riP V Report No. 556-a riL : IU0PVf I I - - - % - - - - - - iNuciear Power: Its Signiticance for the Developing World July 10, 1975 (Supersedes April 18, 1974 edition) Public Utilities Department Not for Public Use Document of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Development Association This report was prepared for official use only by the Bank Group. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. The Bank Group does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....... ......................... i - v I. INTRODUCTION ......... ............... *................. 1 II. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE ..... ........................ 3 III. THE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE SUPPLY OF PLANT .... ........... 8 The Reactor Technologies ...... ............ 8 Operating Experience with Reactors ................... .. 11 Reactor-Manufacturing Experience ......... . .............. 13 Turbine Manufacturing Experience .... ................... 15 IV. THE EVOLVING COST PICTURE ..... ........................ 18 Capital or First Costs ............... .................. 19 Canital Costs for Plants in Developing Countries ....... 19 Operating Costs for Plants in Developing Countries ..... 21 P1ant Ava1lab1ilty .... ................................. 22 Fuel Prices .. ....... . . ....... ......... . .... 22 Estimated Power eneration Costs - . 23 Uranium Resources ...................................... 27 V. SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS ....................... 31 Opposition to Nuclear Power ............................ 31 Environrmental Impact during Normal Operations . . ......... 31 Nuclear Accidents ....................................... 32 ' aef'Lt ar.d D'lversior. ofL NucAlear Ywt-eri'ais ........3 5 Waste Handling ........................... 36 VI. PREPARATIONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR POWER T1k1 T%12TL' f% T I. 'Yft% 1q.jr yVo 2 INA DXEvPN COuULQI.aJ...*ee.@. . .**. . * .9...* 37I "JQ.ULUL7 h1 vv L L pC 1 .. . ....... .... . . ... . . . . .3; . Regulatory As-pects . .................................s. *.**.@* ,37 Nuclear Insurance .. .. .................... ... .38 International Saeguards .3 8 Training.. ... . ... . ...... 38 Public Relations .3......... . ............ . VII. ILICATINS ........ ................ 4 ANNIMES 1. > Clhrter 2 of the BsnkI'a Ranort "Nuclear PcIer for Small Electricity Systems," TO-674, July 15, 1968, V&.ueftr Pr PI t Tec2,.hnfth j,,," 2 * Reac.or Technolwies: StatUg and Operating Ze ensce. 3. Est.-;et t-'t' ' Ci: CstB: 600.- 1w PO' an:t-a Developing Countries 4. Extract from "Potential Market for Nuclear Plants t198O4 - 9 ;--% A-' Rof oure of 1 iz J. Page 1 Estimatu e WOd 1 W0uUces Uraniul! Page 2 World Uranium Production Capacities NUCLEAR POWER: ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR MTIE DEV-ELOPrNG WORLD* SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS i. Although at present the proportion of electricity generated in nuclear power facilities is only some 4-5% of all electricity produced, it is increasing at an extremely rapid pace. Projections taking into account nuclear plants now under construction and these for which facilities have been ordered suggest that nuclear power's share of production will be about 20% in 1980, and very possibly exceed 55% by the end of the century. Even before the recent rise in oil prices, it would have been economically attrac- tive for 15 developing member countries to acquire more than a hundred units 500-600 MW or larger for operation during 1980-1989: Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan. the Philippines, Romania, Spain, Thailand, and Yugoslavia have or will have power systems sufficiently large to accommodate units of this dimension. (Technical and economic considerations generally require that no single unit should re- present more than 10-15% of total system capacity.) At current and foreseen levels of fossil fuel prices and availabilities, nuclear plants of much smaller sizes, down to 200 MW. would be economically attractive in a nL,hber of power systems. Were units of this size to be made available, the nucleat power market would expand through 1990 by about -nother hundred ,nfits and include an additional eight developing member countries. However, units smaller than 500-600 MW are unlikely to be offered bv manufacturers for some time because their order books are filled with requests for larger ones. Indeed, shortages of skilled manpower, manufacturing capacity ar.d other constraints are likely to limit substantially the nuclear power development programs of the developing world. Moreover, heretofore easy access by developlng countries to bilateral and supplier sources for financing nuclear plant may become more difficult in the light of the demands industrialized nations are placing on suppliers. ii. Compared with conventional oil and coal-fired powerplants, nuclear pla nts are characterized by markedly higher capita costS…'- aout 1.5 to 2.5 times) and lower fuel costs (about one-half to one-sixth). They also show greater economies of scale. For these reaso.-s nuclear power Costs ecrease more rapidly than fossil fuel power costs as size of units and plant utili- zati on factors nce-ase. Under the condt'orns prevailing in recent years nuclear plants of 500-600 MW capacity operating at 70% or higher plant utilization. factors had become econu-ucally attractive in most industrial countries. Even with the markedly changed competitive position of nuclear power brought about b-y th e recent increases in the price of oil, it continues to be attractive principally for supplying the base load of sizable (larger than 2000 MW) power systems. Thus to meet the continuing problem of supplying smaller systems, and non-base load requirements and the short duration peaks of larger power systems, the world will still require hydroelectric developments, diesel units, gas-turbines, pumped storage plants, and fossil-fuelled steam pnt-. * The original paper dated April 18. 1974 has been updated in nart to reflect latest developments in regard to safety issues. iii. Some 15-20 years after the advent of the first industrial sized r.ucLear pow-er pLants, two reactor techuologies Deing orrered commercially -- light water reactors, and heavy water CANDU reactors -- have demonstrated reliability 'n power system operation comparabie to conventional plants. Sufficient experience has been acquired in their construction to lend confidence to current cost estimates and completion schedules so that they may be acquired and operated by developing countries without undue risks. Other technologies, such as the high-temperature-gas-cooled reactor, and the advanced-gas-cooled reactor, have been tested in experimental plants. Although a number of large units of these types are under construction, these tech- nologies have still to demonstrate their reliability under industrial operating conditions. At the end of 1973 there were about 130 nuclear reactors in commercial operation throughout the world, with aggregate capacity of about 50 million kw, and another 250 under construction with capacity of over 220 million kw. All told, at the end of 1973 they had produced 807 billion kwh, the equivalent of the total electric production of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries in 1973. About one-half (395 billion kwh) wds generated in plants based upon Magnox type reactors, the construction of which has now been discontinued. Virtually all the balance was produced by light water reactors (377 billion kwh) and Canadian heavy water CANDU reactors (29 billion kwh). All other technologies combined have produced only 6 billion kwh or less than 1% of total. As has been true of all new technologies, both light water and CANDU reactors experienced a period of "teething" difficulties which may now be considered successfully overcome. For example, nuclear plants 600 MW and larger operating in the US in 1972 achieved on average performances comparable to that of similar sized conventional fossil-fuelled plants, i.e., availability of 70-75%. The developing world, of course, has had very little construction and operating experience so far. Only seven reactors aggregating about 2000 MW were in operation by December 1973 in three developing countries: India, Pakistan, and Spain. Another 23, aggregat- ing 15,000 MW, were on order or untder construction in a total of 10 develoning member countries: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Spain and Yugoslavia. Construction and operational exnerjanran hn_v varied from case to case and no specific pattern can be detected so far to differentiate between developing and industrial countries- iv. Nuclear plants are comnosed of (i) the nuclear steam. supply system (NSSS: reactor, primary heat exchangers and associated pumps); (ii) special turbines; (iii) conventional electro-mechanical equi'ment (generators, trans- formers, switchgear, controls, etc.); and finally (iv) civil works. The sources of supply for nroven NSSSa are at nresent about 12 companies, in 7 countries, which have great differences in experience among them. Suitable turbines capable of workina with the low-qualit stenam produced y both the light water and CANDU reactors, are available from about 12 manufacturers in 9 countries. All the nther elements -- the "balance of plant" arLe avu,lavL&e on an even broader scale. - iii - v. Implementation of present forecasts regarding the growth of nuclear power beyond 1990 and its dominant role in the energy sector are critically dependent on either a considerable interim expansion in the amount of proven uranium renervpn nr on the timelv develonment of the "breeder" tvpe of reactor, which would use fuel 50-70 times more efficiently than present reactorn. Cuirrent nuc-lear progrnmn may exhaust nresently proven uranium reserves available at less than $10 per pound (the 1973 price was $7-$8) by 1QR6- And bv the vyenr 2000 w.f thnt2t npw dis-ovPries of reserves, reactors might be using uranium in the $30-$50 per pound price range. (It should be noted that ntu.lnr power Costs are relatively inseonsitiv to higher costs of production of uranium ores. Nuclear fuel costs represent only about 20% of the total cost of nuclear generation and, f thst fraction, urasni ore account for only one-third, i.e., 6-7% of the total, the balance being 1 1 s.l. . . A1 fl..n A__ t 4 _ _ ..4 … aAws' _A_ .nA e^4 _Sel..n ' Mn r n nc largely fuel ellement fabriRuca tLL0*Sn p roVessing and enri .c ... .-,, there appears to be considerable room for finding more uranium as past ex- plorat.ion efforts were spurreA bLu y bthuUe r.eeAs oaf a fe-w cotw.tries ith n'.ulear weapons development programs and slowed down considerably when adequate sources to supportt those L prorm had beer. l f.U As to breede re actors, present prospects for commercial operation on a significant scale a re in tI *he 98- 1 99u razige thouh. L iicy tiave t.LL L.c UUL LIA.iL.LL LW L U&CW.L.Ly associated with the development and scaling up of a new technology. Medium sized experimental breeder reactors exist in France, the UK, and the 'uSSR. These countries and Germany, Japan, and the US have recently stepped up their programs to develop large iv00 mw commercial breeder reactors. vi. 