Public Disclosure Authorized
PHILIPPINE SOCIAL PROTECTION NOTE
June 2016
NO. 10
Social Protection in the Philippines
Public Disclosure Authorized
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an
“emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
Thomas Bowen1
This note focuses on the way in which the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) conditional
cash transfer (CCT) program and the national household targeting system for poverty reduction,
Listahanan, were used by DSWD, and leveraged by humanitarian agencies, in response to super-
Typhoon Yolanda (November, 2013). Based on this experience, and keeping in mind that the 4Ps
Public Disclosure Authorized
program is not designed to respond to disasters, the note makes the case for the utility of building
a separate, emergency cash transfer (ECT) program that is capable of delivering an immediate and
much broader cash transfer response in the event of future large-scale disasters. An explicitly disaster-
responsive, unconditional cash transfer program could reach a larger share of affected households
than is currently possible, with grants of increased value reflecting acute need and in a timely,
coordinated and transparent fashion. For beneficiaries, the provision of cash once initial life-saving
needs have been met can increase agency and promote faster recovery, enabling repairs to homes,
assets and a faster resumption of livelihoods. For DSWD, such a program could also help to reduce its
substantial institutional burden to deliver in-kind assistance, the delivery of which is often logistically
more difficult and costly than cash based assistance.
Overview
On 8 November 2013, one the strongest typhoons ever recorded, Typhoon Yolanda (internationally
referred to as Typhoon Haiyan) struck the Philippines, with severe human and economic
Public Disclosure Authorized
consequences. With wind speeds exceeding 300 km/h, Typhoon Yolanda is the most powerful storm
to have made landfall in the history of the Philippines.1 The storm elicited “storm surges” of over
four meters (13 feet) in some regions. Nearly 6,300 people died and a further 4.1 million people
were displaced.2 The storm affected some of the country’s poorest regions with estimates of up to an
additional one million people having fallen into poverty as a result.3
The Philippine Social Protection Note
series aims to disseminate experiences,
good practices, and key findings from
the Philippines on the topics related to
social protection. It also aims to broaden 1
This policy note is a condensed version of a broader review of social protection and disaster risk management
the dialogue on social protection and
in the Philippines, based around a case study of Typhoon Yolanda, (see: Bowen, T. “Social protection and disaster
stimulate public engagement in moving
forward the policy agenda. The views risk management in the Philippines: the case of typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)”). The country case study was one
expressed here are those of the authors of a series of four case studies produced under the task: Making Social Protection Systems More Responsive to
and do not necessarily reflect those of Natural Disasters/Hazards in East Asia and the Pacific. Financial support to prepare those studies was provided by
the World Bank. the Rapid Social Response (RSR) trust fund. The other three case studies in the four-part series include Fiji, Tonga
and Vietnam. Additional financial support for the Philippines case study was provided through the World Bank’s
Climate Change and Poverty global report: “Shock Waves: Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty”.
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Social Protection in the Philippines
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an “emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
In response to Yolanda, DSWD implemented a variety of social protection and social welfare programs to meet the multiple and
changing needs of the affected. These programs can be broadly grouped into the following categories: distribution of in-kind relief
items, cash transfers, shelter, and community driven development. These programs are mapped out in Figure 1 along a stylized
post disaster timeline, illustrating the post-disaster phases in which each program was implemented. The focus of this note is on
DSWD’s cash transfer programming (CTP) – in particular the use of the 4Ps conditional cash transfer. For a detailed account of how
DSWD utilized each of these other programs in response to Yolanda, please refer to Bowen, T. “Social protection and disaster risk
management in the Philippines: the case of typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)”, the broader case study from which this note is derived.
Figure 1: The primary response, recovery and reconstruction programs of DSWD in the case of Typhoon Yolanda
Note: “Relief, early recovery, recovery and reconstruction” refer the typical international conception of the post-disaster phases over time. “Response” and “recovery and
rehabilitation” represent the GoP conception of these phases. They align as illustrated on the figure’s x axis
After immediate survival needs were addressed through relief interventions, DSWD delivered a number of cash-based
response programs, including through its national CCT program, the 4Ps. Upon the declaration of a “state of calamity”,
the requirement for beneficiaries to comply with the “conditions” (pertaining to the education and health of children in the
household, as well as attendance to monthly family development sessions) of the 4Ps conditional cash transfer program is
waived by DSWD in affected geographical areas for a set period of time. This makes the 4Ps’ cash grants unconditional at
a time when conditions may be hard or impossible to meet if, for instance, the supply side is down or access to facilities
is limited. Utilizing the pre-existing 4Ps system in this way, DSWD were able to quickly release of a total of P550.5 million
(US$12.5 million) of “unconditional” 4Ps cash grants to Yolanda affected 4Ps beneficiaries between November 2013 and
February 2014 – just three months after the disaster struck.4
In the case of Yolanda, both the World Food Program (WFP) and UNICEF also utilized the 4Ps delivery system to deliver
additional emergency cash transfers to affected households – “topping up” the grant amount. The grant amounts
received by the 4Ps beneficiaries from DSWD post-Yolanda remained fixed at the same amount that is delivered by the
The case study and this policy note were authored by Thomas Bowen (tbowen@worldbank.org), Social Protection Specialist, Social Protection
and Labor Global Practice (GSPDR), World Bank. Oleksiy Ivaschenko (oivaschenko@worldbank.org), Senior Economist, GSPDR served as Task Team
Leader. Aleksandra Posarac (Program Leader: Poverty, Human and Social Development - Philippines), Cynthia Burton (an independent Disaster Risk
Management and Social Protection Specialist), Pablo Acosta (Senior Economist GSPDR) and Jehan Arulpragasam (Practice Manager, GSPDR) also
provided valuable guidance and expertise throughout the drafting of the report.
