Report No. 12942-KG Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report May 13, 1994 Country Operations Division I Russia aiid Central Asia Department Europe and Central Asia FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY U MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12942 KG Docment of the World Bank Type: ECO This documenthas a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization CURRENCY QmUVALENm Until May 10, 1993 CurenJcy Unit Ruble 1 Ruble = 100 kopecks After May 10, 1993 Currency Unit = Som 1 Som = 100 tyin Period Aveage- End of otdq (RubleslSom per US Dollar) Ruibles 1992 Quarter 102.4 100.0 Quarter II 94.6 100.0 Quarter m 177.7 254.4 Quarter IV 396.4 414.5 Quarter ! 580.1 684.0 Quarter II" 4.1 4.3 Q e m 5.6 6.5 Quarter IV 7.8 8.0 194 Quare I 10.1 11.7 1/ May lo-June 30, 1995. WEGIGTS AND 4EASURES Metric System GOVERNNTN FISCAL YEAR January I - December 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PREFACE This report is based on the fidings of sever World Bank missions to the Kyrgz Repubc between July 1993 and Apri 1994. The main economic mission visited the country in July 1993, and was led by Tevfik Yaprak and icluded Isabel Guerro, Cstina Leijonhfvud, Barbara Ossowidca (World Bank), Merih Celan, Se R. Sea Gupta, Henry Laurant, James Leiel, and Esen Olgenerk (Consultants). The World Bank wishes to thnk the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic for their support and cooperatin. The report was prepared by Zeynep Taymas and Tevfik Yaprak, with valuable comments and contrifuions by Isabel Guerero, Christina Leijonhufvud and Michael Mill. Cevdet Denizer and David Gree contributed to the drfting of an earlier version of the report. The report was processed by Ala Cubukcu and Debra Mckene. The work was carred out under the general supervision of Kadir Tanju Yir(ikoflu, Division Chief, and Russell J. aweeta, Director. This docment has a resticted distron and may be used by recipient only in the performance of dir offica duties. Its contents may not oewise be disclosed wito World Bank aut on. AIDREVITIONS ANwcAnoopl and ficig Xomhf ERRA Et Rt i R ESA E}ded Stuctural Adjustme_ Faciliy GDP Gross Domestic Prduct PSU Fome Soviet Unioni IdP International Moneay Fund JSC Joint Stock Compan MlTMR Ministry of lndusry Trade and Material Resources NBK Natdonal Biak of Kyrgntan SOE State Owned Eneprise She Special Meana of Payment SWF Stae Prpety Fund VAT Value-dded Tax TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Sum ........................ i A. hnroduction .1 B. Economic Developments . 2 C. Reorm Agenda . 7 Pri v atiton.. 7 Enterprise Sector Reform . 9 Financial Sector Reform . 14 Pricing and Tra.e. 1S soaocyPol.cy. 18 D. Sectonal Refor ms. 22 Agriculture . 22 2ining.23 B. Mediun-Term Outlook .25 Statistical Annex Tet Tabls 1. Seiected macroeconomic Indicators .2 2. Summary Monetay Accounts .5 3. Agriculura Products to be Purchased forSt Neid for 1994 .17 4. projected Changes in Red Outut. 25 5. Current Account Balance . 26 6. External Fianing Requirements. .27 Exective S _nary 1. The Kyrgyz Republic was among the first states of the Fonner Soviet Union (FSU) to embark on a conVrehensive program of macroeconomic stabilization and systemic reforms. It was also among the couries most adversely affected by the transition. The breakdown of interrepublican trade and paymns mechanisms and general economic decline in the FSU caused severe disrtions in the Kyrgyz econmy. The country also suffered from a large deterioration in the terms of trade and the loss of union transfers that, prior to independ , had been used to finance large trade deicits. Real income and living standards of most of the population have falen dramatically. 2. In 1993, the real GDP continued to decline at an anrnal rate of 16 percent. The industrial sector experienced the highest output loss at over 50 percent during the last two years, with capacity utilization as low as 30 percent in some subsectors. Although agricultural output fell only 8 percent in 1993, this was the continuation of a longer downward trend in the sector, caused by decreasing productivity an! deteriorating natural base. More recently, this situation has been exacerbated by lack of inputs and credits, distorted pricing policy and the state's pervasive intervention in marketing. While a private sector has emerged in small scale services, this bas not yet been able to comensate for the drastic decline in trade and transportation that accompanied the loss of output in the real sectors. 3. In 1993, the Kyrgyz Republic's external trade continued to shrink. During the last two yeas, exot volume declined by about 65 percent, with manufctured exports most adversely affected. Imports have been reduced to the economy's minimum requiments and consist mainly of petroleum products, natural gas, grains and a few industrial goods. Moreover, the rapid rise in imported energy prices toward world market levels hb led to a large terms of trade deterioration, amounting to about 65 percent during the last two years. Despite the drastic cut in imports, these unfavorable extemal developments have resulted in a trade deficit of around 11 percent of GDP in 1993. 4. The Kyr,yz authorities responded to the economic crisis by embarking on a program of macroeconomic stabilization and systemic reforms. In May 1993, the Kyrgyz Republic took courageous steps toward stabilizing the economy by leaving the Ruble zone. It introduced its own national currency, som, while at the same time adopting a stabilization program supported by an IMF Stand-by arrangement and Systemic Transformation Facility (STF). Progress to date on both stabilization and structural reforms has been uneven, however, as explained below. 5. Slow progress in enterprise restructuring coupled with the lack of financial discipline in the economy undermined the Government's stabilization efforts. As the tight credit policy took hold, non- viable enterprises managed to survive by accuming arrears to suppliers and by defauldng on their bank loans. This has exploded into a web of economy wide arres. As the finanial crisis approached, the Goverment and the National Bank (NBK) relaxed monetary controls, and the stabilization program could not be fulfilled. Although, the NBK regained some control over monetary expansion after October 1993, it was not able to bring monetary expansion in line with the programtargets set for end-1993. However, a tight monetary stance has been mantained through the first quarter of 1994. As a result, there has been a clear downward trend in inlation, which was 7 percent in March 1994. -i- -ii- 6. On the fisc front, the Govement has managed to reduce the budgetary deficit from 16 percent of GDP in 1992, to 8.7 percnt in 1993. This redudion, however, will be difficult to sustain in the fiue. The burden of adjustment has been on expeditre cuts. Wile the Govemment was able to limit wage incrases, and stemline generos welfare expendiues, some essential current expenditres and capital outlays bad to be dstically cut to compeat for a precipitous decline in tax revenue. Total tax revenue declined frm 14 percent of GDP in 1992 to only 8 percent in 1993. This was due to a multitude of tax exemptions, non enforcement of new tax measures, increasing barter activity, and weak tax adm aton capacity. The resulting budget deficit in 1993 was financed equally by extnal resoures and credits from the NBK. The worisome decline in tax revenue has contnued during the first quarter of 1994. This trend, if not reversed, has the potential of undeminin stabilization efforts. Measures to revoke previously grnted tax exemptions, expand the tax base, and better enforce compliance are urgendy needed. Syseanc Rdorms 7. One of the objectives of the reform program was to rapidly eliminate distortions inherited from the command system and reduce the state's role in the economy. Most prices were liberalized and legal bauriers to private sector activity were eliminated. Privatization proceeded at a remarkable pace, though enterprise restructuring has lagged behid. Restrctions on imports, quotas on exports, and foreign exchange surrender requirements were eliminated, and a unified exchange rate was inroduced. In interrepublican trade, the mmber and quantity of commodities subject to interstate trade agreements were reduced, allowing more latiude for decetalized trade. After the first wave of reform measures, however, some momentum was lost in 1993, as the authorities vacillated between market oriented policies and old habits of state intervention in response to the mountig hardship of transition. Securing supplies of essential goods, preventing futher price increases and supporting ailing enteprises to arrest output decline gained priority. As a result, many measures taken in 1993 attempted to reinforce the state's role in pricing, trade and distribution. There are indications, however, that in early 1994, the Government has renewed its liberalization efforts, particularly in pricing, and domestic and foreign trade. 8. MdaWzdon. The privatization program has been given high priority by the Govemment. By January 1994, one third of total enterise fixed assets had been fully or partially privatized, with privatization of trade and services nearly complete. Despite its speed, the privatization process has not led to the creation of more effective management strures , because the predominan method of privatization bas been the transfer ot share ownership to labor collecives that fail to impose nessary restucuring such as cost-cuttng and labor shedding. Moreover, with the excepdon of small retail and service establishments, privaized enterprises, e.g., wholesale trade enterprises and warehouses, have contied to remain under the direct influence of ministries. At the same time, privatization in agrcue which started in 1992, was suspended within a year. In the process, 165 state or collective farms (out of the total 470) were reorganized into 17,000 peasant enterprises. The experience of these farms, however, has been uisfactory due to unir practices in distibuting assets, unclear leasing rights, lack of support services, and the state's continued monopoly in distnibution and procuremnt. 9. The Govermnent has recognized the deficiencies inherent in its privatization progm and has already started taking corrective measures. The new Concept Note approved by the Parliament (January 1994) provides for (i) auctioning and/or competitive bidding for eaprises up to 100 employees; (ii) a combination of competitive cash bidding, auctions and the consideration of privatization proposals based on clear criteria, for medium to large enterprises; and (iii) improving privatization methods by mandating that at least 25 percent of the shares in an entprise be privatized by competitive means, limitiDng -iii- privileges of labor collectives, eacing and clarifyiing the role of investmen funds, removing business 'profie' trictions on privatized enterprises, and conducting a nationwide public informaion campaigp on privatizadon. Subsequent decrees foresee converting all SOEs into open Joint-stock companies, auctioning enteprise shares still owned by the state, and allowing owners the right to sell their shares to outside buyers. The Government also intends to put agricultural reform back on track. A Presidential decree adopted in Februay 1994 provides for lease of agricultural land for 49 years, and the right to seul and inherit land leases, and use them for collateal. While these developments move in the right direction, the decrees issued in the first quarter of 1994 now need to be translated into concrete action. 10. Eterprie Sector. Despite the pressing need for adjustment, the Govemment has so far not initiated the process of phasing out nonviable enteprises. Nor has it given enough consideration to corporate governance and restucurng enterprises that are likely to remain under state ownership for some time. At the same time, enterprise losses have advrely affected the development of the baning sector which continues to act as a cashier and record keeper for the state, rather than as a financial intermedaor. It has become clear that drastic measures are needed to impose financial discipline on entep and reduce their burden on the economy, before the bankig sector itself can be restructured. At the sme time, the initial focus in the financial sector should be on enhancing the financial infrastucture and the regulatory framework. 11. Enterprise reform should proceed simnutaneously on several fronts. The recurence of interenterprise arrears must be stopped, possibly thrugh compulsory inroduction of a bank drft system to control commercl payments. The Goverment has decided to transform all SOEs into joint stock companies (ISC), regardless of the intended timing of their privatzaion. Within JSCs, management autonomy should be established, accompanied by an accepted chain of accountability. In this respect, the Government should consider the best possible instimional arrangement for exercising the state's oversight function for SOEs. Given its past interventionist approach to SOE management, the Ministy of Industry, Trade and Material Resources (MITM) may not be the right instituon for this purpose. The Government is also determined to reduce the financial drain from large loss-making SOEs. It has identified about 30 largest loss-making SOEs to be put under a special restruc g progrm. For this purpose, it intends to establish a high level agency, called the Enterprise Reform and Resolution Agency (ERRA) wbich will have the mandate to close down these enterprises, as well as to restuce them by downsizing and by spining off their assets. Operating losses during the restucing process and costs of passive restucurig will be financed through the budget, and these entepriss will be cut-off frtom bank credits. 12. PrIng andD"rien. TheGovernmenthasmade tlprogress minimplemendtg price reform. Retail margins imposed on all goods after introduction of the som are now in effect only for bread. The number of finms classified as monopolies-the prices of which are subject to the control of the Anti-monopoly and Pricing Committee-was reduced from fifty in Seember 1993 to nine in April 1994, covering natural monopolies such as utilies, and the Bread Complex pending its demonopolization and privaization. Although a program has been drafted to demonopolize the Bread Complex, its design falls short of creating a competitve enviromnent for bread production and distbution. Moreover, in February 1994, the price subsidy on bread was eliminatd by a 150 percent increase in bread prices, and replaced by a targeted cash compensation scheme. Since early 1993, increases in import cost of petroleum products and coal have been passed tough to comer. However, eectricity, gas, and heating tariffs charged to households are still controlled and highly subsidized. -iv- 13. Throghout 1993, a wide range of indirect price controls were in effect because of the state's conued involvement in trade and distrbetion through state orders and domestic supply cotacts. In early 1994, the state order and purchase systems were abolished and replaced by a state needs system to be implemented through voluntary supply contacts. Some state procurement is, theefore, likely to continue in agricuture, mainly to fulfill commitnts under bilaeral clearing agreements. In order to avoid the disincentive that this system had on the agricultural sector, procurement contracts will have to be freely negotiated, and indexed to inflation, in case of payment delays. Moreover, there should not be any link between the provision of inputs and supply contracts. 14. The Government's commendable effort to eliminate major price distortions and restrictions on extrnal trade needs now to be vigorously pursued by the breaking up of large, state-owned, trading and transport enterprises; accelerating their privatization; and allowing free entry to the sector. The M MI-which deals with the bulk of wholesale trade within and outside the country-has valuable klowledge about FSU markets. Its expertise needs to be preserved and made available for enterprises, as they begin to procure their input and market their output independently. The remaining conmmercial functions under the control of MITMR should, therefore, be corporatized immediately. Although most of the large wholesale distribution network of MBAR has been privatized, this has been in the form of anfes to labor collectives, without breaking up into smaller units. This situation has resulted in lack of effective ownership and contnued intervention by MMR in trade and distibution. The transport sector which is still majority state owned should be privatized as a matter of priority, with a view to creating a competitive enviroment in the sector. 15. Scadd Polky. The susainabiity and the pace of reform will depend on how effectively the Government can establish a social safety net, including unemployment compensation, and benefits targeted at the truly needy. There are several reasons to expect increased unemployment in the years to come. Enteprise restructuring is expected to accelerate, including the divestiture of social assets and services, which would leave no incentive for workers to accept unpaid leave. Also, a new legislation reduces the employers' financial responsibDity for dismissed workers. In response to anticipated unemployment, the Government has set aside budgetary funds to support the Employment Fund, and passed legislation to clarify the definition of the unemployed and rationalize unemployment benefits. Nonetbeless, the ehigibiity for unemployment benefits will have to be further revised to prevent undue pressure on the Employment Fund. At the same time, improved delivery of unemployment benefits and services would be needed to address possible mass layoffs, includig a program of support through liaison with employers and workers. 16. During the transition, the real income of some segments of the population will contine to fall. Therefore, priority needs to be given to developing a social assistance targeted to those most in need. In 1992, about 35 percent of the population was estimated to be poor. Since then, the real income and living standards of most of the population have fallen dratically. The proportion of the population below minimum subsistence has probably increased. A comprensive baselme survey of a sample of households, the result of which are expected to be available in mid-1994, will help the Government to better assess the extent of poverty in the country. The Govenment has adopted a strategy for social protection which stresses that support will be provided but only to those in need and only in ways consistent with financil realities, and some targeting of social pteton has already been started. The Government's intention is to move toward a means-ested system, in which verified need rather than categorical status, is the core principle of allocating benfits. Purther development of meanstesting based on indirect indicators is believed to be realistic in the Kyrgyz Republic, since the country has a wide range of existng benefits and a system for delivering them. Detailed work is now underway to introduce more ace means-tting systems, including specific ways to targ cdld allowances to fmildies most in need. The Govemment also intends to consolidate existing family allowances, bread price compensation, and other special social benefits Into a single cash benefit to be targeted to those most in need. 17. At the same dme, attention needs to be given to ensuring that basic services ae proteted from expenditue cuts and that structual issues are addrssed. Over the last two years, the health service has suffered from funding cuback, major logistical problems and an exodus of professionals to odter countries. The Mistry of Heath has tried to make some significanImprovements in its operational efficiency, through the rationaliza of hospital beds and the i ion of more appropriate treatment systems for a variety of diseases. Cutbacks in the country's education system bave generally been less severe, and there is no evidence of any drop in school enrolments. Various reforms have been implemented, including an increase in cost recovery in higher eaion, but further stucur change will undoubtedly be needed. In particuar, essential expend for primary and secondary education shoud be protected during the trasston penod. Secoral Reforms 18. Systemic refo-m will not generate sustined growth unless sectoral reforms are undrtake simultneously. Apar from its relatively large industrial base, the Kyrgyz Republic has two important sectors, agriculture and mining, the isLues of wbich need to be addressed as soon as possible. In the agI*ulww sector, the Govermnent should: (i) start developing a cpeve agro-reform program, inclun land reform, farm restruuing, and clarification of water and grazing rights; (i) continue deregulation of the sector by establishig compeve prcemen, by abolishg export licensing and by following a pricing policy that does not penalize producers; and (iii) shif the emphasis within the Ministry of agriculture from adminismtrave management of production to policy andysis, reform implementation and information di ion. Moreover, key invesments are needed in ania health and processing of meat and wool to improve productivity and export prospects. 19. The Government is in the process of devising a consistent and iy compeve policy framework for the mining sedor. Such framework should include: (i) tansforin the role of the Stae as regulator rather than as direct owner in mining venures; (ii) easuring inernationally competive taxation and royalty regimes; and (iii) providing for secure exploration and marketig of mineral products. The Government should consider privatizing and restrcturing some of the enterprises under Kyrgyltin. Consideration should also be given to reinforcing govement institutions to supervise the sector, such as the establishment of a secretiat of mines. Balac of Payments Outlook 20. The Kyrgyz Republic's economic growth will ave to be driven by the expansion of extern trade. This is due both to the constrai imposed on domestic demand by the stabilization progm and to the small size of the domestic economy itself. In the short-term, there is not much scope for a large rebound of trading activities among FSU counties, nor is it realistic to expect that the Kyrgyz Republic can diversify its export markets on a large scale to non FSU comtriaes. Eventually, however, it shoud be possible for the country to change its production mix, to take advantage of emergng new markets, and to enhance trade through regional trading argemnts. Nonetheless, the Kyrgyz economy will conflinue to face a structural balace of payments deficit for many years to come. -vi- 21. A vray gradual inease in exos of electicity, Wriculal co oities and seleted manfactured 8goods could bo acved wit Indsial nes r and poveme n payments and trade reaons with major tradWg prters. At the same time, some price Incrases can be expected in the country's major expor. However, dtroughout 1994 and possbly in 1995 as weMl, the Kyrgyz Republic's import bill will condme to be adversely affected by highe ener and raw materal prices. Moreover, the country's imports wil have to increase in real terms, as their current low level is not sstnable, nor ls it conducive to outp reovey. Against this bacgound, nd considering debt service payment obligaD and the need to keep a certain level of foreign exchange resves, te country's xernal financin reremt are expeted to rage between US$320 and US$380 million durng 1994-96. If disbu frm exisBt commtens are takn into accu, this would rqure additonal new of US$70 and US$330 million in 1994 and 1995, respectively. 22. The balaoe of payments scoario prented in this Report assmes a gru improvement in the COUnty'S 0ex al financial situation, and thus a decline in its exteral fiancing requements toward the year 1998. Whether this can be achieved i highly uncetain and will depend largely on the steng of export gowth and the efectiveness of the restucturing proces. in the event that the country's external final situation does not improve due to factors beyond the Govemment's control, the donor communt showud codiue to support the Kyrgyz Republic through conoessiond assistance, as long as the Goverme demonstts its comitment to the reform pogram trough decisive and timely actions. Condcul 23. The Kyrgyz Republic, a "fast track reformer among FSU countries, does not yet show any signs of economic recovery. This Is patdy due to difficulties inherent in the utrion period, but it also ruts frm the country's relatively small size, geographic isolion and the lack of ready exploitable natural resources. There have also been some important policy sippage in the refom process. There is little rme to suspect that these were due to the Govement's fltering m t to reform, alhough some power groups withi and outside the Govenmoent may coinue to have a vested iterest in maintinin the stus quo. Rather, the diffilties enunered in 1993 arose maly from the vacuum created by the iadequacy of old institutions, and poor desig and lack of s on of various components of the reform progm. In parcular, some reform conts have failed to inorporate identified deficiencies In Implemention capacity, so that their prospects for realzadon were overestiMad. There was also an overal udstimatiod of the ty of tnmg insttutions and their ability to respond to changing maket signals and coieons. 24. The Kyrgyz Republic cannot afford serous policy slippages in the yeas ahead. The donors who hep the Government design and implement te refms, likeie, he a respoibility to fulfill. The refrm packe will have to be credible, reac, and most iortay, inplementable. Monetay and fisca policies wiNl have to be designed in a way to accommodate rrudct an social costs. Although socia discontt has not yet emerged as a major detent to the reform process, the overall lack of fincial discipline in the country-in paricular poson of household utiliy bills, ie prise areas and priveges accorded to labor collecdves and managers-may be viewed as an atempt to alleviate social dissat . The Govenment will need to put a strong emphasis on social assistance and poverty monitng. Also, in its developme strategy, the Goverment will have to strike an propdre balace between refom measur that would yidd longer term results, and actons that would have an immediate and visible impact on the well-being of the population. A. Iutodueon 1. The Kyrgyz Republic has been at the foreft of the reforming counies in the form Soviet Union (FSU). T trae ition process has not been easy for the popuaton at large. The county exp nced an upe ted decline in red incoens frm 1991 to 1993, triggered by the breakdown of inte blican trade and payment angemens ad disoder in the FSU economy. The Kyryz Republic's hardship has probably been more pronounced t in other fast-refoming ctries of Cenal and Easten Europe because of the country's extreme dependence on imported oil and gas, geographical isolaon and lack of ibmediely available natr resources. In spring 1993, the Governm inoduced a new cumrency and adopted an orthodox stabiltion program within the frmwwork of an IMP stany angement. The prom was to be accompanied by substantial extenal resorce inflows from biateral and mliateral sources. Furthmre, the Govemment had displayed a strong commitment to market- based systemic reforms in a series of decisions and announcemes. 2. Toward the end of 1993, economic policy perceptions and discussions becme cniderably blurred and uneasy, however, fiscd and monety tightening produced additional constrai on the financil management of state enerprs. The central policy concen was the "crerdt cmuch" generated by monetary contion. The rapid rise in interenteprise arrears and bank overdrafts threatend the orderly evoion of finial and insttutiona relations in the newly emerging system. Anther round of consolidated settlement of arrears and overdraft and possible relaxation of credit limits was co pated to provide pardal relief from the eneprise sector's severe difficulides. As a resut, the tabilization program came under strong pressure and monetay targets were not fuiy adhered to. 3. At the same dme, the economy has suffered from large enernl shock. Besides contributiDg directly to output losses, these exteral shocks required domestic adjustment to prevent trade deficits from widnn beyond financeable lImits. In 1992, expndiure reduction was aained mainly through extemealy high inflation and wage repression. In 1993, expenditure reduction was to be achieved by formafy strucred moneay and fiscal tightening, which is a new pbenomeo still to be leamed and intnlid ir Se Kyrgyz institutional settig. 4. The Kyrgyz Republic is at a crossroads. If it wavers in its resolve to proceed with tough mesures and muddles through the refom process, transition and ensing hadsip would be prolonged and the Republic would nm the risk of losing the donor commuits suot. Any atempt to launh a domesic demand-led economic recovery is likely to widen trade and fiscal deficits, endanger financial stability and reduce the Kyrgyz economy's creditwortiness in the mhd-1990s. On the other hand, the country may choose to remain steadily on the reform path. Measures taken in early 1994 indicate tht the Government has renewed its refotm eforts and is demined to pusue market-oiented policies. This does not mean that the Kyrgyz Republic wiU have to taclde aU the isues it faces im u y, but priorites will have to be set and rigorously pursed. The design and the implementtion of the economic reform program should recognize the difficulties inherent in the transition period and, if needed, find "less than pefectw solutions to address them. This would bestow on the donors the need to be innovative, flexible and supportive. It would also require that the Govement not lose sight of where it wants to steer the economy in the medium term. 5. This report provides a brief overview of recent economic developments, includig te man difficuldes encountered in the stabizaton process (Section B). It also assesses the progrs-to-date of stuctral reforms and draws a reform agenda to be implemented in the next two years (Section C). Given their cental role in recovery process, it reiews major policy issues in agdculure and mining 2 (Setion D). It en concludes by assessing the country's medium-term outlook, its external financing requirements, and possible risks to the reform process (Section E). D. Economnc Developmens' 6. Throughout 1993, the Kyrgyz policymakers have contiued to adjust the economy to severe external shocks, incuding a sharp fal in the volume of external trade, a large deterioration T1k i. seeed Macroemwc Iiboo in the terms of trade, and the loss of union transfers. Red GDP is estimated to have declined another 16 percent in 1993 (Table 1). 