102562 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DDR PROGRAMME 2013-2014 PILOT Pilot Reintegration Project Project Management Documentation Measuring Psychosocial Wellbeing in Democratic Republic of Congo Report of a Pilot Study Working Paper No. 4 April 2014 Rebecca Horn Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program Pilot Reintegration Project Documentation Series DDR Programme 2013-2014 Pilot Republic of South Sudan Book 1: Project Management Documentation • Pilot Reintegration Project: TDRP Key Learning Report • External Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project • Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey • Pilot Reintegration Project Document as Implemented (October 2014) Book 2: Implementing Partner Documentation • SECTION I - Consultancy to Implement Livelihoods Support UNICON Ltd - Final Report • SECTION II - Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects IOM South Sudan - Final Report • SECTION III - Consultancy to Implement Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation Adam Smith International - Final Report Book 3: Livelihoods Support Training Materials and Start-Up Kit Report • SECTION I -Livelihoods Support Training Materials • Entrepreneurship, Cooperatives and Financial Literacy Training of Trainers Curriculum • Entrepreneurship, Cooperatives and Financial Literacy Training Manual • Agriculture Methods and Business Skills Training of Trainers Curriculum • Agriculture Methods and Business Skills Trainer’s Handbook • SECTION II - Livelihood Start-Up Kits Summary & Reflection Book 4: ICRS and M&E Manuals • Information Counseling and Referral System User’s Manual • Monitoring & Evaluation Manual 2014 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.tdrp.net www.worldbank.org This report was produced by the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). The findings, inter- pretations, and conclusions herein are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TDRP donors, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denomina- tions, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Cover Design and Text Layout: Duina Reyes-Bakovic Photo Credits: TDRP, NDDRC and Implementing Partners Foreword D isarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programming including entrepreneurship, cooperatives (DDR) Programme has been found to be a criti- and financial literacy trainings, livelihoods start-up kits, cal component of consolidating peace, establish- Information Counselling, Referral Services (ICRS), and ing stability, and allowing recovery and development to community empowerment through community support take root. Since 2011 the Government of the Republic projects. of South Sudan has been developing a new nationally led and owned DDR Programme aimed at enhancing the The primary objective of the NDDRC’s Pilot Reinte- country’s stability and prosperity by facilitating the re- gration Project was to test reintegration approaches and turn to productive civilian life of former members of the modalities and develop actionable lessons to inform and National Organized Forces (NOFs). The current events improve the Republic of South Sudan’s future DDR in South Sudan only further emphasize the importance programming. An important piece of this work is the to the country of DDR and its connection to the nation’s compilation of documentation on the process, activities overall development. As such, it is critical that the coun- and lessons learned to be used by the NDDRC in future try continue and invigorate its work in developing a na- tranches. In addition, all manuals, curriculum and train- tionally-led well-designed and well-implemented DDR ing materials developed throughout the pilot were also Programme. developed to be available for use in the NDDRP. To ensure the full DDR programme was well designed I would like to thank TDRP for their guidance, commit- to fit the context and needs of South Sudan, the Pro- ment and hard work both on the Pilot Project and in the gramme was started in 2013 with a pilot, during which production of this documentation. In addition, I would lessons could be learned and incorporated before scaling like to thank African Union and Bonn International Cen- up to the full caseload. The Republic of South Sudan’s ter for Conversion for being our partners in this process National DDR Programme (NDDRP) Pilot conducted in and our Implementing Partners, UNICON, IOM South 2013-2014 was a vital first step in the country’s efforts to Sudan and Adam Smith International and consultants for institute the full National DDR Programme. their dedication and commitment to this project. The Pi- lot Reintegration Project has increased the capacity of As reintegration is the ultimate measure of success of a the NDDRC management and staff working on DDR DDR process, the Republic of South Sudan places great and produced a wealth of knowledge and lessons which importance on the reintegration process. In February will provide a great benefit to the people of South Sudan 2013, the Republic of South Sudan’s DDR Commis- when used in the full DDR programme. sion officially requested the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) of the World Bank to Pilot the Reintegration Component of the DDR Pro- gramme Pilot Phase in South Sudan through a generous William Deng Deng contribution by KfW of the Federal Republic of Germa- Chairperson ny. The Pilot Reintegration Project began in April 2013, National DDR Commission serving 290 ex-combatants by providing reintegration Juba, South Sudan iv Table of Contents Foreword............................................................................... ii Pilot Reintegration Project: TDRP Key Learning Report. ................................................... 1 External Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project................................................. 35 Annex A: Mid-Term Review of the Pilot Reintegration Project......................................................................119 Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey................................. 169 Pilot Reintegration Project Document as Implemented (October 2014).................................... 219 Annex A: Pilot Reintegration Project Document (September 2013)...................................................................................271 ..........................333 Annex B: Implementing Partner Terms of Reference. iii Pilot Reintegration Project: TDRP Key Learning Report October 2014 Table of Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations......................................................................................... 5 Executive Summary......................................................................................................... 6 1 Background................................................................................................................... 9 1.1 South Sudan DDR Programme Objective ........................................................9 2 Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project............................................................ 10 2.1 Goal & Objectives.............................................................................................10 2.2 Reintegration Approach...................................................................................10 ................................................................. 11 3 Process of the Pilot Reintegration Project. 3.1 Project Caseload...............................................................................................11 3.2 Project Timeline..................................................................................................11 ...........................................................................................12 3.3 Project Preparation. 3.4 Implementing Partners......................................................................................13 3.5 Components of the Pilot Reintegration Project.............................................13 3.6 Project Phases....................................................................................................14 ................................................................................................15 3.7 Project Finances. 4 Pilot Reintegration Project Activities........................................................................ 16 4.1 Livelihoods Support . .........................................................................................16 4.1.1 Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy trainings..............................................................16 4.1.2 Livelihood start-up kits............................................................................18 4.1.3 Technical skills extension........................................................................19 4.1.4 Leveraging available government services through ICRS referral and follow up....................................................................21 4.1.5 Tools developed and available for future use....................................21 4.2 DDR Community Support Projects ..................................................................21 4.2.1 Site selection and community mobilization . ......................................22 4.2.2 Installation/rehabilitation of boreholes or community requested common good projects. .....................................................22 4.2.3 Tools developed and available for future use....................................23 4.3 Institutional Capacity Building . .......................................................................23 4.3.1 Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support, and Systems Development...................................................................23 4.3.2 Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS).........................24 4.3.3 Tools developed and available for future use....................................25 4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation ..............................................................................25 Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 3 4.4.1 Beneficiary data collection...................................................................26 4.4.2 M&E capacity building..........................................................................26 4.4.3 Collection of lessons learned and reflection. .....................................27 4.4.4 Tools developed and available for future use....................................27 5 Lessons Learned.......................................................................................................... 28 5.1 Livelihoods Support Lessons Learned..............................................................28 5.2 DDR Community Support Projects Lessons Learned......................................30 5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Lessons Learned..................................................30 5.4 Institutional Capacity Building Lessons Learned ...........................................30 5.5 Structural Lessons Learned . .............................................................................31 6 Changing Dynamics in South Sudan DDR................................................................ 32 ........................................... 33 7 Strategic Recommendations for Future Programming. 4 Acronyms and Abbreviations BICC Bonn International Centre for Conversion CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CAAFG Children Associated with Armed Forces or Groups DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau HQ Headquarters ICRS Information, Counselling and Referral System M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NDDRC National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission of the Republic of South Sudan NDDRP National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme NOF National Organized Forces PMU Project Management Unit SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement SPLA-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition SSAF South Sudan Armed Forces TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program of the World Bank UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan WAAFG Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 5 Executive Summary T he Pilot Reintegration Project of the Republic of oritized community engagement in the implementa- South Sudan’s National DDR Programme (NDDRP) tion of this peace dividend. (Implementing Partner: was conducted with the overall aim to test reintegra- IOM) tion approaches and modalities, and to develop action- • Institutional Capacity Building included two able lessons that can inform and improve the Republic of tracks with the first focused on project management South Sudan’s future DDR programming. Reintegrating training, mentoring, staff support, and systems de- ex-combatants into civilian life is a major challenge and velopment. (Implementing Partner: Adam Smith In- in fact the key measure of a DDR programme’s success. ternational). The second track of capacity building Managed by the World Bank’s Transitional Demobiliza- tion and Reintegration Program (TDRP) in close coordi- was the completion of an information counselling nation with the National DDR Commission (NDDRC) and referral system. The NDDRC now has a cus- and through financial support from Kreditanstalt für tomized system that will allow for collection and Wiederaufbau (KfW), the reintegration pilot was con- reporting on ex-combatant data as well as facili- ducted in three phases from April 2013-October 2014. tate counselling and referral to the ex-combatants. (ICRS completed directly by TDRP in close coordi- This first pilot DDR Programme focused on 300 mem- nation with NDDRC) bers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/South Su- • Monitoring and Evaluation included both com- dan Armed Forces (SPLA/SSAF) in their transition out prehensive data collection and additional capacity of the armed forces into civilian life. The pilot reinte- building focused specifically on M&E. The pilot gration project began with 290 participants carried over collected ex-combatant registration and baseline from the reinsertion phase of the full programme at Ma- data, a community baseline survey, and an ex-com- pel Transitional Facility. The 290 individuals were from batant satisfaction survey. These tools and data are the Wounded Heroes division of SPLA/SSAF. This clas- all available to NDDRC for future use. (Phase 1 sification, however, is not related to injury and all par- ticipants in the pilot were able-bodied individuals. The Implementing Partner: Adam Smith with Integrity pilot was conducted in the four states of the country’s Research, Phase 2: TDRP) northwest region, Greater bahr el Ghazal. Each of the components produced documentation of les- sons learned as well as tools including training curricu- The project was implemented through four components: lum and manuals, the ICRS system, etc. to be utilized • Livelihoods Support was the largest component and/or built upon in future programming. of the work. This focused on assisting individuals Finally TDRP took stock of the programmatic and op- in establishing sustainable alternative livelihoods erational learnings of the piloting process alongside the in their communities of return. Incorporated in this shifting dynamics of DDR since December 2013. The component were (i) entrepreneurship, cooperatives following key learnings emerged: and financial literacy trainings conducted over a series of interactions, (ii) livelihoods start-up kits, LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT LESSONS LEARNED (iii) technical skills extension, and (iv) leveraging available government services. The technical skills Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and extension included agricultural extension visits as financial literacy trainings well as targeted vocational training and expert vis- its. (Implementing Partner: UNICON) • Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and fi- nancial literacy trainings are the most crucial com- • DDR Community Support Projects were placed ponent of reintegration programming. at communities with high levels of ex-combatant return. These projects included the construction • Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and fi- or rehabilitation of water boreholes or specifically nancial literacy trainings should be delivered via a requested common good projects. This process pri- combined curriculum. 6 • The joint entrepreneurship, associations/coopera- • DDR Community Support Projects should be imple- tives and financial literacy training should begin mented through the appropriate line ministry linked early in the DDR cycle and continue throughout to to the DDR Commission through a State-managed, encourage livelihood and market-based decision- coordinated mechanism. making throughout the DDR process. • A clear criterion for community selection and proj- • The baseline (Transition Facility or Vocational Cen- ect choice is necessary, with all decisions agreed to tre) and follow-up reintegration trainings (in-field pre-budget formulation. or community) should be formulated as one holistic training course with various modules. MONITORING AND EVALUATION LESSONS • Information on trainings and services to be provided LEARNED to XCs throughout the DDR process must be shared • Monitoring and Evaluation (and Management In- not only with ex-combatants but also with all staff formation Systems) require specific staff skills that including trainers. need to be agreed to by all stakeholders from the • All XCs and community trainings should emphasize outset. hands-on, visual approaches in keeping with best • Funding agents will have to commit additional re- practices for low-literacy adult learners. sources both for capacity building and potentially Livelihoods start-up kits embedding resources within the Commission. • Both Internal and External M&E systems are re- • Livelihoods start-up kits are an essential component quired for an effective DDR program of reintegration programming requiring significant staff, resources and attention to logistical detail to • Use of ICRS caseworkers as data collectors in tan- ensure full and timely distribution. dem with external enumerators is both effective and enhances ongoing M&E. • Start-up kit contents must be accredited and agreed upon through a consultative process. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING LESSONS LEARNED • Alignment of start-up kits with vocational training is critical and should include contents used during • Development of tailor-made systems (e.g., ICRS) is training and distribution upon completion of the vo- time and training intensive, and to be effective need cational training. to be initiated well in advance of a DDR program. Technical skills extension • Conducting an organizational assessment followed by the identified organizational adjustments are nec- • Partnering with the Ministry of Agriculture to pro- essary prerequisites to effective staff capacity build- vide agricultural extension trainings to XCs through ing. Agricultural Extension Workers is an effective and • Task specific, on-the-job trainings were the most ef- sustainable approach. fective capacity building approach. • Vocational Expert Visits or Apprenticeships require STRUCTURAL LESSONS LEARNED too much individual attention and resources there- fore are not a viable approach at this time. • DDR must be more closely linked with Security • Providing vocational skill courses through state lev- Sector Reform (SSR) than in former iterations of el institutions shows potential as an approach and DDR in South Sudan. should be explored further. • Coordination between the SPLA/NOF and the • Trainers must team up with ICRS caseworkers NDDRC in the preparation of the combatants while across all trainings to ensure continuity and to en- still within the military is essential in ensuring a cost effective and sustainable programme. hance service delivery across the entire process. • Reinsertion and Reintegration are intrinsically inter- DDR COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROJECTS LESSONS woven and should be planned as such. LEARNED • Communications including sensitization and public • DDR Community Support Projects have high social information with external audiences and internal capital returns and should be part of a greater recon- communications require significant attention and ciliation process but not a core component of DDR. coordination. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 7 • Psychosocial issues and substance abuse are factors • Increased clarity on categorization of DDR benefi- restricting sustainable livelihoods. ciary groups and numbers of beneficiaries; • Gender and child sensitive programming needs ad- • Reduced cost; ditional attention and coordination. • Increased harmonization of programming in rein- • Systemic approaches to ensure ex-combatant voice sertion and reintegration; in programming are required. • Full national government implementation; and • The full DDR programme as piloted is too costly • Continued momentum. to be brought to scale thus the alternative approach incorporated in the NDDRC’s new Harmonized Re- The current events in South Sudan underscore the impor- insertion and Reintegration Strategy should be ex- tance of DDR to the country and its connection to the na- plored. tion’s overall development. As such, it is critical that the country continue and invigorate its work in developing Matching the findings above with the realities of the re- a nationally-led well-designed and well-implemented cent events, this analysis finds that the priority areas re- DDR programme. The learnings from this pilot as well quiring attention for a renewed strategy include: as the tools developed are relevant and timely as these contribute to the development of an effective and realis- • Increased linkage between SSR & DDR; tic full National DDR Programme. 8 1 Background D isarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration mitigating potential negative impacts through commu- (DDR) has been highlighted as a Government nity based activities. DDR has been found to be a critical of South Sudan’s (GoSS) priority as an integral component of consolidating peace, establishing stability, component of the country’s progress toward establish- and allowing development to take root. ing sustainable peace and socio-economic development. The importance of this process was further highlighted The overall GoSS objective of the South Sudan DDR by the events beginning 15 December 2013. Programme is “To support the transformation of SPLA / SSAF into a more professional, efficient, and cost- At last count, the SPLA’s standing parade was approxi- effective armed force.” The overall programme further mately 194,000. Many of these soldiers have received aims to enhance the country’s stability and prosperity by little to no military training, are illiterate, and some facilitating the return of the National Organized Forces’ are over pensionable age. Following the signing of the former members to productive civilian life. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), some SPLA members were redeployed to other institutions includ- The socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants can ing the Police, Wildlife, Civil Defence (Fire Brigades), contribute significantly to the overall process of peace and the Correctional Services (Prisons). These services consolidation and prosperity in South Sudan. Experi- are often jointly referred to as the National Organized ence in other post conflict countries demonstrates sta- Forces (NOF). bilization and the assumption of a normal life for these target groups is likely to prevent new tensions and can The Government recognizes that the armed forces need to contribute to burgeoning economic life in small commu- transition to a more proportionately-sized and resourced nities. The strategy’s main objective is to contribute to national army (SPLA) which respects human rights and post-conflict stabilization and the creation of an enabling operates under effective civilian oversight. A reduction environment for sustainable development through socio- in force size is needed to modernize SPLA as well as to economic reintegration of people affected by the con- reduce the national defence budget. Currently, approxi- flict. In recent years, bilateral and multinational partners mately 40 percent of the national budget is consumed by have supported a large number of projects in the fields of defence expenditures, a significant proportion of which community development and the fight against poverty. is used to meet salary and welfare costs. Streamlining The strategy will, therefore, tend to create synergies be- the military is, therefore, in the Government’s overarch- tween these projects where possible to avoid duplication ing interest. As the soldiers are demobilised, the number in the response and coordination of actors involved. of citizens with formal access to weapons should reduce. In South Sudan, the current DDR design encompasses As those carrying arms pose a potential future source one year of programming. This includes a three month of insecurity if not managed appropriately, DDR is seen reinsertion phase at a transition facility followed by six as one component of a broader security sector reform months of reintegration services and finally three months process. of follow-up, counselling, and referral by the National DDR Commission’s (NDDRC) state staff. 1.1 South Sudan DDR Programme Objective The overall programme aims to enhance the country’s stability and prosperity by facilitating the return of Na- The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to tional Organized Forces’ (NOF) former members to pro- security and stability in post-conflict environments to ductive civilian life. Initially, the government suggested foster recovery and development. This is conducted by processing 150,000 ex-combatants through the new pro- disarming, demobilizing, and sustainably reintegrat- gramme. More recent estimates (pre-December 2013 / ing DDR target groups in their chosen communities of January 2014), however, suggest that the actual numbers return while supporting longer-term development and are in the range of 60,000-80,000. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 9 2 Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Project T 2.2 Reintegration Approach he government of South Sudan initiated the DDR programme with a pilot to ensure that a full pro- gramme fits the context and needs of South Sudan Reintegration is a core component of the overall DDR and that lessons learned during the pilot could be incor- process and is highlighted in the South Sudan DDR pol- porated before scaling up to the full caseload. The Pilot icy as the key measure of the DDR policy’s success. Re- Reintegration Project includes the reintegration services integration programming aims to contribute to the con- and reintegration related capacity building components solidation of lasting stability and development through of the pilot DDR programme. the improvement of social and material conditions of ex-combatants and other beneficiaries. Reintegration is a 2.1 Goal & Objectives process of continuous social and economic development, initiated during the DDR phase, and ideally continuing The primary goal of NDDRC’s Pilot Reintegration Project is to test reintegration approaches and modali- through a stabilisation period into the medium and pos- ties and develop actionable lessons which can inform sibly long-term. Ex-combatants return to civilian life ei- and improve the GoSS’ future DDR programming. ther in their community of origin or in new communities These modalities include direct services to beneficiaries through reintegration and seek sustainable livelihoods. and project management. This is achieved through the DDR programmes can catalyse long-term development following objectives: and peace consolidation. Best practice reintegration models incorporate a more holistic development pathway Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objec- that builds linkages between the initial phases of DDR’s tives of the Pilot Reintegration Project: medium-term recovery and stabilization initiatives with consideration for longer-term sustainable development. • Develop lessons learned that can be applied to fu- ture South Sudan DDR programming; Economic reintegration needs are highlighted as the Pilot • Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration DDR Programme’s priority. Social activities have been Management in South Sudan that can live beyond minimized for this initial tranche in favour of finding the the life of the pilot phase. correct economic reintegration models that can be repli- Socio-Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegra- cated. Social reintegration activities are not prioritized tion Project: given ex-combatants were members of SPLA who are largely lauded and well regarded by local populations for • To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and their role in the country’s liberation. The pilot also rec- enhancing their livelihood opportunities in commu- ognized successful reintegration of ex-combatants is not nities of return; the result of the reintegration work alone but the culmi- • To facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of ex- nation of the full suite of services provided from the time combatants into their families and communities of of demobilization through disarmament, reinsertion, and return. reintegration programming and services. 10 3 Process of the Pilot Reintegration Project 3.1 Project Caseload Pilot Caseload by Chosen State of Return The first pilot DDR Programme served just under 300 Lakes 93 members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/South Western bahr el Ghazal 92 Sudan Armed Forces (SPLA/SSAF) in their transition out of the armed forces into civilian life. The pilot is es- Warrap 75 tablished and delivered in the four states of Greater bahr Northern bahr el Ghazal 30 el Ghazal (Warrap, Lakes, Northern bahr el Ghazal, and TOTAL 290 Western bahr el Ghazal). The Mapel Transition Facility located in Western bahr el Ghazal is the transition facil- ity serving the Greater bahr el Ghazal region. The pilot reintegration project began with 290 partici- pants carried over from the Mapel Transition Facility Northern Bahr el programming. All 290 individuals are from the Wound- Ghazal Warrap ed Heroes’ division of SPLA/SSAF. This classification, Western Bahr however, is not related to injury and all pilot participants el Ghazal Lakes were able bodied individuals. All participants underwent a dual verification process that confirmed i) their involvement with NOF, and ii) that the identity of the individual presenting themselves was in fact the individual listed. Prior to registration, each individual provided their Demobilization Certificate and their names were checked against the demobilization list lesser caseload may be attributed to NOF’s lack of con- provided by SPLA. In addition, each individual showed fidence in the project following the CPA DDR which photo identification – the national ID, the military ID or made a negative impression, as well as other factors an identification form created and signed by the com- such as ongoing questions regarding pensions. This ini- manding officer and the UNMISS DDR officer. As the tial caseload reflects insufficient buy-in from SPLA and Pilot Reintegration Project caseload was dictated by the NOF in the DDR Programme overall. The pilot caseload caseload in Mapel, the World Bank’s Transitional De- included 272 men and 18 women and the average age mobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) was was 43 years based on self-reporting at registration (by engaged in conversations with NDDRC, UNMISS, age group, 95 participants were under 40 years of age, BICC and SPLA regarding the pre-Mapel verification 175 between 40 - 54, and 20 over the age of 55). process. Several individuals were turned away as they did not meet the verification criteria. The Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS) was used dur- 3.2 Project Timeline ing Registration and individual information was securely The South Sudan National DDR Programme was de- captured. signed to last for one year beginning with a three-month Over the course of the pilot project, five participants reinsertion phase at a transition facility followed by six passed away, leaving the caseload at the end of the pilot months of reintegration services and finally three months standing at 285 ex-combatants. of follow-up, counselling, and referral by NDDRC state staff. In April 2013, the first caseload of ex-combatants The pilot was initially envisioned to serve NOF’s 500 started at the Mapel Transition Facility where they re- members including SPLA/SSAF. The reasons for the ceived vocational, literacy and numeracy, and life skills Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 11 training. The initial design called for the project to be- in the pilot phase. TDRP agreed to this expanded role gin in April 2013 and run through April 2014. However, which includes: 1) testing the DDR reintegration modali- the transition facility officially began their three-month ties for the country’s new national programme, 2) capac- training in June 2013 thus shifting the reintegration time- ity building of NDDRC systems and staff, 3) financial line. management of the reintegration services for this initial pilot tranche, and 4) the establishment of an Information, During the last weeks in the camp, the pilot project pro- Counselling and Referral System (ICRS). The funds and vided ex-combatants in the Mapel facility with classes project are managed by TDRP and the project is imple- on entrepreneurship, cooperatives, and financial literacy mented in partnership with NDDRC through IPs. As part focused on applicable skills supporting them in their of TDRP’s technical assistance, a team of TDRP staff segue to reintegration. In September 2013, the first pilot and consultants conducted a series of missions between tranche of 290 former soldiers graduated from the Ma- 2012 and 2014 with the primary objective to provide pel Transition Facility and the ex-combatants (XCs) re- oversight and management of the NDDRC Pilot Rein- turned to their communities. The pilot project provided tegration Project. livelihoods support in their communities of reintegration TDRP conducted missions on 8-26 October and 27 No- through which the XCs received follow-up entrepreneur- vember-13 December 2012 focused on identifying rein- ship and cooperatives trainings and start-up toolkits to tegration opportunities and, together with NDDRC, de- assist ex-combatants engage in sustainable livelihoods in veloped a Pilot Reintegration Design. The team explored the area of vocational training they received. In concert livelihood activities in line with the experience and inter- with this work, the communities received DDR commu- ests of the ex-combatants while keeping in mind relevant nity support projects and cooperatives training alongside market realities through meeting with stakeholders and the returning ex-combatants. utilizing research and profile data. The second mission worked in collaboration with NDDRC to test the pro- The project will run through October 2014. The pilot de- gramming design for a pilot reintegration project and sign included a mid-point break to come into effect on to test XC interest in various components. This testing December 15, 2013 and activities were to be resumed on was done with two methods: (i) meeting with NDDRC January 6th 2014. The conflict that sparked on December leadership and DDR stakeholders, and (ii) conducting 15, 2013, however, delayed activities until April 2014 in person focus groups with current military members due to security, thus extending the project with imple- who will be included in the DDR pilot and community menting partner (IP) service delivery to be completed by members from communities of intended return in Lakes July 2014 and all evaluation and knowledge transfer by and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. Based on the input October 31, 2014. collected, the mission adjusted the previously suggested reintegration activities to account for the mission find- 3.3 Project Preparation ings and formulated a draft pilot reintegration project de- sign for further input by NDDRC. The draft reintegration TDRP worked closely with NDDRC in preparation for pilot design was presented at an interactive session with the new programme by providing technical assistance stakeholders on 11 December 2012 in Juba. with a focus on reintegration since late 2011. Addition- ally, TDRP provided technical assistance to NDDRC to In January 2013, the team solicited additional input and hone the new DDR programme’s overarching vision of edits to the pilot reintegration design. The TDRP team reintegration into an operational reintegration approach. incorporated the feedback and completed a final draft The NDDRC and TDRP teams built the reintegration de- pilot reintegration programme document for the first sign from the national policy and strategy documents, reintegration pilot. The team then conducted a mission developing and finalizing the reintegration approach in in March to agree upon final implementation modalities the winter of 2012/2013. In designing this approach, including identification and contracting requirements for TDRP applied knowledge gained through earlier TDRP partner organizations. These included agreeing of the fi- research specifically on livelihoods, vocational train- nal specifics of the programme including: reintegration ing, and cooperatives. Stakeholder meetings and focus livelihood activities such as in the area of cooperatives, groups were also conducted to inform design. small farming and micro-enterprise development; DDR community support projects; and the eventual Monitor- In late 2012, KfW on behalf of the German government ing and Evaluation system that was to be implemented. in coordination with NDDRC requested TDRP to as- Following these discussions, the commission issued sist in piloting the reintegration programme of the first their final Pilot Reintegration Project Programme Docu- tranche of up to 500 ex-combatants to be demobilized ment in March 2013. 12 3.4 Implementing Partners 2) DDR Community Support Projects – the agency In- ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) Mis- Implementation of the project components entailed the sion in South Sudan was contracted for the period contracting of three IPs. In March 2013, TDRP began the from August 19th, 2013 to June 30th, 2014. IP solicitation process for the pilot. This process included 3) Institutional Capacity Building and Monitoring and an initial request for Expressions of Interest (EOIs), their Evaluation – the firm Adam Smith International review, and a correlated Request for Proposals to those with M&E sub-contractor Integrity Research were with valid EOIs. Proposals were received and reviewed contracted for the period from May 14th, 2013 in April 2013. through November 30th, 2013. The following implementing partners were selected for 3.5 Components of the Pilot the pilot: Reintegration Project 1) Livelihoods Support – the firm UNICON Interna- In order to achieve the overarching reintegration objec- tional Ltd. was contracted for the period from May tives, the pilot reintegration project includes the follow- 15th, 2013 to October 31st, 2014. ing four components: • Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial literacy trainings • Livelihood start-up kits • Technical skills extension: Livelihoods (i) Agricultural extension visits Support (ii) Vocational expert visits (iii) Targeted supplementary vocational training • Leveraging available government services through ICRS referral and follow up DDR Community • Site selection & community mobilization • Installation of boreholes, water pump rehabilitation or community Support requested common good projects Projects Institutional • Project Management Training, Mentoring and Support and Systems Capacity Development • Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS) Building • Data collection: (i) Registration data collection Monitoring (ii) Baseline Surveys – Ex-combatants & Communities of Return and (iii) Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey Evaluation • M&E capacity building: (i) M&E training (ii) Creating procedures and tools Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 13 3.6 Project Phases The project was implemented in three phases. As seen in the following diagram, the service delivery components were broken into two to allow for additional flexibility to assess mid-way through the project and incorporate those lessons into the remaining programming. Although entirely unintended, this break between phases was scheduled for December 15, 2013 and thus the devastating civil unrest did not impact delivery in Phase 1. Phase 2 was postponed due to security and services resumed starting April 2014. Implementing Partner Service delivery was finalized by the end of July 2014. Phase 3 of the pilot was established to ensure that the pilot achieved the learning objectives by imbedding an external evaluation and a period of knowledge consolidation and transfer. Phase One: Phase Two: Phase Three: Initiation Consolidation Evaluation & Knowledge Transfer (April to December 2013) (April to July 2014) (August to October 2014) Capacity building including systems Institutional development and project Additional M&E, ICRS & service Capacity building evaluated & Capacity management training and delivery capacity building lessons learned shared mentoring to NDDRC through the conducted Building PMU and in the four SPMUs Creation of tools&systems; NDDRC Monitoring staff trained in use and M&E Conducted & NDDRC staff XC satisfaction survey finalized. management of the tools and continue to receive support on the Process and outcomes evaluated and use of M&E tools; systems and and learnings, processes and systems systems; baseline conducted; and Evaluation monitoring processes launched. processes monitored and evaluated transferred to the NDDRC The livelihoods fundamentals training Livelihoods support activities - Livelihoods in Mapel, Start-up Kits distributed and Ex-combatant will receive follow-up Evaluated & lessons learned shared; state-based reintegration livelihoods and refresher trainings NDDRC ICRS continue counseling & Support support opportunities referral DDR M&E Implementation of community The identification of communities/ support projects & NDDRC staff Community Community support projects preparatory environmental and continue to receive support on the Support social analyses, initiation of projects use of M&E tools; systems and evaluated & lessons learned share Projects processes monitored and evaluated 14 3.7 Project Finances grant from KfW of Germany in the amount of 2 million euro. NDDRC was included in discussions of project The ultimate objective of conducting the pilot reintegra- fund usage to ensure full awareness of project manage- tion project is to test methods and modalities during this ment. These funds were spent as follows. phase in such a manner that they could be replicated in the future. This has particular bearing on costs. As a The direct ex-combatant services are found in the live- pilot it can be expected that certain economies of scale lihoods support total or $1,087,482. With 290 partici- are missing, and thus costs will be higher than scaled- pants in the pilot programme, the cost per ex-combatant up implementation of the same modalities. However, comes to $3,750 per participant. This cost is above the emphasis was placed on minimizing costs where pos- anticipated costs to replicate such a model with larger sible throughout the process. NDDRC was called upon caseloads due to a combination of 1) economies of scale to make several tough choices in prioritizing among impacting purchasing and training, and 2) reduced train- the various programming options allowed by the DDR ing of trainers and preparation time necessary once a full policy. The areas chosen in this pilot were based on les- project is implemented. Community members also par- sons learned in the CPA DDR, DDR research, and best ticipated in cooperative trainings within this component practices. (284 community members in Phase 1 and 129 commu- The pilot reintegration project was funded through a nity members continuing in Phase 2). NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs Phase 1 Phase 2 TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL COMMITTED COMMITTED Livelihoods Support $800,200 $287,282 $1,087,482 Mapel Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and $164,500 $0 $164,500 cooperatives trainings Livelihoods Start-Up Kits $323,100 $0 $323,100 State-based Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and $312,600 $146,433 $459,033 cooperatives trainings Technical Skills Extension- Agricultural extension visits $48,417 $48,417 Technical Skills Extension- Vocational expert visits $14,247 $14,247 Technical Skills Extension - Targeted Vocational Trainings $63,547 $63,547 Assistance in accessing available government services $14,638 $14,638 Community Support Projects $155,750 $294,250 $450,000 Capacity Building and Monitoring & Evaluation $519,506 $247,525 $767,031 Mentoring/Capacity Building $442,836 $84,519 $527,355 Government employee Training of Trainers $117,855 $117,855 M&E Surveys $76,670 $45,151 $121,821 NDDRC Participation Funds $120,000 $120,000 $240,000 Evaluations $28,269 $0 $28,269 Contingency $78,929 $78,929 Juba Ex-combatant and Crime Survey $76,540 Final transfer of lessons learned to NDDRC $2,389 TOTAL ALL $1,623,725 $1,027,986 $2,651,711 Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 15 4 Pilot Reintegration Project Activities 4.1 Livelihoods Support 4.1.1 Entrepreneurship, associations/ cooperatives and financial literacy All ex-combatants participating in the NDDRC pilot programme were eligible to receive a suite of reintegra- trainings tion livelihoods support services. This included (i) live- This sub-component was the primary emphasis of the lihoods support trainings on entrepreneurship, associa- reintegration training due to a combination of factors. tions/cooperatives and financial literacy to operationalize Firstly, due to the informal nature of the market in South the vocational training received at the transition facility, Sudan and the limited job market it is very likely that (ii) livelihood start-up kits correlated to the vocational for an ex-combatant to utilize the vocational training trainings received in Mapel, (iii) targeted technical skills they received in Mapel they will need to start up their extension through either expert visits by agricultural ex- own venture - be it a business, partnership or coopera- tension workers or vocational experts, or targeted supple- tive. This is in keeping with the best practice successful mentary vocational skills training, and (iv) assistance in programes seen that focused on the entrepreneurship and accessing available government services through refer- financial literacy aspects of training, rather than contin- ral and follow up by ICRS caseworkers. These services ued vocational training (e.g. Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, are designed to support ex-combatants with a variety of and DRC). vocational paths including cooperatives/associations of a mix of ex-combatants and community members, small The same experience also shows us that in the absence farm and/or rural agricultural enterprises, and individual of entrepreneurship training, no matter how well skilled micro-enterprise businesses. an XC is, they do not succeed. Research also shows that, with the exception of agriculture, the overwhelm- Highlights of this work include: ing majority of ex-combatants will not continue in the vocation they have been taught but will use this train- • All ex-combatants at the Transition Facility par- ing to first earn sufficient capital to migrate to their own ticipated in Mapel based intensive entrepreneurship, chosen opportunity or use capital inputs to start in the cooperatives and financial literacy trainings area that they want to work in. As an example, 25% of • 93% of ex-combatants participated in state-based ex-combatants responding to the satisfaction survey re- follow-up trainings (270 of 290) ported not working in the vocation in which they were trained at Mapel with the survey having been conducted • 92% of agricultural track ex-combatants participat- less than 1 year after the training. Of those 52 XCs who ed in agricultural extension trainings (119 of 129) said they were not working in the vocations on which • 99% of livelihood start-up kits distributed (288 of they were trained, 38 of them chose to make a living by 290 with 2 XCs unreachable) being self-employed in farming. Literature shows that entrepreneurs who are pulled rather than pushed into a While it is too early in the process to determine the im- sector or opportunity have an infinitely greater chance pact of this programming, early indicators suggest that of success. Additional DDR studies show that XCs who the XCs are utilizing the training and techniques. For join or initiate economic associations or cooperatives example, per the XC Satisfaction Survey, 61% self- will have a greater chance of success fully reintegrating report making a living by operating their own business socially and economically. The caveat being that this is and 23% self-report currently participating in a coop- contingent on the size of the cooperative (small coop- erative or association (up from 5.1% self-reporting that eratives are most successful) and the composition of the they participated in a cooperative at some point in their cooperative including community members. life before joining the DDR programme). The ex-com- batant satisfaction survey report provides full detail on The main thrust of this training was on empowering XCs the findings. to adopt a sustainable livelihood approach. This train- 16 ing included 1) a 10-day intensive training conducted at Once the ex-combatants graduated from Mapel and re- the Mapel Transition Facility during the last two weeks turned to their chosen communities, the trainers with the of camp, and 2) state-based follow-up trainings in both support of NDDRC state level staff circulated within the phase 1 and phase 2. The training was an important states to provide follow-up trainings to the XCs and com- complement to the vocational skills training provided by munity members joining the XCs in cooperatives or as- UNESCO at Mapel as it urged the XCs to think about sociations. The follow-up training was designed to build those skills from a business/entrepreneurship potential on the intensive foundational training provided at Mapel. perspective. Further, the trainings drew on the literacy During phase 1, according to implementing partner re- and numeracy trainings received, providing tangible porting a total of 253 ex-combatants received the busi- uses of the information and including financial literacy ness/cooperative training in addition to 284 community training modules. Additionally, the training in the camp members. In phase 2, 170 ex-combatants and 129 com- facilitated XCs to initialize thinking on cooperative or munity members attended trainings. This was confirmed partnership work, into which they were encouraged to by the findings of the ex-combatant survey in which 94% incorporate community members upon return to their of respondents reported participating in various State- communities. based business and association/cooperatives trainings with each of them attending on average two training ses- The training at Mapel was very well received. According sions of this kind. These trainings included 15 modules to the ex-combatant satisfaction survey, 98% of the re- covering a variety of entrepreneurship, associations/co- spondents were satisfied with the training they received operatives and financial literacy topics on an as-needed in Mapel, 97% stated that they learned new knowledge basis depending of the needs of individual XCs and their during the entrepreneurship trainings, and 86% of par- situation. The XCs’ needs were determined by a needs ticipants stated that they have made use of the skills evaluation conducted by the training team. they learned. Additionally, the Mid-Term Review, final The field training used several well-known learning ex-combatant satisfaction survey, and implementing methods that proved to be successful in the region, such partner reporting found a demand and applicability of as (i) simulations and role-play, (ii) learning by doing, the entrepreneurship, cooperatives, and financial literacy (iii) visuals and illustration, (iv) hands-on experience trainings. via interaction with existing businessmen, (v) individual To conduct the training for 290 ex-combatants, 10 South counselling, and (vi) practice sessions. The State-based Sudanese individuals were recruited based on their back- livelihood trainings were received very positively, as an ground in business or related fields and language skills overwhelming majority (94%) of respondents who at- and trained during a two-week programme in Mapel. tended the trainings said that they learned new knowl- This allowed the trainers to meet many of their future edge at the in-State trainings with a further 71% of them students and receive basic information on them, includ- stating that they had used these new additional skills in ing literacy level, approximate location, possible group- their life. New skills that XCs mentioned included how ing preferences, and incorporate these ground realities to better work with others, how to form associations/co- operatives, how to keep financial records, and how to into the training material. An international training ex- manage business, among others. pert conducted this training. The expert first developed the Training of Trainers (TOT) curriculum as draft as The pilot also saw a significant increase in ex-combatants well as the field training manual and training materials choosing to participate in associations or cooperatives to be used by the trainers during the business/coopera- after completing the pilot training. Only 14 ex-combat- tive training for XCs. These materials were then adjusted ants (4.8%) reported having participated in associations/ over the course of the TOT to respond to additional in- cooperatives at the start of Mapel. In comparison, 23.5% formation on local context and trainees’ demographics, of respondents (48 of the 204 ex-combatants respond- and then utilized in the Mapel and state-based follow-up ing to the satisfaction survey) reported participating in trainings. These curriculum and training materials are associations/cooperatives in July 2014. Only one coop- now available to NDDRC for future use. The TOT’s suc- erative had completed the official registration process by cess is reflected in the XC satisfaction survey in terms of July 2014 however, many groups were in various phases the satisfaction overall with the training, and in particu- of formation after receiving the entrepreneurship, coop- lar none of the five participants expressing low satisfac- eratives and financial literacy trainings. The NDDRC’s tion sited concern with the trainers but rather referenced ICRS caseworkers reported working with 17 such groups training content and wanting additional training on the which were formed by a total of 68 ex-combatants joined topic. by 442 community members as of July 2014. Meanwhile Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 17 more than half of the respondents of the satisfaction sur- Additionally, the inclusion of the training at Mapel by vey (61.3%) were making a living by operating their the reintegration implementing partner constituted a new own business. approach to that seen previously. This design forms a natural continuity between the trainings received in the In the project’s phase 2, a second 10-day ToT was pro- camp and the trainings in the communities of return, al- vided to NDDRC’s 16 ICRS caseworkers in order to lowing for improved learning outcomes. This approach provide quality training services to XCs and to increase also provided the XCs increased information on services the capacity of the NDDRC state teams in service deliv- available during reintegration with the intention of re- ery. The training matched to that provided to the external ducing misinformation and reinforcing their return home trainers in Phase 1 with further adjustments made to lo- as part of a continuous DDR process of support. Overall calize the context and for use by the ICRS caseworkers. this allows for the XCs to be introduced to the reintegra- The decision to use national staff as trainers had both tion trainers, develop a rapport, and better understand the positives and negatives. The positives included that the services which will be available in the programme once ICRS caseworkers have knowledge and experience in they return to their communities. The approach directly working with the XCs and were well able to reflect the responded to a lesson learned in previous DDR pro- needs and challenges they may face in the field as well gramming where the programming at the center and in areas of knowledge that would be particularly in demand the states were completely disconnected. This approach by the XCs. Additionally, in terms of implementation, shifted the paradigm of viewing each DDR component the ICRS caseworkers have strong knowledge of the in isolation to viewing it as one process experienced by areas and are able to locate the trainees in challenging the XC. Prioritizing an overlap period during which re- environments. The primary negative aspect of the ICRS integration trainers stay at the Transition Facility may caseworkers acting as trainers is that these staff do not become more challenging as scale increases; however, it have any background in entrepreneurship or business, is strongly encouraged. The importance of accurate and as opposed to externally hired trainers. Despite this consistent information sharing with the ex-combatants, drawback, the trainings in phase 2 were well received. which is only achieved through accurate and consistent It is also of note that when combining the knowledge information sharing with all staff and trainers, cannot be transferred to the locally hired UNICON trainers, state overemphasized. managers, and NDDRC ICRS caseworkers, the TOT has become a capacity-building tool that ultimately contrib- 4.1.2 Livelihood start-up kits utes to the development of South Sudan in ways beyond Livelihood start-up kits which matched to the training the Project’s direct goals. that each received in Mapel were distributed in Phase 1 of the pilot. This process involved the initial design of Utilizing NDDRC staff as trainers in Phase II of this the contents of each kit, contracting suppliers, logistics work piloted a new approach. This added to the effec- of warehousing and delivery, and distribution at each tiveness of the trainings. However, as to be expected, of the four state offices. Lessons learned from the CPA most of the ICRS caseworkers do not have a business DDR were revisited in the development and implemen- background, which is beneficial in a trainer on these top- tation of this sub-component and particular emphasis ics. Additionally, it is important to balance the workload was placed on 1) timely delivery of goods, 2) quality of of the caseworkers so they are available to counsel and goods, 3) relevant materials to trainings delivered, and 4) refer. As the programme builds to scale pairing skilled oversight of the delivery process of complete toolkits. trainers with ICRS caseworkers appears to have the highest potential for success. Regarding the initial design of the kit contents, the tool- kit composition for all eight vocational tracks was de- Regarding structure of the training, the pilot’s initial de- signed through discussions with the Ministry of Labor’s sign called for the implementation of separate business Multi-service Training Center (MTC) in Juba to ensure and cooperative trainings. However, based on the recom- that the tools included in the kits would be appropriate mendation of the training expert these were combined for local conditions and match national best-practices into a single joint curriculum including modules on each on vocational training. The UNESCO Mapel vocational topic. This allows ex-combatants to learn a broad range trainers were also consulted to ensure the tools were in of approaches and then determine their ideal business line with those used in the trainings. The final list of structure based on market realities once they returned to tools was then agreed upon by UNICON, TDRP, and their communities. This flexibility greatly expanded the NDDRC. This process was completed responsibly and value of these trainings. 70% of the ex-combatants stated that they were satisfied 18 with their toolkits, one fifth of whom were very satisfied. port to their communities. A large amount of detail and Sixty-nine ex-combatants chose the driver/auto-mechan- logistics is required in this process. To ease some of the ic track. This group did not receive sufficient vocational transport challenges, when numbers of beneficiaries are training in the previous reinsertion phase and supple- scaled, up, alternate approaches such as regional distri- mentary vocational training was added during reintegra- bution centers may be worth exploring. tion as they were uninformed on their intended profes- sion or the use of their tools. Not surprisingly, most of By the end of the pilot, 288 of 290 ex-combatants have those who were dissatisfied were auto-mechanic train- collected their toolkits according to NDDRC reporting. ees. However, many lessons were learned in the process The final 2 ex-combatants are not able to be located. and in future projects, ex-combatants themselves should 239 out of 290 ex-combatants collected their toolkits by be involved in the approval of the lists and regional dif- the end of phase 1 and the remaining ex-combatants in- ferences should be incorporated in aspects such as seed formed they could collect their toolkits at any time in choice. their respective NDDRC state office. A thorough bidding process was conducted with 66 orga- Overall the process of design, procurement, and distri- nizations approached and 16 submitting bids. NDDRC bution of toolkits to ex-combatants was highly success- was closely involved in the entire procurement process ful. Despite the short delivery timeline, the toolkits were to ensure knowledge transference on the process and comprised of quality goods, and were distributed in full. steps required for responsible procurement. As a result According to the results from the XC satisfaction survey, of this process, NDDRC now has a solid database of 77% of the non-auto trainees said that they were still us- potential suppliers from the region that can be used in ing the tools provided in the toolkits. 83% of those in the future similar assignments for supply of goods. High agricultural track were still using their tools. Some chal- standards for procurement are crucial and these must be lenges faced in the process included the short timeframe maintained moving forward. This pilot was notable in did not allow for as much consultation on the toolkit con- that all contents of the toolkits were delivered to the Juba tents as would have been ideal. In particular, XCs should warehouse within three weeks of contracting. This was be consulted. a major achievement. 4.1.3 Technical skills extension Kits were compiled and grouped by state in Juba with ac- In addition to the general entrepreneurship and coopera- tive oversight by TDRP and NDDRC. The kits were then tives trainings, additional agricultural focused business transported by road to the four state capitals. Orientation training was added during phase 2 of the pilot to ensure meetings were conducted at NDDRC state offices with the large group of ex-combatants that chose the agricul- NDDRC and Implementing Partner state teams to ensure tural livelihood path (44%) received targeted advice to they were prepared for the distribution including use of support their reintegration. In addition, feedback from the ICRS system to track the entire process. phase 1 suggested that some XCs were in need of ad- The official distribution of the toolkits was conducted ditional technical skills training in particular vocations from November 1st-5th, 2013. This process was im- beyond what was learned at Mapel. Therefore, in Phase 2 plemented in close cooperation between all parties – a sub-component of technical skills extension was added NDDRC state office, representatives of NDDRC HQ, to provide these additional services. the Implementing Partner and World Bank/TDRP. In 4.1.3.1 Agricultural extension visits each state, distribution teams were present and active to ensure that start-up kits arrived in good order and were Of the current caseload, the largest group of individu- distributed to the beneficiaries in a timely fashion. The als (129 or 290) are interested in farming post military ICRS system was used to generate documentation for service. This is well aligned with the current market the distribution process including state specific distribu- potential particularly in areas outside the capital cities. tion lists and individual forms for each XC to sign upon The agriculture development potential of South Sudan is receipt of their kit. In addition, XCs were required to enormous. According to the African Development Bank demonstrate their DDR photo ID credentials in order to reports, the absolute majority of the households in South receive their kit. Through clear documentation the staff Sudan are primarily dependent on agriculture and live- was able to easily confirm receipt and respond from a stock and 75% of the country’s land area is suitable for position of information to ex-combatant questions. Ex- agriculture. At the same time, only 4% of the arable land combatants with bulky kits (agriculture, masonry, etc.) is cultivated and farming is predominantly of a subsis- or coming from large distances were assisted with trans- tence nature. This creates almost unlimited opportunities Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 19 for those willing and able to develop themselves within able use of resources. Strong relations between NDDRC the field of agriculture, albeit with significant transport and the Ministry of Agriculture should be fostered as the and logistical challenges. However, the constraining fac- latter will be a critical partner in any effective DDR in tors limiting the agriculture development are mainly (i) South Sudan lack of knowledge, and (ii) lack of resources. South Su- dan’s agricultural indicators are far below the regional 4.1.3.2 Targeted supplemental vocational standard, while the natural conditions are in many cases training much better than those of their neighbours. Preceding the reintegration phase, ex-combatants re- To further support this group, Phase 2 livelihoods work ceived training in 1 of 8 vocational areas as conducted included agricultural extension training. This training by UNESCO at the Mapel Transition Facility. As dis- was made available to build upon and upgrade the tech- cussed above, those ex-combatants who were to receive nical skills developed at the Mapel Transition Facility. auto-mechanic/drivers trainings were found to require The agricultural sub-component was designed to be in- supplemental training during the reintegration phase troduced in Phase 2 to align with the growing season. due to challenges in implementation at Mapel. To ad- The training included improved methods, best practices, dress this concern in phase 2 the project facilitated the 52 and small farm business skills. The Ministry of Agricul- ex-combatants to attend driving training through them ture assigned seven agricultural extension workers to the receiving driving licenses and 2 ex-combatants to attend DDR project to implement this work. Among the day-to- auto-mechanic courses. In addition, the project covered day responsibilities of the Ministry of Agriculture exten- the mandatory medical examinations as well as official sion workers are to (i) train the population in the field of license issuance fees for all XCs who attended the driv- agriculture, (ii) promote the development and adaptation ing schools. of appropriate agricultural technology, and (iii) promote the efficient production and marketing of agricultural While this was not initially included in the pilot design products. It is clear that these goals align perfectly with as all vocational trainings were to be provided in Mapel, the goals of the South Sudan DDR programme. the effort provided a relevant case study on the process and costs of vocational training provision in local centers The Ministry’s agricultural extension workers attended a rather than in cantonment camps. Through the provision 7-day TOT to supplement their knowledge. In this man- of state-based driving and auto-mechanic courses it was ner, the programme was well aligned with the National found that there is potential to provide trainings through DDR policy which calls for the DDR programme to existing training programmes at the state level. This conduct reintegration through line ministries where pos- could avoid one of the most criticized pitfalls of DDR sible, and in so doing increase the capacity of the partner programming, i.e. the flooding of certain markets and Ministry. By further training the agricultural extension limited success rates when large numbers of trainees are workers, the programme contributes a positive benefit to given a small menu of options for vocational trainings. the communities at large where the extension workers However, it is of note that the absorptive capacity of are assigned in the course of their day to day work. the training centers will require careful assessment. Ad- ditional benefits of this approach include the increased Operationally, the agricultural extension workers were capacity of training local institutions over time and the joined by ICRS caseworkers and Implementing Partner potential for more region specific training to respond to state managers to comprise agricultural training teams market demand. when conducting trainings for the XCs who chose agri- culture as their field of reintegration. This allowed addi- 4.1.3.3 Vocational expert visits tional flexibility in the training mechanism as many ex- combatants are found to work at both a trade and farming. In Phase 2, vocational expert visits were added to test Through this approach 119 XCs of 129 who chose the the modality for future programming. This allowed the agricultural track received follow-up trainings. Just as ex-combatants of non-agriculture reintegration fields with the entrepreneurship and cooperatives training, the to receive a visit by an experienced professional with implementing partner developed a curriculum and train- proven skills in their respective field. The drivers/auto- ing materials for a TOT and the field extension trainings. mechanics were not eligible for this additional attention All these materials are now available within NDDRC for as they were attending the additional training in Phase 2. future use. Overall, the addition of agricultural specific The expert visits were not mandatory and the XCs were trainings was well received and the use of Ministry of free to decide if they wanted to participate in this sub- Agriculture Extension Workers was a good and sustain- component or not. The reach of this activity was also 20 limited by experts’ availability in locations close to those sorb all capacity of these programmes thus leaving them of the corresponding XCs, other options chosen by the unavailable for other citizens. The DDR policy should ex-combatants (see section 4.1.4 below) as well as the explore how to expand these services to ensure use by majority of the population being busy cultivating at the ex-combatants does not offset their use by others. time it was on offer. The expert visits were limited to one welding expert who visited the states of Western Bahr 4.1.5 Tools developed and available el-Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes and mentored the XCs in for future use the welding reintegration field. In addition to the collection of actionable lessons learned, While vocational expert visits or apprenticeships can the pilot has also developed tangible tools that NDDRC be very effective on an individual basis, this pilot found can utilize in future work. This includes: that such an approach needs high levels of attention by NDDRC to implement as well as careful state-level pre- Training Materials planning. With additional logistical support and coordi- nation, NDDRC in cooperation with small business rep- • Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial litera- resentatives and training facilities may be able to provide cy curriculum and modules the XCs in all the states with adequate level expert visits • Entrepreneurship, cooperatives and financial litera- that will benefit their reintegration. However each ap- cy TOT Training manual prenticeship must be individually negotiated and vetted for appropriateness and training must be conducted for • Agriculture Business TOT curriculum and modules the hosts to clearly set expectations and structure to the • Agriculture Business TOT training manual process. This takes not only time, but also significant • Agriculture supplemental training materials staff and resources. Livelihood Start-Up Kits 4.1.4 Leveraging available government services through ICRS • Start-Up Kit Process and Lessons Learned Report referral and follow up • Start-Up kit Contents, Lists, and Costs In keeping with the national DDR policy, the NDDRC • Contracting Process Documentation is tasked with understanding the available services of government institutions and linking XCs with those ser- 4.2 DDR Community Support vices. It was learned through this pilot that while there are many services available, transaction costs limit the Projects use of many of these services, leaving them often un- The pilot reintegration project also provided communi- derutilized in an environment of massive need. As an ties with a peace dividend through targeted community example, through various ministries the Government of projects in communities receiving high concentrations of South Sudan provides opportunities to registered cooper- XCs in the pilot caseload. In addition to the community atives (e.g. tractor lease, subsidized seeds etc.), however projects, community members participated in coopera- very often financial illiteracy prevents people (including tive trainings as outlined above in the livelihoods sup- XCs) from successfully registering a cooperative and/or port section. the registration fee becomes the final obstacle that they, even collectively, cannot overcome. Highlights of this work include: In response to this, phase 2 built in a sub-component of • Communities were consulted and engaged in the sit- assistance in accessing and leveraging available govern- ing or repair of water boreholes. ment resources. These opportunities were identified by • IOM supported the reintegration process through the the state teams and particularly the ICRS caseworkers implementation of 17 community projects in the tar- and included assistance with land registration, coop- get states (an additional 7 to the initial 10 agreed). erative registration, tractor usage, and timber. This sub- component found a high return and saw the ability to • Based on the number of XCs from each state, West- leverage valuable assets and services by eliminating the ern Bahr el Ghazal received nine community sup- transaction costs to XCs. This is a good indication; how- port projects, Lakes five projects, Warrap two proj- ever as the project scales up the larger numbers could ab- ects, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal one project. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 21 4.2.1 Site selection and community completed in March 2014. The original tenders for the mobilization three boreholes in Lakes State were launched in March 2014 and despite some challenges due to well depth, all DDR Community Support Projects were requested by projects were completed by May 2014. Due to the com- NDDRC to consist of water projects in 10 communities. petitive bidding process and fewer solar pump installa- First the Implementing Partner, IOM, used the informa- tions than originally envisioned, a surplus of operational tion from NDDRC’s ICRS to identify the areas within funds remained in the budget in the programme’s closing these states where the highest number of XCs planned months. Authorization was received to drill an additional to settle in order to identify project implementation sites. five boreholes with these funds in Western Bahr el Ghaz- Communities were then selected by NDDRC using an al due to impassable roads in other areas. In Northern agreed upon selection criteria including ensuring that Bahr el Ghazal State, the community requested a proj- projects were placed in communities different than those ect that was outside the preferred project categories of of the UNMISS Reinsertion Community Projects. water and marketplace improvements. The community of Malual Bai Payam identified completion of a payam Delivery of these projects was then discussed and agreed administration office as a project to be supported by the upon by members of the community in question. In this programme. Construction began on the payam office process 39 community meetings were conducted with through a community initiative prior to the programme up to 1,285 attending across all the sites. These discus- and had not been finished due to lack of resources. Com- sions ensured representation of a range of community pletion of the payam office was listed as a high priority stakeholders and were conducted in coordination with for the community and thus its completion was approved NDDRC state offices and rural water departments. In one as that community’s project. case, a borehole project was not needed as they had suffi- In each community, a series of community meetings cient water supply but the local community suggested an were held to explain the community’s role in manag- alternative common good project. In that case a payam ing the investment after project completion. At each of office was completed at the community’s request. the water project sites, community water management The project made efforts in mainstreaming gender with committees were established and training on the man- the community-wide meetings typically attended by agement and maintenance of water points as well as the promotion of good hygiene practices was undertaken. women group representatives along with youth and el- Pump repair toolboxes were distributed to all borehole ders. Fourteen water management committees were sites for use by pump repair technicians to service and trained, with the female membership ratio averaged repair the pumps. 