WPS6323 Policy Research Working Paper 6323 The Role of Men in the Economic and Social Development of Women Implications for Gender Equality Lídia Farré The World Bank Development Economics Vice Presidency Partnerships, Capacity Building Unit January 2013 Policy Research Working Paper 6323 Abstract This paper is a critical review of the literature on the issue the contribution of men, as fathers and husbands, to the of how male behavior affects female outcomes in the health and socioeconomic outcomes of women in both promotion of gender equality. It employs the family as developed and developing countries. Finally, it discusses the main unit of analysis because a large part of gender a set of economic policies that have intentionally or interactions occurs within this institution. This survey unintentionally affected men’s attitudes and behaviors. first summarizes recent studies on the distribution of The main implication is that policies meant to achieve power within the family and identifies several factors that gender equality should focus on men rather than have altered the bargaining position of men and women exclusively target women. over the last decades. It then reviews empirical work on This paper is a product of the Partnerships, Capacity Building Unit, Development Economics Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at lidia.farre@iae.csic.es. The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Produced by the Research Support Team The Role of Men in the Economic and Social Development of Women: Implications for Gender Equality Lídia Farré Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica and Barcelona GSE Keywords: gender inequality, development JEL: J16 <>Introduction As an interdisciplinary concept, gender refers to women and men, the relations between them, and the institutions that govern these relations. However, most of the literature on gender focuses on women and girls and the factors that affect their socioeconomic outcomes. A commitment to gender equality in economic outcomes, as in other areas of social development and human rights, has emphasized women’s empowerment. There is evidence that expanding woman’s opportunities—particularly health, education, earnings, rights, and political participation—decreases gender inequality and accelerates development.1 In developed countries, women are considered responsible for the reduction in economic gender disparities.2 However, despite important advances toward equality, differences in the socioeconomic outcomes of men and women persist. Recently, policy makers and social scientists have begun to emphasize the crucial role and responsibility of men and boys in reducing gender disparities. In both the developing world and the developed world, men continue to wield enormous power over many aspects of women’s lives. In the public sphere, as heads of states and government ministers, as leaders of religious and faith-based institutions, as judges, as heads of armies and other agencies of force, and as village heads, men design and implement policies that may or may not favor women’s priorities and needs. As public authorities, men also exert control over a large variety of resources, such as health, education, transportation, and finance. Legal and regulatory barriers that restrict women’s access to these resources perpetuate gender inequality in many parts of the world. In the private sphere, as husbands (or partners) and fathers, men can directly affect the economic and social progress of women. In many societies, men have the final say on issues related to family planning and reproductive health, their wives’ and daughters’ labor market participation, and the use of family resources, including medical and educational expenditures. In the developed world, men’s limited participation in childcare and housework places a significant burden on women’s educational and professional careers. 2 In both public and the private life worldwide, men have a significant and undeniable role in the socioeconomic progress of women. Ignoring men in the design and implementation of gender-oriented policies may not only limit the effectiveness of these policies but also exacerbate existing disparities. This paper presents a critical review of the literature on men’s contribution to the economic and social development of women and its implications for gender equality. It employs the family as the main unit of analysis because the family is the institution in which gender interactions are likely to be most intense, ranging from marriage and child-rearing decisions to consumption, time allocation for work, and human capital investments. This paper identifies situations in which men’s actions or decisions affect women’s achievements and discusses the implications of policies designed to produce gender equality. The survey is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the process that governs decisions within the family and the economic factors that affect this process. Section 2 considers recent studies that investigate the critical role of fathers and husbands in the economic well-being of their wives and daughters. Finally, this paper concludes with a revision of economic policies that have affected men’s attitudes and behaviors toward gender equality. <>The Distribution of Power within the Family: Why Did Men Shift It toward Women? Modern economic theory recognizes the presence of multiple agents within the family. These agents have distinct preferences and jointly determine observed outcomes. Thus, household allocation decisions are the result of a bargaining process in which a household’s members seek to allocate the resources that they control to the goods that they particularly care about (Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992). Thus, the bargaining strength of each spouse is crucial to the final allocation. Relative income clearly influences the intrahousehold distribution of power (Duflo 2004; Thomas 1990, 1994), but it is not the only variable that affects the decisional process. Factors that change a household’s economic environment, particularly its members’ respective bargaining positions, are also important. 3 Among these factors, the rise in returns to human capital may increase men’s incentives to share power with women (Doepke and Tertilt 2008) and make polygyny less affordable (Gould, Moav, and Simhon 2008). The narrowing gender gap in pay partly explains the reduction in gender violence against women (Aizer 2010). The substantial increase in the female labor supply has also affected men’s attitudes toward working women and has increased employment among younger generations (Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004). Studies have suggested that the gender of offspring influences men’s political views and preferences toward the redistribution of power between men and women (Warner 1991; Washington 2004; Oswald and Powdthavee 2010). Finally, media exposure has changed public opinion regarding women in society (La Ferrara, Chong, and Dureyea 2007; Jensen and Oster 2009). Previous studies identify several factors that have led men to share or to give up some of their traditional privileges and authority in favor of women. Next, we carefully describe these studies and derive lessons with implications for the design of future policies on gender equality. Doepke and Tertilt (2008) show that technological change and its associated increase in the returns to human capital may have caused an expansion of women’s rights through the nineteenth century in England and the United States.3 These higher returns increased the importance of education and recalibrated the trade off between the rights of a man’s own wife and those of other men’s wives. When the returns to education increase, finding well-educated spouses for one's children becomes a greater concern. Similarly, higher returns to education increase fathers' concern about the rights of their daughters, because the daughters' marital bargaining power matters for the grandchildren's education. The authors argue that improvements in married women’s economic rights increase females’ bargaining power within the household. Because there is evidence that women spend more resources on their children’s well-being than men do (see Duflo 2004; Thomas 1990, 1994), more bargaining power for women means greater investments in children’s human capital. Although husbands may not benefit directly from increases to their wives’ bargaining power, they might indirectly gain from augmenting other women’s rights in two ways. First, men are altruistic toward their own children, some of whom may be daughters. Because men want their daughters to be treated well by their sons-in-law and want their grandchildren to be well educated, men have motivation to improve their 4 daughters’ bargaining position. Second, fathers prefer high-quality mates for their children and therefore stand to gain from building the human capital of their future grandchildren through their mothers. Note that this theoretical mechanism suggests that the historical advance of women’s rights in the West was driven by old-fashioned self-interest deriving from men’s concerns about their daughters’ welfare and their descendants’ education. This phenomenon suggests that inducing developing countries to improve women’s rights on men’s accord may be a more promising strategy than attempting to externally impose gender equality. Governments can further the cause of women’s rights by focusing on policies that increase families’ incentives to educate their children, provide high-quality public education, and offer subsidies for families who keep their children in school. In the context of technological progress with increasing returns to human capital, men’s preference for wives with higher skills seems to be responsible for the transition from polygyny to monogamy. This argument is developed in the theoretical model of Gould, Moav, and Simhon (2008). Skilled men in modern economies increasingly value skilled women for their ability to raise skilled children, which increases the value of skilled females in the marriage market to the point that skilled men prefer one skilled wife to multiple unskilled ones. This theoretical argument emphasizes that education can improve the well-being of women (and their children) because they are all better off in monogamous than in polygynous societies. Previous evidence suggests that education is an important factor for the economic and social development of women, but certain social structures may distort this positive relationship. For example, patrilocal marriages (i.e., brides joining the households of grooms and their families upon marriage), which prevail in most parts of South Asia, seem to suggest that a husband’s family is likely to retain the major part of any additional gain an educated woman generates. Hence, men seem to have a strong incentive to prefer educated women as brides, especially because returns on women’s schooling are significant. Marriage markets in South Asia exhibit a widespread presence of dowries (i.e., payments from the bride’s family to the groom’s family). Intuition suggests that parents of educated women face lower dowry demands. Thus, competitive adjustments in dowry that internalize returns on schooling should induce parents to educate their daughters. However, the persistence of low levels of female school 5 enrollment and the available micro-level evidence on dowry payments suggest that such incentives are neither strong nor generalized. Dasgupta, Maitra, and Mukherjee (2008) argue that marital arrangements may be responsible for these patterns. In South Asia, married sons typically live with their parents in a subordinate capacity. Thus, when parents seek wives for their sons, they may value characteristics that facilitate the continuation of parental control over their sons after marriage. A lack of education on the part of the bride may constitute such a characteristic. Hence, parents may prefer uneducated brides unless educated brides have significantly larger dowries. This situation reduces parental incentives to educate daughters. Therefore, the success of the human capital investment policies identified by previous studies crucially depends on the living arrangements and cultural norms of each society. In the developed world, women have caught up with men in terms of human capital accumulation, and the gender gap is shrinking (Heathcote et al. 2010). This substantial economic empowerment of women has been accompanied by a decreasing trend in female domestic violence. Aizer (2010) proposes an economic theory of household bargaining that incorporates domestic violence, suggesting that an increase in a woman’s relative wage increases her bargaining power and reduces levels of violence by improving her outside options. Using new sources of administrative data for the United States, the author finds that the decline in the wage gap witnessed over the past 13 years can explain 9 percent of the reduction in violence and the costs associated with it. Although Aizer’s model seems appropriate to describe the situation in developed countries, it does not consider the role of culture, which is likely to have a crucial effect on domestic violence in developing countries. Female economic empowerment may threaten the image of men as breadwinners, and men may respond by increasing violence against their wives (Angelucci 2008). Information and media exposure have proved useful in affecting individuals’ attitudes toward a variety of issues. Several papers by Fernandez et al. show that the increase in female labor force participation after the 1950s led successive cohorts of women to enter the market at higher rates. The dramatic increase in female participation shaped men’s views toward working women (Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti 2004) as well as the views of society in general toward the conciliation of work and family life (Fernández 2007; Fogli and Veldkamp 2010). 6 Jensen and Oster (2009) explore the effects of the introduction of cable television on women’s status in rural India. They find that the introduction of television improves the status of women, with women reporting lower acceptability of spousal abuse, lower preference for sons, greater autonomy, and lower fertility. Furthermore, cable is found to increase school enrollment, which may be an indicator of similarly increased status and decision-making authority within the household. The authors argue that cable television may affect women’s socioeconomic status through several mechanisms. For example, television may affect fertility by providing information on family planning services or changing the value of women’s time. Alternatively, women may be given more freedom to do things outside the home, such as going to the market, because the value of men’s leisure is increased by television. Television may also expose rural households to urban lifestyles, values, and behaviors that are different from their own, and these households may begin to emulate these lifestyles. This result is consistent with the evidence in La Ferrara et al. (2007), who find that exposure to soap operas in Brazil reduces fertility. Their argument is that soap operas (novelas) portray families that are much smaller than those in Brazil, a country with a high fertility rate. Thus, exposure to alternative family compositions seems to alter individuals’ fertility preferences. The possible change in norms, values, and preferences due to media exposure is particularly intriguing in contrast to typical proposals for improving education and women’s status or reducing fertility. These alternatives imply significant resources and may be effective or achieved over a long period. There is promising potential for modifications to these behaviors due to changes in attitudes that are cheaply and quickly supplied by television. Finally, there is evidence that an exogenous event such as the gender of offspring may provide a mechanism for social change by which fathers’ connections with their daughters undermine patriarchy. An interesting line of research has examined the influence of having daughters on fathers’ political views. Warner (1991) and Warner and Steel (1999) analyze U.S. and Canadian parents and find that support for policies designed to address gender equity is greater among parents with daughters and is particularly strong for fathers. The authors argue that the anticipated and actual struggles that offspring face and the public policies that address these problems are important to parents, who invest significantly in their children. Washington (2004) uses 7 data on the voting records of U.S. congresspersons to provide persuasive evidence that congresspersons with female children tend to vote in favor of reproductive rights issues, such as teen access to contraceptives. Furthermore, Washington (2008) argues for broader results: congresspersons support a range of measures that favor women, such as flexibility for working families and tax-free education. Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) model the idea that daughters increase parents’ left-wing tendencies. Their model incorporates the presence of pay discrimination and the fact that women derive greater utility from public goods than men do. In this scenario, women prefer a larger supply of the public good and a greater tax rate on income because their marginal utility from the former is relatively high, and the tax penalty they face as a result of the latter is relatively low. Because men have female children, however, they shift their political stance and become more sympathetic to the female desire for a steeper income tax schedule and a larger amount of the public good, so they become more left wing. Similarly, a mother with many sons becomes sympathetic to the male case for lower taxes and a smaller supply of public goods and becomes more right wing. Their theory is supported by German and U.K. data. Although it seems that the gender of offspring affects an individual’s attitudes, previous evidence has only examined political views. It would be interesting to investigate whether the gender of offspring has implications for practices linked to the labor market, such as employers’ hiring decisions and wage-setting structures. Overall, previous evidence indicates that men’s behaviors and attitudes toward women are likely to be affected by a range of factors (i.e., technological progress, media exposure, wage gaps, sex ratio, and offspring’s gender). Given the considerable influence that men exert on the economic development of women, these factors should be considered in the design of public policies intended to improve women’s well-being. <>The Role of Men in the Socioeconomic and Health Outcomes of Women This section reviews recent studies that identify an important role of fathers and husbands for the well-being of their wives and daughters. It focuses on the access to education and health institutions, as well as on public and private arrangements that influence women's economic and social outcomes. <>Reproductive Health and Sexual Behavior 8 Men are important actors who influence the reproductive health outcomes of women. The role of men is even more important in some developing countries or patriarchal structures where husbands or other family members control women’s health-related decisions. In these societies, women’s reproductive health is affected by male policy makers, male health care administrators, and male service providers, who may perpetuate a dominant male definition of what is important for women’s needs. Men also affect women’s reproductive health as partners and fathers. Accordingly, understanding men’s behavior and beliefs toward fertility and family planning is crucial for the design of successful reproductive health policies. Next, we review studies on male reproductive roles. We focus on men’s knowledge of various contraception methods, attitudes toward those methods, communication between couples and family planning decisions. If we assumed that childbearing and pregnancy were primarily women’s concerns, then it would not be surprising to find that men had little knowledge of contraceptive methods in general (and female-controlled methods in particular). We would also not expect men to know much about the female reproductive cycle. In fact, poor knowledge of reproductive health issues among males may pose barriers for women in seeking care for these problems. However, there is mixed evidence on male education about contraceptive methods. In general, men are as knowledgeable about contraceptive methods as women are (Ezeh et al. 1996), but they are better informed about male methods than females are (Hulton and Falkingham 1996; Mbizvo and Adamchack 1991), and they may be less informed than women are about female methods (Kalipeni and Zulu 1993). This knowledge is usually defined as men’s awareness of contraceptive methods, phrased in surveys as having “heard of� a particular method, and does not refer to other aspects of contraceptive knowledge or the use of a given method. In some developing countries, the conclusions are less optimistic. A study by Bloom, Tsui, Plotkin, and Bassett (2000) of Uttar Pradesh, India, shows that men know very little about reproductive health (fertility, maternal health, and sexually transmitted diseases). Although the understanding of these issues is largely driven by sociodemographic characteristics, men’s beliefs about their ability to control reproduction have independent effects on their knowledge in each of these areas. Men’s lack of reproductive health knowledge leaves women particularly vulnerable in this region because they are dependent on their husbands and other kin for most types of 9 health-related decision making. Thus, educating men about the reproductive process, disease prevention and the benefits of reproductive health care for both men and women seems to be urgent to reduce, for instance, the growing AIDS epidemic in India. Men’s knowledge about contraception is important, but its use and effectiveness depend directly on men’s involvement. Several studies have