ICRR 13781 Report Number : ICRR13781 IEG ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 09/14/2012 Country : Mali Project ID : P093991 Appraisal Actual Project Name : Education Sector US$M ): Project Costs (US$M): 35.00 48.07 Investment Program Ii L/C Number : C4222 Loan /Credit (US$M): Loan/ US$M ): 35.00 48.07 Sector Board : Education US$M): Cofinancing (US$M ): Cofinanciers : Board Approval Date : 07/18/2006 Closing Date : 12/31/2009 12/31/2010 Sector (s): Primary education (34%); Secondary education (22%); Vocational training (21%); Tertiary education (18%); General public administration sector (5%) Theme (s): Education for all (67% - P); Administrative and civil service reform (33% - S) Prepared by : Reviewed by : ICR Review Group : Coordinator : Susan Ann Caceres George T. K. Pitman Soniya Carvalho IEGPS1 2. Project Objectives and Components: a. Objectives: The Education Sector Investment Program II is a sector -wide approach for the development of education in Mali supported by 15 donors, including the World Bank . The objective of the ten-Year Program is to provide increased and equitable access to higher quality education . It includes: development of quality basic education; general secondary, technical and vocational education, and educational training by apprenticeship; development and implementation of a sustainable policy for the development of higher education and scientific and technological research; and transparent and participatory management, decentralization and planning of education . The project being reviewed is the second -phase of the three-year input from the Bank. The project’s development objectives stated in the Financing Agreement (p. 5) were: “to increase the proportion of the Recipient ’s children completing quality first -cycle basic education and improve the overall efficiency of resource use in the education sector .� The development objective specified in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, p.2) is identical. b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? No c. Components: There were three components in the project : Improving the quality of basic education (US$ 10.58 million at appraisal; US$ 17.23 million actual). This component aimed to increase reading practice through the setup of a reading area, including the necessary textbook stocking devices and books, in 25 percent of the classrooms of schools in the first cycle of basic education (4,600 classes to be equipped) and providing libraries and 2,000 school textbooks to each of the five Teacher Training Institutes . It also provided direct support thorough grants to all schools in the first cycle of basic education having an operational School Management Committee for purchasing school supplies . It also supported the introduction of a 60-day training certification of 3,000 community school teachers and a 60-day accelerated training program for 1,800 new teachers in accordance with the Alternative Teaching Staff Recruitment Strategy . Increasing access to education (US$ 22.15 million at appraisal; US$ 37.6 million actual). This component supported the construction of schools at the first and second cycles of basic education (970 classrooms) including furniture, water supply and latrines; the construction and equipment of one general secondary schools (for 600 students); and the support of apprenticeship programs in key areas for employment of out of school youth. Strengthening institutional management capacities of the education sector (US$ 2.27 million at appraisal; US$ 3.87 million actual). This focused on : (1) management of human resources, including the evaluation of managers, their training and adaptation to job profiles; (2) the improvement of resource allocation and efficiency through the strengthening of budgetary and financial management, a regulatory framework for the autonomous management of technical and vocational secondary public schools, financing of private education, and the elaboration of an instrument to allocate resources more efficiently and reduce inequalities; annual audits including the assessment of school construction and the management of textbooks; (3) setting-up of an Integrated Education Management Information System; and (4) program coordination and management including learning assessment in the year 2007 and at the end of the project. d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Project Cost : Project cost for the Bank financed portion increased from US$ 35.00 million to US$48.07 million because additional funds were added to the project (ICR, p. 23). In 2007, additional resources were provided to each component : US$6.5 million was added to component 1; US$15.44 million was added to component 2; and US$1.60 million was added to component three. Not all of these additional funds were spent . These additional funds were to be used for : (i) the provision of textbooks and teachers guides; (ii) increasing the number of reading areas; (iii) expanding direct support to improve school productivity grants; (iv) construction of additional new primary classrooms, two additional secondary schools, teacher training institutes and procurement of equipment; and (v) teacher training and strengthening institutional management capacity . Specific increases in intermediate indicator targets were : (a) to increase construction of primary classroom from 970 to 1,370, (b) reading areas from 4,600 to 9,600 and (c) secondary schools constructed from one to three . Financing : The Program was to be financed by 15 donors that planned to contribute US$ 367.20 million of the total Program cost of US$1,121.70 million. The World Bank provided 3.1% of the initial financing. The project received an IDA credit for US$35 million in July 2006. In May 2007 the project received additional financing from an IDA credit (US$ 15.00 million) and an Education-for-All Fast Track Initiative grant (US$ 8.70 million) in December 2007. Thus, total Bank financing was to be US$58.70 million. The actual amount disbursed was US$ 48.07 million and at project closing US$13.82 million was cancelled. The amount cancelled is larger than the value of the credits and grants less the amount disbursed because of fluctuations in the exchange rate of the US$ and Special Drawing Rights (the currency of the Financing Agreement). The Program was supported also through parallel financing from 14 other donors. These include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the U . S. Agency for International Development, the United Nations Children’s Fund, Switzerland, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter -American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations . Some donors (France, Canada) also provided budget support and technical assistance . Together these donors planned to contribute US$ 317.20 million (ICR, p. 23). At the time of the writing of the ICR, the amount of the contributions from these donors was not available . Borrower Contributions : The Borrower planned to contribute US$ 754.5 million. At the time of the writing of the ICR the amount of contribution made from the government was not available, and it was still not available at the time of this Review . Date: Date The project was extended by one year from December 31, 2009 to December 31, 2010 to permit full implementation of incomplete components due to delays at inception . 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: a. Relevance of Objectives: Substantial . The government of Mali established its vision and strategy for the country's education sector in its Ten-Year Program for the Development of Education . This document promotes the universal completion of primary education. A three-phased Education Sector Investment Program was established as a way to help Mali achieve this program, and this project was the second phase whose objectives were aligned with key components of the government’s program. The Country Assistance Strategy (2008-2011) emphasized improving access and quality of education, and promoting more gender balance (CAS, p. 29). The CAS also emphasized a harmonized approach with other donors, which this project undertook with 14 other donors who provided support to the government's broader program. There was also a need to improve the efficiency in the education system as evidenced by high rates of student repetition, high teacher absenteeism, and need for better management and use of resources . Even so, the quality objective was also overly ambitious given the short life of the project and time it would take to build capacity through training. b. Relevance of Design: Modest . The activities outlined in the project's components could be expected to lead to the intended outcomes . However, the Results Framework presented in Annex 3 of the Project Appraisal Document does not provide a clear and logical causal chain between these activities and the attainment of the development objectives (PAD, p.42-45). First, there are no outcome measures to demonstrate improved use of resources in the education sector . Second, activities related to secondary education (i.e. construction of general education secondary schools and support to apprenticeship programs for out of school youth ) were not consistent with the stated intent of the project's development objective, support for first cycle of basic education . A Specific Investment Loan (SIL) was selected instead of the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) because the APL approach was too rigid for the Government's program and some of the triggers were defined too vaguely (PAD, p 9). 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): The Bank was only one of 15 donors supporting Mali’s education sector (PAD, p 9). Their interventions and funding supplemented the Bank ’s inputs and so these parallel activities and financing will have affected the outcomes of this project and the extent of their spill -over impact on the Bank-financed activities cannot be determined. It should also be noted that the ICR (p 9) questions the reliability of some of the data presented . To increase the proportion of the Recipient ’s children completing quality first -cycle basic education The objective, "To and improve the overall efficiency of resource use in the education sector " has been split into three components : increase children completing first -cycle basic education, improve the quality of basic education, and improve overall efficiency in education sector . To increase the proportion of Malian children completing a first cycle of basic education : Substantial Outputs: 1,369 classrooms for the first and second cycle of basic education were built, nearly meeting the target of 1,370. One teacher training institute was constructed . 2,400 students gained access to secondary education following the construction of 3 secondary schools, meeting the target Outcomes: 16, 680 youth were enrolled in apprenticeship programs, meeting the target of 11,000. Gross enrollment rate for first cycle basic education increased from 66.6% in 2005 to 83.4% in 2010, meeting the target (82.2%). The gross intake rate for boys at 84.8% slightly exceeded targets (84.6%). In contrast the intake rate for girls of 72.1% fell short of the target (78.0%). The ICR (p.14) reports "underfunding in school construction by the government and other donors which may explain why the intake rates and the expansion of the system did not improve as anticipated ". The proportion of girls relative to total enrollment in first cycle of basic education increased from 43.8% in 2005 to 45.5% in 2010, narrowly missing the target (46.2%). Similarly, the proportion