Implementing Programs of Human Development

SWP-403

World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 403

July 1980

Edited by: Peter T. Knight
Development Economics Department

Prepared by: Nat J. Colletta
Eastern Africa Projects Department
Jacob Meerman
Development Economics Department
Milton Esman,
Joseph Mbindo,
John Montgomery,
Everett M. Rogers,
Constantina Safilios-Rothschild and
Norman Uphoff,
Consultants,
Development Policy Staff

Copyright © 1980
The World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors
and should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated
organizations, or to any individual acting in their behalf.
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to any individual acting on their behalf.

WORLD BANK
Staff Working Paper No. 403
July 1980

IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

A Background Paper for World Development Report, 1980

Political support, finance, administration and demand (the way families and individuals respond to services) are crucial linked factors in improving education, health, hygiene and nutrition, especially in the poorest areas of the developing nations. Recognizing these links, the World Bank staff responsible for preparing the World Development Report arranged a series of seminars and workshops in the fall of 1979, bringing together the authors of these papers, other consultants and invited experts, and a wide range of Bank staff to discuss the issues treated in these studies. The resulting interchange is reflected in the five studies in this volume. They are written from different disciplinary perspectives—political science, public finance, and public administration respectively for the first three, and a combination of sociology and social anthropology for the papers on sociocultural influences and the role of the family.

Edited by: Peter T. Knight
Prepared by: Nat J. Colletta
Eastern Africa Projects
Department

Milton J. Esman
(Cornell University)
Consultant

Joseph Mbinding
(Stanford University)
Consultant

Jacob Meerman
Development Economics
Department

John D. Montgomery
(Stanford University)
Consultant

Everett M. Rogers
(Stanford University)
Consultant

Constantina Safilios-Rothschild
(Pennsylvania State University)
Consultant

Norman Uphoff
(Cornell University)
Consultant

Copyright © 1980
The World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
U.S.A.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editor's Preface</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART I:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Considerations in Human Development</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Uphoff, Cornell University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART II:</strong></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying for Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Meeran, Development Economics Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART III:</strong></td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Administration of Human Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milton J. Esman, Cornell University; John D. Montgomery, Harvard University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART IV:</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Cultural Influences on Human Development Policies and Programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everett M. Rogers, Stanford University, Nat J. Colletta, Eastern Africa Projects Department, Joseph Mbindyo, Stanford University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART V:</strong></td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the Family: A Neglected Aspect of Poverty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, Pennsylvania State University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The five studies constituting this working paper were prepared as background papers for Part II of the World Development Report, 1980. They, together with a number of works cited in them, were drawn upon extensively in the preparation of Chapter 6, "Implementing Human Development Programs: Some Practical Lessons"; they also were helpful in preparing the other three chapters of Part II, which is entitled "Poverty and Human Development."

The study by Uphoff addresses poverty-reducing human development in terms of political analysis and strategy, drawing on concepts and terminology familiar to economists. It begins by examining general considerations for policy analysis, such as the imperative of political "solvency," the reality of power stratification, the criterion of policy feasibility, and the shape of cost and benefit time paths. Themes specific to poverty-oriented human development are then considered, ranging from the political weakness of poorer sectors to advantages of externalities and distributive, rather than redistributive, consequences. An analysis follows of political differences among and within the main program areas (education, health, nutrition, and, to a lesser extent, population). These differences involve legitimacy, visibility, targetability and divertability (and corruptibility). Relevant implications of differences among national political systems are then examined. Uphoff then moves from a "macro" to a "micro" framework by addressing the politics of actors, decisions and interests associated with different stages of program design and implementation.

The study by Meerman analyzes the costs of human development and the resources needed to cover those costs. It presents estimates suggesting that a central government financial strategy for human development would require public expenditures in a range of 11 to 21 percent of gross national product. The challenge is that most governments in lower-income countries are unable to generate resources for human development equal to even the lower bound of this range. If resources are inadequate, while taxes are already close to the limit, are there viable alternatives? The answer is: Yes, to some extent. Meerman's paper outlines and assesses those alternatives.

The study by Esman and Montgomery identifies and analyzes the administrative dimensions of programs designed to reduce poverty in developing countries. It focuses on human development activities, primarily in health, nutrition, family planning, and elementary and nonformal education, but the findings have application to a broad range of programs oriented to the poor in urban as well as in rural areas. The problems addressed have become especially critical because of growing international concern about the most needy, and because the urban and rural poor are difficult to reach through conventional service programs. Further, if the poor are reached, they may not use the services and products offered. The administrative stance that will evoke appropriate responses from intended users differs radically from that of the "command style" of conventional bureaucracies. Esman and Montgomery paper accordingly indicate the analytical and operational means available to governments and donor agencies for improving administrative performance, proposes a short agenda for applied research, and identify a number of policy issues that remain to be resolved. Their special focus is on the needs of program and
project planners and administrators, and of the international agencies working with them in the search for better ways to reduce global poverty.

The paper by Rogers, Colletta, and Mbindyo analyzes key socio-cultural variables in human development programs, thus complementing the discussions found elsewhere in this publication. It emphasizes that noneconomic variables have been the focus of increasing attention by development specialists in recent years, and that the success of anti-poverty policies and programs has often been predicated on behavioral change. To be effective, however, planned behavioral change must consider the possible influences of social and cultural factors. This paper therefore aims to establish a general sociocultural framework for examining socioeconomic development, to identify the major sociocultural factors involved in terms of their possible influence on human development programs, and to elicit implications for future policy. Success, the authors suggest, rests on using an holistic approach emphasizing the interaction of values, institutions, and processes of behavioral change, and recognizing the variations encountered at the microlevels of village and urban communities.

The paper by Safilios-Rothschild analyzes the role of the family in the context of absolute poverty, with special reference to the implications for anti-poverty policies in general, and human development policies in particular. It delineates the relevant dimensions of the family and its overall role in development, emphasizing the fluid and dynamic nature of families, household and kin networks and the inapplicability of Western models. It reviews the available evidence concerning the family in its developing world context, emphasizing roles of family power and decision-making; patterns of inequality in the intrafamilial allocation of labor and such resources as food, health care and education; and the mediating role of kinship and the family in access to the bases of agricultural productivity. And after examining the strategies used by families to cope with poverty, Safilios-Rothschild presents evidence concerning the impact of modernization and development policies and programs on family structure and dynamics, emphasizing the spread of female-headed households and changes in the prevailing division of labor and role interdependencies.

Each of the studies is amply documented, provides a review of the relevant literature and reflects an extensive interchange with Bank staff and invited experts. It is hoped that they will be useful for academics as well as those involved in the design and implementation of policies, programs and projects in the area of human development. The studies are presented in formats appropriate to the perspective and preferences of the authors. Richard Herbert undertook the final editing of the papers. Rhoda Blade-Charest, Banjonglak Duangrat, and Jaunianne Fawkes did the typing and coordinated other aspects of producing the manuscripts. On behalf of the team responsible for the World Development Report, 1980, I would like to thank all the authors, consultants, invited experts, and Bank staff who participated in the process leading to the publication of these studies.

Peter T. Knight
PART I

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Norman Uphoff
Cornell University
# POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Overview</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Summary of Findings</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. SOME GENERAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Solvency</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Stratification</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Feasibility and Optimality</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Time Paths</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. SOME PARTICULAR POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POVERTY-REDUCING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Disadvantages</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Advantages</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AMONG HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Comparisons Among Areas</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Comparisons Within Areas</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Incentives</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Sector Configurations</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cleavages</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE POLITICS OF PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Problem Identification and Analysis</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Program Design</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Mobilization of Support</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Authorization and Funding</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Implementation</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. CONCLUDING REVIEW</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOTNOTES</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX: ILLUSTRATIVE CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

0.01 Few observers or participants now argue that development can be pursued without regard to political considerations, or that it is a uniformly beneficial process which should be insulated from politics. National planning bodies and development assistance agencies have nevertheless largely avoided a formal and explicit analysis of politics as it relates to their enterprise. Such discussion of political factors as has occurred has been reserved for off-the-record conversations or for explaining away the "failures" of development planning. Yet it is also patently clear that the "successes" of development have usually come when planning and policy efforts capitalize on political considerations. Bringing more explicit analysis of political factors into the formulation of development programs is long overdue.

A. Overview

0.02 It may be argued, to be sure, that bringing politics "out of the closet" is a risky undertaking for development planners and practitioners. They have no political mandate themselves and may fear getting "burned" if they were to become overtly involved in political calculations and commitments. Accordingly, the sidestepping of political analyses seems to be the safest course. It appears prudent to maintain that development plans and decisions are technically based, or simply to take for granted the political premises of others. Such a position is not, however, as sound or as safe as it may first appear.

0.03 Development has always involved distribution just as much as it has production. The classic division of labor offered between economics and politics, which holds that the economy should produce and that the political system should distribute, is too simple a proposition. In reality there is a fundamental bond between production and distribution, mediated by the fact that the factors of production are themselves distributed and by their use give rise to claims on the output from production. Unless political interventions reverse the dynamic, market mechanisms will fulfill the admonition: to those who have shall be given, and from those who have not shall be taken away. In practice, politics will commonly be employed to reinforce the distribution patterns inherent in economic relations, but political resources can be also mobilized to change these patterns.

0.04 Proposals concerning what will be produced, and how, necessarily contain within them some bias as to who will benefit from that activity, because they usually imply whose resources will be used to produce the increment, thereby generating claims upon output. Planners and practitioners make distributive choices every time they enter into decisions or recommendations about production, whether they know and like it or not. Even if they are not willingly "political," they cannot escape being part of political

* Footnotes are found at the end of this paper.
processes of allocation as they help to shape the emerging structure of production. Indeed, the decision to leave allocations to the interplay of "market" forces is itself a political choice.

0.05 Political considerations must be addressed in formulating any development plan or policy, even in cases where production alone seems involved. We know that the implementation of any government program requires political support. This derives from persons in authority and from at least some sectors of the public, or from external sources. As will be discussed in the following section, considerations of political feasibility are as crucial to the success of programs as are those of economics or of technology. It is no longer acceptable for a "good" economic analysis to proceed without regard to technical feasibility, or for a "good" technical design to be oblivious to considerations of cost and of benefit. Similarly, neither economic nor technical analyses should be divorced from considerations as to what is politically tenable. To be effective in the pursuit of development aims, therefore, more complete analyses are needed than have hitherto been available.

0.06 To date, however, there has been a disposition in development planning circles to see politics only as a matter of "constraints" which inhibit the achievement of certain desirable goals. Yet effective political analysis should be conceived of as the process of devising and assessing options as well as tracing out limitations, in much the same way that economic and technical analyses point up possibilities as well as constraints. (The same can be said of sociocultural analysis, which economists and technicians have been inclined to view essentially as mapping "barriers to change," rather than as identifying a range of motivations, values and group capabilities from which support, not just resistance, can be derived.)

0.07 In principle, political analysis is as broad and encompassing as economic analysis. Indeed, it can be argued that the factors of political production are even more numerous and varied than the factors of economic production. Further, in politics the sectors subjected to analysis, as well as the modes of infrastructure, are simultaneously more complex and less fixed. Problems of aggregation and disaggregation are also more severe, while the prediction of outcomes for a policy is handicapped by greater volatility, as is the process of verification by a lesser capacity for measurement. These considerations have customarily encouraged economists to pass over political analysis as being "too soft." Yet the importance of the subject matter should prompt analysts to persevere with concepts and methods appropriate to it.

0.08 The present study is an attempt to provide a background to the World Development Report, 1980 by addressing problems of human development in terms of political analysis and strategy. To the extent that a number of political science colleagues have contributed to the formulation of issues to be addressed, and have contributed ideas to this paper, it is a collaborative effort. Responsibility for the exposition and for the conclusions, however, clearly remains with the author. He is working primarily from a framework that addresses questions of political analysis.
in terminology familiar to economists, according to a model called the new political economy. It requires no exposition in its own right, only that the reader have some knack for following analogies, in this case for extrapolating from the economic realm to the political one. 4/

0.09 Political theory as developed and used for policy purposes probably cannot, and should not, replicate economic theory. The respective universes of phenomena definitely overlap but are nevertheless different, and political relationships probably always will remain more complex and elusive than their economic counterparts. But the aims of both disciplines are becoming more convergent. Just as political analysis can benefit from economics, then so will economic analysis probably gain from taking a less narrow view of the phenomena under its nominal purview. 5/

0.10 The question of whether or not political science as a discipline can contribute to a more successful resolution of the problems of development strategy cannot be answered conclusively in this paper. This is for three reasons. First, the present study has drawn on only a fraction of the discipline's intellectual resources; second, the time for its preparation was short; and third, given the breadth of the subject, no single paper or even a set of papers could encompass all that might usefully be said of political aspects of development strategy.

0.11 If this study were to present a more conventional political science discussion, it might attempt to explain how regimes acquire and lose authority, or how they develop their political orientations. More weight would then be given to factors of ideology and of political values. Instead this paper will give more attention to generic factors of political process and motivation. While the overall ideological orientation of governments is important, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain development outcomes. Without derogating this dimension of politics, the analysis that follows seeks to reach beyond labels and thus to apply as much to socialist as to capitalist or intermediate regimes.

0.12 Our focus of concern is not on all aspects of human development, but rather those which are oriented to the reduction of poverty. The main program areas involved are education, health and nutrition. There is also some concern for population programs, as they will be discussed below. Within these areas we will be most interested in those human development programs contributing to an enhancement of the productivity and well-being of the poorer sectors, which offer the greatest scope for improvement in this context.

0.13 The discussion is organized under five main headings. We will begin with an analysis of some general political considerations for policy analysis (Section I), followed by a review of particular considerations bearing on the politics of human development (Section II). An analysis of political differences among and within the relevant program areas is presented in Section III. The differences among national political systems with relevance to the subject are taken up in Section IV. Moving from this "macro" perspective, we look at the politics of human development program
design and implementation (the project cycle, as it is commonly known) in Section V. Then, in conclusion, we consider what is most important about the politics of poverty-oriented human development in Section VI. For the convenience of the reader, we now present a summary of the findings of the analysis as elaborated in those Sections.

B. Summary of Findings

0.14 An understanding of the politics of poverty-oriented human development must begin with an appreciation not only of the structure and dynamics of politics generally, but also of the politically weak position of the poorer sectors whom such programs are to serve. This latter weakness can be offset by political initiatives and organization, and can be compensated for, at least in part, by external assistance. But the success of such initiatives and organization of assistance efforts hinges on an understanding of politics. For a variety of reasons, economic planners and development technicians have in the past generally avoided political considerations. But there are stronger reasons for addressing such considerations explicitly. Implicit, unstated assessments of political factors would be less correct, because they would lack the scrutiny and criticism that would facilitate a more correct analysis. Further, such implicit assessments tend to view politics in terms of constraints rather than of opportunities.

0.15 There are four essential elements for understanding political calculations in this context. The first is the imperative of solvency for any regime or political organization, that is, the need to maintain a greater stock/flow of political resources than will be expended to remain "in business" and pursue objectives. The second is the reality of stratification, which ranks sectors of the polity in terms of their connections of personnel and support to the regime; policy payoffs will be shaped by the inequalities of political power and access to the regime which result from stratification. The third element involves considerations of the feasibility or optimality of policies, the reckoning of political as well as economic costs and benefits; these considerations are influenced by the value placed on political resources by stratified sectors and by regimes keeping their solvency in mind. The fourth element involves the shape of the cost and benefit time paths distinguishing political and economic factors from one another; the viability of policies will depend on whether benefits or costs are more "front-loaded" and on how much the regime desires the net benefits, or must avoid the net costs. More could be said about the working of political systems, but these four elements provide a suitable framework for analyzing the politics of programs of human development.

0.16 Poverty-oriented human development presents a number of advantages and disadvantages compared to other poverty-reducing programs. A prominent disadvantage is the political weakness of the poorer sectors. A low level of human development activity is both cause and effect of this weakness. Ways must therefore be found to attack this political version of the "vicious circle of poverty." In addition to various political tactics, external assistance in human development breaks this circle. Also needed are appropriate organization and beneficiary participation for human development.
strategy. As such organization is not easy or always sustainable, it presents some problems. Yet, on balance, the costs and risks are worth undertaking. An additional and common disadvantage is the relatively high recurrent cost of human development programs. This can be alleviated by designing lower-cost programs and by mobilizing local resources through local organization.

0.17 On the credit side, human development programs are essentially more distributive than redistributive compared to some other poverty reducing programs. The increments gained in knowledge, health and vitality are not attained at the cost of comparable reductions for someone else. Thus the politics surrounding them should involve less conflict, though this does not mean that there are no issues of allocation. When it comes to financing, there is competition over funds between human development and other programs, and indeed, among human development programs themselves. Some intense struggles may be observed over the location of human development facilities, and as more efforts are made to redirect the activities of these programs to assist the poor, we can expect conflict over the mix of services, for example, between primary and higher education, or between preventive and curative health programs.

0.18 Even if they are not able to avoid some zero-sum competition, human development programs remain attractive politically for a number of additional reasons. There are substantial externalities for richer sectors even from poverty-oriented programs. Human development expenditures often have the double impact of being both consumption and investment, making them more popular than some other kinds. The demand for most of these services is greater than the supply. They are generally regarded as quite legitimate programs and can enhance the legitimacy of the government. Because they are so divisible, they can be allocated in ways that enhance political support. Having relatively lower capital costs, and through using known technologies, they can be started up more quickly than other projects with lower initial economic cost and higher political benefit (this is the converse benefit of the disadvantage of higher recurrent economic costs).

0.19 Thinking of human development programs as a common category has limitations because there are some significant differences not only between areas, such as education and nutrition, but also among programs even within an area, for example in the case of rural health clinics, control of communicable diseases, health education, and accident prevention campaigns. Differences in particular programs need to be considered. These involve their legitimacy, their visibility, their divisibility, their targetability, and their divertibility (and corruptibility). These differences affect any assessment of the political characteristics -- the costs and the benefits -- of each program. Of special interest are those programs which have fixed and limited demand, like primary education or immunizations. These are tremendously valuable to a person to undergo once, but once only (so the economists' term "inferior goods" is not appropriate). Because such experience cannot be accumulated or transferred, these programs are less liable to divertibility and indeed need less effort at targeting to reach the poor.
A common way of approaching this subject is to look at typological or ideological differences among different political systems, in order to estimate their receptivity to poverty-oriented human development accordingly. While these factors cannot be dismissed entirely, enough exceptions are found to any rule to make them of limited utility as a framework for analysis. More fruitful is an appreciation of the structure and dynamics of politics generally, with a consideration of choices bearing on the solvency as well as on the objectives of the regime. This approach is more oriented to improving the prospects of poverty-reducing human development programs in any kind of political system. In this context, one needs to look at the incentives to the regime and how the programs contribute to these, at the configuration of political sectors and how supportive they might be of the programs, and at the cleavages -- ethnic, ideological, partisan and other -- which might affect program implementation. Ethnic and regional divisions are specifically seen as potentially obstructive, since they can fuel serious political conflict. At the same time, such divisions are usually exacerbated by uneven human development, so these programs represent one of the ways of ameliorating such cleavages in the longer run, even if they heighten competition in the shorter run.

Finally, a good deal of consideration needs to be given to the politics of the program development process (a less linear and less rigid concept than that of "the project cycle"). We find different kinds of politics -- different actors, different decisions, different interests -- associated with the various tasks of program development: problem identification and analysis, program design, mobilization of support, authorization and financing, and implementation. The level of decisions shifts back and forth between national and local levels; some decisions are once-for-all, while others are recurring. This process continuously changes the political situation and puts a premium on maintaining and even increasing program support, within the government, among influential sectors, and within the public generally. Implementation in particular is not something divorced from the preceding tasks, but on the contrary requires continuous interaction with them. Agencies operate within some kind of network of political connections with allies and antagonists. This fact must be appreciated and allowed for in program design, in seeking coordination, in providing external assistance, and so on.

The importance of beneficiary organization emerges again and again from an analysis of the politics (and administration) of poverty-oriented human development programs. Local government units, cooperatives, peasant associations, health committees, parent-teacher associations, mothers' clubs, urban neighborhood planning boards and other like bodies can make great contributions to the planning and implementation of human development programs. They are of particular assistance in making utilization more appropriate and more efficient, in mobilizing resources for the initial construction of facilities and for any recurrent costs, and in maintaining facilities. Beyond this capability, they help to strengthen the base of political support for such programs, making them better able to compete for funding and staff over time. Such organization can compensate for the low level of individual political resources by aggregating them with the aim of contributing them to, or withholding them from, the political
process. Some regimes may not like such an increase in political power, but it is an essential ingredient in the process of sustaining programs in a way that can promote human development. That development in fact involves more than education or health or better nutrition, more than an augmentation of people's physical and intellectual capacity. It involves also an increase in their political, social and psychological capacities. The prospects for human development are most notably enhanced, therefore, by support for the development, however difficult, of a variety of local organizations engaging the poor majority and contributing to the development of their human potential.
I. SOME GENERAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

1.01 Some political considerations affect all public policy and program choices, and not just those involving poverty-oriented human development. They should therefore be identified as the basic parameters of politics, conditioning any decisions within the public sector. These general considerations apply *a fortiori* to poverty-reducing human development efforts, however, because of the weaker political position of the special publics that these programs intend to involve. In characterizing these groups as a category -- "the poor" -- it is recognized that this implies more homogeneity than in practice exists. More will be said on this topic later. For purposes of analysis and exposition, however, some generalizations are necessary and indeed useful, although throughout the ensuing discussion it should be remembered that there is some degree of heterogeneity among the poor, as indeed among other strata of any society.

1.02 The poorer sectors, who are currently supposed to be receiving program benefits from most of the development efforts of agencies and countries are limited not only in their economic resources but also their political resources. They have low status, scanty education and little voice and weight in the political process. In developing countries they have the possible advantage of numbers, but these seldom count for much politically even if elections are in fact held. Seldom are the votes of the poor mobilized or recognized *en masse*. Literacy tests, patron-client controls, ethnic or other divisions, or induced apathy combine to dilute the effect of numbers. The poor also have some potential power from the use of force, but this potential is generally exceeded and negated by the coercive capacity of the state.

1.03 The poor thus have relatively few resources per capita to contribute to either the political or the economic process or production. They have a correspondingly diminished claim in their own right to the fruits of production whether these emanate from the public or the private sector. In practice, however, in total amount the poor may contribute a great deal to the economy and to the state through their labor and their agricultural output. But their bargaining power is limited by the urgency of their consumption needs or their lack of organization. They therefore achieve relatively less from what resources they have than do better-endowed and better organized sectors. If there are to be any lasting adjustments and improvements in the distribution of income streams or, more significantly, of assets, something must be done by the state or by other political entrepreneurs. The operation of market forces alone will not produce significant advancement for the poor.

1.04 There is usually reason to expect that redistribution will be opposed by some of those sectors that are better-endowed with political and other resources. Such sectors are better able to contribute resources to those attaining positions of authority and to the implementation of policies, so the policies made and carried out tend to favor these better-endowed sectors. While it is true that some gains can accrue to the poor without
directly detracting from the well-being of the richer sectors (a positive-sum situation), advancement for the former usually diminishes at least in relative terms the power position of the latter with respect to future political and economic allocations. Redistributive policies are therefore likely to cost a government some of the support and the contributions accruing to it from the better-endowed, including the middle-class sectors, who may be more directly in competition with the poor for jobs, space and status. The ability of the government successfully to offset these tendencies, and even to make poverty-oriented programs politically profitable, depends on its exchanges with the whole set of sectors within the polity, including the poor whose resources can be enhanced and mobilized.

1.05 Strategies for the reduction of poverty confront those governments willing to pursue them, and those donor agencies willing to support them, with a more difficult political task than that of the pursuit of growth in gross national product. 7/ This conventional strategy "builds on the best," taking advantage of the resources, regions and sectors already most advanced and productive. The reduction of poverty, however, requires building on "the rest," whose political as well as economic resources per capita are meager. But "the rest" cannot derive much from either their political or their economic participation unless the returns therefrom are deliberately enhanced by the state, by political actors cooperating with the poor, or by the political action of the poor themselves. 8/

A. Solvency

1.06 Perhaps the central insight into political dynamics emerging from a political-economic perspective is that regimes face the same requirement of solvency that enterprises confront in the economic realm. (A "regime" in this context is defined as the top set of persons occupying positions of authority in a political system; the same requirements can, mutatis mutandis, be extrapolated to agency or project leadership.) The common use of economic metaphor to describe political phenomena -- for example, the use of such terms as political assets, liabilities, investments, returns, capital and, significantly, bankruptcy -- invokes an intuitive understanding that there are certain resources which are employed in politics, with varying productivity and sufficiency, much as in economics. In particular, a necessary condition for any government to remain "in business" is its control of some margin of resources exceeding the expenditure required to carry out policies and to maintain authority. To fail to remain solvent in political-economic terms results in the ineffectiveness of policies and a decline in the fortunes of the regime.

1.07 In this paper, it is not necessary to enter into an analysis of what constitutes "political resources," that is, what, in the political process, are the factors of production equivalent to land, labor and capital in economics. The factors we need to deal with range from the "hard" resources of economic resources and political legitimacy. For present purposes we can refer to these factors in fairly aggregated terms; each is as essential but as different from the others as are land, labor and capital in economic activity. All political resource factors are real, not abstract, and they originate in the activities and attitudes of persons seeking to acquire, influence and/or exercise the authority of the state. 9/
1.08 Sectors of the polity, as well as the regime itself, produce and exchange these resources variously in pursuit of their political aims. A regime will have at any particular time some stock of resources in hand or under its direct control. This stock is continually augmented by a flow of new resources from sectors and from the activity of the regime itself. Whether or not the stock is growing, diminishing or remaining constant depends on the relative rates of expenditure and acquisition. The regime will presumably also be able to acquire some resources "on credit" if its standing with sectors (domestic and external) is good. Legitimacy is particularly important in this instance, as it entitles the regime to have the benefit of any doubts.

1.09 Rather than further analyze political resources, it is more appropriate to elaborate on the idea of solvency, and thus to make clearer the kind of calculations underlying any government's choices about the policy or set of policies it is to pursue. Even if a government may in principle be agreed on poverty-reducing goals, the exigencies of the political environment may preclude or at least greatly restrict their pursuit. There has been a tendency among economists, and some political scientists, to regard "political will" or "commitment" as an independent variable, as something that governments can choose to demonstrate if they only want to. The analytical construct of political-economic solvency nevertheless makes it evident that regimes, like individuals, operate in a world which permits only partially free will.

1.10 Quite apart from the ideological dispositoin of decisionmakers, the exhortation that political leaders ought to favor and assist the poor will be more (or less) readily attended to depending not only on the distribution of resources within the political system, but also on the margin of resources a regime controls over and above its requirements to maintain itself in authority. It is a matter of conjecture how many regimes take only the latter consideration into account. Most national leaderships have some aspirations for creating a better and more equitable society. How many would be prepared to give up their positions of authority if they were unable to promote these ends remains unknown and not particularly relevant. What is clear is that if leaders make decisions only in terms of ideology, according to whose welfare they value the most, this process makes them more liable to become politically insolvent. If leaderships are not mindful of the sources and the amounts of political resources being acquired to maintain their regimes, they are likely sooner or later to find themselves with insufficient means either to maintain authority or to enforce any policies.

1.11 An understanding that governments, and any other political organizations, face the same kinds of imperatives as economic enterprises, lest they be put "out of business," should help move discussions away from simplistic notions of "political will." Any set of political actors determined and skilled enough to have achieved national authority will have some appreciation of how political power is acquired and exercised. Ideological values in many cases give both direction and energy to political actors, but their actual course, like that of a sailing ship, is made of many tacks to sustain the political wind in their sails. Political will, then, is not some deus ex machina which could resolve all difficulties if
invoked. On the contrary, it is something conditioned by the structure of political situations: On which sectors does the government depend for what resources to sustain its authority and pursue overt and tacit policies? What demands and expectations do these sectors have? What are their respective capabilities for making the political equivalent of "effective demands"? What are the capabilities of political and administrative infrastructure (discussed below) on which the government can draw?

1.12 Most governments are not operating right at the edge of insolvency, a situation whereby they must seek to assure sufficient resources on a day-to-day basis to remain "in business." Yet few governments are so certain of continued resource flows through firmly institutionalized channels that they cannot imagine an erosion of support leading to immobility of policy and/or loss of authority. While not necessarily trying to maximize their reserve of political resources, regimes must make choices with a view to maintaining that margin. Such apparently "strong" regimes as those that held sway in recent years in Ethiopia, Iran and Nicaragua were put out of business by different combinations of a withdrawal of popular support and an opposition employing physical force. Still more vulnerable were such populistic regimes as those of Nkrumah, Sukarno and Allende, which had alienated the more powerful entrenched sectors in their societies and their external allies. More moderate, reformist governments such as those of Kenya, India and Colombia have faced problems of their own which make solvency a continuing issue. Given this context, the purpose of the analysis outlined here is to identify what kinds of actions need to be taken to expand the scope for choosing developmental policies that particularly benefit the poor.

1.13 Taken as a group, the poor have relatively less to offer a regime (or other political contenders) because they have fewer political resources per capita than other members of the polity; that is, they have less status, less education, fewer political skills, and so on. The large numbers of the poor will only make much difference if elections are effective means for determining allocations, or if armed conflict reaches the point where mass support can swing the balance of power in favor of the insurgents. A regime favoring the poor to the extent to alienating better-endowed sectors may find that the poor cannot provide it with enough of the resources it needs to maintain itself in authority, such as economic resources or effective force, if the poor have not become better organized and active participants in the political groupings possessing greater, and more strategic, resources.

1.14 If we move beyond the tautological explanation of a regime's choices and its success in terms of its "political will," we see that there are various tradeoffs and possibilities in the formulation of strategies to implement development objectives. A desire to help the poor is certainly not a sufficient condition and sometimes not even a necessary one. The possibility exists that a regime pursuing policies such as export-oriented growth could benefit the poor through a rapid creation of jobs, even though it was not particularly concerned with producing this benefit. To the extent that the poor are politically organized and mobilized, able to become part of a regime's combination of forces for maintaining its authority, or able to destabilize the polity so that their wishes must be taken into account, a
regime may serve their needs without any particular ideological commitment to them. It is similarly evident that a regime with the best intentions of assisting the poor, but which is unable to mobilize and manipulate political resources in such a way as to sustain more political "income" than "expenditure" will be liable to removal, whether by constitutional or other means. Such an eventuality will leave the poor all the more vulnerable and exploitable.

1.15 Some policies that assist the development of the poor will not, at least in the short run, yield to a government political resources equal to the value of those expended. To maintain solvency in the pursuit of poverty-reducing programs, a government needs to maintain an aggregate balance of political resources sufficient to deal with all claims, peaceful or otherwise, made upon it while it is expending some of its political capital to gain compliance with its policies. A number of steps can be taken to mobilize and then to maintain the margin of resources needed to assure political compliance and the solvency of the regime. It should be noted that assisting the development of the poor is not necessarily politically unprofitable. The relative expectations of the poor as a sector are often lower than those of better-endowed sectors, and fairly modest improvements in their condition can be much appreciated. The continuing loyalty of lower-class sectors to the memory of Nkrumah in Ghana and of Peron in Argentina suggests this possibility. Some form of political organization, however, is needed to make such support pay off politically. We therefore begin our discussion with an analysis of the steps that are most easily undertaken within the parameters of the existing system, and then move on to consider those which involve a greater measure of political entrepreneurship and change.

1.16 First, it must be noted that regimes need not have a positive balance of all resource types, or with all sectors of the polity, since resources are in varying degrees interchangeable. Coercion, the most fungible, may be used to gain compliance when more positive rewards, such as money or status, or claims of legitimacy, are not sufficient inducements. If economic resources are scarce, for example, status rewards, normative appeals based on legitimacy, or some sharing of authority may be offered instead. One of the leading aspects of political skill is knowing how to shift resources to achieve the maximum aggregate compliance from their disposition.

1.17 To the extent that a government enjoys some surplus of resources accruing to it from its other policies, there can be, in effect, some political subsidization of those poverty-oriented programs that are not profitable, drawing on the margin of resources created from effective governance overall. This can be done at the regime's discretion so long as the other sectors do not object to this and begin withholding resources from the regime. To increase the margin of political resources available to underwrite programs for the poor, a regime can deliberately promulgate certain policies that are "popular" with the better endowed sectors. Support won in general terms can often be used to "fund" other activities of a regime, so long as nonbeneficiary sectors do not object to this transfer.

1.18 A government may make particular efforts at persuasion of the better-endowed sectors as to the wisdom of its actions in helping the poor to develop. This may be through appeals to enlightened self-interest or by
pointing out certain direct benefits which human development can have for others besides the poor, as discussed in Section II (2.23). If such arguments are successful, the better-endowed may be willing to contribute some of the resources needed to sustain poverty-oriented programs without getting direct and immediate compensation themselves. Alternatively, they may be persuaded at a minimum to refrain from withdrawing resources (taxes, information, and so on) from the regime in retaliation for efforts to transfer resources to the poor. If a regime cannot benefit politically from helping the poor, it should try to keep political foes from capitalizing on opposition to its poverty-oriented policies.

1.19 Bilateral or multilateral foreign assistance is one of the most available means for bolstering solvency, in political as well as economic terms, when domestic sectors cannot or will not "finance" poverty-oriented programs. Such assistance may be rendered in the form of financial aid, by according greater status, by giving useful information, and by the provision of military training, equipment or forces, or of diplomatic recognition (legitimacy) and support. Authority as such cannot be given transnationally, but other resources may be given to buttress claims of national authority, making it thereby more effective. There are limitations on the extent to which external resources, even if willing, can bankroll politically a regime embarked on redistributive measures if it is unable to increase its domestic mobilization of political resources for such policies. This is because foreign assistance may be seen (or portrayed by opponents) as illegitimate, thus reducing the accrual of legitimacy to the regime if the aid becomes too obvious and too controversial.

1.20 A more promising, and more fundamental, approach is to mobilize resources domestically through the organization and motivation of program beneficiaries. As long as the poor are capable of acting only as individuals, they do not count for much in any national political equations. But with organization, training, and links to important political actors, those with few per capita resources can aggregate these resources into a political force capable of balancing others. Numerous examples of successful mobilization of support from poor sectors exist. 12/ This is not to suggest that such organization is always easy or predictable. But it is possible, and, to the extent it is successful, it has the added benefit of creating a capacity which can assist in the administration and implementation of human development programs, a topic treated by Esman and Montgomery in their companion paper.

1.21 It is possible that such an approach may alarm the more privileged sectors and prompt them to oppose the regime. While they might accept some distribution of benefits to the poor, they are less likely to acquiesce in the aggregation of new political power that can compete with them for the future outputs of policy. It is also possible that the organizations established may not support the incumbent regime beyond the short run (though, as the footnote to the preceding paragraph indicated in the case of Mexico, it is possible the organizations will be coopted). The approach of mobilization, while offering substantial advantages to any serious anti-poverty strategy, entails some political risks that must be accepted or neutralized.
1.22 Finally, we can suggest that an anti-poverty strategy includes investments in political and administrative infrastructure to facilitate participation by the poor in decisionmaking, in implementation and in ensuing benefits. This will not be welcomed by all regimes, or by all sectors within a political system, but some movement in this direction whether in democratic or corporatist terms will increase the weight of the poor within the system even if the sector is not organized as a special interest. Political party organization, government bureaucracy, the courts, local government units, communication systems, educational opportunity and so forth could be made more accessible to the poor. To the extent that this is done, programs which increase the productivity and well-being of the poor are less of an act of charity and more a matter of providing such benefits as are expected by other participants in politics.

1.23 The political and administrative infrastructure of a regime is in fact one of the major factors contributing to its solvency. The functioning of party, bureaucratic, judicial, constitutional and other mechanisms is thus crucial for its maintenance. Policies and programs which strengthen these entities will be favored over others, and those which weaken infrastructure will find it difficult to win acceptance from the government (as, for example, in the case of a donor-aided project which undermines the distribution of employment opportunities through patronage). In thinking through poverty-oriented initiatives, due consideration should be given as to what these will do, positively or negatively, to the institutions which mobilize, channel and control political resources for the regime. One should not be surprised to find a great deal of political production and distribution processes more efficient, predictable and effective.

1.24 In general, one should bear in mind that solvency is a very real consideration and concern for practically all regimes. It affects their ability to undertake programs, just as programs in turn affect their solvency. Some of the political resources involved are nontangible, but they all have very real consequences in terms of maintaining public compliance with decisions of the regime, and their diminution can have drastic ramifications for a regime's tenure in office or its ability to carry through certain policies it favors. The relevance and tenability of poverty-oriented programs will be judged at least in part with reference to the regime's resource position, how much margin it has to work with. Even if the regime is not courting bankruptcy, policies that entail net expenditure rather than political profit will reduce its ability to pursue other valued ends, and all regimes have a variety of competing goals in view.

1.25 The value placed on various resources, gained or foregone, must ultimately be decided by persons in authority. One cannot and should not assume that all regimes are interested in promoting economic development or the reduction of poverty, or even of increasing their solvency through positive development efforts. Some are not. Even so, analysts can and should anticipate how different programs add to, or subtract from, the different political resources being contributed to the maintenance of a regime by significant sectors of the public. One purpose of the political-economy model has been to sensitize nonpolitical persons to the reality of those noneconomic resource flows that shape a government's capacity to pursue any programs at all.
B. Stratification

1.26 One difference between politics and economics may be more a matter of formalistic theory than of fact. The economic construct of a "free" market implies a degree of equality among all participants in terms of factor endowments, and it certainly presumes that they are free to sell their factors of production and buy goods and services as they like. Considerations such as the "coercion" of need undermining people's bargaining power are not given much thought. While it is true that liberal-democratic theory presumes a similar equality among participants in the "political" market, our political-economic understanding proceeds from a clear recognition that such a market is stratified. Even when participants have similar factor endowments, their relationships to the regime may well differ, depending on the disposition of incumbents as to whether or not to favor certain sectors.

1.27 In politics there is less often a disposition to "buy" from and "sell" to any person regardless of class, status, ethnic affiliation, and so on. In political terms, not all persons are satisfied with maximizing their own income, but rather pay attention to the well-being of others, which they desire to see increased in some instances, and reduced in others (economists think of this as the interdependence of utility functions). Politics is not always or only a zero-sum game. Its most attractive dynamic is the positive-sum possibilities that arise from mobilizing otherwise slack resources, reallocating resources in ways more productive of total satisfaction, or creating the political equivalent of "consumer surplus." Groups nevertheless find that advances at one point in time tend to improve subsequent advantages.

1.28 Not all sectors are similarly useful to, or valued by, a regime. Those which are closest to a regime we can call the core combination. These sectors contribute the most resources and personnel to the regime, at least to get it established, and, by helping to maintain it, gain the most from it in policy payoffs. In most developing countries, this combination will include some but not all of the following sectors: military, bureaucracy, industrialists, traders, landowners, organized labor, and intelligentsia. Sectors which are favored by the regime and benefit from its policies without making significant contributions to its maintenance can be considered within the ideological bias of the regime. Those sectors with which the regime is not particularly sympathetic, but which are willing to bargain with it over policies, constitute stability groups. Their cooperation is usually important for maintaining the position of the regime, but relations are on a quid pro quo basis. If there are sectors so opposed to the regime they will not deal with it, seeking rather to bring it down and to replace the prevailing stratification with another, these constitute extra-stability groups. Further, there may be sectors that are not engaged in political exchange processes on any significant basis, such as migrant workers, and they can be regarded as unmobilized sectors. 14/

1.29 The higher up in the political stratification a sector is, the larger a share of policy outputs can be expected to accrue to it. In some systems, the allocations are fairly open, even blatant; in others the differentials are less obvious, though the bias comes through in implementation. 15/ As a rule, the poor are among the unmobilized sectors, though to the extent
they are organized, they may rank among the stability groups. We find no examples where they are part of the core combination, but one might hope they would be included in the regime's ideological bias. This would mean that they get a stream of benefits as a matter of regime preference. Whether this stream can be sustained will depend, as noted in the previous discussion, not just on the ideological predilections of the regime but on its objective resource position, that is, on whether solvency is problematic or not. Perhaps the chief incentive for upgrading the poor within a prevailing political stratification is the possibility that they will contribute to and even become part of extra-stability groups. While this defection would not serve a regime's political interests, it may create new possibilities for bargaining on behalf of the poor if the regime is prepared to become more responsive.

1.30 It may seem reasonable, following the logic of most economic analysis, to assume that benefits distributed among different groups, if not commensurable, are at least equivalent. But, politically, this is not the case. Just as the utility derived from similar goods may differ among persons, so also will the differences in the value attached by a regime to the distribution of benefits among groups. Similar increments from programs in terms of the gross national product can have very different political values. The higher a group stands in the regime's stratification of sectors, the more its benefits will be valued by the regime. This general fact of political stratification needs to be considered in thinking through the political attractiveness and tenability of programs, whether they are poverty-oriented or not.

C. Feasibility and Optimality

1.31 It is difficult enough to judge a policy or program either economically or technically in terms of its feasibility and optimality. Each set of factors is usually multivariate, and we find that usually the best course of action in technical terms is not the best economically (for example, least cost or highest rate of return), and vice versa. What often happens is that either technical or economic considerations are set as "givens," as constraints within which a solution is sought. And that solution is judged feasible or optimal in terms of the other set of considerations. Thus feasibility represents sufficiency of resources received vis-à-vis those that must be expended, and optimality represents the best available course or solution considering all factors that have been taken into account.

1.32 Rather than treat either economic or technical factors as fixed, it is usually preferable to work out some joint solution treating both as variable, and then working towards some optimal choice. There are invariably tradeoffs between, for example, least cost and highest quality. Rather than specify some level of either as a constraint a priori, it is often better to examine what alternative combinations of each would give the greatest total value. Even if one cannot make the two scales commensurate, one can make judgments among different "bundles" of benefit.

1.33 In a similar manner, assuming that economic and technical combinations can be integrated, there remain political considerations. These can be regarded in terms of fixed constraints or can be taken into account as variables,
whereby a best (optimal) combination of attributes is sought in a policy or program. This combination may have to be analyzed with nominal and ordinal comparisons rather than cardinal measurement, but the principle is the same as with more quantified analysis.

1.34 An example will help to illustrate this process, by taking two different kinds of policies for reducing the rate of population growth: (I) increased school enrollment for women, and (II) increased family planning facilities. In terms of quicker impact on population growth II is more preferable to I, so it would be generally judged preferable on technical grounds. The cost per reduced birth would also be less with II, especially if any time discounting is figured. So it is also "better" policy in purely economic terms of reducing population growth. On political grounds, the opposite judgment may be made, either because family planning is politically unpopular, or because education is politically profitable, or both. So, in political terms, policy I is more advantageous than policy II.

1.35 In the accompanying figure, we find a designation of nine different policy combinations concerning population reduction. A level of investment, in either family planning facilities (first row) or educational expenditure (first column) is judged productive if the resource expenditure in technical-economic or in political terms is less than the benefit (I<0). Where resource yield is at least equal to expenditure, such a level (I=0) is judged feasible (middle row and middle column). Where resource expenditure is greater than yield (I>0), such a level is judged unfeasible (last row and last column).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politically Productive</th>
<th>Politically Feasible</th>
<th>Politically Unfeasible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technically</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Economically)</td>
<td>I&lt;0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Economically)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasible</td>
<td>I=0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfeasible</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I&gt;0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Political Economy Matrix for Comparison of Choices.

1.36 If one thought only in economic or technical terms, combinations A, B and C would all be better than D, E and F. Conversely, in purely political terms, if there were any considerations of joint payoffs, A would easily be the preferred solution, and E would represent a minimum acceptance policy.
combination. C and G might be ruled out as less good than B or D, respectively. F, H and I could be easily discarded. The problem is how to approach A, or how to choose between B and D if A is not attainable. For the foreseeable future, no numerical yardsticks will produce incontrovertible results, but the very formulation of this problem should help to orient program and project planners toward something which might be called aggregate optimality.

1.37 Some effort to arrive at political-economic estimates of optimality is important in part because when it comes to the acceptance and implementation of programs and policies the logic of economic "efficiency" in meeting the needs of specified "target groups" contradicts the more crucial logic of politics. The more successful one is in planning a program or policy to benefit only the poor, the less political support the program or policy is likely to have. Since the poor, though numerous, have fewer resources per capita to contribute to political as well as economic activity, their support, unless organized, is worth less than that which may be lost from politically more influential groups which would like to have the investment in housing, extension services, schooling or other benefits for themselves.

1.38 In terms of building and maintaining political support for a program or policy, a certain amount of economic or technical "inefficiency" in targeting benefits for the poor may be politically "efficient." Letting some benefits "trickle up" to better endowed sectors or deliberately letting collateral benefits "spill over" to them may be optimal in terms of sustaining a program which will enjoy enough aggregate support to provide net benefits to the poor. To be sure, if the "linkage" is too great it will defeat the purpose of assisting the poor, and end up strengthening others instead. But judgments about feasibility and optimality need to be made in such aggregate political-economic terms.

1.39 One example of such efforts at optimization comes from the area of urban development, where projects may combine some amount of citywide garbage collection facilities or some middle-class housing with slum rehabilitation intended to improve the lot of the urban poor. In purely economic or technical terms, to meet the donor agency's objectives, only investment in slum rehabilitation should have been made. But to gain the significant political support which made government approval possible, the investments benefiting middle-class sectors and other nonpoor urban residents apparently had to be made.

1.40 Innovation is probably more important than precision in addressing such issues. The political-economic payoff of given policies can usually be changed by some redefinition of beneficiaries, some alternate manner of funding, some combination with other activities, or by the acceleration or deceleration of implementation, and so on. The purpose of our discussion here is to underscore the possibility of tradeoffs that could make a poverty-oriented program more likely to be accepted and sustained, given the fact that the constituency for such programs is politically weak.

1.41 Planners and officials can probably never know all the political considerations which government decisionmakers weigh at the top. Many must be inferred (following the logic of revealed preference). But planners and officials also operate with very imperfect knowledge in the economic and
technical realms. The point is to accept and to integrate what political knowledge can be generated, not to substitute this for economic and technical analysis, but to relate the political and the nonpolitical calculations. This effort should lead to programs and policies that are closer to some optimum in total terms than would be the case if only the latter set of calculations were thought through.

D. Time Paths

1.42 The comparison of total costs and benefits for a policy or a program may not be as crucial in determining whether or not a government adopts it as could be the distribution of costs and benefits over time. Because of the need for regimes to maintain some excess of resources over expenditure, the total net return from program or policy investment may not be as important as its short-run effects. Only rather solvent regimes can afford to neglect time paths of benefits and cost, and program or policy design should accordingly take them into account. This consideration applies to poverty-oriented programs where their costs are more "up front" with benefits slower in coming, though the reverse can be the case.

1.43 For some purposes it is important to distinguish between economic costs and benefits and political ones. The two sets are not commensurable by a single standard, yet their respective time paths can be described and instructive conclusions can then be drawn. Most persons are reasonable familiar with the manner of analyzing economic costs and benefits, so it is useful to begin by discussing them. In any investment program, economic costs are more predictable than benefits. Also, the costs begin accumulating from the outset, whereas benefits are usually lagged by some period of time. Since there are maintenance and recurrent costs after initial capital investments have been made, economic costs are almost always greater, at least initially, than are benefits.

1.44 Whether the investment becomes profitable early on or not depends on the time path of benefits and costs as well as on the magnitude of difference between the two. Costs per year may be constant, diminishing, or increasing. Benefits may begin accruing quickly or only much later. Apart from the gross differences between costs and benefit, the more favorable activity will be one with diminishing cost and quick benefit, whereas the less favorable will have increasing costs and much delayed benefits. Such an activity may indeed never yield net benefits. In economic analysis, differences in the rate of accrual of costs and benefits over time are adjusted for by using a rate of discount to reduce all costs and benefits to a single set of summary values. This procedure tells us whether a particular investment so calculated would produce net discounted value over a certain period. It does not indicate how much capital would be needed to cover the initial resource outflow when starting up the program. In making decisions about investment, this consideration is often more crucial than an estimate of ultimate profitability.

1.45 Policies represent a bundle of resource expenditures and subsequent revenues, including economic resources but also such others as information, status or force. In the same way that there are likely to be "up front" expenditures required in excess of income with an economic investment, so
will policies generally involve other start-up costs. Because the political resources involved are less tangible (or less measurable) than goods and services, they are seldom considered explicitly. But the various kinds of compliance involved with a policy or program go well beyond simply giving or receiving economic resources, and a regime must manage to cover all the variations if it is to carry out a program effectively.

1.46 To say that a program is "popular" is to indicate that the political benefits are "front loaded" and that the political costs are moderate or deferred. Unpopular programs have a reverse relation between initial costs and benefits. Over time, the patterns may change. Certain factors may raise the political costs of a popular program as it proceeds. In that event the question as to whether or not it remains popular depends on whether or not benefits also increase. An unpopular program may become popular if benefits markedly increase and/or costs imposed by it decline. Several other possibilities exist. A regime may affect the respective costs and benefits by advertising the latter and obscuring the former. Possibly, a regime may not appreciate which costs will face it in the future, and, indeed, various social groups may not realize the costs of a program to themselves. On the other side of the equation, governments can try to educate the public as to the benefits of a program where these are not adequately appreciated. What counts in the final analysis is what regimes and sectors think to be true, since this perception affects how they will use the political resources at their disposal.

1.47 The preceding are obviously aggregate characterizations. Few programs are popular or unpopular with all sectors. It is in fact net judgments about a program that are being made. If favorable opinions are held about a program by enough influential sectors, these outweigh any adverse views of less influential ones. It may be that a program is unpopular with a majority of persons, that is it provides fewer benefits than costs to them, but if they have relatively few political resources, their negative opinion will not be sufficient to change or cancel the program. Similarly, their positive opinion about a program which is judged adversely by more powerful persons will probably not be enough to preserve it.

1.48 The process of program design must be carried out with a full appreciation that some opinions carry more political weight than others. The shape of political benefit and cost to a regime depends on who is affected positively and negatively by the program, since it is not just the volume of resources involved but the value placed on them that counts, as the above discussion of stratification indicated. This circumstance affects the design of programs for the poor, whose political weight is diminished by their low resource endowment and their usual lack of organization. If their share of power within the political system were greater, the shape of time paths representing net benefit to the regime would be different, and more favorable for the undertaking of measures to reduce poverty. The resources that the poor could contribute to a regime in return for favorable programs could help offset losses imposed by more privileged sectors taking exception to anti-poverty measures.
1.49 It is commonly observed that regimes have relatively short time horizons, that they are unwilling to make policy investments with a long-term payoff. This makes "political will" the explanatory variable, a concept that we have already taken exception to (1.11). A policy time path having "up front" political costs and delayed political benefits, such as the one suggested in Figure 2, is not uncommon. To the extent that a regime has limited or uncertain solvency, it will be deterred from following such a policy even if the margin of economic benefits over costs is positive, as is also indicated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. Illustrative Benefit and Cost Time Paths.](image)

1.50 To state in such a situation the regime has a "high discount rate" for future political resources is likely to reflect the objective situation more than the time preferences of the regime. The problem of politically "financing" programs that have high net costs at the outset is significant for most regimes, because net benefits are invariably less certain and somewhat delayed. An example would be reorienting education toward a more agricultural and vocational content, while parents still expect schooling to prepare their children for white collar jobs. Payoffs from this policy would be some years in coming. To the extent that a regime's solvency is in question, it will need to be persuaded that the net benefits are relatively more substantial and certain than otherwise, and not so long in coming. Indeed, the regime may simply not have the political capital needed to expend in the initial period when net costs are being imposed on the polity, that is, on significant sector of it. It it unable to cover these costs, the policy would not be viable.

1.51 It may appear to economists and technicians accustomed to dealing only with "hard" resources, that is, with quantifiable and observable ones, that the above analysis is only imaginative. Persons who have dealt with political actors at higher levels know, however, that there is a reality represented by this use of economic metaphor. The analogy from economics effectively reaches dynamics and relationships that are seldom spoken of analytically, being confined instead mostly to gossip, scheming or journalism. The resource of legitimacy which may be shrugged off by "materialistic" planners is very important to political actors for the impact it has on people's behavior and their willingness to comply with the decisions of the
state. Legitimacy represents a form of political credit with persons and with sectors that can be drawn on for getting policies implemented and regimes defended. The factor of status, such as projecting a favorable "image," may seem a matter of vanity on the part of some actors, but it is the stuff of power for others, perhaps those who are lacking other resources in the amounts they would like.

1.52 Because economics as a discipline presumes all exchanges are "freely" made, it allows for force only in the matter of enforcing contracts. But in fact, elements of coercion and violence are found in the relationships between more and less powerful persons in most societies, and between the state and various sectors, particularly poor ones, in many developing countries. To the extent that institutions of authority are not highly and widely legitimated, some employment of force is more likely to be found. Political actors certainly understand that this resource is a "factor of political production," whether employed by the state or by assertive sectors.

1.53 Pointing out these and other factors in this section does not establish their validity. What has in fact been introduced in this discussion is more of a model than a theory of politics. Its purpose is to provide a general framework for analysis of political operations and strategies. It was prompted initially by concern with the problems of developing countries and has particularly pointed up the difficulties faced in attempting poverty reducing policies. With this general introduction underscoring the salience for policy analysis of regime solvency, political stratification, political-economic feasibility and optimality, and the incidence of benefits and costs over time, we now turn in Section II to a more specific discussion of political considerations concerning poverty-oriented human development.
II. SOME PARTICULAR POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POVERTY-REDUCING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

2.01 Policies differ in their formulation and implementation not only because different objectives are involved, such as improving the balance of payments, increasing school enrollments, preserving indigenous culture, installing potable water supplies, modernizing lagging industries, conserving forest resources, or lowering population growth. Each policy involves a different set of persons and groups with a different incidence of costs and benefits. This fact means that the support bases for policies will differ, as will the points and kinds of resistance to them. Some specific consideration of poverty-reducing human development programs as they may vary from policy measure in general is therefore warranted. These programs represent a sub-set shaped by both the nature of their activity (health, education, nutrition) and by the intended beneficiary group. Both dimensions need to be considered, as portrayed in the following diagram, with human development concerns represented by cell A.

POLICY MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Publics</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Publics</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.02 Poverty-oriented human development programs represent only part of the larger set of human development activities in any country. They include both regular and special activities. The former are represented by primary education, which should be available to all but which the poor often do not avail themselves of, thereby occasioning special activities of a compensatory nature, as in the case of vocational education aimed at the kinds of employment opportunities the poor could take advantage of. Many, but not all, of the political considerations bearing on human development in general bear on this sub-set of activities. Similarly, most of the political considerations bearing on any programs serving special publics will affect this sub-set. In this Section, therefore, we will address particular problems relating to poverty-oriented human development programs by looking at them from two perspectives. The first involves what is particular about poverty-oriented programs, and the second assesses how human development may differ from other activities.
2.03 Under the first category of poverty-oriented programs, we would consider, in the educational area, primary and vocational education (as suggested above) and also nonformal education aimed at improving the productivity and well-being of poorer sectors. (Note: when productivity is referred to without any qualification, such as economic or political or social, it includes all of these aspects of human productivity). Qualitative changes in education which would increase accessibility for the poorer sectors, and the relevance of education provided within the system would also be included. These changes would include greater use of vernacular languages, changes in the school calendar to reduce absenteeism, revision of the curriculum, more suitable teaching methods and materials, and the like. In the health area, high priority would be given to development of the primary health care system, including the use of more health centers, health posts and para-professionals. (It is recognized that hospital facilities are needed to back these elements up.) Also ranking high would be investments to improve public sanitation, to curb diseases and parasites particularly afflicting the poor, and to introduce other preventive program such as maternal prenatal care. All nutritional programs which reach the poor would be included, though those tailored to remedy nutritional deficits would be most important. It is more controversial to consider which population programs, if any, should be included. Some of the considerations for including programs in this area on the grounds that they facilitate human development of the poor are taken up below, although the analysis would not be changed if they were not included.

2.04 We also recognize that there can be substantial differences among areas of human development, and also among poverty-oriented programs. Even within an area like education, health or nutrition there can be substantial differences in the political superstructure surrounding sub-area policies. This is because of the roles played by the different groups served or affected, sympathetic or hostile, activated or pacified. Even sub-sub-area policies can have quite different dynamics. Such differences are examined in Section III with regard to their political implications. In the present discussion we will consider political factors associated more generally with poverty-oriented efforts, appreciating that these generalizations need to be refined, as indeed they will be in the following section. First we will look at the aspects of such programs which, from a political point of view, present disadvantages, and, second, assess those which offer some advantages for improving the economic and social status of the special publics served.

A. Disadvantages

2.05 The politics of human development will be affected by the situation of those special publics whose advancement is the objective of such policies. As has been noted, the overall weakness of the poorer sectors in political as well as economic and social terms means that they are disadvantaged as participants in the political process. The process of initiating and maintaining programs for the poor thus presents predictable difficulties. With appropriate political initiatives, however, as described later in this section, these obstacles can often be overcome. Poverty-oriented programs are faced with the problem that the lack of human development among the poor is both cause and effect of their political weakness. While the lack of economic assets and lack of improved human capital both affect the poor and
are mutually reinforcing, when it comes to political activity and effectiveness, it is the latter deficiency which is probably more important.

2.06 Political effectiveness derives from one's total combination of resources and from one's skill in using them, particularly in concert with others. Status and information constitute important political assets, and these are closely linked with human development. Education, health and vitality are essential to the kinds of effectiveness enjoyed by the better-endowed sectors, quite apart from their wealth. Economic resources cannot automatically be converted to use as political resources to gain, influence or exercise authority. Skill and organization are mediating factors. When these are nurtured among the poorly-endowed they can make their resources and numbers more productive.

2.07 The importance of organization among the poorer sectors is suggested here and elsewhere in this paper. No inference should, however, be drawn from that discussion that no such organization presently exists, or that the fostering of such organization is easily accomplished. As will be discussed, some informal social organization often exists among the poor, and some of this may in turn be used to support their political interests. Such poorer groups may also be organized along residence, ethnic or other lines. We often find tribal or home residence groups playing a role in Africa; patron-client networks exist in many parts of the world; and there are peasant syndicates or venders' associations in a few countries. There is, therefore, a good deal of variation in the organizational responses of the poor to their circumstances. It should also be noted that efforts from outside the community to promote new organization have often had little impact.

2.08 The political weakness of the poor can be reduced through human development programs that enhance their productive and organizational skills, their social status and their command over information. Such programs, however, cannot overcome the liabilities occasioned, for example, by remote geographic location. Unfortunately, to obtain accelerated human development depends in part on securing the support of more politically active and effective constituencies. An initial difficulty encountered by poverty-oriented programs is therefore this political variant on the well-known "vicious circle of poverty" argument. This difficulty can be mitigated by political and/or economic efforts. External assistance may serve to compensate for the adverse resource position of the poor by providing economic and other resources to a regime which favors them in spite of their limited political capacities. Another way of dealing with this low-level equilibrium situation is to make investments in political and administrative infrastructure, amplifying on considerations raised in the previous section.

2.09 To the extent that a regime does not obtain as many political resources from the various sectors of the polity as it might, and is unable to use them efficiently in implementing policies, the general condition of political resource scarcity will lead it to shy away from risky and unprofitable programs such as some benefiting the poor. In circumstances where the political infrastructure does not involve the poorer sectors, they may not be able to express and wield their support for the regime even if they are
appreciative of what is done on their behalf. Where the administrative infrastructure does not reach the poor on a reliable basis, resources expended on poverty-oriented programs will not achieve their economic-technical objectives or produce political benefits.

2.10 Apart from efforts directed at beneficiary or clientele organization, as discussed below (2.14-2.17), it is important to strengthen the institutions of a government intending to assist the poor if such efforts are to be politically sustainable. Political party channels, effective interest groups, voting rights, accessible courts and a supportive bureaucracy will all help to encourage participation of the poor in the political system and to create within it more political weight to balance at least partially the influence of more privileged sectors. (We are mindful that about half of the developing countries have military governments, which usually provide less opportunity for participation in at least several of these ways; this is also likely to reduce the attention given to the poorer sectors in regime policy.) Investments in improvement of political and administrative infrastructure can make poverty-oriented programs more politically feasible. Extending such infrastructure and making it more efficient is no guarantee that the poor will be served, but its continued ineffectiveness ensures that serving them will be more costly and hence less likely.

2.11 Human development programs usually have relatively high recurrent economic costs, which can be a disadvantage. Initial capital investment for most programs is relatively low. They can be started up fairly cheaply and quickly, by building schoolrooms, clinics, food distribution centers or other simple facilities. The technologies of this process are well-known. The costs of training personnel can be substantial. No special expenditure needs to be made in this area, however, if the costs can be covered by the regular education program or by private (individual) investments in educational qualification. Once in place, programs nevertheless present a continuing and even mounting demand on government financing, though this demand can be lessened inasmuch as less costly methods of service provision are adopted. The role of the "barefoot doctor" in China is well-known, and is discussed in several of the following papers. This concept can be extended, as it has in the case of the village nutrition-scholar program in the Philippines. Recurrent cost growth can also be contained by some community contribution to recurrent costs, and the use of cost-saving organization like village cooperative pharmacies.

2.12 Because external donors have been mostly unwilling to provide resources for financing recurrent costs, the domestic cost of these programs is relatively high. This necessarily reduces their attractiveness to governments faced with resource scarcity of their own, since it becomes cheaper economically and politically to choose those development activities having a higher foreign component in their financing. On the other hand, such programs are generally popular government outputs, particularly in the cases of education at all levels and health care programs, and this popularity suggests considerable political benefit. This effect will be discussed below as an advantage of such programs, but it also presents a difficulty. This is that, once expanded, such programs are hard to cut back, especially because their support structure includes such service providers as teachers, school administrators,
doctors, nurses, midwives, pharmacists, and government staff. These in fact constitute a political sector themselves, one that is more influential as a rule than the poor they serve.

2.13 The fact that human development programs should deserve active political support from the middle class sectors providing the services, as well as from recipients, would seem to be in their favor, rather than to their disadvantage, as poverty-reducing measures. But one also finds that the political weakness of the poor means that appropriate education, health and other social services are difficult to channel in their direction. 20/ To the extent that providers become the major support for the maintenance of programs, the provision of services will be organized more for the convenience of the providers than for the satisfaction of the poor or even of the policy-makers who may have wanted to assist the development of the poor. When cuts in service are made for budgetary reasons, those that suffer most are usually those services which could reach the poorest of the poor. Levels of staffing and the quality of instruction are allowed to fall more in primary schools than secondary ones; medical supplies are found in the hospitals patronized by the middle and upper class, but not in clinics serving the urban and rural poor; coverage of nutrition programs is nominally contracted at the top, but in practice the effect is felt at the bottom. When cutbacks are made, they are likely to be greatest in those activities which have the smallest proportion of expenditure on provider salaries, and least where a great many (influential) service purveyors are involved. 21/ Educational programs, for example, prove resistant to proposals for reduction not so much because parents and pupils are effective at bringing pressure to bear, but because teachers represent one of the weightier political sectors in any country.

2.14 These considerations underscore the importance of the organization of beneficiaries or of clientele, a difficult undertaking and one posing various problems. On both political and administrative grounds, such organization is not only desirable but a necessary component of making human development programs for the benefit of special publics. If they are better organized, these sectors can provide greater reward to the regimes assisting them. Further, as the companion paper by Esman and Montgomery shows, their organizations can facilitate the implementation of poverty-reducing programs, thereby giving the special publics more reason to be supportive. But such efforts at organization may present political costs to a regime that may offset their benefits unless the regime places particular value on improving the productivity and well-being of the poor.

2.15 The extent to which clientele organization among the poor facilitates the administrative delivery of services is not in itself a controversial issue. But the value of such organization for the programs involved goes beyond matters of administrative efficiency. Such organizations are likely to make other demands on a government besides those concerning the maintenance or improvement of social services. To the extent that such organizations become genuinely independent, they may seek services or policies at a level above that which the government wishes to give them, or thinks that it can afford. Even if the government is receptive to these demands, other sectors may well be opposed to them, as meeting the demands will involve some redirection of resources from the more- to the less-advantaged.
Truly mobilized and energized organizations among special publics can represent a threat to the political and economic position of groups already more powerful and central in the political system. 22/

2.16 If the discontent and opposition generated by these other sectors can be contained, through persuasion or other policy payoffs, and if the government is disposed to work with such organization of the poor, rather than disadvantages, advantages may accrue from it. This has been exemplified in a slum improvement project in Calcutta. In this case it was found that once the government was prepared to involve the urban residents in the process of redesigning their communities through special committees, the rate of initial implementation was slowed down, by about one-third. The rate of maintenance of improvements once they were completed was much better, however, and it became possible for the governments to introduce taxation in the urban sector, something that had been politically impossible before. Resources for recurrent expenditures were thereby mobilized as a consequence of the more participatory approach.

2.17 The question of recurrent cost looms large with regard to human development programs, as we have noted, though it may be inflated by unnecessarily costly approaches. Also, the question is a relative one, since the amounts involved always need to be compared with other items. The cost of eliminating one vitamin deficiency in the population of an African state sounded large until it was shown to be less than the national airline lost each month. Whatever the amounts involved, the maintenance of education, health and other social programs oriented to the needs of poorer groups, rather than being shaped simply according to the wishes of provider groups, should be easier with some form of organization of beneficiaries. Accordingly, for the sake of having programs that are poverty-reducing, it may prove necessary to bear the political costs of organizing the clientele. 23/

B. Advantages

2.18 Despite the above political difficulties that may be encountered in pursuing poverty-oriented development programs, there are some general advantages involved that also deserve consideration. We have already explored some of the costs and requirements of these programs. In fact, the benefit structure of the programs appears to offer some incentives for regimes to undertake them on the grounds that they are more feasible than some other poverty-reducing measures. To emphasize this, however, is not to argue for human development programs in preference to such other poverty-reducing measures as the creation of employment or the broadening of access to land, since the programs in question can only constitute one element, albeit a major one, of an anti-poverty strategy. We are in fact only considering which aspects of the programs are favorable from a political viewpoint.

2.19 One distinction made in the political science literature which applies generally to these programs, including the poverty-oriented ones, is that compared with some other programs, they are more distributive than redistributive. 24/ To express the concept in game theory terms, the programs are more positive-sum than zero-sum, though this characterization needs to be qualified. To the extent it holds, there are a number of implications for the
attendant political dynamics of such programs. These have the effect of making them less likely to be resisted by entrenched political interests within the system.

2.20 With regard to short-run fiscal implications, these programs, like any other financed with domestic resources, involve some zero-sum competition for funds (this would be obviated by external funding). Although improving the health and education of the poor does not detract from the health and education of the rich or the middle classes, the resources spent on the former cannot be spent on programs that benefit the latter. Yet with regard to assets and income, human development programs are not redistributive, taking benefits away from some to give them to others, as would be the case with land reform or more progressive taxation. Since those who "have" are more powerful than those who "have not," two alternatives present themselves: either coercion must be expended to effect a transfer of resources, or some other benefits of similar value must be accorded to those giving up the resources in a zero-sum situation. These circumstances make such programs politically and economically costly.

2.21 In the cases of education, health, nutrition and family planning programs, the gains for beneficiaries are additive in the sense of not diminishing the knowledge, well-being and vitality of others at the same time. Indeed, as suggested below (2.23), the position for others may even be enhanced by some improvements accruing to program beneficiaries. Taking a longer time horizon, there may be some redistributive effects from education, since knowledge constitutes an asset. Over time, there can be competition from the previously less-well-endowed which reduces the advantages of some "haves" in cases where only few of the latter had previously acquired education. To the extent that expanded education and opportunities may lead to a different distribution of jobs that are highly compensated in terms of income, status and authority, there can be some zero-sum consequences. This will not be the case if the supply of such jobs increases proportionately with education -- an unlikely eventuality with regard to status and authority benefits, even if economic opportunities are proportionately increased. Improvements in health and nutrition per se are less likely to lead to conflict with the "haves" since these gains, unless coupled with educational advancement, make less difference with respect to eligibility for higher level employment. Some greater competition with middle class persons could result, but the latter are not likely to attribute this to improvements in the health and nutrition of the poor as such.

2.22 Where nutrition programs redistribute access to food without increasing national supply, there is a zero-sum situation. This is one reason why external food aid is politically so important for such nutrition programs. Within the health and education areas there are bound to be some conflicts over the distribution of services -- whether expenditures should be increased for hospital-based care or for rural and urban outreach clinics, for secondary and university education or for primary and vocational education. These questions can touch off conflict between poor and rich or middle class groups. Also, the location of services can prompt conflict among poor groups. These examples confirm that there are some zero-sum issues within the human development area. But the intensity of conflict should be somewhat less than where redistribution of assets is the leading means for countering poverty.
2.23 The fact that human development programs contain to a certain extent indirect benefits for the richer sectors is in their general favor. These benefits are described in economic analysis as externalities, in that the improvements introduced for the poor have advantages for the rich even if they are not part of the direct benefit structure of the programs. To the extent that richer sectors employ the poor, the economic productivity of the latter will be greater if they are better educated, less sick and better nourished. Some of the returns from this productivity should accrue to the labor force, and a larger share will accrue to the extent that workers are organized to make effective claims on increments to output. But at least some share will also benefit the employing class. How large this benefit will be depends on how the programs are financed. If the greater share of taxes is paid by the nonemploying middle class, the richer employing class will be a relative gainer; to the extent that the programs are financed with foreign resources, the benefit would be a windfall for the richer groups.

2.24 With regard to family planning programs, the most immediate benefits may be thought of as assisting the richer sectors. The larger size of poor families puts greater demands on public facilities (though, de facto, the poor may be excluded from those facilities which richer groups enjoy); if unemployment is increased, through demographic growth, this may contribute to higher crime rates, particularly as urban slums expand. In general, the quality of life may be diminished in terms of space, security and aesthetics. In fact, the quality of life may be declining most rapidly for the poor. Crime, for example, is more directed among the poor than against the rich. Public facilities used by the poor are likely to deteriorate more than those for the rich, though any deterioration experienced by the latter will be much noticed and resented.

2.25 It is ever more apparent that the poor continue to have larger families not out of ignorance, but out of necessity or choice, as hands are the only "capital" for those having little or no land and financial resources. Family planning programs are in the first instance not necessarily beneficial for the poor. But, as discussed in Section III (3.06), there are some reasons for believing that the poor, rather than just the rich, gain from diminished family size. Family planning programs should not therefore be seen simply as a "conspiracy" of the rich to gain by limiting the numbers of the poor. The fact that there is a projected benefit for the rich nevertheless makes such programs more viable politically.

2.26 A further consideration making human development more attractive is the double nature of their benefits. The latter part of the cost-benefit equation is generally weighted somewhat higher because human development benefits are doubly efficacious. As Morgan has argued, expenditures for education, health and nutrition can be regarded both as consumption producing present satisfactions and investment yielding future increases in productivity. Such duality may not be sufficiently accepted by economists to justify counting such expenditures twice in GNP accounts, as Morgan suggests. Politically, however, it means that sectors may derive more satisfaction from such expenditures than from other uses of public resources.

2.27 In part for this reason, the time distribution of benefits from human development programs appears different from many other kinds of development investment. Rather than having immediate costs and deferred benefits,
as suggested earlier by the shape of the political curves in Figure 2 of Section I, the political benefits appear more often to be "front-loaded," that is, accruing early. Whether or not political costs grow over time depends on several factors. Specifically, such growth depends on whether there are indeed mounting recurrent economic costs to be paid for through more taxation, and whether, as could be the case with education, the newly-educated begin competing for scarce jobs.

2.28 Figure 2 sketched out a situation where political costs and benefits were out of step with one another, while economic costs and benefits increased proportionally and gradually over time (the figure assumed the program was growing in size and had no lumpy capital costs at the outset). If we reverse the political cost and benefit curves shown in Figure 2 to approximate the situation described in 2.27 above, and if we treat the vertical scale measuring costs and benefits as commensurable for both economic and political factors, we arrive at combined political-economic cost and benefit curves as shown in Figure 3a below. In the hypothetical situation shown in Figure 3b, the combined net benefit increases rapidly in the initial years, but peaks as costs start accelerating (political costs mounting, while economic costs continue to grow at a steady rate). After a decade, net benefit would cease.

2.29 This illustration is not intended to show the time path of net benefits for human development programs generally, but rather to indicate the path in cases where benefits are front-loaded with deferred, but increasing, costs over time. Although one might conclude that initiating such a program would be prudent, regimes facing conditions of political resource scarcity in the short-run may well be attracted to it because of its quick accrual of short-run net benefits, politically more than economically. Governments may accept economic projects that generate subsequent deficits, and calculate they can fill the gap with future revenue from other projects or from borrowing.
Similarly, in political terms, a program may be undertaken on the assumption that some other policies or actions in the future may generate the political support or resources necessary to cover future political deficits. On balance, the time distribution of benefits from many programs will be attractive for generating quick, short-run balances of favorable opinion and cooperation from large sectors of the public. These may not be the most powerful sectors, as noted already, but for reasons also discussed, the short-run opposition of such sectors may be less than would be the case with other poverty-oriented efforts. If only the poorer sectors are benefiting from the programs, the shape of the curves might be more like Figure 2, with political benefits more deferred, and in the short-run certainly smaller.

2.30 The nature of benefits from human development programs often makes them somewhat advantageous politically. This does not mean they do not have corresponding costs. We have already discussed political and economic (especially recurrent) costs. But on this side of the equation, there are some qualitative aspects of benefit that should be noted. Inasmuch as the programs are supposed to improve the productivity and well-being of persons, there is a particular legitimacy about them. We have touched on the possibility that upgrading human development will benefit others, such as employers, in financial terms. But beyond this possibility there is a widely held belief that persons deserve to have their productive potential developed, and their misery reduced.

2.31 To the extent that a society espouses egalitarian ideals, even if ex post equality is nowhere found, efforts to provide a degree of ex ante equality, that of opportunity, are regarded as laudable. Persons who lack basic education and have poor health and nutrition are denied opportunities to put their natural talents to good use. This is a loss for society as a whole as well as for the individuals concerned. Even if the society is not particularly egalitarian, the logic of elementary justice supports expenditures on basic education, health and nutrition needs. 27/ To be sure, where groups within a society are antagonistic to one another, believing that the other is categorically inferior or undeserving, this logic will break down. 28/ It nevertheless remains untenable, by any established moral code, to be against helping persons to develop their inherent physical and intellectual potential, or simply to keep body and soul together.

2.32 Legitimacy can be understood as a political resource produced by members of the public and credited to a regime which they regard as being "right and proper" and/or acting accordingly. A policy which is deemed legitimate will to that extent demand compliance. This will be done voluntarily, on normative grounds, and would include paying the taxes to support the policy, registering regarding eligibility, providing information on surveys, and so on. The implementation of policies regarded generally as legitimate (none are universally and unreservedly so regarded) will be easier, entailing fewer costs to the government because it needs to expend few coercive or other resources on enforcement. The overall legitimacy of a regime will be enhanced if it carries out policies regarded as legitimate. Those so regarding the policies will then credit the government itself with claims on their compliance, because the government is acting in a "right and proper" way. Human development programs, therefore, can have certain positive
externalities for a regime in terms of "spill-over" legitimacy. This may be one reason why governments classified as "authoritarian" often go in for substantial expenditures on human development. Governments which are "socialist" are by their own terms of legitimation obliged to invest heavily in this area.

2.33 The benefits from these programs are themselves remarkably divisible, to use a term familiar to economists. There may be a certain amount of "lumpiness" in that one cannot open half a hospital or half a school in an area. But a small hospital may be called a clinic, and a school may have only one room. There is more flexibility of expenditure than with, say, a road or a power station. A mile of road does little good unless connected to a road system, and a hydroelectric facility requires a large investment in the dam, generators and distribution network to be operation. The political benefits from being able to distribute services incrementally across a large area are therefore very attractive. Indeed, it has been argued that politicians as a rule will favor programs which have more divisible benefits over those which do not. 29/

2.34 Additional schooling, health care or nutritional improvement is appreciated by virtually all segments of any population. Yet it can be increased practically at will, as it involves very simple construction and well-known technologies. Expansion is a matter of increasing budget allocations and staff. There are, to be sure, problems of logistics and administration to be reckoned with, but these would probably be less serious than in the case of a road or a power facility, as least once they were constructed. It may appear that the benefit produced by a road or power facility is more predictable, since social services may fail to be provided or to be effective. This may be especially so in the case of those aimed at the poorer sectors. But the flexibility of distribution of such services means that facilities can be spread very far. Since human development programs are of course capable of being appreciated anywhere that people live, they are geographically more generalizable than many other development programs. Agricultural programs and even most physical infrastructure are more constrained by natural resource endowments or topography.

2.35 A further characteristic of human development programs as a set is their complementarity, that is, their reinforcement of one another. They are not (as will be discussed in the next section) substitutes for one another, but improvements in one category make for greater payoff from improvements in another. Education contributes to better health, as does nutrition. Better health in school children improves learning, as does better nutrition, and reduction in disease makes for greater net nutritional value from what is consumed. The forward and backward linkages from population reduction are also well established. Unfortunately, the benefits from such linkages are not always immediate, and the population linkages just mentioned are fairly long-term. Politically, the complementarity is nevertheless something which can be stressed. Indeed, governments usually speak of what they are doing in the area of education and health under the heading of "social services," implying they are something of a "package." Family planning services are often joined with health programs, particularly efforts in the area of maternal and child health (and gain more legitimacy as a result). 30/ Where explicit nutrition activities are being undertaken, they, too, are often grouped in this package when governments tell the public what is being provided for them.
2.36 Further externalities from this cluster of programs affect the operation of political and administrative infrastructure. A better educated (as well as a healthier and more vigorous) public is better equipped and often better motivated to be involved in the kind of interactions with the government and the political system generally occurring through party activity, elections, political communication, visiting or responding to officials, etc. There may even be some political content involved in education programs, ranging from general citizen training to overt partisan indoctrination. A government thus has some diffuse interest in human development programs for their synergistic effects which may contribute, albeit indirectly, to the solvency of the regime.

2.37 As noted at the outset, we should not regard human development programs as a homogeneous set of activities, though there are some reasonably common features they generally share. These considerations bear on the general efficacy and political viability of a human development strategy within the broader field of anti-poverty efforts. Beyond this overview, however, we need to consider the implications of differences between and within these policy areas. This is the subject examined in the next section.
III. POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AMONG HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

3.01 The discussion thus far has treated human development programs essentially as a common set of initiatives for assisting the poor, making only passing reference to differences among them. Political analysis should give at least some explicit attention to these differences. This is because when a strategy to promote the reduction of poverty is considered under various political conditions, some programs may be more tenable than others. One cannot say that health, education, nutrition and population programs are substitutes for one another, because on technical or welfare grounds, as well as on political ones, they have different characteristics. We have just noted that these programs have considerable complementarity, so that nutrition programs reinforce health activities, and education reinforces nutrition efforts. Some of the analysis of improvements in meeting various basic needs suggests that some sequences of the human development effort may be more productive over time than others. For example, primary education may have a higher payoff for other related benefits than vice versa. But to the extent that these programs, in their respective ways, each help people to become more productive and active, there can be some tradeoffs and different emphases, taking advantage of what may be greater receptivity to some activities than to others.

3.02 In particular, one finds there are considerable differences within the respective program areas. The demand for curative health programs, for example, is generally greater than that for preventive programs, and some means of reducing population growth are more culturally acceptable than others. In this section, we begin with some general comparisons in political terms among the areas of health, education, nutrition and population programming, with special concern for poverty-reducing approaches, taking note of differences among sub-sectors where these are particularly relevant. In the latter part of the section, we will consider more specifically some differences in the characteristics of programs within the various areas, to refine the political analysis outlined previously. In the appendix to this paper there is a listing in outline form of programs within each of the four major functional areas. This listing makes more concrete the activities referred to in subsequent discussion. It also makes clear that there is considerable diversity within each area. Under the sub-headings "contributing programs," the listing indicates the extent to which the sectors are mutually reinforcing, as stated in 2.35.

A. Comparisons Among Areas

3.03 Some differences may be discussed in terms of the distribution or redistribution of benefits. We have noted (2.19-2.22) that human development programs generally are less redistributive than many others, and thus may be less susceptible to political resistance by those who are already well-endowed. Some further distinctions are, however, possible.