examined the ways in which culture and social organizations influence contraceptive patterns. Research from Ghana (Ezeh 1993) and Nigeria (Bankole 1995) suggests high levels of influence by men over women’s contraceptive decisions. However, the reverse may not be true. Bankole’s analysis (1995) of the Nigerian Yoruba shows that the number of offspring has important consequences for apparent equality in spousal desire for more children. Additionally, there is evidence that men’s preferences have a major direct impact on the first decade of a marriage and the first four children. It seems that men are likely to want more children in families with few members and that women’s wishes prevail with larger numbers of surviving children in the family. The importance of including men in policy design and research related to reproductive health has been highlighted by other researchers. Bankole (1995) and Dodoo (1993) suggest high probabilities of invalid estimates for unmet contraceptive need in sub-Saharan Africa when these estimates are derived from data collected only on women. In Zimbabwe, although men report having “the final say� in contraceptive use, women are responsible for obtaining contraceptives (Mbizvo and Adamchack 1991). These and other studies demonstrate discordance within couples in terms of contraceptive use. The main conclusion in previous research is that men agree on using contraception for birth spacing purposes but not to limit family size. The fact that men prefer more children than women suggests that reproductive health programs or policies in developing countries should involve both sexes. Note that most of the conclusions in previous studies are derived from surveys in which individuals stated their preferences about contraception use and knowledge. Stated preferences may substantially diverge from revealed preferences or actual behavior. Thus, additional fieldwork is needed to accurately measure women’s “unmet need,� the difference between women’s fertility preferences and their use of contraception. 10 There is also scarce evidence about male views on abortion, an important element in fertility control given that an estimated one in four pregnancies worldwide is terminated deliberately. Abortion is perhaps the best example of a direct connection between laws or policies and poor reproductive health outcomes. In most countries, men legislate, ratify, and enforce abortion. In Turkey, for example, abortion among married women is restricted to women who have their husband’s permission, reflecting conservative interpretations of Islamic law (Gürsoy 1996). Furthermore, men may directly affect women’s decisions about abortion. For example, in an investigation of amniocentesis and abortion in New York City, Rapp (1999) finds that partners’ beliefs greatly influence women’s use or refusal of prenatal tests, such as amniocentesis. According to Rapp’s results, women who felt that their male partners would love and help to raise a disabled child were less likely to undergo such testing, and their decisions about testing relied heavily on their partner’s beliefs about the desirability of a disabled child. A study by Browner (1979) in Colombia shows the strong influence of partners on women’s abortion decisions. In instances in which women were directly told or perceived that their partners would abandon them, they sought abortions more frequently and with more resolve. In many parts of the developing world, women consider childbearing their only means of gaining status. Thus, women often find themselves in a paradoxical situation: high fertility is their main channel to improving their status, but it also increases their risk of sexually transmitted diseases, HIV contagion, or maternal death. Women’s access to contraception and health services is limited by constraints on their autonomy. In countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia, India, and Korea, studies show that when women seek health care, they do not decide by themselves but rather depend on decisions made by a spouse or senior members of the family (Thaddeus and Maine 1994). In Nigeria, for instance, the only person who can give permission for a woman who develops obstructed labor to leave home for the hospital is the woman’s husband. In his absence, others present are reluctant to accept such responsibility. In Ethiopia, women use primary care facilities close to their homes because of customary laws restricting their travel to other communities. As a result, women often face obstetric complications or staff errors and misdiagnosis. Thus, constraints on women’s hospital access are likely to have severe implications for their health, particularly during pregnancy or at the time of delivery. 11 In developing countries, women are often uneducated, and an important part of their identity arises from motherhood. In this context, infertility is an issue of profound human suffering. Childless women may not be invited to weddings or other important social events. Often, the woman takes the blame, even when the problem lies with the man. Women keep their husbands’ secrets and bear the insults. In Chad, a proverb says, “A woman without children is like a tree without leaves.� If a woman does not bear children, the husband may take a new wife, with society’s blessing (Inhorn and van Balen 2002). In developing countries where social security, pensions, and retirement- saving plans are not customary, childless adults have no one to care for them. Thus, infertility becomes an enormous economic problem. The previous evidence highlights the importance of men for women’s health. As a result, fertility and family planning programs that focus solely on women will continue to achieve only limited success. In the next section, we revise some policy interventions that have increased contraceptive use by increasing men’s education in this area. <>Domestic Violence Domestic violence is a universal phenomenon. Regardless of whether a country is poor or rich, spousal violence is pervasive. Men’s violence against women is a key determinant of gender inequality because it disempowers and impoverishes women. Furthermore, violence against women profoundly limits the choices available to women and girls. Women’s economic empowerment, particularly the autonomy to work outside the home, has been proposed as a powerful instrument to eradicate domestic violence. On one hand, an increase in income may lead women to end abusive partnerships (Aizer 2010). On the other hand, increased employment outside the home reduces domestic violence by reducing the time partners spend together (Dugan, Nagin, and Rosenfeld 1999). However, a wife’s economic independence represents a challenge to culturally prescribed norms of male dominance and female dependence. When a man lacks this sign of dominance, violence may be a means of reinstating his authority over his wife (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). Outside employment can also lead to an increase in domestic violence due to the insecurity and jealousy that men feel when their partners are exposed to the potential for sexual encounters with other men (Daly and Wilson 1993, 1998). 12 As indicated by previous studies, the effect of a woman’s intrahousehold economic status on violence seems to be theoretically ambiguous. Although an increase in household economic resources attributable to women may reduce economic stress and spousal violence, it may also introduce additional tension and conflict. In an effort to maintain the status quo, a woman’s increased economic strength may be countered by an increase in violence. Consistent with this theoretical ambiguity, the existing empirical evidence on the link between women’s involvement in income-generating activities and violence is inconclusive. In a recent survey of developing countries, Vyas and Watts (2008) find that women’s involvement in income-generating activities is generally associated with a higher lifetime history of physical violence. The National Family Health Survey 1989– 99 for India reveals that women face greater domestic violence, and women who work away from home face even more violence (Eswaran and Malhotra 2009). The authors argue that this increase in violence occurs because these husbands perceive a greater danger for their women to have contact with other men, which triggers spousal jealousy and violence as a response. In contrast, Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that in Kerala (India), women with regular employment are far less likely than unemployed women to have ever experienced violence. Beyond employment status, Panda and Agarwal’s innovative study (2005) uses women’s ownership of property (land and house) to capture economic status. They find that women’s ownership of property is associated with a sharp reduction in domestic violence. Aizer (2010) uses evidence for the United States for 1990–2003 and finds that decreases in the male–female wage gap reduce violence against women. This evidence suggests that improving the employment and earning opportunities of women relative to men reduces violence and its associated costs. Note that this study is based on administrative data on female hospitalization for assault. Therefore, its conclusions are unaffected by the important degree of nonrandom underreporting that affects other studies based on self-reported measures of domestic violence. Microfinance, both credit and savings, has also been proposed as a potential tool for empowering poor women in developing countries. However, these programs have a varied effect on men’s violence against women (Goetz and Gupta 1996; Kabeer 2000; 13 Schuler, Hashemi, and Huda Badal 2010). Microfinance programs can reduce women’s vulnerability to men’s violence by strengthening their economic roles and making their lives more public, but when women challenge gender norms, they sometimes provoke violence in their husbands. By putting resources into women’s hands, credit programs may indirectly exacerbate this violence, but they may also provide a context for intervention. Another strand of the literature focuses on the link between domestic violence and dowry. Several studies of Asia indicate that spousal violence is used to extract rents from the wife’s family after marriage. For example, Bloch and Rao (2002) find that marital violence is closely linked to low dowry payments and that a woman who comes from a wealthy family is more likely to be beaten by her husband in an effort to extract higher transfers from her parents. In Bangladesh, where dowry has been illegal since 1980, the practice persists, as does the perception that a generous dowry will strengthen the position of a woman within her marriage. Furthermore, dowry demands in Bangladesh have been found to be positively related to the risk of spousal violence in both urban and rural areas (Naved and Persson 2005). This evidence suggests that the type of marriage “contract,� particularly its ex ante provisions (i.e., the size of the dowry), should reflect the interests of the wife and her family in deterring or mitigating ex