Pollcy, Research, and External Affairs | WORKING PAPERS Macroeconomic Adjustment L and Growth Country Economics Department The World Bank May 1991 WPS 672 sa The Macroeconomics of Public Sector Deficits The Case of Ghana Roumeen Islam and Deborah L. Wetzel In developing countries, fiscal policy - in particular, the reduc- tion of public sector deficits - has been a key element of stabilization and adjustment programns. An empirical analysis of fiscal deficits in Ghana, where they have been a prominent feature, reveals their significant effects on both the real and financial sides of the economy. ThePolicy. Research, and Extenal Affair Cornplex distibutes PRE Working Paprs todisseaminate thefindings of wodk in progress and to encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank aaff and aU others intrested ir developmnent issues. These papers cany the names of the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the authors' own. They should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Board of Directors, its management, or any of its member countries. Policy, Research, and External Affalrs Mcocnombc Adjustment and Growth This paper - a product of the Macroeconomic Adjustment and Growth Division, Country Economics Department - is part of a PRE research project on "The Macroeconomics of the Public Sector Deficit" (RPO 675-31). Copies are availablefree from the World Bank, 1818 E Street NW, Washington, DC20433. Please contact Raquel Luz, room Ni 1-057, extension 34303 (170 pages, with figures and tables). Ghana's economic program after independence external lending was unavailable until 1984. emphasized public investment and spending as This policy led to high inflation, negative real the road to growth, a strategy that led to recur- interest rates, an overvalued currency, and the ring fiscal deficits and declining growth. By emergence of black markets. These forces 1983, per capita income was 10 percent lower further eroded the tax base and ultimately than in 1957. Since the 1984 Economic Recov- increased the deficit. ery Program, Ghana's fisco' deficits have declined and the public seLor has been rational- The authors also find that high levels of ized. Average growth rates have become inflation, combined with government restrictions positive. on private currency holdings, affect the demand for assets in Ghana, leading to a Laffer curve Islam and Wetzel provide two different effect in goveinment seigniorage: After a certain definitions of the fiscal deficit in Ghana. The point, an increase in the inflation rate actually first, more conventional approach aggregates the causes a reduction in seigniorage revenue. Yet components of the public sector, including the given the government's dependence on monetary central government, the social security and finance, reduced seigniorage meant more money national insurance trust, state-owned enterprises, creation and higher inflation. and the cocoa marketing board. However, because of the lack of data, this method of According to Islam and Wetzel: treating the deficit may understate its true value. *The fiscal deficit has had only little effect The second way looks at the total financing on private consumption; lagged consumption and flows to the public sector. Data on the central disposable income were more important. government debt are supplemented with data on the claims of the central bank and banking * Public sector investment in Ghana has system against state-owned enterprises and data mostly substituted for private investment. The on public external debt. current program of divestiture of state-owned enterprises shouli lead to an increase in private Islam and Wetzel examine the ways Ghana investment. chose to finance its deficits and how these affected the financial side of the economy. They * The fiscal deficit had a significant negative find that before implementation of the adjust- effect on the external side. The official real ment program of 1983, the government relied exchange rate tended to appreciate, the trade mainly on money creation for financing, though balance worsened, and the black market pre- this was more by default than by choice since mium rose. The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal Affairs Complex. Anobjective of the series is to get these findings outquickly, even if presentations are less than fullypolished. The findings, interprctations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy. Produced by the PRE Dissemination Center TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction 1 II. Measuring the Deficit 8 The conventional approach to the public sector deficit 14 The consolidated public sectcr deficit 15 The central government 18 Social Security and the National Insurance Trust 25 The state-owned enterprises 27 The central bank 32 Defining the public sactor deficit based on its financing 34 Economic and policy determinants of public sector deficits 38 III. Fiscal Deficits and Financial Markets 51 Financing the deficit 53 Inflation, the demand for assets, and seignorage 63 The model 63 The demand for money and quasi-money 66 Simulation results 72 Conclusion 78 IV. Fiscal Deficits and Private Consumption and Investment 79 Fiscal deficits and private consumption 83 Fiscal deficits and private investment 88 V. Fiscal Deficits and External Sector 99 The model 114 The steady state 125 Empirical evidence 139 VI. Conclusions 150 References 165 Appendix 170 This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the World Bank Research Project 675-31 and presented at the World Bank conference on the "Macroeconomics of the Public Sector Deficit" held on July 11-13, 1990. We are grateful for the comments and sugrestions of William Easterly, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Vikram Nehru ar.d the conference participants. I. INTRODUCO>QO A pervas *e macroeconomic phenomenon in both industrial and developing countries has been the growth and persistence of fiscal deficits. The issues surrounding fiscal deficits are certainly not new, but the economic developments of the past decade have led to renewed interest in fiscal themes. In the developed countries, the growth of the U.S. federal deficit provided the impetus for a reassessment of the effect of fiscal deficits on economic activities. In the developing countries, fiscal policy, particularly the reduction of fiscal deficits, has been one of the cornerstones of short-term stabilization and medium-term adjustment programs. The macroeconomic theory concerning fiscal deficits has undergone a considerable transformation since Keynes emphasized fiscal policy in his General Theory. Rational expectations and the proposition of Ricardian equivalence put the effectiveness of traditional demand ranagement policies into question. Much of the discussion over fiscal policy in the past fifteen years has addressed the question of whether fiscal deficits and the way in which they are financed will have an effect on economic activity. While the theoretical debate continues, in practice fiscal deficits continue to be an important issue. In developing countries in particular, economic programmes in recent years have emphasized demand reduction via reductions in fiscal deficits. The underlying assumption is that fiscal 2 deficits will have an effect on demand. The idea that fiscal deficits are something that can be measured and managed is implicit in that assumption, yet as experience in both developed and developing countries shows, deficits may not be so easy to measure nor to control. This study presents an empirical investigation of fiscal deficits in Ghana and assesses their effect on the financial and real side of the economy. The case of Ghana is interesting because of the major role that fiscal deficits have played in her economic history. At the moment of independence Ghana was perceived to be at the forefront of the African countries. Her population was well educated and economic infrastructure was strong. Under Nkrumah, the first government led a statist economy that emphasized public investment and public spending as the road to economic growth. As time went on, governments became more and more profligate and deficits increased. Over the same time period, economic conditions degenerated. In 1983, the nadir was reached -- per capita income was over ten percent lower than its 1957 level.1 In 1984, the government initiated the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in an attempt to rescue Ghana's economy. An important component of this programme has been the reduction of fiscal deficits and the "rationalization" of the public I For an interesting review of Ghana's economy since independence see Rimmer (1989). 3 sector.2 The ERP is still in place and fiscal deficits have been reduced relative to their levels in the 1970s. Average annual growth of real GDP has averaged 6 percent in the post- 1983 period as compared to -3.4 percent in the period from 1978 to 1983. Given the multitude of factors at work in the Ghanaian economy, it is difficult to attribute the decline and renewal of the economy to any one factor. We will instead try to evaluate the impact that fiscal deficits may have had on certain macroeconomic variables which may in turn have affected Ghana's economic performance. The study is set out in three sections. In the first section, we consider various measures of the fiscal deficit in Ghana. An ideal measure would include all components of the public sector including central, state and local government, decentralized agencies, state-owned enterprises and even the central bank. Although the data for all these levels of the public sector are not available, we construct a measure of the consolidated fiscal deficit from the available information. We then construct an alternative measure of the fiscal deficit b>ssed on the flow of funds to the public sector. In the second part, we focus on fiscal deficits and financial markets. We first consider how the way Ghanaian deficits have been financed may influence certain 2 Other components of the programme are devaluation of the exchange rate, liberalization of the trade regime and , more recently, financial reform. 4 macroeconomic variables, particularly inflation. We then assess how inflation affects demand for money and quasi-money. A simple model i6 constructed that allows us to assess the relationsh:? between fiscal deficits, inflation, and seignorage. The third part of the study addresses the effect of fiscal deficits on private consumption ( NB: private investment is discussed in the companion paper by Ms. Islam). The relevance of the variouRa theories concerning the effect of fiscal deficits on private sector demand is considered by estimating a consumption function. The relationship between fisca1 deficits and the external sector (the real exchange rate and the trade balance) is also considered in the companion paper. The empirical nature of the study calls for a caveat. Generally, the data for developing countries is not always as complete and as consistent as developed country data. Data difficulties and limitations are particularly acute in African countries and Ghana is no exception. z. general, the most reliable data sources available were used, but there is no guarantee that the measurement of any given variable was consistent over time. Given the severe lags in accounting and general instability in the Ghanaian economy during the period that we cover (1970-1988), it is quite likely that there is a fair amount of "noise" in the data used, which may affect our regression results. In addition, because of data limitations, 5 we tend to use fairly simple equations for estimLtion. While thase equations may not represent the frontier of econometric modelling, they do let us glean some information about the basic relationships betweent fiscal deficits and other macroeconomic variables. The principal conclusions of our anal;sis are as follows: 1.) Because of the lack of data, the conventional approach to treating the deficit may present a misleading picture in Ghana. Determining the deficit using financing flows to the public s3ctor provides an alternative measure of the claims that the public sector makes on resources that differs considerably from the conventional measure. Using either measure, Ghana has had significant public sector deficits over the past two decades. 2.) Lack of access to external lending and weak domestic financial markets imply that the bulk of the public sector deficit was financed by money creation. AcceQs to external lending allowed the government to substitute foreign financing for money creation after 1984, but money creation did not fall as much as one would expect. In the mid-late seventies, the correlation between money creation and inflation was high, suggesting that fiscal deficits contributed to the high levels of inflation at the time. This relationship is less clear cut in the eighties, but this is not surprising given some 6 substantial supply shocks during the period, 3.) Inflation has a significant, negative Influence on the demand for money and the demand for deposits. The domestic interest rate was not found to have any significant effect on either the demand for money or the demand for deposits. One possible explanaticn of these results is the highly regulated nature of Ghana's financial markets until recently. 4.) A simple model set out in section II indicates that high rates of inflation provided the Ghanaian government with seignorage revenue only 1 to 2 percent of GDP greater than it would have received with an inflation rate of 20 percent. Since 1984, the level of seignorage has not differed greatly from the level that would have existed at a 20 percent rate of inflation. The model also suygests that had the government not appropriated private currency in the currency conversion of 1979, seignorage revenue would have been higher throughout the period. 5.) Lagged consumption and disposable income were found to be the principal determinants of private consumption. The results of this estimation indicate that neither pure Ricardian equivalence nor the pure Keynesian theory 'nold. The significance of disposable income indicates that liquidity constraints affect consumption decisions. Numerous fiscal 7 variables were tested as set out in the research proposal, but none were found to be significant. 6.) Private investment was found to be negatively affected by public investment, thus indicating that some crowding-out did occur in Ghana. Private investment is also positively influenced by a relaxation of credit constraints and by corporate tax revenues. (This suggests t.-.at corporate tax revenues might be highly correlated with corporate profits.) The real interest rate was not found to have a significant influence on private investment. 7.) Public expenditure has had a significant impact on the official real exchange rate, the trade balance, and on the black market premium. Increased public expenditure was found to have a negative effect on the trade balance. It was also found to have a negative effect on the official exchange rate (higher public expenditures tended to appreciate the real exchange rate). The empirical results also show that a rising public sector deficit along with stringent restrictions on foreign exchange transactions lead to a very high black market premium. 8 XI. MEASURING THE DEFICIT Implicit in the notion of targeting the fiscal surplus or deficit3 is the idea that one is able to obtain a reasonable measure of the deficit. This is not necessarily as straightforward as it might seem. Keynesian theory initially vtewed the deficit as exogenous. It soon became clear that the deficit was actually endogenous, given talat tax revenres and government expenditures are partly determined by the level of economic activity. Various r7easures of the deficit have heen developed to adjust for cyclical movements in the economy and to incorporate the effects of certain macroeconomic variables (particularly inflation). As ir normally the case, the most appropriate measure of the deficit depends upon the purpose of the analysis. Tanxi and Blejer (1984) discuss what they call the "conventional deficit" with reference to the definition set out in the International Monetary Fund's "Draft Manual on Government Finance Statistics". This measure arranges the payments and receipts of the government sector accounts as follows: Fiscal Deficit - (Revenue + Grant,' - (Expenditure on Goods 3 For the rest of the discussion we will refer only to deficits as they are generally the more common phenomenon. 9 and Services + Transfer Payments + Net Lending), or alternatively, Fiscal Deficit = Borrowing + Net Decrease in Cash Uloldings - Amortization This approach does have its shortcomings. First, the definition emphasizes cash flow concepts rather than accrual concepts of accounting. At times, the cash flow concept may not fully reflect underlying trends. For instance, if a government purchases goods and services and delays payment (builds up arrears), the cash concept may not reveal in the current year that the level of spending has changed. Tanzi and Blejer point out that while capturing the monetary impact of the budget, the cash concept may not capture the income- reating (i.e., the Keynesian) impact. Thay note that in the heyday of Keynesian economics (the mid-sixties), the accrual concept was generally preferred to the cash concept. The classification of grants as a revenue source rather than as a financing item is also a practice that is questionable. Grants are not usually permanent sources of income and therefore may fluctuate. (In Ghana they have fluctuated dramatically over the years.) Unless grants are a guaranteed source of revenue, it might be advisable to 10 classify them as a financing item. Similar questions may be raised as to whether net lending should be included as part of the public sector's deficit. If the net lending is extended to the private sector then it does not necessarily reflect public sector usa of resources, but rather, it reflects the public sector's role as a financial intermediary. If the net lending is extended to the public sector (say from the central government to a state-owned enterprise) then it does imply a public sector claim on resources, in which case net lending probably should be included on the expenditure side. In practice, in many developing countries at least, lending between the various levels of the public sector is often not repaid and thus effectively becomes a net transfer. Tanzi and Blejer note a final issue concerning this measure of the deficit. When inflation is significant it may be difficult to distinguish in an economic sense between amortization payments and interest payments. As all interest payments are considered as an expenditure item and no allowance is made for the repayment element implicitly included in the interest payment, the size of the deficit may be overstated. The World Bank's "World Development Report 1988" discusses different measures of the deficit.4 It first cites the Rublic sector borrowinga reuirement (PSBR) as a useful 4 See World Bank (1988), p.56. 11 indicator of the public sector's net use of financial resources. The PSBR represents the total excess of expenditure over revenue for all government entities, all of which must be financed by new borrowing net of repayment of previous debt. This measure is also referred to as the "consolidated public sector deficit". In the calculation of the PSBR expenditure includes wages of public employees, spending on goods and fixed capital formation, interest on debt, transfers and subsidies. Expenditure does not inclade amortization payments on government debt or accumulation of financial assets (net lending). Revenue includes taxes, user charges, interest on public assets, transfers, operating surpluses of public coijanies, and sales of public assets. Revenue does not include the drawdown of cash reserves. A measure that is often used is the "orimary deficit". This subtracts all interest payments from the PSBR in order to obtain a measure of the current policy stance. The argument is that the interest payments currently being made reflect past policy decisions rather than present policy. In order to evaluate current policy, these payments should not be included in the deficit measure. Another concept of the deficit excludes only the inflationary component of interest payments. Finally, the Report discusses the "structural deficit". This measure presents the deficit adjusted for up- and down- turns in the business and/or commodity cycle and for factors 12 that might cause temporary deviations from the trend level of expenditure and tax revenue. Such temporary deviations might be caused by any temporary expenditure or tax policy such as a tax amnesty or a decision to withhold government sector wages. While in theory the structural deficit is clear cut in practice it is often difficult to calculate, particularly in developing countries. Recent research5 has emphasized the importance of obtaining a complete picture of the public sector claim on resources by including all levels of the public sector. Thus the consolidated public sector deficit should include data not only on the central government accounts, but on regional and local accounts as well as on decentralized public agencies and state-owned enterprises. The measures of the deficit discussed to this point have largely been pragmatic ones in that they provide measures that are for the most part practicable given the average level of data availability. Both Boskin (1982) and Buiter (1983) note that these measures, and the way they are calculated, may be quite far from the analytical concepts that are used in the theoretical debate over the effects of the fiscal deficit.6 5 See Easterly (1989a, 1989b), Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel (1989) and World Bank (1988). 