Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region Peter Walkenhorst (American University of Paris) 290 Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region 8.1 Introduction The Lake Chad Region (LCR) is an economically taken by the government have severely affected interdependent area that encompasses parts of economic activity and cross-border trade in the LCR. Cameroon (Extrême-Nord), Chad (Chari Baguirmi, Official border crossings have been closed, the movement Hadjer Lamis, Kenam, and Lac), Niger (Diffa and of people has been limited, and the supply of agricultural Zinder), and Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe). inputs, such as N fertilizer and fuel, has been restricted. The region is characterized by strong historical, ethnic, These impediments and the insecurity of traditional cultural, and political ties, as well as commercial linkages trade corridors have triggered a shift toward alternative, that extend across its porous borders. Indeed, many if not longer trade routes, thereby increasing transaction costs. most of the cross-border exchanges are not recorded in Yet despite the insecurity-related challenges, cross- official import and export statistics. border trade continues at a reduced level through formal and informal channels with crops and livestock from Informal trade is widespread throughout Africa Cameroon, Chad, and Niger being supplied to markets (Bouet, Pace, and Glauber 2018; World Bank 2020), in Nigeria in exchange for cereals and semifinished or particularly if formal state institutions are under finished merchandise from Nigeria. stress. Traders try to avoid import or export declarations as well as border taxes, and customs and other border There is a risk that a vicious cycle will develop around agencies often tolerate the cross-border trade of small trade and conflict in the LCR. Conflict and insecurity consignments without the need to comply with formal reduce trade, with adverse consequences for economic procedures. This does not necessarily mean that these growth and household incomes. Increased poverty, in trade flows go untaxed, though. Border officials might turn, incites discontent and the willingness to join rebel levy fees that do not have a legal basis, and state or local groups, which further fuels conflict. Breaking this cycle authorities often ask for informal payments at roadblocks requires that the authorities encourage and support or in marketplaces. productive activities so that the population has prospects of an improving economic situation and, thus, a stake in The LCR is far from a seaport and, hence, heavily a peaceful future. landlocked. This condition means that the cost of connecting to international markets is high. As a result, The following analysis describes and assesses the trade consumers in the LCR pay a high price for imports from patterns and trade networks in the LCR on the basis global markets, whereas producers in the region get a low of available information from national authorities, price for their exports to international clients. The region international organizations, and academic observers. faces other challenges that stress its production base and The focus is thereby on comparisons between the current depress economic development. These challenges include situation, which is marked by the Boko Haram insurgency erratic weather patterns with frequent periods of drought, and countermeasures taken by the authorities, with the as well as environmental degradation of the lake. The most “normal,” pre–Boko Haram period. The paper aims to important threat to the well-being and the livelihood of highlight the effect of the conflict situation on economic the population in recent years has been the deteriorating activity and cross-border trade and thereby help identify security situation, though. strategies that can be used to improve the livelihood of the LCR population. Unfortunately, quantitative information Conflict and violence related to the rise of the Boko on economic activity and developments in trade flows in Haram movement and counterinsurgency measures the region is virtually absent, so the discussion has often 8.1 Introduction 291 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace to fall back to estimates or rely on anecdotal evidence. and CEMAC are not fully aligned, the aforementioned These data should be interpreted with care. provisions could be applied on a reciprocal basis. Given the preponderance of informal cross-border 8.1.1 Trade policies and institutions transactions in the LCR, official import and export procedures seem to be handled flexibly. A recent World The Lake Chad region extends across four countries Bank study reports that at the Figuil border crossing that use different currencies for trade transactions. between Cameroon and Chad, tariff levels are applied Nigeria uses the naira, and Cameroon, Chad, and differently depending on the officials in charge, the truck Niger use the franc. In practice, these different means of exchange do not pose a major obstacle to cross-border  verage MFN Applied Duties by Product Table 8.1: A Groups, 2019 trade, though, as traders in the LCR are used to operating in different currencies in parallel and will often accept Cameroon Niger Nigeria payment in a currency other than their own. Animal products 21.8 24.5 24.5 Dairy products 24.8 17.2 17.2 Another institutional difference is that the four Fruits, vegetables, 27.0 17.8 17.8 countries are members of different regional trading plants blocs. Cameroon and Chad are members of the Coffee, tea 29.9 18.5 18.5 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa Cereals and 21.4 13.6 13.6 (CEMAC) and the Economic Community of Central preparations African States (CEEAC), whereas Niger and Nigeria are Oilseeds, fats, and 19.8 11.1 11.1 oils part of the Economic Community of West African States Sugars and (ECOWAS). Whereas trade policies and procedures are 20.6 12.6 12.6 confectionery to a large extent harmonized within the regional trade Beverages and agreements (RTAs), this is not the case across RTAs. 27.3 17.4 17.4 tobacco For example, the import tariffs applied by Cameroon Cotton 10.0 5.0 5.0 (CEMAC) are generally higher than those charged on Other agricultural 16.4 9.6 9.6 imports into Niger and Nigeria (Table 8.1). The fact that products different trading blocs meet in the LCR makes formal Fish and fish 25.7 16.0 16.0 trade integration between the neighbors more difficult, as products other countries in the respective blocs would have to agree Minerals and metals 17.1 11.6 11.6 to any trade policy changes. That said, all four countries Petroleum 9.6 7.7 7.7 are signatories of the African Continental Free Trade Area Chemicals 11.4 7.2 7.2 (AfCFTA), which promises to reduce the remaining tariff Wood, paper 20.5 11.2 11.2 and nontariff barriers to intra-African trade and harmonize Textiles 19.7 16.1 16.1 trade procedures over time. To advance this longer- Clothing 30.0 20.0 20.0 term goal, members of ECOWAS and CEMAC could Leather, footwear 20.9 12.3 12.3 discuss and implement trade facilitation and integration Nonelectrical 12.1 6.8 6.8 measures in the region, which might, for example, lead machinery to the adoption of provisions similar to the ECOWAS Electrical machinery 17.2 11.2 11.2 Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS). The ETLS involves Transport 16.0 8.3 8.3 visa-free movement of persons and an exemption for equipment agricultural and livestock products as well as handicrafts Manufactures, n.e.s. 22.1 14.2 14.2 Source: WTO database on Tariff Profiles, 2019. from the requirement to provide a certificate of origin. Note: No data are available for Chad, but rates should be identical to Cameroon/CEMAC. CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; MFN = Most Favored Nation; As long as the tariff and nontariff measures of ECOWAS n.e.s. = not elsewhere specified. 