The author wishes to sincerely thank all of the stakeholders consulted during the preparation of this report for their time and invaluable insights. This
includes: government representatives (in particular the many representatives consulted from the Department of Social Welfare and Development), World
Bank Manila Country Office staff, regional organizations, international development partners, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
2 philippine social protection note
4Ps in normal, non-emergency programming. However, in the case of Yolanda, WFP and UNICEF topped up the amount
delivered by DSWD to a subset of 4Ps households in affected areas, effectively scaling up the 4Ps grant amount during a
time of increased need for the disaster affected beneficiaries. This was a pragmatic and replicable practice that illustrates
the potential efficiency gains for humanitarian agencies and affected beneficiary households when delivering post-disaster
grants through a pre-positioned national cash transfer program. Indeed, WFP again utilized the 4Ps to deliver cash top-ups
to 4Ps beneficiaries after Typhoon Ruby (Hagupit) in 2014.5
Ahead of future disasters, DSWD, in partnership with the World Bank, is exploring the adoption of an “Emergency Cash
Transfer” (ECT) program that is able to deliver post-disaster cash transfers to a larger share of affected households.
Currently, the post-disaster cash transfers that are delivered through the 4Ps are only provided to 4Ps beneficiaries and
not to other affected households that may be equally or more poor and as or more affected by the disaster. This is because
they are delivered through a CCT that is not designed to be explicitly responsive to disasters. The introduction of an
Emergency Cash Transfer program as a complementary but separate program would preserve the integrity of the 4Ps CCT
as an instrument for long-term human capital accumulation and poverty reduction. In that regard, an ECT program would
have the explicit objective of providing temporary income support to affected households. This additional instrument will
better equip DSWD to deliver a more equitable, broad-based post disaster cash transfer intervention that reaches both
4Ps and non-4Ps affected households alike. This will, in turn, also help to supplement some of DSWD’s substantial burden
to deliver food / in kind support with a cash based response, once immediate food based needs have been met and
beneficiary needs transition away from survival to asset re-accumulation and livelihood restoration.
The post-disaster cash transfer program will need to be linked to appropriate risk financing mechanisms to ensure that
it is financially viable and able to deliver to beneficiaries in a timely fashion. Designing and building such a program
is one thing, but the program itself will create a significant contingent liability for DSWD, given its objective of reaching
larger shares of affected households with cash than it currently does, and with grants of increased value depending on
need. Similarly, liquidity must be rapidly available to disperse grants through the program in a timely fashion. A first
necessary step will be assessing and quantifying the contingent liability of the program under several scenarios (scale of
disaster, number of beneficiaries, amount of assistance to be provided, etc.). Then, appropriate linkages to the contingent
financing of DSWD (the Quick Response Fund) and the Department of Finance / GoP (National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Find – NDRRMF, formerly “calamity fund”) will need to be established. In this capacity, an ECT would provide
a pre-prepared channel for DoF to disburse post-disaster funding through.
Figure 2 – A stylized figure of how an Emergency Cash Alongside the GoP and DSWD cash based programs, separate
Transfer would enhance DSWD’s post-disaster, unconditional humanitarian cash transfer programs (CTPs) were also
cash transfer capabilities implemented in the Yolanda response - to an “unprecedented
degree”.6 At least 45 international humanitarian agencies
implemented CTPs – unconditional and conditional - within
the inter-agency response to Yolanda. UNOCHA (United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
reported that between December 2013 and August 2014,
more than three-quarters (77 percent) of these CTPs were
conditional cash transfers (60 percent of which were cash for
work, 20 percent cash for food or shelter), while just under
one quarter (23 percent) were unconditional.7 Four agencies
alone in the inter-agency response distributed around US$34
million, benefitting 1.4 million disaster-affected people.8
Considerable effort was made to coordinate the large number of CTP providers with the social protection based cash
transfer programs - with some positive results. For example, humanitarian agencies were able to utilize Listahanan’s
rich information on households – including relative levels of poverty and vulnerability - in the affected areas to target
assistance. Ultimately, however, post-Yolanda response documentation and reviews reveal that 1) there has been no
rigorous evaluation of the impact of the overall CTP response, and 2) there nevertheless appear to have been issues in
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Social Protection in the Philippines
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an “emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
CTP coordination leading to coverage gaps and duplication. The leveraging of existing SP information systems such as
Listahanan for increased future CTP coordination should continue to be explored ex-ante the next disaster by relevant CTP
implementing agencies and DSWD.
An Emergency Cash Transfer program could further increase overall CTP coordination for future large-scale disasters, to
the ultimate benefit of the affected beneficiaries. The introduction of an ECT program may further encourage additional
humanitarian agencies to channel their cash transfers through such a pre-existing, but more expansive and equitable,
DSWD/GoP led cash transfer program. With such a pre-prepared program capable of reaching a larger share of affected
households than was possible in the case of Yolanda, there may be less need for humanitarian agencies to independently
work to reach those outside of the program’s reach by setting up their own ad hoc cash transfer programs, as was the case
in response to Yolanda.
