Executive Summary 92704 v1 Turn Down the Heat Confronting the New Climate Normal Executive Summary Turn Down Heat the Confronting the New Climate Normal © 2014 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved 1 2 3 4 17 16 15 14 This work was prepared for The World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this commissioned work. 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Contents Acknowledgments v Foreword vii Executive Summary 1 Abbreviations 21 Glossary 23 Figures Figure 1: Water resources: Relative change in annual discharge for a 2°C and a 4°C world in the 2080s 5 Figure 2: Multi-model mean of the percentage of austral summer months (DJF), with highly unusual temperatures (normally unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to the 1951–1980 base line period 7 Figure 3: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months (JJA), with highly unusual temperatures (normally unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to the 1951–1980 base line period 10 Figure 4: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months (JJA) with highly unusual temperatures (normally unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to the 1951–1980 base line period 13 Boxes Box 1: The Case for Immediate Action 2 Box 2: Social Vulnerability Impacts of Climate Change 6 Box 3: Selected Climate Risks in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region 8 Box 4: El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 9 Box 5: Selected Climate Risks in the Middle East and North Africa Region 11 Box 6: Selected Climate Risks in the Europe and Central Asia Region 14 Box 7: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Latin America and Caribbean Region 17 Box 8: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Middle East and North Africa Region 18 Box 9: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Europe and Central Asia Region 19 iii Acknowledgments The report Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal is a result of contributions from a wide range of experts from across the globe. The report follows Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts and the Case for Resilience, released in June 2013 and Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided, released in November 2012. We thank everyone who contributed to its richness and multidisciplinary outlook. The report has been written by a team from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, including Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Christopher Reyer, Bill Hare, Katharina Waha, Ilona M. Otto, Olivia Serdeczny, Michiel Schaeffer, Carl-Friedrich Schleußner, Diana Reckien, Rachel Marcus, Oleksandr Kit, Alexander Eden, Sophie Adams, Valentin Aich, Torsten Albrecht, Florent Baarsch, Alice Boit, Nella Canales Trujillo, Matti Cartsburg, Dim Coumou, Marianela Fader, Holger Hoff, Guy Jobbins, Lindsey Jones, Linda Krummenauer, Fanny Langerwisch, Virginie Le Masson, Eva Ludi, Matthias Mengel, Jacob Möhring, Beatrice Mosello, Andrew Norton, Mahé Perette, Paola Pereznieto, Anja Rammig, Julia Reinhardt, Alex Robinson, Marcia Rocha, Boris Sakschewski, Sibyll Schaphoff, Jacob Schewe, Judith Stagl, and Kirsten Thonicke. We acknowledge with gratitude the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) for their contributions to the social vulnerability analysis. The report was commissioned by the World Bank Group’s Climate Change Vice-Presidency. The Bank team, led by Kanta Kumari Rigaud and Erick Fernandes under the supervision of Jane Ebinger, worked closely with the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics. The core team comprised of Philippe Ambrosi, Margaret Arnold, Robert Bisset, Charles Joseph Cormier, Stephane Hallegatte, Gabriella Izzi, Daniel Mira-Salama, Maria Sarraf, Jitendra Shah, and Meerim Shakirova. Management oversight was provided by Rachel Kyte, Junaid Ahmad, James Close, Fionna Douglas, Marianne Fay, Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez, Karin Kemper, and Laszlo Lovei. Robert Bisset, Stacy Morford, Annika Ostman, and Venkat Gopalakrishnan led outreach efforts to partners and the media. Samrawit Beyene, Patricia Braxton, Perpetual Boateng and Maria Cristina Sy provided valuable support to the team. Scientific oversight was provided throughout by Rosina Bierbaum (University of Michigan) and Michael MacCracken (Climate Institute, Washington DC). The report benefited greatly from scientific peer reviewers. We would like to thank Pramod Aggarwal, Lisa Alexander, Jens Hesselbjerg Christensen, Carolina Dubeux, Seita Emori, Andrew Friend, Jean-Christophe Gaillard, Jonathan Gregory, Richard Houghton, Jose Marengo, Anand Patwardhan, Scott Power, Venkatachalam Ramaswamy, Tan Rong, Oliver Ruppel, Anatoly Shvidenko, Thomas Stocker, Kevin Trenberth, Carol Turley, Riccardo Valentini, Katharine Vincent, and Justus Wesseler. We are grateful to colleagues from the World Bank Group for their input at key stages of this work: Bachir Abdaym, Gayatri Acharya, Sue Aimee Aguilar, Hanane Ahmed, Kazi Fateha Ahmed, Kulsum Ahmed, Angela Armstrong, Rustam Arstanov, Oscar Avalle, Mary Barton-Dock, Patricia Bliss-Guest, Livia Benavides, Raymond Bourdeaux, Carter Brandon, Adam Broadfoot, Joelle Dehasse Businger, Ludmilla Butenko, Alonso v TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL Zarzar Casis, Tuukka Castren, Térence Céreri, Diji Chandrasekharan, Adriana Damianova, Laurent Debroux, Gerhard Dieterle, Svetlana Edmeades, Ahmed Eiweida, Nathan Lee Engle, Eduardo Ferreira, Homa-Zahra Fotouhi, Luis Garcia, Carolina Diaz Giraldo, Ellen Goldstein, Christophe de Gouvello, Marianne Grosclaude, Nagaraja Rao Harshadeep, Leonard Hessling, Tomoko Hirata, Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Rahit Khanna, Saroj Kumar Jha, Erika Jorgensen, Steen Lau Jorgensen, Angela Khaminwa, Srilata Kammila, Melanie Kappes, Sunil Khosla, Markus Kostner, Andrea Kutter, Jeffrey Lecksell, Hervé Lévite, Andrea Liverani, Kseniya Lvovsky, Pilar Maisterra, Eugenia Marinova, Benjamin McDonald, Craig Meisner, Nancy Chaarani Meza, Alan Miller, Andrew Mitchell, Nadir Mohammed, Rawleston Moore, Laurent Msellati, Farzona Mukhitdinova, Maja Murisic, John Nash, Kayly Ober, M. Yaa Pokua Afriyie Oppong, Alexandra Ortiz, Nicolas Perrin, Grzegorz Peszko, Elisa Portale, Irina Ramniceanu, Rama Reddy, Nina Rinnerberger, Sandra Lorena Rojas, Alaa Ahmed Sarhan, Daniel Sellen, Bekzod Shamsiev, Sophie Sirtaine, Marina Smetanina, Jitendra Srivastava, Vladimir Stenek, Lada Strelkova, Amal Talbi, Raul Tolmos, Xiaoping Wang, Monika Weber-Fahr, Deborah Wetzel, Gregory Wlosinski, Mei Xie, Emmy Yokoyama, Fabrizio Zarcone, and Wael Zakout. Thanks also to to the following individuals for their support: William Avis, Daniel Farinotti, Gabriel Jordà, Lara Langston, Tom Mitchell, Lena Marie Scheiffele, Xiaoxi Wang, and Emily Wilkinson. We would like to thank Gurbangeldi Allaberdiyev, Zoubeida Bargaoui, Eglantina Bruci, Shamil Iliasov, Hussien Kisswani, Artem Konstantinov, Patrick Linke, Aleksandr Merkushkin, Nasimjon Rajabov, Yelena Smirnova, and Evgeny Utkin for their participation and valuable contributions at the Capacity Building Workshop held in the spring of 2014 that helped inform the report. We acknowledge with gratitude the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), European Commission, the Italian Government; and the Program on Forests (PROFOR) for their contributions towards the production of this report and associated outreach materials. vi Foreword Dramatic climate changes and weather extremes are already affecting millions