292 8.1 Introduction Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region size and load, or the time of day (World Bank, 2018a). adjacent to the road, as it provides them with an Also, guidance notes from the customs authority leave opportunity to supply goods and services to transport substantial room for interpretation and, hence, digression operators. The performance of this corridor is, thus, by officials, which can facilitate trade but can also enable important for international trade and the prosperity of demands for informal payments. the LCR and also plays a key role for political, social, and economic integration in the region. According to Cantens and Raballand (2017), this flexibility is typical for fragile borderlands. Informal Almost 80 percent of Chad’s imports enter the agreements with headquarters provide leeway for local country through the Douala-Ndjamena corridor. The customs officers to adjust the fiscal burden on traders to deteriorating security situation and attacks by Boko Haram the prevailing circumstances. Importers meet regularly on the northern segment of the corridor have, therefore, with customs officials to negotiate and agree on an been a very serious concern for transport operators, who acceptable tariff and tax burden. These arrangements have explored the use of alternative transport routes to make it possible to reduce clandestine border crossings Ndjamena. In particular, a passage that avoids the Far and the associated risks of detection by border patrols North of Cameroon and runs on Chadian territory has or encounters with rebel fighters, while providing state gained interest and traffic, and the Chadian authorities authorities with a certain amount of tax revenues. and their developing partners are considering upgrading and developing the track (World Bank 2018b). Instead of going from Ngaoundere via Garoua and Maroua 8.1.2 International connectivity to Ndjamena, the alternative route would run from Ngaoundere east to Koutéré and then continue north to The Lake Chad region is heavily landlocked. The two Moundou and Ndjamena (Map 8.1). Parts of the road main consumption centers in the region, Maiduguri and still need to be reconstructed or rehabilitated to make Ndjamena, are located more than 1,300 kilometers (km) this alternative branch capable of handling a substantial from the nearest gateway seaport. The trade corridor from increase in traffic, but corresponding preparation and Port Harcourt to Maiduguri is 1,370 km long; the one work are in progress. from Lagos to Maiduguri, 1,530 km; and the one from Douala to Ndjamena, 1,800 km. For comparison, in West The new eastern branch of the Douala-Ndjamena Africa, the distance from Abidjan to Bamako amounts to corridor would provide transporters with an “only” 1,115 km, and in East Africa, the trade corridor alternative, more secure route to ship their goods from Mombasa to Kampala is “merely” 1,165 km long. to Ndjamena and thus mitigate the risk of Chad The remoteness of the LCR means that trade transaction being cut off from international markets by Boko costs are high and thus imported goods from Europe, Haram attacks in the Far North of Cameroon. On Asia, and the Americas will be relatively expensive in the other hand, the rerouting would drain traffic from local markets, while goods that are destined for export to the Ngaoundere-Garaoua-Maroua branch and, hence, global customers will fetch a relatively low price. deprive the population along the corridor of business opportunities. Moreover, there is significant risk of a The Douala-Ndjamena regional rail/road corridor hysteresis effect. Even once Boko Haram is defeated passes through the Far North region of Cameroon and and the Far North of Cameroon is safe again, it seems plays a critical role in linking secondary population unlikely that all the previous traffic would return to the centers, such as Garoua, Maroua, and Kousséri, to Ngaoundere-Garaoua-Maroua branch. The emergency- the capital cities Ndjamena and Yaounde, as well as inspired development of the Ngaoundere-Koutéré- to international markets via Douala. Strong transport Moundou branch could thus lead to further economic activity along the corridor also benefits the communities depression and isolation of the LCR in the longer term. 8.1 Introduction 293 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Map 8.1: Alternative Routing of the Douala-Ndjamena Corridor Source: World Bank. Note: AFD/EIB/EC = African Development Bank, European Investment Bank and European Commission. 294 8.1 Introduction Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region 8.2 Violent conflict and international trade The Boko Haram insurgency that started in 2009 substantial damage might be inflicted on the economy. has severely affected economic activity in the LCR. Indeed, the containment measures might turn out to be Originating in northeast Nigeria, the conflict has spread counterproductive in the longer run if they lead to an across borders into Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Boko impoverished population sympathizing with the rebels, Haram has repeatedly launched deadly attacks, including supporting them, and strengthening their ranks with new on economic targets such as commercial roads and recruits. markets, and has generally created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. Key livelihood activities, such as fishing and harvesting cash crops, have been disrupted or 8.2.1 Border closures abandoned because of fear of reprisals from Boko Haram or the state’s response to the terrorist group. More than At the beginning of 2012, Nigeria closed its 2.6 million people within the region have been displaced international borders in the northeast part of the because of the hostilities. country to limit the movement of Boko Haram fighters, disrupt their supplies, and inhibit their ability to levy Conflict creates humanitarian tragedy and misery, informal taxes on traders. As the violence subsequently as well as representing an major impediment to intensified and spread to neighboring countries in development. Violence and insecurity have been shown the LCR, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger also imposed to disrupt and slow down economic growth (Blomberg stricter border controls and closures. The severity of the and Hess 2002) and can lead to affected countries falling situation has been further compounded since 2020 by into a so-called conflict trap if the hostilities are ongoing the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the imposition or repeated (Collier et al. 2003). Trade itself can be either of additional cross-border travel restrictions and bans. a driver of conflict, by providing rebels with supplies from neighboring countries as well as a potential stream Data from the International Organization for of income from informal taxation, or a force of stability, Migration (Map 8.2) show that as of March 2021, by generating employment and prosperity that would be many border crossings in the northeast of Nigeria put at risk by