 13 percent of the education funds from the South Africa and, in Pakistan, the discussion central government went to the schools, with over the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which the remaining 87 percent used for personal applies a legal regime to the federally admin- gain or non-education purposes. Later sur- istered tribal areas differing from the rest of veys, implemented after the first was made Pakistan. public, showed that the flow of funds to In pursuing social cohesion policies, an- schools increased to around 80–90 percent other signal is restoring public services to the in 1999–2000. The expenditure tracking sys- middle class, who may be crucial for political tem boosted citizen and donor confidence in support for change. For example, increasing the aftermath of the civil war. However, the social investments in Chile in the 1990s was system has since weakened.38 balanced by restitution of civil service pen- Wealth-sharing can generate support and sions and appointments;39 sunset clauses for confidence in stable situations and in transi- white civil servants in South Africa balanced tions. Most countries rich in natural resources fast action on maternal and child health care share smaller or larger amounts of the reve- for the poorest communities.40 Policies aimed nues from extraction with subnational gov- at tangible results for these groups are often ernments (as in Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria). not pro-poor, and hence are often difficult Such wealth-sharing arrangements are often for development practitioners to agree on as vital when civil wars have been fueled by nat- priorities. But they can be part of the political ural resources or have featured disputes over economy of successful change.41 128 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 4.4 Pakistan: Using the budget to signal change Types of violence: Subnational, political, cross-border, trafficking, ideological including transnational Transition opportunity: Limited space for change following Key stakeholders: Federal, regional, and local government accession of new government in 2008 and military campaign of (including tribal areas); excluded groups; neighboring countries; 2009 in Swat valley international partners; national and transnational militant groups Key stresses: Cross-border conflict spillovers; transnational Institutional challenges: Accountability and capacity terrorism; regional competition; corruption; political and social constraints in public administration; security, judicial, and inequality; income and asset inequality; regional inequities; political institutions youth unemployment; tensions over natural resource wealth- sharing in peripheral regions Late in 2009, the agreement by Pakistan’s federal and provincial eral government sacrificed part of its share of the national divis- government leaders to the Seventh National Finance Commis- ible pool of resources in favor of the provinces. While all prov- sion Award was hailed as a “major achievement and a positive inces will receive an increase in resources, two of them also event for those who believe that the future of a vibrant Pakistan accepted a reduction in their shares to provide more resources lies in a democratic federation.”42 to Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces—which were In Pakistan, grievances over inequity in revenue-sharing go both affected by internal conflict and the war in Afghanistan. back a long time and have been part of a broader set of tensions The award was also an important part of efforts to assuage sepa- between regions within Pakistan. They have been exacerbated ratist sentiments in Balochistan and to settle more than 30 years by debates over the distribution of political power and, more of disputes between Sindh and Punjab about the distribution of recently, over the independence of institutions of accountability, water. On its own, however, the award does not address local notably the judiciary. All this in a context where Pakistan faces governance and institutional challenges. The decline of public terrorist threats, subnational tensions, separatist movements, revenues and the impact of the floods of 2010 have also con- regional insecurity, and severe economic inequality. strained the overall potential for the allocation and transfer of Attempts to set in place a new agreement had failed for 17 funds, and legal and resource challenges remain constraints to years. As part of the 2009 five-year public finance award, the fed- implementation. Source: Porter, Andrews, and Wescott 2010. Delivering early results to deliver results to violence-affected popu- lations. (Chapter 5 then presents examples Country lessons show that inclusive-enough of possible interventions across the security, coalitions have to be complemented by tan- justice, and jobs spectrum for both the im- gible results to restore confidence in national mediate and longer term.) institutions. Results on the ground build Perception surveys in Africa and Latin confidence for three reasons. First, they are America indicate that employment and se- concrete indicators of a government’s good curity are people’s most pressing problems.43 intentions toward citizens. Second, they Electricity, literally the most “visible” of all demonstrate the government’s ability to de- results, can be critical for progress in secu- liver on its promises. Third, they build con- rity and job creation. In many countries, a fidence by indicating that leaders are able to perception of increased justice for excluded withstand pressure from their own support- populations may come about not only ers to play a “winner take all” game and that through action in the justice sector per se they instead provide benefits to all citizens. but also through broader social justice that This confidence-building requires listen- includes greater provision of health, educa- ing to popular expectations, setting realistic tion, or social protection. The specific short- priorities for what can be delivered, drawing term results most important for restoring on nongovernment capacity to deliver, and confidence will depend on an assessment of communicating results to the population. the priorities of the population and the pref- This section identifies various practical ways erences of key stakeholder groups (box 4.5). Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 129 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 4 . 5 Building early confidence in Haiti—Challenges and reflections Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, Lt General, Brazilian Army; former Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti; WDR Advisory Council Member During my time as UN force commander in Haiti, the mis- generator was provided to a small fishing community to use in sion faced many challenges. In the very beginning, the big- the fish market. It seemed like a good idea at the time, but the gest one was how to balance demands for security and locals were not used to sharing the costs for fuel or mainte- development. nance, and very soon the generator was broken. From the start, it was made clear that the primary goal The performance of local institutions is fundamental. With- of the UN force was to protect and serve the interests of the out strong political leadership, reasonable laws, and a judicial citizens. At the same time, troops were encouraged to act system that works, efforts will be in vain. Indeed, many actions with determination against individuals and groups respon- may actually make matters worse. In Cité Soleil, after many sible for violence. This meant good intelligence work fol- years without either a courthouse or police headquarters, one lowed, when necessary, by robust operations using force if of the aid agencies rebuilt the courthouse and military troops necessary. At the same time, troops tried to show that they started patrolling jointly with the national police. Pretty soon were respectful and supportive of the population. things started to improve as the police gradually won the trust Institutions and individuals are not alone in such circum- of the local people. stances, and they must work with others in the international It was amazing to watch long lines of citizens in front of the and nongovernment communities and encourage them courthouse waiting to resolve their problems through the to set aside parochial mindsets and behaviors. If there is law and to see the growing numbers who went to the com- not success in this, there is risk of wasting lots of time talk- missariat to ask for help from the police. People know when ing on coordination and cooperation without improving someone is trying to help and they respond positively. In Haiti, performance. after just a few months, they began to bring to the UN troops Once the environment is safe, it is important to focus on valuable intelligence, to hand in weapons, and to deal with delivering basic services, creating jobs, and improving infra- criminals and the perpetrators of violence. They also began structure. At that time, as soon as the mission defeated the to participate in community efforts and start businesses. Peo- street gangs, the peacekeeping forces began to deliver ple moved back into their homes, rebuilt the markets, and potable water each day and, working with local leaders, to thronged previously abandoned streets. The experience in help with small-scale projects like renovating community Haiti convinced me that if national leaders, with the right kind centers and cleaning schools. Military troops also worked of support from the international institutions, focus on a few with NGOs to clear canals and distribute food, mattresses basic building blocks, citizens themselves will fix the problems and stoves. and rebuild their countries. In all this, there was careful concern to not waste scarce funds on projects ill-suited to local conditions. Indeed, mak- WDR note: Haiti is often referred to as a “post-conflict” country, but this is inaccurate. Haiti did experience civil uprisings against the ing the most of financial resources was always uppermost in autocratic Duvalier regime; Jean-Claude (“Baby Doc”) Duvalier fled the mind of the military contingent. It was important to the country in 1986. Since that time, Haiti has experienced a suc- guard against the very human desire to not act quickly cession of military rule, flawed elections, coups, democratic elec- unless it is sustainable in the longer term. For instance, a tions, militia activity, and gang violence. What is the right balance of quick, countries highlighted the need for govern- visible results and longer-term ments to demonstrate at least two to three institution-building? visible results locally in the first year follow- ing a new pact for change, and ideally one Although tangible results are needed in the or two in the first months (box 4.6). Results short term, these will be insufficient to pre- need to be repeated at regular intervals, vent violence recurring without simultane- however, to maintain momentum and citizen ous steps toward transforming institutions confidence. (see chapter 5). Striking a balance requires Combined political, security, and de- an astute reading of available capacity and velopmental capacities are often needed to tradeoffs. WDR consultations in several deliver confidence-building results quickly 130 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 4.6 Only a few visible results are needed to restore confidence: Examples from civil war, organized criminal, and subnational violence Liberia Types of violence: Civil conflict, political violence, criminal and gang-related violence, trafficking Transition opportunity: Moderate space for change, presiden- Key stakeholders: Government needed to restore confidence tial elections, strong international support of opposition parties and civil society, neighboring countries and regional institutions, donors and investors Key stresses: Long history of violence, trauma, grievances and Institutional challenges: Corruption and low domestic mistrust, corruption, youth unemployment revenues, undermining political governance and constraining efforts to increase government capacity The Liberian government capitalized on a well-managed donor program and a long-standing dearth of public-spirited government to visibly deliver public goods, restoring confidence in government. The key was to be specific about what was promised—restoring elec- tricity in Monrovia in a year, for example—and to make sure that the government actually delivered what it had promised. Tornorlah Varpilah, Liberian Deputy Minister of Health, told the WDR team that Liberia took some immediate actions to satisfy public opinion. The first was to guarantee peace and security using UN forces. Then the President took action to provide free primary education, free primary health care, and electricity in the capital city. Those interventions helped build confidence in the government.44 Simultane- ously, the government worked to improve capacity in the public finance and justice systems for the longer term. Colombia Types of violence: Civil conflict, trafficking, criminal and gang-related violence Transition opportunity: Preventive action in the face of rising Key stakeholders: Government, armed groups, citizens, civil criminality and failed peace talks society, regional, international partners Key stresses: Legacies of violence, presence of criminal Institutional challenges: Lack of reach of state; accountability networks and drug production/trafficking, perceived social and challenges economic deprivation, natural resource wealth In 2002, the government made restoring security a top priority and defined a set of fairly narrow targets for violence-affected areas: restoring safe transit by deploying military resources to protect the main road network and sponsoring convoys of private vehicles that allowed many Colombians to travel between major cities in safety for the first time in years; reducing homicides and kidnappings; restoring social services to the national average; and improving trust in the state. Meetings around the country during the electoral campaign and a review of the strengths and weaknesses of past efforts informed selection of these targets. A review of the previous Politica Nacional de Rehabilitación (PNR)45 program, for example, indicated that it had spread its efforts too thinly across different regions, so the new government chose a smaller number of violence-affected areas. It also drew on wider capacities to execute the program, including U.S. support for security-sector capacity-building and the engagement of Colombian NGOs and other donors in social programs in violence-affected rural areas. Frequent perception surveys of citizens kept the government up-to-date on progress. Pakistan Types of violence: Subnational, political, cross-border, trafficking, ideological, including transnational Transition opportunity: Limited space for change following Key stakeholders: National, regional, and local government accession of new government in 2008 and 2009 military (including tribal areas), excluded groups; neighboring countries; campaign in Swat valley international partners; national and transnational militant groups Key stresses: Cross-border conflict spillovers, transnational Institutional challenges: Accountability and capacity terrorism, regional competition, corruption; political, social, constraints in public administration, security, judicial, and income, and asset inequality; regional inequities; youth political institutions unemployment; tensions over natural resource wealth sharing in peripheral regions Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 131 B OX 4.6 (continued) Following the Pakistan government’s 2009 military offensive to drive militants from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP; formerly the Northwest-Frontier Province), the government—with the World Bank, Asian Devel- opment Bank, UN, and European Union—undertook an assessment to address needs and understand the factors underlying violence. In addition to traditional analyses of economic and social data, the assessment involved a crisis analysis and consultations with more than 1,000 representatives of communities from FATA and KP. Focus group discussions were also held by local NGOs and women’s groups. The primary issues were jobs and justice system reform, including the country’s overall legal framework (different in FATA from the rest of Pakistan) and the resolution of land and family disputes. The exercise highlighted the danger of overpromising: initial plans did not take capacity into account, resulting in unrealistic timelines. Since the assessment, Pakistan has faced the even more immediate challenges of the devastating humanitarian disaster caused by the floods in August 2010. But the assessment still gives a detailed pic- ture of citizen priorities. Sources: Baily and Hoskins 2007; McCandless 2008; World Bank and ADB 2010; WDR team consultation with national leaders from fragile and conflict-affected countries in Berlin, 2009; WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organizations, and security personnel in Colombia and Pakistan, 2010; Arboleda 2010; Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral 2010. and initiate cross-sectoral institutional trans- the government, or that it will be difficult formations. Governments have used tools to transform these modes of delivery far- associated with one domain of action (se- ther down the line when state institutional ca- curity, justice, economic) to achieve goals in pacity has increased. It is indeed critical that another. Navigating transitions has involved a nongovernmental programs, particularly in- clear focus on the stresses that drive violence ternational programs, give appropriate, visible and on designing programs to mitigate them. attributions of credit to national institutions. This implies an interdisciplinary approach to Development programs stamped with the strategy based not on sectoral programs and logo of international institutions do not build outcomes but on balancing security, justice, trust in national institutions. Yet nongov- and economic opportunity (box 4.7). ernmental mechanisms can be used to boost confidence in government responsiveness to its citizens, as box 4.8 on Afghanistan’s Na- How can results be delivered when tional Solidarity Program indicates. Similarly, states face a legacy of weak capacity the involvement of NGOs under government and legitimacy? coordination in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste Governments that have restored confidence (see chapter 8) increased the perception of of stakeholders and citizens have typically government effectiveness in the health sector. mobilized nonstate actors to deliver results Community-driven development (CDD) rather than doing everything themselves.46 approaches have been applied in varied con- Drawing on “supplementary capacity” has texts. While such programs alone cannot meant tapping into both local nonstate struc- transform the security, justice, or economic tures (communities and community organi- dynamics in violent settings, their use is a zations, traditional institutions of justice, the good indicator of the range of purposes they domestic private sector, NGOs) and external can serve and the relative ease of adapting assistance (regional organizations, interna- their design to different needs.47 Attributes tional donors, the international private sec- such as participatory planning and decision- tor; see chapter 6). making, cooperation between local authori- Governments are often concerned that ties and the committees selected by com- drawing in NGO, private sector, or commu- munity members for the purpose of a CDD nity capacity will take the credit away from program, and community control of funds 132 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 4.7 Different sectors, core goals National programs (sometimes with international support) have used tools from one “sector” to meet goals in another. These approaches can be effective in a variety of situations—in countries recovering from civil war and in societies affected by drug-related violence, ranging from low to middle income. Justice and inclusion goal—Security intervention. In Burundi, a key part in the Arusha peace process that stabilized the long-running civil war was the creation in 2004 of a new national army, the Force de Défense Nationale, in which the Hutu ethnic group represented 40 percent of the officer corps. This was important for the Hutu, who account for more than 80 percent of the population but had long been excluded from the military and had suffered from military actions against them as far back as 1972. Justice and inclusion goal—Economic intervention. Jamaica’s inner cities have been at the center of the country’s crime and violence problem, which, coupled with growing poverty, has further exacerbated social fragmentation and the weakness of civic organizing in inner-city communities. With donor support, the government launched a program to provide inner-city community infrastructure and services for the poor in 2006, which includes measures to promote short-term conflict mitigation and resolution, as well as medium- term social prevention and capacity enhancement interventions. Security goal—Economic intervention. In Mozambique, the civilian population was caught up in successive military offensives. During Mozambique’s transition, joint international-national efforts to provide assistance and sustainable resettlement to both former com- batants and the internally displaced eased the potential tension that postwar population shifts and a lack of livelihood opportunities might otherwise have caused. Security goal—Multisectoral intervention. To address rising urban violence in Cali, Colombia, the DESEPAZ program (a Spanish acro- nym for development, security, and peace) integrated employment and microenterprise programs for youth, urban upgrading, and pri- mary education alongside security interventions. The program was also noteworthy for its organizers’ understanding of crime: because most homicides occurred on weekends, holidays, and at night, selling alcohol and carrying guns at those times were banned. A 30 per- cent decline in homicides in 1994–97 is attributed directly to the program. Economic goal—Justice and inclusion intervention. After early efforts to implement the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina, international monitors found through interviews with business persons that trade between Bosnian, Croat, and Serb majority regions was substantially affected by ethnically denominated license plates. The Office of the High Representative mandated that nonethnic license plates be issued to all cars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and within weeks of this initiative, traffic and trade had surged. Economic goal—Security intervention. After the establishment of the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo in June 1999, UN administrators observed that trade between Kosovo and its neighbors was depressed. Insecurity on the major highways from Pristina to border cross- ings was identified as an obstacle, so NATO’s KFOR troops were deployed to provide security along major highways and transit points. Exports rose from €27.6 million in 2002 to €297 million in 2010, and imports from €854.8 million to €2.1 billion. Economic goal—Security intervention. In Liberia, partnership between the UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Develop- ment Programme, and the World Bank maintained the country’s degraded roads, so that parts of the country were no longer cut off from the capital during the rainy season, with a consequent boost in confidence. Sources: Roque and others 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008a; International Crisis Group 2007; Igreja and Dias-Lambranca 2008; Villaveces and others 2000; World Bank 1999b, 2006e; Cousens and Harland 2006; Statistical Office of Kosovo 2010; Chesterman 2004; Giovine and others 2010. mean the programs can signal a change in construct social capital and strengthen social the attitude of the state to communities, even cohesion;49 signal inclusion of marginalized before physical projects are completed. They groups (such as women and youth); and con- can thereby enhance state-society relations, tribute to decentralization, either by design increase citizen trust in institutions, and con- or through adaptations over time. tribute to longer-term institution building The importance of community engage- (box 4.8). Experience from a range of appli- ment in local-level interventions can be il- cations48 suggests that CDD programs can ex- lustrated by psychosocial support programs. tend the state’s reach, especially in areas from Political and criminal violence alike can which it has been absent during a conflict; re- cause significant psychological and social Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 133 B OX 4.8 Community-driven development strengthens state-society relations in Afghanistan Types of violence: Intergroup, ethnic, and political violence; organized crime and trafficking; cross-border; transnational ideological Transition opportunity: Initial large space for change: Bonn Key stakeholders: National and local government, security Accord, loya jirga, presidential, parliamentary and provincial elec- forces, community leaders, civil society groups, citizens, interna- tions, national development budget tional partners, transnational militant groups Key stresses: Legacies of violence and trauma, transnational Institutional challenges: Severe accountability and capacity terrorism, criminal networks, low incomes, youth unemployment, constraints in public administration, security, judicial, and politi- corruption, gender discrimination cal institutions Afghanistan, one of the world’s poorest countries, has experienced a near continuous period of invasion and occupation, civil war, and oppression since the late 1970s. Between the overthrow of President Daoud before the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the Bonn Accord in 2002, the central government never had authority across the entire country. In addition to a long legacy of violence and poverty, the country faces the daunting stresses of internal conflict, terrorism, ethnic tension, regional and global security stresses, and extensive corruption. Development under these conditions obviously is particularly challenging. However, the largest development program in Afghani- stan, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), has registered some important successes. Since its inauguration in 2003, it has established more than 22,500 community development councils across 361 districts in all 34 provinces and financed more than 50,000 develop- ment projects. Through the democratically elected, gender-balanced councils, the program builds representative institutions for village governance. Typical projects construct or improve critical infrastructure, such as communal drinking water facilities, irrigation canals, local roads and bridges, and electrical generators, and offer vocational training or literacy courses to villagers. Economic evaluations show consistently high rates of return across all sectors (above 12 percent). A midterm evaluation by the Uni- versity of York in the United Kingdom in 2005–06 found significant evidence of greater public faith in the national government, along with better community relations. The independently conducted Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase-II of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program in 201050 reinforced this finding through a large-sample quantitative assessment using randomized controlled trials to compare outcomes in 250 villages covered by the NSP, with 250 villages not yet participating in the program. As part of the inde- pendent evaluation indicated above, a survey was conducted between October 2007 and May 2008 that showed that the simple pro- cess of electing councils and planning local investments increased villagers’ trust in all levels of government. Across the board, those in villages participating in the NSP had more trust in government officials, showing that it is possible to markedly change perceptions of state institutions through effective local interventions. Furthermore, a separate study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, DC, found that “the CDCs and tribal shuras51 are seen as more responsive to Afghan needs than provincial governments and provincial councils, and in many cases are the only sign of improvement villagers have seen in the past five years.”52 Sources: Beath and others 2010; Patel and Ross 2007; Selvarajan 2008; Brick 2008; Barakat 2006. (box continues on next page) suffering. Activities aimed at improving men- northern Uganda was found to be mutually tal health and well-being of at-risk popu- empowering and more effective in reintegra- lations through psychosocial support have tion than traditional psychological efforts— proven to be more effective if communities the child soldiers felt “decontaminated” psy- are involved. For example, evaluations of two chologically and the community was more psychosocial programs in conflict-affected willing to accept them back socially.54 regions of Indonesia from 1999 to 2001 Traditional and community structures for found that the program that used a more ho- dispute resolution are also potential partners listic approach, engaging the wider commu- in delivering early results—and it may be un- nity, had a greater impact than the one that wise to ignore them. In many fragile settings, focused solely on trauma and used a medical formal systems for the provision of justice model.53 Similarly, engaging the community are weak or broken down. At the local level, in traditional healing and cleansing ritu- this breakdown opens gaps not only in the als for child soldiers in Angola, Liberia, and core criminal justice system, but also in the 134 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 4.8 Community-driven development strengthens state-society relations in Afghanistan (continued) Do officials work for the benefits of all the villagers? 80 +4* 80 71 73 69 68 70 65 +6* +5* +4* +7* 60 56 +5* 51 % “yes” respondents 50 +5* 40 29 30 +3* 20 10 0 President Provincial District Members of Central Government Police NGO workers ISAF/U.S. governor administrator parliament government judges army soldiers officials NSP village Non-NSP village Source: Beath and others 2010. Note: Villages that participated in the NSP program exhibit more trust in national and local governments. Participants responded that they believed that national and local government officials worked for the benefit of all villagers significantly more often in NSP villages than in other villages. Statisti- cally significant differences are shown with asterisked percentages above the Non-NSP Village bars. In the x-axis, the label ISAF is referring to the Inter- national Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. regulation of land and family disputes. Such cessful initial transitions have drawn heav- gaps have led to popular frustration and have ily on nongovernmental capacity associated opened opportunities to violent opposition with the credibility of national institutions. movements such as the Taliban in both Af- For instance, religious organizations run 81 ghanistan and Pakistan, which have in some percent of public primary schools and 77 areas of the country established a shadow percent of public secondary schools in the presence offering an alternative local dispute Democratic Republic of Congo, through resolution system.55 Gangs can play a similar a protocol-based school management sys- role in urban communities. The WDR Fafo tem,57 which was what kept the schools run- perception surveys in countries affected by ning through the turbulent 1990s.58 violence found that most respondents saw Communities can also play a central role traditional authorities as best placed to re- in service provision (box 4.9). In many frag- solve land disputes, even though they also ile environments, NGOs often ensure that believed that national or local state structures basic social services, such as health care, edu- should deliver other key governance func- cation, water, and sanitation, continue to be tions.56 (Chapter 5 explores complementari- provided to the population. Delivery modes ties between traditional and formal systems can include government agencies contract- in justice reform.) ing out some social services to local NGOs,59 Civil society and faith-based actors can international NGOs working closely with lo- also play an important role in service delivery cal NGOs and community groups, and local in many violent contexts when government NGOs collaborating with community groups capacity and reach are limited. Many suc- in the absence of the government. Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 135 One area that does not lend itself well to partnership with nonstate actors to deliver B OX 4 . 9 Nepal: Bringing others in—supplementing fast results is security. Nonstate actors can government capacity in education be effective in supporting security efforts, for instance in community policing aiming to Types of violence: Civil conflict, interethnic and political violence, reduce crime through community partner- criminal violence, and trafficking ship; joint programs against crime between Transition opportunities: Modest Key stakeholders: National and municipalities, civil society, and the private space for change: “palace killings” and local governments, civil society stepped-up Maoist campaign in 2001 groups, marginalized ethnic groups, sector; and community engagement to pre- international partners, regional vent and respond to gender-based violence neighbors (see chapter 5). Going further and implicitly Key stresses: Legacies of vio- Institutional challenges: Feudal ceding to others the state monopoly on secu- lence and trauma; social, political, structures and associated exclu- rity should be avoided. New research shows and economic inequality; youth sion; accountability and capacity that preexisting social networks, when used unemployment; corruption; human constraints in public administration, rights abuses; rising expectations of security, judicial, and political institu- by the state and competing elites, can stir up formerly unrepresented tions; lack of inclusion of different conflict or perpetuate its damaging social groups effects—as in the evolution of vigilantism in Nigeria (box 4.10).60 While circumstances In 2001, recognizing that extensive local capacity to provide education already clearly vary, the risks of such groups becom- on the ground had better success than the nationalized education system, the ing predatory or difficult to demobilize are government devolved responsibility for primary schooling back to school man- considerable—not least because their meth- agement committees through amendments to the Education Act. (The govern- ods of recruitment are not generally based ment relied exclusively on communities for the delivery of basic education until 1971.) The responsibilities of these committees included generating resources; on merit, while their armed status can make formulating budgets (using a combination of government incentive grants, their social accountability tenuous. A similar international aid, and local resources); and hiring teachers. Significant local tradeoff exists with private security compa- resources were unlocked, with every rupee of government grants leveraging nies in internationally supported operations. 1.5 rupees in community financing. For instance, Coalition Forces in Iraq faced Decentralizing teacher hiring also spurred accountability, as the government froze the number of government-appointed teaching slots and introduced sal- problems in addressing abuses by private se- ary grants to allow communities to recruit teachers locally and hold them curity companies entrusted with core state accountable for classroom performance. Better school governance reduced security tasks.61 teacher absenteeism, improved learning achievements, increased community A related issue is the proliferation of pri- donations, and boosted primary completion rates (from 42 percent in 1998 to 60 percent in 2003). vate security companies around the globe. Even though the country was in active conflict, net enrollment rates in pri- They provide an array of functions, includ- mary education increased from 69 to 92 percent between 1998 and 2008. Gen- ing monitoring, investigation services, and der parity improved from 83 to 98 percent from 2003 to 2008. The impact on bodyguards. Their growth is often attributed girls, dalits, and janajati (Nepal’s lower-caste groups) children was also signifi- cant: the rate of out-of-school children dropped from 50 percent in 2004 to 15 to a widespread sense of insecurity and a percent in 2008 for dalits, from 42 percent to 11 percent for girls, and from 44 lack of trust in the police and the judiciary. percent to 11 percent for janajatis. In Central America, the private security in- Sources: World Bank 2009e. dustry expanded dramatically in the 1990s following the signing of peace agreements. In El Salvador and Guatemala, private security firms sometimes incorporated ex-combat- personnel for each police officer.62 A worri- ants from civil wars, and throughout the re- some development, as noted by the president gion, many working for private security firms of the Guatemala Chamber of Security, is the are former government security personnel. severe shortage of trained security person- By 2008, legal and illegal private security nel, so the typical marginal company ends up companies in Guatemala and Honduras em- recruiting farmers from the interior of the ployed around 120,000 and 60,000 guards, country and sending them to work with little respectively, with five to six private security or no training. 136 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 4.10 Nigeria: Strengths and risks of nongovernment capacity in the security sector— the Bakassi Boys Types of violence: Widespread criminal and gang violence, vigilantism Transition opportunity (missed): Rising insecurity and Key stakeholders: Government, vigilante groups, perpetrators of criminality crime and their victims, citizens Key stresses: Criminal networks, youth unemployment, Institutional challenges: Low capacity and accountability in corruption police and judicial institutions Vigilantism has often provided security in the absence of effective state performance. While it may be seen initially as legitimate, it presents tremendous risks to both the state and citizens, especially in protecting universal standards of due process (often the justice is summary) or in separating petitioner, prosecutor, and judge (often a mob dynamic prevails). Although Nigeria has had significant income from oil revenue, the country remained stuck in low per capita income and saw little by way of the development of effective institutions. Throughout the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s, corruption and non-accountable institutions remained defining features of the Nigerian political landscape. Earlier episodes of separatist conflict (in Biafra) had not resur- faced, but oil-rich areas in the south had seen civil violence, and Nigeria had also experienced sectarian violence in its eastern provinces. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, vigilantism was rampant in eastern Nigeria. In response to a rash of robberies and home invasions, residents formed vigilante groups that patrolled and guarded entire neighborhoods at night. One such group was the Bakassi Boys, who initially earned the support of politicians and the public because they reduced crime. In the words of one newspaper columnist: “I am a living witness to the fact that for three years before the year 2000, in my part of Imo State, life was made unbearable by the callous activities of armed bandits. They suddenly seemed to have so multiplied that anybody found outside his front door after dusk was risking his or her life. Then suddenly things began to happen. Well-known hoodlums who were friends of the police gradually took notice and either fled or stayed at their peril. Home was becoming haven again, and evening parties and outside engagements re- turned to the community. It was such a great relief. Asked thereafter to choose between the Bakassi Boys and the police, the village folks preferred the former.”63 Vigilante groups are celebrated in Nigerian popular culture—pictured in movies and on calendars—as appropriate defenders of the public against criminals. Even mainstream observers of Nigerian society, including eminent political scientists like Peter Ekeh, saw the Bakassi Boys as qualitatively different from other vigilante groups. Yet, as noted by Human Rights Watch in 2002, the Bakassi Boys came to be viewed as an uncontrollable and illegal band, which, though filling a void left by a weak state, had become ruthless mercenaries who could be hired to eliminate political or commercial opponents. Beyond these accusations, the celebrated operations of the Bakassi Boys were problematic because of the lack of due process accorded presumed criminals. As one anthropologist notes: “The Bakassi Boys originated in acts of necessity undertaken in the face of terror. Noble intentions, however, have a tenuous existence in the midst of the endemic corruption, political factionalism, and electoral machinations that characterize the Nigerian political landscape. Thus Nigerians remain suspicious of the power ceded to vigilantes.”64 Sources: Ekeh 2002; Nwana 2000; McCall 2004. Early results need to be compatible with, of state and nonstate, bottom-up and top- rather than undermine, long-term institution- down approaches. Such coalitions are a better building. The choice of results and the man- underpinning for longer-term institutional ner in which they are to be achieved is transformation; in fact, some early results ac- important because it can set directions for tively build momentum for institutional later institution-building. For instance, if transformation, as has been the case with the communities are passive recipients of aid, National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan. they have fewer incentives to take responsibil- As countries end one episode of violence or go ity for violence prevention; and if social pro- through an initial political transition, they re- tection is provided by external actors alone, main at high risk of recurring violence. The national institutions have fewer incentives to need at this point is to create legitimate social undertake responsibilities to protect vulnera- and governmental institutions and improve ble citizens. Hence, there is a need for building prospects of economic prosperity. Chapter 5 coalitions for delivery that include a mixture will discuss these issues. Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 137 FEATURE 4 Indonesia: Restoring confidence in Aceh Types of violence: Civil conflict, gang-related violence, vigilantism Transition moment: Significant space for change: 2004 Indian Key stakeholders: National and provincial governments; GAM Ocean tsunami, 2005 peace agreement (political and military wings); conflict victims; Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU), and wider international community Key stresses: Distribution of natural resource wealth, legacies of Institutional challenges: Weak capacity and accountability of conflict, reintegration of ex-combatants, loss of life and devastation provincial political and administrative institutions, coordination of due to tsunami external inputs I n the choreography of peace negotiations—from efforts to build both national support and local inclusion to the judicious use of external support—the peace process in Indo- Signals for confidence-building The Helsinki MOU articulated the main elements of the peace settlement, signaling a genuine break with the past. Acehnese nesia’s Aceh province exemplifies many of the attributes of ef- fective conflict prevention and resolution after 30 years of sus- demands for greater political autonomy within a unitary Indo- picion and outright hostility. nesian republic were clearly spelled out, along with provisions for this autonomy to be institutionalized in a new Law on the Governing of Aceh. This would give provincial and local gov- Inclusive-enough coalition ernment authority over a broad spectrum of public affairs, ex- Agreement on the parameters of the peace agreement—in the cept in foreign affairs, external defense, national security, and form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in monetary and fiscal matters, where the central government Helsinki in August 2005—came at the end of six months of would retain jurisdiction. The MOU also allowed for greater carefully mediated negotiations between the Indonesian gov- Acehnese political participation, including a commitment to ernment and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties—a Merdeka, or GAM). Both sides did their best to ensure things prerogative not granted to other provinces. Provisions were went smoothly. The team representing the Indonesian govern- also made to hold local elections in Aceh as soon as possible. ment was handpicked by President Susilo Bambang Yud- Equally important, the MOU dealt with key security and hoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. In a deliberate effort to justice concerns: reintegrating former combatants and assist- assuage GAM’s concerns about adequate representation for ing victims of conflict. Provisions included the release of po- non-Javanese, the core team was drawn from other provinces. litical prisoners and detainees within 15 days of signing the Learning from previous processes, the government was careful MOU; amnesty to all who had engaged in GAM activities; and to manage communications in Jakarta and at a national level full political, economic, and social rights to all political prison- to demonstrate the benefits of the process, avoiding focusing ers and detainees. The Indonesian and Aceh authorities pledged on provincial buy-in at the expense of national support. The reintegration support to ex-combatants in the form of farm- Finnish nongovernmental organization, Crisis Management land, employment opportunities, and social security (in the Initiative, led by former Finland president Martti Ahtisaari, event of incapacity). GAM agreed to demobilize all 3,000 of its played a key role in facilitating the discussions. military troops and decommission their arms. In return, the The government mobilized support at the national level for Indonesian government agreed to withdraw “non-organic” peace talks by emphasizing the cost of the conflict to the na- forces, with the remaining permanent battalions composed tional budget—in expenditures on security measures (esti- mostly of ethnic Acehnese.66 mated at US$2.3 billion or 21 percent of the total economic Rights to natural resources had long been a bone of con- cost of the conflict) and forgone tax revenues from lower oil tention, and the MOU addressed them by stipulating that and gas exports—and the imperative of stability in Aceh to Aceh would retain 70 percent of revenue from all current and private investment in the country.65 future hydrocarbon deposits and from other natural resources 138 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 4 Indonesia: Restoring confidence in Aceh (continued) in the province. This was a better deal than that enjoyed geting of aid. The four most heavily conflict-affected districts— by other hydrocarbon-producing regions.67 Addressing deep- Aceh Utara, Bireuen, Aceh Timur, and Pidie—received more rooted fears about the rule of law and human rights, the MOU than 50 percent of all funds. GAM members (both combatants provided for the separation of powers between the executive, and noncombatants) and political prisoners received the larg- legislative, and judiciary branches of government. est share of direct assistance, collectively worth almost Rp 400 billion.69 These provisions helped get ex-combatants and other key Commitment mechanisms to lock in signals target groups back into the workforce. The Aceh Reintegra- A key commitment mechanism was the Law on the Governing tion and Livelihood Survey, commissioned by the World of Aceh, passed by the Indonesian Parliament in August 2006. Bank, indicates that male ex-combatants are 7 percent more This institutionalized many of the provisions agreed in the likely to be in full-time employment than their civilian coun- Helsinki MOU and serves as a framework for relations be- terparts. Most former combatants and ex-political prisoners tween Aceh and the central government. have returned to the occupations they held prior to joining A special effort went into addressing the ongoing commit- the insurgency—mainly farming and agricultural wage labor. ment to peace and economic integration. The Aceh Peace- The survey also finds that male victims of conflict are 14 per- Reintegration Board (Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh, or BRA) cent more likely to be in full employment than male non- was created by a governor’s decree in 2006 as the principal victims.70 Poverty has decreased in Aceh since the end of the local agency responsible for overseeing the peace process and conflict, more so in the conflict-affected areas than in the the economic reintegration of ex-combatants, political prison- nonconflict-affected areas, but the province still lags behind ers, and conflict victims. BRA—a provincial agency reporting the national average. to the governor of Aceh—was given a broad mandate encom- Aceh also shows how community-driven programs can passing the design, funding, and implementation of various kick-start local reconstruction and social protection. Soon af- policies and procedures related to the reintegration process. ter the peace agreement was signed, BRA initiated community- The Aceh Monitoring Mission, created after the Helsinki based reintegration assistance through the Kecamatan Devel- MOU, is a good example of external parties monitoring stake- opment Program. Aimed exclusively at conflict victims, the holders’ commitment to their promises. Comprising represen- program provided US$22.7 million of government money in tatives from the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and five ASEAN one round of grants and operated in 1,724 villages in 2007.71 countries, it was deployed to oversee the demobilization of It focused on conflict-affected communities to help them GAM, the decommissioning of its weapons, the reintegration improve living conditions through small projects. Poverty de- of GAM forces, and the removal of “non-organic” police clined by 11 percent more in villages participating in the pro- forces and military battalions from the province. In addition, gram than in those that did not.72 Given that almost 90 percent the European Commission funded the Aceh Peace Process of funds went to purchase private goods, community-driven Support Program to assist in implementing the peace agree- development (CDD) projects can be an effective mechanism ment in four areas: election support, police reform, justice re- for distributing one-off cash transfers in emergency situa- form, and local governance reform. tions.73 Survey data show that 88 percent of recipients felt that both BRA-KDP and KDP funds were spent on the most im- portant needs.74 Delivering early results In Aceh, the government, working with external and local ac- Sources: Aspinall 2005; International Crisis Group 2005; Morfit 2007; tors, delivered some crucial early results for peace-building. MSR 2009; World Bank 2010a; Government of Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement 2005; Braud and Grevi 2005; Schulze 2007; World The total estimated amount of funds committed to reintegra- Bank 2008a; Barron 2010; Barron and others 2009; Morel, Watanabe, and tion and peace-building is Rp 9 trillion.68 The distribution of Wrobel 2009; Government of Aceh, Syiah Kuala University, and World funds across districts is evidence of effective geographic tar- Bank 2008. Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 139 Notes 1. Background work for this Report included review of almost 30 low- and middle-income country cases—both successful efforts to transition away from violence and those less successful—that expe- rienced a mix of forms of stress and types of violence as identified in chapters 1 and 2. The cases var- ied widely in their institutional characteristics, ranging from low-capacity countries with relatively accountable institutions to higher capacity countries with weak accountability mechanisms. This work was supplemented by national and regional consultations with politicians and analysts from government and nongovernment institutions. 2. As noted in the guide to the WDR, commitment mechanisms are means of persuading stakeholders that intentions will not be reversed. This follows the common economic definition of commitment mechanisms or commitment devices. See Dixit 1980; Schelling 1960; Spence 1977. 3. See Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Walter 2004; Nilsson and Jarstad 2008; Wennmann 2009. 4. See Stedman 1996; Adam and Mesnard 2003; Nilsson 2008. 5. Fearon 2004, Keefer 2008. Also, for peace agreements, see Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes 2007. For power-sharing arrangements, see Papagianni 2009; Gates and Strøm 2008; Spears 2002; Sawyer 2004. For security sector reforms, see Azam and Mesnard 2003. For consociationalism, see Lijphart 1969, 1977; and Andeweg 2000. 6. International Crisis Group 2008b; Friends Committee on National Legislation 2009. 7. Odendaal 2010; Ojielo 2007; UNDPA 2010a. 8. Seely 2001; Keita 1998; Straus 2010. 9. According to leadership development literature, the three qualities of effective leadership include the ability to set direction, including defining and vetting a vision among relevant individuals and groups; to create alignment, including coordinating the knowledge and work of a collective in ser- vice of this broader direction/vision; and to maintain commitment to this broader direction/vision, including through the expansion of the group’s efforts to achieve collective goals, not just individual goals. For more information about leadership theories, see Northouse 2008; Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy 2005; McCauley and Van Velsor 2004. 10. Knox 1996. 11. Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance 2010; WDR team consultation in Timor-Leste, 2010. 12. Dupuy and Binningsbø 2008. 13. de Waal and Flint 2008. 14. See Sapelli 2000. Other examples include Argentina, where under the Alfonsin administration, efforts to make more rapid progress in transitional justice within the security sectors were accom- panied by four coup attempts, a political crisis, and the subsequent more cautious approach to reform adopted by the Menem administration. See Addison 2009; de Greiff 2010. 15. WDR team interview with former president Álvaro Uribe, 2010; WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organizations, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010. 16. Jeffries and Thomas 1993. 17. Kimani 2008; International Crisis Group 2009d; Cheeseman and Tendi 2010. 18. Mack 2003. 19. WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organiza- tions, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010; WDR team consultation in Timor-Leste, 2010. 20. Walter 1997. 21. These include inter-clan pacts in Somaliland; traditional dispute resolution at a national level in Mali; the ceasefire agreement brokered by community action in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea; and the peace committees in South Africa. See also Menkhaus 2010; Bradbury 2008; Van der Graaf 2001; Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010; Carl and Garasu 2002. 22. Data on battle deaths in Uganda from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Harborn and Wallensteen 2010). Data on homicides comes from statistics based on LA County Sheriff ’s Department, California Department of Justice and Los Angeles Police Department, and compiled by the Los Angeles Almanac (Thornton and others 2011). 23. Anderlini 2010b. 24. Sirivi and Havini 2004. 25. Hunt and Posa 2001. 140 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 26. Las Madres de la Plaza first appeared as a distinct group on April 30, 1977, when 14 women de- cided to gather near the pyramid of the Plaza de Mayo in downtown Buenos Aires and demand that the repressive military regime disclose the whereabouts of their children who were abducted by the military due to their political ideals and associations and subsequently disappeared. Initially dismissed, then ridiculed, and later brutally persecuted, the ranks of Las Madres continued to grow and received recognition internationally for their nonviolent demonstrations in a society cowed into silence where all the traditional means of public expression, dissent, and protest were forbidden. Over time, the group of mothers transformed into a political movement and became a symbol of resistance against the military dictatorship. See Navarro 2001. 27. For instance, shaping a positive and inclusive relationship between citizens and the state has been an important part of Timor-Leste’s institutional and political agenda since 2007. The government has actively worked on improving its communication and engagement capacity; a relaxation of the country’s language policy (though most young Timorese speak Bahasa and very little Portuguese, the official language policy since 2000 mandated that Portuguese would be the national language of instruction and administration. This resulted in poor functioning of the civil service, a lack of development of media, and weak communication between the state and its people) is indicative of a general shift in the government’s approach. Simultaneously, the international community started to lend more consistent support to initiatives that promote dialogue (see Von Kaltenborn- Stachau 2008). 28. Hartzell 2006; Paris 2004. 29. Cadeado and Hamela 2009. 30. Cadeado and Hamela 2009. 31. U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007. 32. Agence France-Presse 1999. 33. See de Greiff 2010, 11: “How do transitional justice measures promote this sense of civic trust? Prosecutions can be thought to promote civic trust by reaffirming the relevance of the norms that perpetrators violated, norms that precisely turn natural persons into rights-bearers. Judicial insti- tutions, particularly in contexts in which they have traditionally been essentially instruments of power, show their trustworthiness if they can establish that no one is above the law. An institutionalized effort to confront the past through truth-telling exercises might be seen by those who were formerly on the receiving end of violence as a good faith effort to come clean, to under- stand long-term patterns of socialization, and, in this sense, to initiate a new political project around norms and values that this time around are truly shared. Reparations can foster civic trust by dem- onstrating the seriousness with which institutions now take the violation of their rights . . . vetting can induce trust, and not just by ‘re-peopling’ institutions with new faces, but by thereby demon- strating a commitment to systemic norms governing employee hiring and retention, disciplinary oversight, prevention of cronyism, and so on.” 34. Transitional justice approaches are defined by the UN as the “full range of processes and mecha- nisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, service justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms and individual prosecution, reparations, truth seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof ” UN 2004b, 4. See also Orentlicher 2004, 2005; UN General Assembly 2005a. 35. Gonçalve 2008. 36. Sirleaf 2007b. 37. Porter and Rab 2010. 38. See Kanungo 2004. 39. Sapelli 2000. 40. WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010. 41. Successful social cohesion policies require recognition of language and/or cultural practice in cases where a group perceives itself systemically excluded and disrespected. In so doing, care must be taken to avoid creating further fissures or entrenching practices that curtail the civil rights of women, caste groups etc. See Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock 2006; Gupta 1970. 42. Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 2010, 10. 43. WDR calculations based on data from the Latinobarómetro survey (1993–2008) and the Afroba- rometer survey (1999–2009). See Afrobarometer 2009; Latinobarómetro 2009. Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink 141 44. WDR team consultation with current and former leaders from conflict-affected countries and re- gions in Berlin, 2009. 45. The Politica Nacional de Rehabilitación (PNR) is a program of the Presidency of the Republic aimed at the establishment of peace; national reconciliation; and the normalization of areas af- fected by development imbalances, weakness in the institutional presence of the state, and social conflicts. See Presidencia República de Colombia 1993. 46. See Pavanello and Othieno 2008; Baird 2010. 47. Barron 2010. 48. The literature on community-driven development in situations of fragility and conflict is exten- sive; see, for example, Baird 2010; Cliffe, Guggenheim, and Kostner 2003. 49. Experimental evaluations of CDD programs are rare. One example is Fearon, Macartan, and Weinstein 2009, who carried out research on the impact of a community-driven reconstruction program in 42 communities in Liberia. “A field experiment in which villages in northern Liberia were randomly assigned to receive international development assistance provides evidence that the introduction of new local-level institutions can alter patterns of social cooperation in a way that persists after the program’s conclusion. Villages exposed to a community-driven reconstruc- tion program exhibit higher subsequent levels of social cooperation than those in the control group, as measured through a community-wide public goods game. These results are striking. They suggest that changes in community cohesion can take place over a short period of time; can occur in response to outside intervention; and can develop without fundamental changes either to the structure of economic relations or to more macro-level political processes. Random assign- ment of communities to treatment provides confidence in the causal nature of the relationship, and the use of behavioral outcome measures reinforces our sense that the effects are real. These findings suggest that post-conflict development aid can have a measureable impact on social cohe- sion” (Fearon, Macartan, and Weinstein 2009, 12). For a broader discussion of violent conflict and the transformation of social capital, see Colletta and Cullen 2000. 50. The randomized impact evaluation of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) is a multiyear study designed to quantify changes—across indicators such as economic activity, agricultural production, access to infrastructure and services, and structures and perceptions of local governance—in 250 “treatment villages” compared to those villages not participating in the NSP. The evaluation is being led by Andrew Beath of Harvard University; Professor Fotini Christia of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Shahim Kabuli of the World Bank, and Professor Ruben Enikolopov of the New Economic School, and is being implemented in conjunction with the Vulnerability Analysis Unit (VAU). It is being supported by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) of the Govern- ment of Afghanistan. For more information, see the National Solidarity Programme website: http:// www.nsp-ie.org/index.html. 51. Shura is an Arabic word for “consultation” or “council.” The word itself can describe an assembly, an organized body of participants, or an administrative body or council, or may describe a deci- sion-making process. In Afghanistan, tribal shuras have played an important role in community security and governance since the absence of a functioning government in 1978, and continue to play a pivotal role in the provision of justice. 52. Patel and Ross 2007, 43. 53. See Melville 2003. 54. Verhey 2001. 55. Carter and Clark 2010; Siddiqui 2011. 56. As noted in chapter 1, the WDR team asked the Norwegian research institute Fafo to conduct surveys in seven countries and territories, involving a mix of nationally representative samples as well as subregions affected by violence. One of the survey areas focused on the entity that should be responsible for providing public goods, such as reducing unemployment and protecting natio- nal security. The survey offered respondents a range of actors (the national government, private enterprises, traditional authorities, and so forth). In answering the question: “Who should be the main body/entity responsible for allocating land?” respondents as a whole (across the seven loca- tions—Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (North and South Kivu prov- inces), Mali, Sierra Leone, and the West Bank and Gaza) chose traditional leaders as the second most important entity for land allocation following national governments. In some countries (for instance, Côte d’Ivoire), the percentage of respondents who identified traditional leaders (57 per- 142 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 cent) actually surpassed those who identified the national government (30 percent). Of all the re- sponsibilities, land allocation (22 percent) was on average the most popularly identified area for traditional leaders, followed by protecting rivers and forests (6 percent). See Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. 57. Protocol-based school management system is a school management system in which control is decentralized. The government provides authorization for private entities (in most cases faith- based groups) to operate schools under specific government guidelines and regulations. These guidelines cover areas such as curricula, norms regarding class size, qualification and salaries of teachers, and system of assessment. 58. Baird 2010. 59. Contracting out is one mechanism for accountability between policy makers and service providers and tends to work better when both parties are focused on outcomes and keep the formal pro- cesses light. Effective monitoring and evaluation of results is essential to reward good performers and improve or replace those who are not doing a good job. See Baird 2010. 60. See, for example, Wood 2008, which shows how warring parties make use of networks at the sub- state level, and also how legacies of conflict are transmitted through these networks into political and military life, local identities and authority structures, gender roles, and political relationships. See also Peterson and Zuckerman 2010. Blattman charts the need for further micro-level research on the topic. See Blattman, forthcoming; Spear and Harborne 2010. 61. For a discussion about privatizing certain security functions in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and enforcement, see Gerson and Colletta 2002. 62. Gómez 2008; Meléndez 2007; Muñoz 2010; Arias 2009. 63. Nwana 2000, 1. 64. McCall 2004, 1. 65. World Bank 2010a. 66. Government of Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement 2005. 67. MSR 2009. 68. This amount represents only one-seventh of the amount provided for the tsunami reconstruction effort—even though the estimated economic cost of the conflict (Rp. 107.4 trillion) was almost twice the cost of damage and losses from the December 2004 tsunami (MSR 2009). 69. MSR 2009. 70. The MSR report hypothesizes that this could be because people who were employed during the conflict were more likely to be targeted or possibly that nonvictims are more likely to be students. Moreover, it is also likely that employment-generating projects that target conflict victims may miss non-victims who also need assistance (MSR 2009). 71. Barron 2010. 72. Barron and others 2009. 73. Morel, Watanabe, and Wrobel 2009. 74. Barron and others 2009. C hapter 5 describes the dilemmas of institutional trans- formation for resilience to violence. The first of these is about timelines: delays in a “too slow” reform process pro- long states’ vulnerability to violence. But lessons from the history of institutional transformation provide cautionary evidence that going “too fast” creates other risks of backlash. Countries that have addressed violence have sequenced reforms, frequently over a generational time period, to develop social consensus, and to allow their societies to absorb change and to develop their institutional capacities. The second dilemma is about the prioritization of institu- tional reforms. This chapter provides lessons from country reform approaches to security, justice, and jobs, as well as from wider issues like elections and corruption, on how experimentation, adaptation, and pacing can result in “best-fit” reforms that are adapted to the local political context. EXTERNAL STRESS CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS CHAPTER 5 TRANSFORMING TRANSFORMING IN ST TU TRANSFORMING I TI ON S IN IT ST UT IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs Pacing and sequencing • Transplanting outside “best practice” mod- institutional transformation els without putting sufficient time or effort into adapting to context (for instance, in P ent-up demands for change in frag- Iraq).2 ile and transitional situations, and • Adopting an output orientation that de- the importance of legitimate, ca- fines success in the de jure space in the pable, and accountable institutions capital city (for example, by passing laws, for violence prevention, mean institutional writing sector plans and policies, or creat- transformation is central to effectively link- ing new commissions or organizational ing security and development approaches. structures) and not an outcome orienta- This section of the Report describes lessons tion in the de facto world where people on the pacing, prioritization, and sequencing live (by improved services, even if basic, in of reform. insecure and marginalized rural and ur- ban areas), such as in Timor-Leste from Avoiding “too much, too soon,” and 2002 to 2005.3 finding the “best fit” • “Cocooning” efforts into parallel channels With deficits in the quality of governance in that facilitate short-run accomplishment many sectors in most fragile situations, the by bypassing national organizations and best approach may seem to be rapid, across- institutions, and undermine national in- the-board institutional transformation. But stitution-building in the longer term, as, the scope and speed of reform are themselves for example, in Afghanistan in 2001–03 risk factors—and attempting to do too much and to some extent afterward.4 too soon may actually increase the risk of Once national and local reformers have resumed conflict. The “too much, too soon” set priorities and sequenced their goals for syndrome leads to many of the symptoms transforming institutions, the next steps observed in difficult transitions such as the might seem straightforward. Out there some- following: where is the “state of the art,” the “best prac- • Overtaxing the existing political and social tice,” the “technically perfect” way. Common network capacity of national reformers (as sense says not to “reinvent the wheel” but to in the Central African Republic and Haiti adopt what works well. And so, national and in the early 2000s).1 international actors alike feel the temptation 146 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 5 .1 China’s approach to gradually piloting economic reform Ambassador Wu Jianmin, Chairman of the Shanghai Center for International Studies; WDR Advisory Council Membe r China’s economic reform and opening up to the outside The central government of China did not ask other prov- world policy has led China in the last 32 years to a strong inces to adopt the same reform. It wanted the good results of and steady growth. This policy generated a tremendous the reform to convince those hesitant provinces. The fact change in China. There are three key factors which made speaks louder than any argument. Three years later, Anhui China’s economic reform successful: bottom-up approach, province which practiced this reform enjoyed more food on gradualism, and a principle to pilot reforms and measure their plate. Gradually, other provinces followed suit. their impact before debating whether they should be At the beginning of China’s economic reform, people had national policy. very different views about it. Many people believed that the China’s economic reform started first in the countryside. reform underway was not in compliance with Chairman Mao’s In 1978 China’s urbanization rate was 17 percent. The over- teaching. The Chinese government under Deng Ziaoping whelming majority of the Chinese population was in the adopted a principle to pilot reforms and measure their bene- countryside. In 1978, 18 peasants from Anhui province, Xiao- fits before debating whether they should be national policy, gang village, decided to break away from the centrally- building on the change in thinking that had taken place after planned economy and signed a secret contract. In accordance the Cultural Revolution which aimed to “emancipate the mind” with this contract, they divided the land at their disposal into from divisive ideological debate. small pieces. Every peasant was responsible for his small To carry on successfully the reform, what we need most is piece of land and agricultural production. This contract pro- people’s support. We can get it only when reform brings tan- vided a powerful incentive for them to produce more food, gible benefits to the people. Step by step, a unified narrative so that they could enjoy a better return. The provincial gov- on development, based on results, was created. History proved ernment was very much supportive of this 18 peasants’ initia- Deng Xiaoping right, avoiding the division of the Chinese peo- tive. At the same time, in Guangdong province, some people ple into different camps, or engaging in an endless sterile started private business with the local government’s tacit debate and instead producing a real improvement in the peo- agreement. However, other provinces were very much skepti- ple’s welfare. cal about it. They believed that kind of reform was wrong, “capitalistic,” and incompatible with a socialist China. to apply off-the-shelf international best prac- own practical and feasible solutions adapted tices. But these practices are often designed to their particular set of available institutions for environments that are secure, have a high and capabilities. An example is China’s Town- degree of capacity in state institutions, and ship and Village Enterprises: These were not have functioning competitive markets. Envi- “private sector” firms at all. They were instead ronments of repeated violence are insecure, a transitional device that provided many of have institutional deficits, and generally have the functions of private sector firms (dyna- only partially functioning markets. So the mism, innovation, investment) without all the simple notion of “not reinventing the wheel” legal and institutional accoutrements private and just adopting best practice does not suc- sector firms need. So, rather than wait for the ceed nearly as often as one might hope. environment to be right for one institution An alternative is to focus on pragmatic, (private firms), the Chinese government cre- best-fit options adapted to political realities, ated a new form of enterprise (box 5.1). institutional capacity, and levels of insecurity. Countries successfully moving away from Early attention to basic functions of fragility or violence have adapted solutions citizen security, justice, and job creation from abroad to suit their context. The fact that simply copying does not work does not negate Chapter 2 underlined that the stresses associ- the value in learning from other country ex- ated with violence can occur in the security, periences. By so doing, countries create their justice, and economic arenas. The research Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 147 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 5 . 2 It takes time to build institutions. First things first—citizen security, justice, and jobs Minister George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Singapore; WDR Advisory Council Member It takes time to build institutions. Getting the urgent things allow profit to become a dirty word. Opening wide the portals done first, especially improving security, delivering basic to the outside world was a sine qua non—the sea port, the justice, and providing jobs, helps people to feel more hope- airport, telecommunications. Managing the politics of change ful about the future. Success then creates the condition for was always a challenge. At every step of the way, we had to further success. Without a practical approach, new institu- give hope to the population that tomorrow would be better tions cannot take root in the hearts and minds of ordinary than today. A long-term massive public housing program was people. For Singapore in the early years, being pragmatic launched with home ownership a priority. This gave every was not a choice but a necessity. Ideology was a luxury we household an equal stake in Singapore’s development. The could not afford. We had to do first things first and get our program was financed through a system of compulsory sav- priorities right. Then, as the economy took off and life got ings. A national focus was brought to the education system, better, we could be more refined and sensitive in public helping us to overcome racial and religious divisions. Having policy. We were fortunate to have many friends who wished to accommodate so many people on a small island, we had to us well and assisted us in ways big and small. develop skills in urban planning, including good public trans- In the first few years of independence, the priority was portation, traffic management based on pricing of scarce road on security, law and order, and creating favorable condi- space, and provision of green space so important for public tions for investment and economic growth. Confidence was morale. We studied the experiences of other countries and everything. National Service was introduced within a year. adapted them to our own situation. Secret societies and other criminal activities were sup- All this had to be done in a way that won majority support pressed. Corruption was progressively rooted out. To pro- at every general election. The key was winning the trust of the mote investment, labor and land acquisition laws were people. Institutions which endure are sustained by the respect reformed early. Against conventional wisdom in many and affection of the population. It is a process which takes at developing countries at that time, we eschewed protection- least a generation. Institutions are not built by merely passing ism and encouraged multinationals to invest. We did not laws or engaging consultants. on the stresses and institutional factors as- justice, and jobs. These interventions include sociated with risks of violence covered in those that deliver early results to build citi- chapter 2, country cases studies, and consul- zen confidence, which can either buy time for tations with national reformers all point to institutional reforms to take hold, or actively the importance of prioritizing the institu- support such reforms. Emphasis is also placed tions that provide citizen security, justice (in- on interventions that use best-fit institutional cluding control of corruption), and jobs to approaches that offer practical solutions to prevent a recurrence of violence and lay the given problems; they may be context-specific, basis for future reform.5 This prioritization but they demonstrate the adaptability of a is confirmed by findings of the Voices of the wide range of tools. Early actions and best- Poor project and the country-level surveys fit approaches are linked to priority reforms conducted for the WDR: people’s top prior- that can be undertaken with limited capacity, ity after basic security and law and order is even in fragile contexts. These are set apart their own economic survival.6 Prioritizing from reforms that would generally be applied security, justice, and jobs does not mean ad- more gradually as they require more funda- dressing all the wide-ranging functions that mental social, economic, or political shifts. will be needed in these areas as societies develop—but simply focusing on basic prog- Multisectoral approaches ress in these areas early in transitions from violence (box 5.2) The interventions in this chapter are pre- This chapter presents a range of practical sented for each domain—security, justice, interventions across the domains of security, and jobs and associated services—separately. 148 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 5.3 Coordinated political, security, and development responses to violence—Lessons from urban, subnational, and organized criminal violence in Latin America Multisectoral violence prevention programs suggest a way of bringing different actors together to address the complexities of violence. In rapidly urbanizing areas—not only in the developing world, but also in high- and middle-income countries—violence is character- ized by the convergence of a wide range of risk factors, including overcrowding, inequality, youth unemployment, and drug crime. While violence has traditionally been managed through the criminal justice sector and coercive responses, recent multisectoral approaches, particularly in Latin American cities, have demonstrated the benefits of a more integrated response. The approaches emphasize a balance between long-term structural prevention and control-oriented approaches and address a variety of stress factors simultaneously. The emphasis on local government and community engagement in design, implementation, and oversight has fostered better diagnoses of the drivers of violence and ensured stronger community ownership. The city of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, had a steep rise in homicide rates from 1997 to 2001. The victims and perpetrators of violence were often young men under the age of 24 living in slums. Preventive actions were implemented by the state government of Minas Gerais, in partnership with the city and nongovernmental organizations, under the program Fica Vivo, which targeted youth for social support, education, and sports. Social interventions were accompanied by a new form of policing that first captured sought-after crimi- nals and then installed a permanent community police element—gaining the trust and confidence of the population. An evaluation of the program in one of the targeted communities showed reductions of as much as 45 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants per semester compared with the rest of the city. Fica Vivo has a return on investment of 99–141 percent of the total cost of the program. In Bogotá, Colombia, between 1993 and 2002, a multisector strategy was credited with progress in combating urban violence. The strategy included campaigns to promote citizen disarmament and control of alcohol consumption; neighborhood crime-monitoring committees; family police stations to control domestic violence and reduce assaults on women; police reform measures; urban renewal efforts, such as the Transmilenio urban transport program; and employment programs. Evaluations showed that some of these inter- ventions resulted in sizable reductions in the levels of violent crime. For example, restrictions on gun carrying during weekends and holidays are credited with reducing the homicide rate by 14 percent. The urban renewal and transportation program, known as Trans- milenio, was credited in some of the most violent areas of Bogotá with reducing overall levels of crime and violence dramatically by 86 percent. Interventions related to the strengthening of the police force and interventions to alleviate the backlog of cases in the judicial system and speed up trials also had notable reductions in the levels of violent crime, with a 76 percent reduction in the assault rate.7 Source: Alvarado and Abizanda 2010; Beato 2005; Fabio 2007; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005; Duailibi and others 2007; Peixoto, Andrade, and Azevedo 2007; Guerrero 2006; Llorente and Rivas 2005; Formisano 2002; WDR team consultation with law enforcement, civil society, and Brian Center (Executive Director, A Better LA in Los Angeles), 2010. However, their combination, both within tive conflict resolution mechanisms). Brazil and across the domains, is both feasible and, and Colombia have established some of the in fact, desirable in most instances, as high- most intensive efforts to foster multiagency lighted in chapter 4. The interventions thus approaches, creating teams drawn from the should not be viewed in isolation but as military, police, and civilian service agencies part of a comprehensive approach to deliv- that work together in combined national ering results and transforming institutions. and local offices to address all aspects of lo- Specific multisectoral approaches bridging cal crime reduction and violence prevention these areas have generated promising results. (box 5.3). While programs of this kind are For instance, in rapidly urbanizing areas in demanding for interagency coordination, Latin America and the United States, where their results suggest that their underlying gang- and drug-related violence have resisted principles are worth considering in violence- “hard” policing efforts,8 there has been over affected areas in other regions. time a gradual shift toward multisectoral pro- grams of prevention at the community level. The programs combine short-term, quick- Citizen security impact programs (targeted policing, urban upgrading, and social service provision) Consolidating and coordinating security with longer-term preventive interventions services is a fundamental first step in insti- (changing cultural norms, building alterna- tutional reforms to prevent violence. For- Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 149 mer United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary- They also need to be accountable for General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean- their finances: civilian oversight can- Marie Guéhenno points out that, “Re- not work effectively where the security establishing trust between the people and the forces draw their sources of revenue off- state must therefore start with the core func- budget. Equally important, ensuring tion of a state, the capacity to assert its mo- that the security and justice sectors are nopoly on the legitimate use of force.”9 funded adequately and transparently is A state may have lost the monopoly over critical to stem the diversion of illegal the use of force because rebel forces or armed revenues from natural resources or traf- criminal groups operate in its territory with ficking to the security forces. Reforming impunity—but also because fragmented se- budget systems in the security services curity services within the state operate with- was part of the Colombian Democratic out overall coherence of command and con- Security Policy (box 5.4).13 Reducing trol, contradicting each other. In the West off-budget sources of finance (such as Bank and Gaza, prior to security reforms en- revenues from companies) was similarly acted in 2005, the Palestinian security forces important in Indonesia’s transformation had 12 divisions under multiple chains of of the role of the military in political command and multiple authorities, employ- life. Palestinian leadership eventually ing 40,000 people. This lack of monopoly of addressed the fragmentation of the se- force and clear lines of authority had the ef- curity forces by complementing political fect of increasing the potential for corrup- and security strategy with the use of tion and racketeering.10 The need to consider budget and payment systems to increase a coordinated approach on police and mili- accountability.14 tary reform is also recognized in the 2007 • Commit the military to improvements security sector reform framework of the in accountability and human rights. Un- Organisation for Economic Co-operation derdeveloped security forces deployed and Development–Development Assistance into intensified operations may end up Committee (OECD-DAC).11 accused of preying on civilians, as in the Civilian oversight of the security forces is Democratic Republic of Congo.15 Such important early on if security forces are to abuse is potentially disastrous for the be used in the national interest and prevent legitimacy of the state because it cuts to abuses. It involves links between political and the heart of the government’s obligation security strategy and public finances. Three to care for its citizens. key elements in successful civilian oversight are as follows: In post-conflict contexts, large security forces can be an unavoidable necessity in • Have political and military leaders discuss the short term, even if they are a drain on the mission of the security forces in sup- financial resources. The need to build trust porting national objectives. This occurred between erstwhile enemies may call for the in Colombia as part of the Democratic integration of the belligerent forces rather Security Policy (box 5.4). In contrast, little than their immediate disarmament, demo- dialogue was held in Timor-Leste between bilization, and reintegration (DDR). For 2000 and 2005 on the missions of the army instance, following the end of the Ugandan and the police, which some argue culmi- civil war in 1986 and subsequent agreements nated in renewed violence in 2006.12 between opposing forces, fighters were inte- • Use public finance systems to reinforce grated into the National Resistance Army civilian control. Obviously, security sec- before the demobilization and reintegration tor personnel need to be paid and ade- program, the Uganda Veterans Assistance quately equipped to perform effectively. Program, was launched in 1992.16 Similarly, 150 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 5 . 4 Colombia’s establishment of civilian oversight and the Democratic Security Policy Marta Lucía Ramirez de Rincón, Director, Fundación Ciudadanía en Acción; former Senator and Chair of Security Commission, Colombia; former Defense Minister and former Foreign Trade Minister, Colombia; WDR Advisory Council Member The challenge we faced in 2002 was preventing Colombia Having strengthened civilian control of the ministry, we from becoming a failed state. This meant shielding our citi- embarked on an unprecedented exercise in developing a zens from kidnapping and terrorism. It also meant protect- 10-year strategic plan with performance indicators against ing our infrastructure, roads, and democratic institutions which we could chart progress in implementing the presi- against attacks by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and dent’s security policy. As Minister of Defense, I brought in rep- drug traffickers. resentatives of the business community and academics of dif- President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy called for ferent ideological tendencies to provide input for the national the presence of the military and police over the entire terri- security policy. The goal was both to increase the legitimacy of tory of the nation within six months. This required not just the policy and to build confidence in the armed forces. This more people in the armed forces, but also providing them was the first time such consultations had taken place. I also with more equipment and better training in human rights called on entrepreneurs to let us use their experience to help and doctrine, so the police and military could operate suc- the government with procurement systems, logistics, and cessfully under a single command. It was also a result of state-of-the-art technologies. American cooperation through Plan Colombia, a program It is hard to put your finger on the precise reasons for our success. But over the past eight years we have won back con- initiated by the previous Colombian government, headed trol of the national territory. We have ended kidnapping on by Andrés Pastrana. our roads—in the so-called “Pescas Milagrosas.” And we have From the beginning, we stressed the importance of seen the number of terrorist organizations decline to the point greater civilian control over defense. We brought civilians where it would be hard to imagine their revival. Our focus now into the ministry to work with the military commanders on is on maintaining momentum. We must continue to pursue defense and security policy. This had the additional benefit the policies that have brought success in recent years. And we of greater transparency in budget allocations and the man- must go further by strengthening our institutions and ensur- agement of other resources used by the military. Civilian ing democratic civilian control of the armed forces whose engagement in budget planning with security force col- monopoly over the use of force is recognized and respected. leagues helped in the success of the Democratic Security Policy. WDR note: Why is it important to pay attention to the security and justice budgeting process? Security and justice are essential public goods that benefit development and poverty reduction. It is both appropriate and necessary for the state to allocate resources for the maintenance of security and access to justice. Attention must therefore be paid to the financial management of the security and justice sectors so that resources are used effectively and efficiently against agreed priorities in a transparent and accountable manner. Three crucial, inter-related components of managing security and justice expenditure are as follows: • As in other parts of the public sector, security and justice budgets should be prepared against sectoral strategies. Gov- ernments must be able to identify the needs and key objectives of the security and justice sectors as a whole and the specific roles that the various security and justice actors will be asked to play. • Resources must be allocated according to priorities both within the security and justice sectors and between security and justice and other sectors. Sectoral strategies and information on performance are critical components of the allocative process. The key financial and economic managers plus the legislature must have the capacity to be fully involved in this process, and the process must include all relevant actors. Security and justice must compete fully with other sectors for fund- ing. Public expenditure analysis that covers the whole of government can help provide information to inform this process. • Finally, resources appropriated must be used efficiently and effectively. This requires careful monitoring and evaluation of operational performance, both within the security and justice services and by civil servants. Basic well-functioning financial management information systems are critical in this regard. Additionally, it is extremely important that irregularities identi- fied in the course of monitoring are addressed, lest a climate of noncompliance be created or reinforced. The transparency of procurement processes is as important in security and justice as in other areas. Internal audit units or inspector-general functions within the defense, justice, and interior ministries can play important roles in ensuring effective resource use. Sources: Ball and Holmes 2002; Harbone and Sage 2010. Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 151 South Africa expanded the wage bill for se- • Vetting programs differ in terms of their curity services as a transitional measure.17 A targets. No transitional society has re- lack of alternative livelihood opportunities formed or vetted all institutions at the also argues for a cautious approach to DDR. same time and, in fact, rarely even a single In Colombia, many former Autodefensas institution at all hierarchical levels. Choices Unidas de Colombia (AUC) guerillas passed have to be made about both the institu- through a DDR process, only to reemerge tions where vetting will be applied and the as hired killers for the existing drug deal- positions within those institutions that ers or as leaders and operatives in new drug will be subject to screening. gangs.18 The “least-bad answer” between fis- • Programs differ also in terms of the screen- cal costs and security risks may be tolerat- ing criteria. What kind of abuses, precisely, ing an oversized security sector for a transi- tional period as a source of employment for is the system designed to root out? combatants who would otherwise have little • Not all programs are the same in terms of chance of finding work.19 the sanctions they impose; even firings can Guéhenno also notes that “Trust depends take place in many different ways (starting on legitimacy, but legitimacy is also a func- with a relatively mild one involving giving tion of effectiveness. A reformed security people the opportunity to resign without force needs to be perceived as professional. disclosing their participation in behavior Recruitment and vetting [are] probably the considered abusive). Vetting sanctions can single most important factor.”20 Dismantling involve different degrees of publicity and covert, abusive, or corrupt networks within also prospective limitations in seeking em- the security forces through recruitment or ployment in various sectors in the future.23 vetting has also been an important early re- form in many countries that have sustained Actions to reform the security services successful institutional transformations away during transitions are often combined with from violence. In Bosnia and Herzegovina deliberate decisions not to undertake ac- between 1999 and 2002, the United Na- tions that could threaten military support for tions Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina change. In Indonesia, for example, the role of (UNMIBH) vetted all law enforcement per- the military in civilian administration and in sonnel in the country.21 the economy was dramatically decreased, but The removal of abusers has often been little action was taken on past human rights achieved through indirect professionalization abuses. In Chile, civilian oversight, elimi- measures. For example, vetting in security nation of abusive security units, and some services was not conducted in Argentina, but prosecutions of past human rights abuses the requirement to accept nongovernmental were undertaken quickly, but initial prosecu- organization (NGO) submissions on past tions were targeted and limited in scope and abuses when confirming security appoint- military revenues were protected under the ments resulted in implicit “vetting out” of “copper law.”24 officers who did not want to face queries Attention to gender sensitivity and wom- over their past records. Both Chile and Ar- en’s full participation in security-sector re- gentina made use of the recruitment of grad- form can contribute to success.25 Women uates into the security forces and increased bring a more gender-specific value-added to emphasis on professional training to create broader security tasks, including enhanced an environment that furthered professional access to services by women, fewer incidents standards and made it difficult for abusers to of sexual misconduct, and greater trust of prosper.22 the civilian population in the security sector. Vetting programs can be strongly custom- Moreover, studies on policing have found that ized to context in three principal ways: female police officers use less force, are better 152 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 at defusing potentially violent situations, and tackled first to allow for quick wins. Harder facilitate community policing well.26 security concerns such as recovery and re- In Nicaragua, gender reforms of the po- moval of illicit weapons were addressed lice sector initiated in the 1990s resulted in once confidence was built in the process. the police being described as the most Interviews with residents show tangible “women-friendly” force in the region, hailed progress in reduction of minor security for its success in addressing sexual violence.27 breaches, as well as improved community- In a similar vein, the UN Mission in Liberia’s police relations and perceptions of secu- (UNMIL) all-female Formed Police Unit un- rity.32 Similarly, in the municipality of dertook joint crime prevention night patrols Hatillo in Costa Rica has applied commu- with local police in Liberia, helping them nity policing, involving community mem- overcome lingering suspicions of citizens bers in action plans for public safety. One whose trust in the uniform had been eroded year after implementation, the program’s by civil war.28 In Namibia, a Women and Child impact on delinquency was not signifi- Protection Unit was created within the police cant, but the feeling of insecurity decreased force to address the problem of domestic vio- from 36 percent of community members lence.29 In Sierra Leone, female victims had to 19 percent, and public perceptions of also been reluctant to come forward and seek the police improved.33 help from police. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone helped create a Family Support Unit • The private sector can support municipal within the police department that included governments and civil society in local female police officers. This more compassion- crime and violence prevention initiatives. ate environment for victims resulted in an in- The police pacification units in Rio de Ja- crease in reports on sexual violence, 90 per- neiro, Brazil, were started in late 2008 to cent of which came from women and girls.30 replace coercive, short-term interventions Citizen security can be addressed at both in favelas with a long-term police presence local and national levels. At the local level, in- and social services. The aim is to ensure volving communities and the private sector the consolidation of territorial control and can improve the relations between the state peace in the areas of intervention through and its citizens and thereby help prevent vio- the promotion of citizenship and develop- lence and conflict. Effective interventions in- ment, fully integrating these areas into the clude the following: larger city. The private sector helps finance the initiative, thus contributing to social • Community policing works by reducing and economic development in the pacified crime through community partnership. favelas.34 Working with community members, it identifies, responds to, and solves crimes • Communities have prevented and re- and other problems that affect the com- sponded to gender-based violence. The munity.31 Neighborhood policing is simi- European Union (EU) military operation lar to community policing. It aims to pro- in the Democratic Republic of Congo vide a visible police force that is citizen collaborated with local women’s organi- focused and accountable to community zations, which provided information on members, expressing local solidarity, in whom to contact regarding psychosocial, order to meet a community’s needs. For medical, and legal support whenever EU instance, community policing in Kosovo forces came across cases of sexual vio- brought together residents, municipal lence. The UN Mission there also orga- governments, and security providers to nized villagers to establish a community agree upon specific “community safety alarm scheme to warn against intruding plans.” Easier and less sensitive security forces committing violent acts, often problems such as traffic violations were against women.35 Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 153 It can be helpful to maintain long- established, functioning practices to help ad- B OX 5 . 