post malfeasance on the part of the husband. Jacoby and Mansuri (2010) analyze a particular marital institution in rural Pakistan (i.e., the watta satta) that has important implications for married women’s welfare. The watta satta (literally, give–take) usually involves the simultaneous marriage of a brother–sister pair from two households.4 Watta satta is more than just an exchange of daughters, however; it establishes the shadow of mutual threat across the marriages. A husband who mistreats his wife in this arrangement can expect his brother-in-law to retaliate in kind against his sister. The empirical evidence in Jacoby and Mansuri (2010) indicates that women in watta satta marriages have substantially lower probabilities of marital estrangement, domestic abuse, and major depressive episodes. The last two findings, in particular, suggest that the peculiar institution of watta satta protects the welfare of women in rural Pakistan. <>Son Preference 14 Son preference, along with its implied discrimination against girl children, is widespread in the Middle East, North Africa, and South and East Asia. Most researchers interested in son preference have emphasized its adverse consequences, particularly excess female infant and child mortality and the poor health of girl children relative to boys (Das Gupta and Shuzhuo 1999; Pande and Yazbeck 2003). Other researchers have examined the role of son preference in slowing the transition to low fertility as couples bear children until they have a sufficient number of boys (see, e.g., Clark 2000; Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Yount, Langsten, and Hill 2000). The advent of technology permitting prenatal sex selection has shifted the focus of scholars and policy makers to sex-selective abortion and the effect on distorted sex ratios. Since the late 1980s, there has been a steep increase in male-to-female birth ratios, which has been attributed to the increasing practice of sex-selective abortion (Arnold, Kishor, and Roy 2002; Bhaskar and Gupta 2007). Despite the negative effect on female imbalances, prenatal sex selection can be considered a substitute for postnatal gender discrimination. Therefore, the situation of girls born when sex determination technologies are available might improve because they are more likely to be born into families that want them. Indeed, Hu and Schlosser (2010) find a positive impact of this practice on the health and nutrition outcomes of girls. Son preference is one of the strongest manifestations of gender inequality. Social norms and patriarchal institutions lay the foundation for gender inequality that reinforces the preference for sons. This foundation includes kinship and marriage norms, the organization of the agrarian economy, and rules and rituals associated with caste and religion. The pervasive prevalence of payments between families at the time of marriage in many areas of the developing world has important effects on women’s welfare and contributes to the persistence of son preferences. These payments may be substantial. Recent estimates document transfers for marriages that amount to six times the annual household income in South Asia (Rao 1993) and four times the annual household income in sub-Saharan Africa (Dekker and Hoogeveen 2002). These marriage payments may be of different sizes and forms, but they are mainly classified into “brideprice,� understood as payments from the groom’s side of the family to the bride’s side, and “dowry,� or negative brideprices, understood as a payment made by the bride’s family to the groom’s family. 15 Most of the documented research on marriage payments has examined India, where the widespread dowry phenomenon has become associated with the rise in dowry prices, with important implications for the welfare of women (Rao 1993; Edlund 1999). Although this practice was prohibited as early as 1961, it is impossible to eliminate and has spread and increased. In a study of rural South India, Srinivasan (2005) provides strong evidence in favor of a preference for sons over daughters. This nonpreference for daughters is justified by the large amounts of dowry a woman’s must pay to the groom’s family. However, women in this study seem to be in favor of this practice, which is primarily considered a way to create bonds among families and to provide protection and not in connection with growing evidence of dowry-related violence. Pande and Astone (2007) use data from the National Family Health Survey of India for the 1992–1993 period to show that dowry is one of the determinants of son preference in rural India. Comparatively little research has explored marriage transfers in the rest of south Asia, though several studies point to dowry payments now occurring in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Anderson (2000) analyzes the causes of dowry in contemporary Pakistan. He documents three possible explanations for the use of such a payment: a transfer to the groom’s family to acquire a high-quality groom, a compensation payment to the groom for receiving the bride (who is considered a liability for the family because she does not contribute to the household income), and a premortem inheritance to the daughter, which is preserved throughout marriage. The empirical results support the groom-price explanation for urban areas, whereas dowry is considered to be inheritance in rural areas. An article by Nasrin (2011) examines contemporary dowry payments in Bangladesh and considers dowry to be an asymmetry in gender equity that favors men. Her study of three villages shows that girls are often considered a burden for the family because of the cost of dowries. Parents seem to be willing to place their daughters into early marriages because of the low level of marriage transfers. Substantial research by anthropologists has aimed to distinguish between societies in which the burden of marriage payments falls primarily on the groom’s family and brideprices are paid and those in which the bulk of the transfer comes from the bride’s family and dowries are paid. Brideprice-paying societies are relatively 16 homogenous, women have a prominent role in agriculture, and polygyny is practiced (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa and China). Dowry, in contrast, is found in socially stratified, monogamous societies that are economically complex in which women have a relatively small productive role (e.g., South Asia). There is also evidence that although brideprices are relatively uniform within societies and do not vary by family wealth, dowries increase with the wealth and social status of both sides of the marriage bargain. The economic system also affects gender equity and son preference. For example, in East and South India, the main crop is paddy, and women play a key role in weeding, transplanting, harvesting, and threshing. In contrast, in the North and West, wheat and other dry-agriculture crops predominate, and the work involves more male- biased “muscle power,� particularly where there is irrigation. Researchers have argued that the higher demand for women’s agricultural labor in rice areas makes girls and women more valuable than in wheat areas, contributing to less discrimination against girls in rice-growing regions (Bardhan 1974; Miller 1981; Mayer 1999). In the rural Philippines, Estudillo, Quisumbing, and Otsuka (2001) also find evidence of a gender pattern in the allocation of resources from parents to children. Sons are preferred with respect to land inheritance, whereas daughters are treated more favorably in schooling investment. This bequest pattern is consistent with girls’ comparative advantage in nonfarming employment Finally, inheritance laws that render sons crucial to retaining family property (Agarwal 1994) and the need for sons to exercise power in violent areas or to ensure household security (Dharmalingan 1996; Oldenburg 1992) are thought to influence gender inequality and thus to influence son preferences. As a result of the social and economic structures that characterize several areas in East and North Africa and South and East Asia, daughters are often considered an economic drain on families. Once married, daughters’ incomes invariably go to their marital households, and sociocultural norms do not allow parents to expect material support from married daughters. In the developed world, evidence of son preference is also present in some critical parental decisions. For example, recent research presents proof of parental gender preferences regarding custody. An analysis of small samples in the United States 17 (Wisconsin, Michigan, and California) suggests that paternal custody of boys is more common following divorce5, even though children are often assigned to the mother. Additional insight is provided by a study by Dahl and Moretti (2004, 2008) that analyzes the impact of son preference on divorce, child custody, marriage, and shotgun marriage in the United States and finds significant parental bias in favor of sons over daughters in all cases. The empirical evidence shows a large custody effect; fathers are 11 to 22 percent more likely to obtain custody in all-boy families than in all-girl families. The authors compare the United States to five developing countries and find that the gender bias is greater in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Kenya and that in China and Vietnam paternal custody is much more common. For example, in Vietnam, 48 percent of parents who obtain custody of boys are fathers, compared to approximately 20 percent in the United States. <>Education Differences in education between men and women have disappeared, or even reversed, in almost all developed countries (Bae et al. 2000). However, a large gender gap prevails in several developing countries, such as North Africa, the Middle East, and Pakistan as well as much of India, Bangladesh, and East Asia. Gender inequality in education is an important form of discrimination against women. In many developing countries, poverty, and cultural beliefs prevent girls from benefiting from educational opportunities to the same extent as boys. There is often a powerful economic and social rationale for investing in the education of sons rather than daughters because daughters are perceived to be less valuable once educated and less likely to abide by the will of their fathers, brothers, or husbands. Girls are usually needed at home or need to earn money. When girls are employed as child labor, bear the main burden of housework, and take on the role of caring for younger siblings, their performance and attendance in schools is affected, resulting in physical and mental fatigue, absenteeism, and poor performance (Aikma and Unterhalter 2005). Whereas educating a boy is generally considered a sound investment, sending a girl to school is frequently considered either to provide no gain at all or, worse, to waste resources. The low value attached to girls’ education reinforces early marriage and early pregnancy, trapping girls and their children in a vicious cycle of discrimination. Too often, marriage is either a higher