disruptive violence or fundamental changes remain closed (red squares), w  hile almost all other in governance.386 border posts in the LCR are open only for commercial traffic (yellow squares). Very few crossings are described The response by the authorities to rebel or terrorist as open for entry and exit (green squares). violence can also cause trade and economic disruption. Measures such as border closures; restrictions on the Border closures have a severe impact on the local production, use, and sales of certain products; or curfews populations. They imply a drastic reduction in demand and other constraints to people movement can have a for transport and other trade-related services, which often profound effect on economic activity. Such actions might provide employment for a sizable share of the men and be necessary as emergency responses to rein in and defeat women of the border communities. the uprising, but if they stay in place for a long time, 386 In countries with point-sourced export commodities, such as oil or gemstones, there is also the risk that the concentrated export revenues will provide a trigger for the government and rebels to fight over control of the production locations (Calli 2015). 8.2 Violent Conflict and International Trade 295 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Map 8.2: Border Status in the Lake Chad Region as of March 2021 Source: International Organization for Migration database, March 2021. 296 8.2 Violent Conflict and International Trade Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region Border closures also depress trade volumes and force 8.2.2 Transport impediments traders to make costly detours. This means longer transport times, more fuel and vehicle maintenance Trade in the LCR is slowed down and taxed by expenses, and higher payments to clear roadblocks and formal or informal checkpoints and roadblocks along checkpoints on the longer route. In some cases, there are transport routes. These controls by the police and also higher trade taxes involved. For example, the closure military are intended to impede the movement of Boko of borders in northeastern Nigeria has shifted trade flows Haram fighters and their supplies. In addition, bandits from Lagos and other Nigerian ports that are destined and terrorists operate their own informal checkpoints for Chad to pass through Niger. Nigerien customs has to extract payments from traders and travelers. A survey collected new transit fees on these trade flows to Chad, of 305 transporters in the LCR undertaken on behalf and goods have subsequently also been taxed by Chadian of the World Food Programme in 2016 found that customs. In 2016, Niger and Chad signed an agreement supply routes for cereals in Borno State are subject to to avoid this double taxation (Cantens and Raballand a particularly high number of checkpoints (Table 8.2), 2017). reflecting the intensity of Boko Haram activity and corresponding countermeasures in this region. Similarly, Yet despite the widespread border closures, interviews the total amount of payments demanded is very high in with local traders in June 2019 suggest that it is still Borno State and also in some other regions, such as Diffa possible to traverse into the neighboring country at in Niger. supervised border crossings if “facilitation payments” are made. An individual would have to pay US$12.50– The transporter survey also asked the respondents to 14.00 in bribes to cross from Cameroon into Nigeria identify the main constraints to their trading activity. (Sagagi and Thorburn 2019). For trucks, the unofficial Insecurity and poor road infrastructure were seen as the payments were reported to be at least 20 times higher. main impediments to trade and transport (Figure 8.1). In Hence, it is still possible—but expensive—to cross at the Chadian and Nigerian parts of the LCR, insecurity was closed border stations in the LCR. mentioned more than twice as often as infrastructure as the most serious concern, while in Cameroon and Niger, the poor state of the road network topped complaints about the lack of security. Figure 8.1: Principal Constraints Faced by Transporters in the LCR percent 60– 50– 40– 30– 20– 10– 0– Insecurity, Poor Availability Not enough Not enough Lack Family or banditry, road and price return transport of domestic harassment infrastructure of fuel cargo demand credit tasks J Cameroon J Chad J Niger J Nigeria Source: Brunelin and Renk 2016. Note: LCR = Lake Chad region. 8.2 Violent Conflict and International Trade 297 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Table 8.2: Transport Impediments on Cereal Supply Routes Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Extrême- Hadjer Lac Diffa Adamawa Borno Yobe Nord Lamis Average distance (km) to main 93 50 178 109 34 249 92 cereal market supply Number of formal checkpoints 2 3 8 5 2 16 3 Number of informal checkpoints 5 1 2 2 1 8 3 Total number of checkpoints per 7.5 8.0 5.6 6.4 8.8 9.6 6.5 100 km Amount of taxes paid by pickup 1 11 11 40 1 3 2 driver (US$) Amount of taxes paid by truck 73 N/A 19 76 1 127 12 driver (US$) Source: Brunelin and Renk 2016. Note: km = kilometers. 8.2.3 Restrictions on fertilizer use and must be treated with particular chemicals, notably nitric acid, to produce an explosive. This transformation The authorities in the Lake Chad basin have into explosive materials requires advanced education in implemented strict limits on the use and trade of chemistry and specialized laboratory equipment, which nitrogen fertilizer (N fertilizer) because of fear that it might be difficult for a terrorist group in a field camp could be used by Boko Haram for bomb-making.387 In to procure and operate. Some observers have therefore Nigeria, imports of nitrogen fertilizers have been limited argued that it would be more effective and less disruptive to a positive list of “safe” products, and a comprehensive for farming if the authorities were to strictly control the tracing protocol has been put in place to govern the import and handling of nitric acid instead of restricting import, manufacture, distribution, and handling of a broad range of fertilizers that are by themselves not N fertilizer.388 Similarly, in Niger, farmers in the Diffa dangerous (Argus Consulting Services 2016). region have had to apply for licenses to buy nitrogenous fertilizer, and imports from Nigeria have been prohibited. These restrictions have resulted in higher fertilizer prices 8.2.4 Restrictions on access to farming and reduced application rates, with adverse consequences and fishing locations for crop yields. The presence of Boko Haram in certain zones and the Nitrogen fertilizer can and has been used by terrorist response by the authorities to militarize large areas groups to produce improvised explosive devices that has cut off some farmers and fishers from their land were later used in violent attacks. Some fertilizers, such or fishing grounds. Farmers in these areas have been as ammonium nitrate, can be used as explosives in their reluctant or unable to work their land because of fear of own right and are, therefore, on the list of banned imports encounters with Boko Haram or fear of being taken by in Nigeria. Others, such as urea, are chemically stable the military to fight Boko Haram. In addition, restrictions 387 Improvised explosive devices pose a significant threat. Bombs and land mines have been injuring or killing people in the LCR and restricting people’s access to agricultural land. The Mines Advisory Group reported that between January 2016 and March 2018, 439 casualties resulted from land mines and unexploded bombs in northeastern Nigeria. See Mines Advisory Group website, https://www.maginternational.org/what-we-do/where-we-work/nigeria/. 