'wnile the sources or naturai uranium are scattered tnrougnout 20 countries around the world, the enriched fuel on which the light water reactor technology depends is presently available from very few sources, dominated by the US. Other countries are entering the market, and it is likely that supplies will be available from 4-5 industrialized countries by the early 1980S when reactors ordered today would commence operation. Developing countries should be fully aware of this situation with respect to fuel supply, and pay particular attention to assuring a dependable long- term supply of fuel when ordering nuclear generating units. The fact that CANDU type reactors utilize natural uranium is a particularly attractive consideration for those countries which have ore, or which may wish to have wider fuel supply options for strategic, security, or political reasons. vii. The development and operation of nuclear power facilities has taken place in an atmosphere of awareness that the technology had associated with it a host of new safety and environmental hazards. The nuclear industry and the governments of the nuclear powers have drawn up very stringent stand- ards with respect to the design, construction and operation of all the facilities involved, and carried out extensive research into the effects of radiation on man and the earth's biosphere. The release of low-level radiation products associated with the normal operation of reactors would appear to give no general cause for concern. The US Environmental Protection Agency estimates that annual average radiation exposure of the US population in the year 2000 - iv - arising fran nuclear plants would be less than 1% of the dose from diagnostic x-rays. On the other hand there exists a finite, non-zero, albeit very small probability of a very large reactor accident, involving a core melt-down and subsequent release of large amounts of radioactivity in the environment. Such an accident has never occurred and therefore its probability and consequences can only be derived by theoretical calculations. "The Reactor Safety Study" (known as the Rasmussen Study) released in draft form by the AEC in August of 1974 was the first thorough attempt to quantify the probabilities and consequences of such hypothetical accidents by using a technique known as "event tree" and "fault tree" analysis. The main conclusions of this study show nuclear power risks to be "smaller than many other man-made and natural risks." Criticisn has been ex- pressed and a final version of the report will be issued in the Fall of 1975. Although several changes are now being made it is not expected that the overall picture will change substantially. Also, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss;ion has plans for a number of LWR safety experimental studies, including the large, 1/60 scale Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT). Many other experiments are sponsored by the nuclear vendors and the Electric Power Research Institute (the R & D arm of the U.S. electric utilities). Results from these experimental studies will provide a quantitat:ive basis regarding the margins of safety inherent in present reactor designs and cal- culational methods. There are also hazards involved in processing, storing, transporting and disposing of radioactive wastes, some of which, notably the actinides, have extremely long half lives. Another serious concern is caused by the possibility of theft or diversion of special nuclear materials which provide the raw material for the construction of nuclear explosive devices. The risks generated by a plutonium economy are often cited in this connection by critics of nuclear power. viii. At national and international levels a regulatory framework has been established to control all nuclear activities and to ensure very high levels of safety and public health protection. These controls have contributed critically to the nuclear industry's excellent safety record. An elaborate system of controls also exists in the safeguards area, to prevent unauthorized use of nuclear materials. However, many weaknesses in the systems (both national and international) have been brought to light and a need for stronger and more effective measures is apparent. Since this report attempts to focus on the economic and technical aspects of nuclear power it does not dwell on the merits of existing or proposed safeguards (e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty) which are judged to be matters in the purview of political national and international bodies. ix. The advent of nuclear power in the developing world, as has been pointed out in its 1968 Report "Nuclear Power for Small Electricity Systems" does not raise any new policy issues for the Bank. Nuclear plants are simply another option to be considered when searching for the least cost solution to the problem of supplying the growing demands for electric power. A review of the technical and economic developments in the nuclear field in recent years suggests that a significant number of developing countries will wish to acquire nuclear plants, and may seek the Bank's assistance in this connection. The Bank could exercise a useful role with its borrowers since the acquisition of nuclear plants will involve a major transfer of technology. The Bank's long association with electric power systems in developing countries would enable it to help borrowers identify in timely fashion the preparatory steps necessary to reach decisions on acquiring the new technology' and to assist in marshalling the resources to meet this need. Although a request for financing a nuclear plant may not be received for some time, the need to provide technical assistance in helping borrowers carry out the planning and other preparatory phases is likely to arise much sooner. I. INTRODUCTION 1. Although the Bank Group has made loans and credits of more than $6 billion in the aggregate for the development of electric power, it has made only one small one in connection with nurlear nower generation. That was in 1959 to Italy. Since that time only ten developing member countries 1/ have made their own commitments to acquire nuclear nper gen.erating facillties, and of these only three 2/have plants actually in operation. Except for one informal request in 1968. no one has sought Bank Group finrancing of elther a nuclear installation, or any component. Financing for nuclear installations has been readilv available, and generally on attractive te.rs. Yoreover, in the past, nuclear plant and its principal elements have not been available on a basis sufficiently broadly international to make Bank Group financing appropriate. 2. The Executive Directors of the Bank requested in 1967 that they be given a report comprehensively treating the prospects and problems nuclear power might hold for the developing world. This report, "Nuclear Power for Small Electricity S-stems" (TO-674) was prepared by the then Projects Department, and issued July 15, 1968. Although 5-1/2 years have intervened since it was published, two statements which appeared in the Foreword of that report are worth repeating in this paper: "The report indicates that the Bank considers nuclear stations as an additional alternative to hydro, diesel, conventional steam or gas turbines. As with the other alternative forms of power generation, the Bank would expect utilities needing to expand their generating capacity to consUider such alternatives and to decide on the basis of a detailed study of their specific problem which alternative offers the most economic solution of the problem. "Wherever the Bank is prepared to make loans for power development and the borrowing utility reaches the conclusion that a nuclear power station meets this test, the Bank will consider the proposed project just as it would consider its alternatives; and if the Bank's appraisal confirms the conclusion reached by the utility about the project's justi- fication, it will be considered suitable for a loan. It should be noted that this has been the Bank's consistent position in regard to nuclear power facilities." 3. Bank staff have continuously monitored developments on the commercial nuclear front, and mounted a concerted effort in 1970 which involved discussions both with major power systems involved in nuclear developments and a number of the key facilities manufacturers. In particular, this review concluded that 1/ Argentina, Brazil, Republic of China, India, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Spain, and Yugoslavia. 2/ India, Pakistan, Spain. the barrier of international availability of nuclear plant had been broken, nrd meaningfuil tnnmnetition rould be expected for the supply of reactors &ad turbines of demonstrated capability. 4. In 1972-1973, the Bank accepted a role as one of the sponsors of a "_Mrket Survey for Nuclear Po.er in Developing Connt¶1es" cuted 1w the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agency's survey of 14 countries and Its extrapolation to all developir.gcou4rie r the wod-- with which the Bank is in general agreement -- conclude inter alia that over the next Uj~U _II _~ _ .L_ &I_ _ 6 AU __A UI5L L 4 '. J~ S _ *4 U _ 'A A * * o . .@tn uecaluet Lalce lueve'Lop'Ln wor'LI LISL1%. cze cwzwdume.M v U.lbu ioo M414.. 1_ of new nuclear plants, i.e. of the order of all their presently installed generating capacity. Recent large ircrease in the price of oil will accel- erate this movement. In fact, present indications are that developing countries witn electric puwer SySteMS lJarge e,-ough to opeLate koUw iLLM.L.Ly available nuclear powerplants and which are presently dependent on imported oil will reconsider their optiOnS as rapidly as possile, with paLLrcU.Lt attention to nuclear power, as well as coal. It is thus likely the Bank may be approached in the near future to consider financing nuclear puwer projects. 5. it seems appropriate at tnis juncture to reexanmine the Lactors likely to affect the role nuclear-generated electricity may play in the developing world in the next decade. hnis is the purpose of this paper which reviews: (i) the growing role of nuclear power in the world's overall energy mix; (ii) current nuclear powerplant technologies and their sources of supply; (iii) the shifting economics of nuclear plants vis-a-vis conventional plants, and the nuclear fuel situation; (iv) environmental and safety aspects of nuclear power; (v) administrative and institutional aspects of acquiring a nuclear technology; and (vi) the implications of these factors for the Bank. 6. The paper was prepared by the Public Utilities Department of the Bank. It has benefitted from a review of its contents as to fact carried out by the IAEA, whose contribution is gratefully acknowledged. - 3 - II. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 7. Durina the last 20 vears oil and natural gas have become the most important components of the world's "energy mix." 1/ In 1950 coal represented ahout two-thirds of the mix, anti nptroleum and natural gas together another third. 2/ By 1970 their roles had reversed, the result of a process started PnFr14&av *n the e-antitrv in the TTn fnllnwing the edit-overv and tdevelopment of large oil deposits in the 1920s and 1930s. With the rapid exploitation of M4i4Ala Vaat and Afr"i^" 041 after World War I, thls n,np.as extended to Western Europe and Japan. Parallel developments took place in the USSR and other centrally planned economies. By 1950 the US energv mix hAd "matured" and petroleum consumption, after having increased at a rate twice that of overall energy, began to grow at a rate only s14htly abnov lt-- By 1970 the mix of energy consumed by Western Europe and Japan had also stabilized, especially with regard to oil consumption. NaturalJ gass receanly Adiscovered in Europe's offshore continental shelf is starting to make an impact there. In suma-r, th. e pa-t .A year -; ..4 a vey 4A rapld ,- of petrole.'s contribution to the energy mix. This is not likely to continue, however, as tbAe e A'UiLL; "LAU arC,d LILLU.Lo.l Aactors -WALL.4A haused Jl have by Lw spet st of their impact. They are reviewed briefly in what follows. 