6 Boskin (1982) also makes the important point that, given the difficulties inherent in obtaining a measure of the deficit, econometric analyses of the impact of the deficit may be based on analytically inappropriate concepts or on substantial measurement error and that the issues at hand are not being analyzed or tested in an appropriate manner. 13 Buiter (1983) goes into some detail in presenting a set of stylized accounts that corresponds to an estimate of the comprehensive net wealth or permanent income accounts for the public sector. From these accounts he derives the government budget constraint. He essentially extends the permanent income hypothesis to the public sector.7 Buiter argues that in a first best world not only private agents, but governments and international organizations as well, would decide on spending, saving, lending, production and portfolio allocation constrained only by comprehensive wealth or permanent income. Buiter goes on to argue that both the conventional analysis of the public sector balance sheet8, and the comprehensive wealth accounts that he outlines, should be incorporated into an analysis if the public sector. The conventional accounts provide a guide to the binding constraints on public sector behavior in any given period. The comprehensive accounts provide an indication of the real net worth of the public sector over time and hence optimal policy when the only constraint is permanent income. We have not attempted to construct these comprehensive wealth accounts for Ghana. 7 The permanent income hypothesis set out by Friedman in 1957 argues that current consumption decisions are determined by expected lifetime income (as opposed to only current income). The theory in its simplest form is represented by the optimization of intertemporal consumption subject to lifetime wealth. While the theory ordinarily discusses private consumption, Buiter extends it to public sector decisions as well. 8 These typically contain only marketable financial assets and liabilities. 14 We first consider in detail the data that are available for Ghana and construct a measure of the consolidated public sector deficit from the income and expenditure accounts of the government. The definition of the deficit used follows that of Tanzi and Blejer (1984). We then consider the effects that economic and policy variables have had on the conventional deficit based on the framework set out in Marshall and Schmidt-Iiebbel (1989). Because the conventional measure of the deficit underestimates the true public sector deficit, we then construct a measure of the public sector deficit from the financing side using information that is available on the total stock of domestic and external public sector debt which provides an alternative assessment of public sector claims on resources. 1.) The conventional aDRroach-to the public sector deficit Discussions of the fiscal deficit in the literature on Ghana generally focus on the accounts of the central government with reference made to the importance of other parts of the public sector (e.g. state-owned enterprises).9 Reports of the international organizations include more detailed information on components of the public sector such as the Social Security and National Insurance Trust and the Cocoa Marketing Board, but no attempt at consolidation is 9 See Green (1987), Huq (1989), Killick (1978), and Rimmer (forthcoming). 15 made. There are a number of reasons why a consolidation of the public sector has not been undertaken. One reason is that data on the state-owned enterprises, which constitute a sizable portion of the industrial sector, are not available until 1984, and even then they are not complete. Another difficulty is that some of the accounts of public sector institutions are kept on a fiscal year basis while others are kept on a calendar year basis. a) The consolidated public sector deficit With these difficulties kept in mind one can at least gain an idea of the order of magnitude of the fiscal deficit by taking into consideration the data that are available. Figure 2.1 shows the public sector revenue, expenditure, and deficit (as a percent of GDP) that consolidates all the available information including data on the central government accounts10, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust accounts, and data on the net profits or losses of the Cocoa Marketing Board (through 1988) and the Ghana Industrial Holding Corp (through 1986)11. Very little data is available 10 Note that the data presented on the central government exclude capital expenditure financed through external project aid and the corresponding grants and loans. To the extent that these loans a.-e disbursed, the figures presented may underestimate capital expenditure and thus may give a figure for total public sector expenditure that is underestimated. The exclusion of this information becomes problematic in the years after 1984, when project aid into Ghana increased dramatically. 11 The consolidation added up the central government accounts and the social security accounts. The net operating surpluses (deficits) of the Cocoa Marketing Board and the Ghana Industrial Holding Corp. were added (subtracted) to (from) the revenue side. FIGURE 2.1 PUBLIC SECTOR: REV., EXP. & DEF. 1969/70- 1988 28- 26 24 0~2 18 0 106/017/517/018 16 14 0~~ 12 z~ - hi~ 997 94/517/018 C)~ ~ ~~a RV X E 17 on local government revenues and expenditure in Ghana. In general, the government has traditionally been very centralized and the central government has provided over half of the revenue of the local governments in the form of budgetary transfers. The absence of data on local government finance therefore does not pose major problems for our measure of the fiscal deficit. In contrast, the absence of data on the state-owned enterprises other than the Ghana Industrial Holding Corp. does imply that we are missing an important part of the claim on public sector resources. The effect of this absence will be discussed below. Considering Figure 2.1 which is based on a consolidation of the above-mentioned accounts, we see that for the majority of the past two decades public sector expenditure has surpassed revenue and that public sector deficits have been significant. Consolidated gublic sector expenditure was approximately 19 percent of GDP in the 1969/70 fiscal year and peaked at 26 percent of GDP in 1975/76. It dropped sharply after 1975/76, reaching a minimum of roughly 8 percent of GDP in 1983. Since 1983 consolidated public sector expenditure has risen and has reached a plateau at about 14 percent of GDP. While an attempt was made to take intergovernmental transfers into account, the breakdown of information did not allow for the complete removal of all double counting. Prior to 1984, data on a fiscal year basis and that on a calendar year basis were consolidated by classifying calendar data under the fiscal period ending with the given year. For example, 1975 yearly data are classified with 1974/75 fiscal year data. It was not possible to reclassify fiscal year data into calendar year data. 18 Consolidated gublic sector revenue peaked in 1970/71 as a result of a sharp increase in revenue from import and export taxes on cocoa. Consolidated public sector revenue declined from this point onward reaching a trough in '.80/81 of about 5 percent of GDP. After 1983, revenue collection improved sharply rising to 18 percent of GDP in 1987 and then dropping slightly to 17 percent of GDP in 1988. Based on this data, the public sector deficit (expenditure minus revenue) moved from a surplus of a little bit more than one percent of GDP in 1970/71 to a deficit of 13 percent of GDP in 1975/76. The deficit dropped to about 4 percent of GDP in 1979/80 but then inrreased sharply in 1980/81 due to a sharp drop in public sector revenue. After 1982, the deficit declined and moved into a surplus of approximately 2 percent of GDP and has remained at about that level. Due to the lack of data on the state-owned enterprises and due to the fact that all capital expenditure financed by tied external loans or grants is excluded, we are fairly safe in assuming that the deficit that results from the consolidation of these accounts is not giving a complete picture of the resources that are being claimed by the public sector. Before going on to alternative approaches, let us consider briefly the components of the consolidated deficit that we have just described. i) The central government Given the absence of detailed accounts on the state-owned 19 enterprises,the pattern shown by the consolidated public sector is dominated by the revenue and expenditure of the central government. Central government expenditure as a share of GDP is only slightly less than that for consolidated public sector expenditure as seen in Figure 2.2. This is explained by the fact that data on the Cocoa Marketing Board and on the Ghana Industrial Holding Corp. are in the form of net profits or losses. They were thus included in the consolidation on the revenue side. The difference between consolidated public sector expenditure and _entral government expenditure reflects the expenditure of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust. A breakdown of central government expenditure over the period from 1969/70 to 1988 is presented in Table 2.1. The most striking point brought out by the expenditure breakdown is the dominance of central government expenditure on consumption over expenditure on investment. Throughout the period central government consumption remained steady wnile investment by the central government varied considerably in line with general economic conditions. Neither interest payments nor current transfers take a large part of central government expenditure, although interest rates have increased in the 1980s. Net lending is low throughout the period. As seen in Figure 2.2, central government revenue as a share of GDP has varied considerably over the past two decades. It peaked in 1970/71 at almost 20 percent of GDP, FIGURE 2.2 CENTRAL GOV., REV., EXP. & DEF. 1969/70 - 1988 28- 26 24- 22- 20- 16 0.- 0 o 1~6 o 1~4 Z 1~2 0.~ -2 1969/70 1974/75 1979/80 1984 0 CGREV + CGEXP Q CGDEF OWBU £ICOO CLDZIIFIAII64 OF aaliu.L OWmSMII OM M (AS A UMKIh OF I041L £XM90IImUI NO fii L1iI1lw) nowns 1,o0ojn %III,ja 19na OWNVi 9914j15 S 911/i 1gis.fl 5911/rn ig9AJ?ig nsl9ISM/as,3 19939,2 9962 9963 198 9961 920 II0 1960 a. MM. COA?W h1SMOw m". 11.14 1.62 VLSI is.0g 13.60 50.21 95 10.50 Os N6.8 01.9 75.21 66.03 01.05 89.30 64.01 OD. 31 02.96 11.32 14.04 commmum ~~~~49.04 12.0) SO."9 Sis 165.40 92.90 44.03 39.00 45.46 45.02 45.00 4S.9IS 44.32 41.91 41.61 56.92 11.26 11.41 16.41 16.01 WKSNO SKMKS 22-46 3S.ID 39. 33.66 29.32 39.12 24.64 20.44 24.99 23.14 26.03 21.40 24.90 24.94 24.66 19.22 3D.33 3S.12 33.51 33.00 as" GM we $[MM$99.20 21.13 99.19t 91.01 25. 21.96 10.90 9.41 20.41 11.10 9091 16.11 19.236 22.91 23.20 31.10 21.04 29.1lb 22.90 23.61 INIVlSS 0.35 0.01 WM0 0.62 L.9 0.43 5.04 0.06 1.351 9.04 11.9IS 92.80 21.44 23.92 14.92 92.44 10.62 15.41 9.10 1.98 VatU9c 0.77 L.4 1.44 L03 1.00 NA NA 64 "A to M4 $a NA M NA 4 III 64 M 3.96 cooft ~~~2.58 ia. 3.30 0.6S 9.04 M4 NA NA la 6 M4 At NA NA Ka Am to .4 641 4.02 ComV 1125r 30.39 IL"4 038 H4.3 9341 94.46 99.01 14.61 1390 95096 21.09 20.00 99.0) 24.62 26.9 91.49 12.33 90.02 6.91 9.41 IesEC tim 30.2 O26 IC.66 109 93.6 93.2 14.16 90.15194.44 4.83) M 9036 24.98 20.63 99.50 24.98 64 St NA 64% 64% M U9MM TO dUR R C9S OF O 21.12 90.201 M 64 oh 64 M NA 14.4 2.40 3.46 2.14 3.02 2. 11 3.90 9.90 0.13 6.96 0.13 1.62 so" L1~~~0.4 0.L 0.23 0.41 I 035 0.30 0.29 0.49 0.1Is 0.21 0.94 0.26 0.21 0.24 NA a4 M4 "A 64 M4 OUIIIUamIUCM SUllffir 0.60 0.60 -0La 0.94 0.61 0.00 -3.41 -2.49 -1.21 0.44 .0.00 0.43 0.42 .0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00 99L 6141 914 CWIKto1uO 90.11 22.33 90.9) 14.54 98.49 20.90 21.11 29.02 21.19 91.90 92.43 11.40 10.07 0.66 1.61 92.21 91.21 93.40 91.34 19.94 am .FM ECoOIAIOUU1Ib 92.66 "A.9191.06 14.21 94.91 946.0 21.36 24.915 90.20 91.05 S0."6 11.03 &6.9 1.31 0.90 90.19 93.41 11.93 94.14 91.93 COwif 615m LO6 39 9.05 0.33 L.0 1.91 I."9 2.44 2.10 9.05 1.40 2.40 9.93 1.90 0.31 9.39 9.19 2.21 2.69 9.83 UuuUOMS go" w&s 0F GM. S."61 3.9 9.90 L33 9.66 64 to so M NA I64 0.95 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01d 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Oal CWS1M MUSM 0.6 0.0 0.M LO 0.6 0.6 3.4 2.43 2.18 0.00 0.09 3.106 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 let. lat ioo" 2.03 30 110.66 0.64 0.71 S."4 91.96 99.36 L.30 La0 8.40 3.34 3.02 4.06 2.11 2.00 4.4 3.04 4.56 3.99 Wv. am -2.9" .2.11 0.0 0.60 0.00 8060 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00' 0.00 2.60 2.09 USa. spol 43.II.911.9v) 10o.0 90.0 t6wos 900.6 900.0 900.00 9.00.6 90 0.00 96.0 90.00 960.00 900.00 900.00 900.0 900.00 900.00 100.00 100.60 9D.00 900.00 . ------------ -- - ---- ------------- - --- .- -.---------------------------------------------------- ski SMOs on "a5 22 dropped sharply over the next two years and had a second, but lower peak in 1974/75 at 15 percent of GDP. Central government revenue then declined sharply over the next six years reaching a low of 4.52 percent of GDP in the 1980/81 fiscal year. Revenues increased slightly over the next few years and in the period between 1983 and 1986 they increased sharply and have since leveled-off at about 15 percent of GDP. The decomposition of central government revenue (see Table 2.2) shows that Ghana, like many other African countries, receives the greatest part of its revenue from taxes on international transactions and from import and export duties in particular. As other studies on Ghana have noted'2, the taxation of cocoa exports has been particularly heavy. The percentage of total revenue and grants from indiract taxes averaged 66 percent over the period. Import duties provided an average of 16 percent of total revenue over the period and export duties contributed an average of 22 percent. Other indirect taxes on domestic goods and services averaged 27 percent of total revenue over the period. In contrast, the percentage of total revenue and grants from direct taxes such as those on income, corporate taxes, and payroll taxes (not including contributions to social security) averaged 21 percent over the period from the 1969/70 fiscal year to 1988. The dependence on export taxes as the primary source of 12 See Rimmer (1989). OmMa 015331 G hINO MVaUi 4AS A ftIh3I OF bIDAL 8(V1() 3101IG10 91011 1913112 t1613/) ISV 9134 54/15 1915/16 3916/l i 1912IS1111 1919180 IWO0/At 3983/82 1190 1583 1964 19583 1186 38 ISO t. TW0 K S 92.34 3.9 80.61 89.31 65.89 09.1IS 66.93 93.01 10.84 91.26 93.31 90.5 SS .01 84.54 82.59, 19.19 80.61 63.49 85.-46 14-02 A. Set# 1*805 19. Il 13.04 SO.94 22.40 19.40 30.36 24.93 21.14 39.16 11.49 20.16 26.04 29.43 28.60O 31.9? 18.23 19.316 39.16 31.69 20..14 win58 am ImC. P3ITS: 39.12 13.02 11.91 22.38 19.49 19.15S 24.29 23.00 19.31 11.40 19.93 13.60 19.91 16.49 12.20 33.66 33.330 13.69 16.11 23..d3 INIOVISM3. 6.16 5.1 8.39 16.08 8.42 6.49 10.23 9.65 11.12 9.68 10.16 3.89 6.31 5.8as 3.40 3.21 2.9? 2.42 3.22 3. Jo 6611T 30.98 1.34 1.52 12.30 11.01 11.28 14.01 11. 35 I 625 1.12 9. 12 13.71 13.60 12.64 8.61 10.61 10.8.4 31.21 12.95 11.s6 P*3IL 0.00 6.00 0.60 0.60 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.33 0. 09 0.01 9.82 S. 5) 8.40 S. 04 4.0Q2 4.62 4.70 4.10 3.91 lD*1cm 1311 0.03 0.02 6. 02 0.03 6.00 0.23 0.24 0.56 0.2* 0.00 0.11 2.62 3.01 1.13 0.13 0.33 0.13 D. 11 1.42? I 1-1 om¶1v TAXES 0.03 0.82 0.02 0.03 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.13 6.00 0.00 0.32 0.22 0.31y 0.312 0.04 0.06 0. *5 0.06 0.00 613(8 0.80 0.66 0.66 0.00 0.80 0.23 0.24 0. Is 0.13 0.00 0.31 2.50 0.19 1. 54 P.62 0. 30 0.61 0.12z 1.36 1. 13 L. laIVSI 1*15 I1.SS 16.60 48.32 64.43 65.13 68.9 62.01 69.32 31.08 13.16 13.10 64.51 62.64 51.94e 64.62 60.91 61.53 65.31 63.11 51.68 Xmas ~~~~~26.13 32.16 21.63 21.42 16.23 16.42 29.10 32.13 26.18 19.00 31.26 42.99 42.04 40.90 15.90 24.56 22.26 26.65 23.36 25.15 013(86.5*1*. Tuba. vA? I0.38 6.66 6.50 10.13 5.66 5.13 6.41 6.08 4.69 3.93 3.50 S.46 * 11 5.33 2.32 1.95 2.92 4.33 1.53 8.03 S(351s a a 16.21 14.31 31.44 11.39 10.13 10.49 32.39 25.G8 21.04 15.01 23.16 31.62 33.43 28.62 13.58 22.62 19.34 22.34 16.03 31.13 O66M33 mamliN 80 VA NA is Ng 80 NA4 NA MA 80 8A. NA IA 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.49 8.96 4.50 1.45 WESIVanSnICEES 0.22 0.41 0.39 0. 30 0.22 0.32 6.24 0.31 0.45 0.00 0.00 5.92 4.31 6.95 80 8 NA MA Ng 80 1LI 44.8"2 53.8 40.10 31.81 49.49 52. S5 32.11 31.30 44.90 54.1is 45.84 21.52 20.51 15.04 40.12 36.40 39.25 38.66 40.20 32.53 sa.I 11111S 33.1) 11.17 34.62 15.32 1903 17.21 9.16 11.41 35.68 16.26 14.35 14.12 14.12 30.81 19.25 13.95 16.35 19.34 16.03 16.62 cup" simIE 11.66 12.3 10.62 18.14 35.3 13.21 L.83 C.8 25.61 16.31 11.91 13.11 14.66 9.41 14.46 10.50 13.49 13.40 10.95 9.31 0130 601080(S 1.33 4.61 3.40 0.49 LO6 4.06 4.33 4.59 0.159 0.05 2.64 0.61 2.34 1.41 4.19 3.45 4.86 5.93 5.01 1.33 1363 IRS 3.301 54 3 5.4 2.69 23.31 30.21 35.34 32.95 31.13 18.11 3.5St 30.56 0.0S 0.13 0.04 28.64 21.91 22.15 19.33 24.19 15.91 am ~~~~~33.5 550 3650.1 0 23.66 38.4 34.61 21.96 31.63 '8.66 3. 14 30.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.34 19.91 21.18 18.95 24.11 15.9' 01m0 6.19 8.16 0.19s 0.35 1.41 0.84 0."5 0.10 0.5St 6. 1 0.30 0.05 0.13 0. 04 1.31 2.005 0.117 0.3 0.02 0.0(0 GUM TAXES056 13L.3 1UASIS 0.8 L.OD 0.80 0.38 0.39 0.66) 0.601 0.66 6.66 0.66 0.53 1.31 3.54 4.33 0.802 0.48 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 am66 TAM0 B.64 1.32 6.61 0.66 0.33 0.42 0.66 0.80 0.80 0.66) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 II. lIam OE80M 1.50 6.31 13.13 30.64 13.32 30.24 13.69 6.93 9.09 0.12 6.13 8.00 6.19 14.41 36.85 16.11 35.33 30.25 9.13 8.46 ,%%I OF GM. F1(5 ETC. 2.31 1.62 1.55S 2.49 1.92 1.80 3.41 2.23 1.69 1.39 1.45 3.16 Z. 48 3.88 NA 0.06 2 01 kh IsA 8A 980808 Dim 3.33 4.44 9.11 10.64 10.5 1i .94 30.64 6.23 1.00 1.22 4.19 5.95 4.00 1.44 MA IS. to 10. Z9 NAk 8.20 tAA MN11 N.3LC (AITM1InalS 2.5S3 3. T4 6.42 6.37 9.179 6.31 9.66 4.00 3.5 1I .12 4.19 5.19 3.93 1.33 8A 80 kA 80 8.20 kSA KaWS. Wv*sISS.1011gESI 0.80 0.10 1.29 1.46 0.12 1.58o 0.98 2 23 3.53t 0.09 0.00 0.35s 0.01 0 33 "A 0.00 kA k0 k0 80 16M585 9033013(8 ((VlLS OFCO 1.11 0.93 0.66 0.05 0.02 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.0E0 000D 0.00 80 0 00 0.0 ISo A NA kA 013(8033.468980*13 3.03 3.38 1.20 0. 45 0.81 0.32 0.96 0.41 0.26 0.23 0.46 0.96 0.31 3.14 NA 0 09 Z. '1 NA 0.91 ftA 153. CAPitA. Inflaw3 0.00 0.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00i 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00( 0.00 0.00 0.00u 0 00 0 00 0.00 0 00 000o MAL 1.531*13 99.92 99.32 3000.00 99.95 99.319 99.99 300.00 300.00 9. 94 100.00 300.00 96.63 98.86 99.03 19.44 lit, 9 ¶11.~98 14.15 94 16 9?.~ 41 IV. 6*841 (9WsAs) 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.05 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1. 31 1 34 0 ¶59 0.56 4.0U4 4.02 5.25 5.44 7t.11 TOIL KLlA We mats1 300.00 166.030.00 100. 