388 See End User Certificate Portal, “Guideline for Procuring Fertilizer Chemicals,” https://euc.nsa.gov.ng/fertilizers. 298 8.2 Violent Conflict and International Trade Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region on certain transport vehicles (for example, motorbikes in Niger) have impeded access to more remote farming locations. As a result, crop production has suffered and output of cash crops for export is down (see, for example, section 3.4 of this paper, “Dried red pepper exports from Diffa”). Similarly, bans on fishing boats, fishing, and fish selling have had a devastating effect on the fishing communities around the lake and on cross-border fish trade. The bans are intended to deprive Boko Haram of escape and supply routes across the lake and to cut the income stream that the terrorists supposedly derive from the fish trade. For the fishers, the ban has meant that they and their families had to look for alternative livelihoods or continue to fish clandestinely and thereby expose themselves to significant security risk or severe sanctions (see, for example, section 3.3, “Smoked fish exports from Diffa”). 8.2 Violent Conflict and International Trade 299 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 8.3 Trade relationships The Lake Chad region has a history of lively cross- 8.3.1 Intraregional cereals trade border exchanges. Products from agricultural surplus areas supply towns and cities, while manufactured goods Nigeria is the origin of most grain supplies in the LCR. are shipped from the south of Nigeria or Cameroon to the Cereals are grown in rural areas throughout Adamawa, agglomerations of Maiduguri and Ndjamena, from which Borno, and Yobe States. In addition, substantial supplies they are distributed to the surrounding areas. Large urban come from Kano or even further afar. These supply centers and border towns feature important permanent streams continue, despite the Boko Haram insurgency, markets, as well as warehouses. The latter make it possible but local production has been adversely affected by to store surplus merchandise and later deliver it to other reduced N fertilizer availability and higher fertilizer localities. Smaller towns typically hold weekly markets. prices, restricted access to land in militarized zones, and direct regulation of selected agricultural activities. For The transport infrastructure to the south of Lake Chad example, the cultivation of “tall” crops, such as maize or is better developed than that on the lake’s northern sorghum, was banned because it was seen as decreasing shore ( Map 8.2). In fact, some cross-border trade of fish military visibility and potentially creating hiding grounds and other products used to occur across the lake using for the insurgents. pirogues, as this direct link is quicker and cheaper than road transport around the northern shore.  armer-Reported Typical Harvests before Table 8.3: F and during Conflict in Borno State Mutual trust is of fundamental importance in trade Typical Typical Farmer Crop harvest harvest Percent relationships, and many trader networks in the LCR ID planted (2004–08), (2009–13), change are based on regional or ethnic affiliations. Many of tons/ha tons/ha these networks among Hausa, Kanouri, Arab, Peul, or 1 1.0 0.3 -70 Cowpea Fezzanais extend across borders and facilitate import 2 2.0 0.5 -75 and export transactions. Research using high-frequency 1 2.8 0.4 -86 price data found that informal networks along the 2 Maize 4.8 1.0 -80 border between Niger and Nigeria are highly effective 3 15.0 2.2 -85 in integrating markets (Aker et al. 2014). Common 1 0.8 0.0 -100 ethnicity was reported to result in lower price dispersion Sorghum 4 20.0 6.4 -68 across countries than across regions of differing ethnic 3 Rice 3.0 1.5 -50 composition within countries. 4 Millet 5.0 1.1 -78 Source: Kimenyi et al. 2014. The following sections illustrate the cross-border trade Note: ha = hectare. relationships for several commodities in more detail. Some of the value chains are important across the entire Anecdotal information from interviews with four region (cereals, fish), while others illustrate sectors that farmers in Borno State suggests a major slump are of significance in individual countries or regions (red in agricultural output. Higher prices and reduced pepper in Diffa, Niger; onions in northern Cameroon; availability of farming inputs has depressed yields by cattle in Chad). more than 50 percent (Table 8.3). The magnitude of these changes is confirmed in a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Global Food Security 300 8.3 Trade Relationships Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region Program, which estimated changes in sorghum, rice, 8.3.2 Traditional trade flows for fish and millet production in Borno State between 2010 and 2015 to amount to, respectively, 82 percent, 67 percent, Two types of fish trade exist around and across Lake and 55 percent (CSIS 2020). These findings attest to Chad. The first type is the supply of fresh or processed the damage that the Boko Haram violence and the fish by fishers or merchants to markets in nearby villages countermeasures taken by the authorities have inflicted and towns for consumption in proximity to the fishing on the agricultural economy. grounds. The second type is the long-distance trade of dried or smoked fish. This second type of trade involves The Diffa region in Niger traditionally imports specialized traders and large transport vehicles, and it substantial amounts of cereals from Nigeria. Before connects to urban centers within countries or across the Boko Haram attacks, the axis Damasack–Diffa borders. In particular, large quantities of fish have was the major trade corridor. However, this route is no been shipped through Baga and Maiduguri to major longer used because it is no longer safe, and supplies have agglomerations in southern Nigeria (Map 8.3), such as instead been sourced along the Geidem-Gashua corridor. Abuja, Onitsha, Enugu, Lagos, and Ibadan. It should be According to reports by the World Food Programme, noted that most of these exports are informal and not these places of origin are providing almost 70 percent of recorded in official trade statistics. the traditional grains, maize, and cowpeas (niebe) found in markets in Diffa (Brunelin and Renk 2016).  