1991 1992 1999 The trade deficit remained at around 11 percent of GDP, with both exports and imports at much ODP" 15.6 161.9 9,391.0 lower levels of volume than those in 1992. ReP De!. % ne 107.0 -1487.0 1,281.0 Despit stabilization efforts, inflation remaid high, at 1300 percent per annm. Although the Poducin I cne Government succeeded in drastically reducing U1.e -2 .00 -25.0 the budget deficit to 8.7 percent of GDP, it did Lve .6.0 -9.0 -10.0 so by severely cutting aU expenditure Crp Stor -17.0 1.0 -3.0 categories, particularly wages and investment, Red wap 1990100 not by improvin revemne efforts. Ave wage 79.0 54.0 37.0 Mini= ge 52.0 24.0 14.0 7. The rapid rise in imported energy prices l l IOD -13 -31.0 -10.4 oward world market levels has led to large E 42.4 32.6 21.0 tms of trade losses for the Kyrgyz economy, %o 42.9 43.6 31.5 amounting to over 40 percent in 1993. The average unit price of energ imports in3045d0 D 43 16.6 8.7 by fftfold in 1992; and by an additional p,,,,_ seventeenfold during the first three quarters of Nku nOrion umi 192- on ai9 f 193 1993. With these increases, the Kyrgaz s _ Republic is now paying world prces for petroleum imports from Russia and Kazaklstan and 60 to 80 percent of world prices for naural gas imports from Udekistan. 8. As in previous years, the sharp decl in exernal demand was the prmary fctor behid the large fall in output in 1993. The drop in economic activity in all FSU economies led to a conaction in aggregate demand, particuarly for invetment goods. Moreover, the introduction of the Kyrjyz national currency in May 1993, although crucial for successibl stabilization, compnded the difficulties in interrepubiican payments and resulted in firther trade restictions by neighborig countries, causing a slarp decline in Kyrgyz exports. Official trade data indicate a 35 percet decline in export volume in 1992, and a farther decline, by about 30 percent, duriBg 1993. The fail in manucured exporls has been 11 For a died rview of deeoens in 1992 and eadryas, Y e Mb Kywzy Republc: lTM Treie to A Ma*a EDco_y-, a Wo;d Bd Country Study, Word Ba. Wasdon D.C.. 1993. Kytgyz Republic Economic Report 3 particularly large. Out of 400 item exported in 1991, exports of about 80 items have viraly halted. This large fall in external demand caused a severe drop in industial production. Total industrial output declined by over 50 percent during the past two years, with even bigher output losses in machinery, electoelncal and electronics subsectors. 9. The decline in the agriculural sector was relatively less severe. Agricultural output fell ' 8 percent in 1993, mosdy in the livestock sector, where animal mnmbers and productivity continued to tall. In the crop sector, output declined by only 3 percent in 1993. Despite the relatively modest output decline conmaed to industry, agiculue faces severe financial problems. The Govemment's continmed policy of keeping agricultural prices low, together with long payment delays for procment under the state order system, have drastically eroded agricultural income and the farmers' ability to purchse inputs and sustain past production levels. 10. The absence of basic national income statistics prevents analyzing the adjusment pattern of domestic expenditures, but major adjustment probably came from consumption, as average real wage has decined by 55 percent during the last two years. It is genrally believed that there has been minimal investment activity. However, many entprises have accumuated substi inventories. 11. The decline in economic activity has not led to an increase in open unemployment. Throughout 1993, only 1.5 percen of the labor force registered as unemployed with the Employment Service. However, the underlying rate of unployment may have been about 10 percent at the year's end, since at least 200,000 workers were on unpaid leave or were out of work, but not registered as unewployed. This relatively low level of open unemploymet is due mainly to the lack of enterpise resucring. 12. As a small member of the ruble zone, in 1992 the Kyrgyz economy was under the influence of maroeconomic developments in the rest of the FSU, parcularly Russia. Efforts to achieve stabilzation were undermined by the lack of policy coordation and enuing nstabiliy in the ruble zone. In May 1993, the Kyrgyz Republic took a courageous step toward stabilizing its economy by being the first FSU country, after the Baltics, to leave the ruble zone. It ioduced its own national crwency, the som, and adopted a stabilization program supported by an IM stand-by arrangement and access to the Systemic Transformation Facility. 13. The stabilzation program sought to reduce monthly inflation from 25-45 percent during the first quarter of 1993 to single digits by the year's end. This was to be achieved by strict controls on monetary expansion and a drastic cut in the fiscal deficit from 16 percent of GDP in 1992, to 7 percent in 1993. Fiscal tightenmg was to be achieved by limitng wage increses, li_matig budgetary transfers to the enterprise sector, and reducing social expendures through targeting and reducing the bread subsidy. On the revenue side, new and higher taxes were intoduced and VAT exmptions were abolished. The targeted budget deficit was to be financed by extra financing wiot recourse to monetary financing during the remainder of the year. 14. The program targeted radical changes in monetary and financial policies in order to move toward market-based allocation of financial resources. A floating exchnge rate and a libra foreign exchange 4 regime, without any restrictions on current and capital account transactions, were adopted. The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBK) established a foreign exchange auction market. Credit and deposit interest rates were liberalized. The NBK also planned to eliminate directed credits and channel resources to the banking system through refinance credit auctions at competitive interest rates. 15. Monetary Developments. During the initial months of the IMF program, monetary expansion was kept under control and targets set for end of June 1993 were attained. Starting in August, however, implementation of the monetary progran encountered difficulties, as the Government failed to initiate the required enterprise sector adjustment and establish financial discipline in the economy. Maintenance of payments discipline is the single most important prerequisite for the success of macro-level policies. Only when economic agents are forced to pay for the goods and services they acquire can tightened monetary and fiscal policies be sustained and aggregate demand and inflation be reduced. 16. Lack of progress in imposing hard budget constraints on loss-making enterprises has led to severe financial disorder in the economy. Non-viable enterprises have managed to survive by accumulating arrears to suppliers, partiwlarly to the energy complex. They have also defaulted on bank debt while contiuing to receive new credits from banks they own or from state-owned banks, financed mostly by NBK credits. As a result, the financial problems of ailing entrprises infested other enterprises, banks, and NBK. Interenterprise arrears, which had been partly cleared in January 1993, reemerged at a much larger scale. As the financial crisis approached, pressures on the Govemment and NBK mounted, and fimlly resulted in relaxing monetary controls. Between August and October, NBK provided large amounts of directed credits to the enterprise sector more than doubling NBK credits. 17. After October 1993, NBK regained some control over credit expansion, but it was unable to bring it into line with program targets set for end-1993. Neverdteless, despite strong political pressures, it has mainined a tight monetary stance through the first quarter of 1994 resulting in a substantial fail in iflation from above 30 percent a month in September 1993 to 7 percent in March 1994. It appeas, however, that the magnitude of monetary tightening required to affect this downward trend has been large in the absence of payments discipline and the u increase in in e rrse wears. This appears to have resulted in a substantial demonetization of the economy. Most of trade transactions are reportedly being conducted on a barter basis, and recently enterprises have started to pay wages in kind. These developments may have also contributed to a further contraction in economic activity. There seems to be a need for some remonetization of the economy. However, this should be done only after significant progress has been achieved on establishing payment discipline and expectations for high inflation have been reversed. 18. Although nominal monetary targets were not attained, there was a clear and sharp decline in all monetary aggregates in real terms. For example, broad money icreased by only 180 percent between December 1992-93 compared to 1360 percent inflation. The same was true for the period after the introduction of the som. During the second half 1993, broad money inased by 40 percent, while iflation during the period was 247 percent. As a result, broad money dramatically contacted from 30 percent of GDP at end December 1992 to 7.5 percent in December 1993. This parly reflects the deepening disintermediation in the banking system due to very low deposit interest rates offered by r Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report n bans, which varied in the 120-250 percent range during the second half of 1993, and Tale 2. Summary Moneay Amount were largely negative in real terms. Dec 92 Junm 93 Sep 93 Dec 93 19. Total domestic credit incsed from som 0.4 billion in December 1992 to som A. Not inpassets m38.3 -348.3 -445.1 A56.4 2.0 billion by the end of the year (Table 2). A third of this expansion was accounted by B. Net domesc asset 289.3 851.2 1,147.2 1,358.6 goverment borrowing. These funds, DomeStcidlt 443.5 1,178.7 1,532.1 2,008.5 Net caims on govenment 7.0 371.4 598.2 m.4 however, were onlent to the eterprise Creditw theeconomy 343.7 844.0 1,009.1 1,466.3 sector. The funding of the credit expansion ohe im, net -154.2 -327.5 -384.9 -649.9 has been somewhat unuua. The broad ba b somehat uusual The road D. Broad money 251.0 502.9 702.1 702.2 money's share steadily declined from about cunvm 89,5 157.4 287.1 398.4 57 pacent in Decemer 1992 to 35 percent Depoit 161.4 345.5 415.0 303.8 at the end of 1993. There were two other sources of funding: the increase in net foreign liabilities, which roughy financed 5 DM one third of total credits, and net other liabilities of the monetary system, which also fumded about a third of domesdc credit. The composition of this item, however, is not fuily known, and seems to contain accued but not collected intrest rnings of the bankimg system, including NBK. A significant portion of credit expansion, particularly during the last quarte, has thus been in the form of automatic rolling over of non-performing eterprise loans and capitalizadon of interest. The implication of this process is that credit expansion has increasingly been channeled to fiancially distrsed enterprises, at the expense of crowding out of creditworthy entities. 20. As commercial banks were unable (or unwilling) to mobilize financial savings, the major source of credit was NBK. Refinance credits and NBK lending to the govemment accounted for about 75 percent of total domestic credit. NBK's policy was to increasingly channel refinance credits through credit auction. It held regular credit auctions during May-October 1993. Auction interest rates increased from around 110 percent in May to 260 percent in October. However, as monetary expansion exceeded program limits as a result of large amounts of directed credits during the third quarter of 1993, NBK discontinued credit auctions in October in an attempt to prevent further expansion. Refinance credits channeled tho auctions in 1993 accounted for only 20 percent of total NBK credits to the banking system. Refinance credit auctions were resumed in April 1994 and the NBK now intends to chamel all refinace credit through auctions. 21. Fscal Developments: In 1993, the budget deficit was reduced to 8.7 percent of GDP, and came close to the 7 percent program target. Underlying this subsial decline was a large reduction in expenditure, from 32 percent in 1992, to 23 percent in 1993, which took place in the face of a precipitous decline in tax revenue from 14 percent of GDP in 1992, to only 8 percent in 1993. Four major factors contributed to the worrisome decline in tax revenue. First, tax measures introduced during V Interest as at NBK auctins and deposit inemt raes offesd by commercial banbs have turned posiive i al tms in Mash - Api 1994. 6 the year (e.g., excise taxes) were not fully enforced, and several taxes that had been proposed were repealed by Parliament. Second, the Prime Ministry issued a multitude of tax exemptions to large enterprises, including the state gold enterprise. Third, revenue collection was hindered by an increase in barter activity and unreported transactions, particularly between private businesses, and by a weak tax collection systemn. Fourth, as credit was tightened, enterprises defaulted on their tax payments. These factors can erode tax revenues even furfther and urgently need to be addressed to ensure that deficit reduction in 1993 can be sustained. 22. On the expenditure side, the Government failed to curb budgetary transfers to enterprises, which by the end of the year reached 5 percent of GDP. The planned reduction in the bread subsidy and in social assistance spending through better targeting was not fully achieved. Consequently, the burden of adjustment fell on investment, current expenditures, and wages which were further eroded in real terms by about 40 percent in 1993. 23. Inflation and the Echange Rate: Throughout 1993, inflation remained high and volatile. increases in monthly consumer prices fluctuated in the 15-20 percet range, except in months when large and discrete adjustments in administered pnces caused larger jumps in the index (of above 30 percent in September and October). Annual average CPI inflation was 1300 for 1993, a slight increase over 1992 which appears to be driven by large increases in imported energy prices and adjustments in administered prices (bread prices, housing rents and utility tariffs). WPI inflation, on the other hand, was in the 700- 850 percent range in 1993-a decline over 1992. 24. The level of price increases can not be easily explained by the monetary conditions prevailing in the country during 1993. The rates of increase in both broad money and total domestic credit were much less than inflation. Declining demand for real cash balances due to lack of confidence in the new currency, expectations for condnuing high inflation, and negative real interest rates may have been one of the factors contributing to persistent high inlation. However, given the fact that the Som has been appreciatng in real terms against the dollar, decline in demand for real cash balances does not appear to have been the primary factor. Rather, the unchecked icrease in i prise arrears appears to have been the most important factor contributing to high inflation. Gross interenterprise arrears, estimated at som 90 million in Januay 1, 1993, increased to about som 1,600-1,800 million by the end of the year, almost as large as total domestic credit. Since arrears enable enterprises to obtain inputs and continue operations, they play the same role as money in fueling aggregate demand and sustaning high rates of inflation. This situation substantially weakens the effectiveness of formal monetary policy to curb aggregate demand and inflation. 25. The performance of the som has also been somewhat difficult to discern. It was introduced at 4 somJU.S. dollar and 200 rublelsom under a floating exchange rate regime, whereby the som exchange rates were determined in the foreign exchange auction market under the auspices of NBK. Soon after its introduction, the som was widely accepted as the medium of transacdon, and for a few weeks, it even appreciated against both the U.S. dollar and the ruble. In July, the som started to depreciate in nominal terms and fell to 12 som/U.S. dollar and 150-160 ruble/som by March 1994. However, during the same period, the som appreciated in real terms by about 50 percent against the U.S. dollar, while depreciating against the ruble. Although it is not possible to fully explain this outcome, the sharp decline in real incomes and financial savings and the relative tightness of "formal" money could have contributed to the somOs real appreciation. Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 7 C. Reorm AgWa 26. During 1993, it became increasingly clear that effective progress on structural reforms-enterprise restucring, in particular-is essetial for stabilization. Within the structural reform program itself, the various components of the progran shoud support and reinforce each other. Unless distortions inerited from the command economy (pricing, state involvement in procurement and distribution) are eliminated, structural reforms will fall to yield their desired results. Price liberalization, for example, would have little impact on changing economic agents' behavior, if markets are still dominated by large, state-owned trading institutions. 27. The privatization program has been given high priority in the Govermment's agenda. However, the program has fallen short of meeting the economic objective of creating more productive enterprises with effective governance structures, and the political end of involving the broader population in the reform program. The privatzation process was initiated in December 1991 when the Privatization and Denationalization Law was adopted, and the State Property Fund (SPP) was established as the single agency to design and implement the program. The privatization program got off to a slow start but qwicly gained momentum, when Parliament approved a new "Concept Note" in December 1992, specifying rapid sale of small-scale entprises and mass privatization of medium to large-scale enterprises through competitive methods, including use of vouchers or Special Means of Payment (SMPs). 28. The revised privatization program set an ambitious target of privatizing 35 percent of fixed enterprise assets by end 1993. The speed of privatization in 1993 was indeed impressive. By January 1994, about 4,450 state-owned enterprises, accounting for 33 percent of total fixed enterprises assets, had been fully or pardy privatized. At present, the privatization of services and trade is nearly complete: 99 percent of fixed assets in services, and 82 percent in trade, have already been privatized. Privatizadon in industry and construction has also advanced rapidly resulting in privaizadon of 40 and 68 percent of fixed assets, respectively. 29. Despite its speed, the privatization process so far has failed to a large extent to create more efficient economic entities. The predominant method of privatization has been to convert enterprises into joint-stock companies (JSCs) and transfr share ownership to the labor collectives of these enterprises. Virually no voucher auctions have taken place and competitive biddig for enterprise shares has been used for only 1.4 percent of total privatized assets. Seventy-seven percent of total privatized assets has been prvatized by transferring shares-or in some cases enir enterprises-to the labor collectives of these enterprises by establishing JSCs. This form of privatization is particularly marked in industry, where 99 percent of privatized assets has been transferred through conversion to JSCs. In addition to priority access to ownership of shares, labor collectives have also benefitted from substanial prvileges in payment terms, including exclusion of the enterprises' social assets (housing, kindergarten, company store, leisure resorts, etc.) in calculating the sales price, and interest free payment periods of two years or more. The state has retained significant portions of shares in most enterprises converted into JSCS. Arbitrary give-away of shares to existing state managers has also been a common element in these conversions. With the exception of small privatized retail and service establishments, many privatized 8 enterprises have remaied under the direct influence of minstries or concerns, which have continued to play the key role in pricing, prouemet and allocating financial resources. 30. In additon, the new JSCs were crated as "closed form" companies, whereby a shareholder is not permitted to sell his/her share if he/she chooses to leave the company, but must return it to the collective. This has hindered much needed labor restructuring, emergence of effective ownership structures and the creation of a secondary market for enterprise shares. Restructui and adjustment to evolving market conditions have been further discouraged by "profile" restrictions on privatized enterprises. These are claue in privatization contracts that constain new owners in their business decisions regarding such considerations as product choice and employment levels. Finally, although 80 percent of SMPs was distributed by September 1993, mass privatization through SMP auctions has not yet been initiated. As a result, large segments of non-employee cidzens have so far been left out of the privatization process. This has led to a perception that the privatization program has turned into an unfair distribution of national wealth to influential groups, such as enterprise managers and labor collectives. 31. To create more efficient post-privatization entities, the following adjustments in the overall privatization process are needed: (i) improve the transparency in the methods of privaization, thereby opening the process to a larger segment of the populaion through greater use of auctions and compettive bids and increased access to investment fumds; (ii) eliminate privileges and arbitrary transfers of majority shares to labor collectives; (iii) correct the closed form of joint-stock companies by allowing shareholders to sell their shares if they decide to leave the company; and (iv) remove "profile" restrictions on privatized enterprises that preclude them from undergoing necesary adjusnt and restructuring. 32. At the end of 1993, the Government significantly changed course in the privatization program, reflecting a good understanding of many of the major problems in the previous program and the political importance of correcting them. In January 1994, Parliament passed a new Concept Note and Law on privatization. The Concept Note provides for privatization of all small-scale enterprises (with up to 100 employees) though auctions and/or competitive bidding with use of cash and vouchers. Medium (100 to 1,000 employees) and large-scale enterprises (over 1000 employees) will be converted into joint-stock companies before their privatization. The main methods for future privatization of those enterprises will be competitive cash bidding by individual investors for up to 70 percent of the equity and voucher auctions, open to individuals and investment fiuds, for 25 percent of the equity. 33. The methods of privatization proposed in the new Concept Note indicate a subsnti improvement. A minimum of 25 percent of any enterprise shares must be privatied through auction in exchange for vouchers. In addition, labor collective privileges are substantialy decreased by a clause that linits the transfer of shares of any one enterpise to labor collectives to 5 percent of total enterprise shares. To clarify the role of vouces, the former SMPs will be exchanged for new privatization coupons that will be "demonetarized" by denominating them in points rather than in currency terms. The first pilot voucher auctions are plamned for April 1994 and a nationwide public information campaign has been launched. As a first step in creafting a primary sewrities market, privatization coupons will be deemed tradeable. Finally, the potential role of investment funds is enhanced by prohibiting the state from founding them and elimating regional restritions on citzens' rights to invest in them. 34. In February 1994, a governmental decree intuced other important measures to improve the privatization program. These include: converting all state enteries into open joint-stock companies Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 9 within four months; retroactively converting closed joint-stock companies into open joint-stock companies within two months; allowing shareholders the right to sell their shares to citizens outside the company; auctioning enterprise shares that remain in state hands, starting March 1, 1994; and subnutting detailed procedures and criteria to government review for use in selecting competing privatization proposals. 35. Provided they are implemented, these legal measures represent good progress in overconing the deficiencies of the former privatization program. Other legislative measures that need to be put into action in the Government's 1994-95 agenda are: (i) adoption of the SPF's resolution eliminating "profile" restrictions in previous privatization contracts as well as in future contracts; (ii) transfer of enterprise shares remaning with the State from line ministries to the SPF and the privatization of shares still held by the state; (iii) enactmen of reguations on the operation of Investment Funds and registration of shares in those Funds; and (iv) and definition of the criteria to be applied in selection from competing privatimtion proposals, the most importan of which should be price. 36. Post-privazation Retnuing: Many privatized enterprises are also in need of comprehensive restructuring in order to adapt to the new market environment. They need to improve their productivity, upgrade technology, and adopt modern management systems. Privatized enterprises, like many other SOEs, are facing serious constraints in accessing financial resources and technical support requied for effective restrcturing. The commercial banking system at present does not have the capacity to assist enterprise ratuctrng and to provide long-term financing. Capital market institutions that provide equity capital have not yet emerged. Recognizing that the emerging private sector will have a key role in output recover and transition to a market based economy, the Government is considering to establish temporary institutions to support privatized enterprinse until commercial banks acquire technical and financil capacity to serve these enrprises. With the assistance of international financial institons and foreign investors, the Govemment intends to set up an itrmediay agency to chanmel external funds to privatized enterprises, particularly those with export potential. This agency will phase itself out gdually as commercW banks develop and private financial institutions emerge to take over its lending activities. The Government is also promoting the establishment of a venture capital fimd with the participation of local and foreign investors, including the IFC. Eterise Sector Reform 37. The severe exernal shocks inflicted on the Kyrgyz economy since the breakup of the Union required massive adjustment at the enterprise level, particularly in industrial enterprises. Many enterprises in metal works, machinery and agricultural equipment, electu-machiny and electronics were integrated in Union-wide production chains and were oversized for the Kyrgyz market. They imported most of their energy, raw material and intermediate inputs from other republics and exported around 70 percent of their output. Centrally planned Union-wide trade and finacing arrangements facilitated the large trade volume among the republics that resulted from this economic integration. Moreover, the viability of production units was maintained by a highly distorted relative price stuctre characterizd by unrealistically low energy prices. 38. Since the Union's dissolution, many enterprises, including those which have been privatized, have lost their markets. Drastic changes in relative prices have brought into the open the negative value-added siuation in many enteprises, leading to large financial losses. Downsizing or liquidation of many large 10 enterprises, temporary cessation of operations until new markets are found or traditional markets are recovered, and a substantial increase in long-term unemployment all appear to be unavoidable. 39. Despite the pressing need for adjustment, the Government has so far not initiated an orderly process to phase out non-viable enterprises. Lack of consensus on the diagnosis of the problem seems to be the major factor delaying the Government's response. One widely held mispcpdon is that enterprise problems are temporary and stem from lack of financial resources. This politically appealing approach, which also serves the interests of enterprise managers and others with vested interest in resisting change, appears to have prevailed over efforts to initiate the required adjustment. 