6610.0 30.0308 00.00 100.00 300.00 100.00 300.00 100.00 300 00oo- 100.00 100.00 10o13io (JO 300 00 300.00 100.00 300.00 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 24 revenue has led to a certain degree of instability in the revenue intake and this has also affected the composition of revenue. The early peaks in revenue collection seen in Figure 2.2 (1970/71 and in 1974/75) correspond to those years in which export duties peaked. Changes in export tax revenue were also the result of changes in the tax rate (it was especially high in the early 1970s). These factors explain the slight changes in the composition of revenue during these years. Another rather dramatic shift in the composition of revenues occurs during 1980/81, 1981/82 and in 1982. During these years there is a dramatic drop in revenue from international trade transactions -- import duties remained fairly stable but there was a virtual collapse in revenue from export duties.13 This had a considerable effect on the composition of revenue: direct taxes provided about 30 percent of total revenue and taxes on domestic goods and services jumped from 27 percent of total revenue in 1979/80 to 43 percent in 1980/81. By 1984, however, the traditional pattern re-emerges. With expenditures consistently more sizable than revenue over the two decades, the central government was constantly in deficit. The central government deficit peaked in 1975/76 at 13 The collapse in export duties seems to be the result of several factors. A general collapse of economic conditions meant that more people were turning away from commercial activity into subsistence. An overvalued cedi combined with a decline in cocoa production meant reduced exports and hence, reduced receipts from export taxes (and reduced receipts due to lower import levels). This was compounded by the growth of black market cocoa exports and of the parallel market in general which is not subject to taxation. (see Rimuer (1989) and May (1985)) 25 just under 14 percent of GDP. It gradually declined to about 5 percent of GDP in the first few years of the eighties. With the onset of the Economic Recovery Program, central government deficit fell even further and in 1986 the central government budget was more or less balanced. Since 1986 the central government budget has been in surplus at about .5 percent of GDP. ii.j Social Security and the National Insurance Trust The Social Security Fund (later renamed the Social Security and National Insurance Trust - SSNIT) was established in 1965 and its surpluses have been an important source of finance for the central government. The scheme provides mainly pension benefits, but there are also provisions for invalidity, survivor's, sickness and employment benefits. It is financed by contributions equivalent to 12.5 percent of the employees remuneration from the employer and 5 percent from the employee himself. Any establishment with over five employees is required to join the scheme. Government workers have taken part since 1973. While contributions to the system have not always been up to date (in 1974/75 the known arrears in contributions amounted to 033 million14), the Social Security Fund has not yet had to pay out much in the way of benefits and thus has had consistent surpluses over the past twenty years (see Table 2.3). 14 World Bank data. It. 13 OKMIIS SIflm5 OW 01DE NtIC Ct9 Iinlil1S eIu I OF G .............................. . ............................._._..____. _____............ _ __........... ...... .........___. . _,,_................... _................... ------------------ IW9J10n 193J11 t.flfl 19W?) IIWIG 1914J1 99110 I9Mat U igl lS 9131 11/60 1980181 1981/U? II 1593 984 198 198 991 Il6 41owi lon . .01 *.25 1.91 1.33 2.15 2.64 1.51 0.B8 1.01 0.71 0.62 0.94 0.16 0.33 0.44 0.61 *1.20 1.10 1.20 SlIISE 0.32 0.3, 0.24 029 0. 3 0.6 0.so 0.46 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.14 0.2S 0.26 0.12 0.29 0.21 0.36 0.34 0.43 L U fotlfS0 4.5* 4.13 -9.02 -1.61 .0.26 .2.ns -2.01 .1.0s 4.S0 -0.63 -0.50 -0.48 -0.69 -0.so -0.21 4.24 -0.35 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 6o0m IIMI NM 19 621O. mI(U*VW(-) -0.29 4.12 0. 0.62 40.01 -0.91 -.1S. -0.29 0.22 -0.34 -0.45 -0.03 -2.66 0.1 0.9s -0.16 1.2? 2.06 9.03 0 am samiu oo 2/ 10 W. SOPUU*)/8U(-) 0.3 0.60 4.01 -4.0 0.0) 0.03 0S.0 0.13 0.06 0.0 O.OS 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.93 6A NA LI FI'. SJWtg4.)iU (-) la 60 6 at a0 at 60 6 6 6 1 MA NA 60 0.38 2.26 3.54 4.59 -0.13 . - - ------------------- - --- - ---- - -- - ------ - ------------------------------------------------------------ -------,----------------------- ------------------------ 1* 1e Wm AID osf lE 5D 1 9193 EIC. V MU IN C* AIA_ 10s 9 WlG.mO. 27 Until 1986, the SSNIT was required to invest its surpluses in government paper and as a result it was a substantial holder of medium-term government securities. When such securities were not available, the SSNIT deposited the balance of the surplus with the Bank of Ghana (until the government's next issue of securities). Since 1986, the SSNIT has been allowed to make its own choices regarding its asset structure. iii) The state-owned enterprises The state-owned enterprise sector (SOEs) in Ghana is quite large. Most of the state enterprises were created in the 19609 and early 1970s to meet particular economic and social objectives. In 1986, the state-owned sector consisted of 181 companies in which the government had majority ownership and 54 companies in which the government was minority shareholder. In general the state-owned sector has not lived up to expectations and the return on the sizable investment required and on loans has been low. As a result the state-owned sector has placed a heavy financial and managerial burden on the central government. Data back to 1970 are available for two parts of the state-owned sector -- for the Cocoa Marketing Board and for the Ghana Industrial Holding Corp. For the rest of the state-owned sector data only become available in 1984. After considering the data on the Cocoa Marketing Board and on the Ghana Industrial Holding Corp., we will take a look at the scattered evidence on the rest of the SOEs to get a general 28 idea of the effect that they had on the public sector deficit. a) The Cocoa Marketina Board. The Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) was established as a means of regulating domestic aspects of cocoa marketing and particularly as a means of stabilizing the price paid to domestic cocoa producers. It is responsible for organizing and financing the purchase and transport of cocoa beans to ports and processing plants and for marketing Ghanaian cocoa on the world market. As seen above, the most important source of central government revenue has been the export tax on cocoa. The duty payable is based on the f.o.b. export price received by the CMB for cocoa sales; the duty takes the form of a 100% tax on all receipts above a set price. This price (the price that producers receive) is set by the CMB and has often been considerably lower than world market prices. In addition to the duties paid to the central government, the CMB at times provided loan capital to the government. At other times, however, the CMB deferred paying its taxes -- some 030 million in 1971/7215. It also found itself with a net operating deficit (after taxes) in a number of years. These have been financed directly by the Central Bank. Table 2.3 shows the net operating surpluses and deficits of the CMB (after taxes) dating back to 1969/70. Is World Bank data. 29 b) The Ghana Industrial Holding Corp. The Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) was established as a holding company in 1967 to take over the functions of the State Enterprises Secretariat. It controls the sixteen divisions that originally belonged to the Secretariat and has taken on ten more since. 16 Some of the divisions of the GIHOC, including distilleries, canneries and pharmaceuticals, have generally been profitable. Others, such as bricks, tiles and vegetable oils, have continually made losses. In general, the GIHOC did not contribute to any great extent to the consolidated public sector deficit. If anything, it helped to very slightly offset the deficit (see Table 2.3). c) Other state-owned enteRxrises. For a number of reasons, there is no series of data on the profits and losses of the majority of state-owned enterprises prior to 1984. This makes assessing the deficit of the consolidated public sector particularly difficult. While complete information is not available, state-owned enterprises clearly dominate the industrial sector, and it is worth considering the information that is available. The sources available17 all indicate that most of the non-financial state enterprises have been making substantial 16 See Huq (1989), p.242. 17 Huq (1989); Killick (1978); Rimmer (1989), and World Bank, Country Economic Memorandum (various years). 30 losses or earning meager profits. The only major exception to this case has been the Volta River Authority18. Over the past two decades (and before) many SOEs did not revalue their assets and many more have stopped fulfilling contractual obligations by not paying interest or social security contributions. Many are not even paying income tax19. A report from the mid-1970s, discussed some of the profit and loss figures for a few of the SOEs. In 1972, the Electricity Corporation had a profit of 00.6 million and the Post & Telecommunications had a profit of ¢1.2 million. Ghana Railways and Harbours made a loss of ¢0.9 million in 1971/72 and in the same year the Ghana Water and Sewerage made a loss of 02.2 million. The State Gold Mining Corp made a loss of 06.6 million in 1971/72, but turned a profit in the next fiscal year.20 The available information suggests that there was a significant deterioration in the SOEs functioning in the 1979- 83 period. It is estimated that the operating deficit of about 100 public enterprises increased from 092 million in 1979 to 02.9 billion in 1982 or 3 percent of GDP....The net flow of budgetary transfers to the public enterprise sector was considerable during the 1979-83 period, converting on average to about ten percent of total government expenditure. Moreover i8 see Huq (1989), p. 241. 19 Huq (1989), p.242. 20 World Bank data. 31 the rate of interest charged on government loans was only a fraction of the market rate, entailing a significant implicit subsidy. While the government was the major source of outside financing of operating deficits and investment programs, the domestic banking system made up for the remainder of the financing needs. 21 The scattered evidence available indicates that through 1983, the state-owned enterprises placed a considerable burden on the public sector. A series of data on the "core" state-owned enterprisesU is available from 1984 onward. These enterprises combined with the Cocoa Marketing Board constitute approximately 70 percent of SOE output and therefore data on their operations is a useful guide to how the state-owned sector is currently influencing the public sector deficit. As seen in Table 2.3, the consolidated accounts of these SOEs indicates that since 1984, their results have been good. These consolidated accounts, however, mask somewhat the fact that a number of the 21 World Bank data. 22 The "core" state-owned enterprises include: Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, Electricity Corporation of Ghana, Volta River Authority, Ghana Posts and Telecommunications Corp., Ghana Airways Corp., Omnibus Services Authority, State Transport Corp., City Express Services, State Shipping Corporation (Black Star Line), Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority, Ghana Railway Corp., Ghana National Petroleum, Ghanaian Italian Petroleum Co.,Ghana Oil Co., State Gold Mining Corp., Ashanti Goldfields, Ghana Supply Commission, Ghana National Procurement Agency. The Cocoa Marketing Board is also considered one of the core Stat-owned enterprises, but since it has been discussed above, it will not be included here. 32 state-owned enterprises still operated at a loss. Subventions from the central government during these years amounted to 0488.2 million in 1984, 0679.7 million in 1985 and 01144.7 in 1986.3 Although there is no way to extrapolate backwards from the more recent data to earlier years for the "core state-owned enterprises", the anecdotal evidence does seem to point to the fact that the state-owned enterprise sector placed a considerable burden upon the public sector. Hence, the measure of the consolidated public sector deficit that has been set out above should be considered as a lower bound to our estimate of the actual figure. iv). The Central Bank Another factor that should be taken into account when considering the public sector deficit, but that has not been taken into consideration in the consolidated deficit discussed above, is the loss incurred by the central bank. This is often referred to as the quasi-fiscal deficit.24 The most common source of central bank losses is lending to the non-financial public sector at no or at a very low interest rate. They also may result from rescuing troubled financial institutions, exchange guarantees and from the effect of a change in the a Based on World Bank data. 24 See Teijeiro (1989) for a general discussion of Central Bank losses and how to account for them. 33 real exchange rate on the net foreign asset position5. The difficulty in including these losses into the public sector deficit is that accounting practices vary widely between the central bank and the central government. It is clear that in Ghana the central bank has incurred substantial losses. One recent report stated that the accumulated valuation adjustments on net foreign liabilities reached 0243 billion by end-June 1989, equivalent to more than three and a half times the net domestic credit of the banking system as a whole and over 20 percent of the GDP26. These devaluation losses are essentially a liability of the Treasury. The above consolidation does not take the losses of the central bank into consideration. The consolidation of all of the available data on the income and expenditure (and net operating profits) of the various components of the public sector showed us that, even excluding complete data on the state-owned enterprises, fiscal deficits in Ghana over the past two decades have been significant. A shortcoming of this approach, however, is the fact that it does not incorporate the state-owned enterprise sector. Another difficulty is that capital expenditure tied to project lending and grants has been excluded. The evidence 25 Note that the central bank also makes gains from the inflation tax. 26 World Bank data. This is a nominal loss which should be adjusted for domestic inflation. 34 that is available concerning these two factors indicates that in excluding them from our measure of the consolidated deficit we may be underestimating the claims that the public sector makes on resources. One way to address these problems is to define the deficit based on the financing requirements of the public sector. 2) Defining the public sector deficit based on itg financing. An alternative way of considering the size of the deficit is to consider the total financing that the government has received. Data on the total stock of central government debt outstanding can be supplemented with the claims that the central bank and the banking system have against the state- owned enterprise sector (from IFS) and with the data on public and publicly guaranteed external debt (from the World Debt Tables), in order to derive a measure of the total outstanding stocks of debt of the public sector. Differencing these data on stocks provides us with an alternative flow measure of the financing that was provided to the public sector and thus an alternative measure of the fiscal deficit. As seen in Figure 2.327, the public sector deficit as determined by these data is somewhat different than that determined by consolidating the accounts. This is particularly 27 See Table 3.1 for the information on stocks underlying this figure. FLCLRE 2.3 PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT, 1971-88 BASED ON FINANCING 16- 15 14 13- 12 11 10 0. I- ~7 z w 'L 5 4 3 2 0- -1 1971 1976 1981 1986 0 DOM 1 DOM+EXT 36 true after 1984 when external borrowing rises markedly. The line marked with squares represents domestic flows to the public sector. The line marked with crosses represents the combined domestic and external flows to the public sector. (Therefore the area between the two lines represents external borrowing.) The fiscal deficit as determined by public sector borrowing is roughly 2 percent of GDP in 1971. It rises sharply, reaching 10 percent of GDP in 1973 due to a large jump in external borrowing over 1972 and 1973. Public sector borrowing drops off in 1974 and 1975 only to jump to just 15 percent of GDP in 1976, 1977 and, 1978. This high level of borrowing is all the more remarkable given the lack of external ±..^ sce. The deficit falls again to 5 percent of GDP in 1979. Three more peaks follow in 1980, 1982, and 1986 with public sector borrowing reaching 7.5, 9.7 and 10.24 percent of GDP respectively. In 1987, total public sector borrowing declined to 9.5 percent of GDP and in 1988 it dropped sharply, reaching a surplus of 0.38 percent of GDP." In general the figures given here are considerably larger than those provided by aggregating the public sector accounts. There are two principal reasons for this. The first is, as mentioned above, that the Ghanaian deficit, based on the government accounts (discussed above) exc'udes capital expenditure financed through external project aid and the D Note that the revaluation effects on the external debt due to changes in the cedi/$ rate have been excluded from the total financing required in Figure 2.3. 37 corresponding grants and loans, in other words, aid is treated as income. The project aid and other such financing are included in this measure of the deficit. This becomes particularly important after the implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme in 1984. The second reason that the finance-based estimate is larger is that it includes information on the borrowing requirements of the public enterprises, which was not complete in the government accounts. In the case of Ghana, determining the public sector deficit from the financing side seems to provide a more comprehensive estimate than using the conventional methr I where the various levels of the public sector are consolidated. There are, however, some caveats to using this measure. In particular, while in principal the differencing of the stock measures should give us an accurate measure of net flows, in practice this may not always be the case. In the World Debt Tables, for example, the differencing of the total stock of public and publicly guaranteed external debt does not give us figures equal to the net flows of public and publicly guaranteed debt as listed in the Debt Tables. This is largely due to dollar revaluation effects, accounting discrepancies, and to cancellation of loan contracts. Another potential difficulty of using data on stocks to derive flows is that the effect of inflation on the value of total debt stocks is not taken into account. We address the effect of inflation on the 38 flgws of public sector debt below, but no attempt to consider the effects of inflation on total debt stocks has been made. With the above caveats kept in mind, it might in some cases be more appropriate to use this second definition of the deficit, particularly those where we are considering financial markets. In part II on the effect of fiscal deficits on financial markets we use the public sector deficit based on its financing. For the other parts of the study we use the conventional measure of the consolidated fiscal deficit as set out in section 1 above. 3) economic and polio, determinants of nublic sector defioits. 198Q821=8A Before considering how the fiscal deficit affects the key macroeconomic variables in the economy, it is useful to consider the impact that such variables may have on the fiscal deficit. Inflation is likely to affect the fiscal deficit by increasing nominal interest payments. In Ghana, we might also expect to find the Oliveira-Tanzi effect in which direct tax revenue declines during periods of high inflation as the result of collection lags. The level of the official real exchange rate is also likely to affect the fiscal deficit; any part of the deficit that is denominated in foreign currency will be affected. Changes in the real exchange rate might also have an effect on import duties and export taxes. Finally, changes in the real domestic interest rate will affect the 39 deficit, principally through its effect on the cost of servicing domestic debt. This section decomposes the conventional measure of the consolidated public sector deficits according to its main economic and policy determinants, including GDP growth, inflation, the real interest rate, and a number of domestic fiscal and policy variables. The period we consider covers the fiscal years 1980/81 through 1988.30 The methodology used is a simplified version of that set out in Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel and also follows closely that of the Zimbabwe paper by Morande and Schmidt- Hebbel. The approach starts by identifying the main budgetary items of the consolidated public sector deficit. By using estimated tax revenue functions, and some simple variable transformations, one can decompose changes in the public sector deficit into quantifiable macroeconomic and policy determinants. a)Tax revenue functions The first step in the methodology is to estimate the 2 Because the decomposition calls for a detailed breakdown of the components of the deficit and because this detailed information is not necessarily consistent with the "financing-based" deficit measure, we choose to use the conventional measure of the deficit. It is likely to be more appropriate to use the conventional measure in this instance, because it is the one most frequently used by policymakers. 