istorical Trade Flows for Fish in Lake Chad Map 8.3: H Region Similarly, the long land border between Nigeria and Cameroon used to see lively cross-border trade, mainly of an informal nature. Estimates put the value of exports from Cameroon to Nigeria of paddy rice, other agricultural products, and soap at US$64 million, while Nigeria exported US$176 million worth of cosmetics, plastics, footwear, and other general merchandise to Cameroon (World Bank 2013). A number of major trade routes link the two countries, several of which connect northeastern Nigeria to the Extreme North Region of Cameroon. These include the corridors from Maiduguri to Kousséri, Maiduguri to Maroua, Banki to Mora, Mubi to Guider, and Jimeta/Yola to Garoua. However, the northernmost of these corridors have become subject Source: Neiland and Béné 2004. to important security risks and are therefore avoided by transporters in favor of the more secure corridors from In Cameroon, a large share of fish production used Mubi to Guider, Jimeta/Yola to Garoua and routes to be exported to Nigeria. The main trade routes run running further south (Sagagi and Thorburn 2019). from the markets of Fotokol and Blangoua to the market centers at Baga on the western shore of Lake Chad in  n Chad, most cereal supplies for the food deficit region I Nigeria or directly to Maiduguri. of Hadjer Lamis originate in the Lac region or other domestic surplus regions. In Chad, major export trade used to occur across the lake. Fish caught in Chadian waters were transported and sold to the island markets of Kinasserom and Darrack, 8.3 Trade Relationships 301 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace from which they would continue their journey to Baga smoking process and local sales. Because of the difficulties in Nigeria. of stocking and transporting fresh fish in the climate of the Sahel, not much fish was sold fresh. Instead, the catch In Niger, exports of fish caught in Lake Chad or its was most often immediately smoked in traditional ovens tributary rivers also run through Baga and Maiduguri to make it storable. It was then packaged in 50 kilogram in Nigeria. boxes for marketing. The entrenchment of Boko Haram on the shores of Lake A small share of the fish caught used to be sold in local Chad, large-scale attacks such as the Baga massacre of markets for consumption by the local population, January 2015,  and containment and reprisal actions by but 80–90 percent of all fish caught was exported to the national and joint military forces have fundamentally consumption centers in Nigeria, notably Maiduguri. disrupted the aforementioned traditional trade routes for For this cross-border trade, fishers would work through fish. As a result, cross-border trade volumes have been specialized intermediaries. Wholesalers would send reduced, and longer, more costly trade corridors are being collection agents into the villages to buy up the fish and used. transport it to local market centers for consolidation into larger lots and subsequent truck-based export to Nigeria (Figure 8.2). In 2014, the value of fish production in 8.3.3 Smoked fish exports from Diffa the Diffa region was assessed as CFAF 20 billion or US$34.5 million (Sissons and Lappartient 2016), so if Exports of smoked fish from the Diffa region in Niger an estimated 85 percent of this production was exported, to Nigeria used to be of substantial importance. then the export value amounted to about CFAF 17 billion Estimates suggest that until 2014, about 14 percent of or US$29.3 million. the population on the shores of Lake Chad and alongside the Koumadougou River that separates Niger and Nigeria Before the imposition of the state of emergency in derived their livelihood from fishing, fish smoking, and February 2015, Boko Haram already had an adverse fish trade (Sissons and Lappartient 2016). The imposition effect on the smoked fish trade in the LCR. The of the state of emergency in the Diffa region in February terrorist group occasionally attacked transports on their 2015 and the subsequent surge in Boko Haram attacks way to Maiduguri, thereby increasing the risks of such have fundamentally disrupted fishing activity and stopped transports and augmenting transport costs. Moreover, smoked fish exports altogether. Boko Haram forced fishers on the lake shore to make informal payments, thus reducing the profitability of Lake Chad and the Koumadougou River are fertile their activity. Yet despite these criminal activities, fish inland fishing grounds. In the Diffa region, about production and trade continued. 15,000 fishers and their families used to make a living from fishing. It is notable that a large number of fishers In contrast, the declaration of the state of emergency were foreign citizens. The local chamber of agriculture for the Diffa region on February 10, 2015, quickly estimated that only 40 percent of fishers in 2010 were brought fishing and fish trade to a halt. It entailed a from Niger, while the remaining 60 percent were from curfew, a prohibition on motorbike transport, a stronger Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and other countries (Chambre military presence, and more frequent violent attacks from Régionale d’Agriculture de Diffa 2010a). Boko Haram, which was reinforcing its presence in the lake area. Moreover, fishing and fish selling were banned, Smoked fish production typically involved the entire as these activities were seen as a source of revenue for Boko family. The men would go out on the lake or river to Haram, and the lakeside population was evacuated inland catch the fish, and the women and children handled the 302 8.3 Trade Relationships Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region Figure 8.2: The Smoked Fish Market Chain in the Diffa Region Traditional DAN BANDA fishing (wholesalers) Large Export to households Collectors Nigerien/ transporters Nigeria Nigerian Sale Price 140,000 X0F Sale Price Market Small 90,000 X0F intermediaries traders Household- level consumers Sale Price 110,000 X0F Source: Sissons and Lappartient 2016. Note: XOF = West African CFA franc. or fled from their villages and camps to avoid encounters of smoked fish exports after the fishing ban was lifted is with Boko Haram. The border to Nigeria was closed. slow. The conflict with Boko Haram has destroyed a lot of physical, institutional, and social capital, and restoration The authorities have actively enforced the restrictions. will take time. In particular, the military has arrested fish transporters, seized fish transports, and subsequently burned the cargo and vehicles. For example, the regional authorities 8.3.4 Dried red pepper exports from Diffa destroyed 2.7 tons of smoked fish in April 2016 (van Lookeren Campagne and Begum 2017). Red pepper is an important cash crop in the Diffa region. Oxfam estimates that 80 percent of rural As all fishing-related activities became illegal, most households have been involved with pepper cultivation, actors in the value chain had to look for alternative processing, and sales (Sissons and Lappartient 2016). sources of income, such as petty trade, charcoal Annual production used to amount to 10,000 tons, production, or firewood and straw collection. Few with a market value of CFAF 8 billion or US$13 million individuals take the risk of fishing illicitly, and those who (Chambre Régionale d’Agriculture de Diffa 2010a). do so limit themselves to catching fish at night without About 80 percent of total production, with a value of boats for sale to local households. Smoked fish exports to US$10.4 million, was exported to Nigeria via Damasak Nigeria became marginal. Sissons and Lappartient (2016) and Maiduguri. The imposition of the state of emergency report that the income of the remaining, clandestine in February 2015 led to a significant reduction in dried fishers has dropped by more than 70 percent compared red pepper production and trade, as sales and transport with the revenues they had before the state of emergency. of the crop were initially banned and then (from June 2015) restricted to transactions within Niger only. These In March 2019, the authorities lifted the ban on fishing restrictions were motivated by the presence of Boko and fish trade. Yet as the supply of credit and inputs that Haram along the border between Niger and Nigeria and fishers used to get from their wholesalers disappeared, the fear that