priority than education, and girls who are married 18 (even where they have been forced into early marriages against their will) as well as girls who are pregnant are excluded from schools (Singh and Samara 1996). Another key issue related to rights to and in education concerns the persistent violence against girls. Schools sometimes fail to protect the basic rights and dignity of girls (Leach and Mitchell 2006). Violence includes rape, sexual harassment, physical and psychological intimidation, teasing, and threats. Violence may occur on the way to school or within the school itself and is perpetuated by teachers, parents, persons in perceived authority, and fellow students. Schools that fail to provide adequate physical facilities, such as toilets and running water, may inconvenience boys but may mean an end to education for girls before their education has even begun (Scott et al. 2009). The need to travel long distances to school is also a main barrier for girls, especially in countries that place a cultural premium on female seclusion as a result of concerns for girls’ safety and security. Consequently, parents are usually unwilling to allow their daughters to walk long distances to school. Finally, the limited number of female teachers in both primary and secondary schools is a major constraint on girls’ education. The presence of female teachers would make schools more girl friendly and would provide role models for girls (Kirk 2004). <>Household Chores and Childcare Tasks A well-established limitation on women’s economic success in developed countries is women’s greater involvement in household tasks and childrearing activities. Recently, there has been increased attention on trends in domestic and household labor patterns and in gender participation and contribution. This increasing attention stems from the implications of the substantial changes in family formation and dissolution and the changing gender distribution in paid work on the distribution of work between men and women in the home. Most research tends to suggest that women’s hours devoted to housework are declining as a result of involvement in paid employment, but there are mixed views regarding whether men’s hours devoted to housework have changed (Hochschild 1989). Women continue to perform a greater proportion of domestic tasks than men do. Studies consistently reveal that women perform most of the housework and childcare within the family, but the reasons for gender inequity within the home are not well understood. Three theoretical perspectives on the process of domestic labor allocation dominate the 19 literature: (1) the time availability perspective, (2) the relative resources perspective, and (3) the gender perspective. The time availability perspective suggests that the division of labor is allocated according to the availability of household members in relation to the amount of housework to be done. Hence, women’s and men’s time for housework should be significantly related to time spent in market labor and family composition. Shelton’s (1990) research finds that time constraints, measured by employment status, marital status, and parental status, account for a large amount of variation in household labor. The association between these indicators of time constraints and household labor differs markedly by gender, however, and women’s time is more affected by these factors. The relative resource perspective argues that the allocation of housework reflects power relations between men and women; the level of relative resources partners bring to a relationship determines how much domestic labor is completed by each partner. Higher levels of education and income relative to one’s spouse, for example, are expected to translate into more power, which is used to avoid doing domestic tasks. The gender perspective argues that housework is a symbolic enactment of gender relations and explains that there is not a simple trade off between time spent in unpaid and paid labor among men and women in either marital or cohabiting relationships. Early formulations of the gender perspective focused specifically on gender role ideologies formed through childhood socialization about appropriate adult male and female roles (Coverman 1985). More recent formulations have combined gender ideology with the theoretical construct of “doing gender� (Berk 1985; West and Zimmerman 1987). South and Spitze (1994) demonstrate that housework is an enactment of gender; controlling for other factors, they find that women and men in marital households, compared with other household types, have the greatest gap in housework time, indicating the power of the roles of wife and husband. Gupta (1999) shows that after marriage, women’s housework hours increase, whereas men’s housework hours decline. Brines (1994) argues that husbands’ housework contributions do not follow “logical� rules of economic exchange. Rather, the more economically dependent a husband is on his wife, the less housework he performs, most likely as a means of reasserting his masculinity. In other words, wives and husbands display their “proper� gender roles through the amount and type of housework they perform. 20 Most research on the division of household tasks has been conducted using time- use surveys for the United States and Scandinavian countries. Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson (2000) attempt to disentangle the contributions of three previous theories in explaining the evolution of the gender division of household tasks. Using time-diary data from representative samples of U.S. adults, they find more support for the time- availability and relative-resource models of household production than for the gender perspective, although there is some support for the latter perspective as well. Evertsson and Nermon (2007) investigate the gender distribution of household tasks in Sweden using data from the Swedish Level of Living Survey for the years 1991 and 2000. The analysis shows that changes in spouses’ relative resources only resulted in a moderate change in women’s share of the housework between 1991 and 2000. The changes that do occur indicate that women’s share of housework decreases if their relative resources, in terms of education level and social status, increase during the time span analyzed. If a woman’s economic dependency on her spouse decreased during these two years, her share of the housework also decreased. The decrease in women’s share of the housework is mainly due to an increase in men’s time spent on housework. However, regardless of access to resources, Swedish men perform less housework than Swedish women. <>The Effect of Gender Policies on Men’s Behavior and Attitudes toward Women The evidence summarized in the previous section identifies an important role for men in the well-being of women. Men clearly influence women’s health outcomes by controlling reproductive methods and access to health care facilities. Men can damage women’s health through their violent behavior. There is also evidence that culture and public institutions that favor men and place women in a residual position (patriarchal societies and certain kinship norms) limit women’s autonomy in many ways. In developing countries, these social structures favor the persistence of son preference and have adverse effects on outcomes for girl children. In developed countries, the unequal distribution of household tasks represents an important barrier for gender equality in the labor market. 21 In this section, we review gender policy interventions aimed at achieving gender equality that intentionally or unintentionally affect men’s attitudes and behavior and consider their ultimate implications for women’s outcomes. <>Health Interventions Men’s sexual and reproductive needs had been overlooked until the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, where it was agreed that information, counseling, and services must be made available to men. At the Women’s Conference in 1995 in Beijing, it was argued that shared responsibility between men and women on these matters would improve women’s health. Because men are the main decision makers, particularly in many developing countries, it seems obvious that involving men would indeed enhance women’s health. Next, we review some successful cases of men’s involvement in women’s health. Evidence has demonstrated the benefits of educating men about contraception in Bangladesh (Becker 1996; Green, Gustafson, Griffitshs, and Yaukey 1972) and Ethiopia (Terefe and Larson 1993). These studies find that the inclusion of husbands in family planning programs results in a relevant increase in the use of modern contraception methods. Similarly, Wang, Vittinghoff, and Rong (1996) find lower contraception discontinuation rates in their randomized study in China. When both parents are educated about family planning, intrauterine device users have significantly lower pregnancy and abortion rates than users whose husbands are not educated on the matter. The evidence in these studies suggests that educating men about contraception makes a difference in overall contraceptive use, but it is important to simultaneously educate both partners. Ultimately, there is a strong effect on the outcome when both partners (individually or separately) receive family planning education. Several studies also suggest that education and health services provided during the antenatal period can reduce pregnancy and delivery complications. Mullany, Becker, and Hindi (2007) prove that the inclusion of men in reproductive health interventions can enhance positive health outcomes. They conducted a randomized controlled trial in urban Nepal and find that women who received antenatal services during the second trimester of pregnancy together with their husbands were much more likely to attend a postpartum visit than women who received education alone. Similar results are found by Bhalerao et al. (1984) in a study conducted in Mumbai, India. In this case, greater involvement by husbands in antenatal care counseling significantly increases the 22 frequency of antenatal care visits, significantly lowers perinatal mortality, and pays dividends even among uneducated and low socioeconomic groups. The previous evidence suggests that involving men in reproductive health- related issues has a positive effect on women’s welfare. However, the magnitude of this effect and its external validity are difficult to assess because research has been limited to a small number of country case studies. <>Reducing Domestic Violence In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that the role of men is crucial in changing unequal power relations. In particular, actions that involve men in movements to end violence against women focus on men’s roles and responsibilities and emphasize men as part of the solution to combat gender violence have received increased attention. Local, national, and international laws, conventions, and agreements define gender- based violence and legislate against those who use it. There has been more public education, awareness, and