40. As a result, many ailing enterprises have avoided restructuring. While some of the most problematic have been forced to cease operations temporarily, introduce shorter work weeks or put workers on prolonged unpaid leaves, many enterprises have continued to produce unsalable products, avoid labor cuts, and incur large losses. These losses have been financed in part by increasing arrears, particularly to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) supplying petroleum and electricity. For example, as of July 1993, the bills unpaid to the energy complex represented 70 percent of its total bills. Because energy companies were unable to collect their receivables and not pernitted to withhold supply, they could not pay the state trading companies that import energy products. As a result, the state trading conmanies have not had the resources to purchase agricultual products, especially wool and tobacco for export. This in turn has produced a web of interenterprise arrears that put the Government's stabilization efforts and the financial viability of many enterprises at risk. 41. The financial problems of the enterprise sector have also spilled over to the banking system. PNior to the adoption of the stabilization program, enterprise losses were financed by directed credits at highly negative interest rates (10 to 50 percent in early 1993). The NBK was the major source of funding for these credits. Following the adoption of the stabilization program, the NBK initially tightened credit and automatic access to NBK resources was restricted. This squeezed enterprise borrowing. Response of enterprises to this tightening was to default on their debt service obligations to banks. Banks in turn were unable to honor their obligations to the NBK. By the third quarter of 1993, this process and inte_enrprise arrears had reached such a level that in many parts of the economy trade transactions were virtally paralyzed. In order to deblock this situation, the Govermnent resorted to directed credits from NBK resources to selected enterpnses which were partly used to clean up terenterprise arrears. As the root cause of the problem remained unaddressed, this intervention resulted in a further increase in non- performmg bank loans and associated mcrease in banks' overdue liabilis to the NBK. At end 1993, about half of the loan portfolio of the banking system was non-performing. These adverse developments in the financial sector underlined once more the urgent need for rapid enterprise restruturing. 42. Increased efficiency of SOEs and their rapid adaptation to market-oriented and competitive principles are crucial. But the old stucres and intruments used to admnister the former command economy have been only patally dismantled. New structlures, capable of exercising constructive transitonal control over state enterprises, should be put in place to support stabilization and market transformation. To achieve this, enterprise reform should proceed on several fronts: (i) imposing hard budget constraint, (ii) corporatizaion, (iii) improving corporate governance, (iv) enterprise restructuring, and (v) dealing with "big loss makers." Kyrgyz Republic Econoic Report 11 43. Hard Budget Corwbat. Financal discipline in te enterprise secor is urgently requred so that SOEs will stop acmuatng additional bad debt to banks and other enterprises. Higher interest rates have not reduced loan demand, nor have the penalty ierest rates charged by the banks and NBK for overdue loans prevented enterpri from defaulting on loan payments. Unless the systm is able to enforce payment, nominaly raising interest rates still rther is not likely to be effective. Interest rates must become binding to act as a rationing device. At this stage, then, it is more important to make sure that interest ates are actualy paid than to increase their level. Also, the build up of itrenterprise arrears must be actively discouaged. This could be achieved by "harden" the payment systm through the compulsory introduction of a bank draft to control commerial payments, which would force buyers to acquire only goods and services that they have the cash to pay for and would assmue sellers that they will receive payment when goods or semces are provided. It would also avoid prepayment problems, where the seller fails to deliver goods that have been paid for. If an SOE does not have the financial resources to acquire inputs, it will be motivated to cut back production and improve sales of existing stock, rather than pass its financial m is onto suppliers. 44. Kyrgyz enterpriss have so far not faced the dtreat of bankrptcy and its consequec. This has been a major factor contriutng to the pervasive "softening" of the budget constraint and ensuing financi disorder. It has also led to a envionment chadr ized by "moral hazard" where even financially viabl entities tended to delay payments or default on their financial obligations. Now that the "Insolvenc Law" has been passed by Parliament, the Govermient has an opportunity to reverse this beavior. It has to speedily develop procedus and instutions required for effective .mplementation of the Law. A resolute implementation of insolvency procedures in a number of SOEs would have a "demonstration effect" which would support other measures aimed at establishing finanil discipline in the economy and hardening the budget constaint faced by SOEs. 45. Ceiporaezadon. All SOEs need to be tansformed into JSCs, regardless of the timing of their future privatization. In a JSC, the state (for as long as it is the owner) delegates managerial responsibility to professional management under the noninterventionist oversight of agcies designated for this purpose. The boards of directors of the new JSCs should be given a management, rather than a buacratic, character. They should include outside members from the public and private sectors, and from professions qualified to contnlxute to the successful managemt of the enterprise, as well as worker rersetQon. 46. In all forms of conglomerates, corporatization should be carried out at the level of the enterprise or the smallest legal entity potentally viable as a business unit. In particular, concens as well as existing vertically and horizontally integrated complexes should be broken up, so as to increase competition and ecom ic efficiency. If necesay, prior sudies should be performed to guide this process. 47. Laws to protect competition should be strengthened and barriers to entry (such as licensing new busiess) should be abolished. The closed form JSC should be eliminated. Provision for the orderly widing up of eepris is as important as ftee entry because it allows financial and economic reources to be liberated from nonviable actvities, so they can beome avaflable for investment in more viable ventres. Banks and investors require an exit option so that they can recover as much as possible of their investment; without that option they would not invest. It is thus essential that an adequate insolvency/liquidation law be ena d procedures and nstuims requied for its effective 12 implementation be put in place. In Januay 1994, Parliament passed the Law on Bankruptcy. The Government now must establish institutions for processing and enforcing bankruptcy procedures. 48. Corporate Govewrnance. Management autonomy is the most imporant objective of internal governance in a commecialy oriented JSC. Only then can accountability be acceptable. This is best achieved by a board of directors that acts as the top management body rather than as a mere supervisoty body. The board should be given full autonomy to appoint, supervise and dismiss executive management, if necessary. The board, in tum, would be accountable to the owner(s). The board is the link between owner(s) and executive management. In this role, one of its tasks would be to negotiate with the State, as owner, about the appropriate speed of moving to competitive market behavior. It would also negotiate how much autonomy should be granted to the enterprse. 49. Until enterprises are fully privatized, the state will retain some interest in enterprises. Its portfolio would require a contimuous oversight function. The state will act differently depending on whether it is a majority or minority shareholder in an enterprise. There is indication that the Government intends to delegate its oversight functions to line ministries, in particular to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Materia Resoues (MTMR). This is an unsatfactory arrangement becuse of the past interventionist approach to SOE management. The Government should, therefore, give careful consideration to new institutional arrangements for the exercise of the state's oversight functions. 50. Effective oversight requires meanigful financil performance and balance sheet data for all enterprises. At present such data are not readily available due to different accountig concepts and to iaequate allowance for iflation. The current system of valuation of assets is faulty and antiquated. Meaningful profit and loss judgements camot be made from income statements. in many cases, accountng practices foUow an outmoded scheme that treats "value of output" as revenue, whether the output is sold or merely added to inventory. This is why the Kyrgyz authorities classify many enterpris as profitable when plant interviews and other evidence show most of them to be clear loss-makers. 51. Rigorous case-by-case studies of large enterprises are urgeady needed to determine profitability and losses. These studies should look into causes for each situation and esimate prospects for future viabiliy. It wil be necessary to identify the main points of discrepancy between the prevailing accounang concepts used by enterprises and modem concepts used for gaining a clear view of financial operations and results. The findings of the studies should be acompanied by initdal proposals for rapid reform of accounting concepts and systems in the major enterprises, to be applied later to the enteprise sector as a whole. 52. Restentaing. Government oversight of enterprises will be temporary, though it may last several years. In the meantime the oversight role will focus on enabling the enterprises to be run as successful businesses and then to be sold. Many enterprises will have to restrure, liquidate or down-size by shuttin down operations with no potential for fiture viability and spinning off excess or unproductive assets. 53. A distinction should be made between -passive" restucturing, (i.e., debt resolution, closing down unprofitable parts of a business, and organizational and staffing changes) and "active" restructuring, which would include new investment. The Government should not be involved in active resuutunng. Worldwide expenence has shown that the increase in selling price hardly ever offets the budgetary Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 13 expendur required. Therefore, the fuure private buyer should assume responsibility for investments required to improve productivity and develop the business. 54. The re tcriw process must also separat comnercial from noncommerial activities, removing the later from the enterprise to make it commercially viable and attractive to a future buyer. Since many enterprises, especialy the major ones, have considerable responsibilities for providing soci services (e.g.. housing, health care, recreational facilities) to their workers, it may be necessary to make interim arrangements for their temporay continuton. This should be done on a contractual basis, with the cost of the activities being reimbursed to the enterprise by the local authority or whoever is deemed to be the appropriate long term provider. While the issue is fraught with political and social difficulties, early preparation and implementation of plns to resolve it are needed. The ILO is carrying out a study that will provide further information about the scale of this problem. 55. Dealng wuh "Big Loss Maks. " Reducing the financial drain of loss making enterprises on budget and credit resources is a major challenge facing the Government. The identification of nonviable enterprise amidst the rapidly changig economic environment is a complex, difficult task. Phasing out al non-viable entities in a short period of time would affect a large portion of the employed population, and may prove to be beyond what is politically and socially feasible. Moreover, addressing the entire problem is beyond the Government's present institutional capacity. Therefore, the Government intends to deal with a limited number of large loss-making enterprises that account for a subsntial portion of eneprises losses. It has identified about 30 large SOEs which will be put under a special restrcuring programn. Given the strong links between restructuring and macroconmic policy, and the diversity of financing sources and beneficiaries, a mecansm is needed to provide overall policy guidace and oversight. The Goverment decided to establish a high level agency, called the Enterprise Reform and Resoluton Agency (ERRA). The ERRA will be a small agency and employ long and short-term consultants (e.g., longer term financial management specialists, industrial management specialists, short term sectoral specialists and experts in business analysis, liquidation procedures, engineering practices, etc.) to conduct studies and prepare and assist implementation of rmeuctring programs. 56. The restructuing agency would be gided by the following principles: (i) All restucturing would be "passive;, (no new capital investments aimed at significantly changing product lines or production processes would be contemplated) and would focus on the rationalization and down-sizing of enterprises, spinning off excess or unproductive assets, debt reduction and retructuring the capital base; (ii) Restructuring efforts would be limited to a small number of large enterprises in financial distress whose impact on the survival of other enterprises (through interetiterprise arrears) or the baing system (via non-performing loans) is critical. Until the time restructuing plans are worked out and implemented, those enterprises which are in most financial distress will cease operations and be put under a "care and minteac" program which would limit frther financial losses; (iii) Enterprises placed in the agency's receivership would be denied access to credits through the banking system. Funds for ERRA would be allocated through the budget. The 14 agency must approve fincial plans and demand changes in expenditures to ensure compliance with the restucturi plan; (iv) All restrucutug plans would be time bound. If the reucting plan is not completed successfully by the end of the period, or there is no indication of a turnaround, the enterprise would be liquidated in an orderly mamer; (v) The agency would have sole authority to decide on the future of enterprises placed under its receivership. Its decisions would be bing and represent the Government. 57. The Govenment will set aside a fixed amount of budget funds to finance the cost of ERRA operations. It intends to use countepa funds of external borrowing for this purpose. The amount of funds to be provided to ERRA will depend on the pace of restuctring and will not exceed the amount of countpart funds. These funds will be used to finance: (a) downsizing, spinning off assets, and liquidation; (b) severance pay; (c) working capital needs; (d) temporary operating losses; and (e) on an exceptional basis, minimum physical investment necessary to maintain viable activities during the implementation of restructuring programs. 58. As part of the restucuring progran, ERRA will also resolve non-performing loans and arrears of enterprises under its control. At present these enterprise are unable to service their debt to commercial banks. In turn, commercial banks are unable to repay their liabilities to the NBK, which was the source of funing for loans to enterprises. ERRA will takeover the loans and associated liabilities to the NBK from the commercial banks. It will assume the repayment obligation to the NBK. The terms and conditions of repayment will be jointly dermined by ERRA and the NBK. Regarding int erprise arrears, ERRA will first assist in netting out arrears between eepri. For the reainiDng net debts, it will determine the amounts and mode of setdement on a case-by-case basis. Fiandal Sector Reform 59. The Kyrgyz financial system is dominated by state-owned commercial banks, with an extremely limited role for non-bank finmcial institutions (i.e., state insurance company, secities exchange, and foreign exchange bureaux). The banking system is, in turn, domminate by three large state-owned banks; Agroprom, Promstroi, and Kyrgyzatan Bank, successors of specialized banks of the former Union-wide bankdng system, accounting for aboout 85 percent of total assets of the banking sector. During the last two years, fifteen new commnercial bans have been established, which are largely owned by sta-owned enterprises and ministries. The banking system confinues to be segmented and concentrated as banks coinue to lend to their own share holders and traditional clients, with competition only slowly emerging. 60. Developments in 1993 led to a severe deterioration in the financial health of the banking sector, particularly of the three large state-owned banks. The system is facing extreme illiquidity and many banks are believed to be also facing insolvencr. The balace sheets of bans are burdened by non-performing enterprise loans, generally extended by the directives of the Government and funded by refinance credits from the NBK. Deposits accomunt for less than 20 percent of total assets of the system, and have been declining even in nominal tenns since the third quarter of 1993, mainly as a result of negative real deposit interest rates. Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 15 61. Although there has been some progress, the technical capacity and basic banidng infrastructure are underdeveloped. The banking system still uses the old Soviet accounting and reporting systems. There has been little progress in improving the quality of services, especially in domestic and intemational payments. Commercial banks lack techn:cal capacity in credit risk assessment and project appraisal. Although prudential regulations regarding capital adequacy, exposure limits, and lending to shareholders were enacted, these are not being enforced. The NBK's on-site supervision capacity is limited. 62. With its present financial and institutional weaknesses, the Kyrgyz banking system cannot fulfill its primary nctdons of mobilizing and efficiently allocating financial resources. The system has to be overhauled in terms of lending practices, technical infrastructure, and financial soundness. At present, the main concern of the authorities is the bad loan portfolio and erosion of the capital base of the three large state-owned banks. Proposals have been made for a generalized portfolio clean-up exercise and recapitalization of these banks. However, such an intervention under the present crcumutances would not help improve the financial soundness of the banking system on a sustainable basis. 63. The root causes of the financial problems of the banking system lie in enterprise losses, the lack of finmcial discipline in the entire economy, and the government's interference in lending decisions of stte-owned banks. Therefore, a generalized financial restructuring in the banking system should not be undertaken before some progress is achieved in enterprise restructuring and imposing fimncial disciplme, particularly, on large loss-makers. The first crucial step in banking sector reform is a strong political commitment to stop the interference of ministries and high level authorities in lending decisions. Such a commiment is urgently needed and, when made, should be widely publicized. This will set the stage for banks to move toward commercially-based banking practices. Debt clearance in the context of enterprse restrucuring programs to be undertaken by ERRA would also partally reduce the bad debt burden on the balance sheets of the banking system. As measures to impose financial discipline on enterprises begin to take hold, and relations between enterprises and banks are clarified and freed from govemment interference, the environment would become more conducive for a comprehensive banking sector reform. Until such tme, efforts need to focus on enhacing the banking infrastructure and regulatory framework. The Government should also develop a financial sector reform strategy aiming at reducing the present concentradon in the banking system in ord"z to promote competition, increased private sector role through privatizing large state-owned banks, and improved quality of financial services. Pricing and Trade 64. One of the overriding objectives of the reform program has been to rapidly eliminate distortions inherited from the command system reduce the state's role in the economy. Most prices have been liberalized, and legal barriers to private sector activity were eliminated. Restrictions on impots, quotas on exports, and foreign exchange surrender requirements were abolished and a unified exchange rate was introduced. In interrepublican tarde, the number and quantity of commodities subject to inttate trade agreemen have been reduced, allowing more latde for decentralized trade. 65. After the first wave of reform, some momentum was lost in 1993, as the authorities vacillated between market oriented policies and old habits of state intervention in response to the mounfing hardship of transition. Faced with a precipitous decline in output, continuing high inflation, deteriorating living 16 slandards and deepening disruptions in trade and paymens relations with the FSU, the Government focus undertandably shifted to short-term concerns. Securing supply of essential goods, preventing furher price increases and supporting ailing enterprises to arrest output decime gained priority. Many measurs taken in 1993 have thus atempted to reinforce the stae's role in pricing, trade and distribution. 66. Compulsory state orders, abolished in 1992, were reintroduced for wool, tobacco, cotton and grains. The system of supply contrts which mandates industrial enterprises to supply determined quantities of products to specified customers was established. Export licenses and prohibitive export taxes were introduced with a view to keeping goods in high demand in the country and ensuring delivery of exports under interstate trade agreements. These measures, together with the continuing dominance of M lR and Ministry of Agriculture in trade and distribution, created a system whereby about 70 percent of output became subject to direct or indirect state control. 67. Price controls were also reinforced. Prices for agricultural procurement under state orders were determined by the Government, and were generally lower than those that could be obtained in alternative market channels. The Anti-Monopoly and Pricing Committee (AMPC) actively interfered with pricing decisions of enterprises designated as monopolies, defined as having more than 35 percent share in domestic production. Almost all of large-scale enterprises were identified as monopolies under this definition. Their prices were determined by the AMPC using a cost plus formula which imposed a maximmm of 25 percent markup limit. Moreover, in June 1993, in order to prevent excessive price increases, mark-up ceilings in the range of 10-25 percent were introduced on retail trade of a wide range of commodities. 68. In external trade, the State's direct involvement has been mainly through Clearing Agreements which allow goods to be exchanged between republics on a barter basis. This ensures that the clogged up payments system does not obstrct the supplies of basic raw materials. The MIMR procures goods for export and distrbutes imports to designated users. The supply of the items on the Clearing Agreement lists is obligatory and the procurement was enforced through the state order system. In 1993, the Kyrgyz Republic had clearing agreements with Russia and Uzbekistan. The clearing agreement with Russia provided for export of cotton fiber, raw wool, raw tobacco, wool yarn and scrap metal in retrn for specified petroleum products, metal products and wood. The agreement with Uzbekistan covered exports of nonferrous metals, cables, electrical engineering products, and butter in exchange for natural gas and fertilizers. Most agreed prices were close to world prices, with the exception of tobacco and wool exports to Russia and natural gas imports from Uzbeklstan. The implicit price paid by Russia was higher than the estimated world price, by about 35 prcent for tobacco and over 100 percent for wool. At the same time, the Kyrgyz Republic paid only 60 percent of world prices to Uzbekistan for natural gas. 69. In most cases, the Government lacked institutional mechanisms and financial resources to fully enforce these various controls. Nonetheless, they have led to umncary distortions, encouraged enterprises to shift their activity to informal channels and seek inefficient barter arrangements, and caused further disruptions m the flow of commodities. Although the state agencies were not able to procure agricultural goods under the state orders due to lack of financing, the producers were not allowed to sell or export their products through alternative market channels. This, in turn, has led to piling up of inventories and serious financial problems, particularly in the agricultural sector. Kyrz Republic Economic Report 17 70. Cogniza of the distortdns creatd by this system of controls, the Govenment has reently renewed its liberalization effmts. Substani progress has been made in implementing price refonn. Retai margins have been e ated for all goods ecept bread. In April 1994 the number of firm classified as monopolies was reduced to nine, coveing mostly natural monopolies such as utlities, and the Bread Complex, pending its demonpoization an privatization. Moreover, in February 1994, the price subsidy on bread was eliminated by a 150 percen increase in bread prices, and replaced by a targeted cash CO naton. Since early 1993, increses in import cost of petoleum products and coal have bee passed thro to conmers. However, electricity, gas, and heatng tariffs charged to households are still controlled and highly subsidized. 71. In early 1994, the trade system was also subsntially Lberalized. All remaining import and export licensing requirements have been lifted, with the exception of a small number of hazardous materials and items of cultural importance. Although export tax remain on several products, their rates have been reduced considerably. The Goverment intends to eliminate export taxes on most items in the imedit future and phase out those remaining over the next 12-18 montis. At the same time, the Governmet adopted a new procrement sysem for "state needs" to replace the oblitory state orders in prog key agricultural goods. The main purpose of the Tab. 3. Agdckua Produt to b Purhase .nw system is to ensure that the state procures for St Needs for 1994 a sufficient amount of agricultural goods to meet its obligations under barter trade agreemens with Russia and Uzbeista The Prdaes 1993 nw system covers essentially the same set of d us ou agricultural goods procued under the state order systm in 1993 (Table 3). The new aT 312.0 20 fature is that the system will be implemented 4,,i-fetmnewed tb sts15 by voluntay supply contacts signed with (fom 1993 havest) 32.5 64 producers in advance of harest. Although the L d 0.6 Sugabeet sed 0.6 Goverment claims that the prices will be _seed 14.4 negotiated with suppliers, it has also announced Liveslock and pouy 31.6 a list of base prices to be used in contas. To Wool (dhi ad s a-din. clean mwke contacts attractive to producers, the fII Weh) 4.0 25 Goverment commits to pay 25 percent of contract value upon signing the contract and Se.: KYrz "*&Wa. the rest mediaely upon delivery. At the same time, the Govemnt constitu a de facto monopsony for many products. Thus while the process of procurement has been liberalized unless sigificant private trading activities emerge a competitive market environent will not be established. 72. Two major issues stil need to be tacked in relation to Clearing Agements. First, while the agreem are close to world prices, the domestic pricing and payment system results in sbtant cross subsidization. Energy users are de facto being subsidized through non-payment of energy bUls. Agricutural producers and mining enterprises are implicitly taxed by being required to sell to the sae at domestic prices that are less than world equivalents. Moreover, they do not receive the payment in a timely mamer for crop sales. Second, the bilateal agrbeems have a negative effct on the rest of 18 the ecoom via other mestrions used to eforce the agreements. For example, dominant state tradig istitutions are maitained. The Goverment should fiurer reduce bilateral clearing arrangements to cover only the most critical commodities or those for which the trading partner is willing to offer an atrctive price. If trading partners insist on Clearing Arrangements for individual commodities, they should involve transparent biddin and procem procedures. 73. The Govemment's commendable efforts to eliminate major price distortions now need to be vigorously pusued by creatng a compeitve envrnme in domestic trade and distribution. MITMR (wbich is involved in the bulk of the county's wholesale trade) is the repository of much information on, and contacts with, etprises in the FSU and much of the procurement and distribution know how in the Republic. This expertise needs to be preserved and made available to enterprises as they begin to procure inputs and distibute outputs independeny. Although MlR's wholesale trading enterprises have been privatized, this has been in the form of transfers to labor collectives, without break up into smaller companies. This has resulted in lack of effective ownership in these enterprises, and continued intervention by TMR in trade and distribution. Social Policy 74. The social security system inherited from the Soviet regime was characerized by wide eligibility for categorically allocated benefits without targeting particularly vulnerable groups. As a result, nearly half the total population used to receive benefits of one kind or another, mostly pensions or child allowances. In 1991, for example, such expendures amounted to about 18 percent of GDP. The social security system was also characterized by a lack of separation between social insurance and social aistance. All benefits were viewed as entitiemen, with virtually no link to contributions. In addition, the system had no ability to iden*t contributions (as opposed to work histories) made on bebalf of individuals. Enterprises and trade unions were actively involved in delivering both in-kind and cash benefits. Moreover, many benefits were excessively generous. 