the terrorist group used informal taxes on red a lot of the fishing equipment has fallen into disrepair. pepper trade to finance its activities. This deterioration of the production base, together with the impoverishment of the fishing population and Also known as “red gold” because of its high market the disappearance of the network of traders and other value, red pepper used to be grown by 5,000 to 6,000 intermediaries in the value chain, means that the recovery pepper producers in the area that is irrigated by the 8.3 Trade Relationships 303 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Koumadougou River. At harvest time, the pepper was The local border closure also means that farmers can sun-dried for 15 to 25 days and then packaged in jute no longer purchase fertilizer to nourish their crops bags that typically contain 17 kilograms of product. and fuel to operate their irrigation pumps from across Intermediaries that are operating at the village level on the river in Nigeria. Moreover, domestic purchases in behalf of pepper traders negotiated the prices with farmers Niger of fertilizer and fuel have been restricted for fear and organized the transport to market centers, where the that Boko Haram might use nitrogen fertilizer for bomb shipments were sold locally or consolidated onto large making and use fuel to propel the vehicles and motorbikes trucks for export to Nigeria. Consumers would typically of its fighters. Farmers need a permit to obtain fertilizer buy the product in powdered form to prepare sauces or to and fuel, and allocations are substantially below historical season meat and rice. levels of use, so pepper yields have suffered. The closure of the local border with Nigeria forced Moreover, the militarization of the border zone has traders to ship their product to Nigeria via trade routes meant that many farmers have been unable to access that are substantially longer(Map 8.4). Instead of taking their land. Military forces have established ad hoc camps a direct route of about 125 km from Diffa to Maiduguri, in the pepper production zone, and regular patrols of the traders are now diverting their trip through Geidem and border zone by national and multinational forces limit the Damaturu (430 km) or even pass through Zinder and possibility for farmers to work their fields. In addition, Kano (almost 1,300 km). The longer route exposes them many farmers have fled their villages because they fear to extra security risk for themselves and their cargo and that Boko Haram might attack them. As a result, the significantly augments their transportation costs. cultivated pepper area has dropped markedly. Map 8.4: Red Pepper Trade Routes from Diffa to Maiduguri Source: Sissons and Lappartient 2016. 304 8.3 Trade Relationships Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region The combination of the restraints on sales and trade is the transporters and not the traders who are most of red pepper, the restrictions on fertilizer and fuel seriously affected by and concerned about attacks, theft, use, and the limitations on land access have had a and violence (Brunelin and Renk 2016). profound effect on the pepper sector. Red pepper output in the Diffa region is estimated to be 50 percent  onstraints to Onion Marketing in Borno Figure 8.3: C State lower than before 2015, and farmers’ income from pepper Number of replies in market survey (out of 45) production is as much as 80 percent below the pre- 40– emergency level (Sissons and Lappartient 2016). Also, 35– intermediaries, such as transporters, have been adversely 30– affected by the reduced volumes and increased transaction costs. For example, transporters face a 50 percent drop in 25– their activity volume and income. 20– 15– 10– 8.3.5 Onion exports from Cameroon 5– 0– Onion production is an important branch of Inadequate Inadequate Lack of storage facilities transport facilities capital agriculture in some parts of Cameroon. It is estimated Source: Sulumbe, Shettima, and John 2015. that 85 percent of onion production is concentrated in the North and Far North regions of the country, where it is the most important cash crop (Kamdem, Kamga, and 8.3.6 Cattle exports from Chad Schreinemachers 2017). As a result of cultural norms, onion production is mostly controlled by male farmers Chad is a major exporter of animal products. Because (Kanga et al. 2016). meat requires refrigeration during transport, most trade takes place by transporting live animals. A significant Parts of the local onion production are sold in nearby share of Chad’s exports is thereby destined for Nigeria markets to local consumers, but a significant share and transits through the North or Far North region of is shipped to consumption centers in the south of Cameroon. Major transshipment points in Cameroon are Cameroon or exported to Nigeria and Chad from the cattle markets of Bogo and Adoumri (Engola-Oyep markets such as Kousséri and Amchide. Ndenkah and Herrera 1997). (2013) estimates that total formal and informal exports of onions from Cameroon to Chad amounted to 19,249 There are several marketing pathways  (Map 8.5). One tons, at a value of CFAF 3.4 billion. The main market for circuit crosses the Lake Chad region and supplies the onions on the Nigerian side of the Nigeria–Cameroon Maiduguri market. This export flow is particularly active border is Wulgo in Borno State (Magrin and Ngaressem in the dry season. The so-called northern circuit passes 2014). through Ngueli and also joins Maiduguri. It is active year-round and drains export herds from markets located In a survey of onion traders in Borno State, the lack of in the center and north of Chad. The center circuit passes adequate storage facilities and appropriate transport through Bongor to reach the Banki market via the Bogo facilities were identified as the most important relay market in Cameroon. This pathway brings animals challenges to onion marketing ( Figure 8.3). The lack from the center and the south of Chad. In addition, the of security was not mentioned as a primary problem in southern circuit crosses the area of Pala in the province this survey. However, this absence is consistent with other of Mayo-Kebbi Est and leads to the market of Mubi in survey findings on cereal markets in the LCR, where it 8.3 Trade Relationships 305 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Nigeria after crossing Cameroon. It is supplied by flows Chad to Nigeria at 520,000 animals in 2000, of which from the southeast of Chad. only about 35 percent were declared and captured in official statistics (Duteurtre and Koussou 2002). More Map 8.5: Circuits of Cattle Exports from Chad recent estimates put the volume of live cattle exports from Chad to Nigeria at 300,000 animals (Koussou and Duteurtre 2013). Although these estimates might need to be treated with care, they suggest a marked slowdown in transit and trade between the pre–Boko Haram period and the period of insurgency. Moreover, the subsequent intensification of the conflict has led to further reductions in trade flows. Data from the customs authority in Yagoua, an important livestock crossing point from Chad into Cameroon and Nigeria, suggests that cattle transit fell from 53,662 animals in 2015 to about 33,000 animals in 2016 and 2017, which corresponds to a reduction by about 39 percent (World Bank 2018a). In addition, the number of cross-border livestock theft incidents in Cameroon has increased on both Source: Duteurtre and Kousso 2002. the Nigerian