of girls relative to total enrollment in second cycle of basic education increased from 40.0% in 2005 to 41.5% in 2010, not meeting the target (44.0%). The completion rate of primary education for grade 6 increased from 43.2% in 2005 to 59.1% in 2010, meeting the target (56.4%). The completion rate for boys in grade 6 was 67.7%, while only 50.6% of girls completed grade 6. Since the ICR does not contain a disaggregated gender baseline, it is not possible to determine what gender specific improvements in completion rates have occurred; however, the ICR (p. 14) reported that the gap between boys' and girls' primary completion widened during the project implementation . The ICR did not explain whether any of the increase in completion rates was due to a change in the promotion policies . To Improve the quality of basic education : Modest Outputs The percentage of the government's operating budget allocated to basic education increased from 35% to 40%, meeting the target (40%). Even so, the ICR notes (p.15) that the low level of the recurrent budget to primary education and the high level of inefficiency does not give enough room to hire teachers and expand the public provision of schools. In 2010, students attending public schools represented only 60 percent of the total enrollment, with parent-financed community schools mostly in poor rural areas filling the gap . 9,600 classrooms in the first cycle of basic education were equipped with reading areas (target 4,600). None of the library equipment for teacher training institutions was provided because procurement delays led to cancellation of bids. 6,000 teachers received pre-service training, meeting the target of 1,800. 5, 400 new teachers participated in a -60 day accelerated training program, meeting the target of 1,800. 5, 400 community teachers received in -service training, meeting the target of 3,000. A student evaluation system was established and testing was carried out in 2007 and 2009. The ICR (p. 13) reported that the results have been used by the Government to inform education reform such as introduction of national languages, improve reading instruction, and strengthen role of inspectors . Outcomes: A high ratio of students to teachers persists within the system, 64 students per teacher against the target of 50. The percentage of textbook and manuals reaching schools increased from 40% in 2006 to 75% in 2012, not meeting the target of 90%. The ICR did not report the text-to-student ratio. The proportion of students in second, fourth, and sixth years of the first cycle of basic education acquiring basic competency in reading and math varied considerably by grade and none of the targets were met . In all cases competency in mathematics declined . There was also a general decline in both reading and math competency in the higher grades: Grade 2 decreased reading competency from 49.6% to 47.1% (target 60%). Grade 2 decreased math skills from 41% to 38% (target 60%). Grade 4 increased reading competency from 47.7% to 51.6% (target 60%). Grade 4 decreased math skills from 45.0% to 41.8% (target 60%). Grade 6 decreased reading skills from 62.4% to 48.6% (target 60%). Grade 6 decreased math skills from 43.03% to 31.8% (target 60%). It is not clear from the ICR what effect expanded enrollment and induction of poorer students from less educated backgrounds might have had on the decline of average competency scores . To improve the overall efficiency of resources used in the education sector : Modest Outputs: 204 senior staff were trained in managerial skills; 167 staff received computer software training and 22 staff were trained in finance and accounting . A personnel database was created and registered 19,206 teachers. Audits of school construction and external assessment of the ESIP II were completed, and while the textbook audit was not completed during the project, the Task Team report that it was submitted in 2012. A school mapping instrument to allocate resources more efficiently was expected to be completed in late 2011. An effective system to transfer financial resources (i.e. school grants) to schools and a manual to guide administrators were established. The share of schools financed by direct support to improve school productivity increased from a baseline of 25% to 100% and 4,500 schools benefited. These grants enabled schools and communities to purchase equipment, and repair schools, which led to the timely re -opening of schools, as well as to mobilize parents and communities to assist in the school repairs, and manage funds in a transparent and efficient manner at the school level, based on the grant procedures manual . By the close of the project, a Management Information System was available . However, the Task Team told IEG this was not in operation. Outcomes: The proportion of non-teaching staff in the education sector increased from a baseline of 24% to 25% in 2010, not meeting the target, which was to lower the share to 20%. The total share of repeating students in the first cycle decreased from 18.6% in 2005 to 12.9% in 2010, meeting the target (13.7%). There was little difference at the end of project in repeater rates for boys (12.8%) and girls (12.9%). The total share of repeating students in the second cycle decreased from 23.9% in 2005 to 17.6% in 2010, meeting the target (18.8%). The share of repeating boys at project completion (17.1%) was better than that for girls. However, the above decrease in repeating students may be the result of increasing the number of children in school because of improved access . 