0 Ghana switched from a fiscal year accounting basis to a calendar year accounting basis in 1982. 40 behavioral equations for the tax revenue functions. For Ghana we have estimated four separate functions: direct taxes, export taxes, import duties, and other indirect taxes (sales and excise taxes). These functions were estimated for the 1970/71-1988 period; the results are set out in Table 2.4. Direct taxes depend positively on GDP which is used as a proxy for the tax base. The relationship between direct taxes and inflation is a negative one, indicating that the negative effects on income tax revenue due to collection lags. etc. (the Oliveira-Tanzi effect) outweighs the positive effect that inflation may have on direct tax revenue due to "bracket creep" ( the effect traditionally discussed in the tax literature in reference to inflation in developed countries). There is a positive relationship between the real exchange rate and inflation which may be explained in two ways. A real exchange rate depreciation ( an increase in our measure) is likely to lead to increased exports and thus higher income, which would increase the intake on tax revenues. Tax rates may also be higher in the traded-good sectors than in the non- traded goods sectors, leading to an increased revenue intake with a depreciation. Three dummy variables were included to take policy changes with respect to the tax regime into account. The first is for the 1974-79 period; the second marks the "first coming" of Rawlings and both the political and economic uncertainty as well as a massive deterioration in the performance of the tax administration over the period: the 41 Table 2.4A Estimation Results for Tax Revenue Functions (1970/71-1988) A. Direct Taxes DTt 8 ao + a,Yt + al'rt + a3RER, + a,D7479 + a,D7983 + a,D84 + et Rearession a. a, as . O M DW R' 1. -9.41 1.38 -.64 1.05 .610 .560 .370 1.91 .941 (-2.95) (5.51) (-3.87) (6.03) (4.71) (3.38) (3.91) B. Export Taxes ETt 0a + PLEXt + Prt + 3RERt + *TOTt + PsD8082 + £t Rearession Bo a _ B. B I. B B. DW R' 1. 7.39 .54 -.09 .44 .905 -6.17 2.63 .982 (6.57) (1.94) (-.14) (.801) (1.53) (-16.11) 2. 8.61 .49 - - - -6.49 2.03 .978 (28.57) (2.66) (-22.4) C. Import Duties IDt - * y+ 7IXt + y2t + y3RERt + y,TOTt + at Rearession v , 'T 7. v- DW Rl 1. 6.41 .743 .429 1.20 .624 2.29 .84 (17.56) (3.37) (1.40) (5.22) (2.11) 2. 6.63 .708 - 1.03 .714 2.58 .82 (19.54) (3.13) - (5.14) (2.39) D. Other Indirect Taxes OITt - AG + A1Yt + AaWt + A3D79 + A,D73, + et Ragression Aa A. A. A. A. OW R' 1. -16.5 2.05 -1.41 -.28 -.66 1.93 .78 (-2.85) (4.53) (-6.26) (-1.17) (-2.64) 2. -14.7 1.91 -1.40 - -.62 1.63 .76 (-2.60) (4.32) (-6.17) - (-2.49) Note: All regressions were performed on real variables in logs (except for those variables that are indices and dummies) using OLS. Residual autoregressions for each final equation did not show evidence of autocorrelation. 42 last marks the beginning of the structural adjustment program and efforts to improve revenue mobilization. All three variables have a positive, significant relationship with direct tax revenues. For export taxes, an index of export volume was used as the base. Inflation, the real exchange rate, the terms of trade, and a dummy for the period between 1980-82 were also included in the estimation, but only exports and the dummy variable were significant. Export taxes are positively related to exports and very strongly and negatively related to the dummy variable. This dummy variable reflects three years when export tax revenue plummets (as discussed above). The cause may be because in the early eighties those cocoa producers who were still producing were likely to be selling their cocoa on the black market. Another factor that may have contributed is the breakdown in tax administration due to the severe economic crisis during those years. Import duties were regressed on an index of import volume, inflation, the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. An increase in imports is shown to have a positive effect on import duties. Inflation was found to be insignificant. An depreciation in the real exchange rate was found to have a positive effect on import duties. This may result from the fact that an increase in the real exchange rate would assist exports thereby improving access to the foreign exchange necessary to import. To the extent that the 43 ability to export increases the ability to import, a depreciation in the currency could lead to a rise in revenue from import duties. A depreciation also raises import tax revenue by increasing the domestic value of imports. An increase in the terms of trade (defined here as the unit value of exports over the unit value of imports) was also found to increase import duties. This is likely to be due to the fact that an improvement in the terms of trade allows a country to import more and thus to increase its revenue from import duties. The last revenue function estimated is that for "other indirect taxes" e.g. sales taxes and excise duties. We regress other direct taxes against GDP (a proxy for the tax base) inflation, the real exchange rate and a number of dummy variables for policy shifts and/or changes in regime. Other indirect taxes are positively related to GDP, and negatively related to inflation . A dummy variable for a shift in regime in 1973 is significant and negatively related to other indirect taxes. The other dummy variables tested were not significant. b) Decomoosition of the public sector deficit According to the methodology set out in Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel (1989), Table 2.5 sets out the changes in the main economic and policy determinants of the fiscal deficit from 1980/81 through 1988. The domestic macroeconomic 44 Table 2.6 Ghana Chenge of Ee.onele and Pelley Dtrctminonte of Conselidated Nen-Financial Public Sector Deficit 1/ 60/S1 61/62 130 10 18 1914 13n5 1930 1307 1son 1. Doesai variable.l Real GOP (Y ) 0.070 -0.202 -0.153 0.007 0.020 0.051 0.052 0.049 0.062 Exports (EX') -0.045 -0.001 0.049 -0.279 0.020 0.211 0.105 0.077 0.128 Imports (!M) -0.022 -0.162 -0.217 -0.102 0.270 0.112 0.148 0.129 0.047 Domestic I rate-real (dr) -0.149 0.1O 0.276 -0.94 0.709 0.284 -0.191 0.066 0.062 Doesetic Inflation (dP ) 0.170 -.10 -0.821 0.06 -0.674 -0.229 0.211 -0.025 -0.057 Real exchange rate (RER') -0.860 -.809 -0.071 0.467 2.044 0.417 0.448 0.277 0.042 2. Foreign Veriables Foreoign I rate n(die) 0.020 -0.006 -0.017 -0.021 0.010 -0.021 -0.015 -0.001 0.008 Terse of Trade (TOT') -0.170 4O.253 4.105 0.067 0.802 -0.059 0.126 -4.0O3 -4.073 8. Policy Variables foreoign debt (De/P*) 4.06 -0.061 -0.020 0.019 -4.070 0.06 0.29, 0.246 0.012 Domestic debt (D/P) -0.1lf -0.042 0.061 -0.205 -0.218 -0.049 -0.058 4.821 -0.847 Wage bill (WS/P) 0.10 -0.299 -0.109 -o.22 -.017 1.279 0.278 -0.015 0.082 Goods and servicee (CS/P) 0.108 -0.070 0.021 4.103 1.060 0.086 -4.131 0.108 0.095 Transfer. and subsidies (TS/P) -0.155 -0.248 0.116 -O.151 -0.276 0.160 -0.121 -0.064 0.108 SOE net op. surplue (PD/P) 2/ i.9J3 -4.017 -1.241 -0.282 2.201 -4.730 5.919 0.402 -0.882 Investment (I/P)^ 8/ 0.839 -0.517 -0.179 -O.88 0.075 0.720 -0.027 0.862 0.220 Policy duey- dir taxe (d07479) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Policy dumy- dir taxes (d7983) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Policy duiy-post U4 dir tax(db94) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Policy dumy-3082, gxp. tax (dD0i"2) 1.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Policy dummy-oth.ind.taxes (d078) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1/ Due to limited data availability Includoe central govornment, SSIIT CMi, OKHC, but not other stat.-owne enterprises. 2/ Net operating surpluse or defleto of the $SNIT, CII and ODIOC. 8/ Caplitl expenditure of central govern_ent and SSNZT. 45 variables considered are real GDP, real exports, real imports, the real interest rate (as defined by the Fisher equation), inflation (as measured by the change in the GDP deflator), and the real exchange rate. Two foreign variables are considered, the nominal interest rate and the terms of trade. A set of policy variables is also considered including the real domestic and foreign debt stocks, the government wage bill, government spending on other goods and services, and government transfers and subsidies. Public sector net operating surpluses (for those SOEs for which the data is available) and public investment are also considered as policy variables. Finally, there are five "policy" or "regime" dummies which are indicative of either changes of regime or periods where there was massive erosion in tax collection. Table 2.5 shows that until 1983 real GDP growth was close to zero or negative. Since 1984 it has picked up considerably reaching 6.2 percent in 1988. Both export and import growth have picked up since the adjustment program in 1984. Changes in the domestic real interest rate have been erratic, largely reflecting dramatic changes in the inflation rate given controls on the nominal rate. Inflation has been unstable over the period under consideration, though in recent years the changes have not been so dramatic. Finally, the changes in the real exchange rate reflect the cedis depreciation over the period. Particularly noteworthy is the depreciation of more than 200 percent in 1984. 46 The changes in foreign variables indicate that the nominal foreign interest rate has for the most part remained stable. The terms of trade on the other hand has not. Finally, table 2.5 also shows some of the policy variables over which the government has somewhat more control. From 1984 onward foreign debt increased dramatically and domestic debt declined dramatically. The real wage bill fell throughout the period until 1985 when there was a large jump. The changes in spending on goods and services were mostly negative until 1984 when a large jump occurred. After 1984 spending tended to increase from year to year. Transfers and subsidies have not followed any systematic pattern. Nor have SOE net operating surpluses which show significant changes from year to year (both positive and negative). Prior to the adjustment program public investment fell dramatically. Since 1984, it has grown considerably each year (with the exception of 1986). Table 2.6 sets out the decomposition of the consolidated public sector deficit into the main budgetary variables (This breakdown reflects a simplified version of equation (17) in Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel (1989) or alternatively equation (4) in the appendix of the Zimbabwe paper.). Note that both domestic and foreign interest payments have been determined implicitly, using the interest rate and the stock of domestic and foreign debt, respectively. The table also includes a residual which incorporates those items of the deficit which 47 Table 2.6 Ghana Decoeposition of the Consolidated Non-financial Public Sector Deficit /1 According to Changes In Budgetary Vailables (Ratio. to GOP) ----------------------------------------------------------------- 60/31 81/82 1982 t.8e 1984 1985 to6 1907 e196 I. Changes of Included Variables Wages 0.004 -0.010 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 0.023 0.009 -0.00 -0.001 Other Goods S Serv. -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.019 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 0.001 Transfers A Subs. -0.00 -0.006 0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 Direct Taxes -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 Export taxes -0.026 0.000 -0.000 0.016 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.008 -0.018 Import duties -0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.009 -0.004 0.000 Other Indirect Taxes 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.01 0.012 0.006 0.012 -0.008 0.001 Doe. i payments (impl.) -0.000 -0.008 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006 For. i payments (impI.) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.003 SOEo os. (.udof, - sur)/2 -0.006 0.02S -0.026 0.00. -0.00 0.009 -0.018 -0.007 0.010 Investment 0.007 -0.012 -0.002 -0.004 0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.006 0.004 Explained Sum 0.004 -0.00 -0.080 0.004 -0.009 0.020 -0.046 -0.007 0.001 II. Chgx. of Exci. variables /3 0.022 0.013 -0.009 -0.022 -0.009 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.011 Consolidated Public Sector Deficit 0.027 0.005 -0.039 -0.018 -0.017 0.013 -0.041 -0.012 0.012 _________________ ________________ _________________ ________________ ... __ _ _ -- - -- - - - _____________________________--- /1 Data for the Consolidated Public Sector in Ghana Include the Central Government, Social Security and National Insurance Trust, the Cocoa Marketing Board, and the WHane Industrial Holding Corp.Data for other SOE. not availabi /2 This Is the net operating surplus/ deficit of the MSNIT, CUS and 01GOC. /3 Residual which Includes changes in those factors not considered explicitly. 48 were not explicitly treated either for lack of detailed data or because they are relatively insignificant. Finally, Table 2.7 sets out the final results of the decomposition which allows us to identify the changes in the consolidated fiscal deficit according to their underlying macroeconomic and policy causes. The effect of the main macroeconomic variables has by and large been negative. Consider 1984 as an example. In this year the main macroeconomic variable contributing to a reduction in the deficit was inflation; the positive effect of a reduction in inflation reduced the deficit by 21.6 percentage points of GDP (note that in 1983 the converse happened and inflation contributed to an increase in the deficit by 35.8 percentage points). At the same time changes in the real interest rate increased the deficit by 11.3 percent of GDP. The positive effect of GDP growth on tax bases (the economic effect) contributed to a reduction in the deficit of .7 percentage points of GDP; and the "denominator effect" (due to the fact that the deficit and every budget item are expressed as ratios to GDP) reduced the budget deficit by .2 percentage points of GDP. The other variables can be analyzed in a similar way. The table indicates that the dramatic changes in macroeconomic variables in 1983 and 1984, particularly changes in the inflation rate had a strong impact on the fiscal deficit. These effects have become less pronounced over the past five years as the Ghanaian economy has grown more stable. 49 TAILS 2.7 OMNA DECOMPOSITION OF THE CHANES IN CONSOLIDATED NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS 1/ ACCORDING TO CHANCES IN ECONOMIC AND POLICY VARIABLES (Ratio, to COP) .. . ______....____,._._..... ........ .................................,__,,............. _._ .... - -. _.__. --------..._,.._ , IO/St 81/52 IM3 I93" 1914 1SI5 1918 191? 01116 1. Changec Due to Domestic Variables Real GOP (Y')-denominator -0.006 0.027 0.019 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -.005 O -.00 -0.004 R"l CDP (Y')- numrator -0.017 0.057 0.042 -0.002 -0.007 -0.013 -001O -0.012 -0.016 Exports (EX') 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.012 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004 4.003 o.Sti0 Imports (IMi 0.001 0.011 0.012 0.004 -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.. Domestic I rates (real-dr) -0.084 0.034 0.051 -0.191 0.113 0.028 -0.021 0.006 0.006 Domestic Inflation (dP^) 0.069 -06007 4.110 0.a6 -0.210 -06OO5 0.067 -0.006 -0.013 Real Exchange Rate (RER ) 0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.026 -0.016 -0.021 -0.028 -0.004 2. Changes Due to Foreign Veriablos Foroign nom. 1. rate (di*) 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -O.OO -0.003 -0.000 0.004 Term of Trade (TOT') 0.011 0.016 0.005 -000 -0.014 0.004 -0.00? 0.006 0.004 S. Changes Due to Policy Variable Foreign Debt (De/Pe)' -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.000 Domestic Debt (D/P)' -0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 -005 -0.001 -0.001 -4.007 -4.005 Wage Bill (UI/P) 0.004 -01012 -0.008 -0.006 -0.000 0.025 0.012 -0.001 0.002 Goode and Services (CS/P) -4.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.020 0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.003 Trnnstore and Subsidles (TS/P)' -0-05 -0.007 0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 50 net op. surplus (PD/P)^2/ -4.005 0.027 -0.020 0.001 -0.009 0.009 -0.019 -0.008 0.009 Invstment (I/P) 3/ 0.007 -4.018 -0.002 -0.004 0.007 0.010 -0.001 0.007 0.006 Policy du_y- dir taxes (dD747) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Policy dumy- dir taxes (d7983) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Policy dumy-post 64 dir tax(dD84) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 Policy dumy-002 I EXp. tax (d88082) 0.019 0.000 0.000 4.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Poliey dumy-oth.ind.taxes (d47T) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0°000 0.000 0.000 SUM OF EXPLAINED CHANCES 0.062 0.016 -04.02 0.154 -0149 -0.020 -0.024 -0.01 -4.001 UNEXPLAINED CHANCES -0.03a -0.011 0.012 -0.172 0.131 O.O4 -0.017 0.024 0.013 CHANCE IN CPSD 0.027 0.005 O .-009 -0.018 -0.017 0.013 -0.041 -0.012 0.012 1/ Due to imited data availability Includes central government SSNIT, CB, OINOC, but not other state-owned enterprises. 2/ Net operating surpluses or deficits of the SSNITi CMI and C2HOC. 3/ Capital expenditure of central governeant and SSNIT. 50 Finally, Table 2.7 shows that the policy variables under the government control have generally not had as much impact on the deficit as the macroecononic variables have had. We see that the large wage increase in 1985, contributed a 2.5 percentage increase in the deficit, but that the effects of other policy variables in this year were relatively small. As with the macroeconomic variables, more stable policy variables in recent years have led to much smaller impacts upon the deficit. 51 XIX.) FIXCAL DUIXCXT8 AND FINANCThL MARRUTo It was not until the mid-sixties that the economic literature began to integrate the effects of deficit financing on asset markets into discussions of fiscal policy. Earlier analyses did not allow for the fact that fiscal and monetary policies might imply changes in private sector portfolios and hence changes in private sector wealth. The early analyses (Christ (1968), Blinder and Solow (1974)) are referred to as the "government budget constraint literature." As its name implies this literature sets out the government budget constraint (the fiscal deficit must equal the sum of domestic borrowing, external borrowing and money creation) and considers the impact that changes in the method of financing the deficit have on portfolio holdings and the resulting effect on output. The strand of the literature concerning the relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation is referred to as the "public finance approach to inflation", 31 and is based on the work of Phelps (1973), Dornbusch (1977), and Buiter (1983, 1985), among others. Van Wijnbergen (1982), van Wijnbergen et al (1989) and Easterly (1989a) extend and undertake applications of this framework in various developing countries. Like the government budget constraint literLture, this strand relies on the government budget constraint, but the 31 See van Wijnbergen (1989), p. 1. 52 focus here is on money creation as a source of finance. In these models, inflation is determined as a residual tax. It is a residual because, given constraints on external borrowing and the willingness of the public sector to hold public debt, the government must turn to money creation to cover the gap. To the extent that rate of money creation exceeds the rate of growth of the demand for money balances it will be inflationary. Inflation acts as a tax because it forces the private sector to reduce expenditure just to maintain the real value of money balances it wishes to hold for a given rate-of- return structure. Van Wijnbergen et al (1989) emphasize that in the short run demand pressure or cost-push factors may be important determinants of inflation, but they argue these factors contribute little to the understanding of sustained inflation. In the previous section we saw that over the past two decades Ghana has had large public sector deficits. This part of the study focuses on the way in which Ghana chose to finance these deficits and how these decisions may have affected the financial (as opposed to real) side of the economy. In general, until the imiplementation of the adjustment program, the government relied on money creation as the principal method of finance which led to high rates of inflation32. In the heavily controlled Ghanaian economy, these 32 Other factors, such as supply shocks, as well as money creation contributed to the two price shocks of 1981 and 1983. See Chhibber and Shafik (1990). 