1. Natural Disasters and Poverty in the Philippines
The Philippines is currently ranked as the country with the second highest level of disaster risk in the world and is the
eighth most vulnerable country to the effects of climate change.9 10 Its location, climate and topography expose the country
to many recurring natural hazards. These include both climate-related hazards (e.g. typhoons, floods, drought, storm surge,
landslides) and geophysical hazards (e.g. volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunamis). Recent research has suggested that of the
10 most exposed cities in the world to natural disasters, eight are located in the Philippines (including Manila - 4th).11 An
average of 20 tropical cyclones hit the country every year, of which five to seven are destructive. Below, Map 1 illustrates
the relative global concentration and severity of tropical cyclones that have historically struck the Philippines. Moreover,
climate change projections predict increases in annual mean temperatures for the country range from 0.9°C to 1.1°C by
2020, and by 1.8°C to 2.2°C in 2050.12 These changes in temperature are projected to lead to more intense tropical storms
and typhoons. Different areas of the country will be impacted in different ways. For example, regional projections for the
Philippines include a 60 – 100 percent increase in annual rainfall in the Central Visayas and Southern Tagalog (including
Metro Manila) by 2050, while annual average rainfall in Mindanao is expected to decline by 11 percent.13
Map 1: The historical instances and intensity of tropical storms and hurricanes14
Salfir-Simpson Hurricane Intensity Scale
Tropical Depression Tropical Storm 1 2 3 4 5 The Philippines
Source: Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) 2015, p. 67
4 philippine social protection note
While typhoons occur with particular frequency in the Philippines, the country is also exposed to many other types
of natural hazards. Approximately 74 percent of the country’s population and 60 percent of its land area are susceptible
to multiple natural hazards.15 Notably, the country is located on the ‘Pacific Ring of Fire’, a ‘ring’ of volcanic and seismic
activity that runs along the edge of the Pacific Ocean, where around 90 percent of all earthquakes occur and 75 percent
of all active volcanoes are located.16 Earthquakes are a relatively common occurrence in the Philippines, with 14 having
occurred since 1990.17 Recently, for example, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake struck Bohol province in central Philippines,
October 2013, just weeks before Typhoon Yolanda made landfall. The earthquake was felt in 60 municipalities and six cities
across six provinces, affecting 3.2 million individuals, of whom 95,884 were displaced.
The impacts of repeated and increasingly frequent natural Figure 3: Poverty status over time (2003, 2006 & 2009)
disasters are undermining poverty reduction in the Philippines.
Despite a high rate of economic growth in the Philippines over
the last decade, the national poverty rate has not significantly
declined. According to the GoP’s official poverty estimates, income
poverty has remained almost unchanged since 2003 at around 25.2
percent. One reason for this is the high degree of transient poverty
in the Philippines. Many Filipinos live just above this poverty line,
cycling in and out of poverty due to high vulnerability to shocks –
including natural disasters. Indeed, as Figure 3 illustrates, between
2003 and 2009, 44 percent of the population was poor at least
once – and of that 44 percent, two out of three households moved
in and out of poverty. A study by Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang (2013)
combined physical storm data with household surveys to conclude
Source: World Bank (2014), Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic
that, on average, typhoons that hit the Philippines depress of the Philippines for the Period FY2015-2018, p 4
affected household incomes by 6.7 percent (net of public and
private transfers) and household expenditures by 7.1 percent.18 Consequently, they found that typhoons led to significant
reductions in human capital investments among affected households, especially in education (-13.3 percent) and health
(-14.3 percent).19 While food expenditures did not appear to decline as strongly among affected households, reductions in
their food expenditure did extend over a longer period of time, in many cases beginning immediately in the year of storm
exposure and continuing for three years afterwards.20 These impacts are not disaggregated by income status, but highlight
the relative burden on households possessing lower steady-state income and expenditure levels.
2. The Philippines’ Disaster Risk Management Framework and Its Linkages to Social Protection
The Philippines has one of the most advanced social protection systems in the East Asia Pacific region. Undergoing
rapid and comprehensive social welfare reform since 2007, DSWD has developed a number of national SP programs to
help poor households manage risk and shocks. Advanced information and delivery systems have also been developed to
accompany these programs. For example, the Pantawid Pamiliya Pilipino Program (4Ps) is a nationwide conditional cash
transfer program aimed at poverty alleviation and human capital accumulation that reached 4.4 million households in
2014. The targeting for the 4Ps is informed by a comprehensive national household targeting system, Listahanan, which
contained information on 15.1 million households in 2015.
Social protection is at the forefront of the overall government response to disasters like Yolanda. As natural disasters
constitute one of the most frequent and severe types of shock facing Filipino households, the GoP’s lead agency for social
protection and social welfare - the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) - plays a prominent role in
meeting the needs of poor and vulnerable people who are adversely affected by their impacts. This role became intensified
during the Yolanda response and led to a number of important lessons regarding the most effective ways to utilize and
scale up existing SP systems for large-scale disaster response.
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Social Protection in the Philippines
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an “emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
DSWD is also the government’s lead agency for four clusters of the UN cluster system during the response phase; food
security, camp coordination and camp management, shelter and protection. The cluster system, instituted in 2006 as
part of the UN Humanitarian Reform process, is designed to facilitate effective humanitarian coordination by strengthening
leadership and accountability in key sectors at the national and global levels.2 The cluster system may be triggered to
coordinate the government’s response and/or the broader international humanitarian response to a disaster, as was the
case during Typhoon Yolanda. In 2007, the GoP formerly adopted the Cluster Approach, assigning government cluster
leads to each of the 11 Clusters. Where DSWD’s clusters are concerned, partner humanitarian lead agencies are as
follows: United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Protection; World Food Program (WFP), Food Security;
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Shelter; International Organization for Migration
(IOM), Camp Coordination and Management/Non-food Items.21
Under the national DRM framework , DSWD takes overall responsibility for coordinating “disaster response”. The
overarching goal of the Disaster Response vice-chair is to “provide life preservation and meet the basic subsistence needs of the
affected population based on acceptable standards during or immediately after a disaster”.22 However, the disaster response
thematic area includes both immediate response activities and early recovery activities. Immediate response activities include
needs assessments, search and rescue and relief operations, provision of food and non-food item relief packages, etc. Early
recovery activities acknowledge that “the multidimensional process of recovery begins in a humanitarian setting” and
includes activities that help to restore basic services, livelihoods, governance, security and rule of law, environment and
social dimensions, including reintegration and social and emotional rehabilitation of displaced populations”.23
Figure 4: The National Disaster Risk Reduction Council: Division of Responsibilities24
Source: Figure adapted from GoP, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC),
“National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP), 2011-2028”, 2011.