5. Efficiency: The PAD did not conduct an economic analysis of the project, but instead reported the economic rate of return for primary education (15 percent) and secondary education (25 percent). The ICR also did not conduct an economic analysis . It reported the analysis conducted for the education sector in Mali. This analysis revealed low levels of recurrent budget for primary education in Mali, insufficient budgetary investment for construction of new classrooms, and high level of inefficiency in the system . Even so, this information does not provide an indication of how efficient the project utilized funds, or the value it received for the money spent . There are several examples in the ICR that indicate questionable efficiency . Construction costs in Mali, as evidenced by the unit cost of a project classroom at US$ 17,500. The World Bank (2009) indicates that the range of construction costs in Africa is from US$ 5,000 - US$47,000. There is also the difficulty that this measure does not give a student per capita cost, or what other items were included in the costs (e.g. building materials, latrines, water supply, stores etc) and a rational comparison is not possible . However, it was a notable accomplishment of the project that 1, 369 classrooms were constructed, nearly meeting the target of 1, 370, despite the cancellation of US$ 13 million - but this alone is not a measure of efficiency . Administrative efficiency was low. Although 38% more than planned was spent to improve institutional management capacities achievements were modest . In addition, delays in procurement and timely reports impeded implementation of project activities and disbursement and approximately 20% of the IDA/FTI credit (US$ 13 million) went undisbursed, which could have been utilized to benefit more children in Mali . (ICR, p. 16). Efficiency is rated as modest . ERR )/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) FRR ) at appraisal and the re -estimated value at evaluation : re- Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope* Appraisal No ICR estimate No * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome: There was substantial relevance of objectives, while modest relevance of design . The project contributed to increasing the primary education completion rate, provided training to teachers and apprentices, and supported decentralization in school management . However, the ICR neither provided data demonstrating improved quality in basic education nor evidence of the efficient use of sectoral resource . Thus, one objective was rated substantial, while the other two had modest efficacy . Efficiency was rated as modest . a. Outcome Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: The government has a high level of commitment to the project interventions and reforming the education system . This commitment is evidenced by the government's increase in the recurrent budget for education sector from 35% to 40% of its operating budget. Donors remain engaged and committed to the government's education plan and they have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to provide a framework for a multi -donor approach to support the education sector in the future . Donors have endorsed the third phase of the Ten -Year Program for the Development of Education. The next phase of this project has been prepared and is being implementing incorporating some of the lessons learned from this project, such as strengthening the technical capacity of the Teaching Academy to supervise construction sites and clarifying the roles and responsibilities for school management between local government and the Ministry of education . Several factors pose moderate risks to development outcomes . Basic education financing is highly donor -dependent. Persistent disparities in primary education remain related to rural areas and gender . The support within the Ministry has waned for girls education and there has not been any unit within the Ministry specifically tasked with this issue . Weak institutional capacity provides insufficient monitoring at the school level, particularly needed with decentralized responsibilities. Inefficiencies in the education system remain high as evidenced by high repetition rates, high administrative costs, low levels of student performance, and teacher absence . a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate 8. Assessment of Bank Performance: a. Quality at entry: Preparation was based on analysis of the sector and the lessons learned from previous projects . The ICR also reported that preparation was participatory . However, there were a number of weaknesses at entry, which negatively affected project implementation . First, the project was designed to be executed in three years, but given the scope of the project and its complex activities this was unrealistic . A narrowing of the scope and objectives of the project may have been needed, given the managerial capacity (ICR, p. 12). Second, there was insufficient analysis of country financial systems and ability to support school decentralization . For example, the National Investment Agency of Territorial (ANICT) carried out fiduciary aspects linked to school construction with local government, but was not charged with quality control, nor was any other agency (ICR, p. 7), which should have been identified at entry . Third, there were insufficient mitigation measures to address weak institutional capacity, particularly related to fiduciary issues and the ability to manage a complex project with multiple agencies to coordinate . Fourth, the Bank team overly optimistically appraised the capacity of the Ministry Staff who were unfamiliar with international accounting practices, procurement process, and financial management . (PAD, p.2). Fifth, there were weaknesses in the selection of indicators and some indicators were selected for which the project had no direct activity (ICR, p. 14). at -Entry Rating : Quality -at- Moderately Unsatisfactory b. Quality of supervision: There was good coordination and harmonization among