8. On the supply side, the scientific application of the techniques of geology anrd geophysics led to the discovery of deep oil ar,d gas deposits. World-wide proven reserves have in the past been kept comfortabljy ahead of demand and production. In addition, the eechnology of iarge pipelines and the develop- ment of bigger and automated tankers have kept the cost of transportation of petroleum products down to a fraction of that of coal: about 1/5 to 1/7 for oil, about 1/2 for gas. This has been a critical competitive factor, along with the (then) comparatively low prices or oil. 9. On the demand side, the transport sector accounts for about 15%-25% of total energy consumption. 3/ For technical and/or economic reasons it has become a virtually exclusive province of petroleum. Automoblies and airplanes are a "captive" market with present engine technologies. Railroads and shipping have been converted from coal to petroleum as a result of overall 1/ The total amount of energy used. Components are compared in terms of equAl enpergv antnt- 2/ For the limited purposes of this note, discussion of hydroelectricity is avodn4Ad Thav. ov-ar aauasral less AdeAvlopeaA ^ounti4sa w4tilth vmu still-untapped water-power resources, and where costs are such that their Alpiplnnmant w411 ihg wF .n.v4v,a at- r..ffjav- pvr.v4Aaa ah.e AT ^f al -,-- r---- r-_ A--- the world's energy, or about 25% of its electricity. 3/ For Instance in the EEC irn 1971, primay ener u age was distributed: (I) industry 332, (ii) transportation 16%, (iii) residential/commercial 294%-, (ivs.) electrici:cy T2t zr.d (;) other 42. - 4 - system economics: lower capital and operating costs, flexibility of operation, customer preferences (e.g., cleanliness) all have been factors which made oil more attractive in spite of its higher cost vs. coal as measured by heating value alone. 1/ 10. Residential and comsercial use accounts for about 20% of primary energy consumption in industrialized countries and about 10% in the developing world. Lighting and the electric motors in air-conditioners, refrigerators, and other household appliances represent a "captive" martet for electricity. Domestic and industrial space heating which together represent up to 40% of all energy consumption in industrialized countries, present ample opportunity for competition and substitution among energy sources. Heating is presently dominated by gas, having in the past relied in succession on wood, coal and oil. Availability, price, installed cost of appliances, and convenience (cleanliness, automation) are the main factors usually considered in making a choice between fuels. Electricity has also been used for space heating, mainly in the US in connection with commercial buildings where saving in duct space is an important cost factor. In the past this practice has been criticized as wasteful of energy 2/, but it need not be. The more prevalent use of the heat-pump 3/ and other heating devices, together with significantly improved insulation, will encourage more efficient electric heating, which- under appropriate circumstances will be both economically attractive and conservative of primary fuel. This will be especially significant as power systems begin to rely on nuclear plants for most of their off-peak generating needs. 11. Industry and electric utilities account for another 25% each of the primary energy market (with the latter growing at nearly twice the rate of the other users). Coal, oil, gas and nuclear power will compete for these markets primarily on the basis of their respective costs per unit of heat delivered at the plant. 4/ The outcome of this competition depends very much on local conditions, especially proximity to coal mines. In the case of the 1/ In 1925 more than 90! of locomotives and 50X of ships used coal. Today these uses are negligible. 2/ Powerplants convert only one-third to two-fifths of the heat in fuel they burn to electricity, and so direct reconversion of electric power into heAt in space heatina anl4gra4ons rannnot be more than 33-A0% effirient in terms of original fuel. 3/ A reverse refrigeration.-tye machine, electrically-driven, which delivers heat from the environment (e.g. the air) to the space to be heated. An efficient installatio.n will deliver two tims tbhe heat value of the electricity required to run it. 4/ I Plants burn.ing eal ussually have slighltly highe. c-4pial coa1 s th.ar 4..fe burning oil or gas. This can be offset by a fairly small fuel cost dA iferentia'l. Nuclear pLants, or. thLAe other hand, hLave uacIa hlgLher ca-p-LtaJl costs, and become attractive only where substantial differentials exist between nuclear and loss"l fuel costs. utility industry, coal transport costs can be minimized as powerplants can be built near the mines and the electricity transoorted. For these reAQnna coal, at least in many regions of the US, the UK, and Western Europe, has maintained a very sisnificant share of the utility market. Tn thp TTS whre coal is relatively cheap, its choice as a boiler fuel is dictated by purely economic considerations. In the UK. Western Eurnnop and Japnn, however, it continues to be used largely because government policies have protected it against the inroads of (then) cheaner imnnrtdri noil Tn t long rIn, nuclear energy seems destined to become the dominant utility fuel. 12. Table 1 summarizes past developments in the world energy mix since 1925 and includes nrn4pt1inn for 190A andA 2000 Ti sh'8 the .hargirg roles of the various primary energy sources: coal, oll,-gas, hydro and nuclear; it also gfve-s the gront.h of t ener i and the po it which goes through the secondary form of electricity. The rather striking change which in fnvao n vin the £uture energy i -x due to the introduce=on of nuclear power is based -- at least for 1980 -- on fairly detailed analysis of the published pla"n of the major IndustrIal countries. Ano-her notable aspect of this evolution is the growing importance of electricity as a form nf energy utIlzation. Table 1 World Consumption of Primary Energy: 1925-2000 Actual Estimated 1925 1950 1970 1980 2000 Tota15Primary Energy, 12 18 51 83 205 1u kcal % Distribution Coal 81.7 60.4 33.6 24.6 17.2 Oii 13.1 24.6 39.6 42.4 34.5 Natural Gas 3.1 10.4 19.9 20.3 13.8 Hydro /1 2.1 4.6 6.5 6.0 6.9 Nuclear - - 0.4 6.7 27.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Electricity % of Total 7 14 25 31 50 Nuclear % of Electricity - - 2 21 55 /1 Based on 2577 kcal/kwh electricity, the equivalent heat rate in modern steam-electric generating plants. Source: International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin. Vol. 15. No. 5. 1973. -6- 13.* With the dawning of the "atomiic age" after World War II, anid the advent of modest (and then subsidized) nuclear power demonstration plants in several industriaLizeu n.ation. , souLe of tLhLe more enthuGi tic ad C^tes of nuclear power were predicting not only that it would become the predominant source of electricity in a few years, but that this would be acco-mpanied by a dramatic lowering of costs. Neither of these predictions materialized, primarily for three reasons: (1) the priues o, fossl' fuels, and particularly that of oil, remained low until very recently; (2) the problems of introducing a new and highly complex technology were probably undereatimated; and (3) a growing concern for safety and radiation effects on man and the environment has delayed public acceptance of nuclear power. Although the first commercial- scale nuclear powerplants have been producing electricity for about 18 years, up to the end of 1970 less than 2% of the world's electric power generating capability was nuclear, virtually all of it located in the industrialized world. Recent developments have changed the prospects for nuclear power. The industry has mounted an intensive effort to bring a number of reactor types to maturity, and to prove their reliablility. Tne end of an era or low fossil fuel prices has highlighted a cardinal attribute of nuclear energy: relatively low and stable fuel costs. Finally, increasing needs for electric power and realization that nuclear plants contribute less to pollution than fossil fuel plants are likely to promote more rapid public acceptance. By 1973, installed nuclear capacity had more than doubled in proportion since 1970, to 4.3% of all generating capacity. It is expected to climb to 7% by 1975, and as Table 1 indicates, to 21% by 1980. It is clear that nuclear power has firmly entered the "take-off" zone. 14. Most industrialized countries -- the US, UK, Western Europe and Japan -- contemplate that not less than 50% of their electric requirements in the year 2000 will be met from nuclear sources. In several cases -- France, Japan, and Sweden -- the proportion may be as high as 80-85%. In the less-developed world nuclear power has already made an impressive start, when plants committed and under construction as well as operating facilities are taken into account. India, Pakistan, and Spain have reactors in operation, aggregating a little more than 2000 MW. Other plants under construction or ordered in the developing countries 1/ now total nearly 15,000 MW. Table 2 indicates the extent to which the world has made a commitment to nuclear power, and furthermore shows that the average size of reactors under construction is about 880 MW, compared with about 370 MW for units in operation. In fact, reactors are not now generally commercially available in sizes smaller than 500-600 MW. 1/ Excluding Finland from this classification, and including only Yugoslavia of the centrally-planned economies. Table 2 Nuclear Power Reactors Throughout the World (All Types 50,000 kw and larger) January 1, 1974 Under Country In ODeration Construction/Ordered Total No. 1000 kw No. 1000 kw No. 1000 kw Argentina* - - 2 940 2 940 Austria - - 1 723 1 723 Belgium 1 410 2 1,330 3 1,740 Brazil* - - 1 657 1 657 Bulgaria - - 4 1,760 4 1,760 Canada 6 2,646 A 3,20 10 5, China (Taiwan)* - - 4 3,072 4 3,072 Czechoslovakia 1 143 4 2,478 5 2,621 Finland - - 3 1,540 3 1,540 France+ 9 2,Q I 19 17,515 28 20,485 Germany (F.R.) 7 2,359 12 11,338 19 13,697 Germany (D.R.) 1 70 2 730 3 800 Hungary - - 2 880 2 880 I-A , - * 4 At% c~~~ ¶1 I r 0 u 1 3 6u00 5 1,10U 0 1,710.U Italy 3 581 1 822 4 1,403 Jlap an 6- 2,580 3 20 1428 I26 16,869firne V e. ,-IJo 'U .L4 Z. O0 .-L0,007 Korea* - - 2 1,195 2 1,195 Me- x lC OI- - 1 600 1 I60 Netherlands 2 534 - - 2 534 Pakisa s * 1 137 - - 1 137 Romania* - - 1 440 1 440 Spain* 3 1,120 7 6,520 0 7,640 Sweden 3 1,360 8 6,289 11 7,649 Switzerland 3 1,054 4 3,560 7 4,614 United Kingdom 28 6,117 10 6,634 38 12,751 United States 35 20,790 141 142,353 176 163,143 USSR1/ 16 3,444 8 6,500 24 9,944 Yugoslavia* - - 1 630 1 630 Total World 128 46,918 Zb9 237,102 397 284,020 Developilog Member Countries 7 1,857 24 15,164 31 17,021 Average Unit Size (World) 367 881 715 * Designates developing member countries + Data for France are as of April 1974. 1/ Data possibly incomplete. Sources: 'Power Reactors 1973", Nuclear Engineering International, April 1973. "Power and Research Reactors in Member States", IAEA, September 1973. Nucleonics Week, Vol. 15, No. 4, January 24, 1974. Nuclear News, Vol. 17, No. 3, February 1974. -8- TTI. TH}I'E TrCU,UAT Ar-TVCI AND TH F SUPPTY OF PTLANT .L I .L LiL * ta.LliS OJa. L - 15. Nuclear plants differ from conventional fossil-fuel-burning plants, principally in the way steam ls raised to drive the turbine-generators. The nuclear technology employs a reactor (and associated sub-systems) whereas the conventional plant relies upon a boiler. In both cases, electric power is generated from the heat energy in steam through turbine-generators. It is clear that questions of design ana equipment reliability arise in connection with the strictly nuclear elements 1/ of nuclear plants, because they are the products of a new technology. Tnese same questions arise as well in connecltlon with the turbines designed to operate with both the US light water type reactor systems, and the Canadian heavy water (CANDU) reactor systems. These systems produce steam of relatively low temperature and pressure which requires tur- bines of special thermodynamic design and very large dimensions, unlike the machines employed in association with other reactor technologies which are essentially the same as the equipment successfully used for many years in conventional fossil-fuelled plants. The Reactor Technologies 16. The prevalent use of the word "reactor" obscures the fact that several differing types of nuclear reactors have in fact been developed, based upon the use of different materials, technologies, and designs. Generally speaking, reactors are classified by: fuel (e.g. natural or enriched uranium); coolant (e.g., gas, water); and moderator, the material needed to slow neutrons and facilitate nuclear fission (e.g., graphite, heavy water, light water). 