5 Reform of the Haiti police force, even in difficult dress policing and public security, even if these circumstances are not very “technical” solutions. In Haiti, Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive noted Types of violence: Widespread crime and gang-related violence, militia activity, organized crime, drug trafficking that the country needs a modernized force with advanced technical equipment for large Transition moments: Major space for Key stakeholders: Government, change, new national and police lead- citizens, international partners, urban areas, which face sophisticated and ership, significant external support police highly violent networks of gangs and orga- nized crime. In rural areas, however, the tra- Key stresses: Legacy of violence and Institutional challenges: Weak mistrust, drug trafficking and orga- political, judicial, and security ditional rural police force operated effectively nized crime activities, low incomes, institutions; lack of accountability; in resolving small land and property disputes. youth unemployment, corruption low trust in security forces Establishing a force with sophisticated tech- nical equipment and a mission more suited The transformation of the Haiti National Police from the least to the most to urban areas “should not make the police trusted institution of the state over five years can be attributed to a reform plan feel that it is no longer their job to walk up of internal and external actors. Reform was viewed not only as an internal tech- the hill and resolve a property or family dis- nical activity, but first and foremost as a political process requiring the buy-in of Haiti’s leaders. Their political support ensured that financial resources were allo- pute before it escalates into violence.”36 cated to pay salaries and support day-to-day police operations. Another external Making security reform a top priority does factor was that the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), through its not mean fully comprehensive reform and military and police presence, contributed to internal security, allowing space modernization across all aspects of these sys- for a thorough police training program. With these critical external factors in place, the Haiti National Police (HNP), tems. Basic reforms that improve citizen secu- supported by MINUSTAH, professionalized the force, raised the morale of its offi- rity, and that prevent outright capture of the cers, and boosted public confidence. It implemented procedures to vet existing system, can enable reforms to move forward officers and recruit new ones. Including women in the police force was given a in other political and economic areas, allow- priority by both the government and police leadership. A strengthened internal affairs unit acted decisively in cases of wrongdoing, reinforcing the value of and ing more gradual comprehensive reform and need for officer integrity. A seven-month initial recruit training program (rather professionalization. Haiti’s police force pro- than the typical two to three weeks often seen in post-conflict environments) vides an example of progress in basic func- was implemented alongside other specialized training programs. Each officer tions and state-society trust in the security in- was properly equipped to undertake his or her policing functions and received regular salary payments. The police uniform, closely associated with the corrup- stitutions from a very fragile start (box 5.5). tion and human rights abuses of the past, was changed—both to prevent for- mer officers from using their uniforms for illegal activities and, more important, as a public symbol of the change in the police force. The HNP also strengthened Justice its management, delegated more authority to the field, and enhanced its admin- istrative and support functions. Criminal justice functions and dispute Haiti’s population has recognized the changes in the HNP: asked in 2009 resolution whether they had seen a change in police work over the past year, 72 percent reported a positive change, and 83 percent reported that the security situation Experience has shown that coordination in the country was either “a lot” or at least “a little” better than in the year prior. across justice agencies is critical to reduce Tested by floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and nationwide food riots, the service on each occasion has performed credibly. Immediately after the earthquake and impunity, and that effective linkages must aftermath of January 12, 2010, the police was the only arm of government seen exist between the police and other justice to be functioning in the streets of Haiti. institutions, including the judiciary, public Source: UNDPKO 2010a. prosecutors, and prisons, to address crime and violence.37 While the police force in Haiti post-2004 made impressive strides (see box 5.5), advances in the courts and prison sys- in illegal activities. By contrast, the rule- tem did not match the police force’s increase of-law reforms introduced by the Regional in capacity and legitimacy, so offenders were Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands often released back into communities with- (RAMSI) focused in parallel on police re- out due process and continued to engage forms, further developing a court system that 154 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 once had a good reputation and refurbishing building. In Latin America, innovative local the country’s prisons.38 In middle-income courts have been effective in bringing justice country contexts such as the transitions from to the population (box 5.6). military rule in Chile and Argentina, where Other approaches to increase access to accountability posed greater constraints than justice that have shown positive results in capacity, reform of security and justice ser- areas underserved by the formal system are vices proceeded at a more or less similar pace mobile courts and the use of paralegals. In and were mutually reinforcing (some early Nicaragua in the early 2000s, mobile courts changes, some more gradual).39 Conversely, and community-based paralegals were cred- as noted in chapter 3, in Colombia capacity ited with a 10 percent reduction in crime increases in the military and police were not where the scheme operated.45 The approach matched by similar increases in resourcing by Timap for Justice, a not-for-profit orga- and capacity within the courts, constraining nization offering free justice services in sites overall progress.40 across Sierra Leone, has also demonstrated Vetting of personnel, discussed above important results. Paralegals backstopped by in connection with the security forces, can lawyers have assisted communities to address also be crucial for judges and prosecutors. In disputes and grievances since 2003. Qualita- Bosnia and Herzegovina, three High Judicial tive research has shown that Timap’s inter- and Prosecutorial Councils (HJPC), made up ventions have empowered clients (especially of international and national personnel, re- women) to claim their rights. Community structured the court system and reappointed perceptions of institutional fairness and ac- all judges and prosecutors between 2002 and countability of the police, traditional lead- 2004. Almost 1,000 posts were declared va- ers, and courts also improved as a result of cant, and there was open competition to fill Timap’s work.46 Building on Timap, donors them.41 Indirect mechanisms have also been and the government of Sierra Leone joined used to improve professionalism in the jus- with nongovernmental organizations and tice sectors. In Chile following the transition community-based groups in 2010 to develop to military rule, rapid action on civilian over- a national approach to justice services, in- sight of the Carabinieri was combined with cluding a front line of community paralegals a reform to the promotion and confirma- and a smaller core of supporting lawyers. tion processes of judges, which encouraged Access to justice (and services) is often lower-level prosecutorial independence and denied to those who are not registered, and merit-based promotion to higher courts.42 registration initiatives can be an impor- In terms of capacity-building, a focus tant form of recognition of citizenship on basic administrative functions, replac- and community identity for marginalized ing of obsolete procedures, and targeting of groups.47 Organizations like the Commu- improvements in caseload processing have nity of Sant’Egidio, through its BRAVO tended to deliver better results than grand le- (Birth Registration for All versus Oblivion) gal and judicial reform plans.43 Governments program,48 the International Committee of and donors have often tended to sacrifice this the Red Cross, United Nations Children’s pragmatism in approaches to reform justice Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations High systems, favoring redrafting legal codes over Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as the administration of essential justice and well as nongovernmental organizations, have basic institution-building (as in Afghanistan supported national authorities in register- after 2001 and Iraq after 2003).44 Provision ing births in difficult contexts. Effective tools of local-level justice services is important to include putting specific provisions in peace maintain confidence in institutional reform agreements for birth registration and proper efforts, and partnering with communities or identification, utilizing community “report- civil society to do so can be an important link ers” such as midwives through mobile regis- between early results and later institution- tration programs, and combining birth regis- Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 155 B OX 5.6 Innovative court solutions in Latin America Twenty-four-hour courts—arraignment courts that hear complaints and review fresh evi- dence—show how criminal cases can be expedited. One example is the 24-hour court that was established in 2005 by the Supreme Court of Guatemala. This is an interinstitutional effort, with not only the judiciary, but also the Public Ministry, the Ministry of Government, the National Civil Police, and Public Defense Institute participating. Apart from operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, the 24-hour court availability has facilitated compliance by the police with the due process requirement of presenting detainees to a court within a six-hour limit. Over the first three years of the court’s operation, the number of cases it dismissed declined from 77 percent to under 15 percent. Nearly 50 percent of all arraignments ended in alternatives to detention, such as bail, house arrest, weekly presentations at the local court, or restrictions on travel. Drug consumption cases fell from over 30 percent to about 7 percent. And the courts made greater use of alternatives to trial. In flagrante delicto courts were established in Costa Rica in 2008 on a pilot basis in San José to reduce criminal case disposition times. They were set up within the existing legal frame- work, with no need for further legal reforms. Their purpose is to ensure due process guaran- tees in simplified procedures to handle cases where the defendant is caught in the act of com- mitting of a crime (that is, in flagrante delicto). These courts remain open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and operate with several shifts of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. The cases are turned over immediately to the prosecutors, who may request an immediate hearing with the judge to analyze alternative mechanisms, such as summary judgment or preventive detention. When the defendant and the public defender choose an expedited trial, it can take place immediately or be set in a few days. In Colombia, Justice Houses—integrated, multi-agency service centers—are used to solve con- flicts. These Justice Houses, first designed and implemented by USAID (the United States Agency for International Development) in 1995, have assisted over 7.8 million citizens since inception, mainly from low-income communities. There are now 50 well-staffed facilities throughout the country in urban and rural areas, some of which are regional in nature. Given their success in reducing local conflict and preserving peace, plans include the construction of 10 new Regional Justice Houses in partnership with the Ministry of Interior and Justice. Other social services include Peace Centers, which are expanded versions of Justice Houses where the community has access to programs that promote citizenship values, peaceful coexistence, and amicable solution of conflicts. The first Peace Center opened in December 2002 in Barrancaber- meja, one of the most violent areas in Colombia, and there are now 15 throughout Colombia. Sources: World Bank 2010i; USAID Guatemala 2008; USAID 2009b. tration with the provision of complementary communal disputes, even when and some- services such as immunization.49 times because it is titled—traditional insti- Supplementing formal justice with tra- tutions are widely held to be more reliable ditional community systems can be another in resolving conflict than the state.51 In Mali best-fit. Deep and comprehensive judicial in recent years, combinations of local tradi- reforms can rarely be achieved in the short tional institutions and the state have settled or medium term. One challenge of justice land disputes, with community groups ad- reform, then, is to create bridges between judicating between contestants, and all par- the formal and informal systems in the early ties then recording the judgment at the local stages of transitions. Traditional systems all prefecture.52 Informal women’s courts can over the world settle disputes over land, prop- also supplement formal structures, generally erty, and family issues. As many as 80 percent convened by civil society to allow women to of the people in today’s fragile states relies on recount abuses. Women’s courts have been nonstate actors for various forms of security used in Guatemala for abuses during the civil and justice.50 For instance, in Kenya—where war, in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon land is frequently a source of private and for rapes during the 1982 Sabra and Shatila 156 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 massacres, and in Japan around issues of corruption reformer on several global action- World War II “comfort women.”53 able governance indicators, such that 78 per- The lesson here appears to be to use a cent of Georgians felt that corruption had process of recognition and reform to draw decreased in the last three years, the best result on the capacities of traditional community among the 86 countries surveyed.56 structures and to “pull” them gradually in Private and international capacity can the direction of respect for equity and inter- supplement state systems in applying best-fit national norms. One such example is Timor- approaches to fight corruption in fragile Leste’s blending traditional customary law situations. Liberia recognized it lacked the provisions into the formal legal system. In capacity to properly oversee its national for- Timor-Leste after independence, a de facto estry industry in the post-conflict period and hybrid system emerged, where local justice turned to nonstate capacity to ensure reve- mechanisms continued to function in parallel nue recovery from logging (under former to the formal legal system. The main reasons president Charles Taylor, less than 15 percent for confidence in the traditional system were of taxes owed from forestry revenue were col- that it resolved conflicts according to cul- lected) and to safeguard against money from tural norms and heritage (51 percent of sur- sale of illegal wood being laundered through vey respondents) and was less expensive and the legal supply chain. The government con- more effective than the formal justice system tracted a private inspection company to build (38 percent of survey respondents).54 As the and operate a system to track all timber from formal justice system gained capacity, rather point of harvest through transport to sale, than attempting to entirely displace this in- with an agreement to transfer the system formal system, the government in 2009 began back to the government after seven years. The a nationwide public consultation on the legal system ensures the government collects all recognition of customary law processes, as revenues because it will not issue an export envisioned under the constitution. Customary permit until the Central Bank confirms that penalties, such as financial compensation, are all taxes have been paid.57 Similarly, both In- being incorporated into the formal legal code. donesia and Mozambique have used private The process has also involved a debate on the sector customs collection agencies to help in- tensions between formal and customary ap- crease efficiency in an area that is always proaches applied to such crimes as rape.55 highly vulnerable to corruption.58 Transparency of budget and expendi- ture information is an easy change to put in Corruption place early on, and can be crucial to stem Justice is also concerned with ensuring equi- illegal flows of funds into violent activi- table access of citizens to the state’s resources, ties. For example, Timor-Leste’s Petroleum that is, it is concerned with corruption. In Law, which came into effect in 2005, was Georgia, the Saakashvili government that was established very early in the transition to swept up to power by the Rose Revolution of independence. It establishes a high degree 2003 cracked down on corruption in the pub- of transparency over funds and recom- lic sector after 2003 by better disclosing public mends that the government only withdraw officials’ assets, strengthening whistleblower amounts up to what is needed to maintain protections, and improving public financial the capital value of the country’s oil assets.59 control and procurement measures. In addi- The framework for petroleum revenues has tion, it criminalized active and passive bribery, remained robust and protected national as- enforced its criminal legislation and created sets, even during a bout of renewed inse- the Anti-Corruption Interagency Council, curity in 2005–06, and is supplemented by tasked with developing and implementing a open reporting to parliament and the public new national anti-corruption strategy. Three on expenditures in each ministry, including years later, Georgia ranked as a top anti- the security sectors. Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 157 Local community and civil society or- ary transfer appropriation for the president’s ganizations can also combat corruption. office was virtually eliminated, with these “Social accountability” approaches draw on funds instead transferred to service ministries the incentives for citizens and communities (Health, Education, and Social Affairs).63 to monitor the expenditures most directly Private sector enterprises can also estab- affecting their welfare. These tools include lish their own pragmatic, best-fit procedures citizen report cards, community scorecards, to deal with the risk of corruption, even in participatory public budgeting, and pub- weak institutional contexts (box 5.7). lic expenditure tracking surveys, as well as community-driven development approaches where expenditures are publicized transpar- Jobs ently at the local level. In fragile situations, Private sector recovery such social accountability tools can contrib- ute to building citizens’ trust in the state at Alleviating key bottlenecks identified by the national and local levels.60 The results can the private sector can help to restore confi- be significant. In the Kecamatan Develop- dence by signaling to entrepreneurs a more ment Program in Aceh, Indonesia, 88 per- business-friendly environment generating cent of the population surveyed believed that economic revival and setting the stage for the program funds had been properly ad- broader reform. An early emphasis on sim- ministered and spent on what they consid- plification of business regulations—rather ered most important.61 In Madagascar, com- than expansion or refinement—has proved munity monitoring in the health sector (via effective. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the community scorecards) led to a 10 percentage “Bulldozer Initiative” of 2002, and subse- point increase in consumer satisfaction with quent “guillotine” initiatives by the entity health services (from 39 percent to 49 per- governments, mobilized the local business cent) in as little as four months. Scorecards community to lobby for the elimination also helped improve the regularity of salary of significant bureaucratic impediments to payments and interactions between users, private sector growth. The Bulldozer Initia- health staff, and village administrators.62 tive delivered 50 reforms aimed at eliminat- Determined reformers, supported by ing excessive bureaucratic steps in 150 days, equally determined international partners, improving the investment climate.64 Selective can achieve important gains in public ac- legal amendments that permitted freer trade countability and transparency, even in dif- and simplified inward investment have also ficult circumstances (box 5.7). In 2002 the produced early successes. Similarly, in 2001, Palestinian Authority embarked on a reform as part of a strategy for private sector–led de- of its public financial management system velopment, Rwanda overhauled its contract and in less than two years achieved several enforcement regime, long an impediment to notable improvements. All revenue payments investment. Domestic business registrations were centralized into the central treasury ac- increased at 10 percent a year from 2001 to count, eliminating previous discretionary 2004, driving formal sector growth of 6 to and non-transparent spending by line min- 7 percent in 2003 and 2004.65 istries. The Department of Supplies and In violent situations, where business con- Tenders in the Ministry of Finance assumed fidence is very low, however, creating the full jurisdiction over all purchases (above the right environment for businesses is often not threshold value of US$15,000) by ministries enough to attract investment; more direct in- and agencies, including the Security Finan- tervention is needed for the private sector to cial Administration. Salary payments to secu- play its catalytic role. One approach is to sup- rity personnel were made directly into their port value chains.66 Links between produc- bank accounts instead of the previous cash ers, traders, and consumers can unravel with handouts. And the previous large discretion- violence, eroding trust between social groups. 158 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 5 . 7 Experiences in countering corruption Flexible and robust mechanisms for combating corruption in the private sector Mo Ibrahim, Founder, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel; WDR Advisory Council Member When I founded Celtel in 1998 to build and operate mobile on the ground with invaluable protection and cover. It indeed phone networks across Sub-Saharan Africa, well-meaning enhanced financial discipline throughout the operations. The friends, shaking their heads in disbelief, told me two things: wonderful support of our board members and their commit- You will not succeed because there is no potential market ment to respond quickly to any unpredictable funding require- for this new technology in this poor continent and you must ments was crucial. In fairness to African officials, the number of be prepared to bribe every decision maker, at every level. incidents where our people came under pressure to pay was far Well, Celtel was indeed a tremendous success. Africa less than we had expected. On the three occasions we did resort proved to be the fastest growing continent for mobile to legal action in local courts, we won every single case. The phones. As for corruption, I did two simple things. First, I valuable lesson I learnt was that corporate governance pays and established a powerful and prominent company board. it enhances your bottom line. It is not enough for company Then we decreed that any payment, initially above US$30,000, boards to make grand statements on corruption. Until and must be board approved. unless they put in place the policies that enforce and support This decision proved to be crucial to enforce the anti- their managers on the ground, their pronouncements will bribery stand of the company and provided our managers remain an empty attempt at discharging their fiduciary duties. Making anti-corruption institutions effective in Rwanda after the genocide H.E. Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda; WDR Advisory Council Member In the early post-genocide period, Rwanda’s recovery efforts A vital lesson drawn from our experience is that institution- were focused on stabilization, restoring security, fostering building and appropriate laws are imperative. Nonetheless, social trust, and rebuilding and reforming political institu- making institutions and laws work effectively is often more dif- tions, as well as laying the foundations for economic recov- ficult. In our context, the commitment to fight corruption was ery and growth. Three years after the genocide and civil an important priority for the incoming Government in July war, work on institution-building to restore virtue and fight 1994. A zero-tolerance policy resulted in the resignation or corruption began in earnest. Such efforts included the cre- dismissal of holders of public office, among others, including ation of the Rwanda Revenue Authority, Ombudsman’s some members of the Government of National Unity. Action Office, Auditor General’s Office, National Public Prosecution was taken in this respect, by Parliament and the Executive, to Authority, National Police and the Rwanda Public Procure- enforce the notion of political accountability at a critical ment Authority, among others. These were complemented moment in our history and has nurtured increasingly effective by legislative measures such as the Organic Law on the governance institutions. This has been reinforced by a contin- Leadership Code of Conduct, all of which were in place prior ued policy of consistently prosecuting corrupt officials. Upon to the development of long-term economic strategies, thus reflection, it is clear that action against high-level officials, dem- ensuring that our fragile economic development was not onstrating that no one is untouchable, was critical. A continued wasted away through theft and greed. strong public support for the anti-corruption effort was and is still of utmost importance, as this remains a work in progress. Restoring these connections by bringing to- grants for new market development that ex- gether market actors and providing infor- ploit the private sector’s capacity to innovate mation about market trends can create jobs and help entrepreneurs develop new product and rebuild social cohesion.67 It also provides lines while sharing the risk of investment.68 local businesses with legitimate new market connections as an alternative to illegal activi- Investment in basic infrastructure ties, as with the Kosovo dairy and Rwandan coffee sectors (box 5.8). An approach that Domestic and international investors need is promising for new market development, basic infrastructure. Electricity emerges as even in fragile environments, is matching a key constraint to recovery efforts by the Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 159 B OX 5.8 Value chain development in Kosovo and Rwanda Kosovo Types of violence: Civil conflict; ethnic violence; political, criminal, and gang-related violence Transition moment: Large space for change, declaration of Key stakeholders: Farmers, private sector, ethnic groups, statehood, national and municipal elections, new constitution municipal and national government, Serbian government, regional and international partners Key stresses: Unemployment, legacies of violence and trauma, Institutional challenges: Accountability and capacity constraints corruption, ethnic divisions, trafficking, unemployment, low in public and private institutions, destroyed infrastructure, legacy incomes of exclusion Dairy is a traditional consumer product in Kosovo. In the 1990s, the command production system broke down and cooperatives dis- solved. Many families became self-sufficient units, producing to meet their own consumption needs and trading surplus for other goods and services. The conflict of 1998–99 destroyed much of the production base, damaged infrastructure, displaced people, wid- ened ethnic divisions, and eroded Kosovars’ trust in each other and their government. Shortly after agricultural production and eco- nomic activity resumed in Kosovo, donors began working with value chain participants to upgrade the dairy industry. Value chain implementers worked first with individual farmers to make no- or low-cost changes to improve yields and quality, then expanded their reach by working with larger groups and associations. Thereafter, they steered farmers toward commercial channels, helping them fur- ther upgrade their processes to improve productivity and quality and to rebuild links with processors. In parallel, they worked with pro- cessors to orient them to end markets and, based on demand, to upgrade their processes and products to improve quality, expand production, and increase market share. By working from the micro to the macro as Kosovo moved from relief to development, donors and implementers supported upgrading and sustained growth in the dairy sector. In just over three years, for example, the Kosovo Dairy Value Chain project boosted domestic sales by €36 million and added 624 new jobs following an investment of €3.9 million. The impact on social cohesion is unclear. While a dairy board was set up that explicitly included both ethnic Albanians and Serbs, there was no evidence as to whether the board had a direct impact on participation of different ethnic groups or increased cooperation between ethnic groups. Rwanda Types of violence: Genocide; political, communal, and cross-border Transition opportunity: Large space for change post-genocide Key stakeholders: Smallholder farmers, private sector, government, international partners Key stresses: Intercommunal tension and ethnic divides, Institutional challenges: Severe accountability and capacity continuing security threat—mistrust/fear, trauma and legacy of constraints in judicial, security, and political institutions—public abuse, return of refugees and IDPs (internally displaced persons) and private; legacies of communal suspicion and violence Coffee, grown mostly by subsistence farmers, has long been an important source of income in rural areas and foreign exchange for the Rwandan economy. But the war and genocide of 1994 had a devastating effect on the coffee sector due to loss of life and the destruction or neglect of coffee trees. By 1996, coffee production was only about half the 1993 level. Between 2002 and 2006, the USAID (United States Agency for International Development)-funded US$5 million Agribusiness Development Assistance to Rwanda project boosted export-ready coffee production and created several thousand seasonal jobs. Traditionally, farmers depulped and washed their cherries by hand before selling them to traditional exporters of semiwashed coffee. Modern stations now encourage farmers to sell them unwashed cherries, since they can process them more efficiently with modern equipment. By selling directly to the station rather than through intermediaries, the farmers are paid more per pound while avoiding the tedious hand labor. The result has been tremendous. Between 2000 and 2006, the country went from producing 18 tons of fully washed coffee to 940 tons. There is also some evidence that greater economic security among participants in the coffee value chain is also linked to lower ethnic distance, lower distrust toward other ethnic groups, and a tendency toward conditional forgiveness. Sources: USAID Rwanda 2006; Boudreaux 2010; Grygiel 2007; Parker 2008; Chuhan-Pole 2010. 160 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 private sector in fragile environments—but design assumes away violent conflict: the tech- comprehensive reform of the electricity sector nically perfect design is particularly susceptible is made difficult by insecurity. Based on the to disruption, takes a long time to build, and World Bank Group’s Enterprise Surveys, the is difficult to defend. Restoration of electricity number one business environment constraint in Lebanon demonstrates both the positives faced by firms working in conflict areas is and the negatives of a best-fit approach to lack of electricity.69 A state-of-the-art electri- reform and institution-building in the elec- cal grid typically has fewer generators (be- tricity sector, which is also critical to private cause of the economies of scale to genera- sector job creation. An alternative best-fit tion, bigger is better) that are located far from system gave nearly all households access to consumers (since fuel sources—coal, natural power, but at higher costs in the long term gas, hydro—can be expensive to move). That (box 5.9). BOX 5.9 Technically less than perfect, but robust to circumstances: Best-fit electricity provision in Lebanon Types of violence: Civil war, sectarian violence Transition opportunity: Space for rapid reconstruction and Key stakeholders: Citizens, government, private sector, confidence building, but continued instability and threat of sectarian interests, governments of neighboring countries, violence international partners Key stresses: Corruption, sectarian competition, legacies Institutional challenges: Weak institutional capacity for public of violence, cross-border conflict spillovers, regional political service provision, tenuous inclusion arrangements involvement By the time the Ta’if Accord (1989) put an end to civil war (1975–90), Lebanon was marked by widespread destruction of infrastructure and a climate of instability. At the time, little public confidence existed in the state and its institutions to deliver basic services. The electricity sector had suffered heavily during the war from extensive destruction and the significant reduction of payment collections. Despite this, most Lebanese people still benefited from some access to electricity during the war and in the initial stages of recovery— and continued to do so in subsequent periods of instability. Already during the war, the bulk of electricity was provided by the private sector in the absence of a functioning public sector. A mix of individual and collectively owned electricity generators, run by a few formal and many informal private businesses, became an established part of the utility market. The ability of the private sector to fill the void left by a flawed public service owed much to an open and unregulated economy—and a strong culture of entrepreneurship. Even after the end of the civil war, the private sector remained a critical energy supplier. Privately sold generators continued to supply electricity (primarily during blackouts) to both households and businesses and often covered whole neighborhoods. By 1994, for example, 98 percent of businesses and 95 percent of households were estimated to have received round-the-clock electricity, with a signification portion from private sources. Although small-scale private capacity filled a void left by a lack of public sector engagement, the small, unregulated, and private provision of electricity has serious economic and environmental drawbacks as a long-term system. Private generation costs Lebanese households nearly twice as much as public generation. And the public electricity sector has yet to be reformed. State subsidies to the sector in 2007 were estimated to have reached 4 percent of the country’s GDP. Lebanon’s electricity sector thus illustrates the benefits of best-fit approaches during periods of crisis, but also the need to exit them over time to prevent long-term inefficiencies. Given the electricity crisis during reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the question arises as to whether a best-fit, short-term solution could have been found. Iraq opted to rebuild its national electricity grid, but lack of progress in such a massive undertaking has left the proportion of unmet demand for electricity largely constant since 2003, at 40–50 percent. Did the political, economic, and security con- text in Iraq create an enabling environment for a private sector–led solution? In 2003–04, several Lebanese companies started estab- lishing secondary neighborhood grids in Baghdad, supplied by small, private electricity generation. The Government of Iraq also con- sidered policies to promote small, private generation in 2005, recognizing its own lack of capacity to meet demand in the short term. However, the deepening security crisis in Baghdad, including active campaigns to target small private power suppliers, preempted this approach. In comparison to Lebanon, Iraq’s weaker tradition of private entrepreneurship and record of effective public service delivery into the 1990s may be additional reasons for the lack of emergence of privately generated electricity in the past decade. Sources: World Bank 2008f, 2009d; Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Environment 1999; UN Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit 2010. Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 161 Road rehabilitation is another infrastruc- successes and has generated 12.4 million la- ture investment critical to both private sec- bor days building or rehabilitating more than tor recovery and employment generation. It 10,000 kilometers of roads through 2010 in can aid both directly, by using local contrac- all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.75 tors and applying labor-intensive methods, But labor-intensive public works are rarely and indirectly, by facilitating access to mar- sustained in fragile situations. These pro- kets. For instance, in Afghanistan, the Salang grams commonly are donor financed, and do- tunnel—the only pass connecting Kabul to nors prefer short durations, between two and northern Afghanistan that is in use through- three years. Alternatives to short-term inter- out the year—was reopened for traffic within ventions could be labor-intensive public works weeks of the 2001 Bonn agreement after a programs in rural areas that are seasonal or four-year blockage, cutting travel time from vary in intensity between the seasons, to com- 72 hours to 10.70 In the Democratic Repub- plement employment in agriculture (and that lic of Congo, the construction of a bridge could be integrated into community-driven linking two cities, Kikwit and Tshikapa, had development programs; see chapter 4), or similar effects. Travel time was cut to a few programs that are linked to a longer-term hours, as opposed to the previous five days, national strategy, such as the Feeder Roads lowering the prices for food, fuel, and most Program in Mozambique, in operation since other commodities imported to the diamond 1981, and India’s long-term National Rural city of Tshikapa from the agricultural zones Employment Guarantee scheme.76 For pub- of Kikwit and surrounding cities.71 lic works programs to be successful, evidence suggests that it is important to have clear objectives (for instance, aimed at addressing Public finance for employment and one-time shocks or poverty), to select projects other “best-fit” approaches that can create valuable public goods, and to Regulatory reform and infrastructure invest- ensure predictable funding.77 ments often take time to deliver jobs, how- Providing (short-term) jobs needs to be ever. Governments aiming to generate em- complemented by enhancing skills and em- ployment in insecure areas may need to ployability. Low skill levels—especially of provide an initial “bridge.”72 A 2009 World young people like former gang members and Bank review of labor-intensive programs in combatants—constrain their opportunities 43 low- and middle-income countries in the for sustainable employment. International past 20 years finds that well-administered experience has shown that traditional voca- programs can have a substantial impact on tional training programs without clear links the welfare and nutrition of poor beneficia- to the labor market, though frequently im- ries, and that it is feasible to operate such pro- plemented, are ineffective.78 A more promis- grams on a large scale—as with Ethiopia’s ing intervention is traditional apprenticeship Productive Safety Net Programme (7 million programs and programs that include work beneficiaries in 2006) and India’s National placement opportunities.79 Rural Employment Guarantee Act.73 Labor- For those who did not complete primary intensive programs in fragile and violent set- education, second-chance programs (such as tings can be a quick win for stabilizing a high- education equivalency or life skills training) risk situation; examples include sporadic are an important stepping stone to further employment initiatives in the Gaza Strip since education, training, and employment oppor- the 1990s and the Liberian Emergency Em- tunities. Second-chance programs can have a ployment Plan, which created 90,000 jobs positive impact on at-risk youth, both directly within two years.74 Afghanistan’s National (which increases their chances of acquiring Emergency Employment Program, now employment and receiving higher wages) known as the National Rural Access Program, and indirectly (by providing them with in- was expanded across the country after early formation and skills to make good decisions, 162 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 giving them better prospects for a successful services such as M-Paisa in Afghanistan),87 life, and consequently reducing their chances and lack of appropriate training (which of engaging in risky behavior).80 Conditional needs to be designed for those with limited cash transfers could be linked to programs education and also stress basic skills such as that focus on preparing both offenders and literacy and numeracy). In order to be effec- communities for offenders’ reintegration, tive and avoid indebting poor households, through technical and life skills training and self-employment assistance programs need links to employment opportunities,81 such as to address all these constraints and not be YouthBuild International, which is active in limited to providing financial assistance.88 over a dozen countries and supports youth Despite the popularity of self-employment for a period of up to 24 months.82 programs in fragile and stable settings, evi- Support to agriculture in violence- dence is scarce, however. The evidence (for affected countries is also essential. Together middle-income countries) shows that self- with the informal sector, agriculture is the employment programs can significantly in- most likely source of jobs in many conflict- crease the probability of young participants affected situations.83 Even in a relatively ad- finding jobs, at least in the short term. But vanced economy, such as Bosnia and Herze- the cost-effectiveness and the longer-term ef- govina, informal employment is estimated fects still need to be proven.89 to account for more than one-third of total Asset expansion programs have also employment,84 and agriculture is an impor- helped in some successful transitions from tant income provider. There, for example, violence—such as land reform in the Re- self-employment in agriculture was suc- public of Korea and Japan,90 and housing cessfully supported for many demobilized programs in Singapore (see box 5.2). Land soldiers who chose to reintegrate in rural ar- reform contributed to post-conflict stability eas and engage in small-scale farming. They in those countries and, when combined with received livestock and equipment (with a policies that favored agricultural growth and minimum holding period to ensure that they exports, set the stage for high rates of eco- would not be sold on the market) and coun- nomic growth in succeeding decades. These seling, which enabled them to reestablish positive experiences have proved difficult to their livelihoods.85 A wide range of activities replicate though, due to political resistance can support this sector, including strengthen- and institutional capacity weaknesses.91 A ing agricultural services, providing local ex- different type of program to help violence- tension programs that combine input supply affected communities reestablish livelihoods with training on basic business skills, restor- and restore lost assets is, very simply, transfer- ing rural roads, improving the agribusiness- ring funds directly to citizens to support their enabling environment, improving land and recovery. This may be done by government water management, and organizing farmers transfers, as with transitional payments to into associations to connect them to com- demobilized ex-combatants in Angola, Mo- modity buyers and agricultural credit. zambique, and Rwanda—or Timor-Leste’s Supporting self-employment is another cash payments to internally displaced people best-fit approach to creating jobs and gen- and veterans. Such programs can provide a erating incomes.86 The main constraints to sense of justice for populations previously self-employment include the lack of market- excluded from state attention. There is a creating infrastructure that brings trade into common perception that corruption or leak- rural areas, lack of electricity that allows the age is more likely in a cash transfer program, use of higher productivity technology, lack but years of practice have highlighted proven of formal marketplaces and workplaces, high safeguards to reduce leakage.92 local taxes and fees, lack of access to informal Temporary labor migration to neighboring savings and financial services (which could countries or farther abroad can provide job be alleviated by the use of mobile financial opportunities for skilled and unskilled labor- Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 163 ers from fragile or conflict-affected countries their communities. Women can be actors in and requires few reform elements. Successful violence; for instance, in El Salvador and Eri- examples include the Russia Federation’s aid trea, nearly a third of the combatants were for the post-conflict Tajik regime,93 and the women.96 But far more often, violence up- various migration streams for Pacific Islanders roots women’s lives and livelihoods, as chap- especially to Australia and New Zealand.94 ter 1 described. Aiding women to recover Such measures include fixed annual migra- socially and economically from violence not tion quotas, temporary seasonal employ- only benefits the women themselves, but also ment, skilled and professional workers pro- their families and communities. For exam- visions, and education scholarships. Labor ple, in El Salvador, involving former women migration can diffuse some of the pressures guerrillas in land reform led to the inclusion on the labor market and generate remittances of both men and women as beneficiaries, en- that can be used for social and economic ex- suring that grievances on these issues would penditures like schooling or business start-up not later affect the post-conflict settlement.97 capital. Well-designed bilateral schemes can A different example of economic empower- thus deliver important economic gains but ment, from Nepal, demonstrates how well also mitigate the economic and social costs thought out projects can produce small but for sending and receiving countries.95 significant social shifts within just a few years (box 5.10). Engaging women in economic activities Economic empowerment of women in fragile and post-conflict countries is not, Involving women in economic initiatives can however, without challenges. Women face generate jobs and income and lay the basis limited mobility and physical access to mar- for longer-term empowerment, as well as kets, incomplete access to market informa- enable them to contribute to the recovery of tion, and restricted access to credit and other B OX 5.10 Economic empowerment of women: Women’s Empowerment Program in Nepal Types of violence: Civil conflict, interethnic and political violence, criminal violence, trafficking Transition opportunities: Modest space for change: “palace Key stakeholders: Federal and local government, civil society killings” and stepped-up Maoist campaign in 2001 groups, marginalized ethnic groups, international partners, regional neighbors Key stresses: Legacies of violence and trauma: social, political, Institutional challenges: Feudal structures and associated and economic inequality; youth unemployment; corruption; exclusion; accountability and capacity constraints in public human rights abuses; rising expectations of formerly administration, security, judicial, and political institutions; unrepresented groups lack of inclusion of women Women in Nepal have suffered disproportionately from the decade-long civil war and the continued waves of political, criminal, and ethnically driven violence, including in the country’s southern Tarai region. Women are among the poorest population groups; their traditional social and economic networks were severely affected and many became heads of households as a result of the conflict, and their educational attainment is significantly below that of men. In this context, empowerment of women is especially critical in engendering sustainable economic growth and human development, as well as signaling a break from the past. The Women’s Empowerment Program provided cost-effective training and support to 6,500 groups of 130,000 members in the Tarai from 1999 to 2001. Its impact on the lives of the participating women has been encouraging. Almost half of the women who participated in the program gained a level of literacy, and two-thirds of the women started a business since joining it, thus having an independent source of income for the first time. When 200 groups were asked how the program had changed their lives, they most frequently mentioned gaining self-confidence and an enlarged sphere of influence in the household, followed by learning to read and being accorded more rights. Source: Ashe and Parrott 2001. 164 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 financial services, and they are also subject political, or military influence at national to restricting attitudes and systemic gender and local levels are unlikely to succeed in discrimination and exclusion through unfa- their broader objectives. Initial transitions vorable legislation.98 These obstacles are not to multiparty elections have been shown insurmountable, however. Efforts as varied to increase the short-term chances of con- as promoting women’s access to finance and flict, even though countries with very robust helping financial institutions to bank on democratic institutions lower their risks of women entrepreneurs profitably (such as violence in the long term.100 Elite coopera- in Afghanistan), establishing baselines with tion may require prior steps to build trust a gender focus on helping the government and confidence, such as those undertaken in formalize women’s participation in national South Africa.101 In contrast, leaders lacking reconstruction efforts (for instance, in Libe- trust in “winner-take-all” scenarios may ma- ria), promoting training and business men- nipulate outcomes and protests, which can toring opportunities that reach women en- trigger serious violence—as in Iraq in 2005 trepreneurs (in Iraq and Jordan), and using and Kenya in 2007.102 Holding elections be- legal reform initiatives to ensure that existing fore a reasonable degree of security has been gender-discriminatory legislation is revised achieved, and a non-coercive environment and that new legislation provides a level play- established for polling, makes little sense ing field for women (as in the Democratic (box 5.11). Republic of Congo) can be effective tools to Where conditions of trust and security do make the gender balance less unfavorable not indicate that rapid elections will deliver to women.99 increased legitimacy, other options exist. Ap- proaches that build on traditional decision- making mechanisms (such as the Afghan What to do systematically Loya Jirga103) have been used to transition but gradually toward greater inclusiveness. National sov- ereign conferences in francophone Africa in Focusing on citizen security, justice, and jobs the 1990s, which in most cases represented means that most other reforms will need to a cross-section of society, were effective for be sequenced and paced over time, including negotiating transitions from one-party auto- political reform, decentralization, privati- cratic rule to plural democratic regimes and zation, and shifting attitudes toward margin- provided a workable framework for a peace- alized groups. Systematically implementing ful change of power.104 Some nonelectoral these reforms requires a web of institutions structures, as in the case of the South African (democratization, for example, requires constitutional convention and transitional many institutional checks and balances be- executive structures, have also provided for yond elections) and changes in social at- considerable accountability downward to the titudes. There are exceptions—where the members of the groups represented, through exclusion of groups from democratic par- debates within political parties and business ticipation has been a clear, overriding source and labor groupings. Using alternative op- of grievance, as in South Africa, fairly rapid tions while the conditions are put in place for action on elections makes sense. But in most elections also allows time to build a culture situations, systematic and gradual action ap- of democratic practices (see box 5.11). pears to work best. Devolution and decentralization can Elections are a means of institutional broaden power-sharing but are best transformation, not its end approached step-by-step Elections without a substantial degree of co- Territorial devolution and decentralization of operation among those wielding economic, political, administrative, and economic pow- Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 165 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 5 .11 Pacing institutional transformation Elections are not a panacea Lakhdar Brahimi, former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to Iraq and Afghanistan; WDR Advisory Council Member It is ten years since the Report of the Panel on UN Peace It is important not to confuse speed with haste in political Operations, which I had the great privilege to chair, was processes: too hasty approaches can precipitate the opposite produced. The Report called for the exit of UN forces to be effect from the one we seek to support. The international com- determined on the basis of a broad and carefully studied munity’s high hopes for Iraq’s 2005 experiment in proportional range of peacebuilding and institution-building require- electoral democracy produced a contest for power that ments being met. We said that elections were not a pana- increased rather than allayed sectarian violence, and the con- cea. I think there has been movement in the right direction stitution hastily produced later is proving almost impossible to over the past decade, but there still is some way to go to implement. Similarly, the 2009 presidential election in Afghan- better understand how and when to conduct elections to istan proved to challenge rather than bolster perceptions of the maximum benefit of a peace process. institutional legitimacy in the immediate aftermath. Attention is needed to ensure that new democratic pro- The options are not mutually exclusive—there is great cesses reinforce rather than undermine the fragile peace worldwide demand for more inclusive and responsive gover- that has been achieved and promote institutional legitimacy nance, and elections can be a crucial means to provide this. and accountability. Institutions for political participation and But their timing requires careful attention. Democratic tradi- checks and balances devised at the national and local level, tions have developed in most countries over a considerable by their very nature, can take many different forms, such as period. Democratization efforts today similarly require atten- constituent assemblies, consultative conferences, and power tion to historical heritages and existing political cleavages and sharing pacts. For example, the Afghan Loya Jirga drew its must be seen as an ongoing process of social transformation legitimacy from a traditional system of political exchange and the development of a broad range of institutions that pro- and decision making (although some Afghans and larger vide checks and balances rather than an identifiable “event.” numbers of foreigners were critical of the participation of Democratization does not start or end with elections. Members viewed by them as responsible for past abuses). Building a culture of democracy Nitin Desai, former UN Under Secretary General for Social and Economic Affairs; former Secretary and Chief Economic Adviser, Ministry of Finance, India; WDR Advisory Council Member A constitution and elections are only the beginning of a Traditions can be invented but are most effective when functioning democracy. A lot depends on the emergence of they are not codified, leaving some elasticity to accommodate working practices that respect the rights of the opposition changes in the balance of political power. These traditions and that set standards for political behavior that, in time come often from imitation of practices in old established become traditions. Even constitutional provisions like those democracies like the United Kingdom or the United States. for an independent election commission to supervise the How can one impart some knowledge of something that electoral process require unwritten working practices for should remain unwritten? Perhaps by showing the parties to independence to become effective. That has been the expe- the post-conflict settlement the way in which democratic pro- rience of India, where the respect for parliamentary norms cesses work in developing countries where they have stood shown by Pandit Nehru and the early congress leaders set a the test of time, India being one big example. Maybe this is standard that matters, not least when it is under threat. something that these young democracies can themselves con- Thus, the leader of the opposition is treated with as much tribute to the post-conflict effort. respect as the head of government and is entitled to public services that allow him or her to function effectively. 166 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 ers also offer the potential to broaden power- ity of devolved structures to local citizens, off- sharing, but with caveats. Between 1946 and setting the potential for local elite capture.113 2008, 49 countries experienced secessionist It is also important to ensure that new institu- demands that resulted in violent conflict.105 tions are offered adequate technical support Fragile states that have resisted movements and the fiscal resources to deliver services.114 for autonomy or independence by force have Various decentralization experiences indicate often found themselves embroiled in costly that achieving success on all three fronts at wars, as Nigeria did with Biafra (1967–70); once—political arrangements, technical ca- Sudan with its southern region (1955– pacity, and adequately accounted funding— 1972,106 1983–2002); Pakistan with East Paki- is difficult, and that agreeing on a sequence stan, which became Bangladesh (1971); and is critical, as with the experience in Northern Myanmar with the Karen and Shan people Ireland (box 5.12).115 and other ethnic groups (1948–today).107 The argument in favor of greater decentralization Transitional justice to recognize past of power (for example, through federalist crimes structures that hand significant autonomy to local representatives) is that it can avert center- Some countries have addressed the sins of the periphery ethnic conflict, or secession. For past early through traditional justice measures example, in Sierra Leone in 2010 the OECD to define a healthy new form of nationhood. reported that “decentralization and devolu- Germany made a deliberate effort after World tion are important peace-building and state War II to address the past, including a focus building activities” and that “the decentraliza- on the dangers of totalitarianism and the tion process has gone a long way to redress- atrocities of the holocaust in the high-school ing some of the fundamental flaws in Sierra curriculum, and the establishment of sites Leone’s original political structure.”108 of remembrance and education throughout However, devolution and decentraliza- the country, including former concentration tion also carry risks. The OECD-DAC “Do camps.116 Other countries that have instituted No Harm” paper warns that donor support early transitional justice procedures include for devolution without sufficient analysis of Argentina and Chile after their transitions political context or capacity constraints can from authoritarian rule. In Argentina, in ad- cause serious problems if “political power at dition to a truth commission117 and various the center is highly fragmented, or constel- reparation programs for victims, junta lead- lations of local power are misunderstood.”109 ers were tried and convicted for massive hu- Similarly, evidence shows that decentraliza- man rights violations. While initial processes tion processes may make local democracy faltered and were suspended for a 10-year pe- more vulnerable to political capture when riod, prosecutions of human rights violators restraints and accountability measures are have resumed and currently comprise more absent.110 Devolution can also lead to a lack than 600 cases.118 Chile’s experience is not of local accountability and significant op- radically different: truth-seeking119 and repa- portunities for corruption111 and reinforce or rations have been followed by more than 600 create elites who can use devolved power to prosecutions, with more than 200 convictions pursue their own interests—to the detriment thus far.120 of both local and national interests.112 Other countries have relied less on prose- Successful devolution requires gradual cutions and formal justice processes. A com- preparation. Agreeing in detail on the degree parison of transitional justice approaches of “subsidiarity” (pushing authority to the in five countries that have made promising lowest capable level) in security, justice, and transitions out of violence (Cambodia, Mo- economic functions is essential to prevent zambique, Rwanda, South Africa, and Viet- further center-periphery friction. A second nam)121 found that nonjudicial measures success factor is to ensure proper accountabil- include truth commissions122 and repara- Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 167 BOX 5.12 Devolution and decentralization can help manage conflict, but are better done gradually Types of violence: Political and sectarian violence Transition opportunity: Space for progress—Good Friday Key stakeholders: British and Irish governments, political parties Accord, referendum that represented opportunity for power- and armed forces/groups in Northern Ireland, citizens, diaspora sharing arrangements Key Stresses: Inequitable access to political and economic Institutional challenges: Low inclusion and accountability in power, sectarian tensions, perceptions of discrimination security and justice institutions, low trust, legacies of extrajudicial dispute resolution In many center-periphery conflicts—where groups are engaging in violence to gain autonomy or secede from the state—the devolution of political power has been proposed as a possible solution to resolve conflict, maintain or restore law and order, and rebalance relations between local and central governments. But devolution is not an automatic answer to regional tensions and can at times amplify conflict. In Northern Ireland, it was not only the 1921 partition of Ireland that drove the conflict, but also the devolution of authority to a new Northern Ireland Assembly and the effects on center-periphery relations. Unionists found a need to reemphasize that they were British, while the Catholic minority lost faith in political structures that provided few safeguards for them. In Northern Ireland, a new process of devolution was a centerpiece of the Good Friday Accord, introduced gradually to allow confi- dence to be built up. The Accord was signed in 1998, but decommissioning of the Irish Republican Army’s weapons and the security reforms were not completed until 2005, and the devolution of policing and justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly was finally com- pleted on March 8, 2010. Source: Barron and others 2010. tions programs for victims,123 as well as ad- serve on panels in 12,000 community courts. ministrative sanctions, such as vetting,124 Gacaca is based on an extended plea bar- and traditional or local justice measures.125 gaining principle and has elements of both While the differences in the approaches were punishment and reconciliation; it is expected significant, there was no straightforward re- to draw to a close in 2011, having processed lationship between the approach and the at- more than 1.5 million cases. It was a con- tainment of stability.126 tentious approach, but with only 30 convic- Where abuses are on such a huge scale that tions to date at the international tribunal, a the formal justice system is unable to deal decimated national judicial system, and jails with them, special procedures may be justi- filled beyond capacity, there were few options fied. Rwanda faced this challenge following other than a community process to deal with the genocide that left at least 800,000 people the enormous pressures.127 dead at the hands of their fellow citizens. In November 1994, the UN Security Council Economic reforms—in moderation set up an international tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, to prosecute people accused of Economic reforms are needed to escape violations of international law. Rwanda’s the cycle of violence, but they must not be own jails, meanwhile, were bursting with victims of the “too slow-too fast” trade-off. 120,000 people accused of genocide-related Fragile and conflict-prone situations often crimes—and there were only 15 judges to share a raft of structural economic prob- oversee their trials. The situation called for lems—low per capita GDP, fiscal imbalances, extraordinary measures. Rwanda’s solution chaotic regulations, dependence on agricul- was to adopt a traditional community con- ture and natural resources, high illiteracy, flict resolution system, gacaca, and to train rapidly growing populations, and a dearth more than 250,000 community members to of physical infrastructure. All raise the risk 168 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 of violence, but addressing them too rap- risks. A review of privatization efforts in frag- idly also raises the risk of reigniting violence ile settings suggests that such reforms need to or deepening societal cleavages. Major issues be carefully prepared.130 This can be a lengthy for investors are “significant downside risks,” process, but it can assist both with transpar- which implies that individual economic ency and with managing expectations about policies may be less important initially than the gains and accommodating the losers. conveying certainty about the overall trajec- tory—including security.128 Most economic Shifting attitudes toward excluded reforms create real or perceived “winners” groups is crucial but takes time and “losers.” Reform areas particularly sensi- tive to social tensions include access to land Tackling horizontal inequalities131 between and water. It is therefore important to pay at- social groups is particularly challenging be- tention to the distributive aspect of growth. cause it demands behavioral change to re- In macroeconomic policy, gradually in- verse deeply ingrained habits, attitudes, and troducing feasible and prioritized reforms ways of doing business among the “exclud- will allow for an appropriate level of breath- ers.” Frances Stewart distinguishes direct ap- ing space and enable foundational institu- proaches (to privilege groups), indirect ap- tional reform without running the risk of proaches (to reduce group disparities), and political backlash. The benefits of adopting a integrationist approaches (to break down gradualist approach are evident in Mozam- group boundaries).132 bique, where early macroeconomic reforms Histories of exclusion create pent-up de- after the 1992 peace accord focused on over- mands for action in redressing the legacies coming fiscal crises, curbed hyperinflation, of the past, such as preferential quotas for created a situation of stability, and built the employment or education. The risk is that confidence and trust needed to enact deeper they can make existing differences more per- reforms.129 In order to be effective, early re- manent and salient, actually slowing integra- form efforts must also reflect the specific po- tion. Pratap Mehta argues that “the best way litical and economic contexts and macroeco- of conflict mitigation or prevention is the nomic problems in a given situation, instead creation of political structures and identi- of attempting to be one-size-fits-all solu- ties where questions of rights and citizenship tions. For instance, while the government in are progressively detached from questions the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002 of which particular communities people be- to 2004 undertook a decisive stabilization long to.”133 The implementation of affirma- policy involving a major tightening of the tive action programs is often associated with fiscal stance to curb hyperinflation, Bosnia mounting opposition as well as perceptions and Herzegovina adopted, in the early post- of corruption. conflict period, a currency board, preventing Addressing gender equality beyond eco- the central bank from printing money. nomic empowerment also takes time. Gender Experience indicates that privatizing for roles and relations change during periods of the purpose of economic growth is better conflict, and appear to signal social progress. done gradually. Moving economic assets But such gains may not be sustained or may from public to private hands has two distinct be counterbalanced by a reversion to tradi- motives: one is fiscal, to stem losses or gain tional identities and norms when families revenue from the sale of assets, and the other and communities are threatened. In effect, is productivity, to spur economic growth. economic realities can push in one direc- Clarity about motives helps avoid common tion while social traditions pull in the other. mistakes. Shutting down inessential enter- In many countries the economic situations prises that drain revenues can be an early of women widowed by violence may mean priority. But early or rapid privatization of that they need to look for jobs and business essential or valuable state assets runs major opportunities, but social mores can make Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 169 this difficult. The experience of the National create the space to build national capacities Solidarity Program in Afghanistan indicates in the longer run. Timor-Leste, after the 1999 the significant potential benefits of programs referendum, faced serious health problems, that enable women to participate in the pub- a destroyed infrastructure, and virtually no lic sphere but also indicates that social and trained personnel. Instead of pursuing a top- cultural change takes time (box 5.13). down reform of the health service immedi- ately, the Interim Health Authority signed agreements with international NGOs for Education and health reforms are each district and focused its efforts on de- crucial medium-term challenges veloping sensible plans, monitoring delivery, Education systems have the potential to miti- and training a new cadre of health staff. The gate conflict and contribute to peacebuilding Timor-Leste model fostered a learning envi- in the long term, but also to exacerbate and ronment by using 100-day planning cycles perpetuate violent settings, depending on with clear targets and a strong focus on re- the nuances of policies, designs, and imple- sults, building confidence and capacity by mentation efforts, as well as the different meeting those targets. Over time, the govern- drivers of conflict and fragility. For instance, ment gradually phased out NGOs and took an internationally led education campaign back responsibility for the health services. in Afghanistan in 2002–03 failed to remove The program had drawbacks—among them, messages of hate and intolerance from cur- high unit costs—but it did provide a path ricula, and it is feared that this socializa- toward institutional transformation while tion of intolerance may exacerbate social ten- continuing to serve immediate needs.137 A sions over time.134 Conversely, in Bosnia and similar approach has been used in Afghani- Herzegovina, the international community stan and has proven reasonably robust in in- made deliberate efforts to exclude divisive secure circumstances (see also chapter 8). messages from educational content, but has had unintended consequences of increasing suspicions of external politicization of educa- Institutional transformation as a tion, in effect exacerbating local divisions.135 continuous process Education does not need to stop at the classroom door. Parental behavior, the family The risk of a moderately paced and flexible environment, and the extent to which young approach to reform is getting stuck, either people feel connected to their parents (or moving too slowly or not making the next to caregivers who play a parental role) have step when needed. Many best-fit solutions shown to be either one of the strongest pro- may indeed remain in place for the long tective factors in the lives of young people term—for example, this may occur with or one of the strongest risk factors. Evidence traditional justice systems because they are shows that investing in family-based parent- more effective at maintaining social cohe- ing training that promotes positive, healthy, sion at the community level—while others protective parent-child interactions can re- are temporary stop-gap measures only. For duce domestic violence, the extent to which the latter, realism about timelines is essential young people associate with delinquent peers, to avoid losing ground on hard-won results. alcohol and substance abuse, school dropout, There are a variety of ways to sustain impetus and arrests.136 Therefore, parenting training for improvement that we discuss here. is one of the most cost-effective ways to pre- One way to build both internal esprit de vent risky behavior among young people. corps and external legitimacy is to work up Where reform of the health service and from small, more achievable targets to pro- the training of national personnel would take gressively more ambitious ones. Stress is years, delivering public services using inter- carefully calibrated, and tasks are selected national capacity for transitional periods can in ways that do not threaten to overwhelm 170 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 5.13 Development approaches can empower women in the most fragile environments Afghanistan Types of violence: Intergroup, ethnic, and political violence; organized crime and trafficking; cross-border; transnational ideological Transition opportunity: Initial large space for change: Bonn Key stakeholders: Federal and local government, security Accord; Loya Jirga; presidential, parliamentary, and provincial force, community leaders, civil society groups, citizens, women, elections; national development budget international partners, transnational militant groups Key stresses: Legacies of violence and trauma, transnational Institutional challenges: Severe accountability and capacity terrorism, criminal networks, low incomes, youth unemploy- constraints in public administration, security, judicial, and ment, corruption political institutions; lack of representation of women Gender has been one of the most politicized issues in Afghanistan for a century. Afghan women and girls today still face suffering, humiliation, and marginalization from the discriminatory views of the role and position of women in society. Gender gaps are wide- spread in health, education, access to and control over resources, economic opportunities, and political power and voice. And yet, this role is not stagnant. The National Solidarity Program (NSP), the country’s largest development program, operates in villages across the country through democratically elected community development councils (CDCs). Through mobilization by facilitating partners, women are involved in voting, while CDC modalities provide a variety of configurations enabling more balanced gender participation (mixed CDCs, parallel committees (one male, one female) that report to a mixed-gender CDC, or a women’s committee that consults with a fully male CDC). Results of a comparison between NSP and non-NSP villages using a rigorous study design in an independent evaluation suggest that having women in charge of decisions in community projects improves the perceptions by both men and women of women in leadership roles (see figure). This is not being advocated as “the” solution, but it shows that incremental steps can lead to incremental progress, even for culturally difficult issues of inclusion. F I G U R E A Opinions on the role of women in community life: “Is there a woman in the village who is well respected by men and women?” More men and women in villages that participated in the NSP believe that there is a woman who is well respected in their village than did respondents in villages that did not participate in the program. Statistically significant differences are shown with percentages above each bar. 50 40 +10% % of respondents +7% 30 42% 20 37% 10 0 Male Female NSP village Non-NSP village Source: Beath and others 2010. Sources: Beath and others 2010; UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UNOHCHR 2010. the organization. In 2006, with support from 100-day chunks. A pilot program in the the World Bank Institute, the government Ministry of Education resulted in the dis- of Burundi introduced a rapid-results ap- tribution of 250,000 textbooks to primary proach. This approach, now applied across schools in 60 days, a task that had previously 80 government projects, breaks up long- taken an entire school year. In a health care term development plans into manageable pilot program, 482 pregnant women visited Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 171 health centers and were provided with HIV/ ing. Rigorous evaluation of results is AIDS screening in one month—almost seven one key element of evaluating alternative times the previous monthly average of 71.138 approaches, but not the only one.141 Pro- A similar simplified approach was followed grams need built-in mechanisms of in Indonesia in the early years following the learning so that what is promising can be turbulence of the 1960s, where ministries scaled up and what is not working can be undertook simple annual targets to improve changed—in shorter cycles of continu- service provision. ous feedback. Such evidence about what This chapter began by describing the works and what does not work will in “too fast-too slow” dilemma in institutional turn be useful for other countries as they transformation. What are the principles of a strive to adapt experience from abroad to middle way of progress that can produce suc- their own context. cess? An emerging literature on approaches This “middle way” requires capacity, which to development across a variety of domains— is scarce in fragile states. That is why the from economic policy to social policy to in- “best-fit” approach and careful prioritization stitution building—promotes a flexible and and sequencing go hand in hand. If existing pragmatic, and thus “experimental best-fit,” capacity is focused on prioritizing items in approach to progress.139 This includes the following: sequence (rather than trying to do everything all at once), some items can move ahead rap- • Pressure for performance around mean- idly, and once they have enough momentum ingful goals. Overall, this is a shift from to sustain gradual progress, the country can measuring progress around “outputs” move on to tackle the next items. (whether budgets spent, items procured, Delivering results and transforming in- legislation passed, or policies adopted) to stitutions are primarily the responsibility assessing performance around “outcomes of state and nonstate actors in countries af- including citizen trust.” fected by violence. However, the international • Pragmatism and flexibility in the ways community—bilateral donors, international goals are accomplished. Pressure for per- organizations, nongovernmental organiza- formance must be accompanied by giving tions, businesses—can provide essential sup- port for such processes, and it has done so flexibility to the agents responsible for per- on many occasions, including many of the formance. Reformers need to be given the initiatives described in this chapter. Yet, the space for “disruptive” innovations that international community is itself challenged may look inferior but hold the seeds to by the evolution of violence since the Cold progress.140 War era, and has its own transformation to • Monitoring, information, and evalua- adapt to new contexts. To this we turn in tion systems for decision-cycle-oriented chapter 6. feedback loops and continuous learn- 172 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 5 Violence in Central America—Depth of institutional transformation matters Types of violence: Civil conflict, trafficking (national and cross-border), criminal and gang violence Transition opportunities: Peace agreements, cease-fires, elec- Key stakeholders: Governments, armed groups, refugees, tions, rapidly rising insecurity and criminality ex-combatants, conflict victims, citizens, international partners Key stresses: Legacies of violence and trauma: presence of Institutional challenges: Severe accountability and capacity international criminal networks, repatriation of suspected gang constraints in judicial and security institutions members, perceived social and economic deprivation, youth unemployment; human rights abuses M ost countries in Central America experienced violent civil conflicts through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Al- though all of those that experienced war signed peace accords, transport of drugs, led to dispersed competition for control of transit routes with a consequent impact on several countries in the region—particularly those in the Northern Triangle of the legacy of civil strife has had long-lasting and profound El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Today, the majority of negative repercussions. Although civil war has ended, new the drugs transiting from South America to the United States forms of violence, such as trafficking and organized crime, comes through Central America en route to Mexico or the Ca- have been on the rise. During the civil wars, around two mil- ribbean. lion people are estimated to have been displaced or sought ref- In the last 10 years, homicide rates have resurged signifi- uge in other countries. The trauma exacted by these conflicts cantly, and Central America now has an estimated 70,000– created a culture of violence with a long legacy. 300,000 gang members. Not all countries are equally affected, More recently, external stresses—specifically, increased however: according to official statistics, El Salvador, Guate- transit of drugs through Central America—have contributed mala, and Honduras exhibit significantly higher homicide to violence. The dismantling of the Cali and Medellín drug rates than the rest of Central America. In 2009, Guatemala re- cartels in Colombia, which had controlled the production and corded 6,450 murders and only 231 convictions. In El Salva- Repeated violence in Central America and rising homicide rates a. Repeated violence in Central America, 1965–2009 b. Homicide rates in Central American countries 80 Civil War 1965–96 Homicide rate (per 100,000) Current drug violence > 20 70 Homicide rate (per 100,000 population) 20–40 BELIZE 60 Attempted coup 1999 40–60 Coup in 2009 60–80 50 GUATEMALA > 80 HONDURAS 40 NICARAGUA 30 EL SALVADOR Civil war 1979–89 20 Civil war 1979–92 Current drug violence 10 COSTA RICA 0 PANAMA 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Honduras El Salvador Guatemala Belize IBRD 38419 Coup attempts in 1988–89 Panama Nicaragua Costa Rica March 2011 Source: WDR team calculations based on homicide data from WDR Database. Source: WDR team. Note: Homicide rates are per 100,000 population. Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 173 dor, levels of impunity are also very high: in 2005, only 4 per- were amply vetted. In addition, Nicaragua also undertook an cent of homicides were resolved by legal convictions. extensive reform of its police forces, adopting legislation and Both external stresses and differences in approaches to in- national guidelines on arms control, piloting targeted commu- stitutional transformation between the Central American nity policing, and initiating public health projects focusing on countries may help explain the current differences in levels of the risks of armed violence. Notably, the modernization of the violence. National Police Force of Nicaragua included a number of ini- tiatives to mainstream gender and increase the participation of women, such as the addition of training modules on gender- External stresses based violence within police academies; the introduction of The deportation of suspected gang members from the United women’s police stations (staffed by female police officers and States back to Central America has influenced gang culture focusing on cases of gender-based violence); the reform of re- and membership. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras suf- cruitment criteria, including female-specific physical training fered the effects of the massive repatriation of suspected gang and the adaptation of height and physical exercise require- members and illegal immigrants from the United States while ments for women; introduction of transparent promotion re- Nicaragua was much less affected (box 2.4). Where drug traf- quirements; introduction of family-friendly human resource ficking is more intense, the levels of violence seem to be higher. policies; and establishment of a working group to evaluate and Guatemala’s Peten region, a corridor for transshipments into improve the working conditions of female officers. Mexico, suffered more than 100 homicides per 100,000 people The conflict in El Salvador, by contrast, ended in a military in 2008 and 2009.142 stalemate with no clear victor. This led to compromises: the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) decided, for example, to abandon its demands for vetting the Institutional capacity, inclusion, and accountability judiciary in exchange for deeper reforms of the military, al- After the end of the civil wars, each country undertook re- though there were some subsequent reforms in the judiciary. On forms—including reforming the security forces and, eventu- the other hand, the military had to accept, for the first time, ally, the judiciary. Both Guatemala and El Salvador included having its officers vetted by civilians (the ad hoc commission such reforms in their long-negotiated and comprehensive established by the peace agreement, which recommended the peace agreements, while in Nicaragua reforms were undertaken dismissal or transfer of 103 officers), and the integration of for- at the end of the war. In accordance with the peace agreement mer FMLN members into the new NCP (National Civilian signed in January 1992, El Salvador reduced the size of the Police). military (from 60,000 to 15,000), disbanded elite military The Comprehensive Peace Agreement that settled the Gua- groups and two police bodies, and over time created an entirely temalan conflict was negotiated with the Salvadoran experience new National Civilian Police that integrated elements of the as a backdrop and featured intense international pressure to former guerrilla movement, former police officers, and new obtain similar results—but in circumstances in which the state recruits (allowing a 20-20-60 percent proportion among these had essentially defeated the insurgency. The severity of the cohorts in its first promotion). The approach therefore was crimes committed by forces that belonged to or supported the broad-ranging. The comprehensive peace accords in Guate- state, in a context of international pressure, helps explain why mala signed on December 29, 1996, not surprisingly included the government appeared to make concessions. Yet while some some of the same elements: redefinition of the functions of the units of the armed forces were eliminated and the police force military and police, reduction of the military, disbandment of was reformed, the changes were not significant enough to make special elite units, and reform of civilian police. a sustained difference in terms of security; with new pressures The type of transition moment each country faced at the from drug trafficking networks, violence increased rapidly.143 end of its internal conflicts affected the reach of otherwise similar measures. In Nicaragua, the Frente Sandinista won the Sources: Bateson 2010; CODEH 2008; CICIG 2010; Dudley 2010; Insti- conflict outright. Its ability to induce institutional reform tuto Universitario en Democracia Paz y Seguridad 2010; STRATFOR therefore was significantly greater than in Guatemala or El Sal- 2009; UNODC 2007; UNDP 2008a; Zamora and Holiday 2007; Popkin vador. Both the Nicaraguan security forces and the judiciary 2000; WDR team calculations. 174 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Notes 1. World Bank 2006c; WDR consultation with government officials, United Nations, donor representa- tives, local nongovernmental organizations, and community-based organization representatives in Haiti, 2010. 2. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009. 3. Porter and Rab 2010. 4. Lockhart and Glencorse 2010. 5. Spear and Harborne 2010; Harbone and Sage 2010; de Greiff 2010; Guehenno 2010; Sherman 2010; Sage and Desai 2010; Roque and others 2010; Dobbins and others 2007; Collier and others 2003; Collier 2007; Johnston 2010. 6. Narayan and Petesch 2010. 7. Guerrero 2006; Llorente and Rivas 2005; Formisano 2002. 8. Crawford 1999; Sutton, Cherney, and White 2008; Willman and Makisaka 2010. Mano dura (“iron fist”) policies may be effective in the short term but may have long-term negative consequences— they promote youth incarceration, reducing crime in the short term, but may ultimately lead to greater recidivism and more serious crime in the longer term (see Cunningham and others 2008). 9. Guehenno 2010, 2. 10. Pan 2005. 11. OECD-DAC 2007a. 12. UN Security Council 2006. 13. Ball and Holmes 2002; Transparency International 2011. 14. Public financial management (PFM) reviews are a useful tool to improve transparency and gover- nance in the security sector. A PFM review in the Central African Republic found that 25 percent of the national budget was spent on the security sector, of which 21 percent was on the military and gendarmerie (law enforcement agency charged with police duties, but organized along military lines) and only 3 percent was on the police, and that 75 percent of the security sector expenditures were on salaries, which were relatively clearly controlled. A major drain on recurrent expenditure was an over-age component, comprising over one-third of the army. The main area of concern was about receipts and income, which remained off-budget, including taxation on flow of persons and commerce. As a result of this report, the European Commission has started financing the pensioning off of the over-age in the army, and the World Bank has provided training in public financial man- agement practices to key staff in the security sector as part of its program on improving capacity and functioning of public financial systems in the government (World Bank 2009f). 15. Perry 2008; International Crisis Group 2009a; Human Rights Watch 2009; Reyntjens 2007; Kelly 2010. 16. Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996. 17. South Africa Ministry of Defence 1996; Williams 2005; Batchelor and Dunne 1998. 18. Rozema 2008. 19. Guehenno 2010. 20. Guehenno 2010, 5. 21. OECD-DAC 2007a. 22. International Center for Transitional Justice 2010; Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff 2007; Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf 2009; de Greiff 2006; Hayner 2010. 23. de Greiff 2010. 24. Addison 2009. 25. The general target for female representation in police formers and other security agencies in post- conflict countries has been 30 percent. However, this may take time and not be feasible, especially as most developed societies do not fulfill this target. For example, Finland has 10 percent, the United States 12–14 percent, and Canada 18 percent. Mobekk 2010. 26. Mobekk 2010. 27. Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. 28. UNIFEM, UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, and UNDPKO 2010. 29. OECD-DAC 2007a. 30. OECD-DAC 2007a. 31. Sherman 2010. 32. OECD-DAC 2007a. 33. Willman and Makisaka 2010; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2008. Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 175 34. O Dia Online 2010; Jornal O Globo 2010. 35. UNIFEM, UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, and UNDPKO 2010. Similarly, tra- ditional dispute resolution systems can be adapted to address violence against women. For instance, 90 percent of women were satisfied with the shalishi process (a community dispute resolution system) when it was introduced by a rural women’s group in West Bengal, two-thirds felt that they were better off, and nearly 90 percent said that physical violence by the husband had decreased or stopped. See International Center for Research on Women 2002; Bott, Morrison, and Ellsberg 2005. For more on Shalishi process, see Samity 2003. 36. WDR team interviews with Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerine in Haiti, 2010. 37. For example, the OECD Handbook on Security System Reform underscores this approach when advocating that police reform be done as part of an integrated justice sector reform that includes the judiciary and prisons; see OECD-DAC 2007a; UNODC and the World Bank 2007. 38. Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010; Wainwright 2005. 39. International Center for Transitional Justice 2010; Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff 2007; Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf 2009; de Greiff 2006; Hayner 2010. 40. For more information, see feature 3 in chapter 3. 41. Guehenno 2010; OECD-DAC 2007a. 42. International Center for Transitional Justice 2010; Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff 2007; Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf 2009; de Greiff 2006; Hayner 2010. 43. World Bank 2010i. 44. Between 2001 and 2009, the Government of Afghanistan passed 244 laws, legislative decrees, regulations, and amendments, addition and repeal of laws and regulations. In addition, the gov- ernment has entered into 19 charters, conventions, agreements, and protocols. See World Bank 2010g. 45. Another successful example of the use of Peace Justices and mobile courts to provide better access to justice, especially for the most disadvantaged groups, was in Honduras, as part of a project to modernize the judicial branch. Project results include (1) enhanced access to justice for vulnerable groups (30,000 annual users), first-instance courts in rural zones (1,000 annual users), and mobile courts in urban-marginal areas (7,000 annual users); (2) specialized service to 10,000 women in family courts; (3) improved protection to 15,000 women and children against domestic violence; (4) specialized service to 1,500 persons from vulnerable groups; (5) establish- ment of an integrated financial management system that promotes transparency and efficiency of the courts; (6) development of the judicial career with all the manuals for the selection, classi- fication, and evaluation of personnel that will allow the transparent and competitive selection of 3,200 personnel; (7) adoption of a new management model for case management that will allow monitoring and evaluation of 1,200 judges; and (8) improved services to internal and external users of the courts through an IT (information technology) system and judiciary information kiosks. See Scheye 2009. 46. Dale 2009. 47. For example, in Angola, over 70 percent of children were unregistered in the mid-1990s. UNICEF 2007. 48. Comunità di Sant’Egidio 2010. 49. UNICEF 2007. 50. OECD 2007. 51. Berger 2003; Coldham 1984. 52. Straus 2010. 53. Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. 54. Everett 2009, 33. 55. Timor-Leste Independent Comprehensive Need Assessment Team 2009; WDR team consulta- tion with Attorney General Ana Pessoa in Timor-Leste, 2010; Everett 2009, 33. 56. See OECD 2010e; World Bank 2006a. 57. Blundell 2010. 58. For Indonesia, see SUCOFINDO 2002. For Mozambique, see Crown Agents 2007. 59. Porter and Rab 2010. 60. Boko 2008. 61. Barron and Burke 2008. Another tool includes social audits involving communities in cross- verification of government records, such as the one used successfully under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in Andhra Pradesh, India (Centre for Good Governance 2009). 176 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 62. Agarwal, Heltberg, and Diachok 2009. 63. World Bank 2004. 64. Herzberg 2004. 65. BizCLIR 2007. 66. See Parker 2008 for a synthesis of practical lessons from value chain projects in conflict-affected environments; see also Bagwitz and others 2008; The SEEP Network 2009; Stramm and others 2006. 67. Evidence about the impact of value chain projects on social cohesion is mixed. For example, in Nepal, participants in a fresh vegetable value chain project pointed to improved community relations stemming from their expanded common interest. And joint efforts and research in Rwanda indicates that participation in a coffee value chain project was linked to low ethnic dis- tance and distrust. In contrast, a groundnut value chain project in Guinea, while strengthening ties between two ethnic groups, did not include the local refugee population, a key party in local tensions. For Guinea and Nepal, see Parker 2008. For Rwanda, see Boudreaux and Tobias 2009. 68. In the West Bank and Gaza for instance, the Facility for New Market Development (FNMD), funded jointly by the U.K. Department for International Development and the World Bank, has been providing matching grants and technical support to private Palestinian companies seeking to expand their product lines and markets since 2008. In just over two years and with financial support amounting to US$2.4 million, companies enrolled in the project realized US$32.7 mil- lion in incremental export and local sales from market development plans the project supported; 42 companies entered 34 export markets in five continents; 48 products have been improved, including 15 products that are now certified by international and local standards bodies; 92 new products have been developed; more than 670 people have been hired to help with busi- ness expansion; and 85 business service providers offer their services through the FNMD Online Roster. Development Alternatives Incorporated 2010. 69. Twenty-two of the 181 countries included in the Enterprise Surveys are fragile and conflict- affected states. Ten of these countries have electricity as the most important environment con- straint facing firms (and usually electricity is much higher than any of the other issues). It is also in the top three issues for 17 out of the 22 countries assessed. Only two countries, Côte d’Ivoire and Tonga, do not have electricity in their top six environmental constraints. Other constraints include obtaining finance, political instability, practices of the informal sector, and corruption. World Bank 2010d. 70. BBC News 2010. 71. World Bank 2011a. 72. A thorough review of job creation programs in post-conflict environments can also be found in ILO 2010. 73. The Productive Safety Net Programme launched in Ethiopia in 2005 is an important policy ini- tiative by government and donors to shift millions of chronically food-insecure rural people from recurrent emergency food aid to a more secure, predictable, and largely cash-based form of social protection. See Sharp, Brown, and Teshome 2006. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India was implemented on February 2006 in 200 of the poorest districts in its first phase. An additional 130 districts were covered by the Act during 2007–08 in its phase II. The remaining districts have been brought under subsequently. See del Ninno, Subbarao, and Milazzo 2009; India Ministry of Rural Development 2005, 2010; Blum and LeBleu 2010. 74. Giovine and others 2010; Arai, Cissé, and Sock 2010; Sayigh 2010. 75. Lockhart and Glencorse 2010; UNOPS 2009. 76. Wilson 2002; McLeod and Dávalos 2008; Centre for Good Governance 2009; India Ministry of Rural Development 2005, 2010. 77. del Ninno, Subbarao, and Milazzo 2009. 78. Lamb and Dye 2009; Tajima 2009. 79. Beasly 2006. 80. Cunningham and others 2008. 81. Mattero and Campbell-Patton 2008. 82. Cross 2010 discusses both opportunities and challenges of this approach. 83. Mills and Fan 2006. 84. Demirgüc-Kunt, Klapper, and Panos 2011; Cunningham and others 2008 85. Heinemann-Grüder, Pietz, and Duffy 2003. Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 177 86. See, for instance, ILO 2010 for a detailed analysis of self-employment and other local economic recovery activities in post-conflict settings. 87. M-Paisa builds on the experience of M-PESA in Kenya; see Mas and Radcliffe 2010. 88. See, for example, World Bank and others 2009. A successful management training program for small and medium enterprises is Business Edge of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which makes locally adapted and translated adult-learning materials available, trains local trainers, builds capacity of local training companies (who tend to be small and medium enterprises themselves), and establishes quality assurance mechanisms so that local firms might in turn train the local population. Business Edge operates in several fragile and con- flict-affected economies, including Iraq, Papua New Guinea, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. In Yemen, nearly 30,000 participants were trained from 2006 to 2010. An independent evalu- ation found that the program had a lasting impact on the country. Business Edge fostered a vibrant management training market that is active even after subsidies have been withdrawn. In Pakistan, an assessment of the program showed that the number of small and medium enterprises preparing cash flow statements after training increased by 20 percent and that 71 percent of participants with irregular credit histories had cleared or decreased their outstand- ing amounts six months after the training. See Peschka 2010. 89. Cunningham and others 2008. 90. For Japanese land reforms, see Kawagoe 1999; Tsunekawa and Yoshida 2010; For broader state- building experience in Japan, see Tsunekawa and Yoshida 2010; For Korean land reforms, see Shin 2006. 91. Lipton 2009; Rosset, Patel, and Courville 2006; IRIN 2009. 92. See World Bank 2008d on the design and implementation of cash transfer programs in emer- gency situations. 93. It is estimated that more than 650,000 Tajiks live and work in Russia—representing 18 percent of Tajikistan’s adult population and as much as 80 percent of all Tajiks abroad. Remittances are estimated to account for around 50 percent of GDP—one of the highest figures in the world (Kireyev 2006, 3, 7). 94. Economic Times 2008. 95. Four elements are considered the backbone of successful schemes: (1) choice of workers to ensure that hiring is skill-appropriate rather than hiring overqualified workers who are likely to use the scheme as a stepping stone; (2) circular movement of workers to allow good employees to return in subsequent years rather than be offered a one-time-only chance at offshore employment thereby reducing the incentive to violate the agreement; (3) cost-sharing on travel-related costs with employers so that fixed costs borne by migrants are not so large that they make overstaying attractive; and (4) commercial viability so that the scheme remains private sector driven and reflects labor market conditions in host countries rather than by arbitrary quotas that become outdated if labor market conditions in destination countries change (World Bank 2006b). 96. Kingma 1997. 97. International Alert and Women Waging Peace 2004. 98. “For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where women run only 18 percent of the small businesses, discriminatory provisions in the Family Code require married women to obtain marital authorization to go to court in a civil case, to buy and sell property, or to enter into any obligations, including starting a business. Banks generally require co-signature/approval of hus- bands if women are to obtain loans. The Family Code also affects the ability of all women to obtain employment, because proof of marital status is required, and this is difficult in a context in which identification papers are largely unavailable. Neighboring Rwanda, by contrast, has no such regulations, and women in that country run more than 41 percent of the small businesses.” IFC 2008, 3. 99. IFC 2008. 100. Fearon 2010a. 101. Eades 1999; WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa, 2010. 102. See, for example, Snyder 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Epstein and others 2006; Goldstone and others 2010; Zakaria 2003; Mansfield and Snyder 2005. For Iraq, see Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009. For Kenya, see International Crisis Group 2008b. 103. The Loya Jirga is a forum unique to Afghanistan in which, traditionally, tribal groups have come together to settle affairs of the nation or rally behind a cause. Historically, it has been used to 178 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 settle intertribal disputes, discuss social reforms, and approve a new constitution. More recently, a Loya Jirga was convened in 2002 following the fall of the Taliban government and the Bonn Accord to choose the new transitional government for the country. See BBC News 2002. 104. Success was not universal, however, and some conferences failed to produce an institutional avenue for peaceful transition (Robinson 1994; Clark 1994; van de Walle and Bratton 1997). 105. Harbom and Wallensteen 2010. 106. Historically, the first civil war in Sudan started in 1955 and ended with the Addis Abba agreement of 1972 (see Gadir, Elbadawi, and El-Batahani 2005). However, rebels in the south (primarily Anya Nya) were not organized until the early 1960s, and battle deaths from violence did not reach major civil war thresholds until 1962, not falling till 1973 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). 107. See also Horowitz 2000; Barron and others 2010. 108. OECD 2010c, 24. 109. OECD 2010a. 110. Narayan and Petesch 2010. 111. Narayan and Petesch 2010. 112. Wilkinson and others argue that proportional representation may spur in-fighting among var- ious ethnic groups over a small number of highly coveted political offices, limited economic resources, and positions of social status; it may also lead ethnic leaders to bargain harder with their rivals and overplay their hands (Wilkinson 2000; de Zwart 2000). Others argue that decen- tralization can reinforce ethnic identities, produce discriminatory legislation, provide resources for rebellion, and facilitate the collective action necessary for secession. Those that have recently found in favor of devolution as a way of maintaining national integrity have done so with cave- ats: Brancati argues that decentralization can reduce the likelihood of secession and ethnic con- flict, but can have the opposite effect if regional parties are too strong. Lustick and others have run simulations that suggest that power-sharing in multicultural countries can lessen the likeli- hood of secession—but will in the process mobilize ethnic minorities (Brancati 2006; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004; OECD 2004. 113. Crook and Manor 1998. 114. Schelnberger 2005; Tukahebwa 2000. 115. Crook and Manor 1998; Ndegwa and Levy 2004. 116. Grimm 2010. 117. Truth commissions are non-judicial, independent panels of inquiry typically set up to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a country’s past. Commissions’ members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. See International Center for Transitional Justice 2010. 118. See, for example, Filippini 2009. 119. Truth-seeking is a process through which societies attempt to make sense of the atrocities they have suffered during conflict or authoritarian regime and to prevent future injustices. Through the truth-seeking process, victims are able to find closure by learning more about the events they suffered, such as the fate of disappeared individuals, or why certain people were targeted for abuse. It involves the protection of evidence, the opening and maintenance of archives, the opening and publication of state information, and production of comprehensive reports. These efforts often come from official inquiry groups called truth commissions. See International Cen- ter for Transitional Justice 2010. 120. For recent numbers, see, for example, Estrada 2010. 121. Roque and others 2010. 122. See Hayner 2010; UNOHCHR 2006. 123. See de Greiff 2006. 124. See Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff 2007. 125. See, for example, Huyse and Salter 2008. 126. Roque and others 2010. 127. Roque and others 2010. 128. Svensson 2000. 129. UNDP 2008b. 130. A World Bank study found: “There was a tendency in some post-conflict situations to give high priority to immediate and widespread privatization. While there is much in the histories of the countries studied to support the priority given to privatization of state enterprises, this does not Transforming institutions to deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs 179 necessarily imply that sweeping and total privatization should be among the first reforms under- taken” (Kreimer and others 1998, 34). 131. Horizontal inequality is a measure of inequality among individuals or households, not groups. It differs from “vertical” inequality in that measurement of vertical inequality often is confined to income or consumption between groups. See Stewart 2010. 132. Stewart 2010. 133. Mehta 2010, 23. 134. INEE 2010. 135. INEE 2010. 136. Betancourt and Williams 2008; Melville 2003. 137. After the 1999 referendum, Timor-Leste faced serious health problems, a destroyed infrastructure, and virtually no trained personnel. The Interim Health Authority signed agreements with inter- national NGOs for each district, and focused its efforts on developing sensible plans, monitoring delivery, and training a new cadre of health staff. The initial priority was to provide basic health care and services. In the first phase, international and national NGOs occupied a central role in providing emergency health services throughout Timor-Leste, independently funded through humanitarian assistance. In the second and third phase, Timor-Leste fostered a learning environ- ment by using 100-day planning cycles to standardize the service packages provided in different parts of the territory, with clear targets and a strong focus on results, building confidence and capacity by meeting those targets. Over time, the Interim Health Authority was replaced by a new Ministry of Health, which assumed district management of the system and facilities. As a result of this framework, by late 2001 a fully Timorese Ministry of Health had recruited more than 800 health staff, given 60 percent of the population access to basic services within a two-hour walk from their homes, and boosted health facility use to 1.0 outpatient visits per capita. By 2004, an estimated 90 percent of the population had a facility within a two-hour walk, and health facility use rose from 0.75 outpatient visits per capita to 2.13. The health ministry and district opera- tions were among the few state functions resilient to renewed violence in 2005–06, continuing to operate and indeed to provide assistance to the displaced population. World Bank 2002a, 2008h; Baird 2010; Rohland and Cliffe 2002; Tulloch and others 2003. 