75. As part of its reform program, the Goverment recognized that major changes would be needed in the system of social protection. It took measures to reduce social protection spending by (i) reducing generalized subsidies and liberalizing prices; (Hi) failing to fully index benefits at a time of rapid inflation, and (iii) dehlierately targeting support to those most in need. Child allowances were reduced in coverage so that only people with incomes below a set minimum were eligible, while bread price compensation payments were made only to particular groups (such as pensioners and child allowance recipiems). These measures reduced social protection expenditures to considerably less than half its previous level. 76. Addressing Unemplyme. There are several reasons to expect significant changes in the employment situation in the near future. First, in Jamnury 1994, the Parliament passed a new Bankuptey Law, and the Govenment will inevitably have to subject enterprises to hard budget constraints. Second, severance pay for retrenched workers paid by their previous employer is now only one month's salary rather than three months' as in the past. Employers no longer have to pay to retrain retrenched workers; these costs will be the complete responsibility of the Employment Fund. These changes will increase the willingness and financial ability of employers to dismiss workers in the fture rater than put them on unpaid leave. Third, as eterprises start to operate under commercial conditions, they may be expected to divest social assets and services by firms, which would reduce employees' incentive to accept being Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 19 on unpaid leave. It is likely that in coming months much of the hidden unemloyment will become open and the numbers of unemployed applying for assistance from the Employment Service will increase substantially. 77. In response to these problems, the Government has take several steps, and new employment legislation has been passed by the Parliament. Various changes have been introduced: unemployment benefits have been rationalized and simplified using a three-tier system; benefits are paid monthly, on a rolling basis, to spread out the workload; and the minimum wage is now used as the base for calcuatig unemployment benefits. The recent legisation includes provisions for a private sector role in providing employment services. To maintain the financial viability of the Employment Fund, the employers' contribution has been raised from 1 percent to 1.5 percent of the payroll. An employee contribution has not yet been itoduced, however. Also, the preliminary Government budget for 1994 contains som 47 million to support the Employment Fund, in case it cannot fully cover unemployment benefits in the event of a large increase in unemployment and claimants. 78. Further emphasis needs to be placed on the policy and investment requiements of the labor market. While a good start has been made by the Goverment in revising the employment legislation and benefit system, additional changes should be considered. Further clarification, for example, is needed in the definition of the unemployed, of suitable jobs, the nmmber of times in which such jobs could be urned down by unemployed workets before they become ineligible for benefits, the obligations of the unemployed, and the exent of part-time earnigs. This is especially important to prevent undue pressure on the Employment Fund, which is still in surplus. In view of the need to maintain the financial viability of the Employment Fund, and also to encourage the development of the principle of unemployment nsurance, an employee contrbution to the Employment Fund should also be introduced. 79. A special response will be needed by the Employment Service to deal with situations in which large numbers of people are likely to lose their jobs through mass lay-offs. This will require the prepation of a program to provide timely and adequate unemployment benefits and services, including iiaison with employers and workers, using tripartite advisory committees. Where the employment situation is unusually severe, the introduction of public works should be explored with the local authority and community leaders. A strengthened training program will also be needed to assist the unemployed. The existng technical and vocational training system needs to be reoriented towards the commercial and service sectors (while maintining and improvmg training for areas such as agiculture). 80. Proediag the Poor. In 1992, about 35 percent of the population was esdmated to be poor based on the official household budget survey, but using a minimum consumption basket of goods. Since then, the living standards of most of the population have fallen dramatically and the "squeeze" effects of the stabilization program are being harshly felt (including in the public sector where real wages have fallen dramatically). The proportion of the population below minimnum subsistence has probably increased. For example, an in-depth analysis of the circumstances of about 600 vulnerable women and their families, carried out in mid-to-late 1993 by a cultural anthropologist, indicates that poverty is spreading. An analysis of health data reveals a slight upturn in infant and maternal mortality rates. In general, however, health status does not seem to have deteriorated subsantially. A comprehensive baseline survey of over 2,000 households was carried out in the second half of 1993 to ascertain more about household incomes and expenditures, employment and unemployment, and health and nutrition status, etc. The results are still being analyzed and will be available to policy-makers by mid-1994. 20 81. In the short-term, priority urgety needs to be given to developing a system of social assistance, tgetd to those most in need. The Government intent to shift towards a more means-tested system of socia protection, in which verified need rathr t categorical status, becomes the basis for allocating benefits. The delivery of social assistance will become the clear responsibility of the Government, assisd by local communities and non-govenmenta organtions, and responsibility for paying child ailowaces will be removed from enterprises. Funding of child allowances has already been transferred from the Pension Fund to the budget. The further development of a means-testing mechanism is realistic in the Kyrgyz Republic, since the country has a lage range of existig benefits and a system for their delivery. Unifying different social assistance programs into a single consolidated scheme would also * b #*inPs*pptWsm Fi 5iimmEpuI~1tmdan used by SP; * Mi-d*a.se~dA~U tna**p~I ataile a~am~, hi~ sim *M0dt$WtW*Si f.fen m m m _ ~ m*~p~ t'#~w*~p~h.* w~oiwwI& * C d W mIa~Ii~4*p *P pt_q4f~sinwaut. v1aWbu~... * asmw W. z su*~m u# w*:'*~~sa :'mtssir l _ g_s.t+_-~bqbu a uj iuahim~ud puli. .'.'~~~~~i*tv# ~miwam?oirc n X =_~1 u~$~saa omlas~1r . * -Y: -. . . btncb@ i1se Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 21 reduce ad s expenditures. Detiled work is now underway to design ways to introduce more accwate income- and means-testing system, including specific ways of targeting child allowances to fimilies most in need. 82. Pig es. About 600,000 people in the Kyrgyz Republic presently receive a pension. The minimum pension is currently som 45. It is critical that the pension system be reformed, to free up staff time to do targeted social assistance, and to reduce financW pressure on the Pension Fund, which moved into deficit in early 1994 (due to the nominal increase in the minimum pension and rvenue collection problems, stemming from the financal difficulties of enteprises). 83. The Govenment is now revising its pension legislation. To reduce the burden of early retreme on the Pension Fund, the draft legislation proposes that enterpnses become responsible for the cost of early retirement of their employees. It also proposes that persons must work for a minimum of five years before being cligile for a pension, and that the calculation system and terms for pensions be simplified. Purther legislative changes should include: (i) clearly separatng the provisions for social pensions (which are efectively social assistance) from work pensions; (li) the abolition of working penioners to have their pensions reassesed; (ffl) the reducton of special supplementary pension payments and substiution of social assistance for pensioners in need of additional support; (iv) the further splification of pension categories; and (v) in time, stregthening the link between contribudons and pensions later received. 84. On the reveme side, it is important to broaden the payroll tax base for contributions. The payroll. tax rate was reduced from 37 percent to 33 percent; although this move is consistent with the need to reduce the tax on enpries, the tining may have been inappropriate, due to the impact on the Govment's budget during the transition period. Several avenmes now need to be explored including: (i) enlarging the number of organizations subject to the payroll tax; (ii) making sure that all forms of compensation are included; (iii) checking existng rates of collection; (iv) making the employee component of the overall payroll tax contribution clearer; and (v) considering whether the division of payroll tax revemne between the three insurance fimds should be changed, with a reduced proportion going to the existing Socal Insurance Fund and a greater proportion allocated to the Pension Fund. 85. Basic Scdil Services. Atention needs to be given to ensure that priority and basic services are protected from expenditure cuts and that structural issues are addressed. At kdependence, the country inherited a comprehensive, though rather inefficient system of health care, with high ratios of personel and facilities to population. Over the last two years, the health semce has suffered from funding cuacks, major logistical problems and an exodus of professionals to other countries. The Ministry of Health has tried to make significant improvements in its operational efficiency, through rationalizing hospital beds and introducing more appropriate treatment systems for a variety of diseases. The sector has also benefitted from significant amounts of support from exteral agencies, but more external assistance is needed. As far as the country's education system is concerned, the cutbacks have generally been less severe, and there does not appear to have been any drop in school enrollments. Various reforms have been implemented, including an increase in cost recovery in higher education, but fiurter structal change will undoubtedly be needed. In particular, essential exenditr for primary and seconday education should be protected during the transition period. 22 D. Secdral Refoi=3 86. Systemic rforms will not generate susined growth unless sctoral reforms are undertaken simultaneously. The discssions on privatzion, entprise restuctuing, and private sector development addressed the main element of reorm that would have a beang oan industril production. This section focuses on reform in agculte and mining. 87. The agriculural decline in the Kyrgyz Republic to date is not as severe as in some other countries of the FSU that have faed both conmi disruption and drought. The aWegate estimates, however, shld be interpreted with cato A number of distbing developments suggest that agricutural performance may deteriorate markedly in 1994 and thereafter unless remedial measures are undertaken. Th sector is curety facing a severe financial cris that constan farms' abily to mainain curent production. Early indicatons suggest that use of ipts, including frdlizer, fuel, and high qualiy seed will be lower in the curent season than in 1993. In addition, the pas that are the foundation of the Kyrgyz livestock industry are degding rapidly, largely in response to overgrazing as feed from other sources becomes more scarce. Price controls, state orders, and administraive ineference in farm management have limited the oppounies for farms to increase eanings. Delays in payment of receivables in an inflationary envronm reduce real producer prices. In response, many firms are turn away from commercial production and orienting toward self.sufficiency for their employees. This tend is evident in the fall in maketed and processed output, which is much greater than the fall in production. 88. Privatzation of farms has been minimal and experience with those privatizations that have taken place has been unsatisactory. The Government adopted a progm for convertg state and collective fams into private farms in 1992. By early 1993, 165 state or collective farms (out of the total of 470) were reorWnized and/or privaized into about 17,000 peasunt rpris, agricultual cooperatives or assocations of peasant en is. Due to unfair practices in distring assets, unclear lease-hold rights, lack of support services for new private farms and the state's coninued monopoly over inputs and procrement and distrbution channels, new private farners reportedly found themselves cut off from their pottal markets. In early 1993, implementation of the program was suspended with a view to developing a more comprehensive agro-reform program. 89. Although the prospects are sobering, a number of measures can be undaken, as outlined below, to facilitate agricuturl recovery. Continued dergu m can provide a more favorable pnce and marketing regime, and improve agricutural eanmngs. The Government has abolished state orders, domestic supply agreements, and other measumes of compulsory promt. If the state chooses to procure agricultural commodities, it should obtain full financing for the purchases, and designate a commercial agent to undertake competitive bidding on its behalf. The privadzation and demonopolization of the Bread Producs Concern should start immediately. Import licensing should be required only for ' An AJiulur Sector Review to be dicused wihhIe dGoveament ia May and a Miing Secto ot ptovitde detaild infmation on _ghse and mning, respectivy. This section hWbishUgh obly suy hads an _ . Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 23 heat and saety reaso, such as for agriclul chem . Impots of food, fiber, ad agriculud inputs should not be taxed so that domestic processing industries can grow and modemize. 90. Acoelerated implemention of lead n,Jfnu andfanu wacauw according to the share system will gradually provide netives for improved management. In F}ebry 1994, the Government issued a decree, "Measures for a of Land and Agrarian Reformn" to reinse privatzaon in the agricultural sector. The decree officially desi the Ministy of Agiculture, rather than the State Property Fund, as the agency responsible for agrictual reform and pnvatzio of agriculture and agro- enrprises. It also outles initial arrangements to put agricultural reform back on track, including proiiding for the right to sell and inherit land leases and use them as colateal, and for the right of leaseholdets to join their plots and set up joint-stock farms. To enhae agricultural privatizaion, the Govenment plans to form oopaive baks and extded credits to new private farmers to ease their cuent liquidiy contrints. 91. Procedures for inils to ext with their shaes to form individual famns, assocmains, and/or new collective eeprises shoud be clea. The same procedres should pera to rorgaizaton of state and collective farms. Waer rights and azirights should be specffied during the process of land reform and restuung. The Ministry of Agriculture should prowvde greater leadership in implmentig land reform and farm resrucm ring, in partship with local comnun_m on which paricipants are reprsented. The authority over pltion of reform ueny exercised by local agricultural administrators should be transfered to the local commite and the nationl Mistry of Agrculture. P divatizatio should include the pstatl monopolies that provide agricultural inpus, as wenl as the congomerates in mareting. 92. Within the Minay of A4dalw, a shift in emphasis and personl om taditional administrative management of production to analysis of policy, implementtion of reform, and provision of technica and econmic information to producers would better serve the sector under current budgetary constaints. The functions of local governmental officis should be redined to focus on provision of information and eWplicitly to preclude i tive interference in production or marketing. Farms should be removed from the ad misrave jurisdiction of local agrictural officials. 93. Key iavs wexts in animal health, processing of meat and wool, and inbrmation for producers wil improve produivity, export prospects, and public health. A more detailed account of possible Investmensprojects in the agricultural sector wil be presented to the Consltative Group by the Government. Mbtg 94. Principal mineral products currently produced in the Kyrgyz Republic include antimony and andmony oxides, mercry, gold, uranium oxide, and mior production of rare earths, and molybdenum. Production of ti-ungtn has not yet commenced even though the mine is 80 percet completed. Intational markets for andmony and mercuy are small and highly spclized. Kyrgyz producers command respectable world market and interaepublian share for some of these commodities. In the case of uranmum, rare earths, tin/ftunsten, and molybdemm, internadonal markets are very depressed and Kyrgyz republic producers face difficulties in sling their producs. Gold producton at the Makmal mine 24 is wel below rated capacity due to fuel and spare parts shortages. Curret levels of production of these commodities can only be viable over the short to medim term by vite of low labor and energ costs per unit value of output. 95. The mediocre outlook for current minerals production is, however, more than offs by the prospectve beneft from the development of very large and medim-sized gold deposits at Kumtor and Dzherul. The fonaer is one of the world's lugest undeveloped gold reserve and the Govermen has entered into a joint venture agreem with a Canadin uramum producer. Preliminary estimations indicate that a capital hesbent of approximately US$300 million is required to pouce about IS tons gold per yea, with a world markt value of US$165 million. The Dzherui deposit is much smaler, with an inational market value of US$22 to US$44 million. 96. The Goverment is in the process of devising a consistent and interntionally competitive framework of polices in respect of the sector. Policy quesdtns, among others, wbich need to be determined by the Government include the respective roles of the State and private investors,capture by the State of value added through taxation or direct patticipation in minig acvies, the appropriate roles of gOvernment superviory bodies, the valuation of mineral deposits, the maketing of mineral commodities, and the incentives to be put into place to encourage development of the sector. The Law on Subsoil Resources promulgated in 1992 tends toward too much goverment control and intervention in the sector. It is deficient in many respects, among others, the delieation of national and regional authority in the isuance of exploration and mining licenses, and lack of clear criteria for assessment of work and ependiture reuiements. In addition, requiements to sell gold produced to the Cenral Bantk as well as the price and payment n for such sales are unlear. 97. In order to captre the maximum value added from the aurent mining operations and attract mvestment to new ones, the Government should devise policies, legislation and fiscal provisions in respect of the sector that are consistent with internationa best practices; these include, but are not limited to: (i) transforming the role of the State as regulator and suervisor of the sector rather than as direct owner in mining ventures; (ii) ensuring internationally competitve tUxation and royalty regimes; (iii) proviig for secue exploration and mining products; (iv) allowing the free marketing of mineral product; and (v) providing for international dispue resolution and/or biratin mechanism. 98. The Govermment should also create and/or reinforce govenment insi ons to supervise the sector. In this respect, consideration sboud be given to the creation of a secriat of mimes, a mie cadastre and licensing service, and a mines inspectorate department; in addiion, the restructuring of the State Commie on Geology to emphasz collection and dsemination of basic geology information would be desirable. 99. Over the course of the next several months, the Govemment should consider the privatization and restuctuing of some of the enterpris currently under Kyrgyzaltin. After appropriate studies, other mining entrprises may require restructuring and/or liquidation. 100. Enviomnent considerations have by and large been neglected over the yeas. A pressing problem is the proper disposal of urani tailings and other toxic wastes. The Government should mobilize the resources necessary to remedy some of the dangerous nl situations, and move Kyrgyz Republic Economic RqWt 25 tward abling efv standards, control and procedures a wel as de of the nsi to enforce them. F Medium-Term Outlook 101. The Kyrgyz Republik faces the double allenge of stabilizing the eonomy in the short term, while layin the basis for sustainable growti in the later part of nineties. The Govement is cumently working on a stabilizaion progm that ams at reduing monthly inflation to low single digit levds by 1995. It is envisaged that this program wil be supported by the IMF under a three year ESAP arrangement. If stabization objectives ar successfly achieved, this would provide a less distorted economic eniome, in whih eonomi agents could make rational choices. The medium term oulook and a balance of paymnts scenario pr_eeted below is only indicatve of what may happen under certain asumions. It is not meant to be predictive of what will happen or what should haqpen. 102. It is assmed that a recovery in output may not occur before 1996, for several reasons (Table 4). First, during the period of resructuing (possibly the next two years) the decline in output is likely to condue. Many industrial enterprses are not viable under mardet conditons. As financial discipline is maitind and the enepris sector incrmsingly faces hadening budget constraint it TsWe 4. Jefted OwReal Ou49 9et* will no long be possble to sustain a certain level of 1993 IM 1995 1996 1997.5 ou thrtough caesed invenories. Second, it iS ReU GDP -16.0 4.0 to -4.0 -1.3 to 1.1 1.5 to 3.3 4.4 to 5.7 likely that the i1 Apic 40 -5.0 to -3.0 0.0 to 2.0 2.0 tI 3.0 3.0 tO 4.0 sector's down-ward spiral of edusq -25.0 -12.0 to -10.0 -5.0 to -3.0 0.0 to 3.0 5.0 to 6.0 declinig output, worseing Servce -17.7 -2.0 to 0.0 0.0 to 3.0 2.0 to 4.0 6.0 to 8.0 productivity, and deterioatg naual resource source:. hibuy mal fte 993 and m uff pnoiwfr 199- base will take sometime to revese. Third, while the private sector is prospering in small-scale services, this would not be sufficient, in the short-run, to comte for the decline in trade, t, and urban services. 103. The longer term may offer more favorable prospects for the Kyrgyz eonomy. The Kyrgyz Republic has a considerable induial capaciy. Industrial enises which are ray facig a declinig extemal demand could become a source of growth provided that they adjust to evolving maret conditions. Human capital and fixed assets of these entpises have the poetal of shifting to new produs with improved quality. This potental can be expected to contribute to an export led output recovery if trade and payments relations with major trading partners in the FSU are improved and economic activity in the region saurts to rebound. Moreover, the "weedn out" of nonviable industrial enteises would release resources for use by acdvities that can flourish under the new economic conditions. An agriculta sector strategy-which would include deregulation, privatn lending to qualified borowers, key invesmt m wool and meat processing and improved advo y services for producers-could bring impovent to the sector, if implemented decisively. The Kyrgyz Republic has 26 natur resowes that can be profitably exloited on an expanded scale. World class gold rsrves have already atac iterest from forein ivestors. Amuual gold production could reach $150-200 million with sbtanti amoumt of investmt. Expansion of hydroelectric capacity may be warranted, and the country's geology suggests potential for undiscovered petroleum reserves and natural gas production. 104. Extensl Trade. The KyWz Republic's economic Tbb S. Cmeil Acoun Blams (S Mlon) growth will have to depend to a significant exen on the 1993 1994 199S 1996 1997 1998 expansion of extenal ade. This is due both to the constraints A. ade balance -166 -225 -220 -215 -207 -196 Imposed on domestc demand by EWU335 367 389 417 459 507 the stabilizatihonn pogm and to FSU 223 244 257 274 298 326 the small size of the domestic Enorgy 31 47 52 55 65 76 Odher 191 197 205 218 233 250 economy itself. In the short term;, Odercou. rs 112 124 131 143 161 181 there is not much scope for mpqons -501 -593 .609 -631 -665 -703 atradin activites to rebound FSU -317 376 -384 -393 -403 -413 among l'su countries, nor is itBW -171 207 -210 -213 -217 -220 amongulu)C MU comniatr, MuDr is it Cheetrgy -14610 20 -173 -180 -186 -193 realistic to exqect that the Kyrgyz oCber counries -185 -217 -225 -238 -262 -290 Repblic can diversi its export B. Nor-inteZrst serAs 1t -25 -15 -18 0 5 mrets qcly on a large scale C. 1n aWi m81s -2 -24 26 -27 -29 -32 to non-FSU countries. Ode countries -2 -10 -15 -19 -22 -27 Moreover, ltougo 1994, the D. Tlansfes 26 68 53 63 44 39 Kyrgyz Rpublic's iMnort bill Offici 116 96 67 70 48 41 w-fl contimm to be advemly Prvate -91 -28 -14 -7 -4 -2 will continue to be adversely afficted by risi energy and raw B. Crrent account bance -132 -207 -208 -197 -192 -183 material prices. A further (befor officia tansfers) -248 -303 -275 -267 -239 -224 increase of about 30 percent is Memo hn, % of CGDP assumed in enr import prices, Curent account balance -8.3 -8.2 -8.0 -7.1 -6.5 -5.7 due to gas pnce hikes. (bre fofficial transfr) -15.5 -12.0 -10.5 -9.7 -8.1 -7.0 Eventually, however, it should be possible for the country to change SoMce M and BAnk sfprojecoms its productiont mix, to take advanage of emerging new markets, such as China, and to enbance trade through regional tading arangements. Nonetheless, the Kyrgz economy will continue to face a stucral balance of payments deficit for nmy years to come. 105. A very gradual incre in exports of light m anufacture, electricity, and traditional agricultural c;nmmodities could be achieved with industial rtucduring and improved payments and trade relations with major trade partners. Penetation into non-FSU markets is likely to be gradual in the short term. Exports and transit trade of goods from otier FSU countries to China are potential sources of expansion. In paticular, there are prospects for exports of processed leather, meat (or livestock), and minerals to other non-FSU couties. It is possible to assume that exports would incrase from US$335 million in 1993, to US$367 million in 1994, and to US$507 mrillion in 1998. Kyrgyz Repubi Ecnraic Report 27 106. The Kyrgyz economy hporsb t s all its oil and natural gas needs, and a large part of its raw mateals, mainy metals and chemicals. Due to rapid price inceases, the shae of energy in ta imports ireased from 10 perent in 1991, to around 35 percent in 1993, despite an estmated 40 percent decline in volme. Morover, due to shtge of foreign exchange earnings, inchlding rubles, during the last two yeas imports have virtualy been reduced to the economy's minimum requreme for most essenta goods, such as petroleum products, natal gas, gains and a few industrial imports. It has not been possible to import many agricutual chemcals, in particular, fertlizers and vetnary medicine, rewltng in an adverse impact on output. 107. The current low level of importlis not sustainable. A reversal T e6 -- of output decline will require a substntial increase in im port. iM 19iw Is 196 19I, I Moreover, the energy and telecommunication sectors urgetldy No_-int.ei need imports of spare parts and w baoe V -246 -279 -249 -240 -210 -193 equipment to stabiize continui DeI senvice -2 -25 -100 -91 -103 -98 infrastructure deterioradion. As AuI2ntoIn o 0 1 -75 -64 -74 -66 privatzarion amiH e n uctungsr bm -2 -24 -26 -27 -29 -32 PdVW1AfiO WA VtfUCUri4 PM Cwp i gmssresw -27-19 -28 -21 -14 -10 momenum, demand for capital Imports will also exnd. The Totd fiancing repIrenint 275 323 378 352 328 301 Kyqyz Repblic now pays world Shn Ysof fhinaIg 338 323 378 352 328 301 prices for petroleum import and Grate 116 96 6 70 48 41 agred to pay 8 opercnt of world Multiatera 107 79 171 168 153 138 prices for natural gas imports fraom Bil el 106 132 115 89 102 97 UIzeis. mis is estimated to ad Fored diet invem 10 15 25 25 25 25 over US$35 million to the current ES, Omo an d annual ener imnports of US$170 io Capd .6 .. .. .. .. . Million, even if energY consumptio M1o Bem % of ODP is fter cut bwck and domestic Total fi nc qment 17.2 12.8 145 12.8 11.0 9.4 energ, mainy electicity and some coal, is subsiued for imported oil efr and natural gas. As a resut, total sou,ce:wD F a NW X*tstepjwI impos are esimated to increase from US$500 million in 1993 to US$593 mon in 1994, and US$703 million in 1998. 