2/ Most presently developed technologies - and all those in prototype or commercial operation -- can be classed as 11gas-cooled", "light vater", or "heavy water". These are summarized in the table below and described briefly in what follows. TE Various terms are in common use to describe these. "NSSS" means "nuclear steam supply system." "Nuclear island" is another term meaning about the same thing. This report refers to all the nuclear-associated elements as the "reactor" or "reactor system." 2/ For a simple, concise discussion of the fundamentals of nuclear technology, and the principles upon which the several extant reactor systems are based. see Chapter 2 of the Bank's 1968 report, "Nuclear Power for Small Electricity Systems," appended here as Annex 1. Table 3 Reactor Types and Designations Gas-cooled syst m Magnox Natural uranium-fuelled graphite-moderated gas-cooled (Ca,) system. It was used in the first stages of the UK and French programs. It takes its name from the material (a magnesium alloy) in which the uranium rods are encased. AGR Advanced gas-cooled reactor. A UK development of the Magnox ysvtem using slightly enriched fuel in the form of uranium oxide, clad in stainless steel. HTGR High-temperature gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactor. A further develomnent of the ean-cooled reactor- unine highly enriched uranium and thorium as fuel, and helium as coolant. Heavv water avntmm PHWR Pressurized heavy water reactor. This tpe u--es natural uranium as fuel, and is moderated and cooled by heavy water. (The din ig desim 4s called CisU.) HW L-R Heavy-ater-Aoderated bolling 14-ater-cool st The UK design is called SGHWR: steam-generating heavy water r-ac:tor. Lu.WR L'.It water reactor. Light water is both moderator and coolant. The fuel is enriched uranium. This group incl udes twO oasic types, below. BWR Boiling water reactor. Tne coolant boils inside the reactor vessel. 'wI rPressurized water reactor. The coolant does not boil inside the reactor vessel. LWGR Light-water-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor. Breeder Systems LMFBR Liquid metal fast breeder reactor. This technology is plutonium fuelled, sodium cooled, non-moderated using uranium as a source of additional fissile plutonium fuel. _ 10 - Reactors of all these technologies (as well as associated turbines) are in operation on at experlm.entale, or commuercial bass1. Denth nf successful operating experience differs, however, and except for the LMFBR, is discussed below against the background of the need for the developing world to acquire plants of demonstrated reliability only. 17. Complex equipment which incorporates new technology, new design or new materials, or is produced by particular fi, for the first time can be acquired only with risk: the risk of production units not working to the standards of prototypes, or inexperienced producers not being able to ma.u- facture to specifications and/or to schedule. These risks can be substantial for electric power utilities acquiring 'Large generaLting plant, ranging from the economic burden of capital and operating costs exceeding expectations to the risk of not having plant available when needed. *The onrly protecti"on against such risks is to procure equipment of demonstrated technology from manufacturers whose products have achieved sufficient actual operat'rng experience. 18. In order to minimize risks to borrowers, the Bank has been applyiag a criterion of reliability to all equipment it finauces, defined as follows: "...when a complex mechanical plant is required (and this covers a broad range from thermal powerplant to locomotives) a developing country should limit its consideration to makes and designs which have already been manufactured and operated successfully in some other country' s system. This view is based on two principal foundations, namely: (a) a developing country requires even greater reliability of operation than a developed country and demands an even greater assurance of the successful outcome of any proiect investment...; and (b) the Bank has been familiar with numerous instances where complex equipment, even though manufactured by well- established and generally reliable firms, gave serious and long lasting difficulties in the case of prototypes even when no new principles were involved." "As all of these considerations are valid a fortiori in the case of nuclear plants, which involve radical new principles and teckmnologies the Bank would consider it risky for a developing country to install plant having basic design and components which differ materially from what has been in successful utility operation elsewhere. Only installations which meet the criteria outlined above will be referred to as 'proven'. In this context, a substantial size extrapolation is sufficient reasor for the criterion not to be met."' i71 Tpe 4a.nks 1°68 re --- P for S^^ lectricity Svntem, page 4. This standard is generally accepted by manufactuers and electric power 8y8 tem no a4na-. ream-or.able Operaing .Ex erien.ce w. R.1 c o.r. t9. .Wactors i.L commeri.a" operation tnrougnour Ene world nad produced nearly 807 billion kwh through the end of 1973. About half of this total (5i.L.Lon '-wuj nau been generated in plants based upon gas-cooled tech- nologies now considered obsolete largely from a cost viewpoint, and no longer offered cumme rcially. Virtuaily all the balance of nuclear generation has been either by light water reactors (377 billion kwh) or by Canadian heavy water reactors (29 billion kwh). The aggregate operating experience of all the other technologies listed in Table 3 is only 6 billion kwh. The pre- ponderance or successrui commercial operating experience overwhelmingly suggests that in acquiring nuclear plant, the developing world limit its choice to seiecting between the Canadian heavy water technology, and the US light water technology. As was true of all new technological advances, eacb encountered a "breaking-in" period in which difficulties occurred but which have now been overcome. Both have achieved reliability in operation on average equal to or better than those of conventional fossil-fuelled plants. Power systems in the developing world can acquire reactors of either tech- nology within acceptable margins of risk. Table 4 summarizes existing and projected reactor installations by principal technology. Paragraph 20 very briefly describes the status of development or experience of each reactor type, except the LMFBR. More details on all types are presented in Annex 2. - 12 - Table 4 Reactors Commercially Operable /1 and Under Construction December 31, 197I3 (Classified by Technology) Operable Under Construction or Planned Net Capacity Net Capacity No. MW z No. MW x Gas-Cooled Magnox 36 8,556 15.9 - - AGR 1 32 - i0 6,189 3.1 HTGR 1 40 - 7 4,590 2.3 Heavy Water CANDU 9 2,640 4.9 11 5,214 2.7 Light Water PWR 39 25,539 47.3 119 110,446 56.3 BWR 32 17,206 31.9 73 70,035 35.6 Total 118 54,013 100.0 213 196,474 100.0 /1 Excludes HWGCR, HWLWR and LWGR, and fast-breeder types. Source: See Table 2. 20. The Magnox reactor has a long record of successful operation, but is no longer offered commercially. Its successor, the AGR, has also been most successful in prototype operation in the UK. The Central Electricity Generating Board has ordered ten 600/625 MW units, but some difficulties have been experienced, and none of them has come into commercial operation yet, although the first is expected to durinR 1974. The HTGR is the latest development in the gas-cooled technology. One experimental unit and one 40 MW prototype have been in oneration for several years. The first large commercial unit (330 MW) is scheduled for service in June 1974 at Fort St. Vrailn, Colorado. The HWLWR, SGHwR, and HWGCR prototype plants have been in operation in Canada, France, Germany and the UK but commercial experience is -very lii..led. - 13 - Reactor Manufacturing Experience 21. The first light water reactors were manufactured almost exclusively by two US companies, General Electric andA Wesvinhouse. TLis siLtuatiLon changed somewhat during the second part of the 1960s and will change even more in the next five years. Two other US co-panies, Babcock and Wilcox and Combustion Engineering, are beginning to acquire a significant portion of the market, while several European and Japanese firms will be manufacturing the major part of their domestic nuclear power facilities. Almost all of the groups outside the US ha-ve license agreements with either General Electric or Westinghouse. Most early nuclear plants were bought on a turnkey basis. Th..e present teneLidcy is for utilities to engage architect-engineers and to contract separately for the main parts of the plant, such as the reactor, the heat exchanguers, the turbine, and the generator, thereby enlarging the number of firms which can bid. The supplier of the reactor may also sub- contract such important items as the pressure vessel or the heat exchangers. Table 5 shows how the market for light water reactors is being met, and hlghlights the large differences in experience among manufacturers. 1/ 1/ The information in Tables 5 and 6 is from a number of sources, and is probably incomplete. It is presented to illustrate the general scope of supply of nuclear equipment. - 14 - Table 5 Suppliers of Light Water Reactorsl-2/ (December 31, 1973) Reactor Commercially3/ On Of Which Country Type Operable Order Exports (Companv) No. MW No. MW No. MW (AC ) / PWR 1 390 2 1,260 - France* (Pramatome) PWR 1 266 17 15-57S - - (CieGE) BWR - - 2 1,940 - - Ge rinany Cerinany) PpWR 2 958 7 7,100 2 1,375 (Kraftwerkunion)5/ BWR 2 896 6 5,321 1 692 (B_R) PWR - - 1 1i300 - -- (AMN) BWR - - 2 1,822 (!.N!) PlJR - - 1 95 (Mitsubishi) PWR 1 470 4 2,747 ~~UQL.C1LLLJ. I iB4JflLD I. 'JY la.. 0t/ - (roshiba) BWR 1 460 5 3,408 - Sweden (ASEA) n'm 1 440f v 7 4,96 1 660 Swi . zeriarid (GC L;SCo) BWR 1 306 2 L,805 - - Llnited States (C!:) BWR 24 11,341 48 49,010 16 7,329 (Westinghouse) PWR 18 9,539 59 66,372 12 8,114 (i&W) PWR 3 1,992 17 16,801 - - (C.E.) PWR 1 710 23 25,133 - i/ [:xciudes centrally planned economies. 2/ Larger than 30 MW. i/ Not all are operating because of licensing problems. 4/ In association with others. J/ Data includes reactors built by Siemens and AEG before formation of KWU. MAIN SOURCE: Nuiclear News, Vol. 17, No. 3: February 1974. * .>~ta for France are as of April 1974.) - 15 - 22. The design and manufacture of PHWRs of the CANDU type have been carried out by the Atomic Energy Company Limited of Canada (AECL), a Crown Company. AECl. has already built six units, five in Canada and one in India. Four 745 MW units are under construction in Canada. Another 125 MW CANDU reactor built by CCE has been operating successfully in Pakistan since 1972. A 600 MW unit was sold by AECL in 1973 to Argentina, a country particularly interested in exploiting its own natural uranium, and another to Korea in 1974. 