53 high rates of inflation resulted in negative real interest rates and, because of the fixed nominal exchange rate, in overvaluation of the currency. These in turn implied implicit taxes on financial intermediation and reduced incentives for exports. They also implied increasingly high returns in the informal economy which eventually became pervasive. All of this served to erode the tax base, thus increasing the deficit and leading to more money creation and the continuation of the vicious circle. In the first half of this section we consider the means of finance that the government used and trace through some of the implications for the economy. In the second half we focus on the tradeoffs between inflation and seignorage revenue in Ghana and consider some alternative scenarios using a simple model based on the model suggested in Appendix II of Easterly et al (1989). Z.) Flvanging the Deficit Table 3.1 provides a detailed breakdown of the financing components of the public sector deficit. As discussed in the previous section, access to external borrowing prior to 1984 was limited. External debt flows (minus revaluation) generally ianged between -0.74 and 1.62 percent of GDP with the exception of 1973, in which the flow of external financing was 4.86 percent of GDP. With the Economic Recovery Programme and the arrangement of a structural adjustment program, external sgosu e.oetl~-6 eooos --- -- a 2 ----- 600----- 6 o'' uet*-a -- jootr 16618' 9-d 0 *6 -18 gu_ta 36:631 0*?661 ge, i ii- .ota /.2).o uP3 636* 3306 t06" ees 53 63 l Oll 506 66 git go's tollti " Pt1 Wt1 1068g 'a ug H.1 ties oo (IN so) 1Am W it. ate e.g. L~~~ISI sas2,it see. a*-a socc gesag Saega al-" "Ile e111, la-St U." 01e WIS 14It 14-011 £0611123u U331 039 till "et all solo till aog feells "It ISOl WI t at16 St1s "Is eP to' 0 As amK Utd 01633o uo 1 tito U1 160o ISO 0210 .r* ml itol gte o ago9psi 568 W 60so's I VP go hjISAUN MUM tilt sol0 Solt "l0 6ol0 60i it's 2il 8913 60's Sol6 6s fel file colt 63 60191 Is661 fol Om61All1 1161 W363 0010 isOe Li9 3011 11310 9660 511V 6i 110 soilo 3L10 61i "It lo's "It VW W va Vs 6 SUES 811.92 Sol0 600o 30111 6il 51I 103 061i 1s 606a le 66#3f' "le og16 sell Itg Ulf Ulf dost cg's son3 Tn12 et't lies 61 le's se at's egso: oto,t anlo semi £108 ero 0 305le 1861 36 L's Sto 60 060 680 5IIII A £113 two rn AO 'IO331335 1.85 6ml lost ml6 1661 Mot 16411 gati If101 1 o *. Nt t1ie aOl SLOt 1st 610t clot 3161 vat 6651 St 1 at t call3 ~ 3* Galt 11£9 it' 1". ggt 11tI "It colt *S "I t *3,I "63 g' 33 SSOAlA lAshsa 1 Nl t o C lot@ "It ist tilt 016e 16t "II 106t 61t go's' O11ti' "lo tol0 66 10lo 0862 AMO *9 I6 651gum 3365wj 36 It3'll tllt 168s 160- 100o 600o 900 0910 tit 901. e1at Wo.- *il* 000 6ill, "If poll UtiW *. 1111 IO Towni 660t tloOt toll W3e "le 8601 001 0 001 0 0000O, "Is 0010 000 00 00 We060- 6001t- 6131t mIIUwS 361t 666601 661t 2102 till trat 1000 9010 0210 till 06,1 all 0.0- W10- 000 till "06- 16,01 Vin *o)69u MOS 1153 6616W*UM A MM 'WMS 610o 0910 Oto £6.0 610o- 600010 ol- ISeo sil0 0,0 310o 660l 631t 6o Osl0 Oil Sel0 0010 gm As O -mm a saw ltel- 110o- 6610 669 681 303- 139 till 6210 toll "It 0l0- £30* tO1t Ott 638- IIIt 080 60 in am9 MANE U0 01 310o 600- 6010- 600o- 30 6610 600 0010 Iilo 1010 SOsl 000-0- "lo Colo00 660 0010 000* DININUNI 31661 06 010 0100- toO* 300o 00o toll *o sleo 4100- i 9O 60 £0. 1o 0010 0010 0010 Col 66123 UWaiW Oslo so60 sil0 eilo "lo 6310 ezlo 660 6l10 050 10 "It 061t &&,- eas 660o 6L0 MM1 £18361 33. fl10- "lo- 660o Sil0 010- ago ego0 iso0 ~Sel 630 110o 610a 61,0 680 0010 00,0 000o 0010 sUnS &866w63 300 10o So,* 0310 110o- Sol 1t eii so "Il 121t 160l 039 silt Co00 660- sale "It 618- mm 11 wv :16"35 11535 1.6601 609-0 *60- 663z atts co61 t65 egg0 itol file 30li 1111i 01i 11 sale so06 all toll sle Tam0 mUswU6o a U" ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6661 1661 666 41661 6661I 6661 3661 See1 0661 Gi61 list 116t go6s list PLOS 6161 £161 ties 665 (do A 30083 Son) …- -..-- - - -...…-- - - -…-- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -.. . . . . . .….. . .- -- - - tq t2 Iidw so sum-le It' "6 16 55 borrowing increased reaching 9.89 percent of GDP in 1987. Before the ERP, Ghana was effectively required to finance her deficits domestically. The decomposition of domestically held public debt shows that the principal financier to the government has been the Bank of Ghana. In the first years of the seventies debt held by the monetary authorities was relatively small, even negligible in 1973. It increased to 3.25 percent of GDP in 1974 (presumably to pay back the debts owed to the commercial banks and the Social Security Fund given the negative sign on their lending flows in that year). Over the next four years the government's reliance -on the monetary authorities was extremely high: 5 percent of GDP in 1975, 8.23 percent in 1976, 9.14 percent in 1977, and 9.37 percent in 19781 It then dropped sharply to -0.13 percent in 1979, rose again to 3.32 percent in 1980 and 2.38 percent in 1981. In 1982, central bank financing was 2.11 percent of GDP and rose to 4.12 percent of GDP in 1983. After 1984, reliance on the central bank was greatly reduced. In at least half of the years considered, the financing provided by the central bank to the central government was greater than all other domestic financins sources combined. Over the same period, the state- owned enterprises also depended on the central bank for financing. The other notable source of finance for the central government is the Social Security Fund. As mentioned in part 56 II, the Social Security Fund was until recently required to invest its surpluses (which in many years were considerable) in government stocks. Thus the Social Security Fund was a captive source of finance. The reliance on borrowing from the commercial banks has generally been low, with a peak of 2.02 percent of GDP in 1977. Borrowing from the secondary banks has also been fairly low, ranging between -0.58 and .59 percent of GDP. As can be seen from Table 3.1, in more recent years the government has actually been paying off its debt to the central bank and to the secondary banks. Borrowing from the private sector and from public enterprises has not been a significant source of finance for the government. From 1985 onward, domestic borrowing falls relative to the rest of the period. The rise in external borrowing during this period suggests that with the onset of the structural adjustment program the government has been able to substitute external finance for domestic finance. The overall picture is thus one where the government relied heavily on borrowing from the central bank to finance its deficits until 1985, when it obtained the option of substituting foreign borrowing for domestic borrowing. To the extent that borrowing from the central bank led to an increase in the supply of money balances that surpassed the increase in demand for money balances, such borrowing implies inflationary consequences. 57 In Fiqure 3.1 the GDP deflator and CPI inflation rates are set out. The two indices more or less follow the same pattern with three price shocks coming in 1977, 1981, and 1983. If we compare these inflation rates with Figure 2.3 of public sector deficits defined from the financing side, and with the data on the government's sources of financing, the relationship between the reliance on money creation in the mid-late seventies and high levels of inflation seems fairly clear. Heavy dependence on monetary finance began in 1976, the year in which the sharp rise in inflation began. In 1977 and 1978, reliance on money creation remained high but inflation began to drop, and in 1979 both fell sharply. For the rest of the period, however, the relationship between the deficit and inflation seems somewhat less clear. In 1980, borrowing from the central bank is 3.32 percent of GDP (as opposed to 9.14 percent of GDP in 1977). It falls to about 2.11 percent in 1982. It rises to 4.12 percent of GDP in 1983, the third year of price shock. Thereafter the reliance on borrowing from the central bank declines, and in 1987 and 1988 the government pays back some of its debt to the central bank. The inflation that results from money creation (and from other sources) affects other areas in the economy. In Ghana interest rates have been controlled until very recently. The high inflation rates that Ghana experienced over the period FIGURE 3. 1 INFLATION RATES, 1971 -1988 1130 - 120 110 - 100 90 70 9w t <60 so 40 30 20- 10 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 0 GDPDEF + CPI 59 thus imply negative real interest rates". Figure 3.2 shows nominal and real deposit and lending rates from 1971 through 1988. We can see from these figures that both deposit and lending rates have been negative throughout the period. Despite the recent liberalization of interest rates, with the exception of 1985, real rates have remained negative. The spread between the nominal deposit and lending rate is also presented in Figure 3.2. Up until 1980 the spread between the two rates was fairly stable at about 3.33 percent through 1974 and then at 2.5 percent through 1980. In 1981 the spread fell to almost zero, it then jumped dramatically to over 5 percent34. It has varied considerably over the rest of the period. Such an interest rate spread reflects the costs of financial intermediation as well as implicit taxes on such intermediation in the form of reserve requirements, deposit restrictions etc. Nevertheless, negative real interest rates and taxes on 33 Real interest rates are calculated as ((l+r)/(l+p)- 1)*100, where r is the nominal rate of interest and p the CPI inflation rate. 34 While some of the instability after 1981 may be attributed to inflation the sharp decline and rise in the spread is partly due to sizeable changes in the nominal deposit rate. In 1980, the nominal rate on 12 month deposits was 13 percent it increased by six percent in 1981 to 19 percent and then dropped dramatically to 9 percent in 1982. It then rose to 12.5 percent in 1983. The lending rate was slightly more stable at 16, 16.5, 19.5,15 and 17.3 percent for the years mentioned.It seems quite plausible that this instability was caused by the change in government during those years given that interest rates were heavily controlled at the time. I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I 61 financial intermediation reduce the return on assets in the economy and thus reinforce any tendencies toward financial disintermediation that may have already occurred as the result of inflation. In Ghana, the negative real interest rates in the formal financial system, combined with strict credit allocation, encouraged the development of an extensive network of informal credit markets. Financial disintermediation was also encouraged by a currency conversion in 1979, whereby a proportion of the currency holdings in private hands was expropriated and by demonetization of the largest currency notes (50 cedi) in 1982. In addition to leading to negative interest rates, the inflation that was at least partly engendered by reliance on money creation for financing the deficit led to overvaluation of the official exchange rate, given the fixed nominal rate. This overvaluation, not only affected Ghana's trade performance, but increased the premium on parallel market activity (defined as the black market exchange rate over the official exchange rate) and lead to increased activity in the parallel markets. May (1985) estimated that parallel market activity reached 32.41 percent of the official market GDP in 1982.35 Increased black market activity resulting from inflation also eroded the tax base (particularly from cocoa) 3s See Azam and Besley (1989), May (1985) and Pinto (1987) for discussions of parallel markets in Ghana. The effect of fiscal deficits on the official and parallel exchange rate is discussed in the companion paper by Ms. Islam. 62 as normally taxable activities slipped into the parallel market (recall from part II the dramatic decline in cocoa export duties in the early eighties). To the extent that this loss in revenue implies increased deficits that are financed via inflationary means, the cycle could be never-ending. With the onset of the structural adjustment program, however, the government devalued the cedi and has progressively deregulated exchange markets so that inflation is no longer necessarily translated into higher black market premiums. Finally, high inflation resulting in part from money creation contributed to the erosion of the tax base. Overvaluation of the currency led to reduced exports, an important source of revenue in Ghana. Reduced exports implied less foreign exchange for the financing of imports and hence, a reduction of revenue from import duties. Lower economic activity resulting from lack of imported inputs also implied lower sales and excise taxes. To sum up, prior to 1984 Ghana was constrained to finance her fiscal deficits domestically. For the most part, the deficits were financed by money creation. This was particularly the case in 1977 and 1978. Extensive reliance on this method of finance implied an increase in the money supply and a sizable increase in the rate of inflation. After this period the effects of domestic financing on inflation become less clear but still seem to contribute to high inflation rates up until 1984. In this year the government substituted 63 external finance for domestic finance, and to the extent that the increase in net foreign assets was monetized it also has had inflationary consequences. In the heavily controlled Ghanaian economy, the resulting inflation made real interest rates negative thus inhibiting financial intermediation. It also led to overvaluation of the currency and an increase in the black market premium. Both negative real interest rates and the overvalued currency contributed to increased incentives to operate in the parallel markets. 2) Inflation, the Demand for Assets. and Beignorage This section considers how inflation in Ghana affects the demand for both money and quasi-money and in turn, how these demands affect seignorage revenues. A simple model is used to consider the effect on seignorage revenue of a lower rate of inflation. We also consider the effect that the expropriation of currency during 1979 (and in later years) may have had on money demand and in turn on seignorage revenue a) The model The model used is a simple version of that proposed in Appendix II of Easterly et al (1989) and is based on the "public finance approach to inflation" literature discussed above. The basic equation of the model is the budget identity: (1) DEF- EF + DCg + L 64 This states that the government deficit muist be equal to the sum of external finance (EF), domestic credit to the government (money creation), and domestic borrowing from the banking system.6 External finance is assumed to be exogenous. The specification of the portfolio demands of the private sector determine the private sector demand for currency and the allocation of their remaining assets between deposits and foreign currency: (2) N = f(wr, id, Y) (3) D = f(r, id' Y) Where r is the rate of inflation, id is the real interest rate on deposits and Y is income. The demand for foreign currency is determined as a residual. Loans to the government is the residual after private credit needs have been met: (4) Lo m D (1 -P ) - where e is credit to the private sector and is taken as given. 36 For simplicity we have assumed that domestic and external interest payments are zero. 65 Domestic credit to the government is determined as high powered money (H) minus net foreign assets (EFW) plus any additional net liabilities (NOL): (5) DC9 - H - EF - NOL, High powered money is equal to reserves on deposits and currency: (6) H = AD + (c + A(l-c))M, where A is the reserve ratio on deposits, D is deposits, c is the currency/Ml ratio and M is Ml. The above relationships are used to determine equilibrium in the market for domestic debt and in the market for high powered money. Both are functions of the rate of inflation: (7) L= f(r) f1 < O (8) H gq(r) g1 > O In equation (7), the market for domestic debt will be negatively related to the inflation rate because inflation depresses deposits and thus for a given level of private credit, reduces the amount available of credit to the government. The equilibrium equation for the money market 66 implies that the deficit financeable through money creation will be a positive function of inflation as long as the maximum point of the Laffer curve has not been passed. Using this framework, we specify the demand for money and quasi-money and, given the rate of inflation, solve for seignorage revenue. Before considering some alternative scenarios, consider the demand equations for Ml and quasi- money. b) The DemI'd for )tbnev and Quasi-money Figure 3.3 shows Ml and quasi-money as a percent of GDP. Ml as a share of GDP ranges from between 11 and 23 percent of GDP. Demand or Ml peaks in 1976 and 1977 and drops off sharply after 1978. We might expect that the high levels of inflation of 1977 and 1978 led to a decline in the demand for currency. The currency conversion of 1979 might also have affected demand for Ml. We also see a sharp drop in demand foi Ml in 1982 which may be the result of several measures taken in the early eighties including demonetization of the 50 cedi note in 1982, the freezing of bank deposits in excess of 50,000 cedis pending investigation for tax liability, the recall of bank loans for the financing of trade inventories, and the requirement that business transactions in excess of 1,000 cedis be conducted by checks. Such actions are likely to have prompted movement into foreign and informal asset FIGURE 3.3 Ml AND QUASI-MONEY (PERCENT OF GDP) 24 23 22- 21 20- 19 18 17- . 16 a 0 ~15 14 I- 13 z Iii 12 a: ~11 a. 10 9 a 7 6 5 4 3 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 D Ml 1- QUASI-MONEY' 68 markets. Figure 3.3 also shows quasi-money as a percent of GDP. The demand for quasi-money to GDP follows a similar pattern to Ml, declining from 9 percent of GDP in 1976 to about 3 percent in 1984. It is also likely to have been affected by the measures discussed above. The basic equation we use to estimate money demand is as follows37: Mt = ao + a,frt + a2Yt + a3rt + ju (1) where M is equal to the log of real M1, X is equal to the inflation rate calculated from the GDP deflator, Y is equal to the log of real GDP, and r is the real deposit rate, all indexed to time t. The coefficients of X and r will be the semi-elasticities of real base money with respect to inflation and the real deposit rate, respectively. As inflation increases we would expect the demand for real money balances to decrease as private agents substitute into real goods or perhaps into foreign assets. We thus expect to find a to be negative. We would also expect a. to be negative because as real deposit rates increase, private agents are likely to hold 3 There is a large literature on money demand and money demand equations. Because our interest is in the relationship between inflation and the demand for assets and interest rates and the deuand for assets, rather than in the functioning of the monetary sector as a whole, we use very simple equations for our estimations. 