108. Exnal FYnwacg JtequiSk #4. Balane of payments projections indicate that the Kyrgyz Republic will need substan extera financial assistae during 1994-98. Financing requrements are estated at US$323 million for 1994. After inceag to US$378 million in 1995, financing reqiements are expected to grdually decline, to around US$300 million by 1998 (Table 6). These 41I fi g rqums seo does nt ice impot rei ts and potni soumos of finci fr gold mine pr*oecs due to uceitinties regaling dte timing of irnetmens. In additn, doe projecs wil go ahed onlg if fiorign financing i secumr Theufonre, it would not affect tde couatry's finanuing nrqirmts arsing fim oather sources. 28 amounts are equivalen to about 12.8 percen of projected GDP in 1994, and 9.4 percent in 1998. Due to the large derioration in eternal tems of trade the Kyrgyz Republic has been facing dung the last two years, a vety large portion of financing during 1994-96 wold be required in the form of balance of paymen support and grans. The sbare of project related finacing can be expected to increase over time as investme, pariculy In agriculture and energy sector, rebound after 1996. 109. In 1994, the estmated financing requiements comprise a non-interest current account deficit of US$279 milon, debt sevjce paymes of US$25 million, and US$20 million increase in official reserves. Disbursemen under credits received m 1993 are expected to provide finncg of about US$143 million. Official grants, in the form of food aid and technical assistance already committed, are estimated to amount to US$96 million. Foreign direct investm can be expected to remain at a modest level of US$15 million per annum. Thus, there remains a finacing gap of about US$70 million. In 1995, finacivg requiements are expected to increase to US$378 million because of a sharp increase in debt semice payments. As disburents under already comitted credits will provide only about US$50 million, there will be a need for new financig, amountig to about US$328 million. The Goverwrment intends to identiry potential sources of financing for closing the financing gap in 1994 and build up a pipeline of financal assistce for 1995, during the second Consultative Group Meeting, scheduled for June 1994. 110. Debt-Service Burden. The Kyrgyz Republic has transferred its share in FSU external debt to Russia under a "zero option" agreement signed in 1992. However, in mid-1993, it had to convert previous nrble credits and balances on correspondent accounts with Russia, Kazakhsn and Uzbekist into SDR or U.S. dollar denomint debt, equivalent to about US$168 million, at Libor plus 1 or 2 interest rate, with maturities ranging from three to five years and grace periods not exceeding 18 months. As of end-1993, together with external borrowing in that year, the country had an external debt of US$285 million, equivalent to 18 percent of GDP. Due to short grace periods for PSU debts and as the Republic will have to repay in one insallment in 1995 a US$27.8 million loan from the European Union, debt service payments are esdmated to increase to US$100 million in 1995, equivalent to about 26 percent of exports. The Kyrgyz Republic will need to borrow largely, at concessional terms, durig 1994-98 to avoid further incring its debt service burden. If the Kyrgyz Republic obtains around 80 percent of total financng during 1994-98 at concessional terms, the debt service burden would decline, from a peak of 26 percent of exports in 1995, to below 20 percent toward the end of the decade. However, if this level of concessionality cannot be obtained, the Republic may face difficulties in debt service, especially during the 1996-99 period. 111. M(or Un e*inis and Risks. The major risks and uncertainties identified at the beginning of the reform process are still preset today. These include: (i) possible policy slippage, (ii) limited administrative and implementtion capacity, (iii) adverse developments in the exteral enviromt, including the inability to finance the reform program. The experience of the past two years helped the Government and donors to better appreciate the relative magnitxde of these risks and their possible costs to the economy. 112. Polcy Sippage. There may be three possible causes of policy slippage: the policymakers' lack of genune comnmitent to the reform process; implemetion difficulty because parts of the reform progrm are poorly designed, or key supporting comp lag behind; and social discontent. There is Little reason to suspect that policy slippage in 1993 and early 1994 was due to the Govnenment's Kyrgyz Republic Economic Report 29 faldng detminaion to proceed with the transition to the market economy. Rather, it arose mainly from the vacuum created by the abolition and/or inadequacy of old insdutions, and poor design and lack of synchronization of various components of the reform program. For example, dircted credits were reiunuted because the bankig sector was unable to perform its resource allocation role; land reform and farm restrutring initiated in 1991, were suspended in early 1993 because they were not carefully designed. Social discontent has not yet become a major deterrent to the reform process. But the overall lack of financial discipline in tlte country-in particular inenerprise arrears, postponement of payments for utility bidls, and privileges accorded to labor collectives and managers-may be viewed as mechisms to preserve the relative income positions of certain social groups. 113. The Kyrgyz Republic needs to minimze policy slippage in the years to come. The donors who help the Government design and implement these reforms also have the responsibility to make the reform packge credible, realistic, and more importaty, implentable. Monetary ad fiscal policies will have to be designed in a way to accommodate restructuring and social costs. Economic reforms have not yet produced visible benfits, and they are unlikely to do so in the next couple of years. In 1993 alone, the Government's restrictive wage policy further eroded ra wages by about 40 percent. The Government will need, therefore, to put a strong emphasis on social assistance and poverty monitoring, as mentioned earlier in this Report. Also, in its development strategy, the Government will have to strike an appropriate balance between reform measures that would yield longer term results, and actions/projects which would have an immediate and visible impact on the well-being of the population. The donors should help the Kyryz Republic prepare and finance such projects. 114. Implementaon Capacity. While appropriate policy design is critical, the program itself must be implemented. In the Kyrgyz Republic, an important bottleneck ocurs at the implem on stage. This is partly due to the fact that some of the reform componen have failed to incorporate identified deficiencies in implementation capacity, thus overestimatidng their prosects for realization. But it has also resulted from institutonal weaknesses, and lack of appropriate trunmg. While technical assistance can help overcome the lack of training, it has to be carefully chosen, demand driven and directly related to esolving practical issues. 115. EBteral Eniironment. Given its relatively small size, the Kyrgyz economy is very dependent on exteral developmens, both for external trade and finamcial assistance. Trade will continue to play a major role in the Kyrgyz Republic's economy. Since the country has a diverse set of neighboring markets, its expanded production will be able to concentrate on commodities for which the country is ideally suited. This would be possible only if high trade integration with otier economies is enouraged, regional cooperation is developed and the payments issues among FSU countries are addressed. 116. The Kyrgyz Republic has been a relatively favored beneficiary of foreign assistance, which has parily compensated for the loss of sizeable past Union transfers. It should be recognized, however, that the size and composition of this financial assistance is conmtional on the progress made in implementig reforms. The scenaro presnted in this Report assumes gradual improvement m the country's exernal financial situation, and thus a decline in its external finaning requiremens toward the year 1998. Wnether this can be achieved will depend on the strength of export-led recovery and the effectiveness of the restructuring process. In the event that the country's extenal financial situation does not improve due to factors beyond the Government's control, the donor coummuity should continue to 30 suppon the Kyrgyz Republic through concessional assistance, as long as the Govermemnt remains committed to the reform program and demonstrates this commitment through decisive actions. Statistical Annex Tables Table of Contents 1. Population and Employment 1-1: Population and Employment - Summary Table 1-2: Employment by Sector 1-2a: Sector Shares of Employment 1-3: Workers and Employees in State Sector 1-4: Labor Force Participation Rate 1-5: Registered Unemployment 2. National Income Accounts 2-1: Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices 2-la: Distribution of Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices 2-2: Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices 2-2a: Gross Domestic Product - Growth Rates at Constant Prices 2-2b: Gross Domestic Product - Implicit Price Deflators 2-2c: Gross Domestic Product - Growth Rates of Implicit Price Deflators 2-3: National Income and Gross National/Domestic Product 2^4: Composition of Net Material Product and Gross Domestic Product 2-5: Net Material Product at Current Prices 2-5a: Distribution of Net Material Products at Current Prices 2-6: Net Material Product at Constant Prices 2-6a: Net Material Product at Constant Prices - Growth Rates 2-6b: Net Material Product - Implicit Price Deflators 2-6c: Net Material Product - Growth Rates of Implicit Price Deflators 2-7: Depreciation by Sector at Current Prices 2-7a: Sector Shares of Depreciation 2-8a: MPSISNA Conversion - Consumption at Current Prices 2-8b: MPS/SNA Conversion - Gross Domestic Investment at Current Prices 2-8c: MPS/SNA Conversion - Exports/Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services 2-9: Gross Social Product at Current Prices 2-10: Material Input by Sector at Current Prices 3. International Trade and Balance of Pavments 3-1: Consolidated Balance of Payments 3-2: NBK Foreign Exchange Auctions 3-3: Total Exports by Commodity Groups at Domestic Prices 3-4: Total Imports by Commodity Groups at Domestic Prices 34a: Resource Balance by Commodity Groups at Domestic Prices 3-5: Geographical Distribution of Extrarepublic Trade at Domestic Prices 3-5a: Geographical Distribution of Extrarepublic Trade at Domestic Ptices (n percent) 3-6: Geographical Distribution of Extrarepublic Trade (millions of current U.S. dollars) 3-6a: Geographical Distribution of Extrarepublic Trade (n percent) 3-7: Geographical Distribution of bterrepublic Trade at Domestic Prices 4. E D S. PubicFinanos 5-1: General Government Budget Revenue and Grants 5-2: General Government Budget Expendiur and Surplus/Deficit 6. How=sv 5 6-1: Monetay Survey 7. Agdulra Statstics 7-1: Agricultural Production am millions of 1983 rubles) 7-2: Production and Average Yield of Major Agricultural Crops 7-3: Main Aggrgates of Animal Husbandry 7-4: Agriculal Production by Type of Ownership 7-5: Employment in Agriculture 7-6: Main Indicators of Agricultura Farms 8. In and gnr Satistcs 8-1: Industrial Production by Sector (m millions of current rubles) 8-2: Industrial Ptoduction and Growth Rates by Sector (in milions of 1982 rubles) 8-3: Electricity Production and Consumption 9a Prime and Wage 9-la: ldustrwial Wholesale Price dex (previous month= 100) 9-lb: Industi Wholesale Price Index (same month of the previous year- 100) 9-ic: Industrial Wholesale Price Index (same period of the previous year= 100) 9-2a: Consumer and Retail Price Indices (previous month =100) 9-2b: Consumer and Retail Price Indices (same month of the previous year- 100) 9-2c: Consumer and Retail Price Indices (same period of the previous year= 100) 9-3: Nominal Wages by Indstres (in curent rubles) 9-3a: Nominal Wages by Industries (m percent, 1980 = 100) 10. Iousehold Mgnao lcom and EBpendibe 10-1: Monetary Incomes and Expeniturs of the Population 11. Imvestnt Statstcs 11-1: Capital Investments by State Entprises and Orgnizations 11-2: Capital Investment Fincing by Type of Entpris 11-3: Stocks at End of Year 11-4: Change in Stocks by Type and Economic Sector 11-5: Work in Progress in Constution TAME 14-: ICYRGYZ R15DLIC - POPULATION AND EMPLOYMNTf - SUMMARY TABLN (o thouand) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total Popuation 3,584A 3,953.6 4,026.9 4,106.2 4,183.0 4,23.8 4,334.5 4,389.5 4,451.8 Males 1,737.8 1,921.0 1,957.7 1,998.7 2,038.6 2,07S.7 2,117.9 2,148.7 2,183.1 FPa_bes 1,846.6 2,032.6 2,069.2 2,107.5 2,144.4 2,178.1 2,216.6 2,240.8 2,268.7 Urban 1,362.5 1,492.9 1,521.0 1,551.3 I,S85.2 1,622.3 1,647.5 1,668.0 1,681.1 Runa 2,221.9 2,460.7 2,505.9 2,554.9 2,97.8 2,631.5 2,687.0 2,721.5 2,770.7 Blow WorkngAges 1,418.7 1,540.1 1,575.9 1,614.6 1,650.5 1,680.1 1,714.2 1,739.7 1,767.1 WotidngAge Popuaton 1,822.1 2,025 2,051.8 2,083.2 2,110.4 2,144.1 2,185.1 2,211.2 2,239.4 Above Workig Ages 343.6 391.0 399.2 408.4 422.1 429.6 435.2 438.6 445.3 Pesn Older and Youe IIn the Able-Bodied Ages Who Are Wo*ing 57.9 59.6 60.8 51.5 50.9 50.2 49.9 50.0 older 50.6 55.5 56.0 47.6 47.0 46.3 46.8 46.7 Younger 7.3 4.1 4.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.1 3.3 Total Labor Resous 1,846.1 2,024.4 2,070.8 2,105.2 2,125.8 2,159.8 2,184.0 2,215.0 Tot Bmployed Popuato 1,424.6 1,613.8 1,651.1 1,702.7 1,716.1 1,738.9 1,747.9 1,754.1 Stoe Secaor 1,163.2 1,315.4 1,341.3 1,342.2 1,337.8 1,345.2 1,349.9 1,201.7 Lased Enteprises .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 93.4 J Stock Compani .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.5 Economic AssociatIo .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.4 Sol Orgatio .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.3 Joint Venur .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 Colleedve Farms 172.7 191.7 187.6 181.3 183.0 175.5 178.1 193.8 COpOOativ .. .. .. 2A 10.0 27.6 33.0 21.0 ndivMdul aiborAtoivit0 0. 0.3 0.2 1.6 2.9 2.4 3.1 2.6 Pivate Subsidia Agiculur 88.3 106.4 122.0 175.2 182.4 188.2 183.8 208.1 Pivae Agroulture .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.8 stu 192.9 200.4 199.5 202.6 206.5 205.9 203.7 205.1 Religous Wodaes .. .. .. .. 0.4 0.4 0.4 Able-Bodied Person Not Employed in the National Bcoomy 228.6 209.7 220.2 199.9 202.8 214.6 232.0 255.8 Housewives .. .. .. .. .. .. Unemployed .. .. .. .. .. .. at Warkdg age includes women aged 16.54 and men aged 16-59. Sur: Ste Stai Agency. TABLE 142k EYRGYZ REUEIBLDC - EMPlOYMENT DY SECTOR, ANNUAL AVERAGE On tbousaud) 1980 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Mateid Sphero 1,045.7 1,180.3 1,203.S 1,247.8 1,251.9 1,264.4 1,261.0 1280.5 Agiculur including forety 455.6 529.1 539.2 577.2 577.2 57.2 572.0 622.7 Agiultre e _ing foresty 452.4 525.8 535.8 573.9 573.8 574.2 569.1 619.5 Foresky 3.2 3.3 3A 3.3 3A 3.0 2.9 3.2 IndUty, total 398.0 441.2 450.5 456.5 461.9 486.4 487.2 465.7 induaty, otier 295.5 321.8 327.5 332.7 335.4 334.9 334.4 318.7 Constuction 102S 119.4 123.0 123.8 126.5 151.5 152.8 147.0 Other, materil apheme 192.1 210.0 214.0 214.1 212.8 200.8 201.8 192.1 Trnsportation of gSods 65.1 73.5 73.8 71.3 67.3 57.1 56.6 54.8 Maint= wee of roads .. .. .. .. .. .. cn ia vicing mate production .. .. .. .. .. .. Whlaesde trade 102.7 111.0 112.0 114.0 116.1 113.6 115.1 110.5 Retail Trade md cating .. .. .. .. .. .. Mterial Supply .. .. .. .. .. .. nforation and computing srvices 3.9 3.6 5.2 5.8 5.5 5.2 4.6 42 Oheir branches of material production 20.4 21.9 23.0 23.0 23.9 24.9 25.5 22.6 Nonomatei Spbre 378.9 434.0 447.6 454.9 464.2 474.5 486.9 473.6 Transpotation 42.7 47.6 47.7 46.5 43.5 38.1 37A 38.7 Housing 34.9 41.3 42.0 43.8 452 47.8 45.3 43.8 Public utilities and p a sevxice .. .. .. .. .. .. . Heth care, socil eity, physicl curlue and spors 73.9 85.2 89.1 91.1 95.4 101.3 104.6 107.4 Education 150.2 174.0 180.2 185.6 194.8 204.6 215.5 212.5 Cultur and art .. .. .. .. .. .. Scienoe and scienific srvices 34.4 35.9 36.2 35.1 34.1 34.2 34.6 27.4 Credit.. . .. . .. . .. . Inurance 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.4 7.0 7.0 7.2 Gehnel adminiration and defense 36.6 43.4 45.7 46.2 44.8 41.5 42.5 36.6 pivate nonprof iioas seving households .. .. .. .. .. .. Other, material and nnmaterial qphers 571.0 644.0 661.6 669.0 677.0 675.3 688.7 665.7 Toad Employment 1,424.6 1,614.3 1,651.1 1,702.7 1,716.1 1,738.9 1,747.9 1,754.1 1,836.0 Source: Stad Stbdiiw Agency. TABSE 1-IA: KYRGYZ REJUEUC - WrRCENTAGE DlSIRIlUMMON OF E APl)YMENr BY SEWCTR On pm.) 1980 198 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Materli Spbere 73.4 73.1 72.9 73.3 73.0 72.7 72.1 73.0 Agriuloe induding forestry 32.0 32.8 32.7 33.9 33.6 33.2 32.7 35.5 Agicultut exluding foresry 31.8 32.6 32.5 33.7 33.4 33.0 32.6 35.3 Foetry 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Indusry, towa 27.9 27.3 27.3 26.8 26.9 28.0 27.9 26.5 Inustry, otdr 20.7 19.9 19.8 19.5 19.5 19.3 19.1 18.2 Costruction 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.4 8.7 8.7 8A4 Ohier, materi qpher 13.5 13.0 13.0 12.6 12.4 11.5 11.5 11.0 Transprtation of goods 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.3 3.2 3.1 Maintaeane of roads .. .. .. .. .. .. Comunkation sevciag matermia production .. .. .. .. .. .. Wholade trade 7.2 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.5 6.6 6.3 Retal Trade and atering .. .. .. .. .. .. Maeri y .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . Procurent .. .. .. .. .. .. Infodion and computing serieo 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 Other brnches of material production 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 Nonateia Sphere 26.6 26.9 27.1 26.7 27.0 27.3 27.9 27.0 Tnportaio 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.2 Comnton .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . Hosaing 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5S Publ;c utilities and prsoa srvices .. .. .. .. .. .. Hel ce, soca secity, physic cultre and sports 5.2 5.3 5.4 SA 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.1 Education S105 10.8 10.9 10.9 11.4 11.8 12.3 12.1 Culture and art .. .. .. .. .. .. Scienc and scintiic services 2A 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.6. Credit . . . . . . . . . Insuanoe 04 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 Genwal adminiattionanddefense 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 Private nonprofit institutions seving households .. .. .. .. .. .. Other, mateia and nonmaterl qpes 40.1 39.9 40.1 39.3 394 38.8 394 38.0 Toal Employment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Table 1-2. TABLE 1- KYRG'YZ REPUBLC. WORKERS AND EM OYE IN STATE SECTOR (in thosands) Total Workers Emploees Material Sphere 7088 5913 1175 Agriculture induding forestry 190.9 1653 25.6 Agriculture excluding forestty 187.2 162.4 24.8 Forestry 3.7 2.9 0.8 Industry, total 361.3 299.0 62.3 Industry, other 268.9 227.6 413 Constrction 92.4 71.4 2L0 Other, material sphere 156.6 127.0 29.6 Trnsportation of goods 45.6 39.0 6.6 Maintenance of roads 3.2 2.4 0.8 Communication servicing material production 0.0 Wholesale trade 912 72.8 1S. Retail Trade and catering 0.0 Material Supply 0.0 Procurement 0.0 Information and computing services 2.1 1.0 1 Other branches of material production 14S 11.8 2.7 Nonmaterial Sphere 376.0 137.9 238.1 Transportation 22.8 19.5 3.3 Communication 11.0 8.1 2.9 Housing 25.6 20.2 5.4 Public utflities and personal services 0.0 - . Health care, social security, physkal cultur and sports 9S.4 35.8 59.6 Education 1S8.0 37.8 120.2 Ctlture and art 16.2 6.5 9.7 Scence and scientific services 17.9 6.6 113 Credit 0.0 Ishurance 7.0 0. 62 CGeneral adminstration and defense 22.1 2.6 195 Private nonprofit institutions serving households 0.0 Otber, material and nonmaterial spheres 532.6 264.9 267.7 Total 1,084.8 729.2 355.6 Source: State Statistical Agency. TADU 14 KTRGIZ 3U'IUC RA*N LOSC PANRCVAII0 AUM Teea 0-15 1649 2024 9 5044 5 4044 4549 5054 5M9 6044 ov*rG$ 1989CAM3 Totl Ppdel "VA.) 457*1.S0t A 3213 6 M7.6 315.2 2M9 155.5 1474 167.7 15.4 137.0 213.3 Emplyed (how.) 1,7f2. 1.0 LOSA 279. 241. 29.7 220* 127.9 132 1.2 75.8 27.8 11.9 AorForPoFuL (O) 41.4 0.1 5.1 17.2 6.9 9.9 94.2 944 92 76.4 50.4 20.3 5.6 Males, tm.) 2$7.6 847.7 164.3 151. 18#.4 L 121.1 "A 75J 80* 68.7 S8 68.7 EmVoyed (OKu.) 9481 0.6 S7. 144 I07 153. 118.5 5.1 70.7 73.9 56.8 17.4 6.5 LAbor Po Putr (%) 45.6 0.1 35.1 08 9.9 9L0 97.9 95 96.2 91.5 82.7 29.6 95 Pemale (th.) 2,180.2 27 17.0 U8.4 191.2 15. W.$ 487 74.0 86.9 81.7 18.2 144.6 Bmployed (tOrS-) 814.4 0.4 SQ07 u5 IOU 19.4 1121t 623 65.S S43 19.0 102 5.4 LaborFm OPat( 37.4 0.0 52.3 73. 5.0 *7 90 91.4 I S 6W 233 13.0 3.7 Total Populdtioi (thoiM) . . . . . . .. . . . Labor o P ) .. .. .. Mai (dmk) Emloe (ta'. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . Labor F Pat ) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... Employed (O ) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. LaborFer (PaXL ) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . S8uwe' St S8ted A8rny TABLE 1.5: KYRGYZ REPUBUC - REGSERE UNEMPLYMENT (in thusa) Number Receivin Total Males Females Beneis (end of nmenth) 1991 lamxr . .... Febuny March...... April...... May June July 0.094 0.017 0.077 August 0.150 0.027 0.123 September 0.128 0.023 0.10I October 0.125 0.037 0.088 0.009 November 0.107 0.031 0.076 0.037 December 0.136 0.039 0.097 0.074 Januy 0.163 0.046 0.117 0.082 Febmary 0.323 0.091 0.232 0.263 March 0.482 0.135 0.347 0.447 April 0.654 0.131 0.523 0.637 May 0.84 0.161 0.643 0.739 June 0.828 0.166 0.662 0.728 July 1.104 0.243 0.861 0.977 August 1.238 0.273 0.965 1.061 September 1.384 0.304 1.080 1.169 October 1.475 0.399 1.076 1.280 November 1.622 0.438 1.184 1.427 December 1.796 0.485 1.311 1.512 1993 January 1.899 0.513 1.386 1.791 Febrnay 2.259 0.610 1.649 2.024 March 2.434 0.658 1.776 2.182 April 2.578 0.696 1.882 2.173 May 2.700 June 2.700 July 2.700 August 2.8W0 September 2.800 October 3.200 November 3.100 December 2.900 Source: State St*tal Agen¢y. TMSLE218 KVWRGZR3WVU-GmoR0OIflC1mulNrA1scu3fl53Pczslmi,Gfiu) lo tins Igo 398 1m lowe aD 1991 am AukIhW *Afldzt&N$y 1. 776 1.84 1.956 2.121 2.40 2.739 4.393 Indutry. lowI 2469 2.333 2.483 2.719 2.964 S.333 6.909 bh~IubT.Odm .. ,84 1.609 3.92 2.0 2.214 2.29 2.83 coamlu4nas. 622 du6 03 746 772 82 1.073 oew tlw~~~~~~~3,9 .1147 1.733 3,935 2.06 2.273 4,144 TuWpoffflm . 276 298 30 s4o "I 388 655 omab* oftosds . .. . letoilm IuoMA oautan .. . ... hpued molts urgof m h&puidie v u6drna Iof os(11 .. .. . Tows al eeto Ptduff dawot 4960 5.942 5,4 6.134 6.813 7.498 8,126 15,446 11~ Sy EpeadImCowMpty Cam Wm aln 381 485 485 509 5.43 WI 4,63 1069 ab1dies-pooducionsm 27 .3 35l364 .1 .89 516 7 Suvotmom om fion £08 .35du32 ,47 1.311(SOP)57 3.3 Ow, 3muar"deo h eI 10 2.63 2.9 236 243 .05 .86 5,5 Urns ixdu haatn ug 3(So2l)7 .i ,3 245 245 .6 olnp at &eloch 330V8A -8 O4T4P SO334 .39 Routt baehoo P(Net 0190515t OPao*6 3.7 4,1234 ." 6.1345 .3.22 .174 .1.24 -3044 BYExpost fgoa candnmetcios * IwFPotso ods atal aX4 4g Sole,. .. .. .. .. fohAm 21a1 Rudml 2MAgon33 .% 4.1 ,G ,0.7= I~ :: AA 2 W t:: 2: : : 2:: ::2: ::::::: 222 §t: 2¢ t:t~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ t! e : ::: :::::f t:f | * ::: ::: :: 2: : 2 :2:2::: 2::222::::: :: :: s TAMM ZVRGVZRRfUUJC-=MUOMWWtXODVVf4LTCOMOrAXf Mvm OWMWMrMOMW lm lm im iw im Igo im im aybdwuwoftsw Agdod-hWvftfbm4* 1.10 1.7111 1.2" UV 21140 I.M bbow. tw sm 3ilsG $.in Sim b"w.edw 11124 107 IM3 2,M 2AD4 2mi zm ouraugAm - du 644 m 74 7A Im 714 odw I" 404 I'm lAn t."l us zoo TOWAPMU" 2sa gm 302 324 so Su ROW cm& wr4mbmub" I., lsof"obmpot ToWsmookwoMed(OVA) S." OA44 #AM O.M ?OM 7.W Wo NothOwToOMM-SOM OnaDamoWaPad"at I p*w Sm OA" 7.M DYE*-w-C"ww- C--W" - 4,*7 4m S" SAO 6AX 4.M pdvab conanp" - AM w Am 4m AM %w 43oveamam ,j - 9" INS 1.04 I.m us 1,310 1.2111 ,Ow - 1.9m 2.11S 2JM zm 2.7is ZIM %UM GPM fixed I.= 1.70 1.7m IM 201 1.9" 1.711 cbmwinooob - 4% 3a 3% $0 07 so 417 Ramum bdonce Ola enoo OHM - 40111 -LA" 4im 40 4.= -70 40 &mm& Skb ft"W Avmy TALI24AS £VRGYZ R IIBUIC eCGOREM OMBECW Mucr, GROW I RATE AT vOr45 ?pPIEST a apu 196 1287 1886 t9B9 1990 1991 1992 A1baaln slafofetiY 6.4 2.2 10.0 4.1 5.5 .8.0 Fozay . .. .. .. W,uy towt I" 1.7 t7.3 4.0 40.4 -13. bdtty. Odw -A.4 1.9 18.6 4.9 .1.0 0.3 Oc_mtm*h 3.0 1.2 133 IA 15 4..2 Oor1 6.1 -2.9 9.9 3.2 6. -2.7 T __p.tW1a 12.3 0.3 11.9 4.1 7.4 1.7 Whld_fb ............. F bA a g WR .. p.. .. . . . . Ma h9 o. .. ..... Robmli w h r- OUrbufmtd1I8m .. .. .. .. . .. AAIowWwud - .nlr .. .. .. .. . .. cmt Oeamavdtidion ad. .... .. Omh4st ... ..fo .. ..of bpwd.ev~dmof Tdoagu whoadded MVA) S34 0.5 13.1 3. 3.2 -3.6 -19. asvs DonIbo P0dwart bfo.. . GOwe D_st1 Piduwt at mbl pfice 3.4 0.5 13.1 3.8 3.2 -36 -19.0 CutmIdfo 40.2 24 A.4 103 -2.2 -16.1 P*V.omcta on 0.3 1.0 9 9.9 43 -19.7 a kemmew mmumption 0.2 93 6.5 11.9 6t3 -3.2 Gm. Am_t1o INvesmm 9.4 -2.7 13.1 19.4 -2t.4 -2.2 OWN fied hiwauos 154 40.7 3.7 19.9 -1.7 -13.0 EtPtts of gwos gm _ao vio e Woits of Saods asd n&cor senios Sou: Table 22. 1ae lus 19aS 19a7 i1 low tO 1i9 1992 8abu1tOdg1 AI*nu.ltinluiaiqinzt, .. e10 to" 109.4 107.9 1593 126. 221.0 ky, Wd .. no9. 9 95 94.7 99.1 22..7 1dauqW.r .. Go.0 9 94." 89.1 9.1 963 244.4 -ondrum .. 99X NJ 97.! l" to 07 15072 OtlIr .. IQL7 "A IOuA toil i05. 11bA D.9 T_.poati. _. 115.1 9. 11 1023 808. IIIA 185.1 huu~m .. .. .. .. .. .. . Tlmhnih OA _. 101 9.2 _0. 9.2 O.. 11.. 1. GmDiUih.m at_.m .. - .. .. .. .. .. loo GmmipaJ_ .. 977_8 1.2 1.. 1 .. 11.4. 1. P _hsaeg .. ..3 87 9.2 .1. 9.. 11.. . Gsgou.1 .. _8 1_. 1 .9 15.1 ..6 5.1. 47 Ozmsuetows. .. ..2 10.. ..2 10.2 108 32.7. Gml.. _mu .. 18 10.1 _ 13 139 15 1.5 15.2 Pdo m m .. .. .. .. .. IU_: ..mb ..1 -u -2* ** a . . . . _. 6 .. .. _.. . _ . COO& homa. ___ .... _ _.._ . . _ . . T smvs dM((FVA) .. tlX Wt.9 99.2 105. ItQ4 217 cowd _ hIS 9f2 t9 994 1X5.1 IlOi4 273 8fawatBapeow f _ _md 97.7 "A0 tool tnX to" 1t5.4 2142 -_ _owmio 1303 14.9 139,0 139.1 12& I131 247A 0 _lle_gft .. o itt 1 112. 1O72 tOS 127.7 23.1 ownaxd _ ..m flut tOlI 114i4 113.9 115 124.3 1552 db^ufp& d A I i I _ fl.. _ _ .. . Smm' T_l 2_ nd22 139 tw 1999 19 191 1991 1992 As1 i_wIll On" 41.9 Si *1A liI .1 14.2 whdty, ew 4.2 4 2 4X1 124.8 u,daaw 42 4.9 S 4.6 1SSi a-.ua,im -23 41 3.8 2.1 4.1 39.4 OUm -.3 la la 4D 4.4 873 T_NPRWb 4. 2.1 0A .3 2.8 83.2 C _Imbtd .. .. .. _. W ; _ ....... O m Itm .. .. .. .. . . Ni-nwschm.huagI. O*ma~u sa f-o _ .. . ... ~~~ ~.. _. .. _ .. ?aW1pswMudPkatI Wh 4A 2* 41.7 4.0 5 97.2 184~~* .. _ _ .. _usounwp1 .. 2.. .1. _. _. 9.2 Ouma,p& 02 22 0. IS 1ii 87 Pit bomuwmdm -4A Si,01 5.9 14.3 84.3 C - h *-arqo - - AS *- Su OGMdmwgol T.1 1. .42 Ii 17.5 8337 0.,, 0.hvuum..* 5.9 .0. .. 7.. 2.8 ownaffd san0m 4eM -. - . * - - II arb VA .. &. . - _m < rodsw a&& na Al - Th&-2...... TAW524S KMIGYZ I UC - IAL D I LAMP OICSC m (me. t vubk) 1930 1 I9 1987 19#8 I1 1990 1991 19 1. Nlot m h Pro"t 3,722 4, 4,66 410 4,9" 55M 6,027 13, 2. W.gss Sahis NaMatN Sobr 70 8 go 93" 1039 1t3 1,'4 1,0 3. SeemS Coob0mz, NaMask Ipb.. 55 a X 8 do 61 69 so 4. Jmiuusoaf m Rc d,MasHJS,M 27 so 0o S4 76 89 67 32 5. Prdit,N=MatsrSp 25 21 28 30 25 53 a 106 6. LoomsinUcuus, mawhipw 46 75 75 3 87 85 1II 93 7. lzmua eewimnPaIi,_M.iSrbm so 61 62 1 6 65 68 6 8 BsoIob dTle vhms 45 43 68 a 76 66 70 34 9. Pauzuof W SNtM esd8Swvios by 1.mlhu of matw smvnut 10 120 118 132 121 ISO 163 323 10. EBaii aVAse 6w PM ci NapSoYa. PmiIhtim, Mataf Iii p. 120 1t 145 1in 13 35 287 611 :1. J4s Isevi c.ahow oFiame 12. Net he o1afi.mAbm. d .. .. .. .. 13. Naa koom. At Mnde hum Oft NW=1 Profto - (l+2+3+4+54-7-8-10-11+12) 4,1J 4,9 4,915 5,119 5,617 6X 6,80 14X7 14. Comupfiof Fixd CupI 734 957 1,019 10 1,198 153 1325 1,219 15. rmw Nalodm Padntatmm prla- (13+14) 4,9" 5,92 5,934 6, 68 7,48 8,126 15,46 161,000 16. W 152) 4,960 5,92 584 6,134 6,15 7498 8,126 1546 161,000 So8ros: 8SuitedAgmy. m os low it am Ioo tw a A. Ngmiga fuja(m 3.722 4.A3 4.0 4.510 4.9t6 .531 6,027 13..A Al. Pd_d Immm efd Pqulu WMP 211S9 2.751 2,37 23 3.19 3.2 3.75 7.32 Cf. Wogo =d saade 4tef,qi . _ t _ouwqbm 700 373 900 993 I,OIP L.ow 1.2 1.07 C2 tommammlbM p4. 41d. p _iu 443 6O 739 U2o 89 t,019 1.144 3.S5M C3. ms _ t c1la1dmimohacamky 154 248 24U 24 20 232 m 1,019 C3Oa. m.t _Mq t02 193 192 1N 205 221 234 939 C3b ta _ uqbz. 53 S5 56 so 6a 41 U W COs gtu Wlexlmw. 4S 63 do a 76 . 6 0 34 04& udlq .. .. .. .. .. ..... Cs td 4 - .. .. .. .. .. ..... CS. _d(owoft+ at. C_mujeuuUia oeU yem(SNA (A + Cl - C2 + C3 - 04 + CS + CO 2,46 3.137 S.25 3.268 3.SX4 ,786 4.237 6S56 A2. P1skmWnmuo1dlu (MP 1.2 1.2 1,<93 1 1.752 2,02 2,152 5,616 Dl. Ojnudi wow md tan of am.lu4gtuyb.is_udWdlje- 25 21 28 30 23 a3 a4 106 D2. Pouilmumme t-do.. aubaqt_ tOO 120 118 132 121 150 t63 323 D3. Ealpt_ f oiwncdm wflhd xtd.ou~o. bdlbi. m tl_e 120 132 143 lot 13 233 2S7 611 D4. LcMslu4Wcb 46 73 75 o 3 ss It s D5. olwt _*bo (+) Do. odor _iadu (-) B9. Op_zuls &wFbm IN i Nu T- om Pn&dcdm id in*" (SNA) (A2+C2).*+D$-D2-D3-D4+DS+D6) 1.763 1839 1.722 1'm 2m 2434 2463 7.344 93. Com ui ofHzcd Ca$aI (SNA) 734 937 1,019 1.015 1.1t9 I.233 1[2s 1,219 B. am Do_mU.o Pmhhm at siAie pkB= (SNW - (91+12+13) 4.923 5953 5966 141 me2 74 8J.127 I4 Sti 9fg &UdW A,gecy. TABULES 1 KlfGVZ REPUBLIC MNrT MATRUL PRMOD r AT CUMRRE=F PRICES (ulllon of =bba) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 By Industrial Origin: Agriculture including forestry 1,132.2 1,653.9 1,721.9 1,810.8 1,965.0 2,320.0 2,604.7 6,765.5 58,169.0 Agriculture exeluding forestay 1,129.6 1,648.9 1,716.8 1,805.8 1,960.1 2,314.8 2,599.2 6,757.4 58,105.0 Foresry 2.6 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.9 5.2 5.5 8.1 64.0 Industry, total 1,790.8 2,179.4 2,016.0 2,155.4 2,354.5 2,520.4 2,639.2 5,937.4 59,883.3 Industry, other 1,425.3 1,611.7 1,449.0 1,568.8 1,707.5 1,849.1 1,919.2 4,870.7 51,799.0 Cunstrjution 365.5 567.7 567.0 586.6 647.0 671.3 720.0 1,066.7 8,084.3 Odher 801.9 604.2 630.0 543.4 626.8 714.0 782.6 2,177.3 18,920.4 Transportation of goods 116.3 131.0 150.2 145.7 162.2 172.0 211.0 271.3 3,739.1 Maintenanee of roads .. 