138. World Bank 2008c. 139. For economic policies, see Rodrik 2007; for social policy, see Grindle 2010; for institution build- ing, see Andrews 2010. 140. Christensen 2003. 141. Banerjee and Duflo 2009; Demombynes and Clemens 2010. 142. The homicide rate in Peten region was 101 in 2008 and 96 in 2009 according to homicide statis- tics collected by the Guatemalan National Police. WDR team calculations. 143. The peace agreement stipulated a one-third reduction during 1997, down from a benchmark figure of 45,000 members to 31,000. Shortly after the signing of the accords, however, the army reported that its force level actually stood at 35,000, so it only needed a 4,000 troop reduction, which indeed took place (more systematically among rank and file than among the officer corps) (Stanley and Holiday 2002). See the report of the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, as it was winding down its operations (UN Verification Mission in Guatemala 2003, 2004). C hapter 6 examines the achievements and shortfalls of international support for violence prevention and recovery. Multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental agencies have helped committed national leaders deliver great accomplishments in reducing levels of civil wars. But the international system has not kept pace with the adaptation of violent actors themselves, and it is ill-equipped to navigate repeated cycles of violence or the blurred boundaries between political conflict and criminal violence. Interna- tional agencies are geared to minimizing domestic reputational and fiduciary risk—increasingly so—rather than supporting “best-fit” institutional solutions that match political realities on the ground. And there are critical gaps: development agencies have long focused on building national capacity, but much less so in the spheres of security and criminal justice. Security agencies operate in those spheres, but with less long-term focus on building national institutions. “Support for job creation is a crucial gap across the international architecture.” EXTERNAL STRESS CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS CHAPTER 6 VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES International support to building confidence and transforming institutions The promise and peril of at multiple transition points, encourage outside support inclusive-enough coalitions, support the de- livery of early results, and provide sustained R estoring confidence in societies and predictable assistance to help with insti- struggling to prevent or recover tutional transformation. This chapter also from violence generally requires identifies measures to address the dual ac- a combination of leadership and countability dilemma faced by international international support—normally, neither actors—accountability pressures both from alone can suffice. The achievements of the domestic constituencies and shareholders global system in supporting such processes and from the leaders and citizens of recipient have been significant: societies facing diverse states—that often constrains effective inter- stresses—from organized crime and gang national support. violence in Colombia to long-standing, bru- tal civil war in Mozambique (box 6.1)—used international support to help stop violence, The evolving international save lives, and rebuild economies. Many of architecture the measures in chapters 4 and 5 that helped restore confidence and transform institu- The international community has made im- tions in situations of criminal and political portant strides over recent decades in build- violence have been supported, financially ing international institutions and expertise and technically, by international actors. to support a reduction in the incidence of As important as these accomplishments civil war. However, the international system are, they are incomplete: repeated and new has not been adjusted to keep pace with the forms of violence mean that hundreds of mil- emerging analysis of conflict—in particu- lions of people are still trapped in a vicious lar, recognition of the repetitive and inter- cycle of legacies of violence, low trust, weak linked nature of conflict, and the increasing institutions, and continuing risk. This chap- challenge of organized crime and traffick- ter delineates patterns and trends in the in- ing. At the same time, the expansion in ternational architecture that affect its ability international assistance efforts has led to to respond effectively in fragile and violence- overlaps and discontinuities between hu- prone settings. The analysis includes lessons manitarian, development, security, and po- from international efforts to prevent violence litical initiatives. 182 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 6 .1 The benefits of international support: Mozambique Type of violence: Civil conflict Transition opportunities: Ceasefire, peace Key stakeholders: Governments, rebels, agreement, elections civil society, regional and international partners Key stresses: Social and economic depriva- Institutional challenges: Accountability, tion, human rights abuses, external political inclusion, capacity constraints and security interference After 17 years of violence that killed an estimated 900,000 people and displaced a quarter of the country’s people, a General Peace Agreement (GPA) was brokered from June 1990 to October 1992 by the Roman Catholic Community of Sant’Egidio. The final outcome was a full-fledged peace agreement owned by the two parties, the Mozambique Government led by FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) and RENAMO (the Mozambique National Resistance). The result was a complex legal and political system that provided institutions and methods for the transition to the 1994 elections. The sustainability of the peace agreement itself was immediately proved by the absence of any fighting in the seven-month vacuum in which Mozambique was left, before the United Nations (UN) operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) strengthened its presence in the country to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement, support the resettlement of refugees, and help form a national army. The ONUMOZ mandate brought together for the first time the political, military, electoral, and humanitarian components of the UN intervention, with an emphasis on enhancing coordination. ONUMOZ acted as a guarantor of the ceasefire, playing a stabilizing role on the basis of its perceived neutrality and helping create trust on both sides. Its role was facilitated by the content and quality of the peace agreement resulting from the 27 months of negotiations in Sant’Egidio, where a full set of guarantees was devised and proved a key element in facilitating a durable peace settlement after the end of fighting. Strong donor engagement and financial contributions also played a key role in demobilizing combatants from both sides, while human- itarian aid during the early years after the GPA helped lessen tensions among displaced popu- lations. Since the GPA, Mozambique has grown rapidly—GDP increased an average of 8 per- cent a year between 1993 and 2007. Civil liberties and political rights have also increased,1 reflected in elections held in 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009. The readiness of both bilateral and multilateral donors to support the implementation of the peace agreement through large-scale financial support for reconstruction was crucial in the transition process. Mozambique is calculated to have received about US$500 million a year (in both humanitarian and development aid) on average throughout the 1990s, which was equivalent to about two-thirds of imports and 60 percent of the government budget. This external aid has played a pivotal economic role in supporting private consumption at the out- set, and subsequently in providing finance for investment and institutional strengthening that became the driving force behind Mozambique’s economic growth.2 Sources: Quinn 2007; Dobbins and others 2005; Manning and Malbrough 2009; Moran and Pitcher 2004; Jones 2008; Cingranelli and Richards 2010; Brück, Fitzgerald, and Grigsby 2000; Cadeado and Hamela 2009; World Bank 2005b; Hume 1994; Morozzo Della Rocca 2003; Morozzo Della Rocca and Riccardi 2003; Edis 1995; Alden 2001; Bartoli 2005; Walter 1997. The volume of assistance and the More than 124,000 personnel are currently number of actors are increasing deployed in the UN peacekeeping mis- sions, with troop contributions from 115 Worldwide, international support to coun- countries.3 The African Union now has sig- tries affected by violence has increased in nificant peacekeeping capacity. Support for the last 15 years. The international commu- mediation has increased at the United Na- nity has scaled up peacekeeping missions. tions, in regional institutions, and through International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 183 civil society actors. Aid to fragile and conflict- organizations (NGOs) have also proliferated. affected states has also grown from 29 per- Haiti’s Ministry of Planning placed the num- cent of total aid in 1996–98 to 41 percent in ber of NGOs operating in Haiti following the 2006–08. However, much of that shift is due January 2010 earthquake as high as 10,000. to increases in humanitarian assistance and The number of international humanitarian debt relief, which have become increasingly workers has similarly increased at an aver- concentrated in fragile and conflict-affected age annual 6 percent globally over the past states. In the period 1996–98, 34 percent of decade, with roughly 211,000 in the field in humanitarian assistance and debt relief was 2009, and humanitarian funding has tripled to fragile and conflict-affected states—that since the start of the decade.9 increased to 75 percent in 2006–08. Once As a result, and despite continuous policy humanitarian assistance and debt relief are attention and recommendations for reform, taken out, aid to fragile and conflict-affected aid management and broader strategic co- states was 28 percent of the total in 1996–98, ordination are more daunting today than and 30 percent in 2006–08.4 20 years ago. In high-profile contexts like Increasing engagement by middle-income Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, countries with a history of solidarity support and the West Bank and Gaza, strategic impor- is also changing the international landscape tance, significant funding, and limited local at a fundamental level in many regions. The capacity have brought forward a dizzying ar- past decade has brought with it new energy, ray of international and bilateral aid and hu- manitarian agencies, NGOs, and contractors, resources, and influence from a wider set each competing for a piece of the action—and of players. Middle- and new higher-income often displacing local initiatives. countries have become important donors, investors, and diplomatic and trading part- ners for countries affected by fragility, vio- Current international assistance focuses lence, and conflict. They bring with them on recovery rather than prevention additional resources, lessons from their own The international architecture for coopera- economic and institutional transitions, and tion has evolved significantly over the last 60 strong regional connections. Consider Chi- years, attesting to the ability of the interna- na’s economic investment in and trade with tional system to adapt its support to changing Africa (investment is estimated to have at least circumstances and challenges. It is in need of tripled since 2002),5 Brazil’s peacekeeping adaptation again today: its focus on political role in Haiti, Indian development assistance rather than social protest and criminal vio- to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia’s increased as- lence, its linear view of the transition from sistance to the World Food Program, and the violence to peace, its separation of actors evolving roles of South Africa, Qatar, and the across fields of engagement, and the prepon- United Arab Emirates in mediation.6 derance of high-income Organization for Alongside the increase in support has Economic Co-operation and Development come a proliferation of humanitarian, de- (OECD) countries in development policy velopment, security, and political actors and discourse no longer reflect today’s realities. initiatives, bringing increased complexity. In Since the end of the Cold War, interna- 2009–10, there were 14 special envoys to Af- tional support has focused on ending civil ghanistan alone.7 Even security responses are conflict. There are good reasons for this: at the complicated by multiple actors: of 54 peace- conclusion of the Cold War, civil war was the keeping or monitoring operations deployed in dominant form of violence, consuming mil- 2009, 40 involved two or more international lions of lives globally and retarding develop- or regional organizations—creating coordi- ment in the South. Bilateral and multilateral nation, co-management, and accountability agencies underwent major transformations challenges.8 International nongovernmental to adapt their activities to helping end civil 184 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 F I G U R E 6 .1 Uneven international support in West Africa—Post-conflict trumps prevention Total aid and peacekeeping assistance per capita to five West African countries during their transition periods over the last decade. Assistance to “post-conflict” Liberia was over US$415 in 2008 and Sierra Leone’s averaged US$186 between 2000 and 2003. In contrast, assistance to “fragile” Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo averaged just US$42 in each country. 450 Total aid and peacekeeping expenditure per capita 400 350 300 (current US$) 250 200 150 100 50 0 Liberia Sierra Leone Guinea Guinea-Bissau Togo Global (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted average for period 2004–08) period 2000–03) period 2008) period 2002–05) period 2005–08) low-income countries West Africa, selected countries (2000–08) Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. Note: Total combined aid and peacekeeping assistance. This effect of greater assistance to “post-conflict” countries is not due to small state issues (small states typically receive higher per capita aid): Liberia is larger than Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone is the same size as Togo. Peacekeeping expenditures accounted for roughly 55 percent of the aggregate in Liberia and 63 percent of the aggregate in Sierra Leone. wars and supporting recovery efforts, with inexpensive. But tangible financial and se- important successes. In the process, though, curity assistance to address rising violence the international architecture for coopera- can often make a vital difference, as in the tion has paid less attention to other forms of institutional reforms and community pro- conflict, including social protest, organized grams supported by donors in Colombia. crime, trafficking, and cross-border violence. Moreover, assistance to post-conflict coun- This focus on civil war has led aid and tries usually pays little attention to “second security systems to give priority to post- generation challenges” in countries that face conflict transitions. With some exceptions, risks of repeated violence, such as Guate- countries affected by violence and fragility mala and Yemen. receive special attention only in post-conflict International actors do support violence situations—as West Africa illustrates (figure prevention outside the “post-conflict” coun- 6.1). The aid and peacekeeping assistance tries, but the degree and nature of this en- going to countries after civil conflict ends gagement varies substantially across types of greatly exceeds what is provided to countries violence and from state to state. International struggling to prevent an escalation of con- diplomats and security actors have been less flict. Of course, countries that have experi- involved in cases of criminal violence; the UN enced major conflict can have exceptional Peacebuilding Commission’s role in Guinea- needs in costly areas such as infrastructure. Bissau is an exception. Bilateral counter- But societies struggling to prevent violence terrorism and counter-crime programs pro- also have particular needs. Some interven- vide operational support but rarely cross over tions, such as state-society consultations, are into supporting political dialogue or develop- International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 185 ment programs. No bilateral or multilateral fairs, and other departments.16 Canada’s agency known to the authors has a specific Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force policy for assisting countries confronted by (START) recently finalized interdepartmen- rising criminal violence or social protest. tal guidance that requires joint assessment The international tools to address vio- by the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, lence—diplomacy, defense, and develop- and Development (and other departments ment—were not originally designed to work where relevant) before a recommendation together. This weakness in the international is made to ministers about whether Canada architecture has long been recognized, and should engage in a given high-risk setting. there is a growing international policy con- The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs ap- sensus that addressing violent conflict and proved an approach to its security sector promoting economic development both reform work that keeps the question of re- require deeper understanding of the close sources separate from strategy design, so that relationship among politics, security, and programs are not hampered—as many are— development.10 UN “integrated missions”11 by issues of ODA eligibility (official develop- and various bilateral and regional “whole- ment assistance.) The U.K. Department for of-government”12 and “whole-of-system”13 International Development’s (DFID) Stabili- initiatives have emerged to address the chal- zation Unit and the U.S. Office of the Coor- lenge of merging development, diplomatic, dinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and security strategies and operations.14 have development interagency assessment But different disciplines bring with and planning frameworks to encourage joint them different goals, planning time frames, action, including for bilateral interventions decision-making processes, funding streams, in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan,17 and the and risk calculi. They can also create com- U.K. Multilateral Agency Review assesses plexity when each agency in donor countries the support provided by multilaterals in works through their own national counter- fragile situations. parts, making it difficult to set national pri- orities.15 Whole-of-system entities also often leave out those departments and ministries Building confidence that address organized crime and trafficking. And most international actors do not have International actors have supported, or facili- specific processes to ensure a whole-of- tated, “inclusive-enough” coalitions; helped government approach in their representa- develop leadership capacity across a wide tion in multilateral agencies, so that different range of responsibilities; undertaken third- signals on priority action within the same party mediation and prevention activities; recipient country can be provided to the in- supported commitment mechanisms; and in- ternational financial institutions and to dif- voked sanctions when positive incentives did ferent parts of the UN system. not bring national leaders together. They have A number of governments have been also helped deliver early results (see interna- making headway at integrating whole-of- government strategy design and resource al- tional support for national action in chapter location. Australia’s experience with mount- 4). But international interventions have not ing a truly cross-governmental operation in always been as fast, as flexible, or as responsive the Solomon Islands (Regional Assistance to local political conditions as was needed to Mission to Solomon Islands, RAMSI) is per- support early confidence-building efforts.18 haps the most developed; notably, it relied Support to building inclusive-enough on the personal involvement of the prime coalitions minister and his office to drive deep engage- ment by AusAID, and the Australian Defense, Across cases with different attributes and fac- Treasury, Justice, Federal Police, Foreign Af- ing different stresses, international actors can 186 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 use a range of tools to create incentives for have been cost-effective in each instance, coalitions to avoid violence. These include even allowing for large margins of error in • Providing evidence of a deteriorating estimating costs and benefits: every dollar situation. Communications from diplo- of prevention would have saved the interna- matic and development actors in Togo and tional community US$4.1.20 And each time Zimbabwe in the early 2000s, for example, the Fica Vivo program in Brazil prevented focused on the growing gap between coun- a homicide, it saved up to US$82,000.21 Yet tries that had once led their neighbors in since the probability of successful preventive social and economic outcomes but had action in a given case is not known, and since fallen behind in periods of fragility. preventive action often requires diplomatic risk-taking, it is difficult to marshal political • Highlighting the potential negative con- and financial support resources. For instance, sequences of inaction. Following the re- the UN Department of Political Affairs often sumption of Israeli-Palestinian violence scrambles to find travel funds for its envoys in the fall of 2000, the World Bank, with despite the high return on investment in a assistance from the UN and other donors, successful preventive effort. prepared a series of reports that addressed External mediation has helped build col- the relationship between Israeli security laborative coalitions to promote prevention measures and Palestinian socioeconomic of or recovery from violence—and is eco- development. The parties used this analy- nomical. Mediation has played a significant sis as the basis for a resumption of bilateral role in a range of cases—ECOWAS (Eco- negotiations in the context of Israel’s dis- nomic Community of West African States) engagement from Gaza in 2005. mediation in West Africa (see feature 6), UN • Jointly signaling the need for govern- facilitation of Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement, ments to address crisis situations. When Norway’s facilitation in Sudan, and NGO ef- Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008, the forts such as those of the Crisis Management government initially resisted offers of in- Initiative and the Centre for Humanitarian ternational support. Association of South- Dialogue in Aceh, Indonesia. east Asian Nations (ASEAN) mediation It is hard to attribute results conclusively and a visit by the UN Secretary-General— to mediation, or to demonstrate what would buttressed by technical support from the have happened without it; but we do know UN, the World Bank, and the Asian De- that it is cheap. The UN Department of Politi- velopment Bank—produced a policy shift cal Affairs estimates22 that the start-up budget that resulted in Myanmar opening its for “light mediation support” is US$330,000 and for “heavy mediation” is US$1.1 mil- borders to large-scale humanitarian assis- lion.23 However, mediation to manage tran- tance. South-South exchanges with Indian sitions tends to neglect economic factors and and Indonesian political and technical thus faces capacity and personnel constraints leaders who had been involved after natu- (box 6.2). Because mediation support is pro- ral disasters helped to open dialogue. vided mainly by diplomatic mechanisms, The cost savings to the international there are few cases of integrated political community of avoiding or minimizing vio- mediation and economic diagnosis provided lence are potentially considerable—a 1997 to governments grappling with transitions. Carnegie Commission Report on Preventing Routinely lamented, this situation has rarely Deadly Conflict estimated that seven major been addressed.24 Some exceptions include international post-conflict interventions in the World Bank’s support during the Dayton the 1990s cost some US$200 billion, while negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina, fi- prevention would have required only around nal status negotiations for Kosovo, and the US$70 billion.19 More recent work on six cases Agreement on Movement and Access be- concluded that conflict prevention would tween Israel and the Palestinian Authority.25 International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 187 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 6 . 2 Investing in long-term mediation as a cost-effective approach to preventing and responding to violence Martin Griffiths, Former Director of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; WDR Advisory Council Member As has often been observed, most armed conflicts today serving or former senior politicians and officials. This is a lim- are internal to states, rather than between states. Media- ited pool, and those willing to take on the dubious rewards of tion in these conflicts is rarely preventive. It is also often mediation are likely to be very busy men. And they are mostly short-lived. This is partially because mediation is still often men: there are precious few women mediators, an imbalance seen as interference in the internal affairs of a state, par- which does nothing for the quality of the output. tially because there are few national mediators and there A further factor that abbreviates mediation efforts is a sim- are limited numbers of international officials with the ple human one: many mediators prefer to avoid involvement necessary stature and diplomatic skills. Mediation is seen in the post-agreement implementation phase, which extends as a last resort, only acceptable when it becomes evident the time of their involvement and is usually messy and compli- that armed victory is unlikely and when non-state armed cated. A striking contrary example comes from the AU panel groups gain credibility and a degree of international that mediated in Kenya in 2008, where former Secretary- acceptance. General Kofi Annan was a “prisoner of peace” for 41 straight The record, though, varies between regions. In Africa days of talks. That 41 days of continuous effort is viewed as there is a robust tradition of mediation, typically led by unprecedented says volumes about the nature of standard former senior statesmen from the continent, assisted by the mediation efforts. AU’s Peace and Security Commission, which increasingly Agreements intended to initiate a durable peace must deal, holds its member states to political account on the basis of if not immediately, with the whole range of issues relevant to a broad consensus. In Asia, the picture is very different. social transformation. A political settlement is thus necessary Mediation, especially by neighbors, is extremely rare, and it but not sufficient. However, the flaws in today’s approach to is no surprise that regional mechanisms are, by comparison mediation make such a comprehensive and thoughtful inclu- with Africa, much less developed. Europe, by further con- sion in the negotiation rather unlikely. Typically, therefore, dif- trast, has been quite open to third-party mediation, but ficult issues are left for later resolution. It is not by chance, usually by individuals or international NGOs. therefore, that peace settlements, aided by the brilliant but The nature of mediators exacerbates the difficulties. passing presence of mediators, often fail the more rigorous Mediators are, on the whole, drawn from the ranks of tests of implementation. In peace negotiations, international me- has included such provisions in most of the diators often pursue inclusive-enough co- 54 operations it has authorized since the end alitions by encouraging or pressuring for of the Cold War.27 Such provisions in an ini- agreements that include key minority rights tial settlement can create incentives for inclu- and human rights provisions, as well as early sive social and economic strategies. political participation. As third-party fa- But international support often swings cilitation and mediation in internal conflict between “all-inclusive” and “not inclusive and violence have developed, there has been enough” options. In some processes there growing emphasis on including core human is pressure to treat all political groupings rights provisions in peace agreements, and equally and to give everyone a seat at the in 1999 there was formal guidance for the table—in Timor-Leste in 1999, the National UN against endorsing agreements that con- Council for Resistance in Timor was told by tained amnesties for war crimes.26 Similarly, international counterparts that it was only external actors have urged that democratic one among many political groups, despite processes or other accountability and voice almost 80 percent of the Timorese popula- mechanisms be made a routine part of con- tion having voted for independence under flict settlements. The UN Security Council its logo. International actors have also pres- 188 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 sured national authorities not to engage in tional period and led to an extension of the dialogue with groups listed as terrorist orga- program for army and rebel commanders to nizations by the UN, regional organizations, prepare for the upcoming cease-fire.34 An- or bilateral donors, even when those groups other type of program is international sup- command substantial domestic followings. port to national efforts to build an institu- Consequently, those actors have withdrawn tional infrastructure for conflict prevention support when national authorities have taken and prevention and risk reduction (box 6.3). a different path. International approaches to coalition Commitment mechanisms building often exclude women, despite inter- national efforts such as UN Security Council International actors have also helped in Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and UNSCR 1960.28 providing ongoing monitoring and imple- Women bring different issues to the negotiat- mentation guarantees—the commitment ing table—not only gender-related topics but mechanisms described in chapter 4.35 In the also different visions of how to share power, post–Cold War era, their most significant address security concerns, and promote hu- role has been in helping to implement post- man rights.29 According to UNIFEM (United conflict settlements when trust is low. Exter- Nations Development Fund for Women), nal forces can reassure parties and begin to fewer than 7 percent of negotiators on official restore confidence by monitoring and pro- delegations in peace processes since 2000 have viding credible information about imple- been women. Moreover, women make up just mentation, and thus intent. They can also 2.3 percent of military peacekeeping person- deploy troops to provide physical security nel globally.30 Similarly, in peace support oper- guarantees against a relapse.36 Cross-country ations, at the end of 2003, women represented studies repeatedly show that peace settle- only 25 percent of civilian professional staff ments with third-party guarantees are more and 4 percent of civilian police.31 stable than those without.37 Similarly, IMF Despite the challenges, both international (International Monetary Fund) and World political actors and international develop- Bank programs, including those that carry ment actors have demonstrated their ability to no financing but simply give an imprimatur support effective prevention activities in frag- of good financial practice, can help govern- ile transition moments. Donors have funded ments reassure investors and citizens of diverse interventions in fragile and conflict- their commitment to fiscal responsibility affected countries to help support effective and clean government. Among nongovern- leadership and enhance collaborative capaci- ment actors, the Extractive Industries Trans- ties,32 coalition-building, and national and lo- parency Initiative (EITI)38 and the new Nat- cal strategy development. In Guyana in 2006, ural Resource Charter39 have in effect set after a period of rising political tension, the new standards for the responsible use of first-ever violence-free elections were con- some natural resources in a partnership of ducted.33 The Social Cohesion Program— civil society, the private sector, and govern- a joint UNDP-UNDPA (UN Development ments. Adherence to these standards and Programme–UN Department of Political their reporting requirements can also act as Affairs) national initiative that included a a commitment mechanism. national dialogue, a network of local medi- Commitment mechanisms that mix na- ators to help ease tensions among com- tional and international capacity can help munities, and agreements among political shepherd economic recovery and progress on parties—contributed much to this result. In justice. They are particularly appealing be- Burundi, the World Bank and others financed cause they combine the strength of interna- leadership support, which aided in developing tional guarantees with elements of national a vision for economic recovery for the transi- institution-building. Liberia’s Governance International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 189 B OX 6.3 Heading off escalation: Dialogue and compromise in Ghana in 2003–04 Type of violence: Political, local, and intergroup conflict Transition opportunity: Preventive actions Key stakeholders: Local and national leading to peace negotiations before a government, clans, police, civil society, critical national election opposition party, international organizations Key stresses: Ethnic competition linked to a Institutional challenges: Capacity and political contest legitimacy of formal and informal gover- nance systems Ghana, viewed as one of the most stable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, has experienced its own bouts of local or community violence; a recent study identified more than 200 low-level conflicts between 1994 and 2002. The potential for serious violence threatened to emerge in 2002 over the succession to the Dagbon chieftaincy, after the Andani clan chief of the Dagbon ethnic group and 40 of his followers were murdered by the rival Abudu clan. This had national implications: Ghana’s vice president was a Dagomba, and the main opposition party had cho- sen its vice presidential candidate from a faction contesting the succession. The central gov- ernment therefore needed to defuse tension before the next national election. A state of emergency was declared in the Dagbon kingdom, and a commission of inquiry established. But the commission failed to bring a settlement: its report was rejected by both sides. The government then sought UN help to broker a dialogue among youth, women, and labor leaders and state institutions, including the police. A compromise was devised that included a funeral with full state honors for the slain Andani leader and the nomination of an Andani regent. An agreed “roadmap” for succession gave both factions a future chance at pro- viding a successor. The 2004 national elections were peaceful, with chiefs and police cooperat- ing to avoid violence. Building on this dialogue, the Ministry of the Interior, supported by UNDP and UNDPA, created a National Architecture for Peace, consisting of district, regional, and national councils, which brings together locally respected, politically neutral Ghanaians and provides a platform for community dialogue and consensus-building on divisive issues. The councils also serve as an early warning mechanism, used by state officials to identify problems. The national govern- ment now has a Peace Building Support Unit in the Ministry of the Interior to coordinate pre- ventive efforts by national, regional, and district government agencies and to provide mentor- ing and capacity-building to government and nongovernment actors. Sources: Ojielo 2007; GhanaWeb 2006; UNDPA 2010a. and Economic Management Assistance Pro- fall of apartheid in South Africa), their causal gram40 (chapter 4) shows the benefits of joint effects remain disputed.42 Critics cite negative international-national mechanisms in the humanitarian effects and the creation of il- economic sphere, as does Guatemala’s Inter- licit economies that can enrich regimes.43 Ef- national Commission Against Impunity in forts to mitigate such effects have emerged in the justice sphere (box 6.4). the two decades through the use of “targeted” In the extreme, international actors can sanctions—financial and travel restrictions threaten a range of sanctions when national imposed on individual leaders or groups.44 actors seem reluctant to take meaningful The European Union imposed travel restric- steps to avoid new cycles of violence.41 While tions, for example, on Zimbabwe’s leaders sanctions are often cited as an important when they failed to deal with a deteriorating measure in forcing political change in the economy and suppressed mounting political target state (for example, contributing to the tensions. 190 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 6 .4 International-national institutional partnerships—CICIG in Guatemala Types of violence: Legacy of civil conflict, rising criminal and gang violence, trafficking Transition opportunity: Rising crisis, moderate Key stakeholders: Government, opposition space for change parties, victims, gangs, international drug net- works, citizens, regional partners, wider global partnership Key stresses: Rising external pressures from drug Institutional challenges: Low capacity in police trafficking, perceptions of injustice and impunity and civilian justice system, past problems of by victims of violence and marginalized groups accountability To combat corruption and crime, Guatemala created the International Commission against Impunity, known by its Spanish acronym, CICIG, through an agreement with the UN in 2007. Its mandate is to “support, strengthen, and assist institutions of the State of Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations.” 45 It is one of the few instances of an international commitment mechanism deployed to help a state deal with gang-related and criminal violence. CICIG responds to the reality that Guatemala, after a 36-year civil war, has experienced continuous and mounting stresses of gang-related violence and police and judicial corruption. Studies show that a legacy of failed reintegration of demobilized soldiers at the end of Guatemala’s civil war has contributed to today’s spike in criminal violence and gang activity. CICIG draws on independent international and local investigative expertise and refers cases to Guatemalan prosecutors in the domestic judicial system. A Special Prosecutor’s Office for CICIG has been established in the Public Prosecutor’s office, and CICIG has also provided technical assistance and capacity- building support to the National Civilian Police, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Public Prosecutor.46 As of March 2010, CICIG had mounted 1,544 judicial proceedings and arrested 135 individuals, including former President Alfonso Portillo, accused of embezzling funds. CICIG has been an innovative response to the twin challenges of high external stress and low internal capacity. However, while CICIG has registered successes within Guatemala, larger regional challenges of organized crime and trafficking lie beyond its control. Sources: CICIG 2009; Férnandez 2010; Donovan 2008; The Economist 2010; UN 2006a; UN General Assembly 2009a; Hudson 2010. But international and regional norms— Support to delivering early results and mechanisms for recognition and sanc- tions—are not always fully aligned. Some For the leaders of an initial pact to build con- regions have developed norms and prin- fidence, they must deliver results quickly; ciples that recognize responsible national when timely, international assistance can leadership. The African Union (AU) and the bolster these efforts. Rapid assistance for Organization of American States have norms confidence-building can take many forms for dealing with extra-constitutional changes (chapter 4). Early results can be achieved when of government, notably coups d’état.47 But programs are appropriately designed, as the even where a region has a strong principle- initiatives described in chapters 4 and 5 make based standard, international mechanisms do clear. However, much of the assistance for pri- not always reinforce it. For example, there are ority development tasks remains slow, in par- no structured discussions on international ticular when best-fit needs on the ground fall cooperation among non-regional bilateral outside the regular donor processes (see box partners, the UN, and international finan- 6.5). A critical ingredient for bridging the gap cial institutions following the imposition of is the mutual involvement of humanitarian sanctions by the AU on a member.48 and development actors in planning. International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 191 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 6 . 5 Quick action? Ghana helps restore electricity in Liberia H. E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia; WDR Advisory Council Member After the 2005 election in Liberia, the new government populations. Second is the challenge of rigidities in donor sys- announced a 100-day plan that included the restoration of tems unable to provide particular types of assistance fast. In electricity to certain areas of the capital to help restore con- fact, the EU, USAID, and the World Bank were able to provide fidence in the state and jumpstart recovery in economic other types of support (fuel, transmission line restoration) for activities and basic services. With ECOWAS’ support, the the electricity system within the 100 days, but none of the Liberian government approached various donors to help, donors were able to cover the specific need for generators. since the new government lacked resources and institu- Indeed, there is a need to rethink existing policies and pro- tional capacity for implementation. None of the traditional cesses, to modify what I call procedural conformism for coun- donors, which included the United Nations, the World Bank, tries in crisis situations. Another case in point is the rebuilding the African Development Bank, the European Union, and of two primary roads in Liberia. The World Bank, joined by USAID, were able to provide the generators needed for this other donors, made significant commitments to this project. endeavor within the desired timeframe under their regular However, a new procedure was to be adopted which calls for a systems. The Liberian government was eventually success- multiyear construction and maintenance arrangement. This ful in securing help from the Government of Ghana, which represented an innovative new process, but one which required provided two generators that helped restore electricity in a long gestation period for implementation. Liberia gained some urban areas. when the Bank agreed to proceed with one of the roads under The Liberian experience points to two key lessons. more flexible procedures, but the other will likely experience a First is the need for early consultation between national two-year delay under the new process. This case in point is a governments and international partners on realism in deliv- clear demonstration of both the problems of procedural con- ering quick results and demonstrating progress to local formism and the possibility of more flexible thinking. Humanitarian assistance, the main tool threaten the neutrality of a program.50 Other the global system has for rapid relief, can donors, such as the European Commission, provide vital life-saving and stabilizing as- have similar practices.51 Where the popula- sistance. There is evidence that “indirect tion sees all assistance marked with logos deaths”—those caused by disease and mal- of international agencies, the opportunity nutrition in violent environments—have to boost confidence in the ability of national declined faster than deaths caused directly by reformers and institutions to lead the coun- war. This is in part a testament to the increas- try out of violence may be lost. In some cir- ing effectiveness of humanitarian aid—but cumstances, “joint branding,” as was adopted humanitarian assistance alone cannot deliver in Aceh, Indonesia, between the Indonesian on priority political, security, and develop- Government and donors, can help maintain ment needs.49 donor visibility while boosting the legitimacy As domestic pressure on donors to dem- of national institutions. onstrate results has increased, so has the ap- When protracted, humanitarian assistance peal of branding as a communications tool. confronts a dilemma: because it does not, For example, the United States Agency for for the most part, deliver through national International Development’s (USAID) policy institutions, it can undermine national insti- is that all programs and commodities funded tutional capacity. Yet international agencies by USAID are marked with the USAID logo. and NGOs that have both humanitarian and However, there is some flexibility—where development mandates can build bridges needed, a partner country symbol or minis- from relief to early results and institutional try logo may be added, while branding may transformation. For instance, the United Na- be avoided altogether if it can be shown to tions Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has been 192 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 developing the capacity of national and lo- Similar delays have affected bilateral secu- cal actors to protect the rights of disadvan- rity cooperation. Between 2008 and 2010, the taged groups. Most successful are activities United States pledged US$1.6 billion to the that support individuals (such as teachers), Mérida Initiative, which aims to provide law improve organizational capacities (such as enforcement support to Mexico and Central school management structures), and address American countries. By July 2010, only 9 per- state and civil society capacities simultane- cent of the funds had been spent.55 ously. In Sri Lanka, UNICEF has worked with Global funds for peacebuilding and state- the Ministry of Education and communities building have also increased in recent years to to adopt a child-friendly-schools approach, fill financing support gaps in transition set- even in conflict-affected areas, increasing tings. For example, the UN Peacebuilding student and teacher attendance and reduc- Fund (PBF) plays a catalytic role bridging the ing dropout rates. Similarly, the World Food humanitarian and the transitional and devel- Programme has increased its uses of local opment phases, while the World Bank’s State- purchase of food to support domestic agri- building and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) is cultural capacity. able to mobilize technical and financial re- The potential gap between humanitarian sources and foster coherence with longer- and development assistance has long been term development planning.56 In Nepal, for recognized.52 As the examples above demon- example, the PBF has provided US$2.2 mil- strate, UN agencies and international NGOs lion in catalytic funding to discharge and re- with humanitarian and development man- habilitate minors, post-cease-fire recruits, and dates can do much in the critical early phase discharged women back to civilian life. The of transitions to provide quick support while discharge process was completed across the paying attention to longer-term institution- seven principle cantonments in some of the building. Another example is recovery in the most inaccessible areas of the country over a health sector in Timor-Leste: the government four-week period; this initial funding was fol- drew on the capacity of humanitarian NGOs lowed by investments by the Governments of for immediate service provision as an integral Norway and the United Kingdom to finance part of a program that gradually transferred the reintegration efforts that have followed.57 management and service delivery to national Collaborative tools for national-interna- institutions (see chapters 5 and 8).53 tional strategy development have emerged Even when citizen security is acknowl- in recent years to set goals, financing pri- edged as a priority, responses can still be orities, and progress indicators in conflict- slow. In 2005, the UN Mission in Sudan affected countries. Commonly focusing on took more than nine months to deploy early results, they may also contain measures 3,600 troops, just 40 percent of its man- to aid institutional transformation. The dated level. The UN Department of Peace- tools range from Post Conflict Needs Assess- keeping Operations took 12 months to ments (PCNAs)58 to international compacts achieve the authorized troop levels for and strategic peacebuilding frameworks.59 MONUC, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Effectively implemented, they can galvanize the Democratic Republic of Congo.54 Over- national and international stakeholders in coming barriers to rapid contracting and support of a jointly agreed-upon and well- recruitment would make a difference in coordinated program of priority actions sen- the ability of the UN and regional institu- sitive to the underlying drivers of conflict. tions to deploy peacekeeping operations to In practice, however, joint planning and confront violence in a timely manner. The assessment tools have not generally been adoption of the UN global support pack- used to their full potential. Among the rec- age in Spring 2010 is an important step in ognized shortcomings is a lack of real inte- this direction. gration of economic, security, humanitarian, International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 193 and political programs—and thus a focus both used a simple matrix planning format on economic or technical development is- to lay out expected results—from both gov- sues to the detriment of attention to politi- ernment and donors.66 These plans have the cal and security concerns, as well as a near effect of a “double compact” (an idea first complete neglect of transitional justice.60 proposed by Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lock- Some bilateral governments—such as the hart).67 Double compacts describe in a simple United Kingdom and the United States61— form the results that governments are aiming have integrated diplomatic, development, to provide to their own citizens, and can be and security assessment tools, but these are used to facilitate cross-government action in rarely coordinated with other international weak institutional environments. They can or, more importantly, national assessment also be designed to make donor commit- and planning processes. In only two PCNA ments explicit, and to monitor whether these cases, Georgia and Liberia, did humanitarian commitments have been met. In practice, and development partners fully coordinate donor reporting inside recipient countries the humanitarian appeal and needs assess- on how much of their own funds have been ment processes to ensure consistency among disbursed, and in what activities, has often the humanitarian and the transitional and been weak, complicating national reformers’ development actions and promote the nec- efforts to report on public promises.68 essary continuum from humanitarian re- sponse to development.62 International assessment and planning Supporting institutional processes have also registered mixed results transformation in engaging national actors and linking strategy development processes. They are Essential building blocks of international typically structured around discrete one-off support to successful institutional transfor- mation are time and patience, best-fit ap- transitions from conflict to post-conflict that proaches appropriate to the local political ignore the multiple transitions required for context, and supporting capacity for critical progress. They often omit attention to the institutional reform in the areas of citizen security and justice sectors. Although adapt- security, justice, and jobs. The international able to a wide range of situations, they have community’s track record in supporting rarely been used for prevention or for the these building blocks is mixed. analysis of interlinked and cross-border forms of violence (such as organized crime and trafficking)—nor do they generally fo- Time and patience cus on external stresses.63 International assistance needs to be sustained International planning processes in the for a minimum of 15 years to support most early stages of transition have proliferated.64 long-term institutional transformations. Lon- Burundi has had, in addition to its own gevity is something that some international poverty reduction strategy, 13 international NGOs have understood for some time (box or joint national-international strategies and 6.6), while bilateral and multilateral donors plans, on different timetables and with dif- have started to adopt longer time frames. ferent priorities identified, between 2008 Witness the U.K. DFID’s 10-year partner- and 2010.65 In some countries, this kind of ship agreements, the recent Dutch agreement risk has been minimized by strong support with Burundi on a 10-year security-sector to government planning and a close dialogue reform plan, and the 10-year exceptional as- with donors over results. Timor-Leste’s tran- sistance to post-conflict countries from the sition benchmarks in 2001–02 and Liberia’s World Bank. But most strategic donor and results-focused transition framework in 2002 financing frameworks cover from three to 194 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 6 . 6 The Aga Khan Development Network: Local knowledge, longevity, realistic expectations For decades the Aga Khan has supported local initiatives in Northern Afghani- stan, Northern Pakistan, and Eastern Tajikistan—areas geographically and eco- nomically isolated, environmentally marginal, and marked by interethnic ten- sions. The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) approach was forged in self-help traditions to “facilitate change that is . . . long-lasting in consequence and sustainable into the future.”69 In Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan, the AKDN cements its commitment in protocols, agreements, and treaties with local, district, and national governments. It builds a diverse donor base, including local, national, and international contributions; invests heavily in local manage- ment and implementation capacity; develops approaches and services that can be sustained by local partners and institutions if donor interest declines; and adopts a cautious approach to area and program expansion unless driven by local demands, priorities, and readiness.70 Typical engagements exceed 20 years. Working closely with communities, local institutions, and government enti- ties, the AKDN bases its development approach on trust earned through demon- strated long-term commitment to these regions and their peoples. That commit- ment is reflected in its staff: some 95 percent are nationals or regional expatriates who work in beneficiary communities for many years. Sources: Aga Khan Development Network 2003, 2010; Agence Française de Dével- oppement and others 2005; Commission on Growth and Development 2008. five years, with many projects having an even Despite the need for sustained support for shorter life cycle. Foundational reforms can institution building, volatility of aid flows is rarely be achieved within such time frames, a major problem, especially in fragile states. and so are subject to renegotiation whenever Practitioners have long argued that fluctua- a strategy or project ends. tions in donor aid destabilize the budget and Long-term security commitments are fiscal deficit, and that predictable assistance also rare. The majority of peacekeeping mis- is needed to enhance a government’s capac- sions run from two to six years—for under- ity to plan expenditures rationally.72 Insecure standable reasons. A long-term presence on situations are in particular need of consistent the ground would be both exceedingly costly support because of the high potential that and unwelcome by host communities and interrupted reforms will be reversed. Yet aid states. UN missions do exist that have been to fragile and conflict-affected states is much present for decades—such as the UN Mili- more volatile than that to other develop- tary Observer Group in India and Pakistan ing countries—indeed, more than twice as (since 1949) and the UN Peacekeeping Force volatile, with the efficiency costs of volatility in Cyprus (since 1964)—but these are small much more profound in fragile states than in size and mandate. Over-the-horizon forces in those with stronger institutions (see box or longer-term security commitments are 6.7). In a recent study, the economic losses alternatives to too short or too long deploy- associated with volatile net official devel- ments. But the use of such devices to provide opment assistance were more than twice as long-term security support has been rare. An high for weak states as for strong states (2.54 exception is the European Union’s Congo percent versus 1.19 percent of GDP).73 These force, which provided MONUC with rapid estimates suggest that from 30 to 50 percent and strategic support during the national of volatility is donor-driven, independent of elections of 2006.71 events in or actions by the recipient country. International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 195 B OX 6.7 Stop-go aid: Volatility in selected fragile states Over the last 20 years, countries that experienced longer periods of fragility, violence, or conflict experi- enced more volatility in their aid. Figure A shows that the coefficient of variance (CV) of net official develop- ment assistance (ODA), excluding debt relief, is higher for countries that have experienced more violence since 1990. This relationship, reflected by the upward trend line, is statistically significant and suggests that, on average, a country that experienced 20 years of violence experienced twice the volatility in aid of a country that did not experience violence. Volatility of revenues has considerable costs for all governments, but particularly so in fragile situations where it may derail reform efforts and disrupt institution-building. F I G U R E A Aid volatility higher for countries that have experienced violence 1.4 Coefficient of variance of net ODA, 1.2 excluding debt relief 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Number of years of high homicides, conflict, and fragility Low-income countries Linear (Low-income countries) Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. This volatility is illustrated by figure B—it was not uncommon for total aid to Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Haiti to drop by 20 or 30 percent in one year and increase by up to 50 per- cent the following year (humanitarian aid and debt relief, excluded from these statistics, would further increase the volatility). F I G U R E B Annual percentage change in disbursed aid per capita, net of debt relief and humanitarian assistance Aid to these four fragile countries has been extremely volatile over the past 15 years. Aid to Guinea-Bissau more than doubled in 2003, only to be cut in half the following year. Likewise, the Central African Republic experienced a doubling of aid in 2004 and a 25 percent cut in 2005. This applies in all fragile states, for which variance in aid is 0.7 compared to 0.3 in other developing contexts. 150 Annual % change in aid per capita 100 50 0 –50 –100 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Burundi Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau Haiti Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. 196 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Using methodology developed in Kharas and The general response of the international adopting conservative assumptions, a reduc- community to the pervasive capacity deficits tion in volatility of 30 percent by donors in fragile situations is technical assistance. Be- would deliver a value to each recipient frag- cause they are constrained by short contracts ile or conflict-affected country of US$27–39 and under pressure to deliver reports, tech- million a year.74 nical advisers often bring with them a focus Short project duration and small proj- on transplanted best practices from other ect size compound the problem. While the country experiences, which can undermine median IDA (International Development the search for tailored and context-specific, Association, the World Bank’s “fund for the best-fit approaches. In fragile states, techni- poorest”) operation is US$22.7 million, it is cal assistance works best in the turnaround as little as US$116,000 and US$65,000 for period, when leaders and reformers are look- some bilateral donors.75 According to a Eu- ing for help in well-specified areas.80 The at- ropean Commission study, 63 percent of all tributes of effective technical assistance in donor projects in Cambodia have a duration fragile environments have long been estab- of less than three years, and over one-third, a lished.81 Yet, despite a general understanding duration of less than a year.76 A performance of the elements of good design, much tech- review of aid partners in Mozambique indi- nical assistance has not been well prepared cates that while the number of multiyear aid or effectively implemented. Some critiques projects has increased, most of them are still include the following: only for two years.77 Longer project life cycles • A quarter of international aid to Afghani- is vital, given the timelines for institutional stan goes for technical assistance, intended transformations, even under the most accel- to support government capacity-building, erated conditions. with minimal impact.82 • More than 80 cents of every dollar of Approaches adapted to the local context aid Kosovo receives is delivered as tech- The international community remains nical assistance, but this has not pro- tempted to emphasize form rather than the duced lasting capacity within govern- function to be accomplished.78 Within a ment institutions.83 year of its creation, for example, the Coali- • Despite there being only five donors in- tion Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq volved in technical cooperation in Sierra promulgated more than 100 separate regu- Leone in 2007, a mere 22 percent of lations and orders covering a wide range aid dollars was coordinated with country of security, economic, and administrative programs.84 matters. Although the international drafters • Donor technical assistance services have tried to improvise in a complex and volatile been between 11 and 30 percent more ex- setting, they were hampered by their lack of pensive than those available from other knowledge of Arabic, local sociopolitical re- vendors.85 alities, and Iraq’s broader jurisprudential principles. As the United States Special Bilateral and regional actors86 have also Inspector-General for Iraq Reconstruction created civilian surge capabilities with ros- reported, “The CPA—and the U.S. govern- ters of experts who can be deployed at short ment agencies that supported it—demon- notice to countries affected by violence.87 strated an inadequate understanding of But large numbers of expatriate personnel, both Iraqi culture and the complicated in- particularly if deployed for short periods ternal political relationships that existed without knowledge of the country context, among and within various Iraqi groups.”79 are, as with “normal” technical assistance, International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 197 unlikely to build sustainable capacity. The ment procedures were based on the assump- UN Independent Review of Civilian Capaci- tion of ongoing security, a reasonable level of ties recently reached a similar conclusion, state institutional capacity, and competitive stressing national ownership and partner- markets. They thus have difficulty adapt- ship as key principles for the UN’s civilian ing to situations where security conditions response.88 Providing capacity to deliver change between the design and the tendering donor-designed projects is very different in of a project, where a small number of quali- both philosophy and approach to support- fied government counterparts struggle to ing national institutional capacities to de- manage complex procurement documenta- liver good-quality public services.89 tion, and where the number of qualified con- South-South learning offers promise for tractors prepared to compete and mobilize is effective capacity development and best-fit very limited. approaches because it can draw on knowl- Similarly, the UN Secretariat originally edge from countries that have more recently developed procurement systems designed experienced transitions or share regional to support its function as a headquarters- political, economic, or sociocultural charac- based advisory service and secretariat to the teristics.90 The African Development Bank General Assembly. When peacekeeping op- (AfDB), UNDP, and the World Bank all erations were launched, these systems were now have specific South-South facilities, the extended with relatively little adaptation to AfDB’s being notable for its size and focus on all the requirements of a peacekeeping op- fragile states.91 eration, despite the difference in contexts Learning from recent transformations in and objectives. Most bilateral aid agencies middle-income countries can be particularly do not have “risk policies” specific to frag- valuable. The Brazilian NGO Viva Rio works ile and conflict-affected situations—instead, in Haiti’s slum Bel Air to reduce armed vio- they apply their normal criteria. Some do- lence, using its experience of working in nors have approaches or instruments that Brazilian favelas.92 Triangular cooperation to recognize the problem, but these have not support South-South cooperation, involving yet been mainstreamed across country strat- a financing donor and a southern partner egies or in the criteria for project funding providing technical assistance, has also shown decisions.97 some success in peacebuilding.93 The Repub- When the environment is insecure, these lic of Ireland engaged in a triangular learning standard procedures (procedural conformism, partnership with Liberia and Timor-Leste on as Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf the role of women in conflict prevention, calls them in box 6.4) often do not produce management, and resolution.94 South-South the results intended. Frequently complex cooperation might prove particularly relevant and time-consuming, they can be difficult to in supporting executive management.95 An- manage for weak institutional counterparts other important area for South-South coop- and can cause delays. In environments such eration is peer learning for effective leadership as Cambodia, Liberia, and Sudan, it has often and the successful management of conflict.96 been difficult to find qualified international contractors to bid on projects, and their mobilization has been slow.98 Standard pro- Internal international agency systems cedures can also undermine best-fit institu- Responsiveness to the local context in frag- tional approaches to develop capacity or they ile situations is also hampered by internal can have difficulties in meeting objectives processes that were originally developed for of transparency and anti-corruption in en- more stable environments. For example, the vironments with difficult political economy international financial institutions’ procure- considerations (box 6.8). The g7+ group of 198 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 6 .8 Publishing cost estimates as best practice? Trade-offs between transparency and collusion Transition opportunity: Pressure for speed Key stakeholders: Government agency of action in fragile situations tendering, domestic citizens, domestic com- panies, international donors and companies Key stresses: Perceptions of cronyism Institutional challenges: High insecurity, toward contractors from particular political, low institutional capacity, shallow competi- ethnic, regional groupings in contracting tion, legacy of past corrupt practice that can exacerbate risks of violence Dual accountability dilemma: Conducting processes acceptable to international donors and investors while achieving speed and legitimacy in local context In its loan agreements, the World Bank often requires the publication of partner countries’ engineering estimates of the costs of building a road. When the market is competitive, publish- ing the estimates can produce lower bids. Such publication also ensures a procurement norm of transparency and equity—that all bidders are on equal footing and companies with close ties to the roads authority cannot obtain the estimates “under the table.” Set against these benefits is the risk that this procurement practice will facilitate the oppo- site of its intent—collusion. When firms are negotiating an agreement on a collusive price, the cost estimate provides a target or focal point for their agreement. This effect is dramatically illustrated in a World Bank Institutional Integrity comparison of the estimated price against the winning bid on 46 contracts for road construction and repair let during 2009 and 2010 under a Bank-financed project in an Eastern European country. The closeness of the two is inconceiv- able without collusion (see figure). As a result, a procurement norm has achieved neither the goal of quick support—delays are created in publishing the estimate, nor fostering a legitimate and transparent process—due to real or perceived collusion. F I G U R E A Closeness of bids inconceivable without collusion 5 4.5 4 Cost (US$ millions) 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 Contract Number Estimated cost Actual cost Source: Adapted from discussion with the World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency in 2010. fragile states’ Dili Declaration of May 2010 why we must give ourselves a transitional pe- states: “Although we all accept international riod to reinforce our capabilities and systems standards, the donor community must be and not have complex and slow procedural aware of our conditions and needs. That is requirements and conditions imposed upon International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 199 us.”99 Responsible leaders appreciate the abil- Focus on citizen security, justice, ity of well-functioning fiduciary systems and jobs to significantly reduce opportunistic rent- Assistance to countries struggling to develop seeking and reinforce rule-based behavior— well-governed police, justice, and corrections but they need processes adapted to the reality systems in the face of fluid violent threats is of local conditions.100 much more limited than assistance available Suggestions for “best-fit” procurement ar- to build military capacity. The supply of per- rangements are not hard to come by. Country sonnel is constrained, since states do not have experience points to the need for contracting the kinds of reserve capacities in police or processes that allow direct negotiations with criminal justice that they do in their militar- knowledge of regional markets, a focus on ies. For justice, the UN’s Independent Review speed of mobilization and track record in on Civilian Capacities found that it was one operating in insecure environments in con- of the largest lacunae in international civil- tracting, better information to the local pri- ian mechanisms, despite efforts to fill gaps.106 vate sector about procurement procedures, The UN Department of Peacekeeping Op- subcontracting to local contractors to build erations (UNDPKO), bilateral donors, the their capacity, pre-tendering internationally Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), under variable quantity contracts, civil soci- the UNDP, and others have each deepened ety monitoring of procurement to build trust, their delivery capacity related to citizen se- simplifying processes and documentation curity and justice, and the World Bank has consistent with existing donor guidelines, and expanded somewhat assistance for legal and decentralizing donor decision-making to the judicial issues—but major gaps in personnel country office.101 But the search for best-fit and delivery remain. procurement practices has proceeded further Support to the criminal justice system is in some donors than others, and multilateral frequently more challenging to provide than systems have not caught up with innovations support to military reform and capacity in bilateral procurement. building because of the great disparities in The fragmentation of international aid policies, legal frameworks, and organiza- efforts also acts against the provision of tional structures between different nation- institutional support at sufficient scale. Not state providers.107 These disparities have his- only have the number of donors and vertical torically caused tensions in international programs grown to more than the number support to policing and civilian justice, from of recipient countries,102 but aid has itself Bosnia to Timor-Leste.108 Regional organiza- also become more fragmented. In the Dem- tions like the European Union have focused ocratic Republic of Congo, 30 active donors on training to bridge differences in national are financing 362 projects in the health sec- practices. The UN’s 50-person-strong Stand- tor, 262 for less than US$1 million, and 305 ing Police Capacity and its Office of Rule of projects in the justice sector, 199 for less than Law and Security Institutions have also be- US$1 million.103 A recent OECD study iden- gun to make headway in developing standard tified 32 countries receiving aid from 15 or doctrine and training packages for police more donors.104 In contrast, studies on Bots- units willing to deploy into UN operations, wana and the Republic of Korea argue that but this is still a small capacity to manage the development successes in these cases can be current growth in police deployments, let at least partly attributed to the presence of alone support a broader international capac- a single or dominant donor.105 Fragmented ity.109 There is no similar mechanism for joint assistance places a huge administrative bur- training of national judicial personnel to ex- den on weak capacities, draining rather than pose them to different systems and practices, building them. 200 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 and less of a body of knowledge on approach- relatively little emphasis on the value of em- ing institution-building in fragile settings. ployment in terms of violence prevention, Structural constraints in the international and the type and quality of employment that architecture also limit international support can strengthen social cohesion and promote a to security and justice. The UN’s peacekeep- positive role for youth in the community. As ing budget can support the deployment of a result, there is little consensus on the type police forces, but only if a country is under a of employment-related interventions that Security Council mandate. This poses a ma- can systematically make a difference in frag- jor political obstacle to countries that might ile environments. An exception is the use of seek international support for their police community-based public works: while having sector but are hesitant to agree to being very different designs, programs supported on the Security Council’s agenda. Without a by bilateral donors, UN agencies, and inter- peacekeeping operation, national authorities national financial institutions in Afghanistan, can seek civilian or advisory support from Indonesia, Nepal, Burundi, Rwanda, and vari- the UN and operational support from bilat- ous Latin American countries have generated eral actors. But the former does not include considerable transitional employment. Some the actual deployment of police units, while bilateral donors, such as the United States and the latter lacks the legitimacy of support pro- India, have also dedicated a significant pro- vided by a multilateral organization to which portion of their assistance in fragile states to the national authority belongs. income-generating activities. Chapter 5 described the common prob- The role of the private sector in mitigating lems arising at a country level from discon- and recovering from the effects of violence at nects between support to the military and both the local and national level is now widely police and support to the civilian justice recognized,110 especially if creating jobs and system. The lack of a clear focal point for incomes is to outlast donor-funded, short- criminal justice as a whole in the interna- term emergency works. Various innovative tional system may underpin this problem— schemes, including some supported by the remarkably, there are international agencies International Finance Corporation and by for a wide range of functions, but no agency several bilateral donors, have proven effective charged with taking the lead on criminal in building up private sector and entrepre- justice issues. Fragmentation of financial neurship capacity; examples include linking support for the security sectors and civilian local entrepreneurs to larger national or in- justice functions, due to the current division ternational businesses and linking education in what can be counted as “Official Develop- to entrepreneurship development.111 Donors ment Assistance under DAC rules” and to such as the Multilateral Development Banks, the differing financial rules applying under Japan, and China provide significant invest- peacekeeping missions and voluntary sup- ments in infrastructure that supports private port in these areas, also exacerbates discon- sector development.112 However, the inter- nected approaches on the ground. national community has not paid as much With regard to employment creation, un- attention to labor-intensive private sector derstandable shifts by donors to focus support development as is warranted by the impor- on the MDGs have led many to dedicate signif- tance of equitable growth and job creation icant parts of their development assistance to for violence prevention.113 health, education, and basic services like water and sanitation—with relatively little emphasis on job creation. International economic pol- Dual accountability and managing icy advisory services have generally focused the risks of action on growth rather than jobs. This has included consideration of labor-intensive growth paths International actors know that fast engage- as central to poverty reduction, but has placed ment, long-term commitments, and support International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 201 to national institutions are central to pre- FIGURE 6.2 International support to nation-states—The dual venting repeated cycles of violence.114 Why accountability dilemma then is international practice slow to change? We argue that this is because of the “dual accountability dilemma”—international ac- Accountability National International tors, whether bilateral or multilateral, are Actors Actors accountable first to their domestic constitu- Accountability encies and shareholders, and only second to their counterparts or to the citizens of recipi- Accountability Accountability ent states. This leads them to emphasize one set of risks—the risks of action and of engage- ment with weak counterpart institutions—at the expense of the risks of inaction or lack of long-term institution-building outcomes, for which there is less accountability (figure Domestic constituencies Domestic constituencies 6.2). The consequences are twofold: privileg- ing the reputational risks of action over the Source: WDR team. consequential risks of delay and hesitation to channel financing and assistance through the budget of fragile national institutions. likely to prevent the spread of violence. The Working in fragile states necessar- same options are available—option A, wait ily involves uncertainty, fluidity, and high six months to be confident that the funds will risk—but there are risks of action and risks be used properly, but at the cost of averting of inaction. A highly simplified example an estimated 20 percent of the risk, or op- illustrates the problem: A community of tion B, act immediately with a high degree of 100,000 people faces a dire humanitar- confidence that violence can be averted, but ian threat. The external world is willing with confidence that only 80 percent of the to help and has two broad options to do funds can be satisfactorily accounted. Again, so. Both are estimated to cost US$50 mil- most people would say option B should be lion. Under option A, external donors can chosen. wait six months to ensure that all the funds There is no certainty that development will be used appropriately, but this will interventions will save lives and prevent the mean that only 20 percent of the people spread of violence—while hasty interven- will be saved. Under option B, donors can tions often are less likely to succeed. But what be confident of saving all the people, but if the risk is differentiated? One can probably can only be confident that 80 percent of judge that delays in the arrival of peacekeep- the funds can be properly accounted for. ing troops and the financing for salaries and Which option to choose? Most people would the electricity system are likely to spur vio- say that option B should be chosen. Indeed, lence if no action is taken—80 percent likely, sensitivity to the risk of inaction and a tol- for the sake of illustration. For the schools erance for a certain degree of fiduciary risk program, however, one might judge this risk underpins humanitarian interventions— to be lower and that spending a few months and most humanitarian actors would adopt working on the design of the program would option B. deliver better results. Most people would then Now consider this for developmental or say pay for the airlift, the salaries, and the peacekeeping interventions: airlift support electricity—but wait for the schools program. for troops; financing to pay salaries of police, Yet, in practice, the development community education, and health workers and to keep would likely treat the issues of electricity and the electricity system functioning; and a pro- schooling in the same manner; and while the gram to reopen schools are deemed highly UN Security Council sometimes takes deci- 202 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 sions rapidly, the supporting infrastructure Veterans Assistance Program.119 A third is in for peacekeeping deployments results in op- external financial management and procure- tion A outcomes. The strategic challenge is to ment agencies, where international firms have move from should to would—in other words, overall responsibility for program financial to rework risk-management systems to bet- management and procurement and main- ter align risk measurement and risk-taking to tain a program’s consolidated budget and ac- optimal outcomes. counts, as was carried out in demobilization A further example of the impact of dual and reintegration in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, accountability is donor reluctance to channel and Sierra Leone.120 A fourth is “dual key” assistance through the national budget and programs, where both national and inter- national institutions in a violence-affected national actors sign off on critical, high-risk and fragile state despite its impact on trans- transactions, such as the Liberia Governance forming institutions. In addition to avoiding and Economic Management Assistance Pro- the negative effects of parallel systems, aid gram described in chapter 4. And a fifth is in- through the budget supports institutional kind support to items in the national budget, mechanisms of political decision-making on as in Zimbabwe, where a bilateral donor has priorities and trade-offs, leverages the devel- directly financed, procured, and provided opment of public financial management and such items through contractors, as with the accountability systems, and creates a tool provision of medicines to state-run clinics. for coordinating international assistance.115 These approaches can manage donor fidu- However, donors confront a dilemma—as- ciary risk and provide space to establish and sistance to weak institutions is needed if they strengthen national systems. But since they are ever to become strong, but their weakness use international expertise, they are generally in itself poses political and fiduciary risks.116 expensive. A range of more localized options In these high-risk engagements, the interna- is also available to engage with national in- tional community is therefore prone to rely stitutions while dealing with differing levels on bilateral and multilateral organizations to of fiduciary and reputational risk. They in- perform functions normally performed by clude community-driven development pro- the state,117 in order to avoid being associated grams (chapter 4) and contracting to NGOs with the corrupt use of resources or the vio- using results-based financing and output- lence or human rights abuses by the parties based aid in key sectors. Direct support to being supported. subnational administrations and assistance through nongovernment agencies that em- ploy local staff are other ways of managing Available options for risk management assistance outside government budget sys- A range of approaches that deal with differ- tems in situations of weak governance, main- ing levels of fiduciary and reputational risk taining a focus on local institutional capacity exist to engage with national institutions. and skilled personnel. They include greater independent oversight Pooling funds also provides a way to man- and monitoring of government-executed age risk. Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) programs. For instance, in Afghanistan and have increasingly been used in fragile and the West Bank and Gaza under World Bank– conflict-affected situations—for example, in administered multidonor trust funds, inde- Afghanistan and Southern Sudan (box 6.9), pendent monitors have been employed to Iraq, Indonesia, West Bank and Gaza, and scrutinize procurement and expenditures by Haiti. MDTFs can help to bridge the dual both national institutions and international accountability dilemma. For national actors, contractors.118 A related example is releasing they improve the transparency of donor in- donor funds only upon unqualified monthly vestments, ensure greater coherence with na- or quarterly audits by a certified external tional planning, and provide a platform for auditing firm, as undertaken for the Uganda resource mobilization. For donors, MDTFs International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 203 B OX 6.9 Multidonor trust funds: Afghanistan and Southern Sudan Types of violence: Intergroup, ethnic, and political violence; organized crime and trafficking; cross-border; transnational; ideological Transition opportunity: Initial large space Key stakeholders: Federal and local gov- for change; Bonn Accord/Comprehensive ernment, security forces, militias, community Peace Agreement; elections; national leaders, civil society groups, citizens, women, development budget international partners, armed transnational groups Key stresses: Legacies of violence and Institutional challenges: Severe account- trauma, cross-border violence, criminal ability and capacity constraints in public networks, low incomes, youth unemploy- administration, security, judicial, and political ment, corruption, gender discrimination institutions; lack of representation of women Dual accountability dilemma: Accountability and capacity constraints at the national level made multidonor trust funds an attractive solution; trust fund arrangements took advantage of the mandates and competencies of the UN and the World Bank. Afghanistan UNDP established the Afghan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF), supported by 24 donors and valued at US$73 million for a limited period of six months, to pay for the most pressing needs of reestablishing the civil service: paying salaries, rehabilitating government buildings, and procuring equipment. This support bolstered government capability and legitimacy in the early phases of transition and bridged the gap until such time as a subsequent MDTF could provide long-term budget support and finance investment programs. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), supported by 32 donors, disburses funds through a ”recurrent window” to finance the budget (salaries of civil servants and facility costs, particularly in education and health) and an “investment window” to support the gov- ernment’s National Priority Programmes. The ARTF is intended to coordinate funding and reduce the burden on the government, promote transparency and accountability, and rein- force the role of the national budget in promoting national objectives. Since its inception in 2002, donors have committed US$4 billion (as of December 2010), the largest contribution to the Afghan budget. The ARTF moved quickly, disbursing 99 percent of committed funds in 2003–04 and 75 percent in 2005–06, serving as the main vehicle for financing payment of government salaries, as well as key projects such as the Salang Tunnel and the National Solidarity Program. UNDP administers the complementary Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which largely funds police salaries. The current phase of LOTFA was funded by 15 donors providing around US$306 million. Southern Sudan A US$545 million Southern Sudan Multidonor Trust Fund was established in 2005, with financing from 14 donors and with the World Bank appointed as trust fund administrator. The government of Southern Sudan, donors, NGOs, and civil society have criticized the MDTF for slowness and inefficiency, lagging disbursements, and inflexibility. Reviews have pointed to the World Bank’s underestimation of logistical difficulties, institutional deficiencies, and communication challenges—and to inconsistent managerial oversight, especially in the critical early phase. Part of the explanation for this was the dilemma faced by the World Bank in trying to balance the risk posed by swift action (possible misuse of the funds) with the risks of inaction (failing to disburse funds and not achieving goals). The World Bank has taken steps to improve the fund’s management—disbursements in 2010 amounted to US$188 million and reached a total of US$400 million by December 2010 (almost three-quarters of the funds committed). Source: Scanteam 2007; Fenton and Phillips 2009; Randel 2010; Atos Consulting 2009; Scanteam 2010; OECD 2010c; Government of Afghanistan and UNDP 2010; World Bank 2005a, 2009a, 2010b, 2010j; Randel and Mowjee 2006. 204 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 can reduce transaction costs and provide a progress out of fragility. The only agreed forum for donor collaboration and dialogue global framework for measuring the results with national authorities, while MDTF sec- of development assistance is the MDGs retariats can provide information to capitals and their associated indicators. No global that donors may not be able to generate on measures exist to assess progress in ef- their own.121 MDTFs can enable donors to forts to improve human and citizen secu- adopt a collective approach to the risks in- rity. So a simple agreed set of indicators herent in transition situations. 122 In the hu- to measure progress in reducing violence manitarian context, pooled mechanisms may and creating better institutions would allow increase funding levels because they enable both the international community and na- donors to disburse larger sums than they can tional leaders to track progress on violence manage directly. risk management alongside the MDGs. MDTFs, however, are rarely the most im- Nor do reliable global data exist on levels or portant financing instrument in conflict set- patterns of insecurity. Basic data on war battle tings—total funding through some 18 opera- deaths are poor—best estimates are missing tive MDTFs in 2007 amounted to US$1.2 in 36 percent of the cases, and low and high billion, still a small fraction of international estimates are often separated by an order of financing for fragile and conflict-affected magnitude.127 The quality of data on indirect states.123 Moreover, MDTF performance has deaths due to war is significantly worse—es- been uneven across country examples in timates of casualties in Iraq for 2003 to 2006 speed and delivery of outputs, in quality of range from 50,000 to 600,000.128 Homicide processes, and in stakeholder perceptions of data are similarly inadequate for monitoring success. Recent evaluations of MDTFs have violence. While every OECD country reports pointed to inconsistency of MDTF manage- homicide statistics for every year of the past ment processes within and across agencies, five, only 62 percent of developing countries the need for better management of expecta- have one or more observations for the past tions, more robust monitoring and impact five years, and only 29 percent of fragile or evaluation, quicker delivery of funds to sup- conflict-affected states in Sub-Saharan Africa port national confidence building, and more report a single homicide rate. emphasis on support through national sys- An innovative approach that tracks con- tems for institution building.124 Balancing flict and violence reported in the local press the competing demands of providing short- is being used in Aceh since the signing of term financing and building longer-term in- the peace accord in August 2005.129 Another stitutional capacity is illustrated in the expe- source of information on attitudes toward rience of the Southern Sudan MDTF. domestic violence is UNICEF’s periodic Because of their high-profile nature and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, which complex governance system, MDTFs can cover around 100 countries, many of them also increase risk aversion within their host- fragile and violence-affected. On the whole, ing agency. Bilateral donors, in effect, transfer however, there are few agreed baselines for their risk to multilateral MDTF administra- measuring reductions in violence. Better data tors.125 There can also be micromanagement collection is an easy win for improving inter- by donors of MDTF portfolios and earmark- national responses (chapter 9). ing of funds, undermining alignment with Polling to measure citizen confidence and nationally driven strategy and budgeting.126 expectations over time is rarely used in frag- ile states. Perception-based polling could be an important part of measuring citizen pri- Monitoring progress out of fragility orities and citizen trust in government. Such Making the dual accountability dilemma data have rarely been collected consistently even worse is a lack of systems to monitor in fragile states,130 for reasons that range from International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 205 poor communications and underfunded proved their usefulness, and reaches the fol- organizations to fears of how the informa- lowing three conclusions: tion will be used.131 But technological ad- • First, there are serious gaps in support for vances make collecting survey data easier— citizen security, justice, and jobs for coun- this WDR, for example, carried out rapid tries struggling to prevent violence. SMS (short message service) surveys in the Democratic Republic of Congo.132 • Second, “procedural conformism” in in- ternational agencies is unsuited to the challenges of rapid confidence-building Lessons of international and best-fit approaches to institutional engagement transformation. Better ways to manage ac- countability to domestic taxpayers and lo- The paradox of dual accountability is well cal counterparts are needed. understood by actors on the ground—the question is how to do better. Any number • Third, new challenges and the chang- of major reports on international assistance ing landscape of international assistance that have to do with conflict-affected coun- require new efforts to work together. tries in the last decade have underlined the Complex problems of political and crim- limits to what international support can do inal violence require the combined ca- to reduce conflict and bring about institu- pacities of diplomatic, security, and tional transformation in fragile conditions. development actors—and better under- This chapter calls for the consistent applica- standing between OECD, low-income, tion of best-fit practices that have already middle-income, and regional partners. 206 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 6 A tale of two assistance programs—Liberia and Guinea-Bissau Liberia: Strong leadership, critical recovery assistance Types of violence: Civil conflict, political violence, criminal and gang-related violence, trafficking Transition opportunity: Significant space for change following Key stakeholders: Ex-combatants, victims, government, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in September 2003 opposition parties, international partners and peacekeepers Key stresses: Legacy of abuse, violence, trauma grievances and Institutional challenges: Accountability and capacity constraints mistrust, corruption, unemployment, ethnic competition in economic, security, judicial, and political spheres Dual accountability dilemma: Need to increase capacity in national institutions in an environment of extreme fiduciary risk T he international community can provide critical assistance to fragile states during difficult transitions. When done well, this support can make a major difference to countries frastructure development, it offered short-term employment opportunities for many ex-combatants and non-combatants. Liberia’s recovery trajectory also shows how regional trying to avoid or recover from violent conflict, but only when organizations can help. The ECOWAS worked with donors domestic processes are headed in a positive direction. The re- on confidence building tailored to the Liberian milieu. The cent history of international support to Liberia and Guinea- Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program Bissau offer two starkly contrasting stories (see box 6.10). (GEMAP, see box 4.2), introduced in the run-up to the 2005 The international community played a key role in support- elections, provides “dual key” authority in the areas of rev- ing the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed enue earning and expenditure. Jointly managed by the gov- in Accra, Ghana, in September 2003, which brought an end to ernment and the international community, it was designed two civil wars that had devastated Liberia. The UN mobilized specifically to reassure a skeptical population and donors that a peacekeeping mission of 25,000 troops. The highest troop- years of official looting and corruption were over and that ser- to-population ratio in the history of peacekeeping, it provided vices would be reliably delivered. Economic governance has a credible deterrent against opponents of the peace process improved under GEMAP and, with consistent international and third-party assurances that peace would be maintained. commitment and willingness to share risk, it has helped rein- Liberia’s transition government, however, experienced se- force confidence in state institutions. While noting these posi- rious governance and corruption problems (see below). Yet, tives, critics point out that the slow transfer of knowledge and with a peace agreement and international security guarantees capacity to local authorities and stakeholders may have created in place, Liberia’s GDP grew at a healthy 6.4 percent a year dependency—highlighting the importance of integrated and between 2004 and 2008 (having contracted by almost a third sustained external engagement with national institutions. in 2003). In the same period, the international aid community Seven years after signing the CPA, Liberia qualified for provided US$2.6 billion to Liberia, an average of US$146 per the World Bank/IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries ini- capita per year (total international spending, including secu- tiative, setting in motion the largest per-capita debt write-off rity, was considerably higher at US$415 per capita in 2008— in history. The peace process has since been consolidated, the highest to date in Africa). driven by determined, output-oriented national leadership That was not all. International actors such as the UN and and pragmatic international support. Today, Liberia has initi- the World Bank worked with the government of Liberia to lift ated a process of stabilization that few dared imagine a few public confidence through an innovative program to provide years earlier. The challenge now is to ensure that this extra- jobs, restart the economy, and provide tangible evidence of the ordinary and successful episode in international support is peace process. “Roads with UNMIL” restored hundreds of ki- not ended prematurely, that emerging stresses continue to be lometers of roads, reconnecting areas of the country long iso- clearly identified, and that legitimate, accountable institutions lated from one another by the war, enabling trade to resume, receive sustained support. and facilitating humanitarian relief efforts. Drawing on the In contrast to the coordinated international support for Li- resources and expertise of different agencies in the political, beria, no comparable international effort was made in nearby security, and development fields, the project delivered results Guinea-Bissau. This in part reflects a lack of international con- in the short term, while facilitating reform in the transport fidence in national governance and country leadership—but sector in the medium term. Going beyond the confines of in- similar conditions existed in Liberia before the 2005 elections. International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 207 Guinea-Bissau: Weak national processes, uneven international support Types of violence: Civil conflict, political violence, organized crime and trafficking, transnational crime Transition opportunity: Repeated and brief opportuni- Key stakeholders: Federal and local government, military, citizens, ties for change: multiparty elections, peace agreements regional institutions, international partners, international drug cartels after civil war, National Stability Pact Key stresses: Legacies of violence and trauma, ethnic Institutional challenge: Severe accountability and capacity constraints competition, external support for domestic rebels, in public administration, security, judicial, and political institutions; lack of international criminal networks, low incomes, youth access to services; lack of inclusion of different groups unemployment, corruption Dual accountability dilemma: International community that viewed preventive action as too risky; national actors that needed early and sustained support to combat domestic violence and the influence of international trafficking Over the past 15 years, there have been sporadic windows of try on strategic priorities—reforming the security sector, pay- opportunity, but with leadership commitment to overcoming ing salaries to the military and civil service, and restoring some the rifts in society largely found wanting, they received scant electrical service to the capital. support from the international community. Today Guinea- The IMF resumed assistance and a donor meeting was held Bissau remains one of the world’s most impoverished nations in Lisbon in February 2005. But only €1.5 million was pledged. and an “aid orphan,” with a human development index rank A donors’ roundtable in 2006 was more successful—amid of 164 among 169 countries in 2010. growing concerns about the influence of the drug trade and Since independence in the 1960s, Guinea-Bissau has been criminal networks, some US$280 million was pledged, though ruled mainly as a one-party regime interrupted by coups and continuing political instability remained an obstacle to deliv- a civil war (1998–99). International pressures for democracy as ering funds. a condition for aid led to a tentative move toward a multiparty In 2007, in reaction to the president’s unconstitutional dis- political system in 1991. A moment of opportunity came in 1994 missal of the prime minister, parliamentarians formed a major- with the first multiparty elections. But aside from proclaiming ity coalition. They committed the three largest parties in the the elections to be “transparent, free, and fair,” the international assembly to a national stability pact and, after months of nego- community remained largely absent. Similarly, during the civil tiations, passed a vote of no confidence that forced the president war, the international community kept its distance, while re- to appoint a new prime minister. Hopes were dashed when the gional institutions such as ECOWAS and the African Union pact collapsed, triggering a new political crisis and the fall of attempted to mediate and enforce peacekeeping. the government. In 2008, another round of elections, which re- Peace and elections in 1999–2000 gave rise to new hopes, ceived some limited international assistance to ensure the elec- and the UN set up its Peacebuilding Support Office in toral staff was paid, produced another new government. Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). A donor conference was orga- Guinea-Bissau remains deeply fragile and insecure. In 2009, nized to support post-war recovery and reconstruction, and it was thrown into further turmoil with the assassination of the IMF and World Bank provided emergency assistance. the president, a top general, and two ministers. Drug traf- Hopes were undermined by continued poor governance— ficking has become a major concern. Security sector reforms without the supporting mechanisms in place in Liberia. remain integral in addressing this rising violence, but so far The response of the international community: further iso- have received limited backing from international actors. The lation. In what looked like an increasingly risky environment, EU and ECOWAS have helped settle some salary arrears, and the IMF suspended assistance while the African Development Angola and South Africa have modest programs in place. But Bank and the World Bank cut back their programs. Without the international community is largely absent—without re- budgetary support, civil servant salaries went unpaid. Real sponsible national leadership, it is unwilling or unable to take GDP contracted by 4.1 percent in 2002 and 0.6 percent in the risk and provide the kind of sustained support that could 2003. A coup d’état soon followed. have helped Guinea-Bissau back on its feet. Elections were held in 2005, a new government was formed, and the international community slowly reengaged. The UN strengthened UNOBGIS’ mandate to include supporting po- Sources: AllAfrica 2009; Andersen 2010; Atkinson 2008; Bøås 2009; Dwan and Bailey 2006; Jahr 2010; Government of the Republic of Liberia Execu- litical dialogue and national reconciliation and upholding the tive Mansion 2009; Giovine and others 2010; UNDP 2010b; International rule of law and human rights. There was agreement between Crisis Group 2008a, 2009b; Gberie 2003b; Economist Intelligence Unit the new government and the few donors present in the coun- 2008b; IRIN 2005; Vulliamy 2008. 