3.04 Education does not take knowledge or information away from others, in the way that land reform reallocates land, or tax reform redistributes income. It does, however, depreciate the power and advantage of others where these derive from relative monopoly over education. In particular, it
creates more competition for jobs and offices from which other benefits flow. Education is not redistributive in itself, yet it may often be indirectly redistributive over a longer time period. This observation, however, applies more to secondary and higher education than to primary or nonformal education. Insofar as a strategy for human development of the poor embraces particularly the latter forms, the aspects of competition with upper class interests do not arise so sharply. There may be competition fostered between and among poorer groups with regard to primary as well as other forms of education especially if there are salient ethnic or regional differences among the poorer population. Primary education remains the key to social and economic upward mobility, and expansion of educational opportunity at the lower levels, as in African countries like Nigeria, can produce political conflict. 33/

3.05 Health and nutrition programs fit more readily into the nonconflictual category. This is because improved health and nutritional status for poorer groups does not subtract from the position of better-endowed groups, except in that enhanced vitality may assist the poor to be more competitive. This is a rather indirect influence and is more than offset by the benefit richer groups derive from a more energetic and productive workforce (2.23).

3.06 It is not clear whether it is the richer sectors or the poorer ones who benefit more from population programs aimed at reducing family size, particularly among the poor, who as a rule have larger families. There are some apparent benefits for the rich (2.24–2.25), and they do not seem to be directly disadvantaged by such progress. There is some debate in the literature as to whether additional children in poor families constitute a net economic benefit. 34/ Consideration of any net social benefit would add to the incentive to have more children. In fact, an analysis which takes a more macro perspective, looking not just at family benefits but at benefits and costs over time to the lower class as a whole, seems to suggest that it is in the collective interest of poorer families to have fewer children, even though individual families might benefit from having more. 35/ This is an example of a favorite paradox of economists, the fallacy of composition. The political implication is that population programs in at least some situations may encounter resistance from poorer sectors and their ideological allies. 36/ Yet to the extent that such groups can be persuaded of the validity of the macro perspective just stated, the outcome should be that both richer and poorer groups could support population programs based on their respective short-run and long-run interests in slowing the rate of population growth.

3.07 To the extent that population policy questions get entangled in regional or ethnic competition, it should be added, they become almost insoluble through political means. If political representation in parliaments, and the allocation of central funds, are made according to size of a region or a group this will of course place a premium on the possession of a larger population. Measures to curb population growth will thus be interpreted within the context of such a course as being in their interest. This circumstance raises the fallacy of composition dilemma mentioned in the preceding paragraph to a higher level of aggregation than the family unit. There is no ready political solution that would facilitate putting together what ethnic or regional politics have put asunder. Such politics are fueled, we observe, by uneven human development, and this may aggravate political divisions
associated with population programs. A program of broad educational, health and nutritional opportunities may well blunt some of the ethnic competition and grievances which the scarcity of such opportunities would hitherto have exacerbated. 37/

3.08 We have considered earlier (1.42-1.50) the implications of **time paths** for program costs and benefits. Some general differences among human development areas are worth noting in this connection for their political implications, though differences **within** the functional areas are ultimately more decisive, as it is specific programs that are, or are not, promoted, rather than areas as such. We also need to distinguish between political and economic costs and benefits for a regime, recognizing that the latter (economic) can, depending on their amount and distribution, translate into the former (political). The following summary characterization is gross, and could be refined for specific programs. It sketches the kinds of differences in time paths that a regime may experience in the several human development areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Can be</td>
<td>Deferred</td>
<td>Deferred</td>
<td>Can be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Can be</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Can be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>Can be</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Can be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning</td>
<td>Can be</td>
<td>Deferred</td>
<td>Can be</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relatively and less</td>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Tangible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.09 Both educational and health programs have early economic costs. These are, however, offset from the outset by large political benefits because, as will be discussed below, there is great demand for such service, if they are properly provided. A difference in time paths emerges in that educational investments have deferred, but possibly substantial, economic benefits and political costs. The benefits accrue to both individuals and the government; costs are borne by certain individuals who lose advantages when others become more educated, and by a government that bears the ensuing resentment and also that stemming from any lack of employment for those who have received education. Health programs as a rule have negligible political costs of this sort, but the economic benefits are less tangible, whether they accrue to individuals or to the society as a whole. This is not to hold that they are not real, for the very demand for health services reflects their reality. But it is harder for the government to take credit for its investment in health by pointing to the resultant improved economic status of the public, compared, for example, to education, when this leads to employment, and to greater income and status.
3.10 The economic costs of nutritional and family planning programs are more variable as a rule, but unlikely to be as great as in the case with serious educational or health programs. Both offer deferred and less tangible economic benefits. Where they differ is on the political side of the equation. The political costs of nutritional programs are generally minor, because of the legitimacy attached to them. For this same reason the political benefits are likely to be substantial, to the extent that the program is perceived as working. Benefits would accrue most from nutritional programs that are quite visible, as in the case of food distribution, and not from such "invisible" programs as the supplementation of basic foods by vitamins or minerals, as discussed below. If the granting of subsidies to staple food prices comes to be taken for granted, then there are corresponding political costs, for example, riots, if the subsidy is reduced. Not much credit accrues for maintaining such a program, however, after it is introduced. But this discussion leads us into the kind of differentiation undertaken later in this section, and need not be explored further here. Family planning programs are the most likely to involve political costs, particularly at the outset. This depends on the means of birth control being introduced and on the religious, ethnic and other circumstances surrounding the program. At the same time, the political benefits to be expected are probably the least of all four functional areas under discussion. Such programs offer the least politically and possibly cost the most. Any political benefits, like economic ones, are likely to accrue only over time.

3.11 Relating to these themes, and tying together the economic and political factors, is a consideration of the relative supply of and demand for the different functional areas. The degree of political benefit is greater in the cases of those programs where services are being supplied to meet already existing demand. Where demand is less than supply, the political benefits will be less, though some will accrue from any specific sectors of the public that desire that service. Educational, health and nutritional programs are in general the ones for which the demand is great, particularly among the poorer sectors. The composition of demand will vary from one program to another; for example, staff for health posts are likely to be more in demand than are community health nurses who make home visits to identify undesirable health and nutrition practices. It has been common practice to tie such programs (the more demanded and the less demanded services) together for a greater total effect, thus keeping overall demand positive.

3.12 In general we find that family planning programs are characterized by more supply than demand. In part for this reason, they have been tied together with other services for which there is greater demand, as in the case of maternal and child health care. It is possible that demand for family planning may exist among some persons but remain unexpressed because of social disapproval. In such circumstances, the political benefits to a government will be kept low because there is no opportunity to mobilize public opinion on behalf of the program. 38/

3.13 A similar distinction can be made with regard to the legitimacy attributed to different kinds of programs. Educational, health and nutritional programs will generally be seen as legitimate governmental undertakings, while population programs may well be questioned. In practice, when programs
in the first three areas come into conflict with the interests of such private providers as temple school priests, ayurvedic practitioners, or food venders, these sectors may challenge the rightfulness of the programs. These three areas have traditionally been privately provided, but in the 20th century they have been increasingly taken over by the state as "modern" duties of government.

3.14 Providing education on an individual basis is quite inefficient, so the economies of scale in instruction provide a basis for public provision. To be sure, privately-organized or religious education can each claim a certain legitimacy. But the right of persons to acquire at least a basic education, taking them over the literacy threshold, if necessary at public expense, is one now generally endorsed by all governments and publics. There is little basis for objection in principle to inclusion of the poor in educational programs. Health services have been traditionally provided through the various roles of healer, "native" doctor, midwife, and so on. It has been the introduction of "modern," that is, Western medical care that has stimulated the supply of and the demand for government-provided health services. A right to be healthy may be more widely understood than a right to be educated, so the resultant services are practically universally regarded as legitimate.

3.15 Perhaps nutrition possesses the clearest mandate of legitimacy, since the responsibility for dealing with at least the extreme cases of hunger has been one of the oldest functions of government. Famine relief was a responsibility of chieftaincies even before state systems existed, and properly organized governments kept a store of grain for meeting such emergencies. The right to food if one is hungry is widely recognized. It should be noted that some forms of nutrition support may not be so widely accepted, for example if it introduces competition with merchants, or undercuts the hold which the rich can have on indebted, hungry poor people. Yet such "selfish" motives can hardly raise any "legitimate" objection to aiding the hungry. In general, educational, health and nutritional programs which help develop the capacities of the poor will be valued by them and may be viewed, perhaps cynically, by the richer sectors as serving to keep the poor "in working order." The parties involved may act from possibly divergent motivations, but the actual provision of such benefits should not cause conflict over the legitimacy of providing them.

3.16 The same cannot be said of most family planning programs. Decisions about reproduction are generally regarded as being some of the most "private" of decisions. There may also be strong religious endorsement of procreation, or at least of noninterference in this respect. We find, however, that there may be some differences in the legitimacy accorded to different means of controlling births, such as those between contraception and abortion. These differences highlight the importance of making distinctions among programs within any human development area. The analysis in this chapter so far has focused mostly on inter-area comparisons of political implications. At this point it will be more useful to consider some specific aspects of human development programs, building on the concepts and relationships delineated thus far.
B. Comparisons Within Areas

3.17 A number of specific characteristics of programs affect their political feasibility or desirability and warrant consideration. For this discussion we need to look within the individual human development areas and to assess specific educational or health activities. The distinctions being made apply to the political analysis of policies in general, but can be shown definitely to have clear relevance for human development programs, specifically those which are poverty-oriented. Many characteristics could be delineated, but some of the more salient ones will now be discussed.

3.18 We have just discussed some inter-program differences in terms of the balance of supply and demand, such as that between preventive and curative health care, and also the extent of the legitimacy accorded to programs, as in the case of different means of family planning. It will be clear that the analysis of differences does not so far lend itself to quantitative measurements that can be summed into absolute comparisons among programs. On the contrary, we are in a position of having to make some comparative judgments, with some rank-ordering possible, in order to sort out the advantages and disadvantages of different activities. The reality of these factors should not be discounted because of the difficulties encountered in measuring them. Program successes, particularly in human development, depend on cooperation gained from various sectors of the public. This is expressed in political terms by support for the programs and for the regime sponsoring them, and in practical terms by compliance with the elements of the programs. The problems of analysis are more severe to the extent that "people programs" are involved.

3.19 The degree of public cooperation required for specific programs itself constitutes a major difference among programs. Where some voluntary act is needed for the program to operate, more governmental resources are usually required to carry out the program than in instances where compliance can be less deliberate. A program to improve nutrition through the fortification of staple foods is an example of the latter situation. In this case all the people have to do is to eat what they normally eat. Compare this program with the political and economic resources that may be required to conduct a campaign in nutritional education that will get persons to change their dietary habits with equivalent nutritional effect.

3.20 To take a somewhat different example, a program aimed at getting people to boil water before drinking it would be less costly of economic resources, at least in capital expenditure, than would be a program aimed at improving the quality of water through a piped water supply. The political costs of the latter would of course be negligible and the benefits considerable. An attempt to persuade persons to boil water should not be politically costly, though it would be unpopular if fuel is expensive and remote. An attempt to enforce such actions, on the other hand, could indeed become a political problem.

3.21 If some force must be used to enforce a program, even more powerful and potentially costly political resources are involved. The most dramatic example in recent years is provided by the forced sterilization campaign in India during the emergency. This means of population control need not be
forced, though to achieve a faster reduction in population growth, such means could be adopted formally or implicitly. Any compulsory program will be more costly politically than a voluntary one, though the cost depends on who would not otherwise comply, that is, on whether a strong or a weak group is affected in political resource terms.

3.22 At the opposite extreme, where no deliberate action on the part of beneficiaries is required, the program becomes practically invisible and could therefore have few political benefits to the government. The improvements in nutritional status from having salt iodized or sugar reinforced with Vitamin A may not be understood, or at least not associated with government action. The same may be true of the health improvements from piped water, though the convenience of such supply almost certainly is appreciated and redounds to a government's credit.

3.23 Visibility is itself an important political feature of programs because it provides particular opportunities for political figures to take credit for the facility or service involved. This is an important reason why governments tend to expend resources more freely on the capital aspects of programs, and subsequently become supportive of the recurrent costs. A politician can obtain public attention and displays of appreciation when opening a clinic or school, but the ensuing day-to-day operation gains few plaudits. This feature applies not only to physical facilities. Direct subsidization of staple foods is not seen, and therefore less appreciated, than something like distribution through food stamps. What is noticed is when a subsidy is reduced and prices rise, a condition of negative visibility. With regard to education, all forms are visible as activities though one can hardly see what is learned. The sight of hundreds of children trooping off to school in the morning or returning home in the afternoon is something "recurrent" which may engender political appreciation, the more so if the education pays off visibly later on in terms of employment and income.

3.24 How the benefits of any program are distributed -- the likelihood that they will reach the intended beneficiaries or be diverted to others -- depends in part on the nature of the goods and services being provided. A number of distinctions can be made which apply to human development programs in terms of their targetability and divertibility, as well as in terms of the amount and kind of demand generated for them. We have already noted that there is some political logic to relaxing the economic efficiency criterion so that some spillover of benefits to nontargeted groups can facilitate the maintenance of a base of support for a program (1.37-1.38). This is especially important when the poor are the prime intended beneficiaries because of their political weakness as a group.

3.25 The characteristic of divisibility in a program's benefits offers the advantage of making the service more targetable, though, as just noted, targetability is an ambiguous criterion in political terms. We presume that poverty-reducing programs should seek to channel benefits to the most needy. To the extent a program's services are divisible, and are not "public goods" as discussed below, they can be directed more readily to the poor rather than to others.
3.26 It is unfortunate that targetability and divertibility (or expropriability) are often directly related, especially with regard to divisibility of benefits. What can be directed to individuals can also be taken by others unless there is a high degree of control. Poverty-reducing programs may be somewhat susceptible to offering a spread of benefits, but here, in particular, these should not go to enhance further the position of the better endowed.

3.27 Even if, in political terms, it may be reasonable to have some spread of benefits, one might well want to have some control over who the nonpoor beneficiaries of the program are. Nondivisibility as exemplified by general food subsidies thus is not a particularly good political characteristic. Divisibility without controllability, on the other hand, as exemplified by food distribution where the administrative structure is not highly disciplined, and will divert foodstuffs to itself.

3.28 The characteristic of tangibility, usually associated with the material nature of benefits, affects the amount and kind of demand arising from them. Demand in turn affects the efficacy of a program, but also how divertible it is. Diversion in turn affects the legitimacy accorded to the program, and possibly also to the regime. So this feature, too, has some ambiguous implications. There are two aspects of tangibility, referring to the program's output and/or the program's results. Tangible inputs like vaccinations may have benefits only dimly perceived, since people may not appreciate the avoidance of a disease they did not get. The information imparted through education, on the other hand, is certainly nonmaterial, yet it can have distinctly material subsequent benefits. Tangibility of benefits is therefore a combination of output and outcome characteristics, the greatest demand occurring if both are quite tangible.

3.29 Because tangible and material benefits are usually more sought-after than intangible, perhaps symbolic ones, those programs with the first characteristics are likely to create more demand for their output. This can mean the generation of more political support by the programs if demands are met (though it can also mean disillusionment and loss of support if expectations are unsatisfied.) As a rule, benefits which are more tangible and material, as well as more divisible, are more liable to expropriation by unintended beneficiaries, or at least to diversion of program benefits from the legitimate recipients. (An exception would be for the kind of goods discussed below.)

3.30 On balance, tangibility, despite the political risks just mentioned, is advantageous to a government. Quantitative increases are generally more tangible than qualitative improvements. Direct programs in the education sector, and particularly on expansion of programs, would thus be more politically useful than the supporting programs, or improvements and modifications of existing systems, outlined in the appendix (items I.A and I.B). This bias is unfortunate, particularly since it is likely to be more costly in economic terms, but the political benefits are definitely less than in the case of qualitative changes.

3.31 Analysts of public policy make a number of distinctions among the kinds of goods to be provided. One of the most salient concerns public goods, those which can really be produced only for the whole public and not
for specific individuals within it. This characteristic may stem from technical or economic considerations. It may be the case that for any to benefit, all must. An example would be the control of a communicable disease which must be eliminated throughout the entire population for anyone to be safe from it. More often, it is a matter of it being too difficult or too costly to exclude some persons from benefiting, so all will benefit if the good is provided at all. An example would be a road to a remote community which lowers the prices of goods in the market.

3.32 The fact that human development programs are provided by the public sector does not make them ipso facto public goods in this sense. The benefits from many health, educational or nutritional programs are divisible and can benefit just those individuals partaking of them. School or clinic fees can be charged to try to recover costs of operating. Only those persons who subscribed some initial capital might be served. For some of the reasons already discussed in terms of legitimacy, however, the political costs of excluding certain persons from educational or health services may be such as to make these public goods de facto. There are also some programs whose services truly qualify as public goods, for example malaria eradication campaigns, the use of radio for adult education, or the subsidization of prices for basic foodstuffs.

3.33 From our present viewpoint, public goods pose the opposite problem to that of divisibility (and of tangibility). While public goods cannot be diverted, neither can they be targeted so well, except with the qualification discussed in the next paragraph. If public facilities and services are provided, they are generally set up for all citizens to enjoy. As often happens, even where all citizens are eligible, if there is any scarcity of services, they are taken first by the relatively better endowed, even among the poor, who are more knowledgable and more aggressive concerning opportunities. There can thus be de facto expropriation even if public goods by their nature should be distributed to all.

3.34 Some goods may be further characterized in terms of the nature of the demand for them. Some have a fixed and limited demand which makes them less liable to diversion, as exemplified by polio immunizations, or primary schooling. No individual needs or wants more than one of such items since they are not transferable or capable of being accumulated. These examples are different from what economists call "inferior goods," goods for which demand declines absolutely as well as relatively as one's income rises, though the principle and effect are somewhat the same. The goods mentioned here are definitely not "inferior" in any intrinsic sense. They are very valuable if one does not have them already.

3.35 Such goods do not need to be very carefully "targeted" because the structure of demand for them makes them less likely to be expropriated. Elites will not stock up on primary education or health post visits, as they would with credit or fertilizer. One school certificate and one medical examination will suffice. Moreover, these goods usually require some investment of one's own time, which is something of a deterrent to their acquisition by richer people. Where medicines are given out free by clinics, or free lunches are provided to schoolchildren, there may be some accumulation of these goods, but the requirement of time expenditure puts a limit on such diversion.
3.36 If we look at a number of possible nutritional interventions, for example, we can see how different they can be from one another with regard to such policy criteria as targetability or nondiverstibility. Other considerations, as discussed above, can also be listed: the extent of public cooperation required, the certainty with which the nutritional benefits would occur, the targetability of program benefits to recipients (considering only the tangibility of outputs for improved consumption; the outcome of improved nutrition is delayed for these programs, and apparently intervening factors reduce the tangibility attributed by recipients to the programs’ benefits), and the demand for the program’s benefits relative to supply. We can consider in the following matrix two pairs of nutritional interventions, one set aiming at an increased quantity of consumption, through food ration shops or generally subsidized food prices, and the other set seeking a better quality of diet, through nutritional education or by the fortification of staple foodstuffs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Ration Shops</th>
<th>Subsidized Prices</th>
<th>Nutritional Education</th>
<th>Fortification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targetability of benefits</td>
<td>High, if properly administered</td>
<td>Low, since any can benefit so designed</td>
<td>High, if low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondiverstibility of benefits</td>
<td>Low unless very strict controls</td>
<td>Any can benefit may be concentrated in urban areas</td>
<td>Not relevant, all can benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public cooperation -- Amount required</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives for this</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>None needed</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty of benefits</td>
<td>High if not diverted</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangibility of benefits</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High, but may not be appreciated</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demands for benefits</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High, for maintaining subsidies</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Ration Shops</td>
<td>Subsidized Prices</td>
<td>Nutritional Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic costs</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic or technical benefit</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of recipients</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate benefit</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political benefit</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Depends on visibility of subsidy</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political costs</td>
<td>Some, from those not eligible; from illegitimacy of diversion</td>
<td>Opportunity; expenditure on subsidy; voluntary also of withdrawal</td>
<td>Nil, so long as cost of expenditure compliance voluntary repayment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.38 The political logic behind the low priority generally attached to nutritional education and fortification programs becomes quite clear from the above analysis, even though they have some desirable characteristics in the assessment laid out in the preceding paragraph (3.36). The various characteristics of food ration shops and subsidized prices listed in that paragraph directly leads to the economic and political costs and benefits just described (3.37). Nutritional education and fortification programs have modest net economic benefits. Their main advantage is their lower economic cost. But, given the uncertainty of cooperation needed to make nutritional education successful and the narrow spectrum of those needing vitamin or mineral supplements from food fortification, they do not make a major contribution to nutritional improvement (quantity being a more pervasive problem than quality of food consumption). In contrast, rations or subsidies hold out the prospect of large or broad benefits to offset the cost.

3.39 In political terms, because the benefits of nutritional education and fortification are few, intangible or uncertain, there is little that they offer to attract the support of a regime. It is possible that technical calculations of benefit: cost returns might make fortification agreeable, and the lure of hiring health education staff might appeal to a regime. But these are small programs in political terms compared to the other two listed. Those programs offer high or very high political benefits in terms of support because their outputs are broadly distributed, quite tangible, and with predictable payoffs in terms of improvement in consumption. Comparing food distribution with food subsidies, the former seems to have some advantages on both economic and political grounds. The amount of economic cost depends on
the precise formulation of the respective programs, but the economic/technical benefit of subsidies is discounted because they are not targeted, and the cost includes a large number of persons not needing the cheaper of extra food. Both programs have some opportunity cost in terms of how the money could be otherwise spent to political advantage, and both can cause political problems if withdrawn, but the subsidies seem to weigh more on this side of the equation. For various reasons already discussed, the relative political benefit discounted by probable or possible political cost seems to favor food distribution.

3.40 Similar kinds of analysis could be undertaken comparing levels and kinds of education (primary, secondary, vocational, nonformal) or health programs (preventive and curative measures) or different means of reducing population growth. Since there has been little support of such program-related political analysis, there is hardly any systematic data base to draw on, only observations and inferences from program experience. 40/ The analysis so far has focused on the characteristics of human development programs themselves, looking at similarities and differences and drawing some conclusions about their political significance for any political system, ceteris paribus. Of course there are similarities and differences among political systems which have a bearing on which poverty-oriented programs are likely to prove more acceptable and successful. This analysis represents the other side of the coin, and we turn our attention to it in the following section.
IV. DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

4.01 The usual approach to analyzing the political dimensions of development policy has been to delineate various types of regimes. These are characterized in terms of prevailing ideology of the structure of governance. Most comparative analysis has focused on what are seen to be differences among conservative, reformist or radical-revolutionary regimes, or between single-party and multi-party systems, or between parliamentary and presidential democracies, or between civilian and military governments, and so on. From a policy perspective, this has nevertheless proved a rather unfruitful enterprise. This is because patterns of expenditure and programs affecting the poor tend to operate somewhat independently of what kind of decisionmakers hold national power.

4.02 This is not to maintain that there are no differences resulting from the ideology of decisionmakers. But the exceptions are numerous enough to suggest that we cannot necessarily expect "progressive" regimes to do more for the poor's development than will conservative ones. The latter, for their own political reasons, may need to devote resources to human development. Regimes in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, for example, have done more by way of provision of educational, health and nutritional services for the lower sectors than many other regimes more ideologically committed to the advancement of the poor. The correlation between ideology and human development performance is not in itself determinant enough to warrant making that our approach to dealing with differences in political systems.

4.03 Differences in the structure of governments have also proved to be rather inconclusive when explanations are sought for development strategies and patterns of expenditure. The most extensive analysis comparing military and nonmilitary regimes, for example, found no universal differences between the two sets. One can deal with sets of regimes that have some similar characteristics in orientation or policy, labelling them as "progressive" or "conservative," and some instructive differences can be described in this way. But this does not explain policy outputs, except tautologically. Certain structural situations may affect the willingness of a regime to support poverty-oriented programs, depending on which sectors constitute the greatest threat to incumbents' authority, or how much competition there is over policy which might give incentives to building up the poorer sectors and cutting back the advantages of the rich. One is nevertheless not likely to learn enough simply from the type of regime to determine which programs will on will not be received hospitably.

4.04 The more interesting and abiding problem is to account for the gap between policy pronouncement and performance, between what regimes say they want to do and what actually results. There are many factors impinging on program outputs and their distribution. Many are more properly considered as "administrative" rather than "political." But the fact remains that the disparity between policy and programs is not accountable for so much in terms of ideology or of the kind of regime as it is in terms of the dynamics of policy formation and implementation, reflecting in particular the configuration of interest groups involved.
4.05 These dynamics are well described in a discussion of policy implementation in Honduras as well as other Latin American countries. The discussion, by Ugalde and Emrey, accounts for what has come to be known as the "urban bias" in policies:

Political factors explain much of the reason for Honduran sanitation investment being concentrated in the cities. The national policy statements would require an opposite allocation of resources. Sanitation projects located according to the policy would have produced water supply restrictions in the cities where the most powerful organized groups reside and where political mobilization or protests is easier and more visible. No government, much less a military government, is willing to take this risk. The first needs to be satisfied are those with political power. Who should be concerned if peasants have to walk half an hour for water and who will think that this is acceptable in the cities? Programming is based on a realistic appraisal of the power held by different population groups.

4.06 An "ideology" which the authors do find affecting health and related programming decisions is that of the professionals and administrators in that sector which is fairly standard across regime types. Particularly interesting is their observation that a military government may be less willing to risk public protests than a civilian one. This refers back to the more dubious legitimacy of such regimes, and the greater political costs therefore of using force. The relevant variable is not so much being a "military" regime as having limited or uncertain legitimacy.

4.07 As suggested in Section I, the solvency of a regime is one of the most important variables shaping policy choices. Certain kinds of policies are, or are not, attractive depending on the margin of political resources available for the government to dispose of. Highly solvent regimes can afford to act in a more "technocratic" manner, assessing policies in terms of how quickly or efficiently these will achieve their manifest objectives. Such regimes do not have resources from specific sectors. Conversely, low solvency regimes have to make choices in a much more "political" way.

4.08 The margin of resources that a regime can reckon on in governing depends in part on the condition and extent of its political and administrative infrastructure, in part on how ambitious are its plans for the polity, and in part on the demands being placed upon it. Clearly, a regime that wishes to change the status quo is going to require more political resources than one which is satisfied with maintaining it. (Similarly, a regime which does not care to remain in authority needs fewer resources in the short run than one which does not, and in the long run needs no resources.) Ideology of a regime does come into the picture in these terms, as some ideologies enjoin more dramatic and rapid social change than others, and some would prompt incumbents to give up office if unable to attain the kind of society they prefer. To be sure, without sufficient political resources to accomplish desired change or to preserve a valued situation, ideology can be an empty shell.
4.09 Whether or not the poorer sectors benefit from development policies is also a factor that can be somewhat independent of the main objectives of a government. In the case of South Korea, we have had improvement in human development status for large segments of the population as a concomitant of the economic strategy which has stressed labor-intensive, export-promoting industrialization. This has drawn people out of the rural areas and into cities where access to education and other services is somewhat better. The income and health effects have contributed to a higher level of human development, not so much because the government places a priority on this occurrence, but because it was incidental to achieving other goals. In this respect, ideology and political will have been less determinant than the package of development policies chosen.

4.10 The demands placed on a regime can increase markedly, thereby changing it from high solvency to low solvency (or insolvency), so a typology based on solvency conditions is vulnerable to "subversion." A trade union strike that escalates from wage demands to demands against the state, or a military faction demanding for itself the regime's authority in a coup d'etat, for example, can drastically alter the political situation if the regime's policies and infrastructure cannot summon up sufficient counter resources to satisfy or suppress the demands. As solvency is a consequence of the level of demands as well as of what the regime itself would like to do, no rigid typology is reasonable in this regard.

4.11 One broad typology which has some merit for our purposes is that sketched by Cleaves in dealing with politics and implementation in Third World countries. He contrasts "open," "closed" and "intermediate" political systems, according to "the amount of power vested in the government and the structural arrangements linking the bureaucratic apparatus to groups, classes and individuals in the society at large." More specifically:

Open political systems are characterized by a large number of relatively autonomous interest associations, political organizations, and governmental agencies. These diverse actors generally have competing ideas about what the government should do in response to public problems and the scope and direction of change to be sought in the society. In such a context, classes and groups that join alliances or maneuver skillfully can tilt the content of policy in their favor or undermine policies that are contrary to their interests.

When the state apparatus itself monopolizes economic and social power in the society and retains full discretion over policy initiatives, the system can be labelled closed. The policies generally respond to the institutional interests of the group that dominates the government machinery. Commonly in such systems, national elites conclude that their goals for the society, such as economic development or national security, are prejudiced by the social and economic patterns characterizing marginal populations.
The situation is somewhat different in intermediate systems, where power is less centrally concentrated. Policy content corresponds partially to the interests of national elites and of popular sectors who, theoretically, are harmoniously integrated into the state via nationalism. Classes and privileged groups in the "modern" sector of these countries typically behave in ways that are similar to those in open societies. They generate demands, form coalitions,... The existence of large unmobilized populations, however, distorts many aspects of "normal" political life, including public policy. Although traditional groups do not generate policy alternatives or determine their outcome, their very numbers have an important effect on elites' perspective....

4.12 There are varied implications for each of these different types. In the first situation, the "pluralism" observed can enhance policy implementation when public and private resources eventually support compatible goals, but there is also less chance for implementing policies involving significant change. Moreover, programs in such a system are likely to be revamped (or discarded) during their execution when officials have formulated them with little regard for the preferences of influential opponents or potential supporters in the society at large. In the second situation, Cleaves finds the interesting situation that, although a unified core may dominate organized political activity in the country, such a system may not have sufficient power to force compliance from disorganized but wary people in the lower ranks of society who are aware that the government's policies do not correspond to their particular needs. Even though such sectors do not articulate overt hostility toward a policy during execution, and are indeed incapable of organized opposition, they can withhold their individual cooperation to a point of representing a barrier to implementation that surpasses the resources of the political leadership and bureaucracy. In intermediate situations, policies are likely to serve as symbols rather than designs for execution, and side bargains or payoffs are tolerated as a means of preserving the system despite the negative effect this may have on achieving stated policy goals.

4.13 Such distinctions among political systems do not hinge on ideology and political will as variables, but rather more on structural features. To move beyond this, and to gain more understanding of the possibilities and points of resistance for expanding human development programs, we do well to consider (a) the incentives a regime would have for supporting them; (b) the configuration of sectors making up the particular polity and their respective interests and power; and (c) the cleavages that exist within that policy, producing biases that affect policy formulation of any sort. All of these considerations will condition the solvency of a regime and its ability and willingness to pursue certain policies, such as poverty-reducing human development. Each will now be assessed in turn.
A. Incentives

4.14 The incentives which a regime may have for supporting human development in general, and poverty-oriented programs in particular, will depend on the goals and needs which the regime has. Various kinds of benefits may be particularly valued by a regime: (a) strengthening the national system, (b) strengthening the regime, (c) furthering ideological goals, and (d) promoting economic development. 49/ To the extent that a regime seeks these benefits, and programs contribute to them, then those programs will be more attractive politically.

4.15 Human development programs may be seen as promoting national political integration or mobilizing support for the system in general. Primary education in particular is a valuable means of promoting national identity and values that transcend particularistic loyalties of an ethnic or regional nature. Many of the African states have found a general political value in educational programs, that of creating one nation out of many. Probably this value is most appreciated in states where "nation-building" is a priority, and competition for office is not a major concern, though there are support-mobilizing payoffs for the regime which will not be overlooked. We find primary education also popular with regimes in a situation of party competition. It is politically profitable to bestow educational opportunities on the public in order to win its backing. The amount of support given to primary education is not, therefore, determined by the type of regime. For various reasons, regimes in single-party and multi-party systems can have incentives for promoting this kind of program.

4.16 Such programs can also serve to mobilize support for the system and contribute to political stability. Certainly the regime in authority is likely to benefit from this support, but such consequences can be sought without concern only for parochial political advantage. Educational, health and nutritional programs (and population programs to a much lesser extent) can mobilize support for the system by bringing persons into more frequent contact with government services, making the state and its favors more salient to the majority of citizens, particularly those otherwise on the periphery of the system. These services are some of the most broadly attractive ones, and thus more suitable for mobilizing such broad support than an agricultural extension program, or the provision of even rural roads. This is because of the element of human contact in providing human development programs. Where particular regional, ethnic or political movements are making destabilizing demands on the system, such programs may be more readily dispensable and acceptable (at least health and nutrition) as a kind of bond with the state.

4.17 To the extent that rapid population growth may be regarded by regimes as destabilizing, population programs should be quite attractive, even if the results will not be quickly forthcoming. It is better to begin reducing the growth rate sooner rather than later. We have noted earlier (3.06-3.07) that in the long run, a reduction in growth rate, at least for lower classes if not for ethnic groups, should help the less advantaged sectors. Whether reduced population growth contributes to short-term or long-term instability, or to the opposite, one cannot know. 50/ There seems
to be a presumption by the presently more advantaged sectors that they will be more secure if the numbers of the poor are less, and this is identified in their minds with system stability. So it appears that in political terms, population programs are seen as contributing to this outcome.

4.18 An additional consideration concerns external demonstration effects. Where effective programs to alleviate mass poverty have been introduced or publicized in neighboring countries (or by external reference groups), fears that this example may exert an attraction for the poor in a regime's own country may stimulate support for human development. There may also be a matter of pride, as well as the desire to ensure internal stability, involved in prompting human development investments intended to enhance the position of the country as a whole and not just the position of one group or another.

4.19 These programs can, of course, be politically useful for improving the position of a given elite in relation to other competing elites and their constituencies. Such benefits may be "parochial," but they are likely to be strongly felt by decisionmakers. A number of situations may make such benefits more relevant. For example, in many cases, maintaining a political coalition may be facilitated by these programs, as happened with the bumiputra politics in Malaysia. Here, the intention was to hold together the majority Malay community with rural schools and clinics, among other kinds of investment. Human development programs can indeed provide some of the "cement" to hold together parliamentary coalitions, as shown by the experience in such countries as India, Pakistan (before 1958) and Nigeria. The constituency of an incumbent may be strengthened by these programs. Health and educational programs in rural areas can build up a rural constituency to offset a disillusioned, restive urban middle class; this appears to have been the case in South Korea. A regime which has not been elected, basing its legitimacy on performance rather than support demonstrated at the ballot box, may find programs attractive for reasons elaborated earlier (2.32). If human development is broadly accepted as a government task, the provision of health, education and other improvements may be regarded as mitigating the need for other kinds of legitimacy. This rationale has been implicit for a number of military regimes.

4.20 To the extent that a regime has certain ideological orientations which place value on human development, programs in that area obviously become more attractive. The bases for such orientations can be several, and not just the obvious one of socialist ideology. Where a national political leadership identifies with socialist ideology, there is a premium placed on reducing working class and peasant poverty. To neglect this emphasis is to betray the political cause of the regime and to risk internal division generated by more populist leadership elements. At the same time, the reduction of poverty and the development of human resources may be part of the self-image of elites in nonsocialist states who see themselves as "modernizing" agents. Large pockets of illiteracy and disease are not congruent with the image of modernization held by, for example, the military regimes in Indonesia and Brazil. 51/ Ideological orientations are not necessarily overriding considerations, as we have said, but they do contribute to the choices made in allocating resources among competing uses. It is probably true that socialist-oriented regimes will be more willing to run
risks of future political competition than more conservative regimes. The former could place a value on advancement of the lower groups even if it meant eventual loss of power, whereas the latter are less likely to take this view.

4.21 A main justification for human development programs, though not necessarily of poverty-reducing programs, at least in the short run, is that they will promote economic growth. The relevance of economic justifications of programs will vary with the salience of economic growth as an important political objective. If redistribution is also an important political goal, programs in education and other areas are likely to be given further emphasis. To the extent that government decisions are influenced by technocrats who appreciate the contribution to economic development that a more educated, skilled and healthy labor force can make, such programs should be more tenable. Further, if external donor organizations have a considerable involvement with the government and wish to promote human development as part of the economic development strategy, the possibilities will be even greater.

4.22 It is the specific situation which will determine which, if any, of these rationales will encourage a regime to invest more heavily in human development. The second set, comprising parochial political benefits, will be of most relevance to the extent that a regime has weak solvency, or to the extent that competing among elite contenders is high. A more secure regime is in a better position to look to systematic political benefits and to give rein to its ideological predilections, as well as to adopt a longer time horizon for promoting economic development. Some combination of these incentives is likely to provide any regime with a basis for accepting poverty-oriented human development as a part of the government's political-economic strategy. The more a regime perceives all four kinds of incentives as relevant to it, the stronger case there is for promoting programs for human development.

B. Sector Configurations

4.23 Turning our attention from the regime itself to the environment within which it operates we see that the configuration of sectors within the polity affects the viability of human development. It is common to consider what are regarded as the "power" and "interests" of sectors as influencing a regime's choice among policy alternatives. What is not so often appreciated is the structuring of sectoral access to a regime, discussed earlier (1.26-1.30) in terms of political stratification, since this shapes the possibilities and value of support for the programs involved.

4.24 Those sectors within the core combination are most important to identify, since their preferences weigh most heavily with the regime. Depending on which sectors these are, the prospects for a serious and sustained use of human development programs to reduce poverty are greatly affected. This possibility is quite apart from whatever ideological disposition the regime has. The relative power and importance of sectors supporting (or indisposed toward) human development efforts affects the incentives a regime has for pursuing such a strategy. For example, we can see that whereas industrialists can themselves benefit from such
programs by acquiring a more educated and vigorous labor force, agricultural landowners would if anything lose their control over persons who have no alternative but agricultural employment as tenants or laborers. This outcome would reduce the economic and political value of their holdings to the landowners, as both agricultural profits and political influence depend on such control.

4.25 The existence of civil servants with a good deal of clout at the regime's core should make human development strategies more tenable as a rule, though not necessarily those programs aimed primarily at poverty reduction. This sector is usually drawn from the middle and upper class groups most attuned to the benefits of education. They aspire to this particularly for their own children, and expect a reasonable standard of health services (and perhaps also the provision of family planning). It is easier to "sell" these programs to a regime counting on maintaining the approval of a civil service sector for its continuance in authority, partly because this sector is the one responsible for providing the programs (4.30). The extent to which the civil service supports programs oriented to the poor will depend on its general ideological disposition and on what prospects its members see for their children, who would be competing with lower class children for university admissions, government employment, and so on.

4.26 The military sector can vary a good deal from one country to another in its policy orientation. Where it has aristocratic origins, at least in the case of the upper ranks, human development may well not be a serious priority. On the other hand, if (as in countries like Brazil and Peru) the military has very mixed social origins, the promotion of education, together with health and nutrition, will bring benefits particularly to the middle class with which many officers are linked. The provision of some programs for the lower class will also justify military support for the government to persons in those lower ranks, but we cannot predict support for such poverty-oriented programs from the fact that the military is, or is not, closely tied to the government. It does appear that support for family planning programs, at least in Latin America, is less likely if the military is more politically influential. 52/

4.27 Whenever organized labor is part of the core combination, presumably under a socialist or populist regime, the prospects for and emphasis on human development are greatly enhanced. Improving the skills, status and vitality of the working class would be a priority for this sector, though this does not necessarily mean that services are extended to the poorest of the poor. There is a continuing controversy as to whether organized labor in most developing countries constitutes a "labor aristocracy," benefiting itself by its political and economic power but neglecting the poorer majority of workers who are not organized. This may be the case in some instances, but is an overdrawn argument in others. 53/ Compared with other combinations, it is certainly the case that one including organized labor should do more for human development than one without it.

4.28 In analyzing the political possibilities of support for programs, consideration should be given also to the composition of the poorer sectors, who are never really homogeneous. The distribution of programs is likely
to be more advantageous to some than to others. For example food distribution is more advantageous to the families of landless laborers than to those of marginal farmers who can grow crops to meet some of their subsistence needs. There is conflict within the ranks of the poor, and exploitation also. A particularly important distinction will concern which groups, if any, among the poor are organized so that they can make their needs and demands known more effectively. To the extent they are organized, they can more reliably contribute their political resources to a regime, or withhold them. This ability makes them a more desirable partner for any regime with which they are willing to exchange resources, and should elevate them within the prevailing political stratification.

4.29 If they are unwilling to engage in political exchange with the regime, organized sectors among the poor constitute more of a threat and are likely to be relegated to the extra-stability category. In this position, they are liable to have force used against them, and certainly not likely to be rewarded with such program benefits as education and health. So it is not enough to look only at the core combination sectors to get an idea of the political profitability of poverty-oriented programs for the regime. Some attention also needs to be given to how the poor are organized, if they are, and to what their exchange relations, if any, are with the regime.

4.30 One amplification of this assessment underscores the fact that one generally influential, even powerful sector, the civil service, has some special interest in expanding programs because they themselves are providers. A decision to provide more schooling, more medical care, more health education, and so on, means more jobs in the government sector. This expansion increases further the scope and influence of the civil service. When it comes to strengthening the base for human development, therefore, tacit or explicit support from the bureaucracy may be a most important variable. One pitfall is that the civil service support would be conditioned by its own perception of interests, not necessarily by any conviction that poverty-oriented programs were important in themselves. Analyses of health policy previously cited point to distortions in the planning of health services which health professionals have introduced in Latin America and the Middle East. 54/ Nevertheless, inasmuch as the poorer sectors are politically weaker than others, it may be necessary to secure the support of this sector. A regime favoring the expansion of poverty-reducing human development programs may find it necessary to draw on the civil service as a support group for such expansion. This can be done either in the process of parliamentary bargaining to secure authorization of funding, or in the implicit aggregation of support for a policy that will have opportunity costs to other groups desiring government expenditure.

4.31 Support for the conclusion that such considerations weigh in the balance when government programs are planned is found in the experience reported from two countries of West Africa, where the World Bank had been prepared to finance programs to help the urban poor by regularizing squatters' tenure in slum areas. Ironically, the government in a country which had espoused socialist policies was less prepared to respond to the
possibility than a neighboring country with a more "capitalist" tradition. In the first country, the period of socialist government had greatly expanded the civil service, which was now a major owner of urban real estate estate. This sector was also more powerful now than before and despite any rhetoric to the contrary, was unprepared to go along with programs that would undermine their newly-gained economic advantages. In the second country, the public sector was less well developed, and also there was less absolute and relative power available to the civil service that could be brought to bear on government decisions. The obvious needs of the urban poor could get a more sympathetic hearing under these circumstances.

4.32 These examples underscore the point made in paragraph 4.05 above, that policy implementation is often more a matter of sector power and interests than the ideology of the regime or even of powerful sectors themselves. The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion of sector stratification is that it will be advisable for human development programs to be tailored or presented so as to gain the support of, or at least minimize the opposition from, those sectors which are closest to the regime whose authority is needed to produce new or expanded programs. In any country, the dominant sectors can be identified and even ranked with regard to policy areas in which they will have a demonstrable influence. This exercise, even if it is not based on standard kinds of measurement, will help to chart the points of resistance and possible alliance in promoting more widespread efforts for human development.

C. Cleavages

4.33 When analyzing differences in the political environment that may affect human development strategy, an examination should be made of the various cleavages within the society. These are not the source of immutable influences, but they can interfere with the mobilization of support for, and the implementation of, specific programs. The competition that generally goes with cleavage has the potential for being turned to the advantage of human development, as discussed below. As a rule, however, it represents a complicating and probably impeding factor.

4.34 Several references have been made already to the effects of ethnic cleavage within a society. This can make a population program controversial, for example, if it appears that a reduction in the population of a particular ethnic group will diminish its power and security within the country. To the extent that one ethnic group has achieved employment and income, not to mention the advantages of status and authority that accrue from more education, compensatory educational efforts for other groups are politically charged. Any approach which ignores the legacy of ethnic division is bound to run into political difficulties.

4.35 The same kinds of problems are likely to rise where there are deep regional divisions within a country. This circumstance is most likely where one or more regions will have advanced economically because of the location of transport or administrative centers, or because of mining or manufacturing activity. Concomitantly, the level of public services, and particularly of education, is likely to have advanced as well, making
for highly visible disparities. It is reasonable for human development efforts to try to help people in less advanced areas to "catch up." But this process poses a threat to the advantages of the more prosperous areas. They would have to give up their edge over persons from others areas when it comes to securing employment, influencing government decisions, and enjoying relatively higher status. Because of the substantial number of kinds of programs which come under the human development rubric, the best solution is probably to follow a strategy of diversification. Certain educational or health services which remain deficient in the more advanced areas can be supplied with the understanding that this is a quid pro quo for support of more basic educational and health improvements in the less advanced areas. While this process will not narrow the "gap" between regions, it will improve the aggregate stock of human resources in the country.

4.36 Regional disparities can become particularly pernicious when overlaid with ethnic differences involving racial, religious or other social characteristics. These are exacerbated by disparities in human development. The provision of facilities such as schools and clinics across regions so that there is something approaching per capita parity of access is one of the more widely accepted principles for allocating public goods. The more prosperous areas may seek a larger share of public expenditure than is proportional to their population, on the ground that they contribute a greater share of government revenue. This tendency will work against poverty-reducing programs. Such claims can be more readily resisted than some other distributive pressures, however, on the ground that the political system recognizes all persons equally. With the poorer areas themselves clamoring for a larger than proportional share in order to offset their backwardness, it is unlikely that the richer areas need get more than their per capita proportion, unless the government desires to favor the latter or unless the absolute numbers in the richer region are much greater. 55/

4.37 Where there are deep ideological cleavages, these can be as serious as ethnic ones. Usually they will reflect conflicting class interests. They thus have a more material basis than do ethnic cleavages, though little can match the emotional force of the latter when fully activated, and that activation most often is fueled by a sense of material deprivation due to discrimination. Ideological conflict is likely to put the sectors already possessing more developed human resources on the defensive and prepared to resist any programs strengthening their competitors. On the other hand, as noted in Section II, human development programs as a group are less redistributive than some other policy measures desired by less advantaged sectors. In a charged situation, the expansion of such programs may offer a compromise course. The effect that ideological cleavages will have on the outputs of government will be determined by the kind of dynamics already discussed (4.24) in terms of which sectors are within the core combination of the regime. The fact of cleavage is less important than who is in a position of authority or influence to advance the interests of one ideological side or the other.
4.38 There can be political party divisions that parallel ideological ones, but these deserve separate discussion because they bear on the kind of political structures that exist. Where there is political party competition, particular conditions for promoting human development programs can be found. For the reasons discussed in Section II, these programs offer some attractive benefits to large numbers of persons. These benefits make such programs attractive to leaders of political parties. In a situation with party competition, there is the perceived danger that government policy will provide "too many" programs, more in fact than can be financed from limited revenues. We find that in a number of countries where there has been a history of party competition -- Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Jamaica, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, and Venezuela are some of the most clear-cut cases -- government support of human development has been greater than average, particularly in the educational areas. Party competition by itself is not a sufficient explanation for good performance in human development, but it appears to be a contributing factor in a substantial number of outstanding cases.

4.39 While this discussion of the different political factors conditioning the support and effectiveness of poverty-oriented programs could be elaborated, the basic line of analysis should by now be sufficiently clear. Rather than attempting to explain receptivity to human development by proceeding from types of regimes we have looked at the political process more generically with regard to regime incentives and the political environment. The conventional distinction among regimes according to ideology is given less weight, although this is not to depreciate ideology or to minimize the importance of ideological commitments. On the average, populist or socialist regimes have been willing to invest more heavily in programs. But ideological commitment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for human development and it does not seem to be the most fruitful framework within which to build policy-oriented political analysis.

4.40 The structural differences among regimes, for example, whether they are civilian or military, or single-party or multi-party, have also been largely passed over, a decision based on careful cross-national empirical studies that show little or no significant associations for policy performance. On the other hand, a factor such as competitiveness within the political system does appear to have some salience, as just discussed (4.38). We can better understand this effect in terms of the political weight which poorer sectors can have, that is, their effect on who will exercise authority and who will benefit from it, when their larger numbers are taken into account, as they are in elections. This factor, like all others, exhibits important exceptions, however (see note 55), and we need to develop an understanding which allows for and accommodates them.

4.41 More comparative analysis, different from the kind of typological studies mostly undertaken to date by political scientists, is very much in order. Such analysis should facilitate a better understanding of connections between different aspects of dynamics of a political system and certain human development effects. Clearly, the factors raised in this section are as important as those discussed in the three earlier sections taken together. Less can be said, however, on a systematic basis about the relationships
implied because of the limited empirical base available to draw on. We will therefore leave this subject to address a related concern. This involves an analysis of how the process of planning and implementing human development programs, like any others, is subject to political influences throughout. Delineating these influences should further serve to make the formulation of strategies focused on human development more realistic and successful.
V. THE POLITICS OF PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

5.01 The factors disposing or indisposing a regime to support efforts at human development discussed in the preceding section set the stage for planning and carrying out programs, but they do not in themselves determine the outcome. The politics of human development include the process from start to finish of identifying specific program activities, designing them and mobilizing the necessary political support for them, and getting them authorized, funded and implemented. This process is often referred to as the project or program "cycle" but such a characterization implies too linear a sequence. Rather than refer to "stages" or "steps" as part of a "cycle," we would do better to think in terms of various "tasks" as part of a process. This process is long and difficult. It is often diverted, or not completed. 57/

5.02 It cannot be stressed enough that politics affects not only the high-level decisions to undertake a new program or significantly expand or alter an existing one, but also affects every step in carrying out those decisions, or as the case may be, in failing to carry them out. There is a tendency for people to assume that politics stops after the "big decision" has been taken, but this is not so. It is true that the nature of politics varies in connection with the different tasks. We can make some generalizations about the characteristics of the politics for these respective tasks, but the topic is a complex one, and is as yet explored by very few political scientists or indeed anyone else. There are relevant data in many case studies, but not enough work has been done to permit a thorough examination of this obviously important area. 58/

5.03 The various parts of the program development process can be discussed in terms of tasks, as just suggested, keeping in mind that they do not constitute a rigid or sequential set of activities: (a) problem identification and analysis, (b) program design, (c) mobilization of political support, (d) decisions on authorization, (e) decisions on financing, and (f) implementation. This last is particularly complex, drawn out, and, as will be discussed below, may involve or recapitulate the other tasks. There is a tendency to dichotomize implementation from the rest of the process, but this is a great mistake. 59/

5.04 The tasks listed are clearly interactive. Accordingly, the mobilization of support may precede a clear identification of the problem, or any concrete analysis and diagnosis; implementation of a pilot project may go ahead without any commitment to authorize and fund a substantial program. Problem identification and analysis may be part of a program design process if political support for the activity already exists. Indeed, decisions to fund an activity may be taken without a clear authorization of exactly what will be done by whom. Mobilization of political support must usually precede financial decisions, though if international financing is involved there may have been little such mobilization initially. Mobilization of support is indeed more an ongoing process accompanying the other tasks than a task in and of itself.
5.05 We will discuss each of these tasks in terms of their respective political dynamics and dimensions. First, however, it is helpful to make some comparative considerations, sketching out the kind of political differences involved. The cast of political actors and the nature of their interaction will vary depending on: (1) whether the locus of activity is primarily at national or local levels or somewhere in between; and (2) whether the decisions involved are more once-for-all or recurring. These variables are actually more continuous than dichotomous, presenting more of a continuum than contrasting types. But for purposes of discussion we can suggest the following contrasts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus of Activity</th>
<th>Decisions Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Problem identification and analysis</td>
<td>Usually national, often should be local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Program design</td>
<td>Usually national, should have some local focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Mobilization of support</td>
<td>Usually national, should include local support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Decisions on authorization</td>
<td>National, unless decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Decisions on financing</td>
<td>National, unless local contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Implementation</td>
<td>Primarily local though some national activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.06 Different actors obviously come onstage as the program develops. Even actors at the national level change, as different sets of persons become involved in program design (professionals), mobilization of support (interest groups or political activists), and authorization and financing (executive and/or legislative personnel). The process of moving to implementation will usually involve quite a different set of actors, unless some of them have been already involved in problem identification, program design and so on. 60/ The dynamics of politics are very different depending on whether the decisions to be made come at one point in time, or over time. While some interests can put together a lot of political power to shape a single decision, that aggregation may then dissolve, leaving the field open to less powerful but more strategically placed and better organized interests. 61/ We thus see that not only do the relevant actors change, depending on whether decisions come at the national or local level, but also that their respective advantages will differ depending on where, how and how often decisions need to be made.
5.07 There are other considerations involved, as to whether or not expertise constitutes a source of leverage or not, whether the number of persons supporting a program will be influential (for example, whether votes are appreciated or not), or whether a capacity to use force is relevant. We can see that groups having expertise may affect program design in a way that those which can threaten force would not, whereas the latter resource may weigh in funding decisions more than would the former. Decisions on authorization, in fact, may be more affected by the number of supporters an interest group can point to than by its expertise or its potential for using force. Different sectors thus would have a greater possibility of influencing a program's development depending on what aspect of that development is at hand.

5.08 The more decision points there are in the process from initial conception to final implementation, the more likely it is that other political actors besides the government decisionmakers will get into the act. Some programs are essentially simpler, as when an existing program is to be modified or expanded rather than a new one introduced, or when funding can be for one time only rather than recurrent. In the politics of design and implementation, it turns out that veto groups are often more effective than advocates, since preventing action is commonly easier than is achieving it. This is noted not to suggest that these are difficulties of human development programs in particular. We have already considered ways in which such programs find it easier to gain acceptance than do other kinds of development efforts. But the logic of power in most political processes, a logic which gives more leverage to negative actors than to positive ones, needs to be recognized and compensated for.

5.09 This circumstance is taken into account in Cleaves' analysis of policy implementation in developing countries. He suggests that any government program will generally require more political resources for its implementation: (a) the more complex are the mechanisms of its operation (b) the more its activities are divergent from existing programs, (c) the more actors are involved in implementation, (d) the more goals are to be achieved by the program, (e) the more ambitious and ambiguous are the goals, and (f) the more time is required for carrying through the program and producing program benefits. Conversely, fewer political resources will be required for programs that are simpler, more incremental, have fewer actors and fewer goals, have simpler and more defined goals, and anticipate quicker completion and payoffs.

5.10 It bears noting that veto groups include not only the more prominent and centrally-placed sectors. When it comes to human development programs, the presumed beneficiaries are very much part of the implementation process. Their decisions whether or not to participate are often the critical ones in the final analysis, supporting or negating all those decisions that have gone before. That a regime is unchallenged in the political arena and can dictate the design of programs does not insure their successful implementation, as suggested above (4.11-4.12). The perspectives and perceptions of beneficiaries are likely to differ from those of government planners and decision-makers. Consequently, Cleaves suggests that the content and incentives of programs for the poor be carefully adapted to the interests of those who are intended to benefit.
5.11 The politics of program design and implementation are thus pervasive. They are deserving of careful attention for the differentiated influences they bring to bear on efforts to develop human resources, particularly among the poorer sectors, even presuming there is some commitment and support exerted by persons in authority.

A. Problem Identification and Analysis

5.12 The first logical step in any program is to identify a problem or need, analyse its basis, and propose some solution or action that will create a more desirable state of affairs. As noted above, other actions might precede, rather than follow from, this task, but generally it has priority. Quite different political dynamics are, however, involved, depending on how this task is approached.

5.13 If the initiative for dealing with a problem comes from within the bureaucracy, we find that which unit is "out front" shapes the set of interest groups having access to the initial decisions. Each ministry or department will have a certain network of client or support groups that are fairly continuously informed as to what the unit is doing, or even contemplating, whereas all other groups will learn of the possible program only after it has been surfaced for public attention. This gives certain groups an advantage in influencing whether, and how, action should be taken.

5.14 We find that there is usually some "politics" associated with data gathering and interpretation if this is part of the process of initiating the activity. Whose needs are surveyed, what interpretations are drawn from data, all are activities which have consequences for the distribution of government benefits, though they may be seen (and defended) as the least "political" of all. The hidden agendas are biases of bureaucratic actors that can be inscribed in programs through their influence over the introduction and use of data. 66/

5.15 Alternatively, we may find the initiative coming from politicians seeking partisan advantage, or, in a single-party/no-party system, seeking to strengthen support for the regime, or stemming from popular pressures expressed through interest group channels or in a more diffuse manner. In this context, the sectoral interests involved will be more akin to those bearing on authorization decisions than those emanating from bureaucratic initiative. It is possible that "political" channels for initiating human development activities and for generating information will be more objective and effective than bureaucratic ones, if the leadership desires this. 67/

5.16 In his analysis of nutritional programs in eleven countries, Montgomery finds three main ways that such programs have been initiated, each having different political implications for the maintenance and success of the programs. Where the initiative for nutrition work originated in the bureaucracy, it was invariably undertaken by the Ministry of Health, and malnutrition was regarded and treated as a "disease," with very expensive means that emphasized cure more than prevention. No comprehensive policy approach was taken in countries like Tanzania, Thailand and Zambia until other actors came into the policy arena. In some other cases, where a general welfare concern was expressed from outside the government, this led to programs aimed at preventive solutions to malnutrition,
as with the remedial feeding programs in Chile and the Philippines. But such programs did not have enough sustained political support to maintain their momentum. In still other cases, there was some political coalition-building behind the cause of nutrition which led to definite political support. In Indonesia and the Philippines it has been possible to mount a more comprehensive set of nutrition-oriented activities with a sustaining momentum because the program itself has generated new constituencies and coalitions. 68/

5.17 Although it may be the norm for national governments to initiate human development programs, we often find that the ideas and initial support for them come from international sources, from international agencies, bilateral donors or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Such initiatives may be more neutral to and among contending political interests, and may also appear to be more technically based. But if no government unit or political sector has any particular interest in the program, then none may be inclined to support it either. As soon as the program comes under the aegis of one ministry or department, it becomes associated, like it or not, with the network of political supporters (and opponents) of that unit. This poses a dilemma for internationally-sponsored programs, but it is clearly better to have some base of support in the bureaucracy (and country) than none. An important task of political analysis would be to determine the most favorable location and linkages for a given program that is deriving its initial support externally. In choosing supporters, one is usually also picking up some opponents.

5.18 One of the most neglected aspects of program initiation is the involvement of the intended beneficiaries in the initial analysis of what their development needs are, and in the choice of what means would best address these needs. Because there is little experience with this process, it is hard to generalize about its implications. It is often suggested that if the rural or urban poor are involved in assessing their problems and in proposing measures to deal with these, their demands will be excessive and unreasonable, not to mention technically infeasible. Certainly much depends on the kind of program involved, but several of the comparative studies available on the rural and urban poor indicate that, if given responsibility for decisions, and if confronted with the same resource constraints that planners face, beneficiaries can play a useful role. 69/

5.19 We do find that in a number of countries the local people themselves may be quite energetic in starting human development services. One of the most notable experiences is with the harambee self-help movement in Kenya, but such efforts are found in many countries at the local level. Local residents are not in a position to launch national programs for education or health, but they can build primary schools or health clinics with local labor and materials. This action has put a strain on central government budgets in some cases in order to meet the recurrent costs, and it often means that the maintenance of the facilities will be better for having had community involvement in initiating the service. 70/

5.20 The involvement of beneficiaries in the initial decisions about programs has a number of political implications. It can tailor program services to the expressed needs, and thereby gain more political credit for the government from a given volume of expenditure. The very fact of consultation can increase a government's legitimacy and support. On the other side, if expectations are
raised and then disappointed, the government may become less popular than before. Resource use can become less efficient if the result of participation would be more curative rather than preventive health services, or more schools than are needed in an area. There should be some political advantage in involving the local people in initial planning and then also the financing of facilities as this would help to make expectations and demand for service more realistic and limited. 71/ This is not the place to go into an extended discussion of the merits and demerits of popular participation. But we note the possibility and political facets of involvement by beneficiaries in initial decisions, a process now largely reserved to national government or international agencies. 72/

B. Program Design

5.21 The process of program design presumably comes after the initial analysis of, and decisions concerning, a program, though it may come before or after authorization takes place. Even if not all decisions are politically inspired or influenced, they usually have political aspects in that they benefit some more than others and are implemented in the name of the state. As one of the participants in the September workshop who had urban development experience observed, even decisions about the location of water pipes are political, and indeed usually reflect the broader political system of the country. 73/

5.22 Generally the design of programs occurs within some ministry or, department primarily concerned with their implementation. Functional departments will, in the main, be the places where decisions are made as to how many and what kinds of rural clinics to build, how to set up the family planning service, and how to phase construction of and arrange staffing for new elementary schools. The interaction in these cases is likely to be largely between conflicting groups within the ministry. Sometimes it will be between high-level bureaucrats and one or a few politicians who have strong ideas about how a program should be designed. Once in a while it will be between bureaucrats and the rare well-organized private interest group that attempts to influence design. In some instances of externally-funded programs, the design maybe done by foreign technicians. They will be less subject to domestic political influence, but the design they come up with is also therefore less likely to have support broader than that of the sponsoring department.

5.23 Choice of technique is a very important subject. Economists have so far looked at it mostly in terms of the efficiency of resource allocation. In fact its political dimensions may be just as important because of its implications for the pattern of benefits deriving from one technique or another. 74/ Who designs a program may seem a fairly neutral matter, but usually there is some bias in the choice of technique for reaching a designated objective. This stems from the professional training received by individuals or from the interest groups they relate to. Even in some as standard as an expansion in primary school enrollment, the choices among expanding class size, increasing the number of teachers and classes, or utilizing television or other new technology will generally grow out of the orientation of the personnel in the department given responsibility for design. It may be more oriented to (a) cost-cutting efficiency, (b) to the interest of teachers (in this case congruent with those of pupils -- not increasing class size), or (c) to technological advances. The distribution of benefits among taxpayers, teachers, pupils, importers and
technicians will vary considerable for the three alternatives. Of special concern, the interests of the children of poor households are worst served by the first, and probably poorly served (at least initially) by the third. Whether the second is helpful or not would depend on what else is done to make the pupil from a poor home receptive to the instruction.

5.24 It is a good question as to how programs can be effectively designed to reach the poorest of the poor. Almost all programs intended to benefit the poor, including programs oriented to low-income groups, are likely to benefit the upper levels of the poor more than the lower levels, not because they are supposed to, but because of various built-in biases. If elementary schools are constructed in rural areas, for example, they are generally located first in district centers or market towns. More persons will be served that way initially, which is a reasonable approach. But a majority of poorer rural households are likely to be scattered away from such centers, farther from the roads and therefore farther from the school. The same considerations would usually apply to a health clinic. Even apparently free education costs some money; clothes and books must be found, sometimes even informal (and usually illegal) tipping of the teacher is necessary. Aside from these purely financial and distance factors, those households with slightly higher income levels (and perhaps a few more years of schooling by either parent) are more highly motivated to send their children to schools.

5.25 It is likely that the design features of health, educational, nutritional or population programs will be particularly sensitive or supportive to the needs of the poorer sectors of the community. Unless there is particular political pressure brought to bear on program designers. This pressure can come from above by national authorities, or from below by representatives of the poor themselves, or possibly from external donors. This is not to argue against programs unless they assist only the poorest of the poor. The rest of the poor are also poor, and to measure the success of a project only by how much it helps the group most difficult to reach is only to invite failure. More pertinently, the design question is deciding how to provide benefits for all of the poorer groups so that their capacity and self-confidence to act on their own behalf are stimulated to grow, even as others may be benefiting from that program. One could set as a criterion that at least the programs as designed and implemented not make the poorest of the poor worse off. Politically this seems to be the most realistic and constructive approach.

5.26 Design choices have distributive, and thus political consequences, as already discussed. Some of the factors warranting particular attention are the standards incorporated into the design and the clientele for which the program is designed. Some design standards may be patently distributive, such as those of the public housing program in Nigeria which for years designed and constructed only those houses costing about 100 times the per capita income. But there can be less obvious design consequences, as in the case of the Health Services Foundation in Brazil, whose "chrome-plated" facilities were at least double the cost of comparable clinics rendering the same services. This system was well-managed and effective within its scope of service. But the high capital cost meant that a smaller proportion of the population was served than could have benefited from less expensive buildings and equipment. The "marginal" populations not served in such circumstances tend to be the poorer and more rural sectors.
5.27 One facet of this question of standards is the "ratchet effect," known to economists in terms of private consumption patterns. Once a higher level is attained, households find it difficult to retrench and will cut savings rather than reduce consumption. A similar pattern seems to prevail in public programs. This is exemplified by the housing program in Chile, where the government of Eduardo Frei decided, quite sensibly, in order to spread the benefits of public expenditure, to invest in providing sites and services to the urban and rural poor rather than to provide fewer costly, completed "boxes." The public grumbling was such that the following government of Salvador Allende felt constrained to ditch that program and return to handing out completed housing, indeed with furniture as an added benefit. This re-design, of course, cut the number of additional families that could be served.

5.28 The policy implication is that agencies should keep design standards modest even if funds are available in the short run for more elaborate goods or services, because of the impact initial design standards have on public expectations and acceptance. The use of more elaborate standards reduces the benefits for the poorer sectors since these are invariably the last, or least, served. Where certain groups have privileged access to an agency and its goods and services, there will be pressure from such groups to have high design standards, which primarily benefit themselves. The more broad-based the participation of the public and the claims made for the benefits, the more incentive there will be to design program outputs to serve broader sectors of the public.

5.29 There is a tendency when programs are funded from external sources to design them according to standards that suit the foreign donor, or suit the recipient agency whose exceptions to the most "modern" facilities are whetted by access to outside funds. Such temptation needs to be resisted, however. Case studies of foreign-assisted projects in Ethiopia and Bangladesh provide good examples of how maldistributive can be the effects of not adapting program design to local conditions and needs. The provision of goods or services which suit external standards will usually satisfy government personnel who like things that appear more "modern" or "durable." But the consequences of such choices for development of the poor are adverse.

5.30 A related design issue is the scale of activity being planned. There is a tendency to opt for programs that are very large in terms of the finances involved. This has the apparent advantage of lowering administrative overhead as a percent of total cost. But it also suits the political interests of government and donors, for both domestic constituencies and the sponsors of foreign assistance seem to accept the equation of the amount of money expended with the amount of "development" promoted, even though this equation is increasingly seen as misleading and even mistaken. If the concept of a large scale activity is chosen as a matter of design, this biases the nature of the activity not only in favor of capital-using methods, but also often for methods having a high foreign-exchange cost component, whether for expatriate salaries or for imported goods. Such approaches are less likely to reach, or suit, the poor than those methods relying more on indigenous personnel, or local labor and simpler and more appropriate technologies. With more capital involved, there is also some pressure to move quickly in the design stage and to adopt familiar techniques, rather than to proceed in a more experimental and participatory manner. When it comes to serving the human development needs of the poor, however, a good case can be made that the approach induced by large scale concepts is less effective in terms of benefit per unit of expenditure.
5.31 Two steps appear increasingly necessary in this area of programming: first, to secure involvement of the intended beneficiaries in the process of program development and implementation, and, second, to experiment with methods for reaching the poor that are possibly more effective than the conventional ones. Yet the institutional pressures to "move money," evident in international donor agencies but also existing in the governments of recipient countries militate against such approaches. 78/ As long as donor agencies are willing to perpetuate the mechanical mode of thinking that resource inputs by themselves account for developmental outputs, the political pressures within developing countries and within the agencies themselves will continue to generate the large-project bias in all assisted programs, including those devoted to human development. A more considered position within the donor agencies could mitigate the pressures substantially, leading to design processes that are more amenable to local participation and to appropriate experimentation.

5.32 A related matter concerns the possible provision in the design of programs themselves for local participation. This participation can come about through the activities of various organizations and roles, including those of health committees, mothers' clubs, parent-teacher associations, paraprofessionals, and parent assistants. Such an approach has been articulated by the World Bank's sector policy paper on rural development, and advocated by the United Nations and other donor agencies. 79/ It is an approach increasingly supported in the planning documents and policy statements of the governments of developing countries. Yet the process of program design and the ensuing procedures of implementation still often lack such a thrust.

5.33 We have previously noted that the process of fostering local organization for such participation is a difficult one. 80/ It is not widespread in relatively more developed countries and unrealistic expectations should not be projected for it elsewhere. Still, experience exists confirming that greater participation is both possible and useful. 81/ Those who fear that participation by the poor will lead to extreme and unreasonable demands should be somewhat comforted by the evidence that such participation by and large is goal- and service-oriented. 82/ It is likely that most increments in participation will have some effect on programs in favor of the poor. But this process need not be viewed as leading to changes in the system. Such a fear is a source of more opposition to broader participation than is resistance to changes in the distribution of services and opportunities per se.

5.34 Some increased participation in the political process may well be taken as one measure of human development. While programs can be provided in a "service-delivery" mode without significant participation by beneficiaries in the process, it should be evident that human development involves more than a summation of health, educational and nutritional improvements. The productivity and well-being of people derives from such elements as organizational experience, interpersonal competence and confidence, and outwardly-oriented motivation, in addition to increases in skill or vitality. Participation in design could lead to broader participation, and that makes it relevant and positive for human development. There are found to be "politics" surrounding the question of who will be involved in the design process, particularly whether authentic representatives of the poor will be enabled to participate. Those who are interested in promoting human development will find that this stage of program development can itself contribute to the objective if appropriate political support and organizational mechanisms can be mobilized for involving the so-called target group.
C. Mobilization of Support

5.35 The mobilization of support is an essential part of the process of promoting human development programs. This process is often seen as preceding the task of getting program authorization at the highest levels of government. But, as indicated above, it might be better viewed as an ongoing and pervasive activity than as a discrete stage. There is no guarantee that a program designed to deal with an identified problem will proceed to deal effectively with that problem, even with authorization and initial funding, unless there is a continuous mobilization of support from relevant sectors. Montgomery has addressed this challenge with regard to nutritional programs, but the point he made has general application:

The ultimate risk to nutrition objectives in the absence of sustaining political demand from the people is entropy: "do-gooding" programs run down. The political effort to escape narrow professionalism leads to the reorganization of the nutrition programs away from conventional ministries, and the creation of independent agencies, inter-ministerial committees, and national councils with self-renewing leadership. But if these special organizations lack both a bureaucratic infrastructure and sustained political weight, there is little to sustain their prospects for survival beyond the initial enthusiasm of their originators.

5.36 The temptation is seeking political support for development programs is to "go to the top" by aiming to obtain approval for the activity from the highest level possible. While such support is at times essential to sustain a program, this approach is not as sound as it might initially seem. If a program is not popular with at least some politically-significant sectors, then the expending of resources on it becomes a politically unprofitable enterprise. Program designers often call for top national leaders to display "political will" in backing a program for which a base of support does not exist, and against which there may even be definite opposition. A political leader may use some of his political capital to subsidize this kind of program, or, better yet, to build up a constituency for it. But it makes more sense for him to embrace a program for which there is a constituency, that is, one or more sectors, who are willing to contribute various political resources to ensure the continuation of the program by the regime.

The process of mobilizing political resources is best grounded in a combination of broad understanding and appreciation of a problem and some strong, deep support from a sector possessing politically experienced representation. To be sure, if one has to choose between them, the latter approach is more effective. Connections to sectors that are not particularly large, but well-endowed and sympathetic, are valuable. As was discussed in Section II, there are some reasons why groups having elite, or at least middle class, status would support such programs as those involving the feeding of children over expansion in education.

5.37 To institute a program, it may be possible to by-pass the requirement of mobilizing support by involving international agencies and gaining their financial backing. This procedure provides incentives to governments to proceed with a program which presents few direct economic costs in the short-run (and even few opportunity costs if the donor would not support some alternative activity). At the same time, some political benefits are produced from those
aided by the program. It must be stressed in this regard that external support is no substitute for support within the polity during anything but the short run. Again, in analyzing experience with nutritional programs, Montgomery has found: "International agencies can strongly support an active program, as the IBRD did in Indonesia; but political leadership within a country is needed before a nutrition program can gain both a sufficiently high priority and broad enough social perspective to sustain it beyond research, diagnosis and emergency treatment." 85/

5.38 The strategy of coalition building may be focused within the structure of government or outside it. Because units of government themselves are parts of networks of political interest and support, success in drawing a number of such units together can also bring along the sectors with which the units interact. In many developing countries where sectors have little solid organization and fairly diffuse communication patterns, this process may be more effective, and certainly quicker, than trying to forge some kind of direct alliance among sectors of the public. 86/ In the final analysis, however, it is the willingness and the ability of members of the public to give or withhold resources that determines the fate of programs and even regimes. The construction of a coalition of support apart from government institutions is thus in itself a desirable step, provided that the government needs and wants what that coalition has to offer. Alternatively, or in addition, foreign and national supporters of human development programs could encourage the local organization and participation of program beneficiaries. This process can take longer than the coalition-building approach, and its outcome may be less predictable. But to the extent that beneficiaries of programs are organized on behalf of these programs, the ensuing support should, once generated, be steadier and more motivated.

D. Authorization and Funding

5.39 The authorization and funding of programs can be discussed together because they usually involve the same sets of actors and the same configuration of influence networks, though the content and timing of decisions will differ. In one instance, authority is allocated to conduct a set of activities in the name of the state, and in the other, economic resources are provided. These decisions can be taken by the executive or the legislature or by both, according to the political system. The two kinds of decisions can be taken concurrently, but are often separated as a matter of law or practice. Authorization is usually a one-time decision, while funding is recurrent, usually on an annual basis.

5.40 Both authorization and funding are undertaken within the context of a more formally defined political process than the other tasks discussed in this section. The roles of decisionmakers are defined, and their authority to grant program authority and to budget funds are generally unambiguous. The focal points for various interest groups to exercise their influence are well-known, if not all publicly approved. Political parties are more likely to have a role in such decisions than in the more diffuse politics associated with the other stages.

5.41 It would appear that authorization and funding are the definitive stages, but in fact they are only part of the total process of program design and implementation. Both represent hurdles that must be cleared. The political
influence mobilized to gain authorization, if it is not followed by an allocation of funds, is thereby nullified. Alternatively, such influence may suffice to secure initial funding, but not to maintain adequate funding levels in subsequent years. Additionally, beyond the approval of the budget for the activity by the authorities, it is still possible to encounter the covert hindrances of withholding personnel or foreign exchange approvals, so that the money cannot be used as needed.

5.42 It is at the funding stage that competition among various program activities, and thus politics, become most acute. The granting of authorization to programs can be a positive-sum activity; approving one does not prevent approval of another. Indeed, even programs with contrary purposes can be established by executive or legislative enactment. The "crunch" comes in determining which programs will get the funding needed to carry out their activities. It is here, for example, that different kinds of education become competitors with one another, as indeed do the different sectors of human development. The desire of the middle classes to have more secondary and higher education is in conflict with the need of the lower classes to have more and better primary and vocational education. As long as the amount of funds available for government expenditure is finite, all programs become competitors, at least at the margin, for funds. Earlier comments about programs being less "zero-sum" in nature are subject to this qualification, also noted (2.20).

5.43 International funding can be useful in alleviating this competition for domestically generated funds. Programs that serve the poor are at a particular disadvantage politically in this competition, and so foreign financial assistance can be of special value to the poor, thus compensating somewhat for their political weakness. Unless such assistance is continuous, of course, the problem of the poor in competing for budgetary allocations is only delayed, not resolved. When assistance ends, the programs for the poor which were underwritten will be in no better position than before to compete for funds unless the recipients, having experienced the benefits of such programs, have in the meantime become more organized and potent politically.

5.44 There is a whole body of wisdom, seldom cataloged, concerning budgetary strategies for getting programs funded. 87/ The various strategies that have been devised over the years, such as working to get even a small initial appropriation (known as "getting the camel's nose under the tent") with the expectation that it will grow incrementally thereafter, are not, however, in themselves a solution to the political situation of the poor. This is because the success of such strategies is not entirely separable from the political power behind them. We would note that various efforts to try to make the budgetary process less "political," notably through introduction of Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems (PPBS), have not been at all effective. 88/ It makes little sense to try to insulate human development programs from the political process. If, however, external resources can buy "political space" (5.43), this is entirely suitable for the short term. In any case, some change in the constellation of political forces is needed to sustain such programs.

5.45 This observation brings us back to the recurring theme of our political analysis, that for the poor to derive more assured benefit from programs initiated on their behalf, there is need for them to have some form of organization enhancing their political participation in processes of decisionmaking
and implementation. We can predict that when budget resources are insufficient to fund all programs, human development efforts serving the poor will be among the first and most deeply cut. This will occur unless there is such organization, or some alliance with and support from the service providers or other elites, whose education and status give them some political clout.

5.46 The politics of program authorization and funding need not be further elaborated because they are more familiar and recognizable than at other stages of program development, but they still remain essential tasks. The recurring nature of funding decisions makes them particularly crucial. Political resources need therefore to be continually mobilized from a variety of sources, from the poor, from their ideological allies, from self-interested parties and from external agencies, if the level and focus of poverty-reducing activities are to be sustained.

E. Implementation

5.47 When it comes to the implementation of programs, we find some new political aspects and also some recurring, familiar ones. As already noted, the cast of actors changes somewhat and some new problems of decisionmaking and of resource mobilization emerge. But many of the earlier tasks continue or must be redone. One of the main themes that recurs in the political analysis of implementation activities is that if they are to benefit the poorer sectors on a sustained basis the organization of those sectors for administrative and political purposes in support of these programs becomes crucial. An implementation process which is apolitical, and which involves no efforts to mobilize ongoing support or to engage the beneficiaries in the implementation process itself, appears likely to lag and may even be aborted.

5.48 Implementation differs from other phases of program performance in its need for the coordination of many persons, organizations, activities, communications, and so on. Coordination is a matter of getting others to do what they would not have done otherwise, and this process naturally involves some combination of persuasion, inducements and sanctions. To the extent that authority is invoked or influenced, the process of coordination involves some kind of politics. When we are discussing coordination among government agencies, it should be seen that it is not just the agencies themselves that are being affected but also the different interests allied with the respective bureaucratic actors. To the extent that an agency’s status or authority will be reduced by the act of coordination, the supporting groups will see themselves as adversely affected. The coordination process must therefore reckon with political repercussions in this regard.

5.49 Coordination itself requires continuous political efforts to maintain the necessary support from political actors and from sectors of the public. Montgomery has addressed this problem with regard to nutritional programs, pointing out that coordination can take place at any of several levels of government “without apparent loss, so long as the policies themselves retain support,” and citing examples from the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. “Nutritional status is affected by so many different government policies and programs, in fact, that the coordination function seems to require an almost continuous process of coalition-building.”
5.50 The tasks of implementation are noted for their complexity and their changing requirements. The process of translating budgetary allocations into staff positions filled with qualified and motivated people, into the right facilities and equipment at the desired places at the correct time, into programs of activity, and combining personnel and material that meet the objectives of better learning, health, nutritional status or reduced population growth is an undertaking of great difficulty. There has to be communication with the clientele to gain their cooperation, with other agencies whose cooperation is also needed, and with the general public to the extent general understanding and support for the program can be gained. Financial procedures concerning procurement, disbursement, budget submissions, accounting, auditing, and so on, are also involved.

5.51 All kinds of political pressures are likely to intrude on the decision-making concerning these activities, which may in themselves be difficult enough to comprehend and execute in purely technical terms. Special favors to certain groups will often be expected in hiring, in promoting, in locating facilities, in purchasing supplies, in programming which areas get expanded service first, in determining eligibility for school admissions, food supplements, etc. With a high degree of political support from the highest levels of authority, these expectations may be disregarded, if that support is not conditioned on rendering some political favors in return during program implementation. If such favors are handled deftly this can secure increased or more solid political support, yet the converse effect may be to reduce the legitimacy accorded to the program and to make it vulnerable to withdrawal of support if the government is changed. Implementers of any programs, but particularly of poverty-oriented ones, need to find a way to walk the thin line between over-politicizing their program and being responsive to those who give political support.

5.52 In order to deal with the complexity, and to experiment with means of reaching program objectives, it is fairly common to undertake pilot projects. By introducing a technical activity on a smaller scale, one can see whether it produces desired results, and also what organizational, material and other requirements the activity incurs. This approach may in itself be politically neutral, but the task of moving an activity from pilot project status to implementation on a national scale is likely to present political problems. When a pilot project is undertaken by a different agency than that which would implement the project, as in the case of a nutritional supplement program in India, it appears difficult to get the latter agency to accept the program as its own. 91/ The configuration of support groups behind the pilot project may not be readily transferable to the implementation agency, which has its own set of support groups. Difficulties can therefore be encountered in getting a pilot scheme implemented unless the implementing agency is tied in with the initial activity and regards this as its own, and thus contributing to its own political position.

5.53 Even if a pilot project is reasonably successful on technical grounds, when top political leaders are not particularly committed one way or the other, then, as soon as it comes to the question of national implementation, a welter of political considerations will come into play. This is shown by an analysis of the community development pilot project at Etawah in India. 92/ Whereas the pilot project proceeded slowly and effectively in training personnel, focusing on a limited set of activities where it could be successful, and building up support in its own area, the shift to a national program altered this approach
for political reasons. To meet political imperatives felt by the Nehru government, the community development program was very rapidly expanded across the whole country and its rigorous focus was thereby lost. The implementation phase of a program therefore can encounter new political forces not present in the initial stages of program development. 93/.