56%. According to the implementing partner, both the XCs 4.2.2 Installation/rehabilitation of and community members expressed gratitude to NDDRC boreholes or community requested and the World Bank for this initiative which brought common good projects much-needed basic infrastructure to the selected com- munities. Through this initiative, the communities have For the 16 water projects, IOM engineers developed the witnessed that NDDRC’s promise to provide community tender documents for the borehole drilling which were infrastructure was fulfilled promptly and in good qual- reviewed by the NDDRC PMU and firms were contracted ity. Both communities and XCs stated that they would to complete the work. As with the toolkits, NDDRC was look forward to continued support from the government consistently involved and informed of the procurement towards improvement of basic services such as water, details and process as IOM followed their procurement healthcare, education as well as jobs/livelihood oppor- procedures. Exposure to this process further contributes tunities. to NDDRC’s capacity building. Fair and cost based bid- Overall, this component was successful in delivery, com- ding processes are critical in this process and must con- pleting 17 community projects rather than the projected tinue to be used if such programming is continued. and contracted 10. The tenders for Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap While this pilot focused on timely completion of a wa- States were launched and the bids were opened at a ter projects, it was found by the implementing partner PMU meeting in December 2013. Community mobiliza- that communities would generally accept a water proj- tion and training of community management committees ect, however that may not meet the priority needs of was completed in early spring and all six boreholes were the community. In fact, community priorities include a 22 broader range of improvement projects. It was suggested 4.3.1 Project Management Training, that in future programming communities with high level Mentoring and Support, and Systems of XC reintegration select from a broader range of im- provement projects when it is clear that the intervention Development is a priority of the majority of community members. In The Institutional Capacity Building Component was keeping with the national DDR policy, it is likely that conducted primarily through training and mentoring of the whole of government approach of the DDR policy NDDRC staff. For management of the pilot reintegra- while calls for coordination with other line ministries tion project a PMU was formed at the HQ level which with existing community project processes would be the interfaced with the state level teams in the four states most effective path to providing these broader options. participating in the pilot. The PMU reported up to an In this way, community projects could be provided from NDDRC Steering Committee that provided policy guid- a wider group of options by the best aligned ministry. ance and oversight. The establishment of the PMU was This broader approach however requires resources and intended to achieve two purposes: 1) management and time to implement properly and inclusively. operationalization of the pilot and 2) full exposure of a cross-functional team of NDDRC staff to the process- 4.2.3 Tools developed and available es and management required to implement reintegra- for future use tion, increase operational understanding, and capacitate NDDRC to manage programming of potential future • Community Selection Criteria programmes. • Contracting Process and Documentation The formation of the NDDRC’s PMU increased NDDRC’s exposure and awareness of processes and 4.3 Institutional Capacity progress, and helped to expedite some operational pro- Building cesses. However, it has not created a sustainable man- agement structure to oversee future work. In the light of In addition to the service delivery aspect of the pilot rein- the GoSS’ intention to expand and accelerate demobi- tegration project, work on capacity building to NDDRC lization and reintegration support and the foreseen in- systems and staff is a crucial component of the pilot creased number of implementing partners (and possible reintegration project in keeping with the systems and funding streams), time and effort needs to be invested staff development objective. A team of consultants from in improving the regular structure and functions of the Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research organization including cross-functional work and com- worked with NDDRC between May and November munications. 2013 to assist in strengthening the operational capacity of the commission. Additionally, TDRP has been provid- Capacity building training and mentorship was particu- larly targeted at the PMU and state level teams. The team ing technical assistance and support for the ICRS system leader also held regular sessions with NDDRC’s senior since 2012. management to take stock of project progress and to dis- Highlights of this work include: cuss relevant capacity issues within NDDRC. A mentor- ing model was utilized in this work. While it was seen • Multi-day HQ & state based PMU trainings in man- that an on-the-job approach is best for capacity building agement, reintegration, and best-practices conduct- at this juncture rather than sending individuals to train- ed ings elsewhere, the mentoring approach used was flex- ible and at times the lack of concrete structure brought • One-on-one staff mentoring at the HQ level into question the effectiveness of training. • Inputs on organizational structure and impact on re- integration In addition, group trainings were conducted for the headquarters’ PMU staff as well as the NDDRC State • Development of an Informational, Counselling and staff in the four states of Greater bahr el Ghazal. Two Referral System including the software interface four-day training workshops were conducted: one for the and database, and establishment of an ICRS case- HQ PMU in Juba (19-22 August) and one for the staff worker team by NDDRC of the four State Offices of Greater Bahr el Ghazal, in • Capacity building training of ICRS caseworkers and Wau (27-30 August). The trainings focused on project IT staff management including planning, assessment, lessons learned, M&E, and management skills while also cover- ing key issues, systems, and processes that were to be Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 23 put in place. The training in Juba focused primarily on tutional capacity building requires more than the estab- the needs to HQ staff while the training in Wau focused lishment/ improvement of systems and staff training. on the needs, challenges, and processes for the State Institutional capacity depends to a large extent on: a) the staff. The training sessions were facilitated by ASI men- organizational structure; b) planning and management; tors along with NDDRC staff themselves who played a c) communication and learning capacity and practices; central role by providing presentations and leading some d) available resources; and e) staffing, including organi- discussions. Both workshops produced a list of urgent zational culture, motivation, and qualifications. Indeed, and important action points related to the implementa- during their engagement the mentors observed that the tion of the pilot project that were then left to be followed capacity of NDDRC is at least as much constrained by up by the PMU. the way it is organized and managed as by the qualifi- cations of its staff. It is also clear that further support, These trainings were well received and much informa- particularly in bringing greater ownership at state level tion was shared with NDDRC staff whose role impacts is a key priority, whilst ongoing support within the HQ is on reintegration. It was noted that the staff were particu- also recommended. larly engaged on topics related to the pilot project’s com- ponents which is information that should have been con- A comprehensive briefing of ASI’s findings was pro- veyed to all staff by NDDRC through standard reporting vided to the senior management NDDRC and the PMU structures. This was critical information and aligning on 30 September to ensure transfer of lessons learned to NDDRC staff before the start of the reintegration service NDDRC. delivery proved crucial. The strategic capacity building conducted saw limited In addition, the capacity building component targeted uptake. In reflection, the mentoring and staff training systems development in project management and moni- model utilized had good content, but did not address core toring and evaluation (M&E). In addition to HQ and challenges facing the organization and staff. These appear combined State level training sessions, smaller sessions to include organizational structure issues, lack of clear were held at the State level in which the existing systems job responsibilities and individual reporting structure, and procedures were discussed with the responsible staff, lack of internal communications, scarcity of resources, as well as relevant institutional partners. Particular focus lack of clarity with budgets and available resources, low was given to critical approaches to provide reintegration staff morale, and others. Capacity building continues to assistance and conduct M&E, as well as on administra- be needed by the NDDRC, however, the approach used tive and financial management systems. Discussions in- should build from an institutional capacity assessment. cluded the way in which NDDRC would need to involve If the findings of the assessment are then implemented, key stakeholders in the DDR process. Implementing then capacity building can have lasting impact. It is also partner staff was extended at the state offices through of note that many tasks of programme management such support from BICC and through this cooperation devel- as M&E and MIS require highly technical skills. In oped a state level work plan, a budgeting template, and these cases an imbedded consultant providing on-the-job state specific work plans. The NDDRC state teams were mentoring is likely required. engaged at differing levels in this work in the different states and the long term impact is not clear. It is clear that 4.3.2 Information, Counselling and the State staff in the State offices are more aware of the Referral System (ICRS) importance of systems and procedures than at the start of the process. Some of these systems have been revived in In tandem with capacity building work, the pilot includ- discussions at the state level. The ASI team found that ed the design, development, and implementation of the some of the systems/formats of the CPA DDR should not Information, Counselling, and Referral System (ICRS) be discarded offhand but reviewed and assessed for fur- under development by TDRP and NDDRC since early ther relevance. For example, the Financial Management 2012. The work included development of the software and Operational Guidelines Manual are useful but needs and database as well as a significant focus on training to be reviewed. Also Standard Operating Procedures and capacity building of the NDDRC ICRS, M&E, and (SOPs) need to be reviewed. However, it is clear that the IT staff. To date the ICRS includes sections on: profil- use of these systems and procedures need to be guided ing, registration, XC baseline survey data, Transition Fa- and communicated more clearly and systematically from cility training data, start-up kit tracking, counselling and the center (HQ). referral services, and opportunity mapping. The infor- mation is accessible to NDDRC staff through reporting The capacity building work had limited impact but as well as interface access. This information is then able showed potential for progress within NDDRC. Insti- to be utilized by ICRS caseworkers to facilitate liveli- 24 hood counselling and referral to ex-combatants, and is The development of the system for future use is a mile- also available to NDDRC for use in programme manage- stone for NDDRC and truly in DDR programming over- ment and M&E. all. This is the first full development and use of an ICRS in DDR. The system was used through the full DDR The TDRP consultants, in coordination with NDDRC cycle in this pilot. The consultant was available to make and BICC, conducted several trainings for NDDRC adjustments as needed and the result is a fully opera- staff and specifically for 17 ICRS caseworkers under the tional ICRS system. guidance of the ICRS manager. The ICRS caseworkers were drawn from all 10 states to ensure capacity was The ICRS is complete and represents the full DDR built in state offices throughout the country although the cycle, however the system will require additional atten- pilot itself was targeted at the 4 states of Greater bahr el tion is adjustments are made to the programme from the Ghazal. learnings of the pilot. Additionally, areas such as the counselling and referral and reporting have been pro- In early April, TDRP consultants presented the soft- grammed and initiated but can be more fully utilized in ware and conducted training at a three-day workshop of future tranches. NDDRC ICRS caseworkers in preparation for registra- tion to begin on 15 April 2013. The TDRP team further 4.3.3 Tools developed and available worked alongside the ICRS manager and caseworkers for future use as well as UNMISS staff to set up the registration pro- cess and system at the Mapel Transition Facility. TDRP • Organizational Management and Process: conducted a similar training for the initial pilot of the ˏˏ Business management & PMU staff training XC baseline survey. The M&E implementing partner materials also provided trainings to the ICRS caseworkers on the survey methods for the XC baseline survey and the com- ˏˏ State work plan & budget template munity baseline survey. The TDRP also provided vid- • Information Counselling and Referral System eo tutorials and online mentoring for the opportunities mapping sections. Video tutorials have been found to ˏˏ ICRS software & database including source be highly utilized by the ICRS caseworkers and TDRP code is in the process of creating them for all sections of the ˏˏ ICRS User’s Manual system. Additionally, TDRP conducted training on the ˏˏ ICRS Administrator’s Manual counselling and referral sections as well as video tutori- als on additional capabilities of the system. 4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation This very tangible, hands-on training has received sig- The M&E component was included in the pilot reinte- nificant traction and the ICRS caseworkers are evidence gration project to improve NDDRC’s capacity to track of NDDRC staff’s ability to noticeably benefit from ca- achievements and project progress, provide updated pacity building training. These staff have accomplished information to guide decision-making, detect problems a great deal over the course of the pilot project. While as they arise, and ultimately assess the overall project there are structural questions about the coherence of the impact and identify lessons learned to inform NDDRC ICRS caseworker position with the overall commission at project closure. structure which have been raised with NDDRC leader- ship, the capacity of this group has been raised regard- Highlights of this work include: less of where they are positioned. • Pilot M&E data collection included: Registration The development of such a system requires signifi- data, Ex-combatant baseline survey, Community cant efforts on the technical front. The TDRP technical baseline survey & Ex-combatant satisfaction sur- consultant conducted an assessment and validation of vey equipment, the network, servers, network connectivity and bandwidth as well as an assessment of data tracking • Basic M&E training included with the HQ and state needs, systems, and readiness. Further work was con- PMU trainings in keeping with the initial M&E as- ducted to ensure profile data verification, software up- sessment dating as required, and together with BICC and NDDRC • M&E South-South exchange with the Rwanda initiated the construction of a registration data capture DDR commission including an all staff M&E ple- architecture including both biographic and biometric in- nary training and drafting of a foundational M&E formation of ex-combatants for future use. manual for future use Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 25 4.4.1 Beneficiary data collection urban and rural communities across the four states and looked at the impact of DDR on those local communi- The M&E component included collection of registra- ties affected. The instrument for the baseline survey of tion information on all DDR participants which was communities built on lessons learned in the earlier XC complimented by a baseline study of all available DDR survey. It was reviewed and fine-tuned together with participants while they were in the transition facility. NDDRC and TDRP. The baseline provides a snapshot of A community baseline survey conducted immediately community attitudes towards returnees and XCs. Percep- following the XC baseline survey further informed the tions, expectations, fears, attitudes, and socio-economic pilot. The pilot also included a final assessment of ben- circumstances of the communities into which the XCs eficiary satisfaction conducted amongst a sample of over are reintegrating were captured. The enumerator training two-thirds of the XCs. was conducted in Wau from 19-21 September in collabo- ration with UNMISS who generously contributed use of The registration data collection was conducted by their training facilities. The community survey produced NDDRC staff – the ICRS caseworkers at Mapel. An ex- information about the XCs and how community mem- combatant could receive their DDR ID only through the bers perceived their return. The survey also included data registration process which is mandatory to receive ser- on livelihoods, economics, cooperatives, social capital, vices. Registration data was collected for 100% of the empowerment, and security in the communities. Over- participants. This work was completed in collaboration all 805 households across the four states were surveyed. with UNMISS who contributed the hardware and train- The survey was completed on 11 October 2013. ing facilities as well as DDR staff to assist in prepara- tions. There are several technical lessons learned from The XC satisfaction survey was conducted at the end of this work which were captured by NDDRC’s Joint Op- phase 2 with a sample of over two-thirds of participating erations Committee. Overall the process went well and XCs (204 ex-combatants). This survey was conducted to provided a good base on which to build in the future. gain the XC perspective in assessing the modalities used This was the first time ICRS caseworkers collected sur- in the pilot reintegration project and the level of XCs’ vey data on a computer, thus some challenges in survey satisfaction with the various aspects of each modality. time and data entry were to be expected; the delays re- The survey explored both the expectations and satisfac- duced over the process. A profiling process was conduct- tion level of ex-combatants with the services of the pi- ed in advance of the pilot. However, due to a combi- lot DDR programme. Further, the survey looked at the nation of reasons including weak communications and economic, and to a limited extent social, reintegration a lack of clear directives from the military, the group of the participating ex-combatants. The survey further profiled matched to the individuals that actually met the provides triangulated information on ex-combatants par- verification standards only in some cases. In future pro- ticipation in reintegration trainings and services as deliv- gramming, an accurate profiling process could shorten ered by implementing partners and the degree to which the registration data process. the beneficiaries are utilizing those trainings. The survey also collected XCs’ suggestions for improvement on the After all participants had arrived at Mapel, an ex-com- training and services. This survey was very beneficial in batant baseline survey was conducted. The baseline sur- the assessment and learning of the pilot. Additionally, vey of XCs was designed with assistance of World Bank findings were very encouraging in terms of implement- consultants. It was developed by drawing on experience ing partner service delivery and accuracy of reporting. of similar surveys in Uganda, Rwanda, and elsewhere. The survey was first piloted at the Transition Facility 4.4.2 M&E capacity building in Mapel (27-28 May), then adjusted and subsequently handed over to the ASI/Integrity team which trained the Assisting NDDRC in building its M&E capacity was the enumerators and conducted the actual survey. The train- other key area of the component. The enhanced M&E ing of the enumerators (12 NDDRC ICRS caseworkers) system was to be based as much as possible on the exist- took place in Wau 2-4 July, led by the M&E Capacity ing systems within NDDRC and would include effective Building Expert. The training focused on familiarizing and efficient linkages with NDDRC’s ICRS. the enumerators with administering the tool itself, good interview practice, and research ethics required for con- Early on in the process, from 23 June till 19 July, two ducting surveys. The baseline survey sample encom- implementing partner consultants worked with the Com- passed 274 ex-combatants which included all ex-com- mission to assess the situation and propose an initial batants at the center over the period of the survey. M&E system appropriate for the anticipated tasks ahead. In the PMU meeting on 10 July, the consultant team pre- A community baseline survey was also conducted in sented a draft results framework, an overview of how 26 the M&E system could operate, as well as a draft ca- clarifications to enable the Unit to start systematic M&E pacity development plan for M&E. Subsequently, on 25 of the pilot project. The Commission should further clar- July the consultant team delivered an update on the work ify the precise intended role of the M&E Unit and its in- done thus far on the M&E system and capacity, includ- teraction with the ICRS, which currently manages most ing the main components already developed. of the Management Information System (MIS). However, the effectiveness of the project in assisting 4.4.3 Collection of lessons learned NDDRC in establishing an appropriate and functioning and reflection M&E system was hampered by the absence of M&E staff/Unit within NDDRC. Staff turnover has continued Phase 3 of the pilot reintegration project is focused on to be an issue and the lack of an M&E team remains a the assessment and capture of actionable lessons learned challenge for NDDRC. As such there was no significant which can be incorporated into future programming. opportunity to train or mentor M&E staff. This is conducted in the pilot through a multi-pronged approach. First, Implementing Partners were instructed Thus the training approach was shifted to a broad staff throughout the pilot to collect, reflect, and report upon training approach. In phase 1 the ASI/Integrity team lessons learned. Each final IP report includes detailed included broader training on M&E for NDDRC staff, lessons learned. Additionally, TDRP through this final particularly through multiple sessions devoted to M&E report is collecting and aggregating the systemic and during the PMU workshops in Juba and Wau in August, overall lessons learned. Finally, the MTR and final ex- and as part of the ongoing mentoring at the State level. ternal project evaluation are also expected to provide in- Additionally, due to the absence of M&E staff, an in- sight on lessons learned. These final learnings will be creased emphasis was placed on the development of an discussed with the NDDRC leadership and staff through M&E manual to act as a starting point in future work. a workshop at the end of the pilot reintegration project, The consultants in phase 1 contributed towards such a which is set to close on October 31, 2014. manual. In phase 2, through a south-south exchange to bring in the experience of the Rwanda DDR commis- In addition, TDRP worked together with NDDRC to in- sion in M&E implementation, further staff training and corporate lessons learned from this pilot into an updated mentoring was provided and an M&E draft manual was national approach of a harmonized reinsertion and rein- completed. The manual includes the proposed roles and tegration strategy. This approach looks to respond to the responsibilities as well as a detailed draft logical frame- programming and cost findings from this experience. work and reporting schedule for NDDRC. Its purpose is to provide detailed guidance and practical tools for the 4.4.4 Tools developed and available M&E staff and other staff involved in M&E such that for future use they are effectively able to track the project’s progress • ICRS software & database usable for M&E includ- and inform decision making for effective and efficient ing ex-combatant profiling, registration, baseline management of NDDRC operations. The manual will al- data, services delivered, casework, and referrals low all staff (not only staff involved in M&E) to see how data and information about the programme is intended • Ex-combatant baseline survey: questionnaire, ICRS to feed back into management to continuously adapt and section & report adjust implementation in order to improve. Buy-in at all • Community baseline survey: questionnaire & re- levels will help the process of data collection and sharing port of lessons from the analysis. • Ex-combatant satisfaction survey: questionnaire & Once a unit is in place, significant briefing and training report will need to take place in addition to some organizational • Foundational M&E manual Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 27 5 Lessons Learned A s outlined above, the primary objective of is particularly applicable in South Sudan where the job NDDRC’s Pilot Reintegration Project is to test market is too weak to be expected to absorb significant reintegration approaches and modalities and de- labor supply. velop actionable lessons which can inform and improve the Republic of South Sudan’s future DDR program- Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and fi- ming. To this end, a mid-term review (MTR) was con- nancial literacy trainings should be delivered via a ducted in November 2013 to assess progress, make rec- combined curriculum. These modules are to be present- ommendations, and consolidate learnings. A final review ed from the common viewpoint of the entrepreneurial is also being conducted at the close of project and these thinking necessary to succeed be it through an individual learnings will additionally be conveyed to NDDRC upon business, a partnership, associative work or a formal co- completion. operative. This allows ex-combatants to learn a broad range of approaches to call on over the coming years The MTR assessed all components of the Pilot Reintegra- and to determine their ideal business structure based on tion Project including Livelihoods Support, Community market realities once they returned to their communities. Support Projects, Capacity Building, and Monitoring This also allows the flexibility for an individual to re- and Evaluation. Some of the lessons from the MTR, par- ceive detailed training on a specific topic such as single ticularly around livelihoods support, provide important non-association training as determined by the trainers’ insights in recommendations for future planning. Sec- discussions with the individual. ondly, an ex-combatant satisfaction survey was fielded by NDDRC enumerators in August 2014 to capture the The joint entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives expectations, level of satisfaction, and current livelihood and financial literacy training should begin early in progress of the participants. In addition, IPs’ reporting the DDR cycle and continue throughout to encourage and TDRP analysis of the entire reintegration process livelihood and market based decision making through- has contributed to the following findings. Beyond the out the DDR process. Specifically these trainings should MTR, NDDRC conducted an internal review of the work be introduced before the vocational training as it can in Mapel through a joint team of NDDRC, IPs, advisors, guide the individuals’ vocational training choices from and stakeholders. These lessons learned also have impli- a market and business perspective. This training should cations for reintegration programming. then continue as a strand throughout the DDR trainings to keep the ex-combatants’ mindset focused on empow- 5.1 Livelihoods Support Lessons erment and economic sustainability upon reintegration. Learned Vocational trainers should be trained to imbed market based thinking into their respective trainings. 5.1.1 Entrepreneurship, associations/ cooperatives and financial literacy The baseline (Transition Facility or Vocational Center) and follow-up reintegration trainings (in-field or com- trainings munity) should be formulated as one holistic training Entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and fi- course with various modules. In this model the Transi- nancial literacy trainings are the most crucial compo- tion Facility courses constitute the introduction and ba- nent of reintegration programming. These vital train- sic theory with the state-based trainings comprising the ings are an indivisible component of any reintegration practicum/field training modules with additional theory training. The trainings’ entrepreneurial focus, whether as needed. The ex-combatant should complete the full through formation of a cooperative, association, part- course inclusive of all modules at the camp and in the nership, or small business, opens an alternative path to states before receiving a certificate of completion of the formal employment to sustain a viable livelihood. This DDR course. 28 Information on trainings and services to be provided to needs to be aligned with the transition facility service XCs throughout the DDR process must be shared not delivery and respective implementing partners should be only with ex-combatants but also with all staff includ- in close contact. Start-up kits should be made available ing trainers. To minimize misinformation and confusion upon completion of the vocational trainings. Location of an internal communication system must be employed distribution should prioritize ease of transport for the XC through which all staff including trainers are fully in- to their community of reintegration with the kits intact. formed, can accurately respond to basic XC questions on services to be provided over the course of the DDR Sensitization must be conducted on the toolkit contents process regardless of the staff or trainer’s role in the pro- and timing. Due to the high level of anticipation and cess, and be clear who to refer them to for more specific expectation regarding the toolkits, there is potential for questions. significant confusion. Therefore a clear and consistent message should be conveyed to all XCs regarding the All XC and community trainings should emphasize toolkit contents and process. Internal communications hands-on, visual approaches in keeping with best prac- must also ensure all staff and trainers are informed on tices for low-literacy adult learners. These hand-on, the topic to ensure consistency. It is crucial to have a visual approaches were found to be the most effective clear process that is understood by all staff and partners training method in the context of XCs’ training likely assisting in the distribution. due to the low levels of formal educational experience Note: Additional technical detail on lessons learned in and literacy. Traditional classroom training with written this process is available in UNICON’s Livelihood Start- materials is not effective. Up Kit Summary and Reflections Report and UNICON’s 5.1.2 Livelihood start-up kits final report. Livelihood start-up kits are an essential component of 5.1.3 Technical skills extension reintegration programming requiring significant staff, Partnering with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide resources and attention to logistical detail to ensure full agricultural extension trainings to XCs through Agri- and timely distribution. Vocational Training should be cultural Extension Workers is an effective and sustain- accompanied by the necessary tools to utilize their newly able approach. Strong relations between NDDRC and learned skills once ex-combatants return to their commu- Ministry of Agriculture should be fostered as the latter nities. However, the toolkit distribution is a significant will be a critical partner in any effective DDR in South effort requiring continual attention through to complete Sudan. distribution. Additionally, a clear and systematic distri- bution and documentation process is necessary. Vocational Expert Visits or Apprenticeships require too much individual attention and resources therefore are Start-up kit contents must be accredited and agreed not a viable approach at this time. Individual business upon through a consultative process including input apprenticeships or expert visits need high levels of atten- from the federal and state agencies (such as the Minis- tion by NDDRC as each placement must be individually try of Labor’s Vocational Training directorate and the vetted, hosts must be trained and the experience must be regional Multi-service Training Center (MTC), the Min- consistently tracked. istry of Agriculture’s extension workers, the NDDRC state staff and ICRS caseworkers), ex-combatant repre- Providing vocational skill courses through state level sentatives, the implementing partner(s) and private sec- institutions shows potential as an approach and should tor practitioners. This consultative process must also link be explored further. This approach offers a lower cost with the tools utilized in the vocational trainings. option as compared to providing the trainings at a transi- tion facility and allows additional flexibility in terms of Alignment of start-up kits with vocational training is what training topics can be made available to ex-com- critical and should include contents used during train- batants. ing and distribution upon completion of the vocational training. Vocational trainings should utilize the same Trainers must team up with ICRS caseworkers across tools during trainings which the XCs will be given fol- all trainings to ensure continuity and to enhance ser- lowing the trainings. The vocational trainers must all vice delivery across the entire process. In larger casel- be well acquainted with these tools and able to train on oads ICRS caseworkers will not have the bandwidth to them. To achieve this, the planning of the start-up kits operate as trainers, however ICRS caseworkers should Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 29 be paired with trainers with business experience in field The recruitment of relevant personnel will have to be re- training teams. visited by the NDDRC. In addition, funding agents will have to commit additional resources both for capacity For additional level of detail on lessons learned in the building and potentially embedding resources within the livelihoods component of the pilot reintegration project, Commission. refer to the UNICON final report. Both Internal and External M&E systems are required 5.2 DDR Community Support for an effective DDR programme. The DDR programme must incorporate two distinctly separate M&E lenses; Projects Lessons Learned one that addresses management and operational needs of DDR Community Support Projects have high social the DDR Commission and Programme and the other tar- capital returns and should be part of a greater recon- geting the needs of GoSS, external stakeholders, funders ciliation process but are not a core component of DDR. and general community. As such, the M&E system will DDR Community Support Projects should be imple- need to account for both: (i) internal M&E and (ii) ex- mented through the appropriate line ministry linked to ternal M&E. the DDR Commission through a State managed coor- Use of ICRS caseworkers as data collectors in tandem dinated mechanism. The South Sudan DDR policy calls with external enumerators is both effective and en- for a whole of government approach that is extremely hances ongoing M&E. ICRS caseworker involvement relevant for Community Support Projects. In keeping in this area allows for structured interactions over the with the DDR Policy of South Sudan these should be course of the process which has additional M&E benefits implemented through the appropriate line ministry as in terms of qualitative observations on the progress and a special project of DDR to supplement the direct XC needs of the ex-combatants. services provided through the DDR commission. This will allow for the inclusion of a broader range of DDR community improvement projects for which it is clear 5.4 Institutional Capacity that the intervention is a priority of the majority of com- Building Lessons Learned munity members. Looking at the community projects in Development of tailor-made systems (e.g., ICRS, vul- this way allows for greater responsiveness to commu- nerable groups, communications, M&E, etc.) are time nity needs and builds longer term trust in the system as and training intensive, and to be effective need to be a whole. initiated well in advance of a DDR programme. The de- A clear criterion for community selection and project velopment of a context specific ICRS required 2 years of choice is necessary, with all choices agreed to pre-bud- work and multiple rounds of staff training. This provided get formulation. Communities receiving high concen- access to information that was used to implement, man- trations of returning ex-combatants are given priority. age and oversee various aspects of the work. In addition, community choice must take into account An organizational assessment followed by the identi- any other DDR community efforts previously conducted fied organizational adjustments are necessary prereq- there or through Reinsertion projects. uisites to effective staff capacity building. Attention to For additional level of detail on lessons learned in the the NDDRC institutional structure, job responsibilities, community project component of the pilot reintegration individual reporting, institutional reporting, internal project, refer to the IOM final report. communication, budgets and available resources, staff morale, and relationship between the HQ and state of- fices should be prioritized and non-negotiable. 5.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Lessons Learned Task specific, on-the-job trainings were the most effec- tive capacity building approach. Trainings on specific Monitoring and Evaluation (and Management Infor- tasks such as survey data collection were found to im- mation Systems) require specific staff skills that need to prove technical capacities within the commission. When be agreed to by all stakeholders from the outset. Skills given clear job responsibilities and tasks the staff of the levels within the DDR Commission are limited and re- NDDRC has significant potential in oversight and imple- gardless of training, mentoring and capacity building, it mentation. is unlikely that a cadre of skilled staff can be generated to properly administer this crucial organizational task. 30 5.5 Structural Lessons Learned Communications including sensitization and public in- formation need additional attention and coordination. DDR must be more closely linked with Security Sec- Measures need to be taken towards more actively com- tor Reform (SSR) than in former iterations of DDR in municating as well as increased transparency throughout South Sudan. An effective DDR programme in South the programme. Operational processes need to be devel- Sudan will only be one that effectively contributes to the oped to share information with XCs and their communi- reduction of military forces and military expenditure. As ties through radio, mobile phone, follow-up visits, etc. such an active role of SPLA and the National Organized The existing communication strategy needs to include Forces in DDR is essential as the two processes are inter- both an internal and external strategy, updated, and sys- twined. In addition the SPLA’s role in strategic decision tematically implemented. The communications strate- making of DDR needs to be increased to ensure mutual agreement. Linkages between the NDDRC programme gies need to be synergized across stakeholders while and SPLA work must be strengthened. More efforts are incorporating lessons learned. required to understand the SPLA process (including the Systemic approaches to ensure ex-combatant voice in Wounded Heroes) and to bring both processes together. programming need to be designed and implemented. Reinsertion and Reintegration are intrinsically inter- Another area for improvement is in the involvement of woven and should be planned as such. The terminol- XCs in the process of design and implementation. Life ogy of the various partners and stakeholders has created skills programming speaks to the importance of voice and a discrete line separating the two. However, successful self-determination and these principles should be further reintegration of ex-combatants is not the result of the re- incorporated into the overall programming including XC integration work alone but is the culmination of the full representatives on committees and XC representatives in suite of services provided from the time of demobiliza- the communities of return. tion through disarmament, reinsertion, and reintegration programming and services. Only when viewed holisti- The full DDR programme as piloted is too costly to be cally does one see the full process as experienced by the brought to scale thus the alternative approach incor- ex-combatant or DDR participant. porated in the NDDRC’s new Harmonized Reinsertion and Reintegration Strategy should be explored. Even Psychosocial issues and substance abuse are factors with strict fiscal discipline, the overall costs of the full restricting the development of sustainable livelihoods pilot programme as designed with three months in a tran- and as such a successful reintegration. XCs with un- sition facility, followed by six months of reintegration addressed psychosocial issues have significant difficulty services, and completed by three months of ICRS and reintegrating. In addition, whether for psychosocial or follow-up services, is prohibitive to the NDDRC achiev- other, communities and individuals with high levels of ing the projected scale. It was necessary at all times dur- alcohol consumption are also hampered in their develop- ment. ing the pilot to monitor overall cost of delivery of the full programme. Within this atmosphere of strict fiscal Gender and child sensitive reinsertion and reintegra- discipline, over-runs will at times be necessary but must tion programming need additional attention and coor- be clearly articulated and understood by all stakehold- dination. Additional attention, through targeted sub-pro- ers. It is essential that alternative lower cost options be grammes, is required to sufficiently integrate women’s constantly considered and tested. needs and livelihood interests in the preparation and implementation of reintegration support. Structural ap- For additional level of detail on lessons learned in the proaches need to be developed to deal with issues ob- capacity building component & structural lessons of the served in the communities. pilot reintegration project, refer to the ASI final report. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 31 6 Changing Dynamics in South Sudan DDR I n addition to the learnings found from the pilot itself, it is important to note the changed situation in South Sudan as of December 2013, and the implications on DDR in South Sudan. As of the start of the pilot programme in April 2013, South Sudan DDR was a programme with beneficiaries coming from the military and the NOF. The need for this programme was outlined clearly in DDR policy to professionalize, right-size, and streamline the NOF. This would both 1) reduce the potential for idle or underutilized members reigniting conflict by assisting them in establishing sustainable alterative livelihoods, and 2) reduce the weight of these salaries on the national fiscus which could in turn be used for developmental priorities as outlined in the South Sudan National Development Plan. The current events in South Sudan underscore the importance of DDR to the country and its connection to the nation’s overall development. At the same time, the conflict also changes the dynamics of DDR in South Sudan by introducing additional groups to the potential pool of DDR participants. Looking forward, South Sudan DDR programming must now reflect: • The programmatic and operational learnings of the piloting process; • Realities of financial costs of the initial strategy design; and • Recent events in South Sudan which require that the current approach to DDR in South Sudan be assessed. 32 7 Strategic Recommendations for Future Programming Matching the findings above with the realities of the recent events, the priority areas requiring attention for a renewed strategy include: • Increased clarity on categorization of DDR beneficiary groups and numbers of beneficiaries; • Reduced cost; • Increased harmonization of programming in reinsertion and reintegration; • Full national government implementation; and • Continued momentum Increased clarity on categorization of DDR beneficiary groups and numbers of beneficiaries is necessary given the recent events in South Sudan. The individuals that may now qualify for DDR programming fall into the following categories: • Current SPLA & other national organized forces • Former SPLA & other national organized forces (SPLA-IO) • Rebel groups (non-SPLA origin) • Civilians that joined recent fighting (ie. White Army of largely youth, dinka youth who are recruited, etc) • Wounded Heroes / Veterans (loyalties irrelevant) • Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (WAAF) • Children Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (CAAF) • South Sudanese Combatants in Foreign Armed Groups This represents a broad spectrum of experiences and needs and the service delivery modalities for the various groups may differ to best respond to those needs. For example those with a long military history that are being demobilized from the SPLA will be in need of an SSR approach while children would be in need of a separate special programme and the mobilized civilian youth may benefit most from a community based approach. In light of the new actors it would behoove the people of South Sudan to structure the South Sudan DDR programme to provide appropriate DDR programming for the varying groups. What had been a programme limited to only former members of SPLA and na- tional organized forces must now look at attending to a greater variety of groups. Additionally, recent events will require a reassessment of the numbers of beneficiaries to undergo the DDR process. Initial estimates for the National DDR Programme suggested the need to process 150,000 ex-combatants. As the Government of South Sudan has improved internal systems to give more accurate numbers, updated estimates from late 2013 suggested a significant decrease of the overall initial caseload. Following the events of December 2013 the numbers will need to be updated. This situation may require the implementation of DDR at a faster pace or in greater numbers than formerly anticipated and thus now is the appropriate time to use the knowledge learned to date to assess the reintegration approach through a highly realistic lens. The need to reduce costs from the initial design is a second area for attention. While costs of the pilot would be Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project - TDRP Key Learning Report 33 expected to reduce with scale, one of the main findings of the pilot was that the approach as implemented was cost prohibitive and required further tailoring to be realistic. The programme will achieve the scale and impact desired by the Republic of South Sudan only by addressing the financial realities and therein encourages stability and reallocates resources as needed. The need to more effectively align the reinsertion and reintegration work of the DDR programme is a third area of focus which correlates closely with cost. Looking more holistically at the programme allows the government to find additional efficiencies in the programme while also providing a stronger programme to beneficiaries. The continued development and establishment of full national government implementation of the DDR programme is the fourth priority area to be addressed. The initial DDR policy and strategy documents call for national ownership which can have programmatic benefits including full national ownership and contextual understanding in programme planning, service continuity, and cost efficiencies. Finally, it is clear that momentum and motivation are key factors in success. At this time, there is a positive mo- mentum on this programme which is an even greater testament to NDDRC and the implementing partners given the tense environment they are facing. It is recommended that a transitional pilot project be implemented to harness the current momentum and immediately incorporate the lessons learned in this pilot. The Transitional Pilot would segue in a paced manner up to the full scale programme. In summary, the current events in South Sudan underscore the importance to the country of DDR and its connection to the nation’s overall development. As such, it is critical that the country continue and invigorate its work in developing a nationally-led well-designed and well-implemented DDR programme. The learnings from this pilot as well as the tools developed are relevant and timely as these can significantly contribute to the development of an effective and realistic full National DDR Programme. 34 External Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Anthony Finn Ph.D. Claudia Breitung October 2014 FINAL EVALUATION OF THE PILOT REINTEGRATION PROJECT REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NEW NDDR PROGRAMME Anthony Finn Ph.D. Claudia Breitung October 1, 2014 Abbreviations and Acronyms CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CBR Community Based Reintegration DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration EA Environmental Assessment ERM Environmental Risk Management ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations FMFA Financial Management Framework Agreement FPP Final Project Proposal GoSS Government of South Sudan HQ Head Quarters IA Implementing Agency ICRS Information, Counselling and Referral System IGA Income Generating Activities IOM International Organization for Migration IPP Initial Project Proposal KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MDTF-SS Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MIS Management Information System MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTC Multipurpose Training Centres MTR Mid-Term Review NBGS Northern Bahr el Ghazal State NDDRC National DDR Commission NGO Non-Governmental Organization OP/BP Operational Policy / Bank Procedures PAD Project Appraisal Document PIM Project Implementation Manual PIP Project Implementation Plan PMU Project Management Unit PNDDR Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintegration RFQ Request for Quotations SC Steering Committee SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement SPLA-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition SPMU State Project Management Unit SSAF South Sudanese Armed Forces SSDM/A South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army SSR Security Sector Reform TA Technical Assistance TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program TL Team Leader TOR Terms of Reference TOT Training of Trainers TT Task Team UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNMISS United Nations Mission to South Sudan WB World Bank WBGS Western Bahr el Ghazal State 38 Table of Contents I Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 40 Project Background ................................................................................................................... 40 Summary of Findings ................................................................................................................ 41 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .............................................................. 52 1.1 Project Context .................................................................................................................... 52 1.2 Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators .......................................................... 55 1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries ................................................................................................ 55 1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs .......................................................................... 56 1.5 Alterations to Original Project Components and Outputs and Justification ........................ 64 2. Project Outcomes ....................................................................................................................... 67 2.1 Livelihood Supports............................................................................................................. 68 2.2 Institutional Capacity Building ............................................................................................ 74 2.3 DDR Community Support Projects ..................................................................................... 76 2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition ........................ 78 3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................................. 80 3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ................................................................ 85 3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation ................................................................................................... 86 3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank ....................................................................... 86 3.4 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance ....................................... 87 4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR ................................................................................. 88 4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design ................................................................................... 88 4.2 Efficiency ............................................................................................................................. 88 4.3 Effectiveness ........................................................................................................................ 89 4.4 Potential to Grow to Scale and Sustainability ..................................................................... 90 4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................................................... 93 5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance ................................................................................... 94 5.1 Bank Performance ............................................................................................................... 94 5.2 NDDRC Performance .......................................................................................................... 95 5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners ............................................................................... 97 5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research ....................................................... 97 5.3.2 UNICON....................................................................................................................... 98 5.3.3 IOM .............................................................................................................................. 99 6. Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................ 100 6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment ...................................................................... 100 6.2 Project Design and Outcomes ............................................................................................ 102 Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing ......................................................................................... 107 Annex 2: Documents Reviewed ................................................................................................... 108 Annex 3: Consultations ................................................................................................................ 116 Annex 4: Methodological Note .................................................................................................... 118 Table of Figures Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution (Source: NDDRC) ................................................................... 57! Table 2. Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives .......... 58! Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 39 I Executive Summary Project Background 1. The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) DDR Pilot Reintegration Project (Phases 1 and 2) was implemented between April 20131 and August 2014. On December 19th 2013 the Project was suspended in response to the deteriorated security environment in RoSS. Livelihood Project activities restarted on 15th May 2014 (with works on the Community Support Projects already having recommenced during late February 2014). A follow-up learning session to this evaluation is planned for November 2014 in Juba, South Sudan. 2. The Project was implemented in a complex context including the local political economy, the programme history (which was dominated by the legacy of the preceding CPA DDR process), a very unstable security situation, the wider policy environment of the national DDR strategy and supporting national DDR Council decrees and NDDRC strategic plan, and the immediate implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project need to align with the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility. 3. Due to the ongoing conflict between the SPLA and opposition forces, increased rebel militia activity as well as inter-communal clashes in various regions of South Sudan the Project was implemented in a very unstable security context (though the Greater Bahr el Ghazal States were less conflict affected than others). The Project environment deteriorated drastically during Phase 2 with the country facing massive IDP and refugee movements, closure or destruction of essential basic services such as medical facilities and schools, increased mobilization of civilians, a shift from development assistance towards emergency relief and disruption of agricultural activities due to the fighting which has led to a major food crisis with at least one third of the population in need of urgent food aid. 4. The original Development Objectives of the Project are as follows: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives. 5. The socio-economic objectives of the pilot are: (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return; (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants. 6. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows: (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming; (b) Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project. 1 IPs were hired in June 2013 and ICRS activities on registration and the baseline started in April 2013. 40 7. The first tranche of the pilot DDR programme was anticipated to include 500 individuals from the SPLA and other national organised forces. However, the final caseload of DDR participants selected by GoSS to go through the DDR process included only 292 individuals from SPLA’s Wounded Heroes, which is currently a designation not necessarily based on injury, but rather on assignment to the DDR programme. Out of this group 290 ex-combatants graduated from the vocational, life skills & literacy/numeracy training in Mapel Transition Facility (TF) (the wider NDDR Pilot Programme with which the Project aligned) and received reintegration support through the Project. Besides the ex-combatants the main Project beneficiaries were community members in the communities of return where training was delivered in cooperative working and community members in sites where seventeen (originally planned as ten2) DDR Community Support Projects (borehole installations & rehabilitation and one Payam building rehabilitation) were implemented. According to estimates by the IA (IOM) the Community Support Projects benefited approximately 7,500 people. As five ex-combatants died during the reintegration period the caseload at Project closure is 285 individual ex-combatants. 8. The Project was implemented over two phases between June 2013 and September 2014. Phase 1 of the Project had four official components: (i) Livelihood Support which had two sub- components (Start-Up Kits, and Training); (ii) Institutional Capacity Building, (iii) M&E, and (iv) DDR Community Support Projects. Phase 2 of the Project had three sub-components: It continued and innovated the Livelihood Support subcomponent, it implemented and further developed the M&E component including through South-South exchange and it implemented the DDR Community Support Projects. In both Phase 1 and Phase 2 while not identified as such the Project also had a fourth component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US$ 120,000 in Phase 1 and US$ 120,000 in Phase 2) which finances the reintegration participation costs to the NDDRC3 and included the Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the TDRP (World Bank) to the NDDRC which was not a direct cost to the Project. All administrative costs were absorbed by the TDRP. 9. The final evaluation of the Project was conducted in August and September 2014. The evaluation included a comprehensive review of Project documentation, datasets and IA outputs, consultations with 75 individuals, and a field mission to Juba and Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal State (WBGS) where qualitative key informant interviews and qualitative focus group discussions with community members and ex-combatants were conducted. The first community consultation in Nykiejo, Achot Boma, Rochdog Payam, Jur River Country, WBEG consulted 14 men and 12 women as well as separate key informant interviews (KIIs) with the village leader. The second community consultation in Nyinalel, Kuom Boma, Marial Bal Payam, Jur River Country, WBEG consulted 13 men and 1 woman including the village leader. Summary of Findings 10. The final evaluation finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as short to medium term changes resulting from Project activities and outputs) have resulted from the Project. These fall into three broad categories: (i) knowledge transfer and behaviour change (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation of DDR programming activities); (ii) short to medium term changes in the lives of main Project beneficiaries (ex- 2 See Project Implementation Plan (PIP). South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. DDR Community Support. September 2013. 3 Costs directly associated with reintegration activities Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 41 combatants and their communities); (iii) any shift in Project conceptualisation and planning based for any future DDR programming in South Sudan. 11. In the Livelihoods Component the main outcomes are as follows: (i) learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of programme design and procurement, transportation and distribution of start-up kits; (ii) learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge transfer and acquisition and quality control reporting from the field; (iii) inclusion of other national stakeholders on State level in the implementation of the livelihoods sub-component (iv); an increased collaboration with local service providers in delivering livelihoods assistance to ex-combatants; (v) continuous utilisation of toolkits for livelihood activities by a majority of ex-combatants; (vi) increased vocational and entrepreneurial knowledge of the Project participants (that is used by many ex-combatants to initiate livelihood opportunities), and (vii) increased engagement of ex-combatants and community members in group livelihood activities (associations/cooperatives). 12. The results of the Participant Satisfaction Survey4 carried out in July/August 2014 show that there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the livelihoods sub-component. The majority of respondents (61.4 percent) are frequently or sometimes using their tool kits, with the agriculture and carpentry group making most frequent use of the tools in direct comparison to other vocational tracks. Regarding the vocational skills training the XCs received in Mapel most respondents report that the training taught them something new and that they have utilised the training skills in their daily lives (an exception are those XCs though that received an auto mechanic training). Almost three quarters of the interviewed ex-combatants report to currently work in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (particularly those respondents that attended carpentry and agriculture classes). 13. The comparison of the livelihood activities of XCs before and after the DDR programme shows an increased engagement in cooperative work (while only a minority of the programme participants indicated to have worked in a cooperative before joining the DDR Pilot, 18.0 percent of the satisfaction survey respondents report to participate in a cooperative after DDR). This increase in group livelihood activity most likely results from the trainings around cooperative business. 14. However, despite these positive trends these findings should not be overestimated. As the satisfaction survey data does not give clear indication about the success and shape of the newly established cooperatives and associations, the final evaluation cannot make any judgment about their effectiveness and sustainability. Other indicators also convey a rather mixed picture of the socio-economic situation of pilot programme beneficiaries at the end of the DDR pilot; for example, more than 37.9 percent report that they usually have to borrow in order to meet their household expenses at the end of the month. On the other hand 42.6 percent indicate that their income has increased because of the vocational trainings, 37.3 percent see no change in income while 20.1 percent of the interviewees even notice a decrease in earning. Due to these mixed results and the extremely short-time lag between the implementation of reintegration assistance and the final evaluation, definitive and detailed comments on the sustainability of the livelihood activities cannot be made. 4 In July/August 2014, in order to gain knowledge of the ex-combatants livelihood situation TDRP conducted a ex-combatant satisfaction survey of the those who were enrolled in the Pilot programme. 42 15. By design the Institutional Capacity Building Component resulted in more numerous knowledge outcomes and altered institutional behaviour. The main outcomes include: (i) increased awareness in management and key staff of the reality of leading Reintegration programming in DDR; (ii) a greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this first Pilot; (iii) a positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; and (iv) important breakthroughs in the States particularly in working with line ministries in order to support the IGAs of ex-combatants. 16. The evaluation reviewed the conclusion of the MTR that at the time of the MTR it was unclear how outcomes achieved by the close of Phase 1 would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. The MTR found that that staff churn, imbalance in the organisational structure, lack of institutional support from the GoSS and apparent reliance on external TA were all factors negatively influencing the sustainability of Project outcomes. The final evaluation finds that these factors persist and are compounded by the hiatus on DDR programming resulting from the deteriorated security situation and by the removal of DDR from the mandate of UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The final evaluation makes specific recommendations regarding these issues. 17. The Community Component has mixed outcomes. While significant learning took place regarding how an IA can effectively implement DDR Community Support Projects in areas with a concentration of ex-combatants and the water interventions have improved access to clean water for target communities, the effectiveness of the Community Projects with regard to (i) promoting peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate and (ii) promoting community engagement and ownership and reducing tensions between communities and XCs, remains ambiguous. 18. The Project’s objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS5 and current Interim Strategy Note (2013- 2014). 19. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rdSeptember, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012). 20. Apparent weaknesses in Phase 1 of the Project whereby line ministries were not involved in implementation were addressed in Phase 2. 21. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC. 22. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects. 5 The MDTF-SS was operationally closed on December 31, 2012, and financially closed at the end of June 2013. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 43 MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance. 23. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is upgraded from moderately satisfactory (MTR) to satisfactory because: (i) disbursement has been prompt; (ii) extra unplanned outputs under the Community Supports component enabled by cost savings by IOM, and (iii) the continued high unit cost per ex-combatant. 24. In Phase 1 the Project did not compare favourably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is looked into. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support was US$2,759. 6 In Phase 2 of the 290 ex-combatants in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme 285 were targeted with Project activities (5 had died over the course of the Project). Of the 285 targeted, 269 received services. Basing the overall Project cost on the 290 ex- combatant intake as set against the costs of the Livelihoods Support component then the full Phase 1 and Phase 2 cost per ex-combatant remain high at US$ 3,750. 25. Effectiveness is the extent to which the Project achieved its planned-for outputs. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation. 26. The Livelihoods Support component (Phases 1 and 2) successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. In Phase 1 the Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. In Phase 2 the Project delivered the planned-for package of additional and supplementary trainings and livelihood technical supports successfully reaching 269 of 285 ex-combatants targeted in Phase 2. 27. The Institutional Capacity Building component (Phase 1) has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. In Phase 2 the IA from the Livelihood Support component implemented the remaining activities (M&E through South-South exchange and logistical support around the ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey). These activities produced their planned-for outputs. 28. The Community Support component was effective and exceeded the planned-for outputs. Originally there were 10 planned and the IA installed 16 and rehabilitated one Payam building. The additional outputs were secured as originally the IA budgeted for a more sustainable solar water pump however communities opted for manual water pumps.7 29. The Pilot Reintegration Project was meant to be a test-run of the programme design’s effectiveness in order to learn lessons and modify it prior to replication country-wide. While social activities were tested, they have been minimized in the current tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that can be replicated. Against this background the Project has listed the following components to be replicated and scaled in future programming: 6 Costs discussed in this section are direct costs (including IP management and staffing costs) and do not include WB or NDDRC related management or administration costs. 7 The cost of borehole and solar pump averages US$ 25,000 when compared to US$ 11,000 average for manual boreholes and pumps. 44 (a) An independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system at HQ and inter-organizationally with the State level; (b) A functional ICRS system with trained staff; (c) A functional M&E system with trained staff; (d) Livelihood support services including individual and group livelihood activities; (e) Community support projects (but with provisios about design, size and whether or not they should be managed through the NDDRC or DDR). 30. The final evaluation made the following specific findings and recommendations (that are related to (i) achievement of objectives; (ii) the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment and (iii) the Project design and outcomes of each Component. Project Context and Strategic Environment 31. The evaluation finds that the Project has satisfactorily provided ex-combatants with skills thus enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return (first socio-economic objective). Whether it has facilitated social reintegration is not clear (second socio-economic objective). 32. The evaluation finds that the Project has performed highly satisfactorily generating lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming (first reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). It has performed moderately satisfactorily to develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the project (second reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). Project Context and Strategic Environment 33. Conclusion 1. The success of the Project as a pilot, testing the systems and institutional arrangements which are required to implement Reintegration programming, is overshadowed by the wider political, security and donor environment. 34. High-level macro-level issues such as the current security situation in the country and the ongoing talks aimed at resolving the conflict and finding a path to stabilise the situation throw into doubt the future of DDR and SSR in South Sudan. Through the CPA DDR and through the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme (with which the Project has been aligned) there has been a substantial resource allocation to DDR, however, on the macro-level the outcomes of such activity and resource allocation are unclear. 35. Until there is clear buy-in from all relevant stakeholders into both DDR and SSR the NDDRC and other stakeholders are critically hamstrung with progressing the objectives of DDR programming (understood as either the beneficiary-focused outcomes of the Project or the macro objectives of a full DDR programme). 36. From the perspective of the Project objectives, the MTR noted that the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building was critical. It observed that the suspension of the Project would likely result in a dissipation of capacity built and a loss of momentum. It is clear from the evaluation that this conclusion from the MTR has been realised and momentum is being lost; however, in the wider scenario it is critical that the NDDRC, its partners and the donor community engage around the importance of DDR and SSR and strategize effectively around future DDR programming in South Sudan. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 45 37. It should be noted that the MTR concluded it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment, and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency with SSR. This conclusion is supported by the final evaluation. 38. Timing will be essential for any future DDR programming. The past shows that the CPA DDR programme was significantly delayed due to several factors, amongst them limited buy-in of the military and political leadership, and, crucially, a lack of internal consensus on, what DDR in South Sudan ideally should look like. DDR was perceived more as a risk to security than a factor contributing to stability. Partly, this limited support of SSR processes and the very cumbersome reform of the security sector have played a part in creating the current situation in South Sudan. If it does not seriously attend to DDR-related issues early enough in the peace talks in Addis Ababa, the GoSS risks replicating the mistakes of the CPA DDR programme. 39. Recommendation 1a. The NDDRC and relevant key stakeholders work with the donor community to engage the GoSS and the parties to the Addis negotiations, when possible, around the importance of DDR and SSR to future stabilization programming in South Sudan. The NDDRC has and is engaging government however the onus to engage must be shared by the international donor community and based on a coherent, realisable vision of DDR and SSR. Donors must engage the GoSS to engender clear, evidenced support of DDR and SSR in order for any future programming to succeed. 40. Recommendation 1b. The NDDRC be supported in the current modality to lead with the convening of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ of key stakeholders (which could include stakeholders such as the leadership of the SPLA and other organised forces as well as forces in opposition, the UN and other partner institutions experiences with DDR/SSR processes in South Sudan, representatives of civil society), to participate in the range of steps necessary to create a comprehensive and coherent DDR architecture in South Sudan and to advocate with GoSS for such architecture to be enabled. 41. DDR architectures are informed by bringing diverse aspects of stabilisation (including SSR) and development programmes and principles together into a common understanding and approach. Furthermore DDR architectures are processes: they change over time depending on the stage of design and implementation. Critically, in order to put design into practice DDR architectures must be suited to the fluid but specific circumstances of national and local conditions. 