and Chadian sides, depressing the usual intensity of cross-border transactions. Estimates Live cattle trade is highly organized along ethnic lines. indicate that during 2013–18, Boko Haram stole at least Animals are mainly sold at weekly markets. Transactions 17,000 heads of cattle and thousands of sheep and goats rely on the presence of guarantors (damin), who are in Cameroon, worth around US$6 million (World Bank appointed by the traditional chiefs of different groups of 2018a). The stolen animals were then sold in Nigeria to nomadic herders and are recognized as such by market finance the insurgency. authorities. Their role is to welcome the traders of the ethnic group concerned, to house them, to accompany Moreover, there have been a number of violent attacks their animals to the market, to put them in contact by Boko Haram on livestock markets. Cattle and other with buyers, to certify the origin of the animal, and to livestock sales involve large cash transactions, which guarantee the payment of official taxes. The guarantors makes traders who carry large amounts of currency an only intervene in the trade of their own ethnic group: attractive target for bandits. Fear of theft and violence has Missirie Arabs, Ouled Rached Arabs, or Peuls. The ethnic depressed market activity, in particular for cattle. Markets networks of traders rely primarily on a relationship of for smaller ruminants, such as sheep and goats, have been trust, which does not necessarily involve family ties. more resilient (Kimenyi et al. 2014). A large share of cattle trade is informal. Even if borders are formally closed, herders seem to have little trouble walking their cattle across into their destination country.389 Estimates put the annual cattle exports from 389 A saying among local transporters is “The ox has no border; the border was erected for human beings.” See Canalblog, http://neoindependance.canalblog.com/ archives/2014/11/12/30940857.html. 306 8.3 Trade Relationships Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region 8.4 Market activity and food supplies The preceding discussion has highlighted the adverse 8.4.1 Market activity effect that the deterioration of the security situation has had on cross-border trade and trade transactions The activity in many markets in the LCR remains costs. These higher costs will ultimately have to be borne below the level of the pre–Boko Haram period. Most by consumers in the form of higher prices. Indeed, markets in Nigeria east of Maiduguri faced significant field surveys undertaken in three major markets in disruption or had completely ceased to function as of Maiduguri—Monday market, Gomboru market, and February 2021 (Map 8.6). Also, all markets in the Diffa Baga market—reveal that some food prices have risen region of Niger showed significant disruption or reduced substantially since the start of the Boko Haram uprising activity. (Awodola and Obosh 2015). Vegetables (peppers, tomatoes, Irish potatoes) and livestock products (cattle, Map 8.6 also shows that the disruption of economic goats) are the products that showed the largest price and trade activity is not uniform across the LCR. It is increases in percentage terms (Figure 8.4). the area in Borno State to the east of Maiduguri that faces the most severe economic depression, as does the Diffa ncrease in Food Prices in Maiduguri Figure 8.4: I region in Niger (to a lesser extent). Conversely, the Far Markets, Pre–Boko Haram Uprising to December 2013 North of Cameroon and the Adamawa Region in Nigeria Percent are (again) operating at or near normal level. Pepper Cattle Tomatoes Millet Goat 8.4.2 World Food Programme operations Irish potatoes Maize Water melon The areas within the LCR where the market and trade Fish Wheat activities are most depressed are also the areas where Sweet potatoes the food security situation is the most critical. The Orange Soya beans World Food Programme (WFP) has relief operations in all Onions Red beans four countries of the LCR and has been providing food, White beans Groundnut oil nutrition, and livelihood aid to displaced communities or 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 otherwise severely affected parts of the population. WFP Source: Awodola and Oboshi 2015. tailors its operations to the local requirements and tries to supply relief aid to all areas within LCR that are in need, Similarly, analysis by the World Food Programme except for those zones where the insecurity is too high. For (2016) showed substantial food price inflation due to example, in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria, WFP insecurity and increased transport costs. Staple food has interventions throughout the state, except for a few prices in the Nigeria and Niger parts of the LCR were districts close to Lake Chad (Map 8.7). In October 2020, found to be 50 to 100 percent higher than the previous WFP and other food security sector partners supported five-year average. Moreover, in 2017, prices of staple 3.9 million people with food security interventions in cereals in the northeastern Nigeria were 70–124 percent Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States, including 1.7 million higher than those in the previous year (George, provided with emergency food assistance and 2.2 million Adelaja,and Weatherspoon, 2019). with support for agricultural livelihoods (WFP 2020). 8.4 Market Activity and Food Supplies 307 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Map 8.6: Market and Trade Route Activity, February 2021 Source: FEWS NET, February 2021. 308 8.4 Market Activity and Food Supplies Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region Map 8.7: World Food Programme Operational Presence in Northeast Nigeria, January 2021 Source: WFP 2020. Note: GFD = General Food Distribution; WFP = World Food Programme. For its emergency food assistance, WFP uses both assistance might need to be particularly carefully dosed in-kind food and cash-based transfers. The latter are and phased in to avoid strong price hikes that would disbursed as electronic vouchers or mobile money. In adversely affect consumers. 2016, WFP undertook an assessment throughout the LCR to determine the potential for private sector traders to quickly respond to increased demand (Brunelin and Renk 2016). A high-response capacity makes cash transfer programs effective without disrupting local markets to a significant extent. The survey found that in northeastern Nigeria and the Diffa region in Niger, traders estimated to have the capacity to respond quickly to a 100 percent increase in demand. In contrast, in the Far North region of Cameroon and in the Lac region of Chad, almost 40 percent of traders reported that they would not be able to meet a potential increase in demand by 100 percent in less than a week. In these regions, any cash-based transfer 8.4 Market Activity and Food Supplies 309 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 8.5 Conclusions and recommendations The preceding discussion illustrated the adverse effect of trade flows and transport conditions along key that increased insecurity in the LCR has had on cross- corridors. border trade. Reduced trade flows and higher transaction • Investigate additional means to collect high-frequency costs are translating in higher prices for consumers in economic data on cross-border economic activities— a region that was already one of the poorest in Africa such as price data, surveys of border flows, and so before the Boko Haram