23. The AGRs of the type ordered by the Central Electricity Generating Board of the I1X are being built by the E;uccessors to the consortia that were responsible for the MaQnox Droaram. A recentlv-eonsolidated oreaniza- tior. ls now the only supplier of this type of reactor and its associated heat exchanQerr. LiennAing arranvemenesR wlth Europnen and Jananese mAnu- facturers are being negotiated. While at the present time a large AGR unit has not yet been comnleted and nla aed in rnmmnerrial nneratinn;v by the and of 1974 four reactors are expected to be completed, and another six during 1975-1977. 24- CimGraC1mmert-ia1 HTCRn are nroducepd at prepent nnlv hu railf-rnerAl Atonmic (GGA) of the UJS. As mentioned in paragraph 20, a 40 MW unit has been in noperatinn sin-e 1967, and a 3A3 MW unit- will hegin ipnmmprriAl noperation in June 1974. GGA has seven more units on order, ranging in size up to 1140 MW. Turbine Manufacturing Experience 25. As indicated at the beginning of this Chapter, light water and CANnlI reators nv^A.- af-- 0 ,.. -h-...h,4-.11.. 1-- f special design, unlike those employed with other reactor systems and conven- tional fossil-fuelled boilers. There are ay exper and qualified manufacturers of conventional turbines throughout the industrialized countries, and a number of them have also produced the turbines -hich ha-e operated successfullv with light water and CANDU reactors. As is the case with reacors,performar.ce and avnailahl-'ty is lully com-parable w-it more conventional machines. Table 6 s'immarizes manufacturing experience. 1/ 26. Several conclusions emerge from analyzing the operating and manu- facturing experience discussed in thi Chapter: (i) At present, utilities 'n deeopn -or;re Ishou-ld--I ~~SJ ri ~. # U.&.L±LL~ L in U=Vt:.LUjJLLI LUWULLL.L=Z: M1IOUJ.U consider purchasing reactors only of the light water or G^uA h1TJ -tecnlois ^-R ar. -TR -ih als -bel--A-J'--- SJLj 'UIU L) iL."L&U.LU r,.LCO * LIA.7KI 4L1U flL%jAM mLLLIL. cL~US O considered after several plants have been in success- ful co ercial use for a year or more, andU Iave achieved minimum availability of 75%. This is expected to be no sooner tCWf-ah.n 1977J5. 1/ See Footnote to paragraph 21. - lo - Table 6 Suppliers of Turbines Suitable for CANDU, PHWRs and Light Water Reactors 200 MW and Larger (wl L ry Commercially (Company) Operable On Order No. MW No. MrW Canada (llowden a Parscns) 4 2,160 4 800 France* (Alsthom) - - 17 15,575 (Rateau) 1 272 - - (ClEM) - - 2 1,940 G;ermany (KWU) 7 3,293 11 9,693 ('losi) 21/ 657 i/ 410 (AMN) - - 1 822 (Hlitachi) 22/ 940 3 2,164 (Kajima) - - 1 1,100 (Mitsubishi) 2 680 7 5,943 (Tos hiba)2! 2 1,117 4 3,259 Sweden (SFAL-L.aval) 1 458 4 2,0go4/ Swit.zerland kBDro`wi Buverill 4 1,320 4 42703 UILted Kingdo,, . __ (English Electric) 1 7621/ 4 4,085 /Avr) 1 220 - - II.nUt,4 States; (Ceneral Electric) 20 14,760 32 31,668 (We:.-.nnghouse) 92 15j779 36 38,239 Notes: Excludes centrally planned economies. Figures rannot be correlated with Table 5 because turbine-generators may be ordered considerably later than reactors. t/ X 4 ix 0 MW units in consortium with BeAlgiLan manufacturers in.cludig "export". 2/ 1 x 460 MW unit with General Electric. 3/ 3 nnits (22084 MW) wtLl General Electric. 4/ 1 x 600 MW unit with Brown Boveri; 1 x 890 MW unit with ASEA. 3/ i.xport oduer. "AIT, "fo r Fnearneraov Interil19ati4nal, A.r) l 1 *(Dat;A for France are as of April 1974.) - 17 - (ii) Utilities can now procure light water reactors from about 12 companies in 7 countries, and CANDU reactors from Canada. The number and experience of manufacturers of light water reactors has been increasing. The changing situation should be reviewed in connection with each solicitation of offers, which should take place only after careful Drequalification. (iii) The special turbines required by both light water and CANDU reactors can be purchased on an international basis. As in the case of reactors, offers shou1d be solicited only from prequalified manufacturers. (iv) Both conventional and nuclear power generating tech- nologies are dynamic. The apnronriateness of particular proposals for procurement of nuclear plant will have to be evaluated in the light of the technological and manufacturing situation at the time. (v) Although nuclear plants have in the past been available from some manufactur-r-s n a "turnk-ey" bas's, this 's no ______ - - ..,ag~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I 1 c- L 1A ULt LJ O , LIt ~ 1 1 longer generally the case. In any event, it will very likely always be necessary and advan.ageous for power systems in the developing world to retain the services of qualified and exper'ienced architecL-engineers to provide assistance in all the complex phases of locating, designing, purchasing, constructing, and operating nuclear powerplants. - 18 - IV. rTiiE EVULv'LNIG Ou-ST Pr I CTU. 27. The choice between conventional fossil-fuelled generating facilities and nuclear ones involves considering, inter alia, tne classical traude-off s between (1) lower operating costs and higher initial capital cost (the nuclear case), and (2) lower initial capital cost and higher operating costs (the conventional case). It will be apparent that the choice will have to be made under conditions of considerable uncertainty particularly as regards operating costs of fossil-fuelled plants because this involves peering far into the future and trying to forecast the behavior of the prices of these fuels. (Nuclear fuel is discussed in some detail later in this Chapter.) Moreover, all indications are that the modes of operation of nuclear plants and fossil-fuelled plants are likely to be different insofar as their lifetime contribution to the production of electricity is concerned on the power system where they have been constructed. Nuclear plants seem particularly suited to nearly continuous operation over their anticipated lifetimes. Conventional plants on the other hand have historically been relegated to fewer and fewer hours of operation as they age, not so much because they lose efficiency but because newer designs tend to overtake them as time elapses. Thus the objective analysis of all the factors impinging upon the choice is indeed complex. 28. In evaluating the economic attractiveness of nuclear power vs. the alternatives, developing countries will have to take into account these uncertainties. Because relatively few nuclear plants have been constructed in developing countries -- thus the cost data base is sparse -- and because considerations such as concern for the environment have changing impacts on plant costs, no hard and fast rules based upon meaningful cost data can be set forth as a guide. Each situation will have to be considered on its own merits. Some benchmarks can nevertheless be roughly estimated, and this is done in the next several paragraphs. The approach used here is simple: a relationship is developed to show at what cost nuclear powerplants would be just competitive with fossil-fuelled plants for different prices of oil and coal. Gas mnd lignite are not considered for the following reasons. Gas is not widely traded, and except where it is being flared. it is generally more valuable in applications other than as boiler fuel. Lignite is not traded internationally either, and so its exploitation tends to be restricted to mouth-of-mine plants specially designed for local circumstances. Finally, the analysis which follows should be viewed aaainst not only the above back- ground, but also with the following additional caveat in mind. Most economic investigations have been restricted to eonsideration of relatively largae generating units, because nuclear plants have generally not been available in sizes smaller than son-Ann Mu.- Estl.manAr in thin nnpar for amal11P size units are based upon analytic work only, and do not reflect actual rommprrial nrocuiirempnt- Pnperlpnce …rc r m n Capital or First Costs 29. lle t'clii logy of (povCI1tlo . ,I;Il(s in t e.' iimined tate post-war era was b.e- u,.Iuo bu :Ir.,- .d I. -I,r i, r a I s,Z an.! mish int, forward Llhe thermodynanic frontier bv adopting highipr aii. hlgigtr steam temperatures and pressures. TIhe manufactur-.'- an el ct .t 1 Itite;c were xrprv eyitrtPqqffi1 In this endeavor, and unit capacity costs had been constantly driven downward. Ylowever, si'nce 10967l wages Afor const[ructi- on labor, _-,ul higher mrnny costs, longer construction times, and in particular much increased concern for the envLronmuent which hIlas requiLred new zid.L ..costl y appurtenances such- a- cooling towers and exhaust gas cleaning equipment, all have contributed to increasing costs by 80-90%.- 3V. Tihe prjices of nuclear pla hadve 'UV,L r.sinLg in parLleL. In 1967 the US Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) estimated the cost for a 1 millio n Kw nuc.Lear unit ror 1973 service t $135J per kw. ./ Lhis 'Leve'l OL price quickly proved to be transitorv. For reasons noted in paragraph 29, and in addition increased public concernis for safety, licensing delays, design improvements and size extrapolations, and fabrication and construction problems -- "teething troubles" - prices of niuclear plants under constructLon and ordered since the late 1960s have also iicreased sharply, by about 150%. The last seven years witnessed a very r.apid growth in the construction of nuclear plants, and considerable experienice ha:.- been gained in identifying and solving the problems of managing their manufacLure and construction. Current cost estimates are thus likelv to be more reliable than was the case in the past, a view supported by contracts presently being executed. Capital Costs tor Plants in Developing Countries 31. In connection with its "Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Develop- ing Countries" (paragraph 4) the IAEA made detailed estimates of the capital costs of both nuclear and fossil-fuelled generating units. These estimates reflect experience in an industrialized country adjusted to conditions anti- cipated in the developing countries which were investigated in connection with the Market Survey. Such adjustments attempted to take into account, for example, lower costs for labor and local inaterials in developing countries 2/ as well as the likelihood any given plant design would not have to meet the air-pollution, waste-lheat discharge, low-level radiation etc., standards presently being imposed on both conventional and nuclear plants in industrial- ized countries. The Survey concentrated on the market potential for nuclear units of about 500-600 MW capacity, the lower limit of those being commonly 1/ The 640 MW Oyster Creek units were sold for about $115 per kw in 1966, or about the same price as comparable conventional units at that time. 2/ The costs of nuclear and electro-mechanical equipment, for example, were assum,ed to be about the same for construction in developing countries as in industrialized ones. Labor, on the other hand, was assumed to be on'ly abuout u40. - 20 - offered on a commercial basis. To indicate only the order of magnitude of the costs of fossil-fuelled and nuclear plants, Table 7 shows average data for 600 MW units, without special environmental features such as sulfur removal fac4llties or co-lin- towers. The cost of such features might add as maIch as 25-30% to the cost of conventional plants, and 3-5% to nuclear plants. The data in Table 7 are presented in more detail in Afnex 3. ±@.l~ IT Est'LmatedU CUap'iLtaL C'osts of 6% LW ULnits lo r Developing Countries (No Special Environmental Features) / t,. %. - - , ( per r.wj Type of. rLant Nuclear Coal Oil Land and Structures 40.1 21.5 19.3 Reactor or Boiler Plant oO.2 J. -3 43 Turbine Plant 64.8 46.2 45.8 Electrical & Miscellaneous Plant 31.0 21.5 18.0 216.1 142.5 126.8 Contingency Allowance 14.7 9.8 8.8 DIRECT COSTS 230.8 152.3 135.6 Construction Equipment, and Engineering & Construction Management 65.0 35.2 33.2 Other Costs /1 10.2 6.0 5.7 Interest During Construction /2 63.3 28.3 22.0 INDIRECT COSTS 138.5 69.5 60.9 TOTAL COSTS 369 222 196 /1 Includes taxes, insurance, training, start-up, owner's administration 72- Nurlear: s-1/2 vrs,; Coal! 4 yrs.; Oil! 3-1/2 vrs= Source! IAEA 1973 Market Survev Largpr Plpctric power generatin, uniits enoy, su bastantlia economies of scale, and this is particularly true of nuclear units. This of course is why nuclear unlts .hnve so far found general acceptance only in very large sizes. Because of the need to provide reserve generating capacity against emeroenc- and scheduled equlpment outages, large ur:4 ts are suitable cor operation only on large systems. These reserve and other technical consider- ations have led power system managers to adopt as a general plar.ning cr4 teron the rule that a system's largest unit be about 10% of total demand, but not - 21 - larger than 15%. With tlhis in mind, the IA1EA Market Survey developed on ar analytical basis estimated costtS for gelnerating, units in sizes smaller than (as well as larger than) 500-600 MW, which would be suttable for operation on the avstems in developinn countris. 