5.54 The type of policy being implemented presents different degrees of political difficulty, and will require different amounts of political resources, as Cleaves has pointed out in his analysis of policy implementation in the developing countries. Unless a regime is rich in political resources, when it undertakes to assist the poor, it must either mobilize additional political resources or formulate the program in less resource-demanding terms. Fewer political resources will be required, according to Cleaves' analysis, for programs that are simpler, more incremental, have fewer actors and fewer goals, clearer and more limited goals, and quicker completion and payoffs. While making projects technically simple, and so on, may be regarded as "myopic" from a radical perspective, this is a way of approaching poorer sectors that is rather more "far-sighted," he suggests: "the point would be to adapt policy concepts and incentives to the interests of those who are to be benefited by the program." 94/

5.55 Bearing in mind what has just been noted, as part of the implementation process, it may be necessary to redesign programs. Where there is political resistance to a program or noncooperation from presumed beneficiaries, something needs to be done. A policy of simply pouring more resources into the program is likely to be less productive than changing the incentives, the channels of action, or even the technical concept. 95/ Too often, governments or international donors presume that they have correct and appropriate approaches to dealing with the problems of the poor. Yet this is an area of policy where knowledge is slim and success elusive. So it would be wise in the initial design of programs to provide for some redesign based on experience with the program during the course of implementation. Interestingly, in his analysis of "open," "closed" and "intermediate" types of political systems, discussed in 4.11-4.12 above, Cleaves finds political reason why some redesign may be needed for poverty-reducing programs in all three kinds of systems.

5.56 Another reason for having to pay attention to the base of political support during implementation is that maintaining funding usually requires continual demonstrations of support. These have to be made known to the legislature or the executive, or to whoever makes the budgetary allocations. If the program is financed by external sources, this obviates the need for mobilizing and exercising support at the outset. The often intense competition with other programs seeking funding is thereby avoided. But this may, on the other hand, make funding more difficult to obtain when external assistance is terminated, because commitments for funding have been built up within the political system to other programs. Potential supporters would have to drop support for other activities in order to assist in getting the additional program in question funded. For this reason, building up support to get some financial contribution from the host government even where foreign funding is involved makes great political sense. "Precedents" constitute claims of legitimacy and should be built up for funds as well as for authority.
5.57 Support cannot be taken for granted by program implementers. One of the oldest adages of politics is, "what have you done for me lately?" Also, one must reckon with the fact that people often have their own motives for supporting (or not supporting) a policy. It is also an old adage that "politics makes strange bedfellows." So endeavors to maintain political support during implementation must bear both prescriptions in mind. Even if a program has performed well by its own standards and would seem to deserve continued support from others, they are likely to face changing circumstances. New opportunities for investing their political resources come along, some of which can make a stronger claim on their support, given their core interests. Problems may develop in areas where they had thought they had been settled, and these may have to be attended to.

5.58 In politics as in economics, there is such an entity as effective demand, that which is backed by resources the actor is willing and able to expend on its behalf, in contrast to some kind of gross demand. Wants exceed the means of attaining them. So one cannot expect actors to be able to support effectively all activities that they have some interest in. Unless commitments of support are very firm, and grounded in direct material interest or staunch ideological values, they need to be nurtured and appropriately "monitored." Support which comes from different motivations than that of the program designers and implementers is usually less reliable than other kinds, but should not necessarily be passed over, bearing in mind its questionable reliability. Most coalition-building involves some elements of opportunism. The question to be weighed is whether the program must be compromised too much to warrant accepting certain support when that support is for a somewhat different kind of program. Also, there are some kinds of alliances that could cost other support. 96/

5.59 Where the political environment itself is changing rapidly, supporting coalitions may be undergoing rapid change. In the September workshop, one participant commented on the new program in Thailand to fund rural works at the local level, helping the poor by providing some income from employment and by building productive facilities. 97/ The motivation of the groups supporting this program was very diverse, and could only be deduced by their actions in implementation, a kind of "revealed preference." The coalitions and motives behind this program seemed to change from month to month, but it was going forward. Such situations present great difficulties to the project manager. But the point is that such fluidity also presents some opportunities to managers attuned to the workings of political processes.

5.60 The most reliable support is, as suggested, derived from those who have a direct material or strong ideological interest in the success of the program. For this reason, local organization for beneficiaries will as a rule be advisable in connection with program implementation. If successfully established, such organization can contribute both directly to implementation, and also to mobilizing support for the program. The establishment of such organization is, to be sure, often problematic, and itself may rise some political difficulties for the program. But as part of implementation, presumably resulting from program design, this element should be considered, especially in the case of those activities intended for the poor. The contribution of organized participation by beneficiaries in program implementation has not been studied very often on a systematic basis. But enough studies are available to indicate, first, that implementation is more successful,
particularly in getting benefits to those intended to receive them, where there is more participation in carrying out projects and programs, and, second, that this approach generally warrants incorporation into project design. 98/

5.61 For some programs, organization of beneficiaries is not particularly needed for the delivery of services to them. Persons can benefit from schooling, clinic visits, innoculations, food supplements or family planning services without being part of a group. But making these service deliveries most effective and most sustainable is another matter. Getting children (particularly those from poorer families) to maintain their attendance, raising supplemental funds for teaching materials, keeping facilities in repair, scheduling clinic hours so doctors come at a good time and the local people who need attention are there then, improving village sanitation, raising vegetables for school feeding programs, improving food preparation practices, and so on, are all activities that can be done better with organized efforts essentially on a volunteer basis. An example is provided by the local school, health and nutrition committees in Panama. Inasmuch as we find such services in demand, there is more basis for establishing organization around them than around some other kinds of programs.

5.62 An unresolved issue is whether it is better to construct organization around specific functions, such as education or health, or to organize multi-purpose associations. The breadth of functions and the success of Farmers Associations in Taiwan has provided an example of the latter approach, but even there, local development tasks are shared with Township Organizations (local government) and Irrigation Associations. 99/ Most experience seems to indicate that, at least initially, the organized participation of the poorer sectors is more likely to be instigated and sustained around specific activities that can benefit them. Further, since it is the case that the larger and more heterogeneous the organization, the more likely it is that the organization will be dominated by more advantaged persons, there is some reason to provide for organizations that are smaller and more homogeneous in social and asset status, as well as in function. These organizations may need some federative mechanisms to make themselves heard effectively, but that step can follow the establishment of functioning base-level organizations.

5.63 There can be no doubt that establishing local organization among the poorer section is a problematic task. There are many ways in which the effort can be rendered still-born or mutated. From below, the intended beneficiaries may remain indifferent, satisfied only to receive services without participating in any organization; they may even be not too concerned about the services themselves. Organizations, if established, may become the tools of certain factions or vested interests at the local level. 100/ Even where a government wishes to help the poor develop their productive skills, it is hard to alter the local social structure, often characterized by patron-client relations, through which a majority of benefits flow to patrons.

5.64 To the extent that such organizations are successful in becoming established, they may be co-opted by parties or other groupings for political purposes, either in support of, or in opposition to, a government. Internal political strife can undermine an organization established to assist the poor in improving their welfare and productivity by direct programmatic means. Not only the more affluent classes have the potential for exploiting the poor; some
of their own number may assert themselves as local bosses or caciques. Perhaps the most pervasive obstacle is the attitude of the educated sectors, particularly in the bureaucracy, that the poor are incapable of helping themselves. This lack of confidence in the poor is more than justified, and often rubs off on the poor themselves. 101/ The fact that such an attitude on the part of the bureaucracy is self-serving, that is, rationalizes a paternalistic approach to programs, only helps to reinforce it.

5.65 For all the difficulties just stated, we do find cases of successful organization to assist in the implementation of programs. The record is somewhat stronger with regard to construction activities, including school and health facilities, but we find human development activities included among the cases. Of particular encouragement is the fact that communities in some of the countries, thought to be the most "backward" because they are least educated, show a greater capacity to organize themselves to assist in program implementation than do others. 102/ There is a growing appreciation in professional development circles of the importance not just of providing goods and/or services but of fostering the capacity of people to plan and manage activities for themselves. This does not solve all the problems of implementation but rather in turn poses a different set. This capacity is itself an aspect of human development.
VI. CONCLUDING REVIEW

6.01 None of the various approaches to development -- industrial, agricultural, infrastructural, regional, institutional or any other -- are easy. If they were, we would have observed more progress. The reasons for slow (or no) progress are not just a matter of having the right technologies or sufficient resources to invest. Many reasons stem from the social and political frameworks shaping the behavior of individuals, groups and governments. The difficulties attached to a human resource approach to development are similar in many ways to those of other approaches. Some differences can nevertheless be identified in the political realm and these warrant consideration.

6.02 Since our primary concern is with poverty-reducing modes of development, this raises in itself a set of problems which are clearly more a matter of social and political factors than of limitations in technology and resources. If we look at poverty-oriented human development programs, we can assemble a combination of advantages and disadvantages that have to be dealt with during planning and implementation phases. Thought the difficulties to be handled are numerous, they are not overwhelming, and not greater than for other approaches. Indeed, there are in political terms some particular advantages of these programs, such as their externalities for nonpoor sectors, their largely positive-sum dynamics of distribution, their legitimacy, their divisibility and their complementarity.

6.03 If such programs are in part underwritten by external assistance, are backed up by extensions of the country's political and administrative infrastructure and strengthened by organization of their beneficiaries, the political balances and calculations which would otherwise tilt some regimes and political sectors against poverty-reducing programs can be offset. An approach to human development, on the other hand, which is oblivious to political dynamics and impedences is unlikely to result in successful programs or in a cumulative upgrading of human resources to the point that they can be regarded as "developed."

6.04 An appreciation of the fact that polities have structures and processes similar to those exhibited by economies should help in formulating a better strategic understanding. In most situations, the regime, through its authority and other resources, has more power and prominence than do sectors of the polity. But neither is it as sovereign and supreme as most official rhetoric would have us believe. Regimes need to acquire and produce resources for their maintenance and for the pursuit of policy objectives. Ideological commitments serve to point directions for policy, but the requirements of managing political resource stocks and flows, of mobilizing political capital, making political investments, and maintaining political solvency temper and often transcend ideological orientations.

6.05 Whereas the image of the political market, following economic metaphor, may suggest relatively free and equal exchange, with whomever will trade, political realities are different. Endowments of political resources are generally more unequal than those of economic resources. They include some economic resources, but these are amplified by differences
in status, education and access to authority. In politics one thinks not only about one's own well-being but also about that of others, which may be valued or feared. Political behavior is much more conditioned by what economists call "inter-dependence of utility functions," so there is some altruistic behavior and some which seeks to diminish possibility of other persons supporting unwanted policy.

6.06 Stratification is a fact of life, not just in terms of differentiation in assets and status but in priority accorded within the political system. Some sectors contribute strategic resources and personnel to the regime and are in a closer and more advantageous exchange relationship with it. Others are more distant and less favored. The question of which sectors are a part of the "core combination" supporting a regime is one which will affect the viability of human development programs, though the programs themselves can be tailored or characterized in ways that are more acceptable. The bureaucracy is usually close to the regime, if indeed not constituting it, and it is generally sympathetic to human development. This comes partly because of the value placed on education and health by such persons but also because the provision of these services strengthens the positions of this sector through greater employment and larger budgets. It is difficult to generalize about other key sectors, but generally organized labor will be supportive of such programs while agricultural landowners will not, given their respective political-economic interests. Military and commercial interests may be more or less supportive depending on whether the activity bolsters or weakens their position.

6.07 Government policies in any event tend to favor the better-endowed sectors, and to bypass those who are poorly endowed. Human development programs aim at enhancing the endowment of the later, not through material assets, but through increased knowledge, skills and vitality. With regard to assets, these programs are not redistributive, do not subtract from the position of others, but rather add to the position of those receiving program benefits. In relative terms, it is true, there may be some redistribution, and in financial terms, there is invariably competition for funding of different kinds of programs. In this sense the programs are in competition with other government activities, indeed in competition with each other, for a larger share of expenditure. Because the beneficiaries of poverty-oriented programs are themselves poorly endowed, and as a rule less well organized, they are a less influential constituency for such programs than are other sectors. Various approaches may be taken to compensate for this political weakness, but it is an important consideration in planning strategy that, unless the weakness is compensated for, such programs are hard to sustain and extend. Some of the advantages of these programs as poverty-reducing measures have been summarized at the beginning (0.17-0.18) and will be repeated here.

6.08 Foreign assistance can play a particularly useful role in promoting human development programs because its funding can alleviate the competition for program financing in which poorer sectors are at a political disadvantage. In effect it is not just a matter of providing economic resources, but of covering also whatever political deficit these programs present. The limits to this process are that the programs must sooner or later become
all, or largely, domestically financed. This means that political support
groups, usually in addition to the beneficiaries themselves, must be found
and enlisted, so that funding will be sustained.

6.09 Some improvement in, and expansion of, political and administrative
infrastructure appears an important augmenting strategy for poverty-oriented
programs. The political weakness of the poorer sectors stems not only from
their meager resource endowment but also from their existence largely
despite the political system. Some margin of the economic resources they
produce will accrue to the state, but they will have little participation in,
and little influence on, the system unless the bureaucracy, courts, communi-
cations systems, party organizations and elections (if there are any) and other
such institutions are open to, and engage, the poor. It is true that their
low level of human development is one of the reasons why the poor are so
little involved in the political system. As a result we encounter a political
variant of the "vicious circle of poverty" argument. The process of improvement
is nevertheless an iterative one, and is not dependent solely on human develop-
ment activities coming first. Making political and administrative infrastructure
more open and appropriate to the poor will, over time, make such programs less
an act of charity and more a matter of proper policy outputs of the state.

6.10 Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from political
analysis of poverty-reducing strategies is that in order to have and to
sustain such programs, some kind and degree of beneficiary organization and
participation are essential. This is a matter of developing people's capa-
bilities to manage their own affairs, to increase their productivity through
their own efforts, and to exert some influence on their own behalf. Such
capabilities are not developed sufficiently by programs which give or
distribute benefits unilaterally. Human development entails more than
knowledge and vitality. It involves interpersonal skills, self-sustaining
motivation, confidence in the possibility of goal attainment -- all character-
istics which require some kind of group experience and success. Programs
can be undertaken in a purely "top-down" mode of service delivery, but this
process represents a contradiction in approach.

6.11 We are mindful of the difficulties in promoting such organization
and participation, the oft-noted problems of domination by local elites,
factionalism, the making of excessive demands, and so forth. But the
biases and tensions within the social structure giving rise to these problems
do not disappear, and they can have just as much effect in impeding program
implementation in the absence of organization and participation. There are
various ways in which local organization can contribute to carrying out human
development programs, in particular by mobilizing some local resources for
construction of facilities, possibly by paying some of the recurrent expendi-
tures (a more likely approach if local people have been involved in the
planning and other decisionmaking), by getting better and more appropriate
utilization of services, and by improving maintenance because the programs
are viewed more readily as "theirs." Some of the experience reported by
World Bank staff for urban and rural development and for specific functions
like water supply support the idea that local organization and participation
are important for carrying out "administrative" tasks. 103/
6.12 In addition to such functions, beneficiary organization and participation seems crucial for the "political" support it can add to programs, making them politically more profitable to the government and better able to fend for themselves within the political process, especially as regards program funding. Local organizations as diverse as the production team, brigade and commune in China, the Farmers Association and Township Organization in Taiwan, Mothers' Clubs in South Korea, the land reform beneficiaries' cooperatives in Egypt, the Gezira Tennants Association in Sudan, the village health committees in Cameroon and Panama, the peasant unions in Venezuela, and the neighborhood committees in Cuba, have all contributed both to the working of development programs and to their viability within the political system. Some of these organizations are more patently "political" than others, but all serve a combination of political and administrative functions. None have been free from faults, but greater improvements in productivity and well-being have been possible with them than without them. Even when their activities have been primarily concerned with agriculture, they have concurrently contributed to human development.

6.13 It is evident that the environment in which development programs are undertaken is changing, and is far different from that of thirty, twenty, or even ten years ago. People's experience with the defaulted promises of development programs is now many times greater than before, and the extent of cynicism toward purely government-instigated activities has similarly grown. Such a trend becomes even more important in shaping people's behavior and responsiveness toward governmental programs. Human development is bound to increase to some extent the competition over how resources will be used. But such competition is likely to mount over time in any case. The central question is whether the poor majority will itself become a more effective contributor to increasing the volume of resources. The alternative is a more limited volume of resources, and apathy, indifference and withdrawal, still more, wasted minds and wasted bodies.

6.14 Human development is now receiving more attention as a strategy which offers both economic and political advantages over some of the more conventional approaches for GNP growth and a "trickle-down" of benefits. This does not mean that human development is easier to pursue than other approaches. But political analysis suggests that the political obstacles of pursuing this course should be somewhat less than with other poverty-reducing strategies. The political incentives for regimes are evident and substantial, and the costs by and large manageable. The main question is whether the measures introduced for human development will move beyond sectoral improvements of knowledge, health and nutrition and will lead to a population which is overall more skilled, motivated and confident, possessing the mental orientations and social capabilities now possessed mostly by the educated minority.

6.15 Such a transformation cannot and should not be divorced from creation of new power relationships. Human development programs not only affect productivity and well-being, but also power relations in a society. It should be clear that failing to support such programs and to increase channels for participation in the economic, social and political life of the nation is no guarantee that power redistribution will not come. Indeed, a transformation unheralded by human development efforts is likely to be more destructive, and less productive, for all involved.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Standardized Residuals</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Standardized Residuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>S. Yemen</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>Mauretania</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Republic</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>N. Yemen</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adult literacy rate (percent) and life expectancy, as well as per capita income from World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 1979). R^2 adjusted for degrees of freedom was 46.7 percent. Standardized residuals equivalent to measure of standard deviation in normal distributions.

**Note:** See discussion in footnote 11.
Table 2

STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS FOR P.Q.L.I. REGRESSED ON PER CAPITAL INCOME (1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Residual</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Residual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom. Republic</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P.Q.L.I. from Morris D. Morris, Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. Per capita income from World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 1979). $R^2$ adjusted for degrees of freedom was 50.6 percent. Standardized residuals are equivalent to measure of standard deviation in normal distributions. The rank-order correlation of these two sets of residuals (N = 32) is 0.93.

Note: See discussion in footnote 11.
FOOTNOTES

1/ "We have a number of case studies by now which show how illusory it was to hope that the fruits of growth could be redistributed without reorganizing the pattern of production investment first .... the evidence is unmistakable and the conclusion inescapable: divorce between production and distribution is false and dangerous. The distribution policies must be built into the very pattern and organization of production." Mahbub ul Haq, "Employment in the 1970s: A New Perspective," International Development Review (December 1971), p. 12.

2/ Aristotle's advice remains as relevant as when it was written: "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions .... It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits." The Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 3.

3/ Without burdening them with responsibility for the views and approach offered in this paper, the author would like to acknowledge and thank his colleagues Donald K. Emmerson (University of Wisconsin), Warren F. Ilchman (Ford Foundation), Jon Kraus (State University of New York, Fredonia), Joan Nelson (Johns Hopkins University), Norman Nicholson (Northern Illinois University and USAID), Samuel Popkin (University of California, San Diego) and Astri Suhrke (American University), also Michael Cohen, Paul Isenman, Peter Knight, Jacob Meerman, Susan Ueber Raymond, Adrian Wood and others on the staff of the World Bank for their contributions to a workshop held in Washington, September 28-29, 1979, and for follow-up comments and suggestions. Inputs have also been gratefully received from Milton J. Esman, Iliya Harik, Michael Latham, Marc Lindenberg and John D. Montgomery.

4/ This model has been presented in Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), and Norman Uphoff and Warren Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). The model looks like an application of economic terms and theory to politics, but the framework derives essentially from what is known as "organization theory," using economic concepts like capital, investment, infrastructure and profit. Politics is viewed as an enterprise, with decisionmakers mobilizing inputs (resources) which are combined to form various political or policy outputs. The perspective of the first book is more akin to microeconomics, while that of the second, looking more at system than enterprise productivity, is more related to macroeconomics. While the model appears to be an adaptation of neo-classical economic thinking to politics, it is equally congenial to neo-Marxian thinking for its concern with stratification and distributional outcomes. It embraces conflict theory more than the consensus theory of neo-classical economics and structural-functional sociology.

6/ In using the term "special publics," I am following the terminology proposed by Milton J. Esman and John D. Montgomery in their companion paper on the administration of human development. Their term avoided most of the undesirable connotations of the more common one, "target groups." It is preferable because it does not presume unilateral decisions on who is to be served, and how. The idea of target groups negates the principle that the poor should be involved actively in their own development. As Fred Golladay suggested in the September workshop noted above, human development is not something one does to other people, but something that is engaged in by governments, private agencies and the people themselves.

7/ Sam Popkin suggests that a genuine pursuit of maximum GNP growth would be a still more radical strategy, more threatening to the vested interests of now-privileged producers and administrators than would be a poverty-alleviating strategy. A forthcoming book by Robert Bates, *Public Policies Toward Agrarian Africa: Political Origins and Social Consequences*, details how growth has been constrained in Africa by prevailing policies and institutions, such as marketing boards, which in fact impede GNP growth. Policies aimed at doing away with such impediments would likely encounter immense resistance. The reference here is a comparsion with conventional "growth" strategies.

8/ On the dynamics of these actions, see Uphoff and Ilchman, op. cit. Part II.

9/ These resources are analyzed in Ilchman and Uphoff, op. cit., esp. Ch. 3. The idea of "political resources" is widely used in political science, but more descriptively than analytically. Our formulation is the only one aimed at inclusive but mutually exclusive categories such as are found in economics.


11/ The question of ideology as a determinant of human development outcomes will be taken up later, but here we might consider the results of some statistical analysis regressing a combined score for literacy and life expectancy on per capita income (N = 68), and Physical Quality of Life Index on per capita income (N = 32), as shown in Tables 1 and 2. Comparing standardized residuals we find among the outstanding cases (standardized residual > 1.0) a mix of communist, socialist and capitalist regimes. At the other extreme, among the North African countries we find the most radical regime, Algeria (-1.94), far below Tunisia (-1.13) and Morocco (-0.81, the
least progressive of the three. The implication drawn is not that more politically progressive regimes are less supportive of human development, since as a rule they are more supportive, but that there is no necessary or close connection between ideological orientation and human development performance.

12/ A classic example of this approach was Mexican President Cardenas' strategy of organizing workers and peasants in the middle 1930s behind his program of social and economic reform. This is insightfully (and quantitatively) analyzed by Wayne C. Cornelius, "Nation Building, Participation and Distribution: The Politics of Social Reform under Cardenas," in Gabriel A. Almond, ed., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp. 392-498. The peasant and worker organizations were used by subsequent regimes to control and to dampen lower class demands, as it turned out, though the reformist measures of the 1930s have helped to differentiate Mexico from, for example, Brazil (see Tables 1 and 2). In many countries of West Africa -- notably Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal -- leaders were able to mobilize and organize small farmers after World War II. The bringing of small farmers into the ruling party's base has also been key to its success in Kenya. See Geoff Lamb, Peasant Politics: Conflict and Development in Murang'a (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974). Perhaps the best-known example is Ghandi's mobilization of the untouchables (whom he christened harijans: "children of God") into the Indian Congress Party.

13/ The set of institutions considered as political and administrative infrastructure have the same relationship to political processes as the more familiar forms of infrastructure -- roads, telecommunications, power, etc. -- have for economic production and distribution. They increase the mobility of resources by reducing cost or time of movement, the predictibility of resources by furnishing information about their availability, productivity, cost, etc., and the convertability of resources by aggregating larger amounts than possible otherwise. See Ilchman and Uphoff, op. cit., Ch. 8.

14/ This analysis of political stratification in developing countries is introduced in ibid., Ch. 2. For applications in the housing and family planning policy areas, see Peter Cleaves, Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); and Jerry Weaver, "Family Planning Policy," Journal of Developing Areas (July 1978), pp. 415-37.

15/ Data on such allocations are generally hard to come by, but the following table analyzing planned and actual expenditure for housing under the Indian development plans, 1951 to 1969, broken down by different categories, shows not only a marked bias in allocating among sectors, but an even great bias in their actual expenditure. The weaker/lower sectors not only were allocated much less on a per capita basis, but did not even receive all the funds allocated to them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Allocation (million rupees)</th>
<th>Expenditure (million rupees)</th>
<th>Alloc. as % of Expend.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle income group housing</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental housing for central government employees</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidized housing for industrial workers and economically weaker sectors</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income group housing</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slum clearance and improvement</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land acquisition and development</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village (rural) housing</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidized housing for plantation workers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>2,804</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first two categories, covering about 5 percent of the population, receive about a quarter of expenditures; three quarters of the population have less than 5 percent of the expenditure. Figures are from ECAFE seminar paper on "Finance of Housing and Urban Development in India," Copenhagen, May 1970 (rows reordered), cited in Uphoff and Ilchman, op. cit., p. 117.

16/ This figure has been used in Warren F. Ilchman, Harold D. Lasswell, John D. Montgomery and Myron Weiner, Policy Sciences and Population (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 20. It is adapted from Uphoff and Ilchman, op. cit., pp. 3-5.

17/ Here, for the sake of exposition, the common term "target groups" is used with all its connotations of unilateral decisionmaking. The analysis in this paragraph and the two following draws on a paper the author prepared for the Sussex-IBRD seminar on Planning Models for Employment and Income Distribution, Bellagio, April, 1973, and was in part incorporated into the political analysis in H. Chenery, et al., Redistribution with Growth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

18/ These different dymanics are well demonstrated in an analysis of policy-making in the sub-area of higher education in postwar Japan. Comparing the sub-sub-areas of policies towards expanding enrollment, science and technology education, and decentralizing university administration, T. J. Pempel shows substantial differences in the structure of influence, the range of options, the interest groups involved, etc. See his Patterns of Japanese Policy Making: Experiences from Higher Education (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978).

19/ See discussion of these issues in Joan Nelson, Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). One of the conclusions drawn from successful experience using such organization in the case of Calcutta urban development, as reported on in the September workshop, was that donor-assisted projects themselves are not likely to make much difference in the channels of participation, such as through unions or tenant associations, or to provide additional opportunities for participation if such channels do not already exist within the country. Donor-aided projects can amplify and strengthen existing channels, it was suggested, but rarely create them.
This should be less in countries with socialist regimes, but it nevertheless appears there are difficulties in this regard. In the case of China, there have been continuing struggles over getting the bureaucracy to serve the redistributive policies of government under Mao Tsetung, and in Tanzania, similar problems have presented themselves despite the egalitarian goals of President Nyerere's regime. These are examined in Louise Fortmann, Peasants, Officials and Participation in Rural Tanzania: Experience with Villagization and Decentralization (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, 1980).

This point was made by Sam Popkin in the September workshop discussions.

One of the factors which contributed to the demise of Salvador Allende's regime in Chile was the opposition which bringing organized lower class sectors into the political system evoked among the middle and upper classes an opposition symbolized by a (middle and upper class) housewives' protest march against the regime.

"In general, it appears that the tolerance of relatively autonomous political organizations among the poorest sections of the population is an essential feature of the implementation of both gradual [incremental] and large-scale [radical] policies for change," concludes Peter Cleaves in his analysis of case experiences in Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, ed. Merilee Grindle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). His analysis, which emphasizes development for the poor majority, and the accompanying case studies, will be cited a number times below.


An analysis by the author of the budgets of Kwame Nkrumah's regime before its ouster in 1966 found that as his legitimacy and support declined, he cut the proportion of government expenditure budgeted for economic services, from 39 percent in 1965 to 27 percent in 1966, while raising social service expenditure from 21 percent to 32 percent (the social service share of the capital budget was boosted from 8 percent to 22 percent). Interestingly, the military government which replaced Nkrumah continued cutting economic services, to 16 percent in 1968-69, while holding social service expenditure at 33 percent. The Politics of Development, Neither 'Modernization' Nor 'Order', Tables 9-1 and 10-1 of book manuscript in preparation.


This reasoning is also undercut if persons believe that the status one is born into is the result of past merit or demerit in a previous life, as is taught in Hindu and Buddhist doctrines. In terms of political culture and public policy, however, it should be noted that some of the more egalitarian states today are India, Sri Lanka,
Burma, South Korea and Japan. My own village-level research in Sri Lanka during 1978-79 found two-thirds of rural respondents (N = 620) rejecting the idea that the poor should not get government assistance because they "deserved" their unfortunate position.


Some persons misreading Marx's "immiseration" thesis conclude that population growth among the lower classes, making them worse off, will increase their support for revolutionary politics. But Marx himself saw practically no such potential in the lumpenproletariat (see note 50 below), which is what is swollen by population growth. The desperate circumstances of members of this group shorten their time horizon and make them more vulnerable than revolutionary.

The ethnic controversy in Sri Lanka involving Sinhalese and Tamils has not, however, intruded into the population policy area. This can be attributed in part to the extensiveness and evenness of human development in that country. The population growth rate has come down from 3.2 percent in the early 1950s to half that rate currently as schooling, health care and food distribution come to pretty much cover the island. The secessionist activities of a minority of Tamils has not engaged the concentrated population of Tamil plantation workers, whose human development has languished, it should be added. The rate of population growth for this group has also not declined as rapidly.

This example may be somewhat extreme, but the evidence is sound and the implications important. When the World Fertility Survey was conducted in Nepal, one of the questions asked was whether the respondent knew where to go for family planning information. Only about 20 percent answered affirmatively. When parts of the survey were repeated by Gabriel Campbell and associates, rephrasing the questions to take into account cultural sensitivity, they asked where other persons in the village go for family planning information. About 80 percent gave a knowledgeable answer. The large majority therefore knew about family planning services, only they did not want to admit this publicly. (This study, carried out for USAID/Nepal, determined that non-sampling errors were much more significant than sampling errors. Accordingly, smaller samples with more careful anthropological and linguistic preparation would yield better information than surveys which attempt to acquire reliability and validity through large samples, no matter how scientifically selected these might be.)

See John D. Montgomery, "Food for Thought: On Appraising Nutrition Programs," Policy Sciences (8, 1977), p. 309. "Programs that depend on food fortification strategies (milk or rice or salt, for example) tend to elicit opposition from the producers, and even strong political leadership is necessary to sustain the momentum."

The analysis of nutrition programs by Montgomery, just cited, is one the few efforts in this direction.

In the Overseas Development Council's analysis of comparative "disparity reduction rates" (DDRs) for the period 1950s-1970s, these "conservative" regimes had some of the best results, along with "liberal" regimes like Costa Rica, Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. Near the bottom were one of the most "socialist" regimes, Algeria, and one of the most "liberal," Uruguay (at least through the early 1970s). See James P. Grant, Disparity Reduction Rates in Social Indicators (Washington: ODC, 1978).
Some questions have been raised about the DRR, suggesting that it correlates highly with initial level of Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI). The measure of standardized residuals, where literacy and life expectancy were regressed on per capita income, as reported in footnote 11 above and Table 1, does not suffer from this bias. The correlation between the residuals in Table 1 and the countries' per capita income level is only -0.12.

That analysis showed a similar heterogeneity of results. Of the 11 countries one or more standard residual units above the predicted level based on income level, four are communist, three are socialist and four are capitalist. By this measure, North Korea and Indonesia are about on a par. Some of the poorest performers are capitalist Senegal and Ivory Coast, but the poorest performance is by socialist Algeria. It is worth reporting that among the more developed countries, Frederic Pryor found that the level and pattern of public expenditure for social services does not vary significantly between communist and capitalist countries. See Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968).

In analyzing a policy area where ideology should show up most dramatically, land reform, Montgomery found in a systematic comparison of 30 country-cases that ideology, as well as other "typological" variables, was a less powerful explanation for the frequency of land reform benefits reaching small farmers than was the manner in which the regime proceeded to implement the land reform, whether or not it involved local people in the process. John D. Montgomery, "The Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Processes and Outputs," Administrative Science Quarterly (March 1972), pp. 62-75.

42/ See the quantitative analysis of experience in 44 countries by McKinlay and Cohan. In addition to this general finding, they found that military regimes had been established across all levels of economic performance. Moreover, there was little about the form of competition or structure of military regimes that could explain the variation in levels of relative economic performance. No consistent evidence was found of more successful performance by any particular executive type or particular type of civilian groups involved with the military. See R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan, "Economic Performance of Military Regimes: Cross-National Aggregate study," British Journal of Political Science (July 1976), pp. 291-310; also "Performance and Instability of Military and Non-Military Regime Systems," American Political Science Review (September 1976), pp. 850-64.

43/ In a number of countries -- Egypt, Ethiopia, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Somalia, Sudan and Syria, for example -- "progressive" military regimes have introduced significant land reforms and/or human development measures. Case studies are being published in symposium proceedings, being edited by Jon Kraus, on Reformist and Radical Military Regimes. But these regimes represent a wide variety of ideological orientations and came to authority under different circumstances and with the support of various sets of sectors. So the category is a heterogeneous one.

Ugalde and Emrey, *ibid.*; see also Ueber Raymond, *Health and Policymaking in the Arab Middle East*, *op. cit.*

By common convention, force backed up by some claim of legitimacy is regarded as "coercion," while that lacking legitimacy is accordingly seen as "violence." The first implies that compliance with it should be more readily forthcoming. See Ilchman and Uphoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-73.

This became clear from the author's comparative study of civilian and military regimes in Ghana. Some evidence of the anxiousness of the military government which ousted Nkrumah to please the populace was cited in footnote 26 above. Recurrent expenditure as a percent of total went from 60 percent in 1965 to 85 percent by 1968-69 as the successor government proved less willing or able to curb public consumption than Nkrumah had been. See also the comparative analyses by McKinlay and Cohan cited in footnote 42.


This classification follows the lines suggested by Astri Suhrke for our workshop in September.

Rapid population growth as a rule swells the ranks of what Marx called the lumpenproletariat. These persons are at the bottom of society because they are unemployed or employed only in insecure and miserable work. This is due in part to their being in "surplus" but also to their being uneducated, poorly nourished and beset with various ills. The lack of nutrition and social services for them is attributable at least in part to their numbers, though the form of economic organization is most important. Some persons look to such "immiseration" as the stimulus for revolution. But if one follows Marx's own analysis, this group may make for some disturbances but it is not a threat to the system. These people cannot produce sufficient leadership and sustained action to change the system, in his view. The circumstances in which social revolution is possible are quite unusual, not created by the growth of an underclass per se. See John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); and Theda Skojpol, "France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (April 1976), pp. 175-210.
Nationalist military officers established a national pharmaceutical corporation (CEME) in Brazil, intended to provide inexpensive drugs and medication to the poor, an endeavor which unfortunately was sabotaged by foreign corporations. On this, see Robert Ledogar, *Hungary for Profits: U.S. Food and Drug Multinationals in Latin America* (New York: IDOC, 1975), pp. 67-71.

See Weaver, "Family Planning Policy," *op. cit.*, pp. 421-23.

A symposium review of African trade union experience has led one of the original proponents of the "labor aristocracy" thesis to reconsider that argument. See concluding chapter by John S. Saul and case studies in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen, eds., *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975). See also Nelson, *Access to Power*, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-56, on conditions that make organized labor more separate or more attuned to the majority of urban poor. In Africa, the large majority of union members are objectively part of the poor.


The Ashanti Region of Ghana throughout this century has been a major producer of cocoa, and has thus contributed more than other regions to that country's government revenue. In the 1950s, there were efforts made to expand government expenditure for educational, health and other services to that region on the grounds described here. To butt this regional claim up, there was a demand for a federal form of government, so that some authority over services could be exercised within the region. This became a very explosive political issue, the more so because ethnic differences corresponded to regional lines. But in the end no regional authority was granted. Public services, as indicated by the number of hospital beds per 1,000 population, were equal to the national average. *Economic Survey, 1964* (Accra: Government Printer).

Adult literacy is higher than 80 percent in the countries listed compared with an average of about 40 percent for the other developing countries listed in *World Development Indicators* (Washington: World Bank, 1979), Table 23. The other developing countries with over 80 percent literacy, which were less politically competitive, were Argentina, Paraguay, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.

The following analysis was particularly aided by Joan Nelson in the workshop discussions and in subsequent written comments. The discussion in this section has benefited from the author's earlier opportunity to review the manuscript of Merilee Grindle's edited volume on *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). It presents a valuable set of case studies and comparative analysis, including several human development cases. The concluding analysis by Cleaves has been referred to already above (4.11). The reader is also referred to the accompanying contribution to this Working Paper by Esman and Montgomery.
Grindle’s volume (see the preceding footnote) focuses on three aspects of the process: how the program was initially conceived, how clear and feasible were its objectives within the given environment; what strategy was formulated for implementation, involving what organizations, staff, etc.; and how was the program introduced in the field, how were eligible beneficiaries chosen, what local political pressures emerged, etc. One of the few systematic efforts concerning a human development area and dealing with various tasks of program development, is Montgomery’s article "Food for Thought: On Appraising Nutrition Programs," op. cit. It focuses on actors and sequences in setting up a national nutrition strategy-cum-program, on targets and clients, and on systems and decisions.

"The great problem, as we understand it, is to make the difficulties of implementation a part of the initial formulation of policy. Implementation must not be conceived as a process that takes place after, and independently of, the design of policy. Means and ends can be brought into somewhat closer correspondence only by making each partially dependent on the other." Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 143.

For a discussion of how such a shift from decision making at the national level to implementation at the local level can alter the cast of actors and produce very different incentives, see the case study by Irene Fraser Rothenberg, "Administrative Decentralization in the Implementation of Housing Policy in Colombia," in Grindle, op. cit. Conditions of party competition and rapid turnover of local government personnel fundamentally altered and impeded the context of implementation from that which had been envisioned at the national level.

An excellent demonstration of this in the context of U.S. policy implementation is Gary Orfield’s study, The Reconstruction of Southern Education (New York: John Wiley, 1969). He shows how civil rights groups and their allies could secure favorable legislation but could not sustain their influence throughout the implementation process.

See Pressman and Wildavsky, op. cit., Ch. 6.


Cleaves was discussing particularly the experience from Perlman’s case study of "inconclusive" government programs in Brazil to improve the housing of the urban poor, who had not been otherwise involved in the program design process. "In this case, the subdued antipathy of Brazilian favelados (urban squatters) toward their new dwellings sabotaged the government’s stated intentions and actually exacerbated many of the problems that relocation was to resolve." Ibid. Similar experience is reported from the efforts of the Egyptian government to relocate inhabitants living below the Aswan dam.

"Many groups that are asked to change their behavior for implementors to succeed, however, have distinct outlooks. Like the Peruvian peasants who choose to cultivate small individual plots rather than cooperative tracts, or the Brazilian favelados who prefer shanties to concrete apartment
buildings, these target populations have a clear understanding of what is and is not in their interests. In the past two decades, academicians, policymakers and political activists have discovered that groups they once called 'marginal' ascribe to rationality norms that are short-term, not long-term; individual rather than collective; and material, not idealistic. These values are engendered by a situation of poverty and resource scarcity over centuries conditioning family attitudes, religion and status norms. It has become a truism that 'traditional behavior' has an internal logic that maximizes short-term security and tends to reject new behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with it." Ibid.

Some project staff of the World Bank have found that the nutritional status and needs of certain groups may be passed over in surveys because it is impolitic to identify problems with certain ethnic groups or regions. Or surveys may not be taken during the rainy season when the nutritional deficits of the least advantaged groups are greatest, or simply those near roads may be surveyed, introducing a bias into program design which does not give enough weight to the unsurveyed populations.

During the Frei regime in Chile, the government used volunteers from universities and Christian Democratic party youth cadres to make detailed inventories of education facilities and enrollment projections, constructing an index of potential demand relative to existing school capacity. When the usual kind of demands for more schools were made based on "patronage" considerations by MPs or other political figures, the Ministry would show them an index of relative need for more schools within the country. This reduced the legitimacy of their claims and eventually the number of such claims. An additional benefit was that the presence of the volunteer data collectors in rural and poor urban areas, so long neglected, stimulated interest in political participation and spurred parents' efforts to enroll their children in school. See Ernesto Scheifelbein, "The Politics of National Planning: The Chilean Case," Educational Planning, 1:3 (January, 1975), pp. 27-34.


Some of this experience and attendant issues are discussed in Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1975) Ch. 7. On the politics surrounding self-help projects such as schools and health facilities, see Frank Holmquist, "Class Structure, Peasant Participation and Rural Self-Help," in Joel Barkan and John Okumu, eds. Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 129-53. See also Prachanda P. Pradhan, People's Participation and Rural Public Works in Nepal (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural
Recall also the experience reported from India (2.16) where the maintenance of facilities and the willingness of beneficiaries to contribute financial resources improved after they were involved in the planning process for urban redevelopment.

This point is succinctly made by W. Arthur Lewis in Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1966, p. 103) where he suggests that decentralizing decisions and financial responsibility will draw a closer connection in people's minds between services and taxes: "The obvious link between use and taxes not merely keeps use in check; but usually makes people more willing to pay more taxes in order to have services which they value." Such an approach should help to keep down "irresponsible" or "excessive" demands.

On problems with this approach, see Janice Perlman, "The Failure of Influence: Government Policy toward Brazilian Favela Dwellers," in Grindle, op. cit. Participation by local people in initial decisions, as well as other kinds of participation is discussed in John M. Cohen and Norman Uphoff, "Participation's Role in Rural Development: Seeking Clarity through Specificity," World Development (March 1980).

Several years ago, a water supply system for the capital city of a Middle Eastern country was designed without a single water tap in the poorer sections of the city. The project was being designed to be self-financing, and it was assumed the poor could not or would not pay for water; so no access to the scheme was planned for them. (No effort had been made to consult the excluded population, who actually often paid for water carried into their quarter.) The plans were changed when the donor expected to fund the project became aware of this "technical" design feature. The political implications of such a distribution pattern would have been adverse for the donor, given its policy directives to assist the poor.

One of the few treatments of this issue is by John D. Montgomery, Technology and Civic Life: Making and Implementing Development Decisions (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1974), Ch. 6. He analyzes decisions with respect to the technique to be used, the organizational channel through which the activity will be conducted, and the incentives used to get cooperation from relevant publics.

On some of the private costs of "free" public education, see Jacob Meerman, Public Expenditure in Malaysia (London: Oxford University Press, 1979).

The first study compared two training programs in Ethiopia receiving external aid. The first was set up to train agricultural extension agents and was operated in a way that foreign and host government personnel were quite pleased with it. But it was less effective than a health training program which placed teams of health workers into the field as part of interdisciplinary teams, producing persons motivated and prepared for arduous rural health service. The first project was "efficient" in its use of resources according to conventional project standards, whereas the second was "effective," sacrificing orderliness and Western appearance at the training center in favor of giving trainees more practical experience

The second study examined the bias toward higher technology which donors exhibit and which was shared and amplified by technical and administrative staff of the recipient country, Bangladesh. Fewer communities and even fewer districts were served as a result of passing over a more labor-intensive process for constructing tubewells which technicians depreciated as "unmodern" and "messy." Not only was much less employment created in the more capital-intensive process, but maintenance and utilization were less for having installed wells without local participation and learning. See John W. Thomas, "The Choice of Technology for Irrigation Tubewells in East Pakistan," in C. Peter Timmer, ed., *The Choice of Technology in Developing Countries: Some Cautionary Tales* (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1975), pp. 31-57.


84/ In this regard, Montgomery observes "there is no evidence to support the naive expectation that a sincere interest in the poor on the part of political leaders is a precondition to program success in nutrition. The motives of President Marcos and the First Lady of the Philippines became irrelevant when politicians at the village and province levels became active supporters of a program that was so obviously generating popular support on its own, especially in view of its modest cost to the national budget. The Thai government also found that local action supplies a momentum for continued operation of its pre-school nutrition program, with the result that political wisdom dictated program continuity. The coalition built behind the Indonesian program, too, appears to extend beyond the immediate political reach of the president." Ibid., pp. 308-09.

85/ Ibid., p. 308.

86/ In the September workshop, the family planning program in Indonesia was pointed out as a good example of building up a coalition within the bureaucracy to support this activity. A board had been set up which claimed to be a purely coordinating body for all the concerned ministries. Each had its representative on the board and was persuaded that the body posed no threat to its bureaucratic domain. Considerable funds came in from foreign donors, and these were channelled into various programs. Over time, an effective agency was built up, with close relations with all the participating ministries.


88/ See discussion in Wildavsky, Budgeting, ibid., Chs. 17 and 18. Wildavsky concludes: "PPBS has failed everywhere and at all times." (p. 363).

89/ Montgomery puts the matter this way with regard to implementing nutrition programs: "The actors and their characteristic roles change as policies move through successive phases of program and project interventions. Once the initiating actors have played their parts, their roles often turn only passive, latent and supportive; other subsequent functions of the policy process begin to call for different styles of decision-making." "Food for Thought," op. cit., p. 309.

90/ "Coordination takes place in the Philippines through a semi-private center whose links were transferred from the Presidency to ministerial channels in 1976, with no apparent loss; in Indonesia, the Planning Agency coordinates both agency and interagency planning, while the Ministry of People’s Welfare performs a similar function for operations; and in Thailand, both functions are coordinated in the Ministry of Health. Wherever it is situated, coordination is essential in nutrition programs because most of their activities are budgeted and performed by independent organizations." Ibid.
See David Pyle, "From Pilot Project to Operational Program in India: The Problems of Transition," in Grindle, op. cit. The pilot project was conducted quite successfully by a private voluntary organization, but the Ministry of Health was not disposed to carry it through. There were also many procedural and logistical difficulties that arose in the implementation, such as suggested in 5.50 above.


It appears that one way to kill a program is to expand it rapidly from small to large scale, killing it with kindness, so to speak. The land reform program in Nepal, started in 1963 with some success in three districts, was stretched within a few years to the whole country, before a cadre of experienced administrators had been built up and while procedures for dealing with cadastral and other problems were still being worked out. It is possible that the expansion was deliberately undertaken in order to dilute and dissipate the program.

"Implementation Amidst Scarcity and Apathy: Political Power and Policy Design," op. cit. The variables he deals with were discussed in 5.09 above.

See Montgomery, Technology and Civic Life, op. cit.

An example would be, when working in a region that is particularly poor, to gain support from leaders of a regional faction (ethnic or language) that is glad to have anything done in its area, though it may not understand or appreciate the program's aid to the poor. Getting involved with regionalism, and possibly secessionism, could be very damaging politically.

A description of the program can be found in Far Eastern Economic Review (December 1, 1978), pp. 44-45, and ibid. (January 5, 1979), p. 43.


See Benedict Stavis, Local Rural Governance and Agricultural Development in Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, 1974); a revised version will appear in Rural Development and Local Organization in Asia, Vol. II, ed. Norman Uphoff (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1980, forthcoming). See also his analysis, People's Communes and Rural Development in China, 1974, also to appear in Vol. II. The multi-functional communes and brigades build on the smaller, more homogeneous production teams, and are supplemented by political organization of the Communist Party and Poor and Middle Peasant Associations.

These problems are examined in Uphoff et al., Feasibility and Application of Rural Development Participation, op. cit., Ch. 3; and Nelson, Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations, op. cit.
101/ See the analysis of this process among the urban poor in Guatemala City by Roberts, Organizing Strangers, op. cit.; also discussion in Nelson, op. cit.

102/ On self-help activities, Holmquist reports: "Perhaps the most important lesson of the remarkable self-help efforts in Kenya up to now, and in Tanzania shortly after independence, was that the peasantry could accomplish rather staggering feats of development if the political environment provided minimally favorable conditions." "Class Structure, Peasant Participation and Rural Self-Help," op. cit., p. 137. We would also note the experience in the rural sectors of Iran, Nepal and Ethiopia, societies noted for their feudal social structure extending into the modern era. Grace Goodell's unpublished Ph.D. thesis shows how a village freed from landlordism and not incorporated into the Iranian government's oppressive "new villages" was quite able to manage its own affairs; "The Elementary Structures of Political Life," Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, 1978. See also Prachanda Pradhan, "Baglung Suspended Bridges: Outcome of People's Participation in Nepal," Rural Development Participation Review, Summer, 1979, pp. 13-14; and John M. Cohen, John W. Mellor and Arthur A. Goldsmith, Revolution and Land Reform in Ethiopia: Peasant Associations, Local Government and Rural Development (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, 1976). In Latin America, Panama has shown some good results with its programs in rural areas through school, health and other committees at the local level; see Henry Bassford, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Panama," in Jon Kraus, ed., Reformist and Radical Military Regimes, forthcoming.

103/ Refer to various experiences reported to the September workshop, already cited in this paper; see also Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development, op. cit., and Village Water Supply: A World Bank Paper, op. cit.

104/ On China and Taiwan, see Stavis, op. cit., and on Panama see Bassford, op. cit. The Mothers' Clubs have been described in Frances F. Korten and Sarah Young, "The Mothers' Clubs of Korea," in Managing Community-Based Population Programmes (Kuala Lumpur: International Committee of Management of Population Programmes, 1978), pp. 43-54. The Egyptian land reform cooperatives have been described in Iliya Harik, The Political Mobilization of Peasants: Change in an Egyptian Village (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974). Little has been written on the Gezira scheme recently, but see chapter by Nelson Kasfir on the Sudan in Kraus, op. cit. Less appears available on the Cameroon committees, reported to me in discussions with staff of the Pan-African Institute for Development, Douala. See also John Duncan Powell, Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Douglass Butterworth, "Grassroots Political Organization in Cuba: A Case of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution," in Latin American Urban Research, vol. 4, eds. Wayne Cornelius and Felicity Trueblood, Berkeley: Sage, 1974, pp. 183-203. For other cases, see David Korten, "Community Social Organization in Rural Development" (Manila: Ford Foundation, mimeo), October 1979, pp. 22-50.
APPENDIX

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The following is an illustrative classification of human development programs. The activities are listed as (a) direct programs, (b) supporting programs, and (c) contributing programs. The interrelatedness of these programs becomes evident from a look at the third category. Examples are given in parentheses.

I. EDUCATION SECTOR

   A. Direct Programs

      1. Base level (primary) education.
         a. Expansion of existing system.
         b. Improvement of existing system: upgrading materials, upgrading teachers, reducing dropouts (esp. girls) (eg., UNICEF program in Sri Lanka for small schools).
         c. Modification of existing system (e.g., making schools into rural development centers in Nepal).

      2. Middle-level (secondary) education
         a. Expansion of existing system.
         b. Improvement of existing system (some out-of-school training).
         c. Modification of existing system (re-orientation to providing management skills for public and private sectors).

      3. Tertiary (post-secondary) education
         a. Expansion of existing system (may serve basic needs as with decentralized expansion of Tribhuvan University in Nepal).
         b. Improvement of existing system (increased access to rural and disadvantaged groups through special programs, esp. women).
         c. Modification of existing system (shift to technical subjects, agriculture, sciences, accounting, administration; may not be successful without change in reward/opportunity structure).

      4. Vocational (technical) education
         a. Expansion of existing system.
         b. Improvement of existing system (linkage to employment and employers).
         c. Modification of existing system (more "rural" orientation).
5. **Nonformal education**
   
a. Expansion of existing program (such as literacy programs).

b. Improvement of existing programs (increased effectiveness).

c. Modification of existing programs (getting into community consciousness-raising, regarding whole community as clientele).

**B. Supporting Programs** (relate to more than one of the programs above).

1. Producing better (more relevant) educational materials.

2. Teacher training (philosophy as well as skills).

3. New technologies (radio, television, cassettes, etc.).

4. Changing examination-orientation of school systems.

5. Increasing "through-put" of systems by giving more incentives; devising "second-chance" sequences.

6. Adapting indigenous languages to educational uses (as done in Francophone West Africa, according to IBRD Educ. panel report).

7. Community involvement in school programs, direction and support.

8. Feedback systems with persons employing and/or teaching a system's graduates to assess how to improve each level.

9. Linking all education to development tasks, esp. rural development.

10. Linking school programs to other development activities, such as health, agricultural extension, nutrition.

11. Educational administration, improvements in training and supervision.

12. Planning exercises to improve access to education, such as school mapping.

**C. Contributing Programs**

1. Nutrition programs improving learning ability of students otherwise malnourished and debilitated or distracted from learning.

2. Population programs reducing family size and putting less strain on schools' resources, also contributing to better nutrition of the nth child who can then learn better.

3. Health improvement reducing absenteeism from school, and also improving learning ability of otherwise debilitated children.
4. Economic improvement so that child's labor is not so essential to family maintenance (reducing pressure for dropping out) and so there is more demand for educated youth in employment.

II. HEALTH SECTOR

A. Direct Programs

1. Curative Programs.
   a. Expansion of existing, hospital-centered programs.
   b. Improvement of outreach of existing programs (use of paraprofessionals, for example).
   c. Modification of existing systems (introducing systems of rural health centers with effective referral system, and use of paraprofessionals; note such modified systems usually will depend on effective conventional base).

2. Preventive Programs.
   a. Immunization against communicable diseases (measles, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, polio, tuberculosis, etc.).
   b. Control of communicable diseases (mostly parasitic) by vector control, chemotherapy (periodic de-worming) (malaria, echinococcosis, trypanosomiasis, onchocerciasis, filariasis, etc.).
   c. Pre-natal care of mothers, screening high-risk pregnancies.
   d. Industrial medicine and accident prevention (iron supplement for fieldworkers liable to hookworm anemia).
   e. Public health education, aimed at ages 6-10 while still in school.
   f. Public health and sanitation programs (latrine construction).
   g. Epidemiological surveillance, with emergency campaign capability (mass immunization against meningitis in Brazil).

B. Supporting Programs

1. Training medical personnel, from doctors to paramedics.
2. Improvement of laboratory and diagnostic facilities and personnel.
3. Extending and possibly subsidizing pharmaceutical services.
4. Research on control of communicable diseases (esp. parasites).

C. Contributing Programs

1. Improved housing and water supply.
2. Improved income, and with it, improved nutrition.
3. Improved education, as basis for health education.
4. Reduced population growth, putting less strain on health services, and improving maternal health in particular.
III. NUTRITION SECTOR

A. Direct Programs

1. Food Distribution (primarily aimed at calory sufficiency)
   a. General population.
   b. Target groups (drought-stricken, or poor).
   c. Children (pre-school or in-school).
   d. Pregnant mothers (may include supplementation).

2. Food Subsidization.
   a. General food subsidies.
   b. Subsidization of food consumed only by poor.
   c. Subsidization of infant food (conflicts with breast-feeding).

3. Nutrition rehabilitation (for severely malnourished)
   a. Community kitchens.
   b. Hospitalization.

4. Food Supplementation.
   a. Prophylaxis (e.g., iodization of salt, or adding Vitamin A to sugar in Costa Rica and Guatemala, to prevent goiter or blindness).
   b. Fortification (e.g., iron in flour for bread or chappattis, or adding vitamins to sugar).

5. New foods (e.g., Nutribun in Philippines, Incaparina in Central America, or soya milks in Asia).

6. Nutrition education to improve or change dietary habits.
   a. Encouragement of breast-feeding, backed by appropriate policies.
   b. Improved food preparation and storage methods.
   c. Greater use of locally available foods with high vitamin content.

B. Supporting Programs

1. National program for monitoring and evaluation of nutritional status of specific groups (by age, sex, ethnic status, etc.).

2. Basic research on family food practices, sex roles, etc. (finding in India that children's nutritional status was better if ceteris paribus some of household income was earned by mother, and if household owned even a little land).

3. Better industrial processes (e.g., parboiling and minimum milling of rice).
C. **Contributing programs.**

1. Increased agricultural production, and/or reduced food waste.

2. Changed agricultural production, toward more efficient calory and protein provision, particularly of foods consumed by poor.

3. Income improvement through employment generation or income supplements of persons at risk of malnutrition (ration book system or food stamps).

4. Improved water supply and waste disposal (gastro-intestinal diseases and infestation account for major loss of nutrients).

5. Reduced family size through population programs.

6. Better and more education to improve nutritional education efforts.

7. Better social work capability for working with poor families (severe malnutrition usually associated with socially disrupted homes in addition to poverty).

IV. **POPULATION SECTOR**

A. **Direct Programs**

1. Contraception.
   a. Government clinics.
   b. Private sector (Indonesia).

2. Sterilization.
   a. Incentives (tax, bonus, etc.)
   b. Services.

3. Abortion.

B. **Supporting programs**

1. Family planning education and propaganda (general public).

2. Sex education (in schools).

3. Incentives for reduced family size (no free schooling for additional children, income bonuses for small families, etc.).

C. **Contributing programs**

1. Women's education, as well as general improvement in education.

2. Women's employment opportunities.
3. Improved health, reducing infant mortality in particular, such as maternal-child health (MCH) programs.

4. Improved nutrition (contribution indirect through increased infant survival; 1973 PAHO study in Brazil found 60–70 percent of infant deaths nutrition-related).

5. Improved income levels and distribution, affecting people's life-chances and their perception of these.
PART II

PAYING FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Jacob Meerman
Public Finance Division
Development Economics Department
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. FINANCING FULL COVERAGE</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Costs of Human Development</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Revenues</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Human Development Shortfall</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Rationale for State Intervention</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Cash Transfers</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Social Security Organization</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Taxes and the Poor</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONS</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Standards</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Resources</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Legislation</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Health Care</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Nutrition</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Education</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. SHARING THE BURDEN AT LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Decentralization</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Queuing for Human Development</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Incremental Costs of Full Coverage</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Recurrent Costs</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Foreign Lending for Local Costs</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I. Suggestions for Research</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 2. A Graphical Illustration of the Basic Argument</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This background paper addresses the issues of financing associated with the nationwide programs of human (resource) development. It is specifically concerned with the financing of programs in education, health care, nutrition, and family planning. Although the treatment is eclectic, stress is placed on the significant issues and situations which need discussion. No attempt is made to review the fairly well developed set of published material which, in part, discuss financial aspects of human development on a sector-by-sector basis.1/ In taking a more comprehensive or general perspective, this paper to some extent begins where the sector papers end. It also complements the discussion of general political considerations impinging on human development programs presented in the preceding paper, and provides a background to the specific treatments of administration, social and cultural influences, and the role of the family found in the papers that follow. The purpose of this initial section is to introduce the organization of the present paper and to provide a summary of its main findings.

A. Introduction

Many kinds of possibilities for financing are discussed in the paper. Interventions which work in one place are unthinkable elsewhere. It is a long way—culturally, politically, and administratively—from, say, Singapore to Ethiopia. The difficulties encountered in carrying through many interventions are often serious, but not necessarily obvious. A multi-disciplinary approach to issues of human development financing would, therefore, appear desirable. Using such an approach, one would initially consider all the interesting possibilities for financing. This step could be followed by a consideration of their cultural feasibility; administrative problems could be the next to be considered and, finally, political feasibility. To carry out such an analysis would require classification and discussion by the three basic variables of culture, administration, and politics. In part because

---

1/ Much of this material is found in World Bank sector and policy papers, which usually include a discussion of issues of financing for the sector in question from the perspective of the central government. They also frequently provide references to other published materials dealing with financial issues. See World Bank, Education Sector Policy Paper (1979); Health Sector Policy Paper (1980); Nutrition, Basic Needs and Growth, Agriculture and Rural Development Department (1979); Village Water Supply (1976); Population Planning, Sector Working Paper (1977); Basic Needs, An Overview, Policy Planning and Program Review Department (1979); Appropriate Sanitation Alternatives, A Technical and Economic Appraisal, Energy, Water and Telecommunications Department (1979). [References cited will be found at the end of this paper.]
of the coverage in the companion papers, the present paper represents no such heroic undertaking. It concentrates largely on economic constraints, although administrative considerations (addressed in the following paper) receive some attention, and to some small degree politics (discussed in the preceding paper) also enters the picture. Culture, politics, and administration are nevertheless very important sectors. They help explain why the implementation of the many economically attractive financing possibilities suggested in this paper is feasible in only a small minority of the developing countries.

This paper does not consider alternative, more "organic," routes to human development, such as growth which rapidly increases the wages of the unskilled, or even growth per se. The question of compatibility or competition between public interventions to support directly the human development of households and these other routes is beyond the scope of the paper, although such consideration might alter some of its implicit recommendations.

The possibility of increasing various kinds of taxes as a principal means to fund human development is but briefly considered. The principles of taxation are well known, and the conclusions to be drawn from tax analysis are largely independent of the uses to which tax revenues are put. Further, as will be sketched out in the body of this paper, there is strong evidence that most of the low-income countries are already taxing at close to their fiscal capacities as determined by the pattern of their production, in which hard-to-tax traditional agriculture predominates; and by their generally weak tax administrations. In contrast to this state of affairs, a large number of nontax financial problems and opportunities associated with human development have hitherto not been examined closely. For this reason the concentration in the paper is on such nontax aspects of the financing of human development.

Taxes are, however, considered in another context. Taxation of the poor, as an inevitable by-product of general taxation, may seriously contribute to malnutrition and to other negative effects on their development as human beings. In some countries, taxation may reduce the incomes of households whose members are spending 80 percent or more of their incomes on food by a quarter or more. More attention is needed to determine in greater detail just what the tax burdens of the poor are, and to what degree changes in the tax systems could be made to reduce especially onerous burdens.

The organizing principle of the paper is the analysis of costs and of the resources needed to cover those costs. The paper begins in section II with a general estimate of the costs to the central government of funding human development. These costs depend upon several variables:
Most of these variables are briefly considered in section II. (They are all discussed in detail in sections IV through VI.) The analysis in section II then moves to the resource side and considers the question of covering the costs with central government domestic resources—particularly taxes. The conclusion is that for low-income countries costs of human development will far exceed their resources, if they rely primarily on central government funding. (The argument is also presented in a simple mathematical formulation as Appendix 2.) This conclusion sets the stage for the ensuing survey of ways to reduce the central government burden which accounts for the bulk of the paper (sections IV, V, and VI), while Appendix 1 contains some suggestion for further analysis. Section III provides background material prefatory to that survey.

B. Summary

1. Costs of Full Coverage

What are the demands on public resources of modest programs of human development which cover, say, 95 percent of the population? It is difficult to give an uncontroversial answer to this question, for, inevitably, the answer involves a great deal of judgment. The estimate in this paper assumes an entirely central government financial strategy, which would require government expenditure in a range of 11 to 21 percent of gross national product (GNP). Most governments in lower-income countries are in no position to devote resources to human development equal to even the lower bound of this range. Usually, the entire flow of resources commanded by the central governments—including foreign assistance—will be less than 22 percent of GNP. These resources must also finance economic services such as transport and communications, as well as the outlays for administration and security. Usually less than a third of the total available is committed to human development programs.

If the current resources available for human development are very inadequate, and if taxes are close to the limit, are there alternatives?
The answer is yes, to some extent, and much of this paper discusses those alternatives. These include such options as private activity, the potential for legislation, and pricing mechanisms to cover full costs. For this reason the title of the paper is "Paying for Human Development" to avoid the suggestion that these activities should be an exclusive undertaking of the central government but rather to permit an interpretation in which the issues of financing should be seen in the broader context as a problem to whose solution the entire economy, with its many and diverse agents, might contribute.

In part, the alternatives are considered from the perspective that the best-off families -- at least in mixed economies -- can largely finance human development by using their own resources, that is without public subsidy. This is the case for food, health care -- including water and sanitation -- and, to some degree, for primary education. In market-oriented countries, the problem can be regarded as one of developing institutions which will permit such a division of labor, and thus conserve public financial (and administrative) resources. This "solution" conflicts with the political situation in such countries wherein income and political power usually go hand in hand, so that their practice is to use public expenditure to support the higher income families. The resolution of such conflict is a principal topic in the preceding paper by Norman Uphoff.

The best-off families are nevertheless a small minority in the low-income countries. The lion's share for financing human development necessarily falls to the state. The point of departure, or standard for evaluation, in this paper, is, accordingly, the question: How can those interventions which will be most sparing of the financial resources of central government be developed to contribute to human development?

2. Goals and Standards

One way to reduce costs is, of course, to reduce goals and the quality of inputs. Primary education could be a five-year, rather than a six-or-seven-year, cycle; and the teachers themselves can receive but little education. But there are limits to such cost reduction if the intervention is to be effective. The reason why standards must be kept modest is that the choice is either that of appropriate standards, which offer a realistic probability of extension to all in a brief time; or that of higher standards, with very limited coverage which will continue indefinitely.

More generally, the whole question of what the standards of human development should be is a very difficult one to answer. Choices about the degree and types of intervention cannot be evaluated strictly according to cost-benefit analysis. A welfare criterion will also be difficult to apply, because of the problems in measuring changes in household economic welfare once measurement is no longer made in terms of income. This outcome is the inevitable result of producing benefits outside of a market context. Another defective approach is that of applying commonly accepted ideas of what the basic standards should be. "Minimum decent standards" is, for example, an extremely elastic concept. Standards acceptable in the poorest countries (piped water from a nearby standpipe, and a pit latrine) might be illegal in advanced countries. Decisions on how much to spend on human
development, therefore, will inevitably involve substantial judgmental elements.

3. Coverage

Another way to limit government costs -- and indeed the usual way to do so -- is to limit coverage. Different groups can be covered at widely differing costs. Further, the costs of covering the most expensive 10 or 15 percent of the population may be very high, for two reasons: first, the provision of access to geographically disperse populations with poor transport and communications is per se expensive; and, second, the provision of that access may not be enough in and of itself because the associated private costs for the poorest households of using a human development component are often too high to permit consumption. These costs are of many kinds. The very poor, for example, may have trouble communicating with government officers, or they may not know how to get to a government office, or what to do once there. Financial costs may also be high: school books, supplies, and examination fees often are too expensive for poor households. For these reasons the low-income developing countries probably should plan to reach the last 10 to 15 percent of the population only after so increasing economic growth and the development of the necessary administrative infrastructure as to permit effective attention to such special situations.

4. Alternatives

Given appropriate standards, and realistic goals for coverage, there remain many ways to reduce the central government's financial burden in achieving those standards. These are outlined in the illustrative schema on the next page. To illustrate, the central government could undertake to meet the full costs of providing elementary education, or it could use the private sector by providing vouchers -- at a fraction of the public per student cost -- which families can use to attend private schools. Alternatively, it could require a village contribution in the form of construction of schools or payment of a certain proportion of the teacher wage. In the schema a specific means is checked as applying to a human development component when it is fairly important. If the table were to be exhaustive, many more checks would have been necessary. The means may also overlap: for example, in primary education the use of double shift and multigrade teaching could be defined as reducing total costs, or as moving from a less to a more appropriate technology. In the following paragraphs, a brief sampling is provided of some of the means discussed in the paper.
Means to Reduce the Financial Burden of Human Development on the Central Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
<th>Water Supply</th>
<th>Medical Care</th>
<th>Nutrition</th>
<th>Family Planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate Technology</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing Total Costs (internal efficiency)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charging Full Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using the Private Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Targeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Contribution</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x x x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Revenue Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Access to Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legislation. Where village sanitation is a problem, legislation requiring the development and use of well-maintained pit latrines might be desirable in some places, if it were associated with an educational campaign to improve village sanitation. Increasing the minimum age of marriage should lead to healthier children and mothers, as well as to reduced fertility. Some countries—India, for example—have such laws. But in India the effect is much diminished since the law cannot be enforced without a supporting system of registration of individuals and their year of birth. In many countries elementary education is compulsory, but free. In China it is compulsory, but payment is required.
Appropriate Technology, Reducing Total Costs, Charging Full Costs. Medical care in poor countries is best provided by a system in which paramedics account for most of the practice of medicine. The Chinese system of bare-foot doctors is of interest not only because it uses this parsimonious approach, but also because it is decentralized in administration and funding. At the village level it comes close to what might be called socialist health insurance: the barefoot doctor is usually from the village where she or he works. She has been trained some months at a city hospital. On return to the village she becomes responsible for simple medical care and to some degree for sanitation and hygiene. For each attendance at her clinic there is a registration fee; in addition, there is a regular contribution for those village households which choose to join the system. In the aggregate, these funds cover the costs of running the clinic and of hospital referrals.

In developing countries, teacher wages account for about three quarters of educational costs at the primary level. A study of 27 countries found that the teachers' wage bill tripled in the same period that enrollments doubled. Countries desiring to expand primary education need to pay early and careful attention to teacher costs.

In the case of piped water and sewerage disposal, full cost pricing may be compatible with full coverage if a sliding rate tariff is used. Such a scale would ensure a very low charge for the initial consumption, but with rates that increased along with consumption. Since more water is consumed as income rises, the outcome could be full cost pricing, but at very low rates for the poor.

Improved Targeting. Food subsidies exist in many countries and in several (Morocco, Sri Lanka, Egypt) require 4 percent or more of GNP. Such general programs are poorly targeted. Those with an income adequate to their nutritional needs often receive about as much subsidy as those too poor to be able to afford good nutrition. Most of the benefit, therefore, "leaks out." On the other hand, in most countries the use of rationing through income-tested food stamps or ration books is hardly feasible because of inadequate administration. One possible way to reduce the leakage is to be selective with respect to type of food, time of the year, and area. If only low status foods are subsidized (for example, cassava or coarse grains) in places where most of the population is very poor, at times of the year when hunger is most prevalent -- which might be throughout the year in many countries -- such leakage to the rich could be reduced.

Village Contribution. In Tanzania the government has been successful in persuading villages to construct both primary school classrooms and teachers' houses, with the government contribution consisting of the construction materials.
Conditional Access to Benefits. Singapore has made the receipt of public education, family allowances, and other benefits dependent on having small families. In China, beginning in 1979, an urban couple with only one child can receive extra wages (5 yuan a month). The entire amount must be refunded if the couple has a second child. The first child has privileged access to schools and job assignments. It is, for example, exempted from resettlement in the countryside, which is the fate of second and later children.1/

5. Foreign Lending

An additional possibility for reducing the financial burden that human development places on central governments is to support directly recurrent expenditure through foreign loans. The government receives the foreign exchange, transfers or sells it to the central bank, and receives deposits from the latter in local currency "equivalent" to the foreign exchange. Such loans could be scheduled for disbursement over, say, a number of years with the local currency proceeds earmarked for specific recurrent -- and possibly capital -- local costs. As is the case with project lending, one problem with such lending is the associated disincentive to overall mobilization of resources for development. Clearly, the pressure for additional revenues or efficient use of revenues decreases to the degree that foreign resources become a substitute. Such lending, therefore, may involve monitoring both the budget and the balance of payments of the recipient.

6. Decentralization

From a financing perspective, fiscal decentralization might be desirable for three reasons: to reduce the unit costs of providing human development outputs; to increase the local resources generated for human development; and to improve the quality of human development allocatively or distributionally. In most countries, but not in all, increased reliance on local or provincial governments is not likely to have any of the above effects. Although there is little information available, there is no indication that scale of operations is a very substantial determinant of the unit costs of human development. Of far greater importance in determining average costs is the spatial distribution of the recipient population. (Costs in cities are lower than in sparsely populated rural areas.)

As far as an increased mobilization of resources is concerned, most countries have centralized to the point where they allot only very restricted tax bases to regional or local governments. Even if the bases are reserved for the periphery, the administrative capacity to exploit them would usually be less adequate than that of the national government. Because local leadership is rarely in the forefront of social change, devolution of fiscal authority might also bring a substantial decrease in

1/ Lim 1980, pp. 92-3
human development efforts, even in those jurisdictions with adequate resources.

Decentralization could mean that the services provided are far more finely tuned to local needs, and that there is enhanced accountability of the service providing units. Yet the most qualified administrators and technicians are in the central government. Managerial efficiency could suffer greatly following devolution to local authorities. Very poor jurisdictions would, of course, experience substantial decreases in human development, so that both allocative and distributive efficiency would decline.

In large federal countries greater subnational participation could nevertheless be associated with an increased mobilization of resources for human development through matching grants or conditional revenue sharing. Under such arrangements, the center transfers funds to the regions in accordance with specified revenue performance and/or allocational performance by the latter.

7. Rationale for Intervention

State intervention into promoting human development, which is substantial in all countries, has several rationales. Because households have imperfect knowledge as to the value of human development, because there are many externalities with respect to education, sanitation, family planning, and so forth, intervention can improve resource allocation. The promotion of mass programs of investment in human beings also promotes equality of opportunity, at least with respect to the immediate body and mind, and supports the associated hope of reduced poverty and a more compact income distribution in the future. Finally, human development is not only investment, but an end in itself. Immediate welfare is well served if such services are adequate; indeed, sufficient food and good health, with some hope for the future through investment in education, are clearly among the most basic elements the state can provide to promote mass human welfare.

8. Cash Transfers

Reliance on cash transfers to the poor as an alternative to state intervention is nevertheless appealing as a policy option, particularly since taxing the rich to a small degree can increase incomes of the poor by a half or more. This, no doubt, is one reason why cash transfers are so common in developed countries. Underinvestment in human development concentrates among the poor because of their lack of income. It can be argued that if one provides them with adequate income, they will make wise choices about human development in a market context. This argument probably needs a good deal of qualification, because knowledge is imperfect and positive externalities from human development are substantial. But whether or not cash transfers make sense in low-income countries is not only an economic proposition. Administrative and political considerations combine to foreclose the approach. Those who command political power are usually opposed to egalitarian cash transfers. In any event, most developing
countries do not have administrations which permit accurate identification of the poor, because in most places an income means test is not possible. Cash transfers are therefore simply not feasible as a means to promote human development in low-income countries.

9. **Recurrent Costs**

In many countries, there has been an underestimation of the costs of providing human development because of a failure to budget at all adequately for the recurrent costs of such activities. As a result many schools, rural dispensaries, and other programs of human development have operated poorly because of a failure to provide sufficient resources for their operation and upkeep. There are several reasons for this situation. First, the traditional pressure to restrain recurrent costs so as to promote development has probably unduly reduced resources for operations. Second, and in part because of the investment bias, budgeting for recurrent costs in developing countries is an underdeveloped art. A third factor results from inadequate administration. Indeed, what sometimes seems to be a problem caused by insufficient financial resources is more basically a problem in administration (a topic treated in detail in the following paper). If countries continue to emphasize human development, far more attention will need to be paid to recurrent costs than hitherto: but it would be a serious mistake to assume that finance alone is the problem when administration is inadequate.
II. FINANCING FULL COVERAGE

A. Costs of Human Development

Estimation is needed of the government costs of basic human development packages relative to the resources that governments can collect. As will be discussed below, because of elastic standards, differing relative prices, and differing contributions from nongovernment entities, as well as because of the influence of other significant factors, any such estimation made independently of the conditions in specific countries will necessarily be indicative and very rough. The measure used can be the percent of gross national product (GNP) needed to provide to everyone some hypothetical standard packages. This package could consist of five years of school, using inputs of constant quality, such as teachers of equal competency; nutrition at 90 percent of the norm; medical/health care services to a certain quality within one hour or less of travel time; 20 or more liters per day of pure water, available within 100 yards of the dwelling; a pit latrine; family planning services of equal quality to all households; and good knowledge of hygiene. The outcome of such an exercise will be percentages with a very broad range for the various countries.1/

In general, however, the percent of GNP needed to fulfill these basic human development requirements will decrease as country per capita income increases. The reason for this trend is that even if the labor costs of producing a standard unit of the services and their components (as measured by the inputs of teachers, health care workers and so forth) rise in proportion -- or nearly in proportion -- to per capita income, nonlabor costs do not. In other words, if a country’s GNP per head doubles, the unit cost of a standard package of human development services measured in terms of GNP per head -- that is, using GNP per head as a numeraire -- will less than double.2/

1/ A standard package of the type described is not feasible for all countries. In most of the Sahel, water that would be easily accessible and available in large quantity is out of the question. Nutritional needs vary by climate and by demographic composition. If we define the standard package as also having inputs of equal quality, we forego the opportunity for countries to adjust the input composition of the various components to take advantage of differences in relative prices. For example, where educated labor is extremely scarce, as in West Africa, a lower level of teacher qualifications may be desirable than in South Asia which is better endowed with educated manpower. The concept of a standard package is nevertheless used here to help make several points in the overall discussion.

2/ Holding nominal income constant, an increase in income per capita requires that total costs per unit of output fall relative to household incomes. In the case of government services, little decrease in the amount of labor needed to produce a given service may be likely, but it is extremely unlikely that unit nonlabor costs would not decline per unit of output.
It may be that the standard package which has inputs of equal quality and which costs 10 percent of GNP in Chile or 15 to 20 percent in Malaysia would require half of the total resources of the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa, or Afghanistan, or perhaps Bangladesh. As will be discussed below, even if the quality is decreased as far as possible -- that is, using teachers with six years of education rather than twelve; or village health workers with 12 weeks of training, rather than nurses and doctors -- while the quantities and percent of population covered are held constant, the costs of providing full coverage relative to the flow of resources in the poorer countries are still likely to be beyond their means.

If the perspective is the individual country, then what emerges from an examination of the modes of financing for the human development components in that country is that the provision of all such components, under conditions of full coverage, and to that country's standards, will normally range in costs from at least 11 percent to 21 percent of GNP. Since this is a key conclusion for this paper, and since it may not be an obvious one, the reasoning and considerations behind it are presented below.

Few of the governments of developing countries can provide universal elementary education at costs less than 3 percent of GNP. Table 1 below supports this conclusion rather forcibly. The average primary educational enrollment ratio is about half (53 percent). Average spending is 1.67 percent of GNP. Full coverage at constant unit price therefore implies very nearly a doubling of expenditure, to 3.3 percent of GNP. This figure, however, seriously underestimates the total outlay because the expansion necessary to cover the deficit population would bring large increases in unit costs. Even without expansion it is likely that expenditures will, in fact, increase as countries improve the quality of existing primary education, as this is very low in many places.¹/

Peninsular Malaysia has a very comprehensive system of health care -- with the emphasis on medical care -- which over three quarters of the population used in 1974. It relied heavily on the use of low-cost paramedics.

¹/ Tanzania has developed estimates of the costs of providing universal primary education which range from 1.8 to 3 percent of GNP. The lower estimate depended on substantial double shift teaching by teachers as well as on an erosion of teacher salaries by 50 percent through inflation. This assumption may be optimistic. The historic pattern is not one of persistent double shifting but of gradual diminution after full enrollment has been attained. The estimate may have underestimated total need for teachers by underestimating class repeaters. It also ignores the historical expansion (and associated increasing unit costs) which is discussed below. See World Bank, Tanzania 1977, Annex II.
Table 1: BASIC EXPENDITURE DATA FOR PRIMARY EDUCATION BY REGIONS
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Expenditure Unit</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Enrollment Ratio</th>
<th>Demographic Burden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>2.04 GNP</td>
<td>20 GNP Per Capita</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>1.64 GNP</td>
<td>24 GNP Per Capita</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1.33 GNP</td>
<td>11 GNP Per Capita</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMENA b/</td>
<td>1.71 GNP</td>
<td>15 GNP Per Capita</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>1.63 GNP</td>
<td>11 GNP Per Capita</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong> c/</td>
<td><strong>1.67 GNP</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 GNP Per Capita</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ As defined by the World Bank.
b/ Europe, Middle East, North Africa.
c/ Arithmetic mean of regions.
d/ Percentage of population of elementary school age.


Its recurrent costs were very close to 2 percent of GNP. In Sri Lanka, government health expenditure in the early 1970s was estimated at close to 2 percent of GNP (See Table 3 below). An estimate for the recurrent costs to the government of universal rural water supply in Tanzania came to 0.8 percent of GNP.1/

The average food deficit in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh has been estimated at 9 percent of total calories consumed in these countries.2/ To cover this deficit through government-financed food subsidies could easily require 3 percent of GNP.3/ This is probably a conservative estimate because of consumption by some exceeding the norm, and because of the substantial "leakage" involved in eliminating the caloric deficits. The provision of help to the malnourished through such programs has hitherto almost always also involved providing substantial benefits to those who adequately nourish themselves with

1/ Ibid.
2/ World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Department 1979, p. 35.
3/ If agricultural output consisted solely of basic food grains and was equal to a third of GNP, a 9 percent calorie deficit would translate into 3 percent of GNP. Agriculture value added in these countries exceeds a third of GNP, so that the reality is probably not far from the assertion.
their own means. It is noteworthy that the cost of food subsidies in Sri Lanka, even with rationing restricted to the poorest half of the population, exceeded 4 percent of GNP in 1979.

In many developing countries, the recurrent cost budget has been seriously underfunded. In the ardor to get on with development, recurrent costs have received short shrift and have been widely regarded as a waste of resources which otherwise could be used to support development. Today many programs do not work well, or work not at all, because of funding shortages. The estimates given above ignore this trend and are therefore biased downward on this score.

The incremental costs of covering the most expensive decile, or even quintile, of the population will often be a multiple of mean costs of the remaining population. Highly dispersed traditional groups, with poor transport and communication facilities to serve them, as well as with a low level of receptivity for human development, will be covered only at extreme cost. What is regarded as "full" coverage very often excludes this highest decile. For this reason it is shown as a separate item in Table 2.

Table 2: HYPOTHETICAL GOVERNMENT COSTS TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SERVICES IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES (percentage of GNP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequate nourishment</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal primary education</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care, hygiene, family planning</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure water and sanitation</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>7-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated investment</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment for underfunding of recurrent costs</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>9-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental costs of covering 85th to 95th percentile</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For most components, the per year unit capital expenditure will exceed the associated recurrent costs of a year. In Malaysia, in 1974, capital costs per pupil for new primary schools, that is for buildings, land and equipment, were 1.3 times current costs per pupil per year.1/

1/ Meerman 1979, p. 127.
For medical facilities, the same capital/current estimate ranged from 1.5 for the rural clinics to over 40 for hospital in- or out-patient services.\textsuperscript{1/} Investment expenditure, therefore, will be substantial during an expansion phase, as well as when it occurs to replace depreciated facilities. In many countries which wished to expand human development services to full coverage over a two-decade period, a likely resultant expenditure would be that of several percent of GNP per year indefinitely on investment account for human development purposes.\textsuperscript{2/}

These estimates, when combined, result in the ranges indicated in Table 2. (Each country's own standards are assumed to prevail.)

B. Revenues

The preceding assessment of expenditures naturally raises the question of supporting revenues. Turning now to the revenue side of the equation, it is useful to recall that for the past three decades the governments of developing countries have been under strong pressures, both from within their countries and from without, to marshall as many resources as possible for development. The internal pressures have arisen, in part, from the distrust in many governments of their ability to steer private capital to socially appropriate investments. As a consequence, many governments have attempted to follow an explicit public savings strategy: to draw resources into the public sector by fiscal means, and to undertake public investments with these resources. Such efforts demanded substantial increases in taxes, and were a principal force behind the pressure to increase taxes.

Tax performance has indeed been impressive. Country data have been collected, comparing tax-to-GNP ratios for 1953-55 and for 1972-76. In the earlier period, the average country tax-to-GNP ratio was 11.4 percent for the 30 countries for which data were available. For the 63 countries of the later comparison -- which completely included those in the earlier sample -- the ratio was 16 percent.\textsuperscript{3/} Much of this increase was the result of introducing income taxes and broad-based turnover taxes into many national economies. Since 1975 and the oil crisis, however, tax ratios in developing countries have not increased, suggesting that far less fiscal slack is currently available

\textsuperscript{1/} Ibid., pp. 153-4
\textsuperscript{2/} For a comprehensive discussion of a human development investment plan for Pakistan, see Burki, Hicks, Haq 1977, pp. 6-15. At its high point, the annual development expenditure needed to provide infrastructure for basic needs was estimated at 10 percent of public sector outlays.
\textsuperscript{3/} Tait and others 1979, p. 156.
as compared to that existing twenty years earlier. This factor also suggests that expansion of the tax system as the primary mode of financing human development may be largely foreclosed, unless the perspective is very long term indeed.

Also relevant in this context is the fact that tax capacity in the poorer half of the developing countries is below the average. There are at least two reasons for this: tax administration is weaker, and taxable surplus accounts for a smaller share of GNP. In this perspective the tax performance of India -- and many similar countries -- appears remarkable. In India the majority of the population spends more than three quarters of their income on food. As a consequence taxable surplus is very low. In 1975 -- if we define surplus as all income beyond the poverty line, which is the fortieth percentile in India -- the taxable surplus was 41 percent of GNP. As shown in Table 3, the tax ratio in India is about 14 percent of GNP. The ratio of taxes to taxable surplus, therefore, was 34 percent -- comparable with the tax-to-GNP ratios of industrialized nations.

1/ In the Tait study just cited, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ethiopia, Honduras, Pakistan, and Upper Volta all had tax ratios below 12 percent in 1972-76.

2/ Peripheral to the discussion in this paper, but not peripheral to any consideration of human development as government policy which may require substantial increases in government revenues, is the question of the relation between taxation and development. Tax ratio data suggest, strongly, that there has been no relation between the two variables. Using data compiled by the International Monetary Fund for 50 developing countries for 1966-68, the countries with the highest tax rate grew at 6.5 percent annually; the lowest at 5.9 percent. So the difference in growth between the highest and the lowest, while in the same direction, was only 10 percent, although the tax rate difference was 300 percent. Measurement error alone could account for this very weak association. The application of refined techniques to these and other data gives similar negative results (see Meerman [1972] p. 167). Clearly, it is possible for taxes to become so high that growth is checked in economies which rely primarily on expansion of private economic activity to develop. The above evidence, however, suggests that slow growth has not been a result of excessive taxation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Central Government Expenditure</th>
<th>Central Government Taxes</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Subsidies</th>
<th>Enrollment Ratios 6 to 11 Years of Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>none c/</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>(7.6)a/</td>
<td>(1.6)a/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median of 63 Developing Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median of 74 Developing Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Expenditure or budget allocation of the central or federal government only.

b/ Expenditures for all levels of government.

c/ Imported rice is taxed. Agriculture is subsidized, but not consumers.

* Notes and sources for Table 3 will be found on the following page.
Notes to, and Sources of, Table 3

(1) Tait, Alan A., "Some Simple Statistical Tests on Government Expenditures," FAD/76/4 (1976), IMF Working Paper, p. 34. Central government only. Includes transfers to lower governments and other entities as part of total expenditure. Expenditure financed through foreign assistance is also included in the total. Data are an average of two consecutive years in the period, 1970-75.

(2) Tait, Alan A., and others, "International Comparisons of Taxation for Selected Developing Countries, 1972-76," IMF Staff Papers Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 155-6. All data are for central government only, with the exception of Malaysia where state government taxes are also included.

(3), (4) Derived from the same data source as (2). The numbers in parentheses are from data collected by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as presented in a World Bank office memorandum of Timothy King (December 14, 1979).

(5) David M. Jeffrey, "The Fiscal Role of Food Subsidy Programs," IMF Staff Papers Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1977). Jeffrey's data have the same sources as those of Tait above, and are for the year 1975.

(6) World Bank Education Department, Central Projects Staff Education Sector Policy Paper, August 1979, p. 131.

C. The Human Development Shortfall

As indicated in Table 3, in developing countries the central government expenditure (which is funded not only by taxes, but also by income from enterprises, fees, and foreign assistance) exceeds tax revenues by about a fifth. On average, therefore, total resources available to central governments in developing countries are about 20 percent of GNP. In addition to basic human development efforts, these resources must cover expenditures for:

- administration
- police, courts, prisons
- defense, diplomacy
- agriculture
- higher education
- debt service, internal and external
- loans and transfers to cities, states, and other entities
- transport, particularly highways

In most developing countries combined expenditure for the above categories exceeds 6 percent, and in many countries, 12 percent of GNP.

Let us assume that governments are taxing to their fiscal capacity while providing comprehensive human development programs to their own standards. Using these assumptions, and drawing on the material presented earlier, the following picture emerges for the low-income countries of the developing world:
resources mobilized 10 - 20
resources available for human development purposes 4 - 14
resources needed for those purposes (Table 2) 11 - 21
shortfall none $a/- 17$ $b/$

**Range in percent of GNP**

\[ a/ \text{ Limiting case of high resource generation and low resource requirements.} \\
\text{} b/ \text{ Limiting case of low resource generation and high resource requirements.} \]

In brief, it is possible for the central government of a low-income country to provide a comprehensive package of human development items to most residents using the resources that are now available. Sri Lanka has in fact done so while relying largely on central government funding. Usually, however, the outcome is likely to be a very serious shortfall. Although the standards and the costs of providing human development services can be reduced to accommodate low-income countries, there are -- for most countries -- limits to such reduction. Consequently, in general, the provision of a comprehensive package to a country's own standards will require a greater share of GNP as income per head falls. Most of the very poor countries will therefore simply be unable to achieve full coverage to their own standards exclusively through government finance.\[1/\]

One possible way out for such countries is to make a drastic reallocation of government resources into human development programs by directing them from their least productive uses, for example, away from public enterprise deficits and subsidies for post-secondary education. The difficulties, and the limits, involved in such a reallocation are well known. World Bank publications of country economic studies show an overwhelming emphasis on resource mobilization for development and provide a great deal of analysis on the difficulties involved in radically increasing expenditures in selected sectors in a large number of countries.

\[1/ \text{ Recent coverage for those human development components for which data are available:} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low income countries</th>
<th>Middle income countries</th>
<th>Industrialized countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Primary School Enrollment Ratio</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Population with Access to Safe Water</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calorie Supply as % of Requirements</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the central governments in the poorer countries usually will be unable to marshall the needed resources, are there alternatives? The answer is yes and the bulk of this paper discusses such alternatives. In brief, in some countries not only local and regional governments but also private activity (both market and nonmarket oriented) have substantial potential for contributing to human development. In addition, user charges of various kinds for human development services have a role to play. China, for example, has followed a strategy of noncentral-government funding, and has succeeded in providing nearly full coverage with a modest but comprehensive package. In many very poor countries, however, even exhaustive exploitation of such alternatives will not permit full coverage for a standard or average package.

Before proceeding to these considerations it is useful to introduce background material responding to the question: Why should the state intervene with human development efforts at all? If the basic problem is poverty, would not comprehensive cash transfers be the ideal solution? (Needless to say, even if cash transfers were the best way to support human development programs, the grave shortage of public resources necessary to fund them would still persist.) This is linked to a discussion of how taxation may affect the income, and at one remove, human development, of the poor. Specific components of human development will be considered in later sections.
III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. Rationale for State Intervention

All states -- including the most avidly market-oriented ones -- intervene with heavy financial commitments in human development endeavors. Most governments spend substantially on health care, particularly curative medical care, but the amount is far less than that expended on education. Most governments do not spend much on nutrition, but the spending on food subsidies by a few would push up the total substantially. The reasons for intervention are fairly clear. Many households have poor knowledge of human development processes and undervalue the various components, particularly water supply, sanitation, and family planning. Their choices in a simple market context will, therefore, be defective. In the case of education there is generally a conviction among leaders that the content of the curriculum as well as the organization of the educational system is a community decision, better taken in a political context than through the decentralized activity of the market.

Further, there are substantial positive externalities from human development services. Elimination of infectious disease in part of a group, for example, reduces morbidity for the rest of it; education for part of a group, on average, increases the welfare of the rest of it.\(^1\) What is true for a part is also true for the whole. Failure of the state to subsidize human development consumption would result in low or even zero investment in this area by many poor households. This is because the opportunities for human development available to the poor at market costs are generally beyond their means. Even if all households were equal in income and all households were efficient optimizers (which they are not), it would remain desirable to subsidize human development. This is because the market outcome, say, for medical care, or for family planning, would still substantially understatement the total value produced since those who do not buy and sell in the market also benefit a great deal.

Incomes, however, are egregiously unequal and subsidization of human development efforts is also redistributive, that is to say it functions as a principal means to provide a long-run "self-financing" mode of reducing poverty and inequality. The poor can utilize such investments in themselves (in part financed by the state) to increase their life-cycle earnings.\(^2\)

\(^1\) This is one reason why wages of the unskilled and uneducated are higher in advanced than in poor countries.

\(^2\) In the studies of the incidence of central government taxes and expenditure, the poor usually pay less in taxes than what it costs to provide the education, health care, and other human development components which they consume. See Meerman 1975.
State intervention in the field of human development thus has several rationales. Because of imperfect knowledge and the many ensuing externalities, intervention can improve resource allocation. Other goals involve the desire to provide equality of opportunity, at least with respect to the immediate body and mind, and the associated hope of reduced poverty and achieving a more compact future income distribution. Finally, human development is not only an investment but an end in itself. Immediate welfare is well served when it is adequate. Adequate food and good health, with some hope for the future through investment in education, are clearly among the most basic elements that the state can provide to promote mass human welfare.

B. Cash Transfers

Public interventions to foster human development use very large shares of public resources. In some developing countries, public recurrent expenditure alone for this purpose exceeds 12 per cent of GNP. Notwithstanding such sizeable financial and other commitments, unrequited public cash transfers to poor households (as opposed to social security benefits) hardly exist among developing countries as a means to promote the human development or welfare of such households.1/ This is the situation in practice, although there is very strong evidence that a principal impediment to the human development of the poor is simply the shortage of income. In many developing countries the poor use more than two-thirds of their income to provide food. Malnutrition among the poor is nevertheless common. In current practice, developing countries in effect deal with what can be viewed as an income problem by providing subsidized human development components to the general public, or to certain limited groups. From an economic perspective, a more efficient approach would be, first, to solve the problem of poverty through cash transfers to the poor, and, second, to deal with the various externality issues and other obstacles to achieving better resource allocation through public interventions. In the transfer case, consumer sovereignty and the ability of the members of households to purchase whatever they most need is retained.

Such retention may be very desirable for the community as a whole. Through redistributive cash transfers it may prove possible to avoid the great gulf between the low benefits to households from public services and their high public costs which is characteristic of the nonmarket provision of human development services. Such avoidance is desirable if income inequality and externalities are not a consideration -- as would be largely the case for, say, public utilities in the situation being considered here. The provision of water, electricity, and sewerage services at subsidy increases the government

1/ Contributory social security systems in developing countries have low coverage, particularly in the poorer countries. In 1974, provident funds covered 3.4 percent of the population in India, 12 percent in the Philippines, 47 percent in Singapore, but 67 percent in Chile (1972) (see Selowsky [January 1979] p. 16; and Saito and Shome [1978] p. 44). Those covered usually have regular employment for cash wages, which incomes above average.
deficit. But subsidization also increases the cost of providing these services indirectly by encouraging standards of services and rates of consumption beyond the willingness of beneficiaries to pay. This increased burden on the government finances in turn further reduces the ability and the willingness of the government to expand the services to the portion of the population that is not covered. In brief, redistribution per se through subsidization leads to poor resource allocation; it probably will require a larger government deficit for a given transfer in welfare than the equivalent in the form of a cash transfer.

The apparent low decrease in aggregate welfare which would result from cash transfers further increases their attraction. In the majority of developing countries the poorest 40 percent have 14 percent or less of total income, while the highest 20 percent receive half or more. So -- why not tax away about an eighth of their income from the top 20 percent, and transfer it to the bottom 40 percent and increase their income on average by nearly a half or more? The economic welfare of the rich should be reduced only in small degree, while that of the poor would increase substantially.

In countries with a price-elastic food supply -- either through imports or local production -- such cash transfers would lead to a substantial expansion in food supply. In countries where supply was inelastic, food would be redistributed in favor of the poor. If the focus is primarily on nutrition, economists consider cash transfers as efficient because it is extremely difficult to restrict consumer food subsidies -- the other important alternative -- to the poor population. Enormous "leakage" to better-off groups is the rule. The entire taxes-cum-subsidy program, and some of the administrative organization, are avoided in the cash transfer case.

Use of cash transfers would also have important effects on human development other than that involving nutrition. In the case of education, for example, out of pocket costs -- books, transport, uniforms, and examination fees -- are frequently substantial relative to incomes, as are the foregone earnings of many students. Cash transfers would reduce the burden of education on the poor, and the consequence would be higher effective demand. Similarly, provision of water supply and some forms of sanitation services might be feasible without subsidy in a system with adequate cash transfers to the poor. But cash transfers would not offset the need for many human development interventions outside of food supply. Externalities and imperfect knowledge would continue to exist, and state subsidy of health care, health education, and education in general would consequently continue to be desirable.

1/ This outcome -- marginal valuation below marginal cost -- may still be preferable. If a subsidy of value to the poor is paid for by the rich, say, through progressive taxes, it may well be that if the poor could transfer utility, they would be more than willing to compensate the rich fully, for their loss in utility resulting from the tax, with part of their increase in utility from the subsidy.
Taxation of the wealthy to transfer cash to the poor is extremely rare in developing countries because, notwithstanding its theoretical attraction, it encounters obstacles in the form of inadequate administration and political forces. In the majority of developing countries the public administrations are unable to enroll all families, estimate their incomes, and then provide those below the transfer line with cash. Even where such an approach can be implemented, as well as where it cannot, the political barriers encountered are substantial. As the preceding paper by Uphoff emphasized, the poor are usually outside of political life, "marginal" to the participatory community, and unable to mobilize political resources which can be brought to bear on political decisionmakers. The quintile with the highest income, on the other hand, does participate politically and would strongly resist such high taxation. Many "in kind" programs of human development do not, in contrast, meet as much political resistance because they usually benefit rich as well as poor, and because of their quality as merit goods. For these reasons, this paper is built on the assumption that cash transfers are not a feasible mode to promote human development in these countries.

C. Social Security Organizations

Social security organizations have been very important in eliminating poverty --- a primary cause of defective human development --- among their covered populations. The effects of the events they cover -- death of earners, invalidity, sickness, wage loss because of maternity -- are, if uncovered, a major cause of reduced investment in human resources not only for the households which immediately suffer, but also for the extended family which otherwise would be expected to cover the gap. (This theme is further explored in the companion paper by Safilios-Rothschild.) Consequently, increasing the population covered by social security organizations has a number of advantages if human development is a basic goal.

But it is also clear that the expansion of coverage to the very poor, say, to the group spending 60 percent or more of its income on food, would impose extreme hardship if there were to be at least a loose actuarial relationship between benefits and payments.1/ What has also limited social security coverage in the poorer developing nations has been the administrative difficulty in extending coverage to rural populations which have no individual records held in public organizations, and which are characterized by irregular employment, with irregular wages, or in some cases with no cash wages at all. It might nevertheless be worth considering the possibility, in some circumstances, of a public subsidy for the poorest workers to whom it might be administratively possible to extend a social security system. One objection

1/ In 1970 Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico all had social security contributions between 10 and 21 percent of the wage (see Selowsky [January 1979], p.330). There is no reason to expect poorer countries to have lower percentile rates of contribution.
to increasing social security coverage is the possible reduction in aggregate employment attendant on the increased labor costs which may result. This is a very complicated issue. But it is not clear that the net effect of social security on employment has been negative. What is of relevance here is the use of the surplus in social security funds to finance very large investments, which increase employment.

D. Taxes and the Poor

There is another side to the question of the fiscal augmentation of the income of the poor: that of taxation. Many studies exist which estimate the burden of taxes encountered in moving from lowest to highest incomes.¹/ For developing countries, the studies conclude that their tax systems are often slightly progressive, rarely regressive, and often best characterized as exhibiting wandering proportionality as income increases.²/ If the incidence studies are correct in finding that tax systems in developing countries are largely proportional, the consequence are ominous. At any given level there is some variance in tax burdens, so that for many households the actual burdens considerably exceed the mean. In poor countries the mean tax burden, as a percent of GNP, is about 16 percent.³/ Personal incomes, however, rarely sum to more than two-thirds of GNP due to the necessary exclusion from those incomes of depreciation, investment, and other national accounts components. In terms of household income, therefore, the tax burden is far higher, and on average must exceed 20 percent. Even if the variance about the mean is very small, this would imply that many of the poorest are burdened with taxes which exceed a quarter of their after-tax income. Since this group is frequently seriously malnourished, the costs of such taxation must also result in serious injury to their working ability.

This is clearly the outcome if the studies are valid at the low income end. The studies are usually highly aggregative and built on data generated for other purposes. There is rarely any attempt to study in detail

¹/ These studies invariably compare tax burdens by household incomes. Thus all households equal in income are considered equal in welfare notwithstanding very substantial variance in household size at any given household income. It is not known whether tax burden is a function of household size. If it is, the use of household income to measure tax incidence gives very misleading results, as it does in the case of benefits from government spending. The presumption in this paper is that household size and tax burdens in developing countries are only weakly related, so that use of the household income concept does not give grossly invalid results.

²/ Out of 32 tax incidence studies for developing countries, 22 (69 percent) "suggested some progressivity in the effective tax rate schedule. This progressivity pattern was often an uneven one and frequently did not extend up to the highest income bracket or started only from the second or third income class" (De Wulf [1975], p. 70).

³/ Tait and others 1979, p. 156.
the situation of the bottom quintile of the income distribution.\footnote{There have been some disaggregation by agricultural and nonagricultural families. Most of such studies conclude that relative to other sectors, "the agricultural sector was undertaxed" (De Wulf [1975], p. 72).}

Frequently, the measurement of the household's own production, even of home-produced food, is defective. The degree to which purchases and sales by the poor in rural areas use traditional marketing channels which escape all fiscal burdens may also not be considered. In many countries retail trade based on small quantities of local production escapes indirect taxes even in the cities. This is because the taxes are often levied, or better enforced, on manufactures, and then only on fairly large manufactures. Beverages such as beer, produced and bottled in large plants will, for example, be taxed; palm wine, chicha, and other beverages produced by village enterprises usually are untaxed.

To the degree that the poor earn cash incomes and expend them on taxed items, their tax burden must be heavy. Moreover, insofar as the poor consume the same taxed products as the rich -- grains, cloth, intermediate goods such as motor fuels, and so forth -- it will be difficult to reduce the tax burden on the poor without greatly reducing tax receipts.\footnote{In Malaysia in 1970 more than 95 percent of the taxes paid by the poor were in the form of import duties, excises, and licenses. Yet only 9 percent of total receipts from such indirect taxes came from the poor. But such taxes accounted for 49 percent of the federal total. If it were impossible to discriminate among taxpayers with respect to indirect taxes, the federal government would have needed to give up about half its revenue to relieve the poor of a burden which accounted for about 4 percent of federal tax receipts (Meerman [1979], p. 40).} Since ministries of finance are very short of resources many, perhaps most, are those reluctant to make an effort to discriminate in taxation according to the income situation of the taxpayer. A review of excises, customs duties, and turnover taxes could nevertheless reveal items for which the poor are the principal market (not to mention prohibitive tariffs on items which the poor would consume intensively were they available).

The poor also are burdened as producers. In many cases an agricultural export, with an elastic foreign demand, is taxed although it is the principal source of income for smallholders. Such taxes may be explicitly levied on exports, or consist of the more implicit burden of marketing boards, for such commodities as cocoa, tea, coffee, rice and so forth, which operate
with very large margins between their buying and selling prices. 1/ Many producers of such exports have high incomes, so there is again the problem of discrimination among taxpayers. In some countries it has been possible to design special taxation of the plantation sector. Alternatively, a tax on profits, or even a progressive personal income tax, can be levied, since groups with incomes below a certain amount are commonly exempted from such taxes. A reduction in the taxes levied on exports in this fashion is usually desirable because of the continuing need to increase exports and rural employment. (Such export sectors frequently are fairly labor-intensive.) Here again administrative limitations are encountered. In many countries profit taxation or personal income taxation are in practice defective. This is because of the many problems encountered in enforcing these taxes on producers who are self-employed, rural, or even urban but who are operating in small units with defective or nonexistent bookkeeping. 2/

What adds injury to injury is the fact that many of the poor do not benefit much from public spending. Although studies show that on average the poor receive more from the government than they pay in taxes (Meerman 1975) the variance in benefits among the poor is high. Enrollment ratios for primary education, often the chief benefit, are always below average for the poor. In IDA countries the average enrollment ratio of the poor is almost certainly less than 50 percent. Although the average benefit from primary education may be substantial, most poor families in such countries may not, therefore, benefit at all.

1/ In Malaysia, a significant increase in rubber smallholders' incomes could be achieved by a reduction or elimination of the tax on smallholder output of rubber. It is roughly estimated that the export tax is equivalent to almost a third of net family smallholder income from rubber but only 4 percent of federal government revenue. (Malaysia, Selected Issues in Rural Poverty, 9/25/79, Report No. 2685-MA, p. vii). In Thailand, rice has been traditionally heavily taxed, so that rice growers, who are typically poor people, have experienced substantial decreases in their incomes, while the better-off urban minority has enjoyed rice at a price substantially below that of the world market.

2/ The topic of taxation of the poor and what can be done to reduce it is largely uninvestigated. The household sample survey lends itself very well to such investigation although it has been rarely, if ever, used for this purpose in developing countries. In many countries with adequate sampling organizations such investigation could eventually result in improved tax policy with respect to the poor.
IV. CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONS

A. Standards

In a discussion of how a government is to pay for comprehensive human development programs, a necessary step is a determination of what quality or standard of human development is involved. This is because the higher this quality or standard is, the more resources are required. 1/ How much malnutrition is tolerable? Should the price of food be subsidized? How many years of basic schooling should there be? Should some schools have free lunches? Should every pupil have free textbooks? Everyone should have pure water. But how much, and how far away from the house? Every pregnant woman should have access to clinic personnel. But with what skills? And how often and for how long? Should drugs be free? Contraceptives? One way to answer these questions would be to develop a fixed package with respect to inputs and financing mechanisms, which would provide a minimum standard of human development for all. 2/

1/ Although it is difficult to do so without controversy, it is useful to distinguish among standards, objectives, and technology. Standards are the same as the quality of inputs. Presumably outputs increase in quality as the quality or standards of inputs increase. But the emphasis is on inputs since the quality of outputs may be completely undefined. Objectives or goals occasionally explicitly refer to standards, and implicitly frequently involve standards. Usually these are stated in terms of share of population to be covered with a certain kind of program or output; examples would be: universal access to primary health care; five years of education for all; or more comprehensively, life expectancy of 70 years; and universal literacy. Technology refers to the delivery system: teaching in the classroom versus closed circuit television; piped and treated water versus cisterns. Usually a more costly technology is associated with increased quality or standards. Since it is difficult to measure standards, technology may be used as a proxy for them. All three concepts, however, are distinct from financing mechanisms. To illustrate: food subsidies are the financing mechanism; food of a set quality and quantity per person is the standard; adequate nutrition for all is the goal or objective; government stores are an aspect of technology.

2/ A suggested standard package to meet core basic needs is given in Haq, 1977, pp. 3-4. That package includes, for example, an average of 2,350 daily calories for an adult male and public water hydrants with good water within 200 meters of the dwelling in urban areas.
If the criterion in evaluating proposed packages is return on investment, such packaging probably will not be feasible. It has thus far proven difficult to clearly estimate returns on human development, either by component or in combination. Information on the costs is better, although because of the extremely large number of ways to approach the cost issues -- as discussed below -- general conclusions, even within a single country, are hazardous. Unit costs for a package of services to a given standard will also depend upon how quickly the service network is augmented; and whether such extremely high-cost families as nomads are included. In addition, unit costs for a given package will depend upon the way the various components interact upon each other. In cities, linking the supply of fresh water and sewerage disposal can reduce the average costs of each good. In rural environments a policy of combining curative medical care, including obstetrics, with education for (and perhaps enforcement of) adequate sanitation, can reduce costs below what they would be were each component provided independently. There is also interdependence on the output side. Reduction in gastro-intestinal disease through the provision of better water and improved sanitation can increase the effective nutrition gained from eating a certain amount of food. Improved nutrition can improve educational performance. Education in turn can lead to better sanitation and greater care in using the water supply. It is easy to describe this virtuous circle. But it is impossible to say much that is precise about how various interventions contribute to it, and with what effects. It will therefore probably not be feasible to attempt to evaluate proposed packages with varying standards from a classical benefit-cost perspective.

Yet even if it were possible to evaluate standards in a cost-benefit framework, it is not clear that it would be desirable to do so. This would be a serious issue if it were known for a fact that for large groups of the population human development would not lead to much increase in future output. The increase in the welfare of such groups as a consequence of human development efforts could nevertheless be very large. Assume, for example, that the welfare of each person should receive equal weight. It may be that the welfare accruing to the group of households with no future returns from some minimum standard human development package would be so high that it would exceed the present value of the welfare of most financially equivalent public investment programs, even at a low discount rate. Without doubt this conviction is at the root of the widespread belief that adequate human development services should be universally provided. A welfare criterion to evaluate proposed standards nevertheless also fails to provide a solution because of the difficulties in measuring changes in household welfare and in comparing those changes across households, and over time.

In brief, the issue with respect to standards is not simply one of trading off current consumption transfers for future consumption. Nor can

1/ This statement is least valid for primary education. Techniques to measure returns from health care and nutrition programs are undeveloped. It may be possible to estimate the benefit from reducing births, but it is more difficult to measure in advance how much fertility will decrease because of a family planning program.

2/ Later in this paper the implicit assumption that human development packages must be publicly financed is dropped. It is used here to keep the discussion simple.
choices about degree and types of human development interventions be evaluated strictly as investments subject to a cost-benefit calculus. It is poorly understood, not only to what degree such interventions are high-yielding investments, but also how those interventions interact on each other in investment perspective. Decisions on undertaking human development programs, therefore, lie in large degree beyond purely technocratic solutions. (This, at least, is the current situation.)

Another approach is that of applying accepted ideas of what basic standards of human development should be. This commonsense approach, however, is also defective because the concept of minimum standards is an extremely elastic one. Minimum standards increase as levels of income rise. Standards which would be widely accepted in Afghanistan would be defective in Malaysia. The minimum standard in Singapore is higher than that in Haiti. In the United States, an outdoor pit latrine and the supply of pure water from a standpipe down the street would be considered defective practices and as such are illegal in many local jurisdictions. The birth of children at home with assistance from midwives with some modern training; a diet of pulses, rice, greens, onions, and some vegetable oil; a school taught by a teacher with six years of education -- all of these would be regarded as being below tolerable standards in advanced nations. Yet in the poorest developing countries, they might equally be regarded as ideal standards to which the community could aspire.

Professionals, both from developing and developed countries, are notorious for their instance that only some very high standard should be the minimum in their field. "Medical care"(or education or nutrition) is, they aver: "too important to be compromised by a resource shortage." In developing countries the inappropriateness of such an approach is usually widely perceived by the nonexperts. As will be discussed below, however, the adoption in developing countries by such expert practitioners of some model from an advanced country has been a cause of serious resource misallocation. In conclusion, it can be emphasized that standards for human development are relative, and are influenced by the amount of resources available as well as by technology. In human history thus far it has been the level of income that has in practice always limited standards. Further, unlike the case with many economic problems, it is not possible to come up with a technocratic solution which can be brought to bear on the political decisionmaking process as to what standards should be.

B. Resources

Consideration of what a nation can do about human development frequently takes the form of enquiring as to what the government can do to foster such development, using government finances. Education is widely regarded as a public responsibility, and, ipso facto, it is usually believed that its development should be with public resources. Some countries aspire to the provision of adequate health care as a right to be enjoyed by all the citizenry, and it is seen as the duty of the government to actually provide it. Policymakers may accept the readily available technology and some sort of standard package. They see as the basic problem the question of how to generate the
resources to pay for the application of this available approach.

It is more useful to define resources so as to include institutions, legislation, in brief anything that can be so manipulated as to help achieve human development. An examination of actual country experience provides many instances of the extreme diversity encountered during the support of such development. This diversity involves mixes of central government, local government, and private financial resources, as well as a large number of public interventions in which the public finances play only minor roles. Some of this experience will be examined below.

It remains true, however, that a great deal of government activity and expenditure is unavoidable even for minimal comprehensive human development efforts. Because of this situation, and because, in most developing countries, there is very little fiscal slack, government resources to support human development are widely seen as being a bottleneck or a seriously constraining factor. This state of affairs is the point of departure for the following discussion, which concentrates on ways to provide human development which nevertheless conserve central government resources.

C. Legislation

One fundamental approach to saving government funds is to avoid public provision of services or goods below cost and to attempt instead to legislate changes in human behavior. To illustrate: In many countries excessive fertility is a grave problem. Family planning efforts of various sorts are designed to induce couples to have few children, not too closely spaced, and to have them after women are physically mature. Healthier parents and children, higher incomes, and more adequate human development for the family in general are the benefits accruing from successful programs of this kind. One could attempt to legislate the desired behavior into being. Theoretically, one could prohibit couples from having more than two children. No country has attempted such a draconian measure, although Singapore and China have made the receipt of public education, family allowances, and other benefits conditional on having small families. There have also been attempts to reduce fertility by increasing the minimum age of marriage. India, for example, has a law prohibiting matrimony for women under the age of 16, and for men under the age of 18. But the only means of enforcement is through moral suasion, because neither marriage nor births are required to be registered. The very existence of such a policy acting in conjunction with government exhortations to reduce family size is nevertheless widely believed to have some effect in reducing fertility.

It is worth noting in passing at this juncture that most developing countries do not in fact have national registration of births, deaths, and marriages. In those that do -- Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, among others -- a number of policies become possible which cannot be considered elsewhere. These include the careful monitoring of school attendance; control for purposes of collecting the individual income tax; institution of a system...
of food rationing; and control of age at marriage. (There are also advantages with regard to the generation of vital statistics.) In some countries the possibility of developing a national system of registration at low cost exists, and its implementation is worthy of some attention.

Another attempt at legislating human behavior involves the now declining role of the sanitarian. In some African countries, colonial governments required villagers to use pit latrines as a means of controlling disease. In most cases the latrines were duly built and more or less became monuments to European colonialism. Each village had such latrines, which were duly inspected by the sanitarian. But they were rarely used. With the demise of colonial regimes the role of the sanitarian has also declined. Accordingly, what can be viewed as the first steps towards reducing a great deal of infectious disease came to a halt. Further experimentation along these lines is apparently rare.

It is noteworthy that legislation forcing children into schools is common, and is enforced, in many countries. Without doubt the fact that there is a broad community support of such compulsion is a principal reason for the success of such legislation. Presumably, however, in some countries with rather good administrations broad support might also exist, or be secured, for pushing up the average age of marriage and improving sanitation. Resistance to such measures would come from those most affected, in part because of their imperfect knowledge. Combining, therefore, such legislation with intensive educational activity might possibly have synergistic results.

Behavioral modification through legislation is likely to be more successful when the affected groups are well identified and subject to government control. In Cuba the government has been successful in getting physicians to devote a certain amount of time each year to work in rural health centers. The Yemen Arab Republic has apparently been successful in forcing civil servants into rural service with some accompanying "devolution of administrative and financial authority to local units" (Kavalsky 1979, p. 52).

The point of this discussion is not to advance the illustrations per se as some sort of model. Rather, it is to suggest that legislation or regulation, complemented by supporting educational activity, can be tried in some situations. Such an approach can, if successful, substitute for, or be complementary to, more orthodox, financially oriented programs.

D. Health Care

1. Sanitation and Water Supply

Infectious diseases caused by some combination of poor water and poor sanitation are still the largest single cause of death in developing countries. From one perspective the persistence of these diseases can be interpreted as being due to faulty education. Some villagers simply do not
realize that bad water, indiscriminate defecation, and dirty immediate surroundings have deadly consequences. If they realized it, they would eventually modify their behavior accordingly. It is this perspective that provides the impetus for a great deal of the health education being brought to bear on some of the villages of the world. In general this effort has not produced dramatic changes, which is hardly surprising. Behavioral modification as a consequence of education is evolutionary rather than instantaneous. In advanced countries, the failure to use automobile seatbelts and the persistence of cigarette smoking suggests that even where knowledge of negative consequences is widespread, the change in behavior to avoid such consequences is difficult. Habit can be second nature.

One reason — at least in the case of water and sanitation — for the persistence of inappropriate behavior is that the immediate individual costs of modification loom far higher than do the long-run consequences. Water good or bad, is frequently costly to procure in the large quantities needed to promote good household and personal cleanliness. Relieving oneself in a hygienic manner is often inconvenient and embarrassing.

The high cost, sophisticated, technological solution to the problem is the provision of piped and treated water and waterborne sewerage systems. The high-cost solution in effect substitutes technology for education by greatly reducing the household's marginal costs as measured in time and effort (and sometimes in money income), of using a lot of good water and staying clean. These attributes are per se regarded in most cultures as benefits, so that where user costs are low, adequate sanitation and hygiene follow without long drawn-out educational efforts. Where the costs are not a consideration, the sophisticated technological solution is thus clearly the best solution. In cities it is often the best solution even if finances are a problem, although in many cities of East Asia the removal of human wastes by cart or by truck for composting is also common, and can be compatible with high standards of public health. The pipe solutions become feasible because higher urban population densities reduce unit costs to manageable per-household amounts.

Paying for the capital and maintenance costs of such systems is frequently an issue. Many countries, by design or by accident, have attempted to provide them below cost. Their expansion, therefore, implies an increasing burden on government finances. It may also imply serious resource misallocation in the classical sense of marginal valuation by users, far below the costs to the community. In fiscal perspective this implies excessive demand, further increasing the government deficit. This can occur directly or, in the case of a service provided by an autonomous entity, indirectly. If full-cost pricing is used, however, it is likely that many of the poor households with access to piped water and to waterborne sewerage will in practice reject them and will find and prefer a less expensive alternative. Work in Malaysia, a country which usually charges the full costs for piped water, has shown that whereas an estimated 83 percent of urban households had access to piped water,

1/ There is strong evidence that at least 20 liters per capita per day of water are needed to realize the health benefits derivable from it. (See Kalbermatten and others 1978).
14 percent of the access households did not choose to buy the water, and were not connected, directly or indirectly, to the systems. In rural Peninsular Malaysia, 21 percent of houses with access chose not to buy the piped water.1/ The work on Malaysia showed that this neglect to purchase -- even when purchase was possible -- was to a large degree because of low family income.2/ Regression analysis permitted the further conclusion that a third of the households in the lowest two quintiles of the income distribution in the Malaysian Peninsula, which were without access to piped water, would not purchase it at the going price even if it were available.

In Malaysia incomes -- even of the poor -- are on average far higher than those in most developing countries. In addition, the Malaysian water table is high, and surface water is abundant. Production costs, as a function of the hydro-geology, are thus comparatively low. It is likely, therefore, that the same exercise in the poorer countries would have similar results, namely, a large share of the poorer families within cities could not afford piped and treated water. Evidence supporting this view is provided by data for a number of cities. Water charges for the lowest income quintile in Addis Ababa, Ahmedabad, Lima, Manila, Nairobi and Sao Paulo were, respectively 9, 4, 5, 9, 7, and 5 percent of household incomes.3/ Yet the lack of abundant and clean water in cities is a cause of disease to those without it and poses a public health threat to others in the city. Subsidy appears called for, therefore, on the grounds of both externality and of the increased welfare of those subsidized.

The expansion of utility networks is greatly facilitated to the degree to which they generate positive financial returns, which in turn can themselves finance expansion. Any subsidy programs contemplated would thus need to be explicitly discussed in conjunction with investment programs. Presumably the central government would need to provide the resources, not only to meet the cash deficit but also to provide for depreciation and, above all, expansion. If there are to be utility subsidies, another issue is that of who is to benefit. Blanket subsidies would clearly benefit those already consuming, so that benefits would be correlated negatively with income. They would also be extremely expensive. A better alternative is that of the sliding-scale tariff, or so-called "life-line" tariff scheme, which consists of a very low charge for the family's initial consumption of the utility, but with rates increasing as consumption goes up. Since the consumption of water parallels income

1/ Households within 50 yards of a water line to which they could connect were considered as having access. In rural areas in highly developed Malaysia it turned out that 59 percent of the households also met this criterion although only 79 percent of those who had access so defined chose to be connected. Consequently 46 percent of rural households -- (.59)x(.79) = .46 -- consume piped and treated water (Meerman 1979, p. 204).

2/ This conclusion fell out of a multiple regression analysis in which income was one independent variable and the probability of demanding piped water was the dependent variable. Income was highly significant with a large regression coefficient.

3/ Saunders and Warford 1976, p. 188.
levels, the outcome could be full-cost pricing, but at very low rates for the poor. Such tariffs can also be combined with a general subsidy if costs are high and the rich are few. Such a subsidy will be more effective than a subsidy across-the-board, since it is possible to develop the sliding scale tariff so that most of the subsidy accrues to the poorer consumers.1/

In many cities in the developing countries the widespread use of standpipes appears to be desirable. Since their users are overwhelmingly the poor, the distributive effect of their subsidization would be good. Since they promote good health, there would be some value accruing to the better off, whose political support may be needed in expanding a standpipe network. Costs, compared to those of an in-house water supply, would be low. Finally, standpipes have that rare, but highly desirable, quality in a subsidized service of being a so-called inferior good. As incomes increase, demand for standpipes can be expected to diminish. So, in this case, unlike that of so many programs -- food subsidies for example -- there is a long-run self-limiting characteristic which ensures fiscal manageability.

In most of the countryside, centrally supplied piped water networks would be prohibitively expensive. In most rural areas a reliance on wells or cisterns, or on small dams with a limited network of pipes, has been and will continue to be the most common mode of water supply. There are, however, many alternatives: drawing water from streams, or collecting rain water in an ad hoc fashion. Protecting the water supply, or otherwise improving it, and also increasing its quality and accessibility, are all serious problems in rural areas. Even after countries have developed a widespread system of protected or treated rural water supplies -- which normally would involve substantial investment and maintenance outlays -- the need for local education to maintain the system makes considerably more demands on villages and individual families than in the case of the urban piped system.

The upgrading and the expansion of water supplies is and will long be prohibitively expensive in some countries, notably the arid lands of the Sahel. In Mali generating more water often means digging wells hundreds of meters deep. In Bangladesh eight meters is deep enough. In the Sahel it probably makes a good deal of sense not to attempt to provide universally good and plentiful water, but to turn instead to expanding the food supply. Good nutrition can to some degree substitute for the availability of good water and sanitation. Well-fed individuals are more able to withstand the frequent infections resulting from an extremely pathogenic environment. The Sahel has a comparative -- not an absolute -- advance in food, so that resources spent on food may do more for individual well-being than the equivalent amount spent on water. In some circumstances, therefore, the "comprehensive" human development package might best not be comprehensive at all.

As far as the disposal of human wastes is concerned, in some parts of the world a sanitary sewer system, or even a local flush system with a settling basin, are simply too expensive to provide. Pit latrines, or

1/ These issues are discussed in detail by Linn 1979, pp. 263-90.
collection by bucket or other conveyance, would seem to be the preferable modes of disposal, since through their careful use most feces-associated disease can be eliminated, while they are usually not very expensive. Here again the basic problem encountered is, however, one of education and of modifying behavior. The failure of the effort to use sanitarians to enforce the use of pit latrines in Africa was noted earlier. Similar problems have occurred elsewhere in inducing people to use a latrine, or to be more careful with bucket sanitation. 

The preceding discussion has moved far afield from financing of sanitation and of water supply per se. Perhaps it is useful to close by suggesting that a program budgeting approach to sanitation in a context of very limited financial resources might be useful. The goal of the program should be that of modifying behavior toward improvements in basic hygiene. The instruments are the schools, providers of medical care, legislation, sanitarians, and so forth. The success of the program will depend upon how well the government can organize itself to train people (or the people can organize themselves) and to combine inputs in ways that are effective. Schoolchildren can be taught to wash their hands before eating, to use the school privy, and to keep its environs clean. Medical workers can teach mothers that rehydration is the best way to counter dysentery; that babies should be fed with clean hands; that feces left lying about are dangerous. Legislation designed to induce individuals to use latrines may be able to make a contribution. The corollary of all this is that because the expensive technological solution is largely precluded in the poor villages of the world, the problem — at least insofar as it concerns sanitation and hygiene — is to a lesser degree a financial one. To a far greater degree it is an administrative and political problem posing difficult challenges in education and in behavioral modification. (The Chinese, apparently, were very successful in bringing about widespread improvement in the level of rural public health by relentless, nationwide, health campaigns.) In contrast, the upgrading of rural water supplies in most places is also, in part, a question of generating the needed financial resources.

This concept of primary health care as a comprehensive set of different activities which all promote health has to some degree been realized in Malaysia. There, the rural clinic systems use different kinds of resources to promote better sanitation and water supply. The hundreds of rural Malaysian main health centers or subcenters contain curative staff, family planners midwives, dental care personnel and environmental health staff. The last named are charged primarily with improving sanitation and water supply. The system is very comprehensive: most rural births, for example, are attended by a government midwife. Most school children receive inoculations and medical examinations. Most premises are sprayed at intervals to control pathogenic insects. The total recurrent cost of this system — excluding urban hospital

---

1/ Sanitation technology is more flexible than this discussion suggests. Small-bore sewerage, for example, costs about half as much as the usual sewerage systems of advanced countries. The former is designed with a lower carrying capacity and depends for its success on reducing the flow of waste water — laundry, kitchen, bathing — which moves through the system. See World Bank Energy, Water and Telecommunications Department 1979 for a detailed discussion of sanitation technology.
referrals -- was about one half percent of GNP in 1974.1/

2. Medical Care

In most developing countries modern and traditional medical care exist side by side. In many countries modern medicine is purveyed on a fee-for-service basis. If the government or autonomous public institutions provide modern care at subsidized prices, then it is usually associated with public hospitals operating in large cities. In many countries, some modern care is offered in rural areas by such nonprofit institutions as missionary hospitals. A few countries are exceptional in that governments have developed comprehensive national systems of public care. These are usually highly subsidized. In Malaysia, which has such a comprehensive system, current public expenditure on medical care has recently been about 2 percent of GNP. Less than 10 percent of this outlay has been recovered through fees. In some countries public rural medical care has been expanding rapidly. It is usually built on a system of modest clinics, which are staffed predominantly by paramedics.

In most developing countries, if rural families wish to receive modern care they still need to go to the cities. The rural clinics do not in practice reach more than a small share of the rural population. This outcome results from a number of factors. Some countries with adequate financial resources have not developed the administrative infrastructure needed for comprehensive rural care. In many cases, the financial resources needed to provide a largely free system are simply not available to the central government. For poor countries committed to free medical care the consequences may be a token or a partial system which is all that the central government can muster, rather than an explicit compromise with the basic goal of free care for all. In some countries medical care provided by paraprofessionals is repressed since the medical authorities regard such care as compromising medical standards. As physician services are very expensive, the consequence is also a more restricted public system.

The Malaysian rural clinics which have already been noted work reasonably well not only in providing primary care to the rural population, but also in referring more serious cases to the urban public hospitals. The Malaysian rural system is characterized by primary treatment in which physicians play a small role. The latter are rare, and are used primarily in administration and in the treatment of the more complicated cases. As a consequence the system costs but a fraction of what doctor-oriented care would cost.

The Chinese experience is illuminating. Current practice is for every village to have a "barefoot doctor." This person, who is frequently a woman, usually is from the village itself or from one nearby. She has been trained for some months at a city hospital in simple procedures. On her

1/ Linn 1979, pp. 331-35, includes a description of an ideal system of comprehensive health care as well as a discussion of the actual comprehensive system of primary health care of the government of Jamaica.
return, she becomes the local medical practitioner and authority. The system is decentralized. Her supervisors can best be described as the entire village. What is of great interest in the present context is that her services, as well as drugs and other inputs, are not free. To participate, it is necessary to be a member of the village medical scheme, which requires payment of a periodic premium. For each attendance there is also a registration fee. In the aggregate the premiums and fees cover most of the cost of running the clinic. The costs are, however, even for the Chinese peasant, not onerous, in part because the wage of the barefoot doctor is set close to the wage of field workers. It should be noted, however, that the quality of care is not outstanding. Referral to hospitals in larger communities becomes necessary at a lower level of complexity than, say, in the Malaysian system. It is also probable that referral is more problematic than in Malaysia.

China has been able to develop a rudimentary, comprehensive system of medical care that is largely self-financing and which is available to, and can be afforded by, the poorest members of the community. The essential element in the Chinese system is the presence of an extremely large cadre of low-cost paraprofessional practitioners. To a lesser degree, the Malaysian rural system uses the same approach, but with a centralized administration and a far larger endowment of resources. (China has been recently moving in the same direction.) Both countries have developed what might be called medical technology appropriate to their financial circumstances rather than the physician-oriented model of wealthy developed nations.

In some countries it might make sense to train large numbers of paramedics for a year or so -- perhaps under government auspices -- and then to send them forth to practice medicine on a fee-for-service basis. A very large increase in the supply of such personnel could mean a very substantial improvement in medical care for the poor. Such training could be associated with conditions: requirements to practice some time in rural areas; careful selection, including adequate educational qualification; perhaps some kind of formal certification by a board of physicians. This approach would largely rely on market forces and could economize on two entities which are in very short supply in poor countries: administration and money.

In many countries, it is very difficult to get drugs to the sick at a low cost. Frequently, the supply to government clinics is itself erratic, and even if drugs are supplied they may be sold to the highest bidder. It might make sense in some places to remove this burden from the health service and rely on private and competing purveyors, who sell the drugs at very low prices because the government heavily subsidizes them.
E. Nutrition 1/

The elimination of caloric and other nutritional deficits through the provision of food subsidies is a basic goal in a number of countries. In a paper concentrating on financial considerations, these programs are especially pertinent because they often consume very large quantities of public resources, effectively preempting the government from undertaking many alternative activities.

Once a country starts on a widespread program of food subsidization, perhaps initially only in the largest cities, it eventually creates a pressure group which pushes for more benefits. Perhaps more significantly, it effectively locks the government into a program with a built-in tendency to expand coverage until the entire urban population is included, and in some cases the rural population as well. The danger is, therefore, not a trivial one. It is that what begins as a fairly manageable but expensive program develops into a program which becomes the country's principal fiscal problem. Once something like this occurs, the high costs tempt governments to depress agricultural incentives by setting low domestic procurement prices for the locally produced foods which are in the program, and by encouraging food imports.

The programs are nevertheless fairly widespread, although they are usually restricted to urban areas (World Bank, Agriculture and Rural Development Department 1979). In Algeria, India, Morocco, Syria, and in the major oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, the grain staple is subsidized. In most of these countries there are also subsidies for cooking oils, tea, sugar, onions, and some meat items. The package is oriented to the consumption of urban dwellers and by-and-large supplies them with basic food items at a price well within the reach of a modern sector worker. The urban poor (the unemployed and informal sector workers) are also able to get the staple at a price within their range (Kavalsky [1979], p. 15).

In Sri Lanka, rice, sugar, and wheat flour were all subsidized, and available free in rationed quantities to part of the population. In 1975, these subsidies consumed about 4 percent of GDP and a quarter of total central government revenue. In Peru, also in 1975, the subsidy program for several basic foods and for gasoline consumed about 1.4 percent of GDP and a tenth of the central government current expenditure. In Egypt, in 1974, the food subsidy was 10 percent of GNP, and one-and-a-half times total spending on education and health.

---

1/ In the long run the elimination of inadequate nutrition will need to come from greater production both with respect to agriculture, and outside of agriculture. It may be that in some countries the best way now to eliminate malnutrition is to generate employment which in turn results in higher incomes for the poor, and to so develop agriculture or foreign trade that the relative prices of the foods consumed by the poorest citizens in fact fall. Such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
The programs also exhibit high leakage: In general, the rich eat as much basic food as do the poor. If the latter are defined as being in the bottom two quintiles, then -- assuming nationwide coverage -- to assist the poor by a given amount requires an outlay roughly two-and-a-half times higher, since most of the benefit "leaks out" to the 60 percent in the upper three quintiles. Apparently, this ratio of about 2.5 to 1 measures the earlier leakage in Sri Lanka, although it may be somewhat higher, since the very poor probably purchase less subsidized food than does the average household. In the urban-oriented program of Peru, the leakage has apparently been extremely high: apparently less than 15 percent of the total subsidy was consumed by the lowest 40 percent of the population.

In an effort to reduce costs, the government of Sri Lanka subsequently instituted food rationing through food stamps which were restricted to the poorest half of the population. (The stamps are full payment for food.) The costs of the rationing program were nevertheless over 4 percent of GNP in 1978. In most countries with food subsidies, however, means-tested targeting has not been attempted. Administration would be one constraint on any such approach, since registration for ration programs by age, sex, and family status does not appear feasible in many countries. Assessing the income of recipients in order to implement a means test would be even more difficult.

To recapitulate, food subsidies are expensive. Of the developing countries that provide them, the majority restricts coverage to urban areas. Even with coverage restricted to cities, expenditures on the programs of 4 percent and more of GNP may occur, that is to say nearly a fifth -- on average -- of the resources available to central governments in developing countries. In some countries agricultural development is suppressed in a fiscal effort to keep the production prices of food low. Much of the cost -- in some cases, more than half the costs -- could be eliminated were the leakage to adequately nourished groups avoided. Yet because of weak administrations, not to mention political problems, a policy of reducing leakage by well-aimed rationing programs is probably not possible. Are the alternatives, therefore, either intolerably expensive public programs -- in which to some degree finance substitutes for administration -- or many hungry people?

This is a situation in which it might prove useful to have more knowledge as to who the malnourished actually are with respect to region, demography, time, and socioeconomic character. In the process of more clearly determining who is hungry, it is also likely that cost-effective modes of reducing hunger will suggest themselves. Hunger, for some, for example, may be a consequence of market failure. A combination of inadequate storage, defective transport, and import irregularity may lead in many years to a "starvation time" in the weeks or months prior to the new harvest. In such situations, elimination of the bottlenecks is called for, rather than provision of a general program. More broadly, there are three ways to address malnutrition at the consumption end of the food chain which may -- in some countries -- go some way to eliminating malnutrition at low cost: interventions with respect to type of food, season, and region.
Most subsidy programs involve high-status grains such as wheat and rice, perhaps because they are readily available in international trade and frequently as food aid. The diet of the very poor is often different from that of the rest of the community. It may be heavy on cassava, or on coarse grains. One way to reduce subsidy costs is to provide only low status foods at subsidy, but to make them available in unlimited quantities. In some cases, perhaps in most cases, the possibility also exists of rapidly expanding the production of such foods. If that took place, output would be very responsive to increased demand as a consequence of the addition of government purchasing power. Since the better-off members of the community will not buy great quantities of such low class foods there may be a great deal of self-selection, which ensures that the costs of the subsidy are lower, since only those who are more needy make purchases. If food supply has a definite seasonal pattern with a "hunger time" occurring two months or so prior to the new harvest, in some places it might make sense to subsidize food at this time.

Finally, in many cases adequate nutrition has a spatial dimension: The hungry, for example, are in the city slums or the semi-arid regions. If this is so, then subsidized foods can be directed to those places where the hungry predominate. Ration shops restricted to low-income neighborhoods or to the most deprived parts of, say, Brazil's Northeast, would again result in sales of food to populations with an incidence of malnutrition far above average.

All three of these interventions could clearly be operated in combination with improved results. Another consideration would be whether or not to use private distribution networks. As such quasi-targeted approaches are, moreover, without an income test, their administrative burden would be lower than that of a general rationing program. The supply of foods to be made available in greater quantities must also be very responsive if such an approach is to succeed.

The discussion has not touched on infant and maternal feeding programs, school lunches, village weighing programs, nutrition education, or policies for agricultural development. Rather than attempt any such comprehensive discussion, it has concentrated on the food subsidy program, the type of intervention which is by far the most expensive as well as the most important and immediately effective. It has also indicated possible alternatives which are worth looking into since they promise to provide similar nutritional benefits to the target populations at lower costs.

F. Education

1. General Considerations

Many choices bearing on finances are open to countries which wish to develop a system of universal primary education. The question of quality and goals is an important one. A fundamental decision is that
involving the number of years in the primary school curriculum. It is considerably less expensive to offer four years to all, than to offer five or six. Here, too, a distinction must be made between de jure and de facto access to education. There may be a six-year cycle in two components of three years, but the upper primary schools may be few and far between. De facto there may be substantial rationing at the upper primary level by reason of distance from school. The failure rate is another aspect related to quality. In the francophone countries of West Africa this rate is very high. Individual pupils may repeat a grade three and four times. It is argued, however, that the higher quality which results from this repetition is minimal. A policy of lowering standards, which would permit a larger proportion of beginning students to complete the primary cycle for a given financial outlay, is seen, on balance, as representing a more effective use of the school system.

A further consideration bearing on quality is the dropout rate. In low-income countries only 37 percent of the cohort reach the fifth grade. There is evidence that permanent literacy and basic changes in behavior in general are not achieved until four years of schooling have been completed. (World Bank, Education Sector Policy Paper 1979, p. 19). If students are dropping out early, this accordingly reduces educational effectiveness. This provides an additional reason for the emphasis on reducing the failure rate, since the latter is a basic determinant of the dropout rate. An additional cause of dropping out is suggested by the positive relation between earnings and age. The immediate costs to the family of keeping a not-so-young child in school may be fairly high foregone earnings. Out-of-pocket costs -- books, transport, uniforms -- can be very high for poor families. The cost of keeping one child in the lower secondary school can easily consume 20 percent of a poor family's income. To reduce this burden the government of Sierra Leone provides complete government scholarships for all students from the fourth through the seventh form.

Given a set of education standards, there is still much room, however, for cost manipulation. The following are some of the variables with pronounced effects on central government costs per pupil:

-- dropout rate
-- frequency of student intake (semi-annual, annual, biennial)
-- multi-grade teaching (by a single teacher)
-- single or double shifts for classrooms
-- school charges (for example "free" schools where the pupil buys the books and supplies, and pays for the examinations)
-- teacher qualifications
-- teacher wages
-- extent of private primary education
-- degree of local community financial support for buildings, maintenance, and teachers (housing, for example).

The effects of most of these variables are clear. Biennial intake makes possible fewer, but larger, classes than does annual intake. Multi-grade
teaching reduces the need for teachers, as does requiring each teacher to teach two daily shifts. A review of these variables leads to the conclusion that the amount of resources put into primary education from the general fund need not be very closely associated with the overall extent and quality of primary education.

2. **Teacher Wages**

At the public primary level, in developing countries, teacher wages typically account for about three quarters of educational costs. In some countries this element has been higher, reaching, for example, about 90 percent in Sri Lanka and Morocco in 1968 (Coombs and Hallak 1972). Teacher wages vary substantially relative to other wages, but generally fall as the average level of education in a country rises. They are highest in Africa, and rather low in the educationally well-endowed nations of South Asia.

A good proxy for the relative wage is the ratio of teacher salary to per capita GNP, since the latter correlates very strongly with average wage. Table 4 shows the variation in that ratio for seven West African countries which were selected on the basis of data available. The range in the ratio is from less than 4 percent in Liberia to 24 percent in Upper Volta. Teaching costs per student also depend upon the ratio of students to teachers. The second column in Table 4 shows the range for the seven countries as being from 30 (Nigeria) to 60 (Togo). These data in turn permit the calculation of relative teaching costs per student, as shown in the final column of the table. The use of GNP in the denominators of the ratios also readily permits an estimation of what teacher salaries would be as a share of GNP were there universal primary education in these countries (assuming per-student teaching costs remaining unchanged).1/

In developing countries the share of the population of primary school age is about a fifth.2/ If we apply this fraction to the data presented in the table we obtain hypothetical teaching costs for full enrollment ranging from 9.4 percent of GNP in Upper Volta to 1.4 percent in Liberia. In Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, the costs would have been 4 percent. For 13 West African countries the average ratio of taxes to GNP was 16.9 percent for 1972-76.3/ Consequently, the teacher wage alone implies a very serious fiscal burden or impediment to be encountered in moving toward the goal of universal enrollment in primary school.

1/ Historically, per-student teaching costs have increased during the period when total enrollment increased rapidly (see below).


3/ Tait and others 1979, p. 155.
Table 4: RELATIVE TEACHING COSTS AND STUDENT TEACHER RATIO
PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS, IN YEAR STATED
SELECTED WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(Teacher Salary)/l/ (Students)/</th>
<th>(Teaching Costs per Student)/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(GNP Per Head)</td>
<td>(Teachers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (1977/78)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo (1978)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone (1973)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon (1976/77)</td>
<td>6.7 - 11.6</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast (1975)</td>
<td>6.8 - 10.8</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (1976)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta (1978)</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Includes apprentice teachers, monitors, and so forth.

Source: Data files, West African Projects Department, World Bank.

An important question arises as to the degree to which teacher wages reflect scarcity conditions. If the governments could lower their wages—say, in the third of the developing countries with the highest ratio of teacher wage to per head GNP—without political upheaval, would this bring in a teacher shortage, or a serious deterioration in the quality of teaching? Many school administrators do not think such deterioration likely, since they are convinced that most teachers do not have a very good employment alternatives. A second reason for suspecting that, in many cases, wage reduction is economically feasible is the high level of political organization among teachers. Often they form a union or association with a high level of professional consciousness. Their strikes, and threats of strikes, are embarrassing since teachers frequently command a great deal of public support as a worthy group providing a much desired service. These considerations suggest that in many countries there may be some "quasi-rent" in the average teacher's wage, defended by a substantial amount of political power.

It would nevertheless be an error to conclude that teacher wages are beyond government control. The government's own behavior is a primary determinant of what the wage will be, and governments have used several devices to hold those wages down. Inflation—that great civil service wage leveller—has been used, or perhaps permitted, to drastically reduce the wages of public servants, including teachers, in countries as diverse as Argentina and those of West Africa. In Tanzania the government wage scales are tied to educational achievement. Secondary school leavers are paid considerably more than primary school graduates. When pressed for funds at one time, the government hired only primary school graduates as teachers, notwithstanding the availability
of secondary school graduates. In a number of countries assistant teachers are used and are supervised by a master teacher. In rural Togo the government pays for some of the teachers, and the villagers pay for additional ones. In Ecuador, the government hired unqualified teachers to reduce costs. In some of these illustrations the governments may have made financial savings at the cost of reduced quality, and on that score they do not appear to be the best way to handle such problems, but they may have made sense in short-run and political perspective.

An important element in the wage issue is the long-run perspective. Many developing countries have less than two-thirds of full enrollment at the primary level. If universal enrollment is the goal, then the implications of increasing teacher wages on attaining that goal should serve as a good argument for resisting wage demands. History offers little comfort in this respect. A study of the costs of expanding primary education in 27 countries in the 1950s and 1960s found that, on average, recurrent costs tripled in the time that enrollments had doubled, because of escalation in the teacher wage bill (Coombs and Hallak 1972). This escalation was apparently the consequence of various combinations of several factors: In civil service systems, if the average qualifications of teachers, or their experience, increased, the average wage would be increased. If class sizes were unusually large, or multi-shifting was common, at the onset of the enrollment expansion, it is possible that they decreased by the time enrollments had doubled, so that costs per student increased accordingly.1/ There may also have been an increase in wages resulting from increased union power. Expanded enrollments have resulted in primary school teachers becoming a very large and organized group in many countries.

A policy of expanding primary education while avoiding such consequences requires careful and early attention to teachers and to their wages. Planning for expansion also involves a number of related elements. The first is an adequate, but not excessive, annual flow of new teachers which perforce should adjust once the country nears the 100 percent target. Physical facilities must also be provided. It is funding for the ensuing recurrent costs, however, that frequently appears to be poorly planned. Teachers are usually paid regularly, but often material and maintenance costs are gravely underfunded. (This matter will be discussed below.)

In some Islamic countries teachers and their pupils are predominantly male. If the countries were willing and able to use women teachers, who might be paid less, lower per-pupil costs could result while female enrollments, now reduced in part because teachers are male, would be increased.

1/ In Turkey "in the past 15 years" enrollments in elementary school doubled, but the number of teachers tripled (Karaoğmanoglu and Durdag 1977, p. vi). In Bogota, between 1950 and 1973, public primary school teachers increased 25 percent more than did the corresponding enrollment (Linn 1979, p. 6).
3. Private Education

Country experience is diverse with respect to nongovernment primary education. In some countries the private share is large. Most such schools are traditional and religious in nature, be they Muslim, Christian, Hindu, or Buddhist. Many of the religious schools impart knowledge that is primarily of a religious nature. Elsewhere, traditional schools have become modern in their curriculum while still maintaining their religious teaching. In some countries there are no private schools at all.

The government attitude toward private education also varies. In Latin America, some governments provide financial support to private schools. In Lebanon, the government provides a per-pupil subsidy to many private schools of about one-fifth of the average public school per-pupil cost. The payment is made by the government to the specific private school chosen by a family. These private schools cover costs, and may even be profitable, notwithstanding their lower per-pupil receipts. Costs are kept low by use of facilities of poor quality and of less qualified teachers at lower salaries. The relative quality of the private and public systems is controversial. Elsewhere, the private school system has been largely absorbed by the public; or at least is highly regulated with respect to staffing, curriculum, examinations, and enrollment policies. This situation has occurred in Malaysia, where the formerly private schools have been integrated into the government system. All teacher salaries, for example, are now paid by the central government. In India, after the British left, expatriate teachers in the private schools using the English language were replaced with Indians. In the last two decades the share of the costs of such schools that is financed by the central government has increased rapidly, while the schools have increasingly become a part of the public system.

Public policymakers prefer to see an institution which is one of the most fundamental elements in nation-building integrated into the public sector, and made amenable to public policy. But the price has been high. This is obvious in cases where a modern private sector which accounted for a large share of the enrollments has been integrated into the public system. Less obvious is the potential for expansion through the private system. In cities certain private schools are usually preferred because of their presumably higher quality. As a consequence the price elasticity of demand for these schools is high, so that were their tuition charges reduced substantially, the demand for enrollment would increase as well. In some countries it might not be a bad idea to offer tuition vouchers equivalent to a certain percentage of the public unit costs, as well as to offer encouragement to such schools to expand, perhaps by the provision of a government guarantee of any borrowing for capital improvements.

An objection to this notion is that it would encourage some qualities which are generally believed to be highly undesirable, such as social separation and ethnic cleavage. Yet the availability and, in time, dependence of such schools on the vouchers would provide the state with
substantial power to promote the various kinds of affirmative action thought desirable. This could take the form of anything from an open admission policy, to quotas for disadvantaged groups, to a great deal of control over the curriculum.1/

4. Local Participation

One additional way for the central government to reduce its costs is to remove some of the burden falling on local jurisdictions. Tanzania has succeeded in getting villagers to construct both primary school classrooms and teachers' houses, with the government contribution consisting of the bulk of the construction materials. In general, village contributions range from construction, through maintenance, to covering part or all of the salaries of the teachers. It is possible to conceive of a rural primary school system in which the central government provided the administrative structure -- hired the teachers, procured the books, and designed the curriculum -- while the local community paid all of those costs directly related to it: teachers, building, equipment, and books. In many countries local communities cover the costs for one or more of these components. In the modern public school systems of developing countries, however, the state usually covers most costs from the general fund. The degree and the variety of village participation in some countries nevertheless shows that this outcome is not one of necessity. Reinforcing this conclusion, and suggesting another alternative route, is the existence of the traditional religious schools emphasizing literacy in the language of the religion -- which may or may not be the common language -- and completely supported by the local community. In some countries these could be used as the nucleus for an expanding modern system. One reason why such indigenous schools are ignored is the belief that their leadership is not sympathetic to the attitudes and values which a modern school inculcates.2/

1/ For a full discussion of the extremely large number of different devices used by governments to finance schools, both public and private, see Zymelman 1976, Chapter 4.

2/ Performance contracting in education was fairly common in the golden age of laissez faire. Payment to the contractor was contingent on the pupil attaining certain readily tested skills, such as reading and writing. "Nineteenth century India had villagers pay one and one half rupees when a child attained proficiency. Payment-by-results was in effect in elementary schools of nineteenth century England and subsequently exported to other parts of the Empire such as Bombay, Malaya, Canada, Nigeria, and Ghana." (See Zymelman 1979, p. 19.)
V. SHARING THE BURDEN AT LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS

A. Decentralization

1. General Considerations

It is difficult to find clear and simple ideas concerning the best distribution of financial resources and expenditure between a central government and lower level governments, including cities.1/ Perhaps this is the case because administrative and political considerations are more basic to such intergovernmental allocation than is finance. Effective modes of organizing human development programs by level or by government will thus prove elusive unless administrative and sociopolitical issues are considered.2/

For economists, the most obvious criterion to apply to the intergovernmental distribution of functions is that of least costs: Let each level supply those government goods and services which it does most economically. In spite of its simplicity and its potential for quantification, actual achievement of such technical efficiency is usually not feasible. Government output functions are ill-defined. Very little is known in consequence about the relationship between the cost of producing a service and the scale on which it is produced, particularly with respect to human development interventions.3/ There is no systematic body of material, for example, which shows the unit costs of health care or of education as being highly dependent on their scale of operations.4/ The spatial distribution of the population to be serviced is no doubt one of the principal elements affecting unit costs. As geographical coverage is extended from cities to isolated areas which have weak communications and transport, unit costs naturally increase. This factor may overwhelm considerations of scale in planning to provide human development services. It suggests that it may in fact be wise to simply ignore the question of scale economies.

The provision of services by state and local government has certain advantages with respect to allocational efficiency. A policy of formulating

1/ Historical development offers the fundamental explanation as to how fiscal federalism did or did not actually evolve. The focus here, however, is normative.

2/ "Since political factors are the most important determinants of intergovernmental relations in all countries, even the most technical economic appraisal needs to be grounded in a clear understanding of the political situation if it is to be of much use." (Bird [1978] p.3). Bird provides extended analysis to support this conclusion, which is also discussed in the preceding paper by Uphoff.

3/ Shoup (1969 pp. 49-144) has conducted the most systematic and comprehensive consideration of this topic. His results are very speculative.

4/ For a discussion of the extreme difficulties encountered in determining the average costs of medical care in Malaysia, quite apart from considerations of scale, see Meerman 1979, pp. 145-48.
expenditure programs at the source of the money may facilitate the generation of needed resources. This is especially so since the spending would benefit local interests, whether those manifested in the form of providers or receivers of services. The provision of services would take place close to those actually receiving the service, and their needs should accordingly weigh more heavily in the output mix. To a far greater degree than at the national level, local circumstances could be allowed for, and improved resource allocation should be a consequence. The community would also be in close proximity to the bureaucracy responsible for designing and providing the service, as well as to the political planners, and the accountability of the service providing units should thereby be enhanced.1/

The sociopolitical case for centralization is, by contrast, strongly supported by considerations of managerial efficiency. Developing countries almost invariably are short of good planners and implementers. The most qualified people are usually found in the central government. Moving some of them out into local roles would usually mean an overall drop in managerial efficiency, since the financial resources they would command in such roles would be far lower than at the center.

To leave human development efforts to the few local governments which are economically independent would also necessitate a most uneven evolution of such services. The very poor jurisdictions would probably generate fewer resources for such investment. The redistributive element which, as noted earlier, is implicit and unavoidable in broad-based human development programs, would be greatly diminished and the total flow of human development activities for any given country would probably drop precipitously.

This precipitous drop would occur not only because the poorer communities within a country would be less able to make human development investments, but also because local leadership is often hostile to modernization insofar as it threatens the traditional order of things and lays substantial claims on the higher incomes. Indeed, traditional local leadership is rarely, if ever, in the forefront of social change. Finally, as a corollary of the earlier assertion of the concentration of managerial capacity at the center, local authorities often have only very imperfect notions as to how to foster human development. Left to their own devices, they might evolve poorer quality programs than those generated at the national level, even if the will to promote such development were actually present.

1/ The following paper by Esman and Montgomery includes a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of local participation. For an argument to the effect that small, more homogenous, governments have less trouble reaching majority decisions and therefore have lower "transactions costs," see Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Chapter 6.
The discussion needs some qualification. Decentralization has an altogether different meaning in India or Brazil than it does in Mauritius or Honduras. The problems faced by cities are often so pressing, and so peculiarly and fundamentally local in nature, that a strong argument can be made in these cases for the use of local resources and for the provision of local authority to decide and to act. The concentration of managerial and technical skills in cities further strengthens this approach. Water supply and sanitation services in large cities, for example, are usually best financed and provided by the cities themselves.

A relevant consideration is the degree to which it is possible to organize matters so as to maximize the benefits of both modes of organization while minimizing their costs, be they financial, administrative, or political. If it does make sense to have a central government organization provide medical care and other health services, for example, can there be a certain amount of local autonomy? Can teachers and health workers, and above all their supervisors, be drawn from the local population with ties to the community? Should the local administrative unit of the central government be given a certain amount of autonomy with respect to budgeting and staffing, combined perhaps with some sort of local steering group? In the cities of Colombia the organization of medical care exhibits such a pattern. In Cali, for example, health services "are provided by the municipal government acting as the agent of the central government. In this case what has been called the Colombian tradition of centralized policy and decentralized administration appears to work out surprisingly neatly in practice."

2. Current Situation

It is noteworthy that the developing countries are highly centralized compared to the European countries at a similar stage in their economic advancement. Developing countries with populations of thirty and forty million typically have central governments which account for over 90 percent of total taxes, and do not encourage taxation at the local level. More generally, over the last thirty years and in all types of countries, the central administrations have nearly always grown far more rapidly than have local or regional governments. In part this trend reflects the continuous growth of power at the center relative to the periphery. Such growth has been encouraged by increasing manifestations of economic interdependence, which require national solutions to the problems encountered. The increasing acceptance of national standards for employment, welfare, and education have also contributed to this concentration. In developing countries one common rationale for the concentration has been the widespread belief that the most

1/ Provision of such services by the national government is nevertheless by no means unknown. This was true of a fifth of the cases in one study involving 28 developing countries. See Bird 1978, pp. 14-15.

2/ Ibid., p. 17.
successful development planning and implementation required centralized administration and funding. Centralization has also been supported by the development of such new taxes as broad-based turnover taxes and the individual income tax, which have been applied at the national level. Property taxation -- the traditional principal revenue source for local governments -- has decreased both relatively and probably absolutely as inflation has brought cadastres throughout the world into disarray. It is perhaps a sign of the times that, notwithstanding a great deal of "small is beautiful" exhortation emanating from foreign donors of capital and technical assistance, little has been done to restore the property tax, while a great deal has been done to develop national taxes. An implication of this trend is that even if a human development strategy makes most sense as a local or regional undertaking, such a departure is foreclosed for the near future in most instances, unless tax systems are radically restructured, or automatic tax-sharing institutions are developed.

There are nevertheless substantial pressures to rely on local financing of elementary education to a greater degree:

Even developing countries with radically different political philosophies seem to agree that local authorities must assume more responsibility, at least for elementary education. This necessarily involves financial as well as administrative effort. At present, the extent of local responsibility is mostly administrative; their financial contribution to education is extremely limited. A few countries are actively pushing for increased local financial effort in education. The constitutions of Taiwan and Brazil compel local governments, as well as the regional and central levels, to set aside a certain portion of their budgets for education....The only local bodies which fully finance and sponsor public school systems exist in the People's Republic of China. There the organization of the local government bodies differs significantly from those of most developing countries.1/

As noted earlier, in many countries the implementation of a substantial restructuring in order that local authorities can bear a higher share of the costs of primary education requires considerably more local autonomy, improved local administration, and often a different set of values and attitudes among the local leaders.

In many countries a certain amount of automatic revenue sharing exists. In Bolivia, the state universities have at least until recently received a set share of the beer tax, a considerable revenue earner. The provincial governments also receive a set share of the tax on petroleum and mineral exports, if the export originates in their territory. In Colombia, a share of

1/ Zymelman 1979, p. 75.
the beer tax is reserved for the public hospitals. In Malaysia, the federal government provides two basic statutory transfers to the states: a capitation grant which is dependent on state population, and a road grant to cover the costs of maintaining state roads. In the early 1960s royalties on the tin exports of the tin-mining states competed with the federal export tax on tin. These were replaced with a "reassignment grant" of 10 percent of the export duty on the tin produced in the state. The total resource flows involved in these transfers are, however, small: they were 6 percent of total federal resources for 1970-72, but they accounted for 29 percent of state spending in the same period. The Malaysian outcome is not unusual: Small transfers from the center are a principal source of revenue for regional governments. Most resources are marshalled by, and controlled by, the center.

What might make sense in some places is a policy of developing systems of conditional revenue sharing. The U.S. federal system has developed very extensive programs in which the federal government transfers funds to state and local governments if they fulfill certain conditions. In one of the simplest of such devices, the Highway Trust Fund, the federal government reserves revenues from the federal tax on gasoline for the costs of the high speed, limited access, interstate highway system. The trust fund covers 90 percent of the costs of interstate highway construction. The remaining 10 percent is covered by the states for the construction taking place within their borders. Similar programs exist for support of the needy, aged, blind, widowed, orphaned and the otherwise handicapped who are unable to cover the costs of their own support. The states administer such welfare programs and share the costs with the federal government, which at present covers more than 50 percent of the total. Such programs also exist in education, agriculture, and medical care. The controlling statutes usually follow allocational formulae based on criteria such as relative income per capita, geographical area, and population of the recipient jurisdiction. The conditional grant must typically be matched to some specific percentage from the funds of the lower-level government. The percentage itself may be variable, with the federal share increasing as state per capita income falls.

A common use of conditional revenue sharing is in education, where the aim is to avoid the very unequal distribution of per capita resources which results from local or provincial funding. Wealthy jurisdictions spend far more on their schools than poor jurisdictions can afford. The consequence is relative under-investment in the poor as well as a consequent heightened disparity in opportunities later in life. To reduce this inequality a large number of devices -- many involving conditional revenue sharing -- have been developed which, in effect, so transfer resources from the center to the local school jurisdictions as to compensate for differences in fiscal capacity or performance. One common formula involves the provision of central aid to

1/ Economists oppose such earmarking of taxes since it forces funds to be allocated to certain uses, whether or not the marginal value from such uses is high or low. Yet in situations in which general revenues are uncertain, say, because of a politically weak ministry, earmarking may be one way to assure a stable flow of resources. Earmarking may also overcome resistance to an additional tax if the use is a popular one, as it is in the case of education.

2/ Herber 1975, p. 444.
districts in proportion to the relative value of the per-pupil tax base in the various districts.

It is noteworthy that Tanzania's solution to the unequal tax bases of regional governments was more radical. The central government cancelled all the tax authority of the provincial governments, although it somewhat decentralized decisionmaking with respect to development expenditure. This involved the transfer of a number of civil servants from the center to the provinces.1/

Not only are there carrots; there are also sticks. In 1935 the U.S. federal government placed an excise tax on the employer's payroll and stipulated that if a suitable state law were passed to provide unemployment compensation, the federal government would pay all the administrative expenses. It would also permit employers to credit state excise taxes to finance the program, up to 90 percent of the value of the federal excise tax on payroll. In a state which taxed employers an amount equal to 90 percent of the federal excise tax to fund the unemployment insurance program, the net aggregate tax would thus be 100 percent of the federal tax, with 90 percent going into the state unemployment compensation fund, and 10 percent going to the federal government. Within a short time all states joined the program by instituting the required payroll taxes. Considerable differences exist from state to state, since each state determines who is to be covered, who benefits, the rate of the state tax, and eligibility and disqualification provisions. A similar approach could be developed in highly decentralized developing countries to induce expansion of human development programs, although in most countries any such course is foreclosed because provincial governments have very restricted tax authority.

B. Queuing for Human Development

The use of matching grants as discussed above has a certain amount of appeal for national governments who wish to provide a human development component -- rural water systems, textbooks for rural primary schools, improved municipal sanitation -- universally, but who also wish, for various reasons, such as insufficient funds, administrative bottlenecks, to implement the expansion over several decades. If the fundamental normative assumption for evaluating such programs is that one human being has as much weight as another, and that all value consumption equally, then in a dichotomous situation (that is, the human development good is either supplied or not supplied) the rule that maximizes coverage at least cost is that of simple ranking from lowest unit cost first to highest unit cost last. Costs are defined here solely with reference to the central government.2/ They

1/ World Bank, Tanzania 1974. The government describes this policy as "decentralization."

2/ Consequently there is no presumption that the least-cost rule is also the maximum-benefits rule.
are the present value of central government capital and recurrent costs, be they routine or extraordinary (repairs due to rough treatment or administrative deficiency). In such situations villages or localities with an advantageous natural situation will obviously be ahead ceteris paribus of those whose situation is less favorable in making whatever matching contribution is required. Rich localities will precede poor ones; and well-organized communities, which can marshal financial resources and know how to communicate with the authorities, will come out ahead of noncohesive and poorly led groups.1/

The local community contribution could be in the form of some combination of a number of financing mechanisms. In rural villages labor can be an important contribution. In Tanzania in the mid-1970s such self-help labor was equal to about 10 percent of the development budget, and was roughly equal to the recorded own or subsistence capital formation in the national accounts (World Bank Tanzania 1977, Annex I, p. 95). In Tanzania the government furnished the complementary inputs, such as construction materials. Cash contributions are the easiest to deal with. In the case of some services -- water supply, perhaps even health care -- partial or full-cost pricing by amount consumed is a possibility. The willingness and the ability of localities to cover such a cost would be a factor in determining their place in the queue. In the case of rural water supply, evidence that the community will cover the costs of a feasible system of maintenance and repair could also be important. In theory at least, some communities would be willing to contribute more than costs. Presumably these would have well above-average incomes, so that this possibility of a charge (which amounts to net taxation) should not be foreclosed. An autonomous authority controlling its own finances and imbued with the necessary ardor to provide the service to the many as well as to the wealthy might find such an approach attractive. If the excess charge were to be applied to recurrent costs, then the sliding rate tariff approach might be preferable -- insofar as a single entity provides the service throughout a region.2/ Applied to capital costs as a lump sum payment -- which in turn could be financed as a loan by the service-providing entity -- the approach might be worth considering.

The range of possibilities for providing services at low cost to the center is, even within a single country, perhaps wider than is commonly realized. In most countries, reliance on subsidiary governments will be

1/ It would be instructive to correlate the political ranking for the type of program discussed above with the financial ranking. The political ranking could be based on Uphoff's paradigm in which the costs minimized are the political costs of supplying various localities (see his discussion in the preceding paper). The R² between the financial and the political ranking would be of interest, as well as the analysis of the variance not explained by the R².

2/ The sliding rate tariff was discussed earlier in the section on sanitation and water supply.
difficult because of political barriers as well as because of insufficient means and managerial skills. But this will not always be the case. The possibility of developing particular programs on the basis of matching resources with villages and municipalities, both as a queuing technique and also as long-run continuing processes, is certainly worth further attention.
VI. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET

A. Incremental Costs of Full Coverage

The costs to the community per household for various combinations of human development packages vary: in any given country, households can be ranked from those with the lowest costs, to those with the highest. The range should be fairly high. One consideration is the role played by the natural environment: the provision of services to those who occupy the low-lands usually costs less than the provision of similar services to mountain groups. Household costs also rise as population density decreases. This fact was an important consideration in the formation of Tanzania's ujamaa villages which were intended to be large enough to bring down the costs of basic social services to manageable levels.

The issue is, however, more complicated. The above discussion has concentrated implicitly on the provision to families of access to components of human development programs. Access alone is insufficient to induce consumption -- even if the publicly provided good or service is purveyed at zero cost to the consumer. In most cases, the household receiving the component must also combine it with private inputs. A child in school needs a uniform, perhaps shoes, supplies, books, and possibly payment for transport. Above all, he or she needs time. If the child is a pupil, many other activities are thereby foreclosed; in Malaysia these have added up to a substantial part of the income for poor families. For a household in the lowest fifth of the income distribution, the process of keeping a single child in secondary school implied mean out-of-pocket costs of 11 percent of disposable income in 1974. If the earnings foregone by the poor household are added, then a principal reason emerges to suggest why in Malaysia, as in other developing countries, there is such a rapid decrease in school enrollment rates, at all school levels, as incomes fall (Meerman [1979], p. 115). In the earlier discussion of water supply and sanitation, it was also shown that in Malaysia access is no guarantee of consumption with respect to these services as well, since a sizeable share of households consider the prices too high relative to their income.

Access, as the household perceives it, is also important. Objective access need not be congruous with subjective access. It is important, for example, whether the household considers itself competent to communicate with government officials in requesting a food ration card, a water connection, or the assistance of a midwife with prenatal care. Objective access is, moreover, not simply a question of whether or not the component is formally offered to some group in some region. It is possible that de facto, the request for some human development component would be in vain because citizen and official do not share a common language, or there are such marked differences in status that little communication is possible.
Full coverage or consumption, therefore, could be an expensive undertaking for, say, the highest-cost quintile. This is not only because the expense of putting households on the supply for a component may be very high (as in the case of nomads) but also, or alternatively, because whatever the reasons, the high-cost households do not believe that the component is worth what it would cost them to use or consume it.

In most countries, a policy or a campaign aimed at providing all households with a basic human development package would therefore be far more expensive if, say, "full coverage" is interpreted as 95 percent rather than at 85 percent of all households using or consuming the component. A frequent approach to this situation is to generate programs according to regional coverage, and then to assume that once a system is in place nationwide, consumption is universal. As the earlier argument suggests, this is a defective conclusion; even if there is universal coverage it by no means implies full consumption. The basic conclusion, however, remains that high-cost access and high-cost inducement to consumption combine to suggest that most developing countries would be well advised to attempt to attain complete coverage only on a gradual basis.1/

Very few countries have attempted, first, to determine systematically how the various publicly (and privately) produced human development are distributed among the citizenry and, second, to assess the factors determining such distribution. As has already been noted, in most countries there is a poor understanding of who is covered, to what degree they are covered, and as to what are some of the impediments to universal coverage. School enrollment rates, for example, very often do not do correct for over-age students. The degree to which rural health facilities are actually used by rural populations is unknown, and so on. Sample surveys undertaken in conjunction with a study of relevant government programs lend themselves very well to an investigation of human development coverage and problems, as is indicated by recent studies in Colombia and Malaysia.2/ Where a development strategy which emphasizes human development is being pursued, such knowledge is of fundamental importance in planning programs and their expansion.

B. Recurrent Costs

A rapid expansion in human development efforts will normally imply a leap in central government recurrent costs. This is most obvious with respect to elementary education and health care, as these are activities which require large and continuing inputs of the human services supplied by

1/ It is noteworthy that even in the United States full coverage has not been achieved. There are many functional illiterates, and, among certain groups, infant mortality rates and life expectancy are far below what would be expected for an extremely affluent country.

2/ Meerman 1979; Selowsky 1979.
teachers, midwives, and health educators. Sanitation services, if associated education and supervision activities are stressed, could also require large cadres. Certain kinds of nutritional programs could also depend heavily on human resources; a food rationing program, for example, would need an extensive administrative framework. Special stores -- if operated by the government -- would need to be staffed. The subsidy on the food itself would also be a very heavy recurrent cost. Emphasis on human development, therefore, implies a need for far more recurrent resources than does a growth strategy which emphasizes highways, electric power development, support of manufacturing and similar enterprises.

There is a great deal of evidence to the effect that recurrent operations are frequently defective because of a failure to provide sufficient resources for operation and upkeep. Roads deteriorate for lack of maintenance; schools do not operate well (or indeed at all) because of a lack of teachers, supplies, and equipment. Rural dispensaries are frequently abandoned de facto. Agricultural extension workers reach but a small portion of the farmers they could contact were they better supplied and motivated, for example, by being paid regularly. This state of affairs has gradually assumed the dimensions of a crisis in many sub-Saharan countries and studies are under way, or have been recently completed, that are designed to come to grips with it.1/

It is useful to consider how this situation arose. The first explanatory element involved has been investment bias: welfare depends upon growth, and growth is generated by investment. Until recently, human development has been defined as being located outside the investment pale, notwithstanding a certain indecisiveness about the treatment of education as human capital formation (although no country routinely includes education in the investment component of its national accounts). For those who are growth-oriented human development has been seen as an essentially wasteful activity. When the focus is on the public budget, the implicit maximization problem becomes that of how to reduce recurrent cost expenditure, in order to make possible the maximum of investment and growth. Foreign aid donors still lecture their clients on the need to reduce excessive recurrent costs. (Complicating the story is the fact that very often such costs are excessive. Overmanning and wage creep are common and very serious problems.) National leaders and many civil servants imbued with this same worldview are usually sympathetic to the emphasis on investment.2/


2/ As the preceding paper has explored in detail, political considerations are important as well. New projects on behalf of this or that constituency are often more conducive to keeping a regime in power, in the short run at least, than are expenditures designed to ensure that existing programs operate adequately.
There are in consequence both internal and external pressures to constrain current expenditure in order to generate "public savings" to finance development projects. National plans become compendia of such investment projects, often replete with great detail on cost estimates, sources of finances, time-scheduling of project implementation, and so forth. The more sophisticated plans may include a mathematical model involving assumptions on import requirements and, above all, the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) which, in conjunction with target investment, cranks out the desired target growth rate.

In this whole scenario recurrent costs are of interest only insofar as they compete with investment resources. Typically, neither the planners nor the budgetmakers in the ministries of finance attempt systematic estimation and analysis of the recurrent costs engendered by the new investments. Also uninvestigated are those costs resulting from existing activities which are operating poorly because of inadequate maintenance, or a lack of other inputs.

Most developing countries have thus lacked long-range programming for the recurrent cost implications of government development programs. Budgeting is usually incremental. The ministry of finance gives what they received the previous year, plus a bit more. Very often the ministries themselves are in a similar situation as concerns internal distribution. It takes fairly careful analysis and "case building" to abruptly depart from this incremental approach, since such a departure carries with it the implication that some are strongly favored at the costs of others. In advanced countries, such "muddling through" on recurrent costs can work well enough because tax systems have a good deal of flexibility. If more resources are required, it has usually been possible to generate more taxes, frequently simply by increasing rates on existing taxes. But there is little fiscal slack in developing countries, in part because tax administrations are far less effective than they are in advanced countries.

To some degree foreign aid donors are themselves a part of the problem. Eager to push on with development, and generally expecting the recipient nations to finance the local investment costs from their own resources, they have paid little heed to the recurrent cost implications of the investment programs, other than to take steps to ensure that the governments would provide the local resources needed for their own projects. They have rarely attempted to take a comprehensive perspective. There has thus been but little concern as to whether the incremental recurrent costs from all ongoing projects plus adequate funding of existing programs could be covered by the government. It may be concluded, therefore, that in addition to investment bias, a second cause of the recurrent cost problem lies in inadequate budgeting.

A third factor is inadequate administration. What sometimes seems to be a problem caused by insufficient financial resources is more basically a problem in administration (a topic examined in detail in the following paper). Unpaid workers may be the result of insufficient funds, but this situation may also result from a simple breakdown in administrative machinery. If supplies are insufficient, it may be due to failure to order them, or inability to master the complicated procedures for getting the funds from the ministry.
of finance, although those funds may exist and in fact are committed for the supplies. It may also be the case that the supplies are required to be procured from a purveyor incapable of delivering them. Alternatively, if machinery is down for excessive periods of time, it may be because of government repair facilities which lack spare parts or good mechanics, although they are not lacking in the money to pay for them. The likelihood of such breakdowns increases as one moves down the list of countries ranked according to per capita income. Education, skill levels, the "problem solving" mentality, dedication to efficiency, all of these grow rarer as income falls: yet they are some of the qualities needed for adequate administration.

In this same vein it is noteworthy that there are wealthy countries which would be very poor if they were not large exporters of oil. In these countries financial resources are not a constraint, nor have they been for two decades or more. Yet their life expectancies remain low, and their crude birth rates high, with fertility rates which average close to seven (see Table 5 below). Presumably, their governments have set goals which, if attained, would imply radical change in both of these indicators. Perhaps the principal reason for such low social indicators is weak administration and/or inadequate supplies of skilled manpower. In such capital-surplus nations, it is clearly not finance.

Table 5: PER CAPITA INCOME, BIRTH RATE AND LIFE EXPECTANCY, SELECTED COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP (US dollars)</th>
<th>Birth Rate</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>6,040</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6,680</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Middle-Income Countries</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To summarize: more attention needs to be paid to recurrent costs than hitherto, particularly if the emphasis is on human development, in which recurrent costs play such a large role. This extra attention involves not so much the development of new skills and techniques as a re-focusing by finance and operating ministries on the recurrent cost implications of existing and future programs, and their inclusion in the process of developing the expenditure budgets. Very poor developing countries experience not only serious constraints on their financial resources, but also on their
administration. It would therefore be a serious mistake to assume that finance alone is the problem. To act on this assumption might result in an intensification, rather than an alleviation, of the problem of getting existing facilities to operate adequately. Finance is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one.

C. Foreign Lending for Local Costs

1. The Lending Technique

One remaining possibility to help in the reduction of the financial burden of human development on central governments is the use of foreign loans to directly support public recurrent expenditures. As with any foreign assistance, the essence of such loans is the transfer of foreign exchange. In foreign lending to cover recurrent costs, the emphasis would be on the local currency equivalence of the foreign exchange transferred. Normally the government receives the foreign exchange, transfers or sells it to the central bank, and receives deposits from the latter in local currency "equivalent" to the foreign exchange.

In the past, loans whose rationale primarily depended on the government's use of the domestic resources commanded by the newly manufactured local currency have been called sector loans. Frequently associated with such sector loans was a sector analysis of the recipient government's budgeting and plans for the sector, for example, agriculture or medical care. The purpose of such loans was that of expanding government activity in the sector in question in desirable directions. Hence the donor was principally concerned with participating in the government's decisionmaking on the use of some of its domestic resources. The government could often have acquired the domestic resources associated with the loan through taxes or deficit finance, or through capturing some resources by moving into the financial markets. But the "sector loan" made it possible to increase the total quantity of resources (local and foreign) available so that the increased use of resources by government was not at the cost of the private sector. The mechanism involved sale of unrequited foreign exchange by the central bank and increased imports. Since the central bank, in selling foreign exchange, removed local money from circulation, there was a deflationary effect which was offset by the increased local expenditure of the government.

In recent years the IMF and the World Bank have undertaken substantial program lending. In these loans the problem of interest has always involved foreign trade, and frequently a foreign exchange crisis. As implied above, it is nevertheless also possible to concentrate upon the implications of program lending for domestic finance. Indeed, a complete appraisal of any proposed program/sector loan would involve tracing through the foreign trade effects and the effects on the public finances. To examine these, moreover, it is also necessary to consider monetary and price effects.

One approach to lending to cover recurrent costs, therefore, could be the development of loans which emphasized the generation of local
currency to cover recurrent costs, either at the official exchange rate or at a more "appropriate" rate. Such loans could be scheduled for disbursement over, say, a number of years with the local currency proceeds earmarked for specific recurrent costs. A loan could, for example, be granted to assist in the expansion and maintenance of primary education and could disburse foreign exchange and then disburse local funds according to any number of time patterns. These could be an increase, say, from a small annual level, a peak, and then a tapering down — depending on what the prognosis was concerning the generation of, and need for, local currency.1/

2. **Structural Effects**

As already noted, foreign lending to cover recurrent costs implies an increase in imports if it is to be effective. This process involves a lowering in the effective price of imports, be it through trade liberalization or through inflation with a fixed exchange rate, or other means. In brief, sector lending results — in a noncrisis situation where foreign trade is more or less in balance — in a rise in the value of domestic currency which brings a bias against exporting and import substitution, and in favor of the production of nontradeables.2/ It is unlikely, however, that foreign lending to support local expenditure would result in a continuing bias strong enough to seriously alter economic structure. In 1975-76, in a 22-country random sample of developing countries, the mean export share of GDP was 29 percent (World Bank, *World Tables 1976*, passim). If sector lending of 3 percent of GDP — a very large amount — were therefore to occur for many years, it could on average equal about 10 percent of merchandise exports. In most cases, the consequences would probably not pose a serious problem in developing adequate tradeable sectors.

3. **Resource Mobilization**

If the loan is to support a broad program, such as rural health care, a fungibility issue comes to the fore: since the foreign donor is financing the growth of the sector, local resources may be shifted to other activities which otherwise would have gone into improving the health of the rural population. From the donor perspective this may, or may not be desirable. If it is undesirable it may make sense to tie lending in the sector in question to an expansion of the government's own resources equal to, or above,

1/ The World Bank is already funding the recurrent costs of education projects to a maximum of five years.

2/ The same effect also occurs in the case of continuing project lending to cover foreign exchange costs, insofar as there is substantial fungibility (interchangeability) between project expenditure consisting of imports of one kind or another and other uses of foreign exchange. In such circumstances the actual expenditure made with the foreign exchange lent will differ from the nominal expenditure, and the country in question will be in the situation similar to the program loan recipient in this respect.
that implied by the historical trend. A more general concern in such lend-
ing is the disincentive which it causes to the overall mobilization of resources for development. Clearly, the pressure for additional revenues decreases to the degree that foreign resources become a substitute. A pressing and immediate problem in dozens of countries, for example, is posed by those public enterprises whose very large financial losses are covered by substantial transfers from the general fund. Large inflows of sector loans could make it possible to tolerate such losses indefinitely in countries where fiscal pressure would otherwise have forced measures to eliminate them.

It should be noted that this set of issues is distinct from the question of the degree to which foreign aid for capital development has substituted for domestic savings, and reduced public resource mobilization for investment. Related to this question is the fact that capital aid to cover foreign exchange costs usually generates facilities which, in turn, require local funding to cover recurrent costs. The increase in the latter may make future investment with public funds more difficult. Capital assistance, therefore, may generate a fiscal problem on the recurrent cost side -- as discussed earlier -- while solving one on the capital side. Sector lending to support local expenditures would reduce the problem of funding recurrent costs, and could ipso facto result in more local resources being used to generate investment.

A related area of concern is the possibility of defining as a finance problem what may be largely a problem in resource management or administration. As has already been noted in the discussion of recurrent costs, in the government sector, failure of supplies to arrive at work points, or for key personnel to be replaced, or for scheduled and badly needed in-house training to be carried out, or for wages to be paid, or for down equipment to be repaired, may all not be due to a shortage of public funds at the center, but rather to defects in converting those funds into the inputs needed to generate the various types of public production. Where such implementation problems are paramount "throwing money at problems" may be wasteful.

In dealing with these matters, the donor is likely to become deeply involved in the administrative, fiscal, and trade practices of the recipient. Project supervision may involve monitoring the budget and balance of payments. Lending to cover recurrent costs, therefore, may involve as much, or more, participation in country analysis and donor-recipient dialogue as does project aid.

This treatment of foreign lending for purposes of covering local costs rounds off the discussion in this paper as to specific methods of dealing with the question: How is human development to be paid for? Specific suggestions for additional analysis will, however, be found in Appendix 1.
APPENDIX 1

Suggestions for Research

The following five brief proposals with respect to the financing of human development activities have two elements in common: they involve the examination of cross-country experience with public institutional mechanisms; and they involve a large fiscal dimension. The examination of that experience would be undertaken with a view to seeking out developments which it might make sense to repeat in other countries.

(1) In developing countries the extent of taxation of the poor, and what can be done to reduce it, needs investigation. Existing studies of tax incidence suggest that in many cases taxes reduce the income of the poor by a fifth or even more. Such burdens would, in many instances, be the difference between adequate nutrition and severe deprivation. The existing studies are highly aggregate. They usually relate taxes to household income, and do not consider the variance in tax burdens at equal levels of income (horizontal equity). If that variance is large, this procedure may be very misleading. If taxes depend on household composition, then the use of household income as the denominator of the tax burden ratio would also be very misleading. A better denominator is household income per adult equivalent, or household income per capita. In developing countries little attention has been given to the question of how to reduce tax burdens on the poor, yet, if the existing studies are correct, reducing their tax burdens may be one of the most beneficial things governments can do to increase their welfare.

(2) The effects of the events which social security covers -- death of earners, invalidism, sickness -- are a cause of greatly reduced investment in human development, not only for the households which immediately suffer, but also for the extended family which is expected to cover the gap. (See the discussion in the companion paper by Safilios-Rothschild.) Expansion of social security coverage is limited both by inadequate administration, and by poverty itself. Groups spending more than half their incomes on food would have extremely difficulty in making social security contributions. (In advanced nations, they would be recipients rather than contributors.) Under such circumstances, the possibility of a public subsidy for workers whose income makes them just marginal to the system might be considered.

A principal objection to extending coverage of social security is the possible reduction in aggregate employment attendant on the increased labor costs which may result. This objection is based on considerations growing out of economic theory. Some attempt, in individual countries, to estimate the actual effects of such taxes on employment might prove worthwhile. Social security organizations in countries with rapidly expanding employment should generate large surpluses, and frequently do. These surpluses are invested and provide additional employment, although how successfully is not known. If there are serious negative effects because of the associated payroll taxation they may be offset completely, or at least in part, by the investment of the social security funds.
(3) Countries which have systems for registering births and deaths as well as identification cards for their populations, can undertake programs otherwise foreclosed: careful monitoring of school attendance; enforcement of a requirement of minimum age at marriage; administration of the personal income tax. An examination of country experience in attempting to achieve national registrations would be useful in ascertaining the feasibility of such registration in countries which wished to undertake it.

(4) **Fertility** can be affected by financial incentives. China and Singapore have succeeded in reducing fertility through various incentive schemes. In urban China, access to schools, to desirable employment, as well as cash payments or penalties *per se*, are all made dependent on the number of children in a family. A study of the Chinese and other experience with such programs could be useful in determining the requirements for their success -- one of which is a good system of personal registration -- and the possibilities of their implementation elsewhere.

(5) **Consumer food subsidies** are fairly widespread. In some countries they have become a serious fiscal problem. Their leakage to families which can afford an adequate diet is high. The possibility of targeting such programs to those most in need, so as to reduce their cost, is also worth investigating. The subsidies could be restricted to foods which have a negative income elasticity, such as coarse grains in some countries. Country experience with seasonal, and spatial, targeting as well as targeting by type of recipient and food provided should also be examined.
A Graphical Illustration of the Basic Argument

The general argument -- that solely government funding for full human development is not feasible in most low-income countries -- can be presented in revealing fashion using a mathematical formulation. A number of simplifying assumptions are made. These do not, however, do violence to the basic line of reasoning and conclusions. Needless to say the analysis is not rigorous. But it does conform to the way that basic variables affecting the financing of human development work themselves out.

Initially, assume that solely tax resources are available to the central government. Empirical work has shown that tax capacity is a function of per-capita income (Y/N), of nonmineral exports, and of mineral exports. Together, these three variables explain nearly half the variance in the tax-to-GNP ratio of developing countries.1/ Of interest here is the functional relation between tax capacity and per capita GNP. Let this ratio be K, namely, the maximum ratio of central government taxes to GNP which the country's circumstances permit.2/ This is a positive function of per-capita income as is suggested both by empirical work and by theoretical considerations.3/ Hence we can state $K = k(Y/N)$, $k' > 0$.

Resources which could be available to the central government for the funding of human development would therefore be $K$, less competing uses such as defense, administration, transport and so on. Assume that such uses are an invariable proportion, $(a)$, of $K$ so that the government resources which could be available for human development, $(R)$, are $(1-a)[k(Y/N)]$. To simplify set $r(Y/N) = (1-a)[k(Y/N)]$. Consequently we have

$$ (1) \quad R = r(Y/N), r' > 0. $$

Equation (1) could be made more realistic by adding back structural variables, such as the role of mineral exports. Alternatively, the "need" for defense expenditures, one of the major consumers of government revenues, could, in principle at least, be put in as an independent variable. For the exposition here, with its focus on per capita incomes, the very simple formulation is adequate.

Turning to the costs side, consistent with the argument in the paper, let the dependent variable be the financial costs of human development to the central government as a share of GNP $(C)$. Such costs will depend upon standards $(S)$; share of the population covered $(M)$; foreign aid $(F)$; local and regional government participation $(l)$; and support from private non-government participants $(P)$. In addition, costs as a share of GNP will

---

1/ Tait and others 1979.

2/ As discussed in the body of this paper the upper limit of $K$ is less than 22 percent for the majority of low-income countries.

3/ Taxable surplus as a share of GNP increases as incomes increase.
decline as per-capita income (Y/N) increases. As discussed in the paper, if a country's GNP per head doubles, the unit cost of a standard package of human development activities will less than double, so that C is also a decreasing function of (Y/N). Administration, culture, endowment of resources (trained personnel, hydro-geology) and politics will all affect costs, but they have been defined as outside the considerations of the paper. Again, to make cross-country comparison feasible, all variables are defined with a GNP denominator. Consequently the second equation is

\[ C = c(S, M, F, L, P, Y/N) \]

The signs of the partial first derivatives for S and M are positive; for the remaining variables they are negative. If population is ordered from least to highest cost of coverage, the second derivation of M is also positive.

It is useful to discuss how these variables interact in terms of a diagram -- see below -- in which C and R move along the vertical axis -- with a range from 0 to 1 -- and (Y/N) along the horizontal axis. Of the several independent variables (Y/N) is made explicit in the diagram because it has a very strong relation with C, and has a strong relation with R. It also automatically defines countries largely according to their degree of development, which is useful in making cross-country comparisons. Per-capita income is also well defined.

A basic point in the paper is that if the low-income countries are to rely chiefly upon central government resources, then provision of human development to a minimum effective standard for most of their population will be beyond the means of most of them. This outcome is indicated in Figure 1 in which C are the average costs of a comprehensive program of human development with full coverage at the lowest effective standards possible. As long as per-capita incomes are less than W there is a gap between costs (C) and the resources (R) which the "typical" central government can provide. As incomes decline, moreover, the gap increases and is very large at the lowest incomes.

As noted in the paper, while holding standards constant with full coverage, it is possible to reduce central government costs through such departures from reliance on the central government as: foreign aid, full cost pricing of services, legislation, and reliance on support from the periphery. For some countries comprehensive human development and full coverage can thus be at central government costs far below the C schedule, since such governments will be able to transfer a large share of the burden to others. China is an example of low-income country which has been able to provide comprehensive human development to most of the population at very low costs to the central government. Basic to this result has been the degree to which village and other local communities have directly borne the associated financial burden. It is also of great importance that China has been able to operate with very low wages for the purveyors of human development particularly in the cases of teachers and health workers.1/ Because

---

1/ A full explanation of the Chinese situation also requires consideration of political and administrative variables.
of such wages, even the full central government cost schedule for China would lie below the C schedule — conceived of as an average for the low-income countries — of the diagram.

Figure 1: An Illustration of Central Government Costs and Revenues for Human Development as a Function of Per Capita Income

At the other extreme the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have C schedules considerably above that shown on the graph because of their poor endowments of trained manpower. In these countries wages for human development personnel are inevitably very high, as was noted in the section on teacher wages in the paper. Relative to their per capita incomes, in many cases their tax ratios tend to be high, so that their R schedules are also above the R of the graph. Their C schedules are, however, so much higher that these more than offset the relatively favorable situations with respect to resource availability. Tanzania is a good illustration. A high tax ratio and extremely large inflows of foreign aid, notwithstanding, it has been unable to provide comprehensive human resource development to most of the population. Shortages of skilled labor are such a basic problem in Tanzania and other African countries that the gap between C and R remains a very large one.
Another reason why countries are unable to provide full coverage is the tendency for standards to move in tandem with per capita incomes. (See the discussion on standards in the paper.) In terms of the graph, this means that the C schedule, as a behavioral variable, tends to increase along with per capita income so that full coverage continues to recede, notwithstanding increasing per capita incomes. In brief: standards themselves are a function of per capita income. If standards could be held down, many countries could provide full coverage. This is clearly the case in much of Latin America. (Political forces are one reason why a policy of compressing standards is not an easy one to implement.) In part because of this pattern of standards increasing with income per capita, C is a far higher ratio in advanced countries than it is in poorer ones.

Equation (2) fails to depict the possibility of a country applying a double standard. In Brazil's Northeast region, human development is very defective and coverage is very limited. Education and health care could be provided there effectively, but to lower standards so that possibly unit costs of the overall human development package would decrease. In brief, if countries can apply a double standard, then it is not necessarily the case that unit costs increase as coverage increases.

Another variable affecting costs, which is also discussed in the paper, is the possibility of postponing coverage for, say, the most expensive 15 percent of the population. In terms of the graph this would mean a drop in the C schedule -- normally by considerably more than 15 percent -- so that the resource gap is closed at a per capita income lower than W.
References


World Development Report, 1979


PART III

THE ADMINISTRATION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Milton J. Esman
Cornell University

John D. Montgomery
Harvard University
TABLE OF CONTENTS

| I. | INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT | 185 |
|   | A. An Overview | 185 |
|   | B. Organization of the Paper | 189 |
| II. | DEPLOYMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES FOR REDUCING POVERTY | 190 |
|     | A. Nature of Special Publics | 190 |
|     | B. Administrative Resources for Human Development Programs | 191 |
|     | 1. The Market | 191 |
|     | 2. Voluntary Agencies | 192 |
|     | 3. State Bureaucracies | 192 |
|     | 4. Modified Bureaucratic Structures | 194 |
|     | 5. Devolution to Local Authorities | 195 |
|     | 6. Organized Special Publics | 196 |
|     | 7. Combinations | 197 |
|     | C. Diagnosis and Design | 198 |
|     | D. A Note on the Political Dimension | 203 |
| III. | IMPROVEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT | 204 |
|     | A. Information Systems: Evaluation of Impacts and Monitoring of Performance | 204 |
|     | B. Staff Incentives | 207 |
|     | C. Administrative Reform | 209 |
|     | D. Special Publics | 212 |
| IV. | RESEARCH NEEDS | 215 |
|     | A. The Consequences of Alternative Administrative Structures and Practices | 215 |
|     | B. Developmental Applications of Incentives and Organization Theory | 216 |
|     | C. The Role of Organized Special Publics | 217 |
|     | D. Behavioral Implications of Programs | 217 |
|     | E. Stages of Program Development | 218 |
| V. | CONCLUSION: POLICY CHOICES | 220 |
|     | A. Structural Issues | 220 |
|     | B. Operational Issues | 221 |
|     | C. The Time Dimension | 223 |
|     | Footnotes | 226 |
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT

A. An Overview

The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the administrative dimensions of programs designed to reduce poverty in developing countries. It focuses on human (resource) development activities, primarily in health, nutrition, family planning, and elementary and nonformal education, but the findings apply to a much broader range of programs oriented to the poor in urban as well as rural areas. It thus complements the two preceding papers on the political and financial aspects of human development programs, and also has links to the two following papers addressing broader cultural and familial contexts. The problems addressed in this paper are especially critical because:

. Governments and international donors are increasingly concerned that development programs have been by-passing very large numbers of people. The importance of improving the productivity and welfare of and the opportunities for these previously neglected publics has become a compelling obligation, as reflected in the recent emphasis on "basic needs" approaches to development.

. The urban and rural poor need greatly improved access to human development services, but they are hard to reach through conventional "service delivery" systems. Better methods of program design and implementation are needed to reach these publics with cost-effective services that are responsive to their needs, preferences, and capabilities.

Increasing the access of the poor to human development services does not guarantee that they will actually use them. As the preceding paper has emphasized, most of these services require changes in the behavior of the users, imposing costs as well as conferring benefits on them. Some facilities must be maintained by local communities if they are to continue to be useful. If development is the objective, these services require a positive response from intended users. The administrative stance that will evoke these positive responses differs radically from the "command style" of conventional bureaucratic administration.

A greatly expanded repertory of administrative structures and methods is needed to provide human development services to hitherto deprived sectors of the population. Some such structures exist, but must be expanded or reformed; others must be built afresh. Different combinations will be required to provide improved, expanded, and cost-effective services to the intended beneficiaries.
Governments with generally good administrative systems, as judged by normal standards, are encountering important and novel problems of implementation as they undertake projects involving human development and other anti-poverty purposes. These programs operate under conditions of great uncertainty about the needs and capabilities of the publics they intend to serve, about how proposed interventions will be received by these publics, and about what kinds of administrative methods will work. There are few standard mechanisms for human development activities oriented to poor mass publics.

The cultural and social influences involved in this interaction are analyzed in detail in the following paper. It is clear, however, that conventional administrative doctrine and practices must also be expanded and modified to accommodate these new problems and demands; new approaches must be tried and tested. Hitherto, experts in public administration could confine their attention in developing countries to such central administrative problems as the civil service structure, pay scales, position classification, and training; budgeting and accounting; scheduling and monitoring project performance; procurement, storage, release, and delivery of equipment and supplies; decentralization and intergovernmental relations; and interagency coordination. During the 1950s and 1960s, bilateral aid agencies, the U.N., and private foundations all invested substantial sums to improve the performance of these governmentwide systems. Public administration was, to all intents and purposes, treated as a "sector" in technical assistance. In many countries and sectors these "institutional" problems still constitute important constraints on development projects of all kinds.

Today, however, there are other administrative actors and problems to be confronted. Planners and managers of human development programs have to identify, and make greater use of, numerous regional, provincial, local, and voluntary agencies that were previously ignored in development administration. Often these intermediate agencies have to improve their own administrative capabilities in order to perform effectively. At the other end of the pipeline, meanwhile, practitioners are encountering demands from publics that were silent and invisible in the early course of development. Yet these publics can also help to improve the quality and relevance of human development services by organizing their own members and developing administrative capabilities to make use of them.

In short, the administrative tasks involved in improving the intermediate agencies of development and in organizing and supporting special publics are different from those involved in improving central administrative systems. (See Figure 1.) These new tasks require the application of a body of knowledge described in this paper as development administration.

Attempts to reach special publics also require deeper involvement by development planners and administrators with the political and social structures described in the companion papers. Yet these are structures with which they have little experience. In order to reduce the risk of
A can act on B, C, or E. Usually improved performance is seen in terms of conventional public administration theory as delivering services to E. Examples include both the governmentwide systems (civil service, budget or accounting, and planning agencies) and the headquarters of operating ministries, departments, and parastatal agencies.

B can act on C, D, or E, and feed results and information back to A. Improved performance depends on good administrative management, which in turn depends on services provided by A. Examples: regional and district offices of central ministries or departments, provincial governments.

C can present demands on B and A, provide services to D, and act as countervailing force to B. Examples: farmers, unions, irrigation user associations, mothers' clubs, local government authorities.

D designates the intended beneficiaries of poverty programs. In the absence of organization, they can rarely act effectively except by the composite response to human development services. Examples: migrant landless workers, widows unable to own land, pre-school children suffering from malnutrition.

E can provide the social environment of diffuse support or denial to efforts by B, D, and C; also acts as ultimate arbiter of A except in the presence of sustained coercion. Examples: the voting population of a district, speakers of a common language, undifferentiated observers or participants.
costly failure, program designers and administrators must have accurate information about this new task environment, detailing the conditions, preferences, and capabilities of the publics they intend to serve. They must invest not only in acquiring the information, but also in keeping it current as project activities proceed.

Political leaders do not always welcome such measures; sometimes they even oppose the actions required for the success of programs they themselves have launched, for the reasons set out in the companion paper by Uphoff. In such cases, the efficient deployment of institutional resources may be difficult, and development administrators have to explore the feasibility of substituting local for central action, or to make use of organized special publics instead of official service-providing agencies, or to rely on other unconventional procedures for implementing programs.

Sometimes a human development program does not appeal to the special public it is intended to serve, and project managers have to change the design of the program or provide other incentives to public participation. When actual public responses are different from expectations, additional step may be required to convert program outputs to desirable social gains. (See Figure 2.)

---

**Figure 2**

**Simplified Social Process Model of Human Development Programs**

(1) Project Output

(2) Public Response

(3) Social Improvement

(1) Examples: schoolrooms built, teachers trained, village health centers in place, supplies delivered. Administrative task is to gain maximum output from minimum input.

(2) Examples: classes attended, absenteeism reduced, improved understanding of health. Administrative task is to adapt output to public tastes, preferences, needs, and capabilities.

(3) Examples: improved literacy, increased employment, reduced mortality, rise in entrepreneurship. Administrative task is to encourage desired collective consequence of individual choices.

---

Between the ill-educated, low-status publics and the better-educated administrators who hold official status there are likely to be very great physical, social, and cognitive distances. They tend to live in different worlds and to perceive reality differently. The biases are enhanced by the
fragmentary experience of administrators: their urban outlook; the "view from the road" that excludes inaccessible households; the apparent "invisibility" of children who do not attend school and the sick who are never seen in clinics; the diffidence of women responsible for the maintenance of the family; and the lack of contact with the landless and migratory workers who are unable to take advantage of new agricultural technologies. Such obstacles have to be specifically addressed in these programs, uncomfortable and disconcerting as it may seem to try to change the perceptions and values of public officials in order to improve their efforts to reach the poor.

No single body of systematic knowledge is available that directly applies to these problems. There is, of course, vast experience with administrative reform; the techniques for simplifying, rationalizing, and restructuring administrative procedures and systems are well understood; there are studies of efforts to use intermediate organizations and organized special publics for development purposes; and the incentives and motives of people exposed to "modernizing opportunities" have been subjected to intense examination in connection with programs in population, nutrition, education, and public health. These sources make up the reservoir of knowledge on which practitioners draw, sometimes intuitively, sometimes systematically. But they do not cohere into a generally accepted theory of development administration.

B. Organization of the Paper

This paper will further develop these themes. It will indicate the analytical and operational means available to governments and donor agencies for improving administrative performance, propose a short agenda for applied research, and identify a number of policy issues that remain to be resolved. Its special focus will be the needs of program and project planners and administrators, and of the international agencies that are working with them in the search for better ways to reduce global poverty.

It is specifically organized as follows: Section II addresses the deployment of administrative resources for reducing poverty by examining the nature of special publics, listing the six major available administrative resources, and considering diagnosis and design, and aspects of the political dimension. Section III analyzes the improvement of administrative performance by considering the roles of information systems, staff incentives, administrative reform, and special publics. Section IV outlines research needs by assessing prospects for alternative administrative modes, incentives and organization theory, the role of organized special publics, behavioral implications, and stages of program development. Section V focuses by way of conclusion on nine major policy choices relating to structural issues, operational issues, and the time dimension.

* Footnotes will be found at the end of this paper.
II. DEPLOYMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES
FOR REDUCING POVERTY

A. Nature of Special Publics

It is convenient to refer to deprived populations as "the poor," but that concept offers little guidance for program management because of the diversity of needs and capabilities such populations exhibit. The poor represent a substantial proportion of the population of most developing countries. They include such heterogeneous groups as undernourished preschool children, farmers' widows barred by law from acquiring or owning land, unemployed migrants to urban slums suffering from endemic disease, and people unable to read and cipher. The members of such diverse groups would not necessarily find their condition alleviated by any single action that society can take. Even a policy of directly supplying adequate income supports to these victims of poverty--assuming that it were possible--might not suffice in the absence of other changes. Members of these publics are not readily accessible through conventional public programs because they may be scattered, isolated, highly mobile, located on illegal squatter settlements, or alienated from government and disinclined to cooperate with its representatives.

These "special publics" often live in remote or hard-to-reach areas or suffer their greatest privations during the wet season when they cannot be approached by ordinary overland routes; a few even make it a point not to be seen at public facilities set up for supplying family planning and health services, nutrition supplements, or even primary or nonformal education. On the other hand, for their part, the end-of-the-line field workers in a human development service are rarely motivated to break the cognitive, social, and physical barriers that separate them from the special publics with which this paper is concerned. Further, the supply lines to such workers for goods and services and for information, support, and guidance are continually breaking down. Improving administration at the periphery is far more complex and difficult than administrative reform at the center.

Reports of human development project experience in every field confirm this conclusion. Project outputs achieve a service plateau soon after they begin to function, and stay there even when inputs rise once the relatively easy cases have been reached. Thereafter, field workers tend to concentrate their efforts on the more progressive and, by absolute standards, less needy cases. Supplies begin to reach outposts late, in wrong proportions, or not at all once the original endowment is exhausted. Information about "client" responses is rarely recorded in the field, or fed into the management information systems, or studied by the central project managers in order to improve field performance. Hours and conditions of service are set on the basis of convenience and needs of government employees, not of the special publics for whose benefit projects are established.

Human development services end up missing their target not so much for want of good will as because of the objective difficulties of providing services which often are ill-suited to the needs, preferences, or capabilities
of special publics. Such services are often provided by poorly-trained, poorly-motivated and poorly-supervised employees who are at the end of unreliable channels of supply, informations, and other essential inputs. The special publics themselves, moreover, sometimes considered the "target" groups of development activities, often become "moving targets" because their needs change after one set of projects is under way, or because other groups have moved in to replace them. They themselves may have gone on to the cities or to other rural areas to seek other opportunities for survival or self-improvement.

The record of poverty programs in every field repeats a shocking lesson: even projects that achieve early success tend to deteriorate unless they are flexible enough to continue to respond to the changing needs and preferences of the special publics they are attempting to benefit.

B. Administrative Resources for Programs

The range of administrative resources available for human development programs, like those in all large-scale developmental efforts, include a spectrum of private and public institutions. The identification of six major structures of development administration, together with an appreciation of their respective strengths and weaknesses, is a first step in applying government policies and resources to the reduction of poverty.

1. The Market

Market mechanisms can sometimes provide direct benefits to special publics with only modest government intervention. Among rural and urban poor alike, families cross the subsistence line in both directions as the fortunes of individual members change through time. (This process is explored in detail in the companion paper by Safilios-Rothschild.) In such cases, even marginal interventions can help. Thus, for example, nutritional supplementation of foods available through commercial channels has been used to enrich bread and other staple foods in Asia and Latin America with no additional administrative investment except to provide subsidies for the supplement itself. 7/ The addition of Vitamin A supplements to MSG in the Philippines shows that adaptation of local dietary customs to serve the needs of special publics can also be achieved at high levels of cost-effectiveness through market mechanisms. 8/ Parastatal organizations have been effective in distributing pharmaceuticals through commercial channels in West Cameroon. 9/

The principal advantage of the market approach is the low cost to government, especially of scarce administrative resources. The self-monitoring behavior of market forces provides quick feedback about public acceptance and reduces the need for obtrusive external monitoring systems.

The primary difficulty of relying on market mechanisms alone is that many, perhaps most, of the services needed by special publics are unprofitable for the private sector. When urban squatters and landless rural populations are unable to afford marketed services even when they are
subsidized by government, or when subsidies become infeasible, the burdens must be transferred to more direct public interventions. The linkages between the special publics and the market can be strengthened by production-oriented programs as well as by subsidies, but experience has demonstrated that other approaches are also needed for the reduction of poverty.

2. *Voluntary Agencies*

The private sector is also represented by voluntary nongovernmental organizations or private volunteer groups, sometimes domestic in origin, but usually with international connections, that provide human development services. These organizations often function with minimal costs to the government, imposing upon it only minor administrative burdens. Their volunteers can display a strong dedication to serving the poor, flexibility in responding to changing needs and traditions, and a willingness to extend services beyond the clientele served by local offices and field stations of government agencies. But they are not represented in all countries, and the fact that many are operated by foreigners introduces elements of suspicion that can reduce their effectiveness, especially in dealing with politically sensitive groups. In addition, their resources are usually meager and the scale of their operations correspondingly small in proportion to the national need. But because they are often engaged in programs of an experimental nature, their capabilities are of special interest to the planners and managers of human development programs, and they offer an important potential for improving the performance of standard government services. The Philippines have made good use of mixed public and private voluntary agencies to deal with both national nutrition problems and family planning. In Latin America, too, governments have acquiesced in the activities of both domestic and international voluntary agencies in such controversial fields as that of family planning, offering services in accordance with traditions that enlarge the rights of citizens without actually adopting official positions for which the public is not ready.

3. *State Bureaucracies*

The third administrative resource—the one most frequently used and the first to be recognized by program designers concerned with developing national interventions to serve special publics—is the centralized, specialized, and hierarchical bureaucratic system that provides services directly to the general public. Such services can improve agricultural productivity through the management of research and extension; they can provide support to village primary care centers; and they can perform the conventional services of public education. The state bureaucracies are centrally financed and managed, and their activities take place within programs that issue from national plans or political leadership. They respond, with varying degrees of alacrity, to fiscal, administrative, and political controls. They can deliver routine services predictably and with reasonable quality and cost standards. At their best, they are, or can be, professionally organized and controlled, disciplined, and trained to follow rules and routines that provide uniformity, equity, predictability, and accountability.
But they cannot perform all of the services required in the application of human development programs to special public needs, especially where they treat their clients as "targets" or at best passive beneficiaries of their efforts, or where their access to the poor is inhibited by the cognitive and social distances described earlier in this section. In any event, they are costly to mobilize and maintain in the service of large and scattered low-income publics. Bureaucratic agencies are more effective in dealing with less-needy publics. They are slow to deal with nonroutine decisions; they find it difficult to adapt programs and services to distinctive needs, or to changes in needs, among the special publics. They tend, moreover, to be functionally single-minded; and because of their tendency toward highly centralized decisionmaking, it is difficult for specialized bureaucratic agencies to integrate their activities with those of other agencies providing complementary services to the same publics. At local levels they are often regarded as unsympathetic, impersonal, inflexible, and even arrogant. Yet their responsive capacity can be strengthened through staff training, improved incentives and rewards, and better supervising, reporting and monitoring procedures.

Official bureaucratic agencies include parastatal and semi-autonomous institutions, endowed with special authority that can be used to achieve developmental purposes without having to comply with standard personnel and financial practices and controls. Parastatal institutions and special project units have been successful in building and managing large infrastructure projects, especially those that generate their own revenues and can be fiscally autonomous. A World Bank study nevertheless found that state enterprises and special authorities in predominantly agricultural countries had failed to promote either growth or equity during the past decade. Their utility for human development activities, moreover, is especially doubtful, not only because of the burden that a large-scale resort to them would place upon the basic administrative resources of the country, but also because of the conflicts they would engender with regular agencies of government. Most human development activities cannot be insulated from the main line of public administration because of their interdependencies with other public services at all levels of government.

Current doctrine suggests that it is more useful to work within established structures. Results may come more slowly as a result, but services rendered by such organizations have a greater likelihood of becoming firmly institutionalized in the normal workings of government than those provided by special units. As expedient, the use of special-purpose autonomous agencies within established organizations may help to create an awareness of national priorities among civil servants. It may also encourage them to find ways of expediting their own efforts to use existing systems and procedures to benefit the poor. Experimental nutrition programs in Colombia, for example, have been conducted by the Ministry of Social Welfare and not by a special agency.
4. **Modified Bureaucratic Structures**

Without abandoning the use of the official bureaucracy, additional resources can be developed by relaxing conventional centralized controls and extending their reach in unconventional ways. The most frequent and successful use of modified structures involves (a) deconcentration within bureaucracies and (b) augmenting professional staffs with paraprofessional personnel.

Administrative "deconcentration" take place through the delegation of operating responsibility to field agents responsible to ministries and to other central authorities. These procedures permit centrally-sponsored programs to flourish under a variety of local circumstances, and they introduce new elements of adaptiveness and responsiveness to the local constituencies. Deconcentration reduces direct control over quality and cost and it may also produce some disparities in the services provided to different areas, but administrators are finding that these costs are more than offset by the increased quantity of services rendered and a heightened flexibility in dealing with local circumstances. Such federal states as India, Brazil, and Malaysia have always divided governing responsibilities between central and state agencies.19/

Deconcentration can occur in individual programs or in entire ministries, or, in rare cases, even on a governmentwide scale. There are, however, certain preconditions to effective deconcentration: the officers to whom decisionmaking is delegated must be equipped to discharge additional responsibilities; central authorities must ensure that agency rules, policies, and procedures are recorded, kept current, and made available to field workers; supervisors in different jurisdictions must provide standard performance norms to their staffs; and both levels of management must introduce effective reporting systems and inspection procedures.

To achieve the full benefits of deconcentration, two further conditions must be met: First, where detailed site-specific knowledge or quick action is required for effectiveness, central authorities must delegate enough discretion to local officials who are close to the scene of operations (deconcentration to the state or provincial level may not be sufficient if these units are large). Second, deconcentration permits specialized agencies providing related public services to integrate on their own authority their activities in appropriate response to local needs. Field offices must be encouraged and rewarded for successful efforts at horizontal integration of services. To facilitate integration and responsiveness, some governments (that of Ecuador, for example) are experimenting with the delegation of planning authority and even financial control over specialized programs to generalist officers at provincial and even district levels. These measures are still controversial, however, because they redistribute power within government bureaucracies and their consequences cannot be reliably predicted. The administrative problems and consequences of efforts at large-scale deconcentration or program planning and operations are neither obvious nor uniform; they thus deserve careful attention in each situation.
Still greater outreach has been achieved in curative and preventive medicine, nutrition programs, and nonformal education by the introduction of paraprofessionals into the system. These are trained, guided, and supported by central technical and professional staffs. Often they are selected from the community being served. Even if they have limited formal education, such helpers can be trained in the specific skills required to provide services that would otherwise be unavailable, and at costs that the special publics can afford. Their outreach to a wider public and their ability to empathize with its needs can not only permit a more responsive service but also provide a more reliable feedback to project administrators than are normally available from hierarchical bureaucratic structures of professionals and technicians. While their reduced professionalism makes such workers unacceptable in some cases, these marginal disadvantages can be reduced by continued use and support, continuous training and upgrading of skills, more reliable supply systems, and improved supervisory techniques. As "community health workers," paraprofessionals are becoming an established element in health and nutrition programs throughout the world, and are increasingly being introduced on an experimental basis in urban and rural nonformal educational and welfare activities.

5. **Devolution to Local Authorities**

Legally accountable units of local government can perform developmental functions without imposing severe burdens on central government agencies. Their responsiveness to local influence and their accountability to local publics make them especially valuable in human development programs, and their ability to organize and interact with organized special publics reinforces another important, but hard-to-mobilize, administrative resource. Unfortunately, in most low-income countries, local authorities are weak, inefficient, often corrupt, dominated by unrepresentative local elites, faction-ridden, and devoid of financial resources. There are nevertheless contrary cases: Tanzanian rural development in Kigoma and Tabora called for decentralization of multisectoral functions by regional authorities to local government. Further, Indonesia has begun to reward communities that exceed their family planning objectives by giving them access to additional funds.

Any serious effort at devolution to local government usually requires (1) some central financial subsidies plus greater authority for local governments to impose taxes; (2) training programs for local officials and councillors and technical assistance in the provision of the various human development services; and (3) supervision and post-audit review both to monitor the use of resources and to insure adequate performance of the devolved services. Countries that have good metropolitan governments are able to devolve services for urban squatters who have migrated to city boroughs. Developing similar capabilities in rural areas is a much more difficult task, but the benefits it can bring in the administration of human development programs justifies a serious effort where local structures are strong enough to carry an additional load. The success of
the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan derived in no small measure from such efforts.25/ Requiring some "matching" contribution by local authorities to various services, for example, to the salaries of primary teachers or of health paraprofessionals, can be an important stage in a fuller devolution of responsibility.

6. Organized Special Publics

Associational groups of all kinds are important assets in programs aimed at reducing poverty. They can be formal or informal, or perform single or multiple functions. Organizations for those who work small farms, credit unions, women's clubs, irrigation associations, parent-teachers associations, marketing cooperatives, and labor unions are accountable to, and reflect the interests of, their members.26/ They can mobilize public participation as no bureaucratic agency can, and they can interact positively with official service-providing agencies and local governments. They can supplement government-provided services with labor, funds, skills, and information; they can articulate authoritatively the needs of their members; they can provide reliable feedback on project experiments; and they can exert pressure on the official agencies for improved services in ways that otherwise would be impossible for unorganized, low-status individuals. In Ethiopia, for example, Peasants' Associations were able to strengthen local support for the Minimum Package Program to the extent that they "forced" more effective implementation by the official agencies.27/ Other examples can be cited: 4,500 village cooperatives organized by the Indian National Dairy Development Board; 6,000 Mothers' Clubs in Korea; communal irrigation associations in the Philippines; village groups associated with the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee; numerous empresas comunitarias in Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras, organized around land reform activities.28/

It is significant that the 1978 World Bank review of rural development projects in East Africa reported that one-third of them involved "self-help," a term that often refers to the use of organized special publics.29/ On the other hand two-thirds of them did not have that involvement, suggesting the problems that this approach presents, such as: the difficulty of drawing on existing organizations, or fostering new organizations among the poor, the risk of their being dominated by government or by local elites, and bureaucratic and political suspicions of self-help activities. In Kenya, the Group Farmers project had to be delayed because of the reluctance of farmers to organize, a precondition to rendering the development services envisaged by a World Bank-financed project. In Upper Volta, the involvement of community groups of parents is said to have saved a nonformal education project; but similar efforts in Tanzania were unsuccessful.30/ The organized special public is a potential administrative resource, but it is underutilized for reasons that have to be dealt with as human development programs attempt to reach deeper into areas of poverty.
7. Combinations

Most human development services require combinations of administrative structures. Though drugs may be distributed through market channels, they may benefit from subsidies, promotion, and monitoring under bureaucratic agencies; and both efforts may link with local health committees to assist paraprofessional workers. While primary school curricula are usually prescribed by bureaucratic departments of education, school buildings are often constructed and maintained by local authorities that also contribute to teacher salaries. Nutritional programs may rely on paraprofessionals for promotion, but depend on the market for the distribution of subsidized food, on state operated radio for education, and on a bureaucratic agency for monitoring and auditing.

In the past, program designers have preferred to rely on conventional centralized bureaucratic structures because of their identification with the state and the expectation that they will be more responsible, amenable to close financial and operational control, and able to provide uniform services, than alternative methods. As is indicated in the companion paper by Uphoff, in many cases the central bureaucracies themselves are an interest group, concerned with expanding the scale of their operations and convinced that they control the technical skills and operational know-how necessary to effective program design and management. The consequences of this bias toward central bureaucracies are to overburden these agencies and to stifle the development and utilization of alternative resources. This bias, to which human development activities are particularly susceptible, leads to overcentralization, inflexibility, and limited responsiveness to the distinctive needs of intended beneficiaries.

While excessive reliance on centralized bureaucratic structures is to be avoided, so is the opposite extreme of committing more functions to local authorities than they can absorb and denying them the programming skills, specialized information, and financial support that the political center can provide. Strong linkages and shared responsibilities between the center and the periphery represent the most effective means of providing services to low-income publics. The choice of services to be offered, and the method of providing them, depends on the quality and availability of administrative resources. A proper balance may require strengthened administrative institutions and capabilities at all levels of government, so that they can sustain more complex services at higher levels of efficiency. Such decisions are currently made on the basis of administrative judgment, but enough experience is now at hand to permit a more systematic basis upon which to develop an administrative strategy for human development programs.
C. Diagnosis and Design

The program designer should regard administrative resources as variables, not as a fixed quantity or as a stock of capital. Since there are several kinds of administrative structures and combinations of structures on which to draw, managerial capabilities are not as limited in most developing countries as conventional wisdom suggests. Complex management tasks usually require higher education and experience, which may be in limited supply; but the potential for managing straightforward human development services in the field is widely diffused. This latent talent can be activated and reinforced by clear and simple procedures, competent supervision, and short-term training. Limited "high level" administrative capability need not preclude the implementation of programs of human development and of other programs that reduce poverty. In such cases, programs should be developed to emphasize simplicity of design, rely on administrative deconcentration, make use of local authorities, and work with organized special publics. Such strategies can shift the managerial burden to the field, while maintaining essential central controls over public funds. They, moreover, permit governments to draw on, and further develop, abundant but underutilized human resources. In many cases, they constitute not only the most effective, but perhaps the only way to extend human development services to low-income publics.

The nonmarket administrative resources described above can be classified into two groups of resources: official service-providing agencies, including bureaucratic structures and their extensions; and local organizations, including both local government authorities and such organized special publics as unofficial functional associations of user groups, farmers' associations, cooperatives, mothers' clubs, and credit unions. In any given situation, these two elements present the major resources available to program designers for maximizing the reach and effectiveness of human development activities.

Preference for the one or the other of these elements depends on the administrator's estimate of their quality and strength, subject to the principle that field-based managerial resources should be tapped and developed wherever possible. Putting the problem crudely, the planner can conceive of the capabilities of these two groups along a spectrum ranging from "weak" to "strong" and diagnose the situation variables by applying a matrix such as that presented in Figure 3. "Weak" administrative capacity in the official agencies would be identified by limitations in the technical quality and motivation of staff, in their ability to cover intended beneficiaries, and in their information and control systems. Operationally, these weaknesses can be gauged by the presence of notable shortfalls in project support, by delays in meeting project goals, or by inability to change project designs when public response fails. "Weak" local organizations, on the other hand, can be identified by low or unrepresentative membership, inconstant leadership, or the absence of physical or staff infrastructure.
Figure 3

Diagnosing Situational Characteristics of Administrative Resources for Human Development Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Organizations</th>
<th>Official Service-Providing Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The administrators whose program falls into situation A, with a weak administrative structure and a tenuous organization of the relevant publics, will find it unwise to initiate a program that requires either active public participation or the use of a large administrative staff to extend services over a wide area. A more appropriate strategy in such cases would be to initiate projects that are not administration-intensive, such as using radio as a device for extending nonformal education or supplementing teachers in primary schools, or introducing subsidies to spur commercial activities in the supplementation of nutrition. Their responsibilities would not cease there, since presumably these efforts would tend to exclude the most deprived elements of the community.

The administrators should therefore devote their long-term efforts to the task of building institutional capabilities in the official agencies, or the local organizations, or both. Judgments of feasibility and the needs of particular programs will determine where these institution-building efforts are to be invested. If the poor are to be served, it is important to avoid the temptation to concentrate on official agencies to the exclusion of local organizations. Within the official agencies, planners should avoid concentrating on higher-level staffs at the expense of the often-neglected field staffs who actually encounter publics and, who usually represent the weakest links in the administrative chain. In situation "A" it is generally a mistake to resort to "pilot projects" with the expectation that they will expand even if they achieve small-scale successes. Pilot projects initiated where both weak administrative and local organization prevail will require the investment of leadership and operating capital that cannot be replicable, cannot expand on the basis of its own momentum, and will, if anything, arouse expectations more rapidly than they can be met.
The greatest contrast to this situation is represented in Figure 3 by cell D. In that situation relatively effective administrative structures are available to penetrate rural areas and urban slums, and administrators have the further advantage that they can deal with well-organized publics to extend their reach and articulate the demands for services. In these cases, special programs can be designed to serve such clearly designated groups as rural unemployed youth, or nursing mothers in urban slums. Such programs have achieved notable success in Korea, where it has been possible for Mothers' Clubs to establish and maintain quality and cost controls and still adhere to standards of performance that both the official agencies and organized publics can participate in setting for themselves.35/ In cell D cases it is important to ensure that major responsibilities are conferred on local authorities and organized special publics, because they may atrophy if too much of their work is taken over by bureaucratic agencies of the state, and if they are not continuously challenged with useful opportunities to provide service.

In cell B cases, where there is relatively strong local organization of relevant publics, but an underdeveloped administrative capacity, the planner, economizing on the scarcer factor, can explore ways of better utilizing local government, voluntary organizations, and organized special publics. Simplicity of program design is a necessary condition to the development and utilization of these managerial resources. Land reform programs have achieved notable success in the absence of strong bureaucratic capabilities by transferring responsibility for exercising essential administrative functions to such local bodies as tenant committees, subject to control and review by appropriate administrative and quasi-judicial agencies.36/ At the same time, since local organizations can never entirely replace the use of official bureaucratic agencies, the planner needs to invest resources in strengthening basic administrative capacity to provide such complex services as regulation and the logistical supports, leaving local action groups to perform less complex functions. When local health centers in Senegal were unable to reach the public directly in order to improve nutritional status, for example, the Khalifs agreed to summon people to the mosques where nutrition projects were mounted successfully and gradually extended through the country.37/ The sharing of responsibilities among local organizations and official agencies, and restraint of each by responsible action of the other, can constitute an effective long-range institutional development strategy.

In the situation represented by cell C in Figure 3, in the presence of relatively strong bureaucratic capabilities but weak organizations of intended beneficiaries—a not uncommon combination—it is possible to offer human development functions that do not require public response. These actions would include installing public sanitation facilities, providing mass immunization, and developing extension services to improve production and to promote the use of educational and health facilities. The provision of these services
can contribute to the tasks of building and activating local organizational capabilities if appropriate plans are made at the outset, so that they can participate in expanded service such as self-help housing or community nutrition programs.

The provision of services may be a first and necessary step in developing institutions in other fields as well. Health services may foster the development of local health committees, which may then facilitate the provision of nutrition and family planning services. Studies of efforts to organize farmers' associations confirm the proposition that, in the absence of a service provided by the central administration, it is difficult to initiate and maintain substantial community organization or induce measures of self-help and affirmative public response.

This diagnostic approach can be used as a point of departure in both project choices and implementation decisions. It makes planners aware of available resources and opportunities, and suggests ways of avoiding the imposition of impossible burdens upon either bureaucratic structures or local leadership. The level of analysis suggested here can require decisions at the echelons of national or ministerial responsibility, but it also permits disaggregation at the project level for both regional and sectoral decisionmaking. In any given area, this situational diagnosis may yield different results for different sectors. A country may have impressive bureaucratic capabilities in epidemiology, for example, but may be weak in its ability to provide maternal and child care; just as it may have effective associations of water users, but no organizations among barrio women or low-caste landless illiterates in rural areas. As administrative capacity may differ by jurisdictional sector, so may it differ by region. Administrative strategies should thus be differentiated in response to sectoral and regional capabilities.

While local circumstances must always be taken into account, in general it is administratively more feasible for governments to supply services that special publics will immediately appreciate and use, than to create a demand for them. Curative health clinics are likely to be more welcome and more intensively used than are family planning facilities, and their services are thus easier for governments to make available through conventional state bureaucracies. It is also a simpler matter to evoke the organization of users for self-help purposes when they involve services to which they attach a high value, and to require financial contributions from individuals and communities, than it is otherwise. Far less effort is accordingly required to organize special publics on behalf of primary schools, whose benefits they anticipate and welcome, than it is for environmental sanitation programs for which there is little felt need. Where there is a choice, governments and donors prefer, with good reason, to initiate human development programs in response to public demand and to foster the participation of local organizations, or of local authorities, in support of these activities. Such capabilities can then be extended in the future to sustain other activities for which there is little initial demand.
The more an activity requires major behavioral changes on the part of users (as, for example, in their dietary habits), or appears to threaten established norms (as with family planning), or to challenge vested interests (for example, those of traditional health practitioners), or seems to yield only dubious benefits (as in the case of environmental sanitation), then the more patiently they must be introduced, the greater the need for public education and persuasion, and the less cost-effective they will be in the short run, either in political or programmatic terms. Expanding the demand for such services is likely to depend heavily on effective organization of special publics to supplement the efforts of official and other agencies of the state. Local organizations can help to create and maintain an environment favorable to innovative services; they can also insure that those services are responsive to local needs. Where public demand for services must be cultivated, governments should be prepared to deconcentrate decisions to field-level officials and give them the authority to adapt program details, so that they can be readily adapted to distinctive local conditions, demands, and opportunities. The less vigorous the demand, the less feasible are uniform standards or procedures, and the more necessary are experimentation and deconcentration.

Within the same sector, both high-demand and low-demand activities are present. Subsidized food, for example, can be efficiently distributed through market channels at very low administrative cost; if the subsidies are confined to coarse, low-status items that the poor normally consume and the rich avoid, leakage to the nonpoor can be prevented with minimal administrative surveillance (a point made by Meerman in the preceding paper). On the other hand, dietary changes are likely to depend on patient education over extended periods, to be administration-intensive, and to require some form of local organization. In the family planning sector, child care facilities will tend to be enthusiastically used, while at first contraceptive services are rejected. But because low-demand human development activities can eventually make important contributions both to productivity and to welfare, governments and donors should commit resources to such activities. This should be the case even though their payoffs will not be immediate, the administrative effort will be substantial, and local organization will be required to induce user response. In the medium term, however, the returns to such investments, both to the household and to the society, can be substantial. Improved disposal of human excrement is likely to be a far more efficient program, in the sense of producing far greater health benefit to a much wider public at low costs, than the more immediately appreciated curative services.

When in doubt, program designers should bias their efforts in favor of building capabilities and committing resources to field-level managers in official or local organizations in the interest of simplifying administration and tapping latent but underutilized managerial resources.
D. A Note on the Political Dimension

Political considerations affecting human development activities are treated in detail in the companion paper by Uphoff, and only a brief supplementary review emphasizing the administrative perspective will accordingly be presented here. It should first be noted that, occasionally, human development programs may come into existence without strong political support. Such "development by stealth" may spring from international funding from the professional drive of planners and administrators, and even from the pressures of organized publics. National leadership is seldom monolithic; an enthusiastic minister or senior administrator may provide enough support to mount a human development program, for example, even in the face of indifference or skepticism from other political leaders. But political personalities are ephemeral resources, and unless programs yield early political benefits to the regime, continued political support cannot be taken for granted. Program managers must constantly attend to their political fences to insure their access to resources, especially for programs that cater to potentially weak publics or fail to yield quick or visible returns. Although most human development programs oriented to the poor do not directly threaten the interests of more powerful groups, they do compete for scarce resources.

Political factors may also affect the success of human development programs at the local level. Traditional health practitioners may feel threatened by new health, nutrition, or family planning activities and attempt to undermine public support or participation. Local elites may preempt services intended primarily for the poor, or influence the placement of facilities to their advantage. In the choice, design, and provision of such services, planners can protect the interests of intended beneficiaries by making use of organized publics, or by seeking the support of influential locals who are otherwise uninvolved. World Bank studies in the education sector have noted occurrences of the mislocation of schools because of failure of administrators to make use of local participation in siting and specifying facilities, and recommended "school-mapping" to counteract such decisions. Improvements will require a working knowledge of the social structure and political dynamics of the communities concerned. Also required will be the development of a combination of political with technical and managerial sensitivity that will call for new approaches to the training of development administrators and the designing of programs.

The diagnostic methodology which we have proposed relates to administrative resources, to the choices that are likely to be indicated in individual situations, and to strategies that may be required for enhancing institutional capabilities both of official agencies and local organizations. While less amenable than administrative factors to rigorous analysis, the political variables of the kind discussed in the paper by Uphoff must be taken into account as a separate analytical exercise in the choice and implementation of human development programs.
III. IMPROVEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The improvement of administrative performance in human development involves a sequence of actions, beginning with the process of identifying special publics, and going on to actions aimed at increasing their access to services, adapting services until they are appropriate to the need, delivering them efficiently, observing and reacting to public response, and finally reinforcing the capacity of the entire administrative system to support these activities.

A. Information System: Evaluation of Impacts and Monitoring of Performance

This perception of administration as a chain of events requires that planners and managers of human development programs employ special information-gathering procedures for (1) identifying the individuals, households, or groups they are to serve; (2) observing program performance in order to control costs and to facilitate effectiveness in the use of resources; and (3) developing instruments for measuring improvements in client access to, and use of, the services being offered, so that planners and managers can assess the quality, timeliness, and appropriateness of their efforts.

In the larger context of social improvement, project managers must be prepared to evaluate the public's responses to human development opportunities. Analysis of this information permits managers to interpret the outcomes or social benefits derived from programs and to change the mixture of services or the processes by which they are made available. This context of observed interactions is itself a management information system appropriate to these programs. It achieves importance in direct ratio to the uses administrators make of such information through feedback and response mechanisms.

Cost-effective means of identifying special publics have been developed for anti-poverty programs of all kinds. They range from income tests to regional diagnoses and measures of malnutrition and illiteracy. Such services serve to target administrative interventions in direction where the need is greatest. For political reasons, it is often necessary to render services beyond the points of greatest need offering them to an entire population or region despite the consequent reduction of resources available exclusively to the poor or the poorest. Sometimes such decisions are made, not for political reasons, but because of the administrative difficulty of precise "targeting" of services to the poor (as with nutrition supplements, for example), where the cost of identifying the groups in greatest need would exceed the cost of "blanketing" the general public. Sri Lanka thus for many years maintained a minimum level of rice rations available to the rich as well as to the poor, because to exclude populations not in need would be politically and administratively more costly than supplying free food to those who could...
have purchased it on their own. A retrospective study by the World Bank concluded that targeting would have reduced mortality rates substantially (half the costs of the program benefited families that did not need the rations); but, politically, it was deemed impossible to exclude the better-off publics. Human development programs encounter the greatest strain when they exert special efforts to reach the neediest publics, while at the same time providing subventions for similar services extended to those who are somewhat better off. When such programs are primarily designed to alleviate poverty, the precise identification of the groups most in need is necessary even though they may not wind up as the exclusive targets of such programs.

Measuring the access of special groups to these services and the extent to which they are actually use is, in most cases, administratively quite feasible. Extension agents report on the groups that they reach with new technologies, and analysts can measure from their reports the extent to which workers of small farmers or landless populations are being left to themselves. Similar procedures can be used to analyze the characteristics of users of nonformal education, primary education, nutritional services, public health facilities, and population and family planning services. Records of the proportion of special groups being reached by human development projects are already being used by the World Bank in Brazil and elsewhere to compare the rates of change in the status of special publics being served by the programs. The government of Brazil has created a research and development project to provide information on the benefits delivered by different nutrition interventions (rural extension services, health delivery systems, commercial markets, and use of the school infrastructure) in order to determine how to distribute administrative resources to serve a hierarchy of objectives.

The most difficult stage in appraising the impact of human development programs on poverty is that of measuring public responses to specific services. Special studies, even when made on a limited sample basis, are costly, but surveys in public health, nutrition, and education have been used as indicators of changing public responses. Aggregate data also provide unobtrusive indicators of changes in consumption, literacy, disease, and private investment, thus serving as a rough measure of the extent to which special publics are responding to government programs. Reports of declines in peasant use of fertilizer in the third and fourth years of projects in Lesotho’s Thaba Basu rural development project and in Tanzania’s Geita project led to the discovery that the designed project was uneconomic at the farm level, and to continued adaptive research and improved project redesign. One characteristic of PIDER, Mexico’s large rural development program, is its use of detailed analyses of rural household effects (income sources and changes, changes in cultivation practices, for example) in order to make adjustments in program activities. Changes in the animal husbandry program (a concentration on small livestock instead of on large animals) have resulted from this system. The system has included village-level questionnaires since 1977, and
now makes use of participant observation techniques to identify responsive behavior, as a supplement to direct participation in the proposing and choice of projects. Another use of public response indicators is found in the World Bank's 1979 Education Sector Policy Paper, which showed that only half of the primary school entrants reach the fourth grade, and that 15-20 percent of all the classrooms seats are occupied by repeaters. Such unobtrusive indicators of project performance, resulting from routine reporting requirements, can be systematized and generalized across sectors, even in the more difficult responses involved in human development activities.

**Standard reporting devices** serve as useful a purpose in human development projects as in other developmental activities: they reveal the extent to which planned schedules and intended unit costs and quality of inputs are being maintained; they produce evidence of administrative failures that can be corrected by action of central or local administrators; they also provide a basis for correcting program design and administrative structure when performance difficulties can be identified as systemic. But management information systems of this order are no better than top officials make them. World Bank experience provides examples of projects supplied with such casual and incomplete reporting arrangements that managers could not learn from them what was indeed going on in the programs for which they were responsible. At the other extreme, there are records of projects with vastly over-complicated systems of reporting that generate data gathered at great cost at the project level, are consolidated into aggregates that become increasingly hard to interpret at each administrative level, and are finally inflicted with the ignominy of passing directly into central files without review.

Planners should be conscious of the cost of inadequate as well as of unnecessarily complex reporting systems. There is abundant evidence that over-elaborate systems can actually displace the attention of local administrators from substantive project goals. The costs and the benefits of management information systems are significant enough to justify careful design and to emphasize those kinds of information that are essential for continuous performance monitoring and project redesign. Reporting arrangements maintain their integrity only when there is clear evidence to staff members that reports are being read and acted on (a further argument for simplicity). Further, no information system can depend on reporting alone. Reports must be supplemented by inspections, field visits, and information from sources outside bureaucratic channels in order to keep the administrator promptly and fully informed of what is going on in his or her organization.

The first step in improved management information systems, therefore, is to ensure that only essential data about project performance are gathered, thus screening out redundant information and data that are costly to gather but useless in decision making. Only then is it appropriate to mount additional forays in data-gathering for impact analysis. When the system has been streamlined sufficiently, administrators should introduce new data requirements on a pilot basis, with the expectation that information costs
will be carefully monitored. The use of sample data and professional data analysts have proven to be cost effective, despite rather substantial start-up costs, if these specialists are oriented to project performance and understand the use of information primarily as a tool of ongoing management, rather than of "detail-evaluation" after the fact. Efforts to streamline and improve management information systems for human development programming need full cooperation from program and project administrators, and efforts to modify or revise content or procedures should be timed to coincide with other cooperative efforts at improving administrative performance.

B. Staff Incentives

The weakest links of almost every public administration system are the field staffs that work directly with the publics for which human development and similar services are designed. Frequently these employees are poorly trained, poorly motivated, poorly supervised, and poorly served by logistical and supply systems. They, in turn, suffer from low self-esteem when their needs are neglected by those in positions of authority. Most efforts at administrative reform have concentrated on higher-level staff members, especially those located in capital cities; but such reforms seldom affect field performance. Improvements in the field constitute one of the major, heretofore neglected, priorities in development administration.

There are four main approaches to this problem, no one of which is likely to suffice. The first is to improve the technical and operational skills of field level staff, including supervisors. The additional cost is itself an investment in human development, involving training that supplements technical information with knowledge about ways of working effectively with low-income publics and their organizations.

A second approach is to strengthen, and to increase the reliability of, the supply systems, without which field staffs cannot physically reach the publics they are expected to serve, or have the equipment and materials needed to provide services.

A third, less orthodox, approach is to strengthen staff linkages with special publics so that they can both assist field staffs and encourage them to provide services that respond to the priorities, convenience, and capabilities of their members. Organized special publics, like local authorities, can become partners in designing and rendering services, but administrators in the field are not likely to recognize this fact until their potential is more fully developed (we return to the role of special publics later in Section III).
The fourth method is more direct: to improve the incentives of field staffs to provide services in ways that are responsive to the needs of intended beneficiaries. Motivating civil servants to perform developmental functions is especially difficult when they are required to seek out the more intransigent cases for attention, as well as to continue to deal with more manageable problems. In addition to the requirements of adequate civil service compensation (that is, those based on "credentials," "qualifications," and "longevity"), special rewards are therefore needed for the performance of tasks that involve uncertainties, that demand inordinate amounts of time, or that involve the sacrifice of personal convenience and family opportunities. Special pay supplements and other forms of recognition of outstanding performance are probably more important as incentives in poverty programs that they are in more prestigious assignments, for which they are often in fact already available.

At a minimum, governments have to equalize the burdens imposed upon those who accept the special obligations of human development programs in the context of poverty, with those whose careers do not involve such risks and sacrifices. Civil servants engaged in these programs must, for example, have adequate mobility whenever the season—-not the convenience of the official agency—-requires it. The supplies needed for the performance of their tasks in inaccessible locations must be available as readily as they are for services that are more convenient to the routine logistical system. Technologies appropriate to the needs and capabilities of intended users must be provided and tested, so that the credibility of the official agencies is reinforced by successes in the field. Most important of all, civil servants working on these programs need stable assignments and posting in order to develop and reinforce personal relationships and knowledge of the region in which special publics are being served. To achieve adequate duration of field assignments, it may be necessary for individuals engaged in these programs to gain accelerated seniority or promotions or other rewards that usually accompany acceptance of the rotating assignments followed in normal civil service career patterns.

A common and, sometimes fatal, failure in program design is to overload field personnel so that they cannot effectively discharge all the duties assigned to them. Compelled to establish their own priorities, they usually end up limiting their services to members of the public who are easiest to reach—-seldom those in greatest need—or concentrating on office paperwork which is visible to their superiors, again at the cost of service to their special publics. Contributing to this common breakdown are a failure to consult field personnel in the design of programs, the ambitions of senior politicians and administrators to expand program coverage beyond available resources, and the tendency to neglect resources that might be mobilized by organized special publics or local authorities. An example of this set of failures was the Masagana 99 campaign in the Philippines, where field services simply collapsed under the unrealistic burdens that were imposed on them; the staff responded by deploying much of their time on office
routines, which were picked up by the management information system, to
the neglect of direct service to many members of their special public,
those who worked the small farms.53/

In addition to these basic incentives, other administrative supports
may be necessary. These can include immediate reimbursement of out-of-pocket
costs associated with these activities and special compensation in the form
of "risk insurance" or "hardship allowances" to protect or compensate
families of civil servants assigned to duties that deny them the amenities
of normal civil service life.

The pride of service that comes from prestigious forms of administrative
activity can also be attached to programs aimed at reducing poverty by
changing the behavior of the top management. The distribution of honors and
awards can be especially effective in recognizing outstanding performance in
human development programs, including the reinforcement of career commitments
by political leaders, international agencies, and professional associations.
Experiments in developing a special esprit de corps among paramedical personnel 54/
have shown that the service motif is an effective incentive to a career commit-
ment. Professional standards of ethics have already begun to move in the
direction of reinforcing anti-poverty motivations as a result of highly visible
statements made by the president of the World Bank and the ILO, UN, and Colombo
Plan conferences and reports on basic human needs. These efforts should be
continued, extended, and deepened, so that each professional and paraprofes-
sional person who is engaged in the conduct of human development programs is
aware of the changed obligations implied by the new orientation toward reducing
poverty.

Individuals who gain experience in dealing with special publics should
be regarded as important resources on whom project planners and designers can
call. Participatory styles of management 55/ are particularly relevant for
field personnel engaged in human development programs both as incentives to
field staffs and because they bring detailed information to bear on program
design. Improvements in the incentive or reward structures for employees
performing the many thankless tasks associated with human development
services in the field has been a neglected dimension of development adminis-
tration. As we have indicated, improved incentives must be part of more
comprehensive strategies to strengthen administration at the point of
service delivery.

C. Administrative Reform

The improvement of central administrative systems was the major concern
of public administration in the 1950s and 1960s.56/ The main emphasis was
on common administrative support systems—personnel, budget and accounting,
supply, organization and methods, and central coordinative procedures. This
strategy was based on the premise that the performance of the line agencies
that work in the field depends on the effectiveness of these central staff agencies. To eliminate archaic, cumbersome, and inefficient staff procedures that inhibited the implementation of government service programs, such management techniques as position classification, performance budgeting, and central procurements were "installed" in the higher reaches of government, along with institutes of public administration and écoles nationales d'administration. In many cases, these techniques and institutions proved unsuited to their new environment: the forms survived but had little practical effect on the workings of government. Enthusiastic technicians from donor agencies promoted these innovations as ends in themselves, or as means of insuring tighter central controls; they seldom concerned themselves with subsequent effects on program performance. The goal of improved performance was displaced by emphasis on technique. Administrative reformers did not at all appreciate the degree of behavioral change at all levels of the bureaucracy that was necessary if these rationalistic innovations were to influence performance. The result was that these efforts at reform by changing governmentwide systems had little visible impact in the field.

Disillusionment soon set in. Emphasis shifted to piecemeal improvements in individual programs, especially those in which external donors were involved. The World Bank and other international donors preferred to set up special authorities to handle the programs they sponsored, free from standard government personnel, financial, and supply controls. The hope was that special authorities could apply administrative innovations directly to program performance, while eventually diffusing successful practices to other parts of the public administration apparatus through the demonstration effect.

The attention that development assistance agencies can devote to governmentwide administrative systems depends on the extent of their participation in national development. If their support is limited to a few relatively large projects, they may choose to concentrate their efforts and to ensure effective administration in these projects without becoming entangled in the thicket of governmentwide systems. But if their participation involves large numbers of interrelated projects, it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid governmentwide procedures and controls because inefficiency at the center may critically affect the implementation of all the projects the donor agency is supporting. When a donor agency begins to act through "country programs" rather than discrete projects, the governments' personnel, financial, supply, and coordinate machinery unavoidably become objects of concern. But the concern must be effective if it is to be justified at all: the World Bank reports that only one-fourth of its institutional reforms had "clear achievements."57/

Once a donor agency decides to work with governmentwide administrative systems, it becomes committed to substantial investments of effort in sensitive and controversial areas with a slow and uncertain payoff. Institutional changes require new structures, new technologies, new skills, and above all, changes in behavior throughout the government service that may
be perceived as quite threatening. Attempts at improving institutional capabilities should take place only if the sponsors of reform are prepared to develop the necessary expertise and to deploy it over an extended period of time. Even so, success seems to be directly proportional to the degree to which reforms are specific, development-related, and confined to small, tightly-defined institutions, at least in the World Bank’s experience.58/

Such technical changes will probably remain necessary for some time to provide sustained support to human development programs, but they do not necessarily require the introduction of new technologies.59/ Improvements in personnel, supply, budgeting, and expenditure control systems can usually be introduced incrementally without attempting dramatic or seemingly revolutionary changes in familiar procedures. The current need is for, first a project-derived definitions of problems and, second, a careful redesigning of administrative structures and procedures, following the linkages backward and upward from the field. The strategies that have achieved the greatest success in administrative improvement have involved working with respected civil servants who possess field experience, professional knowledge of the system, and commitment to program objectives. In most countries, such persons can be found already working within the civil service, though special efforts will be required to identify them and associate them with a desired administrative change.60/ Central systems and program or field operations must be considered simultaneously and incrementally in future efforts at administrative reform.

The problems that need to be addressed through this strategy at central levels include the universal symptoms of administrative inefficiency: rigidity in budgeting and financial management, along with overcentralized procedures for expenditure control. Supply and logistics procedures, too, are often overburdened by centralized requirements for purchasing and releasing supplies and equipment. Personnel systems suffer from appointments and promotions made on the basis of seniority or patronage that undermine incentives for performance; from selection on the basis of criteria unrelated to job requirements; from slow and cumbersome procedures for recruitment and transfer; from rapid and frequent changes in posting or assignment that are incompatible with the development of local expertise; and from inadequate provision for training. Finally, interagency coordination is also a task that is not well performed in most governments, either at the center of government or in the field, and it is especially important when human development projects rely on locally-based resources. A World Bank review of 48 rural projects in East Africa reported that only 10 percent of the managers would be rated "low" in competence: it was the administrative environment, especially the support systems, that accounted for poor performance in the other cases.61/

The diagnosis of administrative weaknesses at the level of project operations can also be generalized. The most common problems are that
information systems yield insufficient data on project operations, or on their impact on special publics; or that the supply of inputs does not meet estimates of needs for reaching special publics, either in quantity or in timeliness. At project levels, coordination is often wanting, as reflected by difficulties in achieving complementarities among related services. Insufficient discretion is given to local personnel to enable them to adjust services to respond to contingencies in the field, with a resultant waste of resources and a decline in public response. Personnel management at these levels displays all of the weaknesses of the central administrative system, confounded at the periphery by a lack of awareness of the complexity of programs and of the intensity of relationship required between the administration and the publics. Rapid turnover of staff at the local level interrupts the continuity of programming that is essential in the absence of good record, and interferes with the public communications that are so important in human development projects. Reports of this problem are encountered almost everywhere; even in Tanzania, has made a major commitment to rural development, the shifting of local staff members was reported by World Bank studies as a source of weakness in project administration. 62/

The poor motivation of officials is a serious obstacle to project performance in the field, especially given the vulnerability of local projects to corrupt practices.