42. Despite the progress being made through the Project, DDR still appears to exist in an isolated area of programming and this isolation must be bridged. The first step is alignment with agreed SSR programming and the second is to align DDR though dialogue with other development programming particularly around community driven development, institution building or infrastructure projects. In the long term the DDR programme has to ensure that there is a national forum in place, like for instance, the National DDR Council, to continue strategizing on DDR programming on highest political level. The DDR Council, if it is to be replicated in future, has to be more functional than in the past and provide the necessary political and strategic guidance that is needed to align DDR with other development programmes. GoSS should also consider having members of the international community at the Council for advice and transparency. 46 43. Recommendation 1c. In the short to medium term specifically, the NDDRC must draw together an inclusive-enough coalition of thought partners to conceptualise the DDR process including reintegration. This coalition must reach out to all parties to the Addis negotiations and acknowledge that the current situation in South Sudan requires fundamental changes in DDR and SSR programming. It should be supported by an adequate technical secretariat which has outstanding experience with DDR and SSR processes and should be flexible enough to evolve when and if DDR shifts from strategy and design to actual programming with clear, measurable outcomes. ! 44. Recommendation 1d. In the interim and during negotiations the NDDRC should not be allowed to stagnate: the donor community and technical partners should work to address the issues highlighted through the Project (particularly dissipation of institutional capacity and the imbalance in organisational structure) thus ensuring readiness for future programme implementation. The NDDRC and its partners should take a highly strategic approach to the development of a comprehensive DDR strategy, fully conscious of Do No Harm approaches and with realisable programmatic dynamics. 45. Conclusion 2. The wider donor environment and the UN mandate do not appear conducive to DDR and SSR. 46. Recommendation 2. While there has been parallel work on SSR the current donor focus and that of the UN is largely on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. It is critical that the NDDRC and its partners work to sensitise the donor community regarding the importance of DDR – SSR in future development in South Sudan and the significance of integrating these themes into the peace talks in Addis Ababa. A prerequisite for this kind of sensitisation is strong government and military buy-in into the DDR programme at the highest levels of leadership.8 47. Conclusion 3. UNESCO has completed an impact assessment of its activities in Mapel TF in October 2013 9 but due to the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 and the reprioritisation of the UNMISS mandate the final and overall evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was cancelled. 48. Recommendation 3.The overall evaluation is important and so some formal and independent review should be conducted in order to capture lessons learned10 which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases. 49. Conclusion 4. The MTR recommended that future programming should be designed in such a way so that the GoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources. 50. Recommendation 4. The final evaluation reinforces the recommendation of the MTR and restates that GoSS commitment to DDR must be underscored by material support of the 8 The lack of buy-in of the SPLA, other organised forces and the government into the DDR programme has been frequently criticised by donors in the past. 9 See Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy &Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, October 2013. 10 An limited in scope internal draft lessons learned document has been produced by the NDDRC and its partners but was not finalised due to the outbreak of the crisis. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 47 NDDRC and openness to institutional reform of the organisation in line with the findings of the Project. Project Design and Outcomes 51. Conclusion 5. The Project is a pilot and as such learning from the pilot is relevant to stakeholders and partners outside the NDDRC and to the staff of the Commission. 52. Recommendation 5. The NDDRC should disseminate a summary document of the final evaluation to relevant stakeholders and partners and critically, to NDDRC staff. NDDRC staff should also be provided with other materials that have been developed throughout the Pilot Project. 53. Conclusion 6. Reinsertion and reintegration were largely treated as two distinct programme components in the alignment between the Project and the wider pilot in Mapel TF. 54. Recommendation 6. In reality reinsertion and reintegration are intertwined. They should hence be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner in future programme iterations. 55. Conclusion 7. The MTR concluded that in Phase 1 regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. This remained the case in Phase 2 so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 56. Recommendation 7. The MTR recommended that in future programming the M&E Framework utilised by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing the Project. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided. This was not actioned in Phase 2 and so should be actioned in future programming. 57. Conclusion 8. The MTR concluded that regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialling, documenting, learning and innovation. This remained the case through Phase 2 and so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 58. Recommendation 8. The MTR recommended that in future pilot programming this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid recommendation. 59. Conclusion 9. The MTR concluded that the Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. This remained the case through Phase 2. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid conclusion. 60. Recommendation 9. The MTR recommended that this good practice should be replicated in all future programming and this recommendation remains valid. Furthermore it should inform centrally any future DDR programme strategising by the NDDRC particularly as it considers the heterogeneity of the ex-combatant population that will likely need to be considered for DDR in the future. 48 61. Conclusion 10. The Project has been efficient however, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes. 62. Recommendation 10. When estimating the impact on future programming, economies of scale should considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced. Efficiency should be a core principle brought to bear when assessing the wider DDR architecture and modalities including the use of transition facilities 63. Conclusion 11. By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family. 64. Recommendation 11. In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS. The UN should be included in any ‘inclusive enough coalition’ strategizing about the future of DDR in South Sudan and inputting into future programme design. 65. Conclusion 12. The Project did not address Public Information, Procurement, Gender or Disability management capacity at the NDDRC. 66. Recommendation 12. In any future programming these functions must be comprehensively audited and addressed. 67. Conclusion 13. The MTR noted that the Project and the NDDRC itself was constrained by a lack of human resources. This continued for Phase 2 and was exacerbated by staff churn/loss of staff. The evaluation concludes that until this human resource factor and the drivers of staff churn are addressed they will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project. 68. Recommendation 13. The NDDRC should address the organisational weaknesses highlighted in Phase 1 by ASI and should engage GoSS when possible around the punctual payment of staff salaries. It should not exacerbate organisational imbalance if employing PMUs or SPMUs in the future. When addressing stability and skills in the organisation the NDDRC should pay particular attention to the situation with the M&E department throughout the Project which because of a lack of staff seriously undermined any outcome from any M&E capacity building activities (Phase 1 or Phase 2). 69. Conclusion 14. The MTR concluded that in Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub- Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. At the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 70. Recommendation 14. In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting as well as the suggested improvements through lessons learned should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits. At the time of the final evaluation this recommendation remains valid. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 49 71. Conclusion 15. The MTR found that the participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 in Phase 1 suited the culture of the NDDRC. At the time of final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 72. Recommendation 15. The MTR recommended that any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilise a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme. At the time of final evaluation this recommendation remains valid. 73. Conclusion 16. As a result of the flexible design of Phase 2 as well as the infrequent meeting schedule of the DDR Council which was meant to link the NDDRC and the line Ministries around DDR, the commission’s cooperation with the Ministries, particularly on State level, has not been adequately formalised. 74. Recommendation 16. In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise implementation arrangements with the State Line Ministries (especially around the formation of cooperatives and distribution of land to ex- combatants). 75. Conclusion 17.The training of trainers (TOT) that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) have increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. The focus on the ICRS caseworkers, however, further aggravates the institutional imbalance within NDDRC. 76. Recommendation 17. Future TOTs should be sensitive to the institutional imbalance within and should base the selection of trainers on a thorough skills assessment. 77. Conclusion 18. A great number of ex-combatants is still utilising their toolkits. A point of critique was that the toolkits in parts did not match to the tools used during the trainings in Mapel. 78. Recommendation 18. In future iterations of the DDR Programme the procuring agency for the toolkits should consult with the trainers delivering the vocational trainings concerning the content of the toolkits prior to the start of the trainings. Ex-combatant representatives should be involved in identifying the content of toolkits. The same toolkits that will be provided to ex- combatants should also be utilised in the vocational trainings. 79. Conclusion 19. A majority of ex-combatants is seemingly still working in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (especially those in agriculture) but success rates greatly vary from vocation to vocation. Recommendation 19. In future programming vocational trainings have to be more closely linked to the market realities in South Sudan. Conclusion 20. A number of lessons from the CPA DDR programme were not learned (or applied in the wider pilot Project) thus influencing sustainability and impact of some Project activities. 50 Recommendation 20. Future programming needs to base its approaches and modalities on the lessons learned that have been collected in the frame of the Project and the CPA DDR Programme. Conclusion 21. Given the increased involvement of ex-combatants in cooperative work, the business, financial literacy and cooperative trainings appear to have been effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. Despite these positive trends the concept of cooperative/associations seems to be ambiguous and requires clarification (e.g. in some instances groups that were registered as cooperatives and received benefits did not match the official definition of a cooperative) 80. Recommendation 21. For future DDR programming clearer guidelines on cooperative work must be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved in order to ensure an equal distribution of benefits. While less formalised groups should continue to be encouraged, the programme has to clearly spell out the criteria groups need to fulfil in order to receive certain cooperative benefits. Against this background the NDDRC should engage the line ministries around what constitutes an association vs. cooperative, and initiate discussions around which groups can be registered as cooperatives (and whether line ministries accept lower numbers for certain vocations) and who is eligible for extra materials or assets from the GoSS via the NDDRC. 81. Conclusion 22. Although the community projects have brought a positive change for the target communities, the potential impact of this sub-component was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. It appears that the communities concerned are only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC. 82. Recommendation 22. In future programming involving community-based reintegration serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community support projects in order to achieve relevant impacts with regard to peace building and bringing a peace dividend However, given the fact that the costs per ex-combatant are already quite high future programme iterations should consider to focus reintegration assistance on individual support measures (that also benefit the community) while closely aligning the project to other CDD or CBR-type projects separate from DDR which could have equivalent impacts to that originally envisioned for the community support sub-component. Conclusion 23. The Project’s aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types. Recommendation 23. Should the community Support Component be replicated in future, the Programme should consider increasing the number of Project types the community can choose from to enhance ownership. The selection process, however, needs to be closely guided and monitored to ensure democratic and inclusive decision making processes in the community. However, recommendation 22 should have priority over this recommendation. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 51 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1Project Context 83. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project 11 has a complex context consisting of: (i) the external political economy and country context; (ii) the programme context, principally the preceding national DDR process implemented by UN Agencies on behalf of the NDDRC 12; (iii) the policy context (South Sudan National DDR Strategy 2012 - 2020); (iv) the implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project must relate to the wider NDDR Pilot Programme housed at Mapel Transition Facility; (v) since 27 th May 2014 a revised UN mandate removing DDR from the purview of the agency 13; (vi) limited operational budget in the NDDRC, and (vi) the highly unstable security environment in the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS). 84. RoSS became an independent country on the 9th July, 2011 on foot of a peaceful referendum earlier that year held between the 9th and 15th January. The referendum followed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). 85. During December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security and political situation in the country. Over the weekend of 15th December fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict rapidly escalated, spreading throughout the capital Juba, to Jonglei and several other States in South Sudan resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties. 86. Peace negotiations led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started in January 2014 in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa but have been adjourned numerous times with no significant progress made up to date. They re-started on September 15th, 2014. A succession of cessation of hostilities agreements signed by GoSS and SPLA in Opposition (SPLA-IO) have been repeatedly violated or ignored on the ground in some parts of South Sudan. 87. According to the UNHCR assessment of the situation in South Sudan as of August 2014, the continuous breach of ceasefire agreements and the unstable security situation has severely affected the humanitarian situation in the country creating anything between 500,000 and 1.3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and more 447,000 refugees. ! 88. RoSS is a new country without a history of formal institutions and public administrations and so it is building national institutions, administrative bodies and practices for the first time. The institutions of the State that began to emerge in the previous years include those to guide the economic development of the country and to provide services to the general population. However, this process of creating effective and legitimate state structures and practices has been severely impaired by the current conflict. Since most of the country’s public funds continue to be channelled towards the military and the country has been in a state of emergency for more than ten months, most government institutions face severe difficulties in fulfilling their core functions. 11 Henceforth referred to as ‘the Project’ 12 Henceforth referred to as ‘CPA DDR’ 13 See UN Security Council Resolution 2155 (2014) 52 89. Additionally, most donors have reviewed their development support in response to the ongoing crisis shifting funds towards the mitigation of humanitarian consequences of the conflict while suspending or redesigning a number of long term development programmes "#$ 90. South Sudan’s economy is relatively undeveloped, largely undiversified and highly oil dependent. The greatest part of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for survival. RoSS has been hampered by austerity as a result of temporary oil flow stoppages, high inflation following independence, currency depreciation and high reliance on imported food and commodities as well as the economic consequences of the current conflict. 91. Despite slight achievements in the past years South Sudan’s development indicators are very poor. The country has very low literacy, particularly outside urban areas, high infant and maternal mortality rates and low life expectancy.15 Very little infrastructural development has occurred outside of Juba and transport links including those between RoSS and neighbouring countries, particularly those upon which RoSS is reliant for imports, for example, Uganda and Kenya. The situation has led to a breakdown of agricultural production and resulting severe food insecurity. 92. Consequently, the external environment within which the Project has been implemented is characterised by limited economic opportunities, severe development challenges, conflict stressors and famine all of which can mitigate against the achievement of development objectives in a DDR project. 93. The immediate implementation environment for the Project consists of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme.16 The NDDR Pilot Programme consists of all elements in the DDR pilot as it is focused on the time spent in the Transition Facility at Mapel including: registration, verification, processing, accommodating, reinsertion activities, vocational training, life skills, and literacy/numeracy training delivered to ex-combatants. In Phase 2 the Project sought to compensate for poor quality training in auto-mechanic and driving provided to ex-combatants in the Mapel TF. In Project documentation it is identified that the Project is intended to work towards the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme.17 It is, however, also stressed that the Project does not address CAAF/G and WAAF/G, since these groups were intended to be addressed by separate special programmes. While capacity building of the DDR system and NDDRC staff was stated as 14 See Donor Statement July 11, 2014. 15 27percent of population that is aged 15 years and upward is literate; 40percent of males compared to 16percent of females are literate and 53percent of urban compared to 22percent of rural population is literate. National Baseline Household Survey (2009). 16 The Mapel TF Pilot is not part of this evaluation. 17 Objective 1: To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals; Objective 2: To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return; Objective 3: To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return; Objective 4: To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return; Objective 5: To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes; Objective 6: To strengthen the capabilities of the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan. NDDRC, [project doc]: 6. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 53 a direct objective, the Project did not aim at directly building capacity of the line ministries, civil society or private sector. The Project aligned (in design and implementation) with the NDDR Pilot Programme, particularly around the purchase and distribution of start-up kits and the development and delivery of the training curriculum. The Project World Bank task team (TT), consultants hired by the Project and IAs sought to work in varying degrees in conjunction with implementers of the reinsertion component of the NDDR Pilot Programme, mainly UNMISS and UNESCO. However, the collaboration was hampered by an insufficient flow of information between the involved stakeholders especially in the planning stages. The at times weak information exchange seemed to be a stumbling block for closely linking reinsertion and reintegration activities. In future programme iterations it will hence be all the more crucial to have the necessary coordination structures in place to coordinate between various DDR partners. 94. As a result of the outbreak of hostilities in RoSS in December 2013 the Security Council adopted resolution 2155 (2014) in March 2014 that temporarily shifted the UN mission’s main focus from peacebuilding activities to the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. With this reprioritization DDR was removed from the UNMISS mandate. Most UNMISS DDR staff has consequently been transferred to other mission sections. At the time of the final evaluation there appears to be a renewed determination in the NDDRC to build relationships with the UN and lobby GoSS to press for the UN to reincorporate DDR in the next UNMISS mandate. 95. This final evaluation examines the pilot reintegration activities and does not look into the pilot reinsertion component that was funded by UNMISS. The final assessment of the wider pilot at Mapel TF pilot was planned by the UN and NDDRC to be conducted separately and in addition to an evaluation of the training sub-component (impact assessment) that was carried out by UNESCO (consultants for the final evaluation of the reinsertion phase had been identified in December 2013). Due to the outbreak of the crisis and the reprioritization of the UNMISS mandate the final evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was put on hold. All involved stakeholders as crucial regard an independent evaluation for capturing lessons learned which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases.18 96. At the time of the final evaluation discussions were ongoing within UNMISS to at least maintain a small core DDR unit for planning purposes. The NDDRC appeared to be determined to seek technical assistance from such a group which could be part of a broader consortium of international stakeholders to reach out to all conflict parties and to support and monitor strategy processes evolving around DDR in the course of the Addis Ababa negotiations. 97. It should be noted that the MTR concluded that the Project had begun to positively influence the reconfiguration of relationships between the NDDRC and the involved UN agencies and that this was likely to be critical to the sustainability of the outcomes of Phase 2. The evaluation reaffirms this conclusion and recognises in terms of principles of cooperation the NDDRC has shown in Phase 2 a progressive shift in how it wishes to engage with the UN family in the future and this is informing their lobbying of the GoSS and UN regarding re-including DDR in the mandate. 18 Although the JOC started to collect lessons learned in an internal process, the final document produced by the JOC in December 2013 lacks completeness (e.g. it contains very little details about costing). 54 The Project is conceptualised first and foremost as a pilot in order to capture learning about implementation, project design, and institutional capacity and to test the institutional systems necessary to implement and upscale reintegration programming to a national DDR programme. Consequently the performance of the Project can be measured against: (i) the achievements of the Project Development Objectives; (ii) the degree to which learning is being acquired, has been or is likely to be utilised including evidence that Project design and implementation in Phase 2 was adjusted to account for learning in Phase 1 including as documented in the MTR; and; (iii) emerging evidence of outcomes for targeted beneficiary populations. 1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators 98. In the Project documentation the original Project Development Objectives are identified as: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives. 99. The socio-economic objectives of the Project are: (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return; (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants. 100. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows: (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming; (b) Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project. 101. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level. 1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries 102. Originally the intended direct ex-combatant beneficiaries of the Project were a pre- selected group of 500. The NDDR Pilot Programme failed to secure the target caseload of 500 ex- combatants or to secure the target caseload as it was originally profiled for the NDDR Pilot Programme: the profile of the final main beneficiaries was not as specific as originally anticipated and the number not as high as planned. At the time of final evaluation the direct beneficiaries are as follows. The Project benefited the 290 ex-combatants who were targeted by a variety of Reintegration supports during Phase 1. Of the 290 ex-combatants who were benefited during Phase 1, 270 directly benefited from Reintegration supports during Phase 2. According to data provided by the IA a total of 284 community members received the business/cooperative training in addition to 253 ex-combatants in Phase 1 and in Phase 2, 129 community members benefited from activities in the Livelihood Supports component. Additionally, an IA-estimated 7,500 people directly benefited from activities in Project Component: Community Support Projects.19 103. In addition to ex-combatants and community members the Project targeted the NDDRC staff during activities in Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (Phase 1) and 19 June 2014, IOM Final Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project - Consultancy to implement DDR community support projects. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 55 through M&E capacity building in the form of a south-south exchange with the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) during Phase 2. Also in Phase 2 16 ICRS Case-workers at the Commission benefited from activities in Project Component: Livelihood Supports through Training the Trainers (TOT) training in Business and Cooperatives and partially through attending two days of a seven day training module for Agricultural Extension Workers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It was intended that 11 Agricultural Extension Workers would directly benefit from TOT training in Agriculture and Business/Cooperatives but due to logistical challenges 7 received the TOT input. 1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs 104. The original project components are outlined in the Project Documentation and along with Project outputs are discussed below. Project Component: Livelihood Support (US$ 1,087,482 Implemented by UNICON)20 105. In Phase 1 the Livelihood Support Component consisted of procurement and distribution of start-up kits (Subcomponent 1), the design and delivery of training to ex-combatants in Mapel Transition Facility and follow-up support delivered to ex-combatants and community members simultaneously to increase financial literacy and entrepreneurial knowledge and support the formation of economic cooperatives at community level. This follow-up training continued in Phase 2. At that stage the livelihood assistance moreover entailed agricultural extension work and training in improved agricultural methods, best practices and small farm business skills for the ex-combatants choosing agriculture. As alterations to the original project components 21 the Project additionally implemented targeted vocational trainings that were provided to ex- combatants via vocational training centres and facilitated a vocational expert visit to deliver support to interested ex-combatants in vocational skills not covered through the targeted vocational trainings or agriculture. 106. For overall management of the component and the start-up kits sub-component UNICON deployed a Project Lead, a Project Manager, a Livelihoods Training Specialist, a Start-Up Kit Manager, a Procurement Specialist, two Agricultural Training Specialists as well as one State Manager in each of the four pilot States. To deliver the training sub-component in Phase 1 UNICON deployed 10 trainers to conduct training in Mapel TF and the 4 state managers and 8 state trainers to conduct the training in communities of return. In Phase 2 business/cooperative training teams were deployed in each State to conduct follow-up visits to interested ex- combatants. The agricultural trainings were implemented by 7 extension workers of the State Ministry of Agriculture (3 in WBGS, 1 in Warrap State, 1 in Lakes State, 2 in NBGS). Supplementary vocational trainings were conducted in close collaboration with the Wau Vocational Training Centre and the Aweil driving school. Project Component: Livelihood Support Subcomponent 1: Start-Up Kits (US$ 323,100) (costs only occurred in Phase 1) 107. UNICON in alignment with the NDDRC provided eight start-up kits all of which were prepared with the engagement of The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry’s Multipurpose Training Centre in Juba (MTC) and FAO and with on the ground consultation with Mapel TF 20 Total costs for livelihoods support component. Due to the lesser number of participants than initially expected (290 vs. 500) it was agreed to spend less than the initial livelihood support budget (US$ 1.200.000). 21 See chapter 1.5 for a detailed description of alterations to original project components 56 UNESCO Vocational Trainers.22 UNICON followed a clear and comprehensive bid process with an 18-day turn-around between issuing Request for Quotations (RFQ) and opening of bids on September 30th 2013.23The NDDRC was present at the opening of bids. Contracts with successful suppliers were signed on 1st October 2013 and goods were planned to arrive in Juba approximately on 14th October 2013 with distribution to the State offices by the end of October 2013. To a large extent this timeline was met with only a seven-day delay period resulting from flooding which hampered the roll out in some of the States. At the time of the final evaluation distribution of start-up kits from State offices is as follows:24 Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution (Source: NDDRC) State Target Actual Rationale Northern Bahr el Ghazal 30 30 All distributed Western Bahr el Ghazal 92 91 1 remaining Warrap 75 74 1 remaining Lakes 93 93 All distributed Total 290 288 Source: UNICON and NDDRC Project Component: Livelihood Support Sub-Component 2: Training (US$ 764,38225) 108. As outlined in the Project document Livelihood Support through Training was to be delivered in four themes: (a) Cooperatives/associations; (b) Small farm or rural enterprise training; (c) Individual micro-enterprise business training, and (d) Adult or formal education.26 109. Training in Mapel TF (Phase 1) (US$ 164,500): The curriculum as developed by the IA largely home based and adjusted while on the ground in Mapel Transition Facility delivered 15 modules and split the training between the modules delivered in the Transition Facility and further training in situ in communities of return (delivered to both ex-combatants and community members working together in IGAs or in preparation to work as a cooperative).27 22 UNICON reports that the MTCs provided a list of tools for Carpentry, Masonry, Electrician, Plumber, Car Mechanic and Welder. FAO provided inputs for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. 23 See September 2013, UNICON Report on Bid Evaluation Results and November 2013, TDRP Draft Report on Livelihoods Support Component. 24 Kits remaining to be distributed are in the possession of NDDRC State offices. 25 Costs incurred for the following components: i) Mapel Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings; ii) State-based Financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings; iii) Technical Skills Extension- Agricultural extension visits; iv) Technical Skills Extension- Vocational expert visits; v) Technical Skills Extension - Targeted Vocational Trainings; vi) Assistance in accessing available government services. 26 All ex-combatants were asked whether they would be interested to receive assistance with education or livelihood toolkits but none chose the education path. 27 Modules 1 to15 were: (i) Introduction to Micro-Lab; (ii) Financial Literacy; (iii) Business and Market; (iv) Financial Aspects of Business and Cooperatives; (v) Selecting a Business and Cooperative Format; (vi) Steps in Starting a Business; (vii) Business Skills Development in Cooperatives; (viii) Behavioural Skills in Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (ix) Team Building and Management of Cooperatives; (x) Business Plan for Setting –up a Cooperative; (xi) Enterprise Management: Sales and Marketing; (xii) Enterprise Management: Purchasing; (xiii) Enterprise Management: Work Place Management; (xiv) Enterprise Management: Book-keeping; (xv) Concluding and Action Plan for Setting-up Cooperatives. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 57 110. The outputs for this sub-component are: (a) Training Curriculum; (b) Training Manual; (c) Training of Trainers methodology (and resulting cohort of 10 trainers). 111. As conceived in the Project Document the expected outcomes of the activities in this Sub-Component are simultaneously highly ambitious and overly difficult to measure. Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2nd September 2013 and ending 11th September 2013. 112. Follow-Up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives Training (Phase 1) (US$ 312,600). Dynamics of training in the States after graduation in Mapel TF is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping and differences between testimony collected and data provided to the IA by the Trainers. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation (in Phase 1) was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members as follows (table 2). This has not been possible to independently verify for the final evaluation. Table 2. Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Phase 1) State ex-combatants CMs Total Warrap State 70 34 104 Lakes State 93 29 122 Northern Bahr el Ghazal State 30 108 138 Western Bahr el Ghazal State 60 113 173 Total 253 284 537 Source: UNICON 113. Follow-Up Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives Training (Phase 2) (US$ 146,433): In Phase 2 the supplementary follow-up trainings aimed to build on the foundation of trainings received by ex-combatants in Phase 1. The trainings were intended to provide successful ex-combatants with the knowledge to enhance their business performance while those ex-combatants that face difficulties receive additional input and assistance in problem solving. The follow up during phase 1 indicated that ex-combatants were at different levels of progress regarding start-up and management of their enterprises. 114. The outputs for this sub-component are: (a) Training Curriculum; (b) Training Plan & Schedule; (c) Training of Trainers and resulting cohort of trainers; (d) State-based follow-up trainings. 115. A TOT was conducted for ten days from 16th to 26th May 2014 producing a cohort of 20 trainers (16 trainers plus 4 IA hired State managers). The curriculum entailed 13 training modules 58 that link up with the training content delivered in Phase 1.28 A participant satisfaction survey conducted by the TDRP shows that the level of participants’ understanding of the materials is very high (even though somewhat lower than that of Phase 1) but it was not possible to independently verify these findings for the final evaluation.29 116. Following the TOT the trainers delivered the modules to the ex-combatants on State level. Similar to previous State based trainings it is difficult to verify whether the trainings were implemented in a satisfactory manner and to what degree the training objectives were met. According to data provided by the IA 269 ex-combatants (94 percent of the current caseload30) received supplementary training (see table 3). Table 3. Supplementary Trainings in Entrepreneurship, Financial Literacy and Association/Cooperatives delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Phase 2) State Current caseload Trained ex- ex-combatants combatants untrained/not found Warrap State 75 74 1 Lakes State 90 81 9 Northern Bahr el Ghazal State 29 29 0 Western Bahr el Ghazal State 91 85 6 Total 285 269 16 Source: UNICON According to data from the satisfaction survey 61.8% of the respondents were very satisfied with the State based training, the majority being most satisfied with the way in which trainers taught them (91.8%) and the contents of the training (90.7%).31 117. Agricultural extension visits (Phase 2) (US$ 48,417): According to the Project Document ex-combatants are to receive assistance in farming and further appropriate agricultural extension training, which is supplemented with small business training. In line with these objectives the agricultural sub-component was introduced in Phase 2. The agricultural extension work targeted those ex-combatants that opted to pursue a career in agriculture and who had received the agriculture toolkit in phase 1 (129 ex-combatants in total). 118. The outputs for this sub-component are: (a) Curriculum design; (b) Training plan & schedule; (c) Training of Trainers for Agriculture Extension workers; (d) Agricultural Extension field trainings. 28 Modules 1 to 13 were: (i) Introduction and Micro lab: Expectation and Commitment; (ii) Learning Process and Curriculum Design: Illiterate and less educated people; (iii) Financial literacy/numeracy; (iv) Entrepreneurship and Business Development in Cooperatives; (v) Steps in starting a business and Cooperatives; (vi) Business and Behavioural Skills Development in Cooperative Entrepreneurship; (vii) Training in Business Plan and Financial Transactions in Business; (viii) Enterprise Management; (ix) Advance Management Skills and Systems; (x) Training and advisory in Legal Aspects: Registration and Taxation; (xi) Planning and Managing Field Level Operations; (xii) Documentation and Reporting; (xiii) Action Plan & Concluding. 29 IA Interim Report 3 (IR 1 of Phase 2) 30 The Project’s current caseload is 285 ex-combatants as 5 beneficiaries of the initial caseload (290) passed away. 31 See : Ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey Results (2014) (Draft - in Progress). Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 59 119. A 7-day agricultural TOT focusing on small farm business skills and improved agricultural methods 32 was conducted from 28th May to 3rd June 2014. An international agriculture specialist facilitated the training with the assistance of a local agriculture trainer contracted by the IA. The main participants of the TOT were seven extension workers of the State Ministry of Agriculture of Greater Bahr el Ghazal who already had a foundation in training agriculture. A self-assessment of the TOT participants conducted by the IA revealed that the level of understanding and confidence in delivering the modules was moderate/high. The agronomy knowledge amongst the participant group was inconsistent which seemed to challenge the knowledge transfer.33 120. Based on their previous expertise and the knowledge acquired in the TOT the extension workers, in close collaboration with staff from the NDDRC State offices who had joined the TOT training, delivered the subsequent agriculture trainings to the targeted ex-combatants in the pilot States. The objectives of this State based follow-up training in agriculture were, amongst others34: (a) To further support the ex-combatants to utilise the Agricultural trainings gained at Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return; (b) To train the ex-combatants on agriculture improved methods, best practices and small farm business skills; (c) To train the ex-combatants on small farm business skills with an emphasis on livelihood success. 121. The agricultural extension training was delivered to 119 ex-combatants out of the original 129 people who chose agriculture as their field of reintegration. In addition, because the extension workers were travelling together with the Phase 2 training teams, the agricultural extension training was available for the ex-combatants of other reintegration fields to attend, provided that it did not interfere with their core training following a non-objection of the UNICON state manager. The number of additionally trained ex-combatants was not recorded as no separate attendance sheet policy was introduced for them.35 122. To what degree these trainings helped to support the beneficiaries to improve their agriculture livelihoods in their communities of return is difficult to assess. Due to challenging logistics and limited financial means of the Project the ex-combatants were not visited by the extension workers in their communities of origin but were trained in central locations. Given the lack of field visits to the ex-combatants’ homes and the relatively limited training time it can be assumed that more extension work on a one-on-one basis would be needed to have a lasting impact on the individual XC. However, the evaluation does not have the adequate data to gauge the training impact and to substantiate this argument. 123. A total of 399 people benefited directly from training in Phase 2 (follow-up training in business skills/financial literacy/business motivation and training in agricultural business/agronomy practices). This includes 270 ex-combatants (out of which one ex-combatant 32 The modules covered during the training were: i) Introduction; ii) Numeracy and Literacy; iii) Why establish a seed business? iv) Business Planning; v) Agricultural Topics; vi) Agricultural Cooperatives. 33 See UNICON Interim Report 3 34 See TOR for Livelihood Support Phase 2 35 UNICON Draft Final Report 60 died) and 129 community members. During phase 1 a total of 284 community members received the business/cooperative training in addition to 253 ex-combatants. Thus the percentage of community members included in State trainings is well within the Project Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of twenty percent. Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (US$ 519,506 Implemented by ASI with IR) 36 (Phase 1 only) and South-South Capacity Building and M&E (US$ 247,525 Implemented by UNICON) (Phase 2 only) 124. During Phase 1 only Institutional Capacity Building was implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI) with Integrity Research (IR) providing services for capacity building on M&E systems. In total ASI and IR deployed seven team members in the area of capacity building including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. As per the TOR to the Implementing Partner (IP) the outputs from ASI/IR for the period of the consultancy have been: (a) Inception Report; (b) PIP; (c) Draft PIM in collaboration with NDDRC and other IAs (see 2.4 below); (d) Draft Final Report; (e) Regular weekly/monthly written reports to the NDDRC; (f) SWOT analysis for State Offices; (g) Draft M&E manual; (h) Two four day training workshops (joint presentation ASI and NDDRC);37 (i) Intensive on-the-job mentoring of key staff in NDDRC HQ PMU and staff in State offices in Bahr el Ghazal; (j) Baseline and Community Dynamics Surveys and Reports; (k) Survey quantitative data (stored in NDDRC ICRS). 125. The M&E activities of Project Component 1 included M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and conducting Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys utilizing the human capacity of the NDDRC (ICRS case-workers as enumerators). 126. During Phase 2 direct Institutional Capacity Building took the form of a South-South exchange with the RDRC. This activity was planned in response to the poor quality M&E manual produced by the IA in Phase 1 and in recognition that the staffing configuration in the NDDRC during Phase 1 was not such that a stable M&E unit existed. However, the staffing issue persisted during Phase 2. The outputs of the exchange have been as follows: (a) An M&E manual (in draft form as of the time of final Project evaluation); (b) A MSPPT presentation to NDDRC HQ. 127. The chief non-Project financed activity increasing capacity in the NDDRC was the completion of the ICRS, itself an important information management system for the Commission. The ICRS, financed directly by the World Bank is the central IT system to facilitate the 36 Budget includes M&E by Integrity Research 37 August 19th to 22nd 2013 (NDDRC HQ PMU), August 27th-30th 2013 (Staff of State Offices, Bahr el Ghazal). Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 61 registration of ex-combatants as well as their counselling and referral to socio-economic opportunities by ICRS Caseworkers. 128. At the time of evaluation the following are the outputs of activities associated with the ICRS: (a) Final version (3.0) of the ICRS installed on the HQ ICRS server; (b) Source code and draft user manuals (ICRS User Manual V2.0 and ICRS Administrator Manual V1.0) at the time of evaluation all of which is with the TDRP for final sign-off before transfer to NDDRC; (c) Completed Administrator Training of the NDDRC IT Unit on installation, configuration and troubleshooting; (d) Completed ICRS User Training of ICRS Caseworkers. Project Component: DDR Community Support Projects (USD 450,000 Implemented by IOM) (Phase 1 and Phase 2) 129. The stated goal of the Project Component is “to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self- reliance.”38 It is also intended to “test the direct community support mechanism” for future DDR tranches.39 In addition to its goal this Project Component has two objectives: (a) From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties; (b) From a micro-perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties 130. At time of final evaluation the outputs of this Component have been: (a) PIP; (b) Selection of Communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC); (c) Selection of Contractors through the Tendering Process; (d) Engagement of State PMUs and local government; (e) Community orientation to the CDD/R; facilitation of community meetings; (f) Training of management committees; (g) Project implementation; (h) Final report. 131. Prior to the Project start NDDRC opted to prioritise water interventions and improvements of local market places. Interventions targeted counties in the four-state target area with the highest number of ex-combatants registered in the programme. Based on location selection criteria40 drafted by the IA (taking into account the number of ex-combatants registered in the ICRS database and a needs analysis) a matrix was drafted outlining potential target Payams. Based on the matrix the sites were selected by the local authorities in close collaboration with NDDRC and IOM. NDDRC State Coordinators and IOM field staff then liaised with community 38 NDDRC Pilot Project Document: 36 39 ibid 40 See Site Selection Criteria for Water Projects, updated September 2013 62 members and ex-combatants to identify the priority improvement projects that were of highest priority in their communities within the available budget.41 132. According to the IA’s final report it was originally proposed to implement up to 10 community projects but in the end IOM finalised 17 projects (15 boreholes with hand pumps, one Payam building rehabilitation, and one borehole with solar pumping system42). All 16 water projects were coordinated with the Rural Water Departments in each State. The community projects were implemented in the following locations: (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (9 Projects); (b) Lakes States (5 Projects); (c) Warrap State (2 Projects); (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (1 Project – Payam Building rehabilitation). 133. Initially it was planned for WBGS to only drill four boreholes but due to the competitive bidding process and cheaper pump installations than originally envisioned (more hand pumps than solar pumps), a surplus of operational funds remained in the budget which was utilized to drill five additional boreholes in the State. 134. A series of community meetings (39 in total) were held with the target communities in each project site. In these meetings IOM staff explained the role of the community in managing the investment after project completion. 1285 participants (895 males and 390 females) attended the meetings. Ex-combatant engagement in these meetings was reported only in three communities. The breakdown according to States is as follows (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (16 meetings); (b) Lakes States (13 meetings); (c) Warrap State (4 meetings); (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (6 meetings). 135. Due to the outbreak of the conflict in mid-December 2013, activities were temporarily suspended and a no cost time extension was issued by the World Bank until 30th May 2014. Works on the community support projects recommenced in late February 2014 when the World Bank lifted the temporary suspension of the programme. The final Project report was submitted on 30th June 2014. This final Project evaluation did not include a technical assessment of infrastructure outputs. Project Component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US$ 240,000) 136. While not described as a Project Component in the Project documentation the Project has an envisaged management structure comprising: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs) and the Project should interact with the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for the overall work in NDDRC Pilot DDR project. 137. The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP has established the HQ PMU which comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. While the PMU met regularly in Phase 1, meetings were less frequent in Phase 2. According to the Project Document 41 See IOM Final Report 42 The original plan was to upgrade and convert an existing borehole into a water yard. However due to the low yield from the existing borehole, a new borehole was drilled and solar pumping system installed. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 63 the PMU is responsible for overarching management and coordination of reintegration pilot activities. While the PMU has turned out to be an important body to align the activities of various NDDRC departments and to share information amongst the national management level, it did not entirely fulfil its role as the ‘backbone’ of the reintegration process. Although all departments were requested to continuously engage and input through their participation in the PMU, the active involvement of some NDDRC units in the PMU remained marginal. At time of final evaluation the SPMUs were not operative first and foremost due to lack of staffing in the State offices. The SC met several times during the course of the Pilot Project and the TCC in the form of the Joint Operations Committee (JOC) while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC has brought together the major stakeholders including the UN family (in Phase 1). 1.5 Alterations to Original Project Components and Outputs and Justification 138. The Project was designed to be implemented in three Phases with the design and implementation of Phase 2 Project Components being flexible enough to allow the Project to react to learning from Phase 1 and to the changing situation on the ground. Phase 3 was to consist largely of evaluation and learning. 139. As per the Project documentation the original Project Phase 1 was designed as a start-up phase running for three months (15thApril to 31st November 2013) with the aim to “establish a HQ PMU institutional framework, mechanisms, systems and procedures and to contract Implementing Partners who will provide technical assistance and execute programme activities including setting up of economic activities falling under Component 2 [Livelihoods Support].43Phase 1 largely ran to schedule until the suspension of the Project on 19th December 2013. 140. In the original Project documentation Phase 2 was designed as a follow-up and consolidation phase running for four months (1stDecember2013 to 31st March 2014) with the aim of reinforcing outcomes from Phase 1 through follow-up reintegration services “either in the form of cooperatives, entrepreneurship around small farm activities or small enterprise training, or continued education and opportunities to ex-combatants and community members at their place of reintegration.”44 As a result of the suspension of the Project Phase 2 ran from 15thMay 2014 until 31stJuly2014. 141. The project documentation identifies a third phase which was designed as the evaluation and knowledge transfer phase set to run between 1stApril and 15th June 2014. This phase was intended to complete “M&E activities with a beneficiary assessment and community dynamics study, as well as an overall evaluation of the processes, systems and outcomes of the Pilot. The knowledge transfer process will be completed during this phase.”45 In reality Phase 3 has not been a distinct phase and of those planned-for activities that have been implemented they have come towards the close of the Project: XC satisfaction survey conducted in July/August 2013, end evaluation in August and September 2014 with a follow-up learning session planed for October 2014. 142. Aside from minor scheduling changes Phase 1 was implemented as planned however as noted above the Project was suspended on 19thDecember, 2014 due to the deteriorating security 43 September 2013. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 42. 44 Ibid: 43. 45 Ibid: 43. 64 situation. The major implementation challenge arising from the suspension was that no progress had been made on activities in Component: DDR Community Support Projects. Activities were rescheduled to Phase 2 when the IA exceeded planned Project outcomes. The IA exceeded the planned-for number of outputs due to cost savings on construction that were subsequently put to use in an additional 5 sites. 143. . Phase 2 was very lightly designed in order to allow the Project to adjust to learnings from Phase 1 and from the MTR. At design Phase 2 had the following aims: (a) Visit all livelihood projects, that is where ex-combatants have formed working groups (partnerships, associations or cooperatives) once; (b) Ensure at least three follow-up counselling sessions with ex-combatants during their month-end visits to the NDDRC offices when they collect their monthly salaries; and (c) If necessary visit enterprises that are reported to be failing and as feasible, provide additional mentoring assistance to address challenges.46 144. Phase 2 encountered a rapidly deteriorating security situation and so implementation was postponed until 15thMay, 2013. In the interim period partners in the Project design engaged around potential activities for Phase 2. Based on learning from Phase 1 and the MTR the originally planned-for activities were largely overhauled. Regarding the intended aims of Phase 2 the original quantitative indicators (numbers of visits to ex-combatants, number of counselling sessions) were discarded and replaced with the following activities and justifications. More detailed exploration of outputs and outcomes from Phase two is included in Section 2 and 3 below. 145. Component: Livelihoods Support: (a) Shift of emphasis from training external IA-recruited trainers through TOT in Financial Literacy, Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives to training NDDRC ICRS workers. The justification for this shift is to retain expertise in the NDDRC and increase the capacity of ICRS workers to deliver technical counselling to ex- combatants. This design element was initiated by the NDDRC SC and implemented by UNICON. (b) Shift of emphasis from training external IA-recruited trainers through TOT in Agriculture (which included modules on numeracy and literacy, establishing a seed business, business planning and cooperatives) to including Agricultural Extension Workers from the State Ministry of Agriculture. The justification for this shift is: (i) to foster better cooperation with line ministries in the States, and (ii) to maximise delivery to ex-combatants and civilians as Agricultural Extension Workers work with both groups to dispense guidance of agricultural practices. (c) Inclusion of Technical Skills Extension: additional training mainly in auto mechanic and driving but also in carpentry, masonry and plumbing to ex-combatants. The justification for including these activities was the ex-combatant identified poor quality of training in Mapel TF in auto mechanic and driving as well as challenges faced by some ex-combatants obtaining their driving license and making use of the toolkit 46 Ibid: 26. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 65 received as part of this component in Phase 1. These activities were led by the NDDRC in cooperation with local training institutions in the State. A total of 52 individual participated in the driving classes whereas two ex-combatants received supplementary auto mechanics training.47 (d) Inclusion of planned expert mentoring visits by skilled trades people. This was intended to supplement vocational training received in Mapel TF however in reality this was a minor activity. The expert visits were limited to one welding expert, who visited the states of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes and mentored some ex-combatants who were trained in welding and now resided in those states.48 146. Component: Institutional Capacity Building: (a) Inclusion of South-South exchange in M&E. Phase 1 saw the completion of the Institutional Capacity Building component however activities focusing on M&E capacity building were not completed to the required standard and staffing challenges in the NDDRC compromised the effectiveness of those same activities. The Project included a South-South exchange with the RDRC in order to deliver M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and to draft the M&E manual for the Commission. 147. The Project documentation identifies that activities in Phase 3 were to contain a Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) and Community Dynamics (CD) survey. As a result of the changed circumstance on the ground a decision was made by the NDDRC and TDRP to cancel the surveys and replace them with a Beneficiary Satisfaction Survey (BSS). This survey was implemented by ICRS caseworkers between June and August 2014 with a final report due to be completed in September 2014, authored by the Bank TT. 148. In summary these changes to the Project largely have been driven by the deteriorated security situation and by the in-built Project flexibility to react to learning. 47 UNICON Draft Final Report Phase 2. 48 UNICON Draft Final Report Phase 2. 66 2. Project Outcomes 149. Following is an examination of Project outcome sat the time of the final evaluation of the Project. Outcomes differ from outputs in so far as they are the short to medium term changes that follow on from Project activities and the production of outputs. Implicitly the Project is designed so that Project outcomes fall into three broad categories: (a) The knowledge transferred and so behaviour changed (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation of DDR programming activities); (b) The short to medium term changes in the lives of main Project beneficiaries; that is, in the lives of ex-combatants and their communities as per the Project aims; (c) The shift in Project conceptualisation and planning based for any future DDR programming in South Sudan. 150. The Project logic model is such that at the time of final evaluation the Project should have achieved the short-term outcomes of a positive shift in capacity in the NDDRC and acquisition by the Commission of systems or institutional arrangements that should enable it to implement knowledge and skills acquired during the Project, thus positively changing its institutional performance both incrementally during the Project and in any future DDR programming. 151. The final evaluation finds that there have been behavioural shifts and knowledge shifts in the NDDRC in line with the aims of activities carried out in the Institutional Capacity Building component and also generally as a result successfully implementing reintegration programming in the Pilot. 152. Behavioural shifts and knowledge have resulted from activities in the Capacity Building Component in Phase 1 and in Phase 2. They have also resulted from the sum total of activities in the Pilot for example, where in some State offices staff have shown initiative and determination to maximise outcomes for ex-combatants and to proactively involve line ministries in supporting the Pilot programme (Section 2.1 below). 153. While without a Tracer and community survey it is difficult to measure the outcomes for beneficiaries of the project, certainly there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the Livelihoods Support component. Also there are reported positive outcomes for community members through the Community Supports Project as a result of having localised access to clean water. In all cases for ex-combatants and for community members the sustainability of outcomes is unclear and as discussed below (Section 2.1 and 2.3) there are mitigating factors negatively affecting some outcomes. 154. The MTR concluded that at the time of the review was unclear how outcomes achieved by the close of Phase 1 would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. The MTR found that that staff churn, imbalance in the organisational structure, lack of institutional support from the GoSS and apparent reliance on external TA were all factors negatively influencing the sustainability of Project outcomes. The final evaluation finds that these factors persist and are compounded by the hiatus on DDR programming resulting from the deteriorated security situation and by the removal of DDR from the mandate of UN in South Sudan. 155. As is discussed below (Section 2.2 and Section 3) the hiatus in DDR programming will have a major negative effect on the outcomes of the Project unless managed effectively by the Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 67 NDDRC with the support of the GoSS and the external partners to the Commission including not just BICC and TDRP but also UMMISS and donors. This is particularly the case regarding outcomes from the Institutional Capacity Building component and from the creation of an ICRS. 156. The loss of DDR from the UNMISS mandate is a major challenge to the NDDRC and the GoSS. For the NDDRC it constitutes the loss of a logistical support however it also represents an opportunity to re-engage the UN in a changed external and programmatic environment. The Commission are being proactive in seeking the re-incorporation of DDR in the UN mandate if renewed in November 2014 and it is imperative that this re-engagement is highly strategic and done with a view to maximising the input from the UN both as a thought-partner in the ‘good- enough coalitions’ that design and implement DDR programming and also as a logistical partner. 2.1. Livelihood Supports 157. At the time of final evaluation the outcomes of the Livelihood Supports component are: (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of programme design and procurement, transportation and distribution of start-up kits; (b) Learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge transfer and acquisition and quality control reporting from the field; (c) Nascent involvement of other national stakeholders on State level in the implementation of the livelihoods sub-component; (d) Increased collaboration with local service providers in delivering livelihoods assistance to ex-combatants; (e) A majority of Project participants has started utilising the toolkits for livelihood activities; (f) Project participants have acquired additional vocational and entrepreneurial knowledge which many of them utilise to initiate livelihood opportunities; (g) Increased engagement of ex-combatants and community members in group livelihood activities (associations/cooperatives). 158. In the case of the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON has delivered high quality reporting that details the steps in design, procurement, transportation and distribution, and that profiles successful and unsuccessful bidders and other external Partners involved in the implementation of the sub-component. Effectively this reporting constitutes a mini-procurement and distribution manual with market intelligence for the NDDRC to implement future similar sub-components. 159. Regarding learning how an IA can better manage knowledge acquisition, transfer and quality control reporting from the field, in Phase 1 UNICON worked with overly and unnecessarily complicated implementation arrangements, contracting CRADA, a South Sudanese NGO to deliver the training sub-component and encountering significant personnel, quality, and contracting issues with the NGO. Contracting CRADA appeared to be a way of replicating UNICON’s operating model in other countries. However, the approach put a poorly performing organisation and poorly performing CEO between UNICON and the independent trainers who were contracted to deliver training to ex-combatants and the communities. Consequently communications with the key personnel on the ground were mediated by a poorly performing organisation, which it was incorrectly assumed would employ its own staff to deliver training. Consequently intelligence from the field as to the effectiveness of training and dynamics in the delivery of outputs on the ground was interrupted and reporting from the field not to the standard 68 expected by UNICON. In Phase 2 recommendations regarding this issue were considered by the IA leading to improved reporting and less complicated implementation structures to deliver the training sub-component. 160. As mentioned above in Phase 1 all livelihood activities (training and start-up kit subcomponent) were implemented by the IA and sub-contracted service providers with no direct involvement of the Line Ministries on State level. In line with the National DDR Strategic Plan (2012-2020), the collaboration with the line ministries was significantly strengthened in Phase 2. In WBGS, for instance, the NDDRC State Office closely coordinated pilot reintegration activities with various Ministries on State level to maximize gains for ex-combatants. As a result of this collaboration selected groups of ex-combatants received additional reintegration benefits such as plots of land, timber and seeds. 161. Although these developments are still early stage, these are signs of a growing albeit loose relationship between the NDDRC and the State Ministries. Even though the above mentioned activities may have been more a result of a strong initiative of the respective NDDRC State office rather than a structured approach towards engaging State Ministries and it is uncertain to what extent this proactive involvement of the Ministries has been replicated in other States, the given example indicates that the DDR Programme can succeed in harmonizing its activities with other national stakeholders. The cooperation with the Ministries leads to greater alignment of the Pilot Project with the National DDR Strategic Plan that stipulates national institutions and local service providers to play a role in implementing the reintegration component. 162. As of now the collaboration between the NDDRC and the State Ministries on reintegration related issues appears to be loose and is at times characterized by ad hoc engagement and individual initiative. Consequentially, the related operational procedures and processes are – in parts - still unstructured and lack a holistic approach. It is, for instance, still unclear on what grounds groups of ex-combatants have received additional livelihood benefits (most importantly the level of formalisation of an association/cooperative) or what will be the impact on acquired land titles should a cooperative cease to persist. In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise such implementation arrangements. There is a risk that due to the imminent halt in the DDR Programme the emerging ties between NDDRC and other national stakeholders will stagnate thereby negatively affecting the sustainability of the achieved Project outcomes. 163. Whereas in Phase 1 external trainers hired by the IA delivered training, in Phase 2 technical skills training was implemented in close collaboration with a variety of public and private and well-established local service providers. For instance, the IA coordinated its agricultural extension work with the State Ministry of Agriculture. In the agriculture context the IA trained extension workers in best practices and appropriate farming techniques. In addition targeted vocational trainings were provided to ex-combatants via existing vocational training institutions (e.g. ex-combatants enrolled in driving and mechanic courses with the Wau Vocational Training Centre; in Aweil and Rumbek ex-combatants joined classes at a driving/auto-mechanic school). This localised approach towards training not only helps to build the capacity of South Sudanese institutions and organisations but also is likely to be more cost- efficient than implementation arrangements involving external or international training institutions. With regard to future programming it remains to be seen whether the same approach can be applied. Especially when the programme is massively up scaled it is uncertain whether the existing local service providers have enough technical and human resources to handle large numbers of ex-combatants. As much it is feasible to utilise them in DDR operations, it will be Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 69 necessary to carefully assess their capacities prior to the Project start and scope the programmatic options for aligning with institution building work in the States. 164. The training of trainers that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) has increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. It is, however, not clear in how far the trainers were able to utilise the skills and knowledge they acquired in the TOT in the delivery of trainings to the ex- combatants. In light of the reported varying skills levels of extension workers and ICRS staff (in terms of technical but also literacy/numeracy skills) it is difficult to draw conclusions concerning short to medium term outcomes of the extension trainings. 165. According to Project documentation on the entrepreneurship TOT in Phase 2 the trainers were empowered to influence the ex-combatants and instil in them a positive attitude toward their resettlement with their communities through setting up cooperative based business enterprises. At time of the final evaluation it is clear that trainers can articulate the concepts of entrepreneurship and cooperatives and apply the training process. The trainers can also assist ex-combatants in taking key decisions concerning business start-ups.49 166. Despite these positive gains a general critique about the TOT is that the training was relatively short given the amount of knowledge (on the training process and methods) that had to be imparted to the ICRS staff. The trained were granted limited time to develop certain key competencies and to absorb the training materials. Since the group of trainers changed from Phase 1 to Phase 2 the Project could also not build on the previous training and fieldwork, but had to start afresh thereby not being able to utilize the capabilities that had been built earlier in the Project. 167. The MTR identified that the Project assumed that reintegration programming, if implemented well, would increase confidence in the effectiveness of the DDR programme, and as a consequence, confidence in the NDDRC. The MTR noted that at the time of writing there was no evidence for this outcome. The final evaluation re-emphasizes these findings. Given the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013, the fragile security situation and ongoing mobilisation in the country there is generally little to no confidence in DDR as part of or linked to wider SSR. Regarding shifts that may occur in the perceptions and confidence held by ex-combatants and community members, relevant questions were not included in the Baseline surveys and so should be in future iterations. Increase in confidence in DDR, Reintegration programming and the NDDRC are critical to the future role of the NDDRC and future DDR programming in partnership with of SSR. 168. The expert visits that were introduced as a supplementary sub-component in Phase 2 had limited outcomes. While it was planned that a majority of ex-combatants of non-agriculture reintegration tracks receive a visit by an experienced professional with proven skills in their respective field, the expert visits were only offered by one welding expert. The limited reach of this activity was, according to the IA, due to lack of availability of experts in locations close to those of the corresponding ex-combatants, and the involvement of ex-combatants in agricultural work. The scaling-up of this sub-component in future programme iterations will be challenging as it is questionable whether there will be enough local experts available to carry out training on the job. Moreover, the amount of individual attention needed for each ex-combatant is very high and potentially not scalable. 49 Report by Lead Consultant to UNICON on TOT in phase 2 70 169. As mentioned above, the final evaluation faces challenges in measuring the outcomes for individual beneficiaries because of the missing tracer survey and constraining environmental factors. However, based on data of a Satisfaction Survey that was conducted in July/August 2014 by TDRP in close collaboration with NDDRC, it is nevertheless possible to at least identify broad trends. 170. The Satisfaction Survey aimed to find out: (i) the extent to which DDR participants are satisfied with the Pilot Programme; (ii) how well ex-combatants were reintegrated into the society; (iii) how they were faring in the host communities since being demobilized, and (iv) what were their subsequent embankments on the reintegrating process.50 In total the survey had a sample size of 204 ex-combatants (70.3 percent of the current caseload) including 192 males and 12 females.51 171. The results of the Satisfaction Survey show that there have been observable gains made in livelihoods for some ex-combatants through activities in the livelihoods sub-component. The available data though, especially around the establishment of cooperatives and associations has to be analysed with some degree of caution because there appears to be some conflict around the concept of cooperatives in the South Sudanese context (especially the clear distinction between cooperatives, associations and working groups). For future DDR programming clear-cut guidelines on cooperative work have to be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved including line ministries. 172. According to the Satisfaction Survey results the overwhelming majority of respondents (70 percent) indicate to be very or somewhat satisfied with the toolkit they received and most (89.1 percent) remarked that they know how to utilise the tools. Those respondents that had attended the animal husbandry, masonry and auto mechanic/driving classes in Mapel reported lowest levels of satisfaction with the toolkit. The respondents that express dissatisfaction with the toolkit mostly criticise that the tools were of low quality and easy to break and that parts of the tools were missing upon delivery. Another point of concern was raised regarding the types of toolkits. The study finds that 46.5 percent of the respondents mention that the toolkits they had received did not match to what was used at the vocational trainings at Mapel which obviously is a crucial point to consider in future DDR programming. Concerning the short to medium term livelihood impact of the toolkits the survey results show that the majority of respondents still make use of the materials they have received. The study finds that 61.4 percent indicate to frequently or sometimes use the kit, with the agriculture and carpentry group making most frequent use of the tools in direct comparison to other vocational tracks. ! 173. Regarding the vocational skills training in Mapel most respondents report that the training taught them something new and that they have utilised the training skills in their daily lives (an exception are those ex-combatants that received an auto mechanic training). The study finds that 71.3 percent of those respondents that indicate to utilise the vocational training skills mention they taught other family or community members the skills they acquired in Mapel, 57.3 percent state to make use of what they were taught to solve things in the household whereas more than half (51.3 percent) indicate to use the acquired skills to improve their own business. The respondents who report not to have used the vocational skills give as reasons that access to capital 50 See Ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey Results (Draft in Progress) 51 Due to logistical and security constraints not all programme participants took part in the survey. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 71 was lacking (69.8 percent), that they did not have the right tools (51.2 percent) and that the training was not sufficient/they did not learn enough (39.5 percent). ! ! 174. Almost three quarters of the interviewed ex-combatants (74.5 percent of the sample) report to currently work in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (particularly those respondents that attended carpentry and agriculture classes). Amongst the respondents that attended the carpentry course the overwhelming majority (93.3 percent) is still working in the same vocation, followed by the group of respondents that attended agriculture lessons (91.8 percent are still active in agriculture). For the other vocational tracks these figures are slightly or much lower. The study finds that 69.2 percent of respondents that attended the electrician course still work in that vocation, for auto mechanics this figure is 62.3 percent (which is an somewhat surprising result given the low level of satisfaction with the training course), welding 57.1 percent and animal husbandry 46.7 percent. The interviewees that attended the masonry and plumbing course are least successful in this respect. ! 175. These results show that some of the vocational trainings have not been thoroughly linked to marketable skills and knowledge was not always imparted in line with the market realities. Some vocations were simply not beneficial for starting relevant business in the communities of return. This is in part resulting from the lack of counselling on what technical skills would be useful in relation to the market opportunities in the ex-combatants’ respective locations.52 The lack of thorough market analysis has already been a point of criticism in the CPA DDR programme - these lessons learned have obviously not been adequately mirrored in the National DDR pilot Project. ! 176. Out of the sample of 204 ex-combatants only 3 respondents did not take part in the entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperative training in Mapel. The overwhelming majority of the respondents who participated in the course affirmed that they acquired new knowledge, with 59.9 percent indicating to have learned a lot and 31.2 percent to have gathered some new knowledge. The greater majority of participants (73.5 percent) claimed to have used some or a lot of that knowledge and skills in their daily lives whereas 6.4 percent only used very little of what was learned. Only 13.7 percent of respondents mentioned not to utilise the entrepreneurship skills. Amongst this group most respondents (79.2 percent) gave as a reason that there is no opportunity to apply the knowledge. This hints at the lack of economic opportunities and limited absorption capacity of the market in South Sudan which is a major stumbling block for many ex-combatants. 177. Those survey participants that reported using the entrepreneurship skills utilise them when working with other people (83.4 percent). Another 67.5 percent within that group also notes that they had formed a cooperative or that they were in the process of forming one (31.1 percent). This correlates with data received by the NDDRC on the formation of cooperatives in the Pilot Project. In total 17 livelihood groups 53 were set up across Greater Bahr el Gahazal of which most are not registered cooperatives as such but in the process of registering. These findings confirm that the training was effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. This, however, does not mean that ex- combatants solely focus on such livelihood forms. When asked how the entrepreneurship skills were utilized more than half (57.0 percent) of the respondents claim that they managed to 52 See also UNICON. Consultancy to Implement the Livelihoods Support Component– Phase 2. Comments and Recommendation based on Interaction with Trainers after Phase II Follow-up (unofficial document). 53 7 in Warrap State, 5 in WBGS and 5 in NBGS 72 establish a business. More than a third (34.4 percent) says they utilized the skills to improve on an existing business while a slight less number of the respondents (29.1 percent) mention to have found an employment opportunity because of the entrepreneurship training they received. 178. Out of the 204 respondents that took part in the survey 203 participated in a follow-up business or cooperative training after leaving Mapel, with most of them (80.5 percent) receiving training for two full days or more. Similar to the results of the Mapel training, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicate that the supplementary training on entrepreneurship and financial literacy taught them a lot or some additional knowledge (93.6 percent) and more than three quarters (80.5 percent) still make use of the training to a large or some degree. These results clearly indicate a positive impact of the State level training. 179. Other indicators convey a rather mixed picture of the economic situation of pilot programme beneficiaries. In order to meet their household expenses at the end of each month, more than one third of the respondents (37.9 percent) report that they usually have to borrow from someone else, another 25.6 percent on the other hand mentions that they usually break-even and another 23.6 percent states that they usually have money left over. Equally mixed findings came out of the survey when respondents were asked whether their income changed because of the vocational training they received. 42.6 percent report that their income increased, 37.3 percent see no change in income while 20.1 percent of the interviewees even notice a decrease in earning. 180. When comparing the livelihood activities of the respondents before and after going through the DDR programme, there are some slight changes visible. The most striking change is the increased participation in registered cooperatives (of more than 21 people). While only 0.7 percent of the sample indicates to have worked in a cooperative before joining the DDR Pilot, 18.0 percent of the respondents report to participate in a cooperative after DDR. This figure of 18.0 percent is high and must be interpreted with caution. There is a high likelihood that this increase in-group livelihood activities results from the trainings and counselling around cooperative business. 181. The final evaluation finds that this result is a positive outcome of the livelihood support component that should, however, not be over-interpreted. As the satisfaction survey data does not give clear indication about the success of the newly established cooperatives and associations, the final evaluation cannot make any judgment about their effectiveness and value in terms of creating sustainable livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants. As helpful as cooperatives are in creating a supportive environment for ex-combatants and the communities involved, cooperatives need to be understood in the broader market context and its absorption capacity. Not every vocation is equally suited for cooperative business and not every cooperative has a potential to succeed which is a point that needs to be taken into consideration more thoroughly in future DDR programming. 182. Socially, most interviewed ex-combatants (79.8 percent) mention not to face any challenges back in their home communities. The overwhelming majority report that their communities were accepting them after their return from Mapel and that they did not face any hostile or jealous reactions from other community members because of the reintegration assistance they received or their salaries. When asked about their expectations with regard to their military status upon completion of the DDR programme, 85.2 percent of the respondents indicated that they regard themselves as civilian whereas only 14.8 percent expected that they would continue to be a Wounded Hero. Although not every DDR participant hence seems to have understood or accepted that they cease to be part of the military, the overwhelming majority of Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 73 participants do acknowledge the transition process from soldier to civilian. In this respect the programme’s outcomes have been moderately positive. 2.2. Institutional Capacity Building 183. The main Institutional Capacity Building component was implemented in Phase 1 of the Project and assessed at the time of the MTR (at the close of Phase 1). At the time of the MTR the outcomes of the activities in this component had focused on knowledge acquisition, knowledge and skills transfer (from the consultants to the NDDRC) and the seeding of new systems and ways of working in the NDDRC. The component was intended to produce difficult to measure but critical shifts in the institutional behaviour of the NDDRC. The MTR identified that at the key knowledge, skills and behavioural outcomes of the Component had been: (a) Aggregate knowledge products which while listed above as outputs in aggregate form a greater knowledge bank; (b) Increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same; (c) A greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this Project; (d) Positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; (e) Nascent understanding of key systems required for successful operation particularly internal (within HQ and between HQ and State offices) such as communications; operational planning; human capacity, and monitoring and evaluation; (f) Reconstituted M&E department in NDDRC. 184. The MTR noted that at the close of Phase 1 the main outcomes from the Project components had been: (i) organizational shift in the NDDRC M&E unit; (ii) mapping of institutional barriers to improving the performance of the NDDRC; (iii) capacity changes throughout the NDDRC in key areas such as operational planning, the work of the PMUs, and formalization of job roles and descriptions; (iv) nascent improvements in connectivity and information flow between HQ and State Offices, and (v) recommendations pertaining to the way forward for capacity building the NDDRC and critical areas that need to be addressed including relationships with external partners including UN agencies (UNMISS, UNDP and UNESCO). 185. As seen above (Section 1.5) Phase 2 supplementary activities under this Component were the M&E capacity building delivered as a South-South exchange with the RDRC. Supplementary capacity building activities implemented outside the component were: (i) the technical capacity building of the IT unit and ICRS workers around the ICRS; (ii) the programming and installation of the ICRS itself; (iii) training of ICRS case workers in Financial Literacy, Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (iv) training of ICRS in delivering a PDA-based survey (the satisfaction survey). Both the ICRS and the satisfaction survey are not financed under the Project but are complementary activities implemented by the Word Bank TT. 186. At the time of the final evaluation the medium term outcomes of these supplementary trainings are hard to predict. Certainly in the short term and depending on the individual concerned some of the ICRS workers will have increased understanding and skills in the basics of the financial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives, as well as increased skills in delivering a PDA-based survey. 74 187. The NDDRC IT has experienced an increase in technical skills around working with the ICRS as a result of the training and technology transfer however as flagged by the Bank TT itself and by the IT unit there is a need for additional support and some technical functions cannot be actioned by the unit without the direct support of the Bank TT’s IT consultant. 188. Similarly ICRS case-workers may have received a variety of training inputs but how these inputs can or will influence performance in the field is not clear. This Project evaluation does not constitute an institutional assessment and did not take a scientific approach to examine how the NDDRC works in the field however, though observation it is clear that the innovation and achievements evident in those State offices visited by the evaluation arise largely from the initiative and capability of the staff there. In such situations then the training may have a more- than-short-term impact. 189. Performance is influenced by many factors and at the State level where the group of NDDRC staff (ICRS workers) who have been most highly targeted by capacity building during the Project work, performance is severely negatively influenced by the critical lack of infrastructure and resources. Negative impacts of poor resource allocations resulting from the austerity budget (from delays in payment of salaries to basic budgeting items) have been exacerbated by the loss of critical infrastructure as a result of UNMISS withdrawing support (generators, power, transport) and the effects of the ongoing deterioration in security. These factors affect HQ but are far more striking at State level. The factors influencing performance are augmented by the pause in activity by some parts of the NDDRC as it waits to see where DDR will be situated and the wider SSR environment that emerges from the Addis negotiations and the current instability (Section 4). 190. In summary, all these factors contribute to a continuous erosion of ‘institutional capacity’. Apart from the shape of the ICRS unit, much of the nascent systems and positive ways of working that emerged during Phase 1 have all but disappeared. Arguably the ICRS unit itself while functioning is indicative of what the IA identified as the problematic institutional arrangements and organisational structure in the NDDRC54: it is evidence of an organisation imbalance both in terms of activity and in terms of information flow which will need to be addressed in any future programming and through the proactive leadership of the NDDRC itself. 191. The MTR identified that M&E capacity building in Phase 1 was impeded by a lack of staffing in the NDDRC. Despite the implementation of M&E capacity building activities in Phase 2 a similar situation exists now in the Commission and so M&E capabilities appear at best, rudimentary. 192. The Project did not engage in capacity building activities around public information partly because this field was covered by other partner institutions to the NDDRC such as UNMISS and BICC. Therefore the public information and communications agenda was technically outside the scope of the reintegration pilot. The NDDRC and UNMISS PI departments though faced crucial funding challenges that significantly aggravated sensitisation efforts and outreach. Although the NDDRC in collaboration with its partners carried out sensitisation events in the assembly areas prior to the start of the DDR programme, not all potential DDR candidates could be reached (partly because of lack of cooperation on the side of 54 October 30th, 2013. ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 75 the SPLA commanders, difficult access to the XCs’ home communities and wounded heroes communication channels being by word of mouth, discrepancy between profiled caseload and actual programme beneficiaries). Due to this gap in sensitisation ex-combatants had different and sometimes overly high expectations for their reinsertion training. Although the DDR trainers were providing orientation to the XCs upon their arrival and additional sensitisation sessions in Mapel were carried out during the reinsertion period to counter lack of sensitisation, the information provided to XCs was incomplete and lacked coherence. General information about the DDR programme during reintegration was provided by the ICRS caseworkers but not in a structured manner (i.e. following the PI strategy). For future programme iterations it will therefore be crucial to better integrate sensitisation activities throughout reinsertion and reintegration programming (e.g. information dissemination about the DDR process should be closely linked to the vocational and life skills modules). Moreover, sufficient funding needs to be availed to cover the sensitisation campaigns for the targeted recipient needs.55 ! 2.3 DDR Community Support Projects 193. At the time of final evaluation the outcomes of the DDR Community Support component are: (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively implement DDR Community Support Projects in areas with high concentration of ex-combatants; (b) Improved access to clean water for target communities where water projects were implemented; (c) Learning regarding the effectiveness of Community Driven Development/Reconstruction (CDD/R) Projects in the DDR context. 194. At the time of the MTR no project outcomes from the DDR Community Supports Projects were reported due to implementation delays stemming from disruption of transport links as a result of the rains and the suspension of the Project on December 19th, 2013. The timing for the community projects turned out to be a major factor influencing Project implementation. Due to the rainy season most selected sites were completely inaccessible for several months that not only negatively affected the pace of construction works but also hindered the IA from travelling to the communities to carry out community mobilizations. Seasonal changes in South Sudan thus have to be taken into account more thoroughly in planning future DDR phases. 195. Despite the mentioned implementation challenges the IA none the less managed to deliver the required outputs after a no cost extension was issued by the WB until end of May 2014. The Project highly benefited from the IA’s experience with similar types of community based Projects. 196. The evaluation finds that there seems to be an increased understanding within NDDRC of what is necessary to facilitate implementation of CDD/R projects. Through collaboration with IOM on the community sub-component the NDDRC State offices engaged in varying degrees with the communities of return although the individual livelihood support was more in the centre of NDDRC’s attention. Confusion only arose with regard to the bidding process as the NDDRC seemed not be aware that the Project had to follow IOM’s procurement procedures and therefore suggested utilising the GoSS procurement policy. Through a very transparent bid analysis involving the relevant NDDRC departments this issue could be solved. However, future projects 55 See also NDDRC’s internal lessons learned paper (December 2013). 76 should ensure that all actors are aware of the partners’ respective policies and that knowledge about procurement procedures is widely spread within the organisations. 197. The community projects have brought a positive change for target communities. Although the final evaluation did not have a chance to appraise all 17 projects and only 2 sites were visited in WBGS (water interventions/boreholes)56, the evaluation find that the interventions that were assessed are providing direct and clear benefits to the communities and appear to meet local needs and priorities. For example, one water Project in WBGS provided more than 1050 people with clean water which exemplifies the strong impact the Project has on local health and development. 198. The objectives of the community support projects, in particularly the overall aim to promote peacebuilding in the pilot States and the goal to demonstrate NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community, are overly ambitious given the relatively small size of the sub-component. Concluding from the field visits completed in the frame of the final evaluation it appears that the communities concerned were only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC. The lack of understanding in the community of the link between DDR and local development might be partly due to the small caseload with only some few ex-combatants resettling in certain areas, it puts into question the Project’s aspiration to demonstrate NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community. In future one possible way to go would be to increase the scale of the community interventions to ensure visibility and to distinguish the DDR Community Support Projects from other Projects implemented by different organizations in the same community. Instead of linking the community projects to the work of DDR Commission the Project would rather emphasise its peace dividend aspect and the fact that through the assimilation of ex-combatants the community receives additional benefits. Alternatively a coherent sister CDD programme separate from DDR could replace activities. 199. The final evaluation finds that the Project’s aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types. The focus on water interventions and market rehabilitation, which originated from the belief that these interventions are simple to implement, restricted the options that were presented to the communities hence minimizing their level of engagement. An exception was the completion of the Payam building in NBGS that followed a purely community driven approach (the community requested the completion of the unfinished Payam office which was of high priority but outside the preferred project categories of water and marketplace improvements). The building was completed using local skilled and unskilled labourers from the community, an approach that reinforced the community’s ownership of the project. 200. The design of the component has an emphasis on sustainability through the formation of community water management committees. However, as the MTR found, both the experience of IOM in previous projects in South Sudan (outside DDR which identified that there were difficulties maintaining and charging for the water services) and the model of borehole/water pumps being used (manual compared to solar power) point to the high risks to the sustainability of the water infrastructure post-completion. The final evaluation re-emphasizes these risks. 56 Sites that were visited in the frame of final evaluation: 1.) Nyikejo Village (Jur River County, Rochdog Payam, WBGS); 2.) Nyinalel (Jur River County, Marial Bai Payam, WBGS) Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 77 201. Although the evaluation did not use an impact evaluation to assess the impact of the DDR community projects on the target population, there is anecdotal evidence that the communities have little capacity to manage newly constructed infrastructural resources in the medium and long term. Although the IA delivered trainings to members of the water management committees and consequentially knowledge on infrastructure maintenance was imparted to the community, it remains questionable whether these skills will be utilised in future. Ideally, follow-up training or refresher courses in repair and maintenance would be needed to ensure sustainability of the training impact, as would access to spare parts. 202. The community members interviewed for this study all expressed concern that in case the water borehole breaks down the community will lack the necessary financial resources to purchase the needed spare parts. Instead of seeking sustainable and self-reliant solutions to this problem (such as structured savings for the pump installation), most interviewees stressed that they would rather look for assistance from the NDDRC or other government institutions. This exemplifies a strong aid dependency that puts the CDD/R projects at risk and also aggravates the implementation of any future community project of that kind. 2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition 203. As a pilot the Project must be orientated towards trialling systems and institutional capability, documenting learning and auctioning relevant learning. 204. The MTR found that by design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing and disseminating learning. The MTR identified that throughout design and implementation that the Bank TT had worked progressively with the NDDRC, the IAs and with key external stakeholders to emphasis the learning-orientation of the Project. The final evaluation finds that the Bank TT and IAs were consistent in their orientation towards learning as evidenced by the volume of learning content in IA reporting to the Bank identifying pertinent issues and tracking challenges and recommendations for future programming including in areas outside the purview of particular IAs but within their scope of operation. 205. Also the MTR identified that the NDDRC was eager to learn by doing but that logistical challenges and human capacity were limiting factors on the ability of the Commission to fully engage and implement learning. The MTR found that the challenge to the NDDRC is to action the learning it is acquiring: in other words, learning should be reflexive and should practically inform the next phase of the Project and subsequent programme design. Critically, the NDDRC and the Project architects should reflect fully on the recommendations and reporting of all IAs including those further down the delivery chain particularly the Training Professional Dr. Guatam Raj Jain and the Trainers who worked during Phase 1 of the Livelihoods Support Component. In place of the now-cancelled evaluation of the Mapel TF and the programme implemented there the NDDRC should engage UN thought partners in a full review of the both the programmatic learning and strategic learning from the Project interrogating all assumptions of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility including that the appropriate way to design DDR in South Sudan is using the Transition Facility Approach. Any Phase 3 learning sessions should incorporate stakeholders from the wider South Sudan DDR programming environment. 206. Observing programmatic learning pertaining to activities, the final evaluation finds that the learning orientation of the Project persisted into Phase 2. IAs successfully improved field M&E to accurately track outputs and short-term outcomes and the NDDRC worked to collate and manage data from the field. It should be noted that data collection in such complex, fragile and insecure areas as those presented by the Project is highly challenging and often problematic. That 78 said at a programme level the data-collection by IAs and that of the NDDRC has some limitations. For both the IAs and the NDDRC data pertaining to outcomes particularly numbers of functional cooperatives/associations is not reliable. For the NDDRC data sharing and learning sharing within the NDDRC is limited. This appears partly to be a result of institutional imbalance and partly a result of disconnection between human systems in the Commission (which is perpetuated by resource challenges and lack of connectivity between HQ and State offices). 207. As identified in the MTR for learning to be useful it must be actioned. The Project has demonstrated how the NDDRC can implement a pilot reintegration project and it has tracked consistently the opportunities and challenges of the implementation. The question is how the NDDRC and the Project Architects will systematically reflect on programmatic learning; on strategic learning and on how the two interrelate. Critically the learning from the Project while largely programmatic also has relevance to the wider strategic context including the design of any future DDR programming, the necessity of aligning DDR and SSR, and critically ensuring transparent GoSS buy-in to that same DDR and SSR. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 79 3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 208. The evaluation finds that the Project has satisfactorily provided ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return (first socio- economic objective). Whether it has facilitated social reintegration is not clear (second socio- economic objective). 209. The evaluation finds that the Project has performed highly satisfactorily generating lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming (first reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). It has performed moderately satisfactorily to develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the project (second reintegration programme, systems and learning objective). 210. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level. 211. At the time of final evaluation (end of Phase 2 of 3) the Project has made good progress towards meeting of its Project objectives and appears on course to meet its remaining objectives. The MTR documented how the project despite early implementation challenges had recovered to successfully implement the majority of activities in Phase 1 except those negatively affected by factors outside the control of the Project: activities in the Component Community Support Projects were affected by environmental issues and activities in the Component Institutional Capacity Building were affected by human capacity in the NDDRC. 212. The factors affecting the implementation and outcomes of the Pilot can be classified as: (i) those directly related to the Project design; (ii) those related to institutional capacity and arrangements, and (iii) those related to the external environment including the security, policy and donor environment 213. In summary, the challenges that are directly related to Project design and implementation and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows. 214. The factors negatively affecting the Project outcomes since the beginning of the pilot, some of which (as outlined below) have been addressed by the Project implementers are: (a) Limited institutional capacity of the NDDRC; (b) The external environment; (c) The external market for skills imparted to ex-combatants; (d) Data management regarding outcomes of Components Design limitations including internal coherence, timing and use of delivery chains (addressed since the MTR); (e) Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation (addressed since the MTR); (f) Quality of some outputs (addressed since the MTR). 215. The factors positively affecting the Project outcomes are: (a) Fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme (as per MTR); (b) Positive relationships between the TDRP and UN agencies (as per MTR); 80 (c) Close project management and operational involvement of the TDRP (as per MTR) in cooperation with BICC; (d) Responsiveness and ability of IAs to become operational for Phase 2 in a short notice period; (e) Flexibility of IAs in reacting to a somewhat iterative project design (see point a previous paragraph); (f) Cooperation with line Ministries in the States. 216. Design limitations such as internal coherence, timing and the use of delivery chains. The MTR found that in Phase 1 the implementation of the Project during the season when ex- combatants would normally tend their land negatively impacted on the achievement of outcomes relating to sustainable livelihoods by ex-combatants. However the timeframe for the Project implementation was largely outside the control of the key stakeholders other than the NDDRC as the Project was required to align with the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project that itself was poorly timed. 217. The external security environment heavily influenced the timing of Phase 2. The MTR found that the Project appeared to lack some internal coherence with a wide spread of activities matched in the Project documentation with a too-ambitious set of objectives. Similarly the MTR found that the use of delivery chains, particularly in the Component: Livelihood Supports compromised quality control and contributed to unnecessary challenges implementing training activities. 218. Some Phase 2 activities such as training under Component Livelihood Supports do not present a coherent ‘flow’ or logic from the Phase 1 activities. The decision to capacity build ICRS caseworkers through TOT went against the advice of the lead trainer and designer of the training curriculum and missed the opportunity to capitalise on progress made with independent consultants in the States in Phase 1. The decision to use Phase 2 to compensate for shortcomings in the training given by UNESCO in the Mapel TF (training that is programmatically unconnected to the Project) appears out of sync with the intention of a Pilot and rather appears to be compensating for the performance of other agencies in Phase 1. However that the supplementary training was delivered through local vocational institutions rather than through trainers in a Transition Facility is an important point proving that the capacity to train ex- combatants exists in the vocational training sector. 219. In Phase 2 the IA (UNICON) successfully addressed issues relating to the use of delivery chains to deliver training to ex-combatants experienced during Phase 1. In Phase 2 the IA showed a much better understood the environment and the challenges to implementation and expertly dealt with challenges encountered during implementation. 220. Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation. The IAs addressed all effectiveness and implementation delays experienced in Phase 1 and documented in the MTR (effective were lack of experience, lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there). UNICON did not experience any of the effectiveness and implementation challenges it encountered in Phase 1. The IOM exceeded its delivery targets and completed all activities on time. 221. The external market for skills imparted to ex-combatants. The Project documentation identifies that along with testing delivery systems the Livelihood Support component will Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 81 “provide livelihood support services to ex-combatants in their communities of return to facilitate long-term livelihood success.” 57 This outcome of ‘long-term livelihood success’ is greatly influenced by the external environment but also by the reality of the local markets into which ex- combatants are integrated. 222. The training given to ex-combatants by the Project is closely tied to the skills imparted during the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel. While the Project can train ex-combatants in cooperatives and entrepreneurship any outcome from that training is limited by the vocation in which the ex-combatant was trained, the quality of that training and the demand for those newly acquired vocational skills in the market place. With some vocational training it is clear that there is little obvious demand for cooperatives: for example, welding. In the case of welding the Wau ex-combatant welders’ cooperative that was formed during Phase 1 (and had land granted to it from the Ministry of Land and Physical Infrastructure via the NDDRC State office and was given a generator and plasma torch); at the time of the final evaluation this cooperative of six ex- combatants had dissolved. One ex-combatant remained in an unpaid apprenticeship with a local civilian welder. The fate of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperative illustrates a clear underlying weakness in the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Project which negatively impacts on the outcomes of the Project: the vocational training given to ex-combatants is based on a very general and macro-level UN-led assessment of market opportunities. 223. Unfortunately the UN has not conducted a final evaluation of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project so the effectiveness of the vocational training programme has not been measured however; from the observable evidence the main form of cooperative or associative working that is yielding returns for ex-combatants appears to be for those trained in agriculture, not the other vocational skills. This reflects a critical challenge that is universal in vocational training programmes in DDR: how the vocational training aligns with the absorptive capacity of the market. 224. Activities in the Institutional Capacity Building component encouraging the formation of cooperatives have faced other challenges. One such challenge has been the lack of clarity around the officially acceptable definition of a cooperative. In South Sudan the required number of members to register as a cooperative is 21 people: which even within the agriculture sector is a limiting factor. In reality the line ministry at the State accepts a lower number of members when recognising a cooperative but there is no set definition. Consequently the line ministry in Western Bahr al Ghazal accepted six members to register the Wau ex-combatant welding cooperative but such decisions appear to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Consequently a lack of clarity exists around how to advise ex-combatants and community members to form cooperatives. 225. The lack of standardisation and systems at ministerial level and in the NDDRC presents a risk factor to the NDDRC. In the case of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperatives the NDDRC state office managed to secure a grant of a parcel of land from the line ministry to enable the cooperative develop a premises or site for trading. However as with the granting of timber to the Wau carpentry cooperative (a cooperative which at the time of the final evaluation was one person as the others were reported by the remaining members as absent tending their lands) the granting of land has been on a case-by-case basis and highly reliant on the industry of the NDDRC staff thus leading to the possibility of the NDDRC being accused of bias when one cooperative gets a grant of an asset and another does not. 57 September 2013. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 25. 82 226. With the dissolution of the Wau ex-combatant welders cooperative the NDDRC is faced with the unusual situation of a land title granted to a non-existent cooperative without any clear systematic way of managing that land or the grant of land itself. In such a situation the NDDRC is faced with a reputation risk where state offices can be perceived as acquiring land for itself. Regardless of such reputational risk, purely for the harmonization of systems and to accurately gauge how to scale such important support from the line ministries it is imperative that the NDDRC formalises all the relevant definitions and procedures around cooperatives and granting of assets or resources by line ministries. 227. Quality of outputs. As documented in the MTR, at the end of Phase 1 in the Component Institutional Capacity Building the Project encountered poor quality baseline reporting and M&E manual from ASI/IR. The MTR noted how the M&E manual produced by ASI/IR was not completed to the highest standard so during Phase 2 and the Project employed South-South exchanges to address short fallings in the M&E activities of the Phase 1 Institutional Capacity Building component. The outputs of the Phase 2 activities have included a good quality draft M&E manual however the NDDRC still does not have an M&E unit or the capacity to manage high quality M&E so there is no evidence of outcomes from the M&E activities. 228. The institutional limitations encountered by the M&E activities reflect a larger challenge encountered by the Project and which faces any future DDR programming. As documented during Phase 1 by the IA for the Institutional Capacity Building component the NDDRC is hamstrung by an unbalanced organisational structure and staffing challenges. Despite the creation of the PMU by the Project as an attempt to balance information sharing and engender engagement of staff in the NDDRC by the close of Phase 2, a limited number of staff have been involved in the implementation. The IA for the Institutional Capacity Building component warned that the creation of the PMU is a useful mechanism to ensure project implementation but it avoids the greater need to reform the organisational structure of the NDDRC and ensure that staff of all levels is engaged. The final evaluation finds that this finding remains salient. Furthermore the tendency to concentrate capacity building in the ICRS unit is likely to have further imbalanced the organisational structure of the NDDRC. 229. The negative impacts of the lopsided organizational structure are exacerbated by staff churn and the difficulties faced by the NDDRC to meet basic operational costs and salaries under austerity budgets and in the current security environment. A further exacerbating factor is the loss of logistical support as a result of the UN removing DDR from the current mandate of the organisation: in the States UN-supplied generators are locked and the NDDRC can no longer work through the UN to travel from Juba to the State offices. 230. The factors in the external environment negatively influencing the outcomes of the Project were as follows: (a) Breakdown in security and postponement of the beginning of Phase 2 until May 2014; (b) Loss of DDR in the UN mandate; (c) Refocusing of donor strategy on humanitarian response; (d) Continued lack of active support of the GoSS for DDR. 231. All of these factors are highly relevant to the design of any future DDR programming in South Sudan. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 83 232. The breakdown in the security environment in December 2013 and the resulting postponement of Phase 2 had the potential to derail the remaining Phases of the Project. Arguably the most observable negative impact of the postponement has been on internal systems and capacity in the NDDRC as built during the Phase 1 Institutional Capacity Building component and as created by the Project implementation structures (PMU, SPMU, SC). 233. In Phase 2 much of the nascent systems and ways of working that emerged from activities in the Institutional Capacity Building component have disappeared. This is both at HQ and at State level where mentors worked with the NDDRC to build capacity. Structures such as the PMU and SPMUs have not been functional during Phase 2 and so as outlined above, work to implement the Project has become concentrated in a small number of staff in the NDDRC. 234. Despite this it is clear that some cumulative outcomes of the experience of the Project remain. There is an increased sense of empowerment that, if offered the opportunity, the NDDRC can lead DDR programming. Some state-level staff show a clear increase in capacity, drive and innovation but the evaluation cannot conclude that this is pervasive as only one State was visited by the team. 235. The MTR found that prior to the deterioration of the security and political situation there were risks pertaining to the sustainability of Project outcomes as a result of the legacy of the CPA and limited buy-in from the SPLA. The final evaluation finds that as the Project draws to a close the external environment is highly challenging to securing many of the outcomes from the Project. 236. Clearly the ongoing conflict in the country is dynamic however it is unclear how or where DDR fits in any future scenario. It can be argued that the failure of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel to secure the appropriate caseload of ex-combatants for DDR reflected a lack of buy-in by the GoSS and the SPLA. While progress was made to secure the outward support of the GoSS such as through ministerial visits to Mapel during graduation it remains the case that South Sudan is in conflict with widespread recruitment into all factions of the SPLA and in that context the real outcome of the Project: to show national leadership by the NDDRC and to visibly build the capacity of the NDDRC to lead future DDR programming is threatened. Without highest-level buy-in to both DDR and SSR any capacity built in the NDDRC will gradually dissipate as it ‘waits’ for direction to come from GoSS on DDR or SSR. Consequently it is critical that the NDDRC appropriately strategies about future DDR and that other stakeholders in particularly the donor community engage the parties in the Addis talks on DDR and SSR. 237. This last point is critical: engagement on future DDR and SSR programming must come at all levels in order to create any possibility on future DDR programming. Furthermore, the NDDRC must not sit idle, waiting for any decision but rather should be supported by donors and the GoSS at the least to prepare a properly designed, considered and strategized DDR/SSR programme that takes full cognisance of the heterogeneity of groups that may undergo DDR. The NDDRC and its critical thought partners (including the UN, ideally with a renewed DDR mandate even if only in limited fashion) should consider all aspects not just of the Project but also of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Project in Mapel and fully interrogate the assumptions, modalities and efficiencies of what has been implemented. 238. Urgently the NDDRC, its donors and the GoSS must strategize around the wholesale refocusing of the donor community on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan and find space for the preparatory strategic and programmatic work for further DDR-SSR programming. Critically 84 there must be highest level buy-in in all parties to the Addis talks to the relevance and potential of DDR-SSR in South Sudan. 239. While there were challenges arising from the kind of vocational training given to ex- combatants in Mapel overall the implementation and outcomes of the Project were positively influenced by the fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Reintegration programme. As noted in the MTR in Phase 1 the design strengths of the Project, particularly its alignment with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and the national DDR strategy have enhanced the implementation of the Project. 240. The strong relationship between the Bank TT and the UN family, particularly UNMISS and UNESCO helped the Bank TT approach the Project in a holistic manner, understanding the complexity of the overall NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and ensuring a design fit with the wider vocational training and literacy/numeracy training delivered by UNESCO to ex-combatants at the Mapel Transition Facility. In Phase 2 this is less relevant as the Project was attempting to build on its own outputs from Phase 1. 241. Throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2 a critical factor influencing Pilot implementation and the achievement of outcomes has been the intensive support of the Bank TT and BICC and the project management applied not only to the Pilot but also to the development of the ICRS. The Bank’s presence on the ground in Phase 1 and 2, and BICC’s presence on the ground in Phase 1 has been critical to implementation and ensuring the coordination of IAs and NDDRC. 242. The ability of IAs in Phase 2: UNICON and IOM, to become effective in the field at short notice have proven crucial to the implementation of the Project. For UNICON overcoming and learning from implementation delays in Phase 1 greatly improved their performance and the IA had significant work to manage to redesign training curriculum for Phase 2. For IOM, familiarity with the activities and with the environment proved instrumental in the timely implementation of activities. 243. As noted above cooperation with line ministries has yielded results at State level including granting land and materials (teak and seeds for example) to some cooperatives. The project targeted line ministries by including agricultural extension workers in training implemented as part of the Livelihood Support component. In the case of the involvement of line ministries granting land and materials it is important that the NDDRC in cooperation with the various ministries develop guidelines and criteria for such assistance. At the time of the final evaluation it is not clear how including agricultural extension workers in livelihoods training affects how they in turn work with ex-combatants and the communities particularly given the extreme resource challenges for workers in the line ministry. However it is clear that this inclusion is an important step to building positive working relationships with the ministries that could yield good outcomes in the future. 3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 244. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks and aligned with GoSS strategy in DDR. Project documentation was drafted on time but was not available in final draft until around the time of the MTR. It is noted that at the time of the final evaluation project documentation is being redrafted to align with the learning from Phase 1 and the MTR. The available project documentation had the basic weakness of over-estimating the impact of the Pilot (for example, as captured in the project objectives) but this has not negatively Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 85 affected implementation or achievement of outputs. Overall, for both Phase 1 and 2 the Project Management and M&E of the Project has been of good quality and intensive. 3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation 245. Overall, the identification of risks has been satisfactory however the risk management strategy as mapped out in Project documentation is unsatisfactory and not in sufficient detail. In reality when expected and unexpected risks have been encountered the Bank TT has performed well and approached the implementation of the Project with patience and in a solutions-orientated and problem-solving manner. 246. Critically the project underestimated the risk of deteriorating security and political situation (rated as ‘Substantial’, lower than the rating ‘High’ as per project documentation) but this risk, which is out of the control of the Project has been realized and has stopped implementation. Also, the MTR notes that the Project did not identify lack of political buy-in as a risk to success or how the lack of progress in SSR might impact on the Project. Phase 3 of the Project should clearly orientate itself to actioning two distinct categories of learning: (i) learning pertaining to project design and implementation and (ii) learning pertaining to strategic engagement in SSR and DDR for the future. 3.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank 247. As per the MTR the final evaluation finds that the Project M&E framework is a high- level design with both Scorecard and ‘Substantive’ indicators relating to progress towards achieving the objectives of the Pilot. The indicators are clustered around three outputs: (a) State-level operational and technical support: the provision of operational support focused on Greater Bahr el Ghazal to the NDDRC, enabling it to work with line ministries and other partners to facilitate and support project planning, development and implementation processes ensuring that lessons learnt on both process and delivery are identified and captured. (b) Agricultural livelihoods: development and implementation of agricultural livelihoods support to ex-combatants that have returned. (c) Urban livelihoods: development and implementation of non-agricultural livelihoods support through entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives training for ex-combatants choosing urban settlement in skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrical engineering, metal fabrication and construction. 248. The MTR findings around the efficacy of the Scorecard indicators, the over-ambitious nature of project objectives and the lack of indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a pilot project: that is, one orientated towards trialling, learning and innovation were not acted upon. Rather Bank M&E consisted of BTOR/AM, improved IA reporting and close monitoring of activities on the ground. Practical day-to-day monitoring of Project activities has been strong. The Bank TT has reported concisely and effectively and has combined monitoring of Project progress with close, effective, on –the-ground implementation support, particularly in the early stages of project when delays were being encountered. 249. The evaluation re-affirms the finding of the MTR that the project management of the Project and the work of the IAs have firmly focused on learning methodologies. 86 3.4 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance 250. By incorporating a focus on community-inclusive approaches in its design (Livelihoods component and dedicated Community Support component) the Project has aligned with the Conflict Sensitivity guiding principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme: (a) It is recognized that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation will adopt a community-based approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high numbers of demobilized soldiers will be returning. 251. The Project aligns with principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the Project. The Project has been compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors particularly Principal 1 (take context as the starting point) in so far as the Project is embedded in the NDDRC and supports national ownership, and principal 4 (prioritize prevention) and principal 5 (recognize the links between political, security and development objectives) through supporting reintegration and micro-economic development. Principal 10 (avoid pockets of exclusion) is implemented through the ex-combatant and community inclusive approach. The Project aligns with the World Bank approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011. 252. In project documentation the Project identified the need for Environmental Analysis as the first activity in the Community Support Component. During implementation the IA (IOM) identified that the component would align with its own UN procedures for ensuring environmental safeguards and so the Bank TT identified that a full Environmental Analysis was not necessary. 253. The principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity should be front and centre in any strategizing by the NDDRC regarding future programming. They should guide thinking that explicitly addressed the heterogeneity of the ex-combatants that may be targeted in any future DDR programme. Specifically, the logic that there is one army (SPLM) and that that army is an army of returned victorious heroes must be deconstructed as plainly that is not the current reality. The risks of the GoSS strategy of incorporating rebel groups into the national army as a modality of SSR-DDR must by fully interrogated. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 87 4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR 4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design 254. The Project’s objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS (now closed) and ISN FY 13-14. 255. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rd September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012). 256. Apparent weaknesses in Phase 1 of the Project whereby line ministries were not involved in implementation were addressed in Phase 2. 257. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC. 258. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects. MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance. 259. The Project was interlinked with the MDTF-SS in three ways: (a) The Project’s focus on capacity building is in the same spirit of the MDTF-SS that had a capacity building element to strengthen state institutions in their governance, management, planning and service delivery functions in most of its 21 projects. (b) Within its Priority Areas 2 and 3, the MDTF-SS’s funded projects directly supported ex-combatants as beneficiaries of training programmes for example the Education Rehabilitation Project. Also, the UNDP implemented CPA DDR was co-funded out of the MDTF-SS with US$ 36.4 million. (c) The Project likely benefits from MDTF-SS support to the general development of South Sudan as the economic reintegration of ex-combatants will only be successful if they can be absorbed by the local economy. Within its Priority Area 4, the following measures were financed: supportive government policy, a legislative framework and extension services for a modernized agriculture as well as private sector development. This should be especially beneficial for the Projects activities within the Livelihood Support Sub-Component. 4.2 Efficiency 260. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is upgraded from moderately satisfactory to satisfactory because of: (i) disbursement has been prompt; (ii) extra unplanned outputs under the Community Supports component enabled by cost savings by IOM, and (iii) the continued high unit cost per ex-combatant. 88 261. Disbursement to IPs has been as scheduled. In Phase 1 ASI received all six payments as per schedule totally US$519,506. UNICON received four of five payments with the fifth pending contract extension leaving US$162,140 to be paid out of a total contract of US$920,200. The World Bank disbursed the fifth payment on 24th March 2014 on acceptance of final Phase 1 report. In total at the time of final evaluation eight of nine payments have been disbursed on time (US$ 1,482,057 of scheduled US$1,531,564). The final payment of US$49,507 is due on approval of final report that was submitted in draft form during the week ending 5th September 2014. In Phase 1 IOM had two of five payments made with three pending Phase 2 leaving US$408,563 to be paid on completion of Phase 2 (out of a total contract value of US$450,000). All payments were disbursed on time in Phase 2. At the time of the final evaluation the total disbursements to IAs has been US$2,501,070 of US$2,451,563. 262. The MTR noted that while recognizing that if the Project leads to future programming there are likely to be economies of scale which reduce the cost per ex-combatant, in Phase 1 the Project did not compare favourably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is compared. In phase 1 the cost per ex-combatant of all livelihood support was US$2,759.58In Phase 2 of the 290 ex-combatants in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme 285 were target with Project activities (5 had died in the interim period between Phase 1 and Phase 2). Of the 285 targeted 269 received services from the Project. Basing the overall Project cost on the 290 ex- combatant intake as set against the costs of the Livelihoods Support component then the full Phase 1 and Phase 2 cost per ex-combatant is US$ 3,750. 263. The only regional comparisons are with full national DDR programmes so this distorts the comparative analysis somewhat however the differences with neighbouring DDR costs is still relevant: the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US$1,817 59 ; the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US$2,06560 and Burundi $2,77561. The question to the NDDRC is whether the costs can be reduced should the modalities and focus of the Pilot be brought to scale and where can savings be made? 4.3 Effectiveness 264. Effectiveness is the extent to which the Project achieved its planned-for outputs. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in Section 2 above. 265. The Livelihoods Support component (Phases 1 and 2) successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. In Phase 1 the Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. In Phase 2 the Project delivered the planned-for package of additional and supplementary trainings and livelihood technical supports successfully reaching 269 of 285 ex-combatants targeted in Phase 2. 266. The Institutional Capacity Building component (Phase 1) has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. In Phase 2 the IA from the Livelihood 58 Costs discussed in this section are direct costs and do not include management or administration costs. 59 ICR ICR00002168 DRC IDA-H0890 IDA-H3620 TF-54242, pp. 28-29. 60 ICR00001169 Rwanda IDA-36340, IDA-3634A, TF-52159, pp. 19-22, 31-43. 61 ICR00001169 Burundi IDA-H076, TF-53794, pp.26-28. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 89 Support component implemented the remaining activities (M&E through South-South exchange and logistical support around the ex-combatant Satisfaction Survey). These activities produced their planned-for outputs. 267. The Community Support Programme was effective and exceeded the planned-for outputs. Originally there were 10 planned and the IA installed 16 and rehabilitated one Payam building. The additional outputs were secured as originally the IA budgeted for a more sustainable solar water pump however communities opted for manual water pumps.62 4.4 Potential to Grow to Scale and Sustainability 268. The Pilot reintegration Project was meant to be a test-run of the programme design’s effectiveness in order to learn lessons and modify it prior to replication country-wide. While social activities were tested, they have been minimized in the current tranche in favour of finding the correct economic reintegration models that can be replicated. Against this background the Project has listed the following components to be replicated and scaled in future programming: (a) An independently functional management team as well as a management and reporting system on HQ and State level; (b) A functional ICRS system with trained staff; (c) A functional M&E system with trained staff; (d) Livelihood support services including individual and group livelihood activities (e) Community support projects. 269. The final evaluation concludes that all components have the potential to be replicated and scaled up (at least in part) in future DDR programming. However, in order to be sustainable and effective some will require some additional inputs (like the M&E system) and/or more substantial revision. 270. The design of the Project emphasized sustainability by approaching the unstated but overall purpose of the Project, (that is, to build the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing and concurrently enhance the capital of the NDDRC to implement an effective and relevant reintegration programme) of placing the NDDRC front and centre and emphasising national ownership. The Project was designed as a first step on re-enabling the NDDRC post-CPA DDR to take that leadership role and so eventually develop and implement a strategic, effective, efficient and relevant national DDR programme. Put simply, the point of the Pilot has been to begin enabling the NDDRC to assume its role in Reintegration programming in DDR. 271. The NDDRC has significantly strengthened its leadership position in the course of the Pilot Programme and has assumed a critical role in coordination and project management. Since the beginning of the NDDRP the Commission has been actively involved in the strategic development of the Programme and its sub-components. Together with the UN, the SPLA, line ministries and other DDR stakeholders the Commission has drafted and finalized a National DDR Policy, Strategic Plan and National Programme Document that gave critical guidance for the implementation of the reinsertion and reintegration sub-component. A Joint Operations Coordination Committee that has been chaired by the Commission was set up to control, coordinate and monitor reinsertion activities in the transition facility in Mapel which indicates the 62 The cost of borehole and solar pump averages US$ 25,000 when compared to US$ 11,000 average for manual boreholes and pumps. 90 high level of national ownership. Although the UN took a lead in the implementation of reinsertion activities, the Commission clearly benefited from its active involvement, was able to build its capacity and played a key role in oversight. The final evaluation finds similar trends for the reintegration sub-component. The Project Management Unit (PMU) put the Commission in the centre of the project and through the ICRS department the NDDRC gained significant experience on state level in managing livelihood assistance. Important lessons have been learned that will allow modification of the DDR programme prior to replication country-wide. 272. Despite these positive trends and a visible and growing involvement of many NDDRC departments in implementation and oversight there were a range of factors that negatively influenced the extent to which the NDDRC was capacitated to assume its leadership role thereby negatively affecting the sustainability of the Project. Due to financial constraints of NDDRC some of the key positions on national and state level were not filled and as a consequence certain systems and departments that the Project had planned to leave at its closure (like the State PMUs and the M&E department). Due to the imbalance in NDDRC’s organisational structure (already outlined in chapter 2.2) some departments were side-lined resulting in difficulties for the IA to leave an independently functional management team that is able to run reintegration programming in future DDR tranches. Not least the lack of support from the GoSS (e.g. the delay in the establishment of the National DDR Council, lack of interest in DDR on the side of the line ministries) has exacerbated the Commission’s efforts to guide and implement the Project in a fast and efficient manner. 273. Furthermore, a critical challenge to the NDDRC (and so the Project) was how to increase donor interest to ensure a second round of programming with a view to gradually growing a national DDR process. At the time of the MTR it was assumed that any successes thus far would hopefully contribute to donor confidence and interest in aligning behind a next iteration of Reintegration programming, however, with the outbreak of hostilities mid-December 2013 and the changes in the internal security environment any progress made on persuading donors to contribute to future programming was damaged. 274. At the level of Components, the Project has had dynamics of sustainability. The design of the Training sub-component in the Livelihoods Support window emphasizes TDRP learning on supporting ex-combatants to obtain sustainable livelihoods through the provision of generic business and cooperative working skills that capitalize on already-acquired vocational training. The unplanned strategy of utilizing TOT methodology had the potential to create a network of domestic trainers who themselves are capacitated to build a cooperative and do business in South Sudan. The TOT of the agricultural extension workers in Phase 2 is a positive example that illustrates how the DDR Programme can build on domestic human resources and utilize them for training ex-combatants. 275. The principle of including community members in training has the potential not only to contribute to social inclusion and mitigate tensions but also has the potential to create more sustainable units of diverse background and approaches to cooperative working practices. Due to lack of a Community Tracer Survey the final evaluation cannot assess whether the inclusion of community members into the trainings supported social inclusion and mitigation of conflicts but what can be noted is that there is a strong community involvement in livelihood activities involving ex-combatants (for instance, the 17 working groups that have been listed so far involve 68 ex-combatants and 442 community members). Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 91 276. The Institutional Capacity Building component focused on creating a baseline for sustainable institutional development within the NDDRC to best enable it to assume the role of leading on Reintegration programming in DDR and by employing mentoring rather than formal training the component approached skills transfer and capacity building in a more gradual, collaborative manner which suits the learning style of the Commission. Through the chosen approach the Pilot Project has triggered some learning on the side of the Commission especially in the field of project management and oversight. Partly stemming from external factors such as the outbreak of the conflict the capacity building stopped at a time when the Commission was just about to utilise the acquired skills in actual programming. Due to the imminent halt in DDR activities after closure of the Project the nascent capacities can most likely not be sustained over time. 277. The ICRS System that is one element of the Capacity Building component is currently inactive. Since the system is only as useful as the data it contains, the ICRS will require continuous updates otherwise its sustainability will be highly questionable. In terms of replicability the ICRS system would be ready to be utilised in future programming but would require some data adjustments. 278. By design the Community Supports Project component has emphasized the sustainability of the infrastructure to be provided through working with communities to create community water committees and if possible generate income through water charges in order to finance the servicing of boreholes and pumps. However, the final evaluation finds that the infrastructural installations are unlikely to be as sustainable due to quality of outputs. Experience not only from South Sudan but also other countries shows that success rates of maintaining hand pumps are generally low. Solar powered higher volume water pumps, for instance, would have a longer lifespan then the infrastructure that were installed in the Pilot thus mitigating the reluctance of communities to charge for water and the difficulties obtaining spare parts. 279. Although the Project attempted to enable some community members to independently manage and maintain the water installations, it is uncertain to what extent the communities indeed follow the suggested approach (this might vary from community to community). According to the IA this is not only a particular problem for Projects in South Sudan but also in other countries. As a way out and in order to ensure sustainability of water installations, future water community projects should ensure that the community agrees to generate income e.g. through water charges prior to the Project start. To ensure that this conditionality does not compromise on ownership the Project has to grant enough time for community sensitisations. 280. In view of the lack of a community tracer study it is also not clear whether the Community Projects have helped to foster trust between the ex-combatants and the rest of their communities (as stated in the Project objectives). Given the small number of returning ex- combatants, their limited engagement in the IA’s community mobilizations and the relatively small scale of the Projects the impact will most likely be much lower than expected. 281. Further complicating factors negatively impacting on the sustainability of the DDR community projects are the manifold social problems within the communities concerned. Particularly alcohol abuse appears to be a challenge in the rural areas as it erodes the social fabric and significantly hinders the development of coping strategies of the community. For any CDD/R project such negative social influences are a significant risk that can jeopardise project success and should hence be thoroughly considered in project design and implementation. 92 4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 282. The risk to development outcomes is substantial. As has been outlined above the key risk to the outcomes of the Project has been the security situation in South Sudan that deteriorated to such an extent that the Pilot was suspended on December 19th 2013. Peace negotiations are scheduled to recommence in Addis, Ethiopia on September 15th, 2014 but the security situation remains highly unstable and a humanitarian crisis is unfolding. 283. During the MTR it was identified that it in order for the NDDRC to build capacity and improve its reputation it would be critical to maintain the momentum of implementation achieved during the Project. Given the ongoing mobilization of civilians and violent conflict in the country it seems inappropriate to initiate any planning for subsequent DDR phases without radically revising the current DDR approach (and here especially a closer alignment with other SSR activities). Since most donors, as a reaction to the crisis, have channelled their funding and efforts to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, there appears to be very little openness to consider any short to medium term funding for DDR/SSR activities. For the Project this is a severe backlash as the momentum is likely to be lost. There will be a gap in programming which puts at risk the progress that has been made so far. Especially with regard to the capacity building that has been done a lot of investment will most likely vanish. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 93 5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance 5.1 Bank Performance The performance of the TDRP is assessed here in relation to how it performed as per its agreement with the KfW and the NDDRC as providers of Technical Assistance to the NDDRC. The Pilot Reintegration Programme does not constitute formal lending from the Bank. The Bank’s role is limited to Trust Fund management and provision of Technical Assistance as outlined in the agreement.63 (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 284. Quality at Entry pertains to the design of the Project and the performance of the TDRP throughout the period of design and implementation. The TDRP performed satisfactorily because: (1) by design the project took consideration of the capacity of the NDDRC; (2) it executed its role in a manner that was conscious of wider stakeholder roles in the great SSR-DDR environment including those of the Line Ministries and the UN family; (3) built on learning from the CPA DDR programme; (4) emphasized national ownership. 285. By design the Project was simple with straightforward components and sub-components and so constituted a measured starting point to assess and gradually build the capacity of the NDDRC while concurrently implementing a pilot reintegration programme that was intended to benefit the 290 ex-combatants that underwent reintegration assistance. The components emphasized procurement, and management and facilitation of external implementing Partners as well as assisting the NDDRC to critically reflect on its own internal workings and competencies rather than being overly complex. 286. Interaction with the wider stakeholder community was carried out in a collaborative manner but always with the focus on enabling the NDDRC to lead the Pilot Reintegration project. The TDRP often with the assistance of the NDDRC, facilitated networking the IAs (UNICON, ASI and IOM) with the key stakeholders in the wider NDDR Pilot Programme such as UNESCO and UNMISSS. The TDRP’s own involvement sought to learn from the UN agencies in particular and tried to positively guide the NDDRC’s interaction with those same agencies. 287. The TDRP’s role in the Project was informed by a good understanding on the history of DDR in South Sudan and cognizance of the learning from the CPA DDR. The TDRP’s knowledge was assisted by the NDDRC’s self-reflection and own learning from the CPA DDR 63 The Project Management here is a combination of the management of the Project by the TDRP, and the work of the PMU as a unit constituted within the NDDRC as part of the institutional arrangements to implement the Project. The relevant TDRP activities identified in the invitation from the NDDRC to engage around the Project are limited to establishing a Technical Support Unit and Project Management Teams and instituting M&E. The agreement between the donors (KfW) and the Trust Fund Administrators (TDRP) is more detailed when outlining eligible expenditure and identifying the role of the TDRP. Bank-executed Activities consisting of: (1) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on such aspects as alien ex-combatants as well as cross-border and cross- cutting activities, such as capacity development, research, and evaluation; (2) technical assistance and enhanced supervision activities designed to improve quality and knowledge management for demobilization and reintegration; and (3) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on gender. Trust Fund Management and Administration: establishment and operation of the Trust Fund Technical Team; management of the Trust Fund; and supervision as well as monitoring and evaluation of Projects. 94 and from the knowledge shared with the TDRP by the stakeholders in the NDDR Pilot Programme. 288. The Bank was appropriately reactive to the deteriorating security situation that forced the postponement of Phase 2 of the Project. However, the re-start of the Project in May 2014 was at very short notice affecting the preparation by IAs to implement altered project activities such as changing the livelihoods training from building on the capacity built with independent trainers in Phase 1 to focusing on the ICRS team in the NDDRC. Similarly the Bank-led ex-combatant satisfaction survey (in place of Tracer and Community Dynamics surveys originally planned) was designed with limited preparatory time. 289. While the IA and the Bank implemented these activities effectively there should be more time to reflect on changed design of activities and the reasons for this. Also, the Bank should afford itself more time to plan such M&E activities as the ex-combatant satisfaction survey. Often in programming in FCS it is generally accepted that in emergency contexts (such as that in South Sudan) and because of the context, responsive projects (such as this Project) cannot be afforded adequate preparation time or space for reflection. This does not have to be the case. Given that Phase 2 was re-started in a hurried fashion it is important for the Bank with the NDDRC to give adequate space to Phase 3 (learning) and laying the foundation for effective and efficient strategizing about potential future SSR-DDR programming in South Sudan. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 290. Bank supervision in the form of TF management and Project management is rated satisfactory because: (i) the Bank satisfactorily identified most safeguard issues; (ii) the Project management by the Bank was responsive to the needs of the NDDRC and the implementation of the Project, and (iii) the Bank facilitated additional TA and project implementation assistance although as emphasized above, at times this assistance was operational and not technical assistance. 291. The Bank satisfactorily identified safeguard issues and the NDDRC project documentation clearly identifies the same. In collaboration with the IOM practical and efficient alternatives to ERM were identified however due to the suspension of the Project these were not implemented. The Bank closely managed financial risks and where issues emerged between IAs that were external to the Bank’s own purview the Bank TT worked to support the NDDRC to facilitate resolving the issues. 292. Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the Project, the capacity-issues of the NDDRC and sought to address implementation delays including those emanating from all IAs. The Bank TT were closely involved in assisting IAs to become effective when faced with implementation challenges and throughout the duration of the Pilot Project they were closely involved with monitoring the progress of IAs. 293. The final evaluation notes that recommendations around Bank project M&E have not been implemented and recommends that in future pilot interventions the recommendations of the MTR on project M&E are given due consideration. 