conflict, while the region faces forth—in cooperation with other donors and to learn other challenges such as remoteness, environmental from prior experience in the region (for example, the degradation, and climate change. Part of the economic Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control damage can be directly connected to terrorist violence, in the Sahel and and Famine Early Warning Systems but another part is related to counteractions by the Network [FEWS NET] surveys). national and regional authorities to contain and eradicate • Promote the digitization of public data and information, Boko Haram. To counter the ongoing threat and such as farmer registries, to gain knowledge of who is respond to the immediate and longer-term needs of the producing and selling which crops. population, regional authorities need to look beyond • Support the collection of information on economic security cooperation and move to more significant civilian activity and trade to provide policy makers with a better components for economic development and regional information base. In addition to the compilation of integration. In this context, policy makers in national and more comprehensive and consistent market price data regional administration and their development partners as is currently available from FEWS NET and WFP, might want to consider the following issues as part of a data on traded quantities in markets and the sources of strategy to improve trade and help restore long-standing supplies could be collected and monitored. economic linkages. 8.5.2 Trade facilitation 8.5.1 Information The following are some short-term measures for Before listing desirable policy direction that Lake mitigating the costs of conflict: Chad countries could investigate, the paucity of reliable and comprehensive information about trade • Consider encouraging trade through trader groups or flows in the area must be underscored. Without good associations and provide military escorts, if necessary, trade data, it is difficult to form a picture of one of the key for convoys along key trade corridors to relaunch cross- drivers of the economy in the region and an economic border trade. dimension that is core to understanding the crisis and its • Collect information on illegal checkpoints and developments. Therefore, a first issue to consider is how other blockages; trade and share this information to improve economic intelligence of cross-border flows. across relevant agencies to improve enforcement and The following are some recommendations: to identify mitigating strategies that improve the performance of regional value chains where possible. • Consider digitizing and using available quantitative • Strengthen the capability of customs agencies to detect and qualitive information from all border agencies illicit trade while facilitating commercial transactions. (customs) in the region to draw a more precise picture Equip customs agencies with more modern equipment and intelligence techniques for improved surveillance 310 8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region and better targeting of risk. Interconnect customs • Simplify measures at the border for small-scale traders agencies regionally to improve exchange of data and and invest in infrastructure tailored to the needs of information. small traders. • Ensure that traditional border agencies (instead of • Improve the performance of long-distance trade security forces) retain in control of border crossings; corridors, notably with respect to trade procedures, clarify the roles of border agencies; and minimize the reduction of harassment, and infrastructure quality. presence of multiple agencies to avoid rent seeking. • Arrange regular meetings between border agencies in neighboring countries to coordinate security issues, 8.5.3 Other policy issues address common challenges, and monitor progress on trade facilitation. The following are some short-term measures for mitigating the impact of conflict: The following are some long-term measures for rebuilding for growth: • Regularly assess the effectiveness and efficiency of economic and trade measures intended to counter • Strengthen and consolidate the provision of border Boko Haram, as these affect the livelihoods of export agency services, such as veterinary inspection services, producers and traders: at key border crossings to provide better service quality Ì Consider ways to allow gradual and safe access to for traders. Use border crossings as a place to build out parts of the lake to renew fishing and fish trading. and restore the provisioning of government services. Ì Reevaluate restrictions on movement, access • As security considerations allow, reconstruct damaged to farmland, and tall crops to balance the need infrastructure and markets that are instrumental for to contain and suppress Boko Haram with the relaunching regional trade. Maximize the returns desirability to restart the local economy. from investments in connective infrastructure (both Ì Critically evaluate and manage the risk that between and within countries) by coordinating with agricultural inputs, such as N fertilizer and fuel, regional partners. pose as potential weapons, with a view of improving • Because the new branch through Chad would likely farmers’ access to these inputs. Examples of possible have adverse effects on the prosperity of the LCR risk management approaches include trusted trader in the longer term, critically assess the effects of the programs that certify the intermediaries who can planned rerouting of the Douala-Ndjamena corridor trade in particular products. and identify mitigating measures where possible. • Provide support for communities that have been • Implement AfCFTA commitments and create a deprived of their traditional export production and cooperation framework to further facilitate trade at trade livelihoods, so that they remain stable and do not borders between ECOWAS and CEMAC members offer recruitment potential for Boko Haram. (for example, by allowing visa-free movement of • Promote the use of solar-powered irrigation pumps to persons and providing an exemption for trade in overcome fuel restrictions and shortages. agricultural and livestock products, as well as for • Advance the application of digital agriculture handicraft, from the requirement to be accompanied innovations, such as mobile money or animal tracing, by a certificate of origin). These measures are already to reduce the risk of theft. part of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme and could possibly be applied at ECOWAS–CEMAC borders on a reciprocal basis. 8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 311 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace The following are some long-term measures for mitigating the impact of conflict: • Provide additional public services close to borders or in cities and markets nearby to build trust in public authority. • Target support for specific value chains to improve key sources of livelihood in the region. One possible way could be to approach this regionally and thus focus on mutually beneficial value chains. 312 8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations Technical Paper 7. Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region References Aker, Jenny C., Michael W. Klein, Stephen A. O’Connell, and Muzhe Yang. 2014. “Borders, Ethnicity and Trade.” Journal of Development Economics 107: 1–16. 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