Response activities are financed through the National and Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Funds (NDRRMF
– formerly ‘Calamity Fund’ - & LDRRMF) and Quick Response Funds. The NDRRMF is a lump sum fund appropriated under
the General Appropriations Act (GAA). In a post disaster context, however, the process for securing the release of funds
is lengthy: implementing agencies send a request to the OCD, who review the application before sending to the NDRRMC
for review, who, if approving, send to the Office of the President, who advise the Department of Budget Management to
release the funds. This is especially problematic in the response phase when activities must be undertaken immediately.25
As such, 30 percent of the NDRRMF is allocated to “Quick Response Funds” for relief and recovery programs. Unlike the
NDRRMF, the QRF does not require the recommendation of the NDRRMC or the approval of the Office of the President
to trigger the use and release of funds. The NDRRMF is replicated at the local level through Local Disaster Risk Reduction
2
The Cluster Approach operates at two levels – at the global level, the aim is to strengthen system-wide, humanitarian preparedness and technical
capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies by designating global cluster leads and ensuring there is predictable leadership and accountability
in all the main sectors or areas of activity. At the country level, the aim is to ensure a more coherent and effective response by mobilizing groups of
agencies, organizations and NGOs to respond in a strategic manner across all key sectors or areas of activity, each sector having a clearly designated
lead, in support of existing government coordination and emergency response mechanisms.
3
The Philippines’ Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (PDRRM, or Republic Act 10121(RA10121)) established the framework for the creation
of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC).
6 philippine social protection note
and Management Funds (LDRRMF); no less than 5 percent of regular source revenue must be set aside for DRM activities.
Of the total amount appropriated to LDRRMFs, 30 percent is allocated to local QRFs for response and recovery activities.
3. The Impacts of Super-Typhoon Yolanda
Typhoon Yolanda struck the Philippines on November 8, 2013. With wind speeds exceeding 300 km/h, it is considered the
most powerful storm to have made landfall in history.26 Yolanda cut a path directly across the central Philippines, severely
affecting areas in the Eastern, Central and Western Visayas and northern Palawan (see Annex 1, Map), precipitating a storm
surge of over four meters in Eastern and Western Samar and Leyte that led to massive loss of life and extensive damage to
public and private assets.
The human and economic costs of the disaster to the Philippines were extremely high. In terms of economic devastation,
Yolanda cost the country an estimated P571.2 billion (USD 12.9 billion) in damages,27 with over a million homes damaged
or destroyed. This equated to 0.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Nearly 6,300 people died, 80 percent of them
from the country’s second poorest region, the Central Visayas. A further 4.1 million people were reportedly displaced.28
As of 2014, the GoP reported that more than 1,000 people were still “missing”.29 Along with the sheer strength of
Typhoon Yolanda, well-documented issues with the communication of early warning information, specifically in terms of a
widespread lack of understanding of the term “storm surge”, contributed to these devastating human impacts.4
Yolanda affected some of the country’s poorest regions and was anticipated to increase national poverty incidence by
1.9 percentage points, with projections of up to an additional one million people falling into poverty.30 Pre-typhoon
poverty incidence in the six hardest hit regions31 ranged from 29.1 percent in Western Visayas to 45.2 percent in Eastern
Visayas.32 Estimates in the GoP’s Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda Plan (RAY), 2014, indicated that the poverty gap in
these regions had already increased as a result of the disaster. The results of the 2014 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey
(APIS) released by the Philippine Statistics Authority showed poverty incidence among Filipinos rising to 25.8 percent in
the first half of 2014, from 24.6 percent in 2013 with Typhoon Yolanda believed to be a contributing factor.
The impact on production and livelihoods was significant, and remains potentially debilitating, particularly for the
hardest hit regions. The large-scale destruction of crops and other physical assets has disrupted industry and has increased
unemployment and underemployment. Vast quantities of crops were destroyed, including 161,400 hectares of coconut
farms. Farmers also reported losses of livestock, agricultural equipment, post-production facilities, fishing vessels, and
irrigation systems. These losses have had a substantial long-term negative impact on the domestic economy and household
welfare. There also are strong multiplier effects to the informal sector, which constitutes a large share of the local economy
in the affected regions. The government estimates that around six million workers were affected by the typhoon, of which
around 2.6 million are vulnerable workers without adequate social insurance or unpaid family workers.33
The occurrence of other intense weather events before and after Yolanda has further increased the fiscal burden and
hardship experienced by significant segments of the population. Weeks before Yolanda struck, Bohol Province and other
parts of central Philippines experienced a 7.2 magnitude earthquake, with damages estimated at P2.2 billion (US$50
million). Following Typhoon Yolanda, Typhoon Glenda struck the north and central regions in the Philippines in July, 2014
resulting in an estimated total cost of P10.8 billion (US$ 247 million). Indeed, Yolanda or any other typhoon / disaster in
the Philippines should not be thought of in isolation, but as one in a succession of frequent events, the impacts of which
are accumulative for the most exposed and vulnerable.