5.2 NDDRC Performance 294. The NDDRC’s role in the Project was to lead the Project with TA from the TDRP. Throughout the implementation of the Project the NDDRC engaged positively with the TDRP Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 95 and did so with an emphasis on learning by doing. The NDDRC engaged positively around resolving implementation challenges such as those faced around M&E and some IAs becoming effective. In the case of the latter the NDDRC facilitated IAs at HQ and State level and where particular benefit was identified the Commission sought to capitalize on progress made. 295. Throughout the Project the NDDRC was hamstrung by resource challenges and challenges from its own institutional arrangements (the latter point being identified by ASI) which itself it identified as being unable to alter. Resource challenges were felt across the NDDRC but most critically in the States. In HQ very fundamental challenges such as losing power when the generator switched off had severe impact on the infrastructure supporting the work of the Commission, such as IT and communications. Simply put, no power means little work can be undertaken on site. Most critical deprivations have been the lack of human and financial capital in the State offices. NDDRC staff in the States performs multiple roles so the ability of the NDDRC to capitalize on the activities in Institutional Capacity Building Component has been limited. Material resources such as transport, the state of repair of vehicles and communications were all severely restricted at State level. This situation has been further aggravated by the change in the UNMISS mandate and the consequent withdrawal of the mission from any DDR related activities. The NDDRC State offices that were formerly provided with fuel and communication systems through UNMISS are now largely inactive due to lack of electricity and internet services. 296. ASI identified challenges in the institutional arrangements that in the analysis of the IA were negatively affecting the ability of the NDDRC to implement learning from the CPA DDR and to build capacity and expertise to effectively implement the Project (and future iterations of same). From the perspective of the NDDRC institutional arrangements are fixed as a result of the Commissions alignment under its respective GoSS ministry. The reality is that challenges to the effectiveness of the NDDRC to implement the project resulting from institutional arrangements were navigated in part through the creation the PMU. This approach of finding practical workaround significantly helped NDDRC to coordinate between its respective departments and to take the lead in implementation of reintegration activities in close collaboration with the IAs. The PMU, however, also created a parallel structure to the existing institutional arrangements thereby unintentionally marginalizing some NDDRC staff during the Project. The marginalization occurred both at strategic and at operational levels. In order to avoid such imbalances in future iterations it is incumbent on the NDDRC to balance ways of navigating institutional challenges with ensuring that staff members are included in the various stages of the Project and future iterations. 297. The ICRS department has strongly benefited from the Capacity Development activities throughout the Pilot Project and has played an outstanding role in the implementation of the reintegration sub-component. Taking into account that the ICRS department has been built from scratch the achievements are substantial. The ICRS caseworkers have gained significant experience in the support of ex-combatants which enables them to attend to programme beneficiaries throughout the whole DDR process (registration, data capture, follow-up and referral). Because of the involvement of the ICRS unit in extension work and training in Phase 2 the caseworkers are now also better capacitated to advice ex-combatants on socio-economic opportunities than at the Project start. As the database itself is not operative due to lack of connectivity on State level, and the financial restrictions and withdrawal of material support through UNMISS took effect before the system could be fully rolled out, ICRS has not been tested in its final version in day-to-day operations. 96 298. Over the course of the pilot NDDRC closely engaged with various donors to attract interest and to ensure funding for subsequent pilot phases. It was assumed that through the gains made for ex-combatants in Mapel one would also be able to start DDR operations in two more locations (Torit and Bor). From the beginning donor dialogue turned out to be very challenging due to the negative perceptions of DDR in South Sudan resulting from the CPA-DDR programme. Moreover donors were unclear about how the DDR pilot in Mapel would be replicated in other locations given that NDDRC envisioned different institutional setups for the implementation of pilot activities in Greater Equatoria and Greater Upper Nile. 299. NDDRC had a productive collaboration with the involved UN agencies. Particularly around operations in Mapel NDDRC closely liaised with UNMISS and UNESCO on national and State level. Through the interaction with the UN the Commission sought to learn and build its own capacities while ensuring that the programme followed a national strategic vision. As a result of NDDRC’s challenging financial situation the focus of the interaction with UNMISS often shifted towards logistical support which was provided by the mission to NDDRC. Against this background the Commission did not always fully capitalize on the mission’s DDR planning capacity. At the time of the final evaluation, however, the NDDRC positively acknowledges the strong technical, logistical and financial support that was provided by the UN in the pilot process and appears to be determined to continue the collaboration despite the fact that DDR has been removed from the UNMISS mandate. 300. Over the course of the Pilot Programme the NDDRC has assumed a strong leadership role which allowed the Commission to give strategic guidance and to coordinate the various stakeholders involved. However, the Commission would have been even more effective in taking the lead on DDR if it had received more political backing from GoSS. For instance, the delay in government contribution to the programme retarded activities and procurement of items needed to run operations Mapel. The DDR Council, which was supposed to provide political guidance was established late and did not meet as often as required. It hence did not give sufficient strategic guidance and also did not succeed in harmonizing between different national stakeholders in DDR issues. Because of this lack of harmonization on DDR Council level the NDDRC faced severe challenges in aligning its Project activities with other national programmes as envisioned in the National DDR Strategic Plan. Although the line ministries were requested by the DDR Council to provide a comprehensive and casted programme indicating how each Ministry would support implementation of the wider DDR Programme, the alignment process turned out to be very slow and cumbersome. 301. NDDRC’s cooperation with the Ministry of Defence (MOD), particularly the Directorate of Veterans Affairs, and the SPLA intensified throughout the pilot process leading to close interactions between the institutions. However, due to inadequate political guidance through the DDR Council and the seemingly limited confidence and buy-in of the MOD and the SPLA into the programme, NDDRC’s efforts to implement the DDR pilot were significantly undermined, as evidenced by the limited number of DDR candidates that were assigned to go through the DDR pilot process (only 290 candidates were selected instead of the targeted number of 500 people). 5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners 302. The Pilot Project had three IAs: ASI, UNICON and IOM. 5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research 303. ASI and IR implemented the Institutional Capacity Building component with IR taking responsibility for the M&E focus including conducting the Baseline and Community Dynamics Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 97 surveys. At Project start-up ASI and particularly IR showed a lack of preparedness regarding project documentation, background and modalities. Despite this ASI implemented the Component in an effective manner, adapting to challenges and opportunities as they arose during their engagement by the NDDRC. As identified above the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff was context specific and delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project’s overall rationale as a pilot project. ASI’s reporting was consistent and succinct during the Project and added to the value of the Project as a learning process. 304. Initially, deliverables from IR were of poor quality. While implemented effectively on the ground the Baseline report from IR lacked analysis and was not confident in its own methodology, tools or approach – something that fundamentally undermined the validity of the findings. The Baseline report repeatedly applied conditionality to its analysis and undermined any conclusions that might be drawn from the work. IR recovered from this poor start somewhat with an improved report for the Community Dynamics study but the report still lacked sufficient quality analysis and quality. As noted above the M&E manual was also of poor quality. 305. Overall the potential institutional impact of implementing Baseline and Community Dynamics studies was undermined by the absence of an M&E unit during the initial stages of the Project. This similarly prevented the IA delivering capacity development in M&E. This essentially null level capacity prevented the principle of integrating the study of impact to create a feedback loop for future programming or program delivery taking root in any significant way in the NDDRC. This presents a missed opportunity. 5.3.2. UNICON 306. Initially in Phase 1UNICON displayed poor project preparation. As discussed above the IA encountered barriers to effectiveness such as lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. Despite a poor start to the Project UNICON through its perseverance and allocation of extra resources to the Project successfully addressed the barriers to implementation. 307. In Phase 1 UNICON’s reporting displayed strong M&E and an orientation towards the Project as a learning process. By the suspension of the Project UNICON had successfully delivered its project outputs but due firstly to issues with the delivery chain involving CRADA and second due to challenges receiving quality reporting from the field the delivery of training in the community was not possible to verify or correctly assess. In response to this UNICON has documented challenges obtaining accurate in field reporting from implementers of sub- components. 308. In Phase 2 UNICON actioned its own institutional learning from Phase 1 from all aspects of Component design and implementation as well as learning on general operational issues in South Sudan. The IA improved on already strong M&E emphasising actionable learning for both the current Project and future DDR programming in South Sudan. 309. Throughout the Project communications from UNICON have been succinct and comprehensive. 98 5.3.3. IOM 310. Generally, IOM engaged well with the Project and exceed delivery. 311. In Phase 1 IOM faced significant implementation challenges mostly because of access restrictions to the selected Project sites because of the rainy season and the challenging road network in South Sudan. Despite these delays in construction and the Project suspension due to the outbreak of hostilities IOM in the end delivered the component in an effective manner and was able to successfully deliver (and even exceed) the project outputs within the agreed timeframe. 312. Monitoring and reporting on activities and outputs were concise, intelligible and on time. The collaboration with the NDDRC on national and State level was described by the involved stakeholders as constructive but was at times hampered by NDDRC’s challenging recourse situation which aggravated joint supervision of the community projects.64 64 Although the Project provided funds in the IOM budget for allocation to the DDR Commission for supervision of community support projects and other project related expenses, these funds were only transferred to the NDDRC at a very late stage of the Project. In the beginning IOM was not provided with sufficient information on how to administer the funds to the Commission (see 2014. IOM Final Project Report). Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 99 6. Conclusions and Recommendations 313. Findings and recommendations are presented below and as follows: (i) as they relate to the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment and (ii) as they relate to the Project design and outcomes of each Component. Where relevant mention is made of whether or to what extent recommendations from the MTR have been acted upon. 6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment 314. Conclusion 1. The success of the Project as a pilot testing the systems and institutional arrangements which are required to implement Reintegration programming, is overshadowed by the wider political, security and donor environment. 315. High-level macro-level issues such as the current security situation in the country and the ongoing talks aimed at resolving the conflict and finding a path to stabilise the situation throw into doubt the future of DDR and SSR in South Sudan. Through the CPA DDR and through the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme (with which the Project has been aligned) there has been a substantial resource allocation to DDR, however, on the macro-level the outcomes of such activity and resource allocation are unclear. 316. Until there is clear buy-in from all relevant stakeholders into both DDR and SSR the NDDRC and other stakeholders are critically hamstrung with progressing the objectives of DDR programming (understood as either the beneficiary-focused outcomes of the Project or the macro objectives of a full DDR programme). 317. From the perspective of the Project objectives, the MTR noted that the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building was critical to the success of the Project. It observed that the suspension of the project would likely result in a dissipation of capacity built and a loss of momentum. It is clear from the evaluation that this conclusion from the MTR has been realised and momentum has been lost however, in the wider scenario it is critical that the NDDRC, its partners and the donor community engage around the importance of DDR and SSR and strategize effectively around future DDR programming in South Sudan. 318. It should be noted that the MTR concluded it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency with SSR. This conclusion is supported by the final evaluation. 319. Timing will be essential for future DDR programming: The past shows that the CPA DDR programme was significantly delayed due to several factors, amongst them limited buy-in of the military and political leadership, and, crucially, a lack of internal consensus on, what DDR in South Sudan ideally should look like. DDR was perceived more as a risk to security than a factor contributing to stability. Partly, this limited support of SSR processes and the very cumbersome reform of the security sector have played a part in creating the current situation in South Sudan. If it does not seriously attending to DDR-related issues early enough in the peace talks in Addis Ababa, the GoSS risks replicating the mistakes of the CPA DDR programme. 320. Recommendation 1a.The NDDRC and relevant key stakeholders work with the donor community to engage the GoSS and the parties to the Addis negotiations, when possible, around 100 the importance of DDR and SSR to future stabilization programming in South Sudan. The NDDRC has and is engaging government however the onus to engage must be shared by the international donor community and based on a coherent, realisable vision of DDR and SSR. Donors must engage the GoSS to engender clear, evidenced support of DDR and SSR in order for any future programming to succeed. 321. Recommendation 1b. The NDDRC is supported in the current modality to lead with the convening of ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ of key stakeholders (including stakeholders such as the leadership of the SPLA and other organised forces as well as forces in opposition, the UN and other partner institutions experiences with DDR/SSR processes in South Sudan, and civil society representatives) to participate in the range of steps necessary to create a comprehensive and coherent DDR architecture in South Sudan and to advocate with GoSS for such architecture to be enabled. 322. DDR architectures are informed by bringing diverse aspects of stabilisation (including SSR) and development programmes and principles together into a common understanding and approach. Furthermore DDR architectures are processes: they change over time depending on the stage of design and implementation. Critically, in order to put design into practice DDR architectures must be suited to the fluid but specific circumstances of national and local conditions. 323. Despite the progress being made through the Project DDR still appears to exist in an isolated area of programming and this isolation must be bridged. The first step is alignment with agreed SSR programming and the second is to align DDR though dialogue with other development programming particularly around community driven development or infrastructure projects in communities. In the long term the DDR programme has to ensure that there is a national forum in place, like for instance, the National DDR Council, to continue strategizing on DDR programming on highest political level. The DDR Council, if it is to be replicated in future, has to be more functional than in the past and provide the necessary political and strategic guidance that is needed to align DDR with other development programmes. GoSS should also consider having members of the international community at the Council for advice and transparency. 324. Recommendation 1c. In the short to medium term specifically the NDDRC must draw together an inclusive-enough coalition of thought partners to conceptualise the DDR process including reintegration. This coalition must reach out to all parties to the Addis negotiations and acknowledge that the current situation in South Sudan requires fundamental changes in DDR and SSR programming. It should be supported by an adequate technical secretariat that has outstanding experience with DDR and SSR processes and should be flexible enough to evolve when and if DDR shifts from strategy and design to actual programming with clear, measurable outcomes. ! 325. Recommendation 1d. In the interim and during negotiations the NDDRC should not be allowed to stagnate: the donor community and technical partners should work to address the issues highlighted through the Project (particularly dissipation of institutional capacity and the imbalance in organisational structure) thus ensuring readiness for future programme implementation. The NDDRC and its partners should take a highly strategic approach to the development of a comprehensive DDR strategy, fully conscious of Do No Harm approaches and with realisable programmatic dynamics. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 101 326. Conclusion 2. The wider donor environment and the UN mandate do not appear conducive to DDR and SSR. 327. Recommendation 2. While there has been parallel work on SSR the current donor focus and that of the UN is largely on the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. It is critical that the NDDRC and its partners work to sensitise the donor community regarding the importance of DDR – SSR in future development in South Sudan and the significance of integrating these themes into the peace talks in Addis Ababa. A prerequisite for this kind of sensitisation is strong government and military buy-in into the DDR programme at the highest levels of leadership.65 328. Conclusion 3. UNESCO has completed an impact assessment of its activities in Mapel TF in October 2013 66 but due to the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 and the reprioritisation of the UNMISS mandate the final and overall evaluation of the Mapel TF pilot was put on hold. 329. Recommendation 3. The overall evaluation is important and so some formal and independent review should be conducted in order to capture lessons learned67 which will inform reorientation of potential future DDR phases. 330. Conclusion 4. The MTR recommended that future programming should be designed in such a way so that the GoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources. 331. Recommendation 4. The final evaluation reinforces the recommendation of the MTR (above, conclusion 4) and restates that GoSS commitment to DDR must be underscored by material support of the NDDRC and openness to institutional reform of the organisation in line with the findings of the Project. 6.2 Project Design and Outcomes 332. Conclusion 5. The Project is a pilot and as such learning from the pilot is relevant to stakeholders and partners outside the NDDRC and to the staff of the Commission. 333. Recommendation 5. The NDDRC should disseminate a summary document of the final evaluation to relevant stakeholders and partners and critically, to NDDRC staff. NDDRC staff should also be provided with other materials that have been developed throughout the Pilot Project. 334. Conclusion 6. Reinsertion and reintegration were largely treated as two distinct programme components in the alignment between the Project and the wider pilot in Mapel TF. 335. Recommendation 6. In reality reinsertion and reintegration programming are intertwined. They should hence be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner in future programme iterations. 65 The lack of buy-in of the SPLA, other organised forces and the government into the DDR programme has been frequently criticised by donors in the past. 66 See Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy & Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal, October 2013. 67 An internal draft lessons learned document has been produced by the NDDRC and its partners but was not finalised due to the outbreak of the crisis. 102 336. Conclusion 7. The MTR concluded that in Phase 1 regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. This remained the case in Phase 2 so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 337. Recommendation 7. The MTR recommended that in future programming the M&E Framework utilised by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing the Project. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided. This was not actioned in Phase 2 and so should be actioned in future programming. 338. Conclusion 8. The MTR concluded that regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialling, documenting, learning and innovation. This remained the case through Phase 2 and so at the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 339. Recommendation 8. The MTR recommended that in future pilot programming this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid recommendation. 340. Conclusion 9. The MTR concluded that the Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. This remained the case through Phase 2. At the time of final evaluation this remains a valid conclusion. 341. Recommendation 9. The MTR recommended that this good practice should be replicated in all future programming and this recommendation remains valid. Furthermore it should inform centrally any future DDR programme strategising by the NDDRC particularly as it considers the heterogeneity of the ex-combatant population that will likely need to be considered for DDR in the future. 342. Conclusion 10. The Project has been efficient however, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes. 343. Recommendation 10. When estimating the impact on future programming economies of scale should considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced. Efficiency should be a core principle brought to bear when assessing the wider DDR architecture and modalities including the use of transition facilities 344. Conclusion 11. By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family. 345. Recommendation 11. In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on re-engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS. The UN should be included in any ‘inclusive enough coalition’ strategizing about the future of DDR in South Sudan and inputting into future programme design. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 103 346. Conclusion 12. The Project did not address Public Information, Procurement, Gender or Disability management capacity at the NDDRC. 347. Recommendation 12. In any future programming these functions must be comprehensively audited and addressed. 348. Conclusion 13. The MTR noted that the Project and the NDDRC itself was constrained by a lack of human resources. This continued for Phase 2 and was exacerbated by staff churn/loss of staff. The evaluation concludes that until this human resource factor and the drivers of staff churn are addressed they will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project. 349. Recommendation 13. The NDDRC should address the organisational weaknesses highlighted in Phase 1 by ASI and should engage GoSS when possible around the punctual payment of staff salaries. It should not exacerbate organisational imbalance if employing PMUs or SPMUs in the future. When addressing stability and skills in the organisation the NDDRC should pay particular attention to the situation with the M&E department throughout the Project which because of a lack of staff seriously undermined any outcome from any M&E capacity building activities (Phase 1 or Phase 2). 350. Conclusion 14. The MTR concluded that in Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub- Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. At the time of the final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 351. Recommendation 14. In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting as well as the suggested improvements through lessons learned should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits. At the time of the final evaluation this recommendation remains valid. 352. Conclusion 15. The MTR found that the participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 in Phase 1 suited the culture of the NDDRC. At the time of final evaluation this conclusion remains valid. 353. Recommendation 15. The MTR recommended that any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilise a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme. At the time of final evaluation this recommendation remains valid. 354. Conclusion 16. As a result of the fairly loose design of Phase 2 as well as the infrequent meeting schedule of the DDR Council which was meant to link the NDDRC and the line Ministries around DDR, the commission’s cooperation with the Ministries, particularly on State level, has not been adequately formalised. 355. Recommendation 16. In order to avoid reputational risks for NDDRC it will be essential in future DDR programming to further formalise implementation arrangements with the State 104 Line Ministries (especially around the formation of cooperatives and distribution of land to ex- combatants). 356. Conclusion 17. The training of trainers that were provided to agricultural extension workers and ICRS staff (on entrepreneurship and financial literacy) has increased the pool of domestic trainers that is available to train ex-combatants. The focus on the ICRS caseworkers, however, further aggravates the institutional imbalance within NDDRC. 357. Recommendation 17. Future TOTs should be sensitive to the institutional imbalance within and should base the selection of trainers on a thorough skills assessment. 358. Conclusion 18. A great number of ex-combatants is still utilising their toolkits. A point of critique was that the toolkits in parts did not match to the tools used during the trainings in Mapel. 359. Recommendation 18. In future iterations of the DDR Programme the procuring agency for the toolkits should consult with the trainers delivering the vocational trainings concerning the content of the toolkits prior to the start of the trainings. The same toolkits that will be provided to XCs should also be utilised in the vocational trainings. 360. Conclusion 19. A majority of ex-combatants is seemingly still working in the same vocation they were taught in Mapel (especially those in agriculture) but success rates greatly vary from vocation to vocation. 361. Recommendation 19. In future programming vocational trainings have to be more closely linked to the market realities in South Sudan. 362. Conclusion 20. A number of lessons from the CPA DDR programme were not learned (or applied in the pilot) including e.g. the lack of proper market analysis for the vocational skills training. 363. Recommendation 20. Future programming needs to base its approaches and modalities on the lessons learned that have been collected in the frame of the Project and the CPA DDR Programme. 364. Conclusion 21. Given the increased involvement of ex-combatants in cooperative work, the business, financial literacy and cooperative trainings appear to have been effective in promoting group livelihood activities and imparting knowledge on the formation of cooperatives and associations. Despite these positive trends the concept of cooperative/associations seems to be ambiguous and requires clarification (e.g. in some instances groups that were registered as cooperatives and received benefits did not match the official definition of a cooperative) 365. Recommendation 21. For future DDR programming clearer guidelines on cooperative work have to be in place, agreed upon and implemented by all national stakeholders involved in order to ensure an equal distribution of benefits. While less formalised groups should continue to be encouraged, the programme has to clearly spell out the criteria groups need to fulfil in order to Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 105 receive certain cooperative benefits. Against this background the NDDRC should engage the line ministries around what constitutes an association vs. cooperative and initiate discussions around which groups can be registered as cooperatives (and whether line ministries accept lower numbers for certain vocations) and who is eligible for extra materials or assets from the GoSS via the NDDRC. 366. Conclusion 22. Although the community projects have brought a positive change for the target communities, the potential impact of this sub-component was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. It appears that the communities concerned are only to some degree able to draw a connection between the implemented community project and the assimilation of returning ex-combatants and the work of NDDRC. 367. Recommendation 22. In future programming involving community-based reintegration serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community support projects in order to achieve relevant impacts with regard to peace building and bringing a peace dividend However, given the fact that the costs per ex-combatant are already quite high future programme iterations should consider to focus reintegration assistance on individual support measures (that also benefit the community) while closely aligning the project to other CDD or CBR-type projects separate from DDR which could have equivalent impacts to that originally envisioned for the community support sub-component. 368. Conclusion 23. The Project’s aspiration to strengthen community empowerment and self-reliance was compromised by design because of the restricted number of Project types. 369. Recommendation 23. Should the community Support Component be replicated in future, the Programme should consider increasing the number of Project types the community can choose from to enhance ownership. The selection process, however, needs to be closely guided and monitored to ensure democratic and inclusive decision making processes in the community. However, recommendation 22 should have priority over this recommendation. 106 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Table 3. NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs (Final as of September 9th 2014) NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs INITIAL Phase 1 Phase 2 TOTAL Difference BUDGET TOTAL TOTAL COMMITTED COMMITTED Livelihoods Support $1,200,000 $800,200 $287,282 $1,087,482 $112,518 Mapel Financial literacy, $164,500 $0 $164,500 entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings Livelihoods Start-Up Kits $323,100 $0 $323,100 State-based Financial literacy, $312,600 $146,433 $459,033 entrepreneurship and cooperatives trainings Technical Skills Extension- $48,417 $48,417 Agricultural extension visits Technical Skills Extension- $14,247 $14,247 Vocational expert visits Technical Skills Extension - Targeted $63,547 $63,547 Vocational Trainings Assistance in accessing available $14,638 $14,638 government services Community Support Projects $400,000 $155,750 $294,250 $450,000 -$50,000 Capacity Building and Monitoring & $660,000 $519,506 $247,525 $767,031 -$107,031 Evaluation Mentoring/Capacity Building $442,836 $84,519 $527,355 Government employee Training of $117,855 $117,855 Trainers M&E Surveys $76,670 $45,151 $121,821 NDDRC Participation Funds $240,000 $120,000 $120,000 $240,000 $0 Evaluations $70,000 $28,269 $0 $28,269 $41,731 Contingency $81,711 $78,929 $78,929 $2,782 Juba Ex-combatant and Crime Survey $76,540 Final transfer of lessons learned to $2,389 NDDRC TOTAL ALL $2,651,711 $1,623,725 $1,027,986 $2,651,711 $0 Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 107 Annex 2. Documents Reviewed Project Documentation 2014. NDDRC. NDDRP. Harmonized Reinsertion & Reintegration Strategy. (draft: 15 APRIL 2014) 2014. XC Satisfaction Survey Results (Draft in Progress). 2014. Anthony Finn. Mid Term Review of the Pilot Reintegration Project of South Sudan New DDR Programme. February 2014. 2014. NDDRC. List of Cooperatives Formed. August 2014. 2014. TDRP. Terms of Reference. Consultancy to Implement Livelihoods Support Component. South Sudan NDDRC-Pilot Reintegration Project. 2013. UNESCO. Impact Evaluation: Integrated Literacy & Life Skills Development Mapel, Western Bahr el Ghazal. October 2013 (prepared by Forcier Consulting). 2013. NDDRC. NDDRP Pilot Reintegration Project Document – revised. September 2013 2013. NDDRC. NDDRP Pilot Reintegration Project Implementation Manual. 2013. NDDRC. National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. Monitoring and Evaluation Manual. Draft. November 2013. 2013, April 19th. NDDRC. Minutes of Preliminary Steering Committee Meeting. 2013. Integrity Research and Consultancy. Community Baseline Survey Report. November 2013. 2013. Integrity Research and Consultancy. Ex-Combatants Survey Report. December 2013. 2013. ASI. Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. 2013. ASI. Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. 2013. ASI. Work plan and Deliverables. 2013. TDRP. Terms of Reference. Consultancy to Implement Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation. South Sudan NDDRC – Pilot Reintegration Project. 2013. TDRP. Terms of Reference. Consultancy to Implement Livelihoods Support Component. South Sudan NDDR – Pilot Reintegration Project. 2013. TDRP. Background Document to Terms of Reference for Consultancy to Implement Livelihoods Support Component. South Sudan NDDR- Pilot Reintegration Project 2013. IOM. Technical Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component. 108 2013. IOM. Financial Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component. 2013. UNICON. Consultancy Agreement between UNICON Limited and Christian Recovery and Development Agency (CRADA) (“Consultant”). August 2013. 2013. UNICON. Technical Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013. UNICON. Financial Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013, February 4th. TDRP. Re: Invitation for TDRP to Pilot the Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme Pilot Phase in South Sudan (Correspondence). 2012. NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan, NDDRP Reintegration Implementation and Operations Manual. 2012. NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP) 2012 – 2020. 2012. NDDRC. National DDR Programme of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project Documentation. 2012. NDDRC. Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme in the Republic of South Sudan 2012-2020 (Presentation). 2012. NDDRC. National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme2012- 2020: Strategic Direction (Presentation) 2012. GoSS. Laws of the Republic of South Sudan. The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Council Provisional Order, 2012 2012. World Bank. Trust Fund Administration Agreement between KfW and IBRD concerning the TDRP MDTF (Correspondence). 2011. NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on DDR. 2011. NDDRC. South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 2010. NDDRC. Southern Sudan DDR Commission Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Tool Kit. n.d.GoSS. SPLA and DDR SOP for Determining Eligibility and Selection Criteria. n.d.GoSS. SOP 111 on Reinsertion and Labour Intensive Projects. n.d. NDDRC. South Sudan Reintegration Pilot Programme – Indicators (Draft 1) Mission Reports 2014. May 17th to May 25th. TDRP. BTOR Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 109 2014. May 17th to May 27th. TDRP. SMO 2014. July 13th to July 25th. TDRP. SMO. 2014. July 13th to July 26th. TDRP. BTOR. 2014. July 1st to July 31st. TDRP. BTOR. 2013, April 7th to April 27th. TDRP. SMO. 2013, May 15th. TDRP. BTOR: Initiation of ICRS Registration System and the Pilot Reintegration Project Steering Committee for the Pilot Reintegration Project of the Republic of South Sudan DDR Programme. 2013, May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. SMO. 2013. May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. BTOR. 2013. June 30th to July 27th. TDRP. SMO. 2013. June 30th to July 25th. TDRP. BTOR. 2013. August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. SMO. 2013. August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. BTOR. 2013. October 18th to November 12th. TDRP. SMO.2012. NDDRC. Information Counselling and Referral Systems (ICRS) Report on Mission 13 – 26 May 2012. 2012, October. TDRP. BTOR. 2012, November 27th to December 15th. Aide Mémoire, South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. 2012, November 27th. TDRP. SMO n.d. TDRP. Findings of Pilot Design Confirmation Focus Group. Project Outputs by Consultants 2014. TDRP. ICRS Administrator Manual V1.0. July 2014 (prepared by Adeel Zafar). 2014. TDRP. ICRS User Manual V2.0 (prepared by Adeel Zafar). 2014. IOM. Final Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Pilot Reintegration Project. Consultancy to implement DDR Community Support Projects. June 2014. 110 2014. IOM. Interim Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank. South Sudan DDR – Pilot Reintegration Project. Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Projects. May 2014. 2014. IOM. Final List of Completed Projects. 2014. IOM. South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. Final Financial Report. 2014. UNICON. Draft Final Report Phase 2. 2014. UNICON. Interim Report 3.IR 1 of Phase II. June 2014. 2014. UNICON. Business & Co-Op TOT (Phase II). Curriculum and Training Modules. June 2014. 2014. UNICON. Agriculture TOT (Phase II).Curriculum and Training Modules. June 2014. 2014. UNICON. Manual for Training of Trainers – Phase 2.Conducting Training for Ex- combatants in Financial Literacy and Cooperative Entrepreneurship. August 2014. 2014. UNICON. Report by Lead Consultant to UNICON on TOT in phase 2 (unofficial document). 2014. UNICON. Consultancy to Implement the Livelihoods Support Component– Phase 2. Comments and Recommendation based on Interaction with Trainers after Phase II follow up (unofficial document). 2014. UNICON. State-Level Training Progress. Phase 2. June 2014. 2014. UNICON. Project Implementation Plan (PIP). Phase II. May 2014. 2014. Francis Musoni. DDR Planning, Management, Monitoring and Evaluation: A simplified outline. (presentation). 2013. ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC. October 2013. 2013. ASI. PIP South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Support provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research & Consultancy (Integrity) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). 2013. ASI. Work plan 2013. ASI. Inception Report: South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project. Support Provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research (IR) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). 2013. ASI. Draft Plan ASI/IR Training Sessions. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 111 2013. ASI. Agenda: NDDRC Training Workshop for the Pilot Reintegration Support Project, WAU 27th to 30 August 2013. 2013. ASI. Training Component (Presentation). 2013. ASI/IR. Beneficiary Survey 2013. ASI/IR. Community Dynamics Survey 2013. NDDRC with ASI. Reintegration Workshop (Presentation). 2013. NDDRC with ASI. Republic of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project: Service Component (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Purpose and Modality of the Workshop: NDDRC Training Workshop for Pilot Reintegration Support (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Team Building (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Have Lessons Been Learned? (Presentation). 2013. NDDRC with ASI. Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Programme (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Western Bahr el Ghazal State. 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Warrap State. 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Lakes State. 2013. ASI. Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation Project – Support to the NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Final Report. 2013, June. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013, July. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013, August. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013, September. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013. UNICON. Final Report Phase 1. 2013, UNICON. Report on Bid Evaluation Results and November 2013, TDRP Draft Report on Livelihoods Support Component. 2013. UNICON. Technical Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 112 2013. UNICON. Financial Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013. UNICON. Project Implementation Plan. September 2013. 2013. UNICON. Project Inception Report 2013. UNICON. Request for Quotations. 2013. UNICON. Agricultural Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Auto mechanics Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Carpentry Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Electrical Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Masonry Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Plumbing Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Welding Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Bid Adjudication Steps. 2013. UNICON. Opening of Bids (Minutes). 2013. UNICON. Financial Evaluation (of Bids). 2013. UNICON. Report on Bid Evaluation Results. 2013. UNICON. Progress Report 1. 2013. UNICON. Progress Report 2. 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 1 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 2 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 3 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 4 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 5 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 6 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 7 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 8 Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 113 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 9 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 10 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 11 2013. UNICON. Training of Trainers Manual 2013. UNICON. Training Curriculum (Mapel). 2013. UNICON. Final Report South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013. IOM. Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. 2013. IOM. Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. 2013. IOM. Project Implementation Plan. 2013. IOM. Log frame DDR Community Support Projects. 2013. IOM. DDR Community Project Location Selection Criteria. 2013. IOM. Interim Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank: South Sudan DDR – Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. Other 2014. International Development Partners Principles for Operating in South Sudan in the Current Context. July 2014. 2012 SCL Social. Management and Analysis of the Project Implementation Tracking Data (Reintegration Component of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project) 2012. UNDP. Report on the South Sudan Livelihoods and Economic Opportunities Mapping. 2010. Stockholm Policy Group. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. 2011. GIZ. Reintegration of ex-combatants in Eastern Equatoria State: Opportunity and Partnership Mapping. 2011(a) GIZ. Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Southern Sudan: a Programmatic Implementation Guide. 2011(b) GIZ. Impact Evaluation of the Socio-Economic Reintegration Program of Ex- Combatants in Central Equatoria State in South Sudan (2010-2011). 114 2010. The World Bank and AFDB. Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Southern Sudan: Socio-Economic Study of Communities of Return. 2002.David, Soniia and Beth Oliver. Handbooks for Small-Scale Seed Producers. Kampala: CIAT. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 115 Annex 3. Consultations NDDRC William Deng Deng (Chairperson) Majur Mayor Machar (Deputy Chairperson) Obwaha Claude Akasha (Ag Director General for Operations) Rev. Saturnino Ladu (Director of Reintegration) Samuel Juma Yerimia (Director of Programmes) Rosa Weet (Gender Advisor) Peter Garang Ngor (Procurement and Logistics Coordinator) Kuot Kuot Deng (Senior IT Officer) Chan Moses Awuol (ICRS Manager) William Tong Uruan (State Coordinator) John Alier (ICRS Caseworker, WBGS) Francis Nyibang John (M&E Officer, WBGS) ICRS Caseworkers (x4as Focus Group) Isaac Mabor (M&E Officer) Nathaniel Majok Deng (AG Finance Coordinator) Angelo Wani (Assistant Finance Coordinator) Other National Actors Brig. Gen. Aloisio Emor Ojetuk (DG for Veterans Affairs) Agricultural Extension Workers WBGS (x2 as Focus Group) Wau Vocational Training Centre (Director) UN Partners Mustafa Tejan-Kella (UNMISS) Salah Khaled (Head of Office and UNESCO Representative to South Sudan) World Bank and KfW Stavros Stavrou (TDRP) Alexandra Burrall Jung (TDRP) Kathrin Kästle (KfW) 116 BICC Ada Hakobyan (BICC) Wolf Christian Paes (BICC) Implementing Partners and Consultants Sergey Burnaev (UNICON) Matt Huber (IOM) Adeel Zafar (IT Consultant) GuatamRaj Gain (Training Consultant) Donor representatives Johannes Sperrfechter (German Embassy, Deputy Head of Mission/Head of Development Cooperation) Community Consultations Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme 117 Annex 4: Methodological Note The external final evaluation used a standard methodology of: (i) comprehensive document review; (ii) qualitative key informant interviews (KIIs); (iii) qualitative focus group discussions with community members and ex-combatants (FGDs) as well as with some staff of the NDDRC, (iv) ongoing data triangulation with emerging reporting from the NDDRC, the TDRP and the IAs involved in implementation. Fieldwork for the evaluation took place between 11thAugust and 29thAugust 2014 with site visits to Juba (Central Equatoria State) and Wau (Western Bahr el Ghazal State) South Sudan. In Jur River County two community projects were visited in Roch Rochdog Payam and Marial Bai Payam where FGDs were held with community members and KIIs with community leaders. Installation of hand pumps and drilled boreholes were visually confirmed in both locations but an expert technical assessment of the infrastructure was not undertaken. The evaluation is built upon the MTR (November 2013 to February 2014). The MTR provides one pillar of the analytical framework informing consultations and analysis with project documentation (original and revised and including the ex-combatant satisfaction survey) and IA reporting constituting the other pillar. Triangulation of the analytical framework with data compiled during the field phase and in subsequent KIIs was completed by 11thSeptember, 2014. The format of the MTR report provides the format for the final evaluation. The final evaluation should be read in conjunction with the MTR. Limitations encountered during the inception phase of the evaluation were as follows: (a) Logistical: the lack of availability of UN flights due to how the UN mandate no longer includes DDR and consequently that the Commission is no longer able to access flights through the UN; (b) Availability of some key informants, mainly the IOM where the two informants are currently on leave; (c) Unclear security situation in Western Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes State: although the situation in and around Wau town (risk level 3) appears to be stable the GIZ risk management office (RMO) advised the consultants to minimize road movements and to restrict the planned consultations to Wau town. Regarding the security situation in Rumbek and its surrounding Payams the consultants received contradictory information from various sources. Due to the higher risk level in the State (level 4) the GIZ RMO likewise advised to limit activities to Rumbek centre. Since the situation in Lakes State remains unstable, further and sudden outbreaks of violence are possible which might endanger the planned mission to Rumbek. The consultants will continue to monitor the situation by closely liaising with the UNMISS field security coordination office and GIZ RMO. During field work the security situation in Rumbek deteriorated and in consultation with the relevant parties the team decided not to travel there. 118 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DDR PROGRAMME 2013-2014 PILOT Pilot Reintegration Project Annex A Mid-Term Review of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic of South Sudan New NDDR Programme Anthony Finn Ph.D. FEBRUARY 2014 Abbreviations and Acronyms CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration EA Environmental Assessment ERM Environmental Risk Management ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations FMFA Financial Management Framework Agreement FPP Final Project Proposal GoSS Government of South Sudan HQ Head Quarters IP Implementing Partner ICRS Information, Counseling and Referral System IPP Initial Project Proposal KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau MA Monitoring Agent MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MDTF-SS Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MIS Management Information System MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTC Multipurpose Training Centres NDDRC National DDR Commission NGO Non Governmental Organization OP/BP Operational Policy / Bank Procedures PAD Project Appraisal Document PIM Project Implementation Manual PIP Project Implementation Plan PMU Project Management Unit PNDDR Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintegration PSC Project Steering Committee QCBS Quality and Cost-Based Selection RFQ Request for Quotations SC Steering Committee SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLM Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement SPLA-O Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition SPMU State Project Management Unit SSAF South Sudanese Armed Forces SSDM/A South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army SSR Security Sector Reform TA Technical Assistance TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program TL Team Leader TOR Terms of Reference TT Task Team UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNMISS United Nations Mission to South Sudan WB World Bank 120 Table of Contents Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 122! Project Background ................................................................................................................. 122! Summary of Findings .............................................................................................................. 123! 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................................ 127! 1.1 Project Context .................................................................................................................. 127! 1.2 Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators ........................................................ 129! 1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries .............................................................................................. 129! 1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs ........................................................................ 129! 2. Project Outcomes ..................................................................................................................... 134! 2.1 Livelihood Supports........................................................................................................... 135! 2.2 Institutional Capacity Building .......................................................................................... 136! 2.3 DDR Community Support Projects ................................................................................... 137! 2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition ...................... 137! 3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ............................................................ 139! 3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry .............................................................. 143! 3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation ................................................................................................. 143! 3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank ..................................................................... 143! 3.5 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance ..................................... 144! 4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR ............................................................................... 146! 4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design ................................................................................. 146! 4.2 Efficiency ........................................................................................................................... 146! 4.3 Effectiveness ...................................................................................................................... 147! 4.6 Sustainability ..................................................................................................................... 149! 4.7 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ................................................................. 150! 5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance ................................................................................. 152! 5.1 Bank Performance ............................................................................................................. 152! 5.2 NDDRC Performance ........................................................................................................ 154! 5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners ............................................................................. 154! 5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research ..................................................... 154! 5.3.2 UNICON..................................................................................................................... 155! 6. Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................ 156! 6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment ...................................................................... 156! 6.2 Project Design and Outcomes ............................................................................................ 157! 6.3 Stakeholders ....................................................................................................................... 159! Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing at time of MTR ............................................................... 160! Annex 2. Documents Reviewed ................................................................................................... 161! Annex 3. Consultations ................................................................................................................ 166! Table of Figures Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution ................................................................................................ 130! Table 2. Trainings Delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members ............................... 131! Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 121 Executive Summary Project Background 1. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project was implemented between June 2013 and December 19th 2013 the latter date marking the Project suspension in response to the deteriorated security environment in RoSS. Originally the Project was intended to run for 1 year until June 2014. The Project was implemented in a complex context including the local political economy, the programme history (which was dominated by the legacy of the preceding CPA DDR process), the wider policy environment of the national DDR strategy and supporting national DDR Council decrees and SSDDRC strategic plan, and the immediate implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project fit with the wider NDDR Pilot Programme hosted at Mapel Transition Facility. 2. The original Development Objectives of the Project include (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives. 3. The socio-economic objectives of the pilot are: (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return; (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants. 4. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows: (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming; (b) Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project. 5. The main beneficiaries of the project are: the 290 ex-combatants who received Reintegration supports through the Project as well as community members in the communities of return where training was delivered in cooperative working and where ten Community Based Reintegration activities (bore-hole installation and one Payam rehabilitation) were planned to take place. 6. The Project had four official components: (i) Livelihood Support which had two sub- components: (a) 1: Start-Up Kits, and (b) Training; (ii) Institutional Capacity Building; (iii) M&E, and (iv) DDR Community Support Projects. While not identified as such the Project also had a fourth component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US$ 130,000) which finances the operational costs to the NDDRC and included the (no-cost to the Project) Technical Assistance (TA) provided by the TDRP. 7. The MTR was conducted in November and December 2013 in RoSS with additional consultations in the United Kingdom. The MTR included a verification mission from Juba to Wau and Kuajok, 42 unique consultations, many of which were then followed up with repeat consultations. The MTR also included an extensive review of project documentation and the 122 outputs of all Implementing Partners. The preliminary analysis of the MTR was presented at KfW in Berlin, Germany on December 2nd 2013. Summary of Findings 8. In summary, the MTR finds that with regards to the expected achievements of the core three Project components the following outputs were identified. At the time of MTR the start-up kits had been procured and distributed to State offices in a prompt and efficient manner. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal State all kits had been distributed, in Western Bahr el Ghazal State 3 of 92 kits remained to be collected, in Warrap State 4 of 75 kits remained to be collected and in Lakes 10 of 91 remained to be collected, after a delay in distribution largely as a result of difficult moving in the rainy season. 9. Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum(which was drafted in advance and then finalized in Mapel Transition Facility) took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2nd September 2013 and ending 11th September 2013. Training in the States after graduation is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation was delivered to 253 ex-combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members. This quantitative data has not been possible to independently verify for the MTR. 10. Seven team members from the IA including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor, implemented institutional capacity building. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. The Component produced a variety of outputs that are documented in the MTR as well as strong shifts in institutional confidence and understanding in the NDDRC. 11. Community Support Projects were contracted in two phases and while progress implementing community-based reintegration activities was limited at the time of the MTR in part because of difficulty working in the rainy season the IA had completed most activities in Phase 1. As part of the Project suspension the Component was suspended having produced the following outputs: (i) PIP; (ii) selection of communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC), and (iii) selection of contractors through the tendering process. 12. Project Management and Project Support has enabled the implementation of the Project and created additional project management structures in the NDDRC. Specifically the following have been created: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs). The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP established the PMU, which meets weekly and comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. The SC has met three times thus far and the TCC while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC brings together the major stakeholders including the UN family and meets regularly. At the time of the MTR SPMUs were not functional. 13. The MTR finds that the following outcomes (outcomes can be understood as the shifts in institutional behavior and knowledge because of the Project) have resulted from the Project. The outcomes of Livelihood Supports component include: (i) documented learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution; (ii) documented learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field, and (iii) Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 123 evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increase in the confidence of the NDDRC to manage the processes behind the delivery of material support to ex-combatants. Pending confirmation through a Tracer study, it appears that for now there is an interest and receptiveness by ex-combatants to receive training on entrepreneurship, financial literacy and business skills. 14. By design the Institutional Capacity Building Component resulted in more numerous knowledge outcomes and altered institutional behavior. The main outcomes include: (i) increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same; (ii) a greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this first Pilot; (iii) a positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; and (iv) a reconstituted M&E department. 15. The MTR finds that the Project has produced certain outcomes coherent with it being a pilot; that is, a learning process. By design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing learning and it is clear that the NDDRC is eager to learn by doing but requires more time, financing and human capacity to actually engage fully to implement learning at strategic and operational levels. 16. The MTR finds that the Project’s objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, and (iv) German donor strategy and the MDTF-SS. The Project aligns with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rd September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012). The design of the Project supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR. 17. The MTR finds that the project’s efficiency is moderately satisfactory because: (i) disbursement was largely on target despite implementation delays; (ii) low budget costs for each Project component; (iii) high unit cost per ex-combatant. Recognizing that if the Project leads to a larger project there are likely to be economies of scale that reduce the cost per ex-combatant, still the Project does not compare favorably in costs with other DDR processes in neighbouring countries. The MTR finds that the Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in the report body below. Prior to its suspension the Project was making progress towards achieving the Pilot objectives. 18. In summary, the MTR makes the following specific findings that in Section 6 of the MTR report are complemented by at least one recommendation per finding. 19. Conclusion 1. Prior to its suspension the Project was performing well, and showing strong progress on two of three sub-components as well as a variety of outcomes addressing institutional knowledge, learning, project management and capacity. The suspension of the Project removes what the MTR identifies as critical to the future success of the Project: the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building. Much momentum is likely to have been lost. 20. Conclusion 2. Prior to its suspension the Project was restricted by two broad set of factors: (i) material and human resources at the NDDRC, and (ii) the wider strategic context of 124 the SSR process in South Sudan. In the first instance the NDDRC was severely constrained by a lack of material resources and financing so that everyday performance was restricted while concurrently (and particularly in the States) the NDDRC was constrained by a lack of human resources with insufficient staffing in the States and some spoilers in the HQ offices. 21. Conclusion 2a. While the MTR has focused on the program performance aspects of the Project it is clear to all stakeholders that the Project along with the wider NDDRC Pilot Programme at Mapel Transitional Facility was severely hamstrung through lack of buy-in from the SPLA and likely from lack of confidence or progress in wider SSR in South Sudan. 22. Conclusion 3. Rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programming, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building, project implementation and institutional development dictate the best areas for examining the potential outcomes of the Project and gauging the performance of the Project and the Project Implementers. However, this focus is not reflected Project documentation or M&E frameworks. 23. Conclusion 4. In Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap and (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices. It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. 24. Conclusion 5. Component 1: Livelihood Supports under the Sub-Component 2: Training, the Project delivered a tailor-made curriculum and 60 hours of training comprised of 27 hours of Financial Literacy and 33 hours on Entrepreneurship to 290 ex-combatants. However significant challenges were encountered in the delivering the curriculum due to the low literacy and numeracy levels of ex-combatants. While the curriculum was adjusted to take account of this the effectiveness of training may have been compromised at least as held to account to the original expected outcomes of the Component. 25. Conclusion 6. Component 2: Institutional Capacity Building. M&E capacity building was seriously undermined by lack of appropriate staff in the NDDRC. This was subsequently resolved but too late for progress on the building of M&E capacity in the Commission during the Project. 26. Conclusion 7. The participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 suited the culture of the NDDRC. 27. Conclusion 8. One of the Project indicators of success was positive change in the confidence held by the community and ex-combatants in DDR programming and the work of the NDDRC, but there were no activities or metrics to measure this. 28. Conclusion 9. As a pilot the Project, the TDRP, the NDDRC and IAs were all clearly orientated towards learning and knowledge capture. 29. Conclusion 10. Regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 125 30. Conclusion 10a. Regarding M&E of the Project, the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a learning process orientated towards trialing, documenting, learning and innovation. 31. Conclusion 11. The Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan’s National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. 32. Conclusion 12. By design the Project has emphasized sustainability: (i) by approaching building the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing, (ii) by IAs incorporating sustainability into the design of Component 2 (Trainer for Trainers methodology) and Component 3 (use of VDCs). 33. Conclusion 13. The potential impact of Component 3 was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. 34. Conclusion 14. The Project is efficient with costs minimized and very little remaining room for reducing costs further. However, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes. 35. Conclusion 15. Delivery chains were a key weakness in the delivery of activities in Component 2, Sub-component 2 and compounded the negative effect of some factors affecting implementation such as lack of preparedness of IPs and lack of understanding of the political economy of RoSS. 36. Conclusion 16. By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family. 37. Conclusion 17. Throughout the Project the TDRP’s role shifted from providing TA to providing operational assistance. 126 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1Project Context 38. The DDR Pilot Reintegration Project1 has a complex context consisting of: (i) the external political economy and country context; (ii) the program context, principally the preceding national DDR process implemented by UN Agencies on behalf of the NDDRC2; (iii) policy context (South Sudan National DDR Strategy 2012 - 2020), and (iv) the implementation environment where the DDR Pilot Reintegration Project must relate to the wider NDDR Pilot Programme housed at Mapel Transition Facility. 39. The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) became an independent country on the 9th July, 2011 on foot of a peaceful referendum earlier that year held between the 9th and 15th of January. The referendum followed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). 40. RoSS is a new country without a history of formal institutions and public administrations and so it is building national institutions, administrative bodies and practices for the first time. Economically, RoSS is largely undeveloped and characterised as county with largely undiversified, highly oil dependent and subsistence economy.3 The institutions of the State that currently are being built include those to guide the economic development of the country and to provide services to the general population. They also include the national institution for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programming, the National DDR Commission (NDDRC). Economically the RoSS has been hampered by austerity as a result of oil flow stoppages, high inflation, currency depreciation and high reliance on imported food and commodities. 41. Leaving aside the deterioration of the security situation in RoSS since mid-December 2013 the development challenges for RoSS are substantial. Compounded by recent violence and instability RoSS has very low literacy, particularly outside urban areas and for females, low life expectancy and high infant mortality.4 Very little infrastructural development has occurred outside of Juba and transport links including those between RoSS and neighbouring countries, particularly those upon which RoSS is reliant for imports, for example, Uganda and Kenya. Consequently the external environment within which the Project has been implemented is characterised by limited economic opportunities, severe development challenges and conflict stressors all of which can mitigate against the achievement of development objectives in a DDR project. 1 Henceforth referred to as ‘the Project’ 2 Henceforth referred to as ‘CPA DDR’ 3 In 2010 RoSS was the most oil-dependent country in the world with oil exports accounting for 80% of gross domestic product (GDP). In 2012 Gross National Income (GNI) was US$650 largely because of the significant income outflows to oil companies (WDR 2013). Outside of oil livelihoods are largely concentrated in subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. At the time of the MTR in the national media the President of RoSS has indicated that the country’s two- year-old austerity budget of restricted government spending will be lifted by mid 2014 as a result of increased oil productivity and export. 4 27% of population that is aged 15 years and upward is literate; 40% of males compared to 16% of females are literate and 53% of urban compared to 22% of rural population is literate. National Baseline Household Survey (2009). Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 127 42. At the time of writing of the MTR during December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security and political situation in the country. Over the weekend of December 15th fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict quickly developed into a civil conflict resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties and creating anything between 500,000 and 1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). During January 2014 the GoSS signed agreements on cessation of hostilities with both the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-O) and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defence Army (SSDM/A) to begin to bring fighting throughout South Sudan (and in the case of SSDM/A in Jonglei state in particular) to an end. 43. The CPA DDR dominates the historical program context. As a consequence the Project is tasked with overcoming a negative hangover from the recognised under-performance of the CPA DDR process. Specifically, the challenges that have resulted from this CPA DDR hangover have included ensuring buy-in from the SPLA. However, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building and implementation arrangements (including institutional arrangements) means that primarily systems, capacities and institutional arrangements are the areas in which the performance of the Project can be gauged, rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programme. The MTR notes that this distinction is not adequately reflected in the Project objectives. 44. The immediate implementation environment for the Project consists of the wider NDDR Pilot Programme.5 The NDDR Pilot Programme pilot consists of all elements in the DDR pilot as it is focused on the time spent in the Transition Facility at Mapel including: profiling, verification, processing, accommodating, reinsertion activities, vocational training, life skills, and literacy/numeracy training and psychosocial supports delivered to ex-combatants. The MTR notes that in its official project documentation the Project does not adequately explore how it is intended to fit with the NDDR Pilot Programme other than stating that the Project is intended to align with the strategic objectives of the NDDR Pilot Programme.6 However in reality, the Project was deliberately aligned (in design and implementation) with the NDDR Pilot Programme, particularly around the purchase and distribution of start-up kits and the development and delivery of the training curriculum. The Project World Bank TT, consultants and IAs all sought to work in varying degrees in collaboration with the implementers of NDDR Pilot Programme, mainly UNMISS and UNESCO. The MTR finds that at the time of the MTR the Project had begun to positively influence the reconfiguration of relationships between the NDDRC and the UN agencies above, something that is likely to be critical to the sustainability of the outcomes of the NDDR Pilot Programme or building on future programming or a Phase 2. 45. The Project is conceptualized first and foremost as a pilot in order to capture learning about implementation, project design, national capacity and to test the institutional systems necessary to implement and upscale reintegration programming to a national DDR programme. 5 The Mapel TF Pilot is being evaluated for the NDDRC separate from this MTR. 6 Objective 1: To contribute to the reduction of the size of the SPLA/SSAF and other organized forces by 150,000 individuals; Objective 2: To assist ex-combatants to reintegrate socially into communities of return; Objective 3: To increase employability and livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants in communities of return; Objective 4: To facilitate the release, return and reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAF/G) to their families and communities of return; Objective 5: To support social and economic reintegration of Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAF/G) through community-based programmes; Objective 6: To strengthen the capabilities of the NDDRC, associated Line Ministries, South Sudanese civil society and the local private sector to effectively support service delivery to the people of South Sudan. NDDRC, [project doc]: 6. 128 Consequently while the performance of the Project can be measured against the achievements of the Project Development Objectives it can also be measured against the degree to which learning is being acquired and is likely to be utilised. 1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators 46. The original Project Development Objectives are identified as: (i) socio-economic pilot objectives, and (ii) reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives. 47. The socio-economic objectives of the Project are: (a) To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in communities of return; (b) To facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants. 48. The reintegration programme, systems and learning objectives are as follows: (a) Develop lessons learned that can be applied to future South Sudan DDR programming; (b) Develop and instill a system of DDR Reintegration Management in South Sudan that can live beyond the life of the pilot project. 