69 less money and keep more in deposits. The coefficient on Y, 22, represents the elasticity of money demand with respect to income. We would ex: bct this to be positive because as income increases the demand for money balances rises. The equation was estimated for the 1966-1988 period. The estimation indicated the presence of autocorrelation of the errors so a lagged dependent variable term was incorporated into the equation. The results of the estimation are as follows: (Figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are absolute values of the t-statistics.) M = -3.02 + .846 Ml(-l) - .389r + .376Y - .248r, R2 .80, ( .90) (5.35) (1.84) (1.34) (.654) The errors are free of autocorrelation and normally distributed. Given the likelihood of collinearity between the inflation variable and the real interest rate variable, we re- estimated the equation without the real interest rate term. The results are: M - -3.34 + .912 Ml(-1) - .269w + .328Y, R2 - .797 (.952) (7.74) (2.63) (1.23) The signs of the coefficients are as expected. The coefficients on Nl(-l) and r are significant at the five percent level whereas the coefficient on Y is not. An analysis of the residual correlogram indicated that the residuals are 70 not highly autocorrelated, so that inferences may be drawn from the above results. The estimation indicates that the short-run semi- elasticity of MI with respect to inflation is relatively low at -.269. The equation implies, however, a high long-run semi-elasticity of -2.99 indicating that inflation has a much stronger negative effect on money demand over time. We re-estimated the money demand equation including dummy variables in order to account for the government's demonetization actions in 1979 and in 1982. Given that such events are not immediately forgotten, the dummy variables were set as zero to the given year and then to 1 thereafter. The results indicated that the dummy for 1982 was not at all significant and that for 1q79 was significant, though not at a five percent level. The estimated equation is as follows: M -4.44 + .801 Ml5-l) - .155r + .527Y - .113DUM79, R2 = .829 (1.39) (6.27) (1.35) (1.93) (1.79) Y is now significant at a higher level whereas X is no longer as significant as in the previous equation. This is likely to be due to the fact that the equation has difficulty distinguishing between inflation and the dummy variable. The short run semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to inflation is lower than in the previous equation at -.155. The long-run semi-elasticity seems to be more reasonable as 71 well at -.75. Because of the more plausible nature of the long-run elasticity, the improved significance of GDP and because we would like to capture the effects of government actions on money demand, this last equation is the one we use in the simulation. The demand for quasi-money was estimated based on the following equation: QMt = P0 + P1QMt-l + p2r. + P3(r*+e) + P4wt + P5Y + A, where QM equals the log of real quasi-money, r equals the real deposit rate on 12 month deposits, r*+e equals the US real interest rate on Treasury bills adjusted for black market exchai1ge rate depreciation, and X equals-the GDP deflator inflation rate. Tho interpretations of the coefficients as semi-elasticities holds, but in contrast to the base money estimation, we expect that the coefficient on the real deposit rate will be positive and that the coefficient on the US interest rate will be negative. The expected sign on the inflation variable is less clear than in the previous estimation. An increase in inflation might encourage people to save more, but at the same time it might encourage substitution into real goods. Neither of the interest rate variables in the above equation were found to be significant so they were dropped. The result is as follows (The absolute values of the t- 72 statistics are in parentheses.): QM - -6.24 -. .874 QM(-l) - .582w + .605Y, R2 = .9057 (2.05) (11.73) (6.35) (2.46) All variables are significant and of the expected sign. The short-run semi elasticity of money demand with respect to inflation is .582. Again, we find that the long-run semi- elasticity is very high at -4.47. The dummy variables were incorporated into the equation, but were not even close to being significant ( t-statistics of about .6). As a result we have used the above equation in our simulation. . a% simulation results The demand for money and quasi-money equations discussed in the previous section were used in the model set out in section a) in order to consider the impact of inflation and government demonetization policies on seignorage revenue for the period from 1977-1988. We consider three scenarios which are set out in Figure 3.4: 1) the base case simulating government seignorage revenues given the actual rate of inflation8, 2) the case in which the inflation rate is kept X Note that we are using the inflation rate derived from the GDP deflator. FICURE 3.4 SEIGNORAGE REVENUE UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS (INFLATION AND DEMONTZATION) 7 6 5 0. a~~ tS. 0 z w~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IL' 0.~ O / W A\/ 0- II 1977 197.9 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 198 0 BASE CASE + KEEP 20% INFL 0 NO DEMON 74 at 20 percent, and 3) the case in which the government did not pursue its currency appropriation policies during the currency conversion of 1979. In the base case we see that seignorage revenue ranged from 4 to 6.5 percent of GDP in the beginning of the period to about three percent of GDP at the end of the period. Changes in seignorage respond to changes in inflation with a one period lag. For example, inflation based on the GDP deflator rose by almost 10 percent from 1977 to 1978, but seignorage revenue increased by a little over two percent over the same year. Seignorage then dropped about 3.5 percent in the next period although inflation was declining from 1978 to 1979. Over the period, we see a gradual decline in the amount of seignorage revenue to about 3 percent of GDP with two pronouncied drops in seignorage revenue in 1982 and 1985. Despite high rates of inflation in the early eighties, seignorage revenue did not reach the levels that it had obtained during the mid-late seventies. The reflects the long- run effects of inflation (and government demonetization policies) on money demand. As high levels of inflation and uncertainty persisted, money demand declined and seignorage revenues remained at about three percent despite the increased rate of inflation. This is illustrated by our second scenario in which the inflation rAte is kept at 20 percent. Such a reduction in the inflation rate might be induced by reducing government 75 expenditures in order to lower the deficit that needs to be financed via money creation. Another possibility is that development of domestic financial markets or improvement in access to external finance might reduce the government's reliance on money creation as a source of finance. We see from figure 3.4, that while seignorage revenue is lower when the inflation rate is kept at twenty percent, periods of high inflation do not provide proportionate increases in seignorage revenue. Seignorage revenue during the late seventies is only about 1.5 percent of GDP more than it would have been had the inflation rate been maintained at 20 percent. Moreover, the long-run effect on money demand results in little gain in seignorage in the 1980's. In 1984 we see that seignorage revenue at the inflation rate of twenty percent would have exceeded seignorage revenue at the actual inflation rate of about 40 percent. In the period after 1984, the gain in seignorage over that which would have been received with inflation at 20 percent is negligible. The accumulated effect of inflation on money demand contributed to reduced seignorage over time. The disproportionate increase in seignorage revenue for increases the rate of inflation is confirmed by Figure 3.5. This figure sets out the seignorage revenue received for given inflation rates, based on our model. It shows a Laffer curve effect: that beyond a certain inflation rate (about 125 % for Ghana) seignorage as a function of GDP begins to decline. 76 FIGsRl 3.5 SEIGNORAGE REVENUE 78- 0 z 5 - 3 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 INFLATION RATE 77 All of this highlights what is likely to have occurred in Ghana particularly during the seventies. Financing ever increasing deficits by money creation led to higher and higher rates of inflation that were not met with proportionate increases in seignorage39. This in turn led to even higher deficits which required even further reliance on money finance given the weakness of domestic financial markets, and the inability to obtain finance from abroad. Various measures were undertaken to try to reduce the rate of inflation including the appropriation of currency by the government during the currency conversion. Our third scenario considers whether these actions, while perhaps reducing inflation in the short run, really led to e higher inflation in the long run. Figure 3.4 gives an indication that had the government not undertaken such measures, seignorage revenues would have been higher throughout the period, therefore improving the government's fiscal position and lessening the need to resort to money finance. The increase in seignorage revenues would have been on the order of 1 to 2 percent of GDP. Data on how much demonetization took place is necessary to evaluate the tradeoff of gain vs. loss of the government's actions. It seems unlikely, however, that the one-off gain the reduction of inflation would offset the negative effect on seignorage 39 As well as to a reduction in other sources of revenue such as revenue from export taxes as discussed above. 78 revenues caused by the reduction in the demand for assets induced by such actions. 3.} Conolusion The first part of this section showed us that prior to 1984, Ghana relied heavily on money creation in order to finance her deficit and that this contributed to inflation and negative real interest rates. The second part showed us that these high levels of inflation affected the demand for assets in Ghana which in turn affected theseignorage revenue that the government obtained. Increases in the rate of inflation did not have proportionate effects on seignorage revenue. Indeed, we found a Laffer curve effect where after a certain point an increase in the inflation rate caused a reduction in seignorage revenue. Demonetization by the government in an attempt to reduce inflation was shown to hove reduced seignorage revenues on the order of 1 to 2 percent. In the longer run, the increase in money financing necessary to compensate the loss in seignorage revenues is likely to offset the one-off gains in reduced inflation brought about by the demonetization. 79 IV., FISCAL DEFICITS - ND PRIVATE CONOUMPTION AND PRIVATE ZNmBuiMiNT This section will focus on the effects of fiscal deficits on the real side of the economy. In particular, it will focus on the ways in which the fiscal deficit affects private sector consumption and investment. Figure 4.1 shows private consumption and private investment as a share of GDP from 1969/70 to 1988. We see that in general private consumption constitutes a large portion of GDP. At the beginning of the period private consumption stood at roughly 75 percent of GDP. It rose steadily until 1983 when it reached 91 percent of GDP. Such a trend reflects the deterioration in the economic climate in Ghana over the period. As conditions worsened more and more effort went into subsistence and providing for the present than into investment for the future. After 1984, private consumption levels fell somewhat but remained well above the 1969/70 level. The low level of private investment in Ghana is immediately obvious from Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2. Private investment as a share of GDP stood at just under 12 percent of GDP in 1969/70. It fell over the next three years, but rose again in the period between 1972/73 and 1974/75. From 1974/75 until 1982, private investment fell reaching a low of 2.3 percent of GDP in 1982. It has fluctuated since then, reaching 4.4 percent of GDP in 1988. In the following pages we investigate how fiscal deficits FICURE 4. 1 PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT 1969/70-1988 100 - 90 80s 70 IL o 60 la. 0 50 Iti 40 30 20 10 1969/70 1973/74 1977/78 1981/82 1985 0 CONS - ON 81 Tabl 4.1 year private investment as a proportion of GDP 1967 0.05325 1968 0.06870 1969 0.08542 1970 0.10432 1971 0.09796 1972 0.03410 1973 0.06282 1974 0.09421 1975 0.07312 1976 0.02127 1977 0.05358 1978 0.020 3 1979 0.03845 1980 0.04235 1981 0.02659 1982 0.02305 1983 0.02880 1984 0.04395 1985 0.05411 1986 0.02383 1987 0.02852 1988 0.04423 Source:Quarterl Digses of St4tistices, Ghana, and various World Bank Reports. Figure 4.2 Real p-riv ate investment as aproprino D 1967- 198G 0.11 0.10- 0.09- 0.08- 0.07- 0 0.08- 0.05 0.04 0.03 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 e8 | PIDCGDP| 83 have affected these patterns of private consumption and investment. We will consider first the relationship between fiscal deficits and consumption followed by that i,etween fiscal deficits and investment. 1.) Fiscal Deficits and Consumptioa There has been a great deal of theoretical debate over the years concerning the effect of fiscal deficits on private consumption. The Keynesian tradition holds that current consumption is determined by current disposable income e.g. present income minus taxes. The permanent income hypothesis suggests that current consumption is determined by the present value of future income which implies that both present and future tax levels will affect current consumption. More recently the debate has focused on the validity of the Ricardian equivalence approach which argues that, under certain conditions, private consumption determination will not be affected by the way in which the government chooses to finance its deficit. In other words, taking public expenditure as given, private consumption will not be affected Ly fiscal deficits. The distinction between the first two arguments and the last is of considerable importance to policy-makers. If Ricardian equivalence holds, then reductions on fiscal deficits will not affect the level of consumption in the economy and the basis for deficit reduction as part of stabilization programs no 84 longer exists. In this case, policies and programs to reduce fiscal deficits may be completely misdirected. However, the conditions necessary for Ricardian equivalence to hold are very strict. They include the following: no liquidity constraints; household's planning horizons must be infinite; the rate of discount applied to future income by consumers must be equal to the rate at which the public sector can borrow; and consumers must act rationally in forming expectations of future tax liabilities. Given these conditions, particularly that concerning liquidity constraints, we would not expect to find evidence of Ricardian equivalence in Ghana where credit to the private sector is highly regulated. While most of the empirical work on Ricardian equivalence concerns developed countries (the early literature tended to support Ricardian equivalence whereas much of it now rejects it), there have recently been a few studies that have focused on Ricardian equivalence in developing countries. Haque and Montiel (1987) test for the empirical relevance of Ricardian equivalence in sixteen developing countries by considering whether the liquidity constraint condition and the Yaari-Blanchard condition" hold. The empirical estimates derived in their paper suggest that full Ricardian Equivalence can be rejected in 15 of the sixteen countries in the sample. Their model found evidence that the prevelence of liquidity 0 This is the condition that private and public discount rates are equivalent. This may not hold if the government and the private sector have different planning horizons. See Blanchard (1985). 85 constraints in a large number of developing countries is the principal reason for rejecting Ricardian equivalence. No evidence was found in support of the Yaari-Blanchard effect. Leiderman and Razin (1988) test for Ricardian equivalence in Israel. Their framework considered two channels which might cause deviations from Ricardian equivalence: the finite horizons/Yaari-Blanchard effect and liquidity constraints. Their estimation found that the restrictions imposed by the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis could not be rejected. Expansion of their model to allow for public goods consumption did not alter these results. Haque (1988) focused on the Yaari-Blanchard proposition of finite horizons for consumer planning problems as the source of deviation from Ricardian equivalence. The results of his tests found evidence in favor of the infinitely-lived households in 15 out of the 16 countries tested. Finally, Rossi (1989) develops an approach that emphasizes real interest rates and liquidity constraints in the determination of consumer behavior. He uses pooled data of geographical regions and finds strong evidence that where liquidity constraints are substantial they do have an important effect on consumer behavior and imply that Ricardian equivalence does not hold. In sum, the evidence for developing countries (with the exception of Leiderman and Razin) indicates that Ricardian equivalence does not hold and that the existence of fiscal deficits and their financing will have aconomic effects. 86 Our first attempts at estimating the consumption function followed the research proposal quite closely, variables on public tax and expenditure composition. Given the generally poor nature of Ghanaian data and the high probability that significant collinearity exists among some of the fiscal variables discussed, we decided to abandon the numerous variables suggested in the project proposal and to opt for a much simpler estimation. The equation estimated i. C- + a1 YPt + a2 rht + 3 LCt + 4 FISCDEF, + , where Ct is current private consumption, Ypt is current disposable income as described above, LCt credit to the private sector and FISCDEF; is th't conventional measure of the fiscal deficit as discussed in part II. All variables are as in percent of GDP. Ideally one would use a measure of labor income to determine permanent income, however, no data on labor income are available for Ghana. Following Haque and Montiel (1987) we use GNP minus taxes as our measure of disposable/permanent income. Dornbusch (1983) makes a case for using the "home" real interest rate or the "consumption-based" real interest rate. He argues that the presence of a home goods (nontradable) sector implies that the relevant real interest rate appropriate to consumption decisions depends on the rate of change of the real price of home goods. This "consumption-based" real interest rate 87 is thus the rate used in our consumption regression. It is calculated according to the following definition (from Dornbusch): r = (1 +r*) (Pt/P )1 , where r* is the world real interest rate (we used the U.S. rate), Pt is the relative price of home goods in terms of traded goods, and 1-a is the share of hom3 goods (nontradables) in consumption. The domestic credit to the private sector (from IFS) is used as a proxy for liquidity constraints. The measurement of liquidity constraints in Ghana poses particular difficulties because there is an extensive network of informal credit arrangements that do not appear in any of the official statistics. The measure used may therefore not completely capture the effective liquidity constraint, but it seems to be the best available proxy. The measure of the fiscal deficit used is the conventional measure as discussed in Part II. In the estimation of this equation there was evidence of autocorrelation so a lagged dependent variable was added to the equation. The estimation of this second equation found only lagged consumption and disposable 4ncome to be significant. The interest variable, the private credit variable and the fiscal deficit variable were all found to be insignificant. The results of the final estimation are as follows: (absolute values of t- statistics are in parentheses) 88 C = .04999 + .6668 C(-1) + .3152 Yp, = 86.13 (.005) (5.24) (2.24) Neither pure Ricardian equivalence (in which case the coefficient of Yp would not be significantly different from zero) nor the pure Keynesian theory hold. The significance of Yp indicates that some consumers are liquidity constrained which we expect to find in Ghana. Our equation unfortunately does not allow us to say anything about the effects of the fiscal deficits on consumption. Public expenditure and public revenue variables were incorporated into other estimations, but neither was significant. Further research on the interaction between fiscal deficits and private consumption is therefore needed. 