4
A GIZ / EU Commission assessment of the early warning efforts for Yolanda found that the warning was received with enough time to enact
preparations but that, crucially, the term “storm surge” was not understood by many. GIZ calculated that approximately 94 percent of the casualties
in Tacloban, Palo and Tanauan were caused by the storm surge. The study concludes that “serious warnings and more effective evacuations along the
coastline could have saved many lives”, highlighting the primary importance of information, and the sufficient understanding of that information by
the public, in saving lives.
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Social Protection in the Philippines
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an “emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
4. Post-Yolanda Social Protection Programming
Given its prominent position in the national DRM framework, and overall responsibility for disaster response, DSWD
implemented a variety of programs to assist Yolanda affected households. These programs can be broadly grouped into
the following categories: distribution of in-kind relief items, cash transfers, shelter, and community driven development.
The focus of this particular note, however, is on DSWD’s cash transfer programming – in particular the use of the 4Ps CCT.5
The case of Yolanda also offers interesting lessons regarding the ways in which pre-existing national social protection
systems may be most effectively utilized to coordinate the overall GoP and international humanitarian response
Yolanda’s devastation was so extensive that the government’s response was supplemented with a full scale international
humanitarian response, coordinated through the UN cluster system. A number of international organizations utilized
similar modes of assistance to those of DSWD. In some cases, this assistance was well harmonized with DWSD’s response,
while in others there was seemingly a lack of cohesion.
DSWD, the 4Ps CCT and cash transfer response
In regular times, the 4Ps delivers cash grants to households with children (aged 0-18) that live beneath the poverty
line and meet conditions pertaining to investments in their children’s education and health. The grants in turn are
intended to provide an immediate alleviation of hardship in poor households, while incentivizing long term human capital
accumulation among children to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. The 4Ps beneficiary households, in general,
must satisfy the following criteria: be identified as poor by the national household targeting system, Listahanan; have
children 0-18 years old and/or have a pregnant woman at the time of assessment; agree to meet the conditions specified in
the program, including attending monthly Family Development Sessions (FDS) which cover numerous topics from domestic
violence and nutrition to disaster preparedness (see Box 1).
Box 1: The 4Ps and disaster preparedness
Attendance at Family Development Sessions (FDS), held once a month, is one of the conditions for receipt of 4Ps grants. One of the topics
covered teaches beneficiaries to be disaster-ready, including understanding warning announcements, which items should be packed for
evacuation, including identification documents, clothes, and other essentials, and where to evacuate to. FDS represent one way in which
a CCT can be used for ex-ante disaster preparedness at the household level. Post-Yolanda, FDS was also used to deliver information to the
4Ps households on how to recognize and address post-traumatic stress.
Given issues concerning the lack of understanding of the term “storm surge” among many households that led to their not taking
appropriate evacuation measures for Yolanda, and the resultant loss of life that occurred, it is clear that understanding disaster
communications is crucial to disaster preparedness and survival. FDS sessions provide a medium for increasing household awareness of
pertinent disaster information that could save lives. It is understood that DSWD is currently developing new guidelines and content for
family disaster preparedness FDS sessions, to be delivered in disaster prone municipalities.
To respond to the situation where the health and educations services are disrupted because of a disaster and beneficiaries
are not able to meet the CCT conditions, the 4Ps design includes a provision that suspends conditions for a limited
period of time when a “state of calamity” is declared. After a disaster, it is unrealistic to assume that beneficiaries can
meet the conditions of the CCT, especially in instances where the supply side may be down, with schools and health centers
destroyed or being used for relief operations. As such, a resolution (NAC Resolution No. 13, Series 2013) was enacted by
DSWD in July 2013 to codify the removal of Compliance Verification in cases of a “state of calamity, disaster, complexity and
other exceptional cases” for a maximum of three consecutive compliance verification periods (three months).
5
For a detailed account of how DSWD utilized each of these programs in response to Yolanda, please refer to Bowen, T. “Social protection and disaster
risk management in the Philippines: the case of typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan)” from which this note is derived.
8 philippine social protection note
The DSWD was able to use these protocols to deliver much needed cash, without conditions, to a large number of
4P beneficiaries over a relatively short period of time. On 8 December, one month after the disaster, DSWD 4Ps staff
conducted a massive validation exercise of the affected 4Ps beneficiaries as a first step in delivery. The purpose of the
validation exercise was to 1) locate the 4Ps beneficiaries; 2) identify them from among other displaced households (in
cases where they were residing in evacuation centers and resettlement areas); 3) validate and update the data profiles
of the identified household beneficiaries against existing records; 4) facilitate the issuance of temporary ID cards to be
used for obtaining their cash transfers; 5) prepare necessary documentation for replacing lost cards and provide new,
permanent credentials.34 The validation exercise and other essential administrative steps, were carried out quickly enough
to enable the release of a total of P550.5 million (US$12.5 million) in 4Ps cash grants to Yolanda affected 4Ps beneficiaries
between November 2013 and February 2014.35 It should be emphasized that these were regular CCT grants due to the
beneficiaries, disaster or no disaster. The difference was that the compliance with conditions was voided.