Coping with such problems calls for continuing attention to incremental reforms within each program, and, at times, within the bureaucratic system itself. These tasks require indigenous leadership and at a minimum a permissive political context. International agencies can often provide decisive assistance to national and regional efforts at administrative reform, provided they do not seek to impose rigid external models, standards, and techniques upon the system. There is clearly a need for renewed attention to reform and improvement of governmentwide administrative support systems when these prove to be seriously inhibiting to the performance of programs serving the public. In some cases, a single ministry and the several programs it controls should be the target; in others, selected operating programs are more readily accessible and amenable to reform. Much depends on where the major problems seem to lie and where investment in administrative improvement is likely to yield results. The ultimate criterion, as always, must be effect on performance on the ground, rather than on central control or on the "modernization" of government systems or procedures as ends in themselves.

D. Special Publics

Planners and administrators of human development programs can often improve performance quickly by supporting organized special publics that represent the interest or the needs of the poor. Local institutions, informal community leadership, traditional social structures, and functional groups such as farmer associations, cooperatives and mothers' clubs can all reinforce the capacity of the poor to "demand" services and use them effectively, and they can also contribute to the "supply" of inputs. Since the
poor are often excluded from membership in existing organizations; it may be necessary to foster new ones (a difficult and time-consuming task) or to persuade the leadership or membership of existing ones to take on such functions.

The poor seldom have the capacity for self-organization without assistance and protection from sympathetic outsiders. Official service-providing agencies bear the heaviest responsibility for organizing and supporting the special publics, although political groups and voluntary agencies may at times perform the function. Studies of the linkages between official and nonofficial institutions shows the utility of subdividing administrative responsibility so that each element can contribute to program outcomes on the basis of its comparative advantage.

Strategies for organizing special publics usually require the bureaucratic instruments of government to provide resources and authoritative interpretations of the law, and to maintain balance among the sometimes conflicting elements of the special public as it organizes. Studies have shown that where official service providing agencies view their function as mainly one of "control," the effectiveness of organized local groups declines as an instrument of development; similarly, where the organized publics act without the benefit of supportive links to bureaucratic agencies, they tend to become dominated by local elites or to drift away from their original objective of providing services to their own members.

Governments that desire to stimulate self-help from the publics they wish to assist must be prepared for the possibility that, when organized, such publics will make demands that complicate the lives of civil servants by forcing them to negotiate, bargain, and accommodate the provision of services to their demands. Civil servants tend to be more comfortable with hierarchic styles of administration; they have to develop new skills in order to deal effectively with active, organized publics. But the investment pays of: passive publics contribute little to human development programs, and local organizations that are dominated or controlled by agents of official bodies do not command or maintain the loyalty of their members. A mid-term review of Mexico's PIDER program found that rural works were not operating, and projects were not being coordinated at the village level, because local organization of the special publics they were to serve had been neglected.

In facilitating local organizations, governments must avoid dominating them. But they can impose necessary conditions on their uses of public funds and audit their accounts without depriving them of the autonomy they need to take initiatives and speak out on behalf of their members. The benefits of close linkages are mutual: as most official agencies providing services in human development can multiply their effectiveness by working with organized publics, so the latter can serve their members by capitalizing on the resources made available to them.
The role of local authorities and of associational groups of users of public services is one of the least explored subjects in the literature of development administration. Their importance is documented in numerous success stories involving farmers' associations, water users, credit unions, and service cooperatives relating to production agriculture. But it is difficult to organize and sustain organizations among the poor, especially where they lack stability, experience, and status. Since organization is difficult, it is prudent to capitalize on those that already exist, even though they may appear to be deficient in some respects. The capabilities or preferences of local organizations of intended beneficiaries nevertheless differ markedly. These decisions can therefore benefit greatly from administrative decentralization, including the delegation of enough flexibility to district and locally based staff members to permit them to adjust their operations to the context in which they must work.
IV. RESEARCH NEEDS

Much of the analysis presented in the previous section draws on recognized doctrines of public administration and studies of development experience, together with some extrapolation from experiences in the private sector. But the application of these conceptual approaches to the administration of human development programs requires substantial additional guidance from recent experience. There are five main topics that most clearly require additional research, and they will each be addressed briefly in the following discussion.

A. The Consequences of Using Alternative Administrative Structures and Practices

The effects of deconcentration and devolution, and the use of ministerial versus parastatal structures, are still not well understood, especially in the context of activities designed to reduce poverty. Even such standard techniques as alternative methods of budgeting and expenditure control, personnel training and compensation, and procurement and supply procedures have not been systematically compared. The increased use of paraprofessionals, as recommended here and as illustrated by the World Bank's experiments with the "Training and Visit" system, has not been adequately studied. Little is known empirically about alternative methods of selection, training compensation, and supervision of such personnel, or about the relative utility of assigning them single or multiple functions in different circumstances.

Alternative structural arrangements for the effective performance of routine services in developed countries have been fairly well documented in the literature. It is not difficult to show that, in such operations, rational choices among alternative systems can produce significant improvements in program efficiency. The application of similar analysis to alternative administrative practices in developing countries is a task that can provide useful guidance to program designers and managers. The simplification of the reporting, supply, budgeting, and other procedures used in bureaucratic organizations cannot take place, for example, until the resultant losses of information and control have been appraised, a task for which at present there are few guidelines based on experience. In addition to systematic analysis of these "bread and butter" issues in public administration in the context of human development activities, there is also the need to evaluate both the efficiency of service delivery and also the response by the intended beneficiaries.

Since this is a vast area for useful applied research, the problems mentioned above must be specified and defined before systematic research can be undertaken. As an example, it is widely believed that the deconcentration of decisionmaking to field agents increases the efficiency and
responsiveness of public services. It would be useful to test this proposition by examining and comparing, for particular human development services, the performance of administrative systems that are relatively centralized and deconcentrated. If the latter prove to perform more effectively, it will then be necessary to examine the procedures by which deconcentration has been successfully implemented. This study could investigate the results of simplification of administrative procedures in the field. Existing evidence indicates that current procedures are frequently so complex as to inhibit the capacity of field staffs to provide efficient and responsive service, but it is not obvious how these complexities can be reduced satisfactorily. It is likely that the simplification of administrative systems, and the use of deconcentrated processes, may vary with the kind of human development service being provided, a subject that we have not treated very extensively in this general survey but which must be taken into account both by practitioners and applied researchers. (A more detailed treatment will be found in the companion paper by Uphoff.)

B. Developmental Applications of Incentive and Organization Theory

Industrial sociologists have demonstrated the effectiveness of different incentives and organizational structures for motivating employees to achieve improved output, as measured along a variety of dimensions. These include regular attendance, low turnover, efficient performance, willingness to engage in tasks beyond the call of duty, and ability to inject creative approaches to the solution of management problems. The reduction of corruption in government is a generally recognized need that might best be met through improved application of organization theory. The standards suggested here for the effective administration of human development programs require staff members to change their orientation toward the needs and responses of special publics, especially on the part of field workers who are in direct contact with the intended users of services. Improved performance in this regard can be observed and studied by procedures similar to those already employed in standard applications of organization theory. Such studies could contribute to improved performance through changes in the administrative environment.

Among the most pervasive and corrosive phenomena in public administration are the corrupt practices that divert public resources from their intended beneficiaries and victimize the poorest section of society. Corruption is a sensitive subject, but it is amenable to research. It should be possible to examine the incentive and reward systems of human development programs that are known to be efficiently administered to determine the structures and practices that are associated with rectitude in the provision of services, and to learn how such practices have been institutionalized and maintained. Where the main concern is efficiency or responsiveness, or a combination of the two, a straightforward examination of
and learning from successful experience can be undertaken. In this area of research it is especially important that the research be conducted by persons, particularly local scholars, who are intimately acquainted with the local culture.

C. The Role of Organized Special Publics

The suggestion that organized special publics can provide improved services is drawn from experiences in many sectors, ranging from the use of Farmers' Associations in Taiwan 73/ and the supplying of family planning information and services in Bangladesh 74/ to the distribution of food supplements to pre-school children in Thailand.75/ But much less is known about the possible utility of community organization in support of primary school education, and the effectiveness of similar community participation in the management of primary health care centers and the delivery of pharmaceuticals (though experience in Mali and in other parts of West Africa is encouraging).76/ It is likely that organized special publics can help their members to make more effective use of public programs as well as to mobilize local resources and management skills. Little knowledge is yet available, however, as to how official agencies can effectively support organized special publics, or about the role of local leadership or the consequence of pursuing different strategies in recruiting and restricting membership, or even the effects of different organizational characteristics in improving the capacity of these groups for human development.77/

D. Behavioral Implications of Programs

The ways households and individuals use the services rendered in education and public health will affect the extent and distribution of their contributions to the national wealth. But the dynamic of the "multiplier effect" of large public investments in human development programs is more a matter of hypothesis than of evidence. Aside from direct welfare benefits, it is not clear how various kinds of these programs contribute to labor efficiency or willingness to innovate and other production-related dimensions of economic development. Detailed studies of the investing responses of special publics to various opportunities created by program action in rural villages and urban squatter settlements can provide important indicators of the relative advantages of alternative programs and administrative measures.

It would appear to be sound policy to favor those human development projects which, in addition to immediate welfare effects, tend to activate the community and to encourage additional measures of self-help. It is possible, therefore, that public responses to mass immunization activities in which the special publics are relatively passive may be quite different
from a developmental point of view from those attending environmental sanitation programs that require local organization and responsive behavior. It might further be hypothesized that the easy availability of government-provided services is a disincentive to local initiative. It would be illuminating to test this proposition by comparing cases where government has provided services without asking anything of local communities, with those where assistance has been provided only on a community self-help basis. The different consequences of such activities in terms of the multiplier effect may suggest variations in preferred strategies and methods of providing human development services.

E. Stages of Program Development

It should be possible to study administrative systems at both national and local levels to discover whether a predictable succession of changes occurs as services expand, so that in the future, "blocks" of inter-related program interventions can be introduced successively to bring about maximum improvement in performance. The sequence in which human development services are introduced at the local level have tended in the past to be accidental, or to result from national planning considerations rather than local needs. But it should now be possible to identify the relative effectiveness of programs that begin with education and work through various components of public health, family planning, and nutrition, as compared with other program sequences. Optimal phasing may not be a random sequence.

Similarly, strategies for introducing administrative reforms, including decisions to start with central instead of local levels in changing procedures and structure, may also depend upon sequential processes that are not yet supported by substantial field study.

A further problem involving project staging is the development of strategies for designing and expanding experimental or pilot projects. The use of small-scale projects has been random, essentially dependent on the intuition of project designers. The concern of "pilot projects" as "first phases" of large-scale interventions suggests that the former have often been misconceived and their expectations mis-specified. In contrast to "pilot projects," "first-phase" projects make use of normal channels of administration, or at most set up a temporary "foreign body" within a ministry to get activities started. While the pilot project is no doubt still an essential element in the development an application of new technologies, it is preferable, where possible, to conceive of experimental human development activities in stages that can be expanded and enlarged without undermining the system. Planners should structure the administrative dimensions of small-scale interventions so that they can be phased into large-scale systems. This is a process that differs in important respects from small-scale, administration-intensive, pilot projects that
are considered ends in themselves. The use of established administrative structures is to be preferred for the long run; the occasions when pilot projects are appropriate should be studied to determine how they can contribute to the design of national programs. Since so much of development administration involves the introduction and institutionalization of new activities and procedures, studies that reduce uncertainty about the methods to employ should be a high priority on the research agenda.
V. CONCLUSION: POLICY CHOICES

Nine issues over which governments and international donors can exercise real choice have emerged from our survey of the administration of development programs. At the present state of knowledge, most of these issues remain surrounded by uncertainty. To reduce the risk for program designers and administrators, more intensive analysis of earlier experience as well as ongoing programmatic experimentation will be required. But present knowledge permits at least the identification of alternatives and decisions that have often appeared blurred or amorphous in the minds of project designers and administrators.

These nine issues concern structural, operational, and temporal dimensions of human development, and will be addressed under these headings.

A. Structural Issues

1. Choices among Administrative Resources

   The most important policy conclusion we have reached in studying the requirements of human development programs is the need for enlarging the working definition of administrative resources. Conventional bureaucratic approaches to public administration, important as they are in improving the capacity of central and local administrative systems, will not in themselves introduce the necessary improvements in project performance. The calculated use and improvement of bureaucratic and modified bureaucratic resources and their linkage to the private sector, voluntary groups, and local authorities are found in most poverty programs that require public response.

   Recognizing that there are options, however, is only the beginning of effective program design. Planners need to appraise the social task environments of programs in order to identify the administrative resources that are already available in government and among the publics to be served, and to select specific program interventions and methods of operation that capitalize on existing capabilities. The next step is to determine what investments should be made to strengthen present capabilities and build new institutions.

2. Decisions about Administrative Reform

   Extensive experience with both governmentwide and narrowly project-based administrative reform in developing countries has yielded several conclusions about the conditions under which different approaches are likely to be effective, how they can be mutually supportive, and what time phasing may be most productive.
There are, however, two conditions associated with human development and other programs for reducing poverty that ought to be taken into account before administrative reforms are attempted:

(a) **Systemwide reform should be strongly oriented to performance on the ground**; reforms at the center that cannot promise practical improvement on the ground may represent a waste of political resources and administrative energies.

(b) **Operating efficiency is a useful but not a sufficient goal**; affirmative public response to administrative reform is the ultimate test and criteria of effectiveness.

Reform measures that are not oriented to these outcomes should be seriously weighed to determine whether the anticipated benefits justify the effort.

3. **Choices between "Regular" and "Special" Agencies**

Governments and international donors often prefer to use project authorities and parastatal enterprise as substitutes for administrative reform in existing agencies. This decision is based on the theory that tailor-made institutions, free of ordinary personnel and financial controls, are better fitted to special developmental needs than are conventional organizations. The management of such organizations has been the object of research and training in recent years; the limitations and advantages of the choices are now being recognized. What administrators have to consider more seriously at this point are the kinds of linkages that such special authorities develop with regular agencies, and whether special entities are worth the cost in strained relationships with the regular departments of government with which they must interact in the provision of human development services.

**B. Operational Issues**

4. **Decisions regarding Improvement of Field Staff Performance**

The weakest and most neglected dimension of public administration in developing countries is the quality of administration at the point-of-service delivery. This weakness is particularly costly for administration-intensive human development programs that require special sensitivity to the needs and reactions of hard-to-reach, low-status publics. Prescriptions for overcoming this problem are numerous: offer better and more relevant staff training; provide more supervision; improve the reliability of supply systems; adopt more participative styles of management; introduce performance-based incentives and rewards for field personnel; simplify the details of
program operations; and reduce the overload on field personnel. These options can be scaled to reflect increasing levels of difficulty, initially requiring more resources, then more management, and finally improved performance incentives. All of them are likely to encounter resistance and to involve additional costs; together they represent significant reforms. The listing of these options and combinations raises questions of sequence, because they are not equally easy to undertake, and cannot be introduced simultaneously.

Emphasis on building capabilities at this level of administration—necessary as it is for human development oriented to the poor—represents a far-reaching change of priorities in most developing countries.

5. Decisions about Deconcentration and Coordination

When programs are committed to specialized hierarchical agencies, coordination becomes a major problem at all levels of government. Since the payoff for human development programs is in the field, it is there that the analysis of coordination strategies should begin. Effective coordination at that level usually depends on deconcentration of authority to members of field staff close to the point of contact with the public. It can be facilitated by pressure from organized local publics. As already indicated, there are known preconditions to successful administrative deconcentration. It cannot be casually undertaken if necessary control is to be maintained. To achieve coordination of complementary services on the ground, it may be necessary to confer specific authority for budgetary planning and control, perhaps under simplified procedures, upon local generalist officers who may not be experienced in such administrative refinements and may therefore require special training and support. The implementation of a strategy of deconcentration and coordination thus entails a large number of decisions. These must be planned and executed over several years, and may involve simultaneous action by several ministries and departments.

6. Choices among Management Information System

Information systems for human development programs must provide baseline data about intended publics as well as about their changing needs, capabilities, and preference as projects evolve. They must also produce relevant, accurate, and timely information on schedules, outputs, and costs, and about impacts on the publics being served. Yet, unless they are relatively simple, they will break down or cease to be useful tools of management. Experience indicates that successful information systems favor simplicity and speed in reporting and do not depend on information from bureaucratic sources alone. While it is possible to stipulate general criteria that characterize good monitoring systems, local decisions are needed to identify the data required for each human development program and to devise ways of providing and processing information for timely management use.
7. **Choices about the Role of Local Organizations**

Our recommendation to link the beneficiaries to the structures that provide human development services through organization of the affected publics is a somewhat unconventional approach, although it is a theme that also runs through the companion papers. This subject has been largely neglected in the literature on development administration, except for the community development programs of the 1950s and the community action groups associated with the U.S. anti-poverty programs of the "Great Society" era. In using constituency organizations, the main choices encountered are those between local authorities (usually possessing official status) and associational groups (e.g., farmers' associations, credit unions, women's clubs). In developing a program strategy, program designers should determine which kinds of formal and informal organization are available within their task environment, which ones are most likely to be effective in the program context, and what measures must be taken to activate and strengthen them and to link them to other public interventions.

8. **Decisions about the Strengthening of Local Organizations**

The process of building and then sustaining organizations to mobilize and represent the poor is a daunting task. Where possible, it is preferable to use existing organizations whose members share mutual trust and are accustomed to working together. Some local organizations may not represent the poor directly, but still be amenable to reforms that will distribute benefits to the poor and allow them to participate. Two-tier organizations can combine solidarity with scale. They can do this by drawing on existing informal associations at the base, and building formal secondary or intermediary units to perform functions that require larger numbers and resources: traditional informal groups may provide solidarity, while local authorities provide scale. Decisions of this kind should be part of the strategy of program design, but, because of the uncertainty involved in such decisions, program managers should be prepared to adjust their approaches as they learn from project experience.

C. **The Time Dimension**

9. **Decisions Concerning the Time Frame of Activities**

The time dimensions normally allotted for project cycles will have to be extended in this, the most difficult of development areas. Complaints about the short-term perspectives of development planners have been common in past decades, but it is even clearer that the kinds of social change required to extend literacy, numeracy, and adult skills, to improve public health, to reduce malnutrition, and to encourage rational family planning, all involve deep penetration into social values and customs. It is not enough to program
support for two- or four-year periods and expect a project to be institutionalized on schedule. Project lending and project design can still be conceived in segments that correspond to the cycles of budgeting and lending, but planners must anticipate a continuing responsibility beyond formal project completion, whether or not they use conventional programming cycles as the basis for managing their resources. When recurrent operating costs are left by international donors to the host government, the waning of political support to human development programs can be devastating. This phenomenon has been described in one World Bank report as the greatest sources of disappointment in project performance in the educational sector. International donors should therefore be prepared to continue support to operational costs of such projects until they have become institutionalized and the public demand is strong enough to assure continuing financing.

The implication of this conclusion extends not only to planning horizons, but also to the scope of responsibility of national planning agencies and international organizations. The measures of success to be applied in the 1980s to the reduction of poverty will require institutional commitments to long-term improvement that transcend the project unit of responsibility, despite the pressures on government leaders for quick results and the impatience of development assistance agencies to "terminate" projects.

Reviewing these issues for decisionmaking in a specific country context must remain, unfortunately, a task to be undertaken with each major commitment. Experience will not produce identical answers in countries that are otherwise similar in population, area, physical ecology, political complexion, size and location of special publics, nature of central administrative system, degree of urbanization or prime city concentration, or other variables considered in isolation. Choosing among the administrative resources available in a given situation will involve assessing the nature of the service to be supplied, the size and structure of the demand, and the organizing capacity of the special publics involved. The number of variables to be considered, and the weight to be assigned to each, are too numerous and complex to yield a simple straightforward taxonomy in the present state of knowledge. It is clear, for example, that providing basic education to adult nomadic herders in the Sahel will require choices different from those used in an urban slum; the resultant administrative choices might resemble those used in transmigration programs in Indonesia. The choices may not, however, resemble those made for rendering agricultural extension services in these two contexts. Public health and family planning combinations in the Philippines may not resemble those suitable in Thailand, despite other similarities between the countries for reasons of administrative or political culture or differences in public receptivity. Nutrition programs that proved so successful in Sri Lanka would have had little prospect in Bangladesh, where the agricultural resources were limited. Thus neither the diagnostic taxonomy suggested in Section II of this paper nor the policy choices identified in this Section can be squeezed into a Procrustean formula for quick decisionmaking. The sense of this analysis runs against the expectation
of finding numerous categorical answers and prescriptions. The administrative patterns that will emerge as more countries experiment with approaches suitable to their own human development program needs will have to be studied over the years to come before a plausible taxonomy will emerge.

This conclusion is not intended to denigrate the reservoir of experience and doctrine we have described as "conventional public administration." Just as hard cases make bad law, so the most difficult of administrative programs test and stretch existing conventions of management. This paper accepts just that challenge because it addresses problems that represent the most intractable areas of development administration: the "special publics" that are not reached through ordinary procedures; the administrators who are working at the periphery of government and are least affected by central reform; and the human development programs whose performance is the most difficult to standardize and to measure. The implications of addressing these problems in tandem will not be easy for governments and international donors because, in addition to existing social service arrangements, they often involve the use of large numbers of small-scale, perhaps remotely situated, projects. At present these projects are costly to design and coordinate, hard to administer, and lacking in status or prestige. But to escape from that trap requires experimentation and observation. If governments are to provide human development services to special publics, that is the way they must approach the problem.
Footnotes


6. For early approaches to development administration, see William J. Siffin, Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, Ind.: Univ. Dept. of Govt., 1957); Fred Riggs (ed.), Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1971); James Heaphey (ed.).


14. Robert Chambers, unpublished paper commissioned by the World Bank, January 1980. For an excellent discussion of the inevitable problems of access, arising in an administrative allocation of goods and services as opposed to a market allocation, see Bernard Shaffer, "Exit, Voice and Access," Social Science Information 13 (6), 1974, pp. 73-90; and his "Distribution and the Theory of Access," in Development and Change,
Vol. VI, No. 2, April 1975, pp. 13-36. This issue also contains several case studies highlighting the problems of access to bureaucratic services.


18. See Note 12.


20. We are using the generic term "decentralization" to include two distinct operational strategies. One strategy is "deconcentration" referring to the assignment of responsibilities to sub-units, field-staff or other agencies with none or less sharing of power and authority, while the other is "devolution" meaning a transfer of power or authority by national government to local governing units, with a greater and a more formal sharing of power or authority with local units. See John D. Montgomery, "The Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Processes and Outputs," Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1972, pp. 62-75, for an application of these two distinct phenomena to administrative processes. See also Frank P. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organizational Strategy," in Robert T. Deland (ed.), Comparative Urban Research (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1969). A World Bank study of administrative approaches to deconcentration appears in Ecuador: Development Problems and Prospects (Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, July 1979).


27. Unpublished World Bank project paper.


29. See Note 22.


33. William Siffin suggests that an essential feature of development administration is a "design" approach, where innovative problem analysis and "definition" logically precede the specification of organizational requirements. William Siffin, "Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries," Public Administration Review, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1973; see also his "Development Administration as a Strategic Perspective," in Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms, UN, New York, 1973, Vol III, Technical Papers, pp. 152-160. This strategy of course requires accumulation of more knowledge about effects of different organizational arrangements both on program outputs and public response and social outcomes.


37. Unpublished World Bank project paper.


45. See Note 13, especially David Leonard, Reaching the Peasant Farmer.


48. See Note 22. Western analysis of the delivery of urban services by public agencies highlight the significance of built-in feedback mechanisms in organizations to monitor the use of such services. See for example Dennis R. Young, "Institutional Change in the Delivery of Urban Public Service," Policy Sciences, 2, Dec. 1971, pp. 424-448; and Dennis R. Young, "Exit and Voice in the Organization of Public Services," in Social Science Information, 13 (3), 1974, pp. 49-65. Direct application of these approaches to developing countries (especially for rural areas) is difficult due to the absence of alternative sources of supply of such services.


54. Experiments with MEDEX, described by Richard Smith, M.D., in conversation with the authors.


58. Unpublished World Bank project papers.


61. See Note 22.

62. See Note 22.


64. The UN Research Institute for Social Development, Rural Cooperatives as Agents of Change (Geneva: UNRISD, 1975), a comparative study of 37 cooperatives in 13 countries that showed it was the better-off members who gained control and principal benefits from these organizations.

66. See Note 32.

67. Inayatullah, Cooperatives and Development in Asia: A Study of Cooperatives in Fourteen Rural Communities of Iran, Pakistan and Ceylon (Geneva: UNRISD, 1972) found that cooperatives tend to be politically weak and ineffective in defending the interests of their members.

68. See Note 49.


74. Unpublished World Bank project paper.


76. See Note 44.

78. Examples of such research appear in Montgomery, Lasswell, and Midgal, *Patterns of Policy*, op. cit.


PART IV

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Everett M. Rogers
Institute for Communication Research
Stanford University

Nat J. Colletta
Eastern Africa Projects Department
The World Bank

Joseph Mbindyo
Institute for Communication Research
Stanford University
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prologue</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Background</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Structure of the Paper</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. STRUCTURES, VALUES, AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Approaches to Development: Social-Psychological or Structuralist?</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Interaction of Structural and Value Change Strategies</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Physical Mobility, Occupational Role Change and Educational Aspects of Value Formation</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Theory in Practice: Some Lessons from Attempts at Directed Behavioral Change</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Review and Conclusions</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. INDIGENOUS SOCIOCULTURAL FORMS</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. An Overview</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Traditional Leadership Roles</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Traditional Communication Systems</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Indigenous Organizational Forms</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Indigenous Knowledge Systems</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Traditional Etiology</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Summary</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE KEY CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Delivery/User-System Dynamics</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Assessing Needs of the User-System</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Social Distance Between the Systems of Delivery and of Use</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Lessons Learned from the Community Development Experience</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Social Organization and Stratification</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Decentralizing Development to the Community Level</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Self-Help</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Using Local Groups in Development</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Diversity at the Community Level</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Localized Social Stratification</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Systems of Information and Flows of Influence</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Local-Level Communication of Networks</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Forming Networks for Development</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS ................... 290
   A. Broad Structural and Value Change Policy Issues .......... 290
   B. Strategic Options for Reaching the Poor ................. 291
   C. Reducing Poverty through Decentralization,
      Disaggregation, and "Middle-Rung" Institutions:
      Strategic Advantages and Disadvantages ............... 293
   D. Effects of Stratification and Local Diversity
      on Popular Mobilization .................................. 295
   E. General Policy Implications for Donor and
      Governmental Agencies ..................................... 296
   F. Applied Sociology, Anthropology, and Human
      Development: A Final Note ............................. 296

Envoi ..................................................................... 298

References .................................................................. 299

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of
Ms. T. Todd in the early stages of basic research for the paper, and for
the general organizational and editorial comments which she provided.
Prologue

"As Village Welfare workers we had been summoned by Ilat, a nearby community, to cure their children of fever. When we visited the village, we found several cases of typhoid, malaria, and dysentary plus a high incidence of infant mortality.

"We traced the probable source of trouble to a tiny spring which flowed into a stagnant pool in the middle of the village. Though this pool provided drinking water for the villagers, they waded in it and shared it with their animals.

"So we thought that our line of action was clear and simple. Dig the pool deeper, cover it with a stone structure and install a hand pump. It was as simple a project as that.

"One evening we called the elders to a meeting and informed them of our plan, requesting them to render as much help as they could. There seemed to be general agreement. In our lack of experience, however, we had not yet learned the subtleties by which a 'yes' may mean a 'no' in certain cases. The following morning, when we came to the village, ready to begin the project, we found the place practically deserted. They had all gone to their fields. The mukhtar (headman, a government official) made his appearance to tell us that the people refused flatly to let us install the pump. Let us install the pump! That made us pause and think. So that was how they felt about it; that we were imposing on them something they did not really want. And all the time we took it for granted that we were satisfying their urgent need. Something was certainly wrong.

"With much difficulty we were able to bring them to another meeting a few days later. In the course of the discussion we did our best to make them talk freely; and they told us a great deal! The following are more or less direct quotations:

"'Our fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers drank from this water as it is, and I don't see why we should make a change now.'

"'You say that you want to install a pump at the spring; but I for one have never seen a pump, nor do I know what might happen if it should be put there.'

"'I tell you what will happen. The water will flow out so fast that the spring will dry up in no time.'

"'Not only that, but the iron pipe will spoil the taste of the water for us and for our animals.'

"'You So and So,' put in one of Jibrail's elders, who are much more advanced in their outlook than the people of Ilat, 'do you like the taste of dung in your water better?'
"Well, I admit it is bad; but we and our animals are at least used to it."

"You have told us that the water is the cause of our illness and of our children's death. I do not believe that, and I can't see how it could be. To tell you the truth, I believe that the matter of life and death is in Allah's hands, and we cannot do much about it."

"One more thing. We don't understand why you should go to all this trouble. Why are you so concerned about us?"

"You say that the pump will save our women much effort and time. If that happens, what are they going to do with themselves all day long?"

"At the close of the meeting we realized that we had blundered. We had to begin from the beginning, taking nothing for granted.

- to be continued
INTRODUCTION

For three decades, policymakers and practitioners alike have endeavored to reduce poverty in developing countries by creating the conditions thought to be essential for economic growth. Their first major attempts focused on the identification and the manipulation of economic variables, which were seen as the agents inducing the required changes in behavior. But this approach tended to overlook the importance of noneconomic variables and their complex interaction with economic factors in reducing, if not perpetuating, poverty. Noneconomic factors accordingly began to be taken into account in the design and the implementation of development programs. These factors include political considerations, social and cultural influences, administrative conditions, and such specifics as the hitherto neglected role of the family. Concurrently, an increased emphasis came to be placed on programs designed to reach those living — and dying — in absolute poverty, while broader programs of economic development were complemented by new initiatives in human resource development, now sometimes known as human development.

The studies gathered in this publication collectively and separately address these twin themes of the reduction of poverty, especially absolute poverty, and the structuring of human resource development. The companion papers analyze the specific facets of the financing of human development and of such noneconomic correlates as political and administrative conditions and the role of the family. The main aim of the present paper is to address the other sociocultural variables involved, while acknowledging at the outset their close interaction not only with political, administrative, and familial influences, but also with wider economic and technical matters. The remainder of this brief introduction will further delineate the background to the study, and outline its basic structure and essential findings.

A. Background

Human (resource) development is defined here to include initiatives in nutrition, health, family planning, and basic education. As noted above, human development, as a complementary aspect of broader economic development programs, has become an important feature of antipoverty policy and practice throughout the developing world. The success of such programs is often predicated on behavioral change. Consequently, the consideration of social and cultural factors and of their implications for influencing the outcome of programs plays a central role in the design and implementation of such planned behavioral change. Many of the questions which have arisen during this process nevertheless remain unanswered.
The following questions, which guided the writing of this paper, are illustrative: What are the determinants of behavior with regard to nutrition, health, and family planning under varying conditions? What is the relationship between individual behavior and its social context? What are the beliefs of the intended users of programs with respect to birth, illness, death, food consumption, and education? How can development programs take such beliefs into account? What systems of knowledge and of reasoning may affect the perceptions of users and their ultimate adoption, or rejection, of the technologies of service providers and their products? How do social class, ethnicity, gender, and other differentiating characteristics of field workers and users at the community level affect their interaction? In sum: What role do such elements of social structure and cultural process as values, social organization, and the socialization process play in determining the success or failure of human development efforts involving behavioral change and directed at the reduction of poverty?

B. Structure of the Paper

While this paper does not directly answer all of the above questions, its three central purposes are:

1. to establish a general sociocultural framework for examining the process of socioeconomic development and the reduction of poverty;

2. to identify and to understand some of the important sociocultural factors which can have a compelling effect, either positively or negatively, on human development programs; and

3. to elicit some of the implications for future policy and strategy.

What answers emerge to these questions? In this paper we argue that four considerations increase the likelihood that policymakers, planners, and implementers will attain success in inducing planned behavioral change and in meeting the goals of economic and human development programs. Such persons should:

1. view the development process holistically, giving increased attention to critical interactions among noneconomic values and structural economic and technical factors;

2. recognize the correlate that development does not occur in a vacuum, but interacts with existing sociocultural values, institutions, and processes;
3. acknowledge that local variations in sociocultural forms may require interventions specific to that context; and

4. understand that it is at the microlevel of the village and the urban community that sociocultural factors can most directly affect the outcomes of programs, and where most applied social science knowledge has been gathered on these factors and their impact.

The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section II begins by providing the reader with a general overview of the effects of structural transformation and the formation of values on the behavioral change underlying and animating the broader process of socioeconomic development. Section III then discusses the variety of traditional sociocultural forms -- leadership roles, communication systems, organizational forms, knowledge systems, and etiology (cause-effect logic) -- encountered during that development process. Section IV examines related variables affecting the success, and failure, of human development programs. This discussion focuses on: a user orientation in the delivery systems of development programs, the ways in which those users may be organized, and the systems aspects of the flow of information and influence. The paper culminates in the discussion in Section V of the issues and implications arising from the study for human development policies and programs to reduce poverty.
II. STRUCTURES, VALUES, AND BEHAVIORAL CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW

Underlying any theory of socioeconomic change is a paradigm attempting to explain behavioral change. This chapter will consider three such major paradigms: one which focuses on the values of an individual, a second which stresses structural features, and a third which examines the dynamic interaction of structure and values in order to explain the persistence and/or the reduction of poverty. The method adopted is first, to review the divergent approaches to development represented by social-psychological structuralist perspectives. A second aim is to make an examination of the interaction of structural and value change strategies, with an emphasis on physical mobility, changes in occupation roles, educational aspects of value formation and also on practical lessons from attempts at directed behavioral change. Third, a concluding review will set the stage for more detailed discussions in the following sections.

A. Approaches to Development: Social-Psychological or Structuralist?

Two opposing views, representing nearly polar opposites, have dominated thinking about development over recent decades. On the one hand, theorists in the 1960s explained the failures of development programs as a result of the interference of social-psychological variables. In other words, the social values of the individual were perceived as the main obstacles to the development process. The poor, for example, were blamed for being fatalistic, that is, for thinking that they could not control their own future. This fatalism, in turn, allegedly explained why technological innovations in the fields of health, family planning, nutrition, and agriculture were not adopted by the poor. These theorists perceived social values as being very difficult, even impossible, to change, at least in the short-run.

On the other hand, a school of development specialists in the 1970s attributed the failure of certain programs to structural socioeconomic constraints. They argued that the reduction of poverty could not occur until the poor themselves had access to such resources as land, technology, capital, and information. In this structuralist view, the opportunity for the poor to experience behavioral change would be at hand if power relations could be transformed through the allocation of resources and the reform of institutions. The poor would readily seize their opportunity, changing their values in the process in order to rationalize their new behavior. In short, the new independent variables were structural in nature; values were viewed as a result, rather than the cause, of the changes in individual behavior which facilitated socioeconomic development.
B. The Interaction of Structural and Value Change Strategies

As we enter the 1980s this dichotomous thinking of the past two decades is giving way to a more comprehensive view of how behavior determines socioeconomic transformation. This broader view is rooted in cultural ecology, development sociology, and economic anthropology. It sees values and structural conditions as being equally important, yet interacting, independent variables in the process of inducing sustained behavioral change (Harris 1979; LeVine 1969, Oxaal 1975; Cole and Wolf 1976; among others *). Values are seen in an historical context. The perceived sequence of events is that environmental or structural conditions lead to certain adaptive modes of subsistence (occupations) to maximize group survival. These, in turn, and over time, become "valued" behaviors which form the underlying ideology of a cultural system. The values which result from this collective survival experience are passed on to the next generation as if it were facing the same challenges. In essence, "one generation's practical necessities become the next generation's exalted ideals" (LeVine 1969). For example, societies which accumulate and store food for long periods of time through such adaptive modes of subsistence as farming and herding typically value obedience (following accepted routines), responsibility, cooperation, and a group orientation. Hunting and fishing societies on the other hand, which store no food, tend to reward resourcefulness and to value individual initiative and independence (Barry et al. 1959).

This theory of behavioral change implies that, given such unchanging environmental (structural) conditions as land tenure patterns, the values of the poor are basically "rational" and adaptive. If those conditions change, however, those same values, if unchanged, could become residual social and psychological impediments. To overcome this potential lag between change in structure and change in values, interventions to change values -- for example, through the resocialization process of education -- may be a necessary complement to any structural efforts to reduce poverty.

But if values are changed without any corresponding change in structural conditions, the result may be value conflict expressed in frustration and cultural alienation, and movement out, perhaps in search of an urban environment compatible with the new values. Those who leave could conceivably have placed their new values at the vanguard of structural change in the existing environment. Conversely, it would be to ignore the reality and the power of intergenerational cultural conditioning to undertake to transform structural conditions, for example, through land reform, without initiating complementary changes in residual values deeply rooted in religious and supernatural belief systems.

* References cited will be found at the end of this paper.
What are the implications of this theory? In essence, cultural ideology can serve to reduce or to enhance such potential conflict between values. The net result is that the behavioral change underlying broader socioeconomic change cannot be viewed as a short-term phenomenon. It may, in fact, require a generation if strategies of evolutionary and sustained (rather than revolutionary) change are envisaged. Strategies of revolutionary change, though often faster, may require resocialization or an intervening process of desocialization in which interpersonal relations are changed and the efficacy of old values erased (McHugh 1966).

C. Physical Mobility, Occupational Role Change and Educational Aspects of Value Formation

Occupational roles, that is, the expressions of a mode of subsistence or environmental adaption, develop in the role occupant, for example, a parent considered as a member of the older generation, a particular set of values. This shapes parental expectations, the conditioning process, and the evaluation of children’s behavior (Kohn 1963). This has an effect on such interventions as the direction of physical mobility and job allocation by the state. If such interventions change the characteristics of the occupational role, for example, from bureaucrat to farmer, or from farmer to factory worker, as was the case in the mass movement of Chinese between urban and rural occupations, this may lead to a perception by parents that different values are functional in the new role, and they will accordingly transmit these values to their children. One might view such directed mobility, which may also take the form of voluntary migration, as a "crash program in modernization."

To close the gap between structural transformation and maladaptive values sustaining resistant behaviors, other strategies may prove effective. Examples of such interventions are provided by state control over the socialization processes, as in China, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. Such control is effected through institutionalized programs of early child care during the critical years of value formation, or by altering the values of those responsible for child care through adult education or reeducation, for example, by consciousness-raising mechanisms.

Formal education can also be a significant instrument of resocialization, especially in the creation of "modern" attitudes among "traditional" peoples. Studies have shown (Inkeles 1973; Doob 1957; Dreeben 1968; Armer and Youtz 1971) that the noncognitive aspects of participation in the structure and organization of schooling are critical in two respects. First, they are significant for socializing such attitudes and values as particularism, individualism, punctuality, orderliness, and need achievement, among others. Second, they facilitate the assertion of independence from traditional authority, and the belief in the efficacy of science and technology, which are conducive to functioning in such "modern" productive
institutions and organizations, as factories and bureaucracies. Schooling can, however, also serve to foster individualism and impersonal relationships which divorce the school child from his or her family environment. While "modern" values may be required if the individual is to operate in a modern context, where success is measured by the mastery of such skills as differentiation and analysis, it is not clear that school is an adaptive institution with respect to social relationships. Without a simultaneous process of resocialization, for example, through adult education or exposure of the parental generation to the mass media, the result can be cultural discontinuity, intergenerational conflict, and a marginal existence for youth. This in turn occasions such social problems as rising rates of crime, suicide, and drug abuse.

It is noteworthy in this connection that socialist and centrally planned governments appear to have reduced the occurrence of problems of intergenerational conflict and discontinuity between socialization processes and their outcomes in the home, at school, and in society. They have done so by applying a relatively consistent policy of child rearing and adult education.

To summarize: while structural interventions may be necessary, they are not sufficient for a sustained effort to alleviate poverty. It may also be necessary to transform ideology, expressed in values, through resocialization programs coordinated with the structural interventions. To effect a smooth transition from old to new values, it may be helpful to provide material opportunities that can be given concrete expression in prevailing cultural roles, institutions, and processes. If the poor can recognize the contextual logic to an introduced change, they will be more likely to adapt and exploit it and thus move, albeit often slowly, toward a long-term change in values. Strategies for structural change and values thus become interacting, independent variables in a comprehensive approach to the behavioral change underlying socioeconomic development and the reduction of poverty.

D. Theory in Practice: Some Lessons from Attempts at Directed Behavioral Change

What does the actual experience of development tell us with respect to the theoretical considerations just outlined? Evidence that social values are often very difficult to change, even over a period of years, is provided by the largely unsuccessful attempts of many national family planning programs to change the parental value of an ideal family size. By making contraceptive methods widely accessible to eligible couples, several nations have been able to achieve an adoption rate for family planning procedures of from 25 to 35 percent; the adopters are mainly couples who use contraception to avoid surpassing their ideal family size of three or four children. To achieve the rate of adoption (60 to 70 percent) which would be necessary to reach the national demographic goal
of only two or three children, however, involves changing a strongly-held value. The achievement of this goal has therefore proven difficult in many nations.

The investigation by Mamdani (1972, 1974) in the Indian village of Manupur, for example, showed that, despite more than a decade of government efforts at changing the ideal family size to two or three children, most village couples still felt that at least three or four children (including at least two living sons) were necessary to ensure their security in old age, and for the provision of agricultural labor. Exceptional couples, who had accepted the norm of a smaller family size, were high-case Brahmins for whom the formal education of their children, rather than the acquisition of a large family, was perceived as a route to security. This is an illustration that structural changes, including the provision of contraceptive technology and the prospect of increased occupational opportunities, when accompanied by a value change regarding family size, facilitated attaining the development objective of lowering rates of population growth. But this case also shows that the poor remained relatively uninfluenced, either by the structural transformations or by a change in values.

The field of education offers further illustrations of the complex interrelationships between structural transformation and changes in values as facilitations of changes in individual behavior.

Since India achieved independence, educational facilities have been improved and expanded to provide access for the urban and rural poor. In Uttar Pradesh, primary education has been tuition-free for all castes and both sexes since 1957. The poor give many reasons -- for example, prospects of increased status and the potential for securing employment -- for valuing education, but many of them have not taken advantage of this structural change offering increased access to primary education. Given this apparent congruity between values and structural conditions, one would think that there would be no barriers to the children of the poor taking advantage of "free" primary education for all. When asked why their children are not in attendance, however, many poor parents claim that they cannot afford to buy school uniforms and notebooks, and that they are consequently too embarrassed to send their children to school ill-equipped and in rags. Further, they state that they must have the help of their sons in the fields or in caste work of an artisan character, and that of their daughters at home. While local values toward primary education pose little problem, it is the value placed on the opportunity costs of child labor and such structural factors as the costs of uniforms and of notebooks, rather than school access, which impedes the ability of the poor to capitalize on universal primary education (Luschinsky 1963).

In the above case, the legislation of compulsory education is one measure which might be taken to overcome such resistance. It would most likely be rejected in practice, however, because of its coercive, rather than normative, nature. The government might be able to remove latent structural barriers to participation by the poor through the provision
of uniforms and equipment. The Tanzanian government is in fact launching a program to provide schools in the poorest areas of the country with a basic minimum package that includes equipment and books. The hope is to remove such structural impediments to realizing the objective of universal primary education (World Bank 1980).

To mitigate the opportunity costs of child labor, several countries are attempting to gear the school day and calendar to daily and seasonal variations in order to accommodate work schedules. Botswana, for example, has now considered adjusting the school calendar in herding areas to allow male youths to participate both in school and in their traditional herding tasks. This, it is hoped, will reduce the present high rates of male absenteeism, dropout, and repetition in the upper primary schools (Chernichovsky and Smith 1979). The provision of low-cost community day care in an effort to free school-age females from their traditional domestic roles as caretakers in order to allow them to attend school has been tried out in Sri Lanka and in Malaysia, among other countries (Ariyaratne 1976).

Nutritional and preventive health measures are typically the most strongly-resisted programs in human development primarily because of the difficulties presented, not only by the lack of immediate visible benefits, but also by existing cultural beliefs and etiology (cause-effect logic). In India, in order to counter the supernatural belief of Hindu villagers that the anger of a local deity caused dysentery, the change agents of an antidysentery campaign not only showed movies on the cause of the disease, but also, more significantly, participated in a village prayer meeting to obtain the sanction of the deity before distributing the medicine. This example illustrates that even where traditional beliefs and etiology appear to strengthen resistance to an innovation, successful change can result immediately from a policy of adaptation, or association with them, rather than one of confrontation. At the same time, the longer-term educational process of changing values can be continued (Link and Mehta 1964).

In a comparable example from Tanzania, structural change introduced without attendant changes in values met with resistance and subversion. In this case, the government decided to change the residential pattern of rural Tanzanians from one of isolated extended family homesteads to one of villages along major roads. The aim was to better deliver such basic services as clean water and health and educational programs. At first, the people resisted movement; ultimately, many were forced into the new villages. When these villages appeared incapable of organizing themselves to demand and user services, the Tanzanian government belatedly realized that the underlying assumptions of ujamaa (traditional African cooperation) might not necessarily apply to units larger than the extended family. The government subsequently attempted to educate the members of the new villages in the principles of local government, in order to insure that they would function as a social unit capable of demanding and utilizing the services intended for the village.
Field experience thus clearly indicates that attacking values, on the one hand, or making structural changes, on the other, is not always sufficient to change behavior. Negative influences and resistance to change are best overcome through a "holistic" strategy that combines structural transformation with the resocialization of recipients. The aim of such a strategy is to understand the elements in a given context, and then to strengthen, redirect, and complement the existing resources with compatible elements.

Additive, rather than substitutional, strategies tend to be least susceptible to resistance on ideological grounds. People generally resist those changes that seem to threaten their basic securities, that they do not understand, or that are forced upon them (Spicer 1952). The chances of an innovation being resisted are often greatly reduced if it can draw legitimacy from traditionally accepted authority, for example, from religious leaders; make use of indigenous social organizations that are already institutionalized; be introduced with an accompanying educational program; or be grafted onto the local etiology of the potential users. To integrate indigenous elements into systems delivering human development programs reduces the trauma of change, while adding new elements that can attack poverty.

E. Review and Conclusions

To summarize: economists tend to focus on structural changes such as those that provide increased opportunities and incentives, anticipating that rational reactions to such interventions would result in the desired behavioral change; other social scientists, however, tend to focus on changing the underlying values and beliefs as a prerequisite to adoption and behavioral change. Neither approach is sufficient; the lag between structural and value change, or vice versa, may lead only to short-term gains. To ensure that behavioral change is sustained, changes in values and in structures should be mutually supportive. Those involved in human development should conceptualize and design interventions from a "systematic" framework. Such a policy of using the system, rather than the individual, as the prime unit of intervention would include an understanding of local organizations, cliques, and other informal associations of the flow of influence and information between these elements; and of the linkages between such subsystems and other social systems (Wilkening 1964). In making attempts to close the gap between structural and ideological change, local culture -- values, institutions, roles, and processes -- may be fused, adapted, and modified in order to secure the consensual base necessary for sustained socioeconomic development.

The conditions of behavioral change can be placed along a continuum. At one end, there are situations where the appropriate change in human behavior can be brought about mainly by providing structural transformation. Such measures would include providing improved access to information,
credit, and other services; changing such institutional arrangements as those involved in land tenure; and by working through such incentives as wages or other reward systems. These processes would take place within the existing value framework of the systems of users. At the other end of the continuum, there are situations in which social values must be changed -- through educational and training programs, adult resocialization activities, and similar means -- before structural transformations can have much effect in changing behavior in the direction of human development goals. In the middle of the continuum exist interaction and complementarity between strategies of structural and value change.

There may have been a tendency to underestimate the necessity for value change in the case of many programs in the past, a tendency representing a confusion between the two poles of the above continuum. Values have often been considered very difficult, or too abstract, to measure, and so they have largely been ignored in development programs. Yet while structural change is important, change in values may be particularly critical in human development programs, where the benefits of structural changes may be neither highly visible nor immediate. In such cases residual values may constrain the ability of the poor to take advantage of new conditions. It may be concluded, therefore, that education, or the (re)socialization of appropriate behavioral predispositions, may play a critical role in other structural changes, for example, land reform, intended to reduce poverty. In any event, the process of change, to be effective, must involve indigenous sociocultural forms and institutions. The entities involved are traditional leadership roles and communications systems; indigenous organizational forms and knowledge systems; and traditional etiologies. These will be analyzed in the following section.
III. INDIGENOUS SOCIOCULTURAL FORMS

Those early efforts at development which concentrated on the manipulation of such macroeconomic variables as the investment rate did not always induce behavioral change in, or even reach, the poorest segments of the population. The efforts often failed to meet stated objectives or provide anticipated benefits because they did not effectively work within, or build upon, existing conditions and indigenous cultural patterns (such as those expressed in local associations) which, for the poor, are culturally embedded forms of "risk insurance." Theorists of development often did not in fact recognize that indigenous institutions and organizations existed at all, much less that they could provide important resources for the successful adoption of introduced change.

This "vacuum" approach or "empty vessels fallacy" caused administrators to overlook the potential of using some traditional or indigenous forms of sociocultural organization in their development programs. Analysis of the process whereby change is introduced into social systems or settings has, however, demonstrated that ignoring the influences of, or failing to use, indigenous cultural patterns and local environmental settings may lead to failure, or rejection, of development programs. Niehoff and Anderson (1964), in conducting a content analysis of over 200 case studies of programs in human development, found that many had failed because planners and implementers had not become aware of indigenous factors until they acted as barriers to the acceptance of an introduced innovation. When this occurred, planners often saw traditional culture as a negative force which had to be uprooted and replaced if meaningful development were to occur.

When any new institutional service is provided to people in a local area in a developing nation, it usually replaces and/or supplements a previously-existing form. When that existing form is treated as if it were nonexistent, the indigenous leaders responsible for it are likely to view the new form as threatening, and thus to resist it. An illustration of the importance of utilizing traditional leadership roles in development programs is provided by Niehoff's (1964) study of the introduction of deep wells in Laotian villages. When the village well was drilled on wat [temple] grounds, the Buddhist monks took responsibility for its maintenance; otherwise, the wells were broken and unused within a year because of the lack of a local social organization to support the innovation.

This example suggests that traditional leadership roles are one aspect of indigenous culture which should be considered by development officials. After a brief overview, the remainder of this section accordingly discusses the following indigenous sociocultural forms: (1) traditional leadership roles, (2) traditional communication systems, (3) indigenous organizational forms, (4) indigenous knowledge systems, and (5) traditional etiology.
A. An Overview

An indigenous sociocultural element may be classified as positive, neutral, or negative, vis-à-vis development programs. While it is recognized that such indigenous forms may be used as instruments of exploitation as well as of facilitation in the development process, in order to present our general thesis the present discussion will focus on the facilitative features. We will return to a more balanced treatment in the next section.

Some indigenous forms offer a means by which technological innovations may be introduced to a user system with greater success because the traditional element aids people in their process of fitting the new idea into the old sociocultural context. For example, several national family planning programs in the 1960s in such Asian nations as India and Pakistan at first ignored the roles of traditional birth attendants. These midwives resisted family planning and often started negative rumors about the modern contraceptive methods that were introduced. During the 1970s, however, national family planning programs in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia began to work through the traditional systems of birth attendants, providing training, recognition, and, in some cases, financial incentives to reward the traditional midwives for their family planning efforts. The result was an important contribution toward the success of the family planning program, especially in rural areas and with the urban poor. The general lesson derived from these experiences is that it is better to utilize traditional leaders in development programs than to ignore them and risk their active resistance.

In many cases, a particular sociocultural form does not affect the performance of a development program one way or another. In other words, it is effective neutral in the introduction of a technological innovation. Almost every traditional culture has, for example, a "hot-cold" classification of all foods and drinks (this taxonomy has nothing to do with the actual temperature of the food at the time of its consumption). Research and development program experience shows that, in most cases, the hot-cold complex in an indigenous culture does not affect the acceptance or rejection of nutritional food supplements. This neutral element may, however, be very important in other situations and/or for other development programs. For instance, when water boiling was introduced as a preventive health technique in a Peruvian Indian community, the practice was rejected because the people perceived boiled water as "hot" (even after it had cooled physically), and hence inappropriate for ill persons.

Certain types of indigenous sociocultural forms are clearly harmful and have negative consequences; obviously these must be altered substantially, or replaced by human development programs. An example is provided by the food taboos for pregnant women found in many cultures. As is pointed out in the companion paper on the role of the family by Safilios-Rothschild, in Malawi, this taboo prohibits pregnant women from eating meat, sugar, or milk because it is feared that consuming these foods will
transfer animal traits to the child. At a time when the pregnant woman most needs these protein-rich foods, these taboos prevent their consumption.

Another illustration of negative indigenous cultural forms is the unsanitary methods of birth-delivery utilized by traditional midwives, such as cutting the umbilical cord of the new-born infant with a sharpened thumbnail or with a rusty razorblade. Experience in several Asian nations nevertheless shows that when traditional midwives are trained in more sanitary methods of birth delivery, they usually change their procedures (Rogers and Solomon 1975). Attempts by former governments to eliminate the traditional midwives entirely, as in Indonesia and the Philippines, were not, however, successful. These indigenous birth attendants continue to deliver the majority of births today, and an especially high proportion of the births for less-educated and lower-income parents. This is a case in which the negative aspects of the indigenous role have been altered, by training, into a positive force.

B. Traditional Leadership Roles

The nature of irrigated farming requires that a certain degree of social organization must be present at the local level. There must be some means of making decisions about the priority in which persons will receive irrigation water; these decisions must be implemented by some type of leader who is respected and trusted by his or her neighbors. Further, certain individuals must be responsible for maintaining the irrigation facilities. On the basis of this research in Laos, Coward (1975) concluded that the indigenous leadership roles among farmers with previous irrigation experience can form an important linkage between the users and the government officials responsible for a centrally-administered irrigation project at the time of its introduction. In the past, however, when a large-scale irrigation project was mounted in a local area, the existing indigenous social organization was often ignored, usually to the detriment of the project.

To take another example, the use of traditional religious leadership during a hookworm treatment campaign in what was then Ceylon was the key factor marking the difference between success and failure. After a number of months of user resistance, Buddhist priests and Muslim leaders, as well as folk-healers, were recognized and enlisted in the campaign. This process led to the ultimate legitimization of the treatment, and its acceptance by users (Philips 1955). Today, in what is now Sri Lanka, Buddhist priests are being recruited and trained as community organizers and facilitators of village development efforts among the poor. The emphasis now is on a reacknowledgment of the historic role of the priests as managers of water resources, in an effort to rehabilitate Sri Lanka's ancient tank system of irrigation (Hewage 1976).
The contribution of indigenous leadership roles to development programs seems to be especially important among the client audiences that are the most traditional, the least educated, and the lowest in income. An important reason for the success of the rural health program in the People's Republic of China during the 1970s was the role of "barefoot doctors," paraprofessional health workers who serve their peers in production brigades. A portion of these barefoot doctors, perhaps about one-fourth to one-third, were retrained from their previous roles as traditional health providers. All the barefoot doctors in China today practice a unique combination of traditional (Chinese) and scientific (Western) medicine. This integration of indigenous with modern medicine in China is one reason for the rapid acceptance of this health system in rural areas, especially by the poorest peasants.

C. Traditional Communication Systems

Indigenous communication systems existed long before contemporary mass media -- radio, print, film, and television -- began to penetrate villages and audiences among the urban poor. These systems included the varied roles of balladeers, town-criers, gongs, drums, and other community information and warning systems; and such traditional entertainment as puppeteers, song-and-dance teams, and shadow theaters.

In each village or community throughout the developing countries, there are also other indigenous forums of social exchange. Political debates, the exchange of ideas and information, and other related activities take place in such traditional gathering places as small restaurants in village market squares, traditional community culture centers, and also the areas around churches, mosques, and other religious compounds which serve as centers of interest to many villagers. Such forums of social exchange could profitably be broadened to serve other development functions, or be incorporated into development efforts.

If, on the other hand, they are ignored, such indigenous communication systems can transmit messages which oppose and undermine development programs. In India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, for example, such traditional communication channels have, in the past, frequently carried negative rumors about the side effects of family planning methods, sometimes leading to the outright rejection of the contraceptives being introduced. On the other hand, indigenous communication systems have been utilized in some Asian nations as an integral part of family planning programs.

Crawford and Adhikarja (1973) noted that in many developing nations, messages on such contemporary tropics as agricultural techniques, modern health practices, and family planning are reaching rural people through traditional communication systems. The forms may vary from nation to nation, but the strategy is similar: adapt development information to these forms that have been accepted in rural villages for generations. In this manner, culture can be viewed as a foundation for, rather than a barrier to, change.
Indigenous organizational forms can also be incorporated as mechanisms facilitating the implementation of certain development programs. These intermediate or "middle rung" institutions, which have grown up within the peasant social structure, can provide viable links between the past and the future; the central government and the village; and the donor agency and the target group. They are mediating institutions which are familiar and acceptable within the traditional system, yet they can also serve as educational and distributional mechanisms for development programs.

These institutions can take many organizational forms: self-help groups, village assemblies, or societies which offer aid in the event of death. The rotating credit associations which are found in many developing countries, especially among the rural peasants and urban villages, are yet another institution. They go under a variety of names: contribution clubs, slates, mutual lending societies, pooling clubs, thrift groups, friendly societies, and so on. Although they vary in their duration, membership composition, size, and degree of sophistication, the basic principle upon which they are founded is the same: a lump sum fund composed of fixed contributions from each member of an association is distributed to one individual at each regular meeting of the association.

Rotating credit institutions basically help their members to build up a sizeable sum with which to make larger purchases than would otherwise be possible. In addition, this increased awareness of economic calculation is accompanied by the more diffuse social and solidarity-providing aspects of the institution. For example, when a member is sick, he is visited in the hospital; if he dies, his family is given a contribution towards the cost of his funeral.

Geertz (1962) argued that the rotating credit associations are also an educational mechanism through which peasants learn to be traders and to acquire and hold modern monetary values. Ardener (1953) found that the Mba-ise, a southern Ibo group in Nigeria, have successfully made the transition from a mainly agricultural to a predominately trading economy due, to a large extent, to the growth and development of rotating credit associations.

Rotating credit associations also reflect a movement towards an increased segregation of economic activities from noneconomic ones, while at the same time maintaining the dominance of the traditional values over the developing economic activities. According to Geertz (1962), the associations are able, at least in many cases, to balance these contradictory forces in such a way that some disturbances of social equilibrium are avoided even in a situation of fairly rapid social change.
The rotating credit institutions have therefore shown that it is possible to integrate traditional attitudes with modern functions in such a way that the former actually support, rather than hinder, the latter. It can be argued that it is this pattern of integrating modern economic functions with the indigenous social structure and values that could help sustain development in most of the poor countries.

The rotating credit association is merely one of a whole family of such intermediate "socializing" institutions which spring up in societies undergoing social and cultural change. There are many others. They operate not only in the economic sphere, but also in political, religious, and other aspects of the social system. This family of mediating institutions, roles, and processes should be a critical object of study and use in development programs.

Exactly how rotating credit associations might be functionally utilized in human development programs can be illustrated by the role of the kaes in South Korea. These rotating credit associations were widespread in Korean villages prior to the organization of 18,000 mothers' clubs in 1968 (Rogers and Kincaid 1980). In most Korean villages, the kaes were practically the only existing organizational form in which women were allowed to participate. Government family planning workers converted these kaes to mothers' clubs and connected them to the national family planning movement. The kaes became a mechanism through which the township family planning workers could reach large numbers of eligible women at their monthly meetings. The mothers' clubs then became a forum at which oral contraceptive supplies could be distributed, family planning methods and their possible side-effects could be discussed, and negative rumors about contraceptives could be counteracted. Nor surprising, the kaes/mothers' clubs continued their money-raising functions, but these capital-accumulation functions were directed toward community development activities, including moves for greater female equality.

When the Saemoul Undong (new village movement) was initiated as a national rural development program in the 1970s, the mothers' clubs often took the lead in mobilizing community action for improved housing, better nutrition, and increased agricultural productivity.

In Korea, as in some other nations, rotating credit associations thus provided an existing organizational form onto which a government-directed self-help movement could be grafted. Where such rotating credit associations are not strong, as is generally the case in Latin America, there may be other indigenous organizational forms which could serve a similar function.

It is important to change the functional balance of traditional institutions from social/expressive to technical/instrumental to facilitate their use in economic endeavors. The latent strength of traditional groups lies in their power to socialize, or their ability to teach new behaviors in traditional structures. The result is the ultimate transformation of
the traditional structures themselves, thus inadvertently facilitating social change (Geertz 1962). The simplicity of existing associations and networks and their ready capacity for mobilization may substantially reduce the administrative costs and bureaucratization of the poor that are otherwise often associated with the formation and expansion of human development delivery systems. (This topic is further explored in the companion paper by Esman and Montgomery.)

There are, however, limitations to the scale and to the complexity of activities which such a strategy can support. At some point along the continuum of increasing complexity, such legal and economic mechanisms as contracts, record-keeping, management, and the like, will necessitate the replacement of such traditional associations as rotating credit unions by banks, cooperatives, and so on. Self-sustaining cultural change nevertheless progresses in gradual steps. In the transitional stages traditional associations can fulfill a valuable function by mediating and "translating" between traditional and modern economic values, meanings, and activities in a harmonious and evolutionary manner. The building of such "middle rungs" on the ladder bridging the gap between traditional society and more modern forms of social organization seems to be a characteristic activity of people caught up in the processes of social transformation (Geertz 1962). As Wharton (1969) observed, such institutions are maintained as one form of "risk insurance" for the poor in the broader process of social change; they should be recognized as such, and be treated as complementary to any new "insurance system" whenever possible. Peter Marris (1974) refers to this approach as the "traditionality of modernity"; that is, even where radically new forms are introduced, the old forms need to continue in the interim to allow individuals to see the "structure of oppositions" in exploring and adapting new forms.

The destruction or termination of indigenous institutions without the provision of adequate replacements by human development programs has been especially disruptive for the poor (who usually depend most heavily upon those same institutions). In the past, for example, national ministries of health in several Asian and Latin American nations tried to outlaw traditional birth attendants and indigenous healers, without being able to provide a primary health system of doctors, nurses, and clinics that offered equivalent access and coverage. Similarly, the poor suffered from the disappearance of sharecropping in Turkish villages and with it the sense of personal responsibility by landlords for the welfare of their peasant farmers, because equivalent socioeconomic security systems could not be provided (Kiray 1968). Further, national family planning programs have tried to persuade eligible couples that having several male children is no longer necessary as a means to ensure security in old age for the parents. The social security program, provided by national governments, has not, however, been able to assume the function previously carried out by those male children.
Unlike such indigenous sociocultural entities as traditional roles and social organizations, indigenous knowledge systems are seldom visible to development planners; consequently, they may be especially unable to recognize that such systems exist and can potentially contribute to human development programs aimed at the reduction of poverty. In recent years, several illustrations of the positive potential of indigenous knowledge systems with respect to development programs have nevertheless been reported in the research literature. Many of these examples are in agriculture, but their implications may extend to other programs.

Indigenous knowledge may first of all suggest implications for scientific research and development. In the Puebla Project in Mexico, for example, local farmers insisted that their open-pollinated corn varieties would out-perform the new hybrid corn seed being introduced from CIMMYT, the international corn and wheat research center at Chapingo, Mexico.* Field tests conducted by farmers and supervised by extension workers showed that the hybrid varieties were indeed inferior; consequently, the agronomists shifted their research attention to improving yields of the open-pollinated corn (Gladwin 1976).

Further, the Mexican farmers were able to convince the agronomists that the interplanting of corn and beans was superior to planting either crop alone. Accordingly, the original Puebla Project recommendations to farmers were then countermanded so as to favor intercropping. Previously, the agricultural scientists had claimed that such interplanting greatly complicated the task of insect control. Their field plots nevertheless showed that net income from the corn-bean association was about double that achieved when either corn or beans were planted alone. When these experimental results became evident in 1971, the experts belatedly realized that their original opposition to interplanting was incorrect.

The Human Reproduction Unit of the World Health Organization (WHO) directs one of the world's largest-scale research programs aimed at developing new contraceptives. This research and development program is guided in part by "acceptability" studies carried out by anthropologists and other social scientists who seek to determine which contraceptive methods would be accepted by eligible couples in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The WHO researchers determined, for instance, that traditional contraceptives rarely involve genital manipulation. The biomedical research program at WHO is accordingly working on contraceptives that do not require the user to touch the genital area. Here, as in the case of agriculture, we see how indigenous knowledge can provide some guidelines for scientific research.

* Prior to the initiation of the Puebla Project, a 1967 user survey indicated that about 55 percent of the farmers knew about hybrid corn. But less than 1 percent had planted it in 1967, because the farmers had seen that it was out-yielded by local, open-pollinated varieties (Díaz-Cisneros 1974).
Generally, however, indigenous knowledge systems have been ignored by development researchers and planners. "Those with formal education and training believe that their knowledge and skills are superior and that educated and untrained people must, be definition, be ignorant and unskilled" (Chambers 1979). Only in relatively rare cases have the unique advantages of indigenous knowledge been realized. One such advantage is that indigenous knowledge is often more holistic than scientific knowledge because it is free of "disciplinary blinkers." The advantage of such a holistic approach is illustrated by the case of a cassava-eating grasshopper in Nigeria; an external observer, such as a pest-eradication expert, might not take an holistic view of the local ecosystem. In contrast, an observer with indigenous technical knowledge would not overlook the important fact that because the insects were eaten they contributed to the nutrition of children (Howes 1979).

A similar point is made by the fact that the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines did not originally breed its rice varieties for taste. The first of the "miracle" rice strains, such as IR-8 and IR-20, even though they outyielded indigenous varieties by a factor of two or three times, were not accepted by subsistence farmers in many parts of Asia because they did not like the taste. Later, this problem was overcome, but it suggests that the IRRI plant breeders were less holistic in their perceptions of rice breeding than were Asian villagers; who considered taste important, along with yield, pest-resistance, and lodging-susceptability.

Many development officials are gradually coming to accept the cautious conclusion stated by Bell (1979), based on his review of the research on indigenous knowledge systems: scientific knowledge systems are the main basis for alleviating poverty through development programs, but "they may do a slightly better job if they use bits and pieces of indigenous knowledge."

Indigenous knowledge is, however, by no means, always correct or complete. It often requires some revision or addition. An illustration is provided by Richards' (1979) study of the perceptions of Sierra Leone farmers concerning legume seeds. They perceived the brightly-colored seeds of *Abrus precatorius* as valuable for use as gambling chips and as children's playthings. These seeds are highly poisonous, a fact that was not known by the farmers, and which certainly raises some questions about their use by children. Here scientific knowledge could contribute in an important way to indigenous knowledge. Development planners, by knowing that the poisonous seeds were utilized as playthings, could nevertheless encourage farmers to grow a different legume.
F. Traditional Etiology

Indigenous systems of thinking, especially regarding cause-effect relationships (known more formally as etiology), have an impact upon almost every type of human development program. Such traditional etiology has hitherto been utilized only infrequently by development programs to change the behavior of the poor, but a considerable potential may nevertheless exist.

In India, for example, a tetanus innoculation campaign encountered great resistance when the rationale for delivering the shots was based upon Western cause-effect thinking. The villagers all attributed tetanus to an invisible flying insect called a Jam. When village midwives finally abandoned attempts to introduce the Western cause-and-effect logic that stated that tetanus results from unhygienic conditions, and continued to associate tetanus with the mollification of Jam, the injections were readily accepted by villagers. The midwives were then able to continue their longer-term efforts at education in hygiene (Luschinsky 1963).

Another illustration of the use of indigenous etiology is provided by the so-called "moon phase" study of Pakistan in the mid-1960s. Oral contraceptives were being introduced to the villages, but government officials were concerned that the women involved, who were often illiterate and could not count, would misuse the pill, which was to be taken in 28-day cycles. In the "moon phase" project, the women were instructed to take one pill each day, starting with the first day of the new moon. In essence, the lunar system (which was closely followed in Pakistani villages as a kind of calendar) was utilized to mark off the 28-day cycles in the human estrous cycle. Results of the "moon phase" project may have helped convince government officials that literacy and numeracy were not important prerequisites to the use of oral contraceptives in Pakistan.

It might be argued that utilizing traditional roles, institutions, and processes to change the very values of which they are often the guardians might, in effect, lead to the further entrenchment and reinforcement of dysfunctional traditional values. Efforts can, however, be made within existing cultural ideology to link efforts at modernization in the human development field to traditional values by "symbolically" assigning institutions and processes to the former that are consonant with the latter. The alternative is to go against the moral foundations of a society by using a coercive, rather than a normative, emphasis and thus to make the modernization process culturally discontinuous. A coercive approach destroys traditional structures and with a single blow forcibly substitutes elite preferences for societal predispositions. Other options are, however, available. In Indonesia, for example, President Sukarno effectively built on the traditional principle and process of gotong rojong (mutual cooperation) to symbolically introduce his principle of "guided democracy."
In this chapter, a variety of sociocultural forms have been identified and analyzed as to their impact upon human development programs oriented toward the reduction of poverty. Each form (traditional leadership, communication systems, organizations, and so on) may have either a positive, neutral, or negative influence on development programs, depending upon whether the indigenous form is recognized or ignored; and, if recognized, whether it is adapted to fit the objectives and activities of the program.

Indigenous sociocultural forms may be more firmly adhered to by, and therefore more particularly important for, the absolute poor. Less-educated and lower-income members of the system of users often give greater credence to indigenous sociocultural leadership roles, communication channels, organizational forms, knowledge systems, and etiologies. On the other hand, it remains true that such traditional forms are not always easily visible to program designers and implementers, and, therefore, often cannot be understood or appropriately modified so as to contribute to human development.
IV. THE KEY CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES

In our discussion so far in this paper, we have attempted to show the importance of: (1) combining changes in values with structural transformation in order to bring about the behavior changes sought by programs in human development; and (2) recognizing and utilizing indigenous sociocultural forms in designing and implementing such programs. Although we have presented these two elements of human social organization separately, they are, in fact, interrelated. The values of a people shape their social and cultural institutions; the social and cultural institutions of a people reinforce their values.

The discussion of traditional values and indigenous sociocultural forms provides a framework for the present section, the core of the paper. In this discussion, we draw on social science research and field experience to demonstrate how existing values and institutions can, and do, affect the outcomes of development programs. Specifically, we have selected three key contextual variables, which, if identified and understood, can be managed in order to increase the likelihood of success of interventions in human development. These variables are: (1) delivery/user system dynamics; (2) social organization and stratification; and (3) systems of information and flows of influence.

It seems pertinent at the outset to reiterate the interrelated nature of sociocultural forms. Although we have isolated these three variables for the purposes of the following discussion, they do not represent discrete, mutually exclusive categories of human interaction. The delivery/user system may be affected by systems of information and flows of influence; social stratification may impact on delivery/user systems; and so on.

A. Delivery/User-System Dynamics

Evaluations of programs have shown that, ultimately, not much human development occurs in practice until the behavior of the intended audience, the members of a system of service users, is changed. Acceptance or modification of an idea or technology is not a random process. Instead, it depends heavily on the perceptions of the new entity by the potential users; how well it fits in which existing values and assumptions; whether it is consistent with indigenous social relationships; and how the change agent is perceived with respect to status, language, ethnicity, and similar entities (Paul 1955). The dynamic interrelationships of the development delivery system with the user system are thus a crucial element in the performance of development programs, and one that is often affected by sociocultural factors.
One theme of the following discussion is that the needs of users and their perceptions of the delivery system and of the technology utilized, as well as the perceptions of the user system underlying the delivery system, all influence the effectiveness of human development programs. In the past, user systems have not been adequately involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of development activities. Popular participation is now being viewed, however, as a serious element in the development process. There are three main reasons explaining the change. First, and foremost, there is a growing awareness among many developing nations that their greatest resource in the development process is their own people. A second reason is the increasing realization by those responsible for the varied government delivery systems -- agricultural extension, health, and family planning field workers, among others -- that the ready consumption of delivered entities is dependent upon actual demand. Third, centralized patterns of development decisionmaking have generally been unable to accommodate local sociocultural variations or to mobilize needed local resources (Colletta 1979). Highly centralized strategies have often resulted in marginal mobilization of local economic resources, limited improvement in local planning and management skills, and restricted incorporation of indigenous experiences and knowledge into development programming. Specific benefits of involving members of user systems in development programs include:

1. Assessing Needs of the User-System

There is often a socioeconomic gap between the professionals who staff a development delivery system and the rural or urban poor who constitute the intended audience or members of the system of users. Development officials accordingly plan and implement programs for individuals who are quite unlike themselves receiving lower income, and being less educated and more traditional in their outlook.
Under these conditions, development professionals may find it especially difficult to discern needs. The users may describe their needs in terms that are quite different from those understood by the delivery-system officials, and their needs may change over time as their priorities shift. Users may think about their problems in more holistic terms than do the development professionals, and the needs which they voice may not match specialized development programs.

Despite the practical difficulties of assessing the needs of the user system, when various development programs have attempted to measure, infer, and incorporate such needs, the results have often been encouraging in terms of program performance. Nearly everybody will agree that a knowledge of the needs of potential users can be useful in designing human development programs; on the other hand, the best way to assess such needs is not a matter of consensus.

While the assessment of community needs could undoubtedly guide the design of many programs, it must be cautioned that such data can seldom be utilized directly in this way. In most cases, it is necessary to interpret what respondents report as their needs into a form that is more appropriate for use by designers of development programs. One should not, for example, expect villagers to know that which they cannot observe, such as the soil erosion resulting from long-term pressures of population growth (Richards 1979). In this instance, technical expertise is needed to interpret the impact of population growth on soil erosion and decreased crop yields.

Further, some respondents may not be able to answer survey questions designed to ascertain needs. In a survey of rural development priorities in Sierra Leone, for instance, one villager resisted the instruction to make a list of community problems in rank order, by asking the interviewer: "If you needed a house, which would you rather have -- the walls or the roof?" (Richards 1979). This more holistic perception of the interrelatedness of community problems and resources, implying as it did that "roads," "water supply," and "schools" cannot always be prioritized, may be more characteristic of those who live in a community than of those who plan for its development. Again, we see the potential contribution that indigenous knowledge can make to development planning. While such indigenous "expertise" does not replace scientific expertise, it does supplement it in ways that may be useful in contributing to the success of development programs.

Determining the needs of users in a dynamic situation can be a futile endeavor, because the priority of needs may change from the time that they are measured to the time when a program can be launched to meet them. One way to overcome this problem of changing needs is to extrapolate. A nutritional survey in Jamaica, for instance, showed that bottle-feeding of infants was more likely: (1) among urban than rural women; and (2) among younger than older women (Bantje 1977). Given the considerable rural-urban migration in Jamaica, one might extrapolate a future rate of bottle-feeding as a basis for launching a campaign in favor of breast-feeding campaign.
A knowledge of the needs of prospective users may be critical for the planners of development programs, even when the need that has been identified as a high priority does not seem to bear directly on the program. In Kenya, in a program intended to promote participation and stress health learning, village women choose to build a nursery school and establish businesses, none of which specifically addressed health needs. Project managers were later able to build on the success of these efforts, however, and to use them as entry points for the provision of health services. The nursery school has been involved in immunization and health screening; has provided children with access to sanitary facilities; and has led to the adoption of improved health practices. A bakery project included health-related aspects of medical screening, water collection, and nutrition. In addition, the money earned goes toward meeting the basic needs of the family, all of which can directly affect health (Clark and Crone 1979). In some cases, the need may compete with the development program. Farmers who use agricultural credit ostensibly borrowed for purchasing fertilizer to pay for their children's school fees or to buy medicine provide one such example; the urban poor who may utilize credit to buy radios or wrist watches provide another (Lethem and Perrett 1979).

An attempt to assess the needs of the members of the user system was carried out in the Special Rural Development Programs (SRDPs), integrated pilot programs in rural development undertaken in Kenya in the early 1970s. In one of the pilot locations (South Tetu Division), social scientists from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi conducted a user survey of a random sample of farmers to diagnose needs and problems, including their income levels and current farming practices. The baseline research results pointed to the lopsided flow of income-generating ideas from government agricultural workers, community development workers, health visitors, home economists, and administrative staff to the more progressive farmers. This problem was seen as a major bottleneck to accelerated broad-based rural development. It was also found that there were only a few smaller-sized farms using hybrid corn and chemical fertilizer. Those baseline findings were used in part to design and implement an agricultural strategy to increase corn yields through farmer training institutes, the provision of credit (mainly in the form of seed supplies), and an increased extension follow-up by experienced para-professionals. The result of this poverty-reducing program was increased average income, especially among the farmers of smaller-sized units in the South Tetu District (Roling and others 1976).

2. Social Distance Between the Systems of Delivery and of Use

The social distance between, on the one hand, the sponsors, designers, and managers of, and the workers in, development programs, and, on the other, the user groups, is generally greater in poverty-oriented programs than it is in more conventional development programs. The socio-cultural context of the interaction between the program and its users is thus particularly important.
The communication problem posed is that of an effective exchange of information between markedly dissimilar individuals. Empathy, the ability to put oneself in the role of the other person, is one way to bridge this gap. Usually, it is the development workers who must empathize with the users, as the reverse is less likely to occur. Because field workers need to understand how the poor perceive the delivery system and its technological offerings, family planning and health workers in several nations have been given short-term training to enable them to better empathize with the persons they are trying to serve (Chambers 1980).

Although the initial use of paraprofessional field workers in development programs stemmed from attempts to lower client/worker ratios, such workers have proved to be an effective means of closing the social distance gap and increasing community participation. Paraprofessionals are usually closer socially to the poor that they serve. In China, "barefoot doctors" are recruited from the local village (the production brigade) to which they will provide health care, and they are given a short preservice training. Because the barefoot doctors spend about one-third of their time doing farm work, most Chinese villagers and urban poor see them as peers who have received some specialized training in health or in family planning. The Chinese government is now making efforts to upgrade the skill level and to increase the credibility of the barefoot doctors through additional professional training. As the process of professionalization proceeds, however, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain the close ties between the barefoot doctors and those they presently serve (Lim 1980).

Numerous studies have indicated that, for the user, technical expertise may not be the most important quality of a development worker. Personal acceptability of the worker may be as, or even more, important, than such expertise. Obviously, paraprofessionals are much less technically expert than are professional development workers, but they may in part make up for this through their greater social expertise. In most nations of Asia and Latin America, for example, female paraprofessionals are better able to discuss the sensitive topic of contraception with female clients than are male doctors.

In Colombia, the use of paraprofessionals from the veredas (neighborhoods) throughout the country as the primary contact with users from similar ethnic, linguistic, and class backgrounds has enabled the Profamilia rural family planning program to expand rapidly to encompass over 60 counties in six states, including about 12,400 families. By using local residents with minimal training as motivators, and volunteers as distributors of contraceptives, Profamilia has managed to keep manpower and financial costs low (Echeverry 1976).

The selection of development field workers (according to such factors as sex, age, and acquaintance with the user-system), and also their training, can therefore contribute toward minimizing the social distance between the delivery system and its users, especially in those human development programs intended to reduce poverty.
Obviously, the poor are more remote from the delivery system in social terms than are the more elite users, and, not surprisingly, numerous evaluation studies show that the poor have much less contact with such systems. In Tanzania, de Vries (1978) noted that even in *ujamaa* villages extension agents sought out richer peasants with their own social characteristics: "While 59 percent of the richer farmers in a sample of 344 had high extension contact, only 29 percent of their poorer counterparts had the same." Lack of access is a fundamental reason why the poor are relatively less responsive to human development programs. Closing or narrowing the social distance gap could be particularly beneficial to the poorer potential users.

Not only do the poor, in general, have less access to delivery systems than do the more elite users, but female clients may be at a particular disadvantage regarding contact with development workers. As Safilios-Rothschild points out in her companion paper, when low-income farms are managed by a woman, rather than by a man, access to extension workers, credit, and other forms of technical assistance is especially low. In Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, extension workers were much more likely to contact male than female farm managers.

It is evident from the variety of experiences noted above that if the needs and perceptions of the potential users are taken into account systems delivering human development programs can perform better. While the training of field workers is an important strategy for closing the delivery user-system gap, the recruitment of field workers with characteristics similar to those of the users, or indeed the users themselves, may be even more crucial.