12.9 5.8 9.3 10.4 11.4 2.1 8.3 8.4 Cornmuncation for nateria productin 0.2 11.4 12.7 14.0 15.3 16.7 18.0 27.4 105.0 Wholesle trade 22.6 28.8 30.1 28.7 4.5 27.3 30.2 89.9 375.5 Retil trade and atering 200.8 219.1 238.3 208.3 287.6 296.7 335.8 674.2 3,727.0 Mateia supply 39.3 52.4 63.5 47.8 55.1 56.4 68.0 212.3 2,769.1 Prcurement 41.8 53.5 36.5 48.6 46.5 58.1 41.4 65.1 571.0 Informationand comaputing services .. 7.0 10.7 13.4 14.5 16.6 10.2 21.3 100.1 Other branches of nmterWl production 380.9 88.1 82.2 27.6 30.7 58.8 65.9 807.5 7,525.2 Not Material Product 3,724.9 4,437.5 4,367.9 4,509.6 4,946.3 5,554.4 6,026.5 14,880.2 136,972.7 By Expenditure Category: Consumption 3,298.9 4,220.0 4,200.5 4,389.1 4,798.8 5,473.4 5,973.4 9,923.8 Consumption of population 2,894.7 3,678.0 3,671.4 3,824.3 4,199.5 4,855.0 5,316.4 8,733.3 Social consumption 404.2 542.0 529.1 564.8 599.3 618.4 657.0 1,190.5 Investment (accumulation) 888.4 1,131.0 1,105.9 1,200.7 1,207.8 1,677.3 1,345.8 5,100.0 Fixed capitul 540.8 708.0 651.0 897.0 769.0 966.0 708.0 540.8 Changes in inventories and other 347.6 423.0 454.9 303.7 438.8 711.3 637.8 4,559.2 Losses 46.0 75.0 75.0 85.6 86.9 84.9 114.5 93.2 Not esports -508.4 -988.5 -1,013.5 -1,165.8 -1,147.2 -1,681.2 -1,407.2 -236.8 Sources: State Statistical Agency. TR 2A. KMRG ZEIU1c -990 N OF NET IMATEZIAL MIIOWCr AT CURIF PU S On pwema 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 By ndOui Orin: AgricutkureIuding forory 30.4 37.3 39.4 40.2 39.7 41.8 43.2 45.5 42.5 Agloulureelatudlugtrestry 30.3 37.2 39.3 40.0 39.6 41.7 43.1 45.4 42.4 FoTry 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 Industy, tdoa 48.1 49.1 46.2 47.8 47.6 45A 43.8 39.9 43.7 bdustry, othd 38.3 36.3 33.2 34.8 34.5 333 31.8 32.7 37.8 ConstutnS 9.8 12.8 13.0 13.0 13.1 12.1 11.9 7.2 5.9 Otbe1 21.5 13.6 14.4 12.0 12.7 12.9 13.0 14.6 13.8 T _ eportalofgoods 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.5 1.8 2.7 Mainnenanteof roads .. 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 Communideatin or matei productIon 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 Whoesade trde 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 RFti tade and cating 5.4 4.9 5.5 4.6 5.8 5.3 5.6 4.5 2.7 merial supply 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.4 *2.0 Procurement 1.1 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 bIftorniaolandoomnpuqngss vlea .. 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 Otherbanhohesofnadtrllproduction 10.2 2.0 1.9 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.1 5.4 5.5 Net Maeril Poduct 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 By Expenditure, Caegory: Consumapion U8.6 95.1 96.2 97.3 97.0 98.5 99.1 66.7 Cenmsption of populaon 77.7 82.9 84.1 84.8 84.9 87.4 88.2 58.7 Socialoonsumption 10.9 12.2 12.1 12.5 12.1 11.1 10.9 8.0 Investment (accumulation) 23.9 25.5 25.3 26.6 24.4 30.2 22.3 34.3 Fied ciah 14.5 16.0 14.9 19.9 15.5 17.4 11.7 3.6 Changes in inventores and other 9.3 9.5 10.4 6.7 8.9 12.8 10.6 30.6 Losses 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.9 0.6 Net exmpos -13.6 -22.3 -23.2 -25.9 -23.2 -30.3 -23.4 -1.6 Soure:. Table 2-5. TAKIE" KWIRIZRUKIC -MI MAI ILPROUC AT CCNTANTPRIUS 1V 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 By JndustW Origin: Agtlohule Inudingse fory 771.1 1,494.0 1,57.4 1,614.0 1,787.2 2,074.8 2,389.3 2,052.5 6,312.3 Agoultr eduding foirey 768.5 1,489.0 1,568.3 1,609.0 1,782.3 2,069.6 2,384.1 2,044.4 6,308.6 Foesty 2.6 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.9 5.2 5.2 8.1 3.7 Indury, tol 2,065.0 2,233.5 2,173.0 2,249.5 2,586.2 2,418.6 2,694.0 3,0s3.3 4,385.1 Idutrky, ote 1,685.0 1,672.0 1,601.6 1,653.2 1,949.7 1,770.2 2,034.0 2,345.0 3,585.0 co osuactim 380.0 561.5 571.4 596.3 636.5 648.4 660.0 708.3 800.1 Other 730.9 591.6 609.7 553.5 605.7 677.9 737.1 653.9 1,672.3 Tnmoaportationogoods 2/ 121.6 143.9 150.2 145.7 162.2 155.8 211.4 136.3 237.9 Maeaaofrowds .. .. 5.8 9.3 10.4 11.4 2.1 8.3 Counumeicatimformatewi produecion 7.8 11.4 12.7 14.0 15.3 16.7 18.0 20.8 20.4 Wbo1ea1tmede 19.3 30.5 32.5 32.5 32.4 315.6 354.3 325.1 402.1 Reti tad, and eneing 182.6 228.4 227.9 226.3 250.4 .. Mtal supply 39.3 48.7 52.0 49.2 47.2 78.1 46.2 51.6 156.9 NOcuremes 28.1 38.1 44.7 42.1 44.6 46.4 57.9 19.4 68.7 Ifeationandcomputingervices .. 7.0 10.7 13.4 14.5 16.7 10.1 21.3 19.8 Odierbsnoesofmaterlaproductlon 332.2 83.6 73.2 21.0 28.7 37.2 37.1 71.1 766.5 Not Matera Ptoduct 3,567.0 4,319.1 4,356.1 4,417.0 4,979.1 5,171.3 5,820.4 5,759.7 12,369.7 By Expeditr aegory: Consumption 3,147.7 4,265.0 4,194.5 4,353.0 4,718.8 5,237.5 5,501.0 5,089.1 Compton Of popultion 2,748.1 3,723.0 3,664.5 3,785.9 4,118.8 4,628.2 4,872.7 4,447.3 social c _smtion 399.6 542.0 530.0 567.1 6W0.0 609.3 628.3 641.8 Invesunent (accumulation) 800.8 1,030.0 1,107.5 1,050.2 1,145.6 1,575.3 953.8 2,194.9 Pied ctph! 537.9 659.0 629.0 825.0 720.0 858.0 575.6 Changes in invetories and other 262.9 371.0 478.5 225.2 425.6 717.3 378.2 lAm and dIscepancy 46.0 75.0 78.1 78.2 79.7 78.5 109.8 93.2 Net aeports 427.5 -1,050.9 -1,024.0 -1,064.4 -965.0 -1,720.0 -744.2 -1,612.3 1 1980 is given in 1973 prices; 985-88 are in 1983 pries; 198992 are in the previous yearprices. 2t For 1992 includes maintenance of rads. Soure: State Statistial Agency. TANSE 26&s K8YRGZ REPUNLIC - NET MATERAL PRODUCT AT CONrANf PRICES - GROWTIH RATES On pseaIt 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 By ladustial Origin: Agdriuture incuding foresty 5.3 2.6 10.7 5.6 3.0 -21.2 -6.7 Agricuiture excluding forestry 5.3 2.6 10.8 5.6 3.0 -21.3 -6.6 Forestry 2.0 -2.0 -2.0 6.1 0.0 47.3 -54.3 industry, total -2.7 3.5 15.0 2.7 6.9 15.7 -26.1 Industy, other -4.2 3.2 17.9 3.7 10.0 22.2 -26.4 Contrucion 1.8 4.4 6.7 0.2 -1.7 -1.6 -25.0 Other 3.1 -9.2 9.4 8.2 3.2 -16.4 -23.2 Transportaton of goods 4.4 -3.0 11.3 -3.9 22.9 -35.4 -12.3 Mantenance of roads .. 60.3 11.8 9.6 -81.6 295.2 Comnmunication for materi producdon 11.4 10.2 9.3 8.0 8.4 -11.2 -11.2 Wholesade trade 6.6 0.0 -0.3 .. Retail trade and catering -0.2 -0.7 10.6 .. Materil supply 6.8 -5.4 -4.1 41.7 -18.1 -24.1 -26.1 Procurement 17.3 -5.8 5.9 -0.2 -0.3 -53.1 5.5 Information and computing services 52.9 25.2 8.2 15.2 -39.2 108.8 -7.0 Otr branches of mDaterial production -12.4 -71.3 36.7 21.2 -36.9 7.9 -5.1 Net Materil Product 0.9 1.4 12.7 4.5 4.8 -4.4 -16.9 By Expenditure Category: Consmption -1.7 3.8 8.4 9.1 0.5 -14.8 Consumption of population -1.6 3.3 8.8 10.2 0.4 -16.3 Socha consumption -2.2 7.0 5.8 1.7 1.6 -2.3 Invesment (acumulation) 7.5 -5.2 9.1 30.4 -43.1 63.1 Fixed capitad -4.6 31.2 -12.7 11.6 -40.4 Source: Table 2-6. TAWS 243b KYTRGZ REIUBIJC - NET MATERIAL PRODUCr - IMPLICIT PRICE DEFIATORS 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 By Industra Origin: Agrlcultureincludlngforesuy 146.8 110.7 109.4 112.2 109.9 111.8 109.0 329.6 921.5 Aglculture ecludingforesty 147.0 110.7 109.5 112.2 110.0 111.8 109.0 330.5 921.0 Forestzy 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 105.8 100.0 1729.7 Indutry. toa 86.7 97.6 92.8 95.8 91.0 104.2 98.0 194.5 1365.6 Indusry, other 84.6 96.4 90.5 94.9 87.6 104.5 94.4 207.7 1444.9 Contruction 96.2 101.1 99.2 98.4 101.6 103.5 109.1 150.6 1010.4 Other 109.7 102.1 103.3 98.2 103.5 105.3 106.2 333.0 1131.4 Tranxportaion of goods 95.6 91.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 110.4 99.8 199.0 1571.7 Maintenance of roads .. .. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Communication for matera production 2.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 131.7 514.7 Whleadetmde 117.1 94.4 92.6 88.3 13.9 8.7 8.5 27.7 93.4 R.iltraede,andcatting 110.0 95.9 104.6 92.0 114.9 .. Materia supply 100.0 107.6 122.1 97.2 116.7 72.2 147.2 411.4 1764.9 Procurement 148.8 140.4 81.7 115.4 104.3 125.2 71.5 335.6 831.1 Inforntion and computing service .. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.4 101.0 100.0 505.6 Otherbrmnchesofnmaerbalproducton 114.7 105.4 112.3 131.4 107.0 158.1 177.6 1135.7 981.8 Not Miatri Product 104.4 102.7 100.3 102.1 99.3 107.4 103.5 258.4 1107.3 By Exp$ditur Category: Consumption 104.8 98.9 100.1 100.8 101.7 104.5 108.6 195.0 CoasunMptionofpopulaion 105.3 98.8 100.2 101.0 102.0 104.9 109.1 196.4 Socia conmlption 101.2 100.0 99.8 99.6 99.9 101.5 104.6 185.5 Investmet (accumulation) 110.9 109.8 99.9 114.3 105.4 106.5 141.1 232.4 Fiuxd capital 100.5 107.4 103.5 108.7 106.8 112.6 123.0 Sorce.: Tables 2-5 and 2-6. TAM24C. KMlGIS 3UUllC - MT UIAL _ MOM= .RWWU RA2W CU3WILC DEWATOS On pPatna) 1986 197 198o I9 1990 1991 1992 By Iadustrw Origi: Agrlture ludlagferestry -1.1 2.5 42. tl.8 9.0 229.6 821.5 AgriolAre pdudqfor -1.1 2.5 -2.0 11.8 9.0 230.5 821.0 FOrry 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 S.8 0.0 1629.7 Ibdusty, totil .4.9 3.3 -5.0 4.2 -2.0 94.5 1265.6 Industy, atwe .6.1 4.9 -7.7 4.5 *5,6 107.7 1344.9 coutuctlon -1.9 .0.9 3.3 3.5 9.1 S0.6 910.4 Olher 1.2 -5.0 5.4 53 6.2 233.0 1031.4 TranVootaon of goods 9.8 0.0 0.0 10.4 -0.2 99.0 1471.7 Malntaanc. of . ..s CommnunixdAn for itwW produetbE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.7 414.7 Wolsiae tRde -1.9 .4.7 -84.3 -91.3 -91.5 -72.3 -6.6 Rete Uwe d cobig 9.0 -12.0 24.8 .. Maerial supply 13.5 -20.4 20.2 -27.8 47.2 311.4 1664.9 Pocumrment -41.8 41.4 -9.7 25.2 -28.5 235.6 731.1 jbfrmatbn and oiputing sw'ice. OA 0.0 0.0 40.6 1.0 0.0 405.6 Odkw bmncbmsofmaterilptedrodut 6.6 17.0 -18.6 58.1 77.6 1035.7 881.8 N.t matl Product 42.4 1.8 -2.7 7.4 3.5 158.4 1007.3 Dy B _editure Categoy: Consumption 1.2 0.7 0.9 4.5 8.6 95.0 ConaumptionofpopuLmton 1.4 0.8 0.9 4.9 9.1 96.4 Soeb coul pt-on .02 .0.2 03 1.5 4.6 85.S Inwestet (aocumutfieton) -9.1 14. 7.8 6.5 41.1 132.4 Fuxd captl -3.7 5.1 -1.8 12.6 23.0 Source: Tsbles 2-b. TABE 2-7# KYRGZ RE PUBLIC , DEPRZECLATIN BY SECI'OR AT CURRNT PMICES Win11n of nib"h) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Materia Spher 512 661 713 707 842 854 924 838 1,176 Agricuhure inuding forcesy 137 177 189 196 202 195 207 181 552 Agricultre exxluding furesy 136 176 188 196 200 194 206 179 543 Poresty 1 1 1 .. 2 1 1 2 9 Indubsty, tota 272 357 384 367 486 515 554 494 458 Industry, other 218 282 308 306 373 401 434 374 352 Contuction 54 75 76 61 113 114 120 120 106 Other, mate quphere 103 127 140 144 154 144 163 163 166 Tran>aiombnof goods 71 77 85 96 104 96 103 104 24 Mainatnanceofroads 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 65 Commniaons} 0efor dbsblro duoSion 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 Wholealetmade 15 23 26 27 26 26 31 30 45 Retail trade and caering .. .. Mattid asupply 7 12 12 7 7 7 13 9 14 Procurerent 6 6 6 5 4 3 4 4 1 Informationand o mpuing ssrices 3 4 2 3 2 2 3 - 3 Other branches of materil producion 1 1 1 3 4 4 6 12 Nonntderal Sphere 222 296 306 308 356 399 401 381 445 Trunsprtaion 25 41 36 32 40 42 44 43 23 Communication 8 10 10 I1 12 13 13 12 6 Housing 91 118 122 130 161 188 182 175 215 Publcutiiiesandperonads rvces 26 35 37 39 43 46 49 46 59 Health care, socil scurity, physicd aotu reand apors 20 24 29 24 25 28 31 29 43 Educaion 29 38 43 46 47 49 48 46 56 Culue and at 6 8 9 9 10 10 14 13 13 Sciene and scientific sences 7 9 9 5 5 10 8 7 4 Credit .. Insunance General adminisration and defene .. ... Private nonproft institutions saving households 10 13 11 12 13 13 12 10 26 Other,mamerilandnonmnaertalspherem 325 423 446 452 510 543 564 544 611 Totd Dqepeciadon 734 957 1,019 1,015 1,198 1,253 1,325 1,219 1,621 Sources: Stae Stisical Agency. TAUSL 2-l7As KURGZ RPUB5LIC - SECTOR SHURES OF DEPUECIATION On pmeao) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Materi Sphero 69.8 69.1 70.0 69.7 70.3 68.2 69.7 68.7 72.5 Agriuhr including foestry 18.7 18.5 18.5 19.3 16.9 15.6 15.6 14.8 34.1 Agriculhre excluding foestry 18.3 18.4 18.4 19.3 16.7 13.5 15.5 14.7 33.5 Poremy 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 Industry, total 37.1 37.3 37.7 36.2 40.6 41.1 41.8 40.5 28.3 ndustry, other 29.7 29.5 30.2 30.1 31.1 32.0 32.8 30.7 21.7 Consructon 7.4 7.8 7.5 6.0 9.4 9.1 9.1 9.8 6.5 Other, material e 14.0 13.3 13.7 14.2 12.9 11.5 12.3 13.4 10.2 Transoraon of goods 9.7 8.0 8.3 9.5 8.7 7.7 7.8 8.5 1.5 Mainl_ce of roads 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 4.0 Commmicatinfor Materialproduction 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 Wholesale tde 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 Ret trade and cin .. .. .. .. .. .. Merial aply 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.9 Procuremen 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 Infrmation and conVuting services 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 Odherbranchesofnmrral productim 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 6.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 Nonmnateri Sphere 30.2 30.9 30.0 30.3 29.7 31.8 30.3 31.3 27.5 Trnsotaton 3.4 4.3 3.5 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.5 1.4 Communication 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 Hosing 12.4 12.3 12.0 12.8 13.4 15.0 13.7 14.4 13.3 ublic utlDies and pesonal services 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.6 Health care, social seourty, physical culture and 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.7 Education 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.5 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.8 3.5 Culur and art 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.8 Science and scientific services 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.2 In.rance .. .. .. .. .. . General admanistation and defense .. .. .. .. .. .. Private nonprofit istions servinghouseholds 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.6 Other, material and nonmaterial spheres 44.3 44.2 43.8 44.5 42.6 43.3 42.6 44.6 37.7 Tota Dqreciation 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Table 2-7. TANLE 24&z KIRYL RZL * MPS/SNA CONVERSON - CONSUMPTON ATCUM= MCKS 1/ (Ml*s df nabls) 1910 1985 198 19S7 19S 1989 1990 1991 1992 C.auwskofoPq_moIm 3.9 3.678 3.671 3.04 420 4.1S 5.316 8.733 31u: Vdlw oI bnuI suven. 0"Ofi _hnuswquimwpurAud by bm&k) m7 949 984 1 1.4 1.207 1.411 1.794 to homubds andu _ d owwooaupId dw )p) d d de..fdw.U .. .. .. .. .. .. mlam bp fuilmforwvi durk__Vsva 45 a4 6 65 76 66 10 34 mini M".:wAmnt Wi1ogou muu1m1mmb.da Aveto1md1ivldu 634 73m 813 on2 m 943 t,10 2,007 g srhrdm from a .. .. .. .. .. .. m_Mm NOR-sltu smrim wed in uwIqhma t100 RO 118 132 121 O t163 323 F09: Fird qn-o tnma9 bUdu - _ huU_ b .. .. ... .. .... .ef.,dodmu1xul , spu ,Ids1muorAoyc s-ciIkh 12D U 145 181 IS3 235 287 611 on: _tloamm .. .. .. .. .. .. eV*_ _b Coaw-* 24pdlM VW 2.774 3.3 51 SAW 4AI2 4 5,16MOF 71 SIl cimSuMFMP dP4) 404 54 no 56 S19 618 657 1,132 ple: 3 l- d. bur ygw aml?.uIda amt u.nivliu 64 73 813 872 932 94 LI0 2ao7 plus: oostrAilmu dewon R n I)ffge-.. toe_ex e_ dfi he $as : Dl89rnd ao w ao URta vies OfMUm UMr 05 ndindqMdS .. .. .. .. .. ..... pun: D Hombem M iP s1Me c l.msuiI..sl ..A-ystebmu, .. .. .... minu: SNt suviom um ll_ald jm ,. .. .. .. .. . .. _ls O Sdu_ .. .. .. .. .. ..... api: Qw. umqOi Z uzKe PN 1,4 1.319 1.36 1,89 1.81 1.30 1,77 3.159 T~u c.udu. PWaA) 3,tll2 4,8 WI4 5fO1v91 94 4.23 413 1.6 1/ MP3=?.bh Produ5?S_;W SltA -Sysw NfhIIm Moun somn: Bus insdiAgecy TALt 24, KIRGYZ RBUUC - IwNColVEM- GRo DOMEI I4VKWIM AT CtRRmN cs i/nUllm11ndw) t110 low 1Sl 1 Io tlo9 19o0 A 191 1992 PudCa1dq Aucsq_M" 341 i0n 65s 8 70 96 708 531 h: Gcwnu..g_pafI n43 d mu. Xg Mw u e .. .. .. . .. .. . ... Om CO_M-a0gdq _ 134 gn7 1.019 1.01s 1,W18 1.2 1. 5$ 1.219 b- Wk-IPf"No t- u0w R I i w -*. deu. poo.u.e) 17 42 2 .30 .24 III 31A il. pO DU_1m -8 emu B=d_ def*nmniibl bairn u,ud lb. ommy ab.udO a.pma I blah c .. .. .. .. .. .. ..... aa a: w-mlamB3dEguuosud mod po Trmw 00 vi MV to wwgo at> e aIz tbu_gs .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. lbr lmimfiedumde _ 46 7S 75 86 S7 Ss 1" 9 . ad WukIaps .. . . .. .. .. . . . I f d t) 17 42 0 _ ^ginubMi m Ot=0w 348 423 455 3" 4d9 711 ds 3,20 udm r4eywm1udmadgd wimuma d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. o8lft do4=.Poad.e") 17 42 12 -3D -24 III W0 sit -:M Notmeinoitotom =a adw a" r .gw1: Cma.bOW A) 330 i1 28 34 40 SSD 534 2.20 GmD_om b I_#atmOINA) 1,4 2.10 SIM 3S1 2.493 3 01592 5.. Swom SaMafazhl FkoAIcISyaWna 8NAin8yu.m~~tNuIkau1Moimffls. 11i bat. 3a*alAgoa_ TAIL.2 24wa KYRGVZBU DLKC -MF81A CONVI - W 000lFGOO (HDVACTOR .SIRV:iAT CU4RIUC (_ll-ofgwbh*) 19 198 96 (96 196 198 199 199 1 Expadaw ..ocds ..d Miadul 8v,Iu. 098) 212n1 293 295 2499 a" w - ammnnoo I-b p- Cwi ^ _mpukm ea usI _hweai e** _Wuis bei i1shcsb dm* gi: OkCP .£U9b Id utit by beahil uamu: Sal abuil * bmaexbo.1u GWauid*Lo of goabUulwt us " ne to borde of de am" m U as ofgoo n wubu. Odr *0= e9l: Mpwia4fGoo n NmnSaor N_ bS OWA) ..I_af do oio sa .Mea ..im . . M7s 4296 423 68 ?t1 gin: hopmtUCn .tlnb4otll ON. .. a _- Ceunxe wpaes oatdqs in ed cq*alf.tmUatby eomeeteaui boil. pio: Denci I Arad by asMab =A glb _elvd Am shrad by- . .. h ad: Pad_1 oUlW by an ema1taoaoo , goods t muousr _ U bad.rof U.ouall7 aWAlla goods do mUed U.crsrau .. . . .. .. .. . . . glue: OU.t4mm equl: _dpb of Goo&bm4Nb w&B5iN0) _e* dm - MI NtE_b GNFS GM) . . . . . . Z. I/ MPS-M Iatr Prdus 3yl ; SNA-SystemofNtlorA Aoa. Samo: 54lcSt.t Agency. TABLE 2W: XNGYZ RIPUDUC * GROSS SOCIAL PRODUCT AT CURE RCES 19S0 1M85 1986 19S7 1988 199 1990 199l 1992 (milhlio of rubles) Ariwuue Incuding foin7 1,920.1 2,755.0 2,944.3 3,0313 3,142.3 3,466.4 3$53.0 8,651.3 72,660.8 Ag8uturewcudiag foresoty 1,916.4 2,748.6 2,937.9 3,024.9 3,135.7 3,459.0 3,844.8 8,639.6 72,575.0 Fo1ety 3.7 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.6 7.4 8.2 11.7 85.8 dury, total 5,494.0 7,368. 7,399.5 7,376.1 7,996.3 8,395.0 8,402.7 17,138.1 133,181.3 bdustry, other 4,672.8 6,155.7 6,183.8 6,306.6 6,633.3 7,034.6 6,945.7 15,061.0 118,494.3 Conuction 821.2 1,212.8 1,215.7 1,69.5 1,363.0 1,360.4 1,457.0 2,077.1 14,687.0 Other 992.4 917.7 938.3 879.2 979.7 1,092.3 1,160.0 3,542.0 37,435.9 Tr_oRtaln of goods 203.7 239.6 276.2 273.0 287.3 296.9 341.9 555.0 11,887.6 Maintentae of r .. 82.8 63.4 71.4 85.5 87.6 68.6 S2.3 91.0 Coa nation for mateal production 10.6 16.1 17.3 18.8 20.1 22.0 23.4 36.8 145.2 Wholesaletbade 26.2 33.6 34.3 34.1 10.0 35.1 38.1 45.6 412.4 Reil trade and catern 252.8 2882 306.0 291.1 376.4 394.8 441.1 1,022.8 5,570.7 Materialy 49.1 65.8 74.8 62.7 70.6 72.3 88.0 823.0 10,731.7 Prourammnt 57.2 70.3 49.1 61.8 58.8 73.8 52.4 81.6 796.0 I&mationandco _ung vioe .. 17.1 17.3 21.1 23.3 26.1 17.1 16.9 140.1 O-e bches of mtla psodcton 392.8 104.2 99.9 45.2 47.7 83.7 89.4 858.0 7,661.2 OrmsSocial PrSdc 8,406.5 11,0412 11,282.1 11,486.6 12,118.3 12,953.7 13,415.7 29,331.4 243,278.0 erentge Shas of Gross Social Product) Agulture including forsty 22.8 25.0 26.1 26.4 25.9 26.8 28.7 29.5 29.9 Agriculture acuding fiOty 22.8 24.9 26.0 26.3 25.9 26.7 28.7 29.5 29.8 Foesty 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 idusty, to 65.4 66.7 65.6 66.0 66.0 64.8 62.6 58.4 54.7 Industry, ehe 55.6 55.8 54.8 54.9 54.7 54.3 51.8 51.3 48.7 Constuti_ 9.8 11.0 10.8 11.1 112 10.5 10.9 7.1 6.0 Odwr 11.8 8.3 8.3 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.6 12.1 15.4 tapottatio of goods 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.A 2.4 2.3 2.5 1.9 4.9 Mainfeaoc Of raoas 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.0 Cofmmiottsefor eUrid prduction 0.1 0.1 02 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 Wholean trade 0.3 0.3 03 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 Rcil ttsde and catedzg 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.3 3.5 2.3 Mat supply 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 2.8 4.4 Procuremnt 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 Infonntioandcompoft svices 0.0 0.2 02 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 Other breahes of material production 4.7 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 2.9 3.1 o Social Product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Soures: State Sttidi Agency. TAULE. 214h KVRGYZ REPUBIUC . MATERUL INPUf BY SECITR AT CURRENT PRICES 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 (mtillions of rubles) Agiculture including forestry 790.5 1,101.1 1,222A 1,2205 1,177.3 1,146.4 1,248.3 1,885.8 14,491.8 Agriulture excluding forestry 789.4 1,099.7 1,221.1 1,219.1 1,175.6 1,144.2 1,245.6 1,882.2 14,470.0 Forest1 y 1.1 IA 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.6 21.8 Industry, total 3,703.2 5,189.1 5,3835 5,420.7 5,641.8 5,874.6 5,7635 11,200.7 73,298.0 hdustry, other 3,2475 4,544.0 4,734.8 4,737.8 4,925.8 5,1855 5,026.5 10,190.3 66,695.3 Construction 455.7 645.1 648.7 682.9 716.0 689.1 737.0 1,010.4 6,602.7 Other 1905 3135 308.3 335.8 352.9 378.3 377A 1,364.7 185155 Transportation of goods 95.0 108.6 126.0 127.3 125.1 124.9 130.9 283.7 8,1485 Maintenance of roads .. 69.9 57.6 62.1 75.1 76.2 665 74.0 82.6 Communication servicing material productio 2.8 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.8 5.3 SA 9A 40.2 Wholesale trade 3.6 4.8 4.2 SA 55 7.8 7.9 73 36.9 Retal trade and catering 52.0 69.1 67.7 82.8 88.8 98.1 105.3 297.0 1,843.7 Mlateial supply 9.8 13A 11.3 14.9 15.5 15.9 20.0 610.7 7,962.6 Procurement 15.4 16.8 12.6 13.2 12.3 15.7 11.0 165 225.0 lIformaton and computing services .. 10.1 6.6 7.7 8.8 95 6.9 1S.6 40.0 Other branches of mateial production 11.9 16.1 17.7 17.6 17.0 24.9 23.5 50.5 136.0 Total Material Input 4,684.2 6,603.7 6,914.2 6,977.0 7,172.0 7,399.3 7,389.2 14,451.2 106,305.3 (Percentage Shares of Total Material Input) Agriculture nltuding forestry 16.9 16.7 17.7 175 16.4 155 16.9 13.0 13.6 Aricuture excluding forestry 16.9 16.7 17.7 175 16.4 155 16.9 13.0 13.6 Foty 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Industry, total 79.1 78.6 77.9 77.7 78.7 79A 78.0 775 69.0 Industry, other 69.3 68.8 68.5 67.9 68.7 70.1 68.0 705 62.7 construction 9.7 9.8 9A 9.8 10.0 9.3 10.0 7.0 6.2 Other 4.1 4.7 45 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.1 9.4 17.4 Trasportation of goods 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 7.7 Maintenance of roads .. 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 05 0.1 Communication servicing material productio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 Wholesae trade 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 Retail trade and catering 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 IA 2.1 1.7 Material supply 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 4.2 75 Procurement 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 Information and computing services .. 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 Other branches of material production 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 03 0.3 0.3 0.1 Total Material Input 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: State Statistical Agency. TABLE 3-L KYRGYVZ REPUBLIC - CONSOLIDATED BILANCE OF PAYMENTS (mlions of SUS) 1992 1993 Export (f.o.b.) 2843 326.6 Impot,s (c.i.f.) 395.7 519.9 Trade Balance -110.9 -193.3 Non-Factor Services -235.0 -166.0 Resource Balance 234.0 . -43.0 Net Factor Serices -3.8 10.5 Recelpts 0.0 12.0 Payments 3.8 1.5 Interest Payments 0.0 1.5 Other Payments 3.8 0.0 Net Current Transfers 14.5 28.1 Current Account Balance -100.2 -154.7 Not Direct Investment 0.0 10.0 Net LongTerm Credits -1.7 56.6 Disbursements 5.3 66.1 Repayments 7.0 9S5 Capital N.EMI. 0.0 0.0 Capital Account Balance -1.7 66.6 Errors and Omissions and Short Term Capi -455 -12.9 Overall Balance -147.4 -101.0 Change in Net Foreign Assets 147.4 101.0 Change in NtReserves 1/ 0.0 16.0 Gross Reserves 1/ 0.0 45.7 IMY Credit 0.0 61.7 FSU Correspondent Accounts 147.4 85.0 1/ Assets include gold and converible foreign exohange balances, and US T-bills. Liabilites exclude IMF. Source: Kyrgyz authonties and staff estimates. TAKlE 3-2: KYRGYZ RPUJBLIC - NlK F3FREIGN EXC3ANGE AUCTIONS 1993 Amounts Rates Date Sold Offezed Bid Clearing Max Min (thousands of $US) (SoMI$US) May to Date 49,264.4 May 17 2,074.0 2,500.0 3,002.0 4.00 5.20 4.00 May 26 2,481.0 5,000.0 2,481.0 3.80 5.20 3.80 June 2 1,355.0 1,000.0 1,456.0 4.10 4.75 3.90 June 9 2,007.0 1,500.0 2,104.0 4.30 4.70 4.10 June 16 2,720.0 2,000.0 3,010.0 4.35 5.00 4.30 June 23 2,050.0 1,800.0 2,050.0 4.35 4.40 4.35 June 30 2,838.0 1,500.0 2,888.0 4.30 4.70 4.20 July 7 3,501.0 1,500.0 4,401.0 4.40 5.10 4.30 July 14 3,080.0 2,000.0 3,080.0 4.60 4.90 4.60 July 17 1,500.0 1,500.0 2,925.0 4.90 5.00 - 4.65 August 12 1,367.7 1,300.0 2,473.1 5.90 7.00 5.50 August 18 1,183.0 1,900.0 1,183.0 5.90 7.50 5.90 Aug"st25 1,868.0 1,900.0 1,868.0 5.90 7.50 5.90 September 3 836.0 1,200.0 836.0 5.90 7.20 6.20 SepWmber 8 711.0 1,200.0 710.8 5.90 6.50 6.30 Sptoember 15 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,014.0 6.30 7.30 6.30 Senptmber 22 1,500.0 1,500.0 2,217.0 6.50 7.30 6.30 September 29 756.0 2,000.0 756.0 6.50 7.00 6.50 October 6 1,668.0 2,000.0 1,668.0 6.70 7.25 6.70 October 13 2,000.0 2,000.0 2,613.0 7.10 7.80 6.70 October 20 2,000.0 2,000.0 4,134.5 7.65 8.40 7.10 October 27 1,998.0 2,000.0 1,998.0 7.65 8.50 7.65 November 3 2,000.0 2,000.0 2,381.3 7.70 8.60 7.65 November 10 4,000.0 4,000.0 5,335.4 8.20 9.10 7.70 November 17 1,595.7 2,000.0 1,595.7 8.10 9.50 8.10 November24 1,175.0 2,000.0 1,275.0 8.05 9.30 8.10 December 1 1,179.9 2,000.0 1,179.9 8.05 8.50 8.05 December 8 891.0 2,000.0 891.0 8.05 8.50 8.05 December 15 705.6 2,000.0 705.6 8.04 8.70 8.04 December 22 705.6 2,000.0 705.6 8.04 8.70 8.04 December 29 705.6 2,000.0 705.6 8.04 8.70 8.04 Soutce: National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic. TAKR 3-Is KTRGnYZ RtUBUC -TOTAL XPORT BY COMAOPOIT GROUPS AT DOMiEIC ICES OiMO of cana* zuIg) - Inopublbo - Extreubtc - ToWi T%"e 1987 1988 1919 1990 1991 1992 19S7 1911 1919 1990 1991 1992 1917 1M 19S 9 1990 1991 1992 INDUSTRY 2.150.1 2,423.9 2,433.0 2,340.0 6,311.3 45,44S.4 32.2 47.5 45.2 47.9 27.0 6,393.1 2,162.3 2,471.4 2,478.2 2,3S7.9 6.33S.3 51,831.5 POWER 42.0 78.1 80.2 67.1 186.4 3,046.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.0 78.1 80.2 67.1 181.4 3,046.9 OILAND GAS 11.1 11.4 11.0 9.8 29.4 238.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 11.4 11.0 9.S 29.4 238.9 COAL 20.1 21.6 22.4 21.9 14.3 1,012.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.1 21.6 22.4 21.9 14.3 1.012.5 OTIER FUEL .. .. L. FERROUS METALLURGY 5.8 8.2 8.5 1.1 11.8 18.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.6 0.0 339.9 5.8 8.2 10.5 7.7 1i.8 528.2 NON-FERROUS METALLURGY 122.2 128.6 124.1 144.7 491.6 2,208.2 10.2 17.0 17.8 19.2 7.7 3,454.3 132.4 145.6 141.9 163.9 499.3 5,662.5 CHMCAL AND PETROLEUM 23.2 24.7 24.3 23.0 217.7 667.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4 272.7 23.2 24.7 24.3 23.6 218.1 940.0 MACHNRY AND METAL WORKS 663.1 938.8 945.9 881.7 2,009.5 20,946.7 10.6 10.9 5.1 10.9 8.0 558.5 673.7 949.7 951.0 892.6 2,017.5 21,505.2 SAWML AND LUMBER INDUSTRY 4.7 4.5 4.5 3.5 17.2 301.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 185.2 4.7 4.5 4.5 3.5 24.5 486.3 BUILDING MATERIALS 19.2 12.7 16.7 13.1 66.9 1,445.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 10.3 19.2 12.7 17.1 13.1 67.2 1.455.5 UGHTINDUSTRY 653.S 650.8 650.1 639.7 1,898.2 11,294.7 3.3 13.8 10.0 5.6 2.9 1,414.0 657.1 664.6 660.1 648.3 1,901.1 12,708.7 IOOD PRODUCTION 570.4 521.1 519.0 507.8 1,316.6 3,575.3 8.1 5.S 9.9 7.9 0.4 146.1 578.S 526.9 528.9 515.7 1.31.0 3.72t.4 OTNRINDUSrRlIS 14.5 23.4 26.3 20.6 49.7 523.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.1 14.5 23.4 26.3 20.7 49.7 525A AGRCULTURE 113.5 107.7 95.7 8.A 162.3 791.S 23.1 11.1 5.9 4.9 2.8 32.9 136.6 118.8 101.6 92.3 185.1 824.7 OTERMATRIUALPRODUCnION 5.0 5.2 20.3 IS1 11.9 60.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 11.1 45.4 5.0 5.2 20.4 18.6 23.0 106.2 TOTAL 2,268.6 2,536.S 2,549.0 2.445.9 6,505.5 46,301.0 55.3 S8.6 51.2 52.9 40.9 6,461A 2,323.9 2,595.4 2,600.2 2.49S.8 6,546.4 52,762A o m: Shwt to Tolal Ttido 97.6 97.7 98.0 97.9 99.4 87.8 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.1 0.6 12.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Smmr:S So Stat Ato. TARLE 34 KICtGYZ REUBUC - TOTYAL DIPORTS BY CoMOMlY GROUPS AT DOMiIC MlCES Ms of rabt l-) - bknvdil- - Extfbc - -Tota Trnde 1987 198S 1989 1990 1991 1992 1987 19S8 1989 1990 1991 1992 1987 198 19S9 1990 1991 1992 INDUSTRY 2.705.3 2,900.1 3,183.3 2,910.1 5.178.7 63.59S.1 698.9 710.1 83.S 982.8 1,132.4 2,687.1 3.404.2 3,610.2 4,021.8 3.83.5 6,311.1 66,2S2.2 POWER 35.6 29.9 28.6 33.8 37.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.6 29.9 28.6 33.8 37.1 0.0 OIL AND GAS 291.9 314.3 324.6 268.6 5m.0 19,654.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 291.9 314.3 324.6 268.6 57.0 19,654.3 COAL 41.6 31.4 32.2 38.1 34.6 2*137.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.6 31.4 32.2 38.1 84.6 2,137.1 FRROS MEALLURGY 167.6 187.3 167.8 167.2 1)2.2 4,279.8 9.0 7.6 5.0 3.3 10.6 5.6 176.6 194.9 172.8 170.5 302.8 4,285.4 NON-FElRRUS MWALLURGY 72.9 87.4 91.2 96.1 273 2,505.8 1.7 1.2 8.0 1.4 5.9 3.2 74.6 88.6 99.2 97.5 283.2 2,509.0 CHUMCALANDPEMROLEUM 311.8 33S.6 349.2 323.0 566.1 7,216.2 30.0 19.7 60.0 50.S 43.8 530.5 341.8 35S.3 409.2 3735 609.9 7,746.7 MACHU=R AND MEAL WORIS 743.1 948.8 1,019.5 879.2 1,183.9 16,810.5 30.4 42.2 69.9 106.1 87.7 211.6 773.S 991.0 1.089A 985.3 1,271.6 17,022.1 SAWVML AND LUMM DU STRY t17.9 107.1 128.7 114.3 175.8 2,035.7 15.1 15.2 7.6 15.3 24.7 25.1 133.0 122.3 136.3 129.6 200.5 2,060.8 BUaOMATSRALu 58.4 64.6 67.0 6.3 80.6 735.9 3.4 3.5 4.5 11.1 3.9 1.8 61.8 68.1 71.5 60.4 S4.5 737.7 UlBTINDWUSRY 527.7 470.9 559.8 601.9 1,238.4 4,500.5 262.5 271.4 334.9 364.3 275.2 670.1 790.2 742.3 894.7 966.2 1,513.6 5,170.6 POOP PRODUCTION 287.0 263.5 344.2 247.9 435.9 3,046.5 345.7 3483 347.8 415.1 644.1 1,200.3 632.1 611.8 692.0 663.0 1,080.0 4,246.8 Oa WDUSTRID 49.8 56.3 70.5 713 228.8 672.3 1.1 1.0 0.8 15.7 36.5 38.9 50.9 57.3 71.3 87.0 265.3 711.7 AGRICUUTIUS 6t.6 64.5 88.1 167.1 60J.5 3,707.8 23.9 62.9 95.3 79.9 241.6 477.4 92.5 127.4 183.4 247.0 422.1 4,185.2 ONIU1LATERALPWRWC1N 7.0 7.2 90.2 101.6 49.6 103.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.1 7.0 7.2 90.8 102.2 49.6 103.7 TOTAL 2,780.9 2,971.8 3,361.6 3,179.4 5,406.8 67.406. 