DSWD also demonstrated resourcefulness and flexibility in locating and facilitating the validation of displaced 4Ps
households that had left the affected regions. Reportedly, by January 2014, 23,000 individuals from Yolanda affected
areas had arrived in the Metro Manila region. Public announcements were broadcast to inform displaced 4Ps beneficiaries
that they could contact the respective 4Ps city or municipal links in the area where they were residing to claim their
benefits. If the beneficiaries had lost their identification documents, they were identified and validated against the 4Ps
beneficiary database.
Both the World Food Program (WFP) and UNICEF decided to utilize the 4Ps system to deliver further ‘top up’ grants
to affected 4Ps beneficiaries. This process of topping up DSWD’s 4Ps grants represents the primary example of DSWD-
humanitarian coordination in response to Yolanda. The WFP agreed to work with DSWD in the validation of 4Ps
beneficiaries, subsequently disbursing two separate top up grants to validated beneficiaries. It was agreed that payment
would be delivered through the 4Ps existing payment modalities (including the Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippines
Post, Prepaid Card and Globe Cash (mobile payments)). The first transfers were delivered quickly between December 2013
and January 2014, and the second between January 2014 and February 2014. Each transfer amounted to a fixed amount
of PHP1300 (US$30) per beneficiary household.
Replicating the top-up initiative of WFP, UNICEF subsequently delivered a series of top up cash grants through the 4Ps,
targeted to 4Ps beneficiaries in the worst affected region, Eastern Samar. DSWD had assessed that the province of Eastern
Samar was the worst affected by Yolanda, and as such UNICEF specifically selected it for the delivery of its top up grants. It
was agreed that DSWD would identify, consolidate and validate a database of 5,801 4Ps beneficiary households in the five
worst affected provinces of Eastern Samar.36 The UNICEF top-ups consisted of a cash grant amount of PHP 4,370 (US$100)
per month, for six months, delivered between July and December 2014. DSWD and UNICEF monitoring of the program
during the period July through September 2014 revealed that within the first 3 months of implementation PHP75,609,600
(US$1,700,000) of UNICEF grants had been disbursed to 4Ps beneficiaries in the five municipalities of Eastern Samar,
reaching 5,728 households in August and 5,739 households in September.37
However, non-4Ps poor and vulnerable households are excluded from the cash transfer, and any donor funded top-
ups, because the 4Ps’ system does not have the flexibility to reach non-4Ps households. Being a CCT with conditionality
temporarily removed, the beneficiaries received the 4Ps grants that they were due ahead of time, upon being validated.
Additionally, many received the WFP and UNICEF funded top-up grants. However, poor households without children,
near poor households tipped into poverty by the disaster, etc., that may be equally or more affected by the disaster than
a 4Ps household could not be reached through this program. As DSWD noted to UNOCHA, “the Philippine Government
is supportive of humanitarian agencies using their social protection programs as a vehicle to target appropriately, and
to transfer assistance in a coordinated way. However, they have also advised that agencies should not feel the need to
discriminate between existing beneficiaries and those who are evidently in need of emergency assistance and not on
the scheme.” In these cases, DSWD emphasized that the humanitarian community should target the excluded affected
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Social Protection in the Philippines
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an “emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
population. However, without a robust assessment of the cash coordination, it cannot be said whether the non-government
programs were well targeted and complementary alongside the 4Ps, and together whether overall coverage was adequate
and broadly equitable. Moreover, it appears no assessment has been undertaken to examine the impacts of the delivery
of the CCT grants to the program beneficiaries compared to those poor households not receiving any post-disaster cash
assistance. While it is too late to capture this data, survey work on these impacts for beneficiary households following
subsequent disasters should be strongly considered.
Following the Yolanda response, the coverage of the 4Ps’ regular CCT programming was expanded to permanently enroll
households newly impoverished as a result of the impacts of the disaster. The National Economic and development
Authority (NEDA) noted in Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda II6 that “expanded social protection programs, both
short-term (e.g., cash for work) and medium-term (e.g., 4Ps conditional cash transfers), are important for social sector
recovery, implemented in close cooperation with planned livelihood initiatives to provide opportunities for the poor to
meet basic needs, restore social services to pre-disaster levels, and access income earning opportunities”. To this end,
DSWD reported processing the inclusion of an additional 20,000 households for enrolment into the 4Ps in 2014 based on
updated information on the poverty status of those affected by Typhoon Yolanda.
Government and Humanitarian Cash Transfer Program Coordination
Alongside this and the other cash transfer programs (CTPs) of DSWD, humanitarian CTPs were also implemented in
the Yolanda response - to an “unprecedented degree”.38 At least 45 international humanitarian agencies implemented
CTPs – unconditional and conditional - within the inter-agency response to Yolanda. The UNOCHA reported that between
December 2013 and August 2014, more than three-quarters (77 percent) of these CTPs were conditional cash transfers (60
percent of which were cash for work and 20 percent cash for food or shelter), while just under one quarter (23 percent)
were unconditional.39 Four agencies alone in the inter-agency response distributed around US$34 million, benefitting 1.4
million disaster-affected people.40
Considerable effort was made to coordinate the large number of CTP providers with the government cash-based
response programs - with some positive results. To facilitate inter-agency cooperation and coordination with GoP on
cash transfer response programming, UNOCHA deployed a Cash Coordinator to the field and an Inter-Cluster Coordination
Operational Group (ICCOG) was established in Manila to coordinate field level implementation and monitoring of all
CTPs. The Philippines Cash Working Group (CWG) was also re-established in October 2013 and became operational in
response to Yolanda. The CWG aims to provide a platform for CTP technical support for multi-sectoral coordination and
experience sharing in preparedness, emergency response, and development activities.