of people around the world, damaging crops and coastlines and putting water security at risk. Across the three regions studied in this report, record-breaking temperatures are occurring more fre- quently, rainfall has increased in intensity in some places, while drought-prone regions like the Mediter- ranean are getting dryer. A significant increase in tropical North Atlantic cyclone activity is affecting the Caribbean and Central America. There is growing evidence that warming close to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is locked-in to the Earth’s atmospheric system due to past and predicted emissions of greenhouse gases, and climate change impacts such as extreme heat events may now be unavoidable. As the planet warms, climatic conditions, heat and other weather extremes which occur once in hundreds of years, if ever, and considered highly unusual or unprecedented today would become the “new climate normal” as we approach 4°C—a frightening world of increased risks and global instability. The consequences for development would be severe as crop yields decline, water resources change, diseases move into new ranges, and sea levels rise. Ending poverty, increasing global prosperity and reduc- ing global inequality, already difficult, will be much harder with 2°C warming, but at 4°C there is serious doubt whether these goals can be achieved at all. For this report, the third in the Turn Down the Heat series, we turned again to the scientists at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics. We asked them to look at the likely impacts of present day (0.8°C), 2°C and 4°C warming on agricultural production, water resources, cities and ecosystems across Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and parts of Europe and Central Asia. Their findings are alarming. In Latin America and the Caribbean, heat extremes and changing precipitation patterns will have adverse effects on agricultural productivity, hydrological regimes and biodiversity. In Brazil, at 2°C warming, crop yields could decrease by up to 70 percent for soybean and up to 50 percent for wheat. Ocean acidification, sea level rise, tropical cyclones and temperature changes will negatively impact coastal livelihoods, tour- ism, health and food and water security, particularly in the Caribbean. Melting glaciers would be a hazard for Andean cities. In the Middle East and North Africa, a large increase in heat-waves combined with warmer average tem- peratures will put intense pressure on already scarce water resources with major consequences for regional food security. Crop yields could decrease by up to 30 percent at 1.5–2°C and by almost 60 percent at 3–4°C. At the same time, migration and climate-related pressure on resources might increase the risk of conflict. In the Western Balkans and Central Asia, reduced water availability in some places becomes a threat as temperatures rise toward 4°C. Melting glaciers in Central Asia and shifts in the timing of water flows vii TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL will lead to less water resources in summer months and high risks of torrential floods. In the Balkans, a higher risk of drought results in potential declines for crop yields, urban health, and energy generation. In Macedonia, yield losses are projected of up to 50 percent for maize, wheat, vegetables and grapes at 2°C warming. In northern Russia, forest dieback and thawing of permafrost threaten to amplify global warming as stored carbon and methane are released into the atmosphere, giving rise to a self-amplifying feedback loop. Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal builds on our 2012 report, which concluded the world would warm by 4°C by the end of this century with devastating consequences if we did not take concerted action now. It complements our 2013 report that looked at the potential risks to development under different warming scenarios in Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and South Asia, and which warned that we could experience a 2°C world in our lifetime. Many of the worst projected climate impacts outlined in this latest report could still be avoided by holding warming below 2°C. But, this will require substantial technological, economic, institutional and behavioral change. It will require leadership at every level of society. Today the scientific evidence is overwhelming, and it’s clear that we cannot continue down the current path of unchecked, growing emissions. The good news is that there is a growing consensus on what it will take to make changes to the unsustainable path we are currently on. More and more voices are arguing that is possible to grow greener without necessarily growing slower. Today, we know that action is urgently needed on climate change, but it does not have to come at the expense of economic growth. We need smart policy choices that stimulate a shift to clean public transport and energy efficiency in factories, buildings and appliances can achieve both growth and climate benefits. This last report in the Turn Down the Heat series comes at a critical moment. Earlier this year, the UN Secretary General’s Climate Summit unleased a new wave of optimism. But our reports make clear that time is of the essence. Governments will gather first in Lima and then Paris for critical negotiations on a new climate treaty. Inside and outside of the conference halls, global leaders will need to take difficult decisions that will require, in some instances, short term sacrifice but ultimately lead to long term gains for all. At the World Bank Group we will use our financial capacity to help tackle climate change. We will innovate and bring forward new financial instruments. We will use our knowledge and our convening power. We will use our evidence and data to advocate and persuade. In short, we will do everything we can to help countries and communities build resilience and adapt to the climate impacts already being felt today and ensure that finance flows to where it is most needed. Our response to the challenge of climate change will define the legacy of our generation. The stakes have never been higher. Dr. Jim Yong Kim President, World Bank Group viii Executive Summary Executive Summary The data show that dramatic climate changes, heat and weather extremes are already impacting people, damaging crops and coastlines and putting food, water, and energy security at risk. Across the three regions studied in this report, record-breaking temperatures are occurring more frequently, rainfall has increased in intensity in some places, while drought-prone regions are getting dryer. In an overview of social vulnerability, the poor and underprivileged, as well as the elderly and children, are found to be often hit the hardest. There is growing evidence, that even with very ambitious mitigation action, warming close to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by mid-century is already locked-in to the Earth’s atmospheric system and climate change impacts such as extreme heat events may now be unavoidable.1 If the planet continues warming to 4°C, climatic conditions, heat and other weather extremes considered highly unusual or unprecedented today would become the new climate normal—a world of increased risks and instability. The consequences for development would be severe as crop yields decline, water resources change, diseases move into new ranges, and sea levels rise. The task of promoting human development, of ending poverty, increasing global prosperity, and reducing global inequality will be very challenging in a 2°C world, but in a 4°C world there is serious doubt whether this can be achieved at all. Immediate steps are needed to help countries adapt to the climate impacts being felt today and the unavoidable consequences of a rapidly warming world. The benefits of strong, early action on climate change, action that follows clean, low carbon pathways and avoids locking in unsustainable growth strategies, far outweigh the costs. Many of the worst projected climate impacts could still be avoided by holding warming to below 2°C. But, the time to act is now. This report focuses on the risks of climate change to development in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and parts of Europe and Central Asia. Building on earlier Turn Down the Heat reports this new scientific analysis examines the likely impacts of present day (0.8°C), 2°C and 4°C warming above pre-industrial temperatures on agricultural production, water resources, ecosystem services and coastal vulnerability for affected populations. Scope of the Report Central Asia (ECA).3 The focus is on the risks of climate change to development. While covering a range of sectors, special attention This third report in the Turn Down the Heat series2 covers three is paid to projected impacts on food and energy systems, water World Bank regions: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); the resources, and ecosystem services. The report also considers the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and parts of Europe and social vulnerability that could magnify or moderate the climate 1 Holding warming to below 2°C and bringing warming back to 1.5°C by 2100 is technically and economically feasible but implies stringent mitigation over the short term. While IPCC AR5 WGIII identified many mitigation options to hold warming below 2°C with a likely chance, and with central estimates of 1.5–1.7°C by 2100, only “a limited number of studies have explored scenarios that are more likely than not to bring temperature change back to below 1.5°C by 2100”. The scenarios in these studies are “charac- terized by (1) immediate mitigation action; (2) the rapid upscaling of the full portfolio of mitigation technologies; and (3) development along a low-energy demand trajectory”. 2 Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided, launched by the World Bank in November 2012; and Turn Down the Heat: Climate Extremes, Regional Impacts, and the Case for Resilience, launched by the World Bank in June 2013 constitute the first two reports. 3 The World Bank Europe and Central Asia region in this report includes only the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 1 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL change repercussions for human well-being. The report comple- ments the first Turn Down the Heat report (2012) that offered a Box 1: The Case for Immediate global overview of climate change and its impacts in a 4°C world4 Action and concluded that impacts are expected to be felt disproportion- ately in developing countries around the equatorial regions. Also, CO2 emissions continue unabated. Current warming is at 0.8°C it extends the analysis in the second report (2013) that focused above pre-industrial levels. CO2 emissions are now 60 percent on the consequences of climate change for present day, 2°C, and higher than in 1990, growing at about 2.5 percent per year. If emis- 4°C warming above pre-industrial levels in Sub-Saharan Africa, sions continue at this rate, atmospheric CO2 concentrations in line South Asia, and South East Asia and demonstrated the potential with a likely chance of limiting warming to 2°C would be exceeded within just three decades. of early onset of impacts at lower levels of warming. Observed impacts and damages. Widespread, recently This analysis draws on the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli- observed impacts on natural and human systems confirm the high mate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Working sensitivity of many of these systems to warming and the potential Group reports released in 2013 and 2014, as well as peer-reviewed for substantial damage to occur at even low levels of warming. literature published after the cutoff dates for AR5. The few cases Examples include negative impacts on crop yields, the accelerating where there are significant differences in interpretation of projected loss of ice from Antarctica and Greenland, and widespread bleach- impacts from the IPCC assessments (such as for sea-level rise and ing of coral reefs. The physical effects of warming to 1.5°C, such as El Niño) are highlighted and explained. extreme heat events, may be unavoidable. 21st-century projected impacts. The projected impacts The Global Picture for the 21st century confirm the scale of the risk to development at 2°C—and the severe consequences of exceeding this level of This report reaffirms earlier assessments, including the IPCC AR5 warming. Even at warming of 1.5°C–2°C, significant, adverse risks are projected for a number of regions and systems, such as the and previous Turn Down the Heat reports, that in the absence of potential for the complete loss of existing long-lived coral reefs, near-term mitigation actions and further commitments to reduce associated marine biodiversity and the livelihoods from tourism and emissions the likelihood of 4°C warming being reached or exceeded fishing. this century has increased. Under current policies there is about Multi-century consequences of 21st-century emissions. a 40 percent chance of exceeding 4°C by 2100 and a 10 percent Scientific evidence is growing of the multi-century consequences chance of exceeding 5°C.5 However, many of the worst projected of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. Examples include: climate impacts in this report could still be avoided by holding ‘locking-in’ a long-term sea-level rise of about two meters per warming below 2°C. degree Celsius of sustained global mean warming and a multi-cen- tury ocean acidification with wide-ranging adverse consequences on Selected Key Findings from Across coral reefs, marine ecology, and ultimately the planet. Risk of large-scale, irreversible changes in the Earth’s the Regions biomes and ecosystems. Large scale, irreversible changes in the Earth’s systems have the potential to transform whole regions. At the current level of 0.8°C warming above pre-industrial levels, Examples of risks that are increasing rapidly with warming include adverse impacts of climate change have already been observed. degradation of the Amazon rainforest with the potential for large Examples include: emissions of CO2 due to self-amplifying feedbacks, disintegration of • Extreme heat events are occurring more frequently. The occur- the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets with multi-meter sea-level rence of record-breaking monthly mean temperatures has rise over centuries to millennia, and large-scale releases of methane been attributed to climate change with 80 percent probability. from melting permafrost substantially amplifying warming. Recent peer reviewed science shows that a substantial part of the West Antarctic ice sheet, containing about one meter of sea-level rise 4 In this report, as in the previous two reports, “a 4°C world” and “a 2°C world” is equivalent in ice, is now in irreversible, unstable retreat. used as shorthand for warming reaching 4°C or 2°C above pre-industrial levels by Rapidly closing window for action. The buildup of carbon the end of the century. It is important to note that, in the case of 4°C warming, this intensive, fossil-fuel-based infrastructure is locking us into a future of does not imply a stabilization of temperatures nor that the magnitude of impacts is CO2 emissions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has warned, expected to peak at this level. Because of the slow response of the climate system, the greenhouse gas emissions and concentrations that would lead to warming of 4°C and numerous energy system modelling exercises have confirmed, by 2100 and associated higher risk of thresholds in the climate system being crossed, that unless urgent action is taken very soon, it will become extremely would actually commit the world to much higher warming, exceeding 6°C or more costly to reduce emissions fast enough to hold warming below 2°C. in the long term with several meters of sea-level rise ultimately associated with this warming. A 2°C world implies stabilization at this level beyond 2100. 5 IEA (2012) World Energy Outlook 2012. This was reported in the second Turn Down the Heat report. 2 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY • Extreme precipitation has increased in frequency and intensity 4°C. With earlier glacier melt in Central Asia shifting in many places. the timing of water flows, and a higher risk of drought in the Balkans, this carries consequences for crop yields, • A robust drying trend has been observed for already drought- urban health, and energy generation. In Macedonia, for prone regions such as the Mediterranean. example, there could be yield losses of up to 50 percent • A significant increase in tropical North Atlantic cyclone activity for maize, wheat, vegetables and grapes at 2°C warm- has been observed and is affecting the Caribbean and Central ing. Flood risk is expected to increase slightly along the America. Danube, Sava and Tisza rivers. Under future climate change scenarios projected impacts include: 3. Agricultural yields and food security: Significant crop yield impacts are already being felt at 0.8°C warming, and as 1. Highly unusual and unprecedented heat extremes: State- temperatures rise from 2°C to 4°C, climate change will add of-the-art climate modeling shows that extreme heat events further pressure on agricultural systems. increase not only in frequency but also impact a larger area • The risks of reduced crop yields and production losses of land under unabated warming. The prevalence of highly increase rapidly above 1.5°–2°C warming. In the Middle unusual and unprecedented heat extremes increases rapidly East and North Africa and the Latin America and the under an emissions pathway associated with a 4°C world.6 Caribbean regions, without further adaptation actions, Highly unusual heat extremes are similar to those experienced strong reductions in potential yield are projected for in Russia and Central Asia in 2010 and the United States in 2012 around 2°C warming. For example, a 30–70 percent and unprecedented heat extremes refer to events essentially decline in yield for soybeans and up to 50 percent decline absent under present day climate conditions. Unprecedented for wheat in Brazil, a 50 percent decrease for wheat in heat extremes would likely remain largely absent in a 2°C world Central America and the Caribbean, and 10–50 percent but in a 4°C world, could affect 70–80 percent of the land area reduction for wheat in Tunisia. Projected changes in in the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America and potential crop yields in Central Asia are uncertain at the Caribbean and approximately 55 percent of the land area around 2°C warming. Increasing droughts and flood- in the parts of Europe and Central Asia assessed in this report. ing events represent a major risk for agriculture in the 2. Rainfall regime changes and water availability: Precipitation Western Balkans. changes are projected under continued warming with sub- • While adaptation interventions and CO2 fertilization may stantial, adverse consequences for water availability. Central compensate for some of the adverse effects of climate America, the Caribbean, the Western Balkans, and the Middle change below 2°C warming, this report reaffirms the East and North Africa stand out as hotspots where precipitation findings of the IPCC AR5 that under 3–4°C warming is projected to decline 20–50 percent in a 4°C world. Conversely, large negative impacts on agricultural productivity can heavy precipitation events are projected to intensify in Central be expected. There is some empirical evidence that, and Eastern Siberia and northwestern South America with despite possible positive CO2 fertilization effects lead- precipitation intensity increasing by around 30 percent and ing to increased productivity, higher atmospheric levels flooding risks increasing substantially in a 4°C world. of carbon dioxide could result in lowered protein and • In the Western Balkans and Central Asia, water avail- micronutrient (iron and zinc) levels of some major grain ability becomes a threat as temperatures rise toward crops (e.g., wheat and rice). • The projected impacts on subsistence and export crops production systems (e.g., soybeans, maize, wheat, and 6 In this report, highly unusual heat extremes refer to 3-sigma events and unprec- rice) would be felt at the local, national, and global levels. edented heat extremes to 5-sigma events. In general, the standard deviation (sigma) shows how far a variable tends to deviate from its mean value, which in this report While global trade can improve food security and pro- refers to the possible year-to-year changes in local monthly temperature because of tect against local shocks, there is a possibility for some natural variability. For a normal distribution, 3 sigma events have a return time of regions to become over dependent on food imports and 740 years. Monthly temperature data do not necessarily follow a normal distribution thus more vulnerable to weather events in other world (for example, the distribution can have long tails, making warm events more likely) and the return times can be different but will be at least 100 years. Nevertheless, regions and to the interruption of imports because of 3-sigma events are extremely unlikely and 4-sigma events almost certainly have not export bans in those regions. occurred over the lifetime of key infrastructure. A warming of 5 sigma means that the average change in the climate is 5 times larger than the normal year-to-year 4. Terrestrial Ecosystems: Ecosystem shifts are projected with variation experienced today, and has a return period of several million years. These events, which have almost certainly never occurred to date, are projected for the increasing temperatures and changes in precipitation patterns coming decades. significantly diminishing ecosystem services. This would 3 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL have major repercussions on, for example, the global carbon 2081–2100 compared to the reference period 1986–2005.8 Due cycle. For example: to the time lag in the oceans’ response and the long response • Projected increases in heat and drought stress, together time of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets to atmospheric with continuing deforestation, substantially increase the temperatures (thermal inertia) sea levels will continue to rise risk of large-scale forest degradation (reduction in forest for many centuries beyond 2100. biomass and area) in the Amazon rainforest. This could • Sea-level rise poses a particular threat to urban communi- turn this carbon sink of global importance into a source of ties in the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America carbon; this has already been observed as a consequence and the Caribbean, where large urban settlements and of the severe droughts in 2005 and 2010 when scientists important infrastructure are situated along coastlines. estimated that the Amazon faced a decrease in carbon The impact of rising sea levels will be particularly severe storage of approximately 1.6 Pg carbon (2005) and 2.2 Pg for the Caribbean island communities as possibilities carbon (2010) compared to non-drought years.7 for retreat are extremely limited. Rising sea levels will • Russia’s permafrost regions and boreal forests are sensitive substantially increase the risk posed by storm surges and to changes in temperature that could lead to productivity tropical cyclones, in particular for highly exposed small increases. But there is a risk of increasing disturbances, island states and low-lying coastal zones. In addition, such as fires and pests, leading to widespread tree mortal- rising sea levels could contribute to increased salt-water ity. Forest dieback and thawing of permafrost threaten to intrusion in freshwater aquifers (particularly in the Middle amplify global warming as stored carbon and methane East and North Africa), a process made worse by other are released into the atmosphere, giving rise to a self- climate impacts (e.g., reduction in water availability) and amplifying feedback loop. With a 2°C warming, methane other human-induced drivers (e.g., resource overuse). emissions from permafrost thawing could increase by 7. Glaciers: A substantial loss of glacier volume and extent has 20–30 percent across boreal Russia. been observed under current levels of warming in the Andes 5. Marine ecosystems: Substantial, adverse effects on marine and Central Asia. Increasing glacial melt poses a high risk of ecosystems and their productivity are expected with rising flooding and severely reduces freshwater resources during temperatures, increases in ocean acidity, and likely reductions crop growing seasons. It can also have negative impacts on in available oxygen due to their combined effects. Observed hydropower supply. rates of ocean acidification are already the highest in 300 million • Tropical glaciers in the Central Andes have lost large years and rates of sea level rise are the highest for 6,000 years. amounts of ice volume throughout the 20th century and Projections of coral bleaching indicate that preserving complete deglaciation is projected in a 4°C world. In more than 10 percent of these unique ecosystems calls for Peru it is estimated that a 50 percent reduction in glacier limiting global warming to 1.5°C. Reef-building corals are runoff would result in a decrease in annual power output critical for beach formation, coastal protection, fisheries, of approximately 10 percent, from 1540 gigawatt hours and tourism. (GWh) to 1250 GWh. Physiological changes to fish and fish larvae have been • Since the 1960s Central Asian glaciers have reduced observed and are expected with future ocean acidification. in area by 3–14 percent depending on their location. Below 2°C warming and without taking into account changes Further substantial losses of around 50 percent and up in ocean acidity, fishery catches in a number of locations are to 80 percent are projected for a 2°C and a 4°C world projected to markedly decrease by 2050 as fish populations respectively. As a result, river flows are expected to shrink migrate towards cooler waters. 6. Sea-level rise: In a 1.5°C world sea level rise is projected to increase by 0.36 m (range of 0.20 m to 0.60 m) and by 0.58 m 8 The sea-level projections presented here follow the methodology adopted in the IPCC (range of 0.40 m to 1.01 m) in a 4°C world for the period AR5 WGI with the important update that more realistic scenario-dependent contribu- tions from Antarctica based on post-IPCC literature are included. Recent publications suggest that IPCC estimates are conservative given the observed destabilization of parts of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. Note that the regional projections given in this report are also based on this adjustment to the AR5 WGI methodology and do not include land subsidence. Sea-level rise projections presented in this report are based 7 The change in carbon sequestration is caused by the combined effects of reduced on a larger model ensemble with an ensemble mean warming of less than 1.75°C; uptake of carbon resulting from suppressed tree growth due to the drought, and loss as a result, end-of-century sea-level rise in RCP2.6 is classified as 1.5° warming. See of carbon due to drought induced tree mortality and decomposition over several years. Box 2.1 and Section 6.2, Sea-Level Rise Projections for further explanation. 4 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY Figure 1: Water resources: Relative change in annual discharge for a 2°C and a 4°C world in the 2080s relative to the 1986–2005 period based on an ISI-MIP model inter-comparison. Colors indicate the multi-model mean change; the saturation of colors indicates the agreement across the model ensemble. More saturated colors indicate higher model agreement. Source: Adjusted from Schewe et al. (2013). by 25 percent at around 3°C warming during the summer 8. Social Vulnerability to Climate Change. The social impacts months when water demand for agriculture is highest. of climate change are hard to predict with certainty as they • In Central Asia hydropower generation has the potential depend on climatic factors and their interaction with wider to play a major role in the future energy mix however the development trends. However, there is clear evidence that predicted changes in runoff distribution will mean that climate change is already affecting livelihoods and wellbe- there will be less water available for energy generation ing in parts of the three regions and is likely to do so to a in summer months when it will compete with demands significantly greater extent if more extensive climate change from agriculture. occurs (Box 2). Where governance is weak, or infrastructure 5 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL Box 2: Social Vulnerability Impacts of Climate Change Shocks and stresses related to climate change can undermine poverty reduction and push new groups into poverty. Informal settlements on flood plains and steep hillsides in many Latin American cities and the Western Balkans, for example, have been severely affected by floods and landslides in recent years. While many poor people will be living in isolated, rural areas, continued urban expansion into hazard-prone areas means that a growing proportion of urban populations will be at risk of climate-related extreme events and rising food prices, and thus of increasing poverty levels among urban groups. The impacts of climate change will often be most severely felt by poor and socially excluded groups, whose capacity to adapt to both rapid- and slow-onset climate change is more limited. These include indigenous people and ethnic minorities, migrant workers, women, girls, older people, and children. Although these groups—like their more advantaged counterparts—are already adapting to climatic and other changes, these efforts are often undermined by their limited assets, lack of voice, and discriminatory social norms. For example, increasing water stress, projected for parts of Latin America and low-income Middle East and North Africa countries, can dramatically increase the labor burden asso- ciated with fetching water in rural and poor urban environments; and child malnutrition linked to climate change reducing protein and micronutrient contents of staple foods (wheat, rice) could have irreversible, negative life-time consequences for affected children. Climate change may lead to displacement and also affect patterns and rates of migrations. Most displacement related to extreme weather events has, to date, been temporary. However, if climate change renders certain areas uninhabitable (for example, if they become too hot, too dry, or too frequently affected by extreme events—or sea-level rise) such migration may increase in scale and more often lead to permanent resettlement (as already being seen in some water-scarce parts of MENA). Large-scale migration may pose significant challenges for family relations, health, and human security. There is a risk of disadvantaged groups being trapped in adversely affected rural areas as they lack the funds and/or social connections to move. outdated or insufficient (as in parts of all three regions), Changes to the hydrological cycle could endanger this is likely to amplify the social challenges associated with the stability of freshwater supplies and ecosystem adapting to further climate change. services. Altered precipitation cycles characterized by more intense down- pours followed by longer droughts, loss of glaciers, degradation of Latin America and the Caribbean key ecosystems, and the loss of critical ecosystem services (e.g., water supplies, water buffering, retention, regulation, and soil The Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region is highly protection) will impact freshwater supplies regionally and poten- heterogeneous in terms of economic development and social and tially generate upstream-downstream tradeoffs and synergies. A indigenous history with a population of 588 million (2013), of range of impacts are expected to increase in intensity and severity which almost 80 percent is urban. The current GDP is estimated as global mean temperatures rise from 2oC to 4oC. at $5.655 trillion (2013) with a per capita GNI of $9,314 in 2013. • Projections indicate that most dry regions get drier and wet In 2012, approximately 25 percent of the population was living regions get wetter. Reductions in precipitation are as high in poverty and 12 percent in extreme poverty, representing a as 20–40 percent for the Caribbean, Central America, central clear decrease compared to earlier years. Undernourishment in Brazil, and Patagonia in a 4°C world. Drought conditions are the region, for example, declined from 14.6 percent in 1990 to projected to increase by more than 20 percent. Limiting warming 8.3 percent in 2012. Despite considerable economic and social to 2°C is projected to reduce the risk of drought significantly: development progress in past decades, income inequality in the to a one percent increase of days with drought conditions in region remains high. the Caribbean and a nine percent increase for South America. At the current 0.8oC warming significant impacts of climate At the same time, an increase in frequency and intensity of change are being felt throughout the LAC region’s terrestrial extreme precipitation events is projected particularly for the (e.g. Andean mountains and rainforests) and marine (especially tropical and subtropical Pacific coastline and southern Brazil. the coral reefs) biomes. As global mean temperatures rise to 2oC and beyond the projected intensity and severity of impacts will • Massive loss of glaciers is projected in the Andes in a 2°C increase across the entire region (three significant impacts are world (up to 90 percent) and almost complete glacier loss described below). beyond 4°C. Changes to glacial melt, in response to land Figure 2 shows the occurrence of highly unusual summer surface warming, alter the timing and magnitude of river temperatures in a 2oC and 4oC world. Box 3 gives an overview of flows and result in a higher risk of flooding and freshwater the climate risks in the region. shortages and damage to infrastructure assets. 6 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY Figure 2: Multi-model mean of the percentage of austral summer months (DJF), with highly unusual temperatures (normally unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to the 1951–1980 base line period. • Increased droughts and higher mean temperatures are rainfall events can quickly overwhelm natural drainage chan- projected to decrease water supplies and affect most ecosys- nels in the landscape as well as urban drainage systems that tems and agroecosystems. The increasing risk of drought will are unlikely to have been designed for the projected more raise the risk of forest fires, large-scale climate-induced forest intense future rainfall events and flows. degradation and the loss of associated ecosystem services. • Glaciers will melt at an even faster rate than observed, with Climate change will place at risk small-scale a peak in river runoff expected in 20–50 years, and possibly subsistence agriculture and large-scale agricultural earlier in some watersheds. Glacial lake outbursts and con- production for export nected flooding present a hazard for Andean cities. The loss of Agriculture in the Latin America and the Caribbean region is glaciers will likely impact the páramos (Andean, high carbon heavily dependent on rain-fed systems for both subsistence and stock moorlands) which are the source of water for many export crops; it is therefore vulnerable to climatic variations Andean cities. Moreover, degraded highland ecosystems have such as droughts, changing precipitation patterns, and rising less capacity to retain water and intensified downpours will temperatures. increase erosion with a subsequent increase in siltation and • Increasing risks for agriculture as warming rises beyond damage to hydropower dams, irrigation works, and hydraulic 2°C. There is a clear negative signal for a large variety of crops and river defense infrastructure. with 2°C warming, including soybeans (up to a 70 percent yield • The projected trend of more intense rainfall can significantly decline in some areas of Brazil) and maize (up to a 60 percent increase the risk of landslides especially in sloping terrain yield decline in Brazil and Ecuador) by 2050 relative to a often occupied by the poorer rural and urban communities. 1989–2009 baseline. Simulated adaptation interventions (e.g. The major landslides in 2011 in the State of Rio de Janeiro improved crop varieties, improved soil and crop management, following intense rainfall are a harbinger of the likely severity and supplementary irrigation) alleviated but did not overcome of projected impacts from more intense rainfall events. Intense the projected yield declines from climate change. Other studies 7 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL Box 3: Selected Climate Risks in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region In a 4°C world, heat extremes, changes in hydrological cycles, tropical cyclones and changes in the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) are expected to pose severe problems with risks cascading to the agricultural sector, human health, large urban centers and the functioning of critical ecosystem services. At lower levels of warming, glacial melt in the Andes will reduce freshwater and hydropower for communities and large Andean cities during the dry season, while increasing the risks of flooding in the short term and impacting agriculture and environmental services down- stream. Severe threats are expected from sea-level rise, damages to low-lying areas and coastal