49. The Project does not have prescribed Key Performance Indicators at Project level. 1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries 50. The main beneficiaries of the project are: the 290 ex-combatants who received Reintegration supports through the Project. Originally, the intended beneficiaries were 500 ex- combatants who were anticipated to be entered into the NDDR Pilot Programme. As a result of the failure of the NDDR Pilot Programme to secure the target case-load of 500 ex-combatants or to secure the target case-load as it was originally profiled for the NDDR Pilot Programme the profile of the final main beneficiaries was not as specific as originally anticipated and the number not as high as planned. 51. The Project also targets members of communities of return both through community inclusive reintegration activities (Component 3) and through inclusion in extended reintegration supports around forming economic cooperatives (Component 2). 1.4 Original Project Components and Outputs 52. The original project components are outlined in the Project Documentation and along with Project outputs are discussed below. Project Component: Livelihood Support (US$ 800,200 Implemented by UNICON)7 53. The Livelihood Support Component consisted of procurement and distribution of start-up kits (Subcomponent 1) and design and delivery of training to ex-combatants in Mapel Transition Facility and follow-up support delivered to ex-combatants and community members simultaneously to support the formation of economic cooperatives at community level. For overall management of the Component and the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON deployed a Project Lead, Project Manager, Livelihoods Training Specialist, Start-Up Kit Manager and a 7 Component costs from initial contract plus extensions for Phase 1. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 129 Procurement Specialist. To deliver the Training sub-component UNICON deployed 10 trainers to conduct training in Mapel TF and 4 state managers and 8 state trainers to conduct the training in communities of return. Project Component: Livelihood Support Subcomponent 1: Start-Up Kits (US$ 323,100) 54. UNICON in alignment with the NDDRC provided eight start-up kits all of which were prepared with the engagement of The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry’s Multipurpose Training Centres (MTCs) and FAO and with on the ground consultation with Mapel TF UNESCO Vocational Trainers.8 UNICON followed a clear and comprehensive bid process with an 18-day turn-around between issuing Request for Quotations (RFQ) and opening of bids on September 30th 2013.9 Contracts with successful suppliers were signed on October 1st and goods were planned to arrive in Juba approximately on 14th October 2013 with distribution to the State offices by the end of October 2013. To a large extent this timeline was met with only a seven-day delay period resulting from flooding which hampered the roll out in some of the States. At time of writing distribution of start-up kits from State offices is as follows:10 Table 1. Start-up Kit Distribution State Target Actual Rationale Northern Bahr el Ghazal 30 30 All distributed Western Bahr el Ghazal 92 89 3 remaining to be collected Warrap 75 71 4 remaining to be collected Lakes 91 81 10 remaining to be collected. Difficult moving due to rainy season. Project Component: Livelihood Support Sub-Component 2: Training (US$ 477,100) 55. As outlined in the Project document Livelihood Support through Training was to be delivered in four areas: (a) Cooperatives/associations; (b) Small farm or rural enterprise training; (c) Individual micro-enterprise business training, and (d) Adult or formal education. 56. The curriculum as developed by the IA while on the ground in Mapel Transition Facility delivered 15 modules and split the training between the modules delivered in the Transition Facility and further training in situ in communities of return delivered to both ex-combatants and community members working together in associations or in preparation to work as a cooperative.11 57. The outputs for this sub-component are: 8 UNICON reports that the MTCs provided a list of tools for Carpentry, Masonry, Electrician, Plumber, Car Mechanic and Welder. FAO provided inputs for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. 9 See September 2013, UNICON Report on Bid Evaluation Results and November 2013,TDRP Draft Report on Livelihoods Support Component. 10 Kits remaining to be distributed are in the possession of NDDRC State offices. 11 Modules 1 to15 were: (i) Introduction to Micro-Lab; (ii) Financial Literacy; (iii) Business and Market; (iv) Financial Aspects of Business and Cooperatives; (v) Selecting a Business and Cooperative Format; (vi) Steps in Starting a Business; (vii) Business Skills Development in Cooperatives; (viii) Behavioural Skills in Entrepreneurship and Cooperatives; (ix) Team Building and Management of Cooperatives; (x) Business Plan for Setting –up a Cooperative; (xi) Enterprise Management: Sales and Marketing; (xii) Enterprise Management: Purchasing; (xiii) Enterprise Management: Work Place Management; (xiv) Enterprise Management: Book-keeping; (xv) Concluding and Action Plan for Setting-up Cooperatives. 130 (a) Training Curriculum (b) Training Manual (c) Training of Trainers methodology (and resulting cohort of 10 trainers) 58. As conceived in the Project Document the expected outcomes of the activities in this Sub-Component are simultaneously highly ambitious and overly difficult to measure so the degree to which the Sub-Component has achieved or was on course to achieve its outcomes is unclear.12Training of 290 ex-combatants in the 15 modules of the curriculum took place over 10 days and in a total of 60 hours commencing 2nd September 2013 and ending 11th September 2013. Training in the States after graduation is more difficult to verify because of limitations on record keeping and differences between testimony collected for the MTR and data provided to the IA by the Trainers. The IA reports that training in the States after graduation was delivered to 253 ex- combatants (87 percent of the total 290) and to 284 community members as follows (table 2). This has not been possible to independently verify for the MTR. Table 2. Trainings Delivered to Ex-Combatants and Community Members (Source: UNICON) State XCs CMs Total Warrap State 70 34 104 Lakes State 93 29 122 Northern Bahr el Ghazal State 30 108 138 Western Bahr el Ghazal State 60 113 173 Total 253 284 537 59. The percentage of community members included in State trainings is well within the Project Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of twenty percent however there is little gender balance with women comprising 1 percent of the overall ex-combatant trainee complement but which reflects the proportion of women ex-combatants who underwent DDR at the Mapel Transition Facility (12). The actual impact of this training is not possible to gauge at present but indications of possible future impact would have been available following the Tracer and Community Dynamics follow-up studies in April 2014. Project Component: Institutional Capacity Building (USD 519,506 Implemented by ASI with IR)13 60. Institutional Capacity building was implemented by Adam Smith International (ASI) with Integrity Research (IR) providing services for capacity building on M&E systems. In total ASI and IR deployed seven team members in the area of capacity building including the Team Leader who doubled as the Principle Capacity Building Mentor. The total time spent in field directly engaging with the NDDRC in HQ and in the State offices in greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek, Wau) was 35 working days by each of the four State mentors and 66 days by the TL/Principle Mentor. As per the TOR to the Implementing Partner (IP) the outputs from ASI/IR for the period of the consultancy have been: (a) Inception Report (b) PIP (c) Drafted (with NDDRC) draft PIM (see 2.4 below) 12 NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Document: 25 13 Budget includes M&E by Integrity Research Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 131 (d) Draft Final Report (e) Regular weekly/monthly written reports to the NDDRC (f) SWOT analysis for State Offices (g) Draft PIM in collaboration with NDDRC and other IAs (h) Draft M&E manual (i) Two four day training workshops (joint presentation ASI and NDDRC)14 (j) Intensive on-the-job mentoring of key staff in NDDRC HQ PMU and staff in State offices in Bahr el Ghazal (k) Baseline and Community Dynamics Surveys (l) Survey quantitative data (stored in NDDRC ICRS) 61. The M&E activities of Project Component 1 included M&E capacity building to the NDDRC and conducting Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys utilizing the human capacity of the NDDRC (ICRS case-workers as enumerators). 62. Regarding the Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys ASI worked with IR to produce the studies. For the Baseline study of all 290 combatants ASI/IR followed the following timetable: (a) Trained enumerators/ICRS case workers (July 2nd to July 4th, 2013) (b) Conducted baseline survey (July 6th to July 15th, 2013) (c) Data capture and processing (d) Reporting Project Component: DDR Community Support Projects (USD 155,750 Implemented by IOM) 63. The stated goal of the Project Component is “to promote peace building in the four States where ex-combatants will reintegrate through a focus on community empowerment and self- reliance.”15 It is also intended to “test the direct community support mechanism” for future DDR tranches.16 In addition to its goal this Project Component has two objectives: (a) From a macro perspective at a State level: demonstrate both the NDDRC’s commitment to the larger community through the delivery of these 12 construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure projects (three in each State) and accountability among all parties; (b) From a micro-perspective: strengthen trust and cooperation between all parties 64. At time of MTR the outputs of this Component have been: (a) PIP; (b) Selection of Communities (based on criteria agreed with NDDRC); (c) Selection of Contractors through the Tendering Process. 65. To date the implementation of the Component has been limited to the Site Selection Phase and some Community Mobilization and the Tendering Process. Construction was delayed due to the rainy season. At the time of the MTR and prior to the suspension of the Project it was 14 August 19th to 22nd 2013 (NDDRC HQ PMU), August 27th-30th 2013 (Staff of State Offices, Bahr el Ghazal). 15 NDDRC Pilot Project Document: 36 16 ibid 132 planned to implement 10 projects (9 boreholes and one Payam building rehabilitation) in the following locations: (a) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (4 Projects) (b) Lakes States (3 Projects) (c) Warrap State (2 Projects) (d) Northern Bahr el Ghazal State (1 Project) 66. The design of the component has an emphasis on sustainability through the formation of community water management committees however both the experience of IOM during the CPA DDR (which identified that there were difficulties maintaining and charging for the water services) and the model of borehole/water pumps being used (manual compared to solar power) point to the high risks to the sustainability of the water infrastructure post-completion. Project Component: Project Management and NDDRC Support (US$ 130,000) 67. While not described as a Project Component in the Project documentation the Project has an envisaged management structure comprising: (i) Reintegration Project Steering Committee (SC); (ii) HQ PMU, and (iii) State Level PMUs (SPMUs) and the Project should interact with the Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) for the overall work in NDDRC Pilot DDR project. The NDDRC with the assistance of the TDRP has established the PMU, which meets weekly and comprises the representative staff from all units within the NDDRC. The SC has met three times thus far and the TCC while not part of the overall support of the Project to the NDDRC brings together the major stakeholders including the UN family and meets regularly. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 133 2. Project Outcomes 68. Following is an examination of Project outcomes to date. Outcomes differ from outputs in so far as they are the short to medium term changes that follow on from Project activities and the production of outputs. Implicitly the Project is designed so that Project outcomes fall into three broad categories: (a) The knowledge transferred and so behaviour changed (institutionally and in project design, management and implementation); (b) The difference made as a result of the NDDRC (hopefully) acquiring greater knowledge about project design, management and implementation, and (c) The difference made in the lives of beneficiaries; that is, in the lives of ex- combatants and their communities. 69. It can be argued that if successful, eventually the overall outcome of the Project should have been greater than the sum of its parts. In other words if the Project was successful then the longer term outcome flowing from knowledge transferred (not just through capacity building activities by the IP but also through other dynamics of project design and implementation such as the experience of implementation, TA by the Bank and the knowledge acquired by non-capacity building IPs) will result in concrete changes in the institutional behaviour and performance of the NDDRC, which in turn will influence the design, implementation and success of a future national DDR programme as well as the buy-in and confidence of the GoSS and SSAF. 70. This points to the basic and generic (but in the case of the Project, unwritten) logic model that can be applied to the Project design: by design, the Project when complete should have achieved the short-term outcomes of a positive shift in knowledge in the NDDRC and providing the Commission with systems or institutional arrangements that should enable it to implement knowledge acquired and positively change its institutional performance in the next Reintegration Project. At the time of the MTR the early stage of knowledge acquisition and the links between knowledge and changes in institutional behaviour and performance are not clear. The scale of the institutional development that is required to enable the Commission to implement a national DDR programme is substantial. Despite this the sum short term-outcome of the Project is a diverse body of knowledge and changed institutional arrangements, mainly the PMU. 71. A major challenge to the success of the Project has been finding a functioning recipient for the knowledge acquired during implementation, whether the appropriate institutional body (a PMU, for example), the appropriate individual (a technical or managerial staff member) or the appropriate institutional system (comprehensive M&E or Reintegration programming). 72. While some newly constituted layers in the Commission are performing (PMU, see above) the Project needs to remain objective about these structures and interrogate their effectiveness and suitability in principle to a larger national DDR programme in order to clearly identify what systems or changes have the greatest chance of surviving post-Project 73. There are examples of the challenge of finding a home in the NDDRC for knowledge acquired during implementation of the Project. For example, the Project has managed to procure, transport and distribute high quality reintegration kits to ex-combatants in a timely manner and with clear and transparent procurement systems. The challenge is to enable the NDDRC in the future to manage an IA to complete required tasks to a similar or better level of performance. At 134 present it is not clear where the repository lies for actionable knowledge around managing such a process. 74. Similarly the Project has managed to run Baseline Ex-combatant and Community Dynamics studies but it is not evident where the capacity to manage such a process lies in the NDDRC. And it is not clear how the principles of impact measurement as realized in Baseline, Community Dynamics or Tracer surveys can be translated by the NDDRC into Reintegration programming, monitoring and evaluation or sensitization and outreach. 75. Put simply, at the time of the MTR it was unclear how everything achieved to date (and that was likely to be achieved by the end of the Project) would fit together to have a longer-term outcome on either the NDDRC (institutionally or systems) or on Project design and implementation. This is particularly the case when many of the key pieces (such as particular staff members) have been missing or replaced during the Project. While the NDDRC has lead the Project and has constituted new management structures to implement the Project the progress in Project implementation has relied upon intense and embedded operational support of the TDRP. Prior to the suspension of the Project it was clearly too early to withdraw that support without jeopardizing what is arguably the unwritten priority objective of the Project: the creation of systems and institutional capacity that will persist into the medium to long term. However if future programming occurs or a Phase 2 there is a clear need for the TDRP to have a clear exit strategy at Project start-up that best supports the achievement of the development objectives in a sustainable manner. 2.1. Livelihood Supports 76. At the time of MTR the outcomes of Livelihood Supports component are: (a) Learning regarding how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution; (b) Learning regarding how the IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field; (c) Evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increase in the confidence of the NDDRC to manage the processes behind the delivery of material support to ex-combatants. 77. Regarding learning documenting how an IA can effectively operate in the complex environment of South Sudan in all aspects of design, procurement, transportation and distribution, despite implementation challenges the IA has been strongly learning-focused. In the case of the Start-up Kits sub-component UNICON has delivered high quality reporting that details the steps in design, procurement, transportation and distribution, and that profiles successful and unsuccessful bidders and other external Partners involved in the implementation of the sub- component.17 Effectively this reporting constitutes a mini-procurement and distribution manual with market intelligence for the NDDRC to implement future similar sub-components. 17 See UNICON, 2013 (d) Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 135 78. Regarding learning targeting how an IA can better manage knowledge acquisition and quality control reporting from the field, UNICON has worked with overly and unnecessarily complicated implementation arrangements, contracting CRADA, a South Sudanese NGO to deliver the training sub-component and encountering significant personnel, quality, and contracting issues with the NGO.18 Contracting CRADA appeared to be a way of replicating UNICON’s operating model in other countries. However, the approach put a poorly performing organization and poorly performing CEO between UNICON and the independent trainers who were contracted to deliver training to ex-combatants and the communities. Consequently communications with the key personnel on the ground were mediated by a poorly performing organization, which it was incorrectly assumed would employ its own staff to deliver training. Consequently intelligence from the field as to the effectiveness of training and dynamics in the delivery of outputs on the ground was interrupted and reporting from the field not to the standard expected by UNICON. The IA has indicated that recommendations regarding this issue are being considered as it finalizes its own end reporting to the NDDRC and the TRDP. 79. Regarding providing evidence that if implemented well, Reintegration programming can deliver material assistance in the form of tool kits in a timely manner thus increasing confidence in the effectiveness of Reintegration programming, and as a consequence, increasing confidence in the NDDRC; at present there is no evidence for this outcome. Presently there are no surveys of perceptions in key stakeholders in the GoSS or SPLA or of ex-combatants regarding emerging shifts in perceptions of competency of the NDDRC and confidence in DDR as part of or linked to wider SSR. Regarding shifts that may occur in the perceptions and confidence held by ex- combatants and community members questions were not included in the Baseline and Community Dynamics surveys and so should be in future iterations. Increase in confidence in DDR, Reintegration programming and the NDDRC are critical to the future role of the NDDRC and future DDR programming in partnership with of SSR. 2.2. Institutional Capacity Building 80. The Institutional Capacity Building component has focused on knowledge acquisition, knowledge and skills transfer (from the consultants to the NDDRC) and the nascent emergence of new systems and ways of working in the NDDRC. By design it should have produced difficult to measure but critical shifts in the institutional behaviour of the NDDRC. At the time of MTR the key knowledge, skills and behavioural outcomes of the Component are: (a) Aggregate knowledge products which while listed above as outputs in aggregate form a greater knowledge bank; (b) Increased awareness in management and key staff of the institutional challenges facing the Commission and some strategies to begin addressing same; (c) A greater understanding of the need to action learning from the CPA and from this Project; (d) Positive shift in confidence in the NDDRC regarding the capacity for project implementation; (e) Nascent understanding of key systems required for successful operation particularly internal (within HQ and between HQ and State offices) such as communications; operational planning; human capacity, and monitoring and evaluation; (f) Reconstituted M&E department in NDDRC. 18 See Section 3 below. 136 81. The IA produced a body of knowledge products which together cover key areas of institutional development. When understood alongside the outcomes of the one-to-one mentoring (mainly points b, c and e above) there is the beginnings of a shift in institutional culture and practice which if capitalized upon is likely to return dividends in the medium to long term. However, capitalizing upon this emerging cultural shift is a long and complicated process. At the time of the MTR the NDDRC acquired a greater understanding of the full extent of the journey ahead both in terms of required institutional development and required programme design/implementation. Critically, the NDDRC is aware of the need to action historical learning including that from the CPA and that from this project. 82. Despite these challenges the main outcomes from the Project components are: (i) organizational shift in the NDDRC M&E unit; (ii) mapping of institutional barriers to improving the performance of the NDDRC; (iii) capacity changes throughout the NDDRC in key areas such as operational planning, the work of the PMUs, and formalization of job roles and descriptions; (iv) nascent improvements in connectivity and information flow between HQ and State Offices, (v) recommendations pertaining to the way forward for capacity building the NDDRC and critical areas that need to be addressed including relationships with external partners including UN agencies (UNMISS, UNDP and UNESCO), (VI) fast track the development of ICRS, (VII) core team has been trained on the successful delivery of reintegration components and ICRS. 83. The MTR finds that the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff including the Chairperson, the Director for Reintegration and the State staff was context specific, that is, it was situated within a strong understanding of the operational context of the NDDRC and was delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI/IR also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project’s overall rationale as a pilot. ASI/IR have documented a wide selection of areas to be addressed in any future iteration of the Component.19 2.3 DDR Community Support Projects 84. At the time of the MTR there are no project outcomes from the DDR Community Supports Projects due to implementation delays stemming from disruption of transport links as a result of the rains and the suspension of the Project on December 19th, 2013. 2.4 Performance of the Project as a pilot: learning and knowledge acquisition 85. As a pilot there are certain outcomes that should be expected including actionable learning regarding implementation, political economy/implementation environment; performance of stakeholders and future or follow-on project design. In design the Project is clearly orientated towards capturing learning in all these areas and the Bank TT has worked with IAs to ensure they are also orientated in that direction. It is clear from the significant amount of practical learning acquired that the NDDRC is eager to learn by doing but requires more time, financing and human capacity to actually engage fully to implement learning at strategic and operational levels. The challenge to the Project has been to ensure that as it progresses all relevant learning is communicated clearly within the NDDRC and that staff are engaged. Shared learning must be 19 October 30th, 2013. ASI South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Final Report on Assistance to the NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 137 understood by the NDDRC as an opportunity to re-engage implementing partners, particularly in the UN family, in this knowledge-orientated project. Critically, the methodologies used in the Pilot, particularly by the IAs should be replicated in future programming by the NDDRC. Ultimately the challenge to the NDDRC is to action the learning it is acquiring: in other words, learning should be reflexive and should practically inform the next phase of the Project and subsequent programme design. 138 3. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 86. At the time of MTR the Project was on course to meet its project objectives. It was on course to achieve these project objectives despite early implementation challenges in what is now identified as Phase 1 of the pilot. However, progress that has been made towards outcomes faces clear institutional and external environmental challenges and the ability of the Project to deliver reintegration opportunities and to provide a meaningful kick-start to what is hoped will become a national DDR process is seriously challenged by the external environment, particularly the security and political environment. 87. The challenges met by the Pilot can be classified as either: (i) directly related to the Project design and implementation or as (ii) emanating from or being part of the external strategic, operational and physical environment. 88. In summary, the challenges that are directly related to Project design and implementation and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows. The factors negatively affecting the Project outcomes are: (a) Design limitations including internal coherence, timing and use of delivery chains; (b) Delays arising with IAs becoming effective and/or beginning implementation; (c) Quality of some outputs, and (d) Capacity (human, skills and resource) within the NDDRC. 89. The factors positively affecting the Project outcomes are: (a) Fit with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme; (b) Strong relationship between the TDRP and BICC; (c) Positive relationships between the TDRP and UN agencies; (d) Close project management and operational involvement of the TDRP; (e) Underestimation of the level of involvement required and knock-on effects on TDRP’s ability to respond to IAs in a timely manner. 90. While generally well designed the Project has design limitations negatively affecting the achievement of outcomes. At the time of MTR the project timeline has limited the achievement of outputs and outcomes and has complicated the Pilot design. The Pilot was initiated in line with the intake of the first tranche of ex-combatants to the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme, which occurred during the time of year when normally ex-combatants would tend their agricultural land. The planned time for ex-combatants to be in Mapel Transition Facility was three months however some were on site for up to five months. When ex-combatants graduated from Mapel Transition Facility they did so during rainy season when transport is difficult and in the case of Lakes State unfeasible in many locations. From the perspective of maximising the ability of ex-combatants to put into practice their entrepreneurship and cooperatives training the Pilot is likely to have benefited from better timing so as not to clash with when gardens are tended. With graduation happening during the rainy season many ex-combatants from Lakes State (see above) were been unable to collect their start-up kits and there have been logistical issues getting trainers to communities of return to complete their training of ex-combatants and community members in cooperative working. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 139 91. In general the Project has strong external relevance to the strategic context and the needs of the NDDRC but it does have internal coherence challenges that appear to stem from trying to implement too diverse a range of activities with very limited funds. Internal coherence challenges appear to be around the delivery of limited Community Supports Projects (CSPs). While the capacity of the IA appears strong the budget line for CSPs is limited, the Project document overstates the likely achievements of the component and the documentation is somewhat over aspirational about the usefulness of such a limited intervention. 92. Delivery chains in DDR relate to the layers of implementers employed to deliver services to ex-combatants or the communities of return. In the case of the Pilot and as a result of lack of familiarity with the operating context one IA (UNICON) implemented the Training sub- component with an overly complicated structure and with an implementer who proved problematic in how it has treated the Trainers it hired. Had UNICON better understood the environment including service providers and trainers or had it been more embedded in South Sudan before the Pilot start-up then delivery could have been simplified and the barriers encountered could have been avoided. 93. At the beginning of the Pilot UNICON encountered other barriers to implementation. The main barriers to the IP becoming effective were lack of experience, lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. The poor content quality of the initial project documentation produced by the IA reflected a lack of preparedness. Because of these barriers initial implementation of the Livelihood Supports Component was delayed and there was an urgent and immediate high risk that the achievement of outputs of both sub-components would be negatively affected. However the IP benefitted from extra time allowed for implementation by the Trust Fund (TF) extension to September 2013. 94. Despite this difficult start the IP addressed the barriers to implementation by locating increased human and capital resources in South Sudan and being present on the ground during procurement, transportation and distribution. UNICON deployed additional staff to implement the training curriculum in Mapel and engaged additional 10 trainers to deliver the follow-up training en site in communities of return. 95. During distribution the IA was physically assisted by TDRP staff and consultants to distribute kits at State level and as is discussed below the Bank TT actively facilitated introductions of UNICON to other relevant organizations including the wider NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme partners in order to ensure the effectiveness of this component. 96. The turn-around in UNICON’s performance was critical to the success of this sub- component. The distribution of kits and the involvement of stakeholders (which can be improved upon) hugely improved on the provision of start-up kits carried out during the CPA DDR process in terms of timeliness (ex-combatants were provided with start-up kits within one month of formally graduating from the Mapel TF as compared to nine months in the CPA DDR) as well as bringing State ministries on board with kit design as outlined above. 97. The outcome of the Project Component Institutional Capacity Building is difficult to quantify primarily because: (i) the weak institutional capacity in the NDDRC with which the IP was met resulted in the mentors engaging at a low level and in some cases with units in the NDDRC which were not fully functional or which do not have adequate staffing, and (ii) timing, logistics and staffing challenges that were not unique to ASI/IR which limited the degree to which ASI/IR M&E consultants could coordinate activities with other IAs and the NDDRC. In 140 particular the planned mentoring of the M&E unit failed because of spoilers in the then staff of the unit in the NDDRC. An alternative strategy was developed by ASI/IR, which is to produce an M&E manual to be used in HQ and State Offices.20 98. The one aspect of ASI delivery that was clearly weak was reporting on the Baseline ex- combatant survey. The Baseline survey report appeared hastily put together and had limited analytical content. TDRP and NDDRC comments to the IA resulted in revised versions but from the trajectory of IR engagement on the Pilot it appears that internal staffing and roles were not appropriately aligned in the inception phase. This was partially rectified later during survey administration and the production of the Community Survey report. The M&E manual produced by IR was not optimal and required additional input before being acceptable as a potentially useful tool for the NDDRC. At the time of the MTR the NDDRC does not have the capacity to manage or quality assure future impact orientated studies such as the planned Tracer in 2014. 99. The Project was explicitly designed to begin addressing the capacity challenges within the NDDRC: one Component explicitly addresses this issue as does the methodology applied by the Bank TT in closely working with the NDDRC on Project design and implementation. This cooperation was intended to ensure the implementation of the Project and create structures within the Commission that would simultaneously ensure the implementation of the Pilot while contributing to the creation of effective project management systems. While there are questions raised by ASI in its remit as capacity builder to the NDDRC around the role of the PMU post- Pilot and while the MTR finds that the SC and PMU could better share information in the NDDRC and better involve other key staff, clearly the constructive, partnership approach employed by the TDRP and the focus on capacity building has greatly enhanced the ability of the Project to deliver outputs and secure outcomes. 100. The Project encountered challenges around human capacity and resource capacity in the NDDRC. In summary, the M&E activities of the Capacity Building component were totally undermined due to spoilers in the staffing and then the need to replace the evaluation staff in the Commission. Similarly, the lack of personnel in the States greatly undermined the ability to secure sustainable outcomes from the Capacity Building component. Material resources ranging from financing to fuel and transport including the state of repair of Commission vehicles were limiters on the Commission’s ability to fully engage with the Project. However, when it experienced barriers the Capacity Building IA adjusted its approach to delivering their outputs and to try and have a greater chance at positively influencing systems and institutional behaviour. The input was clearly valued by the NDDRC particularly in the States but the fact remains that the outcome of the Capacity Building component was limited by the often very low starting point of engagement. 101. The design strengths of the Project, particularly its alignment with the NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and the national DDR strategy have enhanced the implementation of the Project. The strong relationship between the TDRP TT and the UN family, particularly UNMISS and UNESCO has contributed to the TT approaching the Pilot in an holistic manner, understanding the complexity of the overall NDDRC Pilot DDR Programme and ensuring a design fit with the wider vocational training and literacy/numeracy training delivered by UNESCO to ex-combatants at the Mapel Transition Facility. During implementation these same relationships enabled the TT 20 At time of writing this manual is still in preparation and has not been reviewed by the consultant. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 141 to facilitate the IAs to relate to the UN family and overcome the implementation delays being encountered. 102. A critical factor influencing Pilot implementation and the achievement of outcomes has been the intensive support of the TDRP TT and the project management applied not only to the Pilot but also to the development of the ICRS. The Bank’s presence on the ground has been critical to implementation and ensuring the coordination of IAs and NDDRC. 103. In summary, the challenges that emanate from or are part of the external strategic, operational and physical environments and which have affected the overall implementation of the Project or which are affecting or likely to affect the Project outcomes are as follows: (a) Security and political environment; (b) Legacy of the CPA DDR; (c) Limits on the buy-in of local SPLA and of the GoSS including the effects of limited SSR; (d) Little and uneven economic development and market opportunities. 104. At the time of writing of the MTR during December 2013 RoSS succumbed to a serious deterioration in the security situation in the country. Over the weekend of December 15th fighting broke out between elements of the SPLA barracked in Juba. The conflict quickly developed into a civil conflict resulting in unconfirmed civilian and military casualties and creating anything between 500,000 and 1 million IDPs. During January 2014 the GoSS signed agreements on cessation of hostilities with both the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-O) and the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defence Army (SSDM/A) to begin to bring fighting throughout South Sudan (and in the case of SSDM/A in Jonglei state in particularly) to an end. 105. Thus at the time of the MTR it is clearly not possible to continue the Project putting all achievements to date under severe stress and significantly damaging sustainability and the possibility of outcomes. The project was suspended on December 19th 2013. 106. Prior to the deterioration of the security and political situation there were risks pertaining to the sustainability of Project outcomes as a result of the legacy of the CPA and limited buy-in from the SPLA possibly as a result of that CPA legacy. While other factors may have been in play clearly the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme encountered major barriers even to the recruitment of the appropriate number of SSAF for the Pilot DDR programme (290 soldiers instead of the target 500) and those who did enter Mapel Transition Facility did not match those profiled in the initial start-up of the pilot. While arguably this did not affect the overall progress towards the achievements of objectives by the Pilot these issues (which were characterized as barriers or problems with local SPLA senior staff) were still a significant blow to confidence in the NDDRC Pilot DDR programme and so to the Project. 107. If the Project is to be restarted the achievement of the Social and Economic objective is likely to be negatively affected by the lack of economic opportunity in communities of return, poor local market conditions and the lack of sufficient policy to address economic development. The Project risk management strategy identified this as a risk to be managed. To manage the risk the Project design focused on activities to reduce the reliance of ex-combatants on job creation policies in the context of (i) limited market opportunities, (ii) the lack of micro-finance to establish cooperatives and (iii) the lack of State-level procedures to facilitate establishing cooperatives. However this same context is still likely to negatively impact on the social and 142 economic benefits to ex-combatant of participating in the Pilot (and arguably, the broader NDDRC Pilot DDR programme). 3.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 108. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks and aligned with GoSS strategy in DDR. Project documentation was drafted on time but was not available in final draft until around the time of the MTR. The project documentation had the basic weakness of over-estimating the impact of the Pilot (for example, as captured in the project objectives) but this has not negatively affected implementation or achievement of outputs. Overall, the Project Management and M&E of the Project has been of high quality and intensive. 3.2 Risks and Risk Mitigation 109. Overall, the identification of risks has been satisfactory however the risk management strategy as mapped out in Project documentation is unsatisfactory and not in sufficient detail. In reality when expected and unexpected risks have been encountered the Bank TT has performed well and approached the implementation of the Project with patience and in a solutions-orientated and problem-solving manner. An example of this approach is the in-depth support of IAs when IAs encountered implementation delays due their own unsatisfactory preparation for the Pilot. Once fully engaged, IAs utilized the same approach to navigating difficulties in implementation. 110. Critically the project underestimated the risk of deteriorating security and political situation (rated as ‘Substantial’, lower than the rating ‘High’ as per project documentation) but this risk, which is out of the control of the Pilot has been realized and has stopped implementation. Also, the MTR notes that the Project did not identify lack of political buy-in as a risk to success or how the lack of progress in SSR might impact on the Project. 3.4 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Bank 111. The Project M&E framework is a high-level design with both Scorecard and ‘Substantive’ indicators relating to progress towards achieving the objectives of the Pilot. The indicators are clustered around three outputs: (a) State-level operational and technical support: the provision of operational support focused on Greater Bahr el Ghazal to the NDDRC, enabling it to work with line ministries and other partners to facilitate and support project planning, development and implementation processes ensuring that lessons learnt on both process and delivery are identified and captured. (b) Agricultural livelihoods: development and implementation of agricultural livelihoods support to ex-combatants that have returned. (c) Urban livelihoods: development and implementation of non-agricultural livelihoods support through entrepreneurship, financial literacy and cooperatives training for ex- combatants choosing urban settlement in skills such as carpentry, mechanics, electrical engineering, metal fabrication and construction. 112. Scorecard indicators for output (a) above are overambitious and vague and probably reflect the view of the TT prior to the engagement of the IA that only then identified the full extent of human and material capacity challenges in the NDDRC. As such the indicators should be revised to more accurately reflect the assessment by the IA and understand the realistically achievable progress given the limitations of NDDRC capacity at present. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 143 113. Score-card indicators for outputs (b) and (c) are a combination of easily measurable indicators (for example, 100 percent of ex-combatants receive a livelihood start-up kit within 2 months of graduation) and those which implicitly defer measurement to future Tracer studies (for example, up to 80 percent of ex-combatants who participated in the non-agricultural training at the Transition Facility initiate decent and sustainable livelihood opportunities, through entrepreneurship training, cooperatives training, financial management, market, product management). 114. The M&E framework would benefit from revision based on the learning from implementing Phase 1 of the Pilot: specifically, it would be useful to scale back the ambition of some of the indictors to more realistically match what IAs have encountered on the ground. For example, it is unlikely that 60 percent of those trained will be assisted to establish economic associations and regardless in this instance ‘assisted’ should be qualified and defined to more accurately reflect the level of support given to ex-combatants and community members thus far in the Pilot. In other words, what does ‘assisted’ mean? 115. The M&E framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Project as a pilot project; that is, one orientated towards trialing, learning and innovation. Despite this as seen above the project management of the Project and the work of the IAs have firmly focused on learning methodologies. 116. Practical day-to-day monitoring of Project activities has been strong. The Bank TT has reported concisely and effectively and has combined monitoring of Project progress with close, effective, on –the-ground implementation support, particularly in the early stages of project when delays were being encountered. 3.5 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance 117. By incorporating a focus on community-inclusive approaches in its design (Livelihoods component and dedicated Community Support component) the Project has aligned with the Conflict Sensitivity guiding principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme: (a) It is recognized that the legacy of conflict in South Sudan is such that the entire population faces multiple needs and challenges in terms of their recovery and development. It is therefore intended that overall DDR programme implementation will adopt a community-based approach targeting a number of activities aimed at the supporting communities, particularly in areas where high numbers of demobilized soldiers will be returning. 118. The Project aligns with principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the Project. The Pilot is compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors particularly Principal 1 (take context as the starting point) in so far as the Project is embedded in the NDDRC and supports national ownership, and principal 4 (prioritize prevention) and principal 5 (recognize the links between political, security and development objectives) through supporting reintegration and micro-economic development. Principal 10 (avoid pockets of exclusion) is implemented through the ex-combatant and community inclusive approach. The Project aligns with the World Bank approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011. 144 119. In project documentation the Project identified the need for Environmental Analysis as the first activity in the Community Support Component. During implementation the IA (IOM) identified that the component would align with its own UN procedures for ensuring environmental safeguards and so the TT identified that a full Environmental Analysis was not necessary. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 145 4. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR 4.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design 120. The Project’s objectives and design are relevant to: (i) RoSS DDR strategies and plan; (ii) national ownership as a pillar of DDR; (iii) the learning principles of pilot programming, (iv) German donor strategy; and (v) the WB MDTF-SS. 121. The Project aligned with the RoSS National DDR strategies and papers particularly the Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (23rd September, 2011) and the South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 (11th March, 2012). 122. The design of the Pilot particularly supports engendering national ownership in DDR, both by facilitating the NDDRC to assume the decision-making and management role for South Sudan DDR and by focusing on building the capacity of the NDDRC. 123. The Project is closely related to and benefited from the MDTF-SS that during its operation phase 2006 to 2012 supported nationwide the CPA implementation with 21 projects. MDTF-SS had five Strategic Priorities of which two were crosscutting: (i) build the capacity of the GoSS and (ii) coordinate and align international assistance. 124. The Project is interlinked with the MDTF-SS in several ways: (a) The Project’s focus on capacity building is in the same spirit of the MDTF-SS that had a capacity building element to strengthen state institutions in their governance, management, planning and service delivery functions in most of its 21 projects. (b) Within its Priority Areas 2 and 3, the MDTF-SS’s funded projects directly supported ex-combatants as beneficiaries of training programs for example the Education Rehabilitation Project. Also, the UNDP implemented CPA DDR was co-funded out of the MDTF-SS with US$ 36.4 million. (c) The Project likely benefits from MDTF-SS support to the general development of South Sudan as the economic reintegration of ex-combatants will only be successful if they can be absorbed by the local economy. Within its Priority Area 4, the following measures were financed: supportive government policy, a legislative framework and extension services for a modernized agriculture as well as private sector development. This should be especially beneficial for the Projects activities within the Livelihood Support Sub-Component. 4.2 Efficiency 125. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is rated moderately satisfactory because of: (i) disbursement was largely on target despite implementation delays; (ii) low budget costs for each Project component; (iii) high unit cost per ex-combatant. 126. Disbursement to IPs has been on target. ASI received all six payments as per schedule totally US$519,506. UNICON received four of five payments with the fifth pending contract extension leaving US$162,140 to be paid out of a total contract of US$920,200. IOM have had two of five payments made with three pending Phase 2 leaving US$408,563 to be paid on completion of Phase 2 (out of a total contract value of US$450,000). 146 127. The Project has low budget costs for each component; put simply, the Project has managed to deliver a high volume of work and outputs from IAs for limited cost (Annex 1). Among some of the IAs the consensus is that the design and implementation of the Pilot received high value for money. 128. At the time of MTR the financial management of the Project by the Bank TT was satisfactory and showed flexibility in line with the overall flexibility of the project management in order to enable IAs meet the unforeseen costs in barriers they experienced during implementation. All IAs were highly appreciative of the consultative and flexible manner in which the TT engaged around project budgets. 129. Recognizing that if the Project leads to a larger project there are likely to be economies of scale which reduce the cost per ex-combatant, still the Project does not compare favorably with other DDR processes when the cost per ex-combatant is compared. In phase 1 the cost per ex- combatant of all livelihood support is US$2,759.21 The only regional comparisons are with full national DDR programmes so this distorts the comparative analysis somewhat however the differences with neighbouring DDR costs is still relevant: the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US$1,81722; the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US$2,06523 and Burundi $2,77524. The question to the NDDRC is whether the costs can be reduced should the modalities and focus of the Pilot be brought to scale and where can savings be made? 130. As stated in the Pilot the costs are minimized, with very little opportunity for reducing costs further on any one component. By component the basic cost of start-up kits averages US$671.65 per ex-combatant before transportation and warehousing costs are added which increase the unit cost to US$923.61. Transportation and warehousing costs constitute 28 percent of the overall costs but by far the highest cost incurred was transportation (US$14,000 total cost of importing and transport to the States and US$ 20,000 total cost of local transport within the States) reflecting the logistical difficulties of moving assets into and around South Sudan during Phase 1. Overall, in Phase 1, the main cost to the Project is the provision of start-up kits totaling US$ 323,100 compared to US$ 477,100 for Training supports (US$ 312,600 Livelihood Supports Training plus US$164,500 Mapel Entrepreneurship Training). 4.3 Effectiveness 131. The Project has been effective in achieving project outputs as outlined in the Project documentation and fully examined in Section 2 above. Prior to its suspension the Project was making progress towards achieving the Project objectives. Regarding Objective 1: To provide ex- combatants with skills enabling and enhancing their livelihood opportunities in their communities of return the Project had successfully distributed start-up kits to the majority of ex-combatants well within the target time of two months. The Project also delivered a package of trainings designed to suit the literacy and numeracy skills of ex-combatants and capitalize on the potential outcomes of their vocational training. Training was delivered to community members to augment the community-inclusive methodology and to increase the likely sustainability of economic cooperatives. In addition the main IA (UNICON) employed a Training of Trainers (TOT) modality to overcome the lack of available trainers that has had the subsidiary effect of skilling 21 Costs discussed in this section are direct costs and do not include management or administration costs. 22 ICR ICR00002168 DRC IDA-H0890 IDA-H3620 TF-54242, pp28-29. 23 ICR00001169 Rwanda IDA-36340, IDA-3634A, TF-52159, pp.19-22, 31-43. 24 ICR00001169 Burundi IDA-H076, TF-53794, pp.26-28. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 147 new trainers and stimulating them to take the first steps towards forming their own economic cooperative. 132. The objectives of the Training sub-component are very ambitious and in reality given the time spent delivering training in Mapel TF and in the communities, and given the literacy and numeracy challenges and that the curriculum was developed and then refined while at Mapel (but to a good standard) some are unlikely to have been fully met at the end of Phase 1 or fully met to achieve the level of outcomes one would expect from the how the objective is framed. 25 This vagueness in objectives is exacerbated by the kind of reporting from the field which overstates the potential impact and complexity of the training which in all reality is training in fundamentals, not training in advanced business as is suggested from an overview of the curriculum. Also, given limits on time it is unlikely that all aspects of the curriculum were implemented in to the communities of return.26 Similarly given the limits on the knowledge of the Trainers it is unlikely that all modules as per the curriculum were implemented. 133. For example, the IA reports that in Warrap community-based training began on 23rd September and continued until 13th November 2013 during which time 70 of 75 participating ex- combatants were trained along with 34 community members in nine modules.27 However during the MTR verification visit to Wau and Kuajok trainers identified that they had not spent much time in communities delivering training. In Kuajok it was identified that by the date of the visit 25 1. Focusing on the objectives of the State-based training, the IA identifies the objectives as follows: (1) To support the ex-combatants utilize the Vocational, Literacy and Life Skills trainings gained at the Mapel Transition Facility toward productive livelihoods in their communities of return; (2) To reinforce and facilitate the operationalization of the decision made by ex-combatants during their training in Mapel to establish themselves in individual businesses or in partnerships and cooperatives; (3) To assist in cooperative formation and offer subsequent training to ex-combatants along with community members who wish to join in the formation of cooperatives and management of cooperatives in different technical sectors; (4) To assist the establishment of individual entrepreneurships or partnerships in business activities by offering further training to ex-combatants in business start-up and management including (i) micro-enterprise skills training as correlated to the vocational trainings received in the Mapel Transition Facility; and (ii) small farm business skills training; (5) To assist ex-combatants in handling the start- up and management process such as board formation, marketing and book-keeping initially; (6) To offer advice in initial troubleshooting such as lack of support of family or community members or selection of location appropriate to the opportunities. 26 Training at State level is outlined as including: (1) Business Start-up Training which has the following modules: (a) Business Development; (b) Cooperative formation; (c) Start-up of Individual and Partnership; (d) Business plan Preparation; (e) Business Skills Development, and (2) Management of Individual Cooperative Enterprises which has the following modules: (a) Legal Process and requirements; (b) Marketing and Sales; (c) Purchase Management; (d) Production and Work Place Management; (e) Book-keeping Practices. 27 (1) Business plan for setting up cooperatives – how to identify resources required to run business, how to name cooperative, how these businesses would be useful to the customers; (2) Financial literacy – how to identify resources required to run business, how to manage resources and how to allocate them, selection of business name, how to make business useful to its customers, how to identify the different type of skills by individuals within cooperative, etc.; (3) Book-keeping management – how to deal with day-to-day operations and how to record transactions, utilization, allocation of profits and how to control others expenses incurred in business; (4) Marketing research – how to inform potential customers, how to advertise the services/goods that are available through this business; assessment, advertisement and promotion of goods and services in the market; (5) Communication skills – how to communicate to the customers in the market and others suppliers - both external and internal suppliers - and how to communicate internally within organization; (6) Planning and controlling – how to plan their businesses, how it will be implemented, when activities shall be taken, and how to control operations to minimize expenses and maximize profits; (7) Time management skills – how to manage time and avoid inconveniences, how to do scheduling; (8) Leadership management skills – how to lead others and how to motivate them, giving them right to participate in decision making process and learn different leadership styles, especially those related to cooperatives; (9) Marketing orientation – how to sell goods and services to customers, how to organize supply of goods and how to check if the goods are still usable, how to select potential suppliers. 148 (November 14th) trainers had trained ex-combatants and community members for just three hours. From this brief visit there is evidence enough that there are deficiencies in reporting from the field, quality assurance of training outputs and an overall lack of realism in the indicators used to plan deliverables in the Training sub-component. 134. Trainers were unsure how to register or if one could register cooperatives at State level so logically, it is not likely that they trained ex-combatants and community members in legal processes and requirements. What this reflects is the need to revisit the alignment of the curriculum with the capacity of ex-combatants and the available time for trainers to work in the communities to create a set of indicators that more accurately reflect what can be achieved. These indicators should align with verification of the exact outputs in each State during Phase 1, however in the case of this pilot verification is unlikely to be possible given the outbreak of conflict. However, in future designs this recommendation should be implemented. 135. Similar to the limitations on verifying the training it is not possible to verify the numbers of cooperatives formed by ex-combatants and community members or to identify whether ex- combatants and community members formed cooperatives where they had expressed and intention to do so. However, the IA reports that the information from Trainers in the field (which is incomplete) indicates that 11 groups of varying sizes were indicating that they would form some type of associative work practice28 or cooperative.29 136. The Institutional Capacity Building component has been effective and produced the planned outputs as well as less tangible (but not less important) outcomes on institutional knowledge, understanding and behaviour. The component has produced a starting point for what should ideally be a long-term process of highly strategic and highly empowering TA and knowledge transfer including through the methodology of mentoring. The effectiveness of the Component is its assessment of institutional capacity at HQ and State level as well as the linkages between the two and critically, the lack of implementation of lessons learned from previous DDR programmes and their evaluations. The core reporting of the IA was consistent and regular and the final report contains practical and accurate learning and recommendations. 137. The Community Support Programmes has not yet been effective at producing outcomes primarily because the Component was designed to be implemented across Phase 1 and Phase 2. While the IOM experienced challenges to implementation as a result of the effect of the rainy season on road transportation planned activities were completed before suspension of the contract between the Bank and the IOM due to the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan. 4.4 Sustainability 138. The design of the Project emphasized sustainability by approaching the unstated but overall purpose of the Project, (that is, to build the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing and concurrently enhance the capital of the NDDRC to implement an effective and relevance reintegration programme) to place the NDDRC front and centre in the new Project thus 28 The term ‘associative work practice’ fits the type of collaborative work being initiated by most groups of ex- combatants because the unit they were forming or intended to form would not meet the legal requirements to be a full cooperative, particularly the need for 21 individuals to be members. Also, difficulties and lack of understanding around registering cooperatives were likely to result in ex-combatants with or without community members, joining together as informal associations to benefit from collaborative work practices. 29 Annex 2 for table of cooperatives and associative work practices Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 149 exemplifying for any future DDR programme to succeed it must be nationally owned and led by the Commission. The Project was designed as a first step on re-enabling the NDDRC post-CPA DDR to take that leadership role and so eventually develop and implement a strategic, effective, efficient and relevant national DDR programme, which would contribute to the long term reform of SSAF. Put simply, the point of the Pilot has been to begin enabling the NDDRC to assume its role in Reintegration programming in DDR. 139. However a critical challenge to the NDDRC (and so the Project) was how to increase donor interest to ensure a second round of programming with a view to gradually growing a national DDR process. At the time of the MTR it was clear that any successes thus far would hopefully contribute to donor confidence and interest in aligning behind a next iteration of Reintegration programming however, with the changes in the internal security environment any progress made on persuading donors to contribute to future programming is likely to be seriously negatively affected. 140. At the level of Components, the Project has had dynamics of sustainability. In the Livelihoods Component the unplanned strategy of utilizing Training Of Trainers (TOT) methodology has the potential to create a network of domestic trainers who themselves are capacitated to build a cooperative and do business in South Sudan. The design of the Training sub-component emphasizes TDRP learning on supporting ex-combatants to obtain sustainable livelihoods through the provision of generic business and cooperative working skills that capitalize on already-acquired vocational training. The principle of including community members in training has the potential not only to contribute to social inclusion and mitigate tensions but also has the potential to create more sustainable units of diverse background and approaches to cooperative working practices. 141. The Institutional Capacity Building component focused on creating a baseline for sustainable institutional development within the NDDRC to best enable it to assume the role of leading on Reintegration programming in DDR and by employing mentoring rather than formal training the component approached skills transfer and capacity building in a more gradual, collaborative manner which suits the learning style of the Commission and which should have the greatest chance of creating genuine and sustainable shifts in institutional culture and performance. 142. By design the Community Supports Project component has emphasized the sustainability of the infrastructure to be provide through working with communities to create community water committee and if possible generate income through water charges in order to finance the servicing of boreholes and pumps. However, the outputs of the component had it gone ahead were unlikely to be as sustainable due to the low-cost and limited design. For example, solar powered higher volume water pumps also have a longer lifespan then the kind being installed in the Pilot thus mitigating the reluctance of communities to charge for water and the difficulties obtaining spare parts and skilled maintenance people. 4.5 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 143. The risk to development outcomes is substantial. As has been outlined above the key risk to the outcomes of the Project has been the security situation in South Sudan that deteriorated to such an extent that the Pilot was suspended on December 19th 2013. The result is that all Phase 2 planned activities are suspended, as are the delayed Component DDR Community Support Projects. At present there is no way of verifying what has happened to ex-combatants who 150 participated in the Project but it is highly unlikely any can progress on livelihood issues in the current situation in South Sudan. During the MTR it was identified that it in order for the NDDRC to build capacity and improve its reputation it would be critical to maintain the momentum of implementation achieved during the Project. With the current security situation in the country this momentum is likely to be lost or seriously negatively influenced. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 151 5. Assessment of Stakeholder Performance 5.1 Bank Performance The performance of the TDRP is assessed here in relation to how the TDRP performed as per its agreement with the KfW and the NDDRC as providers of Technical Assistance to the NDDRC. The Pilot Reintegration Programme does not constitute formal lending from the Bank. The Bank’s role is limited to Trust Fund management and provision of Technical Assistance as outlined in the agreement.30 (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 144. Quality at Entry pertains to the design of the Project and the performance of the TDRP throughout the period of design and implementation. The TDRP performed satisfactorily because: (1) by design the project took consideration of the capacity of the NDDRC; (2) it executed its role in a manner that was conscious of wider stakeholder roles in the great SS DDR environment including those of the Line Ministries and the UN family; (3) built on learning from the CPA DDR programme; (4) emphasized national ownership. 145. By design the Project was simple with straightforward components and sub-components and so constituted a measured starting point to assess and gradually build the capacity of the NDDRC while concurrently implementing a pilot reintegration programme that was intended to benefit the 290 ex-combatants that underwent reintegration assistance. The components emphasized procurement, and management and facilitation of external implementing Partners as well as assisting the NDDRC to critically reflect on its own internal workings and competencies rather than being overly complex. 146. Interaction with the wider stakeholder community was carried out in a collaborative manner but always with the focus on enabling the NDDRC to lead the Pilot Reintegration project. The TDRP often with the assistance of the NDDRC, facilitated networking the IAs (UNICON, ASI) with the key stakeholders in the wider NDDR Pilot Programme such as UNESCO and UNMISSS. The TDRP’s own involvement sought to learn from the UN agencies in particular and tried to positively guide the NDDRC’s interaction with those same agencies. 147. The TDRP’s role in the Project was informed by a good understanding on the history of DDR in South Sudan and cognizance of the learning from the CPA DDR. The TDRP’s 30 The Project Management here is a combination of the management of the Project by the TDRP, and the work of the PMU as a unit constituted within the NDDRC as part of the institutional arrangements to implement the Project. The relevant TDRP activities identified in the invitation from the NDDRC to engage around the Project are limited to establishing a Technical Support Unit and Project Management Teams and instituting M&E. The agreement between the donors (KfW) and the Trust Fund Administrators (TDRP) is more detailed when outlining eligible expenditure and identifying the role of the TDRP. (a) Bank-executed Activities consisting of: (1) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on such aspects as alien ex-combatants as well as cross- border and cross-cutting activities, such as capacity development, research, and evaluation; (2) technical assistance and enhanced supervision activities designed to improve quality and knowledge management for demobilization and reintegration; and (3) analyses and studies on regional aspects of demobilization and reintegration focusing on gender. (b) Trust Fund Management and Administration: Establishment and operation of the Trust Fund Technical Team; management of the Trust Fund; and supervision as well as monitoring and evaluation of Projects. 152 knowledge was assisted by the NDDRC’s self-reflection and own learning from the CPA DDR and from the knowledge shared with the TDRP by the stakeholders in the NDDR Pilot Programme. 148. Throughout the Project the TDRP’s role shifted from technical assistance to operational assistance with Bank staff and consultants becoming embedded in the implementation of the Project rather than remaining in technical or project management roles. In the field during the implementation of any pilot project the Technical Adviser is often under stress to become more involved in day-to-day implementation of the project than is expected from the role of advisor. Metaphorically there is a thin line between providing TA and then being hands-on during implementation. The TDRP clearly crossed over from TA to operational assistance during the first phase of the Project. While this is somewhat of a grey area and a judgment call by the TDRP staff as to what it will take to ensure the successful implementation of the Project, the TDRP should be more explicit in how it plans for this challenge and should more systematically consider the pros and cons of operating outside the TA remit and plan for same. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 149. Bank supervision in the form of TF management and Project management is rated satisfactory because: (i) the Bank satisfactorily identified most safeguard issues; (ii) the Project management by the Bank was responsive to the needs of the NDDRC and the implementation of the Project, and (iii) the Bank facilitated additional TA and project implementation assistance although as emphasized above, at times this assistance was operational and not technical assistance. 150. The Bank satisfactorily identified safeguard issues and the NDDRC project documentation clearly identifies the same. In collaboration with the IOM practical and efficient alternatives to ERM were identified however due to the suspension of the Project these were not implemented. The Bank closely managed financial risks and where issues emerged between IAs that were external to the Bank’s own purview the Bank TT worked to support the NDDRC to facilitate resolving the issues. 151. Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the Project, the capacity-issues of the NDDRC and sought to address implementation delays including those emanating from all IAs. The Bank TT were closely involved in assisting IAs to become effective when faced with implementation challenges and throughout the duration of the Pilot Project they were closely involved with monitoring the progress of IAs. At one point in the implementation of the Project the Bank TT fell behind when providing feedback to ASI on the deliverables by IR and this suggests that the Bank found the volume of work managing the Project challenging. Similarly the IA argues that the Bank’s approach to the project was too hands on and that the form and content expected by the Bank of the IA’s deliverables was too rigid. Specifically, the IA argues that the Bank’s feedback on the Baseline and Community Dynamics reports was too prescriptive and rigid and did not afford IR the freedom to produce the kind of report they planned to produce. 152. The Bank’s role was to advise the NDDRC on the quality of the surveys and the survey reporting and facilitated the NDDRC to develop its understanding of the principle and usefulness of this kind of M&E. Due to the lack of expertise in the NDDRC the Bank lead on reviewing the deliverables of IR and was detailed on its feedback to the IA on the quality and content of their deliverables, which to begin with was poor. It is notable that IR did recover somewhat to produce Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 153 a better quality report for the Community Dynamics study. The MTR finds that in the future the Bank should along with the NDDRC be more prescriptive at the beginning of the Project outlining the form of the deliverable in any contract with future IAs. 5.2 NDDRC Performance 153. The NDDRC’s role in the Project was to lead the Project with TA from the TDRP. Throughout the implementation of the Project the NDDRC engaged positively with the TDRP and did so with an emphasis on learning by doing. The NDDRC engaged positively around resolving implementation challenges such as those faced around M&E and some IAs becoming effective. In the case of the latter the NDDRC facilitated IAs at HQ and State level and where particular benefit was identified the Commission sought to capitalize on progress made. 154. Throughout the Project the NDDRC was hamstrung by resource challenges and challenges from its own institutional arrangements (the latter point being identified by ASI) which itself it identified as being unable to alter. 155. Resource challenges were felt across the NDDRC but most critically in the States. In HQ very fundamental challenges such as losing power when the generator switched off had severe impact on the infrastructure supporting the work of the Commission, such as IT and communications. Simply put, no power means little work can be undertaken on site. Most critical deprivations have been the lack of human and financial capital in the State offices. NDDRC staff in the States performs multiple roles so the ability of the NDDRC to capitalize on the activities in Institutional Capacity Building Component has been limited. Material resources such as transport, the state of repair of vehicles and communications were all severely restricted at State level. 156. ASI identified challenges in the institutional arrangements that in the analysis of the IA were negatively affecting the ability of the NDDRC to implement learning from the CPA DDR and to build capacity and expertise to effectively implement the Project (and future iterations of same). From the perspective of the NDDRC institutional arrangements are fixed as a result of the Commissions alignment under its respective GoSS ministry. The reality is that challenges to the effectiveness of the NDDRC to implement the project resulting from institutional arrangements were navigated in part through the creation the PMU, an approach that was beginning to prove effective. 157. The risk of finding practical workarounds to institutional challenges is that occasionally some staff may become unintentionally marginalized so it is incumbent on the NDDRC to balance ways of navigating institutional challenges with ensuring that staff members are included in the various stages of the Project and future iterations. Arguably some staff members were being unintentionally marginalized during the Project and this should be avoided in future iterations. The marginalization occurred both at strategic levels and at operational levels. 5.3 Performance of Implementing Partners 158. The Pilot Project had three IAs: ASI, UNICON and IOM. With the suspension of the project IOM had achieved little in the implementation of the DDR Community Support Projects and so the performance of the IA is not rated below. 