722.8 m.0 934.4 1.063.3 1374.0 3,164.6 3,503.1 3,744.8 4,296.0 4,242.7 6.782.8 70,571.1 Slam to ToWal 2T 79.4 79.4 78.2 74.9 79.7 95.5 20.6 20.6 21.8 25.1 203 4.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Sam=: Sim Staw A y. TYAN34& 111Z1I WVUUC -UfO0Rt:5BAWIN CCSYNONT GIROUWSA ADOM _C ISi 0EMu.tam - -Uuro1- --mA& T- - OWl Timb 1937 1961 1969 1990 1991 1987 191 1969 1990 1991 1972 1992 1966 199 1990 1991 1992 INDUSTRY -5552 -476.2 -7503 47.7 1.132.6 -18,146.7 466.7 -60.6 -733 934.9 -1,105.4 3,696.0 .1,221.9 -1.138 -1..6 -10.6 27.2 -440.7 PIWXDt 6.4 48.2 51.6 33.3 1513 3,046.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4 48.2 St.6 333 1513 3,046.9 ILAND GAS -230.8 -39 -3.6 -2.1. -46.6 -19,415.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -280. 40. -313.6 -25.6 4.6 -19,4154 CAL -21. -9. -9. -16.2 -73 4,12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -94 -9.8 -16.2 -703 -I,124.6 IS Y1W8AU.U3 -461. -179.1 -193 .1601 -230.4 *4,09.5 -9.0 -7.6 4.0 -2.7 -10.6 3343 -17.1 4186.7 -1623 -162 -291.0 -3,7572 MPMMINUS ba IrALW1 493 41.2 32.9 4t.6 2t43 -297.6 8i 15. 9.1 17.1 1.1 3,451.1 57.8 57.0 42.7 66A 216.1 3153.5 CI5CAL ANWD MBLUM -238.6 -313.9 -324.9 -300.0 -346.4 4548.9 -30.0 -19.7 -60.0 .49.9 *43.4 .257.1 -31.6 433.6 484.9 -49.9 -91.8 4,806.7 lQ llAND M WOLS 40.0 -10.0 -73.6 2.5 U.6 4,136.2 -19.8 -31.3 448 -"9.2 -79.7 346.9 .49.1 ^413 *138.4 -92.7 745.9 4,483.1 SAYIMLAND IEUl uIDUSTtr -113.2 -102.6 -124.2 -110. -158.6 -1,734.6 -5.1 -15.2 -7.6 -1S.3 -17.4 160.1 -128t -117.6 -131.1 -126.1 -176.0 -1574.5 BNlDDINOM&TBU -39.2 -S1.9 40.3 -2 -13,7 7093 -3.4 -3J S 4.1 -11.1 -3.6 1. 426 A5544.4 4 67.3 -17.3 717 IURT INWDUS 126.1 179.9 903 378 6598 6.794.2 -259.2 -257.6 -324.9 -55.7 -272.3 743.9 -t33.1 -77.7 -234.6 -317.9 3t7.5 7,58.1 FOOD PRDCIR 283.4 257.6 174.6 259.9 630.7 52.8 -337.6 -. -337.9 407.2 643.7 -1,054.2 -54.2 84.9 -163.1 -147J.3 237.0 -525.4 OlTEUDDUSTUU -353 -2.9 44.2 -50.7 -179.1 -149S -1.1 -1.0 -0.8 -15.6 -36. -36.S -36* -33.9 45.0 -63 -215.6 -1863 AGNICUI3TUE 44.9 43.2 7.6 -79.7 18 -2,9t6.0 0.8 -S1B 49.4 -75.0 -238. -444.5 44.1 4.6 41.8 -154.7 -237.0 -3.30. OSIEMMTUhALPDUCTlON -2.0 -2.0 -9.9 43.1 -37.7 .42.8 0.0 0.0 -OS -O0S 11.1 45.3 -2.0 -2.0 -70.4 -8:.6 -26.6 2.5 TOTAL -12.3 435.0 412.6 -733S 1,096.7 -21,105. 467. -714.4 -883.2 -1,010.4 -1,333.1 3,296.8 -1,179.8 -1.149.4 -1,695.8 -1,743.9 -236.4 -17,806.7 Urn:8 b .. Yoal Taldo 43.4 37.8 47.9 42.1 463.9 I1. 56.6 62 S2.1 57.9 53.9 -11.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Saucs: Tabl. 3-3 .. 3.4. TAMZS34a KVRI2Z IMVDUC - GUOG3AI3CAM =1517ON OF XTnARm'J3UUC TRAIN AT DOMNIC rmc (mmk mMs -EXPORTS- -IMPORTS-- 93 1938 1969 1990 1991 1992 1937 1968 1989 1990 1991 1992 TOTAL TRADRE 55. 516 512 52.9 40.6 6,461.4 722.8 177.0 934.4 1.063.3 1,37335 3,164.6 INDUSTRIAL COUNTriES . . . . 26.9 3,521.2 . . . Auatr . . .. . 0.1 0.6 . . . SmIium . . . .. 0.1 151.0 . . . Prince .. .. .. .. .. ~~~~~~~~~ ~~597.0 . . . Gumy.. .. .. . 1.7 145.3 . . . h* 0.1 26~~~~~~~~~.4 . .. SWude . .. . .. 0.0 249.1 . .. . UW%SdKiqdom .. . . . . 872.4 . . . Unh3edSta.. .. .. 9.1 413S.S. . DIVELOPISNO CUNTPJIS . . . .. 9.1 2,6962 . . . Asia . .. . .. 3.7 1I83.. .. . ~ia" Ripb*s Rep. 3. . . . .0 9228m . . Rom ~~~~~~~~~~~7.1 . . . RKora Dem. PeqiS Rep. sea . .. . 6.2, . . wool"I . .. . .. 0.7 17.6 . . . VietNam .. . . . .o 0.0 . . . Euope .. . . . . 299.3 . . . Rilgaia. . . . 035 49.1 . . . Gudedovakia . . . . . 28.2 . . leamobs. . . . . 0.3 . . LYdApaslala . .. . . 0.0 9.2 . .. . FMdI 0a . .. . . si24 . . . wuNNow MAlld ma do nor add up to doN bearns aft~ ane do= a.foomplellrqgoods 61W ewmto to gaodudm pfloo4 eupoada a/albotm Onuus NwZ ui e, nebu.sItg. I/Ji ban" CAM ad U. eJlnbdubaUieank6ima. JrM gm. uwe lAmes Ow.O Sag t* l W Aia. UnBin heBls ~Ye.m. Rep at sources:&ew Sds" Agaw. (Pmasp2oUmamToTrM0 -EXPORTS- -IMPORTS- 1to7 193 1969 199 199 1991 1961 1968 1989 1990 1991 1992 TOT AL TR ADE*" 100.0 168.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 INDUSTMALCOUNTRIES ~~~66.2 54.54 . . AaSuI . . . . 0.2 0.0 . . . Bdigu . .. . 0.2 2.5. . . Doommut 0.0 0.0 0ermuY . . . . 4.2 2.2 . . . hlmSn ..0 . . .0 0.0 . . . hay . .. . .. 0.2 OA . . . Nedwkbfted . . . 0.0 0.0 . . . N4Wq . . . . 0.0 0.0 . . . Spain 0. . . . .0 o.o . .. . Sale"e . . . .. 0.1 4.2. . . 9wbnmled .. . . . .0 ISA . . . Un"dKiciqdoa . . . . 0.0 153 . . Uniteds 22e.. . . 4 * 0.7 . . . DEVELCOMCOUNrDU 2CEIS . 22A4 41.7 . . . Aska. . . . 9.1 25.2 . . . AtbhMJsa . . . . 0.0 0.2 . . . Ole.. Nwoeh' Eq. 7. . . . A 14.5. . . Taft Nm. . . . 0.0 0. . . . KOM ~~~~ ~~~~~0.0 0.0 . .. . N-.Dem1mft .. , .PAP 0.0 GA.... . Poise1d ..V . . . 0.23. .. . Ritanmi . . . . 0.0 0.0 . . . YuOswl . . . . 0.0 0.1 . .. . COduebod/W . . . . 0.0 0.04. .. . Roils 0. . . . .2 0.OA . . Tod"s,. . . 0.0 0.0 . . . Yugod-b ~~~ ~~~~OA 0.0 . .. . Tzqsb . . . . 0.0 0.0 . . . Cubwa 2. . . . .0 0.0 . . . SyilmAjbiul . . . 0.0 0.0 . . 011usd .. . . . 69 11.9 . . . e.*Nnw Agd teinus4 oat addup tofrigi he ctSwaalsowaweud.w ukdq iegoods 1yd to tar Imwb ~ImS ahO I sIat de 01usd. Nw Zes1mS Momu. Lnateumb , md P=Wd. bIIsia qrpum Sdo I diaod Dohlum, b*m, linbe. lauwd' LebAim OMIaM. Qa. S" lAttaUb, ad Aset&nbmm aed Yeum. Rep at. Smu- T?n 354. TABtE 34s KVRGUf RI'DUUC - GEOGRAPHCAL DISTRIDtION OF EX1RAREMBLIC TRADE (zntlfes of uavest U.8. dab.) -EXPORTS-----IMPORTS- 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 TOTAL TRADE .. . . . . 76.6 .. . . . . 70.5 INDUSTRIAL COUNTRMES .. . . . . 35.1 .. . . . . 35.8 Regium .. . . . . 0.3 . . . pIw1dS. . . . 0.2 .. . . . 0.3 Ffanm. . . . . 6.8 . . . . . . OenMiY . . . . . 5.9 . . . hceand . . . . . .. * . Japn.. . . . . 2.7 .. . . .. 0.2 Sweden .. . . . . 1.3 . . . . 0.0 Swibatatl . . . .. 4.1 . . . UnIitedKb,domu. . . . . 11.6 .. . . .. 3.2 UAW eStaftea. . . . . .. . . . . 23.1 Odmessa . . . . . 0.3 . . . DEVELOPING COUNTRIBS .. . . . . 41.5 .. . . . . 34.6 Asia .. . , . . 32.3 .. . . . . 17.4 ftanhudln .. . . . . 0.0 .. . . . . 0.0 Chia, Pcopea Rep. .. . . . . 28.0 .. . . . . 16.3 Kome . , . . . 0.0 .. . . . . 0.1 Korea Dot.. Paqipe Rep. .. . . . . 3.4 .. . . . . 0.3 Mongsl . . . .. . 0.2 . . . Europe . . . . 3.6 .. . . . . 11.9 Bulgaria . . . . . 0.4 .. . . . . 1.2 Cfdwa1ovakla. . . . 0.3 .. . . . . 3.3 f-lagy .. . . . . 0.0 .. . . . . 3.1 Poiwid .. . . . . 0.3 .. . . . . 0.2 Tuer 1 . . . . 1.8 . . . . . 3.4 Yugodlva.. . . . . 0.7 . . . Latin Amsedosaid C*rl,a . . . . . . . . . MMiddl BEat S. . . . . 56 .. . . . . .4 Syrian Azab Republc . . . . . .. . Odwsera/. . . . . 5.6 .. . . . . 5.4 at lauehae Cued-a New 7ZAlm. Grmeee Luanaboug. aid Portuga. bIUdate Cyprus mid MaIlta ci lnrS.dea Bahwln. han, Jrdan. Kuwait, Labamne. Oman. Qatar Snai Azahia. Unirad Amb Emwhan. andl yemen, Rep. of. Source: Sutat Swaialsce Agenc. ~~~~~g R E ° ° ° °: X °, ° °° g e--g l q ° ° t ° 2 ° 3a°n -1 ° q q : : ° -i: - o 5 ° 6 ° % .oO~~*ooooovQ600 o0 Mc> q; o ~ooo~ -4#~0e -Oo co S I | . .1 1 0~~~~~~~ . .i ... . . . . . . . . . . i swtt6q330oo3:eto; j:°n3 tZZot°2 .1o I I] F ll 2]S}gii0l iisX0l|1]} 10l1t*l1 TABLE 3-7t KVRGYZ JZIUUC - GBOGRAM1CAL DXSThIWUNOF CFDIRffI3UC TRADE AT DOMMIIC MUCU EXPORTS- IMPORTS-- 1987 198 1989 198 1981 199 198 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 TOTAL TRADE 2.26.6 .. . . ."A5 46.501 17889 .. .. 5,406.0 67.407.0 Anmha 30.4 .. . . 98.2 309.9 $553 .. . . 45.3 "5. Awm1jm 33.7 INA... 11. 399 4*A .. . . 0 327.A 8.hum 320.2 .. .. . 95 I.W85 120.1 .. . . 05 LOW3. E.tmha 12.9 .. . . 29.4 loss 30.6 .. .. 20.3 80.6 (Ieoig 2.5 a.s... 3 191A 84.* .. . . 2.6 300.6 KSMUMM 1~~93.8 Sol. . 8. 30,38.3 249.9 .. . . 7.6 35*673.1 LAatv l09 . . .. 13. 124* 2.2. .. 43. 153.2 1*hmiIs ~~~~ ~ ~~77.1 .. . . 268. 680. 48.9 .. . . 6.3 215.7 Mc4omm 22. 56. 26.3 as W.8 8*0 Rum! 98. 28163 18496.7 3,58.9 2,6183 33.047.2 T*41m- 109 . . . 274.7 646.9 du. .. ... 8. 461.7 TwhunIsma 998 . .. . 278.1 1,126, 4* . ... 1093 4,050.4 1Jim3zm 253.2 SW. . 8. 8SAM. 297.6 .. . . 89.3 5.48.! uz1zsMa= 578.9 .. . . 718. VW943 23. .. . . 17.1 6.1363 TOTAtL TRADE 100 . . . 100. 100*O 100.0 .. . . 100*0 100* Anmh 1.3 .. . . .5 0.2 2.0. ... 0*8 0.1 AzubaI'pn 3.5 .. .. .. 1.8I 0.9 1... .. . 1.5 0.5 n.h.. 5.3 .. . . 3.2 3*0 4.6 . .. 4.1 1.3 Bimb.! 0.6 .. . . 0.5 0.2 0. 0.4... G 0* Goofh 1.3 .. . . 1.2 0.4 3*.. .. 1.5 O.4 KmhImmn ~~~~ ~~~8.5 .. . . 330 32.4 9* . .. . 14A4 253 L1I.MIn! IA .. . . 4* 1.5 is la.... 1 0.3 Ih&hu 1*0 .. . . 09 0*16 . .. 1.2 0.5 Rius!. 4~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~.0 .. . . 43.3 39.1 so* .. .. ..4 49*0 T*mksb 4* . . 4.2 3.4 2.5 .. . ..5 0.7 Twimmoldw ~3.1 .. . . 43 2.4 1.53 . . 20 6.1 uk.!1. 13.2 .. . . 9.2 17.3 10.7 .. .. 7.2 8.1 Usb.Misla 16.7 .. .. . 11 10.4 10.4 .. . . 15.1 9.1 Saw=&Bo &gadAey. TABLE 5-1: KYRGYZ REPUBLIC - GENERAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET REVENUE AND GPANTS 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 (billions of rubles) (millions of soms) Tax revenue 1.76 1.83 2.13 2.18 2.66 22.36 721.30 Taxes on goods and services 0.86 0.92 1.15 1.17 1.47 10.44 345.60 Turnover tax 0.86 0.92 1.15 1.17 1.17 .. 40.30 Value-added tax .. .. .. .. 0.30 7.65 233.50 Excise taxes .. .. .. .. .. 2.79 71.80 Taxes on income and profit 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.56 1.03 10.47 300.20 Enterprise profits taxes 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.36 0.65 7.78 228.60 Personal income taxes 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.20 0.38 2.69 71.60 Other 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.45 0.15 1.46 75.60 Nontax revenue 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.12 0.84 3.14 138.60 Capital revenue .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.60 Total revenue except grants 1.99 1.98 2.35 2.30 3.50 25.50 868.50 Union grants (net) 0.39 0.62 0.54 0.91 1.93 Recurring grants 1/ .. .. .. .. .. .. 461.50 Other payments (net) .. .. .. .. Total revenue and grants 2.38 2.60 2.89 3.21 5.43 25.50 1,330.00 Memorandum Item: GDP at current prices 6.28 6.94 7.62 8.32 16.92 161.00 9,391.00 (in percent of GDP) Tax revenue 28.0 26.4 28.0 26.2 17.5 11.2 7.7 Taxes on goods and services 13.7 13.3 15.1 14.1 9.7 5.2 3.7 Taxes on income and profit 9.2 8.2 7.7 6.7 6.8 5.2 3.2 Other 5.1 4.9 5.0 5.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 Nontax revenue 3.7 2.2 2.9 1.4 5.0 2.0 1.5 Union grants (net) 6.2 8.9 7.1 10.9 27 Recurring grants 1/ .. .. .. .. .. .. 49 1/ Includes grants from the U.S., the Netherlands, the UNDP, and the EEC. The expenditures have not been distributed across economic categories. Source: The Kyrgyz authorities; IMF and World Bank staff estimates. TABLE 5-2: KVRGVZ REPUBLIC - GENERAL GOVERNNMENT BU EXPENDIURE AND SURPLUS/DEFlCIt 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 (billions of rubles) (milions of soms) Net lending .. .. .. .. .. 12.14 473.70 Current expenditure 192 2.12 2.34 2.70 454 37.96 1,614.50 Wages and salaries 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.53 1.11 9.57 280.90 Goods and services 0.60 0.67 0.77 0.84 1.40 10.23 303.20 Interest payments . .. .. .. .. 0.87 36.50 Transfers 0.89 0.99 1.09 1.33 2.03 10.53 97530 Other .. .. .. .. .. 6.76 18.60 Capital expenditure 031 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.19 2.28 75.00 Recurring grants 1/ .. .. .. .. Total expenditure and net lending 2.23 2.51 2.73 3.18 4.73 5238 2,163.20 Total revenue and grants 2.38 2.60 2.89 3.21 5.43 2550 1,330.00 Surplus/Deficit (-) 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.70 -26.88 -833.20 Memorandum Item: GDP at current prices 6.28 694 7.62 8.32 16.92 16L00 9,397.00 (i percent of GDP) Total expenditure and net lending 35.6 36.2 35.9 38.3 31.1 26.2 23.0 Net lending .. .. .. .. .. 6.1 5.0 Current expenditure 30.6 305 30.7 325 29.8 19.0 172 Wages and salaries 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.4 73 4.8 3.0 Goods and services 9.6 9.6 10.1 10.0 9.2 5.1 32 Transfers 14.2 143 143 16.0 13.4 53 10.4 Interest payments .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 0.4 Other .. .. .. .. .. 3.4 0.2 Capital expenditure 4.9 5.6 5.1 S.8 13 11 0.8 1/ Includes grants from the U.S., the Netherlands, the UNDP, and the EEC. The expenditues have not been distributed across economic categories. Source: The Kyrgyz authorities; IMF and World Bank staff estimates. TABLE 64: KYRGYZ REPUBLIC - MONWrARY SURVEY (millins of soms) Dec 92 June 93 Sep 93 Oct 93 Nov 93 Dec 93 Net Forein Assets -383 -3483 .421.8 -536.8 -5585 -579.7 NFA (Convetble Currency) 16.8 73.6 -15 -105.7 -133.8 -162.4 Gold 75.1 9"8 448 53.9 82.2 Central Bank 06 -783 -199.8 -281.0 -326.0 -3533 Commercial Banks including th¢ Savingp Bank 16.2 76.8 99.4 130A 1383 108.7 NFA (Rubles) -55.1 421.9 .4202 431.1 424.6 -4173 Rubles in NBK Vault 25.7 80.4 68.4 66.0 67.9 74.0 Rubles in DMB and SBER Vaults (om 5/93) 0.0 6.2 1.7 1A 2.4 1.5 Counterpart to Currency in CAulation 90.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Balanc with FSU States -171A -508.6 .4903 ^498.5 494.9 -492.8 Medium and Long-Term Foreign Asets (Ture) 0.0 -233 -27.4 -56.7 -76.7 Net Domestic Assets 2893 851.2 1,147.2 1,2833 1,315.2 1,358.6 Domestic Credit 443.5 1,178.7 1,532.1 1,6603 1,847.6 2,0085 Net Cakims on Union Govemient 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Net Caims on General Government 107.0 337A S5.0 4842 480.9 559.1 Net Caims on Republican Governmt 1233 371A 5982 523.9 SIS.9 578.4 Net Calms on Loa Government -163 -33.9 -43.2 -39.7 -35.0 -19.3 Counterpart Funds 0.0 0.0 -343 0.0 0.0 -26.6 Net Clams on Other Offidial Entities -73 -25.2 -30.7 -34.6 -3LO -33.0 Pension Fund -2.5 -9.0 -12.7 -17A -120 -132 Employment Fund -0.7 -2.1 -L9 -2.1 -2.4 -3.8 Pubi OrgIzatins -3.6 -119 -9.7 -9.6 4.1 -80 Post and Telecommunications -0A -L6 -5.9 -5.1 -82 -7.6 State Insurnce 0.1 -05 *0.6 -03 .0.4 -04 Calms on Enterprise 274.4 647.1 778. 875.0 1,027.7 1,205.8 Cains on Private Sector 69.3 219A 263.4 335.6 370.1 303.2 Households and Idivduals 3.6 225 33.1 33.8 40.3 42.7 consumer Cooperati 65.7 196.9 230.3 3018 329. 260.5 Other ltems Net -1542 -3275 -384.9 -377.0 -32.4 -649.9 Capital Acousts .. -214.7 -4743 5378 *620.2 -706A Other laterbank Accounts, Net .. 45 632 166. 58.7 86.3 Other ntenvpublic/Intetbranch Accounts .. 612 612 613 61.8 353 Undassified Assets .. 347.1 4833 534.0 S72.5 S043 Uncassified liabilities _ -525.7 -5183 *601.0 405.3 -569A Broad Money 2510 S029 702.1 719.1 700.0 702.2 Somt Outside Banks .. 157A W.1 333.0 365.7 3984 Soms in rulation .. 180.7 294.0 340A 3752 404.6 Les Soms in DMB and SBER Vaults .. -233 .69 -7A -9.5 2 Rubles Outsde Banks 89.5 . ... Rubles in iculation 90.9 .. .. Lae Rubles in DMB and SBER Vaults -4A .. .. Demand Deposits 139.9 2743 2615 215 212.5 201.7 Forein Cureny Deposits 145 473 130.9 85.9 88.0 722 ime, Term and Other Deposits 7.1 23.9 22.6 28.7 33.9 29.9 Source National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic and IMPstaff estimates. TABIE 7-1: KYRGYZ REPULIC - AGRICULTURAL PRODUCrION On uim5 Gt consut 1W mubles) 1980 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total gs agricultural production 2,31f 2,554 2,756 2,797 2,912 2,985 3,024 2,723 2,574 Cropproduction 1,087 1,127 1,217 1,118 1,148 1,118 1,107 922 930 Grais 149 168 185 180 194 184 173 159 176 Potatoes 51 53 63 60 64 62 70 62 69 VeSetas 132 167 174 IS0 171 183 155 127 114 Prtuits (without grapes) 91 59 107 91 81 64 81 66 65 Grapes 48 16 29 13 13 16 20 14 IS Tobacco 142 310 301 261 262 258 282 220 225 Cotton 175 47 48 56 59 56 63 47 40 Sugarbeets 49 0 1 7 Ojiaseds 5 1 25 1 4 4 5 2 2 Other 245 305 284 306 301 292 259 223 217 Livestok prducion 1,279 1,427 1,539 1,680 1,765 1,867 1,917 1,801 1,644 Lvestock 641 720 705 844 829 866 868 8S6 771 Cattle 232 270 260 289 311 348 381 356 333 Pigs 86 89 80 88 101 103 103 95 92 She anddgoabt 269 276 289 321 321 312 332 300 276 Poultry 55 85 77 146 96 104 52 105 70 Ober. Milk 218 246 361 396 422 477 471 449 382 Eggs 60 77 55 59 64 67 42 62 S7 wool 284 270 313 326 332 386 400 319 294 Otl rlivestock 76 115 105 56 118 120 136 115 140 Agricultural services Material inputs 1,239 1,065 1,188 1,188 1,130 1,113 1,038 1,239 1,222 Crop produefion 487 358 398 389 382 347 328 437 452 Animal production 752 707 790 800 748 766 710 802 771 Agricdtalr nervies Mtmateand product, by oupuL 1,127 1,489 1,568 1,609 1,782 1,873 1,986 1,483 1,351 Crop production 600 769 819 729 766 771 779 485 478 Aninua production 527 720 749 880 1,017 1,102 1,207 999 873 Agicultual eseices By form of ownesip: 2,366 2,S54 2,756 2,797 2,912 2,985 3,024 2,?23 2,574 Shtterpqses 868 1,024 1,121 1,107 1,141 1,117 1,049 768 697 Coopeative entepis 1,004 920 952 946 966 961 934 907 671 Subsi ary and pErsnd plots of poption 494 611 683 744 805 907 1,041 1,041 1,047 Privaet e.t.. ..e. .. .. .. 6 159 Soue: SteStaistica Agency. TAKE7-2 IRGYZ RE1UDUC - MODUCON AND AVERAGE YIEID OF MlAJR AGRICULTURAL CROPS 191i 198S 1986 1987 19MS 1989 1990 1991 1m P82Gatlak- haIusand of a~m Gob .-CliWW 563 550 555 09 549 5Y1 482 434 634 WMUK 542 486 56 6i9 521 564 464 398 559 pbtsabil 21 14 19 20 28 18 19 37 75 RFOe 1 2 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 cow 216 381 430 46 497 452 406 365 981 WI.urlm 6 11 16 39 33 86 167 196 210 ginlbw 477 s5 m 630 616 482 464 401 411 0*m 12 12 15 20 19 16 16 13 13 Rim I I I 1 2 * 3 4 0l1u0s 2 3 3 5 6 6 4 3 4 Su _lwul I I I I 1 2 2 1 3 &gb- 1 2 3 4 5 4 3 2 1 GasnOa) 207 5a de 73 79 74 81 63 52 a-t3w 956 .. 2 13 135 =_- 293 307 329 287 332 324 365 326 362 hbes. . . .... .. .. .. Y.peba 450 445 512 491 553 555 480 399 404 Fat 160 76 196 g9 145 82 141 85 IS GaP" so 27 63 36 28 33 43 29 31 odw SD D0 134 53 117 49 9S 56 87 Com0A4gd.a _guv) 2,446 3,3S 324 3,101 2,4 2,56 2,90 2,474 2.09 Noy 1,017 1,25D 1.310 1,43 1,427 1,310 1,310 1.18D 1,178 AVas oyle- k&U Gob 2.30 2,310 2,720 MOD 2.430 2,990 2.0 22) 2.00 W lwim 1,520 1,8 2,120 2,510 2,14D 2,01D 1,710 2,010 Im 4e3w 1,730 2,656 2.310 2,340 2,16D 2210 2,1C0 1,53 1,75D cta 5,"0) 6,440 6,10 6,86D 6,980 6,810 6,180 5,8S. 5,130 Wlabtbmy 1,130 2,aso 3,010 2.60 250 3,38 3,230 2,50 2,6S0 So ft 1,990 2.240 2330 2M70 240 2.1* 2,160 I80 2,= 0Ga 1,90 2,540 2,410 3,430 2,4t0 2,55D 2.65D 2,450 2,97 Molto 110 55 230 1,630 1,580 530 990 940 630 Ri 2,330 1.730 2,010 1,20 1.780 1,50 1,42D 1,530 I1D pin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0a 0 0 0 0 0I1N& 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.210 1,3) 1,2m 1,59 1,110 82 940 65D 640 Sopbmza 1~~~~ ~ ~~~~~.39 1,740 1,910 2,05 1,780 2.22 1,740 1,56 1.33 Odt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ca-la () 2.710 21,0 2.340 2,6 21,40 2,730 2,730 2D 2,440 cow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 aap*ecw 34,2S0 0 0 0 0 0 16,S30 15M5M0 21.130 12,550 13,700 14.10D 1200 140 13,4^ 13,0 13,f6 12,38) Pub"e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Vqsmbim 19,S10 19.900 21.SK) 25,1) 20,100 21,0 19D 17,930 1,430 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fabl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 Gapes 12,M 3,980 9230 5,75 4,45D 5,010 6,35) 4,530 5 o0sr 4,210 2,120 5,55D 2,0 4,23D 2,410 4,12D 2,590 3540 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 OamsPNarAl Suab* 28,100 33,50 30,2 34,0 33,0 2,00 30130 27,240 22, Ihy 4.410 4,90 5,S10 5,730 5,540 5,10 2,0 4,50 4,0 somm S Smbdsda Agency TABLE 7-3: KYRGYZ REPUIC - MAIN AGGRBGATI OF ANIDAL HUSBANDRY 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 199 1990 1991 1992 IAh eioek (Ohuuan ebhad) 21,931 24,330 25,551 26,159 26,776 27,659 25,78 24,964 20,825 Ctw 982 1,110 1,130 1,161 1,190 1,214 1,205 1,190 1,122 oIwbiob: Cmo 584 427 434 460 487 507 506 519 515 Pigs 336 349 379 388 416 445 393 358 247 _i 9825 9,838 9,908 10,005 10,013 10,060 9,545 9,107 8,362 Goats 234 362 355 385 392 423 428 418 380 Rensa 259 m7 284 293 304 310 313 321 313 Odb 10,296 12,394 13,496 13,927 14,461 152 13,915 13,571 10,402 A,4md buhub p- Modtdwaundsd ton) 1I9 169 193 204 221 241 254 230 220 Beef 51 56 64 66 72 85 91 88 84 Poak 25 23 28 32 36 38 41 33 30 Lamb 61 59 66 67 72 75 77 71 70 YPtIs 15 23 26 30 32 32 33 29 28 O-ur 7 8 9 9 9 12 12 10 9 mmi lus of bom) 682 771 909 997 1,063 1,202 1,185 1,131 957 sop b aim) 416 533 73 612 666 704 714 650 527 Wedduaud-s tof ) 34 33 36 37 38 39 39 37 32 Soun Stt Statis Agenc. TABILE 7-4 KYRGVZ ERPUDUC - AGRICULTURAL PRoDCuICON BY TYPE OF OMWNRSHIP (in milons of ooranst 1983 zubls) 1980 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Tod agriukubl 2,366 2,554 2,756 2,797 2,912 2,985 3,024 2,723 2,574 Crops 1,087 1,127 1,217 1,118 1,148 1,118 1,107 922 930 Aninm busbaldn y 1,279 1,427 1,539 1,680 1,765 1,867 t,917 1,801 1,644 Collecive finns (,Wuho) 936 917 952 946 966 961 934 907 615 Crops 491 519 S0o 477 490 499 488 477 333 Aniinm husbAndy 444 398 447 470 476 462 446 430 282 stte farms 830 979 1,062 1,049 1,074 1,050 985 707 697 Crops 401 462 499 462 480 450 435 280 382 Animal bkubandiy 429 516 563 586 594 600 550 427 315 Odwr Stst.EnterDpre. 106 48 59 58 67 67 64 61 55 Crops 33 17 24 18 21 25 20 17 20 Animai husbandy 74 31 36 40 45 42 44 44 34 Private plots 494 611 683 744 80s 907 1,041 1,041 1,048 Crops 162 129 190 161 157 145 164 146 160 Atimal husbandry 332 482 494 584 649 763 878 895 888 Privae Panms .. .. 6 159 Crops .. 2 34 Animal husbandry .. .. .. 4 124 Lead Fars .. .. .. .. I Crops .. .. .. .. .. A ,l .u.bandry .. .. .. .. 0 Swam.: Stato Staia Agpny. TABLE 7.5: KYRGYZ REPUBLIC - EMPLOYM IN AGRICULTURE (lo tbonsads) 1980 198S 1986 1981 1988 1989 1990 1l 192 Toad 452 S26 536 574 574 S74 569 620 105 Collctoive oms 158 174 170 164 165 1S8 1s8 173 160 St farms 174 219 218 210 202 196 193 190 164 Temporay woe .. .. .. .. Labr ppuivaftplo 88 107 122 175 182 188 184 208 240 Nw PvaCoop .. .. .. .. 2 1 38 PEia fims .. .. .. .. .. 16 80 Od*er 32 27 27 2S 24 33 32 32 23 Source Stae Stecl Amoy. TAKAEY4t KIYRGYZ REUILIC -MLAIN DICATORS IFA MGRK TURAL ARMS Collectivc firm Stat. Parm Oher Private Ptivate 1980 ToWl >Ohccs> (aovhoe) (sat fam) Pots Fare Number of fams 478453 180 231 742 477,500 Gro Output (million 1983 rubles) 2,3 936 830 106 494 Pixed Capital (million 1983 rubles) Profit (million 1983 rubks) 1,127 Number of loswmaking fiam 9 9 Produco (thousand tons) Grain 1,307 641 542 78 47 Sugar boee 956 668 271 17 Sunflowcra 1 Flax Potatoes 293 59 69 4 162 Vgcetabls 400 86 132 4 178 Meat 159 43 46 23 47 Milk 682 209 260 10 203 Eg (million) 416 209 29 4 175 Cant (thouand hees) 982 313 251 134 284 Cows 384 108 87 4 185 Pips 336 108 88 52 88 Sheep, goas 10,058 4,335 4,441 251 1,031 PoultY 10,296 528 2,930 313 6,525 no=e 259 100 100 16 43 Coletive farm State Farm 0te Private Prvate I Y85 TOtal Ocolhoeze) (sovhozes) (Asta fai) Plob Paw. Number of farmo 536,798 178 290 818 535,512 Gross Oput (million 1983 rubles) 2,554 917 979 48 611 Fxed Cal (million 1983 nuble) Profits (million 1983 mubles) 1,489 Numberoflos-makingfarms Its 22 91 Produeton (thusand tons) Grain 1,477 689 699 26 63 Sugar bees. SueflowCr 1 Flax Potatoes 307 60 79 5 163 Vgetables 445 92 170 2 182 Meat 169 42 74 4 50 Ailk 771 279 221 11 260 Bggs (millions) 533 25 312 3 192 Cattle (thousad heeds) t,110 320 414 15 361 Cows 427 110 94 3 219 pNp 349 123 113 43 70 Sheep, goats 10,200 3,965 4,714 86 1,435 Poultry 12,394 384 4,739 1I1 7,156 Honls 277 96 108 8 65 TABIX 7-6 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC * MIN INDICATO OF AGUCULTMRAL FARM, c'td. Colbactv farm State Farms Otaer Ptivate Pvato 1986 Total tkolhozes) (sovhozs) (state farm) Plos Farms Number of fm 555368 178 289 817 554,084 Grms Output (million 1983 rubes8) 2,756 952 1,062 59 683 Fixed Capital (million 1983 uble.s) Profits (million 1983 rubles) 1,568 Number of lossmiadg famns 71 8 63 Prdu-con (thod tons) Grain 1,633 765 771 31 66 Suga bedts Sunfowerv 1 I Potatoes 329 63 89 5 172 Vqegables 512 123 187 5 197 Meat 193 St 84 4 54 Milk 909 302 237 12 3S8 ESP (Millions) 573 25 352 3 194 Cal- (thousnd heas) 1,130 330 408 13 379 cols 434 111 94 4 225 pigs 379 137 127 47 69 Sheep, goat 10,263 3,935 4,72 99 1,506 PMoultr 13,496 428 5,672 142 7,254 Hore 284 97 109 9 a Collective farm State Farms Other Pivate Private 1987 TOWa (koihoze) (aohs) (sate farm) Plots Farms Number of faro 566,609 178 291 1,037 565,103 Gros Outpu (million 1983 rubles) 2,797 946 1,049 58 744 Fi-d Capital (nillion 1983 nrbles) Pmfits (million 1983 rubles) 1,609 Number of lose-making fartm 28 1 27 Producton (thousand tos) Grain 1,909 897 901 45 66 Sugar beats Sunfowes 1. Flax Potatoes 287 51 74 4 158 Vegdables 491 123 169 6 194 Meea 204 54 84 4 61 Milk 715 31 245 13 426 Egg (millions) 612 26 387 4 196 Cattle (thousad heads) 1,161 328 403 14 416 cows 460 110 93 4 254 Pip 1,024 133 129 56 707 Sheep, goats 10,390 3,886 4,678 105 1,721 Poulty 13,927 503 5,605 128 7,691 Horses 293 97 110 8 78 TABLE 74, XWGIZRIMMIC -MAIN IDCATORS 01 AGRICULTURAL FAMI, =W& Coleotv (am StateFarms Odh Private Privau 1988 Total thihzs) (ovlrs) (sae formal Plot Farms Numberoffars 580,582 176 285 1,100 579,021 Goa Output (million 1983 rubles) 2,912 966 1,074 67 805 Fixed Capit (miion 1983 rubles) Ptofits (aiion 1983 ruble) 1,782 Number of los-making arm 24 3 20 1 Production (thousad tons) Gadn 1,758 819 809 59 71 Sugb.. Suaflowern10001 Fin Potatoes 332 59 89 S 179 Vegetables 5S3 139 205 9 200 Meo 223 S4 84 6 79 Milk 1,063 323 248 IS 477 Bg (millions) 666 29 417 5 215 CAtl (ouAnd heads) 1,190 328 395 18 449 C*o 487 110 93 5 279 Pip 416 142 129 71 74 Sheep, goats 10,405 3,791 4,609 108 1,896 Poultry 14,461 494 S,873 140 7,954 Hom 304 97 113 8 85 Colective fam Ste Farms Other private Private 1989 Togal olHo) (avhos) (8t farm) Plot FarmP Nuberoffiam 589,046 176 290 1,180 587,400 Grow Oput (millio 1983 ruble) 2,98S 961 1,050 67 907 FiPxd Capt (million 1983 rubles) Profits (million 1983 ,ble) 1,873 Number of los-u fngfam 12 1 11 Prduction (tousad tons) Grain 1455 772 780 33 71 SugarO be.t 0 0 Sunowers 2 0 1 0 1 Flax Potoes 324 60 90 8 167 Vegeables 585 161 209 8 207 Meab 241 53 87 7 94 Milk 1,202 329 253 16 604 EW (millions) 704 27 432 5 240 Cale (ousnd heads) 1,A4 329 397 19 470 Cows 507 111 95 5 297 pip 445 147 140 80 78 Sheep, goat 10,483 3,727 4,561 110 2,065 PoultrY S,207 490 6,307 139 8,272 Hoam 310 98 115 7 90 TAE 74 KRGVZ REPWUBLIC -MAIN DICATRS OFAGRILTVtAL FABE soue Colec&ofarm State Fan Odhr Pfivate Priate 1990 TOal (oiha) (aovhos) (sat fau) Plots Pars Number of fias 652,11 178 257 1,136 650,809 101 Gros Out (million 1983 rbl) 3,024 934 985 64 1,041 Fixed Capita (mlion 1983 rubl) .. Profitb (miion 1983 tubles) 1,986 .. .. Number of losmaing fmr 31 6 25 Production (tousand ton) Grain 1,572 746 715 44 68 Suga beets 2 1 1 Sunflo 2 0 1 0 1 Flex Potatoes 365 62 106 9 189 Vegetables 487 131 153 5 198 Meat 254 50 82 7 114 M&ik 1,185 316 242 18 610 ggsp (millions) 714 22 439 4 248 Cattl (*ousand heas) 1,205 324 375 19 488 0 Cowv 506 106 91 5 304 0 pigp 393 123 124 72 75 Sbeep, got 9,973 3,472 4,106 129 2,253 12 Polty 13,915 379 5,415 126 7,993 3 Honrs 313 96 108 8 100 1 CoUecefarm State Far Odbet Prdat Pdivat 1991 TOt oium ) (S.vham) (st farrs) PWet Fan Number of fam 677,111 195 275 1,102 671,469 4,070 Gross Output (million 1983 ruble) 2,73 907 707 61 1,041 6 Fmxd Capita (million 1983 rubls) .. Profits (million 1983 ubls) 1,483 702 599 Number of losmaldng fms .. Production (thousand tons) Gain 1,446 702 635 35 70 4 Sugarbeets 13 9 4 SUnflWCowr 1 0 0 0 Flax 0 0 0 0 Potatoes 326 51 76 5 195 0 Vegetables 399 96 124 5 174 0 Mae 230 40 66 5 119 0 Aimk 1,131 265 220 17 629 0 Eggs (milL:am) 650 14 392 3 242 0 Cattle (thousand hea) 1,190 295 329 21 528 17 Cow 519 98 83 7 323 8 Pigs 358 110 97 69 81 1 Sheep, goats 9,525 2,937 3,101 218 2,604 665 Poulty 13,571 338 5,800 108 7,269 56 Horns 321 84 90 11 123 12 TALE 7?4 K1GYZ RIU C 1MA IN DIICATORS OF ARICULTUVRAL FARMS, oa.d!. CUe fartm Stat Farm tber Private Private 1992 TOWal )olo) (SOa) (att farm) Plots Pams Number Of firm 704,412 179 217 1,107 694,214 8,695 Goss Outt (mion 1983 uble-) 2,574 615 697 55 1,048 159 Fixed Capitd (millio 1983 rubles) Prot (milo 1983 zub'm) Number of l..akia am Prodution (thousand ton) Grain 1,602 596 S60 295 64 87 Sugabet 135 65 43 IS 9 Sunfowe 3 1 1 0 1 0 Fixn 0 0 0 Ptatoes 362 39 49 76 1i8 13 Vegetables 399 81 90 53 167 8 Keat 228 24 42 12 135 16 Milk 961 159 141 63 576 22 NWI (mllins) 591 7 303 4 276 2 Cate (thouesand heead) 1,122 204 239 89 540 52 Cvos 515 68 58 32 329 29 pipS 247 53 75 54 65 0 Sheep, goats 8,742 2,023 1,947 689 2,749 1,334 Pbouhy 10,402 82 3,478 78 6,612 152 Homre 313 60 59 29 124 41 Sou8w State Stistal Ageny. TABLE S-1: KYRGYLZ REPBUC - INDUSTRIAL PRODUCION BY SECIOR (millions of current mbles) 1980 1985 1986 1967 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 All Industry 4,138.3 5,711.4 5,999.4 6,0605 6,439.3 6,801.6 6,7685 15,058.3 113,528.8 Heavylndusty 1,8195 2,388.8 2,576.6 2,669.3 2,922.1 3.039.2 2,979.1 5,437.9 55,165.0 Fuel-Energy Industiy 2045 256.5 294.7 271.9 329.5 334.3 346.3 679.8 10,4805 Electricity 143.0 196.0 225.2 204.1 261.1 267.0 280.0 466.6 8,285.9 Fuel Industry 61.5 605 695 67.8 68.4 67.3 66.3 213.2 2,1945 Ferous and Non-Ferrous Metalurgy 123.9 162.3 186.3 216.7 258.4 274.6 306.0 479.2 9,752.4 Chemkals and Petrochemical Indust"y 22.9 34.2 36.3 41.9 45A 44A 45.9 1035 492.2 Machine-Building and Metalworking 880.4 1,151.0 1,2125 1,279.5 1,3649 1,363.8 1,349.0 2,877A 24,286.1 Forestry,Woodworring&PulpandPaperlndustr 78.7 1055 105.9 108.1 115A 1165 108.9 266.9 2,261.3 Construction Materials 188.4 245.2 269.1 2755 299.6 304.7 309.1 615.9 5,316.1 Light Industy 1,250A 1,594.1 1,614.3 1,624.6 1,763.7 1,862.4 1,8545 5,635.8 34,479.2 Textiles 930.4 1,1895 1,218.7 1,223.9 1,347.8 1,3995 1,372.9 4,561.9 29,328.8 Clothing 222.8 2875 286.1 290.8 3035 334.0 348.2 796.4 3,824.6 Leatherand Shoe 97.1 117.1 1095 110.0 112A 129.0 133A 2775 1,625.4 Agricultute/Food-Processing 897.6 1,494.1 1,587.6 1,514.8 1,495.2 1,617.4 1,675.8 3,989.6 18,246.9 Food Procesing 557.7 1,110.4 1,173.3 1,060.2 1,034.8 1,170.8 1,239.2 2,167.9 12,153.8 Meat and Dairy Products 336.7 380.2 410.2 450.8 4555 4415 4315 1,224.1 6,065.6 Fish 3.2 35 4.0 3.9 4.9 5.1 5.i 8.7 275 Source. State Statistical Agency. TAMU5R W 33ii3n - DNWI4I8ALUPOVUCIO NV S6CmOR In 1980 15 97 *988 199 990 1991 1992 _~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~fi=q . .d .g $ (Icudu. 