acceptance of the problem and a larger number of institutions acting in accordance with the laws. The evidence in the previous section indicates that empowering women is not always a solution to eradicate gender violence. There is growing awareness that men can play a significant role in ending violence; thus, violence prevention programs should be addressed to men. Reviews of the literature suggest that sexual assault prevention programs for college men can effectively improve attitudes that may put men at risk for committing violence against women, although these attitudinal changes are often limited to periods of a few months. In contrast, programs that focus only on providing information have not been found to be effective. The evidence suggests that these programs are more effective in all-male groups. For example, Brecklin and Forde (2001) conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of 43 college rape prevention program evaluations and concluded that both men and women experienced more beneficial changes in single-gender groups than in mixed-gender groups. The only experimental evidence on the impact of women’s economic status on domestic violence comes from a randomized intervention combining microfinance with violence education in South Africa. Women randomized to receive the intervention experienced a 55 percent decrease in domestic violence relative to the control group (Pronyk et al. 2006). These results suggest that a combination of women’s economic 23 empowerment and men’s education on gender violence can have a substantial effect in ending domestic violence. <>Social Structures That Devalue Women The evidence in previous papers suggests that economic development does not reduce son preference or eliminate discrimination against girls and women unless social structures, such as dowries, patrilineal living arrangements, and discriminatory inheritances, are eliminated. In India, a problematic issue is that of dowries and their related violence. Dowries, in their coercive, extravagant form, do not enhance a woman’s status or strengthen her bargaining power. By reinforcing the image that daughters are an economic burden as well as affirming the indispensability of marriage and women’s dependent status, the practice maintains and reproduces the devaluation of women. In 1986, the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act was an important instrument toward improving gender equality. However, dowry practices remain common, indicating the inadequacies in the law itself and the need for broader efforts. The problem is that the law is couched in a patriarchal framework that views women as dependent. Some researchers suggest that legally and practically strengthening women’s rights to property could pave the way for the elimination of the dowry system. A starting point would be to modify inheritance laws. In a recent paper, Deininger, Goyal, and Nagarajan (2010) evaluate the impact of changes in the Hindu Succession Act in 1994 that grant daughters equal coparcenary birth rights in joint family property. They show that the amendment significantly increased the probability of daughters inheriting land, but even after the passage of the amendment, significant bias against females persists. Their results also indicate a significant increase in educational attainment for daughters, suggesting an alternative channel of wealth transfer. <>Increasing Female Enrollment in Education Several creative approaches have been proposed to improve and diversify education and to provide incentives for households to send girls to school. On the supply side, education policies must address discrimination and broaden school options. For example, parental concerns about the physical safety of their daughters can make community and nonformal alternative schools more attractive than regular public 24 schools. This is the case in Rajasthan, India, where community schools employing paraprofessional teachers and part-time workers who escort girls from excluded groups to school have increased girls’ enrollment, attendance, and test scores relative to regular public schools (World Bank 1999). Increasing the number of women teachers in schools is likely to have a strong positive impact on girls’ education. In some conservative communities, such as in some areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, parents do not allow their daughters to be taught by male teachers. Therefore, the placement of women teachers can have an immediate impact on access. A study in Nepal indicates that mothers feel more comfortable talking about their children with a woman teacher, and in India (an environment in which local politics is often considered to focus on contacts, favors, and inside dealings), women teachers are considered “more sincere� because they are less likely to be involved in local politics (UNESCO PROAP 2000). The presence of women in schools can also positively affect girls’ retention in school and their achievement. Female role models can support and encourage girls to successfully complete their studies and even to continue their studies to become teachers themselves. At the school policy level, women teachers may act as advocates for girls, representing their perspectives and needs and promoting girl-friendly learning. For example, women teachers may be able to advocate for better toilet and washing facilities. Thus, women teachers play key roles in educating and socializing children beyond gender stereotypes and thus are crucial agents of change. On the demand side, proposed incentives for households to send girls to school include conditional cash transfers, scholarships, stipends, and school meal programs. Conditional cash transfers extend resources to households to defray some of the costs of sending their children to school, tying social assistance payments to desirable behaviors. Programs in Bangladesh, Ecuador, and Mexico, among others, have been successful, although their specific impact on excluded groups must be carefully assessed. The experience of Progressa in Mexico suggests that without careful targeting, resources spent on conditional cash transfers may not have the desired results (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006). Specifically, the program benefited indigenous boys more than indigenous girls. A conditional cash transfer program in Ecuador boosted school enrollment overall by 3.7 percentage points but did not differentially benefit girls or minority students (Schady and Araujo 2006). 25 Scholarships and stipends also offset the cost of schooling by compensating families for the direct and indirect costs of education. Secondary school scholarship programs offer girls financing and encouragement to stay in school. These programs have been highly effective in several countries, notably Bangladesh, where scholarships increased girls’ enrollment to twice that of the national average. Stipend programs also compensate parents for the cost of schooling, but they are tied to such school inputs as uniforms, books, materials, and transportation. Even the opportunity to earn a scholarship has been found to boost student achievement. In Kenya, Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2004) conducted a randomized evaluation of the impact of girls’ scholarship incentives on girls’ learning achievement. The experiment, involving 127 schools, shows that both boys and girls in schools with girls’ scholarship programs achieved higher scores than children in control schools. Various types of school meal programs show an association with higher enrollment and attendance. In Kenya, meals raised attendance in program schools by 30 percent relative to schools without a free lunch, and test scores increased nearly half of a standard deviation. However, a careful analysis of this program showed that most benefits accrued to boys rather than to girls, and the program had little impact on reducing the gender gap (Vermeersch and Kremer 2004). <>An Important Structural Barrier in the Developed World Most care and household tasks are provided through family obligations. They are unpaid but are not free because they are paid for by reducing labor market opportunities of carers. Family carers are predominantly women because of gender norms and the gender wage gap, which makes it more costly for men to reduce their employment hours. In developed countries, the substantial improvement in the labor market outcomes of women has not been accompanied by a more egalitarian division of household tasks (Bianchi et al. 2000). To improve female labor market opportunities, many countries are reconsidering their family benefit polices with a view toward increasingly involving fathers in child care and housework tasks. Pioneering countries in terms of the development of more gender-equal family benefits are Norway and Sweden, where maternity leave systems were extended to paternal leave systems as early as the 1970s. Currently, a large number of countries are 26 reconsidering their benefit systems to extend parental leave periods and impose gender restrictions. In Denmark, Italy, and Norway, for instance, at least one month of the extension is a “use it or lose it� option for fathers. In Austria, two years of extended leave is offered, but only if the father takes at least six months of leave before the child turns three. Iceland has introduced the most radical reform: three months are allocated to fathers, three months are allocated to mothers, and only three months can be freely allocated between the parents. All of these policies aim to provide fathers with stronger incentives to take parental leave and to share household work and the responsibility for child care. Increased individual eligibility for paid and unpaid parental leave schemes has caused fathers to increase their usage of these schemes. This result has been found for the relatively moderate U.S. parental leave schemes (Han et al. 2009), where increased eligibility makes fathers increase leave taking by 50–80 percent, and for the more generous Swedish parental leave schemes (Ekberg, Eriksson, and Friebel 2005), where a one-month quota dedicated to the father makes fathers increase leave by two weeks on average. Considering the effects of child care leave on male care-taking activities, Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel (2007) find evidence that U.S. fathers who take parental leave are more involved in dressing, feeding, bathing, and getting up at night nine months after birth. Examining long-term effects on male care-taking activities, Ekberg et al. (2005) find no effect of Swedish father’s leave usage on their involvement in child care and household work when the child is eight years old. The authors argue that the results are likely to reflect causal effects because identification is based on a comparison of fathers with children born slightly before and slightly after the introduction of the “daddy month,� which increased fathers’ leave by two weeks, on average. It is not surprising that such a small increase in fathers’ involvement has no long-term effects. 