'riese data - - ve- been reviewed and revised to present (January 1974) conditions by thc Bank and are used in the analysis which follows: Est-4u- .ed January 1074 Clap.tal Costs of E ia l d aJ UG j I dl * '. I _.i L aJ ' ..L 3 A. Generating Units for Developing Countries NLo Spec'ja'L Environmental Fleaturesp) US $ per kw Unit Size Type of Plant trn 1~~~ULL~~T tiL I I -U1 I .YW Nuc'lear 1_1 Cal V.l. I00 4 441 3 I I1 IV Iu940 44V .ll 150 865 368 321 200 698 338 286 300 563 296 247 400 493 272 227 600 414 234 201 800 367 215 184 1000 323 206 167 /1 Light water type. Operating Costs for Plants in Developing Countries 33. Experience with nuclear plants in commercial service has shown that the costs associated with their routine operation and planned maintenance are hiigher than similar costs for fossil-fuelled plants: about 50% on average, but less than that in larger sizes, and more than that in smaller. Because the largest element of such costs is attributable to labor, it is reasonable to anticipate that while a comparable cost relationship between nuclear and conventional plant operating costs will prevail in the developing world, thc actual levels will be lower than in industrialized countries. This is the assumption made in these analyses. The results are not at all critical to this assumption: operation and maintenance expenses are only some 7-9% of annual capital costs for 600 MW units. - 22 - Plant Availability 34. "Availability" is a measure of the reliability of a given facility, and in power supply terms is usually stated as a proportion of time, e.g., 0.80, or so many hours in a year, e.g., 7000 hours. Experience with both nuclear and conventional plants has indicated that while availability tends to decrease somewhat with increasing size of individual unit, this effect is about equal for nuclear, coal-fired, and oil-fired units. Units in the 600 MW range have all had comparable availabilities of 0.79-0.81. Plants will usually be operated fewer hours than they are ordinarily available (about 90%), and thus total hours of operation are less than the availability fraction: in this study about 72% actual plant factors have been taken. Fuel Prices 35. Thie price of fuel oil burned in powerplants will depend first on the FOB export price prevailing, and secondly on both ocean and inland freight. It is not possible to predict future FOB prices with a great degree of confidence. For purposes of illustration, prices of $6, $8, and $10 per barrel as burned has been taken for. heavy fuel oil. 1/ This may be thought of as equivalent to crude at about $5-9 per barrel FOB Persian Gulf. 36. Coal has historically been an important powerplant boiler fuel in countries where large reserves could be developed reasonably near the markets for power. This hias been the case in Western Europe, the UK, and the US for example. Good quality steam coal has been available as low as $10 per ton recently in Australia and the US, for example, where mining conditions are favorable, and powerplants are located near mines. Those developing countries witl economirally recnverable coal reserves will of course wish to exploit them. Those that do not, may consider imported coal, on an ad hoc basis as nrices are likelv to cover a mu,ch broader range than oil. Prices for imnorted coal vary widely with quantity, location of market, and of course the quality of the coal itself, and have been as high as $30 ner tOnI- 2/ 37. 'rFie cost of nuclear fuel depends only in a secondary way on the price of uranium. About one-third of the total cost of nuclear fuel is represented by the ore: the balance is the expense of milling and nrocessing; and the fabrication of fuel elements. The total cost of fuel in nuclear generation is small, as is illustrated in the next npramagraphs nnd thus thae effect of changes in ore price is very small. 1/ IHistorically the price for this heavy fuel oil has followed closely the price of crude of equivalent sulfur content. In recent years, fuel oil has been slightly below crude. 2/ For comparison with oil, this price is equivalent in heating value to fuel oil at auout $6 per barrel. ±L.e coal 's ass-uued to lue oI "standard" heat value, 7000 kcal per kg. - 23 - Estimated Power Generation Costs 38. Estimated costs to generate one kwh in 600 MW nuclear, coal-fired, and oil-fired plants constructed in the developing world are presented in Table 9. The underlying assumptions about costs and other factors are those discussed in paragraphs 31-36. Table 9 Estimated Gpneration Cost 600 MW Plant in Developing Country US Cents per kwh Nuclear Goal Oil Fuel Price /1 $8 $10 $20 $30 $6 $8 $10 Capital 0.86 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.41 0.41 Operation & Maintenance 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 Fuel 0.17 0.33 0.65 0.98 0.92 1.22 1.53 Total 1.09 0.86 1 18 1.51 1.37 1.67 1.98 /1 F uelPrices: Uranium oxide U 0 $8 per pound, $36 per SWU* ~~~~~3 8 A< . ^ %^ _r -f -- _ - Coal 3iu-$?0 per ton Oil $6-$10 per barrel * SWU - Separative Work Unit: see paragraph 49. 39. This table illustrates clearly the capital cost vs. fuel expense trade-off relationship between nuclear and conventional plants. It also indicates that nuclear generation costs are about twice as sensitive to capital cost assumptions as is true of conventional plants, but that con- ventional costs are many times more sensitive to assumptions as to fuel prices. For example: in the cases given, the capital cost of the nuclear plant would have to increase by 67% before costs became equal to those of the conventional plant burning $8 oil. Put the other way round, the cost of oil would have to fall to about $4 per barrel before the conventional oil-burning plant became as attractive as the nuclear one. 40. All of the foregoing suggests two things: first, and obviously, present fuel oil and Imported coal price levels make consideration of the nuclear alternative very attractive, at least for large plant sizes; and second, the threshold of unit size at which nuclear powerplants have been attractive - heretofore 500-600 MW - may be lower for those countries - 24 - deepndent upon imported fossil fuels. In view of the uncertainties in fossil fuel prices, the following two tables present "breakeven" fossil fuel prices for different size nuclear plants. Table 10 gives fossil fuel prices in common terms for both fuel oil and coal plants: US cents per million kcal heat content. Table 11 translates these figures into US$ per ton of standard coal (7000 kcal per kg) and US$ per barrel of typical fuel oil (10,150 kcal per I). Tn each instance the comparison is made both against nuclear plant unit generation costs based upon Table 8, and against these costs increased by 25%. It i8 reIar from Table 11 that nuclear power may be quite attractive vis-a-vis fossil fuels, even in relatively small size units. 41. It has been clear for some time that nuclear power would be an attractive means of generatina electricity in a number of developing countries, and indeed at the end of 1973 in addition to 2,000 MW of nuclear capacity in operation in 7 reactors in India, Pakistan. and Spain, 10 member nations had ordered another 23 units aggregating 15,000 MW in new capacity for delivery in the next 6-8 years. These countries are Argentina. Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Romania, Spain, and Yugoslavia. Electric power 1aarkets in developin- countries tend to grow more rapidly than in industrialized countries, and each year will see more power systems reaching the slze where pres-en'ti-available uLnits in the 500-600 MW range will be attractive. Another 5 countries can be expected to join the first group in the later 1980s: Egypt, Greece, Israel, the Philippines, and Thailand. The IAEA has recently re-examined the conclusions of its 1973 Market Survey in the iighn-t of the rise i.n oil prices which took nlace since the report was published, and now foresees a considerable acceleration in the development of the market. in a report not published but made available to the Bank, 1/ the total market for reactors 600 MW and above in the decade 1981-1990 is now projected at about 180 millio. kw, nearly half of which lies in Brazil, India, Mexico, Spain and Yugoslavia. 42. The results of the "breakeven" analyses presented in Tables 10 and 11 suggest that nuclear units in smaller sizes might prove to be attractive to countries with smaller power systems. This would likely be true for Bangladesh, Chile, Jamaica, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, Uruguay, and Viet Nam, as well as for some installations in the countries already referred to in paragraph 41. Tnree observations need to be made about applications in both this latter potential market -- which aggregates some 25 million kw -- and the one discussed in paragraph 41. First, because iacreasing demands for nuclear units among the industtialized countries are already creating production "bottlenecks" attributable to scarc;ties of certain materials but more importantly, skills, those developing countries wishing to shift away from oil-fired plants may find it difficult to obtain firm commitments for delivery of nuclear facilities within the time frame they would like. This argument would apply to nuclear plant in general. Second, as to smaller units - say 200-400 MW -- as has been observed they are not now generally being commercially offered. Increasing demands for larger units may make their common commercial production unlikely in the immediate future. Third, the prospects for taking advantage of the benefits 1/ 1 An extract appears as Annex 4. - 25 - Table 10 Prices of Fossil Fuels at which Generation Costs Equal Costs of Nuclear Power (Fuel Prices in US Cents per Million kcal) Breakeven Fuel PricesL/ Coal2/ o0 iL3 Nuclear Unit vs vs Size "Base" 125% "Base" 125% MW Nuclear4/ "Base-5/ Nuclear4/ "Base"5/ 100 608 854 685 932 200 392 562 451 622 100 298 438 351 492 400 264 398 318 453 (fOO 227 341 267 383 ROO 201 2%6 239 345 !000 161 257 206 303 / t p'Lant utilization or' 7I2%. / St,daLUardL" coal, 71000O kcal per kS g lt' naavy f:uel oil tI (.apital costs . romI. TLable O8 CvI dpiLal Co8tS anid fuel costs iLncreasedU - 26 - Tab'le 1 Prices of Fossil Fuels at which GeneratiXon Costs Equal Co0ts of Nuclear Power Fuel Prices in $ per ton (Coal) $ per barrel (Oil) Rrakevien Fuel Pr1isdl/ CoaJ2/ oil3 Nuclear Unit Vs VS Size "Base", 125% "Base" , 125% Kw Nuclear"L/ "Base"-/ Nuclear'!! "Base'l5 100 42 60 10.20 13.90 200 27 39 6.70 9.30 300 21 31 5.20 7.35 400 18 28 4.75 6.75 600 16 24 4.00 5.70 800 14 21 3.55 5.15 1000 11 18 3.10 4.50 17 At plant utilization of 72%. 2/ "Standard" coal, 7000 kcal per kg- 3/ Heavv fuel oil. 4/ Capital costs from Table 8. 