208 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 6 .10 Uneven international support to violence prevention and recovery in West Africa Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP), Former President of the Economic Community of West African States; WDR Advisory Council Member We assumed the successes chalked up in Liberia would ing impact on the country and the region was and still is be enough justification to see similar quick and strong evident. responses from the international community in Guinea- Above all, the failure to provide funding for the much Bissau to avoid recurrence of violence and conflict. That was needed security sector reform has been particularly dis- not to be. Consequently, the country still totters on the appointing and baffling. The impunity and persistent in- brink of instability, violence, conflict, or state disintegration, cursion into the political domain by the military can only be given the real threat posed by drug trafficking. tackled through a comprehensive security sector reform that The neglect of the international community made it addresses the legal, institutional, and capacity weaknesses of difficult for a number of regional initiatives to put the various security agencies (military, police, immigration, prisons, country on a path of steady recovery and eventual takeoff. customs) and the judicial system. ECOWAS did not succeed in A donor conference in Geneva in 2006 to raise funds for obtaining for Guinea-Bissau the requisite resources to embark a security sector and national reconstruction plan was on the urgently needed reforms in this strategic sector. poorly attended; ECOWAS ended up pledging the most The contrast in international support to Liberia as com- funding. Nor was the national strategy for combating drug pared to Guinea or Guinea-Bissau was quite noticeable and a trafficking adequately funded, even though its destabiliz- source of great frustration to us at ECOWAS. Notes 1. In 1990, Freedom House gave civil liberties in Mozambique the worst possible score and political rights the second-worst on a scale of 1 to 7, whereas the scores had both improved to 3 in 2009. Freedom House uses a 1 to 7 scale, where 7 indicates the lowest level of freedom, with few or no political rights because of severe government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. At the other end of the scale, countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of po- litical rights, including free and fair elections. 2. The megaprojects include the Mozal aluminum smelter, the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric plant, and Sasol gas project. See Cadeado and Hamela 2009; World Bank 2005b. 3. UNDPKO 2010b, 2010c. 4. WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. 5. Davies and others 2008; Meidan 2006. 6. South-South bilateral aid increased by some 68 percent, from 2004 to 2008, to an estimated US$626 million. Data for several major non-DAC development partners, such as China and India, are not included in this estimate (see OECD-DAC 2010b). 7. The following multilateral organizations and governments had special envoys or representatives to Afghanistan or Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009–10: United Kingdom, United States, United Na- tions, European Union, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, France, Australia, Belgium, China, Germany, Japan, Denmark. 8. New York University Center on International Cooperation 2009. 9. Harvey and others 2010. 10. This interdependence has been recognized explicitly in, for instance, in the World Bank’s frame- work for rapid response to crisis and emergencies, which enables it to participate in integrated in- ternational support efforts for programs that include important linkages to areas outside the Bank’s core competencies, while maintaining its engagement in areas of core competencies (World Bank 2007d, 2008b; Stewart and Brown 2007). 11. UN integrated missions are an instrument through which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system- International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 209 wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political- strategic crisis management framework. See Eide and others 2005; Campbell, Kaspersen, and Weir 2007. 12. “Whole-of-government approaches” refers to how agencies and ministries within a government ad- ministration can work coherently together in order to develop a comprehensive response to fragile states in crisis. See DFID 2010, Stewart and Brown 2007; OECD-DAC 2006. 13. “Whole-of-system approaches” specifically refers to how regional and international organizations and the international architecture in general can best develop policy coherence and a comprehen- sive response to fragile states in crisis. See DFID 2010. 14. These include the U.K. Stabilization Unit (created in 2004 as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit), U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, the UN Peacebuilding Committee and Peacebuilding Support Of- fice; and the AusAID Fragile States Unit (created in 2005). 15. OECD-DAC 2006. 16. Wainwright 2005; Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010. 17. Stewart and Brown 2007. 18. OECD-DAC 2007b. 19. Harborne and others 2010. 20. Chalmers 2007. 21. Peixoto, Andrade, and Azevedo 2008. 22. Annual budget costs compiled for UN political missions, Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) mission, and EU representatives by New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. 23. Light mediation start-up budget (LMSB) covers the cost of a small mediation team that is required to address a limited conflict. Such conflicts are typically clearly between two states or coherent par- ties within a state (without a regional dimension) that are amenable to resolution within a short period of time (possibly within a year). The LMSB will allow UNDPA to establish a mediation effort quickly and sustain it for up to three months, while the full costing for the initiative is being devel- oped and resourced. Heavy mediation start-up budget (HMSB) covers the initial costs of address- ing a complex conflict situation. Complex conflicts typically have local and regional dimensions, and the mediation team is likely to be deployed in multiple locations. Complex conflicts are likely to require a heavier presence in the capital and a presence in the regions and neighboring countries. In this regard, the HMSB is intended to facilitate the rapid establishment of the initial UN presence on the ground for a period of one year, while the costing of the full mediation team for the first and subsequent years is developed and resourced. 24. An early, and still relevant, critique of this problem is found in de Soto and del Castillo 1994. 25. World Bank 2008b. 26. For discussion of the interaction between human rights and mediation communities, and the pro- gressively greater incorporation of human rights provisions into peace agreements, see Stedman 1996. 27. Stedman 1996. 28. UN 2000, 2011. 29. For instance, the Guatemalan peace accords incorporated significant commitments for gender eq- uity aimed at the elimination of discrimination against women, including the promotion of wom- en’s political participation and their access to education, health, housing, and other resources—a success attributed to the only female member in the peace negotiations. See Potter 2005. 30. UNIFEM, UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, and UNDPKO 2010. 31. International Alert and Women Waging Peace 2004. 32. A 2010 meeting of anglophone and francophone delegates in Kenya, convened by UNDP, coined the phrase “collaborative capacities” and further refined the institutions relevant to prevention and recovery from violence as “dynamic networks of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in a society” (UN Interagency Framework for Coordination on Preventive Action 2010, 1). 33. Commonwealth Secretariat 2006; The Carter Center 2007; UNDPA 2010b. 34. Wolpe and McDonald 2006. 35. The WDR’s glossary defines commitment mechanisms as ways to persuade stakeholders that in- tentions to break with past policies will not be reversed, including creating independent functions 210 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 for implementing or monitoring agreements. This follows the common economic definition of commitment mechanisms or commitment devices (e.g., see Dixit 1980, Schelling 1960, and Spence 1977). Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 111) find that treaties and UN missions work in concert and note “a positive (though not large) correlation between UN mandates and the signing of a peace treaty, since treaties are necessary for certain UN operations.” The UN can facilitate peace treaties among parties, and enforce peace when agreements become unstuck as “without a treaty and trans- formational UN mission, the likelihood of success drops substantially from an initial value of about 80 per cent to less than 5 per cent at extreme values of hostility” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 130). See also Human Security Centre 2005; Fortna 2008; Walter and Kydd 2002. 36. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001. 37. Walter and Kydd 2002. 38. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international organizations. It aims to strengthen governance by improving transparency and accountability in the extractives sector through the establishment of a global standard for transparency in oil, gas, and mining. See EITI 2009. 39. The Natural Resource Charter is a set of economic principles for governments and societies on how to best manage the opportunities created by natural resources for development. The charter comprises 12 precepts, or principles, that encapsulate the choices and suggested strategies that gov- ernments might pursue to increase the prospects of sustained economic development from natural resource exploitation. See Natural Resource Charter 2010. 40. Additional information regarding Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program can be found in chapter 4, box 4.3. 41. A comprehensive study of 204 cases of sanctions imposed between 1914 and 2006, half of which took place after 1990, found about one-third to be successful (Hufbauer and others 2007). 42. Nossal 1999; Wallensteen and others 2007. 43. Van Genugten and de Groot 1999; Bessler, Garfield, and McHugh 2004. 44. Cortright, Lopez, and Gerber 2002. 45. UN 2006a, 3. 46. CICIG has presented two legal reform packages to the Guatemalan Congress that seek to improve the legal and institutional framework of the criminal prosecution of crimes that fall under CICIG’s jurisdiction. To date, the Congress has approved four essential laws: Law on Arms and Ammunition, Law to Strengthen Criminal Prosecutions, Law on Jurisdiction in High-Risk Criminal Proceedings, and Reforms to the Law Against Organized Crime and Incidents. See CICIG 2009. 47. See, for example, the Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconsti- tutional Change of Government (Organization of African Unity 2000) and the Inter-American Democratic Charter (OAS 2001). 48. Both the UN and the international financial institutions consider regional stances in their ap- proaches to governments, but no structured mechanisms exist to discuss this with the regional institutions. 49. A major focus of humanitarian assistance in past years has been four deadly disease clusters––acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, malaria, and measles—all of which are major killers in wartime. All are preventable and treatable at very low cost. Worldwide increases in immunization coverage over the past 30-plus years have played a large part in reducing mortality from these dis- eases. Between 1974 and 2006, coverage for the six major vaccine-preventable diseases rose from less than 5 percent to more than 75 percent of the world’s population. In addition to preventing and treating disease, a significant share of humanitarian aid budgets is devoted to treating severe malnutrition. Fatality rates for severely malnourished children have decreased because of this and better treatment protocols. Peacetime immunization drives, together with the life-saving impact of humanitarian assistance, have all contributed to reducing wartime mortality from disease and malnutrition. See Human Security Report Project, forthcoming; Guha-Sapir and D’Aoust 2010. 50. These exceptions include where branding would “compromise the intrinsic independence or neu- trality of a program or materials where independence or neutrality is an inherent aspect of the program and material.” USAID 2009a, 16; 2010. 51. Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006. 52. The “Brookings Process” brought together Office of the UNHCR, UNDP, and the World Bank in 2000 to more effectively address the “gaps” that occur in relief-to-development programs, funding, and strategies. International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 211 53. See section on education and health reforms as crucial medium-term challenges in chapter 5. Also see World Bank 2002a, 2008g. 54. Jones, Gowan, and Sherman 2009. 55. U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010b. 56. Garassi 2010. 57. Government of Nepal, UNDP, and UNDG 2010. 58. World Bank and UN 2007. 59. International conflict and fragility assessment frameworks include: United States: Interagency Con- flict Assessment Framework, 2009; United Kingdom: Strategic Conflict Assessment; DFID: Con- ducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes, 2002; SIDA: Manual for Conflict Analysis, 2006; UNDP: Conflict-Related Development Analysis, 2003; USAID: Conducing a Conflict Assessment, 2005; World Bank, Conflict Analysis Framework, 2002. 60. Chandran, Slotin, and Sorensen 2010. 61. U.S. Department of State 2009; DFID 2002. 62. World Bank and UN 2008. 63. OECD-DAC 2010a. 64. World Bank and UN 2007; see also International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2010. 65. Strategies produced by Africa Development Bank (Country Strategy Paper 2008–2011); EC (Coun- try Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme, 2008–2013); UN (UN Development Assistance Framework 2010–2014); World Bank (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2006–2009; 2008 Country Assistance Strategy); Austria (Three Year Program on Austrian Development Policy, 2006–2008); Belgium (Indicative Cooperation Program, 2007–2009, Indicative Cooperation Program, 2010– 2013); France (Framework Partnership Agreement, 2006–2010); Sweden (Strategy to Great Lakes Region, including Burundi, 2004–2008); and United States (Strategic Statement 2006–2008). See AfDB 2008; European Commission and Republic of Burundi 2007; Government of Burundi and UN 2009; Republic of Burundi 2006; World Bank 2008e; Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs 2006; Belgium Development Agency 2006, 2009; French Ministry of For- eign Affairs 2006; SIDA 2005; Government of Burundi 2005. 66. A notable exception to the fragmentation of donor assistance strategies is the preparation of a coun- try assistance framework in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Following the 2006 elections, do- nors confronted the need to begin planning for the post-election period in a fragile and uncertain political landscape. A joint strategy framework, building on the five pillars identified in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Program, appealed to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s partners as a way of mitigating risk while preparing the way for partners to engage in substantive dialogue with the new government on pre-identified and pre-agreed issues as soon as it was formed. Under an initiative by the UN Integrated Office in the UN Democratic Republic of Congo peacekeeping mission and the World Bank, a Country Assistance Framework was developed as a common strategic approach to recovery and development assistance, and was agreed to by 17 international partners. A challenge with such joint donor planning, however, is to keep it flexible enough to respond to new challenges, as subsequently emerged in the Democratic Republic of Congo. See also Rohland and Cliffe 2002; Republic of Liberia and UN 2007. 67. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, in Fixing Failed States, analyze the issue of establishing legitimacy and closing the sovereignty gap in fragile and conflict-affected states through the lens of “double compact.” The double compact focuses on the “network of rights and obligations underpinning the state’s claim to sovereignty . . .” and refers first to the “compact . . . between a state and its citi- zens . . . embedded in a coherent set of rules,” and second, “between a state and the international community to ensure adherence to international norms and standards of accountability and trans- parency” (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 8). 68. Cox and Thornton 2010. 69. Aga Khan Development Network 2003. 70. Fully consistent with the findings of the many development assessments and studies conducted in recent years, including Agence Française de Développement and others 2005 and Commission on Growth and Development 2008. 71. Gowan 2007. 72. These points were made forcefully by ministers of finance from 12 African conflict-affected coun- tries at two post-conflict learning events in 2002 and 2003 (World Bank 2002b, 2003). 212 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 73. Kharas 2008. 74. Volatility has costs in all economic activity with expectations, reflected by risk premiums. Losses associated with volatility can come in the form of additional costs of financial management; the opportunity costs of idle funds (windfalls) or missed investment opportunities (shortfalls); the costs associated with over borrowing and debt buildup when there is uncertainty about amount needed and concessional credits are used; and the costs associated with volatility in fiscal spending and the real exchange rate that can follow from volatility in aid (Kharas 2008). These costs can be further amplified by donor “herding” behavior, which is often more responsive to political instabil- ity and violence. Additionally, the costs of shortfalls may be higher in fragile and conflict-affected states. While an aid shortfall in a typical developing country may lead to the costs above, in a fragile or conflict-affected state, such a shortfall may completely derail transition moments, interrupting reform and possibly leading to political crises. 75. Birdsall and others 2010. 76. Council for the Development of Cambodia 2010. 77. Killick, Castel-Branco, and Gerster 2005. 78. Some forms do travel well, however. For instance, secret ballots and the separation of women and children from men in jails support principled outcomes in most situations. 79. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009, 326. However, the international commu- nity has supported many best-fit measures in complex conflict settings (see chapter 5). As further examples, in 2003–04, while conditions for comprehensive disarmament in Haiti were not in place, UNDP undertook an innovative project that linked disarmament to a community approach in- volving information campaigns, support to community conflict-resolution mechanisms, and mi- croprojects benefiting community groups as well as former members of armed gangs. In the West Bank and Gaza since 2002, the World Bank and several donors have been financing non-salary recurrent expenditures of the ministries of Health, Education and Higher Education, and Social Affairs through the Emergency Services Support Program MDTF in response to a deepening fiscal and economic crisis. 80. See Collier 2007. 81. These attributes include, for example, the quality and experience of the experts (governments should expect and receive highly competent and committed professionals able to work in difficult environments); a simple and well thought out program that can be implemented quickly; effec- tive coordination among donors to ensure consistent policy advice; the participation of national champions to move the process along; and links to specific programs (so that advice and training reinforces new initiatives) (World Bank 2000). 82. Waldman 2008, 10; Michailof 2007. 83. Institute for State Effectiveness 2007. 84. OECD 2008. 85. National Academy of Public Administration 2006. 86. Civilian surge capacity is typically classified as standing capacity (can be in-country within 72 hours of need, and remain deployed for a minimum of 60 days); standby capacity (can be in-country within 60 days, and remain deployed for a minimum of 180 days); and rostered capacity (can be in- country within 180 days, deployment term subject to contract) (see Chandran and others 2009; Sisk 2010; Korski and Gowan 2009). Australia’s International Deployment Group (IDG), for example, is a standing corps of more than 500 Australian federal police officers trained and ready to deploy on peacekeeping missions (see Peake and Brown 2010). The U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Recon- struction and Stabilization is building up a civilian standby capacity of interagency personnel. 87. For example, the United States, the United Kingdom, EU, and Australia. 88. UN, forthcoming. 89. See Baird 2010. 90. Of the different forms that South-South cooperation has taken, technical assistance has been the most common. Although many technical assistance projects focus on economic and social devel- opment, countries in the Global South have also developed specialized capacities in post-conflict peacebuilding. Examples include South Africa’s support to build structural capacities for public service through peer learning among public sector schools (Management Development Institutes) at the Ministries for Public Administration in Burundi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan. Cooperation among 45 municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras helps to manage regional public goods, such as water, in the Trifinio region. See OECD 2010f. International support to building confidence and transforming institutions 213 91. In 2008, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) established the Fragile States Facility (FSF) to “effectively assist eligible fragile states to consolidate peace, stabilize economies and lay foundations for sustainable poverty-reduction and long-term economic growth” (AfDB 2011, 1). The FSF has three grant pillars: Pillar I, the supplemental support window for funding infrastructure, state capac- ity building, and accountability; Pillar II, the arrears clearance window; and Pillar III, the technical assistance and capacity-building window. Eligible states are those that have a harmonized AfDB/ World Bank CPIA rating of less than 3.2, or countries that have had UN or regional peacebuilding, peacekeeping, or mediation operations over the last three years. Pillar III provides technical assis- tance and capacities aimed at filling critical gaps in carefully selected public sector domains through secondment of seasoned professional staff from neighboring countries and on-the-job training opportunities with the objective of building a sustainable cadre of senior civil servants—fragile states that have the capacity in management and implementation of reforms. The program is usu- ally implemented as integrated components of comprehensive capacity-building plans. By March 2010, this South-South cooperation facility had received resources in the amount of UA (Units of Accounts) 85.39 million, equivalent to13.2 percent of the total FSF resources (AfDB 2010, 5). 92. Viva Rio negotiated a peace accord among 14 rival groups, and the homicide rate in Bel Air fell from 26 per 100,000 in 2006–07 to 17 in 2008–09, lower than in any other major Latin American city (OECD 2010f). 93. See UNPBSO 2010. 94. OECD 2010f. 95. UN, forthcoming. 96. For instance, nearly a third of the “peace and development advisers” who are jointly deployed by UNDP and UNDPA to build such capacities in violence-affected countries are either former inter- nal mediators or facilitators from the “Mont Fleur” visioning exercise in South Africa, which was implemented with discrete UN assistance, or have been trained by them. See UNDP 2010a. 97. Funding provided through the Office of the Transition Initiatives at USAID is one example. This transition funding is not subject to the same policies and procedures as other financing provided by USAID. DFID’s Middle East and North Africa Department has created a Program Risk Assess- ment Matrix that assesses risk factors in conflict programming. The EU is currently developing a framework for analyzing the risks associated with budget support to fragile states. 98. For Cambodia, see Jones 2009. For Liberia, see World Bank 2010k. 99. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2010, 9. 100. Colletta and Tesfamichael 2003. 101. Colletta and Tesfamichael 2003. 102. World Bank 2007a. 103. World Bank analysis prepared for the 2009 workshop in Kinshasa on aid effectiveness. 104. OECD-DAC 2008. 105. Azam, Devarajan, and O’Connell 2002; Bräutigam 2000. 106. UN, forthcoming. 107. Etzioni 1999. The United States, for example, uses several layers of police agencies, most of them under local government control, while many European countries favor national police forces with specialized divisions. The principles underlying security provision can also be quite different in oth- erwise similar societies: the ubiquitous use of street cameras to track civilians in a number of Euro- pean cities would be considered invasive in the United States, where history and tradition privilege individual privacy. 108. Lemay-Hébert 2009; Graydon 2005; Greenfell 2006; Wisler 2005; Vetschera and Damian 2006. 109. UNPOL 2011. 110. For a review of the characteristics of the post-conflict private sector and the ways in which the de- velopment community can engage with it, see Mac Sweeney 2008. 111. For instance, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has worked with Nestlé and ECOM, a soft commodity trading company, to support small-scale farmers in the coffee sector around the world (with a mix of investment and advisory interventions) and partnered with Standard Char- tered Bank to strengthen practical business skills of small and medium entrepreneurs in Pakistan. IFC also partnered with the BBC in Afghanistan on a series of radio “edutainment” programs that combine education with entertainment on issues such as unemployment, lack of infrastructure, and inadequate service provision and aimed to raise awareness of the benefits of small business enterprises and provide practical information on small-business-related issues. A recent audience 214 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 feedback survey found that listeners are learning, through storylines and the experiences of others, how to start small businesses and generate income, and that many have acted upon information in the programs to improve their own financial situation (BBC World Service Trust 2010). 112. OECD and WTO 2008; Kawai and Takagi 2004; Davies and others 2008; Meidan 2006. 113. Battle 2008; World Bank 2011b. 114. OECD-DAC 2007b. 115. World Bank and AfDB 2010. 116. Precisely because the budget is a tool for political bargaining, when the government has few re- sources available to it within a budget, its scope for negotiating inclusive-enough pacts is dimin- ished. Diminished also is its ability to balance the process of building more inclusive institutions, for which social service delivery is an important tool (see also Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan 2005). 117. See Boyce and Forman 2010; Porter, Andrews, and Wescott 2010. 118. For a description of the Holst Fund in West Bank and Gaza, see Schiavo-Campo 2003. 119. Mondo 1995; Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer 1996. 120. For Angola, please see World Bank 2009c. For Guinea-Bissau, see Arzeni, Cesanelli, and Pes 2004. 121. Scanteam 2010; Garrasi 2010. 122. OECD 2010i; Scanteam 2010; Garrasi 2010. 123. Boyce and Forman 2010. 124. OECD 2010i; Scanteam 2010; Garrasi 2010. 125. OECD 2010i. 126. Garrasi 2010. 127. See Harbom and Wallensteen 2010. 128. See Roberts 2010 for a discussion of the Iraq estimates and Butty 2010 for a similar discussion with Andrew Mack of Human Security Report Project on estimates for the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996 to present. 129. See Conflict and Development Programs in Indonesia website (http://www.conflictand development.org) for up-to-date information on conflict and violence in Aceh. 130. One example is monthly monitoring of Palestinian perceptions on political, economic, and social conditions by Near East Consulting, http://www.neareastconsulting.com. 131. Scheye and Chigas 2009; Agoglia, Dziedzic, and Sotirin 2008. 132. DRC Speaks! is a geo-polling project utilizing cell phone technology to conduct surveys. It was cre- ated by Mobile Accord in conjunction with the WDR, and with generous donations of SMS by Vo- dacom Congo. Using SMS through cell phones, the project allowed more than 140,000 Congolese to share, without any filters, their thoughts, feelings, and concerns. C hapter 7 extends the analysis of this Report to international efforts to deal with the regional and global stresses associ- ated with the risks of violence. Here we encounter a different lacuna: agencies dealing with country-level support have neglected global stresses, and international agencies tackling global stresses have paid modest attention to the special characteristics of coun- tries affected by violence. Rectifying this requires a two-pronged approach: take more decisive steps to tackle global stresses in their own right, and build into those efforts a conscious effort to reinforce the capacity of states with weak institutions to build up buffers against global shocks. This approach may often need to be initiated at the regional level, where states can pool capacities and share efforts to manage the impacts of global systems. No state or society is impermeable, and most states’ economies are deeply interwoven with regional and global economic systems. EXTERNAL STRESS CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS CHAPTER 7 VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES International action to mitigate external stresses E conomic globalization exposes tions, large changes in the price of oil or food states to external economic stresses can increase social tensions, which internal ranging from international corrup- mechanisms are ill-equipped to deal with. tion to resource shortages. States Because many fragile states have small with weak political institutions are also rou- populations and small economies, their im- tinely exposed to a variety of forms of exter- pact on global markets and systems is slight. nal interference in their internal negotiations. International mechanisms that focus on Social groups within states often have links to global or transnational issues like drug traf- external populations that can be an important ficking have tended to neglect impacts on source of support—but also of both political fragile states. Aid and peacekeeping responses and security interference. Increasingly, trans- to fragile states are normally country-specific, national groups with ideological motivations overlooking both the regional dimension of are forging relationships with internal groups countries’ economic and security arrange- to pressure the state or introduce violence ments and the impact of transnational or into state-society relations. global forces. Where transnational or global As with internal stresses, external secu- mechanisms do interact with fragile states, rity and economic stresses are interlinked. the policies often are suitable only for the Consider trafficking. Arms traffickers often larger, more capable states that contribute move drugs and commodities as well,1 using the greater part of the global gross domestic similar techniques of fraud, corruption, and product (GDP), in the process overlooking money laundering.2 Trafficking has deeply the capacity constraints of fragile states. damaging effects on national security and Furthermore, international systems de- economic systems. signed to address transnational issues are Where buffering institutions are weak, often fragmented and overlapping. For states external stresses can overwhelm internal with substantial administrative capacities, governance. Even states with resilient insti- fragmentation in international systems is a tutions are exposed to international pres- nuisance; for states with weak administra- sures—think of the impact of drug traffick- tive capacities, responding to demands from ing on cities in Europe and the United States. a fragmented international system can absorb These pressures, though serious, have not all available capacity in dealing with a single undermined the legitimacy or resilience of issue area. domestic institutions or triggered large-scale Regional cooperation can help national ac- violence. But for states with weaker institu- tors navigate internal pressures and build buf- 218 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 fers against external ones. For most states, on security and violence are concentrated in most issues, the region rather than the world border areas. With many borders drawn in bears the greatest brunt of spillovers from the colonial era for reasons that had little to violence. Regional cooperation thus offers do with settlement patterns, populations on large potential rewards on issues like the il- either side of an insecure border may share legal transit of commodities and the expan- ethnic identities, common cultural norms, sion of legal, productive opportunities for and family and trading links. trade. Chapter 1 describes how many internal conflicts are generated or fueled by cross- border or global dynamics. Where the actors External security stresses are responsive to a neighboring government, steps by those neighbors may be vital to a suc- Cross-border insecurity and trafficking, par- cessful transition. Relative stability returned ticularly in small arms and drugs, can have to eastern Democratic Republic of Congo highly corrosive impacts on governance and (DRC) only after a Rwanda–DRC agreement the development of stable, legitimate institu- was concluded in 2007.4 The Central Ameri- tions. Nor are the more fragile states and re- can “Esquipulas Process,” which ended the gions able to counter these challenges without Nicaraguan war in 1987, involved an accord significant amounts of international help: the signed by five Central American presidents resources and manpower available to them and a change in U.S. policy toward the Sand- can be simply overwhelmed by these nonstate inista regime.5 Groups of Friends and similar actors. mechanisms have managed to bring together neighbors seeking stable internal pacts that tackle cross-border stresses.6 Cross-border insecurity Even so, international security responses For many fragile states, the regional dimen- are typically organized on a national rather sion of insecurity is central. Chapter 2 shows than a subregional level. As chapter 6 how external security stresses can amplify points out, international peacekeeping op- internal tensions and undermine initial set- erations are rarely organized to deal with tlements to end conflict. Invasion, the pres- transborder security threats, even when ence of foreign troops, or occupation can the major source of insecurity is a group overwhelm the state. Such cases—which in- that operates subregionally. For example, clude Afghanistan, Iraq, and the West Bank the United Nations (UN) has three sepa- and Gaza in recent years—consume much of rate peacekeeping operations deployed in the debate around fragile states, though their areas of Africa infiltrated by the Lord’s Re- number today is small. sistance Army—but each is mandated and More commonly, as chapter 1 illustrates, managed at a national level, and none can violence in fragile states now involves non- share resources or move across another’s state organizations that operate across bor- area of operation. The logic that drives this ders. Porous borders can provide rebels or is that Security Council and UN member organized criminal gangs with escape routes states are sensitive to national sovereignty; from national armed forces. In many parts the irony is that the policy hands a tactical of the world—South Asia, Southeast Asia, advantage to groups that ignore sovereign West Africa, Central Africa, the Horn of Af- borders. This vulnerability makes clear the rica, the Middle East, Central America, the need for enhanced regional roles and capa- Andean region—states face cross-border at- bilities, a point discussed further in chapter tacks by nonstate groups, neighboring state 9. The Multi-Country Demobilization and support for internal rebels, or traffickers and Reintegration Program in central Africa is transnational terrorists.3 Many zones of in- an exception (box 7.1). International action to mitigate external stresses 219 Development programs are also typically organized at a national level, even though B OX 7 . 1 The Multi-Country Demobilization and borders often divide regions with close Reintegration Program: Addressing regional socioeconomic ties. As one example, devel- violence opment programming in Pashtun tribal ar- The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was a eas that straddle the Afghanistan-Pakistan World Bank–led regional initiative in which, between 2002 and 2009, over 40 border requires the two governments to ad- partners collaborated to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate close to 300,000 dress similar issues of insecurity, weak local combatants in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Seven neighboring countries administrations, and strong ethnic and so- embroiled in the regional war fought out in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) participated in the MDRP: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, DRC, cial identities—but there is relatively little Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. exchange between national institutions to This regional program was the best response to a regional conflict that tran- discuss lessons learned.7 Of course, inter- scended borders. Although demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration national security and development opera- (DDR) programs were implemented at the national level, the MDRP’s regional tions are—correctly—designed to reinforce, framework helped build confidence for mutual disarmament by increasing trans- parency across programs and supporting joint learning and collaborative activi- not abrogate, national sovereignty. Where ties. The regional approach also enabled the pooling of financing for DDR, which neighbors have tense relations, orchestrat- in turn promoted efficient resource allocation across participating countries. As a ing cross-border programs can be politically regional program, the MDRP could support cross-border activities, including the complicated. DDR of irregular forces that needed to be repatriated to their home countries. For programs like the MDRP that have both national and regional elements, Some innovative cross-border programs attention should be paid to regional aspects up front, including putting in place do exist. Recognizing that insecure borders a dedicated team and resources. Generating collective action for regional activi- have been recurrent hosts to conflict, the ties and establishing incentives for actors to think beyond their country borders African Union (AU) established the Afri- was not easy, particularly since countries faced problems on their home fronts. Undertaking a large regional multistakeholder initiative like the MDRP was also can Union Border Program in 2007 to de- inherently a high risk, high reward enterprise. marcate sensitive border areas and promote The World Bank, the donors, and the broader development community must cross-border cooperation and trade as a con- be prepared to accept the risks, difficulties, and uncertainties associated with flict prevention tool. The program has four implementing such programs in a post-conflict setting—especially when national peace processes and elections dictate the speed of DDR operations. components. First, it pursues both land and maritime border demarcation since less than Source: Correia 2010. a quarter of Africa’s borders have been for- mally marked and agreed upon, and disputes are likely to continue with future discover- ies of oil. Second, it promotes cross-border overs from the activities of armed groups in cooperation to deal with itinerant criminal Colombia, with communities along the bor- activities. Third, it supports cross-border der overwhelmed by refugees, gang violence, peacebuilding programs. Fourth, it consoli- and drug trafficking. But by 2009, follow- dates gains in economic integration through ing cross-border programming, crime and the creation of regional economic networks. violence were reduced, services improved, An initial pilot project was launched in the and dialogue established to resolve local con- Sikasso region of Mali and in Bobo Di- flicts. More important, despite upswings and oualasso in Burkina Faso—bringing together downturns in diplomatic relations between local, private, and public actors to strengthen the two countries, lasting bilateral collabo- economic cooperation, but the program has ration has been established with respect to lacked resources. 8 these issues.9 Another example of cross-border pro- Regional organizations also play a key role gramming is a UN interagency initiative that in addressing cross-border violence. As the from 2004 to 2009 supported national efforts AU example suggests, and as the post–World to stabilize Ecuador’s northern border region War II history of European cooperation dem- with Colombia. Already facing internal social onstrates, regional organizations can help conflict, Ecuador was confronted with spill- countries address mobile populations and 220 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 the seepage of violence across national bor- Other initiatives, such as the recently released ders. They can also spur regional adoption due diligence guidance on “Responsible Sup- of global principles. Many of them, however, ply Chains of Minerals from Conflict Af- need support to operationalize these roles. fected and High-Risk Areas,” have objectives Euro region cross-border cooperation and that focus not just on tracking flows, but also integration can offer inspiration in tackling on human rights protection and loss of live- some border area challenges in other regions lihoods.12 Efforts to tackle physical traffick- (see box 7.1 and the later discussion of re- ing in commodities are discussed here; those gional economic integration). dealing with the financial dimensions of traf- ficking are dealt with in the following section on external economic stresses. Trafficking Approaches to tackling the trafficking of Internal security—and economic—arrange- commodities is shaped by their physical and ments can also be undermined by external market characteristics; these determine the trafficking. In February 2010, the UN Secu- ease of physical tracking and interdiction. rity Council noted “the serious threat posed Trafficking in commodities with concen- in some cases by drug trafficking and trans- trated production, processing, or wholesaling national organized crime to international is easier to control (table 7.1). This helps ex- security in different regions of the world.”10 plain some of the initial success of the Kim- Chapter 1 discusses the role trafficking plays berley Process in dealing with “conflict dia- in generating violence in fragile states, partic- monds” (box 7.2). Timber, unlike gemstones ularly when illicit revenues provide nonstate or point-source resources, has a big footprint, groups the wherewithal to outbid national with many upstream production and pro- police and armed services. cessing points, and is easily mixed with legal Over the past 15 years, regional and global wood—requiring detailed systems for veri- initiatives have been launched to address ille- fying the legality of origin, and permits and gal trafficking. They typically use one of two expertise to identify restricted species. types of mechanism to stem activities and In contrast to diamonds, weapons (par- bring perpetrators to justice: either they try ticularly small arms) are very portable, are to identify and intercept smuggled commodi- manufactured by many enterprises, are sold ties at points of production,11 transit, pro- everywhere—and are cheap. Despite a steady cessing, or consumption; or they attempt to decline in the total dollar value of the arms identify and disrupt the financial flows that trade since the end of the Cold War, there is both fund and result from illicit trafficking. no apparent corresponding decline in the in- T A B L E 7.1 To defeat trafficking in commodities, pay attention to physical and market characteristics of the products Estimated Concentration annual value of Value-to-weight Concentration of processing or Ease of tracing Ease of consumer Commodity trafficking flows ratio/portability of production wholesale markets origin of product identification Diamonds US$127 million13 High High High Depends 14 High Oil US$1 billion15 Medium Medium High Yes Medium 16 17 Timber US$6 billion Low Low Low Yes Low US$170 million– Arms US$320 million18 Medium Low 19 Low Limited20 Low Drugs (cocaine, heroin) US$143 billion21 High Medium Low No Low Sources: UNODC 2009a, 2010a; Lawson and MacFaul 2010; Small Arms Survey Project 2001; Greene 2001. International action to mitigate external stresses 221 ternational transfer of small arms and light Similarly, the UN’s peacekeeping operation in weapons (SALW). The total annual value of southern Lebanon faces mandates and politi- SALW is estimated at between US$4 billion cal restrictions to investigating claims of illegal and US$6 billion, of which approximately small and heavy weapons shipments to non- 10–20 percent constitutes illicit transactions.22 state armed forces across regional borders.27 There are over 900 million small arms in cir- Drug trafficking is also increasingly im- culation worldwide, produced by more than portant in fragile states. Heroin, cocaine, and 1,000 companies dispersed in more than 100 a variety of recreational drugs are illegal in countries.23 SALWs are responsible for almost almost all countries. Increases in demand in 500,000 deaths a year, of which 50,000 to recent years have driven up prices and cre- 300,000 occur in armed conflicts, most par- ated huge profits for the illegal networks ticularly in poor countries.24 While SALWs do that traffic in them (see box 7.3). Heroin and not cause internal conflict, they do multiply cocaine networks—organized on paramilitary its effects. Beyond massive civilian casualties, lines, to protect themselves from competitors the misuse of SALWs also impacts negatively and law enforcement agencies—are respon- on development. The illegal use of SALWs sible for high levels of death and mayhem. contributes to human insecurity, crippling Tracking and interdiction of drug trad- burdens on health care systems, rising crimi- ers are fragmented. International efforts to nality, and violation of human rights.25 track and seize illegal drugs are intense, but The focus on arms trafficking in fragile given the high value of even small volumes, states has shifted from the international to these efforts have failed to stop global flows. the subregional arena.26 The UN Department Instead, concentrating efforts in one area has of Disarmament Affairs has increased its ef- more often simply displaced the trafficking forts, in collaboration with major donors, route. Since transshipment costs, including to pursue subregional trafficking in arms— the bribery and intimidation of officials en including opening regional offices, as in West route, are only a small fraction of what is Africa. But the country-specific nature of the earned from trafficking, criminal networks UN’s peacekeeping presence restricts the in- have overcome or adapted to even the most terdiction of weapons flowing across borders. sophisticated interdiction systems. Com- B OX 7.2 The Kimberley Process for “conflict diamonds” The Kimberley Process, a certification scheme to ensure that the origins of rough diamonds are sources free of conflict, was initiated to stem the flow of ”conflict diamonds” used to fuel rebel- lions in countries like the DRC, and has been jointly undertaken by civil society groups, indus- try, and governments. It evolved from recommendations by a UN Security Council sanctions committee that investigated the relationship between commodity trafficking and violence in the DRC. The Kimberly Process diamond certification scheme imposes extensive requirements on its 49 members (representing 75 countries) to ensure that the rough diamonds shipped have not funded violence. Although diamonds have high value-to-weight ratios and are very portable, diamond wholesale markets and processing facilities are concentrated in specific locations, with the former primarily in Antwerp and the latter primarily in Mumbai. Some 80 percent of rough dia- monds and more than 50 percent of polished stones pass through Antwerp. Only high-value stones are now polished in New York; most small low-value stones are polished in and around Mumbai, whose workshops accounted for an estimated 90 percent of the global polished dia- mond output in 2009. The number of licit diamond producers is also small. All these factors make it hard to trade conflict diamonds without attracting attention. Sources: Goreaux 2001; Montgomery 2010; Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 2009, 2010. 222 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 7 .3 The economics of cocaine trafficking In 2008, the average kilo of cocaine entered the Mesoamerican transit corridor at a price of about US$1,000.28 The same kilo could then be sold on the U.S. side of the border for about US$33,500. These numbers, point estimates based on average market values, can vary widely depending on market conditions, purity, organization, and vertical integration in cocaine production and trafficking. Still, taking these rough estimates as a starting point, the average potential profit for moving a kilo of cocaine through the Mesoamerican transit corridor into the United States is over US$30,000 before other costs of trafficking are deducted. If 10 to 20 percent of the cost is used in transportation, security, and labor, and 20 to 30 percent of cocaine in transit is seized, this would reduce the potential profits from trafficking an individual kilo to between US$15,000 and US$21,000. Even taking these deductions into account, this profit range is far higher than the annual 2008 GDP per capita of any country in the region. But in economic terms, the prospective drug trafficker must consider two other potential costs: the opportunity cost of other gainful employment forgone and the risk pre- mium associated with the dangerous and illegal occupation of drug trafficking. Recent increases in interdictions and arrests would also increase these costs. Source: WDR staff calculations based on Demombynes 2010; UNODC 2010a pounding this inherent difficulty is the frag- can significantly alter the balance of force mentation of efforts to halt the flow of drugs and severely pressure the domestic capabil- (box 7.4). ity to respond.30 The majority of efforts against traffick- This Report is not the place to engage in a ing in drugs have focused on supply—or on full discussion of the performance of global actions by producing and transit countries. or regional approaches to counter-terrorism. Because drug consumption is illegal in most The adoption by the UN General Assembly countries, only fairly limited mechanisms are last year of a comprehensive strategy for available to reduce the links with violence counter-terrorism provides a starting point through demand-side measures. The poor for engagement on the multilateral front, and record of global attempts to stop the trade in governments (through both bilateral and re- illegal drugs, and the extreme violence asso- gional mechanisms) are increasing their co- ciated with these attempts, have spurred de- operation on counter-terrorism activities.31 bates on legalization and some tentative steps However, global terrorist movements can to test the proposition (mainly with mari- feed on the absence of what the Report has juana, but more broadly with several drugs highlighted as critical to building resilience in Portugal). Opinions are divided (box 7.5). to violence: institutional accountability, le- gitimacy, and capability. Ideologically mo- tivated groups may have a particular ability Insecurity and injustice: Transnational to penetrate where the presence and reach of ideological threats legitimate government are limited (as in the Violent transnational ideological move- Sahel and Afghanistan). These global move- ments29 can flourish in violence-affected and ments often cast their cause in terms of injus- fragile states, making common cause with tice and exclusion32—a message that can res- local movements and drawing resources onate with local perceptions of elite-driven from transnational trafficking routes. The and exclusionary politics and policies. This insertion of transnational ideological move- raises questions about the balance between ments into otherwise localized violence adds global and local approaches to reducing the resources, expertise, and ideological fuel that threat from terrorism. International action to mitigate external stresses 223 B OX 7.4 Multiple interdiction efforts: Cocaine in the Americas In the Americas, the cocaine trail begins with on-farm production in only three South American countries (in 2008, Colombia accounted for 51 percent of global production, Peru 36 percent, and Bolivia 13 per- cent);33 transits through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean; and is sold wholesale and retail in the United States. A proliferation of initiatives is trying to stem this flow: 10 bilateral or regional programs, with many countries belonging to more than one program (see map). This situation raises questions about the coherence of the international response, especially since increased enforcement in one area often leads to diversion to another. The creation of one Caribbean initiative was justified in part because “recent efforts to enhance drug enforcement efforts along the [U.S.] southwest border seem to be having a consequent effect of moving transit routes back into the Caribbean.”34 The current (fragmented) state of international cooperation against drugs in the Americas The map illustrates the fragmented regional focus and overlapping mandates of 10 initiatives related to drug trafficking in the Americas. Each colored line indicates a separate initiative and connects the member countries involved in the initiative. h Mérida The id I A Inter-American rug Abuse Drug Abb Initiative Control Comission (CICAD)– Initiative by Organization of American States (OAS) US-Mexico High Level The Caribbean Basin Consultation Group on Security Initiative (CBSI) Bilateral Cooperation Permanent Central American Commision for the egio gi nal Security Regional y System ty Sy t (RSS) - Sy Eradication of Production, Trafficking, I i by ti Initiative O i of by Organisation o Consumption and Illicit Use of Narcotic Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and Psychotropic Substances and Related Crimes (CCP)- Initiative by Central American Integration System (SICA) Andean Counterdrug Plan Colombia Initiative (ACI) Central American Regional Andean Cooperation Plan for the Security Initiative (CARSI) Control of Illegal Drugs–Initiative b Comunida by Co A d (CAN) a Andina IBRD 38420 March 2011 Sources: UNODC 2009b; U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy 1999; Seelke, Sun Wyler, and Beittel 2011; Cen- tral American Integration System 2009; Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 2010; Andean Council of Foreign Ministers 2001; Embassy of the United States in Mexico 2010. Research into the interactions between about the relationship between violence, de- the local and the international dimensions velopment, institutional transformation, and of terrorist recruitment and mobilization is terrorism. What we do know, however, sug- too limited to allow for definitive statements gests that international development prac- 224 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 7 .5 Expert viewpoints: For and against regulated drug legalization to reduce violence The WDR team asked two well-known authorities on the subject to offer their opinions. Against Mark A. R. Kleiman, UCLA School of Public Affairs If the avoidance of failed states were the sole policy goal, the legalization of all drugs would be transparently desirable: failed states and civil conflicts create congenial conditions for illicit drug-dealing, while illicit drug production weakens states and fuels civil conflict, with drug rev- enues supporting insurgents and other armed nonstate actors and corrupting officials. How- ever, drug abuse creates problems for drug abusers and for their families, neighbors, and co- workers. Prohibition is not a perfect answer: it can exacerbate those problems, create violence and corruption around illicit markets (in producer, transit, and consumer countries), and con- tribute to the problem of mass incarceration. Yet prohibition also tends to reduce drug con- sumption. Alcohol abuse is far more common, and generates far more intoxicated violence, than the abuse of any illicit drug. So there is tension between security and governance and the control of drug abuse: blanket drug legalization would be a blow against terrorism, but would also increase the prevalence of substance-abuse disorders. It is sometimes claimed that the full benefits of prohibition in reducing substance abuse could be achieved through some combination of taxes and regulations, without incurring the costs of prohibition in terms of violence. But that claim rests on two fallacious beliefs: that taxes and regulations would not be profitably defied, and that the economic and political mus- cle of the newly legalized drug industries would not succeed in eating away at the controls that limit their marketing scope. Effective taxation and regulation might be technically feasible, with bans on marketing, restriction of commerce to cooperatives, or delegation of authority to physicians and pharma- cists operating under professional strictures. But there is no reason to be confident that such systems of effective control would be established or would remain stable. The current international drug-abuse control regime too rests on twin fallacies: first, that actions in producer countries can greatly restrict drug abuse “downstream,” and, second, that, since drug production creates security-and-governance problems, any sort of counter–drug activity naturally helps solve those problems. “Source control” efforts are largely futile, and source-country counter-narcotics efforts—not only enforcement but also alternative develop- ment—naturally exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, security and governance problems. They do so by raising prices (and thus revenues, since final demand is highly inelastic to farm gate price) and by conferring competitive advantage on traffickers with the most guns and the most influence: terrorists, insurgents, warlords, armed transnational crime groups, and corrupt offi- cials. The same is true of “crop substitution” or “alternative development.” In Afghanistan, a combination of enforcement and development efforts has concentrated poppy growing in areas under Taliban control, and thus increased the yield to the Taliban from whatever “taxes” it can collect from poppy farmers and heroin refiners. It is possible to imagine a drug-enforcement effort focused on the intersection between drug dealing and security-and-governance problems, pursuing traffickers and growing regions that contribute most to instability. But as with taxation and regulation, imagining a better pol- icy is not the same as implementing it. Reduced source-country enforcement would have minimal impact on the drug problem in rich consumer countries. Soil in which illicit drug crops can be grown is not a scarce resource, and shrinking the supply from one producer generally means a corresponding increase in pro- duction elsewhere. Successful demand-reduction efforts both reduce substance abuse and shrink the revenues of illicit enterprises, including those that threaten the stability of producer-country govern- ments. Forcing drug abusers under criminal-justice supervision for other crimes has much greater potential to shrink total volumes. We should try to optimize the policies that imple- ment prohibition, developing a drug-control regime that serves the goal of reducing the extent of substance-abuse disorders and the damage they cause at the minimum cost in terms of security and governance. International action to mitigate external stresses 225 For Jeffrey A. Miron, Department of Economics, Harvard University Worldwide prohibition of drugs is roughly 100 years old. During that time span, national and subnational governments have expended enormous sums on police, prosecutors, and prisons in attempts to enforce it. Advocates of prohibition believe that, despite these costs, the world has benefited by avoiding a far greater incidence of drug use, addiction, and other negatives. Thus, according to this perspective, the benefits of prohibition exceed the costs. In fact, prohibition causes far more deleterious consequences than it prevents. To see why, consider the consequences of prohibition. First, prohibition generates violence because it drives markets underground. In legal mar- kets, participants resolve their disputes with advertising and lawsuits, but in underground mar- kets these nonviolent mechanisms are not available, so participants use violence instead. Traf- fickers engage in turf battles with rival traffickers and shoot employees who steal, customers who do not pay, and suppliers who renege on contracts. Traffickers also employ violence against law enforcement attempts to arrest them, against politicians who support extradition to the United States, and against civilians who cooperate with the police. Violence soared in the United States, for example, in response to federal alcohol prohibition in 1920 but then declined rapidly after repeal. Prohibition also generates corruption. Those who run afoul of the law have strong incentives for bribery of police, judges, and politicians. Prohibition contributes to the spread of HIV, hepatitis, and other blood-borne diseases because it raises drug prices. When drugs are expensive, users face an incentive to inject rather than consume in less risky ways because injection delivers the biggest bang for the buck. The impact is not only on drug users but on the broader population. Prohibition creates a source of finance for violent groups, including terrorist groups and rebel organizations. Traffickers need protection from law enforcement and the military, so they hire terrorist groups to provide this enforcement. Terrorists benefit by earning income that supports their operations. Without this support, terrorist groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan, the FARC in Colombia, and the Shining Path in Peru would face far greater difficulty in funding their activities. On the flip side, legalization would allow police and the military to devote more resources to fighting terrorist or insurgent groups than fighting traffickers. All these effects are adverse consequences of prohibition. The only possible justification for prohibition, therefore, is that it might reduce drug use or the harmful side-effects of use. Yet abundant evidence suggests that prohibition has, at most, a modest impact in reducing drug use. Repeal of alcohol prohibition produced only about a 20 percent increase in use, while Portugal’s 2001 decriminalization policy for reasonable personal consumption of drugs did not cause a measurable increase (indeed, use was lower afterwards). Across countries, use rates bear little connection to the strictness of the prohibition regime. The Netherlands has a tolerant policy towards use of marijuana, for example, yet use rates differ little from those in the United States. This evidence does not rule out the possibility that use might increase by measurable amounts under legalization, but assertions that use or addiction would skyrocket are inconsis- tent with evidence. Societies have the option of legalizing the good but targeting misuse—as is done for alcohol and other goods that can be used irresponsibly but that most people use responsibly. Consistency therefore requires the same approach to drugs. In sum, prohibition has a broad range of harmful effects and, at best, a modest and specu- lative benefit. Legalization means the harms from drugs fall mainly on those who choose these risks, many of whom were already doing so under prohibition, rather than on innocent bystanders and law enforcement institutions. The choice between prohibition and legalization is therefore clear. Legalization is not a panacea, but it is unquestionably the lesser of the evils. 226 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 titioners and diplomats working to support tional boundaries by allowing their citizens national coalitions and institutional trans- or companies to take a tax deduction for formation should pay attention to the po- bribes paid to officials of other governments.35 tential for excluded groups and neglected Ten years on, the situation has changed regions to become fertile ground for ideo- dramatically. The OECD (Organisation for logically driven recruitment into violence— Economic Co-operation and Development) while international actors working on global Anti-Bribery Convention (Convention on counter-terrorism policy should pay atten- Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi- tion to the way local violence and weak insti- cials) and the UN Convention Against Cor- tutions can help fuel global movements. ruption require that state parties prescribe criminal sanctions for bribing a foreign pub- lic official. This extraordinary turnaround is External economic stresses particularly important for states with fragile governance. The bribes paid to officials of Fragile states and areas can be exposed to these countries to win mineral concessions, externally generated stresses of an economic arms contracts, or other lucrative business nature. Prominent among these are corrup- opportunities almost always originate out- tion driven by outside corporate interests, side their borders—so shutting down trans- illicit financial flows associated with corrup- national bribery is crucial to curbing corrup- tion, tax evasion, and trafficking—and both tion in these states. the price shocks associated with rising global Sanctioning those who corrupt foreign demands for food and fuel and the pressure public officials, however, is still a work in to acquire access to or ownership of essential progress. Transparency International’s 2010 natural resources (land, water, and energy). evaluation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Con- Again, states with relatively weak governance vention found that only seven of the 38 coun- systems and bargaining power cannot be ex- tries party to the convention are actively en- pected to address such external stresses with- forcing the provisions of their domestic laws out global and regional assistance. to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials. Another nine are making some ef- fort to enforce the ban. The remaining 20 are Transnational corruption making little or no effort to do so. Although As chapter 5 highlights, efforts to counter this is an improvement from the group’s first corruption are an important and politically report in 2005, when only four parties had challenging part of national reform processes. prosecuted more than one case, Transpar- Corruption is often not just a local challenge; ency International concludes that “current international malefactors are significant in levels of enforcement are too low to enable corruption dynamics and can pose a substan- the convention to succeed.”36 tial obstacle to national efforts at transforma- The international community is devel- tion. Progress will depend at least in part on oping innovative measures to prosecute of- international efforts to address the external ficials involved in transnational corruption. dimension of corruption. The principle that Yet even when there is evidence that a public states should criminalize acts by their own official in a fragile state has accepted a bribe, nationals who corrupt officials of other states proving the case presents legal, technical, and is now firmly entrenched in international law, logistical challenges that are often beyond the although there is much room for improve- capacity of investigators and prosecutors in ment in its implementation. fragile situations. Where capacity or political As recently as 2000, many developed na- constraints prevent prosecution, authorities tions actually fostered corruption across na- in weaker jurisdictions have exploited the International action to mitigate external stresses 227 B OX 7.6 Partnering with client countries to curb corruption in World Bank–funded projects The World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency investigates allegations of corruption, fraud, coer- cion, collusion, and attempts to conceal this conduct in World Bank–funded projects. If a com- plaint is substantiated, a process is begun and can result in barring firms or individuals from bidding on Bank-financed contracts, with referrals to the appropriate law enforcement authori- ties for possible criminal prosecution under national law. Over the past six years, 67 individuals and firms have been barred from bidding on World Bank contracts from two years up to indefinitely. The list includes very small firms and nongov- ernmental organizations in developing countries to U.K. publisher Macmillan Limited and the China Road and Bridge Corporation, a large state-owned enterprise. During this period, the Bank also concluded a settlement agreement with Siemens AG whereby the Siemens Group agreed to voluntarily refrain from bidding on Bank-financed contracts for two years. As part of its settlement with the Bank, Siemens will commit US$100 million over the next 15 years to global efforts to fight fraud and corruption. Macmillan and others have agreed to cooperate with the Bank’s ongoing efforts to combat fraud and corruption in its projects and to imple- ment an anti-corruption compliance program. The World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Euro- pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank have agreed to honor each other’s debarments so that in the future, a firm debarred by one bank will be ineligible to bid on contracts funded by the other banks. Since it was established in 2001, the Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency has referred 112 cases to national law enforcement agencies. Referrals in 2001–06 resulted in convictions in national courts in Bolivia, Guinea, Norway, and the United States for receiving a bribe, embezzlement, or other corruption offenses. More recently, a referral led the Kenyan Anticorruption Commis- sion to open 38 criminal investigations, two of which are being prosecuted. Acting on informa- tion from the World Bank, the Norwegian government indicted three former employees of Norconsult for bribery, and the Palestinian Attorney General’s office opened an investigation of a contractor on a World Bank–funded project for fraud. Source: World Bank 2010h. laws in other countries to overcome these use in proceedings in both countries. The in- hurdles. Under U.K. law, for example, using vestigations provide invaluable training op- the proceeds of corruption to invest in the portunities when experienced investigators U.K. constitutes an offense under anti-money from developed countries pair up with coun- laundering laws—Nigeria’s Economic and terparts from developing states. Indeed, the Financial Crimes Commission has supplied World Bank’s Department of Institutional U.K. authorities with information that en- Integrity plans to follow this model when it abled prosecutions in the U.K. related to stolen refers evidence of corruption in a Bank proj- Nigerian state assets. Haitian and U.S. officials ect to national authorities (box 7.6). worked together to convict a senior official of Haiti’s telecom authority in a U.S. court Illicit international financial flows for taking bribes from American companies. Three U.S. nationals have also pled guilty Prosecuting corruption in commodities is to offenses in connection with the payments complemented by efforts to interdict the fi- to the Haitian company.37 nancing flows from these and other corrupt As ties between law enforcement authori- activities, including drug trafficking. Many ties in developed and developing states have international initiatives are under way in this grown, authorities have also begun joint in- area. A large number of laws and programs vestigations with the evidence available for aim to identify and stem the laundering of 228 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 illicit funds—whether generated by corrup- lect and use information on money laun- tion, tax evasion, or drug trafficking—through dering, international corruption, trafficking the legitimate financial system. This is impor- of specific commodities, and terrorism. Of tant for violence prevention: many armed these, 30 are focused on money laundering movements in civil and political conflict are or corruption, while another 37 deal with financed from these sources. The Financial specific commodities (drugs, arms, illicit Action Task Force, established in 1990 to con- minerals, and natural resources).41 In addi- trol the flows of drug profits, now has rules tion, there are numerous national offices: just for controlling laundering of illicit funds, and four OECD countries have at least 22 offices financial intelligence units combat money between them dealing with these issues.42 laundering at the national level.38 Such units, The system for identifying money laun- in place in 116 countries, work together un- dering or terrorist financing establishes links der the Egmont Group initiative.39 This ex- between persons and transactions. The more pansion in financial intelligence has been par- detailed the data, the more likely they are to alleled by greater attention from banks and reveal malfeasance. But tracking and inves- other financial institutions to monitor and tigating “criteria-based” activities (foreign report on customer transactions—and by in- exchange transactions, international wire creased interest in law enforcement agencies transfers) multiplies the flow of data to a in following the “money trail.”40 financial intelligence unit. To operate well, Together, these steps in intelligence- these initiatives require sophisticated capac- gathering, monitoring, and the amassing ity. The analysis of transnational financial of evidence increase the ability of the inter- flows can uncover information for use in national community to build strong cases several different jurisdictions, and analysis against organized and transnational crime. in higher capacity environments can thus Using the same principle applied in the pros- be of great use to developing countries (box ecution of Al Capone for income tax evasion 7.7). While analytical capability is high in a in 1931, evidence of illicit financial dealings few wealthier countries, this is not the case in provides a way to prosecute violent criminals most low- and middle-income states.43 for “proxy offenses” without having to rely Pulling out information to uncover so- on witnesses to violence—who can be bribed phisticated networks requires resources and or threatened. In August 2009, 70 countries analytical capacity not found in many units. and dependencies agreed to create a Global Nor are the necessary prosecution and ju- Forum on Transparency and Exchange of dicial system capabilities always in place. Information for Tax Purposes to reduce tax Effective international action depends on evasion through trusts, corporations, and strong networks and information exchanges other devices outside the country levying the between jurisdictions. Even in the medium tax. Modeled on the Financial Action Task term, it is unlikely that developing states can Force, the forum will conduct peer reviews build the capacity to operate financial intel- of members and selected nonmembers to ligence units at the level required to produce determine whether they have entered at least results. Resources may be better devoted to 12 tax information exchange agreements, stopping the flow of funds to secrecy juris- enacted legislation allowing them to com- dictions44 than to controlling the flow out of ply with requests for information from their fragile states. treaty partners, and are in fact providing in- Cooperation across borders is not al- formation when requested. ways smooth. To prosecute cases of cross- However, the sheer number of initiatives border money laundering and trafficking, poses a challenge. More than 74 global, re- jurisdictions must share data that may not gional, and multicountry exercises now col- affect their own nationals or institutions, International action to mitigate external stresses 229 B OX 7.7 The Australian Crime Commission’s high-risk money movement strategy Under its financial crimes program, the Australian Crime Commission is piloting a risk-based approach to identifying funds linked to organized crime. This approach to money laundering, developed with the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC), analyzes bulk financial transaction data to identify and monitor “high-risk” money movements (those most likely to involve illicit funds). To identify these flows and the associated criminal enterprise struc- tures and entities, the commission has developed a methodology to identify unusual and unex- pected amounts of money flowing through AUSTRAC and the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) banking system. This highly selective approach allows investigators to target their resources efficiently. Individuals and groups identified this way are cross-checked for police records and, if found suspicious, are further investigated using surveillance, interviews, and, where necessary, coercive powers. The intelligence enables investigators to follow high-risk transactions into and from Australia and to identify potential criminal actors at each end of the money chain. This approach helped identify one Southeast Asian crime syndicate that imported A$129 mil- lion of narcotics over five weeks in 2001. The group is likely to have conducted similar imports throughout the preceding 12 months, or more than A$1 billion in illicit funds for this syndicate alone. Another Southeast Asian crime syndicate of four small shops transferred A$300 million in drug profits overseas over 12 months in 2001. Sources: Australian Crime Commission 2010; Government of Australia 2010. and must trust the other jurisdiction not to ous international initiatives. In principle, a leak the data to those implicated. NORAD more unified global system capable of analyz- (Norwegian Agency for Development Co- ing financial flows and strengthening country operation) sponsors an informal network financial systems would benefit all countries, that brings prosecutors and anti-corruption particularly if reinforced by stronger justice agency officials from developed and develop- systems in conflict-affected countries. A global ing countries together twice a year to share commitment of this complexity and magni- information and collaborate on cases. Under tude would require significant additional re- the auspices of the Asian Development Bank sources and political will at many levels. Nor and the OECD, anti-corruption officials should the challenge be underestimated— in East Asia and the Pacific meet regularly even though the number of global jurisdic- to discuss common problems. The World tions that account for the bulk of global trans- Bank supports the International Corruption actions is fairly small (see chapter 9).45 Hunters Alliance and, with the UNODC, the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative. Getting the most from today’s systems Resource stresses will take perseverance. Despite progress to date, three problems need attention. The first Fragile states are disproportionately suscepti- is the varying capacity across jurisdictions, ble to globally driven resource shocks. Unlike with a disproportionate weight in developed other low-income countries, fragile states de- country organizations. The second is a mis- pend heavily on food imports and are vulner- alignment of incentives among countries, and able to globally driven increases in commodity even among institutions within a country. A prices and scarcities in essential resources. The third is the imperfect harmonization of vari- pressures are mounting as economic growth 230 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 sources of food, water, and land overseas, BOX 7.8 Growing regional and global approaches to often in fragile states. food insecurity Food vulnerabilities need priority atten- tion. The share of agriculture in official de- Effective early warning systems. Multi-agency food security early warning velopment assistance declined from a high systems that use satellite data to anticipate crop failures and food shortages include the Global Information and Early Warning System, which aims to of 17 percent in the 1980s to 5 percent in improve food security response planning in 22 drought-prone African coun- 2006–08, with only 18 percent of this spend- tries—and the Famine Early Warning System Network, which monitors food ing (some US$1.2 billion) going to fragile supply and demand in all countries, with special emphasis on 80 low-income, and conflict-affected states.46 Some regional food-deficit nations. and global efforts to address food insecurity Regional expertise. The Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) and agricultural productivity are under way Remote Sense Unit in Harare, Zimbabwe, and the AGRHYMET Regional Center in (box 7.8), but much more needs to be done Niamey, Niger, are two specialized institutes that provide national and local food at the country level to develop agriculture in security assessments and help build local capacity in agricultural policy and pro- gram development. Recent regional efforts include the creation in 2002 of the those countries. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Food Security Information Sys- By contrast, international water treaties tem (AFSIS) by member states plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. have shown signs of success in reducing the AFSIS aims to improve food security in the region through the systematic collec- risks of violence. A shared water resource has tion, analysis, and dissemination of food security–related information. more often stimulated a search for compro- Regional price stability mechanisms. AFSIS is closely linked to the East Asia mise than conflict, with cooperative interac- Emergency Rice Reserve Pilot Project, which is building a mutual assistance tions between riparian states over the last 50 mechanism to share rice stocks among the 13 ASEAN and AFSIS countries, addressing shortages, and helping stabilize prices in the region. years outnumbering conflicts by more than two to one.47 The international commu- Financial mechanisms. Insurance for agricultural communities may prove effec- nity has also helped resolve riparian issues tive in countries where conflicts over access to and control of natural resources such as water use. But there are qualifiers. are heightened in periods of drought, flood, or other climate-driven scarcity. Index-based insurance relies on objective measurements such as rainfall (too Although many shared water systems have little, too much), and acts to share risk between farmers and insurance markets. cooperative frameworks, some 150 do not. The schemes have been piloted in instances of crop loss (in Ethiopia) or livestock Many feature both high water stress (low per mortality (in Mongolia). Although index-based insurance has been implemented capita water availability) and fragility in one in more than 15 countries, it has yet to be scaled up or become sustainable, especially in low-income countries. or more riparian state. And climate change may affect regimes based on specific quanti- Sources: Bora and others 2010; Brinkman and Hendrix 2010. ties (as opposed to proportions) of a defined water flow (map 7.1). Based on these cir- cumstances, there are instances where it may in middle-income countries produces new be appropriate to update and refine certain middle classes, which are adopting OECD elements of existing water treaty systems (see consumption patterns in food and energy. chapter 8). Climate change—and the search for adaptive The global search for energy and food sup- measures—is likely to amplify them. plies is amplifying pressure on arable land in As chapter 1 notes, climate change can developing countries, especially where insti- multiply natural resource–related pressures tutions are weak. Land-based conflict is typi- due to its potential effects on food produc- cally treated as a purely national issue, or at tion, water availability, energy demand, and best a subregional issue, but land use is in- land-use patterns (such as carbon sinks and creasingly subject to external competitive biofuel production). Climate change is al- pressures. Commercial leases or purchases by ready affecting water systems and, in some foreign governments or foreign government– areas, the supply of arable land. Climate backed enterprises can overlap with com- change and economic pressures are not sepa- munal land claims and lead to tensions— rate: wealthier countries also face declining famously so in Madagascar, where such an water supplies and are searching for new arrangement over a large land leasing deal International action to mitigate external stresses 231 M A P 7.1 Water availability, fragility, and the potential for riparian conflict in Africa Fragile states are not necessarily water stressed. Most have signed international treaties. Still, some vulnerabilities remain. (Red areas on the map indicate riparian areas that have water stress and few or no treaty components. Those in blue have low or mitigated water stress). Water stress (m3/person/yr) and treaty coverage in international river basins Water stress with few or no treaty components Low or mitigated stress Stress not available Fragile or conflict-affected states (2006–2010) IBRD 38421 March 2011 Source: De Stefano and others 2010. generated popular resentment that, com- Contributing to weak governance in ar- bined with other long-standing tensions, eas of increasing land demand are project contributed to unrest and the eventual top- approvals issued without due diligence, ri- pling of the government in early 2009.48 valries among institutions with overlapping A recent World Bank research effort sug- responsibilities, and insufficient capacity. All gests that foreign investment in land does not these problems are exacerbated by lack of increase with good governance, unlike other transparency. Official records on land ac- types of foreign investment. On the con- quisition are often incomplete; poor data on trary, foreign investment in land tends to be land transfers reduce tenure security and in- greatest in countries with a combination of vestment, increase the likelihood of conflict, weak land governance, abundant land, and and make it difficult to collect land taxes and low mechanization. This finding lends sup- monitor project progress.49 port to growing concerns about the ability of International attention to land pressures is local and national institutions to provide fragmented. The UN’s Food and Agriculture adequate protection to vulnerable groups Organization (FAO) examines the impact of against land acquisition. changing food production and consumption 232 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 7 .9 Global approaches to land In response to a sharp increase in investment involving significant use of agricultural land, water, grassland, and forested areas in developing and emerging countries, the FAO, Interna- tional Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Bank launched a consultative process involving gov- ernments, civil society, international organizations, and the private sector to develop voluntary guidelines for responsible large-scale acquisition of land rights. The principles are intended to assist in “alleviating hunger and poverty, enhancing the environment, supporting national and local economic development, and reforming public administration” by setting priorities for domestic food, shelter, and sustainable development needs. The draft set of “Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources” is as follows: 1. Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized and respected. 2. Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it. 3. Processes for accessing land and other resources and then making associated invest- ments are transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and regulatory environment. 4. All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from consultations are recorded and enforced. 5. Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry best practice, are viable economically, and result in durable shared value. 6. Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and do not increase vulnerability. 7. Environmental impacts due to a project are quantified and measures taken to encourage sustainable resource use while minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts and mitigating them. The draft guidelines will be available for review by the same parties in 2011. Source: FAO and others 2010. patterns on land use; the International Orga- and the least developed countries have modest nization for Migration tracks the impact of capacities to contribute. An important excep- changing land patterns on migration; the In- tion is the way African states pooled their ternational Commission on Property Rights diplomatic energies, under Ethiopia’s leader- for the Poor has analyzed the implications ship, in the 2010 Cancún climate change ne- for the poorest people of arbitrary or un- gotiations, contributing to agreement on ad- regulated transfers of land rights. The World aptation funding of US$100 billion a year—a Bank has provided a comprehensive view of model worth replicating in other fora.50 Mov- how international pressures affect domestic ing forward, international negotiations on cli- land availability and use, and an international mate, energy, and food scarcity issues need to working group has presented draft guidelines keep a careful eye on impacts on fragile states. to improve the governance of land and other International donors can also help fragile natural resources (box 7.9). This exercise states weather volatile external pressures by needs to be deepened to ensure that land in- investing in social protection programs. That vestment does not deprive local populations assistance can take several forms (see chap- of the means of sustaining themselves. ters 8 and 9). While the systems are global, In international dialogues on food, energy, many of the buffer mechanisms that warrant and climate, fragile states have weak voices most attention are regional—true not just despite bearing substantial impacts. As with for issues related to resources, but more gen- international dialogues on counter-terrorism, erally for buffering national authorities and the impact on fragile areas is often neglected, societies against external stresses. International action to mitigate external stresses 233 Between the global and the UN peacekeeping mission. In Aceh, Indone- national: Regional stresses, sia, ASEAN led a joint monitoring mission regional support with the European Union, at the Indonesian Government’s request, to support the peace Like all states, fragile states exist in a regional agreement. In Myanmar after Cyclone Nar- and global space. The region matters for sev- gis, the organization helped open access to eral reasons. Personal relationships within humanitarian workers, with support from subregions are often deep, allowing regional the UN, the Asian Development Bank, and actors and institutions to exercise moral sua- the World Bank. sion and create incentives for responsible Regions that have experienced conflict face leadership. Neighbors are a source of trade, a dilemma. Organized criminal groups and cooperation, and even of potential shared cross-border support to rebels undermine administrative capacity. On the negative side, the potential for cross-border collaboration. neighbors can be a source of insecurity and But collaboration and shared administrative political interference. services could create precisely the net gains Regional organizations provide an increas- in capacity that would allow all participating ingly strong platform for action.51 Since the states to better handle organized violence. end of the Cold War, regional organizations In Central America, the peace processes ex- have become more prominent, in conformity plicitly linked neighbors into monitoring with the principle of “regional subsidiarity” and implementation arrangements, includ- articulated in chapter 8 of the UN Charter.52 ing implementation within their own bor- Chapter 1 of this Report discussed the impres- ders. This not only helped reduce violence—it sive progress made in combating coups d’état laid the foundation for greater subregional and abusive military rule in Africa and Latin economic integration. Even states that have America. The African Union’s African Peer had tense relations, or have suffered from Review Mechanism and the mediatory efforts disruption inflicted by groups based in each of the Economic Community of West Afri- other’s territory, can find common interests can States (ECOWAS) show that support in in tackling transnational threats and protect- the neighborhood has advantages.53 Member ing shared resources like water. In the Middle states of the African Peer Review Mechanism East, cross-border initiatives to manage wa- participate on a voluntary basis and use this ter resources have survived turbulence in po- forum to work toward the aims set out in the litical and security relations;55 Thailand and New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Myanmar have had successful cooperation The mechanism assesses and reviews prog- on health issues and on trafficking. ress toward a set of ambitious governance The physical, demographic, and economic indicators, economic growth, and regional characteristics of many fragile states increase integration.54 The degree of capacity for ac- the potential returns to regional cooperation. tion does vary between regions: regional se- Of the 38 states classified by the World Bank curity, political, and economic arrangements as fragile today, 24 have populations under are only as strong as the interests they share. 10 million, and 13 are either landlocked or Regional organizations are also combin- island nations off the main sea lanes. The ing their comparative advantage in political economies of many fragile states share struc- leadership with global technical capacity. tural disadvantages: physical isolation of In Southeast Asia, for example, ASEAN has the whole or part of the country, combined provided political leadership in a number with high transport costs to export destina- of international engagements with technical tion markets, limited internal demand (and support from other organizations. In Timor- limited economies of scale), weak national Leste, it provided much of the lead diplo- institutions, and scarce trained personnel. matic and peacekeeping capacity within the This lack of competitiveness and consequent 234 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 7.10 The role of regional institutions and initiatives in norm-setting and violence prevention ASEAN’s experience in crisis prevention and recovery Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General ASEAN; WDR Advisory Council Member There are many conflicts simmering in the ASEAN land- A second lesson is that we can find useful combinations of scape. But the region is not totally without its own experi- capacity between our local knowledge and political convening ences in mediation and conflict resolution. ASEAN has role, and the technical capacities of other partners. Our work in played an important role in endeavors. The ASEAN Troika in support of recovery after Cyclone Narghis was supported by the Cambodian conflict of 1997–99, the Timor-Leste peace- technical teams from the World Bank, and performed in con- keeping operation of 1999 onward, the Aceh Reconciliation junction with the United Nations. In the Aceh Monitoring Mis- of 2005, and the Myanmar Cyclone Nargis catastrophe of sion, we worked jointly with colleagues from the European May 2008 were cases of mediation and eventual resolution Union who brought valuable technical knowledge. where the regions and some ASEAN member states have The third is that the more operations of this type that we made valuable contributions and learned lessons from the undertake, the more our capacity builds. In Timor-Leste, long process. It has always been like putting pieces of a diplo- years of joint military training and exercises between the Philip- matic jigsaw together, weaving tapestry of peace, improvis- pines, Republic of Korea, and Thailand, supported by partners ing the best modality and pattern from the available and outside the region such as the United States, paid off. The troops suitable materials at hand. on the ground could communicate, cooperate, and conduct One important lesson for us is that our ASEAN structures joint operations without any delay—but their experiences in can play an important political convening role when there Timor-Leste also added to their capacity. In Myanmar, ASEAN’s are sensitivities with member states. There was a higher role meant drawing on personnel from many of our member level of mutual confidence between Indonesia and the states, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore, who have ASEAN states participating in the Timor-Leste operation. We extensive experience of managing post-disaster recovery, and got around the rigid principle of “non-interference” by also building capacity within our Secretariat. Linked to long-term offering troops under a joint command with an “ASEAN” programs of capacity-building with some of our donor partners, military leader taking an active leadership role. And Indone- these experiences make us more ready to face new challenges in sia made it easier for all ASEAN partners by issuing an invita- the future. The cumulative results of these efforts in managing tion to come and assist. In Myanmar, ASEAN played a central political conflicts and natural disaster relief have helped ASEAN role in the dialogue with the Government after Cyclone in enhancing its capacity to coordinate our development coop- Nargis, helping to open up the affected areas, where over eration strategies. We have learned to contain sporadic violence 130,000 men, women, and children had died and many and tension in the region and would not allow them to derail our more faced traumatic conditions, to international aid. community development efforts aiming at common security and sustainable prosperity for our people. low national income is often offset only by underscored the challenge of distance and foreign assistance and rents from natural re- division for development in Sub-Saharan source extraction. These factors can create an Africa, and called for spatially blind institu- unhealthy mix of what has been called “en- tions as the bedrock of integration efforts.59 claved development plus dependency.”56 In many parts of the world, roads and other Remote and insecure areas have little in- infrastructure are absent from the more re- frastructure—and need more.57 Areas that are mote and insecure areas (map 7.2). In the mountainous or have few roads are difficult Pacific, the high transport costs associated for governments to provide basic services or with small-capacity freighters play the same to police. Isolation tends to result both in di- isolating role as the lack of roads in the Saha- vided identity groups and in marginalization. ran and Sahelian areas of northern Africa and And there are few economic opportunities: the mountainous drug-producing regions of the average GDP per capita of all landlocked Myanmar. developing countries is three-fifths that of A lack of economic incentives for infra- their maritime neighbors.58 The 2009 World structure explains much of the shortage. The Development Report on economic geography reason for low infrastructure penetration in International action to mitigate external stresses 235 remote areas is a combination of low eco- M A P 7. 2 Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional infrastructure challenge in nomic activity and insecure transit, which fragile states lessen the demand from business interests Regional infrastructure is extremely limited in many of the fragile states in and result in low projected returns to such Africa. This map shows the presence of power plants, power lines, and regional investments. The returns can be improved roads in Sub-Saharan Africa (fragile states shaded pink). Some areas lacking if such investments are part of regional net- infrastructure have very low populations to support, but others—such as the works. But governments can be reluctant, on border area between the Central African Republic, Chad, and Sudan—are iso- sovereignty grounds, to allow international lated primarily due to insecurity. This reduces trade across borders and access to electricity, locking insecure areas out of economic connectivity. or regional investment in troublesome bor- der areas. Where issues of mistrust can be over- come—say, by involving a neutral third party or joint organization—shared regional services have a good track record. The pro- vision of some government services by re- gional institutions can result in higher qual- ity of services than countries could otherwise afford—and can build a high-quality cadre of civil servants. For fragile and conflict- affected states, the regional pooling of ser- vices can reinforce rather than undermine national sovereignty and citizen confidence Hydro and thermal in government (box 7.11). This is exempli- power plants greater than 100MW fied in the Caribbean and in Sub-Saharan Africa, where regional solutions have im- Existing power lines and paved regional proved the quality of various public services. roads The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court is a Planned power lines regional superior court of record for six in- and unpaved regional roads dependent states60 and three British Overseas Territories.61 Countries under the court rank Fragile states (2011) IBRD 38422 high on the World Bank Institute’s 2008 Rule March 2011 of Law rating, derived from enterprise, citi- Source: Briceño-Garmendia and Foster 2010. zen, and expert surveys. The Pacific Islands Forum’s Pacific Plan for Regional Integration and Cooperation includes a provision for re- ita on government goods and services, while gional pooling of national services (customs, the average low-income non-fragile state health, education, sports).62 spends US$80) (table 7.2). The poor quality Shared administration also has significant of public services is a serious obstacle to eco- potential. Small and fragile states can benefit nomic growth, eroding citizen confidence in from pooling administrative functions. As governments.65 chapter 4 discussed, the poor quality of pub- Forging shared regional arrangements lic services is a serious obstacle to economic often benefits from support by third-party growth and degrades citizen confidence in mediation perceived to be neutral. For ex- government.63 Most countries spend around ample, the evolving institutions of the Euro- 12 percent of GDP on government goods and pean Union sponsored many arrangements services, but nonfragile states spend about that fostered cross-regional cooperation at twice as much as fragile states do in per cap- the national and local level (see box 7.12). ita terms64 (the average low-income fragile or Suspicion between neighbors can be ame- conflict-affected state spends US$38 per cap- liorated by a trusted third party—a role that 236 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 7.11 Pooling services regionally In the past three decades, the role of regional organizations as providers of public services has increased in Sub-Saharan Africa and the eastern Caribbean. Political independence brought self-determination but also meant that services formerly provided through colonial institutions had to be supplied by fledgling national institutions. Several countries responded by pooling resources regionally and con- tracting out some public service provision to the newly created regional organizations. In most cases, the services contracted out were advisory rather than executive. For instance, countries relied on regional organi- zations for advisory aspects of banking supervision (as with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank or the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale,66 and the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest),67 while retaining the role of each country’s sovereign government in enforcing recommendations. In hindsight, this model worked well when there was a tradition of cooperation in central banking that predated independence. By pooling resources, countries have produced higher quality services and better civil servants than would have been possible had the countries acted separately. The success of this model has encouraged other experiments. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, Civil Aviation Authority, and Supreme Court, regional entities under the Revised Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Treaty, have been followed by a joint telecommunications regulator, the Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority, and a joint natural disaster risk pooling mechanism, the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Fund. These organizations have also raised the bar on what the public and politicians expect for the quality of public services. Similarly, the regional central banks were followed in 1993 by the Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires in Central and West Africa, founded to harmonize business law among member countries and serve as a supranational appeals court on aspects of business law. The West Africa Telecommunications Regulatory Agree- ment, established in 2002, has pursued the harmonization and integration of the telecommunications market in West Africa. Although the role of regional organizations as public service providers has not developed to the same extent in the Pacific, due in part to vast distances and more diverse historical and cultural backgrounds, the University of the South Pacific is an initiative that others can learn from. Opened in 1968 and supported by 12 Pacific Island countries, it is acknowledged internationally as a credible institution of higher learning. Source: Favaro 2008, 2010. T A B L E 7.2 Shared administration can help fragile and conflict-affected states provide better quality public services Government expenditure on goods and services Government consumption, US$ purchasing power % of GDP US$ per capita parity per capita Low income Fragile and conflict-affected states 11 38 131 Non-fragile states 15 80 267 Lower middle income Fragile and conflict-affected states 13 247 858 Non-fragile states 13 470 1,296 Sources: Favaro 2010. Note: Averages of most recent data available (2001 to 2008) for 88 low- and lower-middle-income countries (data are missing for 11 fragile and conflict-affected countries). the Asian Development Bank has played External assistance can help regional with good effect in the Greater Mekong initiatives and regional institutions to real- Subregion.68 Regional organizations have ize their full potential in addressing security been encouraging national leaders to ex- and development links. As with Europe’s plore such arrangements—and seek third- early integration (see box 7.12), where re- party help in managing violence and shep- gions have the political appetite to explore herding transition. sharing administrative capacity or pooling International action to mitigate external stresses 237 B OX 7.12 Early European measures to create shared economic interests in peace The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)—the forerunner to the European Union—shows how economic inte- gration can underpin peace and security. The ECSC was formed to create a common market and jointly monitor the production and use of coal and steel—strategically important goods. The ECSC Treaty was signed in Paris in 1951 and led to the free movement of coal and steel and free access to sources of production. A common High Authority supervised the market, respect for competition rules, and price transparency. The ECSC enabled the lifting of ceilings on coal and steel production in key German industries in the postwar period without seeming to threaten the security of the country’s neighbors. Lifting these ceilings and generating regional confidence in coal and steel markets were important, not just for Germany’s economic growth, but also for European economic recovery as a whole. The notion of cross-border cooperation to spur investment, regulate production, open markets, and build confidence and trust are applicable in other regions prone to political instability or recovering from conflict. Other forms of European cooperation have also managed to develop productive exchanges across borders and individual regions. The “Euro region” began as an innovative form of transborder cooperation (between two or more states that share a common border- ing region) in the late 1950s. With the purpose of stimulating cross-border economic, sociocultural, and leisure cooperation, the Eurore- gion model grew, and was boosted through the creation of the European common market and recent democratic transitions. There are currently more than 100 Euroregions spread across Europe, and the model has in recent times been replicated in eastern and central European territories. Cooperation has not been without problems in areas previously affected by conflict, but there are good examples of cross-border developmental, social, and security programs that involve areas where ethnic minorities reside across several states or in areas that have suffered the trauma of interstate and civil war in the past. Sources: Lockhart 2010; Eichengreen 2010; Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002; European Union 1951; Greta and Lewandowski 2010; Otocan 2010; Council of Europe 1995; Council of Europe and Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia 2003; Bilcik and others 2000. functions or services, external assistance to (European assistance to African peacekeep- that process can be invaluable. So far, inter- ing is a significant exception). The potential national aid has tended to support national for regional arrangements to create buffers rather than regional efforts. Support to re- against external threats and to provide a gional organizations has grown in recent cost-effective way to enhance institutional years, but it is generally directed as technical capacity warrants much more attention in assistance to the organization, rather than international assistance—an issue discussed to larger-scale regional delivery programs in chapter 9. 238 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 7 Central Asia: External pressures and external assistance Types of violence: Political violence, local intergroup conflict, local conflicts with transnational ideological connections Transition moment: Moderate space for change Key stakeholders: Governments, opposition parties, regional partners Key stresses: Legacies of colonial past, transboundary natural Institutional challenges: Lack of political accountability and resource management, human rights abuses, real or perceived inclusion, limited capacity of regional forums and institutions discrimination, corruption R egional cooperation is widely accepted as a process and instrument for preventing conflict, promoting economic growth, and facilitating country integration within the region Given their economies’ small size, relative isolation, and re- liance on exports of primary products, these countries’ re- gional integration and market development could in principle and with the international community. The most successful help develop clusters of suppliers and complementary public model is the European Union, which evolved over half a cen- services, improving all five countries’ access to world markets. tury from the original six-nation European Coal and Steel Local community associations and networks developed dur- Community. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ing Soviet times, based on the contours of economic sub- (ASEAN) and other subregional groups are also often cited as regions such as the Fergana Valley—now partitioned by the models to follow for conflict prevention and economic coop- borders of three countries—could be revived as the basis for eration in Central Asia. But almost 20 years after Kazakhstan, increased intraregional trade, thus reducing the risk of cross- the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbeki- border conflict. stan emerged as independent states from the former Soviet If regional approaches were adopted and strengthened, Union, there has been little progress in regional cooperation in several negative externalities could be tackled more effectively Central Asia, and the risk of conflict may be increasing. and efficiently. These include environmental deterioration, of Despite their cultural links and shared development expe- which the dying Aral Sea is only the most visible example; land rience as part of a large centrally planned economy for most of degradation and desertification, which have reduced crop the 20th century, the five Central Asian countries have pur- yields and the availability of arable land; drug transit and trade; sued different paths and rates of economic and political tran- and eventually the impacts of climate change. sition—partly the outcome of policy choices and partly from Two international studies have estimated that improved re- their Soviet legacy. Their different approaches and uneven gional cooperation could increase Central Asia’s regional GDP natural resource endowments have resulted in increasingly by between 50 and 100 percent—and regional per capita in- differentiated outcomes in growth, poverty, and, ultimately, comes by up to 100 percent—in about 10 years. Lower trans- stability. Moreover, their sometimes conflicting interests—in port costs would increase trade with large neighbors such as transboundary water use and management, for example—in- China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation, fluence their attitudes toward, and thus the prospects for, en- and, indirectly, South Asia. Managing and exploiting trans- hanced regional cooperation. boundary water, irrigated agriculture, and related hydro and other energy resources would be more cost-effective. And col- laborative approaches to regional public goods, such as biodi- Is regional cooperation important? versity, the environment, and public health, would benefit from Central Asia’s geography, history, and people—as well as its economies of scale—as would enhancing security, managing landlocked position and the integrated energy, transport, and natural disasters, and curbing the drug trade. water infrastructure it inherited from the Soviet Union—to- gether make the five countries unusually interdependent. In If so, why is cooperation receding? reality, a modicum of day-to-day coordination of transbound- ary oil and gas pipelines, electricity transmission, and water The explanation for cooperation not developing, and even re- distribution is a practical necessity. ceding—less than 20 years after independence—is that each International action to mitigate external stresses 239 country’s interest in regional cooperation is different, and Regional Information and Coordination Center, based in Al- individual nation-building is still under way. Other factors maty, Kazakhstan, exchanges intelligence to identify and dis- include rupt drug trafficking networks and strengthens regional crim- inal justice capacity. The Central Asia Regional Economic • Diverging approaches to, and different rates of, economic Cooperation program, initiated and funded mainly by the transition—exemplified most obviously by the contrast be- Asian Development Bank, is a partnership of eight countries tween Kazakhstan’s relatively open economy and Uzbeki- and six multilateral institutions to promote and facilitate re- stan’s relatively closed one gional cooperation in transport, trade facilitation, trade policy, • Differing views between the two upstream (the Kyrgyz and energy. Republic and Tajikistan) and three downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) over the What lessons can be learned? management of the region’s two key transboundary water resources (the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers and their A 2008 survey of regional cooperation institutions worldwide tributaries) for hydroelectric power generation and irri- suggested five key lessons relevant to Central Asia: gation, respectively • Effective regional cooperation takes time and effort to de- • Rival searches for the same extraregional and global mar- velop, requiring incremental, gradual, flexible implementa- kets, often complicated by the competing interests and mo- tion with visible payoffs. tivations of the subregion’s principal external actors • It also requires sustained leadership—at the country, insti- • Rekindled cultural, ethnic, and religious identities of the five tutional, and individual levels. titular nationalities—following 70 years of suppression dur- • The size and membership of regional institutions should be ing the Soviet era—coupled with the stresses and strains of kept manageable. modern nation-building. • Financial resources and instruments are needed to support Less tangible but still significant are contending claims to re- regional investments and cooperation. gional leadership by the two largest countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and growing instability in the two smallest, most • External actors should assist wherever possible. fragile countries (Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic)—partic- In addition to these findings, a 2007 World Bank Indepen- ularly in the Kyrgyz Republic where recent political turmoil and dent Evaluation Group analysis of regional programs— interethnic violence could destabilize its neighbors. An outcome including two in Central Asia—listed five design features of of these divergent interests is the dwindling efficacy and influ- successful programs consistent with these principles: strong ence of the regional forums and institutions, whose managerial country commitment to regional cooperation; objectives that and decision-making capacity remains limited. match national and regional capacities; clear definition and coordination of the roles of national and regional institutions; Institutional constraints accountable governance arrangements; and plans for the sus- tainability of program outcomes. The only regional institution involving all five countries is the Central Asia satisfies few, if any, of these criteria. In par- International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea—a single-purpose ticular, there is little or no country commitment to regional body established in the early 1990s to mobilize financial re- cooperation—for the reasons noted earlier—beyond the sources to mitigate the environmental, humanitarian, and so- minimal bureaucratic and technical coordination needed to cial impact of the Aral Sea’s drying up. In addition, the UN has ensure effective functioning of the countries’ integrated infra- sponsored three regional groups. The Special Program for the structure. Indeed, relations have deteriorated in the last two Economies of Central Asia—a framework for periodic dia- years, particularly with tensions strained among some coun- logue inspired originally by Kazakhstan—has only very lim- tries over plans to complete two Soviet-era hydropower proj- ited resources. The UN Regional Center for Conflict Resolu- ects. Some of the countries have agreed to accept the conclu- tion, based in Ashgabat, promotes regional dialogue, security, sions of externally financed, independent assessments of one and understanding. And the recently established Central Asia of the project’s economic, environmental, and technical 240 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 7 Central Asia: External pressures and external assistance (continued) feasibility—apparently signaling their interest in a mutually The need for closer cooperation in Central Asia—to pre- acceptable bilateral solution. vent conflict and to maintain and reinforce regional stabil- ity—may be greater and more urgent than ever, especially in energy and water, and trade and transport, which have so far From conflict to cooperation proven intractable. While the outlook for enhanced coopera- Experience appears to confirm the analysis of at least one Cen- tion may have worsened, this makes renewed focus and coor- tral Asian scholar, Matveeva (2007), who concludes that re- dinated effort by external actors all the more important. In gional cooperation, however desirable in theory, cannot be this context, the Central Asia Regional Economic Coopera- prescribed from outside. The mediation of conflicts inherited tion program’s pragmatic emphasis on coordinated country- by the five countries, if not their resolution, is a prerequisite specific investments in energy and transport infrastructure for more broadly based regional cooperation. And regional benefiting two or more countries may be a model for other cooperation is more likely to evolve in limited well-defined ar- partners to follow. eas of obvious mutual interest or concern. If cooperation is indeed more likely to be ad hoc and in nar- Another couple of scholars, Linn and Pidufala (2008), view rowly defined areas of common interest or concern—not in- relations between the five countries as driven mainly by com- volving all five countries—a flexible operational framework, petition and rivalry—for influence, leadership, markets, and rather than an elaborate regional plan or strategy, is the right resources—warning, in addition, that this may not be a tem- way to shape external actors’ actions. External actors can do porary phenomenon related to nation-building. According to much in convening, mediating, and resolving issues, but with- this view, Central Asia’s regional problems are unlikely to be out mutual interest and political will in the countries, their role resolved in the near term, and the main priority for external will be limited. actors should be to reduce the risk that they may worsen and cause real conflict. Sources: Houdart and Pearce 2010; and others described in endnote.69 Notes 1. For a discussion of these linkages, see for example Naim 2006. 2. See Baker 2005. 3. Rubin 2002; Small Arms Survey Project 2005, 2009. 4. Gambino 2010; U.S. Department of State 2010. 5. Oliver 1999. 6. UN “Groups of Friends” began in the post–Cold War period as a mediation tool for countries attempting to prevent or exit conflict. Friends groups have been operating over the past two decades, providing a core group of interested states that apply diplomatic persuasion—carrots and sticks—in promoting peace settlements. Most often these are informal groupings, with a negotiated and varied rather than rigid mandate based on the country context. See Whitfield 2007. 7. Patel and Ross 2007; O’Loughlin, Witmer, and Linke 2010. 8. See African Union 2007a. 9. UNDP 2010a. 10. UN Security Council 2010b. 11. In the case of heroin and cocaine, which are illegal in almost all countries. 12. See OECD 2010h. 13. Estimated value of conflict and illicit diamonds. In 2008, conflict diamonds were estimated to account for 0.1 percent of the total global production of rough diamonds, which stood at US$12.7 billion. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 2009, 2010. International action to mitigate external stresses 241 14. Gemologists are generally able to identify the origin of diamonds if they receive several parcels of gems coming from the same area. They have great difficulties in identifying origin once stones from different areas have been mixed, and they are completely unable to identify the origins of a polished stone (see Goreaux 2001). 15. This is an estimate for oil trafficked only from Nigeria, where this problem is concentrated, and is based on an estimated 150,000 barrels per day at a price of US$20 per barrel—a significant discount over world oil prices to attract large buyers (see UNODC 2009a). 16. Estimated 2008 value of illegally imported wood products (see Lawson and MacFaul 2010, 125). 17. While it is technically feasible to trace the origins of timber (and this indeed has been the focus of a number of “responsible forestry” initiatives), doing so depends either on tagging at the country of origin and a secure chain of custody, or on a more complicated DNA analysis. 18. UNODC 2010a, 129. 19. The number of legal manufacturers of small arms is estimated to have increased from fewer than 200 companies in 1980 to more than 600 by 2001. As of 2001, at least 95 countries had the capacity to undertake the legal production of small arms. See Small Arms Survey Project 2001. 20. Most, but not all, small arms and light weapons are marked at the point of manufacture, for exam- ple, with a serial number and manufacturer’s mark that is stamped, etched, or engraved into metal- lic parts of the weapon. However, where they exist, the marks often contain insufficient informa- tion for unique identification and reliable tracing, and there is no centralized record-keeping. See Greene 2001. 21. UNODC 2010a, 82, 111. 22. Illicit trade in small arms and light weapons takes place in both the black and the gray markets. For a definition of both markets, see Stohl and Grillot 2009. For information on the SALW, see Small Arms Survey Project 2006. The estimate of the elicit portion is reported in Marsh 2002. 23. Small Arms Survey Project 2011. 24. See Cukier 2002 and Markowski and others 2009. 25. On the developmental impact of SALW, see Bourne 2007. 26. See Small Arms Survey Project 2009. 27. Ben-Ari 2010; Worsnip 2009; UN Security Council 2009. 28. Demombynes 2010. 29. Although the definition of terrorism is fraught, and the question of which groups should be referred to as terrorist organizations is contested, 12 UN Conventions that have been adopted by the Gen- eral Assembly specify tactics that are classified as terrorism. 30. An example of this today is the presence of transnational terrorist organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the subnational conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines (see Putzel 2003; Kilcullen 2009; Acharya and Acharya 2007). 31. UN General Assembly 2006. 32. Berman and others 2009; Berman 2009; Berman and Iannaccone 2006. 33. UNODC 2009b, 65. 34. U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1999, 26. 35. OECD 1996, 2009; Greenberger 1995; Gantz 1998; Hines 1995. 36. Transparency International 2010, 8. 37. Messick 2011. Also see box 8.4 in chapter 8. 38. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in 1990 by the finance ministers of G-7 countries to combat the problem of illegal narcotics trafficking and money laundering through strengthened international cooperation. The FATF’s initial mission was to focus on preventing the use of the banking system and other financial institutions for the purpose of money laundering. As an initial step and based on an analysis of the existing situation, the FATF developed a series of recommendations on specific measures, including the adaptation of national legal and regulatory systems, that would help detect, prevent, and punish misuse of the financial system for money laundering. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the FATF issued additional guidelines to counter the terrorist financing. The FATF relies on a unique cooperation network involving more than 180 jurisdictions around the world, including multilateral organizations such as the G-20, UN, World Bank, and IMF. Additionally, eight FATF-style regional bodies have been created over the years as part of this network. See Financial Action Task Force 2010. 39. The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units is an informal international gathering of finan- cial intelligence units (FIUs) formed in 1995. FIUs are national centers to collect information on suspicious or unusual financial activity from the financial industry and other entities or professions required to report transactions suspected of being money laundering or terrorism financing. FIUs 242 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 are normally not law enforcement agencies; their mission is to analyze the information received. If sufficient evidence of unlawful activity is found, the matter is passed to the public prosecution. The goal of the Egmont Group is to provide a forum for FIUs around the world to improve cooperation in the fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism and to foster the implementation of domestic programs in this field. Intscher 2010. 40. Intscher 2010. 41. WDR team calculations. 42. Such as the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), the U.K. Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC), and the Canadian Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center (FINTRAC). 43. A large proportion of FIUs (about 60–65 percent) receive only Suspicious Transaction Reports, which meet some test of suspicion, and are by and large domestic transactions, usually of a relatively modest amount. This is the mandatory minimum reporting requirement of the FATF Recommen- dations. A substantial minority of FIUs (about 25–30 percent) also receive, or have access to, Large Cash Transaction Reports, reported solely on the basis of the transaction exceeding a threshold value specified in law or regulation. A small proportion of FIUs (perhaps 10–15 percent) receive some Foreign Exchange Transaction Reports, usually those above a specified value threshold. A quite small proportion of FIUs (maybe 5–8 percent) receive, or have access to, Electronic Funds Transfer Reports (“wire transfers”), usually above a threshold, mostly for international, but in some instances also domestic transfers. See Intscher 2010. 44. Secrecy jurisdictions refer to jurisdictions that facilitate illicit financial flows stemming from three overlapping sources: bribery, criminal activity, and cross-border trade mispricing. Secrecy jurisdic- tions undermine development for the poorest countries as individuals taking advantage of these jurisdictions can commit a wide range of crimes such as tax evasion, nonpayment of alimonies, money laundering, terrorist financing, drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal arms trading, counterfeiting, insider dealing, embezzlement, fleeing of bankruptcy orders, fraud, and others. 45. One barrier relates to privacy: access to information on wire transfers, for example, means infring- ing the privacy of the many millions of customers using wire transfers for entirely legal means. 46. OECD 2010b; Willman 2010. 47. De Stefano and others 2010. 48. Cooke and Brown 2010. 49. World Bank 2010f. 50. The Green Climate Fund will support projects, programs, policies, and other activities in develop- ing country parties using thematic funding windows. The fund will be governed by the Green Cli- mate Board comprising 24 members, as well as alternate members, with equal number of members from developing and developed country parties. The assets of the Green Climate Fund shall be administered by a trustee, and the World Bank was invited to serve as the interim trustee, subject to a review three years after operationalization of the fund. The Cancún negotiations also decided that an independent secretariat shall support the operations of the fund. It was also decided that the Green Climate Fund shall be designed by a Transitional Committee of 40 members, with 15 members from developed country parties and 25 members from developing country parties. 51. The preeminent example of regional cooperation in the cause of conflict prevention is captured in the emergence of today’s Europe, after centuries of interstate violence had culminated in the most destructive war in history. From the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Cooperation through the creation of the European Union and its absorption of former Soviet bloc countries, this evolving social compact has so far managed to navigate a range of volatile political and social developments and to bring a degree of political and economic unity that few would have foreseen 65 years ago. The current accession process provides very strong incentives for candidate states to attain specified governance, security, and human rights standards. Lockhart 2010; Eichengreen 2010; Grimm 2010. 52. See Wulf and Debiel 2009. 53. See Shiawl-Kidanekal 2004. 54. For further information, see NEPAD 2010. 55. World Bank 2007b; Kramer 2008. 56. “The cost ‘wedges’ associated with small size, undeveloped human capital and institutions, and market distance mean there is little scope for exports of manufactured goods or services; national economic viability in the Pacific is instead vested largely in three external income streams: i) rents International action to mitigate external stresses 243 from natural resource extraction; ii) aid and fiscal flows; and iii) remittances from labor exports.” See World Bank 2009b. 57. See, for example, Fearon and Laitin 1999, 2003. 58. Faye and others 2004. 59. World Bank 2008h. 60. Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 61. Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, and Montserrat. See Byron and Dakolias 2008. 62. See Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 2005. 63. See also La Porta and others 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Hall and Jones 1999. 63. The result holds for both lower- and lower-middle-income countries, both nominally and in pur- chasing power parity adjusted. 65. Favaro 2010. 66. The Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) serves six countries: Cameroon, Central Afri- can Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic of Congo. 67. The Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) serves eight states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 68. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries (Cambodia, China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) have implemented a wide-ranging series of regional projects covering transport, power, telecommunications, environmental management, human resource development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and agriculture. These projects were carried out with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank, which had a track record of working with each of these countries on a bilateral basis, and was able to offer a platform for dia- logue as well as contribute technical knowledge and expertise that helped set consistent standards acceptable to all. The GMS is recognized as having enhanced cross-border trade while reducing poverty levels and creating shared interests in economic stability and peace. See World Bank 2006d. 69. UNDP 2005a; Asian Development Bank 2006; Linn and Pidufala 2008; World Bank 2007c; Matveeva 2007; Olcott 2010. PART 3 Practical Options and Recommendations T his chapter draws together practical country lessons and options to prevent organized criminal and political violence and recover from their effects. The audience is strategic decision makers in countries grappling with violence or attempting to prevent it—national reformers in government and civil society, as well as international representatives in the field. As this Report has emphasized throughout, efforts to build confidence and transform institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs need to be adapted to the local political context in each country, at each transition moment—and there is a need for humility, since lessons in how to combat changing patterns of repeated violence are being refined and expanded on the ground all the time. This chapter, therefore, lays out basic principles and a toolkit of options emerging from country lessons and illustrates how these can be adapted to different contexts. 8 CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS CHAPTER EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO TRANSFORMI RING CON RE FID S TO ENCE TRANSFORMING RING NG CON IN RE S ST FID TU TO TRANSFORMING I R TI E NCE I NG ON CON S IN FID IT ST UT E NC E IO NS IN ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Practical country directions and options Principles and options, not recipes for differentiating these principles in coun- try strategies. The second section summa- T his Report lays out a different way rizes practical tools for confidence-building of thinking about approaches to and gives examples of how these have been violence prevention and recovery adapted to different country circumstances. in fragile situations. It does not The third section considers insights from pro- aim to be a “cookbook” that prescribes rec- gram design to link early results with longer- ipes—every country’s history and political term institution-building, again illustrating context differ, and there are no one-size-fits- how common tools have been tailored to all solutions. As described earlier, recovering country contexts. The last section considers, from fragile situations is not a short, linear more briefly, lessons on addressing external process. Countries go through multiple tran- stresses and marshaling external resources. sitions over a period of at least a generation Some of the challenges in relation to external before achieving institutional resilience. Be- assistance and regional and global stresses are cause trust is low in high-risk environments, beyond the capacity of individual states and building confidence and political support donor field representatives to resolve. So this among stakeholders in each round of change chapter should be read with chapter 9, which is a prelude to institutional transformation. considers directions for global policy. Managing these complex dynamics and mul- tiple transitions is the basis of statecraft, and this chapter draws heavily on lessons from Basic principles and country- national reformers and country experiences specific frameworks for sustained in chapters 4 and 5. There is no substitute violence prevention and recovery for the judicious blend of political judgment, Basic principles deep knowledge of actors, innovation, and tactical calculus that only national reformers The Report’s analysis underlines that institu- can wield. tions and governance, which are important The first section presents basic principles for development in general, work differently emerging from many different settings where in fragile situations. Restoring confidence societies have been able to prevent and re- through inclusion and early, visible results at cover from episodes of violence and develop the local level is important before undertak- institutional resilience, as well as a framework ing wider institutional reforms. The princi- 248 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 pal tactic national reformers and their part- ciated services)—and that ensure that ners have used to restore confidence in the new initiatives do not lose credibility due face of recent or rising violence and fragil- to corruption. Progress in these areas, ity is to build “inclusive-enough” coalitions. and coordination among them, are the Coalition-building efforts will sustain suc- foundation for broader change. Other cess only if they can address the underlying reforms that require the accrual of greater weaknesses that increase the risks of repeated social consensus and capacities—politi- cycles of violence—deficits in security, jus- cal reform, decentralization, deeper eco- tice, and job creation. Cycles of confidence- nomic reform, shifts in social attitudes building and institutional transformation toward marginalized groups—are best repeat over time. To galvanize and sustain addressed systematically over time once this “virtuous circle” in the face of deep chal- these foundational reforms have made lenges of repeated violence and weak institu- some progress. tional capacity, four key principles emerge. • Don’t let perfection be the enemy of • Inclusion is important to restore con- progress—embrace pragmatic, best-fit fidence, but coalitions need not be “all- options to address immediate challenges. inclusive.” Inclusive-enough coalitions In insecure situations, it is generally im- work in two ways. At a broad level, they possible to achieve technical perfection in build national support for change and approaches to security, justice, or devel- by bringing in the relevant international opment. There is a need to be pragmatic, stakeholders whose support is needed. At to address immediate challenges within a local level, they work with community political realities, with approaches that leaders and structures to identify pri- can improve over time. Sometimes these orities and deliver programs. Inclusive- approaches will have temporary second- enough coalitions apply just as much to best aspects associated with them. For ex- criminal violence as to political violence, ample, jobs generated may not immedi- through collaboration with community ately meet long-term goals for high skills leaders, business, parliaments, civil soci- and wages. Community and traditional ety—and with regional neighbors, do- structures may have drawbacks in their nors, and investors. representation of women or youth groups. Anti-corruption initiatives may have to • Some early results are needed to build focus on major corruption while tolerat- citizen confidence and create momentum ing financial weaknesses in other areas. for longer-term institutional transforma- tion. When trust is low, people do not be- lieve grand plans for reform will work. A framework for tailoring country- Some early results that demonstrate the specific strategies potential for success can generate trust, Within these general principles, each country restore confidence in the prospects of needs to assess its particular circumstances collective action, and build momentum and find its own path. National reform- for deeper institutional transformation. ers will face different types of violence, dif- Transforming institutions takes a genera- ferent combinations of international and tion, but political cycles are short—early external stresses, different institutional chal- results can both meet political imperatives lenges, different stakeholders who need to and generate the incentives for the longer- be involved to make a difference, and differ- term project of institution-building. ent transition opportunities. Throughout, • It makes sense to first establish the basic this Report has covered some of the most institutional functions that provide citi- important variations in country circum- zen security, justice, and jobs (and asso- stances through a simple assessment (table Practical country directions and options 249 TA B L E 8 . 1 Situation-specific challenge and opportunities Types of violence: Civil, criminal, cross-border, subnational, and/or ideological Transition opportunity: Opportunities can Key stakeholders: Stakeholder balances include be gradual and limited, or can present more internal versus external stakeholders, state versus immediate or major space for change. nonstate stakeholders, low-income versus middle- high-income stakeholders. Key stresses: Situations pose different mixtures Institutional challenges: Degrees and mixtures of of internal versus external stresses; high versus low capacity, accountability, and inclusion constraints levels of division between ethnic, social, regional or in state and nonstate institutions affect strategy. religious identity groups. 8.1). There are five factors to be considered in Capacity for formal investigations and pros- applying a tailored strategy—each, of course, ecutions in the police and civilian justice tempered by political judgment. institutions is more important, for example, First is the transition moment and oppor- in situations of organized criminal violence tunity for change. Some situations, because of than in civil war or communal conflicts— political, economic, or security factors, offer although it is important in both. Ideologi- greater space for change and a major break cally motivated violence may require more from the past—a peace agreement, a leader- emphasis on security, justice, and social in- ship or electoral succession, or even a crisis clusion, since this form of violence appears that spurs an opportunity for change. Other to be less motivated by employment or eco- situations present more limited space for nomic considerations. change—a sense of mounting problems that Fourth is the type of institutional chal- spurs debate, pressure for reform by groups lenges. Where states have fairly strong ca- outside government, or a new governmental pacity but inclusion is weak, reform actions reform plan. The type of strategy advocated need to draw marginalized groups into de- needs to take account of this opening. Is this cision making and ensure they benefit from a moment to put forward a long-term trans- national growth, service delivery, and welfare formational vision or to make incremental improvements. Where lack of accountability advances? has been a source of tension, strategies need Second is the type of stress. In situations to focus on responsiveness to citizens and to where the internal divisions between ethnic, act against abuses. Where both capacity and religious, social, or geographical groups are accountability are weak, it makes sense to a major factor in the mobilization for vio- make greater use of state-community, state– lence, strategies need components that ad- civil society, state–private sector, and state- dress political, economic, or social inclusion. international mechanisms in delivering and External stresses such as incursions from monitoring early reform efforts. drug trafficking networks or global economic Fifth is the set of stakeholders. National or shocks clearly require working with regional subnational political and economic leaders or global partners. and current combatants or ex-combatants— Third is the type of violent threat. Suc- while not among the poorest groups—can cessful approaches to address political, com- be crucial stakeholders in achieving security munal, or criminal violence have common- and early results, and they may need to see alities in the underlying institutional deficits benefits from initial reforms if they are to that permit repeated cycles of violence— support them. Where neighboring countries, and common priorities to develop the in- international donors, and investors affect the stitutions to provide citizen security, justice, success of a reform, they need to be brought and jobs. But the particular mix of different into the debates on strategy and the delivery types of violence does make some difference. of early results. 250 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 For deeper analysis of each country con- • identifying both the early results needed text, national leaders and their international for stakeholder confidence-building and partners need tools to assess risks, develop the path toward long-term institutional priorities, and formulate plans for action. Na- transformation. tional governments can often draw expertise • keeping strategies simple, and being realis- from their own line ministries or political tic about the number of priorities identi- parties, as South Africa did in developing its fied and the timelines, as with the changes reconstruction and development program in recommended to the joint UN–World 1993 and 1994, or as Colombia did in review- Bank–European Union (EU) post-crisis ing the strengths and weaknesses of previous needs assessment. efforts to address violence in the early 2000s.1 Where external actors play critical roles, • ensuring that political, security, and de- national leaders can initiate a joint national- velopment actors at national and inter- international assessment with help from national levels have joint ownership of regional institutions, the United Nations assessments and strategy exercises. Where (UN), international financial institutions, assessments and plans are led by only one or bilateral partners, as in Liberia follow- ministry, for example, other ministries ing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement may resist implementation. Equally, for of 2003 and in the post-crisis needs assess- strategies to bring to bear a range of dip- ment in Pakistan in 2009–10. Many good lomatic, security, and development assis international assessment tools exist for these tance from external partners, all need to purposes, such as the post-conflict/post- be consulted in their preparation. crisis needs assessments developed by the World Bank, UN, and European Commis- sion. More formal national-international Practical approaches to processes have the advantage of generating confidence-building buy-in, as well as possible financial assis- tance, from international partners, though Basic tools they may also set high expectations for im- mediate financial assistance that need careful When confronted with a rising crisis or tran- management. sition opportunity, national reformers and One key lesson on assessments and plan- their international partners have a variety of ning processes is that they have often been tools available for confidence-building and lengthy exercises that have difficulty in later the development of “inclusive-enough” coali- adapting to new challenges. Recognizing the tions, based on lessons from a range of coun- analysis of this Report on the repeated nature try experiences (table 8.2). Key stakeholder of violent threats and the succession of mul- groups whose support has often been sought tiple transitions that countries go through to in coalition-building (in different combina- address them, lighter and more regular assess- tions according to country circumstances) ments of risks and opportunities make sense. include the leaders and populations affected Assessments can also be strengthened by and targeted by violence; security actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, com- • considering where the society stands on batants; political leaders with influence, both the spectra of transition opportunities, in ruling and opposition parties; business, and stresses, institutional challenges, and civil society, whose support may be needed to stakeholders. undertake reforms; and neighbors and inter- • explicitly considering the history of past national partners. Including women leaders efforts and the legacy of earlier episodes of and women’s groups has a good track record violence. in creating continued pressure for change. Practical country directions and options 251 TA B L E 8 . 2 Core tools for restoring confidence Signals: Future policy Signals: Immediate Commitment and priorities actions mechanisms Supporting actions • Citizen security goals • Participatory processes • Independence of key • Risk and priority • Key principles and realistic • Local security, justice, and executing agencies assessments timelines for addressing development results • Independent third- • Communicating of costs political reform, decen- party monitoring of inaction • Credible government tralization, corruption, appointments • Dual-key systems • Simple plans and basic justice services, and • Transparency of • International execu- progress measures on transitional justice expenditures tion of functions 2–3 early results • Utilize state, community, • Redeployment of • Strategic NGO, and international security forces communication capacities • Removal of discriminatory policies Source: WDR team. Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization. To build national and local-level support, transparency measures, for example, backing political and policy signals that demonstrate up political and security plans. a break with the past are important. Signals Some options for signaling a break with that help to build political support among the past will necessarily constitute announce- stakeholder groups are particularly effec- ments of future action rather than imme- tive when they are based on immediate ac- diate action. For example, clear signals on tions rather than only on announcements approaches and timelines for political- and of intent. security-sector reform, decentralization, and Signaling through immediate action can transitional justice have often been part of include credible government appointments confidence-building—drawing lessons, how- (national and local) who can command the ever, on the generational timelines often re- confidence of stakeholder groups. Rede- quired to complete the comprehensive insti- ployment of security forces can restore con- tutional reforms described in chapter 3. fidence by signaling an increase in civilian Signals on political reform may include protection—as when Colombia redeployed rapid action toward elections or laying out military contingents to protect civilian road of a series of preparatory steps—as with the transit in 2002–03.2 Similar effects can be transitional executive bodies and constitu- achieved by removing units that have a his- tional reform processes in South Africa, sup- tory of abuse or mistrust with communities. ported by civic education and national and In some cases, the quick removal of legal local action to maintain security during the regimes seen as discriminatory or abusive— political process through the National Peace apartheid laws, collective punishments, gov- Accords. Where elections will take place ernment restrictions on hiring from specific quickly, indicating that these are not an end identity groups—can help restore confidence. but a step toward transformation of institu- Transparency in budgets and expenditures tions and democratic practices (as described can be an important signal of improved gov- in the inputs by Lakhdar Brahimi and Nitin ernance, as with Timor-Leste’s public budget Desai in chapter 5, box 5.11), is important. debates and reporting systems to parliament Particular attention is also merited on local after the renewed violence and instability participatory processes—such as a commit- of 2006–07.3 Most successful signals require a ment to involve violence-affected communi- mix of security, political, and economic con- ties in identifying priorities and delivering tent—with credible resource allocations and programs in their areas.4 252 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 To generate support of stakeholders in This Report’s analysis also provides some low-trust environments, special commit- clear messages from global experience to un- ment mechanisms to persuade key politi- derpin efforts to persuade stakeholders of the cal and economic stakeholder groups and urgency of action: citizens that announcements will be carried • No country or region can afford to ignore through have proved useful. These include areas where repeated cycles of violence the creation of special independent agencies flourish or citizens are disengaged from to implement programs, as with Indonesia’s the state. reconstruction agency in Aceh,5 and inde- pendent third-party monitoring of commit- • Unemployment, corruption, and exclu- ments. Third parties can be national—as with sion increase the risks of violence—and independent agencies or local civil society legitimate institutions and governance monitoring—or involve joint national and that give everyone a stake in national pros- international cooperation, as with the Gov- perity are the immune system that protects ernance and Economic Management Action from different types of violence. Plan in Liberia6 and the Commission against • Citizen security is a preeminent goal, un- Impunity in Guatemala.7 They also can sim- derpinned by justice and jobs. ply be international and provide either mon- itoring or direct execution for a transitional • Leaders need to seize opportunities before period, as with United Nations or regional violence escalates or recurs. peacekeeping missions’ electoral monitoring, Strategic communication on the need for or the ASEAN-European Union Aceh Moni- change and for a positive vision for the fu- toring Mission, which supported implemen- ture is crucial—no one can be persuaded to tation of the Aceh peace agreement.8 support new initiatives if they do not know Several supporting actions can help in they exist, or if their intent and content have confidence-building and in persuading stake- been distorted in reporting. Common les- holders whose support is sought of the bene- sons on strategic communications include fits of collaboration. In some situations, there ensuring that different parts of government may be great unwillingness in the national communicate consistently on the vision for discourse to recognize the potential for an change and specific plans; fostering sup- escalation of violence and the depth of chal- portive messages from civil society and in- lenges. Where the risks of crisis escalation are ternational partners; and directing commu- not fully recognized by all national leader- nications to assuage concerns while avoiding ship, providing an accurate and compelling promises that cannot be kept. Traditional message on the consequences of inaction can consultation mechanisms and new tech- help galvanize momentum for progress.9 For nologies also offer the potential to mobilize example, technical analysis can be produced broader citizen input into debates, as with on the costs of violence and the benefits of the use of traditional community meetings restored security—as for the regional ben- in West Africa11 or youth activists using so- efits of peace in Afghanistan and for the costs cial networking tools to mobilize popular of crime to business in several countries.10 support and oppose violent actions by the Economic and social analyses can also show FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co- how rising violence and failing institutions lombia) in Colombia.12 are causing national or subnational areas to It helps to produce clear plans and bud- lag far behind their neighbors in develop- gets that identify early results as well as the ment progress, or how other countries that approach toward longer-term institution- have failed to address rising threats have building early on, informed by a sense of faced severe and long-lasting development realism in timelines and availability of re- consequences. sources. The key lesson from country experi- Practical country directions and options 253 ences is that it is not necessary to generate ity available to states, and it creates a sense of early results in every area. Two or three broader stakeholder and citizen engagement early results are sufficient in each period in crisis prevention and recovery. For these of confidence-building. Once the pursuit reasons, short-term confidence-building and of these results is properly resourced and longer-term efforts to transform institutions achieved, other available capacities (leader- need to be linked. ship and managerial, technical, and financial) can be targeted at institutional transforma- Differentiating confidence-building tion. Of course, results have to be repeated at tools to match country circumstances regular intervals and help rather than hinder longer-term institution-building.13 The particular mix of transition opportuni- Early results can take the form of progress ties, stresses, stakeholders, and institutional on political and justice, security, or develop- challenges makes a difference in selecting ment outcomes and often involve successful types of confidence-building approaches. combinations of all three. In South Africa, Where political power is contested and op- transitional mechanisms that ensured broad position groups have the potential to derail participation in political, security, and eco- progress, developing collaborative capaci- nomic decision-making during the transi- ties among political parties is crucial. Where tion played a key role. In Kosovo, highway political leadership is uncontested, more security was a crucial early result to support focused approaches to building coalitions increased trade, and hence employment.14 between the ruling party and key stakehold- In Liberia, basic improvements in security, ers whose support is needed, such as subna- electricity, and action against corruption tional leaders, civil society, the military, and were crucial in restoring confidence.15 In Af- business interests, can be inclusive-enough ghanistan16 and in the Democratic Republic to create momentum for change. Where the of Congo,17 reopening key transit routes for engagement of external partners—investors, imports and exports through linked secur- donors, diplomatic partners, neighboring ity and development efforts increased sup- countries—can provide additional support plies in the capitals and lowered producer or help manage external stresses, signals prices. In Chile and Argentina, responsible that build their confidence become more macroeconomic management, social pro- important. (Box 8.1 contrasts the experi- tection, and initiation of transitional justice ences of Colombia and South Africa in ini- measures helped restore confidence follow- tial confidence-building and constructing of ing transitions from military rule. inclusive-enough coalitions.) The choice of early results and how they Two trade-offs to be decided within each are delivered is important because it sets in- country context with regard to using inclu- centives for later institution-building. For sion strategies to build confidence are inclu- example, if services and public works are sion versus justice for perpetrators of past delivered only through national, top-down abuses and inclusion versus efficiency. With programs and social protection only through regard to inclusiveness and justice for groups, international humanitarian aid, communi- country experiences indicate that groups may ties have few incentives to take responsibility be legitimately excluded from political dia- for violence prevention; neither do national logue where there is an evolving belief among institutions have incentives to take on the re- the population that they have sacrificed their sponsibility for protecting all vulnerable citi- right to participate due to past abuses, as the zens. Using partnerships in delivering early FARC were excluded from political talks in results with civil society, communities, faith- Colombia. But that exclusion can pose dan- based organizations or the private sector has gers when it is driven by international op- two benefits: it expands the range of capac- position to engagement by groups that have 254 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 BOX 8.1 Confidence-building in South Africa, 1990–94, and Colombia, 2002 onward Types of violence: Both countries had faced long-standing civil conflict and high levels of criminal violence. Transition opportunity: South Africa faced a more fundamental Key stakeholders: In South Africa, key stakeholders for the transition in the run-up 1994 election and the end of apartheid. two main protagonists, the ruling National Party (NP) and the Before its 2002 election, Colombia faced a sense of rising crisis African National Congress (ANC), were their own members and due to failed peace talks and growing violence, but initially had allied constituencies, Inkatha and other smaller parties, security less space for major institutional change. forces, domestic and international businesses, and neighboring states. In Colombia, before and during the presidential election, key stakeholders in setting a new direction were the ruling party, businesses, the military, and some civil society groups. Key stresses: South Africa’s stresses were primarily internal: Institutional challenges: Both countries had relatively high huge inequities between black and white citizens; ethnic capacity, but low accountability in state institutions, as well as tensions; high unemployment. Colombia faced high internal low social cohesion. social inequity, but also external stresses from organized crime networks. South Africa In South Africa, inclusive-enough coalition-building in the run-up to the 1994 election meant involving all political parties and civil society in discussions over the country’s future, although the ANC maintained a hierarchy in which it led decision making among other ANC Alliance and United Democratic Front members. In Colombia, an inclusive-enough coalition to implement the new government’s Democratic Security Policy did not include all parties: FARC rebels were automatically excluded since they were not recognized by the Colombian government as a political organization. The ruling party instead galvanized support from the military; most business orga- nizations; and some civil society groups, who were also instrumental in leading popular protests demanding action on security; as well as community leaders in violence-affected areas. Business groups were important in supporting the new government’s wealth tax, which provided an important source of finance for the Democratic Security Policy. In both countries, the main protagonists sent signals to demonstrate a break with the past. In South Africa, this involved a move within the ANC to adopt an inclusive approach to other parties and interests and a move by the National Party from discourse over group rights to discourse over individual rights—immediate actions such as the ANC’s unilateral suspension of armed struggle and the National Party’s decision to release Nelson Mandela and unban the ANC, Communist Party, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO); and announcements on future policy, such as the creation of provincial governments to provide oppor- tunities for power for the smaller parties, job security for white civil servants, and free maternal and child health care for the broader population. Colombia In Colombia, the use of the word “democratic” in describing security approaches was intended to show that future policy would not involve the human rights abuses that had been common in the past in Colombia and other Latin American countries. Redeployment of military forces to protect civilian road transit and budget increases to the military were designed to foster business, military, and popu- lar support. In South Africa, however, announcements about future policy went much further than Colombia in the commitments of the Reconstruction and Development Program to social and institutional transformation, reflecting the political background of the ANC Alliance as well as the greater space for change at the time of the transition. In both countries, the degree to which these initial signals have been maintained in the longer term is still a subject of debate, but they were undoubtedly important in mobilizing support. Leaders in each country used different types of commitment mechanisms to provide guarantees that policy announcements would not be reversed: broad mechanisms for transitional decision making, constitutional and legal change, and electoral monitoring in South Africa, reflecting more inclusive coalition-building; and narrower mechanisms in Colombia to ensure cooperation between the military and civilian agencies, such as the creation of a new coordination framework, Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI), reporting to the President. Sources: South Africa: WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa, 2010; Eades 1999; Piron and Curran 2005; Roque and others 2010. Colombia: Arboleda 2010; Guerrero 1999; Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral 2010; WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010; WDR interview with former president Álvaro Uribe, 2010. Practical country directions and options 255 strong local support. Transitional justice They are deliberately kept small in number processes can and often should form part of to reflect country lessons on the priority a dialogue on new directions, but inclusion areas of citizen security, justice, and jobs. strategies can change over time as it becomes These basic program tools are designed to be possible to marginalize consistently abusive delivered in combination. Action on security groups, as with the Revolutionary United alone has not had a good track record in Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.18 delivering long-term results on the ground. With regard to the trade-off between in- Nor are economic programs sufficient on clusion and efficiency, the main question is their own to address problems of violence. how far to go. Exclusion of groups or regions Five common insights for program design from core coalitions has the risk of fostering can link rapid confidence-building to longer- resentment and generating pent-up pressure term institutional transformation. for later rounds of contestation and violence. But including everyone risks stretching col- Insight 1: Multisectoral community em- laborative decision-making capacity too far. powerment programs are important to This tension often takes specific form for build state-society relations from the bot- political leaders in broadening appointments tom up, as well as to deliver development to power through the creation of new senior improvements. Top-down programming posts and expanded participation in decision through the state can help build technical making, when these actions may also slow capacity, but may be misaligned with the the delivery of results. For national policy, process of forging and reforging trust in political parties and governments have been state institutions and in state-society rela- clear that there is a hierarchy of decision tions. Bottom-up program design works making—with many present at the table with community structures to identify and presenting views and engaged in action to deliver priorities for violence prevention. implement strategy, but with one body tak- The clearest signal is to entrust community ing final decisions. For local participatory structures with their own funds to identify decision making, the mere fact of engaging and deliver local activities, as with the Af- communities is often seen as a positive sig- ghanistan National Solidarity Program. A nal, which merits taking the time necessary second model, which can be combined with to gain local buy-in. community block grants, is for state agen- cies and NGOs working in concert to consult with community councils on their activities. Program approaches to link early Examples are the Latin American multisec- results to transforming institutions toral violence prevention programs, which combine community policing with access to Basic tools local justice and dispute resolution services, The way programs are designed must vary creating a safe physical environment (such as according to country circumstances, but ex- public trading spaces, transit); employment perience suggests a core set of basic program and vocational training; civic education; and tools, delivered at scale either nationally or social and cultural activities. Activities that subnationally, that can be adapted to differ- “recognize” community membership can be ent country contexts—from low to high in- an important part of this, through programs come and with different mixes of criminal as simple as registering births and life events. and political violence (table 8.3). These are programs based on the concept of building Insight 2: Prioritization of basic security a rhythm of repeated successes, linking regu- and justice reform programs has been part lar early results for confidence-building with of the core tools countries use to develop longer-term institutional transformation. resilience to violence. Community-based 256 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 TA B L E 8 . 3 Core tools for transforming institutions Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services Foundational reforms and “best-fit” approaches Security sector reform: Justice sector reform: Multisectoral community empowerment • Designed to deliver citizen security • Independence and links to security programs: Combining citizen security, employ- benefits reforms ment, justice, education, and infrastructure. • Capacity increases linked to repeated • Strengthening of basic caseload realistic performance outcomes and processing Employment programs: justice functions • Extending of justice services, drawing on • Regulatory simplification and infrastructure • Dismantling of criminal networks traditional/community mechanisms recovery for private sector job creation through civilian oversight, vetting, and • Long-term public programs budget expenditure transparency Phasing anti-corruption measures: • Asset expansion • Use of low-capital systems for rural and • Demonstration that national resources • Value-chain programs community policing can be used for public good before • Informal sector support dismantling rent systems • Labor migration • Control of capture of rents • Women’s economic empowerment • Use of social accountability mechanisms Humanitarian delivery and social protection: With planned transition from international provision Macroeconomic policy: Focus on consumer price volatility and employment Gradual, systematic programs • Phased capacity and accountability in • Political and electoral reform • Structural economic reforms such as specialized security functions • Decentralization privatization • Transitional justice • Education and health reforms • Comprehensive anti-corruption reforms • Inclusion of marginalized groups Source: WDR team. programs are important, but they cannot on nities exist to reintegrate former security their own deliver wider institutional change. force members into civilian life. Country The lessons from security and justice reform experiences that can provide insights in- programs are to focus on basic functions clude Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, that build trust and performance, such as the Chile, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mozam- following: bique, Nicaragua, and Sierra Leone. • Crucial early actions can include strength- • Linking security and justice reform is im- ening of civilian oversight of the security portant. One of the most common weak- forces alongside capacity increases; crimi- nesses in country experiences has been nal caseload processing in the courts; ad- increasing actions to reform security sys- equate basic investigation and arrest pro- tems without complementary action to cedures in policing; and vetting of budget reform justice systems. This causes several and expenditure transparency to disman- problems. First, increases in arrests by the tle covert or criminal networks across the security forces not processed by the courts security and criminal justice functions. result in either grievances over prolonged Budget and expenditure analysis and detention without due process or the re- strengthening of public finance processes lease of offenders back into the commu- in these areas form a part of early reforms. nity, as in the relatively successful police In some situations, tolerating an oversize reforms in Haiti in the 1990s and the security wage bill (as in South Africa’s 2000s.19 Second, where civilian justice sys- early reforms) is necessary until opportu- tems are absent in insecure areas, the mili- Practical country directions and options 257 tary and police will end up performing tive capacity, and complement programs justice and correction functions beyond with vocational training and life skills.22 their mandate and capacity—and perhaps • Easing the infrastructure constraints to result in abuses. private sector activity is important for • Security and justice reforms should go be- early results and longer-term labor- yond paper reforms, and reach into local intensive growth. Trade and transit in- communities. Extending access to the for- frastructure such as roads and ports can mal justice system in underserved areas be crucial for private sector activity, can help, as with mobile courts. The ca- but the number one constraint cited by pacity of formal justice systems to deal businesses in World Bank enterprise with local dispute resolution is often lim- surveys in violent areas is electricity.23 ited, however. Blending of formal and in- Approaches to restitute electricity capac- formal systems, such as Timor-Leste’s in- ity may involve programs that are fast, corporating traditional justice measures even while these are technically subopti- into the formal system;20 community para- mal in the early period, as in the experi- legals; and the use of nongovernmental ence of Lebanon and Liberia after the organization (NGO) capacity to support civil war.24 access to justice for the poor, as in Nicara- • Regulatory simplification, as in Bosnia gua and Sierra Leone, can help bridge this and Herzegovina’s removal of the bureau- divide. 21 cratic constraints to business activity, can gain business confidence.25 Simplification, Insight 3: Shifting back to basics on job cre- rather than the addition of complexity in ation goes beyond material benefits by pro- business regulation, is crucial to demon- viding a productive role and occupation for strating fast results and adapting to insti- youth. There is still debate over what works tutional capacity constraints. in generating jobs and widening economic stakes in prosperity—not only in fragile ar- • Investment in the value chain for labor- eas but worldwide in the wake of the global intensive sectors—bringing together pro- financial crisis. Because there is no consensus ducers, traders, and consumers—can sup- on the exact set of policies that can gener- port job creation and address links between ate employment—and even less so in envi- different regional, social, or ethnic groups ronments where insecurity is a constraint affected by violence, as in Rwanda’s invest- to trade and investment—program design ments in coffee and Kosovo’s in dairy.26 needs to draw from what is known about • Agriculture and informal sector jobs are pragmatic interventions that have worked. often viewed as second best in relation to The lessons here, drawing from the experi- the formal sector—but they often offer the ences in chapter 5, include the following: only realistic prospect for large-scale job creation. Support can include access to fi- • The role of jobs in violence prevention nance and training, sympathetic regula- argues for judicious public financing of tion, and basic market and transit infra- employment programs, as in India or In- structure. donesia. To ensure that these are com- patible with long-term job creation and • Asset expansion programs have helped in strengthening of social cohesion, it makes some successful transitions from vio- sense to deliver employment programs lence—such as land reform in the Repub- through community institutions, ensure lic of Korea and Japan and housing pro- that wages are set to avoid distorting pri- grams in Singapore.27 But they require the vate sector activities and programs, keep political capital to succeed in redistribu- the design simple to match administra- tion (in the Republic of Korea and Japan 258 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 the power of landowning classes had been ing countries with high levels of corruption considerably weakened) as well as consid- to eliminate it overnight, as it was for OECD erable public resources, access to private (Organisation for Economic Co-operation finance, and institutional capacity. Smaller and Development) societies to do so at ear- programs that provide transfers to vic- lier stages of their development. Moreover, tims of violence, such as Timor-Leste’s deep-rooted patronage systems are a way transfers to displaced people, provide a of holding together potentially violent situ- simpler model of asset expansion.28 ations, however imperfect, so dismantling them before other, more transparent institu- • Labor migration agreements also provide tions are embedded to take their place can an example of best-fit policies in some increase risk. However, high levels of corrup- circumstances: all countries would prefer tion increase the risks of violence, making to generate jobs at home, but where mas- action on corruption important. Two main sive youth unemployment exists, man- mechanisms emerge as realistic early mea- aged migration agreements that inform sures to improve controls over corruption in and protect workers are a good “best-fit” highly fragile situations: alternative.29 • The first is to prevent serious corruption Insight 4: Involving women in security, in major new concessions and contracts, justice, and economic empowerment pro- including those for natural resources, by grams can deliver results and support making processes more transparent and longer-term institutional change. While drawing on private sector audit and in- the pacing of involvement of women in re- spection capacity. forms will vary by local context, experience • The second is to use social accountabil- across regions and forms of violence shows ity mechanisms to monitor the use of the value of accelerating the involvement of funds—making budgets transparent and women. Given the large number of female- using community and civil society capac- headed households in violence-affected com- ity to monitor them, as with the use of lo- munities, women often engage in economic cal budget transparency in community- activities out of necessity. Targeting women’s driven programs. economic empowerment can be a core part of job creation programs, as in Nepal,30 and may have more lasting effects on women’s Managing trade-offs: Toward more status than national gender action plans. Re- systematic reform forms to increase female staffing and gender- The key trade-off in best-fit approaches that specific services in the security forces and link rapid confidence-building with longer- justice systems, as in Nicaragua, Liberia, and term institutional transformation is balanc- Sierra Leone, and a number of high-income ing their positive effects with their possible police forces facing urban violence have de- negative and distortionary effects. An over- livered good results.31 Involving women lead- sized security sector draws resources away ers in decision making in community-driven from other productive activities. Services programs can also shift attitudes toward provided by nongovernment groups or the gender—but as the Afghanistan example in private sector can be costly. Publicly funded chapter 5 shows, this takes time. employment, if badly designed, can draw people away from private sector work. Insight 5: Focused anti-corruption initia- Where best-fit approaches can have some tives demonstrating that new programs can costs that will exceed benefits once security, be well governed are crucial for credibility. state institutional capacity, and competitive This does not mean addressing all corrup- markets return to normal, it helps to design tion at once—it is as impossible for develop- a clear but flexible exit strategy. This can in- Practical country directions and options 259 volve the move from nongovernment to state longer terms—actual levels of insecurity; em- systems, or from informal to formal systems. ployment; access to justice; and differences Next, mitigate the negative consequences. in welfare and perceived welfare between eth- For example, labor migration agreements nic, religious, geographical, and social groups, can be accompanied by information and as shown in table 8.4. They would also cover protection for workers. And public action developments in trust, state society relations, to support employment can be designed to and institutional legitimacy. Governance in- avoid pressure on private sector recruitment dicators take time to shift—a useful short- by keeping wages at self-selecting levels and term measure is polling citizen perceptions using controls on incremental job creation of institutions, as Haiti did to measure early by employers. shifts in the performance of its police.33 Such Similar lessons apply to systematic but polling data are a regular part of govern- more gradual reform (see table 8.3). Mark- ment policy information in high-income and ing these areas as “systematic and gradual” many middle-income countries, but much does not mean they are unimportant—they less so in the lowest income fragile states, have played a big role in successful transi- where, arguably, they would be of most use to tions, from devolution in Northern Ireland policy-makers. to transitional justice and education reform As with the discussion of early results, it in South Africa and Germany.32 What they is important that progress indicators set the have in common, however, is that they in- right incentives for later institution-building. volve a complex web of institutions and so- For example, if security forces have targets cial norms. So, in most situations, systematic set based on the number of rebel combatants and gradual action appears to work best. killed or captured or criminals arrested, they may rely primarily on coercive approaches, and there would be no incentive to build Monitoring results longer-term trust with communities. Tar- National reformers and their international gets based on citizen security (freedom of partners in-country need efficient ways to movement and so on), by contrast, create monitor results from these programs, both to longer-term incentives for the role of the se- demonstrate successes and to create a feed- curity forces in underpinning effective state- back loop on areas that are lagging. The Mil- society relations. Similarly, if progress on lennium Development Goals (MDGs) have security, justice, and jobs is monitored only been crucial for shifting attention to poverty through indicators of access, there are fewer and social issues, and remain important long- incentives for state institutions to work with term goals even in the most fragile situations. communities in violence prevention and pay But they move too slowly to act as a feedback attention to citizen confidence that institu- loop for policy-makers—and they do not fo- tions are responsive to their needs. A mix of cus on citizen security, justice, or jobs. indicators that measure citizen perceptions Table 8.4 shows sample indicators for and security, justice, and employment out- measuring early results of programmatic in- comes to monitor progress can help address terventions. These outcome-oriented mea- both areas. sures will vary by country context, but could include, for example, freedom of movement Fitting program design to context along transit routes, electricity coverage, num- ber of businesses registered, and employment The idea of best-fit approaches has been used days created. These will not, however, provide throughout the WDR: rather than copying a more systematic picture of risk and prog- programs that have been used elsewhere, ress. Useful complementary indicators would adapting their design to local context can cover the areas most directly related to citizen ensure that they will deliver results within security, justice, and jobs over the short and local political dynamics. For example, while 260 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 TA B L E 8 . 4 Feasible indicators for results measurement Indicators Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services Sample program • Freedom of movement • Number of additional people • Coverage and representation in state and indicators: along transit routes with access to justice services community decision-making mechanisms Outcome-oriented (redeployment of (e.g., mobile courts, community (multisectoral community programs) results security forces, focus paralegals, traditional justice • Number of employment days and small on citizen security) systems) infrastructure or income-generating projects (sample associated • Decline in crime rate • Number of cases prosecuted/ produced (employment programs) program in statistics backlog (processing of judicial • Number of businesses registered and parentheses) caseloads) operating, including large, labor-intensive • Transparency of decision making businesses resuming operations in insecure and meeting of targets (publication areas (security, regulatory simplification, of budgets, expenditures, and infrastructure bottlenecks) audits) • Percentage of vulnerable groups reached with services and transfers through national institutions (community social protection, humanitarian aid, vaccination) • Electricity coverage/number of hours of blackouts • Reduction in level/volatility of consumer prices (macropolicy and/or infrastructure bottlenecks) Short-term • Number of violent • Perception surveys by groups • Perceptions of whether employment systematic deaths (ethnic, geographical, religious, opportunities are increasing monitoring of confi- • Perception survey data class) regarding whether their • Business confidence surveys dence in on trends in security welfare is increasing over time and institutions and trust in security in relation to others forces • Perception survey data regarding trust in national institutions, justice sector; and on corruption, nationally and by region and group Long-term • Victim surveys • Household survey data on vertical • Household data on employment and labor systematic and horizontal inequalities and force participation monitoring of access to justice services institutional • Governance indicators refocused transformation on degree of progress within historically realistic time frames Source: WDR team. multisectoral community approaches can Liberia and Mozambique, which both drew be effective in contexts as different as Côte on nongovernmental capacities to monitor d’Ivoire, Guatemala, and Northern Ireland, key functions. In Liberia, a history of funds specific stresses in Côte d’Ivoire and North- corrupted from natural resource extraction ern Ireland linked to geographical or re- sources, as well as concern over the risk of di- ligious divides makes it imperative for version of public funds following the Com- program designs to ensure that activities are prehensive Peace Agreement in 2003, argued seen not as targeted to one ethnic or religious for the use of intensive state–private sector group and instead build bonds between and state-international partnerships to pre- groups. Box 8.2 shows how the core tool vent a recurrence of corruption-fueled vio- of multisectoral state-community programs lence. In Mozambique, corruption had been has been adapted to different contexts. less of a divisive issue during the conflict, but Different types of stresses and institutional increases in trade linked to reconstruction challenges make a difference. Box 8.3 shows programs created new risks, for example, in an example of anti-corruption approaches in customs functions. Practical country directions and options 261 B OX 8.2 Adapting community-level program design to country context: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, and Rwanda The basic elements of community-based programs for violence prevention and recovery are simple and can be adapted to a broad range of country contexts. All community programs under state auspices consist, essentially, of a community decision- making mechanism to decide on priorities and the provision of funds and technical help to implement them. Within this model there is a great deal of variance that can be adapted to different types of stresses and institutional capacities, as well as to differ- ent opportunities for transition. Three important sources of variance are in how community decision-making is done, who con- trols the funds, and where programs sit within government. Different stresses and institutional capacities and accountability affect community decision-making. In many violent areas, preexisting community councils are either destroyed or were already discredited. A critical first step is to reestablish credible par- ticipatory forms of representation. In Burundi, for example, a local NGO organized elections for representative community devel- opment committees in the participating communes that cut across ethnic divides. Similarly, Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Pro- gram began with village-wide elections for a community development council. But Indonesia’s programs for the conflict-affected areas of Aceh, Kalimantan, Maluku, and Sulawesi did not include holding new community elections. Community councils were largely intact, and national laws already provided for local, democratic village elections. Indonesia also experimented with sepa- rating grants to Muslim and Christian villages to minimize intercommunal tensions, but eventually used common funds and councils to bridge divides between these communities. Different institutional challenges also affect who manages the funds. Programs must weigh the trade-offs between a first objective of building trust with the risks of money going missing and the elite capture of resources. Different approaches to pro- gram design to fit context include the following: • In Indonesia, where local capacity was fairly strong, subdistrict councils established financial management units that are routinely audited but have full responsibility for all aspects of financial performance. • In Burundi, lack of progress in overall decentralization and difficulties in monitoring funds through community structures meant that responsibility for managing the funds remained with the NGO partners. In Rwanda, by contrast, greater space for change after the genocide meant the councils could from the start be integrated into the government’s decentralization plans. • In Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, NGOs also took on the initial responsibility for managing the funds while coun- cils were trained in bookkeeping, but within a year, block grants were being transferred directly to the councils. • In Colombia, where the primary institutional challenges were to bring the state closer to communities and overcome distrust between security and civilian government agencies, funds are held by individual government ministries, but approvals for activities are made by multisectoral teams in consultation with communities. • In Nepal, community programs show the full range of design options, with some programs giving primary responsibility for fund oversight to partner NGOs, to their large-scale village school program, where community school committees are the legal owners of school facilities and can use government funds to hire and train their staff. • In Cambodia’s Seila program, councils were launched under UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) auspices and then moved into the government’s newly formed commune structure. The type of transition moment and governance environment also affects how community decision-making structures align with the formal government administration. Many countries emerging from conflict will also be undergoing major constitutional and administrative reforms, just as the early-response community programs are being launched. There may be tensions between national and local governance and power-holders at the center and the community. In Afghanistan, where center-periphery issues are a key driver of conflict, and where warlords are a continuing threat to stability, community-driven development (CDD) programs must be sensitive to national-local dynamics. Afghanistan’s Community Development Councils, though constituted under a 2007 vice presidential bylaw, are still under review for formal integration into the national administrative structure. In other settings of either prolonged crisis or in authoritarian systems, CDD programs can be designed to sustain human capi- tal and offer an avenue for local-level debate in the absence of national-level progress. CDD programs designed in environments with more limited space for change may rely more heavily on nongovernmental delivery of services, employing local workers for skill building and focusing on “neutral,” nonpolitical issues in community debates. Source: Guggenheim 2011. 262 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 8 .3 Anti-corruption approaches in Liberia and Mozambique Types of violence: Both countries had faced long-standing civil war. Transition opportunity: Both countries went Key stakeholders: Government, opposition through major transitions: peace agreements parties, civil society, and donors were important followed by electoral transitions. stakeholders relating to corruption issues in both countries: regional institutions played a higher- stake role in Liberia than in Mozambique on corruption-related issues. Key stresses: Corruption under the transitional Institutional challenges: Both countries had low- government in Liberia between 2002 and 2004 capacity state institutions and low state revenues, reached extremely high proportions, threatening with accountability problems greater in Liberia than progress in the peace agreement by denuding the in Mozambique. country’s large natural resources and potentially financing renewed electoral violence. Increasing trade in Mozambique created the potential for increased customs revenue—but also increased vulnerability to corruption. High unemployment and a legacy of regional and ethnic tensions were issues in both countries—with a commensurate need to attract investors and donor funds to supplement public finances. Both countries outsourced some key functions to the private sector and undertook additional monitoring to guard against corruption and increase revenues. The functions chosen and the nature of external moni- toring were different, however. Liberia focused on forestry inspections and natural resource concessions, reflecting the role of natural resource revenues in financing violence, while Mozambique focused on cus- toms as a source of additional revenue that was vulnerable to corruption. Liberia undertook, through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, “dual key” oversight by regional and international experts of major contracts and concessions. The African Union and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) were instrumental in reaching agreement on this arrangement, along with the international financial institutions, the UN, the United States, and the European Union, in recognition of the potential regional spillover effects of rising corruption. In its initial stages, this arrangement focused more on accountability than capacity transfer, reflecting the severe nature of corruption challenges at the time. More recently, the program has emphasized capacity transfer more strongly. Following the elections, the new government also contracted a private inspection company to build and operate a system to track all timber from the point of harvest through transport to sale. The system ensures the government collects all revenue because it will not issue an export permit until the Central Bank confirms that all taxes have been paid. In Mozambique, the government contracted a private company to run customs inspection functions and collect customs revenues. Both strategies delivered results, with domestic revenues rising and increased donor funds. Sources: Giovine and others 2010; Dwan and Bailey 2006; Jahr 2010; Government of the Republic of Liberia Execu- tive Mansion 2009; Hubbard 2005; Mosse 2007; De Wulf and Sokol 2004; Crown Agents 2007. External factors: Reducing external from trafficking and international corrup- stresses and mobilizing external tion. Many of these constraints on external support assistance and the management of exter- nal stresses are beyond the control of each Societies do not have the luxury of trans- nation-state to address. Chapter 9 considers forming their institutions in isolation—they possible directions for international policy in need at the same time to mobilize external these issues. National leaders and their inter- support for change and to manage external national partners at a country level can, how- pressures, whether from economic shocks or ever, help to mobilize external support and Practical country directions and options 263 galvanize cooperation programs to address lomatic signals, such as the visit of Sheikh shared stresses with external partners. Sharif of Somalia to the Government of Ethiopia in March 2010 immediately after his nomination as president or Timor-Leste’s Factoring in external stresses outreach to the Government of Indonesia, National development strategies rarely in- can all form an important part of the basic volve an assessment of potential external tools for restoration of confidence. stresses or collaborative action with others to Cross-border programs to link security address them—yet action on external stresses and development approaches can be initi- may be key to effective violence prevention. ated by national governments. An openness Regular assessment of risks and opportuni- to discussing both security and development ties, as described earlier should also include cooperation across insecure border regions, considering and planning for possible external based on shared goals of citizen security, stresses. One example is the potential security justice, and jobs, has the potential to deliver impacts of economic stresses, such as volatile results. Cooperation between China’s south- food prices. Another is increased insecurity of eastern provinces and neighboring ASEAN neighbors—how to mitigate, for example, the states under the Greater Mekong Subregion economic spillover of Somalia piracy on the initiative, while still with potential for expan- neighboring economies and fishing indus- sion, has addressed some of these issues.35 tries.34 Still others include, ironically, consid- EU member states have a range of models ering the impact of a successful action against to address cross-border cooperation: while trafficking or rebel groups on neighboring some may be appropriate only for advanced countries—for example, whether these ac- economic and institutional environments, tions will push insecurity over borders, as many involve subregions that were historically Colombia’s dismantling of drug cartels did underdeveloped and driven by conflict, either for Central America and Mexico. after World War II or more recently after the Actions to address external stresses can be Balkan War.36 Lessons from cross-border co- taken in security, justice, and developmen- operation in Europe appear to include the tal areas (table 8.5). Some of the actions to need to start with economic and social issues address potential external stresses and op- (including pooled administrative capacity portunities fall in the purely diplomatic and in universities), as well as shared actions on security sphere. (This Report does not at- border security and trafficking—while avoid- tempt to address these in detail, but it is clear ing actions that can cause political or cultural that they can be crucial for confidence- tensions, particularly those involving ethnic building with external stakeholders.) Bor- groups residing across borders. der cooperation, redeployment of troops to A promising form of bilateral coopera- signal non-interference or engagement in tion to address external stresses further afield shared security approaches, or simple dip- is to address the complex web of corruption TA B L E 8 . 5 Core tools—National action to address external stresses Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services • Border cooperation • Coordination of supply and • Pooled supplementary demand-side responses administrative capacity • Military, police, and financial intelligence • Joint investigations and • Cross-border development prosecutions across jurisdictions programming • Building of links between formal • Social protection to mitigate and informal systems global economic stresses 264 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 8 .4 Bilateral cooperation against corruption and money laundering in Haiti and Nigeria Key stresses: In both countries, corruption with international money-laundering links has undermined the capacity of national institutions to combat violence. Key stakeholders: Government, opposition parties, civil society, and donors were important stakeholders relating to corruption issues in Haiti, with the Unites States playing a particularly important role. Donors were less important in Nigeria, but civil society was much stronger than in Haiti. Institutional challenges: Political obstacles to prosecuting grand corruption were high in both countries. Capacity in the criminal justice system to prosecute complex corruption cases was present in Nigeria but absent in Haiti. Both countries developed links with the law enforcement institutions of other nations. Haiti’s government drew on capacity from the United States not only during the investigative phase but in the prosecution as well. In Nigeria, by contrast, local officials mainly drew on the investigative capacity of the United Kingdom to gather evidence to be used for convictions in Nigerian courts. Since former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fled into exile in 2004, successive Hai- tian governments have sought to recoup funds lost from a corrupt agreement with American telecommunications companies. According to the government, Haiti Teleco, Haiti’s state- owned telecom firm, had provided services at cut-rate prices to American providers in return for kickbacks to senior government officials and key Teleco staff. The case involved a complex scheme of favorable tariffs with kickbacks channeled through an intermediary’s offshore bank account. Proving it in a Haitian court would have been a challenge, given the absence of police and prosecutors with experience handling cases of sophisticated financial crime, and once the earthquake hit in January 2010 it would have been nigh impossible. In December 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice charged two former employees of Teleco who allegedly received kick- backs with money laundering offenses. In June 2010, one of the two was convicted and sen- tenced to four years in prison and ordered to pay US$1.8 million in restitution to the govern- ment of Haiti and forfeit another US$1.6 million. The second employee awaits trial. In Nigeria, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) worked closely with the U.K. Crown Prosecution Service and Scotland Yard to develop evidence against the corrupt governors of three Nigerian states. The EFCC alerted British authorities to the possibility that the governors were hiding the proceeds of corruption in London banks or real estate invest- ments. In one of the cases, the governor was prosecuted in the U.K. for money laundering; in the others, the evidence was used to prosecute them in Nigeria. Under the Nigerian consti- tution, state governors enjoy immunity while in office. In one instance, evidence developed by the U.K. criminal justice agencies was presented by a U.K. law enforcement official to a com- mittee of the state’s legislature, which voted to remove the governor from office, thus lifting his immunity and allowing him to be charged in Nigeria. During these investigations, the EFCC worked closely with U.K. officials and received on-the-job training. Source: Messick 2011. and money laundering through joint inves- can be differentiated for different environ- tigations or prosecutions. Where stronger ments, as in Haiti and Nigeria (box 8.4). jurisdictions pair with those with weaker in- stitutions, these initiatives have the potential Mobilizing international support to build capacity as well as deliver practical results in diminishing impunity. Investiga- Some constraints on international support tions and prosecutions involving trafficking come from policies and systems in the head- can increase this type of cooperation, which quarters of multilaterals and donor coun- Practical country directions and options 265 tries (chapter 9). National leaders and their An important trade-off for national re- partners on the ground cannot individually formers and their international partners is determine these broader changes to the in- to ensure that international delivery capac- ternational system, but they can act to maxi- ity can help deliver fast results while also mize the benefits of existing support. supporting increases in the legitimacy of It helps when national leaders and their national institutions. International humani- international partners in the field lay out tarian assistance, for example, not only can clear, program-level priorities across the se- save lives but also can help greatly in deliv- curity, justice, and development domains. ering quick confidence-building results. But Where national actors are divided in their humanitarian delivery of food imports can priorities (for example, with different min- also distort production in local markets, and istries putting forth different requests, or long-term international humanitarian pro- donor field representatives disagreeing on vision of health, education, and water and overall priorities), international capitals and sanitation services can undermine efforts the governing structures of multilaterals will to increase the credibility of local institu- not receive a clear message to focus efforts. tions. Much of this can be avoided through Priorities are better laid out in a very limited phased transitions from humanitarian ca- number of clear programs, as in Liberia after pacity to local institutions (box 8.5). Similar the civil war or Colombia in the face of ris- approaches can be used in other sectors: the ing criminal violence after 2002.37 Using the International Commission against Impunity national budget process to decide on prior- in Guatemala, for example, combines local ity programs creates leverage to coordinate judicial capacity-building with the use of messages and implementation between the international staff to assist in investigations security and development ministries. and prosecutions.38 The Governance and Being alert to the needs of international Economic Management Program in Liberia partners to show results and manage risks has shifted from an initial focus on interna- can also improve results from international tional executive support for accountability aid. International partners have their own over public resources to capacity-building in domestic pressures—such as demonstrat- national systems.39 ing that aid funds are not misused and being National reformers and their international able to attribute results to their endeavors. A partners in-country have a rich set of experi- frank exchange on risks and results helps to ences to draw on—both in evaluating efforts find ways to bridge differences. In Indone- in the past in their countries and in adapt- sia in the aftermath of the tsunami and Aceh ing experiences from around the world. The peace agreement, the government agreed with tools in this chapter offer options for this ad- donors that incoming assistance would be aptation. Confidence-building through col- “jointly branded” from the Indonesian Re- laborative approaches and early results and construction Agency and donors, with special the foundational reforms that can deliver cit- transparency measures in place. This enabled izen security, justice, and jobs have some ele- both sides to show visible results and manage ments in common. But they need to be well risks, while bolstering state-society relations adapted to the local political context. The in the aftermath of crisis. In donor coordina- task of national reformers and international tion arrangements for highly aid-dependent representatives in the field is made easier— countries, “double compacts,” described in or harder—by the supporting environments chapter 6, can be a useful tool. These agree- in global policy and in the headquarters of ments lay out the results governments aim to bilateral actors and the global institutions. provide to their own citizens as well as clarify Chapter 9 turns to directions for global pol- mutual commitments between governments icy to support countries struggling to prevent and donors. and recover from violence on the ground. 266 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 B OX 8 .5 Phasing the transition from international humanitarian aid to local institutions: Afghanistan and Timor-Leste Types of violence: Both countries have a history of external and civil conflict, with significant ongoing violence in Afghanistan and, in Timor, a more limited wave of renewed political and communal conflict and gang-based violence in 2005–06. Transition opportunities: Significant transitions occurred in both Key stakeholders: Government, civil society, and humanitarian countries: particularly significant was space for change under the and development donors were key stakeholders. UN transitional authority in Timor in 1999–2002. Institutional challenges: Limited service delivery, severe capacity constraints, many donor players were the major challenges. Timor-Leste Following the UN supervised referendum on independence of August 1999, Timor-Leste suffered widespread violence and destruction of its infrastructure and collapse of state services. In the transition period before and after independence in 2002, Timor-Leste man- aged, however, to provide both rapid results and long-term institution-building in the health sector in four phases. In the first phase international and national NGOs occupied a central role in providing emergency health services throughout Timor, independently funded through humanitarian assistance. In the second phase, the interim health authority established in 2000 developed a health plan and performance indicators and signed memoranda of understanding with NGOs to standardize the service packages provided in different parts of the territory still under independent humanitarian funding. In the third phase, NGOs were con- tracted directly by the transitional authority to perform both local management and service delivery functions. In the fourth phase, the Interim Health Authority was replaced by a new ministry of health, which assumed district management of the system and facilities, with NGOs important in specialized service delivery and a capacity-building role, but decreased local personnel over time. All the major international agencies in the health sector worked together within this framework. By 2004 this gradual phasing of responsibility and capacity-building had led to 90 percent of the population having access to health facilities within a two-hour walking distance. Between 2000 and 2004, the use of these facilities rose from 0.75 outpatient visits per capita to 2.13. The health ministry and district operations were among the few state functions resilient to renewed violence in 2005–06, continuing to operate and, indeed, to provide assistance to the displaced population. Afghanistan In the wake of the fall of the Taliban in 2002, Afghanistan’s basic health services were in a dismal condition, with maternal mortality estimated at 1,600 per 100,000 live births. The Afghan ministry of public health outlined a package of priority health services in response (costing about US$4 per capita per year) and contracted NGOs to deliver them, while also establishing rigorous monitoring and evaluation. The NGOs were selected competitively and sanctioned for poor performance. Early results have been optimistic, with a 136 percent increase in the number of functioning primary health care facilities between 2002 and 2007. Despite a worsening security situation, the number of outpatient visits between 2004 and 2007 also increased by nearly 400 percent. These outcomes have relied not only on political support but also on a commitment by the ministry of public health not to micromanage the process. By contracting autonomously operating NGOs while ensuring accountability, the Afghan government both earned and sustained policy leadership in the health sector. It allowed the ministry of public health to address scarce human resources, a lack of physical facilities, and logistical hurdles. The depth of ongoing violence in Afghanistan has not permitted national institutions to assume the role played by NGOs over time, as in Timor-Leste, but the Afghan government and ministry of public health have still managed to achieve much needed health outcomes in an uncertain environment dominated by insecurity and institutional challenges. Sources: Baird 2010; Rohland and Cliffe 2002; Tulloch and others 2003. Notes 1. WDR Consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa, 2010; WDR team interview with former president Álvaro Uribe, 2010; WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organizations, and secu- rity personnel in Colombia, 2010. 