3. *Lessons Learned from the Community Development Experience*

The importance of community factors in affecting the relative success of development programs has been acknowledged for many years. In the 1950s an approach that came to be termed "community development," was in fact followed in over sixty developing countries. The program in India initiated in 1952 was perhaps the largest in scope. Undoubtedly, it was the most noted. It emphasized equity, integrated rural development, and the use of appropriate technology -- the same elements receiving increased attention again today. The community development program in India was coordinated by a national Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, but the approach was, at least in theory, localized at the village level. A generalist village-level worker was expected to guide a community through a process consisting of: (1) identifying community needs; (2) prioritizing these needs to determine which problem to attack first; (3) obtaining resources from government agencies and through village self-reliance activities; (4) implementing community action to fulfill the need; and (5) self-evaluation of the process so that community leaders could become increasingly self-reliant.
Community development programs sought to meet a variety of health, literacy, nutritional, agricultural, and other needs. After the start in India, national programs were established in the Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, and Pakistan, and a phenomenal growth was experienced during the later 1950s, primarily as a result of financial support and technical assistance provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development. By 1960, sixty countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia had community development programs, and about half of these were national in scope. But by 1965, most had been terminated or drastically reduced in size (Holdcroft 1978).

Given the fact that these programs stressed the very factors that we have identified here, that is, community participation, the assessment of local needs, and the utilization of paraprofessionals, the question naturally arises: What went wrong? Four reasons may be addressed:

(1) Many political leaders in developing countries became disillusioned with the poor performance of their community development programs relative to their stated goals of promoting better living in rural communities through the initiative and active participation of the community. In practice, however, many programs were implemented through conventional centralized bureaucratic channels with little regard to the willingness or capability of users to respond (Korten 1979).

(2) There did not exist an appropriate technical package or pricing policies which would directly affect the productivity and incomes of the poor.

(3) The community development programs did not affect "the basic structural barriers to equity and growth in rural communities." Instead, these programs largely accepted the existing local power structure, in line with the "trickle-down" theory of economic development than in vogue (Holdcroft 1978).

(4) Territorial conflicts between various ministries operating at the grass roots level led to the effective demise of many development efforts. There was widespread animosity toward community development programs by many technicians in other development ministries, especially agriculturalists, who perceived the community development programs as competing for funds, personnel, and attention. Generally, by 1965, the agriculturalists were able to gain the upper hand in most nations, and in the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The case in India itself is somewhat typical. In the early 1960s, when food shortages became severe, the community development approach was changed to emphasize mainly food production, and the national ministry was
eventually disbanded. In the 1970s, in a quite different form and within a distinctive organizational framework, certain of the elements in the community development approach have been resurrected.

One of the lessons emerging from the Indian experience in the 1950s is the importance of the village as the appropriate level at which many types of development can best occur. The Indian goal of decentralization was probably appropriate in such a vast nation with a wide diversity of sociocultural conditions. Leadership patterns, potentials for self-reliant activities, and local networks of friends and neighbors could best be utilized at the village level in India. The human resource assistance provided by the national government was mainly in the form of the village-level worker, an individual with about six years of formal education plus perhaps six months of special training; this individual had a back-up staff of experts in agriculture, health, and so on, at higher levels (the block and the district). This worker was not, however, a specialized expert in agriculture, health, or in other fields, and high technology was essentially deemphasized in the Indian community development program.

Further, the community development experience of the 1950s and 1960s suggested that an organizational conflict is likely to arise when a "super-department" (like India's Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation) is imposed at the top. The integrated rural development programs of the 1970s have tried to achieve the necessary interagency coordination at levels nearer to the village.

The community development programs of the past also emphasized human development at the expense of increasing rural incomes. This imbalance failed to motivate the poor and created a negative image in the eyes of national officials as well. Potential conflicts exist when development programs are oriented mainly, or solely, to locally-perceived and/or misperceived needs, a problem in the control of development priorities which has also been experienced in self-help programs.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the earlier programs showed the importance of social-structural constraints on development programs intended to reduce poverty. Patterns of land ownership, the domination of elites, and the powerlessness of the poor meant that many of the benefits of the community development programs accrued disproportionately to the nonpoor. It was unrealistic to have assumed that the community development process could have proceeded smoothly, without conflict, toward general consensus (Holdcroft 1978). In short, despite many positive elements, the community development programs simply did not effectively reach the poor.
B. Social Organization and Stratification

One important sociocultural factor affecting the performance of programs is the social organization and stratification that exist among the client audiences of rural and urban poor. Such social-structural factors can be a positive or negative influence on the performance of programs, depending in part upon the degree to which they are taken into account by those who plan and implement development.

Social organization involves potential groupings of users that may be used as components of development activities. Social stratification on the other hand concerns how they are differentiated into hierarchical rank-orders. Both these integrating and differentiating aspects of social structure may affect programs aimed at the reduction of poverty.

Uphoff states in his companion paper that as long as the poor are capable of acting only as individuals, then they do not count for much in any national political equations. Accordingly, it is mainly through social groupings that the poor can make their numbers count. Berreman (1961) noted, for example, that where lower castes in the Himalayas are more organized and cohesive, nonexploitative relationships with outsiders occur more frequently.

In reviewing lessons from the "New Society" antipoverty efforts undertaken in the United States in the 1960s, it was found that the capacity for organizing the poor was constrained by at least three factors: (1) the proportion of political decisions to personal marketing decisions which affect individual behavior; (2) the degree and pervasiveness of bureaucratic organization; and (3) the proportion of "vertical" to "horizontal" flows of information, influence, and decisionmaking (Brager and Specht 1977).

1. Decentralizing Development to the Community Level

Given this background, social organization and stratification will now be addressed under the following headings: decentralization of development to the community level; self-help; utilization of local groups; diversity; and localized social stratification.

Though sociocultural factors are often most evident at the local level of the village, the urban community, or the region, most decision-making about the programs occurs at a national or a provincial level. If there were a greater degree of decentralization of such decisions, the variety of sociocultural factors that occur within a nation might be more fully taken into account.

One of the central issues in development has been the question of "directionality"; that is: Is it better to start at the top of a national structure and direct efforts down? Or: Is it better to start
at the bottom and direct the necessary operations upward? Many developing countries have realized the constraints of the top-down approach to development and are now striving for more decentralized development efforts. Successful mechanisms or methods to put the decentralized development strategy into effect nevertheless remain unidentified in many nations. One objective of the *ujamaa* movement of village socialism in Tanzania, for instance, was to decentralize rural development decisions to the local level, and this objective has indeed been partly realized: "*Ujamaa* villages have significantly increased the scope for the involvement of the peasants in decisionmaking, self-government, and self-help" (de Vries 1978). One study nevertheless concluded that external influences from the central government still play an important, and often dominant, role in development decisionmaking in those same villages (Blue and Weaver 1977).

One problem with decentralization efforts is that they are often limited by their concern with what can be done within government structures. They do not examine the potential of nongovernmental structures, local associations, and informal leadership for mediating between government and the poor.

On the other hand, if local elites are opposed to a development program, decentralization of certain activities to the local level may lead to the continuation of poverty instead of its amelioration. Village money lenders, for example, may resist the formation of a credit cooperative; large landowners may oppose land reform; and traditional midwives may oppose a family planning program. In cases where a policy of working through local leaders may mean that a development program will not reach the poor, the central government may be the only effective alternative to the subversion of poverty-reducing programs by the local elites.

One answer to this issue is suggested by Uphoff in his companion paper. He argues that, while certain stages (program design and financing) in the development program process are usually carried out at the national level, program implementation must, in most cases, be carried out at the local level.

Sociocultural factors in development are particularly important at the local level. It is not, however, well-known exactly how to balance accumulated program experience and research-based knowledge with decentralized development approaches that take such local factors into account. One approach to decentralization, widely-used in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, is that of self-help; this will now be considered.

2. **Self-Help**

The total amount of resources needed for rapid human development in most countries is so massive that, as Meerman points out in his companion paper, a significant proportion must be mobilized outside the conventional fiscal system; otherwise, rural development is too costly for most national
governments to afford. Community self-help approaches are important in this respect because they provide a way to mobilize resources for development. Self-help also has a wider significance, because when villagers work together in groups they gain a sense of power over their lives.

The key features of self-help movements blend local initiative, locally-mobilized resources, and indigenous leadership to solve problems identified by the local community. In most developing countries, the concept of self-help is rooted in indigenous work arrangements.

Community self-help approaches are given a variety of names in different nations: Shramdan in Nepal; gotong royong in Indonesia, harambee in Kenya, ujamaa in Tanzania, shramadana in Sri Lanka, bayanihan in the Philippines, multirao in Brazil, and saemoul undong in Korea. The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka, a nonprofit, nongovernmental self-help enterprise now in operation in over 2,000 villages, is a typical example. Once a village's most pressing problem has been identified by the local people, a Sarvodaya field worker organizes a weekend shramadana workcamp in which local resources are mobilized to cope with the problem. Physical work is combined with informal education and discussion in order to reawaken collective action, and thus to exert control over the environment (Colletta 1979).

Self-help development activities can be an important complement to the limited government budgets available for development programs. In Tanzania in the mid-1970s, for example, as Meerman points out, the contribution of self-help labor equaled about 10 percent of the total development budget. In these self-help projects, the Tanzanian government typically furnished such construction materials as cement, while the local community provided the labor. Most self-help projects are relatively small-scale; in Kenya, for instance, about 1,800 such projects were completed in 1972, but the value per self-help project was only a few thousand dollars (Kenya Government 1972, p. 220). The trend in Kenya, and in several other nations, is toward fewer but larger self-help projects.

One of the main problems in the self-help approach to development is the "free rider," the individual who benefits from the self-help accomplishments without contributing corresponding labor, funds, or other resources to the self-help efforts. The free rider may feel that he or she can obtain the benefits of the collective action without contributing to it (Olsen 1972; Popkin 1979). One cause helping explain this phenomenon may be the existence of distrust and suspicion among the members of self-help communities; effective collective action rests on a feeling of community cooperation. In order to prevent the growth of free riders, some nations exclude them from utilizing the services provided by self-help activities. Alternatively, the problem may be prevented by exerting strong community pressures on an individual who is not contributing to a self-help project. In Kenya, for example, some communities require compulsory donations to the self-help activity, or else prevent free riders from utilizing the services until they pay their share of the costs. There has, however, been some public criticism of such coercive pressures.
The self-help ethic is by no means to be found in all the nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, or even in all parts of a nation. A World Bank appraisal mission concluded that community self-help school construction was not feasible for sociocultural reasons among the Masai (a nomadic tribe) in four districts of Kenya, although harambee (the self-help movement) is generally widespread in other areas of the nation (Lethem and Perrett 1979). One might discern a general principle here relating, on the one hand, such ecological patterning so that differentiating sedentary from nomadic cultures, and, on the other, the level and type of self-help, as exemplified by the construction of permanent facilities, that might be expected in implementing a given strategy for human development.

Most self-help community projects in developing countries do in fact tend to concern human development with immediate social benefits and long-run economic benefits; examples are projects involving schools, health clinics, domestic water supply, churches, and mosques. There are fewer self-help community projects geared toward providing immediate economic benefits, such as water supply for animals, irrigation, and other agricultural projects. About half of all the self-help activities in the 1960s in Kenya were education-related, while another 20 percent concerned health and social facilities (Kenya Government 1971). Even though an increase in agricultural self-help has been strongly promoted by the Kenyan government in the 1970s, educational and health projects still dominate. In short, Kenyan central government priorities in development alternatives do not always match those of the local people. The latter give high priority to socially-oriented projects while economic/production projects, including government-sponsored agricultural programs, are of lower priority, perhaps because they do not seem to cater to the communal spirit, but instead favor individualism and competition.

The nature of self-help projects indicates that, in many developing nations, the people place a higher priority on such programs as those involving education and public health than do their national governments. Local residents utilize self-help activities as a "preemptive strategy" to influence their governments to shift more funds into educational and health programs. Usually, if the villagers construct a school building or a health clinic, the government can be persuaded to contribute a teacher or a nurse to staff the new facility (Winans and Haugerud 1977).

To some extent, central governments are not able to completely control the direction of self-help activities by local people. On one hand, this may be a problem for national governments, but, on the other hand, it is a basic reason why local people are often so enthusiastic about their self-help projects. Their self-generated development efforts directly address their felt needs.

As the poor are exposed to the effects of greater resources and direct wage incentives, however, one might expect the level of community self-help among them to diminish. Long and Winder (1975) noted in their
research on the transition of subsistence peasant communities to cash crop production cooperatives in Peru that in many parts of the highlands mutual aid had become of relatively minor importance. A basic dilemma emerges as the market economy grows in prominence: the market requires increasing labor mobility, while self-help depends upon firm roots in the local community. With increased mobility people tend to work among strangers and depend more upon government officials to carry out development programs.

There are nevertheless some general lessons that may be derived from the experiences with self-help programs in several nations: (1) that self-help represents one means of decentralizing development planning, cost sharing, execution, and accountability to the local community level; (2) that the self-help process demonstrates the importance of local groups in development; and (3) that as communities begin to experience the effects of greater mobility and exposure to a monetary economy, and as they grow beyond purely subsistence activities, the strength of collective self-help efforts might be expected to wane. In fact, one might hypothesize that there is a direct relationship: (1) between the level of resource deprivation in a community and the prevalence of self-help efforts there has, however, to be a minimal level of resources, seed money, tools, and so on, before self-help can even be initiated; and (2) between the degree of increased mobility and monetarization, and the level of self-help.

3. Using Local Groups in Development

Perhaps the most notable illustration of utilizing indigenous local groups as a mechanism for motivating behavior change as part of a development program has occurred in the Indonesian province of Bali. In this case a traditional form of community structure called banjars was harnessed by Indonesian development officials for the promotion of family planning.

The most recent data available, based on the Indonesian part of the World Fertility Survey conducted in 1976, show that Balinese women had a total fertility rate of about 3.8 percent per woman in 1976 compared to an estimated 5.8 in 1967-71, representing a reduction of more than one-third (Sinquefield 1977). Bali's fertility rate is the lowest of any Indonesian province, and its rate of family planning adoption is the highest. An estimated 60 percent of eligible couples (where the woman is in the reproductive age range of 15 to 44 years) have adopted family planning in Bali, compared to a national figure of 30 percent (Harrison 1978; Hull and others 1977; Piet and Piet 1977).

At the heart of these changes are the 3,708 Balinese community organizations called banjars, which have transformed the family planning program in Bali into a participatory, community-based movement. The banjars have functioned for centuries as traditional mechanisms for mutual aid and cooperative activities, as well as gathering points for recreation and ceremonies. Membership in the village banjar, and attendance at monthly meetings, is compulsory for all married men in Bali.
In 1974, all government officials in Bali launched an effort to work through banjar leaders to create awareness of family planning, to identify potential acceptors, to improve record-keeping and follow-up, and to extend the outreach of the family planning program. Typically, each monthly banjar meeting now begins with a roll call to which each member responds with a statement as to the contraceptive status of his household. These data are plotted on a map of the village, which is publicly displayed, thus creating local group pressures for the adoption of contraceptives.

Organized local groups play an especially important role in political education, agricultural development, public health, and family planning* in the People's Republic of China. Almost every adult belongs to a "study group" of ten to twenty members, led by a trained leader. At the weekly meetings of these study groups, the members are informed of political events and development activities, and through study, discussion, and criticism, their behavior is changed. Such study groups have played an especially crucial role in changing contraceptive and fertility behavior in rural areas during the 1970s, so that contemporary China may have one of the most successful family planning programs in the developing world (Rogers and Chen 1979).

The Chinese experience, supported by similar achievements in other nations, indicates that small groups at the local level, when orchestrated by the mass media and coordinated by a core of trained and dedicated leaders, can provide a useful contribution toward the performance of development programs. The small groups are a mechanism for behavior change, especially when the behavior is motivated by mainly altruistic goals (that is, by ends that are desired mainly for the benefit of society), rather than by merely individualistic goals.

Utilizing a small group approach in development activities at the local level is particularly important for the poor. Individually, they often lack the economic and informational resources or power to adopt technological innovations, to alter the status quo of existing social and institutional structures, or to accomplish other development goals. But when the poor are united in local groups (which may in turn be combined with and/or coordinated into networks of such small groups), they may be able to mobilize sufficient resources to achieve these development ends (Mosha and Matte 1979).

Why have local groups lacked wider recognition and greater use in development programs in the past? One reason may lie in some implicit assumptions of Western intellectual thought: that individual decisions are more appropriate than collective decisions; and/or that it is wrong for leaders or groups to pressure an individual into making behavioral changes. The absolute value of individual freedom in making choices is

* In the People's Republic of China the term "birth planning" is utilized rather than "family planning."
highly regarded not only in Western democratic societies but also among educated elites in many developing nations. Depending upon the local culture norms and societal goals, however, it may be more appropriate to utilize group pressure to facilitate individual behavioral change in a development program. Among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria, for example, the successful maintenance of a program geared to the eradication of sleeping sickness, and involving the clearing of bush along streams, has depended almost entirely upon coercion. The villagers not only did not understand why they cleared the streams every year, but said that they would not continue to clear them if they were not "told" to do so. They were, however, quite willing to do as their traditional leaders "commanded" (Miner 1960). In many settings in Asia, and in some African and Latin American cultures, a collectivistic and or "command" approach to changing individual behavior is not considered inappropriate, either by local people or by their national governments.

In some contexts local groups have to be created in order to achieve program ends. The role of local groups in the achievements of the Puebla Project in Mexico, a model for many other integrated rural development programs in Latin America in the 1970s, is for example considered crucial by an analyst of that program (Diaz-Cisneros 1974). Four main elements were involved in the Puebla Project: (1) relevant agricultural technology to grow more corn; (2) credit; (3) technical assistants, who facilitated agricultural credit and organized groups of local farmers, as well as providing technical information; and (4) "credit groups," each composed of 12 to 20 farmers, who guaranteed each other's loans and who served as a mechanism for the diffusion of technological innovations. Diaz-Cisneros concludes that without the credit groups, the development program "did not move forward." That is, until the credit groups were organized, the Puebla Project was not very effective in reaching its goal of increasing corn production and of raising farm incomes.

Some additional controversy exists about the relative effectiveness of local organizations in promoting rural development. Some observers believe that they are the key to mobilizing talent and resources at the local level, to creating effective channels and audiences for the interpersonal diffusion of technological innovations, and to providing a source of feedback to development agencies. Others believe that these local groups can only be effective with strong leadership, and, since such leadership is often lacking among the poor, the potential for participatory organizations of villagers is usually limited (unless strong organizational skills are imposed from above).

Community-level organizations can also have disruptive consequences which were not originally intended by development planners. Local groups may for instance enter into conflict with development agencies, or they may become politically active, to the alarm of the development agency (for example, as happened in the late 1960s in northeast Brazil).
While local organizations can provide a means of providing access to users of programs in many nations, they may also limit that access. Schools are often utilized by those implementing nutritional programs in order to distribute food supplements to children, but the children of the absolute poor are less likely to be present at school. Because the poor are less likely to belong to formal organizations, those who most need the service may not have access to it when the service is provided through formal organizations. In such cases, it may be possible to organize local groups or informal networks among the poor, although considerable effort by development field workers may be required.

Development programs differ widely, of course, in the degree to which a group or community approach should, or must, be involved. In the health field, for instance, the spraying of DDT for malaria control does not require any local group action. In contrast, the provision of improved water supplies or of environmental sanitation involves public health programs that necessitate a community approach. Similarly, many government family planning programs involve the inclusion of seven iron or vitamin pills along with the 21 contraceptive pills in packages for use in a 28-day pill cycle; the result is improved nutrition and health for the women concerned, although most of them do not know they are taking iron or vitamin pills, and the group or community is not involved. Still other approaches to family planning such as the community-based distribution of pills and condoms obviously involve local groups and communities. In this kind of program, such factors of social organization as the degree to which social stratification, leadership, and communication networks have developed within the community may be interrelated in determining the success of development activities.

Local organizations may be temporary or long-lasting in nature. A village health committee may dissolve after a clinic is constructed (Golladay and Liese 1979); alternatively an organization may turn to other functions once its original mission has been accomplished. An illustration is the mothers' clubs in Korea, which, as already noted, were originally used mainly to promote family planning, but later shifted to activities on behalf of female equality. Temporary groups may require considerable effort to organize; yet members of continuing groups may gradually lose interest and drop out over a period of time. During the 1970s, some 40,000 mothers' clubs were organized in Indonesia; the clubs provide a means through which the members learn improved about family nutrition, and were also used to distribute dietary supplements (Critchfield 1979). Experience to date in Indonesia indicates that these two different, but interrelated, functions have served to maintain the interest of club members over a period of time.

The formation of local groups played an important role in the accomplishments of the Mtu Ni Afya ("Man is Health") campaign in Tanzania in 1973. The campaign's approach consisted of a twice-weekly series of radio broadcasts to groups of 30 to 30 individuals, whose discussion of health topics was guided by a booklet and led by a trained leader. About two million rural Tanzanians, almost 38 percent of the adult
population, participated in these groups. An evaluation of the campaign showed that, for example, 34 percent of the group members built or rebuilt latrines, and that most of these facilities were still being used a year after the campaign (Hall 1978). Other health practices, such as the elimination of stagnant water to control mosquitoes, the installation of mosquito netting on windows, and the cleaning up of rubbish around houses, were also widely adopted as a result of the "Man is Health" campaign. The discussion groups played a central role in motivating this large-scale change in behavior by encouraging collective action, and by motivating individual action through peer emulation.

In 1975 another mass radio-listening campaign was conducted with the theme of "Food is Life," and its results are similarly impressive. Further campaigns were planned on the role of women in development, and on the use of appropriate technology. Botswana and several other nations in East Africa have conducted their own campaigns based on the Tanzanian experience.

How could thousands of local discussion groups in Tanzania be formed for each of the short-term radio-listening campaigns? Many of the groups were "ten-house cells" of TANU (Tanzanian African National Union, the sole political party); the leaders of these cells were mobilized as discussion leaders in the health campaign.

Many of the illustrations of local social organization given in this paper have concerned rural communities. Local groups of a similar nature of course exist among the urban poor in most developing nations, and they represent a parallel potential for programs in human development. In Lima a study of 154 barriadas (urban slums) disclosed that 118 of them had some form of spontaneous association which was formed primarily for purposes of defense against encroachment and removal (Pratt 1971).

Little (1957) shows that formal associations are widespread in West African cities; often such organizations are formed to meet certain needs arising out of adjustment to the urban environment. Membership in an association is frequently on the basis of ethnic/tribal background; in many cases in such Nigerian cities as Lagos and Ibadan, the members of an organization all come from the same village. The urban association may channel private funds to the home village for use as educational scholarships or for other human development purposes, or it may press government officials to provide improved schools or health clinics to the village. In West African cities, voluntary associations among urbanites are oriented especially toward assisting the development of the members' home village. In one study in Kenya (Collier and Lal 1979), it was found that urban migrants were remitting as much as 10 percent of their earnings to their rural kin and that the flow of ideas back to the rural areas seemed to be having a marked effect on stimulating innovativeness among those traditional agriculturalists with urban kin.
In other areas, such as in metropolitan Calcutta, social organizations play an important role in urban community development, a role that was not originally recognized or intended by urban planning officials in the government (Rosser 1976). The costs to the Indian government of Calcutta's development plan would have been so great that there was little choice but to involve social organizations within the communities of the city in urban development.

Given this background, what can we conclude about local social organizations and development? Particularly in the case of programs for human development, local organizations provide one means of collective action to meet the perceived needs of the community. There are numerous poor among the memberships of user-systems. This numerical strength may be converted into social action aimed at the reduction of poverty through the organization of both formal and informal structures and associations. These in turn may provide important vehicles for the creation of demand and for the delivery of services related to human development programs among the poor. Such organizations among the lower strata of society may be one of the few means of expressing community solidarity and efficacy in a generally resource sparse context.

4. Diversity at the Community Level

The importance of the village as a unit in development programs is suggested by the results of a number of studies. In these, the village is utilized as the unit of analysis in determining those factors related to the dependent variable of relative success (that is, performance) of a development program. This is often measured as the degree to which the members of each village have adopted agricultural, health, or family planning innovations. Typically, these studies show a wide variance in this dependent variable; for example, in a study of 24 Korean villages, the rate of adoption of family planning innovations ranged from a low of about 20 percent to a high of 57 percent (Rogers and Kincaid in press). Yet each of these 24 villages had been exposed to the same relatively standardizd national family planning program for a decade prior to the gathering of data.

Factors which best explained the dependent variable in this study (and other like it) included: amount of inputs from the program (such as the number of client contacts made by development workers); the degree of participation by village residents in the program; commitment by village leaders to the development program; and the degree to which local networks and groups within the village were activated.

Analyses of village-to-village differences in the degree of success attained in development programs, especially when the program is one of agricultural development, also emphasize the importance of such geographical/spatial factors as to whether the village is located on a main road; and also the access by villages to institutional services lying outside of the village, such as credit, expert assistance, and markets.
Such village-level analyses of development success may obscure the differences within a village as to which individuals receive greater benefits from a development program (often measured in terms of which villagers are most innovative in adopting the new ideas promoted by development agencies). When studies which use the individual as the unit of analysis are conducted, further evidence of the importance of the community is provided by what are termed "system effects." These are apparent in the portion of the variance in individual innovativeness that is explained by village variables, over and above that explained by such individual-level independent variables as socioeconomic or demographic characteristics. Summaries of these researches on system effects (Rogers with Shoemaker 1971; Rogers and Kincaid 1980) suggest that the community context in which an individual resides has an important influence on his or her innovative behavior. Presumably these system effects come about because other community members exert considerable influence on an individual’s decision to adopt innovations.

Space is an important influence on the process of interpersonal interaction in a system, and hence on how changes in individual behavior come about. Studies of village networks show that the poor usually communicate interpersonally with others who are poor. These homogeneous network links may be due to the fact that the poor are often segregated within a village; their homes are contiguous with each other and isolated from those of higher-income families. In addition the poor often live in less accessible areas within a village (or city), and this, too, accentuates their tendency to interact mainly with each other.

The degree to which the poor are socially or spatially separated varies from community to community, as does the degree to which the poor are involved in development programs. Activity in self-help projects also shows a wide variance; for example, a study of the harambee movement in Kenya concluded: "Variance among provinces, districts, and ethnic groups in rates of self-help activity is quite marked in Kenya" (Winans and Haugerud 1977).

Two points may be emphasized by way of summary. First, the community can be an important unit of analysis for understanding the performance of development programs. This is because while poor communities, by definition, may not possess the physical, technical and, capital resource base necessary for rapid economic development, they often do possess an ideological and organizational framework which can be utilized to legitimize and implement nontraditional economic functions. The second point is that there is considerable diversity in sociocultural factors at the community level. Officials are not always fully aware of these two community-level considerations in the planning or the implementation of development programs, however, because such programs often operate at provincial or national levels, and the community factor is thereby masked.
5. Localized Social Stratification

The role of localized social stratification in perpetuating or reducing poverty in developing countries is a very complex phenomenon. Although relatively well-defined structural relationships within and between social classes may exist in some settings, there are often other important social patterns of organization involving kinship, clan, religion, and the like, that transcend those classes. It is necessary, therefore, to take into account other forms of social segmentation and role differentiation in terms of age, sex, leadership, and so on, that affect factionalism within a community. Further, most local systems in developing countries had traditional types of social stratification which are now being replaced by new forms as a result of social change and development.

The poor are not only poor in an income sense, but also, as Uphoff points out in his companion paper, have low status, scanty education, and little voice and weight in the political process. These various indicators thus combine to the disadvantage of the poor. Further, most development programs are tailored so as to avoid major structural changes, or the mass mobilization of peasants or urban poor. Such dominant groups as elites or the upper classes may see change that would be favorable to the masses as a probable threat to their own power. It has, for example, been observed that strategies to assist smallholders, although distributional in nature, further stratify the poor by coopting the potential leaders of landless masses through the marginal allocation of plots too small to have significant structural effects (Saul and Woods 1971). On the other hand, it is difficult to deny that such incremental strategies, while leaving much to be desired in terms of massive structural reform, do represent a "gradualist" approach, acceptable to elites, to the lifting of some groups out of poverty.

To avoid the "politics of resentment," efforts oriented to redistribution and to the reduction of poverty should not be viewed as a zero-sum game, as Uphoff also points out. That is, poor people can often be assisted without impoverishing the better off. The introduction of a voucher system to increase educational opportunity among the poor in parts of the United States, alone with the system of bursaries or scholarships being employed in such developing countries as Botswana, offered means of providing assistance to the poor without necessarily depriving elites of their options to act. Although many income-generating development programs are designed for peasants, however, it remains that it is often a dominant class that benefits most from such projects, directly or indirectly.

There is substantial evidence that formal education at both the primary and secondary levels has had such positive effects as increasing agricultural productivity, and reducing fertility and mortality. It has not, on the other hand, always provided ladders of upward mobility: indeed, on occasion it has resulted in rising aspirations which have turned to rising frustrations as a result of unemployment and alienation from
traditional culture and occupations. Government policies aimed at increasing educational opportunities should therefore stay in balance with attendant labor market policies to avoid such problems.

The rural elite and such individuals occupying positions of power at the village level as teachers, doctors, and local administrators are often looked upon by village people as a link between them and the urban world of administrators, politicians, and businessmen. In consequence these village elites come to have a somewhat specialized role in village affairs. As pointed out by Dube (1956), for reasons of local prestige, these rural elites nevertheless tend to identify more with the officials and with city ways than with the common people and their traditional way of life, thus alienating the more tradition-minded villagers. Many other studies have indicated that, because development workers are either part of the rural elite or identify with it, they have often tended to have more contact with, and to channel their services to, such elite groups as those of progressive farmers. Elites in developing countries also tend to control the markets for inputs, new technologies, capital, and credit.

Lewis (1979) cautioned that even in the context of decentralization, where greater decisionmaking is delegated to the traditional rural elites, the peasants might not gain much because the rural elites are most loyal to the old inequalities. Cohen and Uphoff (1977) implied that even where peasants have the opportunity to participate, such participation may only indicate the power that landlords have over them unless they also know that they are free to represent their own interests.

In developing countries with highly unequal structures of status, wealth, and power, the effort to steer socioeconomic benefits to the poor can be a very difficult exercise. Rigid social stratification can impede the effectiveness of development programs, especially those that emphasize equity. One such illustration comes from investigations of India's community development program of the 1950s and 1960s. Evaluations of this program at the village level found that most of the benefits (an estimated 70 percent in one study) went to the more elite villagers, even though the ostensible objectives stressed greater equity. "Therefore, all major groups in the village and area have been alienated from the Community Development Program. Low castes want their positions improved; high castes want their positions maintained by suppression of the low castes. The government has alienated the former by their actions and the latter by their words" (Berreman 1961). When government development workers introduced improved agricultural implements and tractors to upper-caste Indian farmers, for example, the development program was criticized by lower-caste villagers because it reduced the employment opportunities open to them (Dube 1956).

Similar evidence is provided by an evaluation of the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in Ethiopia. This integrated rural development program was conducted by the Ethiopian government, with
assistance from Sweden, in a densely-settled region in the Rift Valley. The CADU program was aimed mainly at farmers in the low-income brackets and offered them agricultural innovations, credit, markets, and other development assistance.

Evaluation data indicate that the CADU program was successful in stimulating economic growth. But, due to the constraints of feudalism and of an unchanging social stratification system, and as subsequent events were to prove, "Change has to come to Chilalo ... but not necessarily along lines envisioned by the project design" (Cohen 1974). The client audience of small-scale landowners and tenants benefited, but "The total amount of change has tended to profit primarily provincial elites and others outside the project's target population ... CADU aimed at the small-scale peasant and indirectly hit the large-scale farmer. It proved that better seed and the use of fertilizer could make agriculture profitable, and it did not take much time before the provincial elites learned this lesson by observing CADU projects and began taking a more profit-oriented view of their own land holdings, acquiring more land, evicting low-producing tenants, and engaging in large-scale mechanization" (Cohen 1974).

Not only did the rigid stratification system act, in part, to subvert the CADU program's objectives of attaining greater equity in development, but it also tended to limit the participation of the villagers. The objectives called for more than just a passive utilization of CADU services by individual farmers, but "Attempts to stimulate local government participation have been notably unsuccessful, and grass-roots farmer organizations have yet to get off the ground" (Cohen 1974). Why was more popular participation not evident in the CADU program?

Attempts by CADU workers to organize farmers' committees, cooperatives, or other groups were perceived as threatening by the local power structure and hence were resisted. As Cohen presciently observed: "The relationship between land tenure and political power or social status is such that, if the government stimulates only economic growth, the constraints of the whole social system will limit the effects of such growth and give rise to substantial social costs, and if it stimulates all dimensions of change, it will eventually undermine the entire traditional power structure and status system, in all probability destroying it."

In an in-depth study of 37 cooperatives in 13 countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it was found that the services of primary rural cooperatives are readily expropriated and controlled by better-off rural persons, with few benefits actually going to the poorer masses (UNRISD 1975). Government control, corruption, and the inability of poorer persons to gain membership were cited as major reasons for the failure of cooperatives to reach the poor. In four of the Asian cooperatives studied, a margin of socioeconomic impact on the poor was achieved. The reasons for this success were: location in relatively nonstratified and egalitarian communities; high level of community homogeneity and solidarity; and the existence of linkages with relevant government support agencies (Korten 1979).
An important factor that is often overlooked by development planners is the traditional rivalry between families, clans, castes, regions, and other communities. Cohen and Uphoff (1977) noted that historical rivalry between groups is common, but many professionals, convinced that their intervention will shower benefits on all who participate, are inclined to overlook (or to minimize) any history of competition.

One problem of localized rivalries is that they may not appear as such on the surface, and hence may be difficult for an outsider to recognize. It is also difficult to identify with any degree of generality those features of social structure that might cause or indicate the presence of such interpersonal or intergroup rivalries, since these tend to vary from situation to situation. At a minimum, it is important to realize that local rivalries exist in almost every community.

Most local rivalries are generated by internal social variation. In developing countries this social variation tends to be based on family, kinship, clan, tribe, caste, religion, or even language. These social groups exercise considerable influence because members feel more loyalty to one another, than toward persons outside their group.

Cohen and Uphoff (1977) noted that the structure of a community, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, affects the possibilities and consequences of development. Inasmuch as the smaller communities are usually more homogenous, they may be more amenable to certain kinds of development. Further, it is easier to mobilize such local groups for development. Yet working within such groups may impede efforts to gain widespread participation because of intergroup tensions or jealousy; what may be gained by building on group solidarity can be lost by arousing "other group" antagonism.

On the other hand, in studying the rural community power structure in four Indian villages, Oommen (1970) concluded that the more intense the factionalism and the greater the actual number of organizations in a community, the more widespread the community participation and power dispersion. Drawing upon this conclusion, it can be suggested that greater heterogeneity in a community can lead to less exploitation by elites, assuming that the many factions are organized.

Intergroup tensions can also pose a number of important problems to planners and development workers, however, especially when they occur among such groups as castes. For example: With what particular group, norm, or standard of behavior should the planners and development workers identify themselves in the village? Dube (1956) noted that in India, where village-level workers interact mostly with upper-caste groups, while members of the lower-caste groups look on them with suspicion and distrust. Fraser (1963) noted that even where water wells were constructed for common use by the whole village, the practice of caste separation in the use of water resources was quickly re-established and soon the general pattern for the village was to have one pump well in the lower caste, and one or more in the upper caste section. In the same project, an effort
to establish a cooperative among cloth weavers failed because the weavers were of different castes. This circumstance produced differences in decisionmaking, paralyzed activity, and, in general, discouraged cooperation. Niehoff (1966) cautioned that, unless one has the power of enforcement, an attempt to impose egalitarian ideas on a local society which does not function on the basis of equality may destroy the chances for successful implementation of development.

Critics are quick to label ethnic cleavages, caste, and other forms of local pluralism as forms of "retribalization," "balkanization," and so on, which serve as negative factors in development (Berger, Peter and Neuhous 1977). Rather than being an enemy of human development programs, however, such pluralism might be viewed as a potential source of more diversified and locally-relevant solutions to problems. Further, a policy of allowing the sense of security in local loyalties to flourish could lead to a greater willingness among the poor to take risks and to adopt innovations.

There may be positive aspects of intergroup tension and competition. Competitive efforts on the part of social groups to maintain or improve their status positions vis-à-vis other groups might be healthy and desirable for development. Niehoff and Anderson (1964) reported that community development projects flourished in the South Pacific Islands, where group rivalries of clubs, teams, districts and families were used for constructive competition. Dube (1956) noted that certain development projects, such as the renovation of wells, the paving of village landes, and the construction of soakage and composite pits in India, were accepted partly because other villagers were doing so rather than for the reasons which had motivated the planners. Fraser (1963) also noted that a profound sense of caste solidarity made it easier to establish a leather workers' cooperative in one Indian village.

In summary, social stratification and intergroup rivalries at the village level can either stimulate or impede development efforts. On the one hand, the strong family, kinship, clan, or caste solidarity and competition between these groups can be an important force for development, especially where projects are limited in scope to such groups. On the other hand, development programs that are spread across such groups may be destroyed by intergroup tension, jealousy, and distrust. Where development projects must necessarily be widespread because of resource reasons, the local leadership from all groups should be involved in all steps so as to minimize such local rivalry.

While rivalries among local factions cannot be ignored by development planners and workers, there are no simple solutions to the often conflicting goals of increased production and broader socioeconomic justice in rigidly stratified and economically underdeveloped societies. In societal structures which are rigidly hierarchical and where status, privilege, and power are jealously guarded by elites, it may be necessary to co-opt such elites, at least partially, by implementing human development programs.
which are at once democratizing and distributional in nature, yet offer perceived marginal profits for all groups. Consequently, it may be easier to gain national support for those programs, for example, family planning, which compete less visibly for resources as perceived by the elites.
C. Systems of Information and Flows of Influence

The importance of informal networks of communication has repeatedly been mentioned in this paper with respect to their invisible, but significant, role in changing the behavior of members of the user-system for human development programs. These systems of information interrelate with, and have an impact on, every other aspect of social structure discussed thus far. The following discussion will assess existing networks, then address the theme of the formation of networks for purposes of development programs.

1. Local-Level Communication Networks

Most aspects of rural development are dependent in one way or another upon the receipt of information (McAnany 1978). A farmer must be aware of agricultural credit in order to use it; eligible couples must be aware of available family planning methods before they can adopt one.

One of the main conclusions from the many studies of the diffusion of innovations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia is that interpersonal communication channels are the most important means by which individuals obtain information about new technological ideas (Rogers and Shoemaker 1971). This realization has led social scientists in recent years to probe more deeply into communication networks, which are defined as consisting of interconnected individuals who are linked by patterned flows of information. The structure of the communication network in a system (such as a village) has a direct effect on the rate of diffusion of an innovation. Where individuals are highly interconnected, a new idea will spread more quickly. Where villages are divided into cliques or factions, diffusion is more difficult, and collective action may be impossible.

The personal communication network of an individual has been found to have an important influence on his or her behavior. All else being equal, the individual is more likely to be influenced by the individuals in the system to which he or she is connected by network links. An individual who is not linked at all to others in the village, an isolate, is unlikely to be much influenced by the norms of that village.

Most individuals are linked by network channels with those who are spatially close and of comparable socioeconomic status. Interpersonal communication with such persons is usually easier, in that less effect may be required. But the "returns," in terms of learning about new information, may also be less.

Networks can act as liabilities, as well as assets, for migrants to metropolitan centers. Network linkages connect the poor and provide a means by which they can cope with a threatening, uncertain environment (Lomnitz 1977). Migrants to an urban slum in Mexico City exchanged money, food, and information that helped them learn urban ways. Some observers have termed these informal networks among the urban poor as "schools for urban life" because of their importance in facilitating the adjustment of rural-urban migrants.
The limited networks of new urban migrants can also act, however, to retard their long-run integration into the city environment. Typically, network relationships channel the new migrant into living in an urban slum with other individuals who migrated from the same village, and into a particular type of job which often provides only a relatively low and uncertain income, and which may be a dead-end blocking further advancement.

2. Forming Networks for Development

Where organizations of the poor do not exist, it may be advisable, or even necessary, to create them in order to implement human development programs.

The reception of messages from the mass media by such audience groups as radio forums, radiophonic schools, teleclubs, newspaper-reading forums, and so on, is, for example, more likely to lead to action than is the individual reception of such messages (Mosha and Matte 1979). Research on the concept of group listening has showed that it is often easier to modify social attitudes and behavior in a group setting than it is by working with individuals. The interactive process of group discussion helps to stimulate motivation for change, leading in turn to action. Further, the research evidence indicates that group discussion leads to decisions of better "quality" (that is, choices based more soundly on available information).

According to Mosha and Matte (1979), audience groups have a particular advantage for local development in that it is possible to focus on local community development problems. Further, to a large extent, these groups are compatible with village experiences, cultural values, and preferences. The audience groups also help to foster dialogue between the rural people and their governments.

Mosha and Matte (1979) conclude their analysis of media audience groups by noting the important potential contribution of radio-listening campaigns in closing (rather than widening) communication effects gaps between various socioeconomic categories of the audience. An individual mode of media reception usually leads to a widening of information gaps: the more elite, more educated, subaudience is more receptive to mass media communication and is less restrained by economic and social-structural factors such as land tenure, access to credit, and caste. Accordingly, those individuals in a system that are already information-rich tend to become information-richer, relative to the information-poor. Such findings have led to the theory that mass communication could be made more effective through a group setting. The basic advantage of a forum is its multimedia approach which combines the use of radio with interpersonal communication in group discussion and feedback through a monitor. Neither radio alone, nor group discussion alone, has demonstrated such effectiveness.
A number of experiments on radio forums have subsequently supported this theory. Mass media audience groups are now generally accepted by advocates of nonformal education as a potential tool to increase interest in various subjects and to stimulate motivation towards group and individual action.

Radio as a mass medium seems to be uniquely able to penetrate to the most disadvantaged subaudiences, due to the modest cost of transistor radios and because literacy is not required (McAnany 1978). This special capacity of radio to "get through" is magnified when the audience is organized in listening/discussion groups because the ensuing discussion tends to equalize the group members in terms of their knowledge and attitudes toward new ideas. The informationally-poor can thus catch up with their informationally-richer peers.

Even when television is the medium used for developmental communication, group reception/discussion (through organized teleclubs or community viewing) can contribute toward greater equality of information flow. Shingi and Mody (1976) demonstrated the "gap-closing" capacity of group reception of televised agricultural information in Indian villages. The television programs produced contained knowledge of interest to smaller farmers, but which the larger farmers already possessed. After several of the weekly broadcasts, the larger farmers usually stopped attending. As might be expected, the eventual result of the television programs was that the smaller farmers caught up with the larger farmers in agricultural knowledge, as a result of the "ceiling effect" strategy.

These groups may, however, have only a limited potential because of the expensive organizational network needed to create them, and also because of the high degree of motivation and commitment of group membership needed to sustain them. The possibility of integrating such audience groups with the existing indigenous social groups could possibly offer the answer to these problems. In some of the most successful audience groups (in Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras), the Catholic church played a formative role in their establishment: the local priest organized groups at the community level, thus providing legitimation. Peasants and community leaders were also brought into recruitment activities and into the promotion of the radiophonic schools in the rural areas (Beltran 1976; White 1977).

Forming groupings among the members of the user-system can be an effective development strategy because evaluation by peers is at the heart of the diffusion of technological innovations. As a Middle Eastern villager commented: "If Abu Hani (father of Hani) is willing to try this new variety of seed, I am willing" (Tannous 1944).
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

Throughout this paper a number of policy and program implications, based on sociocultural factors, were raised with respect to human development and the reduction of poverty. In this final section, these implications are summarized and briefly discussed under five main headings.

A. Broad Structural and Value Change Policy Issues

One of the implicit, overarching policy questions that emerges from the present paper is: How far to go in designing and implementing human development programs which have equity as their goal? Equity in the distribution of the socioeconomic benefits of development became a much more important policy issue during the 1970s. But the degree to which equity should be the main objective of human development programs, in contrast to an alternative objective of attacking absolute poverty (while fostering equity with growth), has not yet been clearly resolved. There is agreement, in any case, that human development programs should seek to eliminate absolute poverty by lifting all of the poor above some minimum threshold of quality of life, with the definitional criteria for "quality" varying from country to country. Irrespective of which of these objectives receives the highest priority in human development programs in the future, such programs must in any event possess effective means to contact the poor as a special audience.

Within the framework, a broad policy issue raised is the balance between structural and value change strategies in efforts to alleviate poverty. It is basically argued that such structural interventions as land reform for crop production that is related to an improved nutritional status may be needed to set the conditions for extracting people from poverty. Such structural changes are not, however, always sufficient to transform those intergenerationally transmitted residual values which can serve as constraints on the poor's ability to capitalize on such new structural conditions. (This topic was explored in Section II.) Human development programs are in essence "behavior-changing" programs and, therefore, require a greater amount of attention to socialization processes that facilitate the reformulation of values and desired changes in behavior.

Changes in behavior and underlying changes in values are often more difficult to accomplish among the absolute poor. In such an environment, values and customs are held tightly as a cherished psychological resource in an otherwise physically resource-poor context. Behavioral change is especially difficult to effect in human development sectors, such as those involving nutrition and family planning, where the benefits are likely to be long term with low visibility. Successful adoption of programs and changes in behavior appear much easier to effect among the poor if they are directly related to the money economy or to such visibly productive
sectors as that of agriculture. It may be necessary, therefore, to link those human development programs characterized by payoffs that are long-term and characterized by low visibility to other development programs with highly-visible, short-term payoffs.

It may be further argued that the less visible and more deferred the impact of such programs, the greater the need for initial and continuing educational and resocialization strategies which will support structural changes. Such resocialization strategies appear most effective when they are conducted in established groups and associations. In that environment, continuous reinforcement and maintenance of newly-learned behavior will prevail. Major resocialization, or directed value change, strategies being tried on a massive scale, particularly in socialist and centrally planned economies, include: national programs of universal primary education; universal daycare; literacy and adult education; and, in some cases, the directed occupational role change, and mass relocation of persons to uproot them physically and psychologically from their traditional environment. From such examples, physical and psychic mobility are emerged as clearcut strategies for changing values.

B. Strategic Options for Reaching the Poor

A central concern of this paper has been how best to reach the poor through human development programs. Eight specific strategies emerged from the discussion:

(1) To use the local social organizations of the poor at the community level; where such organizations do not exist, informal networks can be used, and perhaps converted into more formal associations.

(2) To use self-help and other user-centered approaches, not only to increase community participation and commitment, but also to defray costs.

(3) To use indigenous sociocultural forms, which are a form of "risk insurance" for the poor and are particularly likely to be perceived as credible.

(4) To recruit and train paraprofessional field workers from the user-system, or with characteristics similar to those of users, in order to help bridge the social distance between professional development workers and the poor.

(5) To use radio as a medium of mass communication to contact, and orchestrate the involvement of, local groups in development programs.

(6) To use additive, rather than substitutional, strategies which tend to be compatible with the cultural and cognitive
patterns of recipients; this ensures that large amounts of old behavior need not be given up immediately, nor large amounts of new behavior quickly internalized.

(7) To adapt strategies to fit, wherever possible, the recreation and work schedules, and the spatial, climatic, and time/seasonal patterns of the user.

(8) To establish patterns of maintenance for the continuation of an adopted innovation through an emphasis on groups as well as individuals as points of human development intervention.

A first step in making human development programs more effective in reducing absolute poverty is certainly that of ensuring that such delivery systems actually contact the poor, and that the poor are involved in participatory development systems. Such a concept does not just call for involving the poor as passive "users" who live in an institutional and value-free "vacuum," but it also implies at least some degree of involvement of the poor and of their sociocultural context in designing human development programs. This conclusion will necessitate focusing research and development programs to facilitate early investigation of the problems and the cultural patterns of the poor.

Various methods of assessing users' needs were also discussed in this paper. Certain of these needs can be met by adequately delivering available research-based knowledge. Other perceived problems can only be adequately addressed, it is suggested, by exploring the indigenous knowledge systems, line of approach which has only begun to be realized in the late 1970s. Another possible direction is towards more micro-level action research strategies. These can effect a trade-off between academic rigour and relevance in order to obtain relatively quick and inexpensive inputs into the design of human development programs.

Yet another tactic to reach the poor more effectively might be to recruit change-inducing agents with social, linguistic, and economic characteristics similar to those of the user. Such persons could close the social distance gap. The argument here is that while training and subject knowledge are important, a necessary first condition is the perceived legitimacy of those agents (and possibly their recruitment) by the users.

A final strategic suggestion is to initiate program contact based upon the perceived needs of the poor, even if these needs are not the primary goals of the specific program. Frequently, human development goals can be built into programs as latent objectives where local interest and commitment (that is, user motivation) are already assured. Programs which rely too heavily on promotional strategies to motivate users can be open to charges of "conspicuous administration" (Erasmus 1958). A balance needs to be struck between over-administering to the poor as a result of zeal to reduce poverty, and under-administering to them through excessive reliance on market and other structural incentives.
C. Reducing Poverty through Decentralization, Disaggregation, and "Middle-Rung" Institutions: Strategic Advantages and Disadvantages

One theme of this paper has been that the realities of socio-cultural factors as they affect human development programs have often been masked by the aggregated approach of national-level design, implementation, and evaluation. Wide diversity of the sociocultural variables affecting development exists in most developing nations, but such variety cannot be fully used to improve the performance of development programs until at least some disaggregation and decentralization occurs.

Exactly what degree of decentralization is appropriate in the design and implementation of poverty-oriented development programs?

On one hand, the current need for decentralization reflects the growing awareness of the limited capacities of centralized bureaucracies in planning and implementing development programs. On the other hand, the real motivation for decentralization should stem from the recognition that, if the needed rates of development are going to be achieved, at affordable costs, this may have to be done by mobilizing and engaging more of the available energy and resources at the local level.

The principal issues which arise in most discussions about decentralization are the allocation of human, financial, and material resources and the levels at which particular functions could be appropriately lodged. These issues arise mainly because it has been assumed that no adequate mechanisms already exist at the local level. Consequently decentralization options have been seen as expending enormous resources in manpower training, establishing new structures, and redistributing the central government staff and resources at the expense of other crucial national planning and implementation functions. This inappropriate assumption about the local situation nevertheless reflects a "vacuum ideology" of development. This views the village domain as having no viable institutions and resources. The local community itself, however, possesses an array of structures, resources, and leadership which could be tapped for its own development. Rather than create new structures, the relative ineffectiveness of government officials and field workers in planning and implementing development programs and, particularly, in reaching the poor might in itself be a sufficient reason to suggest decentralization through the use of local leaders, indigenous institutions, networks, roles, and other intermediate or "middle-rung" institutions. This paper notes, however, that there are negative as well as potentially positive aspects in resorting to this strategy.

Taking first the positive aspects of the above arguments, the broad objective of decentralization through indigenous forms might be threefold:

(1) To democratize and decentralize the planning of development activities, especially those of immediate
concern to local communities, by conferring spending authority, project development, and accountability on indigenous authorities who possess popular legitimacy.

(2) To expand local self-help groups, indigenous social and economic groups, and other middle-rung institutions and to integrate them into the development process (these institutions are already viewed by the poor as forms of "risk insurance"). Also, to allow for processes of change that are transitional and additive, rather than radical and substitutional.

(3) To promote interregional or intergroup equity. Such a problem posed by decentralization may be increased inequity, positive steps which do not eliminate the incentives to reallocate resources from rich to poor regions must be found. In some cases, it may be necessary to co-opt the elite by offering them marginal profits from programs directed at poor strata of the society.

On the other hand, the decentralization of certain aspects of the implementation of human development programs by using small groups and indigenous forms at the community level has four possible disadvantages:

(1) Existing formal organizations at the local level, if used in development programs, may largely exclude the poor from membership. If so, considerable effort by development field workers may be necessary to organize new groups among the poor.

(2) The development program may be captured to local elites, so that relatively little reduction of poverty actually occurs.

(3) The local groups, by giving a sense of efficacy (the perceived ability to control one's future) to the poor, may have disruptive consequences, notably when the poor turn their local groups toward political activities.

(4) Indigenous forms, if misused, may also tend to reinforce residual values. If, instead of drawing legitimacy from such forms in order to change behavior, one ensures their outlook, then one runs the risk of reinforcing the very values that it is desired to modify in the long term.

This paper has also shown that nongovernmental human development activities may be of considerable importance in many nations. Such activities include self-help, urban "sons abroad" associations (that channel funds from
urban migrants back to their home village), mothers' clubs, rotating credit associations, and so on. Such voluntary development activity provides a potentially valuable complement to more centralized government programs, although the nongovernmental efforts may be difficult to control and direct toward national priorities. On the other hand, local development by community groups directly addresses the community's perceived needs and represents a means to attract local financial resources for development purposes (as a supplement to governmental funds).

The main advantage of using local groups in human development programs is their unique capacity to facilitate collective action. If one agrees that a special quality of the poor is their large numbers, then it is through social organization and mass mobilization of the poor that this advantage can be converted into action that will reduce poverty.

D. Effects of Stratification and Local Diversity on Popular Mobilization

This paper has argued that considerable diversity exists in sociocultural variables from community to community in most nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The importance of this diversity for human development program activities is suggested by the wide range of performance in those programs from village to village. National development programs in the past have often found it difficult to cope with wide local diversity. The decentralized implementation of development activities and the use of self-help approaches may represent useful alternative strategies that can better accommodate that diversity. But such decentralization and self-help may also lead to weakened control by national governments over the direction and conduct of development programs.

The paper argued that factional rivalries between classes and/or groups in the local community can either stimulate or impede human development efforts. An obvious negative consequence of such rivalries is that they interfere with, or prevent, collective action by the local community. On the other hand, such rivalries and social stratification may mean that competition among these subunits can be utilized as a motivating force for development.

In some instances the security the poor possess in maintaining strong local loyalties can serve as a firm basis for their negotiating with, and making demands, on those implementing human development programs. In such cases, one might want to strengthen those loyalties by providing services or printed materials in local dialects.

It has been found that the more local cleavages and factions are encountered, then the greater the power and the organizational capacity -- seemingly favorable conditions for the creation of demand for development programs and services. It is also likely that too much factionalism and power could inhibit the creation of that demand. The right balance is likely to be ascertained only through a case-by-case approach.
E. General Policy Implications for Donor and Governmental Agencies

By virtue of its disciplinary approach, this paper has on balance addressed itself to more micro-level considerations. A half dozen more general policy implications nevertheless emerge with respect to external donor agencies and national governments working to reduce poverty through human development programs:

(1) Decentralize staff to close the physical and cognitive gap between the poor and those who purpose to assist them.

(2) Restaff with persons trained in the more disaggregative and micro-oriented disciplines.

(3) Redirect research and development efforts from a macro to a micro orientation in an attempt to understand the poor and those just out of poverty, the conditions perpetuating poverty, and those conditions necessary for the reduction of poverty.

(4) Work through, and facilitate the efforts of, such other smaller donors as nongovernmental organizations and volunteer agencies, emphasizing their role as knowledgeable brokers of anti-poverty assistance.

(5) Develop more long term, more flexible, and more locally responsive (user sensitive) modes of development assistance, for example program lending, and start-up and recurrent cost coverage. Such programs should be implemented in small stages over longer time horizons with detailed built-in monitoring, feedback, and corrective systems.

(6) Focus on self-sustaining maintenance, as well as developmental, aspects of program assistance. This will require more attention to "holistic" programming and greater anticipation of a program's potentially negative consequences. It will also require the design of new cost recovery methods with users as coproducers of services and a shift in program responsibility, control, and accountability to the users.

F. Applied Sociology, Anthropology, and Human Development: A Final Note

In many ways the tools of calibration, and the general theories and principles, of applied sociology and anthropology are still in their
own developmental stages. For this reason, the present paper may raise more questions than it answers. The insights of sociologists and anthropologists can nevertheless contribute to overall development planning in the area covered by this publication as a whole. This can be done by identifying, through structural interest-group and class analysis, precisely who stands to gain or to lose in a community by supporting a given human development effort. Equally significantly, such researchers can uncover motivational resources and behavioral dispositions, patterns of loyalty, and deeply rooted cultural values. These values can act as constraints, or they can be mobilized and supported through educational efforts to facilitate the goals of human development programs geared to the reduction of poverty (Dore 1976).
Envoi

"An educational campaign was launched, starting with laboratory tests of Ilat's water and samples from neighboring villages. We emphasized to the people that the report on their water was very bad, whereas the other villages received good reports. The way the hand pump worked was demonstrated to them, and they were convinced that it would neither spoil the spring nor dry it up. Quotations from the Koran were cited to the effect that cleanliness was required from every faithful Moslem and that man should do his best to avoid the danger of disease. At the same time, our girl workers visited with the housewives and explained to them how the pump would make their day's work easier and how they could use the time saved in taking better care of their children. They would not get ill so often, and fewer of them would be lost. Finally, we did our best to explain to the villagers that we were doing all this as our patriotic duty, and that it was their duty also to cooperate with us for their own benefit.

"It took one whole month before the situation was ripe for action. We advanced the cost of the pump and its accessories, which we ordered from the neighboring town. We insisted, however, according to our working principle, that they should contribute the necessary labor and pay in cash or in kind as much as they could. Two of our volunteers took with them a donkey and went from house to house gathering contributions. Towards the evening they came back with a small sum of money and a heavy load consisting of barley, wheat, eggs, chickens and fruit. The following morning the villagers started working. The pond was cleaned and deepened; a stone structure was built over it, and the village pump was installed at last."

- from a story told by Afif Tannous, 1944
References


Link, Eugene P. and S. Meta (1964), Victories in Villages-India, New York State University College, Plattsburgh, New York.


O'Sullivan, Jeremiah (1978), Rural Development Programs Among Marginal Farmers in the Western Highlands of Guatemala, Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford, California, Stanford University.


Popkin, Samuel (1979), The Rational Peasant, Berkeley, University of California Press.


PART V

THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY: A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF POVERTY

Constantina Safilios-Rothschild
Pennsylvania State University
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>TOWARD A DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>An Overview</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Structure of the Paper</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY IN DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>THE CONTEXT OF THE FAMILY</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Family Power and Decisionmaking</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Intrafamilial Allocation of Labor and Resources: Patterns of Inequality</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>The Mediating Role of Kinship and the Family in Access to the Bases of Agricultural Productivity</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>FAMILY STRATEGIES TO COPE WITH POVERTY</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Children as Labor and Social Security</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Female-Headed Households</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Flexibility in Household Organization</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Several Sources of Income, and Several Income-Earning Members</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>FAMILY CHANGE AND IMPACT ON POVERTY</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>The Spread of Female-Headed Households</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Changes in the Prevailing Division of Labor and Role Interdependencies Within the Family</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE FAMILY FACTOR IN STRATEGIES TO REDUCE POVERTY</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Understanding Family Structure</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Understanding Family Pattern and Dynamics</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Understanding and Strengthening Current Strategies</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Recognizing the Importance of Mothers’ Education</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Summary of strategies</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY

In the developing countries people do not live alone. The overwhelming majority live, first and foremost, in families and in households. It is only in extreme cases of poverty, marginalization and social isolation that individuals may live alone, cut off from their familial connections. Even when individual male rural migrants working in urban centers such as Nairobi live in a nonkinship-based household with other rural migrant men, in most cases their social context of decision-making remains that of their family and kinship in the rural area of origin. This pattern of social organization based on family and household is even more accentuated among the poor since it often represents an adaptation to poverty and an attempt to survive.

A. An Overview

Because families and households provide this basic social organizational environment development programs aiming to reach particular groups to increase agricultural productivity, or to improve the living conditions of the urban poor, must address themselves to the familial and the household context of individuals and issues. A development program, for example, designed to increase access to formal education by low-income girls would have a higher probability of success if it took this context into account. Specifically, consideration would have to be given to the constraints originating from the competing familial roles of the girls and also the economic utility of their labor contributions to their family and built in strategies to diminish them. Alternatively, rural development programs aiming to increase agricultural productivity, or to introduce agricultural innovations, have to take into consideration the prevailing division of labor in agricultural activities in order to accurately determine the appropriate target population. These programs must also take into account the existing interdependencies, rights and obligations between family and household members.

Adequate knowledge of the prevailing division of labor in households with regard to, first, housework and child care; second, agricultural, market, and other reproductive activities; and, third, the nature of the interdependencies, rights and obligations between family and household members presupposes an understanding of the prevailing types of families and households. Such an understanding cannot be always gained by existing family research studies. This is not only because such studies are not available, but also, and even more important, because those that are available may be often incomplete or misleading. The latter observation holds true because many sociologists, demographers and anthropologists who have conducted research in this area have been conceptually influenced by the Western model of a family, whether it be nuclear or extended (Caldwell 1976).* The residential definition of a family unit employed by censuses and most surveys has tended to overshadow other, equally important, bases of family life. These alternative focuses would include productive,

* References cited will be found at the end of this paper.
reproductive, socialization, sexual and consumption bases. They are neglected simply because it is easier to collect residential data.

The available sociological and anthropological studies from developing countries indicate three major trends.

First, the studies show that men, women and children may be involved in a number of different sets of relations with kin who may or may not reside in the same household. These different sets of relations, each with distinct rights and obligations, may be partially overlapping in membership and may extend over several residentially separated households (Oppong 1978). Co-residence of household members thus does not necessarily imply a boundary within which their reproductive, productive, consumption, child rearing, and sexuality functions are limited. Members of the same nuclear family may sleep in one household, eat in one or more households, and contribute their labor to several households. The food that the rural southern Ghanaian wife produces and cooks in her mother's household is consumed by her husband in another household (Oppong 1978). In many developing countries grandmothers or other female relatives live in one household but may play important child rearing, housework or productive roles in their daughter's or son's household.

The second trend emerging is that in developing countries the prevailing division of labor in any one household with regard to housework and child care, as well as with regard to productive activities, cannot be assessed within one residential family unit. It is necessary to examine all sets of interactions, rights, duties and obligations between members of a particular family unit and members of kin households in order to determine if, and to what extent, role substitution or sharing of tasks is taking place within and across households (Oppong 1978). In most developing countries particularly within the rural context, mothers, for example, are hardly ever the exclusive caretakers of their children past infancy (Barry and Paxon 1971; Weisner and Gallimore 1977). Child care is taken over by a variety of female kin, including "older" daughters who may be only two years older than the child they take care of. Some data from the Akan of Ghana indicate that child rearing tasks may be relegated to members of the kin whose time is least valued (Church 1978). Child care (except that of infants) is therefore predominantly in the hands of grandmothers, unmarried female relatives or daughters. Even the preparation of meals is often in the hands of daughters age ten or older. These characteristics have clear-cut implications for selecting the most appropriate population groups for programs of health education concerning sanitary practices vis-à-vis children, or even for nutritional programs aiming to alleviate poverty. Daughters and other caretaking kin would, in most cases, be equally, if not more, appropriate target populations than the mothers themselves.

A third trend is that in developing countries family units and households change organization, structure and composition most often as a response to migration, poverty and important cyclical productive and reproductive events. In Ghana, for example, as cyclical process for individuals has been documented in which the conjugal family, or matrilineal residential, patterns alternate since they represent the most appropriate
family type at different stages of life and of the migratory cycle. Within the Ghanaian context, for example, the conjugal family is the relevant family type during reproductive years if the entire family has migrated to an urban area; otherwise cyclical migration makes intermittent matrilineage the more relevant type for both spouses (Bartle 1978). Further, developmental stages and cyclical transformations of households may be experienced differently by individual family members. There is some evidence, for example, than in many sub-Saharan countries men and women experience somewhat different household organizational cycles (Sanjek and Sanjek 1975). In many Latin American and Caribbean countries, on the other hand, female-headed households represent the best adaptations of families to high male unemployment rates during the early reproductive stage (Whitehead 1978). Family units and households must, therefore, be viewed as changing units operating within some distinct, and often cyclical, developmental stages. This conclusion is especially true for poor families, as these vary their structure and organization considerably as they try to cope with poverty.

The above three trends have important implications for the definition of the family, especially the low-income family. Three such implications can be noted. First, the family in developing countries cannot be defined on the basis of co-residence alone, and cannot be viewed as having a closed boundary. By focusing on residential family units or conjugal families, one often sees only a part of the network of relations between kin which are relevant with regard to production, consumption, labor or child rearing.

Second, the fact that families do not have closed boundaries implies that individual family members may belong to different relational sets with kin and, thus, may have different obligations and rights as well as access to different options and resources.

Third, families (especially, low-income families) do not necessarily have the same structure and organization throughout the different developmental and/or migratory stages. It seems, therefore, that it is not possible to envisage a uniform definition of the family which can be used in different societal contexts, developmental stages, and migratory cycles. Instead, within each country, region and development program it is necessary to assess not only the relevant relational units between kin with regard to production, consumption or household/child rearing functions tapped by the development program, but also the nature of the changing family structure, organization and dynamics along significant developmental and/or migratory paths or stages. Further, it is important to not view the family as a monolithic institution but rather as an organizational unit for individuals with very different roles, privileges, rewards, options and obligations according to their age, sex and productive roles.

B. Structure of the Paper

Given this background, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the essentials of the role of the
family in the development process, and indicates the kind of information we need to understand those essentials more effectively. The third section in the paper then reviews the available evidence concerning the family in its developing world context, emphasizing the roles of family power and of decisionmaking, patterns of inequality in the interfamilial allocation of labor and of such resources as food, health care and education, and the mediating role of kindship and the family in access to the bases of agricultural productivity. The fourth section examines the strategies used by families to cope with poverty. The fifth section presents evidence concerning the impact of modernization and development policies and programs on family structure and dynamics, stressing the spread of female-headed households and changes in the prevailing division of labor and role interdependencies. The final section reviews the principal conclusions of the study and summarizes suggested strategies facilitating an understanding of the family factor in programs to reduce poverty.
II. THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY IN DEVELOPMENT

The family, as we have outlined it in the preceding section, is an important factor which must be taken into consideration in development because it affects demand for education, health care or family planning, and the supply of labor for rural development or entrepreneurial efforts. Further, the family is a very important context within which to assess the impact of ongoing trends and social changes, such as migration, urbanization, industrialization, and the mechanization of agriculture, as well as the impact of government policies and development programs and projects. Yet the family is not a monolithic unit, and intrafamilial patterns and dynamics may have a differential effect on individual family members. Intrafamilial decisions may have a differential impact on the demand for the education of sons and daughters; resources made available to the family, such as increased income, may be used differently according to who earns and controls the income; or food may be unequally distributed by age and sex; and development programs may have a diverse impact on the options and access of resources of men and of women, and, therefore, change intrafamily dynamics and power relations.

In order for development policies and programs to take the family into consideration, data are thus needed about the following general areas (although the specific focus needed may change from program to program):

1. The prevailing structure of the family: whether female headed, extended, nuclear, etc.
2. The sets of rights, obligation and exchanges between family units and specified kin with regard to labor, production, consumption and mutual or unilateral aid.
3. The power structure in the family and the power bases of men and women.
4. The question of who controls what income, and how income from different sources is used.
5. The matter of who decides, and who implements, the intrafamilial allocation of labor and resources.
6. The prevailing patterns of intrafamilial inequalities and the conditions under which these inequalities decrease.
7. The prevailing division of labor -- who does what within the conjugal family and its relational networks with kin with regard to housework, childrearing and other productive activities.
8. The prevailing pattern of obligations, rights and interdependencies between: children and parents; adult married children and parents; men and women; and different sets of kin; and also the nature of the socioeconomic conditions which alter the bases of these relationships.
Groups of societies tend to be characterized by similar overall patterns with respect to many of the above sets of data. Matrilineal societies and groups within sub-Saharan Africa, for example, share many similarities while patrilineal sub-Saharan African countries, despite many similarities, also show some important variations. Middle Eastern and North African societies represent another group of class- and sex-stratified societies with many similarities in family patterns and dynamics. Social change, modernization, social and economic development and distribution of income (all affecting family structure and dynamics) are, however, taking place at a different pace and in different ways in different countries, and as a result societal and cultural models are not always helpful in providing guidelines. Instead, detailed up-to-date family data must be collected for each society and region in which development programs are envisaged. Further specific dimensions of the context of the family will be explored in the following section.
III. THE CONTEXT OF THE FAMILY

A. Family Power and Decisionmaking

Family members who have the power to make decisions are able to some extent to determine the course of their own lives and certainly to affect the lives of other family members. The possession of power in the family also means that one can "orchestrate" who will decide what, who will be consulted, how much weight each member's opinion will have, who will implement what decision and how much leeway will be granted to the implementer (Safilios-Rothschild 1976). The determination of this most powerful family member is governed by the nature of prevailing cultural values attached to old age and sex status, by the relative importance of the productive roles of men and of women, and by the presence of other legitimate power bases. A broad typology of societies can be constructed by drawing on the factors. We shall now examine two such types of society, with emphasis on the respective power bases of men and of women.

One type of highly class stratified and patriarchal society is exemplified in North Africa, the Middle East, some Latin American countries and most of South Asia (including Pakistan, Bangladesh and India). In this type of society males are supposed to dominate and control women, and older men and women 1/ make decisions for younger female members of the family. In addition to the prevailing values about male dominance and superiority, women are not expected to be autonomous and self-supporting and there are few opportunities for them to work and earn significant incomes, especially in comparison to those enjoyed by men. But even when women are able to earn an income and contribute to family maintenance they are not usually able translate their economic roles into family power. This is primarily the case because they have to turn their earnings over to their husbands, who control all family income (Safilios-Rothschild 1980a). In fact, in these societies the most reliable power base of the women is reproductive, especially the reproduction of sons, a reality with serious demographic consequences (Safilios-Rothschild, 1980b).

Among the low-income families, and under some conditions, poverty can, and does, change the power relations between spouses. In most developing countries women tend to control the production of use values and men of exchange values. Among the rural poor, who produce few income-generating farm products, the sex-based division of labor is, however, less clear cut. Women in landless and smallholder households participate more actively in all agricultural production, and can themselves sell the available small quantities of produce and use the money to buy what is needed for the family. This process has been documented for rural Peru, where women in

1/ In these societies, women can have family power as well as more freedom of movement once they pass reproductive age and become "asexual" (Bart 1969; Mernissi 1975; Safilios-Rothschild 1977).
middle and rich peasant families whose husbands dominate the larger sales of produce and control the earned income (Deere 1978). It seems, therefore, that when the family faces a continuous economic crisis of survival, traditional sex roles tend to break down and women are relegated the problematic responsibility for family subsistence. This accountability gives them the right to control the small amounts of money they earn since they have to use them entirely to buy food, clothes and other necessities for the family. It is questionable whether women are thus able to gain substantial power in the family. They may, however, be consulted more frequently with regard to farming decisions than women who do not contribute as substantially to agricultural labor and family subsistence.

Among Bombay slum families, married women working as domestics or as small vendors used their income almost exclusively for family maintenance; further 60 percent of them kept and controlled their income, while the others had to turn all or part of it to their husbands (Dalaya 1978). Many low-income husbands whose income-earning capacity is marginal and unstable attempt to reaffirm their dominant position in the family by first deciding that their wife must work to help out, and then by taking over her wages. In these cases, no change in the family power structure takes place: the income contributions by women cannot become power bases, since women are not allowed to claim them as their own and to control their use (Saflilios-Rothschild 1980b; Salaff and Wong 1977). These trends are more clearly documented for rural Bangladesh. Here, well-to-do women can sell rice, poultry, dairy and horticultural products to village middle-men in the village market either directly or through young boys and can thus control the sale and keep the profits. Women in small, marginal, landless households, however, have to give up control of the sales to their husbands who take what the women produce to other villages "in an effort to maximize on sale price" (Who Gets What and Why: Resource Allocation in a Bangladesh Villages 1979). The need to maximize on sale prices and the traditional sex roles preventing married women from travelling to other villages serve to maintain control of the meager economic resources in the hands of men and a male-dominated power structure.

In this first type of society, therefore, women have few opportunities to develop an economic power base which could allow them to share family power with their husbands. In poor households, however, wives have a greater probability, by default, of sharing in the economic responsibility for the survival of the family and of controlling their meager economic resources. Further, migration of the male heads which renders rural households at least de facto female-headed most often forces low-income women to undertake previously male-dominated agricultural activities and to make farming decisions (Ross 1977; Myntti 1978). In Thailand, however, a country without a rigid patriarchy and where the status of women has been steadily improving, the responsibility of rural women to feed and clothe the family is related to their being able to keep the money they earn and to have an important say as to how it is spent (Status of Thai Women in Two Rural Areas 1979).
A second type of society is represented by sub-Saharan African countries in which women play a major agricultural role with respect to all types of crops, and are responsible for subsistence crops. In these societies, the power bases of women are broader, especially in those societies which are matrilineal. Women are usually allotted a piece of land on which to grow food for the family and they make all decisions concerning the cultivation of that land. They have also possessed the traditional right to sell the surplus of their crops and to control their earnings. This traditional economic responsibility of women to feed the family (and in many cases to also pay school fees), and the ability to control the income they have earned, can be translated into a measure of power in the family. In addition, the substantial labor contributions made by women to the land of their husbands makes men need the labor cooperation of their wives to ensure the successful operation of their farms. This economic interdependence between spouses gives wives the status of a partner rather than that of a dependent, which results in a more egalitarian decision-making process in most farming matters (Oppong 1978; MacCormack 1979; Riegelman et al., 1976). Despite the fact that sub-Saharan African women have been reported to occasionally withdraw part of their labor from their husbands' land when the cultivation of their own land and, hence, their economic autonomy, is endangered (Hanger and Morris 1973), it must be noted that such an expression of power represents an extreme in which few women can indulge. Most women would hesitate to test their power in this way for fear that either their husbands would divorce them and that they would thus lose their usufructuary land rights; or that the husband would take a second wife more willing to contribute her labor, thus undermining the first wife's position.

In general, we can conclude that the significant labor contributions of women, their economic responsibility to feed the family through the cultivation of land, through marketing and other income-generating activities and through their ability to control earned income represent important power bases for them. This is in addition to those based on reproductive ability and old age. Control of earned income is clearly the key force that tends to break down male dominance and to equalized power relationships between men and women. In its absence, even when women contribute their labor to productive activities and earn incomes, their behaviors are dictated by their husbands and they cannot determine how their income is spent, or how other major family decisions are made.

B. Intrafamilial Allocation of Labor and Resources: Patterns of Inequality

As is the case at the societal level, tasks, responsibilities, privileges, and resources are not distributed equally among household members. Households do not seem to consider it a rational strategy to maximize profit equally for all their members. An important question, therefore, is whether or not such an unequal intrahousehold distribution is in fact rational, and, if it is, for whom. Some inequalities may be
rational from the point of view of adults, but not from that of children. Other inequalities may be rational from the point of view of men, but not from that of women. Still other inequalities may be rational at the level of the family, but not at that of society.

In poor households in which scarcity is the rule and survival the goal, people (as well as planners seeking to address their needs) face some very difficult dilemmas. What is the most important goal? Is it that the household or the family unit should survive, even when individual members may not survive, or may not be able to escape poverty? Or is it more important for individual members to escape poverty even if the family unit or the household disintegrates? If not all family or household members can survive or escape poverty, who should be chosen to survive, or to escape poverty? And on the basis of what criteria?

At the societal level, class determines the size of the share of community income one receives. More specifically, at this level, sex seems to be a less important differentiating criterion among members of higher social classes, but quite important among low-income groups. This is particularly true in developing countries in which the class system tends to be closed and rigid, with few institutionalized avenues for social mobility. In these cases, membership in a high class possesses such important status that it can neutralize the negative effects of the female sex status (Safilios-Rothschild 1980b). A study from Kenya gives us an example of how class status is more powerful than sex status and how the combination of low class and female status leads to exacerbation of poverty among rural women. The study showed that elite women farm managers were visited equally often by agricultural extension workers as were jointly managed farms. Nonelite women farm managers on the other hand were visited much less often than nonelite jointly managed farms, and less often than elite women farm managers. The same trend, though even more accentuated, held true with regard to loans or access to agricultural training (Staudt 1979). Access by low-income men to agricultural services was thus curtailed by the class bias, but access by low-income women to these services was curtailed by the class and sex bias operating simultaneously.

At the household level, however, it is age and sex that constitute the important distributional criteria. The type of productive role played is also important in this allocation process although this in turn largely depends upon age and sex. It must also be noted that sex is the more important criterion, although it tends to be much more significant in low-income than in higher-class households. In the latter, where food and financial resources for education, health care or hired help are not scarce, their distribution between men and women tends to be more equal. Women of these classes are freed of most housework and child care responsibilities (Oppong 1978; Safilios-Rothschild 1980a; Joshi and Rao 1964).

Idiosyncratic factors, such as the use of manipulation as a survival strategy by a household member, may modify the operation of these
age and sex stratification systems. But, in general, labor, food and other resources and privileges are distributed unequally. These inequalities become more pronounced and have more serious repercussions for individual members as food and financial resources become scarcer. Scarcity forces families to make harsh decisions which may represent the best survival strategies within their immediate socioeconomic context and in the short term.

Unequal treatment under conditions of scarcity may spell out the difference between survival and starvation, between illiteracy and education which offers a chance to break away from generational poverty. Further, these inequalities tend to become accentuated as traditional societies experience the varied waves of modernization, development programs and policies, and social changes. These incursions alter traditional practices, beliefs and customs; render traditional survival strategies obsolete or maladaptive; and can exacerbate poverty.

Given this background, the discussion will now move on to an examination of specific patterns of inequality associated with intrafamilial divisions of labor, food distribution, health resources and nutrition and education.

1. Division of Labor

In developing countries housework, child care and productive activities are not distributed among family members according to the Western model, whereby women are consistently responsible for housework and child care, and men for agricultural and other productive activities. Neither are adults exclusively or even predominantly responsible for shouldering tasks. Age and sex are, however, important criteria in determining the unequal patterns of the division of labor. In line with observations noted above, the division of labor is often quite different among poor families than it is among middle-class and rich families. The present analysis focuses on the poor. Three major trends in the division of labor will now be explored.

The first general trend in the prevailing patterns of the division of labor in developing countries is that women in poor households are involved in agricultural and/or other productive -- for example, market -- activities even in such Muslim regions and countries as Northern Nigeria, Northern Ghana and Bangladesh. In Muslim societies, such agricultural and productive involvement by women must often take place "behind the walls" of their compounds. It may include: seed preparation and storage, post-harvest rice processing, grain storage, vegetable and fruit growing, poultry raising, livestock care, food processing and food preservation (Abdullah and Zeidenstein 1979). Marketing activities are usually limited for Bangladeshi rural women. They occupy on the average, 1.68 hours per day (Quizon and Evenson 1978) but this figure is much higher for women in poor households in which the purdah restrictions are waived because of economic needs (Cain 1979). Further, women in landless Bangladeshi households whose husbands are farm laborers or unemployed may work as farm laborers in food-for-work projects (Women in Food-For-Work 1979).
In such countries as India, where the land is scarce and men have been identified as the main food producers, the agricultural labor of women also seems to have been underestimated (Palmer 1977). Case studies in a wheat-growing area of Haryana State in India have shown that the average working time of the rural women is between 15 and 16-1/2 hours per day, about half of which is spent in agricultural and productive activities, including animal husbandry (Chakravorty 1975).

In sub-Saharan Africa, where women are the main food producers, the patterns are even more clear-cut. Reflecting the general trend for women to be responsible for use values and for men to be responsible for exchange values, women are primarily responsible for subsistence crops and men for cash crops. In addition, women contribute labor, usually in the harvesting and post-harvesting operations of cash crops. In Botswana, for example, 73.6 percent of the total labor required for crops is contributed by women. Some crop-related activities, however, are a male prerogative. These include destumping, land clearing, plowing, tending livestock and, to a lesser extent, planting (Perspectives on the Role of Women in Food Production, Food Handling and Nutrition 1977). In Upper Volta, women spend on the average three hours per day (or as much time as men) in food and cash crop production and much more time than men (three hours and 10 minutes versus a mere 15 minutes) in domestic food storage, food processing, marketing, brewing and water and fuel supply activities. Men, however, spend, on the average, 2-1/2 hours per day in straw work and other crafts, and women on the average spend only 45 minutes (McSweeney 1979).

It seems, therefore, that in all developing countries women play important productive roles, especially among the poor, and that sub-Saharan African women play the crucial role in the cultivation of all crops, subsistence and cash crops alike. Rural development policies and programs need, therefore, to take into account the important productive role played by women in supplying the necessary labor.

A second major trend is that pattern of intrahousehold inequality emerges when the distribution of all labor among men and women in terms of household tasks, child care and productive activities is examined. The available time budget data are often limited because they are based on small samples (especially when they were collected by observing rather than by interviewing household members) or because they are based on recall. Despite these limitations, the trends indicate that at least in some developing countries women carry a much heavier work overload than men, while men enjoy a better balance between work and time for personal needs, as well as more free time. Detailed data from rural Upper Volta, for example, show that women have, on the average, 2-1/2 hours per day for personal needs (such as rest, relaxing, meals and personal hygiene), while men have 4-1/2 hours per day, the greatest difference existing with regard to rest. Further, women have on the average 1-1/4 hours per day of free time for religion, educational activities, conversation, or visiting, while men have 2 hours, the greatest difference being in time for conversation. On the average, women spend 9.5 hours per day working and a little less than 4 hours for personal need or as free time, while men spend 7.6 hours
working and 6.4 hours for personal needs or as free time. This situation comes about, first, because all household work and child care is exclusively women's work, requiring on the average 2-1/2 hours per day; and, second, because although men and women spend equal total time in different food and crop productive activities, women spend much more time than men (3 hours versus 15 minutes) in food storage and processing, marketing and water and fuel supply activities. Men, on the other hand, spend three times more time than women in crafts and other occupations and on community projects and obligations (McSweeney 1979).