5/ Capital costs and fuel costs increased 25%- - 27 - of nuclear power should be enhanced if power systems consider embarking on nuclear power programs, rather than purchasing single units. This would not only be more attractive to manufacturers but also hold the possibilities of achieving economies through standardization. Uranium Resources 43. The prices of uranium fuel discussed in this report refer to the basic material produced as a result of simple milline and purifying; usually near the mine itself. The product is uranium oxide - U 0 and is known in the trade as "yellow cake." This is the material snol Pn fueL nrocesaorn and fuel element fabricators. 44. The magnitude of the world's uranium resources depends on the price consumers are willing to nay to dAiscYPve andni mine such ireso2rces ThiwR in discussing these resources, it is important to recognize the extent to which thp nrice of X raniim ics involved in the comn.ert-4t-i relatlon of nuclear v-s-a-vis fossil-fuel-fired plants. If current U30 prices were double -- the level expected to prevail in the mid-1980s -- 3Ne unit generating costof nruclear power would increase less than 1 mill per kwh, 1/ or about 7%. Table 12 summarizes current infon..ati0.n on uran.i.um rese s avMillabkle up to various price levels. Only reasonably assured resources are included; however, estim.ated adAditior.l ,-esources WouIA roughly dobeth iuesg-r ..MLCaA &CCJLL ~ JLMJ~ iJIJ6&&J.y .JJL .J.L= IIIM LA. .L =1M ~ J.LV=LL. Table I12 AaWULe I S. aciaduLzau.Ly tiouureu Ruesurces uo uranium Oxiae Price /1 1000 Short Tons $;/b U 38 united States Rest of World /2 Total Up to: $10 430 790 1,220 $15 630 1,475 2,105 $30 800 /3 /3 $50 4,800 /3 /3 /1 Each price category includes lower priced uranium. 72 Excluding centrally planned economies. __ No data available. Source: USAEC Reports "WASH" 1242 and 1243 for US; IAEA/OECD for rest of world. 1/ A mill is one-tenth of a cent. - 28 - 45. The estimated resources shown in Table 12 may be compared with the projected uranium requirements shown in Table 13. Table 13 World Requirements for Uranium and Separative Work Units /1 New Generation U O. Required /2 Annual SWU Year Millions of kw - 1000 Tons Millions Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative 1973 19 50 22 - 6 1975 21 93 38 91 13 1980 54 272 81 405 29 1985 75 583 150 1002 58 1990 119 1088 248 2035 100 2000 193 2660 355 5300 159 /1 See para. 49 for definition. 77 Assumes operation at 80% plant factor. Source: USAEC Report "WASH" 1139 (revised 1972). It is seen that the uranium available at $10 per pound may be exhausted by about 1986. By the year 2000. reactors will probably be using uranium in the $30-SO per pound price range. 46. Concern on this account has prompted intensive efforts to develop 3 comm^ercially attractive "breeder" reactor which would use fuel 50-70 times more efficiently than present reactors. Uranium occurs naturally in two forms, the so-called "fertile" and "fissile" isotopes. 1/U238 and U235. (The earlier gas-cooled and heavy water reactor technologies operate with fuel containing the naLuraily-occurring proportions of thc heavv ancl light isotopes, about 140:1. On the other hand, the light water and advanced gas-cooled tech- nol'ogies- de-end upon fuel which contains a higher-than-natural proportion of the fissile U235 isotope.) 2/ It is possible to blanket the core of a reactor with fertile -terial and onerate it in such manner as to induce nuclear reactions within the blanket which result in producing plutonium, an artifiicial fissile element which can be used as nuclear fuel. Thus, a "breeder" reactor is one which will produce more fissile material than it consumues . 1/ A terltl to describ.e for...s o ar elemer.t differing in weight, but having identical chemical properties. 2/ Such fuel is said to be "enriched," and its production requires a separate sub-technology and complex processing industry. This is discussed below in paragraphs 49 et seq. - 29 - 47- The develoenet of a successful "breeder" would substantially extend the life of the world's known uranium reserves because they would be used uch more effectively thar. is the case W hpresent reactor techn- .7 ~~~~~ p. L LLd LU LCf nologies. Intensive efforts are underway in several countries 1/ to develop breeders and various estimates have been m-de for the date of initial successful operation: the most optimistic predicts commercial applications beginnir.g i4n the -uLid=10U80s. Legardless of thle time of introduction, the full impact of breeders will not be felt until after the year 2000, and the statement ir. ppaLsL5aph 45 are vaLiu unuer any circumstances of breeder introduction. 48. Uranium is found in more than 20 countries, as shown in Annex 5. Developir.g countries selecting a technology based on natural uranium (e.g., CANDU) thus would have a broad supply of fuel. This would not be the case for those selecting light water reactors or HTGRs, both of which use enriched fuel. 49. At the present time, the major source of enriched fuel for nuclear po_erplants is the US. Tne US plants were constructed during and after World War II to support the US weapons program and have a capacity of 17 million separative work units (SWU) per year. A SWU is a measure of the capital, power, and plant operating cost to produce a certain amount of enriched uranium fuel. France and the UK have smaller plants, unable to produce enriched uranium at costs competitive with the US. All of these plants are based on a technology called "gaseous diffusion." A number of European countries and Japan, as well as the US, are pursuing the development of an alternative technology, "centrifugal separation", which gives promise of being economic at capacities much smaller than the gaseous diffusion process. and therefore at lower initial cost. Cost data are not available, but it is hoped that sizes as small as 5% of the minimum economic capacity of a gaseous diffusion plant will be feasible. Achievement of this would have tremendous significance for the world supply of enriched uranium fuel. Table 14 summarizes present and foreseen availability of enrichment capacity in the western world. Published figures do not exist for the USSR, but they are probably comparable to those of the US. 1/ Experimental breeder reactors in the 200-300 MW range are already in operation in the 'JSSR, rrance, and the Us. Other breeders are under construction in these countries, and in Germany, Japan, and the US. - 30 - Table 14 Capacity of Enrichment Facilities 1000 SWU per year Present Estimated 1983 U IS 17,000 /1 28,000 /1 UK 400 /1 400 /1 France 200 /1 9,000 /1 /3 UTRENCO* 50 /2 10.000 /2 Japaan - 5.000 /2 17,650 52,400 * URENCO is owned by the UK, Germany, and The Netherlands. 11 aseous A4iffusion. 7T Centrifugal separation. 7 IS-ainly VLTODIp, a ualtinational association (Belgium, Frane. Italv and Spain) with facilities located in France. 50. The enrichment picture is far from clear. As evident from Tables 13 ar.' 14 the growth in world neeAs for enriched fuel will necessitate construction of a new plant by about 1984, and additional capacity of 100 million S'w'u per year by the year 2000. Con.structio of the faci1ities a-nd arranging for the enormous power supply will require long-term planning and tremendous investments. The next few years may see a scramble a=ng non- nuclear nations to secure a share of enrichment capacity by entering into long-term fuel supply co,.;racts. Much attention is being paid to the oeral enrichment problem on a broad international basis, and major industrial countries are examining a.11 .the pssi"Llities, Ancludi4g associatios, to own and operate enrichment facilities. It would seem likely in the light of all the foregoing that future options open to developing counrtries will not be much broader than at present. In any event, countries ordering nuclear plants must exercise care to assure a long-term supp'Ly of fuel. This has not so far presented problems, but it may well become a crucial consideration in "going nuclear," as increasing demands are placedu ou uranium resources, and in particular, enrichment facilities. 51. An important final aspect of the nuclear fuel field is that a fairly sophisticated process is required to fabricate the enriched uranium into fuel elements useable in the reactors. Moreover, once the fuel elements are spent - i.e., ""burned up" in the reactor - they must be reprocessed. This involves recovery of material still-fissile and thus valuable, and at - 31 - th1e s w.e t% LiUe permuits separation of radioactiAve ar.d oth.er waste-- -Mcerlf"al fo r disposal. Fabrication and reprocessing are presently available through La clli ti le n Ltih US, QuLuIe, auU Japan which offer compet Ai tJiLve pr-ices. V. SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS Opposition to Nuclear Power 52. A serious impediment to nuclear developmenL may be posed b-y a variety of safety problems which have caused public apprehension and opposi- tion in many countries. In particular, a number or civic and environmental groups in the US have raised critical voices regarding the status of safety in the nuclear industry, the enforcement of safety regulations, and the wisdom of proceeding toward nuclear expansion. Anti-nuclear development groups have appeared also in Sweden, France, West Germany, Japan, Great Britain and other countries. Concerns on which the critics lhave focussed are: the possibility of catastrophic accidents, in particular a loss-of coolant accident following a disruptive failure of the primary coolant system; the effects on public health of routine amounts of radioactivity that normal operation of the plant releases into the environment; the problems of processing, storing and dis- posing of radioactive wastes, some of which have very long half-lives; the possibility of theft or diversion of special nut.Jear materials; the safety lhazards involved in the transportation of nuclear fuels and radioactive wastes; the high toxicity of plutonium and other issues. Although technological solu- tions exist to most of these problems, the debate on nuclear safety often in- volves value Judgements concerning the evaluation of risks, the magnitude of risks society should be taking, and an assessment of social conditions as to the degree in which they affect these risks. Environmental Impact During Normal Operations 53. The principal environmental impacts attendant upon operation of nuclear reactors are (1) rejection of waste heat (so-called "thermal pollu- tion"), and (2) low-level radioactive emissions. As to the first, both con- ventional steam-electric plants and nuclear-fuelled plants produce electric power through the expansion of steam through turbines, imperfect machines that behave according to the immutable laws of thermodynamics, and so inevi- tably waste some heat which is rejected to the environment. The efficiency of converting heat to power can be increased by employing steam temperatures and pressures as high as possible, and modern equipment is designed to wring out maximum electric power from the heat available. Light water reactors, be- cause they produce steam at pressures and temperatures lower than modern conventional boilers, are inherently less efficient and thus waste somewhat more heat than fossil-fuelled Dlants of the same electric canability; their efficiencies are of the order of 33%, vs. 40% for conventional plants. 1/ I/ Ic should be recalled, in considering the degree to which waste heat removal presents a problem with nuclear plants, that it is the difference between their efficiencies and that of the alternative convential plants that is important. HTGRs and the liquid metal fast breeder reactor are expected to perform as well as or better than conventional plants in this respect, i.e., to achieve efficiencies of 40Z. The waste heat must be removed from the plant site and dissipated in such way as to avoid undue concen.tration. - Traditioal, p….oweplnts hv heen sted when possible on rivers or lakes which acted as reservoirs adequate to receive and distribute the waste heat a".d evoent1al is A4ipatega 4it tPhvro.gh the at~s- phere. As plant sizes became larger and larger, the effect on the water system becm A_mo__ __ ._ 1re proouned an 4 - -P -at -4 -t -4 -. @A #F1SA LUIOy>.a UCL.OULC US.' i. m.J n Vl s~ & 0 .W..