5.3.1 Adam Smith International and Integrity Research 159. ASI and IR implemented the Institutional Capacity Building component with IR taking responsibility for the M&E focus including conducting the Baseline and Community Dynamics 154 surveys. At Project start-up ASI and particularly IR showed a lack of preparedness regarding project documentation, background and modalities. Despite this ASI implemented the Component in an effective manner, adapting to challenges and opportunities as they arose during their engagement by the NDDRC. As identified above the ASI methodology was participative, inclusive and effective in involving the NDDRC in learning by doing. The mentoring of NDDRC staff was context specific and delivered in a manner that was cognizant of the fundamental task of the NDDRC: reintegrating ex-combatants in line with the South Sudan National DDR Strategy (2012 – 2020). ASI also undertook the mentoring process with a strong orientation towards programmatic and institutional learning in line with the Project’s overall rationale as a pilot project. ASI’s reporting was consistent and succinct during the Project and added to the value of the Project as a learning process. 160. Initially, deliverables from IR were of poor quality. While implemented effectively on the ground the Baseline report from IR lacked analysis and was not confident in its own methodology, tools or approach – something that fundamentally undermined the validity of the findings. The Baseline report repeatedly applied conditionality to its analysis and undermined any conclusions that might be drawn from the work. IR recovered from this poor start somewhat with an improved report for the Community Dynamics study but the report still lacked sufficient quality analysis and quality. As noted above the M&E manual was also of poor quality. 161. Overall the potential institutional impact of implementing Baseline and Community Dynamics studies was undermined by the absence of an M&E unit during the initial stages of the Project. This similarly prevented the IA delivering capacity development in M&E. This essentially null level capacity prevented the principle of integrating the study of impact to create a feedback loop for future programming or program delivery taking root in any significant way in the NDDRC. This presents a missed opportunity. 5.3.2 UNICON 162. Initially UNICON displayed poor project preparation. As discussed above the IA encountered barriers to effectiveness such as lack of institutional presence in South Sudan and limited knowledge of operating in South Sudan or of the operational context there. Despite a poor start to the Project UNICON through its perseverance and allocation of extra resources to the Project successfully addressed the barriers to implementation. 163. UNICON’s reporting displayed strong M&E and an orientation towards the Project as a learning process. By the suspension of the Project UNICON had successfully delivered its project outputs but due firstly to issues with the delivery chain involving CRADA and second due to challenges receiving quality reporting from the field the delivery of training in the community was not possible to verify or correctly assess. In response to this UNICON has documented challenges obtaining accurate in field reporting from implementers of sub-components. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 155 6. Conclusions and Recommendations 164. Findings and recommendations are presented below and as follows: (i) as they relate to the context of the Project and the wider strategic environment; (ii) as they relate to the Project design and outcomes of each Component and (iii) as they relate to the role of the stakeholders. 6.1 Project Context and Strategic Environment 165. Conclusion 1.Prior to its suspension the Project was performing well, and showing strong progress on two of three sub-components as well as a variety of outcomes addressing institutional knowledge, learning, project management and capacity. The suspension of the Project removes what the MTR identifies as critical to the future success of the Project: the ability to keep up the momentum of the gains made during the Project, particularly in institutional performance and capacity building. Much momentum is likely to have been lost. 166. Recommendation 1. In any future programming or Phase 2 the negative effect of this stop in momentum which can result from a number of factors not just the extreme situation of the deterioration of the security situation should be considered and planned for including that any future activities in capacity building may be starting from a low level. Momentum is critical and where delays can better anticipated and managed they should be. Events such as an outbreak of armed conflict are outside the control of the Project. 167. Conclusion 2. Prior to its suspension the Project was restricted by two broad set of factors: (i) material and human resources at the NDDRC, and (ii) the wider strategic context of the SSR process in South Sudan. In the first instance the NDDRC was severely constrained by a lack of material resources and financing so that everyday performance was restricted while concurrently (and particularly in the States) the NDDRC was constrained by a lack of human resources with insufficient staffing in the States and some spoilers in the HQ offices. While the spoiler issue was addressed the other issues remained outstanding at the time of the MTR and until addressed will restrict the ability of the NDDRC to function and to capitalize on the outcomes of the Project or any future Project. 168. Recommendation 2. Future programming or Phase 2 should be designed in such a way so that the Government of RoSS should be required to commit to increased financing of the NDDRC and the NDDRC to commit to appropriately resourcing itself in material and in human resources 169. Conclusion 2a. While the MTR has focused on the program performance aspects of the Project it is clear to all stakeholders that the Project along with the wider NDDRC Pilot Programme at Mapel Transit Facility was severely hamstrung through lack of buy-in from the SPLA and likely from lack of confidence or progress in wider SSR in South Sudan. 170. Recommendation 2a.This critical macro-issue means that while the NDDRC may benefit both programmatically and institutionally if the Project is re-started, it is critical that any future DDR programming is linked on a strategic level to wider SSR so that project achievements are not lost due to lack of progress elsewhere in the broader strategic environment and so that the DDR programme can align and have currency in the broader SSR environment. 156 6.2 Project Design and Outcomes 171. Conclusion 3. Rather than the outcomes for ex-combatants who have participated in the programming, the focus of the Project on piloting systems, capacity building, project implementation and institutional development dictate the best areas for examining the potential outcomes of the Project and gauging the performance of the Project and the Project Implementers. However, this focus is not reflected Project documentation or M&E frameworks. 172. Recommendation 3. The focus on being a Pilot should be more coherently incorporated in future Project documentation or in Phase 2 of the Project and in all relevant M&E frameworks. 173. Conclusion 4. In Component 1: Livelihood Supports Sub-Component 1 (Start-up Kits) the Project largely delivered its required outputs by providing high quality start-up kits to nearly all ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap and (with some remaining in Lakes State NDDRC offices). It did so in a timely fashion and the performance far exceeded that recorded in the CPA DDR. 174. Recommendation 4. In future programming the modalities utilized by the IA and the market intelligence in their reporting should be fully utilized by the NDDRC when designing and managing the procurement of start-up kits. 175. Conclusion 5. Component 1: Livelihood Supports under the Sub-Component 2: Training, the Project delivered a tailor-made curriculum and 60 hours of training comprised of 27 hours of Financial Literacy and 33 hours on Entrepreneurship to 290 ex-combatants. However significant challenges were encountered in the design of the curriculum particularly in relation to the literacy and numeracy levels of ex-combatants. It is not possible to verify the input for State-based follow-up trainings which included the community. 176. Recommendation 5. In future programming or in Phase 2 the curriculum should be further refined to suit the needs and capacities of ex-combatants, a process which should involve the main stakeholders in vocational training such as UNESCO. All curricula should be systematically quality controlled and reviewed for effectiveness as part of ongoing project M&E. 177. Conclusion 6. Component 2: Institutional Capacity Building M&E capacity building was seriously undermined by lack of appropriate staff in the NDDRC. This was subsequently resolved but too late for progress on the building of M&E capacity in the Commission. 178. Recommendation 6. A key output from the activities of Component 2 has been a capacity audit of the NDDRC. The NDDRC should ensure that the staffing complement is filled in advance of any future programming addressing the capacity and skilling of the Commission. 179. Conclusion 7. The participative methodology of the IA delivering Component 2 suited the culture of the NDDRC. 180. Recommendation 7. Any future programming or Phase 2 activities delivering capacity building should utilize a similar approach of embedded mentoring rather than formal training. Furthermore this methodology should be correctly timed and matched with sufficient resources (including human resources, that is, staff) by the NDDRC so as to maximize outcomes from such programme. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 157 181. Conclusion 8. One of the Project indicators of success was positive change in the confidence held by the community and ex-combatants in DDR programming and the work of the NDDRC but there were no activities or metrics to measure same. 182. Recommendation 8. In Tracer studies attitudinal change regarding the perception by ex- combatants and civilians of the value and usefulness of the NDDRC and DDR programming in general should be included. 183. Conclusion 9. As a pilot the Project, the TDRP, the NDDRC and IAs were all clearly orientated towards learning and knowledge capture. 184. Recommendation 9. This orientation should be maximized on in future pilot programming or in Phase 2. Learning and knowledge capture should be integrated into Project M&E and feedback loops to monitor how learning is actioned by the stakeholders should be designed. 185. Conclusion 10. Regarding M&E of the Project, many of the Project objectives are over ambitious and/or vague. 186. Recommendation 10. In future programming or in Phase 2 the M&E Framework utilized by the Bank should be revised based on the learning from implementing Phase 1. Particularly, the ambition of indicators should be aligned with more realistic expectations of activities under the various Project Components and all ambiguous language should be avoided. 187. Conclusion 10a. Regarding M&E of the Project the M&E Framework does not contain indicators specific to the nature of the Pilot as a learning process orientated towards trialing, documenting, learning and innovation. 188. Recommendation 10a. In future programming or in Phase 2 this must be addressed so as to properly monitor the performance of the Project and its stakeholders and in order to maximize any gains from Project learning. 189. Conclusion 11. The Project design has aligned with all relevant safeguards including: (i) the Conflict Sensitivity Principle of the South Sudan National DDR programme; (ii) principles of Do No Harm, and (iii) World Bank approach to Conflict and Fragility as contained in the WDR 2011. 190. Recommendation 11. This good practice should be replicated in all future programming or in Phase 2. 191. Conclusion 12. By design the Project has emphasized sustainability: (i) by approaching building the capacity of the NDDRC through learning by doing, (ii) by IAs incorporating sustainability into the design of Component 2 (Trainer for Trainers methodology) and Component 3 (use of VDCs). 192. Recommendation 12. In future programming or in Phase 2 sustainability should continue to be emphasized and where challenges exist they should be addressed appropriately. The main design feature that should be addressed is the design of Component 3, particularly the type of infrastructure being put in place and the realistic options to make that infrastructure as sustainable as possible. 158 193. Conclusion 13. The potential impact of Component 3 was overestimated in all project documentation and M&E frameworks. 194. Recommendation 13. In future programming involving community-based reintegration, in Phase 2 or in a re-start of Component 3 serious consideration should be given to increasing the resources available for community based reintegration. Furthermore expanding the scope of activities should also be considered and additional buy-in from local Ministries garnered in order to make activities as likely to produce impact as possible. 195. Conclusion 14. The Project is efficient with costs minimized and very little remaining room for reducing costs further. However, efficiency is compromised by the cost per beneficiary which exceeds that in other national DDR programmes. 196. Recommendation 14. When estimating the impact on future programming or Phase 2 economies of scale should considered and where possible the cost per beneficiary reduced. 197. Conclusion 15. Delivery chains were a key weakness in the delivery of activities in Component 2, Sub-component 2 and compounded the negative effect of some factors affecting implementation such as lack of preparedness of IAs and lack of understanding of the political economy of RoSS. 198. Recommendation 15. In future programming or in Phase 2 the use of delivery chains should be explicitly addressed in the design process and the risks associated with it should be appropriately managed. The planned implementation modalities of IAs should be fully interrogated in light of this recommendation. 6.3 Stakeholders 199. Conclusion 16. By design and during implementation the Project sought to engage the wider stakeholders in DDR in South Sudan including those in the UN family. 200. Recommendation 16. In future programming this approach should be built upon with particular emphasis on re-engaging Line Ministries (particularly as they pertain to assisting in community-based reintegration or support of Income Generating Activities (IGAs)/economic cooperatives), and assisting the NDDRC and UN family to greater share expertise and resources particularly those within the DDR unit in UNMISS. 201. Conclusion 17. Throughout the Project the TDRP’s role shifted from providing TA to providing operational assistance. 202. Recommendation 17. In future the TDRP should more critically assess the risks of such a shift in its role and be more explicit in how it plans for this challenge. The TDRP should more systematically consider the pros and cons of operating outside the TA remit and consider how to develop an appropriate exit strategy given the difficulties inherent with becoming more embedded in operationalization. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 159 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing at time of MTR NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Costs Updated 15 December 2013 Phase 1 INITIAL BUDGET TOTAL COMMITTED Capacity Building and Monitoring & Evaluation $660,000 $519,506 Mentoring/Capacity Building $442,836 Tracer Surveys $76,670 Phase 2 NDDRC Staff TOT Livelihoods Support $1,200,000* $800,200 Mapel Entrepreneurship & Cooperatives $164,500 Start-Up Toolkits $323,100 In-State Entrepreneurship & Cooperatives $312,600 Agricultural Extension Supplementary Vocational Trainings Apprenticeships Community Support Projects $400,000 $155,750 NDDRC Participation Funds $240,000 $130,000 Evaluations $70,000 $30,000 Contingency $81,711 TOTAL ALL $2,651,711 $1,919,706 160 Annex 2. Documents Reviewed Project Documentation 2013. NDDRC. NDDRP Pilot Reintegration Project Implementation Manual. 2013, April 19th. NDDRC. Minutes of Preliminary Steering Committee Meeting. 2013. ASI. Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project . 2013. ASI. Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. 2013. ASI. Work plan and Deliverables. 2013. IOM. Technical Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component. 2013. IOM. Financial Proposal South Sudan Community Support Component. 2013. UNICON. Technical Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013. UNICON. Financial Proposal DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013, February 4th. TDRP. Re: Invitation for TDRP to Pilot the Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme Pilot Phase in South Sudan (Correspondence). 2012. NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan, NDDRP Reintegration Implementation and Operations Manual. 2012. NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP) 2012 – 2020. 2012. NDDRC. National DDR Programme of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project Documentation. 2012. NDDRC. Reintegration Component of the DDR Programme in the Republic of South Sudan 2012-2020 (Presentation). 2012. NDDRC. National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 2012- 2020: Strategic Direction (Presentation) 2012. GoSS. Laws of the Republic of South Sudan. The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Council Provisional Order, 2012 2012. World Bank. Trust Fund Administration Agreement between KfW and IBRD concerning the TDRP MDTF (Correspondence). 2011. NDDRC. Republic of South Sudan Policy Paper on DDR. 2011. NDDRC. South Sudan National DDR Strategic Plan 2012-2020 Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 161 2010. NDDRC. Southern Sudan DDR Commission Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Tool Kit. n.d. GoSS. SPLA and DDR SOP for Determining Eligibility and Selection Criteria. n.d. GoSS. SOP 111 on Reinsertion and Labour Intensive Projects. n.d. NDDRC. South Sudan Reintegration Pilot Programme – Indicators (Draft 1) Mission Reports 2013, April 7th to April 27th. TDRP. SMO. 2013, May 15th. TDRP. BTOR: Initiation of ICRS Registration System and the Pilot Reintegration Project Steering Committee for the Pilot Reintegration Project of the Republic of South Sudan DDR Programme. 2013, May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. SMO. 2013. May 21st to June 14th. TDRP. BTOR. 2013. June 30th to July 27th. TDRP. SMO. 2013. June 30th to July 25th. TDRP. BTOR. 2013. August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. SMO. 2013. August 29th to November 8th. TDRP. BTOR. 2013. October 18th to November 12th. TDRP. SMO. 2012. NDDRC. Information Counseling and Referral Systems (ICRS) Report on Mission 13 – 26 May 2012. 2012, October. TDRP. BTOR. 2012, November 27th to December 15th. Aide Mémoire, South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project. 2012, November 27th. TDRP. SMO n.d. TDRP. Findings of Pilot Design Confirmation Focus Group. Project Outputs by Consultants 2013. ASI. PIP South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project: Support provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research & Consultancy (Integrity) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). 2013. ASI. Work plan 162 2013. ASI. Inception Report: South Sudan Pilot Reintegration Capacity Building and M&E Project. Support Provided by Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research (IR) to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). 2013. ASI. Draft Plan ASI/IR Training Sessions. 2013. ASI. Agenda: NDDRC Training Workshop for the Pilot Reintegration Support Project, WAU 27th to 30 August 2013. 2013. ASI. Training Component (Presentation). 2013. ASI/IR. Beneficiary Survey 2013. ASI/IR. Community Dynamics Survey 2013. NDDRC with ASI. Reintegration Workshop (Presentation). 2013. NDDRC with ASI. Republic of South Sudan: Pilot Reintegration Project: Service Component (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Purpose and Modality of the Workshop: NDDRC Training Workshop for Pilot Reintegration Support (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Team Building (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Have Lessons Been Learned? (Presentation). 2013. NDDRC with ASI. Objectives of the Pilot Reintegration Programme (Presentation). 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Western Bahr el Ghazal State. 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Warrap State. 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. 2013. ASI. Report on ASI’s Mentoring in Lakes State. 2013. ASI. Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation Project – Support to the NDDRC Pilot Reintegration Project Final Report. 2013, June. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013, July. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013, August. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013, September. ASI. Monthly Report. 2013. UNICON. Technical Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 163 2013. UNICON. Financial Proposal World Bank – South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013. UNICON. Project Implementation Plan 2013. UNICON. Project Inception Report 2013. UNICON. Request for Quotations. 2013. UNICON. Agricultural Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Auto mechanics Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Carpentry Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Electrical Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Masonry Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Plumbing Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Welding Kit for No Objection. 2013. UNICON. Bid Adjudication Steps. 2013. UNICON. Opening of Bids (Minutes). 2013. UNICON. Financial Evaluation (of Bids). 2013. UNICON. Report on Bid Evaluation Results. 2013. UNICON. Progress Report 1. 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 1 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 2 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 3 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 4 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 5 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 6 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 7 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 8 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 9 164 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 10 2013. UNICON. Weekly Report 11 2013. UNICON. Training of Trainers Manual 2013. UNICON. Training Curriculum (Mapel). 2013. UNICON. Final Report South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project in South Sudan. 2013. IOM. Technical Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. 2013. IOM. Financial Proposal South Sudan DDR Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. 2013. IOM. Project Implementation Plan. 2013. IOM. Log frame DDR Community Support Projects. 2013. IOM. DDR Community Project Location Selection Criteria. 2013. IOM. Interim Report to the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the World Bank: South Sudan DDR – Pilot Reintegration Project – Consultancy to Implement DDR Community Support Projects. Other 2012 SCL Social. Management and Analysis of the Project Implementation Tracking Data (Reintegration Component of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Project) 2012. UNDP. Report on the South Sudan Livelihoods and Economic Opportunities Mapping. 2010. Stockholm Policy Group. South Sudan DDR Programme Review Report. 2011. GIZ. Reintegration of ex-combatants in Eastern Equatoria State: Opportunity and Partnership Mapping. 2011(a) GIZ. Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Southern Sudan: a Programmatic Implementation Guide. 2011(b) GIZ. Impact Evaluation of the Socio-Economic Reintegration Program of Ex- Combatants in Central Equatoria State in South Sudan (2010-2011). 2010. The World Bank and AFDB. Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Southern Sudan: Socio-Economic Study of Communities of Return. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 165 Annex 3. Consultations NDDRC William Deng Deng (Chairperson) Majur Mayor Machar (Deputy Chairperson) Ambrose Kambaya (Member and Supervisor for Operations) Claude Obwaha Akasha (Director General for Operations) Kamilo Loku (Director of M&E) Kerbino Yel Deng (Director for Communications/Public Information) Rosa Weet (Gender Advisor) Peter Garang Ngor (Procurement Coordinator) Kuot Kuot Deng (Senior IT Officer) Benson Mungai (Web Administrator) Peter Gai (Reintegration) Chan Moses Awuol (ICRS Manager) Meen Mawut Nyok (State Coordinator) William Tong Uruan (State Coordinator) Temrol Deng Garang (State Coordinator) ICRS Caseworkers (x6 as Focus Group) BICC Claudia Breitung (Technical Advisor to the Commission) Wolf Christian Paes (BICC) World Bank and KfW Stavros Stavrou (TDRP) 166 Alexandra Burrall Jung (TDRP) Kathrin Kaestle (KfW) Implementing Partners Kees Kingma (ASI) Andrew Cummings (ASI) Peter Olowo (ASI) Warrap State Trainers (x3 as focus group) Francis Odiwuor (ASI) Western Bahr el Ghazal State Trainers (x3 as focus group) Rustam Davletkhanov (UNICON) Sergey Burnaev (UNICON) Matt Huber (IOM) Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Final Evaluation of the Pilot Reintegration Project Republic ff South Sudan New NDDR Programme - Annex A 167 Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey Implemented by: TDRP & NDDRC Report by: Kate Jinghua Zhou October 2014 Table of Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations..................................................................................... 172 Executive Summary..................................................................................................... 173 ............................................................................... 174 1 Introduction and Methodology. 1.1 BACKGROUND.................................................................................................174 1.2 XC SATISFACTION SURVEY................................................................................174 ................................................................................175 1.3 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT. 1.4 METHODOLOGY...............................................................................................175 1.5 SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF EX-COMBATANTS...............................177 2 Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey and Project Delivery..................................... 180 ..................................................................................180 2.1 PRE-DDR EXPECTATIONS. 2.2 LIVELIHOOD TRAININGS...................................................................................181 2.3 LIVELIHOODS START-UP TOOLKITS....................................................................188 2.4 STATE-BASED INTEGRATION SERVICES.............................................................191 ..................................................... 194 3 Early Results of Ex-Combatants’ Reintegration. ......................................................................194 3.1 EX-COMBATANTS LIVELIHOODS. 3.2 LAND ...............................................................................................................199 3.3 COMMUNITY OF REINTEGRATION...................................................................201 4 Conclusion................................................................................................................. 206 4.1 LIVELIHOOD TRAININGS...................................................................................206 4.2 LIVELIHOOD START-UP KITS...............................................................................207 4.3 STATE-BASED REINTEGRATION SERVICES.........................................................207 4.4 EARLY RESULTS OF EX-COMBATANTS REINTEGRATION...................................207 ......................... 209 ANNEX 1: 2014 Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey Questionnaire. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 171 Acronyms and Abbreviations CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration ICRS Information Counseling and Referral System NDDRC National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission NDDRP National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program NOF National Organized Forces SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program XC Ex-Combatant 172 Executive Summary The South Sudan Pilot DDR Project attempted to test vided at Mapel, additional agricultural focused business the modalities of the reintegration system and develop training was added during the reintegration phase of the lessons learned for future DDR programming. To this Pilot Program. According to the satisfaction survey, the end, 2014 South Sudan ex-combatants’ satisfaction sur- State-Based livelihood training met ex-combatants’ vey recorded the reinsertion and reintegration experi- need for additional technical skills and addressed the ence of 204 ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot issues that demobilized combatants encountered in Program. Based on the self-reported opinions of 204 their reintegration process. An overwhelming majority ex-combatant respondents, the overwhelming majority of the 192 respondents who attended the trainings said of them are adapting well to civilian life, and notable that they learned new knowledge at the in-State trainings advancements in reintegration have been made within with a further 71% of them stating that they had used just one year. these new additional skills. Livelihood trainings achieved the goals of providing With regards to ex-combatants’ livelihoods after return- ex-combatants with a variety of vocational paths and ing to the communities, agriculture and animal hus- basic skills to secure a livelihood in the communities. bandry were the two main livelihood options chosen, All ex-combatants participating in the Pilot Program and it is a positive finding that approximately three were eligible to receive the livelihood trainings at the quarters of ex-combatants were working on the exact Mapel Transitional Facility which included vocational vocations that they were trained on at Mapel. skills training, literacy and numeracy training, life skills training, and entrepreneurship skills training. A little The DDR Pilot Program contributed to the economic over 95% of ex-combatants interviewed were positive empowerment of ex-combatants. The number of busi- that they were satisfied with all the trainings they re- ness associations/cooperatives has tripled in the com- ceived and most ex-combatant participants suggested munities after the Pilot Program, and most ex-combat- that more vocational options could be provided in future ants interviewed were positive that the Pilot Program, programs. especially the vocational trainings, contributed to their increased income. Ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program re- ceived their livelihood start-up toolkits after the series The acceptance of ex-combatants by communities and of livelihood trainings. Overall the process of design, their inclusion in community activities were proved procurement, and distribution of livelihood start-up to be very high. An absolute majority of ex-combatants toolkits to ex-combatants was highly successful. 203 interviewed claimed that they were very well received out of 204 ex-combatant respondents reported that they in the communities, and more than eight in 10 of them received their toolkits and that the types of toolkits they consider themselves as civilians in society. received were consistent with the vocational skills they were trained on. For future programming, more thoughts Taking into consideration the responses to the ex-com- could be put on the practical aspects of the tools included batants’ satisfaction survey, ex-combatants who par- in the toolkits and the logistical aspects of the toolkit dis- ticipated in the Pilot DDR Program in South Sudan are tribution process. adapting well to their post-SPLA life and substantial ad- vancements have been made during their reintegration In addition to the entrepreneurship skills training pro- phase within such a short period of time. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 173 1 Introduction and Methodology 1.1 BACKGROUND nancial literacy, entrepreneurship and cooperatives train- ing, livelihoods start-up kits, and community engage- Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace ment in preparation for community support projects. Agreement (CPA), many soldiers from various exter- nal forces were integrated into the Sudan People’s Lib- The primary goal of the NDDRC’s Pilot Reintegration eration Army (SPLA) while some SPLA members were Project is to test reintegration approaches and modali- redeployed to other National Organized Forces (NOF) ties and develop actionable lessons which can inform including the Police, Wildlife, Civil Defence (Fire Bri- and improve the Republic of South Sudan’s future DDR gades), and the Correctional Services (Prisons). The programming. These modalities include direct services Government recognized—with the intention of reducing to beneficiaries and project management. the size of military forces as well as the national defence budget—that the armed forces needed to transition to a Reintegration Programme System and Learning Objec- more proportionately-sized and resourced national army tives of the Pilot Reintegration Project: (SPLA) that respects human rights and operates under • Develop lessons learned that can be applied to fu- effective civilian oversight. For these reasons, the Na- ture South Sudan DDR programming; tional Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Program has been highlighted as a priority of the • Develop and instil a system of DDR Reintegration Republic of South Sudan and as an integral component Management in South Sudan that can live beyond of the country’s development strategy to establish sus- the life of the pilot phase. tainable peace, enhance stability, and promote socio- Socio-Economic Pilot Objectives of the Pilot Reintegra- economic development. Since 2011, the Government of tion Project: South Sudan has focused on developing a new nation- ally led and owned DDR program, incorporating lessons • To provide ex-combatants with skills enabling and learned from the CPA DDR process. The objective of enhancing their livelihood opportunities in commu- the DDR process is to contribute to security and stabil- nities of return; ity in post-conflict environments such that recovery and development can begin. This objective is achieved by • To facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of ex- disarming, demobilizing, and sustainably reintegrating combatants into their families and communities of DDR target groups in their chosen communities of return return. while supporting longer-term development and mitigat- ing potential negative impacts through community based 1.2 XC SATISFACTION SURVEY activities. In 2014, TDRP conducted an ex-combatants (XCs) sat- isfaction survey of the 290 demobilized ex-combatants In 2012, the South Sudan National DDR Commission who were enrolled in the Pilot Program in order to gain was officially established and was charged with the re- knowledge of how well ex-combatants are reintegrating sponsibility to plan and implement the national DDR into their communities and the main challenges they are program to support transformation of SPLA/SSAF into experiencing. a more professional, efficient and cost-effective civilian life. The DDR program started off in 2013 with a pilot The XC satisfaction survey’s purpose included: during which lessons could be learned and incorporated to ensure a well-designed scale up to a full caseload DDR • Assessing reintegration approaches and modalities program to fit the context and needs of South Sudan. Be- of the pilot reintegration project; ginning in April 2013, 290 ex-combatants were enrolled in the Pilot Reintegration Project and to date they have • Determining the current reintegration status of all received reintegration support including Information ex-combatants; Counseling and Referral Services (ICRS) counseling, fi- • Assessing ex-combatants’ participation in reintegra- 174 tion trainings and services; survey are, however, referred to for comparisons to track • Understanding issues related to access to and ex- patterns and measure changes in XCs’ livelihood, com- combatants’ participation in reintegration trainings munity dynamics, and XCs’ perceptions in order to better achieve the main purpose of assessing the programmatic and income generating activities; operation of the Pilot Program. • Assessing the degree to which ex-combatants ben- efited from the program (especially from the liveli- 1.4 METHODOLOGY hood aspect), and are actively engaged in business associations/cooperatives; A mixed methodology including research on the previous and current situation as a scoping exercise to develop, test • Assessing the responses of ex-combatants to their and adapt the questionnaire, comparative study of simi- new socio-economic status within the host commu- lar post-conflict countries, and qualitative field survey in nities following demobilization and reintegration; the four States of reintegration were undertaken. In or- • Assessing the satisfaction level of ex-combatants der to ensure that questions in the XC satisfaction survey with the reintegration trainings and services pro- could be properly articulated and were relevant to the vided, and obtaining ex-combatants’ suggestions for Pilot Program, a model interview session was conducted improvement on the training and services; and among ICRS caseworkers before they were deployed to • Developing lessons learned that can be applied to conduct the field survey. On the model interview session, future South Sudan DDR programming. ICRS caseworkers in turn shared their insights and sug- gestions for improvement of the questionnaire. 1.3 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 1.4.1 TARGET SURVEY POPULATION By presenting findings of the demobilization and rein- As the satisfaction survey was designed to follow up with tegration processes, the report’s main purpose is to as- ex-combatants enrolled in the Pilot Program, the target sess the relevance as well as the modalities of the Pilot population for this study was the 290 ex-combatants (272 Program activities designed to facilitate ex-combatants’ males and 18 females) enrolled in the Pilot Program. The reintegration. The report’s findings seek to provide facts target sample size for the satisfaction survey was set at and reflections to pinpoint the key challenges that ex- 70% of the target population size (290) and therefore, it combatants face when reintegrating in host communities was hoped that 203 ex-combatants could be interviewed. and to highlight best practices during the reintegration The study eventually located 204 ex-combatants. While process. It is hoped that the results from the satisfaction more than 90% of the ex-combatants in Northern Bahr survey lead to a better design for the overall DDR pro- el Ghazal participated in the satisfaction survey, it must gramming and future project implementation. be noted that the sample size of Western Bahr el Ghazal covered barely more than half (53.3%) of the total num- It is important to note that the XC satisfaction study is ber of ex-combatants in the State. The reason for this not a tracer study that tracks changes amongst ex-com- comparatively small percentage was due to the impass- batants who were traced from the baseline survey con- able roads during the rainy season which made it impos- ducted in 2013. Data and findings of the XC registration sible for NDDRC staff to reach out to all the counties in Table 1: Target Population and Sample of Satisfaction Study # of XCs in the Satisfaction # of XCs in the Pilot Program Survey % of XCs in State of Reintegration Satisfaction Survey Male Female Total Male Female Total Warrap 72 3 75 54 2 56 74.7% Northern Bahr el Ghazal 28 2 30 28 0 28 93.3% Western Bahr el Ghazal 79 13 92 39 10 49 53.3% Lakes 93 0 93 71 0 71 76.3% TOTAL 272 18 290 192 12 204 70.3% Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 175 Western Bahr el Ghazal. With the sample size of 204 re- provided multiple options for every question, it is pos- spondents, analyses could be made on a 95% confidence sible that there were still not sufficient options to capture level with a confidence interval of ± 3.7%. all the answers that ex-combatants had in mind. This study, as with any research project that relies heavily on 1.4.2 TIMING quantitative data analysis, cannot be tested against any set of qualitative criteria in that it cannot fully reflect The preliminary work on the study including desk re- the experience of respondents. Therefore, it is likely that search, questionnaire design, and programming was some data might have been misinterpreted and it is sim- initiated in July 2014. Field research and surveys were ply hoped that the interpretation of the data is representa- undertaken in July and August, and data analysis was tive of what is intended. conducted in August and September. Secondly, considering the size and type of research 1.4.3 DATA COLLECTION sample as well as the fact that the survey was conducted As the XC satisfaction survey was programmed in tab- by NDDRC staff, it is impossible to eradicate the mis- lets and the surveys were undertaken using tablets, col- leading responses provided by interviewees. It is highly lected qualitative survey data were saved directly on the likely that among the 204 interviewed ex-combatants, tablets with the completed survey forms uploaded to the some were reserved in both the manner they responded World Bank Transitional Demobilization and Reintegra- and the content of their responses. Additionally, some tion Program (TDRP) central server on a daily basis. ex-combatants may also have deliberately misinformed Upon completion of field surveys and data collection, all enumerators on some issues due to the fear of authorities the survey data were coded and programmed in SPSS for or in the hope that they might receive further benefits in comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analysis. the future. On the other hand, it is necessary to note that the viewpoints and background of researchers may also 1.4.4 RESEARCH TEAM shape the research and analysis process, thus resulting in inevitable biases in the final findings. The research team was led by TDRP alongside the NDDRC staff. The ICRS manager provided technical Thirdly, as is demonstrated in the table of target popu- support and monitored the completion of questionnaires lation and sample of satisfaction study, among the total throughout the entire field survey process. 204 ex-combatants interviewed, only 12 were women. As gender-disaggregate data is crucial to plan a target- 11 NDDRC ICRS caseworkers worked as enumerators ing mechanism that benefits both genders equally and and travelled to the States of reintegration in order to to determine how gender objectives are faring in regard conduct the interviews. Before going into the field, ICRS to the Pilot DDR Program, the small sample of women caseworkers participated in a half-day intensive training ex-combatants interviewed left a few questions unan- on how to engage survey respondents and conduct tablet- swered: based surveys. In turn, ICRS caseworkers shared their suggestions for the questionnaire’s improvement. As part • How are the South Sudanese female ex-combatants of the training, ICRS caseworkers practiced conducting faring after demobilization in comparison with their surveys amongst each other which further helped them male peers and with women in the communities in familiarize with the questionnaire and prepared them for general? the field survey. • How accessible and appropriate are the Pilot Pro- gram benefits to female ex-combatants, and what 1.4.5 LIMITATIONS are the suggestions on program improvement from While efforts were made to reduce the limitations of the the female perspective? study, various limitations were inevitable due to the sur- • What is the role or participation of female ex-com- vey sample as well as restrictions related to resources batants in income generating activities, especially in and time frame. A number of limitations can be identi- business associations/cooperatives? fied, some of which are common to other studies of the same kind. It is worth noting, however, that as there are only a total of 18 female ex-combatants enrolled in the Pilot Pro- First, in terms of survey data, it should be noted that gram, the answers from the female ex-combatants in- some of the data are missing or invalid which may lead terviewed in the satisfaction survey (67% of the entire to biases in the findings. Further, while the questionnaire female ex-combatant population) are to a large extent 176 representative of the female ex-combatant perspective in 1.5.1 AGE general. As is indicated in the following table, the average age Finally, it should be noted that as the original XC sat- for the 204 ex-combatants interviewed is about 43.0 isfaction survey was in English and did not have an years old. The mean age is older for males than that for official translation in local languages, it was up to the females, 43.3 compared to 37.8. Notably, the youngest enumerators to verbally translate each question for re- ex-combatant who participates in the Pilot Program is spondents. Despite the training for enumerators and the currently 20 years old while the oldest is 70 years old, efforts made to harmonize questions, it is still possible which suggests that the Pilot Program covered a group that there were nuances in meanings of certain questions of ex-combatants from a wide range of ages. during each survey and among different ICRS casework- ers. Further, it is likely that there was a misconception of In terms of average ages in four different States, Lakes States has the youngest group of ex-combatants on aver- certain issues or terminologies between ex-combatants age compared to the other States, as the mean age for and enumerators. ex-combatants in Lakes States stands at 39.4 and median age at 40.0. The mean age for ex-combatants enrolled in 1.5 SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC the Pilot Program in Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, PROFILE OF EX-COMBATANTS and Western Bahr el Ghazal is between 43 and 47 years old (46.2, 45.0, and 43.2 respectively); further, Northern In order to properly understand the challenges of demo- Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal have ex- bilization and reintegration in South Sudan as well as combatants that are currently 70 years old. the effectiveness of the NDDRC Pilot DDR Program, it is necessary to take a closer look at the demographic Interestingly, when further considering the age groups profile of the ex-combatants. This section contains basic that ex-combatants fall in, approximately 8 out of 10 re- socio-demographic information on the ex-combatants spondents are under the age of 50 (81.4%), with 70.6% who participated in the Pilot Program. In addition, it between the ages of 31 and 50. Similar pattern of age should be noted that the demographic data is presented distribution occurs in all four States of reintegration. and analyzed by breaking down into the four States of The age distribution of ex-combatants implies that most reintegration – Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, West- of them should still be economically active, capable of ern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes – in order to facilitate a receiving formal education, vocational training, literacy better understanding of the geographic differences in the and numeracy training, life skills training and entrepre- demographic profile of the ex-combatants interviewed. neurship training to ensure a sustainable livelihood, and Table 2: Age of respondents AGE (years) Gender Number Mean Median Minimum Maximum Range Male 192 43.27 44 20 70 50 Female 12 37.75 39 22 50 28 TOTAL 204 42.95 43.5 20 70 50 State of Reintegration Number Mean Median Minimum Maximum Range Warrap State 56 46.18 45 26 70 44 Northern Bahr el Ghazal State 28 44.93 43.5 32 70 38 Western Bahr el Ghazal State 49 43.24 44 22 64 42 Lakes State 71 39.41 40 20 62 42 TOTAL 204 42.95 43.5 20 70 50 Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 177 21.6% and 10.3% of respon- Figure 1: Age Distribution of Ex-Combatants dents were sergeant and ser- geant major respectively, ex- combatants of senior level ranks is rare amongst survey 100% 90% respondents. There was one % of respondents (204) 80% second lieutenant and one 37% 70% 61-70 major interviewed in West- 60% 39% 25% 50% 45% 43% 51-60 ern Bahr el Ghazal. 40% 37% 30% 41-50 The general distribution of 32% 46% 29% 20% 21% 31-40 former military rank break- 10% 20% 11% 0% 7% 0% 8% 20-30 down differs only to a lim- TOTAL Warrap Northern Western Lakes ited extent in the four rein- Bahr el Bahr el tegration States. In Warrap, Ghazal Ghazal half of the ex-combatants interviewed are former cor- hereby, qualify to enter the job market and more gener- porals (28 ex-combatants), ally to re-enter civil society. which accounts for 40.6% of total corporals within the 204 ex-combatants. There are also 10 former privates, 1.5.2 MILITARY HISTORY 15 former sergeants, and three former sergeant majors in Warrap. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal, there are also The former military affiliation inevitably affects ex-com- more former corporals than former privates, 10 (35.7% batants’ economic status and livelihood, roles and social of ex-combatants interviewed in Northern Bahr el Ghaz- status in the communities as well as individual perspec- al) compared to 6 (21.4% of ex-combatants interviewed tive on different issues. Former military profiles of ex- in Northern Bahr el Ghazal). Different from the other combatants, therefore, provide an alternative angle to three States, a comparatively large percentage (42.9%) understand the data collected in the satisfaction survey. of ex-combatants surveyed were of higher junior ranks in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, as a quarter of respondents As is shown in table 3, the majority of ex-combatants (7 ex-combatants) were former sergeants, 3 respondents who participated in the Pilot Program are soldiers of ju- were former sergeant majors. Further, the only two for- nior military ranks as approximately two thirds of the to- mer regimental sergeant majors of the 204 ex-combat- tal respondents identified themselves as either privates1 ants are both from Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Western or corporals2 (66 and 69 respondents respectively). While Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes States have similar distribu- Table 3:Former Military Rank 1  A private is a soldier of the lowest military rank. Former than Military a private, Rank no particular command appointment corre- but having 2  State of Reintegration A corporal is also a junior rank, indicating a more experienced soldier sponding to the rank. Sergeant Regimental Second Private Corporal Sergeant Major Major Sergeant Major Lieutenant Warrap (56 XCs) 17.9% 50.0% 26.8% 5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Northern Bahr el 21.4% 35.7% 25.5% 10.7% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% Ghazal (28 XCs) Western Bahr el 40.8% 24.5% 14.3% 16.3% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% Ghazal (49 XCs) Lakes (71 XCs) 42.3% 26.8% 21.1% 9.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% TOTAL (204 XCs) 32.4% 33.8% 21.6% 10.3% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 1  A private is a soldier of the lowest military rank. 2  A corporal is also a junior rank, indicating a more experienced soldier than a private, but having no particular command appointment corresponding to the rank. 178 tion of ex-combatants in terms of former military ranks. an advantage and a disadvantage in their reintegration The ex-combatant population in both States primarily experience. For example, higher military rank can be an composes of former privates, i.e. 40.8% (20 ex-combat- advantage for the ex-combatants who seek employment ants) and 42.3% (30 ex-combatants) in the two States in the private security sector. However, such an advan- respectively. Former corporals account for 24.5% and tage may turn into a disadvantage or obstacle when ex- 26.8% of the respondents in Western Bahr el Ghazal and combatants try to re-position themselves in civil society Lakes respectively. There was no significant representa- as civilians. Few ex-combatants interviewed mentioned, tion of ex-combatants of more senior military level in however, that they felt there was any discrimination or Western Bahr el Ghazal or Lakes, except for one former stigma in the job market or in the host communities. This second lieutenant and one former major in Western Bahr finding suggests that the integration of ex-combatants in el Ghazal. communities in South Sudan is comparatively high and the discrimination of the job market towards ex-combat- The military background of ex-combatants can both be ants is not particularly evident. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 179 2 Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey and Project Delivery I n July 2014, TDRP conducted an ex-combatants’ satis- lot Program, the vast majority of the 204 ex-combatants faction survey of the 290 demobilized ex-combatants (80.3%) were told that they would be trained on voca- who were enrolled in the Pilot Program in order to tional skills. More than half of them were also told that gain knowledge of how well ex-combatants are reinte- they would be trained on agricultural skills (66.8%), they grating into their communities, the main challenges they would receive toolkits after the training (65.8%), they are facing, and the extent to which program participants would get business and literacy trainings (61.7% and are satisfied with the Pilot Program,. 56.5% respectively), and they would get help to start their own business (53.4%). For most of respondents, This section primarily analyzes the satisfaction level of therefore, the purpose of the DDR program which was ex-combatants who participated in the Pilot Program in to prepare and enable them to get ready for a sustainable terms of reinsertion services at Mapel, reintegration and livelihood after being demobilized and reintegrated in entrepreneurship trainings at Mapel, livelihoods toolkits the society was correctly conveyed. received after the training, as well as State-based reinte- gration services and follow-up livelihood trainings. Re- The trends of ex-combatants’ knowledge on the DDR spondents were asked whether they were satisfied with program are similar in the four different reintegra- different types of trainings and services, what they were tion States for the most part. However, compared to most satisfied with or what they were not satisfied with, other States, noticeably more ex-combatants in Warrap and what their suggestions were for improvement on the (71.7%) believed that they would be offered a job after trainings and services. the DDR program. 2.1 PRE-DDR EXPECTATIONS 2.1.2 EX-COMBATANTS’ EXPECTATIONS FROM THE PILOT 2.1.1 EX-COMBATANTS’ KNOWLEDGE PROGRAM ON DDR PROGRAM Expectations of ex-combatants from the Mapel Training Respondents were asked what they were told about the Facility were built upon what they were told and their DDR program before they participated in the Pilot Pro- own understanding of the DDR program. As such, it is gram. Data shows that prior to enrolling in the DDR Pi- not surprising that when asked what they expected to be offered at Mapel, most of the re- Figure 2: Information Received on DDR Program before participating spondents expected to be trained on vocational (75.5%) and busi- ness skills (68.1%) amongst other be trained on vocational skills 80% be trained on agricultural skills 67% trainings. Other top expectations receive a toolkit 66% of ex-combatants included receiv- be trained on business skills 62% be trained on literacy/English 57% ing toolkits (63.7%) and receiv- be helped to start own business 53% ing their SPLA salary (51.0%), receive salary 50% receive a bull 45% which are consistent with their receive a tractor 45% general knowledge about the be provided a job 42% receive seeds 41% DDR program. It is quite con- receive land 37% cerning, however, that 7.8% of get additional money 34% receive a house 29% the total respondents expected to be helped with school fees for family 18% receive additional trainings to get get additional formal education 16% more respect or promotion in the 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% SPLA as it should be well under- % of all respondents (204) stood by every participant who 180 spondents (70.7%) mentioned that Figure 3: Expectations from Mapel Transitional Facility improvement could be made to the medical care sector at the training fa- cility. Further, it is encouraging that be trained on vocational skills 76% 64.6% of respondents thought that ex- be trained on business skills 68% receive a toolkit 64% combatants should be more involved be trained on literacy/English 63% in the decision-making and operations be trained on agricultural skills 58% of the camp which suggests that most receive salary 51% receive a tractor 42% Program participants were willing to receive seeds 39% be actively engaged. Other frequently receive a bull 38% mentioned suggestions include provi- get health services 38% sion of better food, better sanitation, get additional money 36% receive extra salary 35% and more drinking water. receive land 29% get health services for family 27% It should be noted that within the receive a house 27% sample of 192 males and 12 females, receive additional training to get promoted 8% 45.5% of respondents provided sug- 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% gestions on female service and 27.3% % of respondents (204 XCs) of respondents gave advice on child- care service. More respondents could goes through the demobilization and reintegration pro- have recommended these two kinds of services if more cess that they would not return to SPLA ranks. female ex-combatants had participated in the Pilot Pro- gram and it can be predicted that provision of female Same as the consistency of ex-combatants’ knowledge services and childcare will be a prerequisite component about the DDR program in different States, State-dis- to facilitate female ex-combatants’ participation in the aggregated data on what ex-combatants expected to be future program. offered at Mapel further supported the general trend of ex-combatants’ expectations. 2.2 LIVELIHOOD TRAININGS 2.1.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR 2.2.1 VOCATIONAL TRAINING IMPROVEMENT ON TRAINING FACILITIES Preceding the reintegration phase, ex-combatants re- AND SERVICES ceived training in 1 of 8 vocational areas at the Mapel Transition Facility. According to the survey, all respon- When asked about their suggestions for improvement dents received vocational training. Among the seven vo- on facilities and services provided at Mapel, most re- cational training options offered, vocational training on agriculture/farming was the most popular Figure 4: Suggestions for Improvement on Facilities and as 85 ex-combatants (41.7% of total par- Services at Mapel ticipants) chose to be trained on agricul- ture/farming followed by auto mechanic/ 80% driving training which was the choice 71% 70% 65% 64% 63% of 61 respondents (29.9%). Both animal husbandry training and carpentry training % of all respondents (204) 57% 60% 50% 47% 46% 46% 44% 44% 43% had 15 participants, representing 7.4% of 40% 41% 40% 36% total ex-combatants in the Pilot Program; 33% 30% 29% 27% 26% 13 ex-combatants (6.4%) were trained on 20% electrical, seven were trained on welding, and both masonry and plumbing had four 10% (2.0%) trainees each. 4% 3% 0% 2.2.1.1 USE OF VOCATIONAL SKILLS nv re be ng n ou r fe bre ing yc se st ci es tte e b or re re ng er e o acc mp ild ac le se es es ot no tea ct g es m ore e c g tte ed e d sa food in ety un nt g d r h te ki tio r a thin s m n t elin im hin oo ps ale akfa ch ther ssib ei a be or m l ca ca arra wat tra saf r co me so ic re iti ic iti be olv tte wa or l c s a r t at e f rin nita ho rv rv ca tv iv s e r m ica a e h ed he m i With the exception of ex-combatants who m e e ss or or le m er m received auto mechanic/driving trainings, most respondents trained on other voca- Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 181 While most respondents were positive that Figure 5: Ways of Using Vocational Skills they learned something new at the training and they made use of the vocational skills 80% that they learned, there are a total of 49 ex- 71% 70% combatants who have not had the chance 57% to apply the vocational skills. Most of them 60% % of respondents 51% said it was because they had no access to 50% 44% 43% capital (69.8%) or they did not have the (155) 40% right tools (51.2%). The majority of all re- 30% spondents lived in rural areas before they 20% joined the military, and most of them chose to return to the rural communities where 10% they were from after demobilization. In the 0% rural settings where farming and livestock teach solve improve establish join breeding are the predominant forms of live- others things at own new another home business business business lihood, there are few opportunities, either formal or informal, for ex-combatants to apply technical skills such as electrical and tions claimed that the vocational trainings they received welding. This area of matching vocational skills offered taught them new knowledge and that they have used at the transitional facility to rural livelihood options re- what they learned in real life. 71.3% of those who said quires further attention in the full scale up. they used the vocational skills claimed that they taught the skills they learned to others in the family and com- As is illustrated above, attention should also be put on respondents who received trainings on auto mechanic/ munity, with a further 57.3% using the skills to deal with driving. Of the 61 ex-combatants who received auto household activities and 51.3% to improve their own mechanic/driving trainings, more than half of them business. Interestingly, those who taught the vocational claimed they have little (14.8%) or no chance (41.0%) skills to others were more likely to have also used the to use the skills. When asked why they have not used skills to improve their business and establish new busi- the auto mechanic/driving skills, most of them explained nesses. This tendency is especially true for those who that the training was insufficient and thus they did not were trained on agricultural skills. Figure 6: Reasons for Not Using Vocational Skills 80% 70% 70% 60% % of respondents 51% 50% 40% (49) 40% 30% 16% 20% 10% 2% 2% 0% l g s n g y ta ol in le in rit pi to to in in cu ca es tra tra ht se to rig er in le nt sw ss st/ ab ie no ce c re ic ol ffi ac un pl to su ap no in in 182 Table 4: Usefulness of Vocational Skills Training Did the vocational training at Mapel teach Have you used what you learned in the Type of Vocational you anything new? class? Training a lot some a little nothing a lot some a little nothing Agriculture 64 16 5 0 51 26 1 7 (85 XCs) 75.3% 18.8% 5.9% 0.0% 60.0% 30.6% 1.2% 8.2% Animal Husbandry 8 6 0 1 4 3 3 5 (15 XCs) 53.3% 40.0% 0.0% 6.7% 26.7% 20.0% 20.0% 33.3% Auto Mechanic 20 29 7 5 15 12 9 25 (61 XCs) 32.8% 47.5% 11.5% 8.2% 24.6% 19.7% 14.8% 41.0% Carpentry 11 4 0 0 9 5 1 0 (15 XCs) 73.3% 26.7% 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 33.3% 6.7% 0.0% Electrician 10 0 2 1 7 1 1 4 (13 XCs) 76.9% 0.0% 15.4% 7.7% 53.8% 7.7% 7.7% 30.8% Masonry 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 (4 XCs) 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% Plumbing 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 (4 XCs) 75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% Welding 7 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 (7 XCs) 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 57.1% 0.0% 0.0% 42.9% TOTAL 127 55 15 7 93 47 15 49 (204 CXs) 62.3% 27.0% 7.4% 3.4% 45.6% 23.0% 7.4% 24.0% learn enough. The other main reason was the lack of ac- who did not get any chance to use the vocational skills. cess to capital. It must be noted that ex-combatants who Particularly, 8 out of 10 of the ex-combatants who were received auto-mechanic/drivers trainings were mostly not satisfied with the vocational trainings were trained in trained during the reintegration phase due to challenges auto mechanic/driving, and all of them further explained in implementation at Mapel. As a result, rather than pro- that they were unsatisfied because the training content viding additional auto mechanic/driving training at the was not appropriate and the training duration was too Mapel Transitional Facility, the project facilitated 52 short. ex-combatants’ attendance at a driving training program as well as securing licenses and two ex-combatants’ at- tendance at an auto-mechanic course during the project’s Figure 7: Satisfaction Level with Vocational Training – Aggregate (204 XCs in total) reintegration phase. 2.2.1.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH VOCATIONAL 4.9% TRAINING very satisfied 15.2% Respondents were then asked about their satisfaction level with the vocational trainings they received. The satisfied vast majority of the 204 ex-combatants were satisfied with the vocational trainings with 53.4% of them (109 53.4% moderately ex-combatants) being very satisfied, 26.5% (54 ex-com- 26.5% satisfied batants) satisfied, and 15.2% (31 ex-combatants) moder- unsatisfied ately satisfied. Not surprisingly, most of those who expressed their dissatisfaction with the vocational trainings were those Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 183 literacy and numeracy skills Table 5: Satisfaction Level with Vocational Training play an essential role in the Were you satisfied with the vocational training you reintegration process, and Type of Vocational received? this is especially true for Training those who seek employment very some a little no outside the agriculture sec- Agriculture (85 XCs) 64.7% 25.9% 9.4% 0.0% tor. Animal husbandry (15 46.7% 33.3% 20.0% 0.0% XCs) With the new knowledge Auto mechanic (61 XCs) 34.4% 27.9% 24.6% 13.1% garnered in literacy and Carpentry (15 XCs) 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% numeracy trainings, most respondents who used the Electrician (13 XCs) 53.8% 23.1% 15.4% 7.7% skills said that they feel Masonry (4 XCs) 75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% more capable at handling Plumbing (4 XCs) 75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% cash (78.2%) and using Welding (7 XCs) 42.9% 28.6% 28.6% 0.0% mobile phone (77.6%) im- TOTAL (204 XCs) 53.4% 26.5% 15.2% 4.9% plying that literacy and numeracy skills exert very positive impacts on ex-com- 2.2.2 LITERACY AND NUMERACY batants’ daily lives. Further, 73.9% of them claimed that TRAINING they were able to help their children with homework due to the literacy numeracy skills. The fact that about 130 203 out of 204 respondents participated in the literacy could help their children with homework not only sug- and numeracy trainings in Mapel. As most ex-combat- gests that ex-combatants have a good relationship with ants in the Pilot Program were illiterate and had limited their children, but also conveys the encouraging message numerical skills before coming to Mapel, 98% of the lit- that the DDR program’s positive effects are influencing eracy and numeracy trainings’ participants were positive a larger population or even generation. It should also be that trainings provided them new knowledge with 86% noted that the literacy and numeracy trainings were espe- of them claiming that they were able to apply the newly cially beneficial in terms of its positive impact on busi- learned literacy and numeracy skills in their daily lives. ness activities. More than half of those who have used the skills claimed that they were not only more capable 2.2.2.1 USE OF LITERACY AND NUMERACY SKILLS of running a business (67.3%), but also better able to un- Upon demobilization, ex-combatants who were gener- derstand receipts (58.2%) and sign documents (53.3%). ally illiterate lacked both professional skills and educa- For the 27 respondents who have not used the literacy tion. As the basis of any form of education and training, and numeracy skills, it was the lack of opportunity to apply the knowledge (73.9% of 27 Figure 8: Usefulness of Literacy and Numeracy Training respondents) rather than the lack of (203 XCs in total) ability to understand the knowledge Did the literacy and numeracy itself (26.15% of 27 respondents). Have you used the literacy and Did the training vocationalat Mapel at training teach you Mapel Have you used the vocational skills? numeracy skills? Not surprisingly, approximately 1 in teach you anything new? new? anything 2 of those who said they did not have 13.40% the opportunity to apply the skills are 2.0% self-employed in either agriculture 12.3% or animal husbandry, i.e. livelihood 14.90% 47.30% options that require less literacy 24.6% and numeracy capacity compared to 61.1% small business. In addition, it may be 24.40% the case that considerable assistance and time are needed for ex-combat- ants to feel confident enough to ap- a lot some a little nothing a lot some a little nothing ply the new skills. 184 not only psychological problems that may Figure 9: Ways of Using Literacy and Numeracy Skills result in difficulties for ex-combatants during their reintegration process. A range of other social and livelihood challenges better/able to handle cash 78% facing ex-combatants in the reintegration better/able to use phone 78% phase may lead to conflicts, self-doubt, help children with homework 74% identity crisis, nervousness, and so on. For better/able to run business 67% these reasons, life skills trainings were understand receipts 58% provided in the Mapel Transitional Facil- able to sign documents 53% ity. Speaking especially to the importance undertstand signposts 47% of voice and self-determination, the life more confident 33% skills training was aimed to reduce socio- economic obstacles for ex-combatants, 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% provide effective social guidance, and, % of cases (176 XCs) therefore, facilitate the reinsertion and re- 2.2.2.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH LITERACY integration of ex-combatants. AND NUMERACY TRAINING 2.2.3.1 USE OF LIFE SKILLS In terms of satisfaction level with the literacy and nu- meracy trainings they received, the vast majority of With two missing cases of the survey sample, 201 out of respondents were satisfied with the trainings (97%), in 202 ex-combatants received the life skills training at Ma- particular, approximately two thirds of them stated that pel. The trainings appeared to have served its purposes they were very satisfied with the trainings. As all project as data collected indicate that an overwhelming majority of respondents (94.5%) felt that they learned something participants received the training at Mapel at the same new at the life skills trainings. 88.2 % of them have actu- time, there is very marginal difference in satisfaction ally used the life skills they learned with more than a half level across four different States. (51.8%) claiming that they have used the skills a lot. Figure 10: Satisfaction Level with Literacy and For those who have used the skills they learned at the life Numeracy Training (203 XCs in total) skills trainings, when asked about how they made use of the skills, most of them said that they used the skills to 3.0% solve conflicts in the family (96.4% of cases) and in the community (84.3% of cases). Same as with the pattern with literacy and numeracy trainings, a small minority of very satisfied ex-combatants (11.8%) have not used the life skills with 17.2% the primary reason being no opportunity for them to ap- satisfied ply the knowledge. 17.2% 62.6% moderately satisfied Interestingly, there are obvious differences in the use of life skills across the different age groups. It appears that unsatisfied middle-aged ex-combatants benefited the most from the life skills training. Ex-combatants who are between the ages of 30 and 50 appear to apply life skills much more frequently than those in other age groups and most of 2.2.3 LIFE SKILLS TRAINING them use life skills they learned to solve conflicts in the community and in the family. For demobilized combat- Reintegration of ex-combatants is a difficult and chal- ants, unfulfilled expectations, competition over resourc- lenging process. Having spent a long time in the armed es, pressures and difficulties in finding employment and forces, ex-combatants may often find it hard to adjust to securing livelihood can all easily trigger conflicts with the demands of civilian life and new social environment people that constitute the reintegration setting. It is a after demobilization. To varying degrees, most ex-com- positive observation that middle-aged ex-combatants batants suffer from psychological problems that to some could take advantage of the life skills they learned to extent inhibit their ability to properly integrate into com- solve communal and domestic conflicts either for them- munities, resulting in unexpected conflicts within com- selves or for others. While it is still too early to deter- munities and even with family members. Evidently, it is mine the impact of life skills at the community level, it Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 185 every participant was satisfied with the life Figure 8: Usefulness of Life Skills Training skills trainings they received (99.0% of respondents). In fact, among all the train- Did life skills training at Mapel teach Did you use the life skills learned at ing modules provided at Mapel, life skills you anything new? the training? training is the one that enjoys the highest 5.5% satisfaction level. The only two participants 5.5% 11.8% who were dissatisfied with the training (in their twenties and sixties) believed that 10.3% they learned nothing new from the training 25.4% and thus, were unable to apply the skills in 51.8% their daily life. 63.7% 26.2% When further asked what they were most satisfied with regarding life skills training, a lot some a little nothing a lot some a little nothing most respondents mentioned the contents of the training and the way trainers deliv- ered the knowledge, accounting for 87.3% and 86.3% of Figure 12: Ways of Using Life Skills responses respectively. 2.2.4 FINANCIAL SKILLS, BUSINESS, solve conflicts ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES in the family 96% TRAINING solve conflicts in the community 84% Besides the training modules discussed above, the im- health concerns 63% plementing partner of the Pilot Program conducted a community leadership 57% two-week intensive training on entrepreneurship skills, including financial and business skills as well as basic 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% knowledge relevant to associations/cooperatives, in or- der to better prepare ex-combatants for the reintegra- % of cases (179 XCs) tion process in the host communities and better assist ex-combatants in securing a livelihood in civil society. is reasonable to assume that the frequency of conflicts The main thrust of this training was on empowering ex- between ex-combatants and non-ex-combatants are on combatants to build a sustainable livelihood approach the decrease as the reintegration process progresses. for themselves. The training was an important comple- ment to the vocational skills training, as it urged the ex- 2.2.3.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL OF LIFE SKILLS combatants to think about those skills from a business/ TRAINING entrepreneurship potential perspective. Further, the As most respondents found life skills trainings to be use- trainings drew on the literacy and numeracy trainings re- ful and practical, it is not surprising that approximately ceived, providing very tangible uses of the information previously learned. Additionally, the training in the camp Figure 13: Satisfaction Level with facilitated ex-combatants to initiate thinking on coopera- Life Skills Training tive or partnership work into which they were encour- aged and to incorporate community members upon their 1.1% return to their communities. 6.9% 2.2.4.1 USE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP SKILLS very satisfied According to the ex-combatants’ satisfaction survey, 202 25.2% satisfied out of 204 ex-combatants participated in the training, and moderately satisfied the majority of respondents (97.0%) were positive that 66.8% they learned new knowledge during the entrepreneur- unsatisfied ship trainings. Further 8 in 10 (80.4%) of those who par- ticipated in this training module claimed that they have made use of the entrepreneurship skills they learned. 186 aged ex-combatants found entrepreneurship Figure 14: Usefulness of Entrepreneurship Skills (202 XCs in total) skills useful, and ex-combatants who were trained on agriculture skills were more Did life skills training at Mapel teach Did you use the life skills learned at likely to take full advantage of the entre- you anything new? the training? preneurship skills by forming cooperatives 5.5% and establishing businesses. 5.5% 11.8% 2.2.4.2 SATISFACTION LEVEL 10.3% WITH ENTREPRENEURSHIP SKILLS 25.4% TRAINING 51.8% 63.7% 26.2% Similar to the cases in the previous three types of trainings (vocational, literacy and numeracy, and life skills training), the en- a lot some a little nothing a lot some a little nothing trepreneurship skills training was very well received at Mapel. 