DSWD and UNOCHA encouraged the humanitarian CTPs to leverage existing social protection and other systems to
increase coordination in their delivery, including:
• The Listahanan
The Listahanan is a national household registry used in the targeting of beneficiaries of the national CCT program and
other government anti-poverty and social programs. In 2015, the Listahanan was updated and expanded to contain
information on 15.1 million households (or 75 percent of all households in the Philippines). In this way, the Listahanan
is a valuable resource for locating households affected by a disaster. The DSWD’s Department for Risk Reduction and
Operations Office (DRROO) utilize the Listahanan to create estimates of the number of households, including poor and
vulnerable, that will be affected by a disaster given its location/path. It is also a valuable resource that informs Post
Disaster Needs Assessments (PDNAs).
6
Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda’s Implementation for Results (RAYII) is a companion document to RAY Build Back Better (RAY) released in
December 2013. RAY presented a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) as well as the Government’s strategic plan to guide the overall recovery
and reconstruction of the economy, lives, and livelihoods in the affected areas. RAY II, a companion piece, presents an overall results monitoring
framework of RAY in line with the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2011-2016.
10 philippine social protection note
The CWG also created a process for humanitarian agencies to coordinate with the Listahanan, digitizing the information
on their beneficiaries by submitting it to the National Household Targeting Office (NHTO – manages the Listahanan) for
verification and or inclusion into the database. This, in turn, helped DSWD to meet its mandate to increase the 4Ps coverage
by 20,000 more chronically poor households affected by Typhoon Yolanda.
• The 4Ps Beneficiary Update System (BUS):
Designed to be regularly updated, by DSWD 4Ps staff, the BUS contains information on poor households with children
(as identified using the Listahanan and a Proxy Means Test targeting method) that are also beneficiaries of the national
4Ps CCT program. The BUS works in conjunction with the 4P’s Compliance Verification System that monitors monthly
beneficiaries’ compliance with the conditions of the 4Ps. Both the BUS and CVS are used to generate the grants payroll
every two months. It appears that a number of CTPs directed assistance directly to 4Ps households utilizing this up-to-
date beneficiary information.
• The 4Ps Spot Checks:
The National Advisory Committee (NAC) suggested that humanitarian agencies implementing CTPs utilize the 4Ps spot
check monitoring system, under the overall guidance of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC).41 Successive
periodic updates by UNOCHA of the overall cash coordination effort reported that CWG discussions had been undertaken
on using some of the 4Ps spot checks questions in their monitoring tools for greater comparability.
• The 4Ps Grievance Redress System (GRS)
The Grievance Redress System (GRS) is a component of the 4Ps CCT that allows anyone to direct queries, clarifications,
complaints, grievances, and appeals to the appropriate 4Ps GRS offices at the community, provincial, regional and national
levels. It has an investigation and verification component, works in coordination with legal and law enforcement authorities,
and is linked with an MIS system that compiles the data to monitor the status of the grievances.42 UNOCHA noted that “the
GRS can serve as a vehicle for humanitarian agencies using the 4Ps targeting infrastructure to channel feedback on the
additional assistance being provided in the emergency response”.43
The extent to which these recommendations were adopted by the inter-agency humanitarian response remains unclear,
and where / if they were utilized, specific details on lessons learned are yet to emerge. Nevertheless, the potential value
of a more unified overall CTP response facilitated by pre-existing SP information systems is clear, and further research into
the streamlining of these information systems into future inter-agency response would add much value. The Listahanan,
BUS, spot checks and GRS are each robust information systems, as evaluated during their delivery of the national CCT
program.44 If leveraged correctly, their pre-existing information and capacity could help to increase coordination of overall
CTP response for future, large-scale disasters.
Ultimately, post-Yolanda response documentation and reviews reveal that 1) there has been no rigorous evaluation
of the impact of the overall CTP response, and 2) there nevertheless appear to have been issues in CTP coordination
leading to coverage gaps and duplication. The CWG memos reported a number of emerging issues in the overall cash
transfer programming during the response phase: “poor coverage of inland barangays; critical levels of under coverage in
Aklan and Antique; over focus in Northern Iloilo compared to other areas in proximity such as Capiz; dispersal of activities
suggest an unbalanced response among the CTPs”.45 After humanitarian operations were concluded, the final inter-cluster
coordination group progress monitoring report concluded with regard to CTPs that, “given the multitude of actors that
provided cash assistance, and the limited oversight and cash coordination structures that currently exist within international
humanitarian architecture, it is not possible to accurately report the total number of households and individuals assisted,
or the total amount of cash transferred to disaster- affected communities”. A UNOCHA evaluation of the response also
concluded that “it is clear that there is much more to be done to ensure that simultaneous use of cash in various clusters
provides maximum impact at household, community and local economy levels”.46
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Social Protection in the Philippines
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an “emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
5. Lessons learned from the Yolanda Response
Reflecting on the lessons learned from Yolanda, and in particular after the poverty incidence increased in 2014, part
of which is attributed to the adverse effects of the disaster, the government realized that an emergency cash transfer
program delivered to all affected households would have been an effective tool in mitigating this poverty impact.
DSWD, in partnership with the World Bank, is currently exploring the design and implementation of such a program.
Alongside its potential to help prevent affected households from falling into poverty as a result of a disaster, this program
could also replace some of DSWD’s substantial burden to deliver in-kind assistance. The provision of food and shelter
during the relief phase will likely remain an urgent necessity at a time when post-disaster markets are not functioning and
needs are more squarely on survival. However, once this life-saving need has been met, typically within the first month,
the continued provision of food packs represents a sizeable administrative burden, and one that may not align fully with
the changing needs of the affected. Increased capacity to deliver cash based assistance to households at this juncture
would reduce the standing capacity of DSWD to deliver food while offering poor households increased agency to begin
to re-accumulate assets, fix their houses, etc. Moreover, a more expansive, government led post disaster CTP such as this
could stand to significantly improve overall CTP program coordination within government and between government and
humanitarian agencies, to the ultimate benefit of the beneficiaries.