development partners . Missions complemented the work of the annual joint reviews. Bank staff played a leading role in preparing and organizing annual reviews . Early in the project, the Bank team identified and raised concerns that the division of the education sector into three ministries in addition to the existing one would negatively affect project implementation . However, there were a number of weaknesses in the Bank's supervision also which negatively impacted project implementation. First, project supervision changed during the course of the project with four different Task Team leaders during four years. The government expressed concern "that the frequent [supervisory] changes created confusion and delays" (ICR, p. 9). Second, the Bank team did not provide realistic ratings during the course of project implementation; satisfactory ratings were given despite issues raised related to procurement delay and low disbursement rate. Third, the Bank was not proactive in resolving issues . For example, Bank staff did not deal with government early in the project to remove the US$ 2 million ceiling limit on the Special Account, which seriously impacted the payment of contracts and replenishment of the account . When the ceiling limit was removed, disbursements doubled within the final year of the project . The ICR noted a number of things the Bank staff could have done to provide better supervision to the project, such as : scaling back and or restructuring the project given the lack of capacity of the implementing agency; or being more pro -active in resolving the procurement issues for books and providing more technical support to solve the audit issue . (ICR, p. 19). Quality of Supervision Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory Quality of Supervision Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: a. Government Performance: The government exhibited a strong commitment to education by setting out its vision and strategy for the sector and by increasing the budget to the education sector . However, the amount of Government funding for this project is not known (ICR, p. 23). There were weaknesses in performance . First, government processes caused procurement delays that severely slowed project implementation. There were two signatories for procurement, the Director of the National Treasury and the Director of the Administrative and Financial Directorate (DAF) and they were not well coordinated. The government-imposed procurement ceiling of US$2 million caused serious delays for the project. When the special account ceiling was removed in 2009, disbursements increased from US$ 20 million in December 2009 to US$ 41 million by project closing in March 2011. Second, the government has made limited progress in building institutional capacity of the Ministry and ensuring accountability for results . It could have done more to use expenditure analysis to improve budget allocations for school construction, recruitment and improved deployment of teachers . The government gave insufficient attention to inefficiencies in the education sector such as high teacher absenteeism, inefficiencies in deployment of teachers, high construction costs, and high administrative costs. Government Performance Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance: There were a number of weaknesses with the performance of the implementing agency . First, the implementation of the project was split among three existing Ministries (Ministry of Basic Education, Literacy and National Languages, Ministry of Secondary and Tertiary Education and Scientific Research ). This arrangement had a negative effect on project implementation, since there was poor communication and coordination between Ministries. Moreover, project implementation was affected by lack of coordination between the line directorates of the ministry and activities carried out at the decentralized levels . Second, the implementing agency was not able to maintain adequate staff in key areas to ensure timely project implementation . It took too long to hire staff . Third, the implementing agency was slow to resolve issues related to project coordination and monitoring . Better supervision was needed to monitor construction contractors to ensure better quality . The concerns raised during the Mid-term review remained until project closing and little was done to address them . Fourth, the support within the Ministry has waned for girls education and there has not been any unit within the Ministry specifically tasked with this issue. Finally, due to the slow pace of disbursements, approximately 20% of the IDA/FTI credit (US$ 13 million) went undisbursed, which could have been utilized to benefit more children in Mali . Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization: a. M&E Design: The PAD provided a detailed plan for the M&E system in which responsibilities were split among three agencies (e.g. Planning and Statistical Unit was responsible for collecting data on project indicators, Administrative and Financial Directorate on financial indicators, and the Director of Pedagogies on teaching and learning indicators ). The Results Framework did not identify outcome measures for related to the efficiency objective . The indicators related to institutional strengthening provided no measure of improved efficiency of resources in the system (i.e., Financial Management Reports provided in a timely manner, financial management and procurement conducted in a satisfactory manner). One notable aspect in the Results Framework was the inclusion of three indicators that disaggregated data by gender, since the PAD noted that access to learning opportunities was lower for girls . (See Section b for other design weaknesses in the Results Framework .) b. M&E Implementation: Prior to the project, timely