97.5% of respondents expressed that they were satisfied with the trainings on financial literacy, business Figure 15: Ways of Using Entrepreneurship Skills skills, and skills related to associations/co- operatives. More than two thirds of them better/able to handle cash 78% were very satisfied with these trainings and better/able to use phone 78% specifically, training contents and trainers help children with homework 74% were what they were most satisfied and ap- better/able to run business 67% preciative about. understand receipts 58% It appears that entrepreneurship skills are able to sign documents 53% more inclined to benefit and satisfy those undertstand signposts 47% who self-employ in primary sectors where more confident 33% there are more opportunities for a group of 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% people to work together. On the contrary, % of cases (176 XCs) among the five respondents who were not satisfied with the entrepreneurship training, two of them were trained on auto mechanic In terms of the use of entrepreneurship skills, most of the skills, two received masonry training, and respondents who actually used the skills said that they one chose plumbing. After they returned to their com- managed to apply the new skills when working with munities, none of the five respondents who were not sat- other people. It should also be noted that more than half isfied were able to combine their vocational skills and of them said that by using the new skills they acquired entrepreneurship skills and make a profit. through the entrepreneurship skills training, they formed a cooperative (68.0%) and slightly more than 3 out of 10 Figure 16: Satisfaction Level with (32.0%) were in the process of forming a cooperative. Entrepreneurship Skills Training This finding is very encouraging not only because the data suggests the effectiveness of the training but also 1.1% because forming or participating in cooperatives is one 6.9% of the most effective means to sustain a viable livelihood in South Sudan where the job market is too weak to ab- very satisfied sorb all the labor supply. satisfied 25.2% Given that the majority of respondents stated that they 66.8% moderately satisfied have used entrepreneurship skills by working together with others or by forming or being in the process of unsatisfied forming a cooperative it can be surmised that majority of respondents applied the entrepreneurship skills by work- ing with others. Not surprisingly, predominantly middle- Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 187 2.2.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVE- they wish they had had better training content and that MENT ON THE TRAININGS AT MAPEL the training could have been longer. When asked about what was the most satisfying aspect Following the questions regarding the satisfaction lev- of the trainings, respondents mentioned the contents of els with different trainings, respondents were further asked about their suggestions for improvement on the the trainings and how the trainers delivered the knowl- trainings they received at Mapel in general. Not surpris- edge most with limited variability based on modules. ingly, the majority of respondents (77.3%) suggested On the other hand, for the small minority who said they that more types of trainings, especially in terms of the were not satisfied with certain trainings, the reasons vary options for trainings on vocational skills, could be of- from modules to modules. For vocational training mod- fered at Mapel. The second most mentioned suggestion ules, respondents were most unsatisfied with the training was the improvement on training tools as 61.1% of the length. This was especially true for participants of the respondents suggested providing more training tools. auto mechanic/driving training who did not actually get The other top suggestions that were put forward by more trained at Mapel because of external factors such as lack than half of the respondents include longer training du- of training tools. In terms of the life skills training mod- ration (58.1%), more opportunities for ex-combatants to ule, the only two participants (1.0%) who were not satis- practice the newly-acquired skills before leaving Mapel fied with the life skills training said they were unsatisfied (57.1%), and training tools of better quality (56.1%). because of the contents and the trainers. Finally, the five Further, it is worth mentioning that 47.5% of the respon- individuals (2.5%) who claimed that they were not sat- dents suggested that the trainings should be better sched- isfied with the entrepreneurship skills training said that uled. More specifically, it is suggested that the trainings should be scheduled during the dry sea- son when it is much easier to get around Figure 17: Most Satisfied Aspects regarding the Trainings or during the slack season when there is not much work to do on the farm. 100% 88% 90% 87% 88% 90% 86% 84% 86% Generally speaking, ex-combatants very 75% 76% 73% 80% well received the trainings at the Mapel % of all respondents 67% 61% 60% Transitional Facility. While it is too ear- 46% 41% 42% ly in the process to determine the impact 40% of these programming, early indicators 20% suggest that the ex-combatants are uti- 0% lizing the training and techniques. It ap- Training content Trainers Training tools Length of training pears that ex-combatants are more likely Vocational Training Literacy and Numeracy Training to be appreciative and satisfied with the Life Skills Training Entrepreneurship Skills Training trainings if they have the opportunities to practice the new skills and to apply the skills they learned after leaving Mapel. The young age, commitment, discipline, Figure 18: Reasons for Not Satisfied with the Trainings and motivation of most ex-combatants enable them to be very susceptible to 100% 100% 100% learning new knowledge and skills. The 90% 83% trainings delivered at Mapel, thus, play % of all respondents 80% 70% 67% 67% a crucial role in facilitating and acceler- 60% 50% 50% 50% 50% ating ex-combatants’ reintegration into 50% 40% 37% 29% 40% 33% 33% 34% 33% 33% civil society where they need to interact 30% 21% 17% with people and find viable livelihoods. 20% 10% 0% 0%0% 0% 0% 0% Inappropriate Trainers Missing Obscure Insufficient Inability to 2.3 LIVELIHOODS training content training tools training language training duration understand training START-UP TOOLKITS Vocational Training Literacy and Numeracy Training In the reintegration phase of the Pilot Life Skills Training Entrepreneurship Skills Training Program, ex-combatants are provided with various forms of support to facili- 188 tate their transition into civilian life. Provision of liveli- agriculture, their expectations for the toolkits focused hood start-up toolkits is one such component. To some more on the basic necessities for farming such as seeds extent, the distribution of toolkits marks the beginning (82.2%), tractors (69.9%), and fertilizers (56.2%). of ex-combatants’ endeavor to seek sustainable liveli- Notably, a large number of ex-combatants wished that hoods after demobilization. After careful selection of the they could have received start-up funds in order to start tools for the different toolkits, the toolkits distribution their own business. While it may be reasonable for ex- was completed by a team of NDDRC, TDRP, and imple- combatants to expect financial support, experience from menting partner UNICON in all four State capitals of the other DDR countries such as Burundi and Rwanda, Greater Bahr el Ghazal region. shows that financial benefits could not support ex-com- batants’ reintegration in the long-term and that only a With the exception of one individual who was trained in very limited portion of such benefits were actually spent animal husbandry, 203 out of 204 ex-combatants (99.5%) on income generating activities. in the survey stated that they received their livelihood start-up toolkits, and the types of toolkits they received 2.3.2 USE OF TOOLKITS were consistent with the exact types of vocational skills they were trained on. Approximately, 90% (89.1%) of the respondents said that they knew how to use the tools. 11 auto mechanic/ 2.3.1 EXPECTATIONS FOR TOOLKITS driving trainees (18% of total auto mechanic/driving trainees) among a few others did not feel confident in Although the tools for the different types of vocations knowing how to use the tools they received. As is ex- were not the same, ex-combatants’ expectations for the plained in the previous section, the auto mechanic/driv- tools were similar. The vast majority of ex-combatants ing training was conducted in the reintegration phase of expected to receive hand tools in their livelihood start- the project, thus it was understandable that those who up kits. For the 85 ex-combatants who were trained on chose to be trained on auto/mechanic/driving were not very familiar with the tools. Excluding auto mechanic/driving trainees, more Figure 19: Expectations for Agriculture Toolkit than 93.0% of the respondents were positive that they were able to use the hand tools 90% tools in their toolkits. seeds 82% tractor 70% Despite stating that the types of toolkits bull 69% money to start/grow own farm 63% ex-combatants received aligned exactly plow 58% with the types of vocational trainings fertilizer 56% generator 55% they received, it is surprising to find high quality tools 53% that approximately half (46.5%) of the machinery tools that matched those used at Mapel 36% 47% respondents claimed that few things or additional tools to those used at Mapel 32% nothing in the toolkits matched the tools 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% used during the trainings. This is true for % of respondents (85 XCs) 57.2% (8 ex-combatants) of respondents trained on animal husbandry, 60.6% (37 ex-combatants) of those trained on auto Figure 20: Reasons for Not Satisfied with the Trainings mechanic/driving, 78.6% (11 ex-com- batants) carpentry trainees, and 75% (3 ex-combatants) trainees of masonry. It hand tools 81% money to start own business 70% is more worrying that despite exclud- generator 63% ing those who received auto mechanic high quality tools 58% toolkits, 37.8% of the rest said that the machinery 44% toolkits they received were different tools that matched those used at Mapel 41% additional tools to those used at Mapel 39% from what they used at the training. Fur- 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% ther, it is also worrying to find out that % of respondents (118 XCs) despite most respondents were satisfied with the quality of the tools in their tool- kits, 45.9% (28 ex-combatants) of those Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 189 who were trained on auto mechanic/driving claimed that with the toolkits they received as 70% of the respondents the quality of the auto mechanic/driving tools were not confirmed that they were satisfied with their toolkits, one satisfactory. fifth among whom said they were very satisfied. Not sur- prisingly, most of those who were dissatisfied were auto The respondents were then asked if they were still using mechanic trainees. Without accounting auto mechanic the tools they received in the toolkits for the vocations participants, about 75% of the rest expressed their satis- they were trained on. The data indicates an encouraging faction with the toolkits they received. fact that more than 60% (61.4%) of the respondents are still using the tools for their vocations. Excluding the 61 For those who were satisfied with the toolkits, they fur- respondents who received auto mechanic toolkits, about ther explained that they were most satisfied about the 78.2% of the rest are positive that the tools are still in usefulness of the tools. For those who were not satis- use, which to some extent reflects the usefulness of the fied with the toolkits, the main reasons include “the tools toolkits and a high satisfaction level among ex-combat- were easy to break” (77.4%) and “parts of the tools were ants with the toolkits they received. missing when they received them” (52.8%). Further, more than half of the ex-combatants who chose animal 2.3.3 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH husbandry training felt that the tools in the toolkits did TOOLKITS not match what they learned to use during the training (nine in a total of 15 were dissatisfied with their tool- In terms of the satisfaction level with the toolkits, the kits). majority of the ex-combatants were generally satisfied Similar to the satisfaction level with trainings, the more opportunities ex- Figure 21: Satisfaction Level with Toolkits combatants have to use the tools, the more likely they are to be satisfied with 100% the toolkits. As such, one can assume 90% 80% that for ex-combatants, the quality and 70% 25% usefulness of the tools are more impor- 60% 50% 57% 39% 57% tant than the quantity of the tools in the 50% 40% 44% 79% toolkits. 30% 0% 50% 20% 29% 39% 10% 20% 24% 7% 15% 25% 29% 2.3.4 SUGGESTIONS OF 0% 0% IMPROVEMENT ON TOOLKITS Agriculture Auto Mechanic Eletrician Plumbing Carpentry (203 XCs) Husbandry Welding Masonry (13 XCs) (7 XCs) (15 XCs) (4 XCs) (4 XCs) (14 XCs) (85 XCs) TOTAL (61 XCs) In terms of the suggestions for the im- provement on the toolkits, a vast major- Yes, very satisfied Yes, moderately satisfied No, somewhat unsatisfied No, very unsatisfied ity of the respondents suggested that the items provided in the toolkits should be of higher quality. Some ex-combatants Figure 22: Whether the Toolkits are still In Use (27.3%) suggested better means of trans- portation for toolkit distribution as it was 100% 90% not rare that some parts of the tools were lost during transport. It is also necessary 0% 80% 5% 14% 70% 10% 22% 15% to note that a small number of respon- 60% 21% 50% 22% 16% 14% dents (13.1%) mentioned the localization of seeds included in the kits, as it appears 23% 0% 40% 21% 25% 71% 30% 26% 20% 40% 55% 0% 43% that ex-combatants from different States 29% 31% 10% 18% 25% 25% have different preferences for crops. 0% 0% (203 XCs) Agriculture Husbandry Auto Mechanic Carpentry Masonry Welding Eletrician Plumbing (7 XCs) (13 XCs) (15 XCs) (4 XCs) (14 XCs) (4 XCs) (85 XCs) TOTAL For future programming, more thought (61 XCs) needs to be put into the practical aspects of the tools included in the toolkits and Yes, frequently Yes, sometimes Yes, but not often Yes, but for other purposes No, have it but do not use No, it was lost/stolen the logistical aspects of the toolkit distri- bution process. 190 trainings were hosted in the State where Figure 23: Suggestions for Improvements on Toolkits ex-combatants lived, more than half of all respondents (55.3%) said they trav- elled more than two hours for the most better quality tools/items/seeds 92% recent business association/cooperative trainings they attended. In Western Bahr different quality tools/items/seeds 37% el Ghazal, on the contrary, respondents better means of transporting during toolkits distribution 27% in the State claimed that the most recent more of the same tools/items/seeds 15% State-based training they attended was either in their payams (48.9%) or less choices of seeds should be localized 13% than two hours away (24.4%). 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% % of respondents (203 XCs) When asked about the amount of time they spent on the State-based livelihood trainings, approximately 8 out of 10 ex- 2.4 STATE-BASED INTEGRATION combatants (80.5%) spent at least two full days cumu- SERVICES latively on the trainings held in their States, with more than one fifth (22.1%) of them claiming that they spent In addition to the general entrepreneurship and coopera- more than two days on the trainings. Data collected in tives trainings, additional agricultural focused business Warrap, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Lakes contributed training was added during the reintegration phase of the to this general pattern of time spent on trainings, while Pilot to ensure the large group of ex-combatants that on the contrary, three quarters of respondents in North- chose the agricultural livelihood path received targeted ern Bahr el Ghazal only spent half to one full day on the advice to support their reintegration. In addition, feed- trainings. back suggested that some ex-combatants were in need of additional technical skills training, beyond what was learned at Mapel Figure 24: Time Spent on State-Based Livelihood Training in particular vocations. Therefore, a State- based reintegration training session was un- 100% dertaken two months after ex-combatants 90% 22% 11% 22% 8% graduated from Mapel. Different from the 80% 44% 14% % of respondents previous trainings that were conducted col- 70% more than 2 days 60% lectively to all participants regardless of 50% 81% 2 full days 58% their States of reintegration, the follow-up 40% 64% 1 full day in-State livelihood trainings were delivered 30% 50% half a day respectively in all four States by NDDRC 20% 1-2 hours 10% State managers and trained trainers. 0% less than 1 hour TOTAL Warrap Northern Western Lakes According to the needs and issues that Bahr el Bahr el Ghazal Ghazal ex-combatants faced in their reintegration process in the communities, State-based livelihood trainings put more emphasis on Table 6: Participation in State-Based Livelihood Training teaching ex-combatants knowledge rele- vant to business association/cooperatives. # of XCs # of XC # of XCs # of XCs in respondents States of trained trained Satisfaction in the Survey 2.4.1 PARTICIPATION IN Reintegration at Mapel in the Survey trained in STATE-BASED LIVELIHOOD States the States TRAINING Warrap 75 70 56 54 Northern Bahr According to the data captured in the 30 30 28 28 el Ghazal satisfaction survey, 94.1% of all 204 re- Western Bahr spondents participated in the State-based 92 60 49 45 el Ghazal business and association/cooperatives Lakes 93 93 71 65 trainings, and each of them attended two training sessions on average. Although the TOTAL 290 253 204 192 Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 191 2.4.2 USE OF SKILLS LEARNED AT STATE- at the State-based trainings compared to the other two BASED LIVELIHOOD TRAINING States. 75.0% of the ex-combatants from Northern Bahr el Ghazal and 31.0% of those from Lakes were auto me- The State-based livelihood trainings are proved to be chanic training participants. The sum of auto mechanic very effective and beneficial as an overwhelming major- trainees in these two States accounted for 70.5% of those ity (93.6%) of respondents who attended the trainings who chose to be trained on auto mechanic/driving in said that they learned new knowledge at the in-State total and may help explain why State-based livelihood trainings with a further 71% of them stating that they training was perceived to be less practical in Northern had used these new additional skills in their real life, re- Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes. flecting the effectiveness of the State-based reintegration training Meanwhile, a significantly larger percentage of ex-com- batants in Western Bahr el Ghazal expressed that they As the State-Based trainings focused intensively on in- learned a lot of additional skills during the State-based spiring ex-combatants to join or initiate economic asso- training and that they made the most use of the skills ciations/cooperatives and empowering ex-combatants to training. This positive appraisal can be tied to the fact build a sustainable livelihood, new skills that ex-com- that approximately half (42.9%) of the ex-combatants in batants mentioned include how to better work with oth- Western Bahr el Ghazal received agriculture training and ers, how to form associations/cooperatives, how to keep 43 in a total of 49 of them ended up operating their own financial records, and how to manage business. businesses. Same analysis applies for Warrap, where half of the 56 respondents were trained on agriculture and Despite most ex-combatants being positive that they 78.6% of them started to operating their own business learned additional knowledge and skills, the usefulness after reintegration. of State-based livelihood trainings was perceived differ- ently across different vocations and States. While most of those who were previously Figure 25: Whether Ex-Combatants Learned Additional Skills trained on agriculture, animal husbandry, at the State-Based Training carpentry, electrical, masonry, and welding responded positively that they have used the 100% additional skills learned at the State-based 90% 20% trainings, 22 of the 61 auto mechanic train- 80% 39% 48% 25% % of respondents ees and three of the four plumbing training 70% 51% 60% participants stated that they had no chance 50% nothing to apply the additional business skills. Co- 40% 78% very little incidently, most of those who have not had 30% 55% 52% 64% some the chance to apply the new business skills 20% 37% a lot 10% were also those who claimed that they did 0% not put in use the entrepreneurship skills TOTAL Warrap Northern Western Lakes Bahr el Bahr el learned at Mapel. As in the tendency found Ghazal Ghazal in the feedback of trainings at Mapel, those who self-employ in the primary sector or become members of associations/coop- Figure 26: New Skills Learned at the State-Based Livelihood eratives are likely to benefit more from the Training business-oriented State-based training. Fur- ther, it is also worth mentioning that those how to better work with others 94% who were trained on technical skills such how to form a cooperative 81% as electrical, masonry, and welding are now how to form an association 70% living on the agriculture livelihood contrib- 59% how to keep financial records uting to the reason why they are able to ap- how to manage a business 54% ply the association/cooperative skills. how to register a cooperative 48% In terms of the responses from the different how to market my goods 48% States, it is evident that fewer ex-combat- 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes % of respondents (180 XCs) have made use of the business skills taught 192 2.4.3 SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH other. In addition, as a certain number of community STATE-BASED LIVELIHOOD TRAINING members were also involved in the State-based train- ings, the satisfaction level with the training also implies, In terms of participants’ satisfaction level with State- to some extent, that ex-combatants have no problem in- based livelihood training, 61.8% of respondents were teracting with community members, suggesting the suc- very satisfied with the training, and only two respondents cessful reintegration process of ex-combatants. who chose the auto mechanic track were not satisfied with the trainings (one was from Warrap and the other 2.4.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR from Lakes). Most of the ex-combatants attended the IMPROVEMENT ON STATE-BASED training and the vast majority of them said they learned LIVELIHOOD TRAINING additional knowledge and skills. As in the case of entre- preneurship skills training at Mapel, ex-combatants were Following from the satisfaction level, respondents were most satisfied with the way in which trainers taught them asked to provide some suggestions for improvement on (91.8%) and the training content (90.7%). the State-based reintegration training. There is marginal difference between the suggestions given by ex-combat- Based on the satisfaction level with business association/ ants to improve trainings in the States and trainings at cooperative-oriented State-based livelihood training, one Mapel in general. Most mentioned suggestions include can assume that due to the informal nature of the market providing more training (90.6%), more financial support in South Sudan and the lack of formal education among (74.4%), and more employment opportunities (65.0%) ex-combatants, targeted business skills are in urgent de- among others. Interestingly, it should be noted that more mand by most ex-combatants, and business associations/ than half of the respondents (56.2%) suggested that more cooperatives is a popular way among ex-combatants and activities that involve both ex-combatants and commu- within the communities to get together and support each nity members should be organized in future programs. This suggestion reflects the willingness of Figure 27: Satisfaction Level with State-Based ex-combatants to break the social network Livelihood Training of ex-combatants exclusively and to be- come part of the larger communities. Their 100% desire of being engaged in the community 90% 21% 14% also implies the success and effectiveness % of respondents (192 XCs) 80% 32% of the entire Pilot Program. 70% 50% 33% 60% unsatisfied For future programming, besides provid- 50% 86% a little satisfied ing targeted support to business associa- 40% 62% 79% some satisfied tions/cooperatives in the primary sector, 30% 44% 52% very satisfied additional thoughts can also be put into 20% 10% how to help ex-combatants who have 0% technical skills and seek employment in TOTAL Warrap Northern Western Lakes the secondary sector benefit equally from Bahr el Bahr el Ghazal Ghazal the business skills training. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 193 3 Early Results of Ex-Combatants’ Reintegration T he following section looks at the economic status senting a 5% increase in the number of ex-combatants and livelihood of reintegrated ex-combatants. Ex- who have their own business compared to that before the combatants interviewed in the satisfaction survey Pilot Program. were asked questions about their current means of liveli- hood as well as their economic involvement in the host Of the ex-combatants who state that they operated their communities. Ex-combatants were also asked about their own business, there are a variety of types of business that land status, whether they or their families have access to they are running. Not surprisingly, most of them (70.4%) land, and how they make use of land. Information and are currently self-employed in farming while only 6.4% analysis on ex-combatants’ income as well as their in- are working on animal husbandry and 6.4% on fishing. come generation activities concludes this section. One fifth of these ex-combatants are owners of shops or restaurants (16.8% and 3.2% respectively), with a fur- 3.1 EX-COMBATANTS ther 10.4% of them being carpenters. For most of these ex-combatants who consider themselves as business LIVELIHOODS owners, the business that they are running is a small- Securing sustainable livelihoods is one of the most sig- scale family business. Without the necessity or ability nificant aspects in the reintegration phase and the socio- to hire external employees, most of the ex-combatants economic reintegration of ex-combatants should aim to (93% of responses) either work at the business they own provide alternative means of livelihood. As is known, themselves or work together with family members. livelihood is closely linked to skills. Upon demobili- zation, ex-combatants who spent years in the armed 3.1.1.2 BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES forces do not have enough marketable skills that could Significantly more ex-combatants chose to participate in lead them to viable livelihoods. To bridge such gaps in associations or cooperatives after they graduated from skills, various vocational trainings were provided to ex- the Pilot Program. While there were only 14 ex-combat- combatants in the Pilot Program to facilitate their entry ants who were members of associations/cooperatives a into the civil life and help them find alternative means year ago before participating in the Pilot Program, 23.5% of livelihood. of respondents (48 ex-combatants) claimed during the satisfaction survey that they participated in associations/ According to the data collected, more than half the re- cooperatives after the DDR Pilot Program, representing spondents said that they managed to return to the type of an increase of more than 200%. work they had before they joined the armed forces, ex- cept for Lakes State where 50% of respondents claimed Not surprisingly, the types of associations/cooperatives that they started different kinds of work after reintegra- that ex-combatants are members of fall in the same trend tion. In South Sudan where there is limited means of as the types of business that ex-combatants are operat- livelihood and where the job market is fragile, it is dif- ing themselves with 73.2% of the associations or coop- ficult for ex-combatants to find formal employment. For eratives being agricultural associations/cooperatives. In this reason, a large number of ex-combatants are inclined terms of the number of members in the associations/co- to operate their own business both before and after the operatives, the average number of members in each as- DDR Pilot Program. sociation/cooperative is 16 people with one agricultural cooperative claiming to have as many as 62 members 3.1.1 SMALL BUSINESS AND BUSINESS and another agricultural association having only three ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES members. Most of the associations/cooperatives have a mix of both male and female members. There are cur- 3.1.1.1 SMALL BUSINESS rently no women only associations/cooperatives in any Of all 204 ex-combatants, more than half of them of the four States of reintegration, and it appears that (61.3%) are making a living by operating their own busi- men are more likely to join associations/cooperatives ness after they graduate from the Pilot Program, repre- than women. 194 3.1.1.3 AMBIGUITY BETWEEN SMALL BUSINESS – who were not used to dealing with business activities AND ASSOCIATIONS/COOPERATIVES and who had very limited association/cooperative man- agement skills – need more time to practice their finan- To summarize the data presented above, among 204 ex- cial skills and accept the use of credit, the Government combatants who were interviewed in the satisfaction of South Sudan should also make more efforts to facili- survey, 125 said that they operated their own business tate the ex-combatants’ access to credit in order to help after leaving Mapel, and 48 stated that they participated secure their livelihood as civilians. in associations/cooperatives. 3.1.1.5 BENEFITS OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS/ The number of ex-combatants who claimed to be mem- bers of associations/cooperatives contradicts with COOPERATIVES feedback from the beginning of the survey where 150 Interestingly, for those who are currently members of ex-combatants asserted at that they either formed a coop- business associations/cooperatives, when further asked erative or are in the process of forming a cooperative by about the benefits of participating in associations/coop- using the entrepreneurship skills learned at Mapel. There eratives that they would not have had if they had worked may be various reasons for this inconsistency of results. alone, the most mentioned benefits were the inclusion in One of the explanations is that the concept of coopera- a larger social network (82.2%) and the improvement of tive/association and how to distinguish small business friendship (66.7%) as opposed to the emphasis on eco- from business association/cooperative are ambiguous nomic income and various technical supports. In fact, it in South Sudan and may vary from one ex-combatant is such a positive observation that the majority of mem- to another. There is a tendency that those who said they bers in associations/cooperatives consider their partici- operated their own business also stated that they formed associations/cooperatives and vice versa. As most of the pation as not only an opportunity to earn more money small businesses that ex-combatants engage in is run by but also as an opportunity to expand their social capital. a group of family members, it is possible that ex-com- This is important because it shows both the willingness batants could easily consider their business as informal on the part of ex-combatants to take part in social life as associations/cooperatives. However, when the questions well as the readiness of the communities to accept them were phrased as whether they worked with others in as- to be part of a group. More encouragingly, data collected sociations/cooperatives of a certain scale, it is likely that from the satisfaction survey shows that in most of the as- only those who worked in associations/cooperatives out- sociations/cooperatives that ex-combatants are members side the family units and those who were members of of, there are generally more community members than groups with more than three members gave the positive ex-combatants. This finding indicates that ex-combat- answer. ants do not mingle merely with their former peers from SPLA but have developed their friendship with commu- In fact, several references, such as field research and anecdotal Figure 28: Benefits of Participating in Business Associations/ evidence, suggest that most of Cooperatives the ex-combatants who par- ticipated in the Pilot Program are members of non-registered social networkings 82% community associations/coop- friendship 69% eratives. skills training 67% learning to make good decisions 56% earn more money 44% 3.1.1.4 BANK ACCOUNT shared or pooled resources 29% It is a worrying prospect that management support 29% despite the business skills ex- additional economic opportunities 27% financial flexibility if need to borrow 22% combatants were taught during marketing support 22% the entrepreneurship training legal support 18% and in-State livelihood training, supply of input products / produce 16% none of the existing business or accounting support 2% association/cooperative has a 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% bank account. While it is under- % of respondents (48 XCs) standable that ex-combatants Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 195 nity members to form associations/cooperatives since Pilot Program and whether they perceived it as easier or demobilization. The enhanced social capital creates the harder for ex-combatants to find employment compared vital basis for ex-combatants to fully reintegrate in their to other community members. communities in the long term. 3.1.2.1 INCOME Other frequently mentioned benefits include receiving more skills trainings, learning to make good decisions, According to the satisfaction survey, approximately half earning more money, and sharing resources. On a more of the respondents (49.2%) stated that they were able to general level, it appears that by participating in associa- sustain themselves without external help or using past tions/cooperatives, ex-combatants benefit both profes- savings. While the number of those who have money sionally and psychologically. Professionally, they get the left over every month has increased by about 10% since chances to utilize their skills to make a living and get 2013, it is a bit concerning to find that about two fifths various supports from broader groups; psychologically, (41.3%) of ex-combatants still rely on family money they are more included in the community activities and transfers (3.4%) or borrowing money (37.9%) in order to have forged the social bond outside the ex-combatants’ cover their monthly expenses, indicating an 8% increase unit. As such, the participation in associations/coopera- compared to a year ago (33.3%). tives could also be considered as contributing to the em- There is a noticeable difference in the patterns of ex- powerment process of ex-combatants combatants’ monthly income in the four States of rein- 3.1.2 INCOME GENERATING tegration. In Warrap and Western Bahr el Ghazal, data collected from the satisfaction survey shows very posi- ACTIVITIES tive trends as a majority of ex-combatants interviewed Successful reintegration of ex-combatants is supported in both States confirmed that they had viable and sus- by the economic independence of ex-combatants through tainable means of livelihood since demobilization. Spe- productive and sustainable livelihoods. After demobili- cifically, 17.9% of the respondents in Warrap and 53.1% zation, livelihoods that ex-combatants take range from in Western Bahr el Ghazal stated that they usually had farming to taxi (boda boda) driving.3 From the project money left over at the end of each month which implies programming perspective, it is interesting to know if the great progress compared to 2013. It is worth mentioning economic status of ex-combatants has changed since the that 11 out of a total of 49 ex-combatants in the State DDR Pilot Program. Respondents were asked, therefore, have stopped receiving salaries from SPLA while the if they could meet their household expenses at the end vast majority of their peers in the other three States are of each month or they had to borrow money to sustain still receiving money on a regular basis from SPLA. their life in this section. They were also asked if they worked on the vocations they were trained on during the Western Bahr el Ghazal showed the biggest progress in term of ex-combatants’ economic conditions and the economic advancement is, to a large extent, related to their participation in small businesses as well as asso- 3  Boda boda drivers are motorcycle drivers who take people around ciations/cooperatives. Among a total of 49 respondents to earn money. from Western Bahr el Ghazal, 43 of them are make a liv- Table 7: Disposable Income usually have usually have rely on family usually usually have money left to use past money break-even to borrow over savings transfers State of Reintegration 2014 2013 2014 2013 2014 2013 2014 2013 2014 2013 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Warrap (56) 17.9 6.1 50.0 42.4 7.1 0.0 3.6 3.0 21.4 40.9 Northern Bahr el Ghazal (28) 7.1 9.4 35.7 59.4 7.1 6.2 0.0 0.0 46.4 18.8 Western Bahr el Ghazal (49) 53.1 24.4 16.3 31.7 18.4 8.5 8.2 4.9 4.1 28.0 Lakes (71) 14.3 10.0 8.6 53.5 2.9 1.1 1.4 1.1 71.4 30.0 TOTAL (204) 23.6 13.5 25.6 44.9 8.4 3.6 3.4 2.6 37.9 30.7 196 Table 8: Economic Indicators Indicators 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 GDP, constant prices (% change) -47.6% 24.4% 7.1% 17.6% 15.7% GDP per capita, constant prices (national currency, SSP) 1,794.7 2,130.9 2,181.1 2,454.6 2,785.2 Inflation, average consumer prices (% change) 45.1% -0.0% 11.2% 9.0% 6.4% ing by operating their own businesses after leaving Ma- holds have to spend more money on necessities, while pel. In addition to sustaining themselves and their fami- their income stays almost the same. One can assume that lies, approximately 80% (79.6%) of them also earn extra without the DDR Program and reintegration support, incomes by selling crops, and about a quarter (24.5%) of economic status and life conditions of ex-combatants them raise animal for sale. could have been worse. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes States, however, it 3.1.2.2 VOCATIONS is surprising as well as worrying to find that the econom- In order to understand ex-combatants’ perception of ic status of ex-combatants has been getting worse since the effectiveness of the Pilot Project and whether their 2013 as more respondents in Northern Bahr el Ghazal monthly income has changed because of the program, and Lakes claimed that they had to borrow money com- respondents were asked how they felt their income had pared to 2013. While it is very important to know wheth- changed after participating in the trainings. Of the 204 er they borrowed from friends or from banks and what ex-combatants, 42.6% were positive that their income their expenditure patterns were, such questions were un- had increased thanks to the vocational trainings. A fur- fortunately not included in the Satisfaction Survey. ther 37.3% stated that their income had stayed the same Among the 13 ex-combatants in Northern Bahr el Ghaz- and only about 20% of them claimed that their income al who had to borrow money at the end of each month, somehow decreased after the trainings. Similar trends of nine of them were auto mechanic trainees. Interestingly, changes in income appear in all four States. Particularly most of these 13 ex-combatants claimed that they ei- positive responses came from Western Bahr el Ghazal ther owned small businesses or were members of as- where approximately 8 out of 10 respondents stated that sociations/cooperatives. Thus it is reasonable to assume they had increased income after participating in the vo- that one of the reasons why they need external financial cational trainings and only one ex-combatant said his in- come decreased after the trainings. This in turn supports support is because their business needs investment. In the impressive progress in terms of economic status Lakes, most of the 50 ex-combatants who usually have made in Western Bahr el Ghazal as discussed above. to borrow money rely on farming to feed their families. As Lakes is the only State in South Sudan that does not It is interesting to mention that while 46.4% of ex-com- have an international border, it is comparatively harder batants in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and 72.8% in Lakes to succeed in running small businesses or engage in trade had to rely on family money transfers or to borrow mon- in the State. ey in order to meet their monthly expenses, only 21 ex- combatants in these two States (9 and 13 ex-combatants While the disposable income of ex-combatants in differ- respectively) said they had less income after the train- ent States varies significantly per the survey data, it is ings. It is possible that another factor that led to their necessary to note that the results are inconclusive. One deteriorated economic condition was market inflation. of the most important factors that may impact the dispos- able income is the inflation of the economy. In fact, the Respondents were then asked if they were working on inflation rate in South Sudan is estimated to be 11.2% in the vocations that they were trained on at the Mapel 2014, representing an increase of approximately 400% Transitional Facility. 152 out of 204 (74.5%) ex-combat- from the year before. However, GDP per capita is not ants claimed that they were working on the exact voca- growing at the same pace as the inflation rate. Accord- tion that they were trained on, more than half of whom ing to IMF estimates, GDP per capita in South Sudan (51.3%) are engaging in agriculture/farming. Unsurpris- increased only 2.4% from 2013 to 2014. With the aug- ingly, among those who also have other means of liveli- menting inflation of the economy, prices of goods and hood (52 ex-combatants) and those who are not working services in the market are soaring. As a result, house- on the kind of livelihood that they received training on Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 197 ing to know about their own perception Figure 29: Whether Vocational Trainings Contributed to of demobilized soldiers’ advantages or Changes in Income* disadvantages in the job market com- pared to community members. To this social networkings 82% friendship 69% end, respondents were asked whether skills training 67% they felt it was easier or harder for ex- learning to make good decisions 56% combatants to find a job or viable liveli- earn more money 44% hood. shared or pooled resources 29% management support 29% additional economic opportunities 27% A positive trend that emerges in all four financial flexibility if need to borrow 22% States shows that of all ex-combatants, marketing support 22% more than one third (34.0%) of them legal support 18% stated that they found it easier for ex- supply of input products / produce 16% accounting support 2% combatants to find employment com- pared to community members with a 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% % of respondents (48 XCs) further 37.9% of respondents saying that there was no difference between *Auto mechanic trainees were removed from the sample because they were still to ex-combatants and community mem- complete their vocational training. bers in terms of employment opportu- nities. This trend holds true for all eight (52 ex-combatants), most of them have chosen to make kinds of vocations that ex-combatants money by doing some work relevant to farming. This is were trained on before going back to the communities, reasonable in that as an agricultural country, agriculture/ and data shows that respondents who chose to be trained farming is one of the major livelihoods for all South Su- on agriculture skills were more likely to feel that it was danese with the economy’s secondary sector incapable easier for ex-combatants to get employment. of absorbing all the labor supply. Interestingly, when further asked about the reasons why 3.1.2.3 EMPLOYMENT COMPARED TO they felt it was easier and harder for ex-combatants to find COMMUNITY MEMBERS employment, the top three advantages and disadvantages were the same: professional skills, education, and social The socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants is a capital. On one hand, for those who were positive that it complex process affected by a wide range of econom- was easier for ex-combatants to find a job, they believed ic, social, and psychosocial factors. As the majority of that ex-combatants had more skills trainings, more edu- ex-combatants mention that they currently have some cation as well as more social connections with people. means of livelihood since demobilization, it is interest- Whereas for the 48 ex-combatants who believed that the ex-combatant identity Figure 30: Whether it is Easier for Ex-Combatants to Get Jobs negatively affected their chance of get- ting employment, they felt that commu- nity members instead of ex-combatants 100% 90% had more skills trainings, more educa- 80% tion, and more social connections. It % of respondents 70% 60% 39% 73% 75% 57% seems that being ex-combatants, there- 38% 50% 20% 25% 39% fore, could be considered as both an ad- 40% 75% 30% vantage and a disadvantage depending 20% 34% 42% 33% 33% 23% 25% 29% on different individuals. 10% 20% 0% 0% Taking a closer look at the data, ap- l re ry try g ng ry an ng ta in ltu nd on ci proximately half (45.8%) of those who To di bi en riv tri el m u ba as rp ic /D W ec u M us Ca gr Pl c El found it hard to find a job were those H ni A ha al m ec ni who were trained on auto mechanic/ M A o ut A driving and therefore, it is not surpris- easier the same harder do not know ing why the most mentioned disadvan- tages of ex-combatants included the 198 3.2 LAND Figure 31: Advantages for Ex-Combatants in the Job Market Ownership of land and cattle is of great importance in South Sudan, a predomi- ex-combatants have more skills trainings 78% nantly agrarian country. As the majority of ex-combatants dwell in rural areas, ex-combatants have more education 64% this section focuses on the land status ex-combatants have more social connections 57% of ex-combatants which is a crucial ex-combatants can easily work in groups 15% indicator of the livelihood status of ex-combatants after reintegration. Re- ex-combatants are stronger 10% spondents were asked whether they had ex-combatants have military trainings 3% access to land, and most importantly, how they made use of the land. Data 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% collected during the satisfaction sur- % of cases (70 XCs) vey indicate that there is marginal dif- ference between the land status of ex- combatants in 2013 and 2014. The four Figure 32: Disadvantages for Ex-Combatants in the Job States of reintegration show similar, if Market not the same, pattern of land status. 3.2.1 ACCESS TO LAND others have more skills 64% Of the 204 ex-combatants interviewed, others have more education 58% the vast majority of them (91.2%) have others more more social connections 24% access to land, and for most of them, ex-combatants are stronger 11% the land that they have access to either ex-combatants have military trainings 11% belong to them or their families. For the 20 ex-combatants who do not have ac- people fear ex-combatants 2% cess to land, their age ranges from 20 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% to 53, and three of them were female ex-combatants. % of cases (48 XCs) Data shows that the non-access to land seems to have little negative impact lack of skills, education, and social connection. In the rural settings where Figure 33: Access to Land most ex-combatants reintegrated into, there was not much demand for tech- 100% nical skills such as auto mechanics. 5% Social networks, therefore, plays a 80% 13% 25% 2% respondents particularly prominent role in getting 23% 60% employment in the auto mechanic vo- 93% cation. Further, it is generally recog- 40% 72% 80% % of all 64% nized that any type of employment is 54% 20% closely related to skills and education, and lack of skills is always one of the 0% main factors behind the high unem- TOTAL Warrap Northern Bahr Western Bahr Lakes el Ghazal el Ghazal ployment rates amongst ex-combatants in post-conflict countries. Despite the yes, I have my own land yes, I have family land intensive vocational skills trainings, yes, I have access to communal land no, I don't have access to land ex-combatants need much more time to do not know digest and practice the vocational skills they were taught. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 199 on their livelihood, as the nine out of the 20 survive on ing, a number of respondents also mentioned that they farming or animal husbandry through associations/coop- use land for other needs such as shelter and running busi- eratives with the rest relying on the vocation skills they ness. 56.4% of respondents in Warrap, 25.0% in North- were trained on such as auto mechanic and carpentry. ern Bahr el Ghazal, 40.0% in Western Bahr el Ghazal, and 19.3% in Lakes claimed their houses were on the 3.2.2 USE OF LAND land. For the most of the 30 ex-combatants who said they had business on the land, their business is not sur- In terms of land use, crop farming is the major agricul- prisingly related to commercial farming and agricultural tural pursuit in all four States with a total of 97.2% of associations/cooperatives. In South Sudan where land is respondents claiming that they grow crops to feed their considered as a basic element for a livelihood, there is no families and a further 44.4% saying that they grow crops ex-combatant in any of the four States who leases land for trading purposes. Another important agricultural ac- to others. tivity that respondents conduct on the land is animal hus- bandry. 22.8% of ex-combatants indicated that they raise Finally, the only respondent who owns land but does not animals for food and 12.2% of them said they raise ani- make any use of the land was found in Lakes State. He mals for sale. Notably, very few ex-combatants in North- attributed the area’s insecurity as the major reason be- ern Bahr el Ghazal and no respondent in Lakes breed hind not using the land as opposed to other more com- animals for trade. It is not surprising that respondents mon reasons such as land infertility or the lack of skills who operate their own business are more likely to grow to manage the land. crops and raise animals for sale. This may help explain why there is a comparatively small percentage of ex- According to other similar studies conducted in coun- combatants in Lakes who use land for business purposes tries with DDR programs, access to and ownership of as the majority of ex-combatants in Lakes are not small land have been recurrent challenges for returning ex- business owners. As food security is the priority and big- combatants. However, as is indicated by the data, this gest concern for South Sudanese, the crops and animals for sale are generally the surplus of household needs. Figure 34: Grow Crops While land-use varies across different States, evident difference in land use oc- 100% 94% 90% 90% curs between genders. Among the nine 80% 81% 74% female ex-combatants who have access 68% % of respondents 70% (179 XCs) to land, eight of them grow crops to sell 60% 48% 50% and four of them raise animals for sale 40% 40% 39% in addition to meeting household needs. 30% 24% 24% 17% It appears that in this case, female ex- 20% 9% 6% 10% combatants are more likely to engage 0% in small business activities compared to um s e ze s s ns a s s ts n et t in an oe m m av r nu rro ill co ai ee their male peers. pk ya sa h be at ss m m rg gr ca d se ot m ca un so tp pu o ee gr sw Besides farming and livestock breed- Table 9: Use of Land Grow Raise Grow Raise Have a Have a crops animals Do not State of Reintegration crops animals house business to feed to feed use it to sell to sell there there family family Warrap 96.4% 41.8% 27.3% 14.5% 56.4% 20.0% 0.0% Northern Bahr el Ghazal 100.0% 42.9% 21.4% 7.1% 25.0% 10.7% 0.0% Western Bahr el Ghazal 97.5% 80.0% 17.5% 30.0% 40.0% 17.5% 0.0% Lakes 96.5% 22.8% 22.8% 0.0% 19.3% 15.8% 1.8% TOTAL 97.2% 44.4% 22.8% 12.2% 36.1% 16.7% 0.6% 200 nities which in return strengthens the Figure 35: Raise Animals reintegration of ex-combatants. Considering the importance of build- 100% ing social capital and the role that host 100% communities play in promoting social % of respondents 74% 69% 80% capital, questions included in this sec- (42 XCs) 60% 51% 40% tion place a strong emphasis on how 20% 8% ex-combatants perceive their reintegra- 0% tion into the communities and how they Goats Chickens Cattle Sheep Ducks view themselves in the communities. To this end, respondents were asked the reasons why they chose their places of reintegration, how they position them- is not the case for ex-combatants in South Sudan. Com- selves in the host communities, and the challenges they pared to their peers in other post-conflict countries such have met in the communities. as Burundi and Rwanda, most ex-combatants in South Sudan have access to land and make good use of land. 3.3.1 PLACES OF REINTEGRATION One of the explanations for this is that South Sudan, with- According to ex-combatants’ registration profiles that out severe land scarcity, holds one of the richest fertile were collected before they enrolled in the DDR Pro- agricultural lands in Africa. Further, as ex-combatants gram, the overwhelming majority of the respondents are generally considered as “wounded heroes” in civil (96.0%) reintegrated into the areas where they were society, there was little difficulty for returning former originally from, and only less than 30% (29.2%) were combatants in acquiring land or getting access to land. It positive when asked if they would consider or ever con- should also be highlighted that the DDR Pilot Program sidered migrating for better jobs. Taking these elements well prepared ex-combatants for managing land as part into consideration, it is therefore, not surprising to find of the vocational skills training, and it is encouraging to that 91.2% of all respondents in the satisfaction survey find no respondent complaining about the lack of farm- stated that family was their top priority when deciding ing skills or the lack of tools or seeds. the places for reintegration which also implies that most ex-combatants were reunified with their families and did 3.3 COMMUNITY OF not have problems joining their families after demobili- REINTEGRATION zation. Whether ex-combatants have the ability to fit back in It is also noticeable that more than eight out of 10 re- the civil society as civilians determines the success and spondents (82.4%) also mentioned economic reasons as effectiveness of their reintegration process. Such abil- another priority in choosing places for reintegration. This ity refers to not only ex-combatants’ capacity to earn a is a positive finding as it indicates that ex-combatants living and sustain themselves after demobilization, but were able to think logically about how to sustain them- also their ability to re-immerse themselves in as many selves after demobilization and how to achieve a better aspects of community life as possible. For this reason, socio-economic condition. As South Sudan has been ex- when it comes to social reintegration of ex- combatants, both ex- Figure 36: Reasons for Choosing the Places of Reintegration combatants and com- munities play a vital role. Particularly, the family reason 91% social network and in- economic reason 82% teractions that develop educational opportunities 32% between ex-combat- safety and security 27% ants and community members promote the 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% socio-economic devel- % of all respondents (204 XCs) opment of the commu- Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 201 periencing rapid urban growth, the rural-urban migration estrangement from their families. It also indicates that pattern is especially apparent in recent years. It is pos- most ex-combatants are successfully adapting to civilian sible that in a few years, the general pull effects of mod- life as well as being accepted by their communities and ern cities will attract many ex-combatants to migrate to families. One can further assume that as the reintegration urban areas for livelihoods and better standards of living. process progresses and ex-combatants are more involved Interestingly, data shows that female ex-combatants are in their social networks in the communities, increasingly more susceptible to migrating due to economic reasons more will consider themselves as average community as eight in 12 stated that they have considered moving members over time. for better jobs. To some extent, the economic reasons for When looking at the disaggregated data in individual choosing places of relocation suggest that ex-combatants States, ex-combatants in Warrap and Northern Bahr el are optimistic about the economic opportunities for them Ghazal were more likely to consider themselves dif- in civil society. Data collected during the Registration ferent from other community members. This is true for Survey in 2013 support this assumption, as 81.8% of re- 33.9% of respondents in Warrap and 42.9% in Northern spondents felt that their economic situation would im- Bahr el Ghazal. prove in the near future. While it is a bit concerning that there are still a number 3.3.2 EX-COMBATANTS’ IDENTITY of ex-combatants who think of themselves as different from community members, it is understandable that it In the reintegration process, the uncertainty of life after is a long-term process for ex-combatants to fully reinte- demobilization makes it highly likely for ex-combatants grate into communities. In fact, compared to their peers to struggle between former military identity and cur- in other countries with DDR programs, ex-combatants rent civilian identity. In order to better understand how in South Sudan are doing well in terms of engaging in well ex-combatants socially and, more importantly, psy- communities and interacting with community members. chologically have reintegrated into the communities, On the other hand, however, it is concerning to find that respondents were asked how they perceive their social there were 30 respondents from Warrap, Northern Bahr identity upon completing the DDR Pilot Program. A total el Ghazal, and Lakes who distinguished themselves from of 85.2% consider themselves as civilians with 64.0% community members and still wanted to be Wounded regarding themselves as the same as other community Heroes. These 30 ex-combatants are those who are most members. It is encouraging to see that most ex-combat- susceptible to severe identity crisis and psychological is- ants were psychologically well prepared to integrate in sues after demobilization as their expected social iden- the communities and did not have an identity crisis. This tity has to be adjusted to reality. trend is supported by the fact that most respondents were closely involved in their host communities and were Among the 21.2% of respondents who expected them- not confronted with stigmatism from the community or selves to be civilians but different from community members and the 14.8% who expected to continue being Wounded Heroes, it Figure 37: Expected Social Status of Ex-Combatants would have been interesting to ask what exactly they meant by saying “being 100% 8% different from community members”, 90% 11% whether they felt or they would like to 80% 21% be superior to community members or 70% they felt they were generally inferior in % of all respondents 60% 34% the community. Further research could 50% 43% 92% 83% be interesting in this aspect. 40% 64% 30% 20% 3.3.3 COMMUNITY 36% 10% 25% ACCEPTANCE 0% TOTAL Warrap Northern Bahr Western Bahr Lakes Community acceptance and social in- el Ghazal el Ghazal clusion are central to the successful continue to be a Wounded Hero, but no longer in the SPLA reintegration of ex-combatants. In civil now a civilian-but different from other community members now a civilian-the same as other community members communities where various social dy- namics are active, ex-combatants may 202 Table 10: Pre-DDR Community Acceptance Will the community be accepting of you upon returning? (% of respondents) Aggregated 4 States Yes totally Yes partly No Do not know TOTAL 85.8% 11.3% 0.7% 2.2% Will people in your community be scared of you because you are an ex-combatant? (% of respondents) Aggregated 4 States Yes No TOTAL 16.4% 83.6% Do you feel that people in your community will be hostile to you? (% of respondents) Aggregated 4 States Yes No TOTAL 28.8% 71.2% Table 11: Post-DDR Community Acceptance Was the community accepting of you after returning from Mapel? (% of respondents) A small few States of Reintegration All accepting Some accepting Not accepting accepting Warrap 96.4% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% Northern Bahr el Ghazal 96.4% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% Western Bahr el Ghazal 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Lakes 91.4% 5.7% 1.4% 1.4% TOTAL 95.6% 2.5% 0.5% 1.5% Are people in the community scared of you because you are an ex-combatant? (% of respondents) States of Reintegration Not scared A little scared Some scared Warrap 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Northern Bahr el Ghazal 96.4% 0.0% 3.6% Western Bahr el Ghazal 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Lakes 97.1% 1.4% 1.4% TOTAL 98.5% 0.5% 1.0% Are people hostile because you have training or reintegration assistance and salary? (% of respondents) States of Reintegration None are hostile Small few hostile Some hostile Warrap 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Northern Bahr el Ghazal 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Western Bahr el Ghazal 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Lakes 82.9% 8.6% 8.6% TOTAL 94.1% 3.0% 3.0% Do you face any challenges in the host communities? (% of respondents) States of Reintegration No Yes Warrap 66.1% 33.9% Northern Bahr el Ghazal 89.3% 10.7% Western Bahr el Ghazal 95.9% 4.1% Lakes 75.7% 24.3% TOTAL 79.8% 20.2% Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 203 perceive different senses of inclusion and social belong- From the data, it appears that the level of community ac- ing which may be either constructive or destructive to ceptance and ex-combatants’ inclusion in the communi- their reintegration process. Ex-combatants’ self-percep- ties is high and that ex-combatants were better received tion of their reintegration into civilian life is, to a large in the host communities than they originally expected. extent, contingent upon how accepted and included they Before participating in the DDR program, 16.4% of re- feel. For this reason, it is important to understand how spondents assumed that people in the community would ex-combatants perceive their level of acceptance in the be scared of them because of their former military iden- community. To this end, respondents were asked how the tity, while only 1.5% claimed that they felt community communities accepted them and how community mem- members were to some extent scared of them. 28.8% of bers treated them after their return. They were also asked the ex-combatants thought community members would about the challenges, if any, they faced when living in be hostile to them, while only 6.0% perceived hostility the communities. from the community. The successful reintegration of ex-combatants is not There are various reasons to this high level of commu- based solely on ex-combatants’ ability and willingness nity acceptance in South Sudan. Besides the fact that to take part in civilian life as part of the community, but ex-combatants are looked upon as heroes by community also on the readiness and acceptance of the community members and that the vast majority of them actually re- to welcome them back and allow them to be part of the integrated back into their home communities, one of the community. Very positive trend is shown from the data particular reasons in this case is that most ex-combatants in terms of the level of acceptance in the community. had been living in the communities for a while before Data indicates that each community in all four States they joined the Pilot Program. Therefore, they had had of reintegration is well sensitized in terms of accept- more time and opportunities to forge social bonds out- ing ex-combatants. An absolute majority of respondents side SPLA and to show community members that they were positive that the communities were all accepting were a threat neither to the security nor the livelihood of of them after they returned from Mapel. This holds true the community. for 96.4% of respondents in Warrap, 96.4% in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, every single respondent in Western Bahr 3.3.4 CHALLENGES IN THE el Ghazal, and more than nine in ten respondents (91.4%) COMMUNITIES in Lakes. Furthermore, it is also encouraging to find that While the level of community acceptance and ex-com- very few community members are scared of (1.5%) or batants’ social inclusion in the community is high, a hostile to (6%) ex-combatants because of their identity, small minority of ex-combatants still felt that they had and the four States share the same pattern of how ex- certain challenges living in the community. One of the combatants were treated by community members. most mentioned challenges ex-combatants encountered It should be especially mentioned that female ex-combatants were Figure 38: Challenges Ex-Combatants Face in the Communities very well accepted into the com- munities, as no female ex-com- batant sensed fear or hostility harder to get services (medical, financial, legal, from host communities, and most etc.) 76% of them found it easier to find a harder to make a living 46% livelihood because of their former military identity. According to the less business opportunities 34% studies on ex-combatants’ reinte- less involvement in the community activities 12% gration in the Great Lake Regions, not being trusted 10% female ex-combatants were gen- harder to build social network with community erally treated worse compared to members 7% their male peers and other female not being respected or welcomed 5% community members. Therefore, it is a very positive finding that harder to form a family/get married 2% female ex-combatants were not 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% discriminated in South Sudan after % of cases (41 XCs) their return to civil society. 204 was the difficulties in receiving services such as medi- feel the difficulties in getting access to social services, cal service and legal service. On one hand, after having but the entire South Sudanese population in general. spent years in SPLA as combatants, it takes time for ex- combatants to get used to dealing with quotidian tasks Taking into consideration the social indicators present- and to get familiar with skills they just acquired through ed above, therefore, ex-combatants in South Sudan are the training. On the other hand, it is also important to adapting well to their post-SPLA life and substantial ad- keep in mind that in South Sudan where there is very vancements have been made during their reintegration limited infrastructure, it is not only ex-combatants who phase within a short period of time. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 205 4 Conclusion T he South Sudan Pilot DDR Project attempted to test • 76% of them have used the skills they learned in the modalities of the reintegration system and de- their daily life; and velop lessons learned for future DDR programming. • 95.1% of them were satisfied with the vocational It aimed to facilitate the socio-economic reintegration of training they received. ex-combatants by providing them with skills that could enable and enhance their livelihood opportunities in civil • Literacy and Numeracy Training: society. • 98% of the literacy and numeracy trainings partici- pants were positive that trainings taught them new While it is still too early in the process to determine the knowledge; impact of the reintegration programming, results of the ex-combatants’ satisfaction survey indicate that ex-com- • 86% of them claimed that they were able to apply batants enrolled in the Pilot DDR Project are adapting the newly learned literacy and numeracy skills in well to civilian life and that notable advancements in re- their daily life; and integration have been made within just one year. • 97% of respondents were satisfied with the literacy and numeracy training. All the conclusions reached below are self-reported opinions of ex-combatants and listed as described in the Life Skills Training: data previously presented. • 94.5% of the respondents felt that they learned something new at the life skills trainings; 4.1 LIVELIHOOD TRAININGS • 88.2 % of them have actually used the life skills they Livelihood trainings achieved the goals of providing learned; ex-combatants with a variety of vocational paths and basic skills to secure a livelihood in the communities. • 98.9% of the respondents were satisfied with the life All ex-combatants participating in the Pilot Program skills training. were eligible to receive the livelihood trainings at the Entrepreneurship Skills Training: Mapel Transitional Facility which included vocational training, literacy and numeracy training, life skills train- • 97.0% of the participants were positive that they ing, and entrepreneurship skills training. A little over learned new knowledge during the entrepreneurship 95% of ex-combatants interviewed were positive that trainings; they were satisfied with all the trainings they received. • 80.4% of them claimed that they have made use of In particular, they were most satisfied with the training the entrepreneurship skilled they learned; and contents and the way in which the trainers delivered the trainings. • 97.5% of respondents expressed that they were sat- isfied with the trainings on financial literacy, busi- Vocational Skills Training: ness skills, and skills related to associations/coop- eratives. • Among the eight vocational training options of- For future programming, most of the ex-combatant par- fered, there were 85 ex-combatants in agriculture ticipants of the Pilot Project suggested that more voca- skills training, 15 in animal husbandry training, 61 tional options be provided on the vocational skills train- in auto mechanic training, 15 in carpentry training, ing. Regarding the improvement on the facilities and 13 in electrician training, four in masonry training, four in plumbing training, and seven in welding services at Mapel, focus could be put on the provision training; of sufficient medical care and broader involvement of participants in the decision-making process. • 96.6% of the total respondents stated that they learned new knowledge at the training; 206 4.2 LIVELIHOOD START-UP KITS had used these additional skills in their real life reflect- ing the effectiveness of the State-based reintegration Overall the process of design, procurement and dis- training. tribution of livelihood start-up toolkits to ex-combat- ants was highly successful. With the exception of one For future programming, financial support to ex-com- individual who was trained in animal husbandry, 203 out batants can to be considered and improved in order to of 204 ex-combatants in the Pilot Program received their facilitate their formation of associations/cooperatives. livelihood start-up toolkits and the types of toolkits they Further, besides providing targeted technical support to received were consistent with the exact types of voca- business associations/cooperatives in the primary sec- tional skills they were trained on. Results of the satisfac- tor, additional thoughts can also be put on how to help tion survey show that: ex-combatants who seek employment in the secondary sector. • 70% of the 203 respondents confirmed that they were satisfied with their toolkits, 4.4 EARLY RESULTS OF • 72% of the 203 respondents were still using their EX-COMBATANTS REINTEGRATION toolkits with 40% of them claiming that they were using the toolkits frequently; and Agriculture and animal husbandry are the two main livelihood options for ex-combatants. After returning • Receivers of agriculture and carpentry toolkits were to the communities, most ex-combatants have chosen to most satisfied with their toolkits and used the tool- make money by doing some work related to farming. It kits most often. is a positive finding that 152 out of 204 (74.5%) ex-com- Ex-combatants interviewed in the satisfaction survey batants were working on the exact vocations that they suggested that the items provided in the toolkits should were trained on, and more than half of them are engaged be of higher quality. In addition, for future programming, in agriculture/farming. more thought needs to be put into the practical aspects of the tools included in the toolkits and the logistical as- The DDR Pilot Program contributed to the economic pects of the toolkit distribution process. empowerment of ex-combatants, and the number of business associations/cooperatives has tripled in the 4.3 STATE-BASED REINTEGRATION communities after the Project. Approximately two thirds of the Pilot participants make a living by operat- SERVICES ing their own business, and most of them are self-em- In addition to the general entrepreneurship and coopera- ployed in agriculture or animal husbandry. It is also very tives trainings, additional agricultural focused business encouraging to find that 23.5% of respondents claimed training was added during the reintegration phase of the during the satisfaction survey that they participated in Pilot to ensure the large group of ex-combatants who associations/cooperatives after the DDR Pilot Program, chose the agricultural livelihood path received targeted representing an increase of more than 200% from 2013. advice to support their reintegration. According to the Further, not surprisingly, 73.2% of the associations/coop- satisfaction survey, the State-Based livelihood train- eratives are agricultural associations/cooperatives. Field ing met ex-combatants’ need for additional technical research and anecdotal evidence suggest that currently skills and addressed the issues that demobilized com- most ex-combatants are participants of non-registered batants encountered in their reintegration process. associations/cooperatives. Besides, State-based livelihood trainings put more em- phasis on teaching ex-combatants knowledge relevant to While only approximately half of the ex-combatants business associations/cooperatives, which contributed to were able to sustain themselves without external help the increasing numbers of business associations/coop- or using past savings, most of them were positive that eratives formed in the communities. the Pilot Program, especially the vocational trainings, contributed to the increase of their income. This needs The State-based livelihood trainings are proved to be to be put in the context of the current economic situa- very effective and beneficial as an overwhelming ma- tion in South Sudan for a better understanding. Despite jority of the 192 respondents who attended the trainings the increased income of ex-combatants, the country’s said that they learned new knowledge at the in-State high inflation rate results in the decrease in disposable trainings, with a further 71% of them stating that they monthly income. Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey 207 The acceptance of ex-combatants by communities and In conclusion, taking into consideration the results and the inclusion of them in community activities were analysis presented in the report, ex-combatants in South proved to be very high. An absolute majority of ex- Sudan are adapting well to their post-SPLA life and sub- combatants interviewed claimed that they were very well stantial advancements have been made during their rein- received in the communities, and more than eight in 10 of tegration phase within such a short period of time. them consider themselves as civilians in the society. 208 ANNEX 1: 2014 SOUTH SUDAN EX-COMBATANTS ANNEX SATISFACTION SURVEY 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 2014 South Sudan Ex-Combatant Satisfaction Survey DDR Pilot Questionnaire Reintegration Project EX-Combatants Satisfaction Survey 2014 A. RESPONDENT’S BIOGRAPHICAL AND FAMILY DETAILS Enumerator ID/Name (please select ONE answer) 1. Abel Likambu 9. Isaac Mabor Arok 2. Angok Angok Deng 10. John Alier Atem 3. Chawuoch Nhial Alit 11. John Chol Atem A.1 4. Compeo Wani 12. John Chol Maker 5. Deng Dennis Thiik 13. John Lasu Bethwel 6. Francis Makol Mou 14. John Mabor Makuei 7. Garang Kuol Lual 15. Simon Achuil Athian 8. 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Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project Document As Implemented 227 ! ! ! @KRU1RG!-J!!TN&3N0&?!'(!)'8I'*&*+,!#*=!/<#,&,! !! ! ! Phase One: Phase Two: Phase Three: Initiation Consolidation Evaluation & Knowledge Transfer @KRU1RG!-J!!TN&3N0&?!'(!)'8I'*&*+,!#*=!/<#,&,! (April to December 2013) (April to July 2014) (August to October 2014) ! Capacity building including systems Institutional development and project Additional M&E, ICRS & service Capacity building evaluated & Capacity management training and delivery capacity building lessons learned shared mentoring to NDDRC through the conducted Building PMU and in the four SPMUs Creation of tools&systems; NDDRC Monitoring staff trained in use and M&E Conducted & NDDRC staff XC satisfaction survey finalized. management of the tools and continue to receive support on the Process and outcomes evaluated and use of M&E tools; systems and and learnings, processes and systems systems; baseline conducted; and Evaluation monitoring processes launched. processes monitored and evaluated transferred to the NDDRC The livelihoods fundamentals training Livelihoods support activities - Livelihoods in Mapel, Start-up Kits distributed and Ex-combatant will receive follow-up Evaluated & lessons learned shared; state-based reintegration livelihoods and refresher trainings NDDRC ICRS continue counseling & Support support opportunities referral DDR The identification of communities/ M&E Implementation of community support projects & NDDRC staff ! ! 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R(!0/()!Z/*-!*-/+!'3/%3/*/b4*/%(!4(?!/(!%3?)3!*%!46-/)@)!*-)!%@)3436-/(2!3)/(*)234*/%(!%C5)6*/@)+S!*-)!'/0%*! 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E-)! '/0%*! /+! 6%(?>6*)?! /(! *-)! ,%>3! +*4*)+! %,! F3)4*)3! W4-3! )0! F-4b40a! `%3*-)3(! W4-3! )0! F-4b40S! N)+*)3(! W4-3!)0!F-4b40S!N4334'!4(?!P4O)+#!! ! @KRU1RG!:J!!G#I!'(!/0%'+!R3&#! ! 1M/WAOK)!TE!6TW"Y!6W@R>! ! ! ! ! 270 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL DDR PROGRAMME 2013-2014 PILOT Pilot Reintegration Project Annex A Pilot Reintegration Project Document SEPTEMBER 2013 272 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! "#$%&"#'!(()!*)&+)#,,-!&.! $/-!)-*01'%2!&.!3&0$/!30(#"! ! ! *%'&$!)-%"$-+)#$%&"!*)&4-2$! (&20,-"$!5!)-6%3-(! ! 789!3-*$-,1-)!:;8<=! ! ! ! ! ! Republic of South Sudan National DDR Programme - 2013-2014 Pilot Pilot Reintegration Project Document - Annex A 273 ! ! ! "#$%&!'(!)'*+&*+,! ! -.! /0%'+!1&0*+&23#+0'*!/3'4&5+!6788#39!.....................................................................................!:;;! "#"! $%&'%()(*+!%,!*-)!./0%*!1)/(*)234*/%(!.3%5)6*!######################################################################!788! 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