27 <>Conclusions Recent years have witnessed considerable advances in women’s attainment of economic and social rights. However, the implementation of full gender equality requires a profound shift in individual attitudes and behaviors, which will ultimately transform the underlying structure of social and economic institutions to make them more welcoming to women. On the basis of the previous literature review, we conclude that men play a key role in bringing about gender equality because, in most societies, men exercise preponderant power in many spheres of life. In a significant fraction of developing countries, men have full control of economic resources; in some cases, they even have the final say regarding women’s health and socioeconomic issues. In the developed world, the unequal distribution of family care and household tasks represents a barrier for the economic success of women. Gender violence is also an important factor that deteriorates women’s position worldwide. Thus, the transition toward a more egalitarian society requires the contribution and commitment of men. The evidence thus far suggests that gender policies that exclusively target women can easily fail to achieve their intended goals. Indeed, some policies designed to promote women’s empowerment have been shown to have adverse effects on women’s well-being. In contrast, programs that take into account the role of men and inform them about the benefits of improving women’s socioeconomic status are more likely to be successful. Programs focused on women’s reproductive health that educate men about contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, and HIV prevention methods are particularly popular. In the developed world, the evidence suggests that it may be relatively easy for a government to provide incentives to men to take parental leaves. However, the challenge seems to be the implementation of strategies that induce behavioral changes through the acquisition of human capital for household work and child care. Violence against women is present all over the world. Informational campaigns aimed at changing individuals' views toward violence emerge as a promising strategy to reduce assaults against women. The main conclusion should be that the design and implementation of any gender policy should be consider not only the implications of the policy for the well-being of women but also the direct and indirect reaction to the policy of men. Overall, the evidence in this review challenges policy makers and development institutions to seriously consider the role of men in achieving 28 gender equality. To this end, it is important to note that gender equality does not mean that women rule over men; rather, it guarantees a level playing field that lacks all forms of discrimination against women. Footnotes (1) See Duflo (2005) for a detailed survey. (2) Several complementary theories have been proposed to explain the profound transformation in the role of women in the family and the workplace in developed countries during the last century. These explanations range from the liberation effect of new consumer durables that greatly decreased the amount of work required to run a household (e.g., washing machines, vacuum cleaners), as suggested by Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2004), to the revolutionary effect of the oral contraceptive, which facilitated women’s investments in their careers, as argued by Goldin and Katz (2002). The expansion of the service sector with a strong demand for white-collar jobs and skill-biased technological change has also significantly facilitated the increase in the female labor supply (Goldin 1990). (3) The expansion of women’s rights is related to the evolution of laws that allowed women to own and control separate property, to write contracts, to own and control their earnings, and to maintain custody of their children. (4) This marital arrangement accounts for approximately one-third of all marriages in rural Pakistan. (5) See Maccoby and Mnookin (1992); Cancian and Meye (1998); Fox and Kelly (1995). Acknowledgements I would like to thank Ana Maria Muñoz and Aline Coudouel at the World Bank and Emmanuel Jimenez and three anonymous referees for their comments and useful suggestions. Corresponding author: L. Farré, Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, IAE-CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Tel: (+34) 93 592 9779. Email: lidia.farre@iae.csic.es. The author is a research fellow at IZA, CReAM, and INSIDE and acknowledges the support of the Barcelona GSE Research Network, the Government of Catalonia, and the Spanish Ministry of Science (grant ECO2011- 29663). 29 References: Agarwal, B. 1994. A Field of One's Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia. Cambridge, England: University Press. Aikman S. and E. Unterhalter. 2007. Practising Gender Equality in Education. Oxfam. Aizer, A. 2010. “The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence.� American Economic Review 100 (4): 1847-59. Anderson, S. 2000. The Economics of Dowry Payments in Pakistan. Center for Economic Research, No. 2000-82 Angelucci, M. 2008. Love on the Rocks: Domestic Violence and Alcohol Abuse in Rural Mexico. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 8(1) (Contributions), Article 43 Arnold, F., S. Kishor, Roy, R.K. 2002. “Sex Selective Abortions in India.� Population and Development Review 28 (4): 739-785. Badawi, J. 1995. Gender Equity in Islam. World Assembly of Muslim Youth Studies on Islam. Bae, Y., S. Choy, C. Geddes, J. Sable and T. Synder. 2000. Trends in educational equity of girls and women. Washington, DC, National Center for Education Statistics, Department of Education Bankole A. 1995. “Desired Fertility and Fertility Behavior among the Yoruba of Nigeria: A Study of Couples’ Preferences and Subsequent Fertility. Population Studies 49: 317-328. Bardhan, P. 1974. “On Life and Death Issues.� Economic and Political Weekly 9: 1293- 304. Becker, S. 1996. “Couples and Reproductive Health: A Review of Couple Studies.� Studies in Family Planning 27 (6): 291-306. Berk, S.F. 1985. The Gender Factory: The Apportionment of Work in American Households. New York: Plenum. Bhalerao V.R., M.M. Galwankar, S.S. Kowli, R.R. Kumar, and R.M. Chaturvedi. 1984. “Contribution of the Education of the Prospective Fathers to the Success of Maternal Health Care Programme.� Journal of Postgraduate Medicine 30: 10-12. Bianchi, S, M. Milkie, L. Sayer, and J. Robinson. 2000. “Is Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor.� Social Forces 79: 191-228. Bhaskar, Venkataraman, and Gupta Bishnupriya. 2007. “India’s Development in the Era of Growth.� Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23 (2): 135-142. 30 Bloch, F., and V. Rao. 2002. Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India. American Economic Review 92 (4): 1029-1043. Bloom, S., A.O. Tsui, M. Plotkin, and S. Bassett. 2000. “What Husbands in Northern India Know about Reproductive Health: Correlates of Knowledge about Pregnancy and Maternal and Sexual Health.� Journal of Biosociology Science 32: 237-251. Bourguignon, F., and P.A. Chiappori. 1992. “Collective Models of Household Behavior: An Introduction.� European Economic Review 36: 355-65. Brecklin, L.R., and D.R. Forde. 2001. “A Meta-Analysis of Rape Education Programs.� Violence and Victims 16: 303-321. Brines, J. 1994. “Economic Dependency, Gender, and the Division of Labor at Home.� American Journal of Sociology 100 (3): 652-688. Browner, C.H. 1979. “Abortion Decision Making: Some Findings from Colombia.� Studies in Family Planning 10 (3): 96-106. Cancian, M., and D. Meyer. 1998. “Who Gets Custody?� Demography 35 (2): 147-157. Clark, S. 2000. “Son Preference and Sex Composition of Children: Evidence from India.� Demography 37 (1): 95-108. Coverman, S. 1985. “Explaining Husbands' Participation in Domestic Labor.� Sociological Quarterly 26: 81-97. Dahl, G., and E. Moretti. 2008. “The Demand for Sons.� Review of Economic Studies 75 (4): 1085-1120. Dahl, G., and E. Moretti. 2004. The Demand for Sons: Evidence from Divorce, Fertility, and Shotgun Marriage. NBER working paper 10281. Daly M., and M.I. Wilson. 1998. The evolutionary social psychology of family violence. Pp. 431-456 in C Crawford & D Krebs, eds., Handbook of evolutionary psychology: ideas, issues and applications. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Daly, M., M. Wilson 1993. “An evolutionary psychological perspective on male sexual proprietaries and violence against wives.� Violence and Victims 8: 271-294. Dasgupta, M., I.P. Maitra, and D. Mukherjee. 2008. Arranged Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: A model with Evidence from India. IZA working paper 3336. Das Gupta, M., and M. Shuzhuo. 1999. Gender bias in China, the Republic of Korea, and India 1920-90 - effects of war, famine, and fertility decline. Policy Research Working Paper Series 2140, The World Bank. 31 Deininger, K., A. Goyal, and H. Nagarajan. 2010. Can Change in Inheritance Legislation Improve Female Asset Ownership? Evidence from India's Hindu Succession Act. World Bank Working Paper Dekker, M., and H. Hoogeveen. 2002. “Bridewealth and Household Security in Rural Zimbabwe.� Journal of African Economics 11 (1): 114–45 Dharmalinganm, A. 1996. “The social context of family size preferences and fertility behavior in a south Indian village.� Genus 52 (1-2): 83-103 Dodoo, F.N. 1993. “A couple analysis of micro level supply/demand factors in fertility regulation.� Population Research and Policy Review 12: 93-101 Doepke, M., and M. Tertilt. 2008. “Women’s Liberation: What’s in it for Men?� Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (4): 1541-91. Duflo, E. 2004. “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pension and Intra-Household Allocation in South Africa.� World Bank Economic Review 17 (1): 1-25. Duflo, E. 2005. Gender Equality in Development. Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis and Development, Policy Paper No. 011. Dugan, L., D. Nagin, and R. Rosenfeld. 1999. “Explaining the Decline in Intimate Partner Homicide: The Effect of Changing Domesticity, Women's Status and Domestic Violence Resources.� Homicide Studies 3 (3): 187-214. Edlund, E. 1999. “Son Preference, Sex Ratios, and Marriage Patterns.� The Journal of Political Economy 107 (6): 1275-304. Ekberg, J., R. Eriksson, and G. Friebel. 2005. Parental Leave - A Policy Evaluation of the Swedish "Daddy-Month" Reform. IZA Discussion Papers 1617, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Estudillo, J., A. Quisumbing, and K. Otsuka. 2001. Gender Differences in Land Inheritance and Schooling Investments in the Rural Philippines. Land Economics. 77(1): 130-143. Eswaran, M., and N. Malhotra. 2009. Domestic Violence in Developing Countries: Theory and Evidence. Mimeo University of British Columbia. Evertsson, M., and M. Nermon. 2007. Changing Resources and the Division of Housework: A Longitudinal Study of Swedish Couples. European Sociological Review 23: 455-70. Ezeh, A.C., M. Seroussi, and H. Raggers. 