2.) Fiscal Deficits and Private layesta2nt The issue of private investment in Ghana is a particularly important one at present when it has become clear that to sustain high growth rates while simultaneously reducing government involvement in the economy would require a substantial increase in private investment. The fiscal deficit is expected to affect private sector investment in a number of ways. Firstly, higher public sector expenditure financed by public sector borrowing can crowd out private sector investment. There are two channels by which this can happen: (i) if higher public sector borrowing raises the 89 real interest rate then this may lower private investment by raising the user costs of capital and (ii) if there are direct credit controls, then higher credit to the government may mean fewer funds available for the government. The main problem in Ghana has been access to credit for a large number of potential investors; this means that investment has to be financed by retained earnings and net profits therefore play an important role. The interest rate however, has been controlled in Ghana: nominal interest rate ceilings accompanied by high rates of inflation have led to negative real interest rates. Table 4.2 shows the real interest rate and the rate of inflation from 1965 to 1988.41 Public sector investment may have an additional effect on private investment depending on whether or not it is a substitute for or complement to public investment. If the government (or government entities) invest in areas that the private sector would invest in anyway or if they undertake investment activities that would make private investment activities unprofitable then higher public investment would tend to lower private investment. On the other hand, if public investment consists of activities that raise the profitability of private investment (for instance- investment in certain kinds of infrastructure) and which the private sector itself does not find profitable to engage in then higher public investment may 'tWe have calculated the rate of inflation using the consumer price index. 90 Tabl.2 Year real rate of interest rate inflation 1967 13.611 -8.4597 1968 -3.6098 7.8947 1969 -3.0909 7.3171 1970 0.94147 3.0300 1971 -2.7919 9.5588 1972 -3.2409 10.067 1973 10.565 17.683 1974 -10.907 18.135 1975 -17.003 29.825 1976 -30.966 56.081 1977 -50.219 116.45 1978 -35.298 73.100 1979 -27.470 54.419 1980 -25.380 50.093 1981 -45.263 116.49 1982 -10.463 22.296 1983 -49.299 122.87 1984 -16.372 39.665 1985 6.7943 10.306 1986 -3.8253 24.565 1987 -12.170 39.815 1988 -8.9521 31.359 Source: International Financial Statistics and Quartarly Digest of Statistics, Bank of Ghana. 91 raise private investment. Other factors that are expected to be significant in determining private investment levels, are corporate tax rates, investment subsidies, and the general investment climate (uncertainty regarding future economic policy, etc.) all of which determine the overall profitability of investment. While the general investment climate in Ghana has not been particularly encouraging in the past, uncertainty regarding the profitability of investing does not seem to be a problem : agents are willing to invest more given the current economic environment but are constrained by other factors (access to credit). The investment equation that we have estimated for Ghana seems to confirm what we would expect from our analysis of Ghana's economy. The variables in equation (A) are defined as follows: PIDCGDP = the level of private investment in real terms as a ratio of gross domestic product. PBICDGD = the level of public investment in real terms as a ratio of gross domestic product. CPTCDGD - corporate tax revenues collected by the government in real terms as a ratio of gross domestic product. 92 Equation a LS // Dependent Variable to PIDCGDP Dates 7-09-1990 / Time: 17:40 SHPL ranges 1967 - 1988 Number of obsrevatione: 22 VARIASLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIC. C -0.0022513 0.0234236 -0.0961106 0.925 PBICDCD -1.1020574 0.3991700 -2.7608725 0.014 DV76 -0.0397535 0.0234011 -1.6987847 0.109 CDCDGDP 0.5569441 0.2297309 2.4243324 0.028 RINT3 -0.0001237 0.0003814 -0.3241632 0.750 CPTCDGD 3.9736432 1.7436781 2.2788858 0.037 R-squared 0.561419 Mean of dependent var 0.051058 Adjusted R-squared 0.424362 S.D. of dependent var 0.026364 S.E. of re5ression 0.020003 Sum of squared resid 0.006402 Durbin-Watson stat 2.041154 F-statistic 4.096258 Log likelihood 58.34770 rnrnrnmmmmmmmmmmemmmminmmmmmmmmm-.m-mmmm--nm.--mmmm-inmin._m 93 CDCDGDP - credit to the private sector in real terms as a ratio of gross domestic product. RINT2 3 the real rate of interest .42 DV76 a dummy variable for 1976. The flow of credit to the private sector was used as a proxy for liquidity constraints faced by investors with the assumption that the higher the flow of credit to the private sector the less investors will be liquidity constrained and thus the higher will be the level of investment. A dummy variable has been included for 1976 since there was a large and unexplained drop in private investment in this year. We find public investment, corporate tax revenues, and the liquidity constraint variable to be statistically significant. We see that public investment affects private investment negatively and there seems to be a one for one effect. This seems to indicate that public sector investment in Ghana has mostly substituted for private investment. This result is not surprising since in fact, the government plays a large role in the economy, and traditionally has not encouraged private investment, emphasizing, the government's role in many '2The real rate of interest was approximAted by the relationship r - (((l+i)/(l+w))-l)*100 where r is the real interest rate, i is the nominal interest rate and w is the rate of inflation calculated using the CPI. 94 activities that could be performed by the private sector. This suggests that if public sector involvement were to be reduced in Ghana or perhaps the nature of public sector investment were to change (with the government focusing on activities complementary to private investment) we would see an increase in private investment. Therefore, the current program stressing the dibvestiture of state owned enterprises could lead to an increase in private investment by substituting private for public investors and also by indicating to the private sector that the government wishes to actively encourage investment.43 We would expect an increase in corporate tax rates to have a negative effect on private investment. Using corporate tax revenues collected by the government as an indicator of the ta) burden faced by firms we find that it has a positive sign. This may be because the level of revenues collected by the government is highly correlated with the profits of firms or with firms income and growth. The higher the profits made by investors the higher will be the taxes paid at any given corporate tax rate. Thus our corporate tax revenue variable is probably picking up the effect of higher profits on investment which, of course, is positive. Unfortunately we do not have separate figures for corporate profits and cannot isolate the effect of profits on investmei:t. Note that corporate profits have a particularly O3The actual effects may be smaller than expected since a great deal of funding for public investment comes from abroad -- if the private sector has no access to funds then investment will not rise. 95 important role in Ghana given that firms are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow as much as they would like to. The flow of credit to the private sector has a positive coefficient as expected. This result tells us that one way to e.iable higher levels of private investment in Ghana would be to ease the supply constraint on credit to investors: as long as firms are liquidity constrained at the going interest rate, there will be excess demand for credit and therefore excess investment demand. The real interest rate does not have a substantial effect on private investment. Nominal interest rates in Ghana have been strictly controlled and the real rate of interest derived from the inflation adjusted nominal interest rate is negative almost all throughout the period of analysis. With negative real interest rates there will be an excess demand for credit as long as returns to investment are positive and the supply of credit will be the factor determining investment demand. Using equation (A) we ran some simulations to see what the effect of varying the supply of credit to the private sector, and of reducing public sector investment would be on private investment levels. Table 4.3 shows the actual ratios of public sector investment to gross domestic product, of private sector credit to gross domestic product and private sector investment to gross domestic product. Table 4.4 shows actual private sector investment to GDP ratios and two simulations: in one case we keep public sector investment (in real terms) at one percent 96 Table 4.3 MNmminmem-mmUininm_minumwinmmnina======min obs PU CDGD PIDCGDP CPTCDGD CDCDGDP RINT3 _J ---winmminmmUm*Smmmminmnmim mn =====mminmm 1967 0.049857 0.053247 0.020408 0.075650 13.61121 1968 0.042348 0.068698 0.018762 0.086578 -3.609759 1969 0.032489 0.085420 0.018618 0.092118 -3.090906 1970 0.037180 0.104324 0.016532 0.082503 0.941473 1971 0.043183 0.097961 0.015154 0.125790 -2.791925 1972 0.036945 0.034103 0.015879 0.100604 -3.240903 1973 0.027413 0.062821 0.016191 0.053418 -10.56482 1974 0.036266 0.094206 0.016727 0.056768 -10.90680 1975 0.054136 0.073121 0.019525 0.105658 -17.00336 1976 0.067576 0.021269 0.018158 0.110896 -30.96554 1977 0.057064 0.053579 0.011153 0.094733 -50.21929 1978 0.033117 0.020633 0.007052 0.070564 -35.29763 1979 0.026929 0.038445 0.008415 0.060904 -27.47029 1980 0.013885 0.042354 0.007934 0.047518 -25.37970 1981 0.019139 0.026588 0.006905 0.042040 -45.26316 1982 0.010723 0.023054 0.007681 0.047222 -10.46282 1983 0.008778 0.028801 0.004111 0.037650 -49.29880 1984 0.024819 0.043953 0.007843 0.047452 -16.37150 1985 0.041580 0.054115 0.013330 0.067873 6.794303 1986 0.072826 0.023832 0.018886 0.079724 -3.825312 1987 0.079422 0.028519 0.019277 0.075758 -12.16987 1988 0.080766 0.044228 0.026560 0.064668 -8.952145 in m m m m m,, m in m m in m m m.....X a.ss-sssw- ss---n 97 Table 4.4 obe PIDCGDP 'NVS.MI INVSDM2 1967 0.053247 0.097720 0.1209L5 1968 0.068698 0.108071 0.133429 1969 0.085420 0.110789 0.143591 1970 0.104324 0.103827 0.136735 1971 0.097961 0.117103 0.121091 1972 0.034103 0.106219 0.1U9912 1973 0.062821 0.079748 0.138100 1974 0.094206 0.083324 0.130640 1975 0.073121 0.118373 0.121397 1976 0.021269 0.081647 0.067839 1977 0.053579 0.081385 0.087049 1978 0.020633 0.055157 0.098565 1979 0.038445 0.055413 0.110358 1980 0.042354 0.046888 0.122S10 1981 0.026588 0.039650 0.112625 1982 0.0?1054 0.047503 0.126595 1983 0.0LA1 0.027061 0.113195 1984 0.043953 0.048085 0.112275 1985 0.054115 0.088475 0.124415 1986 0.023832 0.107055 0.10403S 1987 0.028519 0.104408 0.096543 1988 0.044228 0.124730 0.121252 W.,_.m .,_.._ .. mm.S.. n_.. ._........ 98 of GDP (INVSIM1) and in another we raise private sector credit (INVSIM2) to twenty percent of GDP. We find that if we reduce public sector investment to one percent of gross domestic product, investment as a rercentage of GDP would have been 12.5% rather than 4.4% in 19881 From 19.8 to 1983 private investment as a proportion of GDP would still have been rather low but in most other years we would have seen a definite improvement." When we raise the supply of credit to the private sector and maintain it at 20% of GDP we find that investment would have been a much larger proportion of GDP in all years; in 1983, for instance, we would have had 12.1% rather than 2.9 percent of GDP accounted for by private investment. During 1977 to 1985 availability of credit seems to be the constraining factor; during these years even lowering public sector investment does not have a big effect on private sector investment. "During 1978 to 1983 the black market premium was very high and rising and the parallel market was flourishing. It is possible that during this period legal economic activities were diverted to the unofficial economy and the low investment ratios mal not really be indicative of overall private investment activities in the economy. 99 V. FISCAL DEFICITS AND TEM EXTERNAL SECTOR This see ion of the study examines the implications of fisca) and exchange rate policies for the external sector in Ghana, in particular, the implications for the real exchange rate, the black market premium, and the trade balance. The exchange rate of Ghana's currency, the "New Cedi", which was created in 1967 was 'fixed' until April 1983; several devaluations have been used in the intervening 16 years to adjust the value of the New Cedis relative either to gold or to the US dollar. The fixed exchange rate system in conjunction with foreign exchange rationing and strict capital controls led to the development of a large black market in foreign exchange. The black market in foreign exchange has been affected considerably by the government's fiscal policies and reached sizeable proportions by the latter half of the sixties. Thus, any study of the public sector in Ghana must, for completeness, take into account the parallel market and related activities in Ghana. This section incorporates models of smuggling with the parallel market in foreign exchange and draws on models developed by Lizondo (1987), Pinto (1986) and May (1985). Ghana's parallel market for foreign currency has been growing substantially since the mid 1960s with the increase in cocoa smuggling. tn addition, the decline in export earnings during the late 70s and early 80s and the strict foreign exchange controls led to a large expansion of the black market 100 for foreign currency and to an intensification of export and import sat 4,l ing.45 The evolution of the parallel market exchange rate from 1969 to 1987 is shown in Table 5.1 while Figur^.s 5.1 and 5.2 show the average (PREM2) and end-of-period (PREMIUM) black market premium during the same period. The parallel market exchange rate, which represents the marginal cost of foreign exchange and which was at 8.96 cedis to the dollar in 1978 depreciated to 76.58 cedis/dollar by 1983 while the official rate remained at 2.75 cedis/dollar. Table 5.2 shows the volume of cocoa smuggled out of Ghane from 1960 to 1982 while Table 5.3 shows the growing demand for foreign exchange in the black market.46 Estimates of the demand for currency in the black market show a steady increase during these years. During the late 1970s and the early 80s, Ghana's fiscal deficits were financed by printing money. This led to hiqh inflation rates during the same period with Ghana sufferitng triple digit inflation in 1977, 1981 and 1983. As can be seen in Table 5.4 the rate of inflation was around 116 during 1977 and 1981 and 122% during 1983. There have been two currency reforms, one in 1979 and one in 1982 in an attempt to deal with the effects of high inflation on currency values. In the first reform cash was exchanged at a rate of 70% for holeings of up to 5000 cedis and at a rate of 50% for holdings above 5000 cedis. 45See, for instance Ernesto May (1984). "These estimates are from May, ibid. 101 Table 5.1 Black market exchange atea Year Average black End-of-period market premium black market premium 1969 1.661L 1.6065 1970 1.6993 1.6610 1971 1.4727 1.0000 1972 1.2569 1.2207 1973 1.2893 i.4992 1974 1.5009 1.337ii 1975 1.7287 1.6696 1976 2.5270 3.7826 1977 8.0009 6.6870 1978 5.0777 3.6344 1979 5.6582 5.1964 1980 6.9102 4.0400 1981 9.5455 18.182 1982 9.8244 43.637 1983 8.6727 3.2330 1984 2.6862 2.000^) 1985 2.4142 2.4172 1986 2.2420 2.2220 1987 1.7979 1.6438 Source: Pick's Currency Yearbook, various year. Figure 5.1 The average black market premium 1969-1987 101 9- 8- 7- 5- 4 70 72 74 76 78 00 82 84 86 Figure 5.2 End-of-period black market premium 1968-1987 50 40 30 '-A 0 20. 10- 0 , IX727I7I78I08 I84 70 72Z 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 104 Tables.2:Cocoa Smuggling and Production 1960-1979 (Thousands of metric tons) Year Production Smuggled Cocoa 1960/61 430 10 1961/62 409 8 1964/63 413 14 1963/64 428 11 1964/65 538 14 1965/66 401 17 1966/67 368 17 1967/68 415 21 1968/69 323 17 1969/70 403 25 1970/71 413 31 1971/72 454 37 1972/73 407 42 1973/74 340 34 1974/75 376 30 1975/76 396 38 1976/77 320 40 1977/78 271 45 1978/79 265 50 Source: Ernesto May (1984) 105 Table&3:The Parallel Market Economy (millions of cedis) Year Illegal Money Parallel Market Parallel Market Economy Economy as e of official GDP 1965 0.01 0.08 0.00 1966 1.66 9.71 0.64 1967 1.22 7.64 0.51 1968 0.87 5.71 0.34 1969 1.23 8.50 0.42 1970 0.96 7.15 0.32 1971 1.37 10.72 0.43 1972 1.27 7.73 0.27 1973 1.05 6.53 0.19 1974 3.65 24.54 0.53 1975 8.61 45.47 0.86 1976 15.74 72.68 1.11 1977 118.74 582.96 5.22 1978 282.71 1543.73 7.36 1979 483.15 3243.21 11.51 1980 1195.62 10024.37 24.45 1981 1313.16 12427.07 16.21 1982 2741.99 27827.27 32.41 Source: Ernesto Hay (1984). 3 106 TablefA year The rate of inflattio 1969 7.1654 1970 3.0402 1971 9.5588 1972 10.067 1973 17.683 1974 18.135 1975 29.825 1976 56.081 1977 11J.45 L978 73.100 1979 54.419 1980 50.093 1981 116.49 19M 2...296 1983 122.87 1984 !9.665 1985 10.306 1986 24.565 1987 39.815 1988 31.359 Sourcc: Derived frou p?ico index obtainee from International Financial Statistics, various years. 107 The real money supply fellI currency in circulation also fell by 39e at the time of the reform. In 1982, the 50 cedi note was demonetized. During this period public confidence in the domestic banking system, and in the gwvernment declined. During the last decade before the Economic Recovery Program was initiated, when the black market exchange rate was depreciating and the public sector deficit was rising, the official trade balance deteriorated from a surplus of $212.9 million in 1973 to a deficit of $60.6 million in 1983. The increase in government spending led to an increase in total domestic spending and was partly responsible for the worsening trade balance. Another important factor was the deterioration in Ghata' s terms of trade which was 47% between 1973 and 1983. From August 1978 to April 1983 the cedi was pegged to the US dollar; as domestic inflation increased the Ghanaian currency became increasingly overvalued and the real exchange rate appreciated. The overvalued exchange rate combined with weak demand for Ghana's main export, cocoa, led to a dramatic decline in export earnings from $1066 million in 1979 to $439 million in 1983 and to a worsening of the trade balance even though imports fell in the same period from $780.3 million dollars to $499.7 million dollars. Table 5.5 shows the trade and public sector deficits from 1970 to 1987. The public sector deficit reached a peak of US$ million 1277.82 in 1982, just before the Ghanaian authorities embarked on the Economic Recovery Program. 108 Tabli..S year t:ade surplus fiscal deficit 1970 51.900 20.090 1971 -33.600 21.259 1972 161.40 74.247 1973 212.90 117.17 1974 -29.200 183.04 1975 150.40 490.87 1976 88.800 820.00 1977 29.400 1129.6 1978 112.50 1012.1 1979 262.60 674.55 1980 195.30 1097.1 1981 -243.60 1130.9 1982 18.300 1277.8 1983 -60.600 476.11 1984 32.900 40.960 1985 -36.300 119.19 1986 60.900 71.858 1987 -124.70 51.900 Source: International Financial Statistics, and various World Bank Reports. 109 In 1983, when the Ghanaian government adopted the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), the cedi was devalued from 2.75 cedis/dollar to 30 cedis/dollar and by 1986 to 90 cedis/dollar. There was a dual exchange rate system with some transactions covered under the fixed rate system and others by the exchange rate determined by the demand for and supply of foreign exchange at government managed auctions.4' During 1983-86 exports grew 76.1 % in dollar terms and Ghana's foreign exchange earnings increased.48 The trade balance improvad, from a deficit of US $60.6 million to a surplus of US $60.9 million. At the same time the public sector deficit improved from a high level of US $476.1 million to US $71.9 million and the black market premium imprc ed steadily. As shown in Figure 5.3, higher fiscal deficits had: also been associated with higher black market premia. The black market real exchange rate depreciated during this period, as did the official real exchange rate since the lower domestic absorption (and therefore higher trade surplus) led to a decrease in the relative (domestic currency) price of tradables to home goods. The paths of the black market and official real exchange rates are shown in Figure 5.4. This section of the study tries to explain the stylized facts presented above in the context of a model which takes into 47This systam was meant to reduce the spread between the official and parallel market rates, and actually achieved this. 4BThis increase in export earnings was due partly to an improvement in the terms of trade and partly to an increase in export volumes. 110 Figure 5.3 Scatter plot of the fiscal deficit against the black market premium--1970 - 1987 .J1o. -%j 15000- iunn +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 fiscal 500 + q defict 0 +4 0.0 2S5 5.0 7.5 10.0 black market premium 111 Figure 5.4 Official and black market real exchange ratCs 1969-1987 250- 200- blacic marrket real exchhnge rate o I oatloll real 'exchange rate 0470 712 74 76 78 80 82 84 816 BMRER __ . R1SR 112 account the interrelationships between a government budget deficit financed by the inflation tax on domestic currency balances, the demand for foreign currency in both the official and black markets, and the resultant effects on the trade balance, and the real exchange rate. Given that Ghana's public sector deficit was rising steadily up until 1983, and that the deficit was money-financed, the rate of inflation was also high. With an excess demand for foreign exchange at the prevailing official exchange rate, the black market premium increased. Higher domestic demand and rising domestic prices caused the real exchange rate to appreciate. The higher domestic demand also had a negative effect on the trade balance. Several papers have attempted to explain the reason for the high black market premia prevailing in Ghana. Pinto (1985) looks at the interactions between high black market premia and inflation. His paper is based on the notion that a more stable foreign currency becomes a store of value in an environment with high and volatile inflation. When exchange markets are officially rationed this can lead to high premia in parallel foreign exchange markets. He provides an estimate for the inflation tax maximizing rate of inflation in Ghana and finds that the in the past the prevailing rates of inflation in Ghana were higher than this optimum or maximizing rate. A paper by Chhibber and Shafik (1988) looks at the inflationary consequences of exchange rate devaluation in the presence of 113 parallel markets for foreign currency. May(1984) provides a theoretical framework to examine the way in which exchange controls and black markets for foreign exchange are related to lobbying for import licenses and to smuggling activities. He also develops a methodology based on a paper by Tanzi (1982), to assess the importance and magnitude of the parallel market economy in Ghana. He shows how the incentive to smuggle is related to the black market premium: smuggling will only occur if the import premium outweighs the black market premium. Azam and Besley (1989) present a simple general equilibrium model determining both the parallel mairket exchange rate and the price of consumer goods, with particular application to Ghana. The model developed in this section is based on paper's by Lizondo (1984) and Pinto (1988), on the relationship between the black market premium and government budget deficits. It also draws on May's (1984) analysis of black market premia and smuggling. The first part of this paper lays out the model focusing on exporters' and importers' maximization problems and the financing of the public sector budget. The second part of the paper solves for the determinants of the black market premium. The premium is found to depend on the levels of government expenditure and tax revenues among other things. From this analysis we derive an expression for the trade balance and for the real exchange rate in terms of the black market premium and therefore in terms of government expenditure and 114 revenues. The third part is an application of the theoretical analysis to Ghana. The fourth part concludes. 1.) The Model In this paper, as in Pinto (1985) the government purchases foreAgn exchange from exporters at a fixed rate of e cedis/dollar and sells part of its foreign exchange to importers at rate e. The remainder of the foreign exchange is used to finance government consumption. With a black market foreign exchange rate of b cedis/dollar, the marginal cost of foreign exchange is b; note however, that the government obtains foreign exchange at rate e. Thus the official exchange rate, e, acts as a conduit for real income transfers between the government and the private sector. When the government is a net seller of foreign exchange then the black market premium acts as a source of revenue for the government. When the government is a net purchaser of foreign exchange then real income is transferred to the private sector from the government.49 The system of exchange rates above acts as an implicit tax on exporters who must sell foreign exchange earned from 49However, the basic analysis in this section regarding the effects of higher government expenditure on the black market premium is valid regardless of whether the government is a net purchaser or seller of foreign exchange. This is because, in this model, an increase government expenditure given other sources of finance, must be financed by money creation. An increased stock of money will be held only at a higher premium regardless of whether the government is a net purchaser or seller of foreign exchange. However, the formal analysis is more complex in the net seller case. 115 exporting abroad to the government at less than its marginal cost. This implies that there is a conflict between the goals of encouraging exports and raising revenues to finance government expenditures. If the implicit tax on exports is lowered (the official exchange rate is devalued so that it equals the marginal cost of foreign exchange) then total exports will increase. The government is assumed to get revenues from the inflation tax as well as from conventional taxes and foreign aid. The inflation tax finances the residual requirements of the government net of the implicit tax on exports and net of conventional taxes and foreign aid. In this formulation, an increase in public sector expenditure raises the reliance on the inflation tax. We assume that the inflation tax is given by wm where: e N = nominal money balances, and X = the rate of inflation. At the steady state the rate of inflation equals the official rate of depreciation of the currency. The government' s budget constraint, at the steady state is shown in equation (1) below: (1) (gT-t-A) - m Ae/e, where gT = total government expenditure in dollars which is fixed and which equals P. gm/e + cl qg - government expenditure on nontradables Pm - the price of nontradables g, - government expenditure on importables 116 t - total government revenues in dollars which is also fixed gT-t = the real fiscal deficit Ae/e = the official rate of depreciation 9T maMPHZ;- + g1g1=z 9TI Z<1* A = aid flows to the government, in dollars. Seignorage from the inflation tax is equal to Ae/e m, where Ae/e is the official rate of depreciation and also the steady state rate of inflation. Given that the marginal cost of foreign exchange to the private sector is b and that the private sector's loss is the government's gain, we can write the above as: (2) gT M M/b Ae/e + et/b + g(b-e)/b + eA/b m Ae/o + t/O + g(l-l/0) + A/¢ 50 where 0 = the black market premium et/b=t/O - the real tax burden to the private sector, and eA/b-A/0 - the real value of aid flows to the private sector and similarly for the expressions involving government spending and the inflation tax. The expression gT(b-e)/b represents the implicit tax on exports.51 The government sets e arbitrarily, and since it does not have reserves to deplete in maintaining this exchange rate the official exchange market is rationed by 508ee Pinto (1986). 51Pinto, ibid. 117 capital controls and restrictions on commercial transactions. As in Lizondo (1984) we assume that there is no official net foreign asset accumulation by the government so that R - 0, where R = official reserves. The change in the stock of money is given by (3) M R + D where D = the change in domestic credit and N - the change in the nominal money supply. a.)-Production. Exports. and Imports Agents in the economy produce two goods: exportables (X) and nontradables (N). Importables (I), are not produced domestically and are used only as inputa in the production of nontradables. The nontradable good is consumed by both the government and private agents. Exportables are not consumed domestically. Exportables and importables are traded on both official and unofficial (illegal) markets. Agents maximize the following: (4) PMN + e PXXO + bPxXu - bC1(Xu)-eIo-bl"-eR(Io) -bC2(Iu) -W(1+L.+) subject to: (a N - La il-a (b) L - L1+ Lo+ Lu (c) It LiO-0 (d) Xi$ Li 118 where Px = the world price of exports Pt = the world price of imports which has been normalized to unity p = price on nontraded goods X = total exports I = total imports I* = imports coming through official channels X. = exports going through official channels C,(Xu) -cost of smuggling exports C2(Iu)r cost of smuggling imports R(10) cost of importing through official channels including rent-seeking 1 - labor employed in the production of the nontradable good. Lo labor employed in the production of exports going through official channels Lu - labor employed in the production of exports going through illegal channels. The cost functions have the following properties: i) Cl(Xu)>O ii) C1(Xu)>O iii) R (I )>O C2 (Iu) >° c 1 (I ) >0 Ro(I ) >O Condition (i) implies that the costs of smuggling both exports and imports rise with the volume of exports and imports smuggled. Condition (ii) implies that the costs of smuggling rise at an increasing rate. Condition (iii) says that the costs 119 of lobbying to import through official channels increase with the volume of imports and at an increasing rate. Any exports or imports going through illegal channels are valued at the black market exchange rate b, while those traded through official channels are valued at the official exchange rate, e. The cost of smuggling is denominated in dollars: agsnts have to give up a portion of their export earnings through the black market. Similarly one can think of the costs of smuggling as bribes (etc.)-- some imports which are scarce are given up to pay for the privilege of importing illegally. Importers lobby to import through official channels. The actual cost of importing is higher by the cost of lobbying. We represent these as dollar costs-- again we can think of importers being allowed to import at the official exchange rate by paying some of these import goods as bribes. The first order conditions for the maximization problem are given below: FO=: (i) -=° aPN N=WL1 6LI (ii) 6I ° ~ N (l-a) (l+C2(I-I))I (iii) 6I 0 ' (0-1) = R -C 102 6 120 (iv) SLu 0 " -ePx+bPx-bC!(Xu)a 0 or Xu- Xu(0Px ) 6LO PX FOC (i) says that a fraction 'a' of nontradable production is equal to total wage payments in the nontradable sector. This is characteristic of the Cobb-Douglas production function: a factor's share in total output is determined by the production coefficient, 'a' in the case of labor. FOC (ii) says that the marginal revenue of the imported input must equal the marginal cost of obtaining it. FOC (iii) says that at the margin, the costs of importing through official versus unofficial channels must be equalized otherwise it will always pay agents to switch from one channel to another. FOC (iv) says that, at the margin, the benefits from exporting through official versus unofficial channels must be equalized. eP. represents the revenues obtained in cedis per unit of output exported through official channels. This must be equal to the net revenue from smuggling or the difference between bPA, which represents the marginal value (in cedis) of exporting through illegal channels and the marginal cost of smuggling out exports, bC, ( X ). Again, if this were not so, it would pay exporters to switch exports from illegal to legal channels or vice versa. FOC (v) says that the marginal benefit from producing (and exporting) must be equal to the wage rate. Note that exports are produced with labor alone and 121 according to a linear production funrtion and the costs of production are therefore determined by labor costs. Since all markets are perfectly competitive, marginal revenue is set equal to marginal cost to determine the wage rate. The world price of exports in dollars is P., and the official erchange rate is e. Thus the marginal gain from exporting through official channels in cedis, is ePx. This determines the wage rate in cedis. b.) Balance of Payments We assume that agents in this economy hold non-interest bearing assets alone. The balance of payments in this economy is shown in equation (5) below: (i)F-PxX - I - g = PX(L-LI) - I -g where F a total accumulation of foreign assets. We can use the balance of payments equation (5), equation (c) and first order conditions (i) and (ii) to solve for L aIid I in terms of F,g U'I x and o : (6a)L2 = Ll(PxI gI''F) + _ - _ (6b)I - I (P , g , * ,F) x I An increase in the black market premium increases the allocation of labor in the nontradable sector. This is because an increase in the premium represents an increase in the implicit tax on exports; as the tax rises agents substitute labor towards the production of nontradables. An increase in 122 government spending on importables lowers the supply of labor to the nontradable sector. There are two reasons for this: an increase in government spending on importables in this model must be met by a decrease in government consumption of nontradables thus reducing the total demand for nontradables. Also, if government spending on importables increases then, given the trade balance, either exports must increase or imports must fall or both. Both these effects tend to reduce the allocation of labor to the nontradable sector. Production of exports must increase at the cost of nontradable production. An increase in the trade surplus will reduce the allocation of labor to the nontradable sector. An increase in the trade surplus implies a reduction in domestic absorption or an increase in the production of tradables both of which will tend to reduce nontradable production and therefore the allocation of labor to the nontradable sector. An increase in the terms of trade has ambiguous effects on the labor allocated to the nontradable sector. On the one hand, it raises the return to the production of tradables, while, on the other hand, it lowers the relative price of importables and therefore also raises the net return in the production of nontradables. An increase in the black market premium raises the marginal cost of foreign exchange and therefore the cost of imports. Thus imports fall as the premium rises. An increase in the terms of trade lowers the relative price of importables and 123 therefore agents import more given the trade balance. An increase in the trade surplus, ceteris paribus, implies a reduction in imports. An increase in government spending on importables given the trade balance must imply a reduction in imports since the supply of foreign excbange to the private sector falls. c.) Consumption We assume that agents consume only nontradables: and consume a constant fraction y of their wealth.52 Wealth is defined as the sum of domestic and foreign currency: (8) M+bF=W where F is agents' holdings of foreign currency. Therefore consumption spending is defined as: (9) PCN=y (M+bF) Using equation (9) and Foc (i) and (ii), the balance of payments equation can be rewritten as: (7) F=PX (L-L1(O,PXIFIgT)) - gTz - I(mIFIODzDgT) d.) Money Demand 52The assumption that agents consume only nontradables is a simplifying one; the conclusions do not depend on this assumption but the algebra is simpler. 124 As mentioned before, agents in this economy hold only non- interest bearing domestic and foreign currencies. We denote the fraction of money held in total wealth as A; this fraction A, is a decreasing function of the expected rate of depreciation in the black market. Following Lizondo we assume that agents possess perfect foresight: the expected rate of inflation equals the actual rate of inflation. At the steady state this rate of inflation is equal to the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency. Therefore money demand (M) is given by equation (8): (1) M - A(b/b) W Assuming that private agents can adjust their portfolio composition instantly to the desired level: (9) M A (b/b) bF (l-A(b/b)) Since the rate of depreciation of the cedi in the black market determines the relevant differential rate of return between money and foreign currency for the private sector A is a decreasing function of the black market rate of depreciation.53 Using m = M/e and 0 - b/e equation (9) can be rewritten as equation (10) below: * . (10) m . A(O/F+e/e) Equation (10) above is our differential equation in 0. 5"There are no interest bearing assets. 125 .A Yhe Steady Stato The dynamic equations of our system are: (11) F - Px(LE-L1(OrPX'g1F)) - ZgT-I(mIF*DzgT) (12) m - gT- t - em-A * S (13) m = A(OFb+e/e) * . Equations (1l)-(13) can be solved for the steady state of the economy. The steady state system is saddlepath stable; if an increase in the black market premium improves the unofficial trade balance. This is what we would expect since an increase in the premium raises black market exports (the tax on official exports increases) while it reduces black market imports. The steady state solution for the black market premium is given below:54 (14) 0=*(g9,t,A,A) *gt>O, Ot O * ,A(1-A) * * (i-A)2 -( ) F - -- - r > ° O --0 . C < - , > o For saddlepath stability, we need the determinant of the above matrix to be greater than zero. The determinant ist [al i* 0 6F ;F 11; F;; A A sufficient condition for saddlepath stability is that F > 0. Intuitively, this Implies that an Increase In the black market premium must improve the unofficial trade balance. This makes sense since an increase in the premium raises exports In the black market and lower& Imports. In other words, we must have: - P ar8L1 8 - PK w- W 0 PRE Working Paper Series Contact Author Dot for paer WPS648 Who Paid the Bill? Adjustment and M. Louise Fox April 1991 WDR Office Poverty in Brazil, 1980-95 Samuel A. Mor:ey 31393 WPS649 An Observation on the Blas in Margaret E. Grosh April 1991 B. Diallo Clinic-based Estimates of Kristin Fox 30997 Malnutrition Rates Maria Jackson WPS650 Administrative Valuation of Soviet Karen Brooks April 1991 C. Spooner Agricultural Land: Results Using 30464 Lithuanian Production Data WPS651 Taxation of Financial Assets in Christophe Chamley April 1991 A. Bhalla Developing Countries 37699 WPS652 Demographic Response to Economic Kenneth Hill April 1991 WDR Office Shock 31393 WPS653 The Effects of Option-Hedging on the Donald F. Larson April 1991 D. Gustafson Costs of Domestic Price Stabilization Jonathan Coleman 33714 Schemes WPS654 Reflections on Credit Policy in Mansoor Dailami April 1991 M. Raggambi Developing Countries: Its Effect on Marcelo Giugale 37657 Private Investment WPS655 Interest Rate Policy in Egypt: Its Mansoor Dailami April 1991 M. Raggambi Role in Stabilization and Adjustment Hinh T. Dinh 37657 WPS656 Relative Deprivation and Migration: Oded Stark April 1991 M. Felix Theory, Evidence, and Policy J. Edward Taylor 33724 Implications WPS657 Distributional Aspects of Debt Ishac Diwan April 1991 S. King-Watson Adjustment Thierry Verdier 33730 WPS658 Fiscal Policy With Fixed Nominal Christophe Chamley April 1991 Raquel Luz Exchange Rates: C6te d'lvoire Hafez Ghanem 34303 WPS659 Inflation and Growth in the Transition Andr6s Solimano April 1991 E. Khine from Socialism: The Case of Bulgaria 37471 WPS660 The Developmert of the Colombian Jos6 A. Mendez May 1991 N. Artis Cut iIower Industry 37947 WPS661 The Bretton Woods Agencies and Richard E. Feinberg May 1991 S. King-Watson Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s: 33730 Facing the Tough Questions PRE Working Paper Series Contact A AhQt 12S for g?=r WPS662 Trends in Social Indicators and Jacques van der Gaag May 1991 B. Rosa Social Sector Financing Elane Makonnen 33751 Pierre Englebert WPS663 Bank Holding Companies: A Better Samuel H. Taliey' May 1991 Z. Seguis Structure for Conducting Universal 37665 Banking? WPS664 Should Employee Participation Be Barbara W. Lee May 1991 G. Orraca-Tetteh Part of Privatizaticri? 37646 WPS665 Microeconomic Distortions: Static Ram6n L6pez May 1991 WOR Office Losses and their Effect on the Efficiency 31393 of Investment WPS666 Agriculture and the Transition to the Ka-en M. Brooks May 1991 C. Spooner Market Jose Luis Guasch 30464 Avishay Braverman Csaba Csaki WPS667 VERs Under Imperfect Competition Jaime de Melo and Foreign Direct Invegtment:t , David Tarr A Case Study of the U.S.-Japan Auto VER WPS668 Inflation Tax and Deficit Financing Hinh T. Dinh May 1991 L. Santano in Egypt Marcelo Giugale 80553 WPS669 Are High Real Interest Rates Bad for Nemat Shafik May 1991 M. Divino World Economic Growth Jalaleddin Jalali 33739 WPS670 Inflation Adjustments of Financial Yaaqov Goldschmidt May 1991 C. Spooner Statements: Application of Jacob Yaron 30464 International Accounting Standard 29 WPS671 Lessons from the Heterodox Miguel A. Kiguel May 1991 E. Khine Stabilization Programs Nissan Liviatan 39361 WPS672 The Macroeconomics of Public Roumeen Islam May 1991 R. Luz Sector Deficits: The Case of Ghana Deborah L Wetzel 34303 WPS673 The Macroeconomics of Public Nadeem U. Haque May 1991 R. Luz Sector Deficits: The Case of Peter Montiel 34303 Pakistan