education sector data were not available and the Ministry did not produce regular annual reports. There was limited coordination between the multiple agencies responsible for collecting data and data were often not collected and analyzed on time . Subsequently, the Vocational Training and Apprenticeship Support Fund and the National Investment Agency of Territorial Authorities built a database for recording project activities and provided accurate and timely information of its activities . Processing data from the school level was done manually . Regions did not have the capacity to process their own data . Steps were rushed in publishing annual statistics . The data from the 2009-2010 school year were available only in May 2011. At the end of the project, the government, with the assistance of other donors, is completing a computer network that agencies will be able to use to transmit data. This should facilitate a more timely receipt of data from schools and hopefully will result in faster processing by the Ministry to prepare annual school statistics . During the course of the project, one of the development outcome indicators was changed and revisions were made to some of the intermediate indicators, but weakness in the Results Framework were not addressed during implementation. c. M&E Utilization: Some aspects of data were utilized by the project and Ministry . For example, a number of studies were carried out during the course of the project . The results of these studies were discussed in joint sector reviews and utilized by the Ministry to inform policy choice for the next phase of the education reform program . However, because the processing of annual statistics was rushed, concerns were raised with the reliability of data . Data collection was frequently too late to be utilized for monitoring project activities or ensuring accountability . M&E Quality Rating : Modest 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards: The PAD indicates that two safeguard policies were triggered by the project : Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) arising from construction of schools . The ICR provides information only related to Environmental Assessment and not Involuntary Resettlement, indicating that "the government has its own regulatory rules and body to ensure sound compliance with safeguard policies " (ICR, p. 10). The Task Team stated that regular monitoring was undertaken by the Bank and that no safeguard problems arose . b. Fiduciary Compliance: The project followed the Bank’s financial procedures. The ICR indicates that other donors involved in the broader reform followed the governments’ procedures. Maintaining two financial reporting system and the associated audits was a challenge for the government . The fiscal year for the Government and the Bank were not aligned and so the Government could not submit its annual audit report before the end of June . Delays in the submission of the annual audit report began occurring in 2007, when the report was delivered 3 months later. National program audits were partial and at times rejected. No audits were qualified. Delays occurred in procurement because of the US$ 2 million ceiling that was imposed by the government, which slowed project implementation . c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative): None known. d. Other: None 12. 12. Ratings : ICR IEG Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome : Moderately Moderately There were significant shortcomings . Satisfactory Unsatisfactory While there was substantial relevance of objectives, relevance of design was modest. Two of the objectives had modest efficacy, while the other was substantial. Efficiency was rated as modest. Risk to Development Moderate Moderate Outcome : Bank Performance : Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance : Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTES: NOTES - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: The main lessons that are learned from the ICR and this project are : Before functions can be effectively decentralized from the Ministry, a structure needs to be in place to monitor local and school level activities, as well as clear delineation of each party ’s role/responsibilities. In this project budgets and school construction were decentralized before local -level reform of financial management and procurement systems and teacher management procedures . A SWAp requires careful project design based on sound analysis of the fiduciary and monitoring and evaluation to avoid overloading local capacity . In the case of this project, there was not sufficient analysis of the institutional capacity and discussion of harmonizing schedules . Differing fiduciary reporting schedules led to delays in the delivery of audits and annual work programs . 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: The ICR provided a concise description of project implementation and is well written . The quality of the evidence and analysis was high, particularly the assessment of the performance of the Bank . It explained both outcomes and results, not just implementation. The lessons presented were important for other projects and were based on evidence. There were some shortcomings, since the ICR did not contain sufficient information, consistent with OPCS guidelines. There was no information about the continued relevance of objectives . For this review, the current CAS was consulted to verify that the project remained relevant to current country context . There was insufficient information related to: (1) the resolution of the two safeguard policies triggered by the project and (2) the actual contributions from the Borrower and other Donors and an explanation why the figures were not available . a.Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory