



<b>1. Project Data:</b>		<b>Date Posted :</b> 08/06/2002	
<b>PROJ ID:</b> P059055		<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Project Name:</b> Emg Flood Asst	<b>Project Costs (US\$M)</b>	7.7	6.25
<b>Country:</b> Tajikistan	<b>Loan/Credit (US\$M)</b>	7.0	4.48
<b>Sector(s):</b> Board: UD - Roads and highways (68%), Irrigation and drainage (8%), Power (8%), Flood protection (8%), Water supply (8%)	<b>Cofinancing (US\$M)</b>	0	0
<b>L/C Number:</b> C3123			
	<b>Board Approval (FY)</b>		99
<b>Partners involved :</b> ADB	<b>Closing Date</b>	01/31/2000	12/31/2001

<b>Prepared by :</b>	<b>Reviewed by :</b>	<b>Group Manager :</b>	<b>Group:</b>
Ronald S. Parker	Timothy A. Johnston	Alain A. Barbu	OEDST

**2. Project Objectives and Components**

**a. Objectives**

In April and May 1998, several regions of Tajikistan were hit by strong rains that caused widespread flooding. Credit objectives were to: (a) mitigate the economic and social effects of the floods through the repair and reconstruction of essential infrastructure; (b) establish the conditions for resumption of economic exchanges and growth in the rural areas affected by the floods; and (c) help reduce the risks of occurrence of future similar calamities.

**b. Components**

EFAP included two components: (a) *Transport infrastructure works* ( US\$ 4.00 million or 80 percent of base cost): *Inter alia* reconstruction of nine bridges, repair of about 270 km of roads, repair of embankment protections and the construction of small-scale protection structures using labor-intensive techniques. (b) *Other infrastructure works* (US\$ 1.00 million or 20 percent of base cost): repair of agricultural dikes, irrigation systems and flood protection works, repair and replacement of small rural hydropower plants and transmission lines, and municipal facilities not identified at appraisal (due to lack of adequate damage evaluations and designs). The Supplemental Credit (US\$ 2.00 million, base cost) financed transport infrastructure works (bridges and repairs on about 60 km of roads), 12 km of river embankment reinforcement, repair of about 2 km of power lines, and reconstruction of 6 power sub-stations, and PIU operations.

**c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates**

IDA amended the Credit Agreement following a second flood, extending a US\$ 2.00 million Supplemental Credit towards a program with a total cost estimated at US\$ 2.2 million (approved by the Board on December 14, 1999). The Supplemental Credit did not change the original objectives of the project, but it did increase the amount of resources available for the repair and reconstruction of infrastructure. The Supplemental Credit was complemented by a US\$ 5.00 million credit from ADB, which was implemented using the same Project Implementation Unit. IDA resources were used for reconstruction operations located in Southern Tajikistan, the ADB credit (parallel) financed operations in Northern Tajikistan. ADB also provided grant funds for the preparation of a strategy for natural disaster prevention and mitigation. The original Closing Date of June 30, 2001 was extended in 1999 to December 31, 2001 to allow for the implementation of the Supplemental Credit Program. On April 30, 2002 US\$2.44 million (35% of the original IDA commitment and the Supplement) was canceled

**3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:**

Project objectives were partially met. A number of transport links were reopened, although some were only finished after credit closing. By closing, works on seven bridges were totally completed (appraisal estimate 11). Repair works on a total of about 210 km of roads were completed (330 estimated). Overall quality of works (including river embankment repair) was uneven: local enterprises were inexperienced, and technical supervision was inadequate. Reconstruction of 9 km of power transmission lines and three power sub-stations were completed (eight power sub-stations and 2 km of power transmission lines estimated [post-appraisal]). The project was unable to use all the resources available, however, and its overall impact fell short of stated goals. Simplicity of design and implementation arrangements notwithstanding, the capacity the implementing agency turned out to be even weaker

than anticipated. Implementation was further constrained by relatively cumbersome procurement arrangements -- construction materials and supplies were procured by the PIU, while the provision of labor and equipment works was procured through specialized State construction enterprises.

**4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:**

Over the period of implementation a number of small private sector enterprises emerged on the market. IDA agreed to revise the procurement arrangements to allow some of them to participate in project activities.

**5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):**

Misprocurement and (likely) collusion were prevalent. The PIU was unable to identify, prepare and implement acceptable sub-projects in a timely fashion. Project contractors failed to adhere to construction standards and technical designs. More worrying in the longer-term is the failure to adequately mitigate for recurrent natural hazards, requiring the replacement of the same infrastructure over and over again. In contrast to the cofinancier's project, the Bank project had no policy or institutional objective: the credit was exclusively targeted at physical output. About half (105 km) of the roads repaired had not actually suffered flood damage. Bank supervision missions noted that construction designs were not respected, nor were the technical and quality specifications for construction materials.

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
<b>Outcome:</b>	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
<b>Institutional Dev .:</b>	Modest	Negligible	EFAP had no ID objective. Management capacity remained inadequate throughout implementation, yet the GOT declined technical assistance.
<b>Sustainability:</b>	Unlikely	Unlikely	
<b>Bank Performance:</b>	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	The problems inherent in the implementation of EFAP were greatly exacerbated by instability and insecurity, restricting IDA's ability to supervise the project.
<b>Borrower Perf .:</b>	Unsatisfactory	Highly Unsatisfactory	GOT failed to provided qualified staff for PIU. After IDA discovered substantial procurement irregularities, GOT did not take any action or dismiss the responsible manager until the project was about to close. Contracts were awarded to firms that misrepresented their qualifications, and the ICR alleges clear cases of collusion. Technical designs were not followed, and minimal construction standards were not met.
<b>Quality of ICR:</b>		Satisfactory	

**NOTE:** ICR rating values flagged with '\*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

**7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:**

*Respond to the emergency phase with timely advice, not a slap-dash project.* In a post-disaster context, responding too quickly can lead to projects that ultimately contribute little that is useful from a social and economic point of view. Floods and landslides occur in all areas of Tajikistan with regularity. Speedily replacing and repairing damaged infrastructure over and over again is hard to see as useful. What would be needed is to help the GOT to learn to deal with the fundamentals of disaster management, and support the preparation and implementation of comprehensive, affordable and sustainable natural disaster prevention and mitigation strategy.

*Heed clear warning signs.* IDA should not entrust the implementation of challenging emergency projects to newly created PIUs that have no staff with even minimal expertise, particularly when the government refuses technical assistance support. Short-sightedness in this regard can create project implementation conditions whose deficiencies cannot be overcome by supervision.

*Build in flexibility.* Although the Bank often demonstrated flexibility, the situation on the ground required more. Disaster responses often have to address totally unforeseeable needs. Faced with extremely weak government institutions lacking the necessary resources both human and material, (given timely problem identification) selected emergency components could instead be carried out, on behalf of the Government, by branches of international organizations or NGOs having the necessary managerial expertise. It can be anticipated, however, that emergency reconstruction will be dynamic, and supervision of emergency projects necessarily resource intensive. Staff on the ground helps: supervision arrangements for ERLs often benefit by providing for a substantial involvement of Country

Office staff in day-to-day follow up.

*Learn from past mistakes.* The project adopted the same procurement arrangements identified in the ICR for the Tajikistan Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit (IDA 30370) as being of debatable effectiveness--separating the procurement of construction materials from the procurement of works. As could have been anticipated, the arrangements proved to be too complex and cumbersome and, rather than preventing mismanagement, opened the door to it.

**8. Assessment Recommended?**  Yes  No

**Why?** The project will provide an excellent case study for the forthcoming OED review of post -disaster assistance.

**9. Comments on Quality of ICR:**

Satisfactory. The ICR makes a commendable attempt to catalogue and analyze the many serious deficiencies of this project.