infrastructures. Degrading coral reefs will endanger tourism revenues and undermine biodiversity, fisheries, and the protection of coastal zones thereby negatively impacting livelihoods. For the global community, the potential impact of climate change on the Amazon rainforest is of high relevance. With increasing warming, degradation—if not dieback—of the Amazon rainforest is increasingly possible potentially turning the forest into a large carbon source during dry years and triggering further climate change. Central America & the Caribbean Higher ENSO and tropical cyclone frequency, precipitation extremes, drought, and heat Dry Regions waves. Risks of reduced water availability, crop yields, food security, and coastal safety. Poor exposed to landslides, coastal erosion Caribbean with risk of higher mortality rates and migration, Central America negative impacts on GDP where share of coastal tourism is high. Amazon Rainforest Increase in extreme heat and aridity, risk of forest fires, degradation, and biodiversity loss. Amazon Rainforest Risk of rainforest turning into carbon source. Shifting agricultural zones may lead to conflict over land. Risks of species extinction threatening Dry Regions traditional livelihoods and cultural losses. Andes Andes Glacial melt, snow pack changes, risks of flooding, and freshwater shortages. 3RSXODWLRQ'HQVLW\ >3HRSOHSHUVTNP@ In high altitudes women, children, and Southern Cone indigenous people particularly vulnerable; and  agriculture at risk. In urban areas the poor living on steeper slopes more exposed to flooding. ² ² Dry Regions ² Increasing drought and extreme heat events leading to cattle death, crop yield declines, and ² challenges for freshwater resources. Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)  A DISPUTE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE Risks of localized famines among remote ISLANDS EXISTS BETWEEN ARGENTINA WHICH CLAIMS THIS SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.K. WHICH ADMINISTERS THE ISLANDS. indigenous communities, water-related health problems. Stress on resources may lead to Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United conflict and urban migration. Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Southern Cone Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, Decreasing agricultural yields and pasture on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorse- productivity, northward migration of agro- ment or acceptance of such boundaries. ecozones. Risks for nutritious status of the local poor. Risks for food price increases and cascading impacts beyond the region due to high export share of agriculture. 8 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY suggest that in a 3°C world, the projected negative impacts on individual crops become stronger. For example up to almost Box 4: El Niño Southern Oscillation 70 percent decline in wheat in Central America and the Carib- (ENSO) bean. This implies that climate change threatens not only smallholder farmers, and rural and indigenous communities The Latin America and the Caribbean region is particularly but also large-scale commodity (soybeans, maize) producers, exposed to the effects of strong* El Niño and La Niña events, ranchers, and agribusinesses—with potential negative repercus- which are related to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). In sions on food security and prices in the region and beyond. Central America, El Niño usually results in excessive rainfall along the Caribbean coasts, while the Pacific coasts remain dry. Rainfall • Local food security is seriously threatened by the projected increases and floods tend to occur on the coast of Ecuador, the decrease in fishery catch potential. The Caribbean coasts, northern part of Peru, and in the southern part of Brazil, Argentina, the Amazon estuaries, and the Rio de la Plata are expected to Paraguay, and Uruguay while drought appears in the Andean zones be particularly affected by declines in catch potential of more of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia and in north eastern Brazil. All these than 50 percent as fish stocks migrate in response to warming changes can substantially impair livelihoods through impacts on waters. The Caribbean waters could see declines in the range agricultural productivity, critical ecosystems, energy production, of 5–50 percent. These estimates are for warming of 2°C by water supply, infrastructure, and public health in affected countries. For example, the extreme 1997–98 El Niño event resulted in many 2050, by which time many of the coral reefs—an important fish billions of dollars in economic damages, and tens of thousands nursery and habitat—would be subject to annual bleaching of fatalities worldwide, including severe losses in Latin America. events, further undermining the marine resource base. Ocean Substantial uncertainties remain regarding climate change impact acidification could affect fish populations directly, including projections on the intensity and frequency of extreme El Niño events. through physiological damages at early life stages. The effects However, evidence of changes to ENSO-driven precipitation vari- on the food chain, however, are not yet clear. ability in response to global warming has emerged recently and • The Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, represents an update to the assessment of ENSO projections in the and southern Brazil) as a major grain and livestock produc- IPCC AR5 report. Recent climate model inter-comparison studies suggest the likelihood of global warming leading to the occurrence of ing region is susceptible to climate shocks, mainly related more frequent extreme El Niño events over the 21st century. to changing rainfall patterns and rising heat extremes. This is expected to severely impact maize and soy yields, important * “The Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) is the standard that NOAA uses for identify- export commodities. For example, maize productivity is pro- ing El Niño (warm) and La Niña (cool) events in the tropical Pacific. It is the jected to decline by 15–30 percent in comparison to 1971–2000 running 3-month mean sea-surface temperature (SST) anomaly for the Niño 3.4 region (i.e., 5oN–5oS, 120o–170oW). Events are defined as 5 consecutive levels under warming of 2°C by 2050, and by 30–45 percent overlapping 3-month periods at or above the +0.5o anomaly for warm (El under 3°C warming. Strong and/or extreme El Niño events Niño) events and at or below the –0.5 anomaly for cold (La Niña) events. The resulting in floods or droughts in the cropping season pose threshold is further broken down into Weak (with a 0.5 to 0.9 SST anomaly), Moderate (1.0 to 1.4) and Strong (Ն 1.5) events” [Source: http://ggweather further substantial risks to agriculture in the region. .com/enso/oni.htm] A stronger prevalence of extreme events is projected that would affect both rural and urban communities, particularly on sloping lands and in • Risks associated with El Niño events and tropical cyclones coastal regions. would occur contemporaneously with a sea-level rise of The region is heavily exposed to the effects of more frequent and 38–114 cm thus greatly increasing the risks storm surges. intense extreme events, such as those that occur during strong El Sea-level rise is projected to be higher at the Atlantic coast than Niño events and tropical cyclones. at the Pacific coast. Sea-level rise off Valparaiso, for example, is • An increase of approximately 40 percent in the frequency of projected at 0.35 m for a 2°C