2. Arboleda 2010; WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil soci- ety organizations, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010. 3. Porter and Rab 2010. 4. For more in-depth discussion, see the section on delivering early results in chapter 4. Practical country directions and options 267 5. Barron and Burke 2008; World Bank 2010a. 6. Dwan and Bailey 2006; Jahr 2010; Government of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009. Also see box 4.3 in chapter 4. 7. CICIG 2009; Férnandez 2010; Donovan 2008; UN 2006a; Hudson 2010. Also see box 6.4 in chapter 6. 8. Braud and Grevi 2005; Schulze 2007. Also see feature 4 in chapter 4. 9. See section on support to building inclusive-enough coalitions in chapter 6. 10. See UNODC 2010a; Duffield 2000; Kohlmann 2004. Also see the section on spillover effects of violence and feature 1 in chapter 1. 11. Robinson 1994; Kingah and Kingah 2010. 12. Salazar 2007; Murphy 2008; Bronstein 2007. 13. For more information, see the section on delivering early results in chapter 4. 14. Cousens and Harland 2006; Statistical Office of Kosovo 2010; Chesterman 2004. Also see box 4.7 in chapter 4. 15. Dwan and Bailey 2006; Jahr 2010; Government of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009; Baily and Hoskins 2007. Also see box 4.3 and box 4.6 in chapter 4. 16. BBC News 2010. 17. World Bank 2011a. 18. Dupuy and Binningsbø 2008. Also see discussion on inclusive-enough coalitions in chapter 4. 19. UNDPKO 2010a. Also see box 4.5 in chapter 4. 20. Graydon 2005; Greenfell 2006; Timor-Leste Independent Comprehensive Need Assessment Team 2009. 21. For Nicaragua, see Scheye 2009. For Sierra Leone, see Dale 2009. Also see the section on justice in chapter 5 for more in-depth discussion. 22. Lamb and Dye 2009; Tajima 2009; see section on public finance for employment in chapter 5 for in-depth discussion. 23. World Bank 2010d. 24. For Lebanon, see World Bank 2008f, 2009d; Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Environment 1999, box 5.9 in chapter 5. For Liberia, see Bailey and Hoskins 2007; McCandless 2008, box 4.6 in chapter 4; box 6.5 in chapter 6. 25. Herzberg 2004. Also see section on jobs in chapter 5. 26. USAID Rwanda 2006; Grygiel 2007; Parker 2008; Chohan-Pole 2010; Boudreaux 2010. Also see box 5.8 in chapter 5. 27. For Japanese land reforms, see Kawagoe 1999; For broader statebuilding experience in Japan, see Tsunekawa and Yoshida 2010; For Korean land reforms, see Shin 2006. For Singapore, see box 5.2 in chapter 5. 28. Lopes 2009. 29. World Bank 2006b; Kireyev 2006; Economic Times 2008. Also see section on public finance for employment in chapter 5. 30. Ashe and Parrott 2001. Also see box 5.10 in chapter 5. 31. Mobekk 2010; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. Also see section on security in chapter 5 for more information. 32. For Northern Ireland, see Barron and others 2010. Also see the section on decentralization and devolution in chapter 5. For South Africa, see Hayner 2010; UNOHCHR 2006. For Germany, see Grimm 2010. Also see the section titled “Transitional justice to recognize past crimes” in chapter 5. 33. UNDPKO 2010a. Also see box 5.5 in chapter 5. 34. Bowden 2010; Gilpin 2009. Also see section on spillover effects of violence in chapter 1. 35. World Bank 2006d. See section titled “Between the global and the national: Regional stresses, regional support” in chapter 7. 36. Greta and Lewandowski 2010; Otocan 2010; Council of Europe 1995; Council of Europe and Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia 2003; Bilcik and others 2000. Also see box 7.11 in chapter 7. 37. Liberia: Giovine and others 2010; box 4.6 in chapter 4. Colombia: WDR team interview with for- mer president Álvaro Uribe, 2010; WDR team consultation with government officials, representa- tives from civil society organizations, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010. 38. CICIG 2009; Férnandez 2010; Donovan 2008; UN 2006a; Hudson 2010. Also see box 6.4 in chapter 6. 39. Dwan and Bailey 2006; Jahr 2010; Government of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009. Also see box 4.3 in chapter 4. C hapter 9 sets out new directions for international policy. International assistance to strengthen the national institu- tions and governance that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs, and to alleviate the factors that undermine them, is crucial to break the repeated cycles of violence described in this Report. But it requires an international system better adapted to address 21st-century risks of violence. This means refocusing assistance on preventing criminal and political violence through greater, and more integrated, support for security, justice, and jobs; reforming the procedures of international agencies; responding at a regional level; and renewing cooperative efforts among lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries. EXTERNAL STRESS CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS CHAPTER 9 VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES New directions for international support T he international system achieved support the core institutional challenges for remarkable progress in reducing violence prevention—citizen security, justice, 20th-century violence. The overall and jobs. Internal agency processes are often decrease in interstate war owes a too slow to support confidence-building and great deal to the establishment and growth of too quick to exit, inadequately engaged with an international architecture after World War building national institutions, and preoccu- II that viewed peace and prosperity as linked pied with technical “best practice” rather and embodied shared global standards and than functionality adapted to the local politi- new methods of collective action to address cal context. Divisions between diplomatic, threats. The adaptation of that system at the security, and development agencies, and be- end of the Cold War provided new tools that tween those initiatives dealing with political contributed to a subsequent reduction in the conflict and criminal violence, persist, de- number and severity of civil wars. This Re- spite the practical links on the ground be- port stresses that progress in overcoming vio- tween these issues. Efforts are targeted more lence and reducing risk is above all a national at the national than the regional level, and process and that national actors need to own global initiatives on corruption and traffick- their institutional transformation. Yet many ing lack robust tools to “follow the money” of the national responses analyzed in part 2 across fragile jurisdictions. A focus on smarter of this Report, “Lessons from National and assistance tools is particularly urgent given International Responses,” were achieved with the current environment of constraints on international support. It is difficult to imag- aid budgets. ine how committed leaders in post–World The changing international balance of War II Europe, Indonesia, the Republic of power is also widening the circle of influ- Korea, Liberia, Mozambique, Northern Ire- ential actors. With the rising economic and land, Singapore, or Timor-Leste would have diplomatic influence of lower- and middle- stabilized their countries or regions without income countries, the focus of influence on help from abroad. national action is shifting. Middle-income The international system is hampered, countries, many with a history of solidarity however, by structures and processes that are support and increasing aid programs, are not sufficiently adapted to the current chal- taking on greater responsibilities for shaping lenge as described in chapters 6 and 7. There outcomes beyond their borders. And regional is relatively little capacity internationally to institutions are playing a larger role. In fragile 270 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 situations, the different domestic pressures mala or Yemen. Repeated cycles of political faced by OECD (Organisation for Economic and criminal violence require thinking out- Co-operation and Development) donors, re- side the box, beyond the traditional develop- cipient countries, and middle-income coun- ment paradigm. Issues of citizen security are tries—the “dual accountability dilemma” of not peripheral to “mainstream” development. accountability pressures both to domestic They are in varying forms a problem for sub- constituencies and shareholders and to the national areas of larger and more prosperous leaders and citizens of recipient states de- countries, for countries emerging from con- scribed in chapter 6—often means that their flict that need to prevent recurrence, and for view on priorities and what is reasonable to areas facing new or resurgent threats. More expect of national actors are divided. effective international support to risk reduc- Taken together, these constraints mean tion requires (1) combined tools that link that international assistance is not yet mar- citizen security, justice, jobs, and associated shaling the resources needed to address the services, and (2) structural investments in 21st-century challenges of repeated and in- justice and employment capacity. terlinked violence and weak governance. To achieve real change in approaches, this Re- Operational gaps in capacity— port considers four tracks to improve global New tools for combined action responses for security and development. International actors increasingly recognize • Track 1: Preventing repeated cycles of vio- that development and security march hand lence by investing in citizen security, jus- in hand. But most international instruments tice, and jobs do not. The basic tools presented in chapter • Track 2: Reforming internal agency sys- 8 to prevent repeated cycles of violence re- tems to support rapid action to restore quire linked action from political, security, confidence and long-term institution- development, and humanitarian actors. Yet building these actors generally assess priorities and develop their programs separately, with ef- • Track 3: Acting regionally and globally on forts to help national reformers build uni- external stresses fied programs being the exception rather • Track 4: Marshaling experience and sup- than the rule. United Nations (UN) “inte- port from lower-, middle-, and higher- grated missions” and various bilateral and income countries and global and re- regional “whole-of-government” initiatives gional institutions to reflect the changing have emerged to address the challenge of landscape of international policy and merging development, diplomatic, and se- assistance. curity strategies and operations. But these models still struggle with the reality that different disciplines bring with them differ- Track 1: Preventing repeated cycles ent goals, business models, planning time of violence by investing in citizen frames, decision-making processes, funding security, justice, and jobs streams, and risk calculus. Action has often stopped at the level of light “coordination” The demand for international support that rather than moving toward programs that can help areas struggling to prevent large- combine efforts on the ground.1 scale political or criminal violence is high. The range of practical experience available Prevention does not mean only the preven- in the international system in supporting in- tion of new violence in hitherto peaceful tegrated approaches to prevent repeated cy- areas, but reducing the risk of recurring cles of violence has improved. There has been violence in countries that have already ex- an increase in global and regional mediation, perienced past cycles, for example, Guate- a greater focus on security-sector reform, New directions for international support 271 an increase in police capacity-building, and again moving beyond mere “coordination.” strengthening of links between peacekeep- For in-country management, much inter- ing and civilian assistance. Some innovative national action remains stuck, aptly char- programs have been developed, such as the acterized by the adage, “everyone wants to “peace infrastructure” supported by the UN coordinate but no one wants to be coordi- Development Programme (UNDP) and De- nated.” In this case, the Report suggests us- partment of Political Affairs (UNDPA),2 the ing the principle of subsidiarity: the closer to Inter-American Development Bank’s (IADB) violence, the better the understanding of the community projects for citizen security, and local priorities and the more effectively the collaboration on safe transit between the combined management can operate. In gen- World Bank and UN peacekeeping missions. eral, this would mean empowering national Such initiatives often support combined ac- leadership in the coordination of assistance tion relating to citizen security, justice, and and ensuring that they have the support to jobs, but they are not yet in the mainstream do this. In others, thinking about subsidiarity of diplomatic, security, or development im- may mean empowering regional institutions plementation on the ground. to supplement national governments’ coor- A different way of doing business is dinating role. needed. There is a need to move away from Where national coordinating mechanisms simply tweaking current practices toward lack sufficient authority or capacity to influ- a fundamentally new practical set of tools ence the more powerful international actors, to link development and security, develop- joint global-local or global-regional-local ment and mediation, and development and leadership could improve confidence and humanitarian assistance. New tools should traction. The Association of Southeast Asian aim to have a catalytic effect in supporting Nations (ASEAN), the UN, and the Myan- confidence-building and longer-term insti- mar Government Tripartite Core Group after tutional transformation. Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar is one example, The key lessons from country experi- and the Bosnia Board of Principals3 structure ences of international assistance are that four involving international partners and senior types of programs requiring combined ef- government officials is a second. Where re- forts by development, security, political, and gional or UN special representatives are given humanitarian actors are needed in insecure the task of coordination, the World Bank situations (table 9.1). These would be the top could consider coordinating the work of its priority operational tools for international field representatives more closely behind their partners to target combined action on the leadership—with a clear lead on resource mo- ground. The development of a specialized bilization supporting the political convening suite of catalytic products deliverable at scale role of the UN or regional organizations. nationally or subnationally would enhance the ability of international agencies to re- Structural gaps in capacity— spond effectively to government requests for justice and jobs assistance in preventing repeated cycles of violence. Amongst the member states of the As argued throughout this Report, the insti- multilateral organizations, greater coherence tutions that provide citizen security, justice, and consistency in the positions they take in and jobs are crucial in creating resilience multilateral governance bodies would help to repeated cycles of violence. Unfortunately, foster such combined operations. these priority areas are underresourced and lack ownership in the current international architecture. In each area, there are structural Principles for combined operations gaps in knowledge and operational capac- Shared principles for the management of ity. Economic policy assistance still tends to combined operations are also necessary— be focused more on growth than employ- 272 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 T A B L E 9.1 International tools to link confidence-building and institutional transformation across the political, security, development, and humanitarian spheres Risk and opportunity A shift from early warning to contingency planning for repeated cycles of violence. While agency and academic models assessments of early warning continue to make useful progress, no such model can ever predict the exact timing of the onset of violence or capture all local variations. More useful is a mode of planning that accepts as a starting point that states and subnational areas with weak institutions continually risk being overwhelmed by a range of stresses. Changes to planning and assessment tools as a basis for combined action. To adapt to the reality of repeated cycles of violence and multiple transitions, assessment processes would become lighter and more flexible to provide regular, repeated assessments of risks and opportunities. The assessments would benefit from more realism in priorities and timelines; stronger political economy analysis; and a tighter focus on the goals of citizen security, justice, and jobs. Security, justice, and Technical assistance and financing for multisectoral community programs that involve policing and justice as well as jobs development activities. These efforts can build on initiatives in Latin America and Africa to provide local dispute resolution and justice services, community policing, employment and training, safe public and trading spaces, and social and cultural programs that promote tolerance. Combined technical teams and financing to support the strategic, technical, and public financing aspects of institutional reforms in the security and justice sectors—with economic, governance, and public finance specialists complementing the efforts of security, police, and judicial personnel. These efforts would build on the insights presented in this Report, focusing on basic functions to build trust and performance (including budget and expenditure functions); connections between the police, civilian justice, and corrections systems; and access to justice services at a local level, including through the blending of formal and informal systems. Links to sustained Supporting of national and local capacities for mediation and coalition-building. Countries facing rapid transitions and mediation cycles of violence will need to negotiate new internal pacts, and build consensus, around effective policies to address their many challenges. These negotiations will in turn require that the parties have access to internal mediators, and to their own skills and autonomous platforms, for dialogue and for the resolution of conflicts. By helping build and apply such capacities, development assistance has already contributed to peaceful elections, for instance, in several cases since 2004, and most recently during the constitutional referendum in Kenya in 2010. Further development of national and local capacities for managing cyclical conflict, cascading change, and rapid transitions is therefore not only essential, but also feasible. Supporting of expertise for international mediation. For these efforts to deliver sustained results, they should be linked to the developmental assistance that can provide confidence-building and institutional transformation and should be available to governments for the longer term. Seconding increased expertise from bilateral agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) to UN regional and civil society special envoys and mediators would help bridge gaps in political, security, and economic support. Developmental help during mounting crises. Countries struggling to prevent escalation of criminal and political violence often need timely financial help, although this can be met in part by improving the predictability of funding for mediation, initiating planned development support, and focusing security or development activities on localities with rising threats. Where exceptional additional financial support is needed (for example, in situations of high external stress and weak institutions), the responsible leadership of national reformers can be gauged by the signals they are prepared to give—for example, they might welcome international access to violence-affected areas and transparent reporting of budget and expenditure data under the auspices of an accepted regional prevention plan (see box 9.1 on investment in prevention). Humanitarian Guidelines on phasing humanitarian assistance to build national institutional capacity over time. Where national support to national institutional capacity and governance are improving, guidelines build on good practice by the UNDP, UNICEF (UN institution-building Children’s Fund), WHO (World Health Organization), WFP (World Food Programme), and many nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners in combining humanitarian services delivery with capacity-building. Timelines for phasing the transition from international humanitarian assistance to national institutional capacity will vary by country. A strengthened framework under which international humanitarian assistance can be “jointly branded” with local institu- tions, or in-kind assistance of humanitarian materials and staff provided to support state social protection operations, with appropriate monitoring. Where this is not possible, increased use of community-driven mechanisms and local staff to deliver humanitarian aid would help to build resilient local capacities. New directions for international support 273 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 9.1 Preventing violence: Prioritizing investment in citizen security and justice reforms Investment in prevention Kenzo Oshima, Senior Vice President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Former Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations; WDR Advisory Council Member The vital importance of conflict prevention has been under- such as African Union (AU), ASEAN, and Economic Community stood for many years, and advocates have argued passion- of West African States (ECOWAS). My profound hope is that ately for it. When Article 1 of the United Nations Charter was WDR 2011 will convince these stakeholders that collaboration written, however, enshrining a mandate “to take effective on investment in conflict prevention is urgently needed. collective measures for the prevention and removal of While the UN Security Council retains the primary author- threats to the peace,” the main focus of concern was inter- ity under international law for the prevention of armed con- state war. Since then, the nature of armed conflict has flict, others can play vital roles. This includes, vitally, national changed. Although for many years we were unaware of the governments themselves, who ultimately have the primary magnitude, there has been a significant shift from interstate responsibility to manage violence. These actors are all present to intrastate conflict and then from “classic” civil war to in the country-specific meetings of the UN Peacebuilding mixed problems of criminal and political violence, demand- Commission (PBC), which was established in 2005 following ing a concomitant shift in our prevention focus. on the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s High- The case of Afghanistan exemplifies the consequences Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. However, of this unawareness. After the Soviet withdrawal, the inter- while the two tasks were suggested for it by the High-Level national community was largely oblivious to ongoing inter- Panel, one focusing on response to the soaring risk of fresh nal struggles. Then, in the early 2000s, that “forgotten con- conflicts—“to help states avoid collapse and the slide to flict” became a serious global security threat. Our capacity war”—was omitted from its core functions. In the face of this internationally to foresee the risk that a particular country limitation, the 2010 review of UN peacebuilding architecture, might fall into conflict and to mitigate that risk in a timely while recognizing the narrowness of the mandate, recom- manner has been weak and that weakness has contributed mends that the Commission utilize to the fullest the potential to our failure to prevent conflicts from happening. given by its existing mandate to expand its prevention role. It is important that the international community find Whether through this route or otherwise, the fact remains a better way to coordinate, through mechanisms that that linking political, security and economic actors is a critical include not only UN agencies, but also international finan- part of how the international system can better help countries cial institutions and regional/sub-regional organizations prevent new threats of conflict and other forms of violence. Security and justice as foundational reforms: Addressing violence and criminality Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations; WDR Advisory Council Member War creates crime; and I do not mean the atrocity crimes we and in many cases it would be too weak to do so, the interna- commonly associate with war; rather, I refer to the appear- tional community must then do it with them. It must supply ance of its oldest companion and practitioner: the war prof- doctrine for international policing and criminal justice support iteer. The smuggler of weapons, of fuel, of vehicles and nar- operations, as well as fast and flexible executive assistance to cotics, in war, will often bind with others to create networks help Governments carry out police and judicial functions as of black market activity so efficient that, by the time a peace well as the corrections facilities. And that is all. Nothing more is struck, their potency means they not only survive the war need be done. intact, supremely well-organized, but also they do so with With security and a functioning judicial system in place, a momentum. country recovering from war could hope to maintain the low- A newly formed government in the affected country est levels of public corruption, indeed, extinguish organized could only hope to match them, indeed overcome or defeat crime altogether, and be ready to embrace the in-flow of for- them in the long term, if two early conditions are fulfilled— eign direct investment (FDI) and other forms of financial assis- with vital action by the international community itself. tance. Should we fail to grasp just how fundamental security The target country must first be provided with security and justice are to the whole enterprise of peacebuilding, the assistance, and then must be in a position to deliver an sole beneficiaries of our inattentiveness, and much to their effective judicial system to its people, including police and delight—will continue to be organized crime—the very off- corrections. If the nascent government cannot do the latter, spring of war itself. 274 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 ment, despite rising demands for assistance young entrants to the labor market may take on employment policy from countries fac- a generation in many fragile situations, there ing fragile situations due to unemployed is a need to simultaneously support and eval- and disengaged youth populations. Assis- uate transitional employment measures. tance to countries struggling to develop well- Efforts to strengthen international sup- governed police forces, civilian justice, and port to employment should draw on joint corrections systems in the face of fluid violent security, justice, and economic tools. Unem- threats is much more limited than assistance ployment is traditionally viewed as simply available to build military capacity, and there a function of economic conditions. But in is a disconnect between the policing and civil- highly insecure areas, international security ian justice areas. The section below provides assistance can help ensure safe trade and recommendations to address gaps in support transit, enabling productive investment from for employment and the rule of law. within and outside the country. For violence prevention, there are also links between em- ployment, justice, and identity issues. Pro- Employment grams that reinforce the role of disengaged As described in chapters 5 and 8, there is little youth as community members and support consensus on the exact set of policies that can job creation with social and cultural activities generate sustained labor-intensive growth in merit investment and further evaluation. the face of high unemployment, and even less These approaches would help. But there is so in violent environments. What we have likely to be continued pressure from large un- available is a series of “good fit” examples of employed youth populations unless a more policies and programs that appear to have significant international effort is launched. A delivered results in creating employment in bolder approach could draw together capaci- different country circumstances. At the inter- ties from development agencies, the private national level, better evaluation of these pro- sector, foundations, and nongovernmen- gram interventions and the macroeconomic tal organizations (NGOs) to support a new environment in which they can deliver is an global partnership to galvanize investments important priority. in countries and communities where high At the national level, leaders cannot wait unemployment and social disengagement for a more comprehensive international con- contribute to the risks of conflict. Focusing sensus on employment policies to evolve— primarily on job creation through project they need to address the challenges of youth finance, advisory support to small and me- unemployment in insecure areas now, based dium businesses, training, and guarantees, on the tools they have available. A sensible ap- the initiative would also support social and proach would be to support the types of pro- cultural initiatives that promote collaborative grams described in chapter 8, combined with capacities in communities, social tolerance, evaluations and feedback loops that provide and recognition of young people’s social and information to refine policies and program economic roles. Private sector capacities to design. draw on include large companies that trade Priority programs for job creation to and invest in insecure areas (creating links which this approach should be applied in- with local entrepreneurs), as well as technol- clude investments in supporting infrastruc- ogy companies that can assist with connec- ture, in particular, electricity and transit. A tivity and training in remote insecure areas. second program cluster is those that invest in skills; develop links among producers, trad- Police and justice ers, and consumers; and expand access to finance and assets. Last, recognizing that pri- To fill the rising demand for assistance with vate sector–led growth sufficient to absorb criminal justice issues, systems to provide New directions for international support 275 support for police and justice should be forts to develop rosters of civilian expertise, flexible. This, in three senses. First, some the availability of justice professionals and states have adequate police capacity but face administrators should continue to receive gaps in other aspects of their civilian justice particular attention—but with a focus on ca- systems—or the gaps are in police capac- pacity from the South that can provide expe- ity, not in justice systems. Others have gaps rience of reform of weak systems in difficult across the board. Second, some will need as- environments of political contest. sistance as part of a broader package of con- Police and justice personnel must also be flict management support, often under UN deployed with appropriate training. In both Security Council or regional institution aus- policing and broader civilian justice, national pices. Others will need specialized assistance systems differ greatly in their organizational to strengthen their police and civilian justice structures, legal frameworks, and practices, sectors without broader political engagement. far more so than for military capacity. As Third, some will prefer assistance from within described in chapter 6, the UN’s Standing the region, while others will prefer to look Police Capacity and its Office of Rule of Law to global mechanisms. Any effort to deepen and Security Institutions have begun to make international capacity to provide assistance headway on standardized doctrine and train- should build in this flexibility of response. ing for police units willing to deploy into UN That assistance should also be available to operations. But there is no similar mechanism help national authorities deal with specialized for joint training of national judicial person- transboundary challenges—from financial nel to expose them to different systems and crimes to trafficking issues. These specialized practices, and less of a body of knowledge challenges will be covered in the next section. on approaching institution-building in frag- The starting point for improving the ile settings. Extending training in both areas international response to criminal justice through global and regional centers would capacity-building is increasing the supply of improve the impact of additional person- personnel. National governments, both high nel capacity. Within bilateral assistance pro- and middle income, could usefully invest (or grams, long-term institutional partnerships continue to invest) in increasing the pool of between agencies providing technical assis- police and other criminal justice personnel tance and national counterpart agencies may available for overseas deployment, whether be another mechanism to strengthen the sen- through bilateral or multilateral programs. sitivity of assistance to the local context. There are three main options available to As with employment, combined secu- increase this supply, all desirable: drawing rity and developmental approaches will be on retired officers as advisers; secondment needed to support justice issues. There are of active service members; and provision of areas where, at the request of government, formed police units. Formed police units are the Bank and other international financial requested by a relatively small number of institutions (IFIs) could consider playing a countries under UN peacekeeping missions, greater role in supporting the developmental but demand has clearly grown in recent years underpinnings of violence prevention within in relation to military deployments. Second- their mandates—such as the links between ment of active service members can be as- public financial management and security sisted by career and promotion systems that sector reform and institution-building, legal recognize and reward international experi- administration, justice systems development ence. In all three areas, deployment of women and multisectoral approaches at the commu- police officers has proved valuable. nity level that combine community policing For other functions of the civilian justice and justice services with social cohesion, system, current capacity to supply personnel developmental, and employment creation is weaker than for police. Within ongoing ef- programs. 276 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 But the IFIs are not well placed to support responsiveness. Many individuals working on the core operational aspects of a criminal jus- fragile and conflict-affected states are dedi- tice system. A clear lead within the UN sys- cated professionals attempting to support tem would help. Softer options for change in national efforts. But they are held back by this area include the “global service provider” structures, tools, and processes designed for model currently under discussion, with one different contexts and purposes. Best-fit ap- agency leading on police and another on proaches designed to fit the local context are other aspects of the civilian justice system, as important for international approaches as or one leading on deployments for execu- for national reforms. Budgeting, staffing, re- tive functions and the other on institutional sults measurement, and fiduciary systems re- transformation. Since a consistent theme quire significant changes to achieve a best fit in throughout this Report has been the need fragile situations in almost all the multilateral to link support to police and civilian justice agencies—and in many bilaterals. Existing systems, the division of labor in the inter- systems that implicitly avoid risk—insisting national system would ideally facilitate this on sophisticated controls initially developed linkage rather than further separate capaci- for more stable and higher-capacity coun- ties. Bolder options for change could involve tries, and often choosing to delay assistance breaking down barriers between police and when risks are high—have not delivered con- justice assistance, either at a country level by sistent results. For the g7+ group of leaders of facilitating an integration of the financing fragile states5 who have begun to meet regu- and program management of police and jus- larly as part of the International Dialogue on tice support, or by identifying a single orga- Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, reforming nizational responsibility.4 internal agency procedures, particularly pro- curement procedures, was the number-one suggestion for international reform. Prin- Track 2: Reforming internal agency ciples to bridge the different perspectives of procedures donors and recipient countries on risks and guide internal agency reforms that emerge New international commitment to programs from this Report’s analysis are as follows. that combine citizen security, justice, and employment linkages and an increase in • First, accept the links between security structural capacities to support justice, and and development outcomes. Few internal employment challenges will be effective only systems in the multilateral agencies are to the extent that international agencies can designed to support the links between se- provide assistance fast, and take the risks curity and development outcomes. Pro- necessary to support national institutional gram objectives tend to be narrowly set. development. Without these actions, an in- Economic and social interventions in creased emphasis on prevention will not be situations of insecurity can justifiably be reflected in improved performance on the designed to contribute to citizen security ground. To address this, internal agency re- and justice outcomes (a decrease in homi- forms, new tools to manage risks and results, cides, for example). Security programs and mechanisms to end the stop-go pattern can also be designed to contribute to de- of international assistance are needed. velopment outcomes (an increase in trade, for example). This would require agencies to use outcome measures outside their Principles for internal agency reforms traditional “technical” domains, and work To support countries with rapid confidence- together within the combined program building assistance and longer-term insti- frameworks described above. Rewarding tutional transformation, internal reform is staff for partnership would also help fa- needed for international agencies to improve cilitate cooperation. New directions for international support 277 • Second, adapt to the reality of the absence tivities—and reasons for delays—would of security, institutional capacity, and fully also help to shift international incentives competitive markets in fragile situations. in favor of action. Donors, though, will When insecurity is high, both the costs need to have different ways to manage the and benefits of interventions may change risks of their engagement, which will be dramatically over a short period. This covered in the next section. argues for greater flexibility in adminis- • Fourth, accept that some programs will trative budget and staff planning. In pro- fail, and adapt rapidly in response. Rates of gram budgets, it implies careful sequenc- success in assistance programs should be ing where some programs will be more lower in fragile situations than in stable beneficial at a later date, but also placing development situations, since the contex- more weight on speed (over some cost- tual risk is by definition higher. This is jus- efficiency and quality concerns) in con- tified because returns are also far greater tracting of personnel, goods, works, and when programs work—in peace and secu- services where benefits to fast action are rity terms, but also in development terms high. Where competitive markets are very because these countries start from such a thin and not transparent, different pro- low baseline on the Millennium Devel- curement controls—such as pre-tendering opment Goals (MDGs). The political internationally under variable quantity problem for donors in accepting a certain contracts, or contracting processes that degree of failure is the perception that in- allow direct negotiations with knowledge ternational actors are naive about risks of regional markets—can be appropriate. and slow to act when problems arise. Hav- Where institutional capacity is insufficient, ing a menu of options to shift modalities procedures need to be distilled to the sim- rapidly when failures occur is crucial in plest level of due process, together with managing donor risks without abandon- flexible mechanisms to execute some ac- ing support to national institutions. To tivities on behalf of recipient institutions. avoid disrupting program continuity, em- • Third, balance the risk of action with the bedding contingencies into program de- risk of inaction. The first implication of sign from the beginning is crucial, as will this principle is that countries in need of be discussed in the next section. assistance and their international partners Adopting these principles would help bi- have to accept each other’s concerns on lateral and multilateral agencies reform in- risk. The prime minister of a country in a ternal systems in an appropriate way, to both fragile situation is not wrong to seek im- manage risks and deliver better results. These mediate help to pay salaries and provide principles could be incorporated into agency equipment for the security forces; a minis- procedures in several ways: (1) increasing the ter of development cooperation is not use of adequate contingency funds under wrong to worry about risks of corruption appropriate oversight; (2) adapting models, or human rights abuses. To align their in- such as community procurement, already terests, they must understand each other’s geared to thin markets and low institutional constraints. The second implication is that capacity in national procurement processes; solutions will require that these needs are (3) putting in place effective best-fit measures balanced, rather than risk aversion domi- to increase transparency and control costs, nating. Decentralizing greater responsibil- such as staff able to monitor reasonable re- ity and accountability to international staff gional prices in noncompetitive procurement on the ground can increase responsiveness processes; (4) simplifying processes, delegat- to the risks of inaction. Transparent publi- ing authority, and accelerating turnaround cation of achievements against target times; and (5) changing incentives and per- timelines for donor funds release and ac- formance monitoring mechanisms for staff to 278 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 ensure that those who learn from failure and tolerance and will be able to choose modes adapt quickly are rewarded. Responses will that go more directly through national bud- and should vary by agency—but common gets and institutions; others will need greater principles would help improve the comple- oversight or nonstate involvement in deliv- mentarity of international agency support. ery. Various options exist for managing risk, including the following: Risk and results management • Increasing the contingencies in budgets, under transparent planning assump- Current donor risk management relies on tions. Where governance is volatile, devel- two primary mechanisms: postponing or opment program budgets, as well as the suspending assistance when risks are too budgets for political and peacekeeping high, and using headquarters controls rather missions, would benefit from greater con- than best-fit delivery mechanisms adapted tingency measures so that activities and to local conditions. Both are driven in large delivery mechanisms could be adjusted part to meet the dual-accountability pres- when new risks and opportunities emerge sure from domestic constituencies to avoid without disrupting overall support. The risks of corruption, wastage, or abuse. This planning assumptions for such contin- may manage donor risk, but it constrains gencies—for example, that additional real progress in institution-building on the oversight mechanisms will be adopted if ground. Where continuity in aid is needed, certain agreed-on measures of governance risks do exist, and innovation is needed in deteriorate—should be transparent to national strategy to fit the political context both recipient governments and the gov- (see figure 9.1). An alternative is to embrace erning bodies of international agencies. faster and more consistent engagement through national institutions but to vary • Varying the oversight mechanisms when the ways aid is delivered to manage risks engaging through national budget and and results. Some donors have a higher risk- institutions. Oversight mechanisms to F I G U R E 9 .1 Adapting the modality of assistance to risk Regular support Focus on Contingency Varied Varied Balancing risk and institution-building poverty and standby oversight delivery reduction measures mechanisms mechanisms Regular Flexible for Tracking State-community, risk risks and expenditures; state-UN, and Dual key Non- environment opportunities; independent state-NGO under mechanisms government transparent oversight government execution expectations auspices Economic, security, and Use of local Balancing risk and institution-building: justice programs personnel and Rising violence or post-crisis with high community risk of recurrence systems Balancing risk to avoid disengagement Increasing risk Source: WDR team. New directions for international support 279 adapt to risk include shifting from budget provide recipient governments with larger support to “tracked” expenditure through single programs and international partners government systems,6 and from regular with a way to support programs that greatly reporting and internal control mecha- exceed their own national contribution. nisms to independent financial monitor- Pooling funds can also be an effective way to ing agents, independent monitoring of pool risks, shifting the burden of responsibil- complaints, and independent technical ity for risks of waste, abuse, or corruption agents. from the shoulders of each individual donor • Varying the delivery mechanisms when to the multilateral system. Multidonor trust engaging through national institutions. funds (MDTFs) have delivered excellent re- Variations in delivery mechanisms include sults in some situations. But the performance community structures, civil society, the of these funds is mixed, with criticisms rang- private sector, and the UN and other inter- ing from slowness and cumbersome pro- national executing agencies in delivering cedures and governance arrangements to a programs jointly with state institutions. lack of robust monitoring and evaluation of results and limited support through national In situations of more extreme risk where systems. A small fraction of international as- donors would normally disengage, the fol- sistance in violence-affected countries flows lowing options could be considered: through MDTFs, undermining their over- • Consider executive capacity to supple- all impact. The combined security-justice- ment national control systems, as with development programs and internal agency “dual key” mechanisms, where interna- reforms described above would help mitigate tional line management capacity works some of these challenges. alongside national actors, and agency pro- Measuring transitional progress—as dis- cesses are governed by joint national and cussed in chapter 8 from the perspective of international boards. national reformers—can also give interna- tional actors help in responding to risks. Na- • Use local personnel and community tional reformers and donors need to show structures for delivering humanitarian, results to their parliaments, media, taxpayers, economic, and social programs, which still and citizens. Standard development measures, maintains some focus on local institu- such as economic growth and the MDGs, are tional capacity, mitigating the brain drain excellent long-term goals and indicators, but of local skills overseas. they are not always helpful in fragile situations Risk can also be shared by pooling funds. in the short term. These indicators move too To achieve results at scale, pooling funds can slowly to give feedback to governments and T A B L E 9.2 Compelling and feasible short-term indicators Current data coverage: Most recent 5 years Violence Trust in national Battle deaths Homicide rates institutions 100% coverage, Many every 3 to 4 years, some Fragile 24% coverage Low-income low precision more infrequently countries 100% coverage, Non-fragile 48% coverage Biennially low precision 100% coverage, Middle-income countries 64% coverage Annually, some more frequently medium precision 100% coverage, High-income countries high precision 78% coverage Monthly/weekly (low incidence) Source: WDR team calculations. 280 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 their international partners on the speed and 40, and the IFIs could support poorer and direction of progress, and they do not directly more fragile countries in using the polling measure security, or citizen concerns over is- tools that richer countries draw upon. sues such as inequality, unemployment, or trust in national institutions. The development of indicators that can Ending the stop-go pattern of assistance show short-term progress is not just a techni- International agencies will also need to think cal issue—it is important at a political level carefully about how to lengthen the dura- for both national governments and donors to tion of assistance to meet the realities of show short-term improvements and to main- institutional transformation over a genera- tain support for continued investments— tion without raising costs. As suggested by and at times for the occasional risky and dif- Commissioner for Peace and Security, Am- ficult institutional reforms. The indicators bassador Ramtane Lamamra and Under- presented in chapter 8 on security, trust in Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Opera- national institutions, and progress in gov- tions Alain Le Roy (box 9.2), the flexible use ernance in relation to the historic record of of alternative modalities for peacekeeping how long transformations have taken in other can aid substantially in this regard, includ- countries can help donors as well as national ing over-the-horizon capacities. Building on reformers—by showing that progress is being growing cooperation, the multilateral secu- made even when some setbacks occur. rity agencies—the African Union Peace and International actors could also play a role Security Council, UN Department of Peace- in helping countries develop the capacity keeping Operations, the European Union to measure these indicators (see table 9.2). (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organi- WDR estimates indicate that information zation (NATO)—could work with the IFIs on deaths in civil conflict is available for all to conduct a thorough examination of the developing countries, although only 24 per- cent of fragile countries have homicide data costs and benefits of over-the-horizon de- and the precision of battle-death informa- ployments and other forms of flexible peace- tion is likely lower. A partnership of member keeping to provide long-term assistance in states, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime fragile situations at reasonable cost. (UNODC), the IFIs, and the universities and Better resourcing for mediation and dip- NGOs that collect conflict data could take lomatic facilitation is also an easy win, since this forward. A similar effort could develop it is always low cost and can reduce risks of another useful indicator: measuring confi- violence escalation. This could be linked to dence in institutions through polling. With efforts to foster a norm that mediation or fa- regard to trust in institutions, regular infor- cilitation support should be on call for states mation on security and citizen perceptions longer than is currently the pattern, so that it of the state is available in most high-income is available to facilitate ongoing confidence- and some middle-income countries, but is building beyond the immediate resolution of rarely available in the fragile states, which a crisis. need it most. Polling surveys are cheap and For development agencies, ending the can be administered frequently—and new stop-go pattern of assistance to programs de- technologies are emerging to conduct sur- livering results in citizen security, justice, or veys by cell phone, which this Report did jobs—or simply preserving social cohesion as part of its background research in the and human and institutional capacity—can Democratic Republic of Congo.7 The Report increase impact without increasing overall estimates indicate that most countries have cost. As described earlier, volatility greatly some polling data—but in fragile states the reduces aid effectiveness and is twice as high data are collected very infrequently. A part- for fragile and conflict-affected countries as nership of the regional barometers, Statistics for other developing countries, despite the New directions for international support 281 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 9. 2 Flexible peacekeeping arrangements Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union; WDR Advisory Council Member; with Alain Le Roy, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Societies trying to move away from violence face acute politically complex environments, and often cover enormous problems of mistrust, uncertainty, and lack of confidence in areas. the basic institutions of the state. The use of mediation and The UN and the African Union (AU) operate together in peacekeeping as “commitment mechanisms,” as this Report Sudan and Somalia to try to meet such challenges. The impor- describes them, can help overcome these obstacles to set- tant partnership between the two organizations is not without tlement. It can also extend the authority of the state and complexity and controversy, but represents the shared deter- contribute to the establishment of the rule of law. mination to meet the immediate challenges we confront. In this context, we welcome the messages in this Report The WDR points to the fact that uncertainty and weak insti- about the role that peacekeeping can play in helping states tutions that enable violence can endure in a society for several move away from violence, which broadly accord with our decades, long after the traditional period of intensive peace- experience. The Report’s finding that the deployment of keeping. In too many cases, peacekeepers had to be recalled international peacekeepers extends the duration of a politi- when a brief period of recovery was followed by a relapse into cal settlement accords with our experience. The conclusion a new cycle of violence. that it also contributes to positive economic growth rein- The dilemma here is that national authorities and interna- forces the argument that development and security go tional mandating bodies are often reluctant to contemplate hand in hand. We also share the Report’s emphasis on the longer term peacekeeping engagements. More creative solu- importance of transforming national institutions into guar- tions must be found. These could include combinations of antors of security and prosperity in the long term. long-term programs for security sector development and In order to achieve these goals, peacekeeping needs to reform, light monitoring, and over-the-horizon reinforcements. be given the right capabilities. Although the African Union Over-the-horizon arrangements have been used to good and the United Nations have different mandates and face effect in the intensive phase of peacekeeping, for example, different demands, we share the challenge of managing with the European Union’s Operation Artemis in the Demo- peacekeeping operations deployed to difficult areas, with- cratic Republic of Congo. If development and security indeed out the full range of capabilities needed to succeed. The march hand in hand, so too should peacekeeping and eco- international community learned the hard way in the mid- nomic support to the process of transforming national institu- 1990s the human and political costs of failing to equip tions—including through joint programs, for example, on peacekeepers with the necessary resources to fulfill their security sector reform and in the management of natural mandates. In some cases, this is a question of scale; in resources. We welcome the Report’s call for a deeper examina- others, quality or flexibility. Far from the Cold War days of tion of the costs, benefits, and possible arrangements for lon- static peacekeeping in buffer zones or alongside contested ger term security and political support to national actors seek- borders, contemporary operations are dynamic, operate in ing a more permanent shift away from the risk of violence. fragile countries’ greater need for persistence tance Committee) framework. As outlined in in building social and state institutions. There chapter 6, a 30 percent decrease in volatility are options for reducing volatility (see box could deliver value of around US$30 mil- 9.3), including providing threshold amounts lion per annum to each fragile and conflict- of aid based on appropriate modalities, top- affected state. ping up aid allocations to the most fragile states when specific types of programs have Track 3: Reducing external demonstrated the ability to deliver effectively stresses: New regional and and at scale (as proposed in a recent work- global action ing paper by the Centre for Global Develop- ment),8 and dedicating a target percentage Direct assistance to states needs to be com- of assistance to larger and longer-term pro- plemented by action at a regional and global grams in fragile and conflict-affected states level to reduce external stresses. The analysis under the OECD-DAC (Development Assis- in this Report has consistently emphasized 282 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 9. 3 Preventing violence: Prioritizing investment in citizen security and justice reforms Resolving the donor risk and results dilemma: Learning from the Tinbergen rule Paul Collier, Professor of Economics and Director for the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University; WDR Advisory Council Member In allocating aid, donors currently consider two fundamen- expenditures can be supported, and indeed often need to be, tal objectives: aid should follow need and aid should be if governments are to regain legitimacy in the eyes of their well-used. Unfortunately, in fragile states, these two objec- citizens, but should support actions linked to stabilization and tives are commonly in conflict: needs are far greater than be provided only with additional oversight mechanisms which elsewhere, but governments lack the capacity to spend aid track expenditures. Funds through government can be chan- well. The result has often been that aid volumes oscillate neled directly to the local level and monitored through com- around an inadequate average as donors shift between munity reporting. Social service provision could be scaled up if concern for need and concern for effectiveness. aid were channeled through public agencies outside the con- Jan Tinbergen, one of the most revered Nobel laureates, ventional civil service, co-supervised by government and third formulated a simple principle which illuminates the donor parties such as civil society, and donors. The agencies could dilemma and points to a resolution. He showed that a given fund clinics, schools, and public works run by churches, NGOs, number of objectives can be achieved only if there are at and local communities, in return for public accountability and least as many independent policy instruments. Donors have agreed standards of quality. been attempting to achieve two objectives, meeting need Tinbergen’s rule also says how objectives should be linked and assuring effectiveness, with a single instrument—the to instruments. The donor dilemma can be resolved by linking volume of aid. Such an approach is doomed to failure: either the objective of meeting needs to the volume of aid, and the one of the objectives must be sacrificed or a second instru- objective of using aid well to the choice of delivery modalities. ment must be introduced. Since clearly neither objective Fragile states need large volumes of aid, but aid delivery can be abandoned, the implication is that donors must should look very different from contexts in which government develop another instrument. ministries are effective. Spending money effectively in fragile That instrument is the modality for aid delivery: states is not complicated: for example, community-driven modalities should vary according to the capacity of approaches, mission schools, and clinics have been operating government. While unconditional and unmonitored bud- successfully in the most difficult environments for many years. get support or unhurried project investments are appropri- The needs are manifestly greater than other environments and ate for secure and well-governed states, it is essential to so returns on aid can be commensurately higher. But to estab- develop alternative mechanisms for channeling aid inflows lish that those needs can indeed be met cost-effectively and in fragile situations. New types of instruments are needed build long-term institutional resilience, delivery modalities and should recognise the spectrum of risk, from govern- that encourage experimentation, are evaluated for results, and ments who are well-intentioned but face insecurity and are adapted to respond quickly to experiences of success and weak institutions, to those who are more abusive. Recurrent failure are required. WDR Note: Additional approaches for reducing volatility The Centre for Global Development proposes the scaling up of successful projects in fragile and conflict- affected states. As outlined in Gelb 2010, this would involve timely monitoring, full transparency, and inde- pendent evaluation of projects. Projects that demonstrate early results could then draw upon additional financing through a special multi-donor trust fund designated as a tranche for scaling up. By reducing the length of the feedback loop in project monitoring and evaluation, this approach would align incentives for those delivering aid and those receiving aid and reward successes early in the project cycle, making this approach wholly compatible with output-based aid. OECD –DAC commitments. A further possibility is to explore a commitment under the OECD-DAC frame- work for a percentage of aid programs to go into long-term, larger scale support. There is a value to small, rapid interventions in fragile situations, and it would not be desirable to lose the flexibility to provide this type of assistance. But the percentage of aid currently in small, fragmented, and short-term assistance appears to be too high (see chapter 6) to benefit long-term institution-building. The Accra Agenda commits donors to developing long-term modalities to support the building of “capable, accountable, and responsive states.” New directions for international support 283 the role of external stresses in increasing the as great a constraint to cross-border trade risks of violence, and it is therefore impor- as lack of infrastructure. tant that the recommendations for action do • Cross-border development program- not ignore this important area. Firm, prac- ming. Many insecure border areas share tical, and coordinated action can diminish similar social and economic structures, the external stresses that hinder stability in in which a shared terrain, ethnicity, or the short and long term. And support can be history creates natural bonds. Yet very increased to develop regional and interna- few countries take advantage of this to tional “buffers” to absorb and mitigate these share lessons for development program- stresses. Analysis for this Report suggests ming on both sides of insecure border three areas for such action: cross-border co- areas. Community-driven development operation, strengthening action against the programs, for example, are likely to face trafficking and illicit financial flows that can similar strengths and weaknesses in com- fuel violence, and protecting fragile states munity organization, as is the private from food and resource shocks. sector. Development sectors like health, which has regional and international Cross-border goods: Development, public-good aspects, can be a nonconten- security, and administrative pooling tious form of cross-border cooperation. Cross-border development programming Support for regional goods is underresourced. could simply involve special arrangements In recognition of the importance of external to share lessons, or it could in some cases stresses for violence, donors could increase move toward formal joint arrangements the proportion of their financial and technical to design and monitor programs. support going to cross-border development programming and regional infrastructure, as • Regional security support. Although vio- well as for various forms of regional admin- lence frequently crosses borders, interna- istrative and economic cooperation—giving tional responses remain largely within priority to violence-affected regions. Such them. Two approaches that have been pi- support could take the following forms: loted warrant further consideration: re- gional political missions—including UN • Trade and transit infrastructure. Nu- offices in Africa and Central Asia, the latter merous conflict and violence-affected re- of which has a mandate for preventive gions face obvious gaps in the infrastruc- diplomacy linked to border and customs ture for trade between producer and management and counter-trafficking ini- consumer areas and for ports and air- tiatives. A second is regional initiatives for ports. They include large regions, such as counter-trafficking, such as the joint UN/ Central Africa and Central Asia, but also ECOWAS (Economic Community of West smaller subnational areas that have little African States) West African Coast Initia- access to trade, such as the northeastern tive on organized crime. states of India. Where infrastructure is constructed in violence-affected areas, • Shared regional technical and adminis- care should be taken to use labor-intensive trative capacity. As chapter 7 noted, pool- technologies and provide for local labor ing subregional administrative capacities to avoid tensions over the benefits. In can allow states to develop institutional some regions, discussions about shared capabilities they could not manage on economic infrastructure with joint bene- their own. There are a range of initiatives fits could also create an opening for later that could be undertaken in this area, de- political or security discussions. In most pending on regional needs—from pro- cases, some simple policy reforms need to grams that deliver the specialized assis- be undertaken in parallel as these can be tance for reform of security and justice 284 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 sectors and multisectoral community ruption issues, such as the International Cor- programs at a regional level, to pooled ruption Hunter’s Alliance and the Stolen As- administrative capacity to address skills set Recovery Initiative (STAR), three measures and training for youth, as with shared would help in this effort to reduce violence university facilities. and the illicit financial flows that support it: Rather than these somewhat incremen- • Strengthening the capacity to conduct tal approaches to specific cross-border ini- strategic analysis of these flows in key tiatives, international donors could take a countries with the majority of global fi- larger step to finance regional approaches. nancial transfers. About a dozen financial The principle of such an initiative would be intelligence units in major financial mar- to build on the local political knowledge and kets or hubs have the integrity, indepen- legitimacy of regional institutions, in com- dence, and technical capacity to conduct bination with the technical and financial ca- such analysis. Concerted efforts to analyze pacity of global agencies. Delivered through suspicious flows and exchange informa- regional institutions in collaboration with tion could greatly increase their ability to global agencies, this approach could adapt detect illicit financial flows. lessons from initiatives that have already suc- cessfully pooled developed shared regional • Global financial centers could increase capacity, such as justice in the Caribbean.9 the openness of information provision It could also draw lessons from existing and their cooperation with stolen asset cross-border cooperation, such as the Greater recovery processes. As part of this effort, Mekong Subregion, West Africa’s initiatives global financial institutions could perform on trafficking and economic integration, and strategic analysis and make it available to the European Union’s programs for previ- countries affected. To respect privacy, this ously conflict-affected border regions.10 It analysis could be based on shifts in aggre- would support political initiatives of regional gate flows rather than individual account institutions (such as the African Union Bor- information. The analytical tools exist, as der Programme11 and ASEAN’s subregional chapter 7 describes for Australia’s analysis initiatives) with financial and technical exper- of illicit flows generated by corruption or tise from global partners. Well designed, the money-laundering. But these approaches expansion of such regional initiatives would have not yet been applied globally. also have the advantage of protecting activi- • Developed states and financial centers ties from some of the aid volatility caused by could commit to ensuring that investing fluctuations in national governance. the proceeds from corruption in their countries is a violation of their anti- Stemming the trafficking and illicit money-laundering laws. As part of this financial flows that can fuel violence commitment, they could also step up their cooperation with law enforcement Follow the money: at the heart of action authorities in fragile states. This would against the illegal trafficking of drugs and nat- build on recent precedents for joint and ural resources is tracking illicit financial flows. parallel investigations, such as those be- For areas seriously affected by illegal traffick- tween the United Kingdom and Nigeria, ing and corruption, such as Central America and the United States and Haiti, described or West Africa, most countries have nothing in chapter 8.12 approaching the national capacity needed to gather and process information on financial Mechanisms to coordinate the interna- transactions or to investigate and prosecute tional spillovers of domestic policies are offenders. Along with initiatives that help to crucial. Spillovers from successful action support a global community to address cor- against illegal trafficking in one country can New directions for international support 285 affect another—Colombia’s actions against would be value in joint efforts between pro- drug cartels have had ripple effects across ducing and consuming countries to under- Central America, Mexico, and even West stand the implications of current debates on Africa.13 Similar effects can pertain to other combining demand-side options on drugs, in- commodities: a ban or restraints on logging cluding legalization, with supply-side enforce- in one country, for example, will increase ment. This would require in-depth analysis of demand in other countries that do not have the health, social, and economic implications similar policies. Without limiting sovereign of legalized drug use under different regula- decisions, a platform for dialogue between tory regimes, as well as trends in consumption countries would help governments identify patterns. It would also require analysis of the potential impacts in advance, debate costs systems to regulate and control drugs that be- and benefits at a regional level, and consider come legal and to ensure enforcement where options to coordinate policy or take action drugs remain illegal. to mitigate impacts in countries affected by the decisions of others. Regional institutions could lead such a dialogue, as could a global New action to protect fragile states from agency such as UNODC. food insecurity and resource shocks Joint efforts on trafficking in natural re- Knowledge about the impacts of food, energy, sources can also produce more effective ac- and resource shocks is limited. Rising global tion. The new Natural Resource Charter is demand for food and energy may impact an effective way to build on earlier initiatives, fragile and violence-affected states severely. such as the Kimberley Process and the Ex- New analytical efforts are an important first tractive Industries Transparency Initiative, step in understanding this phenomenon. by focusing on widespread communications One forward step would be for the relevant and citizen pressure.14 International market agencies—the World Bank, UN Energy Pro- regulatory requirements are another form gramme, International Energy Agency, and of consumer country action to combat traf- others—to work together on a World Re- ficking. In timber, these schemes include cer- sources Outlook, bringing together the mul- tification requirements in the United States tiple reports and analysis already undertaken under the Lacey Act, European procurement by these agencies independently.15 Such a re- policies that require government agencies to purchase only verifiably legal timber, and port could give policy makers the valuable in- forthcoming EU due diligence regulations tegrated analysis they currently lack. It could involving bilateral cooperation with select examine the state of scientific knowledge producer countries. Such market require- about the availability of key resources, in- ment systems could be strengthened by cluding oil, food, water, and potentially land, information-sharing arrangements between together with how climate change will affect enforcement in producer and consumer each of them; the economic dimensions of re- countries to assist consumer countries in source availability, including the risk of price acting against suspect shipments. Consumer spikes, inflationary trends, and how resource nations and international actors should also prices interact with wider trends in the inter- provide additional assistance to build capac- national economy; and vulnerability to scar- ity within producer nations to implement city trends among poor people and regions effective chain-of-custody systems that keep affected by violence. Without such analysis, illegally sourced commodities out of the sup- the risk of unintended consequences from ply chain. policy may remain unaddressed—as with bio- Forging a new sense of co-responsibility fuels, where the possible food security impli- for countering trafficking would also produce cations of measures to promote energy secu- better analysis of options. For example, there rity were inadequately considered. 286 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 For fragile states unable to support com- no industry agreement has been reached on prehensive food security initiatives, best-fit self-regulation, the World Bank and the UN options may be desirable. A reliable global Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), food stock system would be ideal, but a the International Fund for Agricultural De- smaller independent emergency reserve— velopment (IFAD), the UN Conference on managed regionally—could bridge the lags in Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and food aid response. Held in existing national other partners have recently formulated storage facilities at strategic locations, such a set of principles for responsible agro- a reserve could allow for rapid response. An investment that stress respect for land and example is the East Asia Emergency Rice Re- resource rights; food security; transparency; serve program established by the 10 ASEAN good governance; a proper enabling environ- Member States, China, Japan, and the Re- ment; consultation and participation; and public of Korea, to provide food assistance social and environmental sustainability (see and strengthen food security in emergencies box 7.9).21 and for poverty alleviation.16 Ahead of potential new impacts from cli- Effective early warning schemes can also mate change, international support could be be a second-best approach to addressing food provided to subregions where fragile coun- insecurity. While reducing the likelihood and tries share river boundaries. Depending on impact of food price shocks would be a first the circumstances, this effort could encom- best option, effective early warning systems pass a shift from agreements based on pre- on food and agriculture can be put in place cise volume to agreements based on percent- to identify, assess, and monitor the evolu- ages, to account for the potential impact of tion of conflict risks and food security levels, reduced flow, and to agreements based on especially in fragile countries. Examples of sharing the benefits from expanded develop- early warning systems that use satellite data ment of river basins that benefit all riparians, to anticipate crop failure and food shortages as well as new agreements where none exist. are the UN-sponsored Global Information Efforts to foster cross-border or subregional and Early Warning System,17 which aims at water management arrangements can ease improving food-security response planning regional tensions even if climate impacts do in 22 drought-prone African countries, and not end up affecting flow rates. the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)–sponsored Famine Early Warning System Network,18 which Track 4: Marshaling support from monitors food supply and demand in all lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries with emphasis on 80 low-income countries and from global and food deficit nations. regional institutions International trading systems should pro- tect fragile states from the pressure of inter- The landscape of international assistance in national resource competition in the search fragile and violence-affected countries has for land or energy. Initiatives addressing changed in the last 20 years, with more aid these issues, such as the Extractive Industry and policy input from middle-income coun- Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Equator tries with a history of solidarity support. Principles,19 and the Santiago Principles,20 Several regional institutions are also playing have formulated standards to guide engage- a greater role in security and development ment in certain sectors, and many institu- issues. Yet discussions of global conflict and tions and large enterprises have produced violence, the norms of responsible leadership guidelines of their own. But broader efforts to to respond to them, and the shape of inter- build on such ongoing private initiatives are national assistance have been driven more by needed. In large-scale agro-investing, where northern than southern actors. The Interna- New directions for international support 287 tional Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State- standards, for example, have been important building has been created to help address this reference points for reformers that led efforts deficit. The WDR process has also conducted to transform authoritarian military regimes wide-ranging consultations with violence- in many regions toward more accountable affected lower- and middle-income coun- systems, with benefits for citizen security and tries, regional policy makers, and regional broader development. The Lomé Declara- institutions, as well as with traditional donor tion in 2000, establishing African standards partners. It found many areas of agreement— and a regional response mechanism to un- the focus on institution-building and gover- constitutional changes in government, has, as nance and on citizen security, justice, and described earlier, underpinned a significant jobs—but also some areas of difference. decrease in coups since the 1990s and strong WDR consultations frequently revealed continental action to uphold constitutional divided views among national actors, re- government.22 gional bodies, middle-income countries, and Modest actions that could strengthen OECD actors over what is realistic to expect collaboration among higher-, middle-, and from national leadership in improving gov- lower-income countries on shared problems ernance, over what time period, and over of violence and development, both global the “forms” versus the “functions” of good and local, are as follows: governance (for example, elections versus broader democratic practices and processes, • Increase both South-South and South- and minimizing corruption in practice ver- North exchanges on violence prevention. sus establishing procurement laws and anti- South-South exchanges have enormous corruption commissions). potential to provide relevant capacity and Perceived double standards were also crit- lessons in current fragile and violence- icized by WDR interlocutors, who reflected affected situations.23 Lower- and middle- a sentiment that donor countries and orga- income countries that have gone through nizations that have faced their own internal their own recent experiences of transition governance challenges could approach short- have much to offer to their counterparts— comings in fragile developing states with as demonstrated in this Report, where more humility. Developed countries are not Latin American countries offered perspec- immune to corruption, bribery, human rights tives on urban violence prevention and abuses, or failures to account adequately for security and justice reforms, China on job public finances. Thus, effective implementa- creation, India on local public works and tion of standards of good governance is also democratic practices, Southeast Asian and a challenge in advanced countries, even more African countries on community-driven so when the international community has development in conflict areas. Yet, South- played an executive government or security North exchanges are also important. While role in violence-affected areas. institutional capacities differ, many North- Lack of concerted support for the norms ern and Southern countries, provinces, of responsible leadership is a concern, be- and cities face some similar stresses. Pro- cause progress in global norms is crucial for gram approaches—such as addressing reducing the risk of violence. Regional and trafficking, reintegrating ex-gang mem- global standards, as well as recognition and bers and disengaged young people, and sanction mechanisms in constitutionality, fostering tolerance and social bonds among human rights, and corruption, have pro- communities that are ethnically or reli- vided support and incentives for national giously divided—will have lessons relevant leadership, particularly where the capacity for others. Such exchanges would increase of the domestic system to provide rewards understanding that the challenges of vio- and accountability is weak. Human rights lence are not unique to developing coun- 288 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 tries and that developing countries are not in perspectives among countries receiving alone in struggling to find solutions. international assistance, their middle- and higher-income international partners, and • Better align international assistance be- global and regional institutions. This is par- hind regional governance efforts. When ticularly crucial in the light of recent social regional institutions take the initiative, protests that demonstrate strong grievances as with the African Union (AU) on consti- and expectations over governance change— tutionality, they have great comparative that were not picked up by standard analyses advantage in traction with their member of security and of development progress. The states. The potential convening role of re- indicators described in chapter 8 aim to ad- gional institutions was also widely recog- dress this deficit through a focus on whether nized in WDR consultations by higher-, countries are on track to make institutional middle-, and lower-income country in- and governance improvements within the re- terlocutors alike (see box 9.4). Supporting alistic generational time frames that the faster regional platforms to discuss the applica- reformers have achieved, and how citizens tion of governance norms is an effective perceive trends in the legitimacy and perfor- way to increase ownership. Adopting mance of national institutions across the po- clearer structures to discuss responses to litical security and development domains. major improvements or deteriorations in These would be a simple way, as Lou- governance (such as coups d’états) among ise Arbour suggests in box 9.4, to compare bilateral and multilateral actors would progress, stagnation, or deterioration. Ensur- also improve information-sharing and ing that such indicators measure outcomes the potential for coordinated responses rather than just the form of institutions without creating unacceptable binding (laws passed, anti-corruption commissions obligations on international actors.24 formed) is also important to ensure that they encourage rather than suppress innovative • Expand initiatives to recognize respon- national action and that they foster learn- sible leadership. While there is always a ing among low-, middle-, and high-income role for frank and transparent criticism, country institutions. The UN Peacebuilding approaches from the North that are seen Commission—which brings together fragile as disproportionately focused on criti- states, donors, troop-contributing countries, cism in fragile situations can be divisive. and regional bodies—has unexploited po- Initiatives, such as the Ibrahim Prize for tential to advise on realistic timelines. African leadership, could be emulated to recognize leaders in different roles (for example, ministers who have a lasting im- pact on corruption or military leaders A continuing global learning who implement successful security-sector platform reform). Multistakeholder initiatives, This Report draws together many rich strands such as the Extractive Industries Trans- of existing research on security and develop- parency Initiative, could consider provi- ment, adding to them through new quantita- sions to recognize individual leaders or tive and qualitative work. But its preparation leadership teams who have improved the has made clear the gaps in knowledge—from transparency of resource revenues and evolving issues such as the links between or- expenditures, whether in governments, ganized crime and political violence, glar- civil society, or companies. ingly underresearched, to the lack of firm More focused and realistic expectations conceptual models and testing of the pro- built into the timetables for governance cesses of institutional transformation, and to improvements would also help bridge gaps the absence of evaluation data on key policy New directions for international support 289 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT B OX 9. 4 The role of regional institutions and initiatives in norm-setting and violence prevention Reaffirming consensus on international norms and standards—The role of regional organizations Louise Arbour, President, International Crisis Group; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; WDR Advisory Council Member Whether based on universal values, such as the sanctity of In the justice sector, for instance, uniformity of institutional human life, or on international legal rules, there are some models and procedures may obscure radical differences in universally accepted norms—reflected in the Charter of the the actual delivery of justice. But the adjudication of disputes United Nations and other international instruments. based on principles of fairness, impartiality, transparency, in- These norms are not self-implementing, and because tegrity, compassion, and ultimately accountability can take they include the right to cultural diversity, their interpreta- many forms. tion must reflect local, national, and regional diversity. The In their assistance to development, international actors resistance to the exportation of “Western values” might be must resist the exportation of form over substance, and accept no more than the rejection of a foreign way of expressing a the regionalization of norms that enhance, rather than impede, particular norm, rather than a rejection of the norm itself. their true universal character. In the same spirit, regional actors Regional institutions can bridge the distance between must translate, in a culturally relevant way, international norms universal norms and local customs. Those customs or prac- and repudiate nonconforming practices. tices must conform, in substance, to the core international And all must concede that the standards set by universal principles from which the international community derives norms are aspirations. Measures of performance should reflect its cohesion. Otherwise, cultural diversity can simply over- either progress, stagnation, or regression in a given country, ride, and undermine, the international framework. toward a common, universal ideal. and program options, such as justice and em- tional transformation and governance ployment interventions. Priorities for future outcomes for sustained violence preven- research and policy work are as follows: tion; confidence-building as a prelude to wider institutional transformation; the • Filling gaps in data. There are gaps in the characteristics of inclusive-enough coali- data on violence (particularly criminal vi- olence) and on citizen trust in national in- tions for reform in fragile situations; how stitutions. Other variables to fully test con- these are adapted or consolidated over ceptual models and evaluate policy options multiple transitions; and the design and are also missing. Priorities for following up benefits of early institutional action on on the WDR’s work would be spending on citizen security, justice, and jobs. As dis- criminal justice systems, institutional per- cussed in chapter 2 (box 2.5), more re- formance indicators of capacity and ac- search is needed on the link between em- countability in security and criminal jus- ployment and violence prevention. tice systems, and employment data. • Evaluating policy and program options. • Testing conceptual models. The WDR There is also a dearth of impact evaluations has put forward hypotheses drawn from on the relationship between specific policy regional and country consultations that and program interventions and security are consistent with available cross-country outcomes. At a macropolicy level, the costs data or qualitative case analysis. All would and benefits of second-best reforms in sit- benefit from further testing and research uations of insecurity and weak institutions to identify detailed pathways of successful merit further attention—as do the se- reform and reasons for failure. They in- quence of reforms to increase revenues and clude the importance of national institu- expand government expenditures and the 290 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 costs and benefits of regional integration. A compelling agenda for action At the program level, evaluating the im- Can the international community help build portance of rapid development results and resilience in countries facing repeated or new of integrated security-development ap- proaches would greatly assist policy mak- threats? Significant areas—North Africa and ers. A focused evaluation agenda to analyze the Middle East; Central Africa, the Horn of the impact of programmatic interventions Africa, and West Africa; Southwest and Cen- to address unemployment in situations of tral Asia; and Central America—currently face conflict or rising violence would also con- risks of new or repeated cycles of violence. Will tribute to a more proactive international the international community be able to help, approach to job creation, including the not just to halt one acute episode, but reduce role of private sector development. Analy- the risk of continuing cycles? Business as usual sis of the economic costs and benefits of is unlikely to deliver sustained results. What is flexible peacekeeping options, as suggested needed is a renewed consensus among inter- by Commissioner Lamamra and Under- national actors in their dialogue with national Secretary-General Le Roy, can inform fu- leaders, based on expectations that are both ture policy developments.25 principled and realistic. Supporting this con- sensus at a practical level will require focused • Tracking the evolving impacts of new and timely assistance to institutions that can phenomena, including rapidly increasing help prevent an escalation of violence. It will demand for energy and scarce resource also require a willingness to try new ways of supplies, as well as climate change, on doing business in humanitarian, develop- areas at risk of violence. ment, security, and mediation assistance in The future research agenda is rich indeed,26 order to help build national institutional le- and a strong network of public agencies, think gitimacy. And it will require decisive action to tanks, universities, and NGOs could produc- prevent stresses outside these countries from tively collaborate in tackling it. A shared col- overwhelming fragile progress. laborative platform for knowledge on vio- All the recommendations of this Report lence, fragility, and development would also have at their heart the concept of shared have the advantage of drawing together work global risk. Risks are evolving, with new led by the political and social sciences, includ- threats to stability arising from international ing economics, and by the political, security, organized crime and global economic insta- humanitarian, and development agencies in bility. The landscape of international power this most interdisciplinary of areas. Such a relations is also changing, as lower- and platform could foster research by institutes middle-income countries increase their share in fragile and conflict-affected states and in of global economic influence and their con- middle-income countries that have experi- tributions to global policy thinking. A funda- enced violence, thus helping to produce the mental rethink is needed on the approaches kind of lessons and learning highlighted here, of international actors to manage global risks as well as informing a new consensus on crit- collectively—and as equal partners. ical norms and their adaptation to national The recommendations are not easy to contexts. This platform can also draw from implement. They require clear political lead- a new research initiative, “Democratizing ership from both developed and developing Development Economics,” from the research countries and sustained attention to change group at the World Bank, which promotes in bilateral development agencies and multi- “Open Data, Open Knowledge, and Open lateral institutions. Real change will require a Solutions” to support South-South learning strong rationale for political leadership. But and collaborative research on common chal- a dual rationale exists: fragility and violence lenges and solutions.27 are major obstacles to development, and are New directions for international support 291 no longer confined to poor and remote ar- and the rising numbers of internationally eas or cityscapes. This decade has seen the mobile refugees. Breaking cycles of repeated increasing penetration of instability in global violence is thus a shared challenge demand- life—in terrorism, an expanding drug trade, ing urgent action. Notes 1. Stewart and Brown 2007. 2. Ojielo 2007; Odendaal 2010; UNDPA 2010a. 3. Following an extensive study carried out by the Office of the High Representative (the chief civil- ian peace implementation agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina) at the request of the Peace Imple- mentation Council, the coordinating structure of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina was “streamlined” in 2002 to eliminate overlapping effort and responsibilities and increase effectiveness. As part of this process a Board of Principals was established under the chair- manship of the High Representative to serve as the main coordinating body for international com- munity activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Board of Principals meets once a week in Sara- jevo and is attended by Office of the High Representative, NATO-led military Stabilisation Force (SFOR), Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union Police Mission, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), European Commission, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). See Office of the High Representative and European Union Special Representative 2011. 4. Recognizing the public-good benefits of some types of security assistance, as the OECD-DAC is considering by providing a separate channel for reporting assistance in these areas, could also help. 5. g7+ is an open grouping of low-income countries experiencing conflict and fragility. It was estab- lished in 2008 and comprises the following countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, the Solo- mon Islands, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. 6. A practical example of this type of shift is Ethiopia in 2005, when government and donors agreed to move from regular budget support to a program of transfers to local and municipal govern- ments. The program included measures to ensure that all regions of the country, irrespective of how they had voted in elections, received continuing central government support. 7. The WDR team, in conjunction with Mobile Accord and with generous donations of SMS (short message service) by Vodacom Congo, carried out a geo-polling project known as DRC Speaks! The project utilized cell phone technology to conduct the survey. Using SMS through cell phones, the project allowed more than 140,000 Congolese to share, without any filters, their thoughts, feelings, and concerns. See section on monitoring progress out of fragility in chapter 6 for more information. 8. Gelb 2010. 9. See Favaro 2010. 10. For the Greater Mekong Subregion, see World Bank 2006d; the section on regional stresses and support in chapter 7. For West Africa, see Favaro 2008, 2010; box 7.10 in chapter 7. For the Euro- pean border region, see Greta and Lewandowski 2010; Otocan 2010; Council of Europe 1995; Council of Europe and Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia 2003; Bilcik and others 2000; box 7.11 in chapter 7. 11. For the African Union Border Programme Cooperation, see African Union 2007a. 12. See Messick 2011; box 8.4 in chapter 8. 13. See Arboleda 2010; UNODC 2010a; WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010; feature, chapter 3. 14. The Natural Resource Charter is a set of common principles and a practical step-by-step guide for escaping the “resource curse.” It has no political heritage or sponsorships and was prepared by an independent group of global experts on economically sustainable resource extraction, assembled by Paul Collier, Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University. The charter aims to foster coordination, both along the decision chain from exploration to expenditure, and among the international actors and stakeholders, by providing a unifying and overarching 292 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 framework for action. It provides the tools and knowledge base necessary to avoid the misman- agement of these diminishing riches and ensure they bring lasting benefit. The charter consists of 12 precepts, detailing the broad princi-ples, specific recommendations, and practical guid- ance. It is also an information toolkit to guide governments and societies in their use of natural resources so that the opportunities they provide are seized in a way that results in maximum and sustained benefits for citizens. The charter provides a clearinghouse for the collation and dis- semination of information and best practice in the governance and management of resource-rich economies. More information on the charter can be found at their website: http://www.natural resourcecharter.org/. 15. Evans 2010. 16. Brinkman and Hendrix 2010; Bora and others 2010. 17. FAO 2010. 18. USAID Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2010. 19. The Equator Principles (EPs) are a voluntary set of standards for determining, assessing, and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. The EPs are considered the finan- cial industry “gold standard” for sustainable project finance and are based on the International Finance Corporation (IFC) performance standards on social and environmental sustainability and on the World Bank’s Environmental, Health and Safety General Guidelines. The principles are intended to serve as a common baseline and framework for the implementation by each adopt- ing institution of its own internal social and environmental policies, procedures, and standards related to its project financing activities. These principles do not create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private, and institutions adopt and implement the EPs without reliance on or recourse to IFC or the World Bank. The Equator Principles can be found in full at http:// www.equator-principles.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf. 20. The Santiago Principles were developed in 2008 by the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and represent a collaborative effort by advanced, emerging, and developing country economies to set out a comprehensive framework of 24 voluntary “best practices” guide- lines, aiming to provide a clearer understanding of the operations of SWFs. Their adoption on a voluntary basis signals strong commitment to the principles, and their implementation should further enhance the stabilizing role played by SWFs in the financial markets, and help maintain the free flow of cross-border investment. To date, 23 countries are members. For more information, visit the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds website: http://www.iwg-swf .org. 21. FAO and others 2010. 22. See Organization of African Unity 2000. Also see the section titled “Interstate and civil wars have declined since peaking in the early1990s” in chapter 1. 23. Of the different forms that South-South cooperation has taken, technical assistance has been the most common. Although many technical assistance projects focus on economic and social development, countries in the Global South have also developed specialized capacities in post- conflict peacebuilding. Examples include South Africa’s support to build structural capacities for public service through peer learning among public sector schools (Management Development Institutes) at the Ministries for Public Administration in Burundi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan, all countries that have emerged from violent conflict. Cooperation among 45 municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras helps to manage regional public goods such as water in the Trifinio region. In Trifinio, regional South-South cooperation has transformed a zone of tensions (no-man’s armed borders) into a zone of integration and development. See OECD 2010f. 24. The view of the African Union with respect to West African countries that have recently experi- enced coups d’états was that donor support to social programs and poverty reduction programs should continue in these countries, but that larger scale support should be paced to support the return to a “constitutional path.” In practice, donors were divided between those that suspended assistance completely and those that continued assistance with no change (WDR team consulta- tion with officials in African Union in Addis Ababa, 2010). 25. An example of recent advances in evaluation in fragile states includes the new Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Initiative, which focuses on questions of legitimacy and utilization of public institutions, public service delivery, local collective action, social capital, and trust in elected officials in projects in Aceh (Indonesia), Afghanistan, Angola, Central African Republic, Cambo- dia, and Guinea. New directions for international support 293 26. This report complements research forthcoming in 2011, including a second issue of the Global Burden of Armed Violence from the Geneva Declaration, the next volume of the Human Security Report published as this report went to press, and the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of the Eco- nomics of Peace and Conflict. 27. Zoellick 2010a. Bibliographical Note This report draws on a wide range of World Bank documents and on numerous outside sources. Background analysis was contributed by: Beatriz Abizanda, Aga Khan Development Network, Nathalie Alvarado, Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, Matthew Andrews, Jairo Arboleda, Paul Arthur, Claus Astrup, Alexandra Avdeenko, Kathryn Bach, Mark Baird, Patrick Barron, Peter Bartu, Christina Biebesheimer, Arthur G. Blundell, Morten Bøås, Saswati Bora, James Boyce, Henk-Jan Brinkman, Tilman Brück, Rex Brynen, Iride Ceccacci, Brian Center, Pinki Chaudhuri, Asger Christensen, James Cockayne, Tara Cooper, Maria C. Correia, David Craig, Christopher Cramer, Martha Crenshaw, Olivia D’Aoust, Victor A.B. Davies, Pablo de Greiff, Alex de Waal, Dimitri F. De Pues, Frauke de Weijer, Christopher Delgado, Gabriel Demombynes, Deval Desai, Peter Dewees, Sinclair Dinnen, Le Dang Doanh, Barry Eichengreen, Gregory Ellis, Sundstøl Eriksen, FAFO, Alexander Evans, Doug Farah, Edgardo Favaro, James D. Fearon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Hedda Flatø, Shepard Forman, Paul Francis, Anthony Gambino, Esther Garcia, Scott Gates, Alan Gelb, Luigi Giovine, Blair Glencorse, Jack A. Goldstone, Margarita Puerto Gomez, Sonja Grimm, Jean-Marie Guehenno, Scott Guggenheim, Debarati Guha-Sapir, Paul-Simon Handy, Bernard Harborne, Niels Harild, Emily Harwell, Håvard Hegre, Cullen S. Hendrix, Anke Hoeffler, Karla Hoff, Richard Horsey, Fabrice Houdart, Yasheng Huang, Elisabeth Huybens, Inter-American Development Bank, Syeda S. Ijaz, Horst Intscher, Kremena Ionkova, Michael Jacobson, Prashant Jha, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Michael Johnston, Patricia Justino, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, Gilbert Khadaglia, Anne Kielland, Robert Krech, Christof P. Kurz, Sarah Laughton, Constantino Lluch, Norman V. Loayza, Clare Lockhart, Megumi Makisaka, Alexandre Marc, Keith Martin, Omar McDoom, Mike McGovern, John-Andrew McNeish, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Kenneth Menkhaus, Richard Messick, Ministry of Rural Development of India, Nadir Mohammed, Hannah Nielsen, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD/INCAF), David Pearce, Mary Porter Peschka, Nicola Pontara, Douglas Porter, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Monroe Price, Habib Rab, Clionadh Raleigh, Martha Ramirez, Anne Sofie Roald, Esther Rojas-Garcia, Paula Roque, Narve Rotwitt, Caroline Sage, Yezid Sayigh, Mark Schneider, Richard Scobey, Jake Sherman, Sylvana Q. Sinha, Judy Smith-Höhn, Joanna Spear, Anna Spenceley, Radhika Srinivasan, Frances Stewart, Håvard Strand, Scott Straus, Nicole Stremlau, Naotaka Sugawara, Deepak Thapa, Åge Tiltnes, Monica Toft, Robert Townsend, Bakary Fouraba Traore, Keiichi Tsunekawa, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), Bernice van Bronkhorst, Philip Verwimp, Joaquin Villalobos, Sarah von Billerbeck, Henriette von Kaltenborn-Stachau, Barbara F. Walter, Jusuf Wanandi, Xueli Wang, Clay Wescott, Teresa Whitfield, Alys Willman, Michael Woolcock, Michael Wyganowski, Kohei Yoshida. Background papers for the Report are available either on the World Wide Web at www.worldbank.org/wdr2011 or through the World Development Report office. The views expressed in these papers are not necessarily those of the World Bank or of this Report. 295 296 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Many people inside and outside the World Bank gave comments to the team. Valuable com- ments, guidance, and contributions were provided by Patricio Abinales, Ségolène Adam, James W. Adams, Douglas Addison, Ozong Agborsangaya-Fiteu, Sanjeev S. Ahluwalia, Ahmad Ahsan, Bryant Allen, Noro Andriamihaja, Edward Aspinall, Laura Bailey, Bill Battaile, Ferid Belhaj, Eric Bell, Christina Biebesheimer, Anna Bjerde, Brian Blankespoor, Chris Blattman, Edith H. Bowles, Mike Bourke, Sean Bradley, Cynthia Brady, Anne Brown, Gillie Brown, Colin Bruce, Paola Buendia, Roisín de Burca, William Byrd, Charles Call, Otaviano Canuto, Michael Car- nahan, Francis Carneiro, Paloma Anos Casero, Mukesh Chawla, Judy Cheng-Hopkins, Fantu Cheru, Punam Chuhan-Pole, Laurence Clarke, Kevin Clements, Cybèle Cochran, Colombia’s Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), Daniele Conversi, Louise Cord, Pamela Cox, Jeff Crisp, Geoffrey Dabelko, Beth Daponte, Monica Das Gupta, Elisabeth David, Martin David, John Davidson, Scott Dawson, Shanta Devarajan, James Dobbins, Joost Draaisma, Gregory Keith Ellis, Ibrahim Elbadawi, Obiageli Kathryn Ezekweli, Kene Ezemenari, Judith Fagalasuu, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Ezzedine Choukri Fishere, Cyprian F. Fisiy, Ariel Fiszbein, Robert L. Floyd, Verena Fritz, Francis Fukuyama, Ivor Fung, Varun Gauri, Madhur Gautam, Germany’s Deutscher Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Coralie Gevers, Indermit S. Gill, Chiara Giorgetti, Giorgia Giovannetti, Edward Girardet, Jack Goldstone, Kelly Green- hill, Pablo de Greiff, Scott E. Guggenheim, Tobias Haque, Bernard Harborne, David Harland, Jenny Hedman, Joel Hellman, Bert Hofman, Virginia Horscroft, Elisabeth Huybens, Elena Ianchovichina, Patchamuthu Illangovan, Sana Jaffrey, Martin Jelsma, Emmanuel E. Jimenez, Hilde Johnson, Mary Judd, Sima Kanaan, Alma Kanani, Phil Keefer, Caroline M. Kende-Robb, Homi Kharas, Young Chul Kim, Mark Kleiman, Steve Knack, Sahr Kpundeh, Aart Kraay, Keith Krause, Aurélien Kruse, Arvo Kuddo, Sibel Kulaksiz, Julien Labonne, Tuan Le, Theodore Leggett, René Lemarchand, Anne-Marie Leroy, Brian Levy, Esther Loening, Ana Paula Fialho Lopes, Chris Lovelace, Andrew Mack, Charles Maier, Sajjad Malik, David Mansfield, Alexandre Marc, Roland Marchal, Ernesto May, Alastair McKechnie, Dave McRae, Pratap Mehta, Piers Merrick, Jeffrey Miron, Peter Moll, Mick Moore, Adrian Morel, Edward Mount- field, Robert Muggah, Izumi Nakamitsu, Eric Nelson, Carmen Nonay, Antonio Nucifora, Liam O’Dowd, the OECD/International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD/INCAF), Adyline Waafas Ofusu-Amaah, Patti O’Neill, Robert Orr, Marina Ottaway, Phil Oxhorn, Kiran Pandey, Andrew Parker, Martin Parry, Borany Penh, Nadia Piffaretti, Nicola Pontara, Rae Porter, Ben Powis, Giovanna Prennushi, Gérard Prunier, Vikram Raghavan, Bassam Rama- dan, Peter Reuter, Joey Reyes, Dena Ringold, David Robalino, Michael Ross, Mustapha Rouis, Jordan Ryan, Joseph Saba, Abdi Samatar, Nicholas Sambanis, Kirsti Samuels, Jane Sansbury, Mark Schneider, Colin Scott, John Sender, Yasmine Sherif, Janmejay Singh, David Sislen, Edu- ardo Somensatto, Radhika Srinivasan, Scott Straus, Camilla Sudgen, Vivek Suri, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Almamy Sylla, Stefanie Teggemann, Thomas John Thomsen, Martin Tisné, Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval, Anne Tully, Carolyn Turk, Oliver Ulich, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Peter Uvin, Manuel Vargas, Antonius Verheijen, Thierry Vircoulon, M. 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Selected Indicators 2011 Table A1 Security Technical notes Selected world development indicators Introduction Classification of economies by region and income, FY2010 Table 1 Key indicators of development Table 2 Poverty Table 3 Millennium Development Goals: eradicating poverty and improving lives Table 4 Economic activity Table 5 Trade, aid, and finance Table 6 Key indicators for other economies Technical notes 336 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Table A1 Security Peacebuilding Military Youth Refugees and peacekeeping expenditures population Troops, Deaths Battle- Intentional Internally police, and from % of % of related homicides By displaced military % of central % Natural natural total male deaths per 100,000 country By country persons Operation observers government of disasters disasters population population (number) people of asylum of origin (number) namea (number) expenditure GDP (number) (number) ages 15–34 ages 15–34 2000–08 2000–09 2009 2009 2008 2010 2009 2009 2009 2000–08 b 2000–09 2009 2009 c Afghanistan 26,589 4.5 37 2,887,123 200,000 UNAMA 18 9.2 2.1 .. .. 34 18 Angola 3,535 .. 14,734 141,021 61,700 .. 4.6 .. .. 34 17 Armenia 0 2.5 3,607 18,000 8,000 16.1 4.0 .. .. 37 19 Bangladesh 0 2.6 228,586 10,432 65,000 10.8 1.1 137 13,241 34 15 Belize 0 32.7 230 17 .. .. 1.1 .. .. 36 19 Benin 0 .. 7,205 411 .. 6.8 1.0 .. .. 34 17 Bhutan 0 1.4 .. 89,070 .. .. .. .. .. 40 21 Bolivia 0 12.6 679 573 .. 7.9 1.6 39 916 36 18 Burkina Faso 0 3.6 543 990 .. 12.1 1.3 .. .. 34 17 Burundi 4,937 .. 24,967 94,239 100,000 BINUB 13 .. 3.8 36 833 33 17 Cambodia 0 .. 135 17,025 .. 12.8 1.2 .. .. 39 20 Cameroon 0 5.9 99,957 14,766 .. .. 1.6 .. .. 36 18 Cape Verde 0 .. .. 24 .. 2.1 0.6 .. .. 38 19 Central African Republic 350 .. 27,047 159,554 108,000 MINURCATd 1,456 .. 1.8 .. .. 35 17 Chad 4,328 .. 338,495 55,014 186,000 MINURCAT .. 6.5 .. .. 32 15 China 0 1.2 300,989 180,558 .. 17.9 2.0 731 111,029 32 17 Comoros 0 .. .. 268 .. .. .. 14 187 33 17 Congo, Dem. Rep. 75,118 .. 185,809 455,852 1,400,000 MONUSCO 19,008 .. 1.1 126 8,164 34 17 Congo, Rep. 116 .. 111,411 20,544 7,800 5.3 1.3 .. .. 33 17 Côte d'Ivoire 1,265 3.9 24,604 23,153 621,000 UNOCI 9,080 8.8 1.6 .. .. 36 18 Djibouti 0 0.7 12,111 622 .. .. 3.7 .. .. 38 17 Ecuador 0 18.0 116,557 1,027 .. .. 3.3 .. .. 35 17 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 0.6 94,406 6,990 .. 7.6 2.1 98 3,189 37 19 El Salvador 0 51.8 30 5,051 .. 2.9 0.6 28 1,813 36 17 Eritrea 57 .. 4,751 209,168 32,000 .. .. .. .. 34 17 Ethiopia 3,555 3.3 121,886 62,889 200,000 .. 1.3 .. .. 33 16 Gambia, The 0 .. 10,118 1,973 .. .. 0.7 .. .. 33 17 Georgia 648 7.1 870 15,020 300,000 29.3 5.6 .. .. 29 15 Ghana 0 1.8 13,658 14,893 .. 1.9 0.7 .. .. 36 18 Guatemala 0 46.0 131 5,768 .. 3.6 0.4 41 2,216 33 16 Guinea 1,174 .. 15,325 10,920 19,000 .. .. 35 1,103 33 17 Guinea-Bissau 0 .. 7,898 1,109 .. UNIOGBIS .. .. .. .. 35 17 Guyana 0 20.7 727 .. .. .. .. .. 34 18 Haiti 244 18.6 3 24,116 6,000 MINUSTAH 11,797 .. 0.0 .. .. 36 18 Honduras 0 58.0 19 1,166 .. 3.8 0.8 31 435 37 19 India 31,599 2.8 185,323 19,514 500,000 16.3 2.8 365 63,679 35 18 Indonesia 1,940 1.1 798 18,213 150,000 .. 0.9 232 182,209 34 18 Iraq 124,002 .. 35,218 1,785,212 2,842,000 UNAMI 233 .. 6.3 .. .. 37 19 Jordan 0 1.8 450,756 2,129 160,000 16.1 6.1 .. .. 36 19 Kenya 0 4.8 358,928 9,620 400,000 8.9 1.8 85 2,075 37 19 Kiribati 0 5.2 .. 33 .. .. .. .. .. 36 18 Korea, Dem. Rep. 0 .. .. .. 30,000 .. .. .. .. 31 16 Kosovo 0 .. 423 .. .. UNMIK 16 .. .. .. .. 37 19 Kyrgyz Republic 0 7.8 .. 2,612 .. 21.4 3.6 16 323 38 19 Lao PDR 0 .. .. 8,398 .. 3.7 0.4 .. .. 35 18 Lesotho 0 34.8 .. 10 .. 3.1 2.6 .. .. 40 19 Liberia 2,487 1.3 6,952 71,599 6,000 UNMIL 9,369 .. 0.8 10 103 33 16 Madagascar 0 .. .. 274 .. 9.9 1.1 .. .. 34 17 Malawi 0 .. 5,443 130 .. .. 1.2 38 2,390 35 17 Maldives 0 1.1 .. 16 .. .. .. .. .. 48 30 Mali 97 .. 13,538 2,926 .. 14.4 2.0 .. .. 32 16 Marshall Islands 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 36 18 Mauritania 0 .. 26,795 39,143 .. .. 3.8 .. .. 35 17 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0 .. 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 36 18 Moldova 0 7.7 141 5,925 .. 1.9 0.5 .. .. 35 18 Mongolia 0 11.9 11 1,495 .. 5.8 1.4 .. .. 39 20 Morocco 0 0.5 73 2,286 .. 11.0 3.4 52 1,545 36 18 Mozambique 0 .. 3,547 136 .. .. 0.9 50 2,017 33 17 Myanmar 2,833 0.2 .. 406,669 503,000 .. .. 17 138,968 37 19 Selected indicators 2011 337 Table A1 Security (continued) Peacebuilding Military Youth Refugees and peacekeeping expenditures population Troops, Deaths Battle- Intentional Internally police, and from % of % of related homicides By displaced military % of central % Natural natural total male deaths per 100,000 country By country persons Operation observers government of disasters disasters population population (number) people of asylum of origin (number) namea (number) expenditure GDP (number) (number) ages 15–34 ages 15–34 2000–08 2000–09 2009 2009 2008 2010 2009 2009 2009 2000–08 b 2000–09 2009 2009 Nepal 11,520 1.8 108,461 5,108 50,000 UNMIN 72 12.8 1.6 51 3,120 36 17 Nicaragua 0 13.0 120 1,478 .. .. 0.7 20 335 39 20 Niger 128 .. 325 822 .. 10.6 .. .. .. 33 17 Nigeria 124 1.3 9,127 15,609 100,000 .. 0.9 .. .. 35 18 Pakistan 11,107 7.3 1,740,711 35,132 50,000 21.8 2.9 123 78,582 36 19 Papua New Guinea 0 8.8 9,703 70 .. .. 0.5 25 397 35 18 Paraguay 0 12.3 89 77 .. 5.0 0.8 .. .. 36 18 Philippines 5,433 3.8 95 993 314,000 4.9 0.8 163 10,331 36 18 Rwanda 3,800 1.5 54,016 129,109 .. .. 1.5 .. .. 36 18 Samoa 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 33 17 São Tomé and Príncipe 0 .. .. 33 .. .. .. .. .. 34 17 Senegal 184 3.0 22,151 16,305 10,000 .. 1.6 .. .. 35 17 Sierra Leone 212 2.4 9,051 15,417 3,000 .. 2.3 .. .. 34 16 Solomon Islands 0 .. .. 66 4,000 .. .. .. .. 37 19 Somalia 3,983 .. 1,815 678,309 1,100,000 .. .. 53 3,161 32 16 Sri Lanka 24,807 7.4 251 145,721 500,000 18.5 3.5 25 35,891 33 17 Sudan 12,363 .. 186,292 368,195 6,000,000 UNMISe 10,592 .. 4.2 68 3,794 36 18 Swaziland 0 1.0 759 32 .. .. 2.1 .. .. 38 20 Syrian Arab Republic 0 3.0 1,054,466 17,914 65,000 .. 4.2 .. .. 38 19 Tajikistan 0 2.3 2,679 562 .. .. .. 31 180 39 20 Tanzania 0 1.0 118,731 1,204 .. .. 1.0 67 1,466 36 18 Thailand 2,067 7.9 105,297 502 .. 8.3 1.8 79 9,929 32 16 Timor-Leste 0 .. 1 7 30,000 UNMIT 1,518 .. 11.8 .. .. 36 19 Togo 0 .. 8,531 18,378 1,000 13.0 2.0 .. .. 37 18 Tonga 0 .. .. 5 .. .. .. .. .. 40 21 Tunisia 0 1.2 92 2,260 .. 4.4 1.4 .. .. 38 19 Turkmenistan 0 2.9 60 743 .. .. .. .. .. 39 19 Tuvalu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Uganda 5,432 8.7 127,345 7,554 869,000 17.1 2.2 75 1,817 34 17 Ukraine 0 6.3 7,334 24,522 .. 7.2 2.9 .. .. 30 15 Uzbekistan 247 2.5 555 6,669 3,000 .. .. .. .. 39 20 Vanuatu 0 .. 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 20 Vietnam 0 1.9 2,357 339,289 .. .. 2.2 .. .. 38 19 West Bank and Gaza 0 3.9 .. 95,201f 100,000 .. .. .. .. 37 19 Yemen, Rep. 0 4.0 170,854 1,934 .. .. 4.4 .. .. 37 19 Zambia 0 7.5 56,785 206 .. 5.7 1.7 .. .. 38 19 Zimbabwe 0 8.4 3,995 22,449 880,000 .. .. .. .. 35 15 Low income .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.5 .. .. .. .. Lower middle income .. .. .. .. .. 16.1 2.1 .. .. .. .. a. Data are as of October 2010. UNAMA is the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, BINUB is the Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi), MINURCAT is the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MONUSCO is the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNOCI is the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UNIOGBIS is the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau. MINUSTAH is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UNMOGIP is the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, UNAMI is the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, UNMIK is the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIL is the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UNMIN is the United Nations Mission in Nepal, UNMIS is the United Nations Mission in Sudan, and UNMIT is the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. b. Total over the period. c. Political mission administered by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. d. Includes peacekeepers in Chad. e. Does not include 22,061 troops, police, and military observers from the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. f. Only includes refugees under the United Nations Refugee Agency mandate. 338 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Technical Notes UN Peacekeeping Operation or Political Mission The name of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation or Table A1. Security United Nations Political Mission, if one existed as of Octo- ber 2010. Source: UN. Battle-related deaths Best estimates of the sum of battle deaths in civil wars from UN personnel 2000 to 2008. For countries with multiple civil wars, the best The number of United Nations troops, civilian police, and estimate for the total number of battle deaths from all con- military observers as of October 2010. Source: UN. flicts is taken. Source: PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset Version 3.0. Where best estimates were missing in the PRIO Battle Military expenditure as a percentage of central Deaths Dataset Version 3.0, best estimates from the UCDP government expenditure Battle Deaths dataset (v 5) were taken. Where best estimates Military expenditure as a percentage of central government were unavailable from both the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset expenditure for the year. Military expenditures data from Version 3.0 as well as the UCDP Battle Deaths dataset (v 5), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are the weighted average of PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset Version derived from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 3.0’s low and high estimates was taken as the best estimate. definition, which includes all current and capital expendi- tures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; Intentional homicides defense ministries and other government agencies engaged Denotes the homicide rate per 100,000 people for the latest in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to year that data are available from 2000 to 2009. The rates have be trained and equipped for military operations; and military been reconciled into a single figure from all sources collecting space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil homicide statistics from both the health and the criminal jus- personnel, including retirement pensions of military person- tice sectors. Data from United Nations Office on Drugs and nel and social services for personnel; operation and main- Crime (UNOCDC) Crime Trends Survey (CTS) and from tenance; procurement; military research and development; the World Health Organization were used as the two main and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor sources of homicide statistics but preference was given to country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures UNODC’s CTS because of its superior coverage. Regression for previous military activities, such as for veterans’ benefits, analyses were used to determine the degree of correlation demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This between other criminal justice/police-based and health-based definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since sources and the two main sources of data. Where correlations that would require much more detailed information than is were high with the other sources, these were used to impute available about what is included in military budgets and off– single missing observations in the main sources of data. Once budget military expenditure items. (For example, military single gaps were filled, both data sources were combined into budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and a single set of homicides based on new regression analyses auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose and later complemented with statistics from national sources. forces such as military and civilian police, military grants Sources: UNODC-CTS; Eurostat (Health and Criminal Jus- in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security tice); Archer and Gartner Comparative Crime Data (1978); contributions paid by one part of government to another.) World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Children’s Fund (UNICEF); Pan American Health Organiza- (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and Interna- tion; TransMONEE Database; national sources. tional Security. Note: Data for some countries are based on partial or uncertain data or rough estimates. Refugees by country of asylum Denotes the number of refugees hosted by a country as of Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP the end of 2009. Source: United Nations High Commission Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Military expen- for Refugees (UNHCR). ditures data from SIPRI are derived from the NATO defini- tion, which includes all current and capital expenditures on Refugees by country of origin the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense Denotes the number of refugees originating from each coun- ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense try. Source: UNHCR. projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space Internally displaced persons activities. Such expenditures include military and civil per- Denotes the number of internally displaced people in a sonnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel country as of the end of 2008. Source: U.S. Committee for and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; Refugees and Immigrants. procurement; military research and development; and mili- Selected indicators 2011 339 tary aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). meteorological, technological, climatological, and geophysi- Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for pre- cal disasters. Source: CRED. vious military activities, such as for veterans’ benefits, demo- bilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. This Total youth population ages 15 to 34 years definition cannot be applied for all countries, however, since Percentage of total youth population ages 15 to 34 years out that would require much more detailed information than is of total population (both males and females). Source: Calcu- available about what is included in military budgets and off- lations based on data from the United States Census Interna- budget military expenditure items. (For example, military tional Database. budgets might or might not cover civil defense, reserves and auxiliary forces, police and paramilitary forces, dual-purpose Total male youth population ages 15 to 34 years forces such as military and civilian police, military grants in kind, pensions for military personnel, and social security Percentage of male youth population ages 15 to 34 years out contributions paid by one part of government to another.) of total population. Source: Calculations based on data from Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute the United States Census International Database. (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and Interna- tional Security. Note: Data for some countries are based on Physical Rights Integrity Index partial or uncertain data or rough estimates. This indicator measures the extent of human rights abuses in a country. It is a composite indicator made up of four sub- Number of natural disasters components: torture, politically motivated disappearances, The sum of natural disasters in a country from 2000 to extrajudicial killings, and politically motivated incarcera- 2008. This includes biological, hydrological, meteorologi- tion. The index ranges from 0 (no government respect for cal, technological, climatological, and geophysical disasters. these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four Source: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disas- rights). Source: CIRI (Cingranelli-Richards) Human Rights ters (CRED). Data Project, University of Binghamton, New York. Number of years each leader has been in power. Calcu- Number of deaths from natural disasters lated from the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders (H. E. Total number of deaths from all natural disasters in a coun- Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza) try from 2000 to 2009. This includes biological, hydrological, and the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. Selected World Development Indicators 2011 I n this year’s edition, development data are in six tables measures of levels and trends or do not adequately adhere to presenting comparative socioeconomic data for more international standards, the data are not shown. than 130 economies for the most recent year for which The data presented are generally consistent with those in data are available and, for some indicators, for an ear- World Development Indicators 2010. However, data have been lier year. An additional table presents basic indicators for 78 revised and updated wherever new information has become economies with sparse data or with populations of less than available. Differences may also reflect revisions to historical 3 million. series and changes in methodology. Thus data of different The indicators presented here are from more than 800 vintages may be published in different editions of World included in World Development Indicators 2010. Published Bank publications. Readers are advised not to compile data annually, World Development Indicators (WDI) reflects a series from different publications or different editions of the comprehensive view of the development process. WDI’s six same publication. Consistent time-series data are available sections recognize the contribution of a wide range of factors: on the Open Data website (http://data.worldbank.org). progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) All dollar figures are in current U.S. dollars unless oth- and human capital development, environmental sustain- erwise stated. The various methods used to convert from ability, macroeconomic performance, private sector devel- national currency figures are described in the technical notes opment and the investment climate, and the global links that following the tables. influence the external environment for development. Because the World Bank’s primary business is providing WDI is complemented by a separately published database lending and policy advice to its low- and middle-income that gives access to more than 900 time-series indicators for members, the issues covered in these tables focus mainly on 237 economies and regions. This database is available at the those economies. Where available, information on the high- Open Data website (http://data.worldbank.org). income economies is also provided for comparison. Read- ers may wish to refer to national statistical publications and Data sources and methodology publications of the OECD and the European Union (EU) for Socioeconomic and environmental data presented here more information on the high-income economies. are drawn from several sources: primary data collected by the World Bank, member country statistical publications, Classification of economies and research institutes, and international organizations such as summary measures the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies, the The summary measures at the bottom of most tables include International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organisation economies classified by income per capita and by region. for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (See Gross national income (GNI) per capita is used to determine the data sources in the technical notes following the tables for the following income classifications: low income, US$995 or a complete listing.) Although international standards of cov- less in 2009; middle income, US$996 to US$12,195; and high erage, definition, and classification apply to most statistics income, US$12,196 and above. A further division at GNI reported by countries and international agencies, inevitable per capita US$3,945 is made between lower-middle-income differences in timeliness and reliability arise from differences and upper-middle-income economies. The classification of in the capabilities and resources devoted to basic data collec- economies based on per capita income occurs annually, so tion and compilation. For some topics, competing sources of the country composition of the income groups may change data require review by the World Bank staff to ensure that the annually. When these changes in classification are made on most reliable data available are presented. In some instances, the basis of the most recent estimates, aggregates based on where available data are deemed too weak to provide reliable the new income classifications are recalculated for all past 341 342 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 periods to ensure that a consistent time series is maintained. Technical notes See the classification of economies at the end of this discus- Because data quality and intercountry comparisons are often sion for a list of economies in each group (including those problematic, readers are encouraged to consult the technical with populations of less than 3 million). notes that follow the tables, the list of classification of econo- Summary measures are either totals (indicated by a t if mies by region and income that follows this discussion, and the aggregates include estimates for missing data and non- the footnotes to the tables. For more extensive documenta- reporting countries, or by an s for simple sums of the data tion, see WDI 2010. available), weighted averages (w), or median values (m) calculated for groups of economies. Data for the countries Symbols excluded from the main tables (those presented in table 6) .. means that data are not available or that aggregates cannot have been included in the summary measures, where data are be calculated because of missing data in the years shown. available; otherwise, it is assumed that they follow the trend 0 or 0.0 means zero or small enough that the number would of reporting countries. This approach gives a more consistent round to zero at the displayed number of decimal places. aggregated measure by standardizing country coverage for / in dates, as in 2003/04, means that the period of time, usu- each period shown. Where missing information accounts for ally 12 months, straddles two calendar years and refers to a third or more of the overall estimate, however, the group a crop year, a survey year, or a fiscal year. measure is reported as not available. The section on statisti- $ means current U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted. cal methods in the technical notes provides further informa- > means more than. tion on aggregation methods. Weights used to construct the < means less than. aggregates are listed in the technical notes for each table. Readers may find more information in WDI 2010, and Terminology and country coverage orders can be made online, by phone, or fax as follows: The term country does not imply political independence but may refer to any territory for which authorities report sepa- For more information and to order online: http://data rate social or economic statistics. Data are shown for econo- .worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. mies as they were constituted in 2009, and historical data are revised to reflect current political arrangements. Throughout To order by phone: 1-800-645-7247 the tables, exceptions are noted. Unless otherwise noted, data for China do not include data for Hong Kong SAR, China; To order by fax: 1-703-661-1501 Macao SAR, China; or Taiwan, China. Data for Indonesia include Timor-Leste through 1999 unless otherwise noted. To order by mail: The World Bank, P.O. Box 960, Herndon, Montenegro declared independence from Serbia and Monte- VA 20172-0960, USA negro on June 3, 2006. When available, data for each country are shown separately. However, some indicators for Serbia continue to include data for Montenegro through 2005; these data are footnoted in the tables. Moreover, data for most indicators from 1999 onward for Serbia exclude data for Kosovo, which in 1999 became a territory under inter- national administration pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999); any exceptions are noted. Kosovo became a World Bank member on June 29, 2009, and its data are shown in the tables where available. Selected World Development Indicators 2011 343 Classification of economies by region and income, FY2011 East Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia High-income OECD American Samoa UMC Antigua and Barbuda UMC Afghanistan LIC Australia Cambodia LIC Argentina UMC Bangladesh LIC Austria China LMC Belize LMC Bhutan LMC Belgium Fiji UMC Bolivia LMC India LMC Canada Indonesia LMC Brazil UMC Maldives LMC Czech Republic Kiribati LMC Chile UMC Nepal LIC Denmark Korea, Dem. Rep. LIC Colombia UMC Pakistan LMC Finland Lao PDR LIC Costa Rica UMC Sri Lanka LMC France Malaysia UMC Cuba UMC Germany Marshall Islands LMC Dominica UMC Sub-Saharan Africa Greece Micronesia, Fed. Sts. LMC Dominican Republic UMC Angola LMC Hungary Mongolia LMC Ecuador LMC Benin LIC Iceland Myanmar LIC El Salvador LMC Botswana UMC Ireland Palau UMC Grenada UMC Burkina Faso LIC Israel Papua New Guinea LMC Guatemala LMC Burundi LIC Italy Philippines LMC Guyana LMC Cameroon LMC Japan Samoa LMC Haiti LIC Cape Verde LMC Korea, Rep. Solomon Islands LIC Honduras LMC Central African Republic LIC Luxembourg Thailand LMC Jamaica UMC Chad LIC Netherlands Timor-Leste LMC Mexico UMC Comoros LIC New Zealand Tonga LMC Nicaragua LMC Congo, Dem. Rep. LIC Norway Tuvalu LMC Panama UMC Congo, Rep. LMC Poland Vanuatu LMC Paraguay LMC Côte d´Ivoire LMC Portugal Vietnam LMC Peru UMC Eritrea LIC Slovak Republic St. Kitts and Nevis UMC Ethiopia LIC Slovenia Europe and Central Asia St. Lucia UMC Gabon UMC Spain Albania UMC St. Vincent and the Grenadines UMC Gambia, The LIC Sweden Armenia LMC Suriname UMC Ghana LIC Switzerland Azerbaijan UMC Uruguay UMC Guinea LIC United Kingdom Belarus UMC Venezuela, RB UMC Guinea-Bissau LIC United States Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC Kenya LIC Bulgaria UMC Lesotho LMC Other high income Georgia LMC Middle East and North Africa Liberia LIC Andorra Kazakhstan UMC Algeria UMC Madagascar LIC Aruba Kosovo LMC Djibouti LMC Malawi LIC Bahamas, The Kyrgyz Republic LIC Egypt, Arab Rep. LMC Mali LIC Bahrain Lithuania UMC Iran, Islamic Rep. UMC Mauritania LIC Barbados Macedonia, FYR UMC Iraq LMC Mauritius UMC Bermuda Moldova LMC Jordan LMC Mayotte UMC Brunei Darussalam Montenegro UMC Lebanon UMC Mozambique LIC Cayman Islands Romania UMC Libya UMC Namibia UMC Channel Islands Russian Federation UMC Morocco LMC Niger LIC Croatia Serbia UMC Syrian Arab Republic LMC Nigeria LMC Cyprus Tajikistan LIC Tunisia LMC Rwanda LIC Equatorial Guinea Turkey UMC West Bank and Gaza LMC São Tomé and Príncipe LMC Estonia Turkmenistan LMC Yemen, Rep. LMC Senegal LMC Faeroe Islands Ukraine LMC Seychelles UMC French Polynesia Uzbekistan LMC Sierra Leone LIC Gibraltar Somalia LIC Greenland South Africa UMC Guam Sudan LMC Hong Kong SAR, China Swaziland LMC Isle of Man Tanzania LIC Kuwait Togo LIC Latvia Uganda LIC Liechtenstein Zambia LIC Macao SAR, China Zimbabwe LIC Malta Monaco Netherlands Antilles New Caledonia Northern Mariana Islands Oman Puerto Rico Qatar San Marino Saudi Arabia Singapore Taiwan, China Trinidad and Tobago Turks and Caicos Islands United Arab Emirates Virgin Islands (U.S.) Source: World Bank data. This table classifies all World Bank member economies and all other economies with populations of more than 30,000. Economies are divided among income groups according to 2009 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are low income (LIC), US$995 or less; lower middle income (LMC), US$996–3,945; upper middle income (UMC), US$3,946–12,195; and high income, US$12,196 or more. 344 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Table 1. Key indicators of development Gross national PPP national Population Gross Adult Population income (GNI) a income (GNI) b Life expectancy age domestic literacy at birth Average Density composition $ $ product rate annual % people % $ per $ per per capita Male Female % ages 15 Millions growth per sq. km ages 0–14 billions capita billions capita % growth Years Years and older 2009 2000–09 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2008–09 2008 2008 2008 Afghanistan 30 2.6 44 46 10.6 370 32.1 c 1,110 c –0.4 44 44 .. Albania 3 0.3 115 24 12.5 3,950 25.8 8,170 1.8 74 80 99 Algeria 35 1.5 14 27 154.2 4,420 283.6c 8,130c 0.6 71 74 73 Angola 18 2.9 14 45 64.5 3,490 91.9 4,970 –2.3 45 49 70 Argentina 40 1.0 15 25 304.7 7,570 568.8 14,120 –0.1 72 79 98 Armenia 3 0.0 109 20 9.5 3,100 16.7 5,420 –14.6 70 77 100 Australia 22 1.5 3 19 957.5 43,770 835.7 38,210 –0.8 79 84 .. Austria 8 0.5 101 15 391.8 46,850 322.5 38,550 –3.8 78 83 .. Azerbaijan 9 1.0 105 24 42.5 4,840 79.3 9,030 8.0 68 73 100 Bangladesh 162 1.6 1,229 31 95.4 590 256.2 1,580 4.4 65 67 55 Belarus 10 –0.4 48 15 53.5 5,540 119.6 12,380 0.4 65 77 100 Belgium 11 0.6 354 17 488.8 45,310 394.0 36,520 –3.7 77 83 .. Benin 9 3.3 78 43 6.7 750 13.5 1,510 0.6 60 63 41 Bolivia 10 1.9 9 36 16.0 1,620 42.0 4,260 1.6 64 68 91 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 0.2 74 15 17.7 4,700 32.9 8,740 –3.2 73 78 98 Brazil 194 1.2 23 26 1,557.2 8,040 1,988.1 10,260 –1.1 69 76 90 Bulgaria 8 –0.7 70 13 43.7 5,770 93.2 12,290 –4.6 70 77 98 Burkina Faso 16 3.3 56 46 8.0 510 18.4 1,170 0.1 52 54 29 Burundi 8 2.8 314 38 1.2 150 3.3 390 0.6 49 52 66 Cambodia 15 1.7 82 33 9.7 650 27.4 1,850 –3.7 59 63 78 Cameroon 20 2.3 40 41 22.8 1,170 43.0 2,200 0.1 51 52 76 Canada 34 1.0 4 17 1,423.0 42,170 1,268.2 37,590 –3.7 79 83 .. Central African Republic 4 1.8 7 41 2.0 450 3.3 750 0.5 45 49 55 Chad 11 3.2 9 46 6.9 610 13.8 1,230 –1.1 47 50 33 Chile 17 1.1 23 23 159.9 9,420 227.9 13,430 –2.5 76 82 99 China 1,331 0.6 142 20 4,778.3 3,590 9,018.8 6,770 8.5 71 75 94 Hong Kong SAR, China 7 0.6 6,696 12 219.2 31,420 307.5 44,070 1.6 79 86 .. Colombia 46 1.5 41 29 225.2 4,930 388.1 8,500 –0.9 69 77 93 Congo, Dem. Rep. 66 2.9 28 47 10.7 160 19.6 300 0.0 46 49 67 Congo, Rep. 4 2.1 11 40 6.7 1,830 10.8 2,940 5.6 53 55 .. Costa Rica 5 1.7 89 26 28.5 6,230 50.1c 10,940c –2.8 77 81 96 Côte d´Ivoire 21 2.2 65 41 22.4 1,060 34.5 1,640 1.4 56 59 55 Croatia 4 0.0 82 15 61.2 13,810 84.9 19,170 –5.8 72 80 99 Czech Republic 10 0.2 135 14 181.5 17,310 247.7 23,610 –4.8 74 81 .. Denmark 6 0.4 129 18 325.8 58,930 208.5 37,720 –5.5 77 81 .. Dominican Republic 10 1.5 206 31 45.5 4,510 81.8c 8,100c 2.0 70 75 88 Ecuador 14 1.1 49 31 53.4 3,920 109.5 8,040 –0.7 72 78 84 Egypt, Arab Rep. 83 1.9 82 32 172.0 2,070 471.9 5,690 2.8 68 72 66 El Salvador 6 0.4 296 32 20.8 3,370 39.2c 6,360c –3.0 67 76 84 Eritrea 5 3.6 49 42 1.5 300 3.1 c 640 c –1.0 57 62 65 Ethiopia 83 2.6 81 44 27.0 330 77.4 930 5.9 54 57 36 Finland 5 0.3 17 17 243.9 45,680 183.8 34,430 –8.2 76 83 .. France 63d 0.7d 114d 18 2,754.6 42,680 2,192.9 33,980 –3.2 78 85 .. Georgia 4 –1.2 62 17 11.1e 2,530e 20.6e 4,700e –4.1e 68 75 100 Germany 82 0.0 235 14 3,484.7 42,560 3,026.7 36,960 –4.7 78 83 .. Ghana 24 2.2 103 38 16.6 700 35.3 1,480 1.4 56 58 66 Greece 11 0.4 87 14 323.1 28,630 320.8 28,440 –2.4 78 82 97 Guatemala 14 2.5 128 42 36.8 2,620 64.4c 4,590c –2.1 67 74 74 Guinea 10 2.0 40 43 3.8 370 9.5 940 –2.6 56 60 38 Haiti 10 1.7 358 36 .. ..f .. .. 1.3 59 63 .. Honduras 7 2.0 65 37 13.6 1,820 27.9c 3,730c –3.9 70 75 84 Hungary 10 –0.2 112 15 130.1 12,980 186.1 18,570 –6.2 70 78 99 India 1,155 1.4 383 31 1,368.7 1,180 3,768.1 3,260 6.2 62 65 63 Indonesia 230 1.3 125 27 513.4 2,230 933.2 4,060 3.4 69 73 92 Iran, Islamic Rep. 73 1.5 44 24 330.6 4,530 837.7 11,490 0.5 70 73 82 Iraq 31 2.5 70 41 69.7 2,210 105.1 3,340 1.6 64 72 78 Ireland 4 1.7 64 21 197.2 44,310 148.1 33,280 –6.5 78 82 .. Israel 7 1.9 338 28 191.6 25,740 201.2 27,040 –1.1 79 83 .. Italy 60 0.6 203 14 2,112.5 35,080 1,886.6 31,330 –5.7 79 85 99 Japan 128 0.1 350 13 4,830.3 37,870 4,245.7 33,280 –5.1 79 86 .. Jordan 6 2.4 66 34 22.3 3,740 34.8 5,840 0.4 71 75 92 Kazakhstan 16 0.7 6 24 107.1 6,740 163.2 10,270 –0.2 61 72 100 Kenya 40 2.6 68 43 30.7 770 62.7 1,570 –0.5 54 55 87 Korea, Rep. 49 0.4 502 17 966.6 19,830 1,331.4 27,310 –0.1 77 83 .. Kyrgyz Republic 5 0.9 28 29 4.6 870 11.7 2,200 1.5 63 72 99 Lao PDR 6 1.7 27 38 5.6 880 13.9 2,210 4.5 64 66 73 Lebanon 4 1.3 410 25 33.6 7,970 55.9 13,230 7.2 70 74 90 Liberia 4 3.7 39 43 0.6 160 1.2 290 0.3 57 60 58 Libya 6 2.0 4 30 77.2 12,020 105.5c 16,430c 0.1 72 77 88 Lithuania 3 –0.5 54 15 38.1 11,410 55.9 16,740 –14.6 66 78 100 Madagascar 20 2.8 33 43 7.9 420 20.1 1,050 –2.2 59 62 71 Malawi 15 2.8 158 46 4.2 280 11.6 760 4.8 52 54 73 Malaysia 27 1.8 82 29 198.7 7,230 371.8 13,530 –3.3 72 77 92 Mali 13 2.4 10 44 8.9 680 15.4 1,190 1.9 48 49 26 Mauritania 3 2.6 3 39 3.2 960 6.5 1,960 –3.4 55 59 57 Mexico 107 1.0 55 28 958.8 8,920 1,515.5 14,110 –7.5 73 78 93 Selected World Development Indicators 2011 345 Table 1. Key indicators of development (continued) Gross national PPP national Population Gross Adult Population income (GNI) a income (GNI) b Life expectancy age domestic literacy at birth Average Density composition $ $ product rate annual % people % $ per $ per per capita Male Female % ages 15 Millions growth per sq. km ages 0–14 billions capita billions capita % growth Years Years and older 2009 2000–09 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2008–09 2008 2008 2008 Moldova 4 –1.4 110 17 5.7g 1,590g 10.9g 3,060g –6.4g 65 72 98 Morocco 32 1.2 71 28 90.7h 2,790h 144.8h 4,450h 3.7h 69 74 56 Mozambique 23 2.5 28 44 10.0 440 20.1 880 3.9 47 49 54 Myanmar 50 0.8 76 27 .. ..f .. .. 11.8 59 64 92 Nepal 29 2.0 201 37 13.0 440 34.7 1,180 2.8 66 67 58 Netherlands 17 0.4 487 18 815.8 49,350 669.6 40,510 –4.5 78 82 .. New Zealand 4 1.2 16 20 114.5 26,830 112.8 26,430 –1.6 78 82 .. Nicaragua 6 1.3 47 35 5.8 1,000 14.1c 2,450c –2.3 70 76 78 Niger 15 3.6 12 50 5.2 340 10.1 660 –2.9 51 52 29 Nigeria 155 2.4 166 43 175.8 1,140 305.7 1,980 0.6 47 48 60 Norway 5 0.8 16 19 417.3 86,440 270.6 56,050 –2.8 78 83 .. Pakistan 170 2.3 215 37 172.9 1,020 459.4 2,710 1.5 66 67 54 Panama 3 1.7 46 29 23.2 6,710 43.3c 12,530c 0.8 73 78 94 Papua New Guinea 7 2.5 15 40 7.9 1,180 15.3c 2,270c 2.1 59 63 60 Paraguay 6 1.9 16 34 14.4 2,270 28.1 4,430 –5.5 70 74 95 Peru 29 1.3 23 30 120.9 4,150 237.5 8,140 –0.2 71 76 90 Philippines 92 1.9 303 34 164.5 1,790 326.1 3,540 –0.9 70 74 94 Poland 38 –0.1 125 15 467.5 12,260 703.5 18,440 1.6 71 80 100 Portugal 11 0.4 116 15 222.6 20,940 243.1 22,870 –2.8 76 82 95 Romania 21 –0.5 94 15 178.9 8,330 310.6 14,460 –8.4 70 77 98 Russian Federation 142 –0.3 9 15 1,329.7 9,370 2,609.0 18,390 –7.8 62 74 100 Rwanda 10 2.5 394 42 4.6 460 10.6 1,060 2.4 48 52 70 Saudi Arabia 25 2.3 12 32 439.0 17,700 595.4 24,000 –2.2 71 75 86 Senegal 13 2.6 63 44 12.9 1,030 22.4 1,790 –1.1 54 57 42 Serbia 7 –0.3 83 18 43.8 5,990 83.6 11,420 –2.5 71 76 .. Sierra Leone 6 3.3 78 43 1.9 340 4.5 790 1.5 46 49 40 Singapore 5 2.4 6,943 16 185.7 37,220 248.6 49,850 –4.2 78 83 95 Slovak Republic 5 0.1 112 15 87.4 16,130 117.1 21,600 –6.4 71 79 .. Somalia 9 2.3 14 45 .. ..f .. .. .. 48 51 .. South Africa 49 1.3 40 31 284.5 5,770 496.4 10,060 –2.8 50 53 89 Spain 46 1.5 91 15 1,464.7 31,870 1,453.6 31,630 –4.5 78 84 98 Sri Lanka 20 0.9 312 24 40.4 1,990 95.9 4,720 2.8 70 78 91 Sudan 42 2.1 17 39 51.6 1,220 84.6 2,000 1.7 57 60 69 Sweden 9 0.5 22 17 455.2 48,930 358.7 38,560 –5.7 79 83 .. Switzerland 8 0.8 191 15 431.1 56,370 319.9 41,830 0.5 80 85 .. Syrian Arab Republic 21 2.7 112 35 50.9 2,410 97.5 4,620 1.5 72 76 84 Tajikistan 7 1.3 49 37 4.8 700 13.5 1,950 1.7 64 69 100 Tanzania 44 2.8 48 45 21.3i 500i 57.5i 1,350i 2.5i 55 56 73 Thailand 68 0.9 132 22 254.7 3,760 518.0 7,640 –2.8 66 72 94 Togo 7 2.6 119 40 2.9 440 5.6 850 0.0 61 64 65 Tunisia 10 1.0 66 23 38.8 3,720 81.5 7,820 2.1 72 76 78 Turkey 75 1.3 96 27 653.1 8,730 1,027.3 13,730 –5.9 70 74 89 Turkmenistan 5 1.4 11 29 17.5 3,420 35.7c 6,990c 6.6 61 69 100 Uganda 33 3.2 161 49 15.0 460 39.0 1,190 3.6 52 53 75 Ukraine 46 –0.7 80 14 128.8 2,800 284.8 6,190 –14.6 63 74 100 United Arab Emirates 5 3.9 54 19 .. ..j .. .. –3.2 77 79 90 United Kingdom 62 0.5 254 17 2,567.5 41,520 2,310.5 37,360 –5.6 78 82 .. United States 307 0.9 33 20 14,502.6 47,240 14,345.3 46,730 –3.3 76 81 .. Uruguay 3 0.1 19 23 31.3 9,360 43.2 12,910 2.5 72 80 98 Uzbekistan 28 1.3 64 29 30.5 1,100 80.2c 2,890c 6.3 65 71 99 Venezuela, RB 28 1.7 32 30 288.1 10,150 351.1 12,370 –4.8 71 77 95 Vietnam 87 1.3 278 26 88.0 1,010 249.1 2,850 4.2 72 76 93 West Bank and Gaza 4 3.3 654 45 .. ..k .. .. .. 72 75 94 Yemen, Rep. 24 2.9 43 44 25.0 1,060 55.1 2,340 0.8 61 65 61 Zambia 13 2.4 17 46 12.6 970 16.5 1,280 3.7 45 46 71 Zimbabwe 13 0.1 32 40 .. ..f .. .. .. 44 45 91 World 6,775s 1.2w 52w 27w 59,219.0t 8,741w 72,038.7t 10,633w –3.0w 67w 71w 83w Low income 846 2.2 48 39 425.7 503 1,014.5 1,199 2.5 56 58 66 Middle income 4,813 1.2 61 27 16,231.0 3,373 30,593.8 6,357 1.4 67 71 83 Lower middle income 3,811 1.2 122 28 8,757.7 2,298 18,130.0 4,758 5.6 66 70 80 Upper middle income 1,002 0.9 21 25 7,483.6 7,471 12,500.6 12,479 –3.4 68 75 93 Low and middle income 5,659 1.3 58 29 16,671.5 2,946 31,607.3 5,586 1.3 65 69 80 East Asia & Pacific 1,944 0.8 122 23 6,109.6 3,143 11,640.7 5,989 6.6 70 74 93 Europe & Central Asia 404 0.1 18 19 2,746.1 6,793 5,104.6 12,628 –6.2 65 74 98 Latin America & the Caribbean 572 1.2 28 28 3,970.9 6,936 5,920.5 10,342 –2.9 70 77 91 Middle East & North Africa 331 1.8 38 31 1,189.2 3,594 2,623.1 7,927 1.6 69 73 74 South Asia 1,568 1.6 324 32 1,704.9 1,088 4,658.6 2,972 5.4 63 65 61 Sub-Saharan Africa 840 2.5 35 43 919.8 1,096 1,675.7 1,996 –1.2 51 53 62 High income 1,117 0.7 33 17 42,583.9 38,139 40,723.8 36,473 –3.9 77 83 98 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. a. Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. b. PPP is purchasing power parity; see the technical notes. c. The estimate is based on regression; others are extrapolated from the latest International Comparison Program benchmark estimates. d. Data exclude the French overseas departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion. e. Data exclude Abkhazia and South Ossetia. f. Estimated to be low income (US$995 or less). g. Excludes data for Transnistria. h. Data include Former Spanish Sahara i. Data refer to mainland Tanzania only. j. Estimated to be high income (US$12,196 or more). k. Estimated to be lower middle income (US$996–3,945). 346 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Table 2 Poverty International poverty line National poverty line Population Poverty Population Poverty Population below national poverty line below gap at Population below gap at Population $1.25 $1.25 below $1.25 $1.25 below Survey National Survey National Survey a day a day $2.00 a day Survey a day a day $2.00 a day year % year % year % % % year % % % Afghanistan 2007 42.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Albania 2002 25.4 2005 18.5 2002a <2 <0.5 8.7 2005a <2 <0.5 7.8 Algeria 1988 12.2 1995 22.6 1988a 6.6 1.8 23.8 1995a 6.8 1.4 23.6 Angola .. .. 2000a 54.3 29.9 70.2 .. .. .. Argentina .. .. 2005b, c 4.5 1 11.3 2006b, c 3.4 1.2 7.3 Armenia 1998–99 55.1 2001 50.9 2003a 10.6 1.9 43.4 2007a 3.7 0.7 21 Australia .. .. 2001a 6.3 1.1 27.1 2005a <2 <0.5 <2 Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Azerbaijan 1995 68.1 2001 49.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. Bangladesh 2000 48.9 2005 40.0 2000a 57.8d 17.3d 85.4d 2005a 49.6d 13.1d 81.3d Belarus 2002 30.5 2004 17.4 2005a <2 <0.5 <2 2007a <2 <0.5 <2 Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Benin 1999 29.0 2003 39.0 2003a 47.3 15.7 75.3 .. .. .. Bolivia 2000 45.2 2007 37.7 2005c 19.6 9.7 30.3 2007c 11.9 5.6 21.9 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001–02 19.5 .. 2004a <2 <0.5 <2 2007a <2 <0.5 <2 Brazil 1998 22.0 2002–03 21.5 2005c 7.8 1.6 18.3 2007c 5.2 1.3 12.7 Bulgaria 1997 36.0 2001 12.8 2001a 2.6 <0.5 7.8 2003a <2 <0.5 <2 Burkina Faso 1998 54.6 2003 46.4 1998a 70 30.2 87.6 2003a 56.5 20.3 81.2 Burundi 1998 68.0 .. 1998a 86.4 47.3 95.4 2006a 81.3 36.4 93.4 Cambodia 2004 34.7 2007 30.1 2004a 40.2 11.3 68.2 2007a 25.8 6.1 57.8 Cameroon 2001 40.2e 2007 39.9e 1996a 51.5 18.9 74.4 2001a 32.8 10.2 57.7 Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Central African Republic .. .. 1993a 82.8 57 90.7 2003a 62.4 28.3 81.9 Chad 1995–96 43.4 .. 2002–03a 61.9 25.6 83.3 .. .. .. Chile 2003 18.7e 2006 13.7e 2003c <2 <0.5 5.3 2006 c <2 <0.5 2.4 China a f f f Hong Kong .. .. 2002 28.4 8.7 51.1 2005a 15.9f 4f 36.3f SAR, China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Colombia 2002 55.7 2006 45.1 2003c 15.4 6.1 26.3 2006c 16 5.7 27.9 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2004–05 71.3 .. 2005–06a 59.2 25.3 79.5 .. .. .. Congo, Rep. 2005 42.3 .. 2005a 54.1 22.8 74.4 .. .. .. Costa Rica 1989 31.7 2004 23.9 2005c 2.4 <0.5 8.6 2007c <2 <0.5 4.3 Côte d´Ivoire .. .. 1998a 24.1 6.7 49.1 2002 23.3 6.8 46.8 Croatia 2002 11.2 2004 11.1 2001a <2 <0.5 <2 2005a <2 <0.5 <2 Czech Republic .. .. 1993c <2 <0.5 <2 1996c <2 <0.5 <2 Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Dominican Republic 2000 36.5e 2007 48.5e 2005c 5 0.9 15.1 2007c 4.4 1.3 12.3 Ecuador 1999 52.2e 2006 38.3e 2005c 9.8 3.2 20.4 2007c 4.7 1.2 12.8 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1995–96 22.9 1999–2000 16.7 1999–00a <2 <0.5 19.3 2004–05a <2 <0.5 18.4 El Salvador 2000 38.8e, g 2006 30.7e, g 2005c 11 4.8 20.5 2007c 6.4 2.7 13.2 Eritrea 1993–94 53.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Ethiopia 1995–96 45.5 1999–2000 44.2 1999–00a 55.6 16.2 86.4 2005a 39 9.6 77.5 Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Georgia 2002 52.1 2003 54.5 2002a 15.1 4.7 34.2 2005a 13.4 4.4 30.4 Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. a Ghana 1998–99 39.5 2005–06 28.5 1998–99 39.1 14.4 63.3 2006a 30 10.5 53.6 Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Guatemala 2000 56.2 2006 51.0 2002c 16.9 6.5 29.8 2006c 11.7 3.5 24.3 Guinea 1994 40.0 .. 1994a 36.8 11.5 63.8 2003a 70.1 32.2 87.2 Haiti 1987 65.0 1995 .. 2001c 54.9 28.2 72.1 .. .. .. Honduras 1998–99 52.5 2004 50.7 2005c 22.2 10.2 34.8 2006c 18.2 8.2 29.7 Hungary 1993 14.5 1997 17.3 2002a <2 <0.5 <2 2004a <2 <0.5 <2 India 1993–94 36.0 1999–2000 28.6 1993–94a 49.4f 14.4f 81.7f 2004–05a 41.6f 10.8f 75.6f Indonesia 1996 17.6 2004 16.7 2005a 21.4f 4.6f 53.8f 2007a 29.4 7.1 60 Iran, Islamic Rep. .. .. 1998a <2 <0.5 8.3 2005a <2 <0.5 8 Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Israel .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Jordan 1997 21.3 2002 14.2 2002–03a <2 <0.5 11 2006a <2 <0.5 3.5 Kazakhstan 2001 17.6 2002 15.4 2003a 3.1 <0.5 17.2 2007a <2 <0.5 <2 Kenya 1997 52.0 2005/06 46.6 1997a 19.6 4.6 42.7 2005–06a 19.7 6.1 39.9 Korea, Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Kyrgyz Republic 2003 49.9 2005 43.1 2004a 21.8 4.4 51.9 2007a 3.4 <0.5 27.5 Lao PDR 1997–98 38.6 2002–03 33.5 1997–98a 49.3d 14.9d 79.9d 2002–03a 44d 12.1d 76.8d Lebanon .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Liberia .. .. 2007a 83.7 40.8 94.8 .. .. .. Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Selected World Development Indicators 2011 347 Table 2 Poverty (continued) International poverty line National poverty line Population Poverty Population Poverty Population below national poverty line below gap at Population below gap at Population $1.25 $1.25 below $1.25 $1.25 below Survey National Survey National Survey a day a day $2.00 a day Survey a day a day $2.00 a day year % year % year % % % year % % % Lithuania .. .. 2002a <2 <0.5 <2 2004a <2 <0.5 <2 Madagascar 1999 71.3e 2005 68.7e 2001a 76.3 41.4 88.7 2005a 67.8 26.5 89.6 Malawi 1997–98 65.3 2004–05 52.4 1997–98a 83.1 46 93.5 2004–05a, h 73.9 32.3 90.4 Malaysia 1989 15.5 .. 1997c <2 <0.5 6.8 2004c <2 <0.5 7.8 Mali 1998 63.8 .. 2001a 61.2 25.8 82 2006a 51.4 18.8 77.1 Mauritania 1996 50.0 2000 46.3 1995–96a 23.4 7.1 48.3 2000a 21.2 5.7 44.1 Mexico 2002 50.6 2004 47.0 2006a <2 <0.5 4.8 2008c 4 1.8 8.2 Moldova 2001 62.4 2002 48.5 2004a 8.1 1.7 28.9 2007a 2.4 0.5 11.5 Morocco 1990–91 13.1 1998–99 19.0 2000a 6.3 0.9 24.3 2007a 2.5 0.5 14 Mozambique 1996–97 69.4 2002–03 55.2 1996–97a 81.3 42 92.9 2002–03a 74.7 35.4 90 Myanmar 2004–05 32.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Nepal 1995–96 41.8 2003–04 30.9 1995–96a 68.4 26.7 88.1 2003–04a 55.1 19.7 77.6 Netherlands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. New Zealand .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Nicaragua 1998 47.9 2001 45.8 2001c 19.4 6.7 37.5 2005c 15.8 5.2 31.8 Niger 1989–93 63.0 .. 1994a 78.2 38.6 91.5 2005a 65.9 28.1 85.6 Nigeria 1985 43.0 1992–93 34.1 1996–97a 68.5 32.1 86.4 2003–04a 64.4 29.6 83.9 Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Pakistan 1993 28.6 1998–99 32.6 2001–02a 35.9 7.9 73.9 2004–05a 22.6 4.4 60.3 Panama 1997 37.3 2003 36.8 2004c 9.2 2.7 18 2006c 9.5 3.1 17.8 Papua New Guinea 1996 37.5 .. 1996a 35.8 12.3 57.4 .. .. .. Paraguay 1990 20.5i .. 2005c 9.3 3.4 18.4 2007c 6.5 2.7 14.2 Peru 2003 52.2 2004 51.6 2005c 8.2 2 19.4 2007c 7.7 2.3 17.8 Philippines 1994 32.1 1997 25.1 2003a 22 5.5 43.8 2006a 22.6 5.5 45 Poland 1996 14.6 2001 14.8 2002a <2 <0.5 <2 2005a <2 <0.5 <2 Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Romania 1995 25.4 2002 28.9 2002a 2.9 0.8 13 2007a <2 <0.5 4.1 Russian Federation 1998 31.4 2002 19.6 2002a <2 <0.5 3.7 2007a <2 <0.5 <2 Rwanda 1999–2000 60.3e 2005–06 56.9e 1984–85a 63.3 19.7 88.4 2000a 76.6 38.2 90.3 Saudi Arabia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Senegal 1992 33.4 .. 2001a 44.2 14.3 71.3 2005a 33.5 10.8 60.3 Serbia .. .. 2003a <2 <0.5 <2 2008a <2 <0.5 <2 Sierra Leone 1989 82.8 2003–04 70.2 1989–90a 62.8 44.8 75 2003a 53.4 20.3 76.1 Singapore .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Slovak Republic 2004 16.8 .. 1992c <2 <0.5 <2 1996c <2 <0.5 <2 Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. South Africa 2000 38.0e 2008 22.0e 1995a 21.4 5.2 39.9 2000a 26.2 8.2 42.9 Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. a Sri Lanka 1995–96 25.0 2002 22.7 1995–96 16.3 3 46.7 2002a 14 2.6 39.7 Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Switzerland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Syrian Arab Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Tajikistan 2003 72.4 2007 53.5 2003a 36.3 10.3 68.8 2004a 21.5 5.1 50.8 Tanzania 1991 38.6 2000–01 35.7 1991–92a 72.6 29.7 91.3 2000–01a 88.5 46.8 96.6 Thailand 1994 9.8 1998 13.6 2002a <2 <0.5 15.1 2004a <2 <0.5 11.5 Togo 1987–89 32.3 .. 2006a 38.7 11.4 69.3 .. .. .. Tunisia 1990 7.4 1995 7.6 1995a 6.5 1.3 20.4 2000a 2.6 <0.5 12.8 Turkey 1994 28.3 2002 27.0 2002a 2 <0.5 9.6 2006a 2.6 <0.5 8.2 Turkmenistan .. .. 1993c 63.5 25.8 85.7 1998a 24.8 7 49.6 Uganda 2002–03 38.8e 2005–06 31.1e 2002a 57.4 22.7 79.8 2005a 51.5 19.1 75.6 Ukraine 2000 31.5 2003 19.5 2005a <2 <0.5 <2 2008a <2 <0.5 <2 United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. United Kingdom .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. United States .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Uruguay .. .. 2005b, c <2 <0.5 4.5 2007c <2 <0.5 4.3 Uzbekistan 2000–01 31.5 2003 27.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. Venezuela, RB 1989 31.3 1997–99 52.0 2003c 18.4 8.8 31.7 2006c 3.5 1.2 10.2 Vietnam 1998 37.4 2002 28.9 2004a 24.2 5.1 52.5 2006a 21.5 4.6 48.4 West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Yemen, Rep. 1998 41.8 .. 1998a 12.9 3 36.3 2005a 17.5 4.2 46.6 Zambia 1998 72.9 2004 68.0 2002–03a 64.6 27.1 85.1 2004–05a 64.3 32.8 81.5 Zimbabwe 1990–91 25.8 1995–96 34.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. a. Expenditure base. b. Covers urban area only. c. Income base. d. Adjusted by spatial consumer price index information. e. Due to security concerns, the survey covered only 56 percent of rural villages and 65 percent of the rural population. f. Weighted average of urban and rural estimates. g. Covers rural area only. h. Due to change in survey design, the most recent survey is not strictly comparable with the previous one. i. Survey covers Asunción metropolitan area. 348 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Table 3 Millennium Development Goals: Eradicating poverty and improving lives Achieve Develop universal Promote Reduce Improve a global primary gender child maternal Combat HIV/AIDS Ensure environmental partnership for Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger education equality mortality health and other diseases sustainability development Share of Prevalence Ratio of Incidence Carbon Access to poorest of child girls to boys Maternal HIV of dioxide improved quintile Vulnerable malnutrition enrollments Under-fi ve mortality prevalence tuberculosis emissions sanitation Internet in national employment % of Primary in primary mortality rate per % of per per capita facilities users consumption % of children completion and secondary rate per 100,000 population 100,000 metric % of per 100 or income % employment under age 5 rate % school % 1,000 live births ages 15–49 people tons population peoplea 1995–2008 b 2008 2000–08 b 2008 2008 2009 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2008 Afghanistan .. .. 32.9 .. 58 199 1,400 .. 190 0.0 37 1.7 Albania 7.8c .. 6.6 .. .. 15 31 .. 16 1.4 98 23.9 Algeria 6.9c .. 11.1 114 .. 32 120 0.1 58 4.1 95 11.9 Angola 2.0c .. 27.5 .. .. 161 610 2.1 290 1.4 57 3.1 Argentina 3.6d,e 19f 2.3 102 105 14 70 0.5 30 4.6 90 28.1 Armenia 8.6c .. 4.2 98 104 22 29 0.1 73 1.6 90 6.2 Australia .. 9 .. .. 97 5 8 0.2 7 17.7 100 70.8 Austria 8.6e 9 .. 99 97 4 5 0.2 0 8.3 100 71.2 Azerbaijan 13.3c 53 8.4 121 98 34 38 0.2 110 3.7 45 28.2 Bangladesh 9.4c .. 41.3 54 106 52 340 .. 220 0.3 53 0.3 Belarus 8.8c .. 1.3 96 101 12 15 0.2 43 6.9 93 32.1 Belgium 8.5e 10 .. 86 98 5 5 0.2 9 9.7 100 68.1 Benin 6.9c .. 20.2 65 .. 118 410 1.2 92 0.5 12 1.8 Bolivia 2.7c .. 5.9 98 99 51 180 0.2 140 1.4 25 10.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.7c .. 1.6 .. 102 14 9 <0.1 51 7.7 95 34.7 Brazil 3.0e 27 2.2 .. 103 21 58 0.6 46 1.9 80 37.5 Bulgaria 8.7c 9 1.6 90 97 10 13 .. 43 6.8 100 34.7 Burkina Faso 7.0c .. 37.4 38 85g 166 560 1.6 220 0.1 11 0.9 Burundi 9.0c .. 38.9 45 91 166 970 2.0 360 0.0 46 0.8 Cambodia 6.5c .. 28.8 79 90 88 290 0.8 490 0.3 29 0.5 Cameroon 5.6c .. 16.6 73 84 154 600 5.1 190 0.3 47 3.8 Canada 7.2e 10 f .. 96 99 6 12 0.4 5 16.9 100 75.3 Central African Republic 5.2c .. 21.8 35 69 171 850 6.3 340 0.1 34 0.4 Chad 6.3c .. 33.9 31 64 209 1,200 3.5 290 0.0 9 1.2 Chile 4.1e 24 0.5 95 99 9 26 0.3 11 4.3 96 32.5 China 5.7e .. 6.8 96 104 19 38 0.1h 97 5.0 55 22.5 Hong Kong SAR, China 5.3e 7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 91 5.8 .. 67.0 Colombia 2.3e 46 5.1 110 104 19 85 0.6 36 1.4 74 38.5 Congo, Dem. Rep. 5.5c .. 28.2 53 76 199 670 .. 380 0.0 23 .. Congo, Rep. 5.0c .. 11.8 73 .. 128 580 3.5 390 0.4 30 4.3 Costa Rica 4.4e 20 .. 93 102 11 44 0.4 11 1.8 95 32.3 Côte d´Ivoire 5.0c .. 16.7 48 .. 119 470 3.9 410 0.3 23 3.2 Croatia 8.8c 16 f .. 102 102 5 14 <0.1 25 5.6 99 50.5 Czech Republic 10.2e 13 2.1 95 101 4 8 .. 9 12.1 98 57.8 Denmark 8.3e 5 .. 101 102 4 5 0.2 7 9.1 100 83.3 Dominican Republic 4.4e 42 3.4 91 103 32 100 1.1 73 2.1 83 21.6 Ecuador 3.4e 34 f 6.2 106 100 24 140 0.3 72 2.2 92 28.8 Egypt, Arab Rep. 9.0c 25 6.8 95 .. 21 82 .. 20 2.3 94 16.6 El Salvador 4.3e 36 6.1 89 98 17 110 0.8 32 1.1 87 10.6 Eritrea .. .. 34.5 47 77 55 280 1.3 97 0.1 14 4.1 Ethiopia 9.3c 52 f 34.6 52 85 104 470 2.1 370 0.1 12 0.4 Finland 9.6e 9 .. 98 102 3 8 0.1 7 12.1 100 82.5 France 7.2e 6 .. .. 100 4 8 0.4 6 6.0 100 67.9 Georgia 5.4c 62 2.3 100 96 29 48 0.1 110 1.4 95 23.8 Germany 8.5e 7 1.1 104 98 4 7 0.1 5 9.6 100 75.5 Ghana 5.2c .. 13.9 82 96 69 350 1.9 200 0.4 13 4.3 Greece 6.7e 27 .. 101 97 3 2 0.2 6 8.8 98 43.1 Guatemala 3.4e .. 17.7 80 94 40 110 0.8 63 1.0 81 14.3 Guinea 5.8c .. 22.5 55 77 142 680 1.6 300 0.1 19 0.9 Haiti 2.5e .. 18.9 .. .. 87 300 2.2 250 0.2 17 10.1 Honduras 2.5e .. 8.6 90 107 30 110 0.7 64 1.2 71 13.1 Hungary 8.6c 7 .. 95 98 6 13 0.1 16 5.6 100 58.5 India 8.1c .. 43.5 94 92 66 230 0.3 170 1.4 31 4.5 Indonesia 7.4c 63 19.6 106 98 39 240 0.2 190 1.8 52 7.9 Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.4c 43 .. 117 116 31 30 0.2 20 7.0 .. 32.0 Iraq .. .. 7.1 .. .. 44 75 .. 64 3.3 73 1.0 Ireland 7.4e 12 .. 99 103 4 3 0.2 9 10.2 99 62.7 Israel 5.7e 7 .. 99 101 4 7 0.1 6 9.3 100 47.9 Italy 6.5e 19 .. 101 99 4 5 0.4 7 7.7 .. 41.8 Japan .. 11 .. .. 100 3 6 .. 22 9.8 100 75.2 Jordan 7.2c .. 3.6 100 102 25 59 .. 6 3.8 98 27.4 Kazakhstan 8.7c .. 4.9 105g 98g 29 45 0.1 180 14.7 97 10.9 Kenya 4.7c .. 16.5 .. 96 84 530 .. 330 0.3 31 8.7 Korea, Rep. 7.9e 25 .. 99 97 5 18 <0.1 88 10.4 100 75.8 Kyrgyz Republic 8.8c 47 2.7 92 100 37 81 0.1 160 1.2 93 16.1 Lao PDR 8.5c .. 31.6 75 87 59 580 0.2 150 0.3 53 8.5 Lebanon .. .. 4.2 87 103 12 26 0.1 14 3.2 .. 22.5 Liberia 6.4c .. 20.4 58 86 112 990 1.7 280 0.2 17 0.5 Libya .. .. 5.6 .. 105 19 64 .. 17 9.3 97 5.1 Lithuania 6.8c 9 .. 92 100 6 13 0.1 71 4.5 .. 54.4 Madagascar 6.2c .. 36.8 71 97 58 440 0.1 260 0.1 11 1.7 Malawi 7.0c .. 15.5 54 99 110 510 11.9 320 0.1 56 2.1 Malaysia 6.4e 22 .. 96 103 6 31 0.5 100 7.3 96 55.8 Mali 6.5c .. 27.9 57 78 191 830 1.5 320 0.0 36 1.6 Mauritania 6.2c .. 23.2 64 103 117 550 0.8 320 0.6 26 1.9 Mexico 3.8c 30 3.4 104 102 17 85 0.3 19 4.5 85 22.2 Selected World Development Indicators 2011 349 Table 3 Millennium Development Goals: Eradicating poverty and improving lives (continued) Achieve Develop universal Promote Reduce Improve a global primary gender child maternal Combat HIV/AIDS Ensure environmental partnership for Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger education equality mortality health and other diseases sustainability development Share of Prevalence Ratio of Incidence Carbon Access to poorest of child girls to boys Maternal HIV of dioxide improved quintile Vulnerable malnutrition enrollments Under-fi ve mortality prevalence tuberculosis emissions sanitation Internet in national employment % of Primary in primary mortality rate per % of per per capita facilities users consumption % of children completion and secondary rate per 100,000 population 100,000 metric % of per 100 or income % employment under age 5 rate % school % 1,000 live births ages 15–49 people tons population peoplea 1995–2008 b 2008 2000–08 b 2008 2008 2009 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2008 c Moldova 6.7 32 3.2 91 102 17 32 0.4 170 1.3 79 23.4 Morocco 6.5c 51 9.9 81 88 38 110 0.1 120 1.5 69 33.0 Mozambique 5.4c .. 21.2 59 87 142 550 12.5 420 0.1 17 1.6 Myanmar .. .. 29.6 99 99 71 240 0.7 400 0.3 81 0.2 Nepal 6.1c .. 38.8 .. .. 48 380 0.5 160 0.1 31 1.7 Netherlands 7.6e 9 .. .. 98 4 9 0.2 7 10.6 100 87.0 New Zealand 6.4e 12 .. .. 103 6 14 0.1 8 7.7 .. 71.4 Nicaragua 3.8e 45 4.3 75 102 26 100 0.2 46 0.8 52 3.3 Niger 5.9c .. 39.9 40g 74 160 820 0.8 180 0.1 9 0.5 Nigeria 5.1c .. 27.2 .. 85 138 840 3.1 300 0.6 32 15.9 Norway 9.6e 6 .. 98 99 3 7 0.1 6 9.1 100 82.5 Pakistan 9.1c 62 31.3 60 80 87 260 0.1 230 1.0 45 11.1 Panama 2.5e 28 .. 102 101 23 71 1.0 47 2.2 69 27.5 Papua New Guinea 4.5c .. 18.1 .. .. 68 250 1.5 250 0.5 45 1.8 Paraguay 3.4e 47 .. 95 99 23 95 0.6 47 0.7 70 14.3 Peru 3.6e 40 f 5.4 101 99 21 98 0.5 120 1.5 68 24.7 Philippines 5.6c 45 26.2 92 102 33 94 .. 280 0.8 76 6.2 Poland 7.3c 19 .. 96 99 7 6 0.1 25 8.3 90 49.0 Portugal 5.8e 19 .. .. 101 4 7 0.5 30 5.5 100 42.1 Romania 7.9c 31 3.5 96 99 12 27 0.1 130 4.4 72 28.8 Russian Federation 5.6c 6 .. 95 98 12 39 1.1 110 10.8 87 31.9 Rwanda 5.4c .. 18.0 54 100 111 540 2.8 390 0.1 54 3.1 Saudi Arabia .. .. 5.3 95 91 21 24 .. 19 16.6 .. 31.3 Senegal 6.2c .. 14.5 56 96 93 410 1.0 280 0.5 51 8.4 Serbia 9.1c, i 23 1.8 100 102 7 8 0.1 18 ..j 92 44.9 Sierra Leone 6.1c .. 28.3 88 84 192 970 1.7 610 0.2 13 0.3 Singapore 5.0e 10 3.3 .. .. 3 9 0.2 39 11.8 100 69.6 Slovak Republic 8.8e 11f .. 96 100 7 6 <0.1 12 6.8 100 66.0 Somalia .. .. 32.8 .. 53 180 1,200 0.5 390 0.1 23 1.1 South Africa 3.1c 3 .. 86 100 62 410 18.1 960 9.0 77 8.6 Spain 7.0e 12 .. 107 103 4 6 0.5 17 8.0 100 55.4 Sri Lanka 6.8c 41f 21.1 98 .. 15 39 .. 66 0.6 91 5.8 Sudan .. .. 31.7 57g 89g 108 750 1.4 120 0.3 34 10.2 Sweden 9.1e 7 .. 94 99 3 5 0.1 6 5.4 100 87.7 Switzerland 7.6e 10 .. 94 97 4 10 0.6 5 5.0 100 75.9 Syrian Arab Republic .. .. 10.0 114 97 16 46 .. 22 3.5 96 17.3 Tajikistan 7.8c .. 14.9 98 91 61 64 0.3 200 1.1 94 8.8 Tanzania 7.3c 88 f 16.7 83 .. 108 790 6.2 190 0.1 24 1.2 Thailand 6.1c 53 7.0 87 103 14 48 1.4 140 4.1 96 23.9 Togo 5.4c .. 22.3 61 75 98 350 3.3 440 0.2 12 5.4 Tunisia 5.9c .. 3.3 93 103 21 60 0.1 24 2.3 85 27.1 Turkey 5.4c 35 3.5 93 93 20 23 .. 30 4.0 90 34.4 Turkmenistan 6.0c .. .. .. .. 45 77 <0.1 68 9.2 98 1.5 Uganda 6.1c .. 16.4 56 99 128 430 5.4 310 0.1 48 7.9 Ukraine 9.4c .. 4.1 99 99 15 26 1.6 100 6.8 95 10.5 United Arab Emirates .. .. .. 105 101 7 10 .. 6 31.0 97 65.2 United Kingdom 6.1e 11 .. .. 101 6 12 0.2 12 8.8 100 76.0 United States 5.4e .. 1.3 95 100 8 24 0.6 5 19.3 100 75.8 Uruguay 4.3e 25 6.0 104 98 13 27 0.6 22 1.9 100 40.2 Uzbekistan 7.1c .. 4.4 95 98 36 30 0.1 130 4.3 100 9.0 Venezuela, RB 4.9e 30 .. 95 102 18 68 .. 33 6.0 .. 25.7 Vietnam 7.1c .. 20.2 .. .. 24 56 0.5 200 1.3 75 24.2 West Bank and Gaza .. 36 2.2 82 104 30 .. .. 19 0.6 89 9.0 Yemen, Rep. 7.2c .. 43.1 61 .. 66 210 .. 88 1.0 52 1.6 Zambia 3.6c .. 14.9 93 95 141 470 15.2 470 0.2 49 5.5 Zimbabwe 4.6c .. 14.0 .. 97 90 790 15.3 760 0.8 44 11.4 World ..w 22.4w 88w 96w 61w 260w 0.8w 140w 4.6w 61w 23.9w Low income .. 28.1 63 91 118 580 2.3 300 0.3 35 2.3 Middle income .. 22.2 92 97 51 200 0.6 140 3.3 57 17.0 Lower middle income .. 25.0 90 95 57 230 0.4 150 2.8 50 13.7 Upper middle income 26 .. 100 101 22 82 1.5 100 5.3 84 29.9 Low and middle income .. 23.5 87 96 66 290 0.9 160 2.9 54 15.0 East Asia & Pacific .. 11.9 99 102 26 89 0.2 140 4.0 59 19.4 Europe & Central Asia 19 .. 96 97 21 32 0.6 94 7.2 89 26.4 Latin America & the Caribbean 32 4.5 101 102 23 86 0.5 47 2.7 79 29.0 Middle East & North Africa 37 12.2 95 96 33 88 0.1 44 3.7 84 18.9 South Asia .. 41.0 79 91 71 290 0.3 180 1.2 36 4.7 Sub-Saharan Africa .. 25.2 64 88 130 650 5.0 350 0.8 31 6.5 High income 12 .. 98 99 7 15 0.3 15 12.5 99 68.3 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. a. Data are from the International Telecommunication Union's (ITU) World Telecommunication Development Report database. Please cite ITU for third-party use of these data. b. Data are for the most recent year available. c. Refers to expenditure shares by percentiles of population, ranked by per capita expenditure. d. Urban data. e. Refers to income shares by percentiles of population, ranked by per capita income. f. Limited coverage. g. Data are for 2009. h. Includes Hong Kong SAR, China. i. Includes Montenegro. j. Includes Kosovo and Montenegro. k. Includes emissions not allocated to specific countries. 350 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Table 4 Economic activity Household General External GDP Gross domestic Agricultural fi nal government fi nal Gross balance of implicit product productivity consumption consumption capital goods and defl ator expenditure expenditure formation services average Average Agricultural value Value added as % of GDP annual added per worker Annual % growth 2000 $ Agriculture Industry Services % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % growth 2009 2000–09 1990–92 2005–07 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2000–09 Afghanistan 10,624 .. .. .. 32 26 42 98 10 28 –36 6.9 Albania 11,834 5.3 837 1,663 21 20 59 84 10 29 –25 3.4 Algeria 140,577 4.0 1,823 2,232 12 55 34 41 14 41 4 8.6 Angola 69,067 13.1 176 222 10 54 36 .. .. 17 9 40.5 Argentina 308,741 5.4 6,919 11,192 10 32 58 59 13 23 4 12.9 Armenia 8,714 10.5 1,607a 4,510 21 35 45 81 11 31 –24 4.5 Australia 924,843 3.3 20,676 30,830 3 29 68 57 17 28 –2 4.0 Austria 384,908 2.0 13,607 20,744 2 31 67 53 18 23 5 1.7 Azerbaijan 43,019 17.9 1,000a 1,198 8 60 32 37 14 22 28 9.9 Bangladesh 89,378 5.9 255 387 19 29 53 80 5 24 –10 5.2 Belarus 48,984 8.3 2,042a 4,017 10 45 45 57 15 38 –8 23.3 Belgium 468,552 1.7 .. 35,974 1 23 76 54 23 24 –1 2.1 Benin 6,656 4.0 429 661 .. .. .. .. .. 25 –14 3.4 Bolivia 17,340 4.1 703 732 12 29 58 74 11 18 –3 6.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina 17,122 5.0 .. 10,352 9 27 64 85 20 20 –25 4.0 Brazil 1,571,979 3.6 1,611 3,315 7 27 66 64 20 17 0 8.1 Bulgaria 47,100 5.3 2,686 8,015 6 30 64 73 8 26 –8 5.8 Burkina Faso 8,141 5.4 126 182 33 22 44 75 22 18 –15 2.5 Burundi 1,325 3.0 117 70 .. .. .. 91 29 16 –36 10.4 Cambodia 10,028 9.0 .. 366 35 24 41 83 3 21 –8 4.8 Cameroon 21,837 3.4 409 703 19 31 50 72 9 18 –6 1.9 Canada 1,336,067 2.5 28,541 46,138 .. .. .. 55 19 23 2 2.3 Central African Republic 2,006 0.8 322 404 56 15 30 93 4 11 –8 2.7 Chad 6,680 10.4 209 .. 24 36 40 69 7 18 6 5.3 Chile 163,670 4.1 3,618 6,160 4 43 53 60 12 19 7 6.3 China 4,984,731 10.9 269 459 10 46 43 34 11 45 5 4.3 Hong Kong SAR, China 215,355 5.2 .. .. 0 8 92 60 8 20 11 –1.7 Colombia 230,844 4.7 3,342 3,001 9 36 55 66 9 23 2 6.7 Congo, Dem. Rep. 10,779 5.2 209 162 43 24 33 74 8 30 –12 27.2 Congo, Rep. 8,695 4.0 .. .. 5 68 27 40 14 26 21 6.1 Costa Rica 29,225 5.1 3,158 5,132 7 28 65 80 7 17 –3 10.2 Côte d´Ivoire 23,042 0.8 652 875 25 25 50 72 9 11 8 3.4 Croatia 63,034 3.9 5,545a 14,804 7 29 64 58 18 28 –4 3.9 Czech Republic 190,274 4.1 3,256 5,945 2 37 60 51 22 22 6 2.2 Denmark 309,596 1.2 15,190 34,613 1 26 73 49 27 22 2 2.3 Dominican Republic 46,598 5.5 2,055 3,829 6 30 64 94 6 8 –8 13.7 Ecuador 57,249 5.0 1,801 1,879 8 49 43 63 14 27 –4 9.1 Egypt, Arab Rep. 188,334 4.9 1,826 2,758 11 35 53 82 7 19 –8 8.3 El Salvador 22,174 2.6 1,774 2,404 14 27 59 92 11 13 –16 3.8 Eritrea 1,654 1.3 .. 118 24 19 56 86 31 11 –28 18.0 Ethiopia 28,537 8.5 .. 187 47 14 39 88 10 20 –18 10.8 Finland 237,512 2.5 19,011 35,783 3 33 64 52 22 22 4 1.0 France 2,649,390 1.5 22,126 47,679 2 20 78 57 23 22 –2 2.1 Georgia 10,737 7.4 2,359a 1,871 10 21 69 82 15 29 –23 7.0 Germany 3,346,702 0.9 13,863 27,015 1 30 69 56 18 19 6 1.1 Ghana 15,619 5.6 352 388 33 25 42 74 19 30 –25 18.3 Greece 329,924 3.6 7,668 8,383 3 20 77 71 17 21 –9 3.1 Guatemala 36,788 3.8 2,304 2,736 11 29 59 89 6 15 –11 5.2 Guinea 4,103 2.5 156 311 11 33 57 84 5 14 –3 20.1 Haiti 6,693 0.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 29 –29 15.2 Honduras 14,632 4.9 1,227 1,842 13 31 55 83 21 34 –30 6.6 Hungary 128,964 2.9 3,943 8,136 4 29 66 67 9 22 1 4.9 India 1,310,171 7.8 359 530 17 28 55 58 12 35 –5 5.3 Indonesia 540,277 5.3 519 657 14 47 39 56 3 28 –10 11.1 Iran, Islamic Rep. 331,015 5.4 2,042 2,931 10 44 45 45 11 33 11 16.4 Iraq 65,837 –0.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.6 Ireland 227,193 4.0 .. 15,308 2 34 64 47 16 26 11 2.0 Israel 194,790 3.5 .. .. .. .. .. 57 24 16 2 1.4 Italy 2,112,780 0.5 11,714 26,800 2 27 71 59 20 21 0 2.5 Japan 5,067,526 1.1 20,350 41,492 1 29 69 56 18 24 2 –1.1 Jordan 22,788 7.1 2,348 2,440 3 34 63 86 17 18 –22 4.8 Kazakhstan 109,155 8.8 1,776a 1,730 5 40 54 42 11 39 8 14.6 Kenya 30,200 4.4 379 367 28 20 52 73 17 21 –11 6.3 Korea, Rep. 832,512 4.2 5,804 14,501 3 36 61 55 15 31 –1 2.2 Kyrgyz Republic 4,578 4.6 684a 1,018 29 19 51 86 23 22 –31 8.3 Lao PDR 5,939 6.9 382 495 35 28 37 66 8 37 –12 8.9 Lebanon 34,450 4.5 .. 31,410 5 18 78 89 15 19 –23 2.6 Liberia 876 0.0 .. .. 61 17 22 202 19 20 –142 10.3 Libya 62,360 5.4 .. .. 2 78 20 23 9 28 40 17.9 Lithuania 37,206 6.3 .. 4,635 4 31 64 65 19 27 0 4.0 Madagascar 9,052 3.9 210 182 24 18 59 85 4 34 –24 11.3 Malawi 4,975 4.9 86 126 36 21 44 68 13 22 –3 17.7 Malaysia 191,601 5.1 398 583 9 55 36 54 13 24 17 3.9 Mali 8,996 5.3 405 515 37 24 39 77 10 22 –9 4.5 Mauritania 3,031 4.7 671 414 13 47 41 61 20 26 –7 10.6 Selected World Development Indicators 2011 351 Table 4 Economic activity (continued) Household General External GDP Gross domestic Agricultural fi nal government fi nal Gross balance of implicit product productivity consumption consumption capital goods and defl ator expenditure expenditure formation services average Average Agricultural value Value added as % of GDP annual added per worker Annual % growth 2000 $ Agriculture Industry Services % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % growth 2009 2000–09 1990–92 2005–07 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2000–09 Mexico 874,902 2.2 2,274 3,022 4 38 58 65 13 25 –2 7.8 Moldova 5,405 5.6 1,349a 1,276 11 10 79 98 20 19 –36 11.0 Morocco 90,859 5.0 1,788 2,306 20 27 53 63 15 36 –14 2.0 Mozambique 9,790 7.9 117 174 29 24 47 86 13 22 –20 7.9 Myanmar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Nepal 12,531 3.7 245 241 34 16 50 81 11 30 –22 6.6 Netherlands 792,128 1.7 24,752 39,634 2 25 73 46 25 21 8 2.1 New Zealand 125,160 2.9 19,148 25,946 .. .. .. 58 19 24 –1 2.6 Nicaragua 6,297 3.2 .. 2,334 20 30 50 90 13 32 –35 8.3 Niger 5,384 4.4 242 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.0 Nigeria 168,994 6.4 .. .. 33 41 27 .. .. .. 4 15.3 Norway 381,766 2.1 19,077 38,445 1 46 53 39 19 23 19 4.6 Pakistan 166,545 5.3 765 890 21 24 55 79 11 20 –10 8.6 Panama 24,711 6.9 2,341 4,011 6 17 77 73 11 26 –10 2.4 Papua New Guinea 7,893 3.4 555 643 36 45 20 71 11 20 1 6.5 Paraguay 15,015 3.4 1,648 2,136 24 19 57 74 9 18 –1 10.5 Peru 126,734 6.0 879 1,390 7 36 56 64 8 25 3 3.4 Philippines 160,476 4.9 905 1,148 15 33 53 83 11 14 –6 5.1 Poland 430,076 4.4 1,605 2,629 5 31 64 64 16 20 –2 2.7 Portugal 227,676 0.7 4,642 6,135 2 24 74 67 21 22 –10 2.8 Romania 161,110 5.6 2,129 6,179 7 26 67 61 15 31 –7 15.9 Russian Federation 1,230,726 5.9 1,917a 2,913 5 37 58 49 18 23 11 15.9 Rwanda 5,064 6.8 193 215 39 13 48 86 10 23 –18 10.5 Saudi Arabia 369,179 3.7 8,476 17,419 2 69 28 39 26 25 10 7.5 Senegal 13,059 4.2 251 223 16 21 63 81 10 29 –20 3.0 Serbia 42,594 5.0 .. .. 13 29 58 78 21 19 –16 16.4 Sierra Leone 1,942 9.5 .. .. 51 22 27 84 14 15 –13 9.5 Singapore 182,232 6.5 22,695 50,828 0 26 74 43 10 29 18 1.2 Slovak Republic 87,642 5.8 .. 8,149 3 35 63 47 20 38 –4 3.4 Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. South Africa 285,983 4.1 2,149 3,149 3 31 66 61 21 19 –1 7.2 Spain 1,460,250 2.8 9,583 17,939 3 29 68 57 19 30 –6 3.7 Sri Lanka 41,979 5.5 697 823 14 28 58 67 16 25 –8 10.7 Sudan 54,677 7.3 526 844 27 36 37 58 17 25 0 10.0 Sweden 406,072 2.3 22,319 41,905 2 27 71 47 26 19 7 2.0 Switzerland 500,260 2.0 19,369 22,884 1 27 71 59 11 22 9 1.1 Syrian Arab Republic 52,177 4.4 2,778 4,479 21 34 45 72 14 16 –2 8.0 Tajikistan 4,978 8.2 370a 501 22 24 54 93 28 22 –43 20.9 Tanzaniab 21,623 6.8 261 324 45 17 37 73 16 17 –6 9.5 Thailand 263,856 4.6 480 654 12 44 44 56 12 29 3 3.2 Togo 2,855 2.5 345 394 .. .. .. .. 9 .. –21 1.4 Tunisia 39,561 4.9 2,975 3,424 8 30 62 63 13 27 –3 3.2 Turkey 617,099 4.9 2,198 3,223 9 28 63 72 15 15 –1 15.3 Turkmenistan 19,947 13.9 1,272a 2,087 12 54 34 49 10 11 30 13.0 Uganda 15,736 7.5 175 191 38 30 32 83 12 24 –19 5.7 Ukraine 113,545 5.6 1,232a 2,010 10 52 38 65 18 19 –1 16.4 United Arab Emirates 261,348 7.0 10,414 29,465 2 61 38 46 10 20 23 10.2 United Kingdom 2,174,530 1.9 21,236 27,450 1 24 76 64 22 17 –3 2.6 United States 14,256,300 2.1 20,353 45,285 1 21 77 71 16 18 –5 2.9 Uruguay 36,093 4.1 6,278 9,370 10 26 64 68 9 23 0 7.7 Uzbekistan 32,817 6.9 1,427a 2,231 21 32 47 56 16 20 7 24.7 Venezuela, RB 326,498 4.9 4,584 7,386 .. .. .. 60 14 22 3 25.0 Vietnam 91,854 7.6 229 335 22 39 39 63 6 38 –7 8.2 West Bank and Gaza .. –0.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.4 Yemen, Rep. 26,365 3.9 412 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.0 Zambia 12,748 5.4 189 227 21 58 21 74 8 20 –1 16.5 Zimbabwe .. –5.7 271 239 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 232.0 World 58,228,178 t 2.9 w 801w 1,035 w 3w 28 w 69 w 61 w 17 w 22 w 0w Low income 419,652 5.5 244 278 27 26 47 81 9 24 –15 Middle income 16,095,002 6.4 493 743 10 36 54 57 13 28 0 Lower middle income 8,805,089 8.5 368 569 13 39 47 50 11 36 –1 Upper middle income 7,280,007 4.3 2,132 3,232 6 33 61 63 16 21 1 Low and middle income 16,526,605 6.4 463 674 10 36 54 57 13 28 0 East Asia & Pacific 6,345,309 9.4 307 491 11 46 43 41 11 40 4 Europe & Central Asia 2,585,329 5.8 2,012 2,806 7 33 59 60 16 21 3 Latin America & the Caribbean 3,976,530 3.7 2,213 3,274 6 32 62 66 15 20 –1 Middle East & North Africa 1,059,429 4.7 1,846 2,824 11 43 46 55 13 28 5 South Asia 1,634,623 7.3 372 534 18 28 55 62 12 32 –6 Sub-Saharan Africa 926,544 5.1 305 322 13 30 57 66 17 21 –4 High income 41,718,726 2.0 13,758 23,429 2 26 73 62 18 21 0 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. a. Data for all three years are not available. b. Data refer to mainland Tanzania only. 352 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Table 5 Trade, aid, and finance High- Foreign Net Domestic Manufactured technology Current direct offi cial credit Merchandise trade exports exports account investment development External debt provided balance net infl ows assistancea by banking Net Exports Imports % of total % of Total Present sector migration $ $ merchandise manufactured $ $ $ $ value millions millions exports exports millions millions per capita millions % of GNIb % of GDP thousands 2009 2009 2009 2008 2009 2009 2008 2008 2008 2009 2005–10 c Afghanistan 530 4,200 35 .. .. 185 168 2,200 4 3 1,000 Albania 1,088 4,548 70 4 –1,875 978 123 3,188 21 67 –75 Algeria 43,689 39,103 2 1 .. 2,847 9 5,476 3 –12 –140 Angola 39,000 17,000 .. .. 6,408 2,205 20 15,130 24 32 80 Argentina 55,750 38,771 33 9 8,635 4,009 3 128,285 48 27 30 Armenia 698 3,304 33 2 –1,326 777 98 3,418 27 17 –75 Australia 154,043 165,471 19 12 –47,786 47,281 .. .. .. 144 500 Austria 137,217 143,527 81 11 8,731 7,287 .. .. .. .. 160 Azerbaijan 21,570 6,469 3 1 10,178 473 27 4,309 12 17 –50 Bangladesh 15,081 21,833 88 1 3,345 674 13 23,644 20 59 –570 Belarus 21,282 28,564 48 2 –6,402 1,884 11 12,299 24 31 0 Belgium 369,760 351,035 77d 8 1,298 34,087 .. .. .. .. 200 Benin 1,000 1,800 .. 0 –535 93 74 986 10e 19 50 Bolivia 4,850 4,410 6 4 2,015 423 65 5,537 14e 55 –100 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,953 8,811 61 4 –2,764 235 128 8,316 44 58 –10 Brazil 152,995 133,609 39 12 –24,302 25,949 2 255,614 19 118 –229 Bulgaria 16,435 23,300 53 7 –4,340 4,489 .. 38,045 91 67 –50 Burkina Faso 800 1,900 .. .. .. 171 66 1,681 14e 15 –65 Burundi 65 410 18 8 –212 10 63 1,445 80e 35 323 Cambodia 4,550 5,390 96 .. –1,051 530 51 4,215 42 16 –5 Cameroon 3,100 3,800 .. 3 –1,137 340 27 2,794 4e 7 –19 Canada 315,552 330,268 50 15 –22,612 19,898 .. .. .. 178 1,050 Central African Republic 110 300 .. .. .. 42 59 949 41e 17 5 Chad 2,700 2,100 .. .. .. 462 38 1,749 19e 8 –75 Chile 53,024 42,378 12 6 4,217 12,702 4 64,277 41 116 30 China 1,201,534 1,005,688 94 29 426,107 78,193 1 378,245 10 145 –1,731f Hong Kong SAR, China 329,739g 352,688 79g 22 18,278 48,449 .. .. .. 125 113 Colombia 32,853 32,898 28 4 –5,146 7,260 22 46,887 23 43 –120 Congo, Dem. Rep. 3,200 3,300 .. .. .. 951 26 12,199 100e 9 –100 Congo, Rep. 5,700 2,700 .. .. –2,181 2,083 129 5,485 74e –18 –50 Costa Rica 8,777 11,395 47 39 –2,729 1,347 15 8,812 33 54 30 Côte d´Ivoire 9,300 6,500 12 16 1,670 381 30 12,561 76e 23 –145 Croatia 10,474 21,203 67 9 –3,154 2,906 90 .. .. 75 10 Czech Republic 113,319 104,982 87 14 –2,147 2,666 .. .. .. 58 226 Denmark 93,102 82,893 67 16 12,490 7,712 .. .. .. 211 30 Dominican Republic 5,460 12,230 70 8 –4,437 2,067 15 10,484 24 39 –140 Ecuador 13,724 15,093 9 5 1,120 316 17 16,851 34 20 –350 Egypt, Arab Rep. 21,150 44,946 37 1 –3,349 6,712 17 32,616 20 78 –340 El Salvador 3,797 7,255 72 4 –1,596 431 38 10,110 47 50 –280 Eritrea 15 515 .. .. .. 0 29 962 38e 113 55 Ethiopia 1,490 7,310 9 6 –1,806 94 41 2,882 8e 37 –300 Finland 62,586 60,037 81 21 3,444 2,570 .. .. .. .. 55 France 474,972 551,092 79 20 –51,857 59,989 .. .. .. .. 500 Georgia 1,135 4,378 55 3 –1,257 764 206 3,380 24 33 –250 Germany 1,120,927 931,434 82 14 168,019 35,841 .. .. .. .. 550 Ghana 5,530 8,140 19 1 –1,198 1,685 55 4,970 20e .. –51 Greece 19,886 59,398 54 10 –37,043 3,340 .. .. .. .. 150 Guatemala 7,360 11,521 43 4 –217 566 39 15,889 42 40 –200 Guinea 980 1,400 32 0 –434 141 32 3,092 49e .. –300 Haiti 549 2,140 .. .. –232 38 92 1,935 17e 26 –140 Honduras 5,235 7,830 35 1 –1,977 500 77 3,430 12e 56 –100 Hungary 83,965 77,550 80 24 409 –5,858 .. .. .. 81 75 India 155,249 243,636 67 6 –36,088 34,577 2 230,611 18 73 –1,000 Indonesia 119,776 91,720 41 11 10,746 4,877 5 150,851 35 37 –730 Iran, Islamic Rep. 78,050 51,450 .. 6 .. 3,016 1 13,937 4 45 –500 Iraq 39,500 37,000 0 0 15,519 1,070 322 .. .. –25 –577 Ireland 114,662 61,871 86 26 –6,499 25,233 .. .. .. .. 200 Israel 47,670 49,150 94 16 7,189 3,894 .. .. .. 78 85 Italy 404,653 410,385 83 7 –66,199 28,976 .. .. .. .. 1,650 Japan 580,845 550,679 89 18 142,194 11,834 .. .. .. 379 150 Jordan 6,366 14,075 73 1 –1,265 2,382 128 6,577 32 109 250 Kazakhstan 43,189 28,374 14 22 –3,405 12,601 21 107,595 106 34 –100 Kenya 4,335 9,670 37 5 –1,978 141 35 7,441 19 40 –189 Korea, Rep. 363,534 323,085 87 33 42,668 1,506 .. .. .. 112 –30 Kyrgyz Republic 1,439 3,037 34 2 –631 189 68 2,464 42e 14 –75 Lao PDR 1,070 1,430 .. .. 107 190 80 4,944 83 10 –75 Lebanon 4,187 16,574 71 0 –7,555 4,804 257 24,395 95 165 –13 Liberia 165 640 .. .. –1,187 378 330 3,484 340e 145 248 Libya 35,300 10,150 .. .. 35,702 2,674 10 .. .. –63 20 Lithuania 16,288 18,193 55 11 1,492 307 .. 31,719 78 64 –100 Madagascar 1,150 2,900 57 1 .. 1,384 44 2,086 20e 11 –5 Malawi 960 1,600 10 2 .. 60 61 963 9e 30 –20 Malaysia 157,433 123,832 70 40 38,914 1,609 6 66,182 35 116 130 Mali 2,100 2,600 22 3 –1,066 109 76 2,190 11e 11 –202 Mauritania 1,360 1,410 0 .. .. –38 97 1,960 41e .. 10 Mexico 229,707 241,515 76 19 –5,238 11,418 1 203,984 20 46 –2,430 Moldova 1,298 3,278 23 4 –439 86 82 3,787 67 40 –172 Selected World Development Indicators 2011 353 Table 5 Trade, aid, and finance (continued) High- Foreign Net Domestic Manufactured technology Current direct offi cial credit Merchandise trade exports exports account investment development External debt provided balance net infl ows assistancea by banking Net Exports Imports % of total % of Total Present sector migration $ $ merchandise manufactured $ $ $ $ value millions millions exports exports millions millions per capita millions % of GNIb % of GDP thousands 2009 2009 2009 2008 2009 2009 2008 2008 2008 2009 2005–10 c Morocco 13,848 32,804 65 9 –4,570 1,333 39 20,825 24 99 –425 Mozambique 1,950 3,750 12 4 –1,171 881 89 3,432 15e 14 –20 Myanmar 6,620 4,600 .. .. .. 323 11 7,210 35 .. –500 Nepal 680 3,550 67 .. –10 38 25 3,685 21 53 –100 Netherlands 498,648 445,802 55 22 42,819 31,938 .. .. .. .. 100 New Zealand 24,936 25,583 22 9 –3,694 470 .. .. .. 156 50 Nicaragua 1,391 3,454 35 4 –1,513 434 131 3,558 32e 71 –200 Niger 900 1,550 7 8 –351 739 41 966 13e 12 –28 Nigeria 52,500 39,000 5 0 22,889 5,787 9 11,221 6 27 –300 Norway 120,710 68,506 20 20 53,531 6,870 .. .. .. .. 135 Pakistan 17,695 31,720 76 2 –15,663 2,387 9 49,337 24 46 –1,416 Panama 885 7,785 10 0 –4 1,773 8 10,722 54 85 11 Papua New Guinea 4,530 3,480 .. .. .. 424 46 1,418 21 26 0 Paraguay 3,191 6,940 11 9 –196 274 21 4,163 29 21 –40 Peru 26,885 21,706 16 2 247 4,760 16 28,555 28 19 –625 Philippines 38,335 45,802 86 66 8,552 1,948 1 64,856 37 46 –900 Poland 134,452 146,626 80 5 –7,207 11,546 .. 218,022 46 60 –120 Portugal 43,192 69,238 72 8 –23,380 2,808 .. .. .. .. 200 Romania 40,500 54,075 79 7 –7,139 6,310 .. 104,943 57 41 –200 Russian Federation 303,978 191,868 17 7 48,971 37,134 .. 402,453 30 26 250 Rwanda 205 1,750 4 7 –379 119 96 679 8e .. 15 Saudi Arabia 188,500 92,200 9 1 22,765 10,499 –5 .. .. 1 150 Senegal 2,180 5,210 41 5 –1,311 208 87 2,861 16e 26 –100 Serbia 8,345 15,582 66 .. –2,413 1,921 142 30,918 70 39 0 Sierra Leone 205 505 .. .. –193 74 66 389 10e 11 60 Singapore 269,832g 245,785 70 g 51 27,181 16,809 .. .. .. 94 500 Slovak Republic 55,933 55,186 86 5 –2,810 –31 .. .. .. 54 20 Somalia .. .. .. .. .. 108 85 2,949 .. .. –250 South Africa 62,627 71,950 47h 5 –11,295 5,628 23 41,943 16 215 700 Spain 218,027 290,240 73 5 –78,683 6,451 .. .. .. .. 1,750 Sri Lanka 7,360 9,883 67 2 –215 404 36 15,154 35 43 –300 Sudan 7,800 8,200 0 0 –1,314 2,923 58 19,633 78e 16 135 Sweden 130,742 118,758 76 16 30,232 10,708 .. .. .. 133 150 Switzerland 172,742 155,595 90 23 23,636 24,803 .. .. .. 181 100 Syrian Arab Republic 10,400 16,300 35 1 66 1,434 7 .. .. 37 800 Tajikistan 1,010 2,569 .. .. –180 16 43 1,466 23 28 –200 Tanzania 2,970 6,347 25 1 –2,307 645 55 5,938 14e, i 17 –300 Thailand 152,498 133,801 75 25 20,284 5,956 –9 64,798 31 146 300 Togo 780 1,400 62 0 –222 50 51 1,573 51e 30 –5 Tunisia 14,449 19,100 75 5 –1,711 1,595 46 20,776 58 75 –20 Turkey 102,139 140,869 80 2 –13,961 7,955 27 277,277 40 53 –44 Turkmenistan 6,595 6,750 .. .. .. 1,355 4 638 5 .. –25 Uganda 3,560 4,410 27 1 –875 604 52 2,249 10e 11 –135 Ukraine 39,782 45,487 70 3 –1,801 4,816 13 92,479 63 82 –80 United Arab Emirates 175,000 140,000 4 3 .. .. .. .. .. 115 343 United Kingdom 350,728 479,890 72 19 –28,690 24,799 .. .. .. 229 948 United States 1,056,895 1,603,768 67 27 –419,870 134,710 .. .. .. 272 5,052 Uruguay 5,386 6,907 26 4 259 1,139 10 11,049 40 34 –50 Uzbekistan 9,850 7,615 .. .. .. 750 7 3,995 15 .. –400 Venezuela, RB 57,595 42,220 67 3 8,561 –3,105 2 50,229 21 20 40 Vietnam 56,574 68,936 55 9 –10,706 7,600 30 26,158 29 95 –200 West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. 535 52 659 .. .. .. –10 Yemen, Rep. 9,270 9,300 2 0 –1,251 129 13 6,258 18 19 –135 Zambia 4,238 3,791 8 2 –1,046 699 86 2,986 6e 19 –85 Zimbabwe 1,700 2,900 34 3 .. 60 49 5,199 177 .. –700 World 12,465,631t 12,553,525t 70w 17w 1,116,269s 19w ..s 185 w ..js Low income 76,234 124,812 50 3 12,033 45 129,218 32 –2,737 Middle income 3,708,999 3,509,321 64 17 346,573 11 3,329,192 78 –13,203 Lower middle income 2,090,954 2,027,292 78 22 177,941 11 1,342,220 127 –9,231 Upper middle income 1,617,007 1,476,640 53 9 168,632 13 1,986,972 61 –3,972 Low and middle income 3,785,241 3,634,105 64 16 358,605 23 3,458,409 77 –15,941 East Asia & Pacific 1,747,818 1,492,279 80 28 102,488 5 771,628 145 –3,781 Europe & Central Asia 650,221 624,980 34 6 85,053 20 1,138,859 38 –1,671 Latin America & the Caribbean 676,338 669,803 60 12 73,902 16 894,367 72 –5,214 Middle East & North Africa 273,042 290,458 .. 4 28,095 73 131,545 36 –1,089 South Asia 197,030 316,340 68 5 38,311 8 326,311 73 –2,376 Sub-Saharan Africa 241,607 248,900 33 3 30,756 49 195,699 78 –1,810 High income 8,682,510 8,926,538 72 18 757,664 0 .. 245 15,894 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. a. The distinction between official aid, for countries on the Part II list of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and official development assistance was dropped in 2005. Regional aggregates include data for economies not listed in the table. World and income group totals include aid not allocated by country or region. b. The numerator refers to 2008, whereas the denominator is a three-year average of 2006–08 data. c. Total for the five-year period. d. Includes Luxembourg. e. Data are from debt sustainability analysis for low-income countries. f. Includes Taiwan, China. g. Includes reexports. h. Data on total exports and imports refer to South Africa only. Data on export commodity shares refer to the South African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa). i. GNI refers to mainland Tanzania only. j. World total computed by the UN sums to zero, but because the aggregates shown here refer to World Bank definitions, regional and income group totals do not equal zero. 354 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Table 6 Key indicators for other economies Adult Gross literacy Population Population Gross national income PPP gross national domestic rate age (GNI) a income (GNI) b product Life expectancy Average Density at birth % composition annual people $ $ per ages % per % $ per $ per capita Male Female 15 and Thousands growth sq. km. ages 0–14 millions capita millions capita % growth years years older 2009 2000–09 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2008–09 2008 2008 2008 American Samoa 67 1.7 331 .. .. ..c .. .. .. .. .. .. Andorra 85 3.3d 178 .. 3,447 41,130 .. .. 1.6 .. .. .. Antigua and Barbuda 88 1.4 197 .. 1,058 12,070 1,550e 17,690e –9.5 .. .. 99 Aruba 107 1.8 586 19 .. ..f .. .. .. 72 77 98 Bahamas, The 342 1.3 34 26 7,136 21,390 .. .. 1.5 71 76 .. Bahrain 791 2.2 1,092 26 19,712 25,420 25,967 33,480 4.1 74 78 91 Barbados 256 0.2 593 17 .. ..f .. .. .. 74 80 .. Belize 333 3.2 14 35 1,205 3,740 1,917 e 5,950 e 0.4 74 78 .. Bermuda 64 0.4 1,284 .. .. ..f .. .. 0.4 76 82 .. Bhutan 697 2.4 18 31 1,406 2,020 3,697 5,300 5.8 64 68 53 Botswana 1,950 1.4 3 33 12,159 6,240 25,065 12,860 –7.4 54 54 83 Brunei Darussalam 400 2.0 74 27 10,211 27,050 19,598 50,920 –1.3 75 80 95 Cape Verde 506 1.6 124 36 1,520 3,010 1,785 3,530 1.4 68 74 84 Cayman Islands 55 3.5 209 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. 99 Channel Islands 150 0.2 787 16 10,242 68,610 .. .. 5.7 77 82 .. Comoros 659 2.2 346 38 571 870 860 1,300 9.6 63 68 74 Cuba 11,204 0.1 102 18 .. ..c .. .. .. 77 81 100 Cyprus 871 1.1 93 18 21,366 g 26,940 g 22,248 g 28,050 g 2.4 g 77 82 98 Djibouti 864 1.9 37 36 1,106 1,280 2,143 2,480 3.2 54 57 .. Dominica 74 0.3 98 .. 359 4,870 624e 8,470e –1.3 .. .. .. Equatorial Guinea 676 2.7 24 41 8,398 12,420 13,088 19,350 –7.8 49 51 93 Estonia 1,340 –0.2 32 15 18,846 14,060 25,316 18,890 –14.1 69 80 100 Faeroe Islands 49 0.7 35 .. .. ..f .. .. .. 77 81 .. Fiji 849 0.6 46 31 3,356 3,950 3,878 4,570 –3.1 67 71 .. French Polynesia 269 1.5 73 26 .. ..f .. .. .. 72 77 .. Gabon 1,475 2.0 6 36 10,869 7,370 18,381 12,460 –2.7 59 62 87 Gambia, The 1,705 3.0 166 42 743 440 2,273 1,330 1.8 54 58 45 Gibraltar 31 0.8 3,103 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. .. Greenland 56 0.0h 0h .. 1,857 32,960 .. .. 0.8 66 71 .. Grenada 104 0.3 305 28 577 5,550 803e 7,720e –7.1 74 77 .. Guam 178 1.5 325 28 .. ..f .. .. .. 73 78 .. Guinea-Bissau 1,611 2.3 56 43 826 510 1,706 1,060 0.7 46 49 51 Guyana 762 0.1 4 30 1,109 1,450 2,313 e 3,030 e 3.1 64 70 .. Iceland 319 1.4 3 21 13,789 43,220 10,653 33,390 –7.0 80 83 .. Isle of Man 80 0.6 141 .. 3,972 49,310 .. .. 7.4 .. .. .. Jamaica 2,700 0.5 248 29 13,481 4,990 19,749e 7,320e –3.1 69 75 86 Kiribati 98 1.7 119 .. 185 1,890 328e 3,350e 0.0 59 63 .. Korea, Dem. Rep. 23,906 0.5 198 22 .. ..i .. .. .. 65 69 100 Kosovo 1,805 0.7 165 .. 5,842 3,240 .. .. 3.4 67 72 .. Kuwait 2,795 2.7 153 23 116,984 43,930 142,710 53,590 1.9 76 80 94 Latvia 2,255 –0.6 36 14 27,936 12,390 37,236 16,510 –17.6 67 78 100 Lesotho 2,067 1.0 68 39 2,139 1,030 4,027 1,950 1.3 44 46 90 Liechtenstein 36 1.0 223 .. 4,034 113,210 .. .. 1.0 80 85 .. Luxembourg 498 1.5 189 18 37,056 74,430 28,694 57,640 –5.2 78 83 .. Macao SAR, China 538 2.2 18,659 13 18,142 35,360 26,890 52,410 10.4 79 83 93 Macedonia, FYR 2,042 0.2 80 18 8,983 4,400 21,550 10,550 –0.8 72 77 97 Maldives 309 1.4 1,017 28 1,197 3,870 1,620 5,230 –4.4 70 73 98 Malta 415 0.7 1,287 16 6,826 16,690 9,259 22,640 3.1 77 82 92 Marshall Islands 61 1.9 331 .. 186 3,060 .. .. –2.2 .. .. .. Mauritius 1,275 0.8 625 23 9,236 7,240 16,924 13,270 1.6 69 76 88 Mayotte 197 2.9j 511 39 .. ..c .. .. .. 72 80 .. Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 111 0.4 158 37 246 2,220 311e 2,810e –15.4 68 69 .. Monaco 33 0.3 16,358 .. 6,670 203,900 .. .. 9.7 .. .. .. Mongolia 2,671 1.2 2 26 4,361 1,630 8,895 3,330 –2.7 63 70 97 Montenegro 624 –0.6 46 19 4,089 6,550 8,194 13,130 –7.3 72 77 .. Namibia 2,171 1.9 3 37 9,323 4,290 13,908 6,410 –0.9 60 62 88 Netherlands Antilles 198 1.0 244 21 .. ..f .. .. .. 73 79 96 New Caledonia 250 1.8 13 26 .. ..f .. .. .. 72 81 96 Northern Mariana Islands 87 2.6 186 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. .. Oman 2,845 1.9 9 31 49,833 17,890 67,892 24,370 10.4 74 78 87 Palau 20 0.7 44 .. 182 8,940 .. .. –2.6 66 72 .. Puerto Rico 3,967 0.4 446 20 .. ..f .. .. .. 75 83 90 Qatar 1,409 9.2 111 16 .. ..f .. .. –0.7 75 77 93 Samoa 179 0.1 63 39 508 2,840 764e 4,270e –5.5 69 75 99 San Marino 31 1.3k 517 .. 1,572 50,670 .. .. 0.4 79 85 .. Selected World Development Indicators 2011 355 Table 6 Key indicators for other economies (continued) Adult Gross literacy Population Population Gross national income PPP gross national domestic rate age (GNI) a income (GNI) b product Life expectancy Average Density at birth % composition annual people $ $ per ages % per % $ per $ per capita Male Female 15 and Thousands growth sq. km. Ages 0–14 millions capita millions capita % growth years years older 2009 2000–09 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2008–09 2008 2008 2008 São Tomé and Príncipe 163 1.7 167 41 185 1,140 302 1,850 2.4 64 68 88 Seychelles 88 0.9 189 .. 746 8,480 1,480e 16,820e –8.7 68 79 92 Slovenia 2,043 0.3 100 14 48,063 23,520 53,821 26,340 –8.8 76 83 100 Solomon Islands 523 2.6 18 39 478 910 976e 1,860e –4.5 65 67 .. St. Kitts and Nevis 50 1.3 189 .. 501 10,100 677e 13,660e –8.8 .. .. .. St. Lucia 172 1.1 279 26 890 5,170 1,527e 8,880e –4.9 70 76 .. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 109 0.1 280 27 558 5,110 965e 8,840e –2.8 70 74 .. Suriname 520 1.2 3 29 2,454 4,760 3,447 e 6,690 e 4.2 66 73 91 Swaziland 1,185 1.0 68 39 2,787 2,350 5,428 4,580 –1.0 46 45 87 Timor-Leste 1,134 3.7 74 45 2,706 2,460 5,162 e 4,700 e –1.3 60 62 .. Tonga 104 0.6 144 37 339 3,260 476e 4,580e –0.8 69 75 99 Trinidad and Tobago 1,339 0.4 260 21 22,076 16,490 33,599e 25,100e –4.8 66 73 99 Turks and Caicos Islands 33 6.1 34 .. .. ..f .. .. .. .. .. .. Tuvalu .. .. 348 .. .. ..l .. .. .. .. .. .. Vanuatu 240 2.6 19 39 628 2,620 1,029e 4,290e 1.4 68 72 81 Virgin Islands (U.S.) 110 0.1 314 21 .. ..f .. .. .. 76 82 .. Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. a. Calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. b. PPP is purchasing power parity; see the technical notes. c. Estimated to be upper middle income (US$3,946–12,195). d. Data are for 2003–09. e. The estimate is based on regression; others are extrapolated from the latest International Comparison Program benchmark estimates. f. Estimated to be high income (US$12,196 or more). g. Data are for the area controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. h. Less than 0.5. i. Estimated to be low income (US$995 or less) j. Data are for 2002–07. k. Data are for 2004–07. l. Estimated to be lower middle income (US$996–3,945). 356 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Technical notes Thus readers are advised not to compare data series between These technical notes discuss the sources and methods used editions or between different editions of World Bank publi- to compile the indicators included in this edition of Selected cations. Consistent time series are available from the Open World Development Indicators. The notes follow the order Data website (http://data.worldbank.org). in which the indicators appear in the tables. Ratios and growth rates Sources For ease of reference, the tables usually show ratios and rates The data published in the Selected World Development Indi- of growth rather than the simple underlying values. Values cators are taken from World Development Indicators 2010. in their original form are available from the Open Data web- Where possible, however, revisions reported since the clos- site (http://data.worldbank.org). Unless otherwise noted, ing date of that edition have been incorporated. In addition, growth rates are computed using the least-squares regres- newly released estimates of population and gross national sion method (see the section on “Statistical methods” later income (GNI) per capita for 2009 are included in table 1 and in this dicussion). Because this method takes into account all table 6. available observations during a period, the resulting growth The World Bank draws on a variety of sources for the sta- rates reflect general trends that are not unduly influenced by tistics published in the World Development Indicators. Data on exceptional values. Constant price economic indicators are external debt for developing countries are reported directly used to exclude the effects of inflation in calculating growth to the World Bank by developing member countries through rates. Data in italics are for a year or period other than that the Debtor Reporting System. Other data are drawn mainly specified in the column heading—up to two years before or from the United Nations and its specialized agencies, from after for economic indicators and up to three years for social the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and from country indicators, because the latter tend to be collected less regu- reports to the World Bank. Bank staff estimates are also used larly and change less dramatically over short periods. to improve currentness or consistency. For most countries, national accounts estimates are obtained from member gov- Constant price series ernments through World Bank economic missions. In some An economy’s growth is measured by the increase in value instances these are adjusted by staff to ensure conformity added produced by the individuals and enterprises operating with international definitions and concepts. Most social data in that economy. Thus, measuring real growth requires esti- from national sources are drawn from regular administrative mates of gross domestic product (GDP) and its components files, special surveys, or periodic censuses. valued in constant prices. The World Bank collects constant For more detailed notes about the data, please refer to the price national accounts series in national currencies that World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2010. are recorded in the country’s original base year. To obtain comparable series of constant price data, it rescales GDP and Data consistency and reliability value added by industrial origin to a common reference year, Considerable effort has been made to standardize the data, 2000 in the current version of the WDI. This process gives but full comparability cannot be ensured, and care must rise to a discrepancy between the rescaled GDP and the sum be taken in interpreting the indicators. Many factors affect of the rescaled components. Because allocating the discrep- data availability, comparability, and reliability: statistical sys- ancy would give rise to distortions in the growth rate, it is tems in many developing economies are still weak; statistical left unallocated. methods, coverage, practices, and definitions differ widely; and cross-country and intertemporal comparisons involve Summary measures complex technical and conceptual problems that cannot be The summary measures for regions and income groups, unequivocally resolved. Data coverage may not be complete presented at the end of most tables, are calculated by simple because of special circumstances or for economies experienc- addition when they are expressed in levels. Aggregate growth ing problems (such as those stemming from conflicts) affect- rates and ratios are usually computed as weighted averages. ing the collection and reporting of data. For these reasons, The summary measures for social indicators are weighted by although the data are drawn from the sources thought to be population or by subgroups of population, except for infant most authoritative, they should be construed only as indi- mortality, which is weighted by the number of births. See the cating trends and characterizing major differences among notes on specific indicators for more information. economies rather than offering precise quantitative mea- For summary measures that cover many years, calcula- sures of those differences. Discrepancies in data presented tions are based on a uniform group of economies so that in different editions reflect updates by countries as well as the composition of the aggregate does not change over revisions to historical series and changes in methodology. time. Group measures are compiled only if the data avail- Selected World Development Indicators 2011 357 able for a given year account for at least two-thirds of the data come from the most recent round of surveys, completed full group, as defined for the 2000 benchmark year. As long in 2005. Estimates for countries not included in the surveys as this criterion is met, economies for which data are miss- are derived from statistical models using available data. For ing are assumed to behave like those that provide estimates. more information on the 2005 International Comparison Readers should keep in mind that the summary measures Program, go to http://www.worldbank.org/data/icp. are estimates of representative aggregates for each topic and PPP GNI per capita is PPP GNI divided by midyear that nothing meaningful can be deduced about behavior at population. the country level by working back from group indicators. In Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth is addition, the estimation process may result in discrepancies based on GDP measured in constant prices. Growth in GDP between subgroup and overall totals. is considered a broad measure of the growth of an economy. GDP in constant prices can be estimated by measuring the Table 1. Key indicators of development total quantity of goods and services produced in a period, Population is based on the de facto definition, which counts valuing them at an agreed set of base year prices, and sub- all residents, regardless of legal status or citizenship. Except tracting the cost of intermediate inputs, also in constant for refugees who are not permanently settled in the country prices. See the section on statistical methods for details of of asylum, such refugees are generally considered part of the the least-squares growth rate. population of the country of origin. The values shown are Life expectancy at birth is the number of years a new- midyear estimates. born infant would live if patterns of mortality prevailing at Average annual population growth rate is the exponen- its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Data are tial rate of change for the period (see the section on statisti- presented for males and females separately. cal methods). Adult literacy rate is the percentage of persons ages 15 Population density is midyear population divided by and older who can, with understanding, read and write a land area in square kilometers. Land area is a country’s total short, simple statement about their everyday life. In prac- area, excluding area under inland water bodies. tice, literacy is difficult to measure. To estimate literacy using Population age composition, ages 0–14 refers to the per- such a definition requires census or survey measurements centage of the total population that is ages 0–14. under controlled conditions. Many countries estimate the Gross national income (GNI) is the broadest measure of number of literate people from self-reported data. Some use national income. It measures total value added from domes- educational attainment data as a proxy but apply different tic and foreign sources claimed by residents. GNI comprises lengths of school attendance or level of completion. Because gross domestic product plus net receipts of primary income definition and methodologies of data collection differ across from foreign sources. Data are converted from national cur- countries, data need to be used with caution. rency to current U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method. This approach involves using a three-year average of Table 2. Poverty exchange rates to smooth the effects of transitory exchange The World Bank periodically prepares poverty assessments rate fluctuations. (See the section on statistical methods for of countries in which it has an active program, in close col- further discussion of the Atlas method.) laboration with national institutions, other development GNI per capita is GNI divided by midyear population. It agencies, and civil society groups, including poor people’s is converted into current U.S. dollars by the Atlas method. organizations. Poverty assessments report the extent and The World Bank uses GNI per capita in U.S. dollars to clas- causes of poverty and propose strategies to reduce it. Since sify economies for analytical purposes and to determine 1992 the World Bank has conducted about 200 poverty borrowing eligibility. assessments, which are the main source of the poverty esti- PPP GNI is GNI converted into international dollars using mates using national poverty lines presented in the table. purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors. Because Countries report similar assessments as part of their Poverty exchange rates do not always reflect differences in price levels Reduction Strategies. between countries, this table converts GNI and GNI per cap- The World Bank also produces poverty estimates using ita estimates into international dollars using PPP rates. PPP international poverty lines to monitor progress in poverty rates provide a standard measure allowing comparison of real reduction globally. The first global poverty estimates for levels of expenditure between countries, just as conventional developing countries were produced for World Develop- price indexes allow comparison of real values over time. The ment Report 1990: Poverty Using Household Survey Data for PPP conversion factors used here are derived from the 2005 22 Countries (Ravallion, Datt, and van de Walle 1991). Since round of price surveys covering 146 countries conducted by then the number of countries that field household income the International Comparison Program. For OECD countries, and expenditure surveys has expanded considerably. 358 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 National and international poverty lines sufficient information to compute a comprehensive estimate National poverty lines are used to make estimates of poverty of total household consumption or income (including con- consistent with the country’s specific economic and social sumption or income from own production), from which it circumstances and are not intended for international com- is possible to construct a correctly weighted distribution of parisons of poverty rates. The setting of national poverty consumption or income per person. Over the past 20 years lines reflects local perceptions of the level of consumption the number of countries that field surveys and the frequency or income needed not to be poor. The perceived boundary of the surveys have expanded considerably. The quality of between poor and not poor rises with the average income data has improved greatly as well. The World Bank’s pov- of a country and so does not provide a uniform measure erty monitoring database now includes more than 600 sur- for comparing poverty rates across countries. Nevertheless, veys representing 115 developing countries. More than 1.2 national poverty estimates are clearly the appropriate mea- million randomly sampled households were interviewed in sure for setting national policies for poverty reduction and these surveys, representing 96 percent of the population of for monitoring their results. developing countries. International comparisons of poverty estimates entail both conceptual and practical problems. Countries have dif- Measurement issues using survey data ferent definitions of poverty, and consistent comparisons Besides the frequency and timeliness of survey data, other across countries can be difficult. Local poverty lines tend to data issues arise in measuring household living standards. have higher purchasing power in rich countries, where more One relates to the choice of income or consumption as a generous standards are used, than in poor countries. Inter- welfare indicator. Income is generally more difficult to mea- national poverty lines attempt to hold the real value of the sure accurately, and consumption comes closer to the notion poverty line constant across countries, as is done when mak- of standard of living. Also, income can vary over time even if ing comparisons over time, regardless of average income of the standard of living does not. However, consumption data countries. are not always available: the latest estimates reported here Since the publication of World Development Report 1990 use consumption for about two-thirds of countries. Another the World Bank has aimed to apply a common standard issue is that even similar surveys may not be strictly compa- in measuring extreme poverty, anchored to what poverty rable because of differences in number of consumer goods means in the world’s poorest countries. The welfare of peo- they identify, differences in the length of the period over ple living in different countries can be measured on a com- which respondents must recall their expenditures, or differ- mon scale by adjusting for differences in the purchasing ences in the quality and training of enumerators. Selective power of currencies. The commonly used $1 a day standard, nonresponses are also a concern in some surveys. measured in 1985 international prices and adjusted to local Comparisons of countries at different levels of develop- currency using purchasing power parities, was chosen for ment also pose a potential problem because of differences in World Development Report 1990 because it was typical of the the relative importance of the consumption of nonmarket poverty lines in low-income countries at the time. Later this goods. The local market value of all consumption in kind $1-a-day line was revised to $1.08 a day measured in 1993 (including own production, which is particularly important international prices. More recently, the international poverty in underdeveloped rural economies) should be included in lines were revised using the new data on PPPs compiled by total consumption expenditure, but may not be. Surveys now the 2005 round of the International Comparison Program, routinely include imputed values for consumption in-kind along with data from an expanded set of household income from own-farm production. Imputed profit from the pro- and expenditure surveys. The new extreme poverty line is set at $1.25 a day in 2005 PPP terms, which represents the mean duction of nonmarket goods should be included in income, of the poverty lines found in the poorest 15 countries ranked but sometimes it is omitted (such omissions were a bigger by per capita consumption. The new poverty line maintains problem in surveys before the 1980s). Most survey data now the same standard for extreme poverty—the poverty line include valuations for consumption or income from own typical of the poorest countries in the world—but updates it production, but valuation methods vary. using the latest information on the cost of living in develop- Definitions ing countries. Survey year is the year in which the underlying data were Quality and availability of survey data collected. Poverty estimates are derived using surveys fielded to collect, Population below national poverty line, national is among other things, information on income or consumption the percentage of the population living below the national from a sample of households. To be useful for poverty esti- poverty line. National estimates are based on population- mates, surveys must be nationally representative and include weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys. Selected World Development Indicators 2011 359 Population below $1.25 a day and population below mary school, minus the number of repeaters in that grade, $2.00 a day are the percentages of the population living on divided by the total number of children of official gradua- less than $1.25 a day and $2.00 a day at 2005 international tion age. The primary completion rate reflects the primary prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty cycle as defined by the International Standard Classification rates for individual countries cannot be compared with pov- of Education, ranging from three or four years of primary erty rates reported in earlier editions. education (in a very small number of countries) to five or Poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line six years (in most countries) and seven (in a small number (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed of countries). Because curricula and standards for school as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the completion vary across countries, a high rate of primary depth of poverty as well as its incidence. completion does not necessarily indicate high levels of stu- dent learning. Table 3. Millennium Development Goals: Eradicating Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary and second- poverty and improving lives ary school is the ratio of the female gross enrollment rate in Share of poorest quintile in national consumption or primary and secondary school to the male gross enrollment income is the share of the poorest 20 percent of the popula- rate. tion in consumption or, in some cases, income. It is a Eliminating gender disparities in education would help distributional measure. Countries with more unequal dis- to increase the status and capabilities of women. This indi- tributions of consumption (or income) have a higher rate of cator is an imperfect measure of the relative accessibility poverty for a given average income. Data are from nationally of schooling for girls. School enrollment data are reported representative household surveys. Because the underlying to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural household surveys differ in method and type of data col- Organization Institute for Statistics by national education lected, the distribution data are not strictly comparable authorities. Primary education provides children with basic across countries. The World Bank staff has made an effort to reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an ele- ensure that the data are as comparable as possible. Wherever mentary understanding of such subjects as history, geogra- possible, consumption has been used rather than income. phy, natural science, social science, art, and music. Secondary Vulnerable employment is the sum of unpaid family education completes the provision of basic education that workers and own-account workers as a percentage of total began at the primary level, and aims at laying foundations employment. The proportion of unpaid family workers and for lifelong learning and human development, by offering own-account workers in total employment is derived from more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more spe- information on status in employment. Each status group cialized teachers. faces different economic risks, and unpaid family workers Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 and own-account workers are the most vulnerable—and children under five years of age that a newborn baby will therefore the most likely to fall into poverty. They are the die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific least likely to have formal work arrangements, are the least mortality rates. The main sources of mortality data are vital likely to have social protection and safety nets to guard registration systems and direct or indirect estimates based against economic shocks, and often are incapable of gen- on sample surveys or censuses. To make under-five mortality erating sufficient savings to offset these shocks. estimates comparable across countries and over time and to Prevalence of child malnutrition is the percentage of chil- ensure consistency across estimates by different agencies, the dren under age five whose weight for age is less than minus United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World two standard deviations from the median for the interna- Bank developed and adopted a statistical method that uses all tional reference population ages 0–59 months. The table available information to reconcile differences. The method presents data for the new child growth standards released by fits a regression line to the relationship between mortality the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2006. Estimates of rates and their reference dates using weighted least squares. child malnutrition are from national survey data. The pro- Maternal mortality rate is the number of women who portion of children who are underweight is the most com- die from pregnancy-related causes during pregnancy and mon indicator of malnutrition. Being underweight, even childbirth, per 100,000 live births. The values are modeled mildly, increases the risk of death and inhibits cognitive estimates. The modeled estimates are based on an exercise development in children. Moreover, it perpetuates the prob- by the WHO, UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund, lem from one generation to the next, because malnourished and the World Bank. For countries with complete vital reg- women are more likely to have low-birthweight babies. istration systems with good attribution of cause-of-death Primary completion rate is the percentage of students information, the data are used as reported. For countries completing the last year of primary school. It is calculated by with national data, either (1) from complete vital registra- taking the total number of students in the last grade of pri- tion systems with uncertain or poor attribution of cause-of- 360 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 death information, or (2) from household surveys, reported radation of natural resources. Value added is the net output maternal mortality was adjusted usually by a factor of of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting underenumeration and misclassification. For countries with intermediate inputs. The industrial origin of value added is no empirical national data (about 35 percent of countries), determined by International Standard Industrial Classifica- maternal mortality was estimated with a regression model tion (ISIC) revision 3. The World Bank conventionally uses using socioeconomic information, including fertility, birth the U.S. dollar and applies the average official exchange rate attendants, and GDP. reported by the IMF for the year shown. An alternative con- Prevalence of HIV is the percentage of people ages 15–49 version factor is applied if the official exchange rate is judged who are infected with HIV. Adult HIV prevalence rates reflect to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate the rate of HIV infection in each country’s population. Low effectively applied to transactions in foreign currencies and national prevalence rates can be very misleading, however. traded products. They often disguise serious epidemics that are initially con- Gross domestic product average annual growth rate is centrated in certain localities or among specific population calculated from constant price GDP data in local currency. groups and threaten to spill over into the wider population. Agricultural productivity is the ratio of agricultural In many parts of the developing world, most new infections value added, measured in 2000 U.S. dollars, to the number of occur in young adults, with young women especially vulner- workers in agriculture. Agricultural productivity is measured able. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS by value added per unit of input. Agricultural value added and WHO estimate HIV prevalence from sentinel surveil- includes that from forestry and fishing. Thus interpretations lance, population-based surveys, and special studies. of land productivity should be made with caution. Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new Value added is the net output of an industry after add- tuberculosis cases (pulmonary, smear positive, and extra- ing up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. The pulmonary). Tuberculosis is one of the main causes of industrial origin of value added is determined by the ISIC death from a single infectious agent among adults in devel- revision 3. oping countries. In high-income countries tuberculosis has Agriculture value added corresponds to ISIC divisions reemerged largely as a result of cases among immigrants. 1–5 and includes forestry and fishing. The estimates of tuberculosis incidence in the table are based Industry value added comprises mining, manufacturing, on an approach in which reported cases are adjusted using construction, electricity, water, and gas (ISIC divisions 10–45). the ratio of case notifications to the estimated share of cases Services value added correspond to ISIC divisions 50–99. detected by panels of 80 epidemiologists convened by WHO. Household final consumption expenditure is the mar- Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the ket value of all goods and services, including durable prod- burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement and ucts (such as cars, washing machines, and home computers), include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of purchased by households. It excludes purchases of dwell- solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring divided by midyear ings but includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwell- population (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, ings. It also includes payments and fees to governments to World Bank). obtain permits and licenses. Here, household consumption Access to improved sanitation facilities is the percent- expenditure includes the expenditures of nonprofit insti- age of the population with at least adequate access to excreta tutions serving households, even when reported separately disposal facilities (private or shared, but not public) that can by the country. In practice, household consumption expen- effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with diture may include any statistical discrepancy in the use of excreta. Facilities do not have to include treatment to render resources relative to the supply of resources. sewage outflows innocuous. Improved facilities range from General government final consumption expenditure simple but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a sewer- includes all government current expenditures for purchases age connection. To be effective, facilities must be correctly of goods and services (including compensation of employ- constructed and properly maintained. ees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense Internet users are people with access to the worldwide and security, but excludes government military expenditures network. that are part of government capital formation. Gross capital formation consists of outlays on additions Table 4. Economic activity to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the Gross domestic product is gross value added, at purchas- level of inventories and valuables. Fixed assets include land ers’ prices, by all resident producers in the economy plus improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of the products. It is calculated without deduction for the of buildings, roads, railways, and the like, including com- depreciation of fabricated assets or for the depletion or deg- mercial and industrial buildings, offices, schools, hospitals, Selected World Development Indicators 2011 361 and private dwellings. Inventories are stocks of goods held Net official development assistance (ODA) from the by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in high-income members of the OECD is the main source of production or sales, and “work in progress.” According to the official external finance for developing countries, but ODA 1993 System of National Accounts, net acquisitions of valu- is also disbursed by some important donor countries that ables are also considered capital formation. are not members of the OECD’s Development Assistance External balance of goods and services is exports of Committee (DAC). DAC has three criteria for ODA: it is goods and services less imports of goods and services. Trade undertaken by the official sector; it promotes economic in goods and services comprise all transactions between development or welfare as a main objective; and it is pro- residents of a country and the rest of the world involving a vided on concessional terms, with a grant element of at least change in ownership of general merchandise, goods sent for 25 percent on loans (calculated at a 10 percent discount processing and repairs, nonmonetary gold, and services. rate). GDP implicit deflator reflects changes in prices for all Official development assistance comprises grants and final demand categories, such as government consumption, loans, net of repayments, that meet the DAC definition of capital formation, and international trade, as well as the ODA and that are made to countries and territories on the main component, private final consumption. It is derived as DAC list of aid recipients. The new DAC list of recipients the ratio of current to constant price GDP. The GDP defla- is organized on more objective needs-based criteria than tor may also be calculated explicitly as a Paasche price index its predecessors, and includes all low- and middle-income in which the weights are the current period quantities of countries, except those that are members of the Group of 8 output. or the European Union (including countries with a firm date National accounts indicators for most developing coun- for EU admission). tries are collected from national statistical organizations and Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents repay- central banks by visiting and resident World Bank missions. able in foreign currency, goods, or services. It is the sum of Data for high-income economies come from the OECD. public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Table 5. Trade, aid, and finance Short-term debt includes all debt having an original matu- Merchandise exports show the free on board (f.o.b.) value rity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term of goods provided to the rest of the world valued in U.S. debt. dollars. Present value of debt is the sum of short-term external Merchandise imports show the c.i.f. value of goods (the debt plus the discounted sum of total debt service payments cost of the goods including insurance and freight) purchased due on public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaran- from the rest of the world valued in U.S. dollars. Data on teed long-term external debt over the life of existing loans. merchandise trade come from the World Trade Organiza- Data on external debt are mainly from reports to the tion in its annual report. World Bank through its Debtor Reporting System from Manufactured exports comprise the commodities in member countries that have received International Bank SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 for Reconstruction and Development loans or International (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous Development Association credits, with additional informa- manufactured goods), excluding division 68. tion from the files of the World Bank, the IMF, the African High-technology exports are products with high research Development Bank and African Development Fund, the and development intensity. They include high-technology Asian Development Bank and Asian Development Fund, products such as aerospace products, computers, pharma- and the Inter-American Development Bank. Summary tables ceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery. of the external debt of developing countries are published Current account balance is the sum of net exports of annually in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance. goods and services, net income, and net current transfers. Domestic credit provided by banking sector includes all Foreign direct investment (FDI) is net inflows of invest- credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception ment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or of credit to the central government, which is net. The bank- more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an econ- ing sector includes monetary authorities, deposit money omy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity banks, and other banking institutions for which data are capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, available (including institutions that do not accept trans- and short-term capital, as shown in the balance of payments. ferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and Data on FDI are based on balance of payments data reported savings deposits). Examples of other banking institutions by the IMF, supplemented by World Bank staff estimates include savings and mortgage loan institutions and building using data reported by the United Nations Conference on and loan associations. Data are from the IMF’s International Trade and Development and official national sources. Finance Statistics. 362 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Net migration is the net total of migrants during the series. Note also that the exponential growth rate does not period. It is the total number of immigrants less the total correspond to the annual rate of change measured at a one- number of emigrants, including both citizens and nonciti- year interval, which is given by zens. Data are five-year estimates. Data are from the United (pn – pn–1)/pn–1. Nations Population Division’s World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. World Bank Atlas method Table 6. Key indicators for other economies For certain operational purposes, the World Bank uses the See the technical notes for Table 1. Atlas conversion factor to calculate GNI and GNI per capita in U.S. dollars. The purpose of the Atlas conversion factor is to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the Statistical methods cross-country comparison of national incomes. The Atlas This section describes the calculation of the least-squares conversion factor for any year is the average of a country’s growth rate, the exponential (endpoint) growth rate, and the exchange rate (or alternative conversion factor) for that year World Bank’s Atlas methodology for calculating the conver- and its exchange rates for the two preceding years, adjusted sion factor used to estimate GNI and GNI per capita in U.S. for the difference between the rate of inflation in the country dollars. and that in Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Euro Area. A country’s inflation rate is measured by the Least-squares growth rate change in its GDP deflator. The inflation rate for Japan, the Least-squares growth rates are used wherever there is a suf- United Kingdom, the United States, and the Euro Area, rep- ficiently long time series to permit a reliable calculation. No resenting international inflation, is measured by the change growth rate is calculated if more than half the observations in the SDR deflator. (Special drawing rights, or SDRs, are the in a period are missing. IMF’s unit of account.) The SDR deflator is calculated as a The least-squares growth rate, r, is estimated by fitting a weighted average of these countries’ GDP deflators in SDR linear regression trendline to the logarithmic annual values terms, the weights being the amount of each country’s cur- of the variable in the relevant period. The regression equa- rency in one SDR unit. Weights vary over time because both tion takes the form the composition of the SDR and the relative exchange rates ln Xt = a + bt, for each currency change. The SDR deflator is calculated in SDR terms first and then converted to U.S. dollars using the which is equivalent to the logarithmic transformation of the SDR to dollar Atlas conversion factor. The Atlas conversion compound growth equation, factor is then applied to a country’s GNI. The resulting GNI Xt = Xo (1 + r)t. in U.S. dollars is divided by the midyear population to derive GNI per capita. In this equation, X is the variable, t is time, and a = log Xo When official exchange rates are deemed to be unreliable and b = ln (1 + r ) are the parameters to be estimated. If b* or unrepresentative of the effective exchange rate during a is the least-squares estimate of b, the average annual growth period, an alternative estimate of the exchange rate is used in rate, r, is obtained as [exp(b*)–1] and is multiplied by 100 to the Atlas formula. express it as a percentage. The following formulas describe the calculation of the The calculated growth rate is an average rate that is repre- Atlas conversion factor for year t : sentative of the available observations over the entire period. It does not necessarily match the actual growth rate between 1⎡ ⎛ p pS$ ⎞ ⎛ p ptS $ ⎞ ⎤ any two periods. et* = ⎢et − 2 ⎜ t / St $ ⎟ + et −1 ⎜ t / S $ ⎟ + et ⎥ 3⎢ ⎣ ⎝ pt − 2 pt − 2 ⎠ ⎝ pt −1 pt −1 ⎠ ⎥ ⎦ Exponential growth rate The growth rate between two points in time for certain and the calculation of GNI per capita in U.S. dollars for year t : demographic data, notably labor force and population, is Yt $ = (Yt /Nt)/et*, calculated from the equation where et* is the Atlas conversion factor (national currency to r = ln (pn /p1)/n, the U.S. dollar) for year t, et is the average annual exchange where pn and p1 are the last and first observations in the period, rate (national currency to the U.S. dollar) for year t, pt is the n is the number of years in the period, and ln is the natural GDP deflator for year t, ptS$ is the SDR deflator in U.S. dollar logarithm operator. This growth rate is based on a model of terms for year t, Yt $ is the Atlas GNI per capita in U.S. dollars continuous, exponential growth between two points in time. in year t, Yt is current GNI (local currency) for year t, and Nt It does not take into account the intermediate values of the is the midyear population for year t. Selected World Development Indicators 2011 363 Alternative conversion factors eign currencies and traded products. This factor applies to The World Bank systematically assesses the appropriateness only a small number of countries, as shown in the primary of official exchange rates as conversion factors. An alterna- data documentation table in World Development Indicators tive conversion factor is used when the official exchange rate 2010. Alternative conversion factors are used in the Atlas is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from methodology and elsewhere in Selected World Development the rate effectively applied to domestic transactions of for- Indicators as single-year conversion factors. Index Boxes, figures, notes, and tables are i by b, f, n, and t following page numbers. Features are specially noted. A multidonor trust funds for, 33, 202, 203b accountability of institutions. See also transparency National Rural Access Program, 161 defined, xvi, 84 National Solidarity Program, 18, 24 (feature), 131, 133b, 136, dual accountability, 26, 26f, 200–202, 201f, 270 141n50, 169, 170b, 255, 261b early policy announcements and, 22 organized criminal violence, 67 (feature) importance of, 10, 84, 85b, 249 Pashtun tribal areas on Pakistan border, 219 military and, 149 passage of laws and regulations, 175n44 to taxpayers, 26 radio “edutainment” programs, 213n111 Aceh road and traffic access, 161 Aceh Peace Process Support Program (European Commission), special envoys to, 183, 208n7 138 (feature) technical assistance, 196 Aceh Peace-Reintegration Board (BRA), 138 (feature) trafficking financing rebels, 54 ASEAN role, 18, 233, 234b violence, 53, 54t building inclusive-enough coalitions, 12, 120, 137 (feature) women’s empowerment, 169, 170b commitment mechanisms to lock in signals, 138 (feature) Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), 33, 203b community-driven programs, 138 (feature) Africa. See also specific countries and regions delivering early results, 138 (feature) Chinese trade with and investment in, 183 economic and human costs of violence, 63 climate change coalition obtaining adaptation funding (2010), Monitoring Mission, 18, 38 (feature), 138 (feature), 252 232, 242n50 Reintegration and Livelihood Survey (World Bank), 138 employment and security as most pressing needs in, 128 (feature) mediation used in, 187b signals for confidence-building, 137–38 (feature) mobile phones, 158b social accountability, 157 regional infrastructure challenge, 235m success in preventing violence, 108 African Development Bank (AfDB), 197, 213n91 adaptability of institutions, 110–12, 111b, 119, 196–97. See also African National Congress (ANC), 14, 120, 121 best-fit approaches African Union (AU) AfDB (African Development Bank), 197, 213n91 African Peer Review Mechanism, 233 Afghanistan Border Program, 35, 44n101, 219 community-based programs, 24 (feature), 133–34b, 141n54, extra-constitutional changes of government and coups d’état, 261b norms for dealing with, 190 cross-border violence, 67 (feature) GEMAP, agreement to, 126b drug production and trafficking, 10 Peace and Security Commission, 187b financing rebels, 54 peacekeeping capacity of, 182, 281b early results crucial to confidence-building, 253 sanctions, 190 education reform, 169 support to social and poverty reduction programs in foreign troops and security stresses, 218 West African countries, 44n105, 292n24 humanitarian aid, phasing from international to local Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), 194b institutions, 266b agenda for international action, 290–91 international ideological movements and local grievances, 5 agreements to abstain from violence. See also elite pacts; specific international support for, 183 declarations and agreements for local initiatives, 194 lack of creditability, 75b investment in conflict prevention, 273b agriculture sector, support for, 162, 230, 257 mistrust of siding with either Taliban or NATO, 100b AKDN (Aga Khan Development Network), 194b M-Paisa, 162, 177n87 amnesties for war crimes, 187 365 366 INDEX Amnesty International, 114 (feature) B ANC. See African National Congress Bakassi Boys (Nigeria), 136b Angola Balkans Guinea-Bissau assistance, 207 (feature) fears of oppression and civil conflict, 74 reintegration budget, 202 modern organized violence, 67 (feature) Annan, Kofi, 187b bargainers and proposers/responders, 82b Anti-Corruption Interagency Council, 156 Becker, Gary, 79b Arbour, Louise, 37, 39 (feature), 288, 289b Belize, violent crime arising in post-conflict state, 4f Argentina Bellerive, Jean-Max, 153 confidence-building, 12 best-fit approaches “disappeared,” women’s role in demanding information on, adapted to local conditions, 8, 13, 22, 106, 145, 196–97, 259–60 124, 140n26 advantages of, 248 early results crucial to confidence-building, 253 for citizen security, justice, and jobs, 256t inclusive-enough coalition-building needing military support, defined, xvii, 117n17 139n14 duration of, 169 security personnel standards, 151 experimental, flexible approach, 171 transitional justice, 166, 255 food aid response, 286 transition from military rule, 154 job creation, 161–63 Armed Conflict Database, 70n62 judicial reforms, 155 arms trade and trafficking, 220–21, 220t, 241nn19–22 preferred to best practices, 107b, 147 arraignment courts, 155b procurement arrangements, 199 ARTF (Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund), 33, 203b ASEAN trade-offs in, 258 crisis prevention and recovery experience, 38 (feature), 44n102, best practices, success not guaranteed by use of, 146–47 271 birth registration programs, 154–55 East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve program, 286 Bolivia, drug trafficking and, 10, 223b Food Security Information System (AFSIS), 230b border areas and insecurity, 218–20. See also regional and as model of regional cooperation, 238 (feature) cross-border initiatives Myanmar disaster situation (2008), 186, 233, 234b Bosnia and Herzegovina political leadership role of, 233, 234b “Bulldozer Initiative” of 2002, 157 subregional initiatives, 35 currency board, 168 ASEAN-EU Aceh monitoring mission. See Aceh developmental progress, 53 Asia. See also specific countries and regions economic goals met through justice and inclusion, 132b mediation rarely used in, 187b education reform, 169 Asian Development Bank, 25, 229, 236, 239 (feature), 243n68 High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, 154 assessment tools international aid for, 183 international tools, 272t law enforcement personnel, vetting of, 151 post-conflict/post-crisis needs assessment, 250 mass rape, 60 strengthening, 23, 250 MDG progress, 6 use of, 22–23 regulatory simplification, 257 asset expansion programs, 162, 257 religious and ideological grievances, 67–68 (feature) assistance programs, international. See humanitarian aid; streamlining of peace agency implementation, 291n3 international support success in preventing violence, 11 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See ASEAN World Bank support for negotiations, 186 AU. See African Union Botswana, success of aid from single or dominant donor, 199 audits The Bottom Billion (Collier), xi, 105b donor funds released upon, 202 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 15, 165b social audits of government records, 175n61 Brancati, Dawn, 178n112 AusAID, 185 branding of aid programs, 191, 210n50 Fragile States Unit, 209n14 BRAVO (Birth Registration for All versus Oblivion) program, 154 Australia Brazil cross-governmental operation in Solomon Islands (Regional Fica Vivo program, 186 Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, RAMSI), 185 indirect vs. direct costs of violence, 65b International Deployment Group (IDG), 212n86 multisector response to homicide rate, 148, 148b Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC), NGO Viva Rio, 197, 213n92 229b, 242n42 police pacification units, 152 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) guerillas, 151 victims of political violence, reparations for, 125–26 Azam, Jean-Paul, 119 break from past. See commitment mechanisms Index 367 Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier), 105b private security industry in, 135 bribes. See corruption regional cooperation to manage public goods, 212n90 “Brookings Process,” 210n52 U.S. deportation of maras, 78b budgets, 33, 127, 128b, 149, 160b, 214n116, 256. See also violence, 172–73b transparency rising despite political peace, 58f Burkina Faso weak institutions failing, 10, 76b AU Border Program pilot project, 219 Central Asia. See also specific countries developmental comparison with Burundi, 63, 64f external pressures and external assistance, 238–40 (feature) Burundi Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program, 239 community-based programs, 24 (feature), 261b (feature) deaths from political violence, 70n62 Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center, 239 development consequences of violence, compared to Burkina (feature) Faso, 63, 64f Centre for Global Development, 34, 282b duration of aid for, 193 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Aceh, Indonesia), 186 integrating former rebels into national army, 100b, 132b Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI, Colombia), poverty reduction, international or joint national-international 114 (feature) strategies, 193 Chad, camps for displaced populations, 61 rapid-results approach, 170 Chad College, 101b volatility in international aid to, 195b Chambas, Mohamed Ibn, 208b Business Edge of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Charte du Nord (Côte d’Ivoire), 82 177n88 children business regulation, 157 infant mortality rates in countries affected by violence, 63, 63f as victims of deadly diseases, 210n49 C as victims of violence, 60 cabinets, size of, 121, 124 Chile California building inclusive-enough coalitions, 12, 121, 122, 127 gang-related homicides in Los Angeles, 123b civilian oversight of judiciary, 154 legalizing drugs, 43n86 confidence-building, 12 Cambodia early results crucial to confidence-building, 253 community-based programs, 24 (feature), 261b political transitions and peacemaking, 13 duration of donor projects in, 196 security personnel standards, 151 EC survey of assistance to, 25 success in preventing violence, 11 qualified contractors not interested in bidding on projects, 197 transitional justice, 166 Canada transition from military rule, 154 Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center China (FINTRAC), 242n42 economic reform, 146b Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), 185, infrastructure investment supporting private sector 209n14 development, 200 capacity of institutions. See institutional capacity social networks of migrant workers, 79b “capture the narrative,” 124 Township and Village Enterprises, 146 Caribbean and modern organized violence, 67 (feature), 76b trade with and investment in Africa, 183 Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Fund, 236b China Road and Bridge Corporation, 227b Carnegie Commission Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 186 CICIG (International Commission Against Impunity). cash transfer programs, 162, 177n92 See Guatemala Cederman, Lars-Erik, 81 citizen security, 148–53 Celtel (mobile phones company), 158b cross-border insecurity, 20, 218–20 Central Africa. See also specific countries defined, xvi, 116n13 spillover effects in, 77b developmental progress and, 6, 7t, 41n51 Central African Republic economic costs of, 5 overtaxing of capacity by “too much, too soon” reform, 146 global effects of lack of, 66 public financial management (PFM) reviews, 174n14 importance of, 45, 252 volatility in international aid to, 195b interdisciplinary approaches, 131, 132b Central America. See also specific countries investing in as essential to reduce violence, xii, 273b, 282b corruption and, 34, 57 linking to justice, 256–57 depth of institutional transformation, 172–73 (feature) local level and community policing, 152 drug trafficking and, 34, 57, 223b nonstate actors not good fit for, 135 gangs and rebels, 55, 57, 69n26 role of security forces and, 19, 149 peace processes involving neighboring countries, 218, 233 security stresses, 73–78, 74t 368 INDEX citizen security (continued) Politica Nacional de Rehabilitación (PNR), 130b, 141n45 selected indicators, 336–37t redeployment of security forces, 251 transnational ideological threats, 222–26 security goals through multisectoral intervention, 132b citizen security, justice, and jobs success in preventing violence, 11, 113–14 (feature), 121, 122, importance of, 128, 147–48, 148b, 248 250 international support for, 199–200 color revolutions, 117n27 serious gaps, 205 Commission on Human Security report (2003), 45, 116n16 roadmap for breaking cycles of violence, 13 commitment mechanisms track for improving global response for security and adaptability of, 119 development, 2, 28–31, 29f defined, xvii, 209–10n35 in WDR framework for building resilience to violence, 45f, 47t, international support for, 188–90 103, 106 signals of break with past and, 104, 124–27, 126b, 138 (feature) civilian oversight of security, 150b, 151, 154, 256, 275 community-driven development (CDD) civilian surge capacity, 196, 212n86 adapted to country context, 30 civil society capacity-building through, 131, 132–33 confidence-building and, 13 citizen security, justice, and jobs, 19, 30 premature load-bearing and, 101b cross-border development programming, 283 service delivery by, 134 donor risk management and, 202 civil wars evaluations of effectiveness of, 141n49 GDP losses due to, 5–6 in post-conflict environments, 122, 138 (feature) natural resource rich countries and, 54 state-society relations strengthened through, 133–34b number of, 51, 52b, 269 community empowerment programs, 255 recurring, 57, 58t. See also repeated cycles of violence Community of Sant’Egidio, 154, 182b classification of economies, 341–42, 343t complementary programs for institutional transformation, 18–19 climate change conditional cash transfers, 162 African states, coalition obtaining adaptation funding (2010), confidence, defined, xv 232, 242n50 confidence-building, 119–42 food insecurity and, 230 as basic principle for violence prevention, 247–48 impact on conflict risk, 35 basic tools for, 17 (feature), 250–55, 251t water stress and, 230 commitment mechanisms. See commitment mechanisms CMI. See Crisis Management Initiative defined, 41–42n52, 116n14 coalitions. See inclusive-enough coalitions delivery of early results. See early results cocaine. See drug trafficking differentiating tools to match country circumstances, 253–55 “cocooning” efforts to bypass national organizations and inclusive-enough coalitions, 120–27, 185–88. See also inclusive- institutions, 145 enough coalitions coercion to maintain national stability, 8 international support for, 185–93, 272t Cold War and civil wars as dominant form of violence, 183 lessons from national reformers, 119 “collaborative capacities,” 41n40, 209n32 roadmap for breaking cycles of violence, 11, 12–13, 18–20 collaborative coalitions, 2, 16–18 track for improving global response for security and Collier, Paul, xi, 33, 105b, 117n34, 282b, 291n14 development, 28 Colombia trade-offs for, 253–55 absence of state governance in regions of, 7 in WDR framework for building resilience to violence, 45f, assassinations of government and political figures ordered by 46–47t, 103–6 drug cartels, 101 conflict diamonds, 25, 34, 43n87, 220, 220t, 221b, 240n13, 241n14 assessment tools, use of, 23 “conflict trap,” 117n34 border security with Ecuador, 220 contracting out, 134, 142n59, 202, 227b community-based programs, 24 (feature), 261b conversation on violence, xix–xx, xxii, 2 confidence-building, 15, 114 (feature), 254b coordinating international aid, 271. See also international support quick, visible results for, 130b corruption court reform, 155b anti-corruption initiatives, 19, 42n61, 156–57, 258, 260, 262b, Democratic Security Policy, 149, 150b 284 disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) bilateral cooperation against, 264b program, 151 credibility of new regimes in legacies of, 126, 248 drug trafficking and, 10, 43n86, 223b, 285 in developed countries, 36 international support for, 184 financial flows and financial system weaknesses, 25, 227–29, justice sector reform, 22, 154 284–85 lessons learned from, 113–14 (feature) private sector anti-corruption mechanisms, 157, 158b multisector response to homicide rate, 148, 148b regional and cross-border initiatives, 20 Index 369 standards and harmonization, 229 diamond trade. See conflict diamonds transnational, 226–27 early results crucial to confidence-building, 253 violence associated with, 6–7, 252 EU Operation Artemis in, 281b Costa Rica fragmentation of international aid to, 199, 211n66 community policing, 152 lootable natural resources of, 54, 57, 81 court reform, 155b payments to ex-combatants, 110 economic costs of violence, 65b peacekeeping force, deployment of, 192 cost-benefit analysis for criminal violence, 81 polling by SMS (short message service), 205, 214n132, 291n7 costs of violence, 5, 65b, 66, 186. See also human costs of violence road and traffic access, 161 Côte d’Ivoire Rwanda–DRC agreement (2007), 218 militants and gangs, 54 school management by religious organizations, 134 multisectoral community approaches, 260 security forces committing human rights abuses, 149 social inequalities and civil war, 82, 83 stabilization policy to curb hyperinflation, 168 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) frameworks, women-run small businesses, 177n98 87b, 95n65, 117n19 women’s organizations, role in sexual violence prevention, 152 country-specific strategies, framework for, 248–50, 249t democratization coups d’état culture of democracy, 165b donor support to social and poverty reduction programs in risks for civil war with, 101 West African countries with, 44n105, 292n24 demographics, key indicators for, 354–55t international community’s norms for dealing with, 190 Deng Xiaoping, 146b reduction of number of in Africa, 36, 68n5 deportation from U.S. court system reform. See justice and fairness of gang members back to Central America, 173 (feature) criminal justice functions and dispute resolution, 153–56, 199, 276 of maras, 78b crisis escalation, recognizing signs of, 252 Desai, Nitin, 165b Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), 43n80, 137 (feature), 186 DESEPAZ (Colombia), 113 (feature), 132b cross-border initiatives. See regional and cross-border initiatives developed countries cross-border insecurity, 20, 218–20 anti-corruption initiatives, 229 culture of democracy, 165b double standards of, 36, 287 Cyclone Narghis recovery efforts of ASEAN, 38 (feature) organized crime within, 76b development. See also developmental consequences of violence D global system of, 2 data gaps for studying violence key indicators of, 344–45t climate change’s impact on conflict risk, 35 national vs. regional administration of, 219 continuing global learning platform, 288–90 developmental consequences of violence, 5, 60–66 future research agenda, 290 GDP losses, 64–65, 65b international aid flows, 280 international scope, 66 justice and fairness issues, 82 poverty/wealth gap and, 60, 60f labor market data in developing countries, 79b, 93n27 spillover effects, 65–66 methodology and, xix trade and, 6, 64, 71n73 weak institutions at risk for onset and recurrence of civil war, Development Assistance Committee framework, 34, 200 73, 84 Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Initiative, 292n25 data sources and methodology, 341 devolution and decentralization, 164–66, 167b death rates diamonds. See conflict diamonds; natural resources in Central America, 172 (feature) differentiating strategy and programs to country context, 21–23, former Soviet Union during transformation of government, 48, 48t, 111–12 101, 102b Dili Declaration (May 2010), 198 infant mortality rates in countries affected by violence, 63, 63f diplomacy, global system of, 2 from wars, 2, 3f, 51, 52b, 68n2, 338 Dirty War (Argentina), 124 debt relief, 183 disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, decision-cycle-oriented feedback loops, 171 151–52. See also reintegration of ex-combatants decision making, hierarchy of, 255 displaced populations and refugees, 61, 66, 127, 338 de Greiff, Pablo, 140n33 dispute resolution, 134, 155, 175n35. See also justice and fairness de jure vs. de facto outcomes, 145 domestic violence, 152, 169 delivery mechanisms, 31, 104–6 donor behavior, change of, 26, 194–96, 212n74. See also Democratic Charter of 2001 (OAS), 51 international support Democratic Republic of Congo donor risk management, 31–34, 202–4, 278–80, 282b. See also dual absence of state governance in regions of, 7 accountability criminal gangs supporting political activities, 5 Dos Santos Cruz, Carlos Alberto, 129b 370 INDEX double compacts, 193, 211n67, 265 ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), 237b, 238 (feature) double standards of developed countries, 36, 287 Ecuador’s border security with Colombia, 220 Doyle, Michael W., 210n35 education DRC Speaks! (geo-polling project using cell phones), 214n132, reform, 169 291n7 religious organizations managing schools, 134 drivers of conflict, 9f responsibility decentralized to local level, 135b, 142n57 drug consumption, 57, 222 Egmont Group initiative, 228, 241–42n39 legalization, 222, 224–25b EITI. See Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative drug-related violence Ekeh, Peter, 136b assassinations of government and political figures ordered by elections, 8, 101, 120, 164, 251 drug cartels, 101 electricity in Central America, 10b, 34, 53 Ghana supplying to Liberia, 32 (feature), 191b in West Africa, 5, 34, 56b importance for jobs and security, 128, 158, 160, 160b, 257 drug trafficking elite cooperation in elections, 164 economics of cocaine trafficking, 222b elite pacts external stresses and, 34, 172 (feature), 217, 220t defined, xv, 72 importance in fragile states, 221 as strategy to prevent violence, 86 interdiction efforts against cocaine trafficking, 223b vicious cycle of violence and, 88 internal stresses and, 74 El Salvador legalization, 222, 224–25b deportation of maras from U.S., 78b policy impact on producing, transit, and consuming countries, economic costs of violence, 65b 43n86 homicide rates, 58 dual accountability, 26, 26f, 200–202, 201f, 270 military stalemate and reforms, 173 (feature) dynamics of change and differences among countries, 48, 99, transition moment, 173 (feature) 111–12. See also differentiating strategy and programs to violent crime arising in post-conflict state, 2, 4f, 54t country context; transforming institutions women guerrillas involved in land reform, 163 employment. See jobs E energy. See also electricity; oil early results consumption patterns, 230 balance of quick, visible results vs. longer-term institution- Equator Principles, 286, 292n19 building, 129–31, 130–31b escaping violence and developing resilience. See transforming basic tools for, 255–58 institutions confidence-building and, 104–6, 128–36, 248 “Esquipulas Process,” ending Nicaraguan war (1987), 218 defined, xvii Ethiopia delivery of, 19, 138 (feature), 253 allocation of budget support to local and municipal interdisciplinary approach, 131, 132b governments, 43n92, 291n6 international support for, 190–93 development progress, 51 early warning system for food insecurity, 230b, 286 MDG progress, 6 East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve program, 286 Productive Safety Net Programme, 161, 176n73 Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 236b ethnic differences. See also justice and fairness Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority, 236b horizontal inequality and onset of civil violence, 75b, 81–82, Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 235, 236b 94nn46–47 Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority, 236b European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 237b, 238 (feature) ECOM (soft commodity trading company), 213n111 European Commission economic activity by country, 350–51t Aceh Peace Process Support Program, 138 (feature) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on duration of aid programs, 196 GEMAP, agreement to, 126b, 206 (feature) public financial management (PFM) reviews, 174n14 Guinea-Bissau assistance, 207 (feature) survey of assistance to Cambodia, 25 Liberia and planning for transition, 32 (feature), 206 (feature) European Union mediation initiatives of, 29, 186, 233 Congo force from, 194 pressure on countries with coups d’états, 16 Guinea-Bissau assistance, 207 (feature) West African Coast Initiative on organized crime, 283 long-standing regional programs, 25 economic reforms, 167–68 mediation used in, 187b interdisciplinary approaches, 131, 132b model of cross-border regional cooperation, 44n100, 219–20, economic stresses, 6, 7t, 74t, 78–81, 90t 235, 237b, 242n51, 284 economic theories of violence, 75–76b Operation Artemis in Democratic Republic of Congo, 281b economic theory and impunity, 116n9 programs for previously conflict-affected border regions, 35 ECOWAS. See Economic Community of West African States travel restrictions imposed by Zimbabwe’s leaders, 189 Index 371 exclusion of groups. See also inclusive-enough coalitions feudalism, 90 (feature) challenges of, 249 finance due to past abuses, 121, 124, 127, 140n27, 162 flows and financial system weaknesses, 25, 227–29, 284–85 ideologically motivated groups capitalizing on themes of key indicators of, 352–53t injustice and exclusion, 222 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 228, 241n38 linked to violence, 252 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN, U.S.), 242n42 public attitudes toward, 168–69 financial intelligence units (FIUs), 241–42n39, 242n43 expectations financial support for security and justice reforms, 29 defined, xv Fixing Failed States (Ghani & Lockhart), 42n71, 211n67 of rapid change, 8, 108–10 flexibility in approaches to progress, 171 unrealistic due to levels of mistrust, 99–101, 100b Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 34, 231, 232b, 286 external stresses, xi, 216–43 food insecurity, 229–30, 230b, 285–86 core tools to address, 263t food shocks (2008–09), 8, 81, 86f, 103 cross-border insecurity, 218–20 Foreign Exchange Transaction Reports, 242n43 cross-border security linked to development, 263 forestry industry. See timber industry defined, 72 former Soviet Union and increased violence due to government deportation of maras from U.S., 78b transformation, 101, 102b diminishing, 107 fragile countries economic stresses, 226–29 affected by conflict and violence, 39n3, 68n8, 87b illicit international financial flows, 227–29 aid programs in, 25, 183 transnational corruption, 226–27 child welfare in, 63 external support and resistance to, 11, 15–16, 106–7 corruption. See corruption gang culture, 173 (feature) external stresses for. See external stresses mobilizing external support, 262–65 food shocks, 81, 103, 285–86. See also food insecurity national action to address, 17 (feature) global tendency to ignore, 217 reducing landlocked or island nations, 233–34 international support, 262–65 mistrust and expectations of, 100b regional action, 281–86 resisting independence, 166 regional stresses, 233–37. See also regional and cross-border Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional infrastructure challenge, 235m initiatives technical assistance, 196 resource stresses, 229–32 Fragile States Facility (FSF), 213n91 role of, 10, 11 fragility track for improving global response for security and composed of weak capacity, accountability, and legitimacy of development, 28, 34–35 institutions, 85, 87b trafficking, 220–22, 220t defined, xvi, 95n65 transnational ideological movements, 222–26 innovative thinking about, 95n68 vulnerability to, 9f in WDR framework for building resilience to violence, 45f in WDR framework for building resilience to violence, 45f, 47t, fragmentation of aid. See international support 103 framework for building resilience. See WDR framework (2011) weak institutions and vulnerability, 101–3 Free Aceh Movement, 108, 120, 137 (feature) external support and resistance to external stresses. See external Freedom House, 114 (feature), 208n1 stresses Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 34, 37, 188, G 210n38, 285, 286, 288 g7+, 43n91, 197, 291n5 gangs F dispute resolution mechanism of, 133–34 Fafo surveys global rise of, 53f on human costs of violence, 59 homicides related to, 123b, 172 (feature) on land dispute resolution by traditional authorities, 134, links to employment, respect, and identity, 79 141–42n56 multisectoral programs of prevention at community level, 148 fairness. See justice and fairness reasons for membership, 79b Famine Early Warning System Network, 230b, 286 gaps in data. See data gaps for studying violence FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization Garang, John, 78 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), 79b, 113 GDP. See gross domestic product (feature), 121, 252, 253 GEMAP. See Governance and Economic Management Assistance Fearon, James D., 10, 78, 84, 85b, 94n39, 105b, 119, 141n49 Program fears of oppression, 74 gender-based violence, 60–61, 61t, 152 feasible results indicators to demonstrate progress, 17 (feature) gender issues. See women 372 INDEX Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2008), 59 Guéhenno, Jean-Marie, 149, 151 geographical location. See justice and fairness Guinea, value chain projects in, 176n67 Georgia Guinea-Bissau coordination between humanitarian and development partners, assistance programs, 207 (feature) 193 reintegration budget, 202 corruption crack down, 156 UN Peacebuilding Commission in, 184 Germany volatility in international aid to, 195b, 207 (feature) recognition of past crimes, 166 Gusmão, Xanana, 125 systematic and gradual reform, 259 Ghana H confidence-building, 12 Haiti Consultative Assembly, 121 anti-corruption initiatives, 20, 264b electricity supplied to Liberia, 32 (feature), 191b confidence-building, 129b National Architecture for Peace, 189b corruption, 227 peace committees, 23 disarmament project (2003–04), 212n79 refugees seeking shelter in, 66 disaster’s effect on institutional transformation, 103 success in preventing violence, 11, 108, 120, 121, 122, 189b election violence, 67 (feature) Ghani, Ashraf, 42n71, 193, 211n67 international aid for, 183 global conversation on violence, xix–xx, 2 justice sector reform, 22 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for multidonor trust funds for, 202 Tax Purposes, 228 NGOs operating in, 183, 197 Global Information and Early Warning System, 230b, 286 overtaxing of capacity by “too much, too soon” reform, 146 globalization police reforms, 13, 153, 153b changes in, xii polling of citizen perceptions, 259 leading to external stresses. See external stresses reforms prior to 2010 disaster, 110b Goldstone, Jack A., 81 volatility in international aid to, 195b Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program health issues (GEMAP), 42n61, 126b, 206 (feature) associated with violence, 66 Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries, 35, 43n98, 236, disease focus of humanitarian aid, 210n49 243n68, 263, 284 reform, 169 greed or grievance as motive for violence, 75b Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (World Bank/IMF), Green Climate Fund, 242n50 206 (feature) grievance as motive for violence, 75b, 88 heroin. See drug trafficking Griffiths, Martin, 187b Herzegovina. See Bosnia and Herzegovina gross domestic product (GDP) high-income countries. See developed countries losses due to civil war and violent crime, 64–65, 65b Hoeffler, Anke, 84 losses due to neighboring conflicts, 5, 65 Holst Fund (Palestinian Authority), 33 military expenditures as percentage of, 338–39 homicide rates. See death rates paired with political instability as predictor of civil war onset, Honduras 93n9 deportation of maras from U.S., 78b Groups of Friends, 218, 240n6 homicide rates, 58 Guatemala judicial branch, 175n45 anti-corruption initiatives, 42n62 private security industry, 135 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 173 (feature), 179n143 violent crime arising in post-conflict state, 4f court reform, 155b human costs of violence, 6, 59–60, 59f deportation of maras from U.S., 78b humanitarian aid economic costs of violence, 65b disease focus of, 210n49 gang membership, reasons for, 79b duration of assistance, 33, 191–92 GDP losses due to violence, 5 growth of, 183 homicide rates, 58 phasing from international to national and local institutions, International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG), 18, 19, 29–30, 265, 266b, 272t 42n62, 189, 190b, 210n46, 252, 265 in post-conflict environments, 2 multisectoral community approaches, 260 rapid relief from, 191 peace accords, 173 (feature), 209n29 trade-offs with, 265 private security industry, 135 human rights abuses violent crime arising in post-conflict state, 2, 4f civil wars and, 64, 82, 82b women’s courts, 155 institutional accountability and, 88 women’s equality, 209n29 military and, 149 Index 373 prosecutions for, 51 link between income inequality and criminal violence, 79 signaling early intent to redress, 125 risk for civil conflict and, 6, 22 Human Rights Watch, 136b vulnerability to criminal activities and, 7 human security. See citizen security infant mortality rates in countries affected by violence, 63, 63f humility, 246 informal employment, 162, 257 Humphreys, Macartan, 141n49 infrastructure investment, 158–61, 200, 234, 235m, 257 Al-Hussein, Zeid Ra’ad, 273b institutional capacity Central American reform, 173 (feature) I challenges of, 249 IADB. See Inter-American Development Bank changes in international capacity, 30 Ibrahim, Mo, 158b “collaborative capacities,” 209n32 Ibrahim Prize for African leadership, 37, 288 defined, xvi, 84 IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and early policy announcements and, 22 Development), xi importance of, 84 ICRG. See International Country Risk Guide indicators of, 95n65 IDA (International Development Association), 196 justice reform and, 154 identity. See justice and fairness operational gaps in capacity, 210n52, 270–71 ideological grievances, 5, 67–68 (feature) strong capacity indicators but low governance indicators, ideology-based groups and transnational ideological threats, 116n4 83, 83f, 222–26, 241n30. See also terrorism and trust and capacity to deliver change, 100 terrorist attacks violence and, 88 IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), 232b weak capacity and early results possible, 131–36 IFC. See International Finance Corporation institutional challenges, types of, 249 IFIs (international financial institutions), role in developmental institutional legitimacy as key to stability, xi–xii, 7 underpinnings of violence prevention, 275–76, 280 early results achieved despite, 131–36 Ijaz, Syeda S., 84 Western model not necessarily relevant, 8 illegal drug trade. See drug trafficking institutional transformation. See transforming institutions Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of institutions, defined, xvi, 41n36 1996 (U.S.), 78b Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 23, 199, 271 IMF. See International Monetary Fund interdisciplinary approaches, 131, 132b immunization drives, 210n49 interlinked violence, 54–55 impunity and use of violence, 114, 116n9 internal international agencies. See international support inclusion. See inclusive-enough coalitions; justice and fairness internal stresses inclusive-enough coalitions, 16–18, 120–27 defined, 72 adapted to local context, 118, 122 economic stresses, 74t, 78–81, 90t confidence-building and, 12–13, 104, 111, 248 justice and fairness, 74t, 81–84, 90t defined, xvii security stresses, 73–78, 74t, 90t international support for, 185–88 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development lessons learned, 124 (IBRD), xi types of coalitions and strategies, 120–24 International Commission against Impunity (CICIG). See India Guatemala “back to basics” job creation programs, 19 International Commission on Property Rights for the Poor, 232 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 161, 176n73 International Committee of the Red Cross, 154 Indonesia. See also Aceh international comparison of economic risks for political conflict, “back to basics” job creation programs, 19 80b building inclusive-enough coalitions, 12, 120, 137 (feature) International Corruption Hunters Alliance, 34, 229, 284 community-based programs, 24 (feature), 261b International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 64, 78, 95n65 corruption crack down, 156 International Development Association (IDA), 196 multidonor trust funds for, 202 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 31, 36, political transitions and peacemaking, 13 286–87 rapid-results approach, 171 International Finance Corporation (IFC), 177n88, 200, 213n111, success in preventing violence, 11, 108 292n19 Indonesian Reconstruction Agency, 265 international financial institutions (IFIs), role in developmental industrialized countries. See developed countries underpinnings of violence prevention, 275–76, 280 inequality. See also justice and fairness International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 232b horizontal inequality and onset of civil violence, 75b, 79, International Institute for Strategic Studies, xi 94nn46–47 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 188, 206–7 (feature) horizontal vs. vertical inequality, 179n131 International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD), 10, 84 374 INDEX International Organization for Migration, 232 J international support, 2, 27 (feature), 180–214 Jamaica agenda for action, 290–91 criminal gangs supporting political activities, 5 branding of aid programs, 191, 210n50 indirect vs. direct costs of violence, 65b for citizen security, justice, and jobs, 28, 29f, 199–200 inner-city community infrastructure and services for the poor, for commitment mechanisms, 188–90 132b for confidence-building, 185–93 militants and gangs, 54 data gaps and development of indicators, 280 Japan donor risk management, 31–34, 202–4. See also dual infrastructure investment supporting private sector accountability development, 200 duration of, 193–96 land reform, 162, 257 for early results, 190–93 speed in transforming institutions, 13 evolving international architecture, 181–85, 205 women’s courts, 156 government misgivings about working with, 131 jobs. See also citizen security, justice, and jobs for inclusive-enough coalitions, 185–88 “back to basics” job creation programs, 19, 257 internal international agency systems, 197–99 best-fit approaches, 161–63 procedural conformism, 205 developing capacity for, 30–31 reforming, 31–34, 32 (feature), 276–81 exploitative employment as risk, 79 key indicators of, 352–53t international support for, 200, 271–74 lessons learned from, 205 investing in as essential to reduce violence, xii, 79, 289 marshaling support from other countries and from global and low skill levels, 161 regional institutions, 250, 286–88 mobilizing for external stresses, 16–17, 20–21, 264–65 prioritization of, 274 monitoring results, 204–5 private sector jobs, 157–58 new directions for, 268–93 reintegration of ex-combatants, 138 (feature) in post-conflict phase, 184, 184f self-employment, 162 preventing repeated cycles of violence, 270–76 social cohesion and, 6 capacity, operational gaps in, 210n52, 270–71 transitional employment, 200 employment, 274 women, employment of, 163–64 justice and jobs, structural gaps in, 271–74 youth unemployment, 6, 30, 274 police and justice, 274–76 Jordan, camps for displaced populations, 61 principles for combined operations, 271 justice and fairness. See also citizen security, justice, and jobs; social recovery instead of prevention as focus of, 183–85 cohesion reducing external stresses, 281–86 confidence-building and, 140n33 reducing risks of violence, 35–38 corruption. See corruption roadmap for breaking cycles of violence, 20–21 court reform, 154–55, 155b, 175n45 track for improving global response for security and criminal justice functions and dispute resolution, 153–56, 199, development, 28, 36–37, 47t 276 for transforming institutions, 193–200 defined, xvi violence with international links, 22 developing capacity for, 30, 88 volatility and fragmentation in, 194, 195b, 199, 208b, 211n66, Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, 235 212n74, 217 economic goals met through, 132b ending stop-go pattern of assistance, 280–81, 282b ideologically motivated groups capitalizing on themes of Internet use, effect on governance, 109–10, 117n26 injustice and exclusion, 222 interstate wars, number of, 51, 52b international support to fix structural gaps in, 271–74 invasions and occupations, 218 investing in as essential to reduce violence, xii Iran, citizen pressure through technology, 110 linking to security, 256–57 Iraq prioritizing investment in, 273b, 274–76, 282b Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 8, 196 stresses and vulnerability to violence, 74t, 81–84, 94nn46–47 elections, 164 factor in civil war, 6, 7t electricity crisis during reconstruction, 160b transitional justice approaches, 140n34, 166–67 foreign troops and security stresses, 218 multidonor trust funds for, 202 K privatized security, failure of, 135 Kagame, H.E. Paul, 158b restoration of confidence and “surge” (2006–07), 8 Kazakhstan, regional cooperation and stresses, 238–40 (feature) spillover effect of occupation of, 78 Kecamatan Development Program, 138 (feature), 157 Israeli-Palestinian violence, 186 Keefer, Philip, 78, 119 Index 375 Kenya layered approach to problem solving, xii, 2 contested elections (2007), 110 leadership criminal gangs supporting political activities, 5 agreements between strong leaders. See elite pacts economic costs of violence, 65b confidence-building and, 106, 119 elections, 120, 164 initiatives to recognize, 37, 288 mediation, 187b qualities of effective leadership, 139n9 militants and gangs, 54 seizing opportunities to prevent violence, 252 organized criminal violence, 67 (feature) Lebanon violence, 54t camps for displaced populations, 61 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to stem sale of conflict electricity restored during civil war, 13, 160, 160b diamonds, 25, 34, 43n87, 220, 221b, 240n13, 285 UN peacekeeping operation, 221 Kleiman, Mark A.R., 224b women’s courts, 155 Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, Internet’s effect on legalization of drugs, 222, 224–25b governance, 117n26 legal reform. See justice and fairness Korea, Republic of legitimacy confidence-building, 12 defined, xvi, 84 land reform, 162, 257 functioning of, 95n67 speed in transforming, 13, 110 lack of legitimate institutions and risk of recurring violence, success of aid from single or dominant donor, 199 85–89, 85b transition moment, 22, 107 trust and, 151 Kosovo Le Roy, Alain, 281b, 290 “back to basics” job creation programs, 19 lessons learned community policing, 152 from Central Asia’s regional cooperation institutions, 239–41 early results crucial to confidence-building, 253 (feature) refugees from, 66 from Colombia, 113–14 (feature) from international support, 205, 271 technical assistance, 196 from national reformers, 119 value chain development in dairy industry, 158, 159b, 257 Levi, Margaret, 41n49, 116n1 World Bank support for negotiations, 186 Liberia Kuwait invasion (1990), spillover effect of, 78 anti-corruption initiatives, 19, 126, 126b, 156, 260, 262b Kyrgyz Republic, regional cooperation and stresses, 238–40 assistance programs, 206–8 (feature) community-driven development (CDD), evaluations of L effectiveness of, 141n49 confidence-building, quick, visible results for, 130b labor migration. See migration coordination between humanitarian and development Lacey Act, 285 partners, 193 Laitin, David D., 105b dual key authority in revenue earning and expenditure, 42n61 Lamamra, Ramtane, 281b, 290 early results crucial to confidence-building, 253 landlocked or island nations, 35, 233–34 economic goals met through security intervention, 132b land reform, 162, 257 electricity assistance from Ghana, 32 (feature), 191b land-use issues, 230–31, 232b Emergency Employment Plan, 161 Large Cash Transaction Reports, 242n43 Governance and Economic Management Action Plan, 252 Las Madres de la Plaza, 123–24, 140n26 Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program Latin America. See also specific countries (GEMAP), 18, 188–89, 202, 262b coordinating political, security, and development responses to international support and government planning for transition, violence, 148b 193, 206–7 (feature), 250 court reform, 155b mass rape, 60 employment and security as most pressing needs in, 128 qualified contractors not interested in bidding on projects, 197 women’s human rights activism, 123–24 refugees from, 66 Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), 33, 203b spillover effects on neighboring countries, 65 law enforcement personnel success in preventing violence, 11 army vs. police, unclear roles of, 149, 200 transition moment, 22 community policing, 152 women prioritizing reform of, 274–76 economic empowerment of, 19 UN standardized training of, 199 peace negotiations, role of, 123 U.S. vs. EU structures, 213n107 security tasks, participation in, 152 vetting of, 151 World Bank/IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, women participating as, 151–52, 174n25, 188 206 (feature) 376 INDEX Liberian Women’s Initiative, 13 labor-intensive programs, 161 Liberian Women’s Mass Action for Peace movement, 123 lessons for, 22 Libya uprising (2011), effect on oil prices, 5, 66 lessons from recent transformations of, 197 Linn, Johannes, 240 (feature) reasons why change so challenging for, 99 local confidence building, 14, 122, 122b socioeconomic consequences of violence in, 63 Lockhart, Clare, 42n71, 193, 211n67 migration, 163, 258, 259 Lomé Agreement (1999), 121 Miguel, Edward, 6, 81 Lomé Declaration (2000), 36, 51, 287 military expenditures, 338 Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda), 67 (feature), 218 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) low-income countries job creation as low priority, 200 civil wars in, 78 low-income countries or countries engaged in conflict and, xi, labor-intensive programs, 161 1, 5, 50, 63, 277 reasons why change becomes so difficult for, 99 monitoring results, 21, 259 Loya Jirga (Afghanistan), 165b, 177–78n103 poverty reduction, 348–49t violence as constraint on meeting, 61–63, 62f, 70n57 M Min, Brian, 81 Macmillan Limited, 227b Miron, Jeffrey A., 225b macroeconomic policy, 168 mistrust, need to eliminate. See trust Madagascar mobile phones, 110, 158b, 214n132 community monitoring in health sector, 157 money-laundering. See corruption land-use issues, 230–31 monitoring results, 21, 204–5, 259, 260t Mali Montaño, Jorge, 10, 76b AU Border Program pilot project, 219 MONUC (UN Peacekeeping Force in the Democratic Republic of land dispute resolution, 155 Congo), 192, 194 nongovernmental interventions for peace, 139n21 Mozambique success in preventing violence, 120 anti-corruption initiatives, 19, 260, 262b violence, 54t civil liberties rating of, 208n1 Mandela, Nelson, 14, 120 corruption crack down, 156 marginalized groups. See exclusion of groups development progress, 51 Matveeva, Anna, 240 (feature) duration of donor projects in, 196 MDGs. See Millennium Development Goals Feeder Roads Program, 161 MDTFs. See multidonor trust funds international support, benefits of, 182b media, role of, 124 macroeconomic reforms, 168 mediation, increased support for, 182–83, 186, 187b MDG progress, 6 heavy mediation start-up budget (HMSB), 209n23 peace agreement, 182b light mediation start-up budget (LMSB), 209n23 security goal met by economic intervention, 132b links to sustained mediation, 272t signal of break with past, 125 mediators and special envoys, 29, 187b, 213n96 success in preventing violence, 11 Mehta, Pratap, 168 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 218, 219b Melanesia multidonor trust funds (MDTFs), 33, 202, 203b, 212n79 gang violence associated with ethnic groups, 54 Multilateral Development Banks supporting private sector ritualized warfare, 68–69n14 development, 200 men, impact of violent conflict on, 60–61, 61t, 138 (feature) multisectoral approaches Mérida Initiative, 57, 192 community programs, 29, 255 Mesnard, Alice, 119 transforming institutions, 148–49 Meteoro program (Colombia), 15 Myanmar methodological note, xix–xx, 341 Cyclone Nargis (2008) disaster situation, 186, 233, 234b, 271 Mexico devolution and decentralization, 166 economic costs of violence, 65b drug trafficking, 57 violence levels, 10 Internet use, effect on governance, 117n26 Middle East and North Africa regional cooperation with Thailand, 233 institutional capacity vs. accountability, 84 peace processes involving neighboring countries, 233 N violence in, xi, 5, 53 Naidoo, Jay, 14, 115b middle-income countries Namibia, Women and Child Protection Unit within police force, 152 aid and support for fragile countries from, 183, 269 natural disasters consumption patterns in food and energy, 230 effect on institutional transformation of Haiti, 103 as examples of recent successful transitions, xii food insecurity and, 230b Index 377 Myanmar disaster situation (2008), 186 Northern Ireland number of, 339 criminal gangs supporting political activities, 5 South-South exchanges and, 186 multisectoral community approaches, 260 World Bank rapid response to crisis and emergencies, political transitions and peacemaking, 13 208n10 social inequalities and civil war, 83 Natural Resource Charter, 34, 188, 210n39, 285, 291–92n14 success in preventing violence, 11, 259 natural resources trafficking financing rebels, 54 exploitation of, 10, 67 (feature) violence, 54t external stresses, 229–32 standards for responsible use of, 188, 285–86 O wealth of, and civil wars, 54, 78, 81 OECD countries World Resources Outlook, 285 security and development assistance from, 26 neighborhood as factor in conflict risk, 40n33 terrorist threats in, 55 Nepal OECD Handbook on Security System Reform, 175n37 community-based programs, 24 (feature), 261b Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 55, 91–92 (feature) (U.S.), 185, 209n14, 212n86 economic empowerment, 163, 258 oil educational responsibility decentralized to local level, 135b prices, effect of terrorist attacks, 5, 66, 94n39 interlinked security, economic, and political stresses leading revenues, wealth-sharing arrangements for, 127 to warfare, 90–92 (feature) trafficking in, 220t, 241n15 PBF funding to, 192 opportunity for change. See transition moments Peacebuilding Commission, 33 optimism, 110, 110b, 116n3 value chain projects, 176n67 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development women’s economic empowerment, 19, 163b, 258 (OECD), 25. See also OECD countries Nestlé, 213n111 Anti-Bribery Convention, 226 Netherlands anti-corruption initiatives, 229 duration of aid for Burundi, 193 International Network on Conflict and Fragility, 26 security sector reform, 185 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development– New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 233 Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), 149, Nicaragua 166, 282b, 291n4 deportation rate from U.S., 78b Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des “Esquipulas Process,” ending war (1987), 218 Affaires, 236b transition moment, 22, 125, 173 (feature) Organization of American States (OAS), 51, 190 violent crime arising in post-conflict state, 4f organized criminal violence women data gaps for studying. See data gaps for studying violence economic empowerment, 19 defined, xv, 39n1 security tasks, participation in, 152 drug-related violence and, 10 Nigeria inequality between rich and poor and, 22 anti-corruption initiatives, 20, 264b nature of modern organized violence, 67–68 (feature) corruption, 227 rise of in post-conflict countries, 2, 4f Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, 264b stress posed by, 76b oil trafficking from, 241n15 Oshima, Kenzo, 273b organized criminal violence, 67 (feature) Otpor movement, 117n25 vigilantism, 135, 136b oversight mechanisms, 31. See also civilian oversight of security war with Biafra, 166 Nilsson, Desirée, 119 P nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). See also civil society Pacific Islanders’ migration, 163 aid programs in fragile countries, 25, 134 Pacific Islands Forum’s Pacific Plan for Regional Integration and data collection and analysis, role in, 280 Cooperation, 235 donor risk management and, 202 Pakistan government misgivings about working with, 131 assessment tools, use of, 23 health system reform, role of, 169 budget allocations as signals of political reform, 127, 128b local coalition building and, 122 confidence-building, visible results for, 130–31b proliferation of international NGOs, 183 cross-border violence, 67 (feature) time frames for support from, 193 devolution and decentralization, 166 NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation), 229 Frontier Crimes Regulation, 127 Norconsult, 227b IFC programs for small and medium entrepreneurs, 213n111 North, Douglass, 86, 105b international ideological movements and local grievances, 5 378 INDEX Pakistan (continued) practical policy and program tools, 16–23, 246–67 international long-term support for local initiatives, 194 basic principles, 247–48 organized criminal violence, 67 (feature) basic tools Pashtun tribal areas on Afghanistan border, 219 for confidence-building, 17 (feature), 250–55, 251t post-crisis needs assessment, 250 for early results, 255–58 violence, 53, 54t core tools, 17 (feature) Palestinian territories country-specific strategies, framework for, 248–50, 249t Holst Fund, 33 framework for tailoring country-specific strategies, 248–50 Palestinian Authority, accountability and transparency of, 157 lessons of what succeeds, 18–19 security forces, 149 linking early results to transforming institutions, 255–60 spillover effect of military operations in West Bank and failure to use tools to full potential, 192–93 Gaza, 78 fitting program design to context, 259–60, 261b Panama, violent crime arising in post-conflict state, 4f managing trade-offs, 258–59 Papua New Guinea monitoring results, 259 nongovernmental interventions for peace, 139n21 reducing external stresses and mobilizing external support, organized criminal violence, 67 (feature) 262–65 violence, 54t in WDR framework, 47t women’s role in peace process, 123 pragmatism, 171 parenting behavior and training, 169 preemptive strike as accepted risk, 74 partisanship of state institutions, 7 “premature load-bearing” of institutions, 100, 101b Pashtun tribal areas (Afghanistan-Pakistan border), 219 prevention of violence. See also specific countries and regions past crimes, justice for, 166–67 international support’s focus on recovery instead of prevention, patronage 183–85 dismantling of, 8, 123 as part of transition, 108 regimes using to maintain their power, 8, 258 repeated cycles of violence, 270–76 state legitimacy and, 95n67 through citizen security, justice, and jobs, 28, 29f. See also PCNAs (Post Conflict Needs Assessments), 192–93 citizen security, justice, and jobs peacekeeping, global system of, 2, 28, 183. See also United Nations “Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects flexible peacekeeping arrangements, 281b Rights, Livelihoods and Resources,” 232b performance legitimacy, defined, 84 prioritization of institutional transformation. See sequencing and Peru prioritizing reforms drug trafficking and, 10, 223b prisoner’s dilemmas, 116n9 mass rape, 60 private sector Philippines, violence in, 54, 54t anti-corruption mechanisms, 157, 158b Physical Rights Integrity Index, 64, 339 crime and violence prevention initiatives, 152, 200 physical terrain features making rebellion easier, 40n33, 93n2 jobs, 157–58 Pidufala, Oksana, 240 (feature) outreach to, in coalition building, 122 pirates private security companies, 135, 136b costs on trade and economic activity, 5, 65 privatization of state assets, 168 Somalian, 1, 67 (feature), 263 procurement procedures, 198–99, 198b Pitsuwan, Surin, 38 (feature), 234b proposers/responders and bargainers, 82b police. See law enforcement personnel publication of cost estimates for projects, 198b policy options. See practical policy and program tools public attitudes toward excluded groups, 168–69 political legitimacy, defined, 84 public finance for employment, 161–63 political stresses. See inequality; justice and fairness public financial management (PFM) reviews, 174n14 Political Terror Scale, 82b public-private partnerships, 13, 253 political theories of violence, 75–76b public services, quality of, 235, 236t Portillo, Alfonso, 190b Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs), 192–93 R post-conflict phase, 2, 3t racial inequality. See justice and fairness failure to address repeated cycles of violence, 23 rainfall shocks and violence, 6, 81 international support in, 184, 184f Ramirez de Rincon, Marta Lucia, 15, 150b organized violence rising in, 2, 4f RAMSI (Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands), recovery and lingering risk for violence, 64 153, 185 security forces in, 149–51 rape, 60–61 poverty rapid economic and social change as drivers for conflict, 75b key indicators of, 346–47t rapid-results approach, 170, 196 rising in countries affected by violence, 4f, 5, 60, 60f recovering countries, defined, 70n50 Index 379 reducing risks of violence, 23–39. See also practical policy and differentiating strategy and programs to country context, program tools 21–23, 111–12 citizen security, justice, and jobs, 28–31 external stresses and international support, 15–16 external stresses and international support, 34–35 international support, 20–21. See also international support international support, 35–38 monitoring results, 21 tracks for, 28–39 practical policy and program tools, 16–23. See also practical transforming institutions, 31–34 policy and program tools refugees. See displaced populations and refugees regional and cross-border initiatives, 20 regional and cross-border initiatives transforming institutions, 8–12. See also transforming aligning international assistance behind, 37–38, 38 (feature), institutions 190, 210n48, 288 “rules of warfare,” nations observing, 109 complementing global level to reduce external stresses, 25, Russia 281–86 aid for post-conflict Tajik regime, 163, 177n93 cooperation to manage public goods, 212n90, 236b, 291n4 increased violence due to government transformation, cross-border trade, 283–84 101, 102b development programming, 35, 219–20 Rwanda layered approach to problems, xii, 2, 20 anti-corruption institutions, 158b reaffirming consensus on international norms and standards, “back to basics” job creation programs, 19 39 (feature) community-based programs, 24 (feature), 261b regional norms, essential in preventing violence, 117n25, contract enforcement regime, 157 289b development progress, 51 regional stresses, 216–18, 233–37 equality for women, 177n98 security support, 283 fears of oppression and civil conflict, 74 shared regional technical and administrative capacity, 283–84 justice system, 167 Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), mass rape, 60 153, 185 MDG progress, 6 “regional subsidiarity,” 233 participation of previously excluded groups, 127, 162 reintegration of ex-combatants, 100b, 132b, 138 (feature), 142n70, transition moment, 22 149, 162, 192, 202 value chain development in coffee industry, 158, 159b, 257 religious differences. See justice and fairness Rwanda–DRC agreement (2007), 218 RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance), 125 reparations for victims of political violence, 125–26, 140nn33–34 S repeated cycles of violence, 2–8, 3–4f, 3t, 57–71 SALW (small arms and light weapons), trade in, 221, decline in wars, 51–53, 52b 241nn19–22 defined, xv Sambanis, Nicholas, 93n9, 210n35 developmental consequences of, 60–66. See also developmental sanctions, effectiveness of, 189, 190, 210n41, 226 consequences of violence Santiago Principles, 286, 292n20 failure to address in post-war assistance, 23 Satyanath, Shankar, 6, 81 global effects of, 66 schools. See education international support for preventing, 270–76 “second best” solutions, 107b, 117n17, 248, 289 modern violence and, 53–58 second-chance programs, 161 need to address, 252 secrecy jurisdictions, 228, 242n44 in WDR framework, 46t security. See citizen security repeated spiral in transforming institutions, 12, 12f, 107–8 “security dilemma,” 74 research needs. See data gaps for studying violence self-employment, 162 resilience of institutions, 98, 103–8. See also confidence-building; sequencing and prioritizing reforms, 145–48 transforming institutions after security, justice, and jobs, 164 in WDR framework, 45f, 46–47t, 103f as core tool, 255–56 “Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict Affected defined, xvii and High-Risk Areas,” 220 investment in citizen security and justice reforms, 273b, 282b restoring confidence. See confidence-building “too fast” process, effect of, 144, 145–46 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. See FARC “too slow” process, effect of, 144 road maintenance, 132b, 161, 206 (feature) Sergenti, Ernest, 6, 81 roadmap for breaking cycles of violence, 8–23 sexual violence, 60–61, 61t citizen security, justice, and jobs, 13. See also citizen security, shared regional administrative capacity, 35 justice, and jobs Sharif, Sheikh, 263 collaborative coalitions, 16–18 shura (Arabic word for “consultation” or “council”), 134b, 141n54 confidence-building, 12–13, 18–20. See also confidence-building Siemens Group, 227b 380 INDEX Sierra Leone success in preventing violence, 11, 108, 115b, 120, 121 coordination of aid programs, 196 systematic and gradual reform, 259 devolution and decentralization, 166 violent crime arising in post-conflict state, 2 justice reform, 154 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 230b lootable natural resources of, 54 Southern Sudan, emergence of, 53 organized criminal violence, 67 (feature) Southern Sudan Multidonor Trust Fund, 202, 203b, 204 reintegration budget, 202 South-North exchanges, xii, 36, 287–88 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 255 South-South exchanges success in preventing violence, 11, 120–21 benefits of, 197, 292n23 women increases in, xii, 36, 208n6, 287–88 economic empowerment, 19 natural disaster situations and, 186 victims of domestic violence, 152 technical assistance, 44n104, 212n90, 292n23 signaling, 137–38 (feature), 251. See also commitment mechanisms Soviet Union (former) and increased violence due to government defined, xvii transformation, 101, 102b need to address crisis situations, 186 special independent agencies, 252 Singapore spillover effects, 65–66, 67 (feature) confidence building, 14 in Central Africa, 77b housing programs, 257 regional cooperation to deal with, 218, 284–85 local level, trust of, 122, 122b in South America, 220 post-independence development, 13 spiral. See repeated spiral in transforming institutions security, justice, and jobs, 148b Sri Lanka Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson, 32 (feature), 79, 126, 126b, 197 school programs and UNICEF aid, 192 small arms and light weapons (SALW), trade in, 221, 241nn19–22 social inequalities and civil war, 83 smuggling. See trafficking stakeholders social accountability, 157, 258 types of, 249 social audits of government records, 175n61 understanding urgency of action, 252 social cohesion. See also inclusive-enough coalitions Statistics 40 (poll barometer), 280 creating sense of fairness and social justice, 127, 140n41 Stedman, Stephen, 119 firearms and illicit drugs, effect of, 7 Stewart, Frances, 168 jobs and, 6 Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (StAR), 34, 229, 284 value chains and, 176n67 stop-go aid in fragile states, 27f Social Cohesion Program—a joint UNDP-UNDPA program, 188 strategic communication, need for, 252 social inequality. See inequality; justice and fairness stresses. See also external stresses; internal stresses Solomon Islands defined, xv militants and gangs, 54 types of, 249 organized criminal violence, 67 (feature) vulnerability to violence and, 9f, 73–95 Somalia economic stresses, 78–81 low conflict interludes in, 8 justice, 81–84 outreach to Ethiopia, 263 reducing risks of violence, 34–35 peacekeeping missions in, 281b roadmap for breaking cycles of violence, 15–16 pirates off shore of, 1, 65, 67 (feature), 263 Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional infrastructure challenge, 235m Somaliland, nongovernmental interventions for peace, 139n21 subsidiarity, 233, 271 South Africa Sudan apartheid and strong state capacity, 116n4 Agreement on Wealth Sharing, 127 assessment tools, use of, 23 camps for displaced populations, 61 confidence-building, 14, 115b, 254b devolution and decentralization, 166, 178n106 constitutional reform and development of trust, 22 multidonor trust funds for, 202, 203b, 204 early results crucial to confidence-building, 253 peacekeeping missions in, 281b elections, 164, 251 qualified contractors not interested in bidding on projects, 197 expertise for reconstruction and development, 250 slow deployment of UN Mission, 192 guaranteeing employment to former adversaries, 100b, 127 women’s role in peace process, 123 international assistance from Suspicious Transaction Reports, 242n43 to Burundi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan, 212n90 SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial to Guinea-Bissau, 207 (feature) Telecommunication) banking system, 229b National Peace Accords, 251 nongovernmental interventions for peace, 139n21 T security services, 151 Tajikistan signals on political reform, 125, 127 international long-term support for local initiatives, 194 Index 381 regional cooperation and stresses, 238–40 (feature) “too much, too soon” syndrome. See sequencing and prioritizing violence, 54t reforms Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 83, 134 Touré, Amadou Toumani, 120 Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, 83 trade tax deduction for bribes, 226 cross-border trade, 283–84 Taylor, Charles, 65, 67 (feature), 156 key indicators of, 352–53t technical assistance, 29, 196, 212n90, 292n23 losses due to violence, 6, 64, 71n73 technology advances, effect on governance, 109–10, 252 piracy, costs of, 5, 65 Teleco, 264b trade-offs temporary labor migration, 162–63 for confidence-building, 253–55, 258–59 temporary pacts in conflict areas, 8 for international delivery capacity, 265 terminology, 342 risk of action vs. risk of inaction, 277 terrorism and terrorist attacks tradition and state legitimacy, 95n67 bilateral counterterrorism and counter-crime programs, 184, 222 trafficking. See also conflict diamonds; drug trafficking costs of incidents within a country, 65 counter-trafficking initiatives, 283, 284–85 costs of transnational attacks on economic growth, 5, 66 financing rebel groups, 54 definition of terrorism, 69n18, 241n29 global rise of, 53f financing, 228, 241n38 stress posed by, 76b, 217, 220–22, 220t, 240–41nn13–22 global threat of, 53, 55, 55f transforming institutions hijacking and kidnapping in Colombia, 15 adaptability, 110–12, 111b. See also best-fit approaches ideology-based groups, support for, 83, 83f, 222–23, 226, bottom-up and top-down programming, 255 241n30 breaking cycles of violence through, 8–12 media coverage of, 53, 53f challenges for, 99–103, 105b social inequalities and injustice and, 83 communication technologies and, 110 UN General Assembly comprehensive strategy for complementary programs for, 18–19 counterterrorism, 222 continuous process of, 169–71 Thailand core tools, 17 (feature), 256t indirect vs. direct costs of violence, 65b corruption, 156–57 regional cooperation with Myanmar, 233 criminal justice functions and dispute resolution, 153–56 theories of violence prevention and WDR framework (2011), defined, xvii 105b, 289 delivering citizen security, justice, and jobs, 13, 272t. See also third-party guarantors and assistance, 100b, 188, 235–36, 252 citizen security, justice, and jobs Timap for Justice (nonprofit in Sierra Leone), 154 devolution and decentralization, 164–66 timber industry, 156, 220, 220t, 241nn16–17, 285 dual accountability and managing risks of action, 200–205 time for transition to institutional resilience, 13, 110, 247 economic reforms, 167–68 speed. See transforming institutions education reform, 169 Timor-Leste elections, 164 army vs. police, unclear roles as source of violence, 149 escaping violence and developing resilience, 98, 103–8, 103f ASEAN role, 233, 234b confidence-building, 104–6. See also confidence-building budget debates, 251 external support and resistance to external stresses, 106–7. building inclusive-enough coalitions, 12, 120, 122, 187 See also external stresses health system reform, 20, 169, 179n137, 192 repeated spiral, 12, 12f, 107–8 humanitarian aid, phasing from international to local as essential for stability, xii institutions, 266b expectations for, 99–101, 108–10 international support and government planning for transition, 193 health reform, 169 justice system, 156, 257 infrastructure investment, 158–61 outreach to Indonesia, 263 international support for, 193–200, 272t participation of previously excluded groups, 127, 140n27, 162 lack of legitimate institutions and risk of recurring violence Petroleum Law, 156 requiring solutions of, 86 signal of break from past, 125 past crimes, justice for, 166–67 success in preventing violence, 11 “premature load-bearing” of institutions, 100, 101b transfers to victims of violence, 258 prioritization of. See sequencing and prioritizing reforms transition moment, 22 private sector jobs, 157–58 Tinbergen, Jan, 282b public attitudes toward excluded groups, 168–69 Tinbergen’s rule, 282b public finance for employment, 161–63 Togo security and, 13, 148–53 evidence of deteriorating situation in, 186 speed of, 10, 11t, 15, 101, 105b, 108–10, 109b. See also refugees from, 66 sequencing and prioritizing reforms 382 INDEX transforming institutions (continued) citizen security, justice, and jobs, delivery of, 199 supporting, 193–200 humanitarian aid, 30 adapting to local context, 196–97 innovative programs, 271 time and patience, 193–96 multisectoral approaches, 132b track for reducing risks of violence, 31–34 peace and development advisers, 213n96 transitions from humanitarian aid, 19 preventive tools of, 23 trust issues and rising expectations, 99–101 South-South facilities, 197 vulnerability to external stress, 101–3 UNDP-UNDPA Social Cohesion Program, 188 in WDR framework for building resilience to violence, 45f, unemployment linked to violence, 7, 30–31, 78, 79, 79b, 252 46–47t UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), 188 women’s economic empowerment, 163–64 United Kingdom transition moments anti-money laundering laws, 227 breaking away from fragility and conflict, 107, 115b Department for International Development (DFID) defined, xvii duration of aid from, 193 differences among types of, 22 Program Risk Assessment Matrix, 213n97 taking advantage of, 249 Stabilization Unit, 185, 209n14 transparency direct costs of violence, 65b of budget and expenditures, 156–57, 251 Multilateral Agency Review, 185 at grassroots, 127 Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), 242n42 trade-offs with collusion, 198b United Nations Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Children’s Fund. See UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 126b, 226 Conference on Trade and Development. See UN Conference on treaties working in concert with UN missions, 210n35 Trade and Development (UNCTAD) triangular cooperation, 197 Convention Against Corruption, 26, 226 trust. See also confidence-building Convention Against Genocide, 26 civil wars and, 64 criminal justice, need to play leadership role in, 276 defined, 41n49, 116n1 crisis prevention and recovery experience, 271 early policy announcements and, 22, 125 Department of Disarmament Affairs, 221 lack of visible improvements and, 124 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), 192, 199 legitimacy and, 151 Department of Political Affairs. See UN Department of Political regional services sharing and, 235 Affairs (UNDPA) transforming institutions and, 8, 98, 99–101 Development Programme. See UN Development Programme unrealistic due to levels of mistrust, 100b (UNDP) violence prevention through establishing, 149 General Assembly comprehensive strategy for counterterrorism, truth-telling process, 126, 166, 178n117, 178n119 222 Turkmenistan, regional cooperation and stresses, 238–40 (feature) High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 154 Twitter revolution, 109 Independent Review of Civilian Capacities, 197, 199 integrated missions, 208–9n11, 270 U interagency initiative on Ecuador-Colombia border, 219 Uganda Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, 194 cross-border violence, 67 (feature) Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), 151 mass rape, 60 Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 152 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey on education funds, 127 Mission in Sudan, 192 Veterans Assistance Program, 202 Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 280, 285 Ultimatum Game, 82b operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 182 UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 30, 154, 191–92 Peacebuilding Commission, 37, 184, 288 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 34, 232b, Peacebuilding Committee and Peacebuilding Support Office, 286 209n14 UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) Peacebuilding Fund, 192 confidence-building programs, 186 Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), innovative programs, 271 207 (feature) mediation budget, 209n23 Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 194 peace and development advisers, 213n96 Peacekeeping Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo regional offices, 25 (MONUC), 192, 194 violence reduction programs, 23 peacekeeping missions, 18, 28, 152, 182, 194, 200, 210n35, 218, UN Development Programme (UNDP) 271, 281b, 338 adapting community-level programs to country context, 24 peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, 221 (feature) Regional Center for Conflict Resolution, 239 (feature) Index 383 Secretariat procurement systems, 197 W Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, WACI (West Africa Coast Initiative), 44n99 and Change, 69n18 Wallis, John, 86, 105b Security Council. See UN Security Council Walter, Barbara, 10, 82b, 84, 85b Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia, 239 war crimes (feature) amnesty for, 187 Standing Police Capacity and Office of Rule of Law and justice for, 166–67 Security Institutions, 199, 275 recognition of, 166 United Nations–World Bank–European Union post-crisis needs reparations. See reparations for victims of political violence assessment, 23, 250 wars. See also civil wars University of the South Pacific, 236b interstate wars, number of, 51, 52b UN Security Council water availability and riparian conflict, 230, 231b conflict settlement provisions on democratic processes, 187 water treaties, 230 drug trafficking, threat of, 220 WDR Advisory Council (2011), xx, xxib GEMAP, agreement to, 126b on anti-corruption mechanisms, 158b international tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, 167 on civilian oversight of defense, 150b peacekeeping functions under mandate of, 30, 200 on confidence-building, 14–15, 115b, 129b urbanization, effect of, 7 on economic reform in China, 146b U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 159b, 191 on external stresses, 10 Famine Early Warning System Network, 230b, 286 on flexible peacekeeping arrangements, 281b Office of the Transition Initiatives, 213n97 on international agency reform, 32 (feature) Uzbekistan, regional cooperation and stresses, 238–40 (feature) on local-level politics, 122b V on mediation as cost-effective approach, 187b on organized crime and drug trafficking, 76b value chains, support for, 157–58, 159b, 176n66, 257 vetting of personnel on pacing institutional transformation, 165b judges and prosecutors, 154 on prioritizing investment in citizen security and justice law enforcement and security personnel, 151 reforms, 273b vicious cycle of conflict, 6–8, 72. See also repeated cycles of on regional initiatives and norms and standards, 38 (feature), violence 234b, 289b vicious cycle of weak institutional legitimacy, 10, 84–89, 85b, 89f on security, justice, and jobs, 148b vigilantism, 135, 136b on South African transition, 115b violence on uneven international support in West Africa, 208b aid volatility increases and, 27f WDR framework (2011), 45–48 breaking cycles of. See roadmap for breaking cycles of violence as roadmap for WDR report, 46–47t civil wars. See civil wars spiral of, repeated cycles to bolster institutional resilience, 45f, combination of stresses resulting in, 7 46, 103–4, 103f cycles of. See repeated cycles of violence theories of violence prevention and, 105b, 289 data gaps. See data gaps for studying violence weak institutions economic and political theories of, 75–76b as factor in repeated cycles of violence, 10, 84–89, 85b, 89f effects of, generally, 50 vulnerability to external stress, 101–3 global conversation on, xix–xx wealth-sharing arrangements, 127 interlinked, 54–55 Weingast, Barry, 86, 105b 21st century version of, 2, 53, 54t Weinstein, Jeremy, 141n49 types of threat, 249 West Africa vulnerability to, 73–95. See also vulnerability to violence anti-drug initiatives, 44n99, 285 Violence and Social Orders (North, Wallis, & Weingast), 105b corruption, 34 violence prevention theories and WDR framework (2011), 105b coups d’état and failure of local mechanisms to resolve, 16 virtuous cycle in WDR framework, 46t, 98, 108 cross-border cooperation on trafficking and economic Viva Rio (NGO), 197, 213n92 integration, 35 Voices of the Poor project, 78–79, 147 cross-border violence, 67 (feature) von Billerbeck, Sarah, 84 donor support to social and poverty reduction programs in vulnerability to violence, 73–95 countries with recent coups d’état, 44n105 domestic stresses. See internal stresses drug trafficking, 10, 34, 56b, 57, 76b, 285 external stresses. See external stresses instability and political violence, 56b multiple stresses raising risks of, 73–84 international support in post-conflict phase, 184, 184f vicious cycle of weak institutional legitimacy, 10, 84–89, 85b organized crime, 67 (feature) in WDR framework, 46t traditional community meetings, 252 384 INDEX West Africa (continued) land-use issues, 231, 232, 232b trafficking and economic integration initiatives, 284 legal and judicial issues, support for, 199 on uneven international support in, 208b Liberia and planning for transition, 206 (feature) West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), 44n99 publication of cost estimates for projects, 198b West Africa Telecommunications Regulatory Agreement, 236b public financial management (PFM) reviews, 174n14 West Bank and Gaza rapid response to crisis and emergencies, 208n10 Facility for New Market Development (FNMD), 176n68 regional lending by, 25 foreign troops and security stresses, 218 road maintenance in Liberia, 132b international aid for, 183, 212n79 South-South facilities, 197 multidonor trust funds for, 202, 212n79 Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF), 192 Palestinian security forces, 149 World Bank Group’s Enterprise Surveys, 160 WFP (World Food Programme), 30, 192 World Bank/IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, 206 WGI. See Worldwide Governance Indicators (feature) “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-systems” initiatives, 25, World Bank Institute Rule of Law rating (2008), 235 185, 209nn12–13, 270 World Bank/UN Conference on Trade and Development Wilkinson, Steven I., 178n112 (UNCTAD)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Wimmer, Andreas, 81 initiative, 34 wishful thinking, 110, 110b World Development Indicators 2010, 341 women World Development Report (2009), 234 economic empowerment of, 19, 163–64, 163b, 258 World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next equality for, 168–69, 170b, 177n98, 258 Generation, 78 peace accords requiring, 209n29 World Food Programme (WFP), 30, 192 international approaches to coalition building excluding, 188 World Health Organization (WHO), 30 political reform, participation in, 123–24 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 78, 85b, 95n65 security tasks, participation in, 151–52, 174n25, 188, 258 Wu Jianmin, 146b as victims of violence, 60, 175n35 Wunlit Covenant (Sudan), 123 women’s courts, 155–56 World Bank Y Aceh Reintegration and Livelihood Survey, 138 (feature) Yemen, conflicts within, 55, 68 (feature) anti-corruption initiatives, 227b, 229 Yeo, George, 14, 122b, 148b collaboration with UN peacekeeping missions, 271 YouthBuild International, 162 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) youth population, 339 frameworks, 87b, 95n65 youth unemployment, 6, 30, 79, 274 Department of Institutional Integrity, 227, 227b diplomatic support for negotiations, 186 duration of aid for post-conflict countries, 193 Z Environmental, Health and Safety General Guidelines, 292n19 Zemun gang (Balkans), 67 (feature) on foreign investment in land, 231 Zimbabwe imprimatur of good financial practice from, 188 evidence of deteriorating situation in, 186 indicators of institutional strength used by, 85 in-kind support from bilateral donor for, 202 on labor-intensive programs in low- and middle-income travel restrictions imposed by EU on, 189 countries, 161 Zoellick, Robert B., xii ECO-AUDIT Environmental Benefits Statement The World Bank is committed to pre- Saved: serving endangered forests and natural • 284 trees resources. The Office of the Publisher • 10 million Btu of total has chosen to print World Development energy Report 2011 on recycled paper with 50 • 28,900 pounds of net percent postconsumer fiber in accordance greenhouse gases with the recommended standards for paper • 130,319 gallons of usage set by the Green Press Initiative, a wastewater nonprofit program supporting publishers • 8,261 pounds of in using fiber that is not sourced from solid waste endangered forests. For more information, visit www.greenpressinitiative.org. With more than 1.5 billion people living in countries affected by conflict, the World Development Report 2011 (WDR) looks into the changing nature of violence in the 21st century. Interstate and civil wars characterized violent conflict in the last century; more pronounced today is violence linked to local disputes, political repression, and organized crime. The Report underlines the negative impact of persistent conflict on a country’s or a region’s development prospects, and notes that no low-income, conflict-affected state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. The risk of major violence is greatest when high levels of stress combine with weak and illegitimate national institutions. Societies are vulnerable when their institutions are unable to protect citizens from abuse, or to provide equitable access to justice and to economic opportunity. These vulnerabilities are exacer- bated in countries with high youth unemployment, growing income inequality, and perceptible injustice. Externally driven events such as infiltration by foreign combatants, the presence of trafficking networks, or economic shocks add to the stresses that can provoke violence. The WDR 2011 draws on the experiences of countries that have successfully managed to transition away from repetitive violence, pointing to a specific need to prioritize actions that build confidence between states and citizens, and develop institutions that can provide security, justice, and jobs. Government capacity is central, but technical competence alone is insufficient: institutions and programs must be accountable to their citizens if they are to acquire legitimacy. Impunity, corruption, and human rights abuses undermine confidence between states and citizens and increase the risks of violence. Building resilient institutions occurs in multiple transitions over a generation, and does not mean converging on Western institutional models. The WDR 2011 draws together lessons from national reformers escaping from repetitive cycles of violence. It advocates a greater focus on continuous preventive action, balancing a sometimes excessive concentration on post- conflict reconstruction. The Report is based on new research, case studies, and extensive consultations with leaders and other actors throughout the world. It proposes a toolkit of options for addressing violence that can be adapted to local contexts, as well as new directions for international policy intended to improve support for national reformers and to tackle stresses that emanate from global or regional trends beyond any one country’s control. ISBN 978-0-8213-8439-8 SKU 18439