Regardless of whether DSWD introduces such a program, DSWD and other government agencies should work in
collaboration with the relevant humanitarian agencies to leverage pre-existing SP information systems for better
coordination during the next large-scale disaster. During Typhoon Yolanda response operations, DSWD encouraged
humanitarian agencies to utilize a number of its pre-existing SP systems and capacity to help coordinate the overall response.
These included the national household targeting system, Listahanan and the 4P’s Beneficiary Update System for program
targeting. The extent to which these SP systems were utilized in response to Yolanda by the humanitarian agencies remains
unclear, but the value of leveraging existing capacity for coordinated response is clear, and was articulated repeatedly
by both DSWD and humanitarian agencies during the Yolanda response. In that regard, these parties should continue to
explore how they can utilize these SP systems for a more coordinated response, in advance of the next disaster.
Lastly, more and better monitoring and evaluation of SP disaster response programs and their impacts needs to be
undertaken for program development and informed recommendations. In evaluating the programs delivered by DSWD
in response to Yolanda it is clear that many of the best practices from this and other experiences have not been captured,
and that little monitoring and evaluation of disaster-responsive programs was undertaken, especially during the response
phase. During the relief phase of any disaster, the urgency to deliver to those in dire need, as quickly as possible, undermines
methodical monitoring and evaluation of programs. This has caused problems for the humanitarian community at large with
regard to evidence based policy adjustments for efficiency gains in their programming. As a result, in the case of Yolanda,
it is difficult to assess the true impact of many of post-disaster social programs and make informed recommendation for
program improvement. With an already strong track record in M&E among its regular programs such as the 4Ps, there
would be much value to be had in extending these processes to post-disaster SP programming, particularly with regard to
quantifying the impacts of the programs on affected household’s well being.
12 philippine social protection note
ANNEX
Map: Typhoon Yolanda’s Path and the Municipal Level Poverty Rate
Source: Reliefweb, REACH initiative
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Social Protection in the Philippines
Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) and the case for building an “emergency cash transfer” program in the Philippines
END NOTES
1
United Nations Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), “Global Assessment Report (GAR) on Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015: Making
Development Sustainable – the Future of Disaster Risk Management”, 2015, p. 165
2
UNISDR, “GAR 2015”, 2015, p. 49
3
Government of the Philippines, “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better”, 2013, p. 3
4
DSWD, “Response and Early Recovery Updates”, April 2014 http://www.fo8.dswd.gov.ph/2014/04/response-and-early-recovery-updates-
typhoon-yolanda/ [accessed: April 2015]
5
See: DSWD, “DSWD, WFP provide cash assistance to 6,700 families affected by Hagupit” , http://www.dswd.gov.ph/2015/02/dswd-wfp-provide-
cash-assistance-to-6717-families-affected-by-hagupit/>, February 2015 [accessed: April 2015]
6
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Final Periodic Monitoring Report: Typhoon Haiyan”, 2014, p. 34
7
Ibid, p. 34
8
Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response”, 2014, p. ix
9
UNU et al, “World Risk Index, 2014.”
10
Verisk Maplecroft, “Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 2015”
11
Verisk Maplecroft, “Natural Hazards Risk Atlas, 2015”
12
The World Bank, “Climate Change Adaptation in Coastal Communities: A Documentation of Project Experience”, 2012, p. 1
13
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), “Vulnerability, Risk Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change: Philippines country
profile”, 2011, p. 5
14
UNISDR, “GAR, 2015”, p. 67
15
GFDRR, “Philippines Country Program Update”, May 2014
16
United States Geological Survey (USGS), “Earth Quake Glossary – Ring of Fire” < http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/glossary/?termID=150>
[Accessed: 03/22/2015]
17
D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, Ph. Hoyois - EM-DAT: International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be – Université Catholique de Louvain – Brussels –
Belgium.
18
UNOCHA, “Cash Coordination Update: Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)”, January 2014, p. 3
19
GoP, DSWD, “Response and Early Recovery Updates”, April 2014 [Accessed: April 2015]
20
Ibid.
21
DSWD and UNICEF, “Emergency Cash Transfer: Narrative report for the July – September 2014 implementation”, 2014
22
UNOCHA, “Final Periodic Monitoring Report: Typhoon Haiyan”, 2014, p. 34
23
Ibid.
24
Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response”, 2014, p. ix
25
GoP, National Advisory Committee (NAC), Minutes: “Special Meeting of the NAC: Humanitarian Agencies’ Cash Transfer Programming for Typhoon
Haiyan Survivors”, 11 December 2013
26
UNOCHA, “Cash Coordination Update: Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)”, January 2014
27
UNOCHA, “Cash Coordination Update: Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)”, January 2014
28
See, for example: World Bank, “Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Impact Evaluation 2012”, 2013
29
Cash Working Group (CWG), Minutes: “Cash Transfer Working group Meeting, 17 March 2014” [Accessed: April 2015]
30
Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, “IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response”, 2014, p. 55
31
Reliefweb, REACH initiative, “Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) Distance from Typhoon Path and Poverty Rate (09 November)” < http://
reliefweb.int/map/philippines/philippines-typhoon-yolanda-haiyan-distance-typhoon-path-and-poverty-rate-09>
14 philippine social protection note
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