The reasons for this sex-based inequality in the distribution of labor can be found mainly in the nature of traditional sex roles. These specify that housework and above all child care are "women's work." To this situation is added the need for women in poor households to actively participate in productive activities for family survival. Women's overload becomes aggravated when they become female heads of households because they have to act as substitutes to perform what would otherwise be men's work shares. It is alleviated when they live with other female kin, co-wives or when they have children over 6-7 years old. Time budget data from Upper Volta show that women with co-wives have twice as much time for personal needs, rest and free time as women without co-wives, thus rendering polygamy more acceptable to women (McSweeney 1979). Women's work overload also explains why children have a very important short-range labor utility for both parents, and especially for mothers.

A third important trend is that children of both sexes (and from the time they are 5-6 years old) make very important labor contributions to the household both in terms of housework and child care tasks and responsibilities, as well as in terms of productive activities. In rural households in the Philippines for example, observational time budget data show that children spend twice as much time as mothers, and 80 percent of the time spent by fathers in economic production. They also spend 50 percent of the time spent by mothers and more than twice the time spent by fathers in home production (Quizon and Evenson 1978). This trend is particularly evident in poor households in which children must start contributing labor earlier, and to a great extent, than in higher socioeconomic strata. In rural Bangladesh, for example, in landless families girls 7-9 years old do twice as much housework and undertake rather more productive activities than do girls of the same age in the families of small and large landowners. This difference usually translates into less chance to attend school. It was also found that boys in landless households started carrying water and messages and gathering firewood at an earlier age than boys in the households of small and large landowners. Similarly, girls in landless households started carrying water, sweeping, cooking, serving meals, and washing dishes and clothes earlier than did their counterparts in landowning households (Cain 1977). Using children as a labor pool is, it seems, an important coping strategy for survival used by the poor.

Sex-based differentiations in the division of labor can also be found among children, although the differences are less sharp, especially before adolescence. In Muslim countries, in which women seldom work in
agricultural activities outside the home, girls are much less often involved in agricultural and marketing activities than are boys. A good example of this trend is provided by rural Bangladesh (Cain 1977). In rural Nepal, however, girls over 9 years of age spend more time in agricultural activities than do boys (Nag, et al. 1977). An even more important sex differential is that girls spend more total time contributing their labor for household, child care and productive activities and that they do so significantly earlier than boys. In rural Bangladesh, for example, while the responsibilities of boys for productive activities do not begin before the age of 9, the responsibilities of girls for housework begin at as early an age as 5 (Cain 1977). The same trends have been documented for the Kivi province of Zaire, where boys up to the age of 10 are not burdened with productive activities, while girls 5-9 years old help with weeding and carrying water (Mitchnik 1972). In rural Nepal, girls 6-8 years old (other work contributions being equal) spend over eight times more hours in child care and five times less hours in school than boys (Nag, et al. 1977). The earlier and heavier labor responsibilities of girls have serious consequences for their ability to attend, perform satisfactorily at and stay in school.

Another important trend in the labor contributions of children is that they increase rapidly with children's age. In rural Bangladesh, for example, children aged 4-6 years old work about one-fifth as long as adults. By age 7-9, their work time increases to one half of that of an adult work day, and to 3/4 by age 10-12. At 13 and above, children work approximately as long as adults (Cain 1977). Children, therefore, tend to carry their own weight quite early in life.

Finally, with regard to labor distribution between old and young adults, the data are sparse but there are some indications that old women in India and Upper Volta tend to work at least as hard as younger adult women (Chakravorty 1975; McSweeney 1979).

2. Intrafamilial Distribution of Food

Food is the most important resource to be allocated within the family in the countries of the developing world, especially the poorer ones. In order to examine the patterns of intrafamilial distribution of food, the different steps of the "food path" must be examined. Four such steps will be examined here. The first step concerns who has the responsibility to provide the food for the family, that is who produces the food or whose income is used to buy food; an associated matter is the question of who buys food and decides how much money to spend on food, and what, and how much, food to buy. The second step involves the question of who processes, stores and cooks food. The third is concerned with who distributes the food to family members. The fourth step involves the question of what factors determine the intrafamilial distribution of food, for example, beliefs about different foods, the distributing family members' education, age and family role, and power status in the family.
(a) Who is Responsible for Food, Whose Income is Used for Food, Who Does the Shopping?

Women usually do most of the shopping in societies such as those of the sub-Saharan African countries, or of that rural Thailand. There, the women have the responsibility to feed the family throughout the year as well as during the "hungry season" by cultivating subsistence crops and/or by marketing products. In these cases, women also control the income they earn and they decide how to use it, that is, what and how much food to buy, either entirely by themselves or in consultation with their husbands (Status of Thai Women in Two Rural Areas 1979; and Perspectives on the Role of Women in Food Production, Food Handling and Nutrition 1977).

In societies in which the men are responsible for feeding the family and whose income or productive activities are mainly used to do so, however, it is the men who predominantly do the shopping. While they may consult with their wives, they have an important say as to how much money is used to buy food, as well as to what and how much food is purchased. This trend has been documented for rural Bangladesh (Cain 1979) and for low-income communities in the Philippines (Noval-Gora 1979). When, however, women also earn an income which is primarily used for family maintenance, in some areas (as, for example, in the slums of Bombay), and to the extent that they are able to keep their income, they are also able to do the shopping themselves. They thus have more say about the quality and quantity of food available to the family. It seems, therefore, that decisionmaking regarding the quality and quantity of food for the family is not necessarily a female prerogative. On the contrary, it belongs to the spouse who is responsible for food and who has control over the income available for food.

In those sub-Saharan African societies in which husbands and wives control their individual incomes and it is women's income that is used to buy food, increases in that income tend to improve the quality and quantity of food, but increases in men's income do not. Since men are not responsible for feeding the family, they tend to use income increments to make productive investments or to buy consumer goods or entertainment and may only help out their wives with cash for food in case of emergencies, or to pay school fees (Nash 1977; Tinker 1979; Carr 1979; Perspectives on the Role of Women in Food Production, Food Handling and Nutrition 1977). But even in societies in which women are not responsible for feeding the family, when the poverty level of the family requires that they work and earn an income, this income (whether controlled by the woman herself, or by her husband) is almost universally used to buy food. Again, there is some evidence that higher income for women is associated with better nutritional status for the children. In Colombia, for example, it was found that 52 percent of the children of part-time, but only 32 percent of those of full-time working mothers, were malnourished (Wray and Aguirre 1969). In rural Kerala, it was found that in landless families increases in maternal income were significantly associated with children's nutritional status. This association was less strong during the slack ("hungry") agricultural season when even aged grandmothers work and children do not receive adequate attention and well-prepared food. When women did not work for wages, increments in the income of their husbands were not associated
with improved nutritional status for the children (Kumar 1977). It seems, therefore, that women’s work, especially during the peak agricultural season, gives mothers (and other female family members) less time for child care and food preparation, and young girls may be left in charge of child feeding. Yet the corresponding increases in female income outweigh the negative effects of such work on the nutritional status of children. If, therefore, satisfactory child care arrangements could be made during the peak season, the beneficial effects of increments in women’s incomes on the nutritional status of children would double (Kumar 1977). The evidence that the "aggregate household income was found to be a weak and statistically insignificant predictor of child nutrition," underlines the importance of disaggregating household income into different sources for the assessment of its effects on nutrition and other outcomes (Kumar 1977).

(b) Who Processes, Stores and Cooks the Food?

Although female members of the family are primarily responsible for both the preparation and the distribution of food, it is not -- as is usually assumed -- necessary the mother who is the one responsible. It is a daughter or a grandmother who is more often than the mother responsible for these nutritionally important tasks, especially among low income households, whether they are female-headed or not. This situation comes about because the mother has a very heavy overload of other productive and household activities. As we have already seen, daughters 10 years old or older become "mother substitutes" in terms of food preparation as well as food distribution. They have already been helping with cooking from an earlier age, for example, in rural Bangladesh (Cain 1977). Similarly, grandmothers or other female kin play the same role, notably in rural low-income households. In addition, 8-9 year old boys also may help with time-consuming tasks in food processing and preparation, but rarely with actual cooking (Cain 1977). Young girls and grandmothers thus often play a key role in food preparation in low-income households in which the mother has to work. This can be especially important during the "hungry" and busy agricultural season when there are additional health hazards. Clearly, these characteristics have significant policy implications for nutritional and educational programs, and for other interventions with a nutritional component.

(c) Mode of Intrafamilial Distribution of Food

Scarcity of food in low-income families poses dramatic questions of social inequality. As long as there is enough food for all members of the family, the existence of inequalities in its distribution does not usually pose serious problems as it rarely leads to malnutrition in any of the family members. It is different story if food is scarce. Then, whether food is equally or unequally distributed among family members becomes an extremely important issue with poignant implications. The difference between being a favored and a disadvantaged family member is the difference between mild undernourishment resulting in energy deficit, and malnutrition which threatens actual survival. In many cases, equal distribution of food would imply that all family members would be to some extent
malnourished. They would, however, be unequally malnourished as they would have different minimum caloric and protein requirements. Food inequalities can be sustained in families partly because they believe that the favored members (for example, adult and adolescent males, or males in general) need more food and partly because food taboos and traditional food beliefs often conveniently justify an unequal distribution of food to the disadvantage of children and lactating and pregnant women. While food inequalities favoring the men, who are often the main bread-winners, have been referred to as "rational" for the survival of the family, we do not know whether the equal or greater productive contributions of women entitle them to an equal or greater share of food, or whether control of income earned by women, and their economic autonomy, are prerequisites for food equality.

A recent re-analysis of the data from the Tamil Nadu Nutrition Study in India indicates that different families follow different modes of food distribution. According to the "equality" model, each member receives amounts of food proportional to perceived needs. This procedure, of course, does not assure access to food according to objectively assessed needs but rather according to beliefs about requirements which may be greatly influenced by the importance of different members to the family unit. According to the "proportionate" model, all members get some food, but only those who are considered more important receive a high percentage of their minimum requirements. Finally, according to the "triage" method, the most important family members receive all they need, and the others only what is left over (Fine mentioned in Horowitz 1979). All these modes of food distribution will probably operate in low-income families in the same locality, with one mode prevailing over others according to the relative status of men and women, children and adults, old and young, and the type of productive roles they play in the family.

The available nutritional studies have many methodological shortcomings. This is because few of them are based on observational data, and few recognize the variety of food sources available to different family members, for example eating in kin households for children, in buying of food outside the family, drinking for men, and so on (Horowitz 1980). Few studies include detailed data about family dynamics and power structure and other characteristics that would help explain observed inequalities. Further, the standard minimum caloric and protein requirements used for men and women of different ages are not adjusted to the reality of the lives of children, women and old people in developing countries. In poor households, as we have noted, women spend as much, or more, time as men in productive activities. Their total workload often surpasses that of men while they have less time to rest. Children, too have a considerable workload from a very early age, and boys work as hard as adult males by the age of 13. Similarly, old women have been reported to work at least as hard as younger adult women.

With these methodological shortcomings in mind, a recent comprehensive review of nutritional studies presenting data on the intrafamilial distribution of food concluded that important inequalities were involved (Horowitz 1979). For low-income households, generally the intake of calories and
protein are most often inadequate for all sex and age groups, yet adults tend to fare better than children. Among adults and children, men and boys tend to have a better chance of meeting a high percentage of their minimum caloric and protein requirements than do women and girls. A nutritional study in Laguna, Philippines, for example, found that fathers met 83 percent of their minimum protein requirements and mothers 73 percent; preschool boys met 77.5 of their minimum calorie requirements and 89 percent of their minimum protein requirements; and preschool girls met 67.5 and 83 percent of their respective requirements. The discrepancies between the extent to which the minimum protein requirements of adolescent boys and girls were met were even larger (Evenson, Popkin and King-Quizon 1979). Another nutritional study in 17 villages in Morinda, Punjab, showed that sex is the most significant determinant of nutritional status: boys aged 6-24 months in all castes were better nourished than girls of the same age by being breast-fed longer, and by being favored by more food after they were weaned. The nutritional discrepancy between boys and girls was, however, much larger in the lower, agricultural caste in which girls were breast-fed for a shorter time period. Further, a girl consumes "less supplementary milk and less solid food, begins consuming solid food later, and receives less of each of the nutrients" (Levinson 1974).

Other nutritional studies have shown that toddlers (1-3 years old) and lactating and pregnant mothers are the nutritionally most deprived groups (and, as we saw above, the girls more so than the boys among toddlers). A microstudy of intrafamily food distribution in low-income communities in the Philippines showed, for example, that toddlers (1-3 years old) get 64 percent of their recommended dietary allowance for calories; nursing mothers get only 46 percent; pregnant mothers, 64 percent; and fathers and other adults, 81 percent (Nogal-Gora 1979). Since most adult women in these low-income communities are usually either pregnant or nursing an infant, it seems that they normally receive much less food than male adults. Indian data from Tamil Nadu also show that it is the weaning infant from 6-18 months old which experiences the greatest nutritional deprivation, closely followed by lactating mothers and then, by pregnant mothers (Tamil Nadu Nutrition Study 1973).

In view of the above finding, the possibility that the standard minimum caloric and protein requirements of women and of school age and adolescent children may be underestimated suggests that in fact the reported sex and age-based inequalities in intrafamilial distribution of food may be even more serious than hitherto suspected.

(d) Factors Affecting the Intrafamilial Distribution of Food

Probably the most basic factor affecting the intrafamilial distribution of food is the extent to which food is scarce. Scarcity of food may occur because of crop failure, poverty, poor distribution of food in remote rural areas, seasonal lack of food, or scarcity of time to prepare food due to the excessive seasonal workloads of women. Seasonal scarcity of food usually occurs during the wet season when energy demands for agricultural activities are at their peak. This scarcity is of great importance because it is recurrent and frequently acute. It has been
further shown to bring about a reduction in the growth of children, and losses in adult weight, especially among lactating and pregnant women (Rowland et al. 1979). The women who have to work very hard during the wet season have little time to cook, and often cook only one simple meal, or else delegate cooking altogether to young girls. In this process, infants needing special foods suffer the most as well as lactating and pregnant women, who must spend more energy than during the dry season, but consume less food (Schofield 1974). Under such conditions, pregnant (in the last trimester of pregnancy) and lactating mothers in Gambia have been found to lose on the average 1.4 kg. of their weight, and lactating women experience a sharply reduced capacity for lactation (Whitehead, et al. 1978). The adverse food conditions and the excessive work demands on women during the wet, "hungry" season may lead lactating women to stop breast-feeding at the onset of the season. They thus increase the risks for their weaned children at a time of high incidence of diarrhea and other parasitic and infectious diseases, and also at a time when they are not able to prepare special foods for them.

Another important factor that affects the mode of intrafamilial food distribution is the question of who distributes the food, and also what are that person's characteristics. Do young girls or grandmothers, who are often in charge of preparing and distributing food, particularly during the peak season, distribute food differently than mothers? Do they tend to accentuate or to decrease inequalities? There is some evidence that "nibbling" of food while cooking may be more prevalent among young girls or grandmothers since they are both less inhibited from doing so than are mothers. Data from Brazil show, for example, that the nutritional status of girls begins to improve at age 13 when they more often substitute for their mothers as cooks and can "nibble" while cooking. The nutritional status of boys on the other hand, begins to improve only after age 16 when they are considered to be adult males (Knight, et al. 1979). "Nibbling" in this case tends to diminish sex inequalities between the nutritional status of boys and of girls and to influence food distribution in favor of girls. But we do not know whether young girls acting as cooks and distributors can (and under what conditions) diminish age-based food differentials.

The education of mothers has been found to be associated with better nutritional status of children, through some link other than household income, but it is not very clear how such education may affect the pattern of intrafamilial food distribution (Leslie and Cochrane, 1979).

Prevailing beliefs about the relative worth of men and women, children and adults, old and young people, and their relative position in the society, as well as the prevailing family power structure, can all be expected to have a considerable impact on the food distribution pattern. The more a society is patriarchal and the more the family power structure is male-dominated, then the more are women economically dependent upon men, and the more are they expected to deter to them and to threat them preferentially over other women. In Muslim societies unequal food distribution in favor of male adults is also enhanced by separate eating arrangements in which men and often boys eat before women and girls, who consume what is left.
In societies in which families eat from a common bowl, young children may experience great difficulty in obtaining a fair share, since older siblings can and do successfully (and occasionally brutally) compete with them for food (Horowitz 1979). Nutritional data from Kenya shows that in pairs of siblings in which the sister was older than her brother, the difference in their relative nutritional status was minimal, while this difference was four times larger in pairs in which the brother was older (Hitchings, 1979). It seems that sex and birth order affect the nutritional status of children partly because mothers may favor older boys, who are already more productive than younger girls, and partly because older boys may be more aggressive in securing more food for themselves, especially is the food is distributed from a common bowl.

The duration of breast-feeding is another factor affecting the mode of intrafamilial distribution of food. Women tend to wean children at an early age. This is because women in poor families must work most often in agricultural or other productive activities, and these are often incompatible with breastfeeding. A cross-cultural study of 83 societies showed, for example, that more women who begin supplementary feeding of their infants when they are less than one month old in subsistence activities than is the case with those who do so after one month of age (Nerlove 1974). Other studies confirm the trend that women wean their children early because they work (Bornstein 1974; Popkin 1975). While early weaning adversely affects the nutritional and health status of children, especially when it occurs during the peak agricultural season, recommendations for prolonged breast-feeding when lactating mothers need to work to buy food for the family and when their own nutritional status is poor can, if implemented, only lead to poor quality of milk for children, and to increased female mortality from chronic depletion. In low-income households in which mothers have to work, while prolonged breast-feeding may improve children's nutritional status, it may thus increase nutritional and health inequalities for mothers.

Finally, it should be noted that prevailing food practices, beliefs and taboos (all of which are not necessarily traditional), are believed by some to affect the intrafamilial distribution of food. This is because beliefs and taboos concerning food regulate mostly the food consumption of children and women, especially lactating and pregnant women (Rosenberg 1979). While the anthropological literature abounds with examples of such food taboos and beliefs (Katona-Apte 1977), there is usually little detailed information supplied. More needs to be known as to their nutritional consequences for the target groups; as to the extent to which they are followed, especially by low-income families with few alternatives regarding, acceptable foods; as to traditional nutritional compensating mechanisms and foods given to the groups who must bear the restrictions; or as to changes in the prevalence of taboos, or as to inappropriate foods which render the traditional taboos or beliefs obsolete (Horowitz 1979). In Malawi, for example, pregnant women cannot eat an animal (because they are afraid they might transfer traits of the animal to the child), or, specifically, eggs, milk or chicken (Ifisomali 1969). It has been found, however, that in areas in which pregnant women, or all women and children, are not allowed to eat
eggs and poultry, these foods are quite scarce or "can be sold for cash which will be used to buy a staple benefiting the whole family more" (Sai 1969). Usually, the scarcity of these tabooed foods is such that the abolition of these taboos would improve but insignificantly the quality of women's or children's diets (McDowell 1976).

In many societies behavior has been found to change before changes occurs in the traditional beliefs. The important question to be researched, therefore, is what changes in the society and/or the family can decrease food inequalities, despite prevailing food beliefs which sustain those inequalities.

3. Intrafamilial Allocation of Resources for Health Care

Since it is known that health care in developing countries is sought more on the basis of the status of a family member within the household than on the basis of the severity of symptoms (Pillsbury 1978), we can expect considerable inequalities in the access to health care of different family members. Male adults have much greater access to health care than do adult women, and scarce resources are more often allocated to them. This imbalance is particularly prevalent in Muslim societies. In rural Egypt, for example, during one four-month period more resources were allocated for medical expenditures related to the illnesses of men than to those of women (Pillsbury 1978). As Muslim women, however, gain in status and power from having borne one or more sons, they receive prompter and more expensive treatment than do childless women (Morsy 1977). In Muslim countries, women also face a structural constraint in their access to health care since they are not supposed to be examined by male physicians. They therefore tend to favor indigenous health practitioners who do not require them to disrobe for an examination, or who are themselves women, as in the case of traditional midwives, herbalists, and so on.

Children seem to be an exception to the above rule in that time and economic resources are more often allocated for their health care than for adults. In rural Guatemala, for example, more than one third of clinic patients were children under 10 years old (Cosminsky 1972). Again, however, in societies in which sons are more valued than daughters for their long-range utility with respect to productive labor and social security, their ailments are paid more attention, including medical attention, than are those of daughters. In rural Guatemala, for example, a greater percentage of male patients than of female patients are 1-4 years old (Cosminsky 1972). This trend is evidenced in spite of the fact that girls in this age group have a higher incidence of malnutrition, diarrhea and parasitic illnesses. In India, more boys than girls are hospitalized for kwashiokor (severe malnutrition caused by a diet high in carbohydrate and low in protein), although its incidence is greater among girls (Martin 1975). An epidemiological study of chronic illness and disability in Orissa and Maharashtra, India, showed, on the other hand, that parents of visibly disabled girls are greatly motivated to seek out, and are responsive to, medical care that would reduce that visibility and make the girls more acceptable as marriage partners (unpublished WHO surveys on chronic disability, 1978).
There is a close relationship between nutrition and health care, as evidenced by the close interrelationship between malnourishment and susceptibility to disease, as well as the effect of disease upon the ability to absorb nutrients. Infant and child mortality, and maternal mortality, are therefore good indicators of both health and nutritional status, as well as of such prevailing environmental conditions as those relating to water, sewage, housing and so on. It has thus been found that more than 50 percent of child mortality is attributable to malnutrition as the underlying or associated cause (Singarimbun and Hull 1977). In 60 to 75 percent of the cases of death from diarrhea, malnutrition is the associated cause of death. When children are malnourished, common childhood diseases such as measles also have much higher fatality rates than occur when children are well nourished (Scrimshaw, et al. 1969).

The observed sex-based inequalities in the intrafamilial distribution of food, as well as in the allocation of resources for health care, are expected to be reflected in mortality rates. A crucial factor is the earlier weaning of female than of male infants as a reflection of a greater maternal concern for, and investment in, sons. This practice is associated with higher mortality rates. Thus, in rural Punjab, the mortality rate of the first five years of life for girls is almost 150 percent higher than that for boys (Wyon and Gordon 1971). Also, a recent UNICEF project in Turkey showed that during the first month of life while girls are still protected by a greater degree of genetic immunity than are boys, boys have a higher mortality rate from diarrhea than girls. After the first month, however, girls increasingly have higher rates of mortality from diarrhea than do boys. This trend is due to differences in the duration of breast-feeding and to other nutritional inequalities that increase their susceptibility to diarrhea. In general, the mortality rates of preschool girls are much higher than those of boys in proportion as the food is more scarce and the health care more inaccessible, and also the society more patriarchal and the economic dependence of women on men more pronounced. The more these conditions change through income distribution and/or greater educational and economic opportunities for women, then the lower the mortality rates and the lesser the sex differences.

Beyond the sharp sex differences in infant mortality, however, the overall high infant mortality rate impinges on the affective nature of the parent-child and mother-child relationship in that no great emotional investment can be made in any one particular child. While anthropologists have observed this pattern to be true, we do not know what are its implications. Further, since infant girls die more often than infant boys, does this make mothers less attached to, and less caring for, daughters than for boys?

A maternal mortality rate is another important consequence of nutritional inequalities adversely affecting lactating and pregnant women. In addition, women have a much higher incidence of iron anemia than do men (for example, in Indonesia it is twice as high among women), mainly because of menstruation and multiple pregnancies aggravated by nutritional deficits. Iron anemia among men and women lowers their energy level and productivity (Basta and Churchill 1974) and increases fatigue and susceptibility to
infections and parasitic diseases. In fact, the combination of malnutrition and iron anemia increases the susceptibility of pregnant women to infections and parasitic diseases. This is especially so when the pregnancy or birth occurs during the "hungry and sick season" of high labor demand, low food availability and wet weather and the breaking of vector-borne diseases such as malaria and guinea worm. It is responsible for a high rate of maternal mortality (Chambers 1979; and Chambers, et al. 1979).

The exhaustion of women stemming from continuous pregnancies and lactation periods while they are both malnourished and overworked has been called the "maternal depletion syndrome." It is responsible for a high maternal mortality rate, and for low life expectancy for women. In those societies in which not only is female infant mortality higher than male infant mortality but also maternal mortality is high, the life expectancy of women is equal to, or lower than, that of men. The male-to-female ratios are especially high after age 40 as, for example, in Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Jordan. In India, for example, for every 1,000 men there are 930 women; in Pakistan, for every 1,000 men there are only 900 women (Bose 1975). Again, as, through successful income distribution, food scarcity among the poor is reduced, as health care becomes more accessible, and as environmental conditions improve and/or as women begin to have more educational and economic opportunities, the life expectancy of women improves dramatically and surpasses by 3-5 years that of men. The recent trends in Sri Lanka, Korea, Thailand, Costa Rica and Chile are good illustrations of these relationships.

4. Interactions Between Malnourishment, Disease, Poor Mental Development and Learning Ability, and Low Productivity

While malnutrition increases susceptibility to infections, infections on the other hand tend to affect nutrition in many ways. These include a lesser absorption of ingested calories, food withdrawal and anorexia (loss of appetite), and fewer losses and diarrhea. The effects of infections on the nutritional status of preschool children are more dramatic when these children were already malnourished at the onset of the infection, which is responsible for pushing them over the borderline to malnutrition (Scrimshaw, et al. 1968). A study of the effects of round worms on preschool Kenyan children concluded that children with light infections absorbed less nutrients corresponding to a food loss of about 3 percent of ingested calories, while heavy infections could lead up to a corresponding food loss of 25 percent (Latham, Latham and Basta 1977).

A recent comprehensive and critical review of the literature concerning the nutritional effects on infections on young children concluded that it is difficult to separate the effects of any single infection on nutrition, especially since most poor children suffer from a number of different infections at any time. After assessing methodological considerations, the review concludes that, in Bangladesh, about 9 percent of the food available to children under 5 is not utilized for maintenance, growth or activity, and that the elimination of all sources of infections could reduce the under-utilization to 3 percent. Further, the review includes
evidence from studies indicating that the presence of diarrhea in infections has very important nutritional consequences because children malabsorb about 8 percent of their caloric intake and because mothers tend to reduce food during the episode of diarrhea by at least 30 percent (Briscoe 1979). It is interesting here to note that the intrafamilial nutritional response to a symptom, diarrhea, may have more, or as serious, nutritional consequences as the metabolic effects of the symptom itself. Because a combination of fever and diarrhea as infection symptoms seem to have the greatest negative effect on the nutritional status of children, malaria and gastroenteritis were found in Gambia to have a significantly negative affect on the weight gain of children, while other infections did not (Rowland, et al. 1977).

The vicious circle of malnutrition and disease negatively affects children and drastically diminishes their chances for education, training and escape from poverty. There is ample evidence that malnutrition affects the mental development of children and their ability to learn, although there is some disagreement as to the extent, the nature and the reversibility of the effects (Smart 1972; Cravioto et al. 1966, Cravioto and Delicardie 1976; Reutlinger and Selowsky 1979). The permanence of the mental developmental impairments seems to vary according to the age at which malnutrition occurs, and with its severity and duration (Cravioto and Delicardie 1976). Children who were treated for malnutrition when they were toddlers were thus found to perform 25 percent below the mean in scholastic achievement at the primary school level (Heyneman and Jamison 1980). Survivors of severe early malnutrition, even after clinical recovery, also show a severe lag in language development (Cravioto and Delicardie 1976). Girls, therefore, who are malnourished more often than boys in the first years of life, would tend to be at a serious disadvantage when they get to school.

But even more important is the fact that many of the children in low-income families, whether they were severely malnourished or not early in life, are undernourished when they go to school and are very often hungry, especially during the "hungry and sick season." Sustained hunger has the same consequences noted above for the classroom behavior and the learning ability of schoolchildren, even when their brains are not permanently damaged. In other words, hungry as well as malnourished children show apathy, lethargy, inability to pay attention and concentrate, and lack of responsiveness ("The Relationship of Nutrition to Brain Development" 1973). This lack of responsiveness and concentration makes teachers not interact with such children as much as with other students, and also to have very low expectations from them. This becomes a situation of self-fulfilling prophecy for the students. Hunger and malnutrition characterize the majority of low-income primary school students who have less energy, interest, and ability to learn than higher-income students. Studies from Thailand, for example, tie malnutrition and ill health to irregular attendance, failure in examinations and dropping out of school (Brimer and Paulo 1971).

In the case of adults, it has been found that the productivity of nonanemic adult males in Indonesia is 20 percent higher than that of anemic males (Basta and Churchill 1974). In this way, anemic individuals work less, earn less money, and have less money available for food. The same
trend is true for men and women whose malnourishment, anemia and/or different types of infections lower their stamina and productivity and, thus, render them less able to provide the family with food and cash. This is particularly true for rural women who, as we have seen, are overworked, anemic and malnourished most of the time and more so than men (especially when they are pregnant or lactating -- which is most of the time). These women are also suffering from infections yet, despite all these debilitating factors, they contribute considerably to and (in the case of sub-Saharan African countries, supply most of) agricultural labor.

5. Intrafamilial Allocation of Resources for Education

Among landless peasants or marginal landowners investments in education do not have high priority, since their payoff is viewed as uncertain and questionable. The urgent immediate concern with the survival of the family and with the avoidance of even deeper slippage into poverty defines the utility of children in terms of labor and economic contributions. From the point of view of the children, investments in their education would represent more rational long-term strategies. This is because such investments could pay off by increasing the probability that they and their children would be able to escape the vicious circle of poverty, malnutrition, ill health, and low productivity and life expectancy. But the decisions concerning their education and their lives are made by their parents. Family survival therefore comes before their individual welfare, unless their parents should think that the two coincide. All children, as we have seen, have a high degree of short-range utility as suppliers of labor for housework, childcare, and productive activities, and contribute, on the average, up to one-third of the total family income (Evenson, Popkin, King-Quizon 1979). The economic efficiency of households has been found to increase with greater total work input from children (Nag, et al. 1977). Parents, therefore, are not highly motivated to forego such important contributions by their children for the uncertainty of education. Sons and daughters, however, have a different utility for the family. Daughters have more of a short-range utility as labor available to the household until they get married (most often at a very early age). Sons offer both a short-range utility as labor and as additional income-earners, as well as a long-range utility as providers of social security. Because of this perceived long-range utility of sons, parents are more inclined to invest financial resources in the education of their sons and to partially forego their labor contributions, anticipating higher, later, economic returns (Court and Ghai 1974). There is evidence that in some areas, for example, in Tanzania, peasant parents educate their sons because they hope that these offspring will escape rural poverty and go to the cities to get a gainful occupation outside of farming. Once established in the urban environment, they will therefore be able to send remittances back home or even to take their parents along with them. Some parents are reported to feel that their sons have failed when, after completing primary education or a few years of secondary education, they stay on to cultivate the land as they themselves have done (Dubbeldam 1970).
Further, in those areas in which parents are financially burdened with providing dowries to their daughters, sons are viewed as potentially able to make important economic contributions and to share this burden with their parents. In Nepal, for example, it was found that the more daughters there were in a family, the more schooling the father wanted for his sons (Lockheed and Jamison 1979). The parents were presumably thus trying to maximize the economic return from their sons.

It is necessary to clarify at this juncture that we are not saying that sons in fact fulfill their role as providing social security to their parents and the entire households, but rather that they are perceived as such, given the absence of any other type of social security. The "rationality" of this belief is based on the reality that in many (but not all) less developed countries and regions men usually have better chances than women to find employment, to be adequately paid and to escape poverty. In addition, women, after they marry, usually come under the authority of their husband and are no longer able to maintain allegiance with their family of orientation. The fewer the resources of the family, the more this differential investment in education on the basis of gender becomes accentuated. It would be a fair generalization to state that when the family has at its disposal sufficient resources for all children to complete at least primary education, then all boys go to primary school or beyond, and the educational chances for girls are primarily determined by their own ability and interest in education. When the family has very few resources at its disposal, however, and it becomes necessary to set priorities and choose among children, then almost uniformly the family chooses to educate one or more sons over any daughter, regardless of her ability or interest. In rural Malaysia, for example, low socioeconomic status represents an important barrier to the access by Chinese women to formal education, but not to such access by Chinese men (Dropout Study 1973). In rural India, the access to schooling by girls is twice as much affected by the size of parental landholdings as is that by boys (Joshi and Rao 1964).

In matrilineal societies, however, daughters are also perceived as social security since they interact closely with their mothers' household and, in the traditional rural culture, often belong to it (at least residentially), even after marriage (Oppong 1978). In some developing countries, as more women, even after marriage, successfully undertake income-generating activities and help their parents, the perceptual balance begins to shift. In Thailand, for example, a matrilineal society in which the daughter's family lives close to the parents and in which married women keep not only the income they earn but after the entire family income, the parents like to have daughters as much as they like having sons, and expect them to take care of them in old age (Status of Thai Women in Two Rural Areas 1979). This expectation is related to the fact that even rural Thai women have universal access to literacy and enjoy low infant mortality and high life expectancy. Similarly, in Hong Kong daughters marry late. In the interim they work and they help out their parents and are thus equally viewed with sons as providing social security (Salaff, 1976). Again, women in Hong Kong enjoy better access to education, health care and a long life expectancy.
It seems, therefore, that the perception of daughters as having long-range utility as social security tends to equalize the intrafamily distribution of resources for education, as well as of food and health care, between boys and girls. What we do not know is what is the "tipping" or "turning" point at which social changes influence parents' perceptions to shift toward viewing their daughters as well, or even more so, than their sons as social security rather than liabilities. We do have some evidence, however, as to the nature of some of these changes. Two such trends will now be analyzed in order to round off the discussion.

First, the changes occur when national and/or international development programs provide equal training and income-generating opportunities to women and to men; when they employ women as health and/or nutrition paraprofessionals, as teachers or assistance teachers, as community development (animatrices sociales) multipurpose community workers, as family planning workers, or as agricultural extension workers (or paraprofessionals); and when they help establish women's credit or market cooperatives. We also know that these developmental programs must provide a certain degree of security and continuity in women's income-generating opportunities in order to have a significant impact. But we do not know how many women with what characteristics of age or marital status must be trained, employed, or involved in income-generating activities. We do not know for how long such involvement is necessary, or how much income the women must be able to generate (in comparison to men). We do not know what degree of security and continuity in their income-generating activities girls and women must have before an equal or greater allocation of meager resources for their education (or their food and health care) is made by the family. There is some evidence, however, that in societies in which women were viewed as family liabilities even small changes can have an important symbolic value. An experimental project, for example, undertaken in 1968 by UNESCO in Nepal showed that the training and employment of rural women as primary school teachers increased the average enrollment of girls in the primary schools of the districts concerned from 13 to 25 percent of all primary school students by 1973 (UNESCO 1975).

A second important social change that helps increase the value of women's education occurs when modernization redefines it as an asset in marriage and especially when it begins to be viewed as an important supplement to, or even a substitute for, a dowry. For as long as low-income parents have to pay a dowry, they tend to view that dowry as their contribution to their daughters' welfare, and it replaces educational investments. There is some evidence that, even in the rural areas of many developing countries such as in India or in the Muslim North of Nigeria, literate women and women with a primary school education are becoming more desirable brides than are illiterate ones (Jacobson 1976; Peshkin 1973). What we do not know is the basis for this change. Are literate and educated wives more desirable because they have a higher status? Are they desirable because they can be more productive farm or business partners? Or because they know how to raise healthier children? The most plausible explanation is most probably points to a combination of higher status and income-generating ability. If this is so, some important questions must be answered before we can determine
the turning point for the equalization of women's access to education: What level and what type of training must a low-income rural or urban woman have before it can be considered to be as good as money, or land, or other goods? And is it only when the education and/or training of low-income women can lead to income-generating activities that is it considered a substitute for dowry?

C. The Mediating Role of Kinship and the Family in the Access to the Bases of Agricultural Productivity

Access to land, and access to the opportunities exemplified by credit, agricultural skills, and information, are the twin themes that must be discussed in assessing the mediating role of kinship and of the family in access to the bases of agricultural productivity. Each theme will now be considered.

1. Access to Land

Poor rural households have been called "assetless." But in fact the important asset that they lack is land, since they are invariably either landless or near landless (Lassen 1979). While we do not have exact figures as to the percentage of landless and near landless rural households which are female-headed we do know that female-headed households are much more frequently landless (Arthur and McNicoll 1978) and poorer than are male-headed households, mainly because they lack the labor contributions of men (Buvinic and Youssef 1978). In fact, some researchers hypothesize that landlessness encourages the rise of women-headed households (Slater 1977), most probably by driving the men to migrate in search of wage employment (Buvinic and Youssef 1978).

The modes of access to land vary widely from country to country and region to region. In general land may be acquired through: (a) inheritance; (b) allocation by clan or national council; (c) clearing of new lands; and (d) buying. In many sub-Saharan countries, the land belongs to the tribe or clan or village and is allocated by tribal chiefs, clan chiefs or village councils to households according to traditional land rights. In some regions and tribes, only men can inherit land or apply to their clan for it; in others, such as, for example, the Zaramo and Luguru in Tanzania, women also have the right to inherit or to apply to their clan for land (Fortman 1979).

In patrilineal societies in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia, land can be inherited only by sons. Although laws have recently extended this right to daughters (often a right to half of the land share of a son), daughters are usually informally pressured to forfeit their share for the sake of their brothers, if they wish to enjoy the continued protection and support of their families and brothers (Cain 1979). While the custom of daughters forfeiting their land rights on behalf of brothers may help decrease to some extent further land fragmentation, it tends to significantly increase the dependence of women on men during widowhood, and to contribute to the creation of more landless female-headed households.
Land fragmentation is not avoided, however, since land has had to be equally divided among several sons from generation to generation.

Land fragmentation can become quite excessive when the land tenure system is such that it is very difficult for family land to be leased or sold by the head of the clan or by the family to nonfamily members, even when it is surplus land. This situation holds for Ghana where the operation of the land tenure system prevents small scale farmers from acquiring sufficient pieces of land necessary to cater to changed farming needs (Tomakloe 1978).

Access to land through the clearing of new lands is a viable possibility only in a few countries and regions (for example in some sub-Saharan countries) where there is plenty of unutilized land. It is an option predominantly open to male and not to female farmers, partly because it is very strenuous work but mainly because traditional sex roles have defined it as a "masculine" activity. Among the Ashanti of Ghana, for example, only 6 percent of women farmers did all the clearing themselves and 15 percent took part in land clearing along with men (Assante 1977).

A question which has not been systematically researched and which cannot, therefore, be at present answered, pertains to what types of land allocation and inheritance are more conducive to higher productivity of the family as a unit, or, alternatively, to higher productivity of individual family members. We know that inheritance laws that lead to land fragmentation diminish productivity but we do not know what inheritance laws and land allocations enhance productivity and help decrease rural poverty. We also know that land reforms, modern land inheritance laws and rural development programs which ignore women's traditional usufruct rights and have title deeds registered in male names only serve to decrease the productivity of female farmers in subsistence farming for which they are responsible. These trends have been well documented with regard to the land reform in Kenya (Pa:a 1976) and village settlement programs in Tanzania (Brain 1976) which deprived women of their own small piece of land and thus of their autonomy and their importance for the survival of the family.

Access to land is a critical issue for the majority of rural people in developing countries, as well as for rural women, whether poor or nonpoor. Yet keeping the small piece of land, the tools or the livestock that poor farmers possess is an equally problematic issue. Seasonal poverty brings about recurrent risks of having to sell the small piece of land or livestock in order to hospitalize a seriously ill family member (Chambers 1979). The high incidence of parasitic and infectious diseases during the wet season coincides with scarcity of food and high work demands and is often responsible for the inability to work on the part of adult family members, thus seriously endangering the next year's crops and exacerbating poverty among the marginal small landowners. Data from rural Bangladesh show how downward social mobility and an aggravation of poverty through the loss of land is a real threat for the near-landless. Since 1960, the proportion of the landless has increased at an exponential rate of growth of between 5 and 7 percent per year (Clay 1978). Further, because of the
large age differences between husbands and wives, married rural women can be expected to be widows on the average for about 10 years. Because of the breakdown of the traditional kin obligations and the land inheritance laws, they can also often be expected to be landless. It seems, therefore, that policies and programs aiming to reduce poverty should aim to help small landowners and women from slipping deeper into poverty by developing alternative income-generating activities to those of agriculture.

2. Access to Credit, Agricultural Skills and Information

Rural poverty in developing countries is perpetuated by the inability of the landless farmers to get credit, and by their lack of possession of those agricultural skills and the information which together could enable them to increase productivity. Agricultural extension workers have been found to visit rich farmers more often than poor farmers, as research from Kenya has shown (Staudt 1979). Poor farmers therefore have less chance than do rich ones to learn about important agricultural innovations, available agricultural training, information regarding access to loans, and less chance generally to receive valuable advice and help. It seems that the existing agricultural extension service tends to build up the potential of well-off farmers, and thus to deepen inequalities between rich and poor farmers.

These trends are accentuated when the low-income farms are managed by a woman, rather than jointly by a man and woman. Only half of the low-income women farm managers in the Kakamega district in Kenya (where 40 percent of households are female-headed) had ever been visited by agricultural extension workers while three quarters of similarly low-income farms with a man present had received such visits. Also, jointly-managed farms have had four times as many household members trained in agriculture and have been 14 times as likely to be informed about, or the recipients of, loans than have female-managed farms (Staudt 1979).

Similar trends have been reported for rural Tanzania even after women farmers participate in an agricultural project. Extension agents visited 58 percent of the men farmers, but only 20 percent of the women farmers, who participated in the National Maize Project (Fortman 1976). This situation is mainly due to the fact that most of the extension agents are men and do not feel comfortable interacting with women farmers, while they also think that women do not understand agriculture, cannot reason, and, therefore, will be wasting their time. It has been found, however, that women farmers who participate in agricultural projects are as progressive as the men who do, and women who do not participate are as traditional as men who do not (Fortman 1977). In Swaziland, women have demonstrated that they are more receptive to new farming ideas than are men (Perspectives on the Role of Women in Food Production, Food Handling and Nutrition 1977). Further, data from Tanzania show that even in jointly-managed farms, information passed on from an agricultural extension worker to the husband is not necessarily passed on to the wife who is at least equally (if indeed not more so than the husband) involved in farming (Fortman 1976).
It seems, therefore, that the agricultural extension service tends to increase not only income, but also sex inequalities between farmers. These effects are even further compounded by the fact that rural female-headed households tend to be poorer than male-headed households, at least partly because the labor or wages of men are missing (Buvinic and Youssef, 1978).

The accentuation of important sex inequalities in agriculture also comes about through the unequal access of men and women farmers to cooperatives and to new technologies. Most agricultural research is directed toward cash crops rather than toward subsistence crops. New technologies, such as the ultra-low-volume sprayer, are thereby distributed only to male cotton growers. The same sprayer could easily be used by women on maize, but women have no access to it (Fortman 1979). In many developing countries, notably those in the Middle East, North Africa and low-income Asia, cooperatives tend to be dominated by men. Access by women to cooperatives has been usually secured in such countries as Bangladesh and India, however, by setting up women's rural cooperatives.
IV. FAMILY STRATEGIES TO COPE WITH POVERTY

What are the strategies that families organize to cope with poverty? Five such strategies can be identified. The first involves the use of children as a labor pool and as social security. The second is expressed through female-headed household. The third concerns flexibility in household organization. The fourth involves varied sources of income, and several income-earning members. The fifth concerns various manifestations of migration.

A. Children as Labor Pool and Social Security

This strategy has been already discussed in some detail in the preceding section with respect to intrafamilial allocations of labor and resources. It will therefore merely be mentioned here for the sake of completeness.

B. Female-Headed Households

In some Latin American and Caribbean societies in which male unemployment is very high, men suffer from chronic financial marginality and keep moving from place to place in search of employment (a strategy discussed later in this section under the leading of migration). They cannot, therefore, be relied upon for the financial support of a family and women prefer not to make permanent marriage commitments to any one of them. Instead, within this context, the more viable alternative in coping with poverty is for women to maintain flexible, intermittent relationships with men, who from time to time assume limited financial responsibility, until the women can find a man to marry who has stable employment. Meanwhile, because the women have no permanent, official relationship with a man who is financially responsible for them and the children, they in fact remain the head of the household and can still claim kin assistance. They develop patterns of sharing resources with such close kin members as parents, brothers and sisters, as well as with such more distant relatives grandparents, nephews and nieces, and so on. The flexibility in residence, kinship and mating patterns represented by female-headed consanguineous households and consensual unions in the West Indies thus offers the best opportunity in that society for pooling resources and coping with poverty. Intermittent mating, furthermore, allows the extension of cooperative bonds between different sets of kin, bonds which persist beyond the duration of the conjugal or quasi-conjugal bond (Whitehead 1978). In addition, polygyny in the West Indies consisting of a legal and a consensual relationship also represents an adaptation on the part of economically marginal men to an environment of poverty (Whitehead 1978).

C. Flexibility in Household Organization

A very important coping strategy utilized by poor households involves dynamic changes and rearrangements in their structure and composition.
There is evidence that poor families vary their structure and composition through different stages of the family cycle in their attempt to adapt to imbalances between family resources and consumption profiles (Concepcion and Landa-Jacano 1975; Tienda 1978a and 1978b). During the "life cycle squeeze," that is, the family stage during which income deficits may be experienced because too many dependent young children are present, the balance between family resources and consumption may be restored by strategically extending the household with kin members who can share the domestic and/or market activities (Tienda 1978b).

This process of extension of the family as a coping strategy among the poor also occurs through "doubling up" of the new family of a child with his (her) parents during the financially difficult launching years (Cain 1978). Yet another adaptive strategy of poor households is the addition of kin to replace such missing family members as a departed son or daughter or a spouse lost temporarily or permanently through migration, separation, divorce or death (Burch 1967; Gendel and Walker 1977; Van der Tak and Gendell 1973; Walker and Gendell 1976). Partly because female-headed households need to replace the absent spouse and his labor and/or economic contributions, and partly because, as we have seen, female-headed households are poorer than male-headed intact households, the former more often than the latter tend to try to cope with poverty by adding kin members through "doubling up" or through a great variety of other mechanisms (Kendall 1978). Further, women in some sub-Saharan African countries have been reported to opt for polygyny as an adaptation that allows them to share household and agricultural responsibilities with the second wife and thus have more time for market activities or simply to be able to safeguard their health and survival (Safilios-Rothschild 1980; Dobert, undated; McSweeney 1979).

These extensions of poor households are not necessarily permanent. Most often they are either seasonal (Whitehead 1978) or changing throughout the different stages of the family cycle (Tienda 1978a). Here it must be noted that household organizational cycles may be experienced differently by men and women. This is especially so in sub-Saharan African countries in which lives of men and women are often autonomous and to some extent separate (Sanjek and Sanjek 1976).

Organizational changes in households do not always entail extensions through the addition of kin. Sometimes, on the contrary, the changes may involve restrictions or substitutions. Children, for example, may be "farmed out" for some time to kin when economic and structural conditions within the family are not optimal for child-rearing. In some rural areas of Ghana, for example, up to 40 percent of the children may be found living in kin families in the fashion (Bleek 1975). These absent children may or may not be replaced by adult kin members who can more efficiently share domestic and/or productive responsibilities.

Because longitudinal data are seldom available, it is difficult to assess to what extent, and under what conditions, the addition of subtraction of kin during different seasons or stages of the family cycle is a helpful
mechanism. It is, however, clear that the households, especially the poor households, in developing countries change their structure and their composition and adopt flexible residential and organizational characteristics according to the economic and social conditions they experience. It follows that these cyclical and/or seasonal organizational changes of households must be taken into consideration in development planning.

D. Several Sources of Income, and Several Income-Earning Members

Probably the most important coping strategy of poor households is the diversification of sources of income and the use of multiple income earners. Even when the rural poor have a small piece of land, they need to have additional nonfarm sources of income to safeguard against bad crops, and other seasonal risks and emergencies which might force them to sell the land, the livestock, or farming equipment. Additional sources of income can be secured through the generation of income by more than one family member. Included in this process are wives, children, older parents and other kin. The ILO report on Kenya estimated, for example, that in 1972 about 44 percent of peasants needed additional income from nonfarm activities, and this 44 percent did not include another 22 percent of landless rural households. In Bangladesh, wives and children of small and marginal landowners have been found to work for wages in order to help the family accumulate resources and/or be able to buy some more land (Who Gets What and Why; Resource Allocation in a Bangladesh Village 1979). In the case of landless farmers and urban low-income people, the strategy of utilizing many income-generating family members is vital for survival. This is because no single member earns a sufficient income to support the family. As this strategy is the key to family survival, we find that women generate some income even in Muslim countries like Bangladesh. They do this in two ways. Either they sell foodstuffs through their children, older female kin, or their husbands (Abdullah and Zeldenstein 1976; Who Gets What and Why: Resource Allocation in a Bangladesh Village 1979); or, in landless or female-headed households, they work for wages or food (Women in Food-For-Work 1979). Women’s contribution are, of course, much more sizeable if, in addition to market income, the value of home production is also taken into consideration. In the Philippines, for example, the market income of women averages about one third that of their husbands, but their full income (market income plus home production) is somewhat higher. Children’s income contributions follow a similar pattern (Evenson, Popkin and King-Quizon 1979). These data, however, are based on households in different socioeconomic groups. This tends to obscure the fact that women’s market income is twice as high in poor as it is in nonpoor households, (as has been documented for rural Bangladesh (Cain 1979) and also that their income contributions are often as high, if not higher, than those of their husbands (Women in Food-for-Work 1979; Delaya 1978).

Among the urban poor, male heads of households often earn less than 50 percent of the total household income. Secondary earners, such as women, and children 15-19 years old, contribute the other half of the income. They do so mostly by working in the informal sector. In Belo Horizonte, for example, it was found that if this additional income from
secondary earners were not available, more than twice as many households would be in poverty (Sant'Anna 1974). This pattern also partly explains why many more urban female-headed households are poor than are male-headed ones. Again, in Belo Horizonte, for example, 81 percent of female-headed households were either poor or low-income (Sant'Anna 1974). In such households, women are primary rather than secondary earners and only children serve as secondary earners, unless the households extend to include other working kin. In fact, the importance of the availability of employment in the informal sector for women and for children 15-19 years old at a location not too far from where the urban poor live (since they cannot afford high transport costs) explains why relocation projects placing urban slum dwellers in government housing at a distance from the city have experienced high default rates. In such cases, the move out of the city means a move away from high-income neighborhoods. These could provide the poor, and especially the women, with a variety of service and other informal sector jobs. Yet these are eliminated, very few women (and children) can work, and the total household income decreases significantly. The net result is that many more households are now poor. This process has been documented for urban relocation schemes in Rio de Janeiro (Rush 1974; Sant'Anna 1974) and New Delhi.

E. Migration

While national and international migration is a strategy which may be undertaken by the well-to-do and the educated in search of greater opportunities, it may also be a strategy for coping with poverty. The migrations of the ensuring two economically and socially divergent groups represent very different phenomena in terms of both motivation and outcomes (Faaland 1979; Chaudhury 1979; Gibbal 1974). In the present discussion the focus is only on the outcomes of the migration of the poor, who undertake it in an attempt to avoid slipping into deeper poverty, and with the hope of possible improvement in their condition.

In developing countries, migration is sometimes the result individual behavior; most often, however, it is largely the result of a family or a household decision (Stark 1979; Connell, et al. 1976). Marginal rural families with several sons may send one son away in search of wages which may, they hope, help the entire family. For example, in rural Bangladesh, and among the Pungabi, the third son of low-income families is often educated. He may be the one who is expected to maximize the familial investment in education through migration; the young sons as a group may act as a substitute for his efforts in this regard (Who Gets What and Why: Resource Allocation in a Bangladesh Village 1979; Wyon and Gordon 1971). Temporarily, seasonally or for an indefinite time period husbands, too, may migrate to other rural areas, to cities or to foreign countries in search of wages. As a result, farming is partially or entirely left up to their wives. Increasingly, young unmarried women and, to a lesser extent, widowed or divorced women migrate to the cities to seek work (Youssef, et al. 1979).
Rural-urban migration may or may not help to redistribute income and decrease inequalities between the rich and the poor in the rural areas (Faaland 1979; Chaudhry 1979). From the point of view of the individual low-income family, however, migration is a successful coping strategy when two conditions apply.

In the first instance, the individual family member who migrates obtains a job and sends back remittances. These help the family survive in terms of food, staying out of debt, not having to sell parcels of land during the slack season or in case of illness, and not slipping deeper into poverty (Chaudhury 1979; Adepoju 1974; Johnson and Whitelaw 1972). To a lesser extent, remittances help finance the education of a younger brother. Only in exceptional cases are the remittances so substantial (or the needs of the family for subsistence so sufficiently filled) that the money can be used to buy cattle, tools or land. In rural Bangladesh, for example, only 7 percent of the poor families used remittances to buy land, while 33 percent of the well-to-do families did so (Chaudhury 1979). While the income of poor rural families tends to increase somewhat as a result of the remittances of a migrant member, in most cases their poverty level does not, therefore; allow them to use the small increments in income for upward social mobility.

The second condition of success is met when the migrating family member, especially in the case of a husband obtains more or less secure employment and brings his family to the city. In such cases his wife and adolescent children can also become secondary wage-earners. Most frequently, however, the lack of education, skills and resources in the family leads to the entire unit becoming involved in the informal sector. Here, wages are quite low and employment security and health benefits are absent. (Cardona 1979; Faaland 1979). Further, the higher expenses required in the city for food, rent, transport and clothing drastically diminish the potential benefits from the relatively higher urban, so opposed to agriculture, wages (Cardona, 1979; Faaland 1979). The family therefore lives in squatter settlements with few, if any, amenities; the children seldom have more educational opportunities; and poverty prevents the migrants from taking advantage of the urban services and opportunities. Detailed data from Abidjan show how such poor, uneducated urban migrants live in low-income enclaves isolated and cut-off from the modern sector of the city and its benefits (Cibbal 1974). Except in extreme cases in which the family was landless and there were no income-generating opportunities in the village, it is difficult to conclude whether or not the lives of the members of migrant families have improved through migration. This is because it is difficult to assess the results of alternative income-generating strategies that the family might have used if they had not migrated (Faaland 1979).

In general, migration of the landless rural poor is often seasonal. The move is to other villages which seem to offer greater opportunities for employment. The move to the new villages can help the migrating persons avoid starvation and directly and indirectly alleviate family poverty (Connel, et al. 1976; Chaudhry 1979). Migration of the poor to the cities, unless the individuals are among the privileged few who are educated, does not open access to the higher urban living standards. It can, however, alleviate the poverty of their rural families and may open up some possibilities for upward social mobility for the second generation of urban migrants.
V. FAMILY CHANGE AND IMPACT ON POVERTY

"Modernization" is imported into developing countries even to the poor, via a variety of national and international, governmental, and private developmental and entrepreneurial programs and projects. Some relevant elements of this "modernization" are: the creation of a variety of wage employment originally primarily for men, but increasingly also (or even more so) for women; the monetization of agriculture by emphasizing cash crops; the mechanization of agriculture; the introduction of Western laws regarding land rights; and the introduction of international trade laws and regulations. Partly as an outcome of the above changes, and partly independently, such countries become increasingly urbanized. This is especially the case with African and Latin American countries where rural populations are still large. The result is that the traditional balance of intrafamilial interdependencies, rights and responsibilities often becomes seriously disturbed. It is this last type of social change, and its impact on poverty, which concerns us here. Two major themes will be assessed: the spread of female-headed households, and its causes; and changes in the prevailing division of labor and in the interdependencies of roles within the family.

A. The Spread of Female-Headed Households

Probably the most profound change in families in the developing countries has been the phenomenal increase of female-headed households in both rural areas and urban slums. Women heads of households are under-estimated because of a male bias operating in census enumerations. This operates because, first, men who have abandoned their families, but who are not legally divorced, are still counted as heads; or, second, because in Muslim countries 12 year old sons are counted as heads (Buvnic and Youssef 1978). Despite such underestimations, which are often serious, female-headed households still constitute from about 25 to 35 percent of all households in developing countries. This percentage is, however, much higher for some regions, such as those rural areas in Kenya in which 40 percent of the households are female-headed, or in cases when de facto female-headed households are included (Buvnic and Youssef 1978; Whitehead 1978). Although there are no systematic data, the evidence points toward the existence of a larger percentage of female-headed households among landless peasants (Cain 1979) and among the urban poor partly because the important income contributions from men are lacking (Buvnic and Youssef 1978). In a study of pavement [sidewalk] dwellers in Bombay it was found, for example, that 39 percent of the households were headed by women (Ramachandran 1972).

What are the causes of these trends? Four such factors will now be identified.

1. Rural-to-urban Migration or Emigration of Male Heads

This movement in search of work opportunities in the cities or in foreign countries is the first factor helping explain the trend to female-headed
households. In such countries as Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and the two Yemens, it is emigration to Northern Europe or to the oil-producing countries that creates female-headed households. In sub-Saharan African countries, it is male migration to the towns and cities that creates de facto rural female-headed households; occasionally, the separation between the urban-based husband and his rural family becomes permanent. In the case of Zambia, where the men migrate to work in the mines, they still retain the decision-making power so that the female heads they leave behind can only make some limited decisions on their own.

2. Widowhood

This is increasingly becoming an important factor in the creation of female-headed households, because traditional kinship bonds and obligations are weakening. In most developing countries, the wide age disparities between spouses guarantee a lengthy widowhood for women of a decade or more, the incidence of widowhood being greater among the poor (Cain 1978). In rural Nigeria, for example, a woman who marries a man 10-15 years older than herself faces a 2:1 to 3:1 probability that she will survive her husband (Mott 1974). Further, high infant and child mortality rates among the poor increase the probability that widows may not have any sons living. In Bangladesh, for example, it has been documented that more than 26 percent of women in poor households in their 40s had no living sons (Arthur and McNicoll 1978). In the event of widowhood they would thus face extreme poverty, since the lack of sons would deprive them access to their late husband’s land and other assets.

Until the present, depending on prevailing lineage rules, the parents or in-laws of widows would take both of them and their children into their own households and look after them. There is increasing evidence, however, that these traditional obligations are weakening, the more so since the addition of an assetless widow and her children to a marginal household would aggravate poverty, and most probably lead to landlessness. Widows are left to fend for themselves and for their children (Shah 1976; Arthur and McNicoll 1978; Women in Food-for-Work 1979; "Social and Economic Development in Upper Volta -- Women’s Perspective" 1978). Widowed women over 25-30 years old with children also have little chance of remarrying; they therefore create and support their own female-headed households. In an Islamic society like that of Morocco, for example, about one-fourth of urban widows are working; in Nepal, the proportion is one-third; and in the Philippines, it is 46 percent (Buvinic and Youssef 1978).

In rural areas, the economic situation of widows is often worse than it is in urban areas. The season is that according to traditional inheritance laws in many developing countries, with Upper Volta being typical in this respect, widows could not inherit their deceased husband’s land. In addition there are fewer income-generating opportunities for women. The family of the husband therefore inherited the land and, in return, they took care of his widow and children while a male relative would marry her. Today, however, because the traditional kinship obligations are breaking down (especially if the supply of land is limited or if
the widow has many children), or because the widow refuses to be treated as "goods" and be married to whomever the head of the family chooses, the result is more often than not a landless female-headed household ("Social and Economic Development in Upper Volta - Women's Perspective" 1978). In other countries, for example, in Kenya, the widow is seldom able to have the land of her late husband registered in her name. Instead, the land is either registered in the name of her sons, or she is named co-heir with her sons (or son). This situation places the mother in a dependent status vis-à-vis her sons. Traditional familial values seem to be changing enough, however, and the mutuality of obligations weakening to such an extent that occasionally sons have taken away the land from their mothers and left them destitute (Jones 1979). Thus, at present the large majority of women-headed households in Asia and Muslim countries and a considerable number in Latin America and West Africa are widows and most of them are landless and poor.

3. Separation and Divorce

Marital instability as expressed by divorce and by desertion is quite extensive in some sub-Saharan African, as well as in some Arab, countries. The number of nonlegal separations, for example, has been on the increase as men migrate to cities. Once there, they often abandon their original families and establish another family in the city, without bothering to legally divorce their first wife. In any event, high rates of divorce lead to the creation of female-headed households to an even greater extent than does widowhood. This is because traditional kin obligations are upheld even less frequently in the case of divorced women than for widowed women, also have a smaller probability for remarrying than do widowed women in the same age group. In such countries as Tanzania and Zambia, the majority of female-headed households are lead by divorced women (66 and 55 percent respectively) while in Uganda, over two-fifths of the heads of female-headed households are in this category. In Libya, Morocco and United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, about one-fifth of the heads of female-headed households are divorced (Buvinic and Youssef 1978).

4. Female-Headed Households as a Strategy for Coping with Poverty

As we have already seen, in many Latin American and Caribbean societies, an important coping strategy involves the establishment of female-headed households, with intermittent periods during which a man or various kin members are added to the household. This strategy, too, increases the incidence of such households.

Regardless of the reasons for which female-headed households emerge, they all share a common characteristic: they are poorer than male-headed households. This circumstance arises because female-headed households usually include fewer income-earning adults, since they lack the important economic and labor contributions of men. In addition, women's wages are less, and women have much less access to land than do men, except as mediated through their sons.
B. Change in the Prevailing Division of Labor and Role Interdependencies Within the Family

In many developing countries, the spreading "modernization" whose different forms were noted at the start of this section often affects the traditional division of labor between husbands and wives. It also disturbs the previously existing balance of interdependencies between them. The usual direction of these changes is from interdependency between spouses toward increased dependence of wives on husbands. The result is considerable dissatisfaction of the part of the wives, as well as marital conflict. A good example of the nature and direction of these changes is provided by the Baule in the Ivory Coast. In this society, marriage traditionally represented not only a reproductive association between a man and a woman but also a productive association. This productive association was between equal and mutually complementary partners in the production and distribution of the two essential products for subsistence: yams and cloth. Men initiated the production of yams, were responsible for it and controlled the subsequent distribution. Women did the same for cloth. This principle in the division of labor spelled out the nature of their symmetrical interdependencies. Women helped men in the task of burning and clearing away the brush and preparing the land cleared and prepared by the men, but the men retained ownership of the yam crop. Men did the weaving and sewing of the cotton that women had produced, cleaned, carded, spun and dyed, but still women controlled the final product. "Modernization" nevertheless upset this balance of interdependence between spouses. This was because weavers could buy Gonfreville thread with cash and were no longer dependent on women dependent on men for cloth. The cooperative productive relationship between spouses has, thus, been changed to a dependent relationship in which men may be generous to their wives, depending on the degree of their affection and respect for them. Women hence become quite dissatisfied, considerable marital conflict ensues, and many women prefer to remain unmarried and autonomous (Etienne 1978).

Other striking sub-Saharan examples are provided by the intensification and commercialization of cash crops, the monetization of agriculture, and the availability of wage employment as an alternative to farming for men (Tinker 1979). The effect of all these changes has been to alter the traditional division of labor between husbands and wives, usually by increasing the amount of work that wives are expected to contribute to the cultivation of cash crops (which are controlled by men), thus leaving them less time to cultivate their own land for family subsistence. In addition, the best land is now demanded for cash crops. The result is that women are often given the least fertile piece of land, which according requires greater expertise if it is to be made productive (La Participation des Femmes Rurales au Développement 1976). Alternatively, they are given land at a great distance from home, which requires the expenditure of a great amount of time for transport (Henn 1976). Women thus have a difficult time meeting their responsibility to feed the family, and become financially dependent on men for cash to buy supplementary food for this purpose (Mñsted 1977). The cash paid by the husbands represents payment for labor...
rendered on their land, yet it is not automatically given to the women as their right and it is not commensurate to the contributed labor. The loss of their own income from surplus food or from marketing (for which they now often have no time) deprives women of their independent partner status and reduces them to the status of occasionally paid family workers. The dissatisfaction expressed by women with the dependent status, and their growing reluctance to contribute their labor to their husband's land is illustrated by the World Bank report on the Cameroon Semey Rice project which mentions that "women complained about household heads retaining the income from rice sales although they, the women, provide the labor for the most critical operations" and become reluctant to work on their husbands' plots. Another report mentions that the Benin Hinvi project "curtailed the women's annual income from the [processing of wild oil palm fruits and the marketing of oil and maize], a loss which has only been partly offset by the possibilities of obtaining paid work with the cooperatives" (Rural Development Projects: A Retrospective View of Bank Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa 1978). 1/

Because the intensification of cash crops often has negative effects on the status of women in the family, women have tried to resist being absorbed as workers on their husbands' plots by attempting to give priority to the labor demands of their subsistence crops (Ritchie 1976). This type of resistance on the part of women, which implies a withdrawal of labor from the husbands' cash crops (Palmer 1977; Hanger and Morris 1973; Rural Development Projects: A Retrospective View of Bank Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa 1978), can be exercised only to some extent and cannot in most cases provide women with a real power leverage. After all, husbands can, in response to such a withdrawal of labor, take a second wife, divorce their wife, or deprive their wife of land.

In addition to the intensification of cash crops, the introduction of "modern" farming methods without concern for their impact on women can have very negative effects. The introduction of insecticides and fungicides, for example, which dramatically reduced the need for weeding, also equally dramatically deprived women of employment in the absence of alternative income-generating activities (Mose 1975). Similarly, most of the new technology introduced has been primarily directed toward making the cultivation of cash crops faster and easier, rather than toward the relief of work in subsistence crops or in food storage and preparation, or in energy or water supply. As a result, the workload of women was much less relieved.

1/ Of course, not all rural development projects in sub-Saharan Africa tend to increase women's economic dependence on men. In a Sierra Leone project, income and power distribution within the family was improved by allocating credit to individual family members rather than to family heads. And in Senegal a project enhanced women's prestige of their enhanced ability to better feed their families and to improve their cash situation (Rural Development Projects: A Retrospective View of Bank Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa 1978).
than was that of men (Morse 1975). It is of utmost importance, therefore, that development projects examine the differential impacts on men and women, and also devise strategies and provide alternatives that safeguard and promote the economic autonomy of women as well as of men.
VI. THE FAMILY FACTOR IN STRATEGIES TO REDUCE POVERTY

If family structure and dynamics are to be better understood and, as suggested at the close of the preceding section, taken more specifically into consideration in development planning for the reduction of poverty, four principles and suggested strategies need to be taken into account. First, the basic family structure must be understood. Second, it is necessary to understand family patterns and dynamics. Third, the strategies used by families to combat poverty must be understood and strengthened. Fourth, attention must be given to the education of mothers.

A. Understanding Family Structure

Understanding family structure, that is, knowing the percentage and type of female-headed households (with or without male relatives) and the type of seasonal, cyclical and developmental changes in family composition is the first principle involved. There are two main implications stemming from this information about families.

The first implication is to address the need to establish provisions for female heads of households to have equal access with male heads to land, credit, agricultural and technical information and training, income-generating activities, housing and to other services and amenities. Since female-headed households are usually much poorer because (a) the male income is missing, (b) women's incomes are much lower than those of men, and (c) the workload of women heads is much heavier than that of wives, a number of special provisions must be made to safeguard equality of access. In the case of access to credit, for example, requirements about collateral, references, and modes of repayment must not preclude female heads of household or other poor people. There are many successful models for setting up credit cooperatives for low-income women. Those fulfill the credit needs of women by extending them credit on the basis of their productive capacity, rather than on the basis of collaterals, and also in the process educate them about money and credit and help them establish a credit history (Buvinic, et al. 1979).

In the case of agricultural, cooperative or health information and services, it is necessary to train women agricultural extension agents, health auxiliaries and other multipurpose village workers. It is also necessary to structure rewards for both men and women workers in such a way as to define reaching and servicing poor female-headed households as an important goal.

In the case of equal access to training or income-generating activities, women heads of households (as well as women in male-headed households) must be provided with technology that relieves women of some hours of daily work. This technology could include: clean water close to home, thus often saving 2-3 hours per day of women's time, if not more;
hand-operated grinding mills, small presses for palm oil, coconut milk or sugar cane; and other cheap, easy-to-operate (and to maintain) devices that help women spend less time on the most time-consuming housework, especially food processing and preparation (Tinker 1979; Carr 1979). In order for appropriate technology to be made accessible and helpful to poor women, collective, cooperative arrangements have been found useful with respect to purchases and the establishment of long-term repayments. In addition, it is imperative that women be taught how to use such devices properly, and how to maintain them effectively. In some cases, low-income women could be taught to make simple labor-saving devices from local material (Carr 1979).

Child care is also a crucial, time-consuming responsibility of female heads of households. Unless alternative arrangements are made, daughters pay a high cost for their mothers' training or work by shouldering the burden of child care and also much of the housework. Such steps as some kind of community arrangement based on a rotating system to child care in exchange for farm labor, or the employment of some women to take care of the children of all women in the community, are needed if the options of the female heads of households, and those of other married women, are not to be extended at the expense of the next generation.

The second major implication of the reality of family structure is that families should be viewed as flexible, changing unit undergoing a variety of constrictions and extensions in response to migration, the agricultural seasons, family cycle stages and level of poverty. These changes have important specific implications for the design of programs in terms of labor availability, as well as in terms of income and demand fluctuations and the demand for different types of services. The demand for food, health care and labor-saving devices, for example, is much higher during the "wet and hungry" agricultural season than it is during the dry season; but the demand for education and training is higher during the dry season.

B. Understanding Family Patterns and Dynamics

The second principle involved is that of understanding family patterns and dynamics, that is, knowing who makes what decisions; what are the bases of the power relations between men and women and what factors change them; who does what, who substitutes for what tasks, and how free time is used; who earns income and who controls it; and patterns of intrafamilial distribution of resources and factors affecting prevailing patterns. Four specific strategies that take these family dynamics into consideration can be identified.

The first of these is that in societies in which women play the crucial role in agricultural production, such as those of sub-Saharan Africa, programs and projects to reduce poverty should make provisions for women to have access to land, agricultural information and training, and to such technology as makes their agricultural work faster and easier, technology which they are trained to operate and maintain.
The second strategy is that household income should be disaggregated by individual family members in order to be able to assess how each member's income is used, and how increases in the income of different family members influences existing patterns of use and control of income, capital asset formation, consumption, nutritional patterns and the mode of intrafamilial distribution of labor and resources. With regard to poor households, it is of particular importance to ascertain whose income is used for food and who income is used for capital asset formation. This differential use of the incomes of husbands and wives, once known, can be of particular help in guiding the implementation of the different strategies needed to increase both spouses' incomes in order to cover the urgent needs of poor families. The disaggregation of household income is less important in patriarchal societies in which the husband controls all income, even that earned independently by his wife. But, even in this case, we do not know to what extent wives' income, even when controlled by the husband, is used differently than corresponding increases in the husband's own income. Further, it is important to determine what conditions of women's employment and earning capacity facilitate women's control of their income, even in patriarchal societies. Such control can establish an important power basis for low-income women other than that of reproductive power. In reality, it is only when such an income-earning power is controlled by women that it can begin to lessen their reliance on reproductive power and their dependence on their sons (Safilios-Rothschild 1980a).

The third strategy is that understanding the patterns of intrafamilial distribution of scarce resources, and the rational bases for existing inequalities, can help in the design of programs to modify those rational bases and to redress those inequalities. The most desirable long-term strategy is, of course, to make cheaper, or to increase the income available for, food, health care, and education so that these goods and services are not scarce and unequally distributed. Strategies which improve women's income-generating ability are of special importance. This is especially so when: (1) provisions are made for working women to be relieved of some of their housework and child care responsibilities through the availability of technology and single labor-saving devices as well as some kind of community child care arrangements (in this way women's income earnings will not be at the expense of their daughters who will have to relieve their mothers of the work overload and be unable to attend school); (2) when women have some degree of organizational control over their work, usually through some kind of cooperative arrangement which has been found to facilitate women's ability to control their income and, thus, to be able to buy more food for the family. Women's cooperatives seem to have been particularly successful in this respect, even in India. The experience in that country with milk cooperatives has shown that the resulting income controlled by women was not only used for family subsistence but was also saved by the women in order to make productive investments. These included the purchase of additional buffalo or land, or were used to repair the dwelling (Somjee and Somjee undated). The process of organizing women into production and/or marketing cooperatives is crucial for keeping production costs low, and helps facilitate the important direct links with the wider market by eliminating the middlemen (Dizon 1978). Such organization
is also crucial for achieving better access to credit and technology, and for helping break down the economic and social dependence of women on men. Several successful projects of this kind are reported in the literature. They include the milk cooperatives and food processing cottage industry in India, and women's agricultural or jute handicrafts cooperatives in Bangladesh.

Other related strategies can aim at changing the rational basis underpinning the unequal distribution of resources. For example, the unequal distribution of food to the disadvantage of girls and women may be modified by strategies that establish the economic and social security value of the girls of their parents, in addition to their short-term labor utility. Such strategies could involve the creation of income-generating activities for adolescent and young girls, especially those activities which require literacy or primary school education. Examples of such employment opportunities are training and employment an auxiliary health workers, multipurpose community workers, agricultural extension para-professionals, assistant teachers or, with considerable additional training, primary school teachers. Auxiliary health workers help facilitate access to health care by women and, as we have already seen, the presence of female primary school teachers in those rural areas where they are currently scarce helps increase the enrollment of girls in school. This increase is achieved mainly because the presence of the female teacher symbolizes the possible economic value of education for girls. In addition to the symbolic function of the employment of young women as professionals and para-professionals, their involvement in different types of income-generating activities before marriage provides them with an income that they contribute to their families, and often leads to a later age of marriage, and to lower fertility. In this way, girls begin to be additionally valued for their more long-term economic contributions to the family. There is also an increased probability that they may continue to work after marriage, to control their income, and to help their parents. In this last respect they can establish themselves as a potential social security source as good as that hitherto represented by sons. Such strategies would help redress imbalances in the intrafamilial distribution of food and of resources for health care and education. The criteria would thus become need in the case of food and health care, and ability and interest in the case of education. The criterion of sex would be replaced.

The fourth strategy in this context is that as long as girls and/or grandmothers undertake most of the activities of child care and food processing and preparation, nutritional education should be addressed to them as much as to mothers. The same concept holds true for instructions in basic hygiene and for other information concerning children's health, or the use and repair of food processing or cooking devices. In societies in which husbands do most of the shopping, some basic consumer and nutritional education should be directed at men, and perhaps made available in the local food stores where the food is bought.
C. Understanding and Strengthening Current Strategies

Acquiring an understanding of the various strategies used by poor families to cope with poverty, and then attempting to strengthen them is the third basic principle involved. Probably one of the most important of these strategies is the diversification of income sources and of income earners. This strategy has important implications for urban projects in that any relocation of the urban poor must take into account the need for women, adolescents, young adults and older kin members to have income-generating opportunities nearly, since otherwise transport costs will render them prohibitive. There are also implications for rural development projects in that different components should aim to provide farm and nonfarm income for men, women and adolescents, as well as for older people, rather than only for male heads of households.

In many cases the strategies developed by the poor are also ingenious, in that they are able to generate an adequate income while solving an important problem. A good illustration of this process is an income-generating strategy undertaken by the urban slum dwellers of Cairo (Zabaline) who collect and sort out the garbage of predominantly lower-middle and low-income homes, sell the bones to industry to make glue, sell other items to middle men, and feed the organic residues to pigs. In this way, they make an adequate living for their families while helping to solve the solid waste problem of the city ("Solid Waste Management in Cairo and Alexandria" 1978; El-Hakim, 1976). The sorting out of the garbage is, however, undertaken in the homes of the slum dwellers. The hygienic conditions are thus very poor and the infant mortality rates extremely high. Further because of the smell, and because of the associated social stigmatization, the people involved are continuously pushed further away from the city (El-Hakim 1976). Aid could, therefore, be extended to them, as proposed by the World Bank, in terms of an improvement in hygienic conditions; the provision of a stable habitat, and of housing, sewage and electricity; and an improvement in the efficiency of the sorting process, for example, by setting up simple conveyor belts, as well as a general upgrading of the status of these people.

There are many such ingenious income-generating strategies invented by the poor in the developing world. These need to be studied carefully, facilitated, and, whenever possible, duplicated in other areas and in other societies.

D. Recognizing the Importance of Mothers' Education

The fourth basic principle involves a recognition of the importance of mothers' education and knowledge as a strategy for investment in the next generation. Improved education for mothers solves this function in terms of a better nutritional status for their children, who will also experience lower mortality, and enjoy greater access to education.
This investment will be even more productive for girls than it will be for boys. Such specific strategies as those which, for example, to provide illiterate mothers with functional skills, including those of literacy and numeracy, seem to have a very good payoff in terms of children's life chances in addition to increasing the productivity and income-generating capacity of the women themselves.

E. Summary of Strategies

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the three most important strategies are those which: (a) maximize the chances of the new generations of boys and girls to use their abilities and to obtain skills that help them overcome poverty; (b) strengthen or stimulate family strategies that effectively cope with poverty; and (c) decrease the dependency of women on men and or on their sons, and help them to establish autonomous income-generating activities, and to be able to control their own income.
References


Caldwell, John C. "Fertility and the Household Economy in Nigeria." 

Cardona, Ramiro G., "New Insights Into the Economic and Social Consequences 
of Rural/Urban Migration." In: Economic and Demographic Change: 
Leiege, Belgium: International Union for the Scientific Study of 

Carr, Marilyn. "Women in Rural Senegal: Some Implications of Proposed 
Integrated Food and Nutrition Interventions." Office of the Adviser 
on Women in Development, June, 1979, processed.

Castillo, G.T. "The Changing Role of Women in Rural Societies: A Summary 


University of Susex, June 19 1979.

of Development Studies, University of Susex, February 1979.

Chaudhury, R.G. "Determinants and Consequences of Rural Out-Migration: 
Evidence from Some Villages in Bangladesh." In: Economic and Demographic 
Conference. Liege, Belgium: International Union for the Scientific 

Church, K. "A Study of Socio-Economic Status and Childcare Arrangements 
of Women in Medina." Paper presented at the Conference on Women and 

Clay, Edward J. "Employment Effects of the HYV Strategy in Bangladesh: 

Concepcion, Mercedes B., and Felipe Landa-Jocano. "Demographic Factors 
Influencing the Family Cycle." In: The Population Debate: Dimensions 

Connell, John, et al. Migration from Rural Areas. The Evidence from 

Cosminsky, Sheila. "Utilization of a Health Clinic in a Guatemalan Community." 
Atti del XL Congresso Internazionale degli Americanisti, vol. II, Roma-
Genova, September 3-10, 1972 (INCAP Publication I-670).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>TITLE OF PAPER</th>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>Rural Poverty Unperceived: Problems and Remedies</td>
<td>R. Chambers (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>Levels of Poverty: Policy and Change</td>
<td>A. Sen (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>402</td>
<td>Education and Income</td>
<td>T. King, D. Jamison, A. Berry (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M.J. Bowman (consultant), G. Fields (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>L. Lau (consultant), M. Lockheed (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>G. Psacharopoulos (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>Implementing Programs of Human Development</td>
<td>P. Knight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N. Coletta, J. Meerman, M. Esman (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>J. Mbindyo (consultant), J. Montgomery (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E. Rogers (consultant), C. Safilios-Rothschild (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N. Uphoff (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404</td>
<td>Population and Poverty in the Developing World</td>
<td>N. Birdsall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>The Effects of Education on Health</td>
<td>S. Cochrane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D. O'Harra (consultant), J. Leslie (consultant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Poverty and the Development of Human Resources:</td>
<td>W. Bussink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Perspectives</td>
<td>D. Davies, R. Grawe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Kavalsky, G. Pfeffermann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing Countries: A Simultaneous Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408</td>
<td>Economic Growth and Human Resources</td>
<td>N. Hicks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>J. Boroumand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409</td>
<td>The Changing Nature of Export Credit Finance and its</td>
<td>A. Cizauskas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implications for Developing Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>410</td>
<td>Trade in Non-Factor Services: Past Trends and Current</td>
<td>A. Sapir, E. Lutz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411</td>
<td>Population Policy and Family Planning Programs:</td>
<td>K. Kanagaratnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trends in Policy and Administration</td>
<td>C.S. Pierce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412</td>
<td>Health Problems and Policies in the Developing</td>
<td>F. Golladay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>B. Liese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>