* af-- S-- -._ intensity of the release itself, and to methods for assuring dissipation. At ruay sltes the concentration of heat has (or would h-ve) reached the level of infringing on the aquatic biosystems, and cooling towers have been adopted. Th aes9e d'e v Lc e a allIo-w t he re J e c t Ion ofL thl e -was-L-t u e heat dA-ifr ectl to L theA~ a -os cp.here,% but at an additional cost. Employment of cooling towers may add as much as 5-;0 to theirtial Cost of a.nuclear facility. Ir.s 8u... ary the effect IV1/. to tL1e 'jJI.LLj L L i IL~L L .L J. .ALy. LI UL.i~7 LLIAC .L.L=L;L on the environment of the large amounts of waste heat released by nuclear plants can be mitigated but thle price muUst be paid. 54. A eo ee secnd eniroletal -pact, thl-e nrmlal operation oe As to t'le seconu' env'~Lrormenta' .LJUJd L,LI IIdL L J ~LLI reactors is accompanied by the continuous leaking of very small amounts of low-level radiation products, some entrained iL cooling water system releases, and some directly to the air as gas. The maximum allowable amount of such releases is specified in the reactor's operating license. Almost all concerned with the problem accept the hazards involved as virtually non-existant. Nevertheless, however small, they may be cumulative and suggebLions nave been made that long-range studies of their effects on the human population be made. It is by no means clear that such studies would yield unequivocal results. in any event, the guidelines issued by the USAEC require releases to be kept so low so as to expose individuals near the plant to not mDre than 1-2% of the limit deemed acceptable. Stated in terms of probable fatalities due to radiation-induced cancer, those attributable to routine nuclear effluents in the US for the period 1970-2000 have been estimated at 1/20% of those caused by unavoidable natural background radiation. 1I Nuclear Accidents 55. A reactor cannot explode as a result of an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction because of built-in negative coefficients of reactivity that tend to shut it down when a power excursion starts. Safety in presently 1/ Everyone living at sea-level is exposed to about 130 millirems of radia- tion annually from natural sources such as cosmic rays, ground radioac- tivity from rocks and building materials, as well as from radioactive potassium-40 which existsnaturallyin the body. This background radia- tion increases with altitude, and may be double that at sea-level in cities such as Denver. People living in Kerala in India have been exposed for centuries to radiation levels of several rems per year from the radioactive sands in the region. By comparison, the prolected annual exposure of the population in the US from nuclear power plants in the year 2000 is estimated by the US Environmental Protection Agency to be about 0.5 millirem, less than 1% of the present average annual dose from diagnostic medical X-rays. onArating nuIcelPar nlants-, huq bhePti AxcAlltnt cnmnardci pri th othv.r tvpns of' powerplants. Indeed, in the nearly 100 reactor-years of experience accumu- lated to date, the pubM.ic hAs mniffwrid no injury a-s a resAlt of an ac-cident. 1/ 44.~~~- -.c h s+-_ (".d mc c na )hs b ---ese to- +i e ,estions. "Ihat is the probability of a serious accident which would release large amounts of.-. -A4ac 4 -44 4i-- 4-t - a-4-- er.vr 9 A ltLlk, n- 1 A wo - '-d bethePco n of .L A LL&.JL . U.L V .. L IL, VW A OIw &V " .L4. MJUJVL U A cz. f& U NJ . LI ~ V.AV W.. such an accident?" It is generally agreed that the worst accident would involve theA LI08s .L of .oSA.0U 2/ A.AA a _L&LtA -WtLer r.eaclWor. -V VL AW LALAL IMSO chAL..LL4n L U_L c would cease instantaneously, the fission products present in the fuel elements . ._.. -1 A o_ 4- - -, 4- -- A 4 .U _ U_n*_sA 4 - 4- _- ---A . ..... A .. & U L. 4i IJLnAu tJ 0 rele s 1.WVr ge0 OuL L .i &AA0 ,V MALDL .A hAL' "VU 4. OVJ V 0W% N.W U..L L 9L massive melting of the core. This could be followed by reactor vessel melt-through, Lprea.ha o4.I. thll.e conlt-oJLALIIenLtUO anLd "Large rz. I40Gacti.LV rel0e.a0J0e Uto th eA4viL.LWLM14Ver.t-* Despite all care in design, fabrication, construction, inspection and operation of a LLc.L p.LIIJj .L--l poLU%e p ltWirzedL k04 C%U LML-0 0J.LOVO L Vth.j Qher-e .L La U L"A bOu probability that a sudden break in a large pipe or even in the pressure vessel o Ll -uid occuar, t1has %;aIL L a.L6LL LUos-of-cUVo.LaLnt cdent.A . DLMU4LaLs tLhe r.L.s, UUWUVO. small, exists, all reactors are required to incorporate a system (made of several reuunnt Sub-systems) to provied emergency cooiing to the core in t.ne eventL of loss of the normal operating coolant. The emergency coolant would prevent the core from overheating and no radioactive release would occur, altnough the plant may suffer serious damage. The probability for a loss-of-coolant accident and of the emergency core cooling systems failing when needed to function are difficult to obtain since no such accident has yet occurred: there lies the difficulty. On the other hand the seq-uence of events following a pipe break and the performance oI the emergency cooling systems can only be gleened through calculations and mathematical models whuich incorporate many slmp4ificatiOnS aid approxmaaUions. Tnese problems and a certain lack of adequate experimental data have caused much controversy in recent years. 57- in the period iy97-1y9j7, tne & &temporarily suspended licensing reactors following failure of tests on emergency core cooling systems, and then studied the problem both through a special Task Force, and public hearings. Much debate en- sued.3/ The USABC later issued revised criteria for the acceptance of reactors, whicn were more restrictive. Altnougn they should satisfy many of the criticisms voiced, the new criteria were still characterized by some as "window dressing," Dut most of the scientists who had expressed earlier disagreement found them acceptably conservative. The nuclear reactor manufacturers on the other hand found the new rule unnecessarily conservative and the financial cost necessary for compliance as being incommensurate to the lowering of an already very small risk. 1/ The single instance where substantial radioactive material was released to the a1nv1onment o-ccrnad a+. the Iindsnla si+t ir. +the IT ealwr i. +th 10950s, and was caused by a type of open-loop air-cooled reactor system no longer used. 2/ This loss of coolant in a light water system would bring about an almost 4nstantaneous sb.,n+AdoM- of nthe --* -ce ch.._ 4- rean+4-, 4aan-4 -114- "zt Ia4-c a nc. a. ~ U a. . A hI4.~.IAy 1 L/ .5.00 I .A.4..AJ G6& fL VUIILLL. explosion." 3/ For example, public hearings lasting 126 days were held in 1972, and 23,000 L- - - - - . - W -- .A.A&J A.04 LO,UO4 114 ..OO .L V4110 VLJALAAU k0 IO.L.Ls the manufacturing and utility industries and in particular the "Union of eCnginersAd nid other" p roetsin arao had pre vf iousryr plished reporit4s engineers, and other professionals who had previously published reports - 34 - 58. Ln cnnsidering the problem of severe nuclear accidents, a realistic assessment of probabilities and the associated consequences must be made. Such a study was sponsored by the AEC in 1972 under the direction of Prof. N. Rasmussen of MIT. The Draft of this Reactor Safety Study (designated as WASH-14OO was issued in August 1974 for public comment. The study employed, for probability estimation, the "event tree" and "fault tree" analysis technique which has been used extensively in the U.S. space industry and in the U.K. chemical industry. The study represents a first but massive effort to quant-ify the risks from nuclear power and to compare them to other non-nuclear risks. The Draft report claims that the chance of a core melt- down per year conld reach 1 in 17 000 but would involve no more than one death and $100,000 in property damage beyond the nuclear plant site. As the bypotetical severity nof such an accident increases its probability decreases. Thus, a core melt-down, followed by failure of all back-up safety systems, ll durI4g the worst possible wather conditions, could lead to some 2300 fatalities, $6 billion in property damage and the permanent contamination of 31 sq. miles of land arolnd the reac-tor, This accident, however, would have a probability of 1 in 10 million. The study concludes that even with 100 n.uclear plant n operation (as wotild be the U.S. situation in the early 80's) the chance of an accident severe enough to kill 100 persons is far less than 4h6 charce of afilane crash of simila-r ma0nitude. The report's main conclusion, stated in general terms, is that potential hazards of nuclear power plants do exist but that they are "smaller than many other man-made and natural risks." Voluminous criticisms and comments have been written on the Rasmussen study. Most notewortby among t-hem is the Reac^tor Safety Stndvv conducted by a group of scientists, unconnected to the nuclear industry, under the auspices tof the American Physical Societv (APS).. It must be noted that their work did not consider the need for nuclear power or its benefits and should nrot be considered as a net assessment of the risks ver,-us the benefits of nuclear reactors. Their major conclusions were: (a) no reasons were un- covered for subsvtantial short=range concern regarding accident risks! (b) a better quantitative evaluation and improvements can and should be made in the safety sit (c) C +he l.e +vae't=tree" and"f'"alt-tred' approach can have merit in a relative sense but absolute probabilities do not inspire much confidence; (d) vhere is no reason wo doub 4 .hat+ the etmervency core c-oolivn erystems will function adequately under most circumstances but better quantitative under- standing is needed, (e) the lor,g-tei. cancer mort1't? ,- as -1ere it ated in the Rasmussen study by a factor of 50. Many changes and refinements are being incorporated in the final version of th,e Rasmussen stud- w-h4ch is due in the Fall of 1975. However, it is not expected that the overall picture of nuclear reactor risks will change substant'ially. Meanwhile, it becomes increasirngl apparent that a similar quantitative risk assessment must be applied to the other parts of the nuclear f-fuel cycle, notably the fuel processi.g plant which is, according to many observers, the weak link in the chain. - 3) - 59. Many of the critics of nuclear power remain nconvinr.a oe the efficacy of the safety devices because a full-scale test has never been performed. Besides the impracticality and enormnns Gnos of h a test, it is doubtful that any useful data could be derived since a very large number of tests would be needed to establish an adeouate Rtat.qtiJt.Js-n hb_a Tra*e, a number of separate effects, systems effects and integral experiments are being conducted or planned in a number of comntripR wi+h m nuclear manufactur"g capability. These sxperiments are intended to provide an improved engineering base on which analvtical methods rest in such areas as heat transfer, thermal hydraulics and metal to water reaction. Two major safety research facilities are the Power Buirst Fanilitv (PRF) fn r the tastigof fuel i-,A-er etreme conditions and the Loss-Of-Fluid Test (LOFT) in Idaho. The former has been comoleted and is oneratJonall The latte+r, hch 48 a a1/6 sc ' - -o a PWR, has unfortunately experienced serious delays and is not expected to undergo nuclear test unt±l 1977. The experimental results fro LTfu, along wi'h the continuing effort in computer code development, will provide a much im- nrovedl rmantiltaMra baszis fore ses4" the- c Source: See Anmex 2, Page 1. i