1992,uss Alhim&y 4,1974 5,S54. 5.173.9 S.873.4 6,277.9 684.8 6401.2 6,481.7 4.770.5 Iha loft"y ,991.t 2 24.S 2..s 2t2.0 5.077.7 2963.6 3,019.9 2,213.6 Pu-Say b q7 13.5 74.8 2A 20.3 MA4.1 35.9 331.5 341.9 282.3 E bift 130.2 205.5 211.2 too.$ 22.3 294.9 23.6 277.6 248.8 Pad 119ay 493 O.5 61.2 595 61.8 61.0 57.9 54.3 3.5 rem and Nu RasMN}mbg 1.8 1U5 186.4 217.2 251.9 276.9 296.4 297.9 266.3 cuu*sbu %dlxwbo 11iy 2l.53 342 56.5 422 44 44A 45.8 47.5 23.8 Me*%"koft -4 mmb-mw 961.8 1,U52.0 1230.S 1,S9.7 1,37.1 1,375.5 1354.0 1J97.3 905.5 F%Ng.y. WeahviMg.f1pa-A pr.fy 14. to0.1 I05. 107.1 114.6 115.0 107.3 120.2 105.7 Cu -mimggth 10S.7 26.1 267.9 27. 30.2 303.8 310.3 304.1 201.9 L*glmftny 1t2 1,49.9 MO5. 1,6S2.1 1,785?4 1,8*2.1 1,833 1*7.0 1,738.9 l s 9gm0 1,19.9 l22.t 1,22.5 153.8 1A06.2 ,377.0 I407.3 1,263.8 MUMbE 224.9 2t9.8 29L6 303.2 317.2 347.2 34.s 442.6 3744 I odSba o 96.5 117.1 110.0 110.3 114A 118.8 133.5 1340 0t.? Ap1wbzJft.ooeWW 8S9.5 t1S.9 1345.5 1I3S 126 1,395.4 1,452.2 IMSA 1,212.9 Food %Wag 547.1 905.5 919.2 840 a2 94. 1,01.8 1S t 4 56S.3 M Delq.t,a1O. ~ 539.1 380.2 410.2 40.7 456.7 441.5 431A4 331.7 14.9 Ikb 5. S4 4.0 .9 4.7 50 5.0 3.5 2.7 (QlamRmsanwom ARUlMy .. .. 4.5 15 6.9 4.9 -t13 4.3 -26.4 avY it q .. .. 6.9 S.5 tO.5 3.9 -3J7 1.9 -26.7 1bdul4mS- 8 .. *0.9 4.5 34.0 6.5 49 3.1 -17.4 ti* .. .. 2.9 -10.1 43.5 S3 -7.2 5.1 *13.5 Pad .. .. -IIS *28 3A -t.3 -5.1I 4.2 -38.3 pw i Nmryas a t) .. .. 14.8 165 16. 9.9 7.0 0.5 -10.6 auI lt a nd 1 ad q m .. .. 6.1 163 1o0 *4.3 .2 3.7 *49.9 M 4 X1B Mw .. .. SJg 8.7 5.6 6.7 S.8 -1.6 3S -352 FMAY. %Oodw4ag, lP Ppr t" .. .. 0.4 .5 7.0 03 47 12.0 -12.1 couamdmh .. .. .9 5.1 10.5 4.5 2.1 -2.0 -33.6 U1Jla y .. .. 1.6 1.0 .7 4 .4.5 S.0 -11.6 2.5 04 10.2 3.9 -2.1 2.2 -102 0m11aw .. .. 1.0 5.6 4.6 9.5 4.5 U80 -I5A l.Ad so .. .. 4.1 0.5 5.7 t2.6 3.6 0.4 -24.1 AVk _bRmFoiP-m .. .. 4.2 .3.0 4.5 7.6 4.1 -9.9 -7.3 FoidP u .. .. 2.6 4.7 -t.5 13.6 7.1 3.6 -46.0 Mod nilDaby P .. .. 7.9 9.9 t3 -3. .3 43.1 -3'52 8b .. .. 17.6 2.5 20.5 6.4 0. -30. 9 8m: . TANBE 8-3: KYRGYZ REFUBLIC - ELECTRICIrY PRODUTIUON AND CONSUMPTION (nilions of KWED 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Domestic prtuction 9,172 10,472 11,394 9,348 14,230 15,116 13,370 14,171 11,892 Thermal 4,326 4,409 4,540 4,551 4,318 4,490 4,407 4,102 2,692 Hydro 4,846 6,064 6,854 4,797 9,912 10,626 8,963 10,069 9,200 Nuclawr .. .. Totl Impors 2,438 3,146 2,791 3,364 2,823 2,698 3,220 4,136 5,318 lbterepuble 2,438 3,146 2,791 3,364 2,823 2,698 3,220 4,136 5,318 Etarpubc Totel spply 11,609 13,619 14,185 12,712 17,053 17,814 16,590 18,307 17,211 Domestic conoumption 6,237 7,816 8,142 8,208 8,675 9,206 9,392 9,878 9,804 Indutry and constuction 3,118 3,430 3,496 3,717 3,811 4,028 3,921 3,914 3,464 Agriultre 1,457 2,106 2,203 2,186 2,274 2,497 2,697 3,132 3,335 Tranport 95 112 116 129 135 136 146 145 124 Otber sectos 469 488 497 559 570 617 653 660 684 Households 506 765 774 745 770 786 939 964 1,009 Looses 593 915 1,057 873 1,116 1,142 1,035 1,064 1,188 Tota Exrts 5,372 5,803 6,042 4,504 8,378 8,608 7,198 8,429 7,406 Inteepbi 5,372 5,803 6,042 4,504 8,378 8,608 7,198 8,429 7,406 E..rarepublic .. Total Cousunsplle 11,609 13,619 14,185 12,712 17,053 17,814 16,590 18,307 17,211 Source: State Statistic Argency. TASMI 9lASr KVRGYZ RIUIUC * IM RSItAL W!OIESAIE PIUCE INWNX **ua Wmo 100) TotIa Pus Machbi Wood Bildking I -gt Food Met Dairy Flour ad Building and Pper Mtals Inwustty Processing Industry Products Grains Jamna 131.9 118.0 161.4 110.4 241.8 121.S tO7.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 February 101.5 99.7 100.9 105.7 100.0 103.7 10.0 100.0 IO.0 100.0 March 101.8 100.0 100.0 145.5 99.9 102.6 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 Apdil 125.9 99.9 100.0 115.0 100.0 158.9 129.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 VW 143.9 99.4 100.0 101.7 100.0 120.9 100.7 621.9 444.6 100.0 June 100.0 99.2 100.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 July 114.7 100.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 129.4 123.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 August 126.4 95.2 167.4 100.0 I(u8.5 121.5 111.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 Septmbe 101.3 102.1 115.3 100.0 99.9 92.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Octber 101.1 98.6 100.0 100.0 102.9 103.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Noembrw 117.2 99.4 122.1 100.0 100.0 109.4 111.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 Decmber 117.1 103.2 134.6 100.0 101.0 126.0 ID.O 100.0 100.0 100.0 Janary 483.0 1736.0 845.7 374.6 306.3 401.9 2222 128.0 426.6 696.0 Febrary 178.7 113.0 222.5 100.0 259.5 127.6 227.3 176.3 104.7 IO.0 March 106.2 100.0 109.5 182.7 97.1 102.2 107.7 100.0 99.1 100.0 Apdl 110.6 124.8 100.0 100.0 113.2 123.5 1006 114.2 143.2 97.0 May 102.9 147.8 100.0 100.0 100.8 102.9 101.4 100.0 141.4 100.0 lune 148.6 164.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 125.0 320.4 100.0 92 103.1 July 104.9 101.9 112.3 100.0 137.7 101.8 100.3 100.6 100.0 100.0 August 98.3 99.1 100.0 130.4 119.4 93.4 100.0 98.6 104.0 100.0 Sptebe 148.4 98.6 100.0 106.3 100.0 107.6 137.1 170.5 S00.9 632.6 Octor 109.4 233.2 1OD.5 121.3 99.9 112.7 107.8 96.3 99.7 100.0 Nvember 119.6 94.9 100.0 149.7 247.8 125.5 107.9 111.4 102.6 .100.0 December 133.1 100.1 143.5 1O00. 100.0 108.2 223.4 113.4 100.5 10. 1993 January 143.0 254.6 141.8 187.1 292.2 142.4 104.6 131.0 125.5 203.5 ebruary, 146.3 101.5 127.4 19.5 219.2 120.7 149.2 332.5 230.3 85.7 March 130.0 1154A 120.6 108.4 111.1 147.4 12.3 103.9 IO.0 100.0 Aprl 125.0 99.5 151.0 151.7 100.6 134.4 106.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 May 134.3 1185 124.8 100.0 127.1 132.3 131.3 190.4 144.3 127.9 June 119.1 113.2 101.5 100.0 104.6 136.1 111.0 100.3 109.4 100.0 July 111.2 137.1 101.3 116.2 101.2 119.8 102.3 99.5 105.3 100.0 Augst 1183 99.6 112.4 100.0 144.7 120.7 117.5 100.0 100.8 153.7 Sepeebeor 135.0 121.5 172.2 108.2 103A 123.3 141.0 135.5 143.8 100.0 October 113A 164.0 101.6 104.1 121.0 112.1 117.2 121.1 125.3 132.8 November 114.0 107.4 107.9 100.0 141.5 115.3 116.6 135.6 1281 100.0 Decembe 117.6 102.2 102.5 100.0 121.2 134.3 107.8 91.4 100.0 100.0 Sourc: Stat Statiscal Ageny. TAiM 941Bt KYGYZ RQIBUC - INDUSIRIAL WHllIO E UMCE INDEX (se mwath oftb pvIous yau 100) Total Fud Machin Wood Boulding Ugh? Food Ma Daily Flour and Buildn ad Papor Maeias Induey Proesg ndtty Produs Grai I991 Janay 158.5 120.4 161.4 110.4 241.8 171.6 113.4 100.0 100.0 278.4 Februa 153.3 116.7 162.4 110.4 240.4 169.5 114.4 100.5 100.0 27.4 MArch 159.9 118.5 162.7 159.3 220.5 173.4 116.2 I00.5 100.0 278.4 AprIl 195.7 1185 155.0 182.8 240,2 259-4 151.8 100.5 100.0 278.4 May 240.8 116.5 163.2 171.3 240.2 273.2 161.3 621.9 330.7 2784 June 242.7 114.3 163.4 171.4 240.2 279.6 160.3 6t1.9 444.8 278.4 July 248.9 115.4 163.3 171.4 240.2 354.8 189.8 611.2 444.8 278.4 Augut 315.2 110.5 279.2 1714 258.7 399.0 178.4 621.9 444.8 278.4 Seplember 321.8 121.1 345.8 163.1 228.5 374.7 179.0 621.9 444.8 278.4 October 328.7 117.3 345.8 1714 238.8 391.1 179.0 635.6 444.8 278.4 Noveber 356.5 116.5 3787 171.4 236.0 408.5 247.0 635.6 444.8 278.4 Deceber 387.6 114.1 434.6 171.3 225.7 467.0 247.6 6S9.9 444.8 278.4 1992 Janay 1,303.5 1,88.4 2,581.6 6744 453.7 1,180.3 467.3 796.2 1,941.2 696.0 Febuay 1,673.9 2,347.6 3,744.1 650.5 930.0 936.4 976.6 2,212.7 1,920.5 690 March 1,974.2 2,190.1 4,451.0 1,044.0 902.6 1,24.9 700.5 2,4669 2,040.3 695.6 Aprl 1,843.3 2,29.2 4,418.4 787A 1,008.3 883.8 537.1 2,853.0 3,135.6 675.4 May 1,838.2 3,045.9 4,418A 787.6 1,010.1 841.0 543.9 2,853.0 3,056.0 675A June 1,876.2 5,010.7 5,173.3 744.5 1,040A 865.1 1,841.5 5882 463.8 608.8 July 1,978.7 5,183.3 5,982.7 736.0 1,94.2 743.2 1,718.0 614.4 468.4 688.8 Auu 1,757.1 5,355.9 S,280.0 980.5 1,636.9 607.2 1,501.8 562.5 500.8 688.8 Seper 1,484.0 5,262.8 2,295.9 1,138.6 1,678.9 68Z.7 1,638.5 947.9 2,098.8 4,321.5 Octor 1,669.7 11,898.2 2,308.2 1,100.8 1,617.8 815.3 1,760.7 908.3 2,03.3 4,321.5 November 1,763.8 11,452.2 2,309.0 1,721.2 2,876.2 1,038.0 1,404.7 947.9 2,110.5 4,321.5 December 2,002.5 10,955.2 2,749.2 1,721.2 2,844.0 87.7 2,994.5 575.3 2,121.9 4,321.5 1i93 Jauay 942.0 1,883.4 1,050.3 778.9 1,603.2 410.3 1,328.3 1,102.9 763.9 124.9 Febmary 622.2 1,686.5 459.2 1,4523 1,061.6 383.3 636.4 1,090.7 1,721.9 1,099.9 Marcb 709.5 1,816.5 545.6 679.6 1,156.8 489.9 797.1 1,130.4 1,727.8 1,1099.9 Aprl 1,141.9 1,705.2 621.1 992.5 1,133.1 462.5 769.9 937.8 1,619.8 1,133.9 may 879.4 1,728.6 611.0 925.8 1,297.1 613.9 934.2 1,784.5 2,145.5 1,449.5 Jun 902.4 1,208.2 621.7 941.6 1,370.7 682.5 895.6 1,771.5 2,0.1 1,405.9 July 924.5 1,669.1 578.0 1,084.2 1,158.0 761.0 916.0 1,762.8 2,457.3 1,405.9 Augut 1,082.9 1,937.9 658.5 785.0 1,318.7 962.3 1,046.0 1,331.0 2,457.8 2,161.6 Sep_ember 1,106.0 2,214.7 1,108.6 803.0 1,128.7 1,042.8 I,05 1,347.3 697.2 543.1 Odober 1,122.8 2,227.9 1,382.3 863.4 1,449.8 1,016.3 1,100.0 1,65.2 7782 459.0 November 1,116.8 2,039.1 1,296.2 756.4 1,341.8 948.0 1,312.8 2,216.4 929.0 459.0 December 1,055.0 2,038.0 987.1 756.4 1,6944 1,156.5 844.9 1,767.9 897.8 459.0 Soure State Stscal Agey. TABlE 94Cr KTRGYZ RPU'UUC - 1NDWIRIJAL WEOIBA1B PRCE DINE (_a i of the previous yr 100 Tota Fuel Machine Wood Buiding 1i.ght Fod Mea Day Flour and Buidn md Pae Matra dusty Poesig lndsuy Products Grais 1V91 Jauary 1S8.5 120.4 161A4 110.4 241.8 171.6 113.4 100.0 100.0 278.4 an-Febnay 158.4 116 161.9 110.4 241.1 170.6 113.9 100.3 100.0 278A Ian-March 1S8.9 118.5 162.2 126.3 234.2 171.5 114.7 100.3 100.0 278.4 Jan-ArlU 168.1 118.5 160A 140.7 235.7 193.5 124.0 100.4 10.0 278.4 JtMay 182.6 118. 160.9 146.8 236.6 209.4 131.4 204.7 146.1 278.4 Jan-Jun 192.7 117.5 161.4 150.9 237.2 221.1 132 274.2 195.5 278.4 Ja-July 200.7 117.2 161.6 153.9 237.2 240.2 143.9 322.4 231.5 278.4 Jan-A t 215.0 116.4 176.3 156.1 240.3 260.1 148.2 359.8 258.1 278.4 Jn-Septmber 226.9 116.9 195.2 156.8 239.0 M.8 151.6 388.9 278.9 2784 Jam-Octobr 237.1 116.9 210.2 158.3 239.0 284.6 154.4 413A 295.5 278.4 Jan-November 247.9 116.9 225.5 159.5 238.7 295.9 162.8 433.8 309.0 278.4 Jan-Deeamber 259.6 116.7 242.8 160.5 237.6 310.2 169.9 448.5 320.4 278.4 19 anuay 1,303.5 1,888.4 2,581.6 674.4 453.7 1,180.3 467.3 796.2 1,941.2 696.0 Jan-Febray 1,488.7 2,118.0 3,1629 662.5 691.9 1,058.4 722.0 1,504.5 1,930.9 696.0 Jan-Marh 1,650.5 2,142.0 3,592.2 789.6 7C.L1 1,137.2 714.8 1,825.3 1,967.3 695.6 Jan-April 1,698.7 2,171.3 3,798.8 789.1 823.7 1,073.9 670.4 2,0il.2 2,29.4 690.8 Jan-My 1,726.6 2,346.2 3,9Q2.7 788.8 60.9 1,027.3 645.1 2,236.4 2,418.7 687.7 Jan-u 1,751.5 2,790.3 4,131.1 669.7 1,890.8 1,0002 844.5 1,961.6 2,092.9 687.9 Jan.Juy 1,784.0 3,132.2 4,395.7 774.9 991.3 963.5 969.3 1,769.1 1,860.8 688.0 Jan-Augus 1,780.6 3,410.1 4,506.2 300.6 1,072.9 919.0 1,035.8 1,618.4 1,690.8 688.1 Ja-Sepmber 1,747.7 3,616.0 4,260.6 838.2 1,139.5 892.7 1,102.8 1,543.9 1,736.2 1,091.8 Jsu4ctdb*r 1,739.9 4,444.2 4,065A 864.4 1,137.3 885.0 1,168.6 1,40.3 1,765.9 1,414.8 Jan-November 1,742.1 5,081.3 3,905.7 942.3 1,340.8 898.9 1,190.1 1,431.9 1,797.2 1,679.0 Jan-Desmber 1,763.8 5,570.8 3,809.3 1,007.2 1,466.1 896.3 1,340.4 1,360.5 1,824.3 1,899.2 1993 January 942.0 1,8I3.4 1,050.3 778.9 1,603.2 410.3 13283 1,1009 763.9 1,284.9 Jan uar 782.1 1,785.0 754.8 743.7 1,332.4 396.8 982.4 1,096.8 1,242.9 1,192.4 JanMarch 757.9 1,795.5 685.0 970.3 1,273.9 427.8 920.6 1,108.0 1,404.5 1,161.6 Jan-April 853.9 1,772.9 669.1 975.8 1,238.7 436.5 882.9 1,065.5 1,458.4 1,14.7 Jan-May 768.8 1,764.0 657.4 965.8 1,2504 472.0 893.2 1,209.3 1,595.8 1,213.6 JaJue 791.1 1,671A 657.5 961.8 1,270.4 507.1 893.6 1,303.0 1,782.2 1,245.7 Jan-July 812.7 1,671.1 641.0 979.3 1,254. 543.3 1,131.8 1,368.7 1,832.3 1,26.6 Jan-Augat 846.5 1,704.4 643.2 955.0 1,26Z.4 S95.7 1,164.8 1,364.0 1,908.0 1,980.2 Jan-September 875.3 1,761.1 694.9 938.1 1,247.5 645. 1,165.3 1,36L. 1,773.5 1,265.0 Jan-OCtobe 900.1 1,807.8 763.6 930.6 1,267.8 682.5 1,136.5 1,390.9 1,674.0 1,184.4 Jan-Novmber 919.8 1,828.8 812.1 914.8 1,274.5 706.7 1,150.2 1,466.0 1,606.2 1,118.4 Jan-Decembe 931.0 1,846.2 826.6 901.6 1,309.S 742.5 1,127.7 1,491.1 1,47.2 1,063.5 Soure: St Statlslc Agec. TANSI 9-2A- KVRGYZ REPUSAC - CONSUMER AND REAIL MICE INDICES (Pevous month G 100) Combined RPI RPI RPI CPI RPI Goods Foodsuffs Non-Food Services 1992 January 257.0 213.9 207.1 2195 200.6 304.7 Februy 129.4 110.3 109.3 109.3 111.3 129.8 March 115.8 112.9 111.2 105.4 117.7 126.4 April 11.9 115.6 114.3 112.0 116.8 127.6 May 1043 105.5 105A 104.0 106. 106A June 1052 104.3 103.8 102.0 105.3 119.1 Juy 108.2 1092 108.5 110.3 107.0 130.3 August 104.8 104.6 104.3 105.3 103A 1085 September 126.9 126.1 127.8 151.6 1082 116.7 October 126.3 124. 123.8 136. 1132 09 November 122.8 125.0 1235 117.3 128.6 134.6 Deember 122 1229 1216 125.5 118A 1327 1993 January 146.3 135.9 132.7 127.6 136.9 161.6 February 139.9 1392 133.9 133.7 134.0 1745 March 124A 123.0 120.2 114.8 124.6 1355 April 116.6 116.0 llSA 113.0 1179 1189 May 121A 126.2 124.6 131.1 117.6 135.0 June 117.1 117.1 116.6 114.7 118.7 1195 July 1165 115.8 1182 112.0 124.9 1083 August 119.6 I23A 1252 1282 122.0 118.8 September 132.8 130.1 119A 1162 122.8 244.6 October 133.1 132.3 127.8 1252 130.7 147.0 November 121.9 121.6 119.3 120.2 1182 1328 December 115.7 116.8 117.9 1189 115.8 lllA Source: State Ststistical Agency. TASLE 94: KYRGIZ REPUBLIC - CONSUMER AND RTAIL RIUCE INDICZS (same month of the previous year- 100) Combied Rn RPI RFI CPI RPI Goods Foodstuffs Non-Food Services M92 Januaty .. 5605 573.7 6394 541.5 463A February .. 6644 6853 789.4 606.7 541.8 arc.. 750.4 7782 8135 145.6 597.0 April .. 674.6 688.1 648.4 733.9 577.0 May .. 9783 6514 613. 695.8 624.9 June .. 950.8 939.7 84S.8 1,0172 5421 July .. 9699 971.7 908.1 1,024.1 629.8 Augus 1,0792 104.8 992.7 1,014.8 643.7 Septemb .. 1,374 1,155.7 1,395.8 9574 773.9 October .. 1,374 1,484.0 1,9422 1,105.8 9635 Novmber .. 1,615.1 832.7 2,1403 1,306.4 1,2954 December .. 1,655.6 1,7312 2,137.1 1,3962 1,2785 Januamy 1,134.9 1,0809 1,058.8 1,0705 1,0492 1,2539 Febnu 1,1522 1,189.8 1,125.1 1,1152 1,1333 1,6882 march 1,106.7 1,154.6 1,088.7 1,229.0 9729 1,514.7 April 1,0127 1,054.1 982.7 1,1515 8015 1,568.2 May 1,171.1 1,250.0 1,150.7 1,430A 850.7 2,1694 June 1,232.0 1,3563 1,270.8 1,3145 1,229 1,948.7 July 1,255I.7 2783 1,1079 1,3095 1,077.0 1,667.8 August 1,4752 1,4564 1,394.0 1,624 9 1,142.0 1,817.9 Setmber 1,4955 1,464A 1,298. 1,3605 2 2,463.0 October 1,526.2 1,5405 1,659.9 1,7033 1,611.0 3,6354 November 1,4922 1,4702 1,382.5 1,284.0 1,488.3 2,045.9 December 1,4613 1O8U 1,385.0 1,261 1,5173 2,016.0 Source: Sate Stsical Agency. TANL 9-2C KYRGYZ REPUBIC - CONSUMER AND RnfAL PRICE INDICES (sam period of the previous yearw 100) Combined RPI RPI RPI CPI RPI Goods Foodstuffs Non-Food Services 1993 JauaY .. M80.9 1,05O8. 1,0705 1,0492 1,253.9 Jan-February .. 1,135.4 1,092.0 1,092.9 1,0913 1,471.0 Jan-March .. 15 1,0909 1,13.2 1051.8 1,48.6 Jan-April .. 1,067.8 1,027.8 1,146A 913.7 1,5232 J-May .. 1,142.3 1,073.1 1,254.6 8913 1,7253 Jan-June .. 1,2093 1,1483 1,2285 1,0664 1,779.8 Jan-July .. 1,218.7 1,1702 1,2652 1,071.0 1,7583 Jan-Augut .. 1,251.9 1,2393 1,3785 1,0927 1,767.9 Jan-September .. 1,2724 1,275 1,3743 1,125.5 1,8645 Jan-October .. 1,3714 1,269.8 1,348. 1,186.5 2,100.1 Jan-November .. 1,383.1 1,879 1,338.0 1,234.6 2,0885 Jan-December .. 1,391.0 1,3013 1,3274 1,2735 2,074.0 1992 1-st Quarter .. 7669 806.6 742,0 853.9 556.7 2-nd Quarter .. 8625 868.8 845.8 890.7 532.4 3-rd Quarter .. .. 941.8 987.7 909.4 7133 4-th Quarter .. .. .. 200.7 1,3103 1,104.1 1993 1-st Quarter .. .,9295 1 .7 1,060.1 1,1323 1557.0 2nd Quartar .. 1,2836 1,159.9 1,263.6 1,0486 "323 3-rd Qouarter .. 1,302.4 1,223.8 1,4289 1,006.0 1,724.7 4-th Quarter .. 1,453.7 1,3693 1204 1,5419 2,03-53 Source: State Satstical Agency. TA3Z9 t KYRtGREIUBIC - NOSWAL WAGRUUNVSCTOR 3V 1m In$ 9m 19 1ma iw two iwo 1992 02n o ublm) BC O NYWIE 14.9 162.6 166.4 71A 183.6 197. 219.2 39.1 2,104.0 MATERl LSECIrS 152.4 169.4 173A 1?7.1 191.5 207.2 2 M.1 223 b*yW 169 188.1 193.8 19S. 214.7 237A 263.7 43.5 2,919.6 B b 181JD 189.8 18.1 201.7 2282 247A 214.3 701D4 Fuld 230 262. 271A4 3. 210.7 317.5 349 564.1 wftuw pw"ao_u m* 244. 26W4 278.6 32.5 .2 320.1 343.9 5403 Wn &obAft=d a l%Wwwt 181.4 2D4 m9J. 212.8 28.1 211. 2.2 452. h aod"Wip"Am i1 MA 194.5 203.9 2073 2310 244. 271.0 481.0 FWuhy W-kiu."Pwp. "1 b" 10i.2 183 19" 190. 215.5 22.4 242.2 427.2 c _nonwim1 m7s to"44 197.8 210.7 227. 25.6 2".9 444.8 Lfg&U i %& 14D.0 155 161.2 I"5 181.6 205.7 226.7 402.3 Tlxtib 149.0 174.8 083 181.1 205.6 21 270.5 492. Cbtbng 142.9 130 139.3 138.7 154.4 I68 129 20.7 L ua ams Ii 15.5 1d. 1.0 167.6 191.7 216.8 234.7 429.7 pFodatu4 1453 157.0 165.7 177.3 18I 199.4 2153 3514 mzmi&dy 152.1 1663 177.2 is5 185.7 200 23 347.5 pFis 129.8 144.8 153.1 154.7 110.7 176.0 194.2 314.6 comanu 179.1 199.3 205.1 211.7 237.9 247.9 273.9 421.4 2,90.9 AgdaIm V 126.0 10.5 15D.9 52.3 161.6 190.0 197.7 330.2 155.0 T _pt 176 184.8 1921 197.5 210.8 2.5 239.1 3424 2174.1 C _mm1uaim 140.4 141.5 1.7 152.3 173.6 186.8 213.5 3726 2J.. Tado(jsu11myduh 125A4 135.0 138I 138.1 144.7 1682 24.9 321.5 1.S2.7 Odl,100.7 1to.8 111.0 114.7 122.0 125.3 137.1 246.2 1,J97.5 NO144ATERILSECORM 1360 145.3 148. 1573 164. 1755 19t2 38D0 1,727.9 Muh Jwm 124.1 136.2 138.9 143.5 154.2 10.9 179S 2804 1,757.4 _da 1744 190.5 197.5 206 235.5 289.1 3014 411.5 2499 Eduasim 131.1 146.1 150.9 163.3 1654 166.2 167. 261 1,5392 Cuai, 107.4 10.2 109.1 113.3 115.2 1183 132.1 243.6 1625.0 bb 126.8 130.2 130.6 1334 1352 137.8 149.8 2530. 183.0 Fk°ftcwe oh1iaw h1.Poo 11.0 121.0 121.9 130.1 1383 14.1 166. 2f6.7 1.5523 Han fium4 cmOs fmiw 144. 56.6 165. 174.4 179.9 18.2 3193 66.3 4J00 3ousmu 143.8 1. 161.8 167.3 1t9 2073 297.3 393.5 2,659.2 tiwo - LMa BOONOiYWME 100.0 109.9 112.5 IIS.9 124.1 133.5 14.2 2360 1422.6 MATERIALSBCIORS 10o0. 111.2 113.8 1162 125.7 136.0 U2.6 256.0 1,4943 100.0 111.0 114.3 116 126.7 140.1 1.554 252S 1,72L5 Eba1df 100.0 I149 105.9 1114 1261 1367 157.1 387.5 Fob 1o0. 110.3 114.1 11.5 117.9 1334 144.1 237.0 g yfh f# 7_W a 4mm) W"10 1094.6 114.2 115.8 12.5 131.2 14.9 229.6 100.0 112.7 1U15 1173 1257 138.5 55.6 249.2 CbmdaWlomdp _ nb b 108.0 113.5 119.0 120.9 134S 148A 15L. 256.7 FP aW y,_ulg0 118.2 119.9 119.1 134.5 18 151-1 266.7 Cmta0ims s 100.0 104 111.2 1185 128.0 14.8 I67.A 2302. tl*I y 100.0 111.3 115.1 114.6 129.7 1469 161.9 287.4 TOAD 100. 118.7 121.3 t21.5 130 182.5 1.5 33S .0.8 Cla_e I1O0 91.5 97J5 97.1 108. 116.7 128.0 2153 T =sIaelefay 10D0 I104 112.1 109.9 123.7 142.2 153.9 281S. Faod itmi IQO0 1l0 1140 122.0 125.1 137.2 14.2 241.8 Mmtmdd iay t10 109.3 116.5 1220 122.1 134.1 145. S 8.5 FMh 100.0 111.6 118. 119.2 131.5 13S4 149.6 242.A Odlfiod_asamas .. .. .. .. .... cuaelom 1OD0 1109 114.1 117. 132A 1380 152. 234.5 1,6143 AJ4d_ 2V 100.0 119A 119.8 120.9 1213 142.9 56.9 262.1 1,234.1 S - l8OD tC 1044 10. 111S 119.3 12.9 15.3 193. 1.324 C _nmwicadm hOO1 IO. 0L8S 1092 1236 133.0 52.1 2654 1,60.2 T!R&(uatlamluba ) 101.0 107.7 IIO 110.1 IIS4 130.9 163.4 256.4 1,419 Otlm 10D.0 1080 110.2 113.9 121.2 124.4 1361 244.5 1,288.5 NOINI4kTERIALCORRS 10.0 106.8 109.5 11S.? 121.1 120 139.9 221.2 I.5 MualalslmdvIss 10.0 109.8 111.9 IIS 1243 129.7 144.9 22.1 1,416.1 Sali nI zd _ldwele 100.0 109.1 113.1 I18 134.9 16546 1m2 23. 1,41.7 Mouastl. 10OD 111.4 115.I 124.6 1263 126. 128.0 204. 1,174.1 culbilI 1 103. 10146 1055 IO07. 110.1 123. 226S 1,513*0 Afs 100.0 1L.7 103. 105.2 106.6 108.7 11.1 197.7 1,485S Had& we. do uft spw 1004.0 102.5 1033 110.3 117.2 123 1414 226.0 1,315j BoMg Zamn, cadl Iau I IOD 108.1 114.2 120.4 124.2 1l0. 210S 459. 2,825.1 100.0 1044 112.5 1163 125.S 144.2 2067 2734 1,92 Sl &M 4 nglAa.. TAI lO.4 DZ, V REU1LC * MONEY lNCOME JAND lmEND Ffl'IE 07!POPUlATON (mIllios o aurt rubbs) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 INCOME TOTAL LABOR INCOME 2,558 3,351 3423 3,f17 3,826 4,305 4,75S 8,043 47,754 RgW ages 2,059 2,54 26S3 2,719 2,922 3,278 3,613 5,28 30,88S of whwch Wages lPd byCoop _ _ _ 32 101 139 204 2.606 Other Wages atd Compensations 68 91 88 92 105 119 140 323 1,457 Imc Paid by Collectie Farms 249 393 386 365 380 401 455 591 10,197 bIcome hom Sale,of Pam Poducts 182 313 296 341 419 507 547 1,600 5,214 TOTALhANS tERCIIS 574 769 85S 8t.S 1,066 1,043 1,284 3,012 23,226 Pensions and Allowances 41S 553 607 632 671 714 81g 2,257 18,895 Scholarships 32 34 35 37 38 38 44 95 581 Incme fom the Frandal Sjstem (insurnce, interst, ec.) 78 125 122 138 231 163 293 373 522 Olherlncome 49 56 90 88 126 128 129 287 3,229 TOTALINCOME 3,132 4,119 4,278 4,412 4,893 5,348 6,039 11,055 70,960 OUTlAYS TOTAL PURCHASES 2,817 3,458 3,524 3,675 4,109 4,535 5,031 8,09S 51,770 Retail Ihde puchases 2,S57 3,141 3,183 3,302 3,689 4,091 4,560 6,960 44,965 Purchased Seridces 260 318 341 373 420 44S 471 1,135 6,805 Rent and Utilties 56 83 89 89 90 92 93 88 496 Trnqsot and CommunIcatons 138 15 169 1S2 195 197 200 3S4 4,417 Healh and other Services 66 77 83 102 123 144 158 435 1,886 Coopea .. .. 0 12 12 20 257 6 TRANSFERS AND SAVINGS 360 s01 584 609 698 819 912 1,976 s,02s Taxes, Fees, Dues and Other 298 384 410 426 471 550 S99 52 4,733 Savings 62 117 175 184 228 269 313 1,124 276 Other .. .. . . _ _ _ _ 16 TOTAL EXPENMIURE 3,177 3,960 4,109 4,285 4,807 5,354 5,943 10,071 S679S INCOMEleesEXPENDITURE -45 160 169 127 85 -6 96 985 14,186 Soul= Sate Staistic AgenA . TAME U1-14t KUGZ REUKUC - CAPTAL RRETIENV SrATE ENTERPSES AND ORGANIZATONS 1/ (mions of curment rubki) 1980 1985 1986 1987 198 1989 1990 1991 1992 Mateial Sphe 807 981 1,014 985 1,019 1,068 1,097 1,549 4,839 Agriultr nud for"ty 314 420 436 413 382 355 371 502 120 Agdculture xcludig fos 313 418 434 411 38D 352 368 498 1,202 Forsty 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 6 Industry, total 357 433 446 445 508 579 558 m8 3,233 1ndudty, other 314 386 397 396 447 510 485 787 3,083 Construction 43 47 49 49 61 69 73 91 1s Other, matera sphere 136 I28 132 127 129 134 168 169 398 TmrasportaftioOfgoods 73 59 61 65 66 59 79 69 118 Maintenance of roads _ - _ . . _ Cmmu1nictboion serviang mtr producion 16 20 21 23 24 22 23 23 32 Wholsale toade 44 45 46 38 38 44 64 76 247 Retai ttde and catring Materil supply _ _ Pr.axourement 3 4 4 Infibrmation and o¢mputing servkcs _1 1 5 2 1 1 Other banches of mat ralproduction - . _ 4 _ Nonmateri Spbere 325 401 446 513 591 570 726 1,014 3,353 Housdag 167 244 267 278 322 327 399 586 2,51 Pubc uliies and peonal serices _ _ 46 40 46 57 69 124 260 Health care, soida securty, physicd culte and spots _ 31 32 36 47 51 80 180 Education 5 _ 7 86 98 101 116 165 273 Culture and art _ _ 10 14 16 18 20 26 30 Sien and scntific servs _ _ _ _ _ 11 8 2 Credit Insurance Geneal admint and defense _ . __ Priate nonprofit instit seving househols _ _ _ _ _ Other, mateal and nonmaterial spheres 461 529 578 640 720 704 894 1,183 3,751 Total Capital Investment 1,132 1,382 1,460 1,498 1,610 1,638 1,823 2,563 8,192 1/ 1980,1985-90 data are in 1984 pries; 1991-92 are in curent prices. Source: State Ststical Agency. TAIsICI .2 U PUZ UC -CUAL ffrMENTNAciNC YTYPE OF EN 1E / (allaof uat,*m) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 StEnterprist s 2/ 925 1,131 1,172 1,225 1,301 1,329 1,456 2,09 11,X Cooperatim 26 22 24 24 28 39 41 55 S29 Private Sector Si 79 91 99 135 119 166 218 1,379 OtherSources 130 1SO 173 150 146 151 160 191 2,079 Totdl CTpital Investment 1,132 1,382 1,460 1,498 1,610 1,638 12 26 1S7 I/ 1980, 1985-90 data are in 1984 prices; 1991-92 are in curent pices. 2/ Incuding inrt c ives Socs Stt Stats Agency. TABLE 11s WZ PBPUDC - SrCKSAT DOF R (Mio of am bbi) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Matei Sph 2,2115 30.7 39S 3,418.3 3,533.2 3,;.0 34.1 7,19.0 Agricture dad foaresty 400.9 730.9 122.9 1,360.1 1,366.5 1,3889 1,29 1,76 14 Agriult exudingfr .. .. _ .. .. _ _ . 14,37.9 Faty _ _ _ .. .. .. .. 189.9 Industly,total 1330 1,9927 1,33 145L7 1,56L2 1,7381 1,847.1 4,64 5021 Industr, other 912.7 1,3139 1,190.7 1,268.2 1,3. 1,534.0 1,599.6 3,8672 47,926.8 Consructn 410.3 6788 1716 1835 193.0 204.1 247.5 2892 2,493 Other, mate sphere 487.6 7S7.1 7503 6065 6055 667.0 680.1 1,274.0 13,6584 Tanportion of goods _ _ .. _ - _ - Maintenance of rads 3.3 S.9 5.0 6.6 65 7.2 8.7 33 24. Comm onevcnmtra produc_io .. _._ .. - .. Wholsale trade 1/ 2416 439.2 410.8 394.8 398.7 423.4 367.9 7328 6,136.9 Ret trade and caring .. .. .. .- - eial niapply 130.1 197.2 200.7 88t5 984 114.6 122.7 S12A 6,8815 Procurement 72.6 114.8 132.8 11S3 1005 1208 1798 35 5387 InforMon and computuig services _ 1.0 13. 1A 10 t0 22.0 773 Other bies of mate production - - - _ _ Nonmaterial Sphere 614.1 1,0195 1,35.4 9135 9S2.3 948.0 9395 1,3661 7,3619 Tannsporon, totl 15.7 22.3 22.1 205 21.0 22.7 243 493 640.0 Communication, tot 3.89 4.9 4. 45 5.4 6.2 7.1 13. 644 Housing 2/ OS L0 07 09 _ _ - _ _ Publc utilites and pesoal servies 28.0 S0.6 54.6 S7A 565 S8.7 S83 745 327.9 Heath care, soi aenty, physia culure and spor _ _ _ .. _ _ Education Culure and art .. .. _ .. _ .. _ Scen and scientific svkes L8 L3 0.6 12 53 82 189 155 136.8 Credit _ .. _ _ _. Genea admintration and defense - _ _ _ __ Prate nonprofit instit serving households and other 3/ 564.3 939A 9528 829.0 864.1 8S22 8309 1,213.7 6,192.8 Other, material and nonmabtrial spheres 1,1017 1,776.6 1,785.7 1,520M, 1,5S7.8 1,613.0 1,619.6 2,640.1 21,020.3 Total Stocks at end of year 2,8S.6 4,500.2 4,3749 433L8 4A48S5 4,742.0 4,743.6 8,559.1 86,008.2 1/ Totl trade. 2/a Start in 1988, including publc utilite 3/ Consumer coopertivs SoUrOe State Stistical Agen. TAME IA 24 KROZ RUUBUC -CEHANGSIN W!OCKSUYTTM A4D NY DCWI(5C MeC=O (sUa launriat vubS.) 1910 1985 198 198 188 198 199 199 199 TOTAL CUANGE IN MMCK 138. 174.6 -125.3 .43.1 153. 256.5 1.6 3,795.7 177,689 NY TYPE Raw Materiel 95.4 68.1 392.9 -7.5 169.0 227.1 159.3 1,393.6 28,456.2 Uafhlbuj Prlodmcton 103 276.1 .489.8 1.8 .17.4 -5.0 38.5 491.4 5,675.2 Outlis laPrpes 1/ .. .. ., Finshe Pxoonctloa, Goods 32.6 696. -41.7 .39.1 .19.1 30.8 -220.1 1,611.9 34,8229 Odoer Stocks 0.3 17.6 13.3 1.7 21.2 3,6 23.9 296.8 8,514.6 BY SECTOR 1386 1,674.6 -1253 -43.1 153.7 256.5 1.6 3,795.7 77,4689 bbMara Sphere 99. 1,269.2 .141.2 78. 114.9 260.8 10.1 3,369.1 71,431 Apmiiclur ding foresty 18.3 330.0 496.0' 133.2 64 22A -112. 485.7 12,803.2 Ag cultur eu1uiet forestry 18 330.0 496.0 133.2 64 22A4 .112.0 485.7 12,832 Indstry, tota 66.3 669.7 -630.4 89.4 109.5 176.9 109.0 2,393 46,26.7 Indesery, cther ~~~~~~~90.5 401.2 -123.2 77.5 100.0 165.8 65.6 2,267.6 44,059.6 Cangmcllou ~~~~~~~~~-24.2 268.5 -50.2 11.9 9.5 11.1 43.4 41.7 2,261 Odtor, nMsmil spher 14.5 269.5 -6.8 -143.8 -1.0 61.5 13.1 574.1 12,404.2 Tnrmnhpoeatonf goods - . .. .. Manmeof rowds 0.1 2.6 .0.9 1.6 -0.1 0.7 1.5 44 2. Whnjssletrad 21 234A 157.6 -28.4 .46.0 3.9 24.7 45.5 364.9 5,4041 Retel trad and catewig .... .. . mateia suply 5.1 67.1 3.5 4112.2 9.9 16.2 8. 389.7 6,369.1 Procurement -14.1 42.2 18.0 .17.5 -14.8 20.3 59.0 -17639 535.2 hbrouatic and cauputtag sevics... 1.0 0.3 0.1 -0OA 0.0 1.2 75.1 Odhe banches ofenateie producin... . . . NntetiSpher 39.5 406.4 15.9 -121.9 38.8 4.3 4.5 426.6 5,9M5. Tunapoetatico ~~~~ ~~~~~2.6 6.6 -0.2 -1.6 0.5 1.7 1.6 25.0 590.7 0as 1.1 0.03 .0.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 6.0 51.3 masoua 31 .. 0.5 -as 0.2 .. Public uftile and -"o sevice 2.4 22.6 4.0 2.8 .1.8 2.2 -0.4 16.2 2534 *Roamiheme, social securi, -by cultur and sport .... . .. Edwcaion . Caulue anda art . . .. Scinc and scolotdi;i servce . .0.5 .07 0.6 4.1 2.9 10.7 .3.4 121.3 Croft. ... . .. Insurawc .... . .. Geneal administratio and defre .. . . .. segvrnhouselald andaddecr4 34.0 375.1 13A4 -123.8 35.1 -11.9 -21.3 382.8 4,979.1 Othe, mateia and uaminaters phere 54.0- 674.9 9.1 -265.7 37.8 37.2 4.6 1,000.7 18,400.0 I/ Twi198 ncudd n nin sheud Productifn taxig18 hw cauerhSsvleso nlddi r oa hneI netre sok) 2¶"cchmgpe (ncrease.)in uniniohedarateuctionfo 98992wuem 104.0,35.0,S754And 593.8 mIlion of Mes 21 Tota tade. I/ Srmftl Im 1988, with publi utilbites 41 Ca,sumor cooperaive. SourcoL Stat StetiuloAgenr. TAILU 114 IKYRGiZ RPUSUC WOIK IN PROGRES IN CONJRUC:TCON (milioot- mbs) 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Materil Sphere 465 604 686 690 860 1,037 1,255 1,1709 6,436 Aglulture including foWeay 14S 234 253 178 222 276 295 3$5 1.178 Agicltur excluding forey 145 234 253 177 222 275 294 352 1,169 Fosestry 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 9 Industy, total 269 312 359 444 553 689 875 1,217 4,586 Industty, other 248 297 342 374 489 631 724 1,105 4,090 Constuctin 21 1S 17 70 64 S8 151 112 496 Other,materllsphere S1 S8 74 68 85 72 85 137 672 Transportatio of goods 13 19 29 22 29 19 19 69 324 Maintenano Of roads _ . _ _ . _ Commnnication servicing maria production 5 11 7 9 16 13 10 15 62 VhAolecSl trade 21 16 22 25 28 28 36 52 282 Retail trade and catering . _ . - Mateia supply Pfoatefat swpt - nfornmation and conmputing serwces 0 1 1 1 3 Other brandces of nmatal producton 12 12 16 12 12 11 19 _1 Nonmaterial Sphere 144 182 195 193 230 314 414 755 4,22 Transortation Communication _ - _ Housing 51 74 72 73 87 123 177 326 2,192 Publklutilltisandperaonalservwes 36 47 44 30 36 55 63 143 652 Health care, socia securly physial cultur and spors 22 29 38 39 45 So 66 105 446 Education 18 19 23 28 34 47 SS 113 639 Culture and art 6 4 7 6 12 18 23 36 140 Science and scientfic serrics 3 4 5 6 7 7 10 9 22 Credit - - bnsuance Ceneal administation and defense Private nonptofit institu s sering households Other, mate and nonmateial spheres 195 240 269 261 315 386 499 892 4,874 Total Work-In-progess in Constuction 609 786 881 883 1,090 1,351 1,669 2,464 10,638 Soure State Saistcal Agency 70' To 02hombul ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~To AImo*-At TO TzhoDul \Toknok 'tAL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' Lake Sonia -ABAD Tokvgui ~~~~~~~~~~~2970 m NARYN ToDvsbanb. TAJIKISTAN 710 TO* uri AU c~~~~ KAZAK HSTAN \v~1o -\ ~ ~ ~ ~ '' :2A0~~~6VGOUA _ ~ 2v '~ ( 4 A 8o&as9 k; A rO -" 9 1080 I3 N. I \ , E ISLAMIC - '' REBUBlC / < ~ (C NAThe boundaries, codors,denomninttions and any oer WomTwHon 0 OF .tANCHIN shown on this mapSd not impl, an the port of the world sank ( ~~~~~~~~ ~~Grup, any judgment on dhe legal statws ot any *erribiy, or any 0 /(, endosenw or a cetonc of such boundories. Ci1 KAZ~~~~~~AKISTAN <.