1996. Men's Fertility, Contraceptive Use, and Reproductive Preferences. Calverton, MD: Macro International Inc. Ezeh, A.C. 1993. “The influence of spouses over each other’s contraceptive attitudes in Ghana.� Studies in Family Planning. May-June 24 (3): 163-174. 32 Fernández, R. 2007. Culture as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force Participation over a Century. NYU Working Paper. Fernández, R., A. Fogli, and C. Olivetti. 2004. “Mothers and Sons: Preference Formation and Female Labor Force Dynamics.� Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (4): 1249–99. Fogli, A., and L. Veldkamp. 2010. Nature or Nurture? Learning and the Geography of Female Labor Force Participation. CEPR Working paper. Fox, G.L., and R.F. Kelly. 1995. “Determinants of Child Custody Arrangements at Divorce.� Journal of Marriage and Family 57 (3): 693-708. Garenne, M. 2003. “Sex differences in health indicators among children in African DHS surveys.� Journal of Biosocial Sciences 35 (4): 601–14. Goetz, A., and R. S. Gupta. 1996. “Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh.� World Development 24 (1): 45- 63. Goldin, C. 1990. Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women. New York: Oxford University Press. Goldin, C., and L.F. Katz. 2002. “The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions.� Journal of Political Economy 110 (4): 730-770. Gould, E., O. Moav, and A. Simhon. 2008. “The Mystery of Monogamy.�, American Economic Review 98 (1): 333-57. Green, L.W., H.C. Gustafson, W. Griffitshs, and D. Yaukey. 1972. The Dacca Family Planning Experiment. Special Issue No. 3, Pacific Health Education Report. Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri, and M. Yorukoglu. 2004. “Engines of Liberation.� Review of Economic Studies 72 (1): 109-33. Gupta, S. 1999. “The Effects of Marital Status Transitions on Men’s Housework Performance.� Journal of Marriage and the Family 61: 700-11. Gürsoy, A. 1996. “Abortion in Turkey: A matter of states, family or individual decision.� Social Science and Medicine 42 (4): 531-42. Han, W.J., C. Ruhm, and J. Waldfogel. 2009. “Parental Leave Policies and Parents' Employment and Leave-Taking.� Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 28 (1): 29- 54. Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten and G. Violante. 2010. The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Inequality in the United States. Journal of Political Economy, 118 (41): 681-722. Hochschild, A. 1989. The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at Home. Avon, New York. 33 Hu, L., and A. Schlosser. 2010. Prenatal sex selection and girls’ well-being? Evidence from India. Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Hulton, L., and J. Falkingham. 1996. “Male contraceptive knowledge and practice: What do we know?� Reproductive Health Matters 7: 90-100. Inhorn, M., and F. van Balen. 2002. Infertility around the Globe. New Thinking on Childlessness, Gender, and Reproductive Technologies. University of California Press. Jacoby, H., and G. Mansuri. 2010. “Watta Satta: Bride Exchange and Women's Welfare in Rural Pakistan.� American Economic Review 100: 1804-25. Janvry, A., and E. Sadoulet. 2006. “Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient: Designing for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality.� The World Bank Economic Review 20 (1): 1–30. Jensen, R., and E. Oster. 2009. “The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women's Status in India.� Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 1057-94. Kabeer, N. 2001. “Conflicts over Credit: Re-Evaluating the Empowerment Potential of Loans to Women in Rural Bangladesh.� World Development 29 (1): 63-84. Kalipeni, E., and E.M. Zulu. 1993. “Gender differences in knowledge and attitudes toward modern and traditional methods of child spacing in Malawi.� Population Research and Policy Review 12 (2): 103-21. Khan, S. 1989. Barriers to Female Education in South Asia. Document No. PIREE/89/17. Kirk, J. 2004. “Promoting a Gender-Just Peace: The Roles of Women Teachers In Peacebuilding and Reconstruction.� Gender and Development 12 (3): 50-59. Kremer, M., E. Miguel, and R. Thornton. 2004. Incentives to Learn. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Poverty Action Lab, Cambridge, MA. La Ferrara, E., A. Chong, and S. Duryea. 2007. Soap operas and fertility: Evidence from Barzil. IGIER Working Paper. Leach, F., and C. Mitchell. 2006. “Situating the study of gender violence in and around schools,� in Leach and Mitchell eds., Combating Gender Violence in Schools. Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books. Maccoby, E., and R. Mnookin. 1992. Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody. Harvard University Press. Macmillan, R. and R. Gartner. 1999. When She Brings Home the Bacon: Labor-Force Participation and the Risk of Spousal Violence against Women. Journal of Marriage and Family 61(4): 947-58. 34 Mayer, B. 1999. “India’s Falling Sex Ratios.� Population and Development Review 25: 323-43. Mbizvo, M., and D.J. Adamchak. 1991. “Family Planning Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices of Men in Zimbabwe.� Studies in Family Planning 22 (1): 31-8. Miller, B. 1981. The Endangered Sex: Neglect of Female Children in Rural North India, Ithaca, NY, Cornell Univesity Press. Mullany, B., S. Becker, and M.J. Hindi. 2007. The impact of including husbands in antenatal health education services on maternal health practices in urban Nepal: results from a randomized controlled trial. Health education research 22: 166-76. Nasrin, S. 2011. “Crime or Custom? Motivations Behind Dowry Practice in Rural Bangladesh.� Indian Journal of Gender Studies 18 (1): 27–50. Naved, R.T., and L.A. Persson. 2005. “Factors Associated with Spousal Physical Violence Against Women in Bangladesh.� Studies in Family Planning 36 (4): 289-300. Nepomnyaschy, L., and J. Waldfogel. 2007. “Paternity Leave and Fathers’ Involvement with Their Young Children: Evidence from the ECLS-B.� Community, Work, and Family 10 (4): 425-51. Oldenburg, P. 1992. “Sex ratio, son preference and violence in India: A research note.� Economic and Political Weekly 27 (49,50): 2657-62. Oswald, A., N. and Powdthavee. 2010. “Daughters and Left-Wing Voting.� Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (2): 213-27. Panda, P., and B. Agarwal. 2005. “Marital violence, human development and women’s property status in India.� World Development 33 (5): 823-50. Pande, R.P., and N.M. Astone. 2007. Explaining son preference in rural India: the independent role of structural versus individual factors. Population Research and Policy Review 26 (1): 1-29. Pande, R.P., and A. Yazbeck. 2003. “What's in a country average? Wealth, gender and regional inequalities in immunization in India.� Social Science and Medicine 57: 2075-88. Pronyk, P., J. Hargreaves, J. Kin, L. Morison, G. Phetla, C. Watts, J. Busza, and J. Porter. 2006. “Effect of a Structural Intervention for the Prevention of Intimate-Partner Violence and HIV in Rural South Africa: A Cluster Randomized Trial.� The Lancet 368: 1973-83. Rao, V. 1993. “The rising price of husbands: analysis of dowry increases in rural India.� Journal of Political Economy 101 (4): 666–77. Rapp, R. 1999. Testing women, testing the fetus: The social impact of amniocentesis in America. New York: Routledge. 35 Schady, N., and M. C. Araujo. 2006. Cash Transfers, Conditions, School Enrollment and Child Work: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Ecuador. Policy Research Working Paper 3930, World Bank, Washington, DC. Schuler, S., S. M. Hashemi, and S. Huda Badal. 2010. “Men’s violence against women in rural Bangaldesh: Undermined or exacerbated by microcredit programmes?� Development in Practice 8 (2): 148-57. Scott, L., S. Dopson, P. Montgomery, C. Dolan, and C. Ryus. 2009. Impact of Providing Sanitary Pads to Poor Girls in Africa. University of Oxford. Shelton, B.A. 1990. “The Distribution of household Tasks: Does Wife's Employment Status Make a Difference?� Journal of Family Issues 11: 115-35. Singh, S., and R. Samara. 1996. “Early marriage among women in developing countries.� International Family Planning Perspective 22: 148-175. South, S., and G. Spitze. 1994. “Housework in Marital and Nonmarital Households.� American Sociological Review 59: 327-47. Srinivasan, S., 2005. Daughters or Dowries? The Changing Nature of Dowry Practices in South India. World Development 33 (4), pp. 593-615 Srinivasan, S., and A. Beidi. 2007. “Domestic Violence and Dowry: Evidence from a South Indian Village.� World Development 35 (5): 857–80. Tanye, M., 2008. “Access and Barriers to Education for Ghanaian Women and Girls.� Interchange 39 (2): 167–84. Terefe, A., and C.P. Larson. 1993. “Modern contraception use in Ethiopia: does involving husbands make a difference?� American Journal of Public Health 83 (11): 1567-71. Thaddeus, S., and D. Maine. 1994. “Too far to walk: maternal mortality in context.� Social Science and Medicine 38 (8): 1091-110. Thomas, D. 1990. “Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach.� Journal of Human Resources 25 (4): 635-64. Thomas, D. 1994. “Like Father, Like Son or Like Mother, Like Daughter: Parental Education and Child Health.� Journal of Human Resources 29 (4): 980-89. UNESCO Principal Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (UNSECO PROAP). 2000. Increasing the number of women teachers in Rural Schools. Bangkok. Vermeersch, C., and M. Kremer. 2004. School Meals, Educational Achievement and School Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya. Harvard University Economics Department, Cambridge, MA. 36 Vyas, S., and C. Watts. 2008. “How does economic empowerment affect women's risk of intimate partner violence in low and middle income country settings?: A systematic review of published evidence.� Journal of International Development 21 (5): 577-602. Wang, C.E., L.S. Vittinghoff, and Z.M. Rong. 1996. “Effects of family planning with husband participation on pregnancy and induced abortion rates in urban China.� Abstract of paper presented at annual meeting of the American Public Health Association, New York Warner, R.L. 1991. “Does the Sex of Your children Matter? Support for Feminism among Women and Men in the United States and Canada.� Journal of the Marriage and Family 53: 1051-6. Warner, R.L., and B. Steel. 1999. “Child Rearing as a Mechanism for Social Change: The Relationship of Child Gender to Parents' Commitment to Gender Equity.� Gender and Society 13: 503-17. Washington, E. 2004. Family matters: How daughters affect their legislator fathers’ voting on women’s issues. Working paper, Yale University. Washington, E. 2008. “Family Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers' Voting on Women's Issues.� American Economic Review 98 (1): 311-32. West, C., and D.H. Zimmerman. 1987. “Doing Gender.� Gender and Society 1 (2): 125-51. World Bank. 1999. PAD for Rajasthan District Primary Education Program. Washington, DC: World Bank. Yount, K.M., R. Langsten, and K. Hill. 2000. “The effect of gender preference on contraceptive use and fertility in rural Egypt. Studies in Family Planning 31 (4): 290-300. 37