world and 0.55 m for a 4°C world the strongest north Atlantic tropical cyclones is projected for (medium estimate). Recife sees projections of approximately a 2°C world, and of 80 percent for a 4°C world, compared to 0.39 m and 0.63 m respectively, with the upper estimates as present. In LAC, close to 8.5 million people live in the path of high as 1.14 m in a 4°C world—the highest in the region. hurricanes, and roughly 29 million live in low-elevation coastal • Extreme events will strongly affect the rural and urban poor zones. The Caribbean is particularly vulnerable as more than who often reside in informal settlements in high-risk areas 50 percent of its population lives along the coast, and around (e.g., flood plains and steep slopes). In 2005, the percentage 70 percent live in coastal cities. More intense tropical cyclones of people living in informal settlements in Latin America was would interact adversely with rising sea levels, exacerbating highest in Bolivia (50 percent) and in the Caribbean highest coastal flooding and storm surge risks, putting entire econo- in Haiti (70 percent). The negative effects of extreme events mies and livelihoods at risk (particularly for island states). 9 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL also affect rural communities as they strongly depend on their energy markets among the most heavily subsidized in the world. environment and its natural resource base. The region is very diverse in terms of socio-economic and political conditions. Thus, adaptive capacity and vulnerability to climate risks • In the Caribbean, substantial adverse impacts on local criti- varies enormously within the region, especially between the Arab cal ecosystems, agriculture, infrastructure, and the tourism Gulf States and the other Middle East and North Africa countries. industry can be expected in a 2°C world. This is due to loss The Middle East and North Africa region emerges as one of the and/or degradation of important assets from the combined effects hotspots for worsening extreme heat, drought, and aridity condi- of increasing sea levels and associated impacts of saline intru- tions. Agriculture, where 70 percent is rain-fed, is highly exposed sion and storm surges, ocean acidification, bleaching of coral to changing climatic conditions. Warming of 0.2°C per decade has reefs, and loss of the physical protection afforded to coastlines been observed in the region from the 1961–1990, and since then from dead and degrading reefs. Impacts from these and other the region is warming at an even faster rate. Projections indicate climatic changes can be expected to grow substantially with that more than 90 percent of summers will have highly unusual increasing warming, especially given the increasing likelihood heat extremes in a 4°C world compared to between 20–40 percent of more frequent intense tropical cyclones. of summers in a 2°C world (Figure 3). Given its high import dependency, the region is vulnerable The Middle East and North Africa to effects beyond its borders. While societal responses to such changes remain hard to predict, it is clear that extreme impacts, The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is one of the most such as a more than 45 percent decrease in annual water discharge diverse regions in the world in economic terms, with per-capita projected for a 4°C world in parts of the region, would present annual GDP ranging from $1,000 in Yemen to more than $20,000 unprecedented challenges to the social systems affected. Climate in the Arab Gulf States. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, change might act as a threat multiplier to the security situation Morocco, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Yemen rank 4, 12, 27, in the region by imposing additional pressures on already scarce 130, 132, and 151 in GDP per capita on a list of 189 countries. In resources and by reinforcing pre-existing threats connected to consequence, adaptive capacity and vulnerability to climate risks migration following forced displacement. Box 5 gives an overview varies enormously within the region. of the key climate risks in the region. The region’s population is projected to double by 2050, which together with projected climate impacts, puts the region under Changing precipitation patterns and an increase enormous pressure for water and other resources. The region in extreme heat pose high risks to agricultural is already highly dependent on food imports. Approximately production and regional food security. 50 percent of regional wheat and barley consumption, 40 percent Most agriculture in the region takes place in the semi-arid climate of rice consumption, and nearly 70 percent of maize consump- zone, either close to the coast or in the highlands, and is highly tion is met through imports. The region has coped with its water vulnerable to the effects of climate change. scarcity through a variety of means: abstraction of groundwater, • Rainfall is predicted to decline by 20–40 percent in a 2°C desalinization, and local community coping strategies. Despite world and by up to 60 percent in a 4°C world in parts of the its extreme water scarcity, the Gulf countries use more water per region. Agricultural productivity is expected to drop in parts capita than the global average, with Arab residential water and of the Middle East and North Africa region with increasing Figure 3: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months (JJA), with highly unusual temperatures (normally unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to the 1951–1980 base line period. 10 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY Box 5: Selected Climate Risks in the Middle East and North Africa Region The region will be severely affected at 2°C and 4°C warming, particularly because of the large increase in projected heat extremes, the substantial reduction in water availability, and expected consequences for regional food security. High exposure to sea-level rise in the coming decades is linked to large populations and assets in coastal areas. In a 2°C world already low annual river discharge levels are projected to drop by more than 15 percent and highly unusual heat extremes are projected to affect about a third of the land. Crop yield declines coupled with impacts in other grain-producing regions could contribute to increasing food prices in the region. The growing food import dependency further exacerbates such risks. Deteriorating rural livelihoods may contribute to internal and international migration, adding further stress on particularly urban infrastructure, with associated risks for poor migrants. Migration and climate related pressure on resources (e.g. water) might increase the risk of conflict. e k a s h r M Maghreb &HQWUDO$UDE 3HQLQVXOD 3RSXODWLRQ'HQVLW\ >3HRSOHSHUVTNP@  Southern ² Arab Peninsula ² ² ²  Maghreb Mashrek and Eastern Parts Arabian Peninsula Strong warming reduction in annual Highly unusual heat and decrease in annual Highly unusual heat extremes in central precipitation, increased water stress and precipitation will increase aridity, decrease Arabian Peninsula. In southern parts reduced agricultural productivity. Large in snow water storage and river runoff for relative increase in annual precipitation, but coastal cities exposed to sea level rise. example in Jordon, Euphrates and Tigris. uncertain trend of annual precipitation in Adverse consequences for mostly rain-fed central part. Sea level rise in the Arabian Climate change risks will have severe agricultural and food production. Sea likely higher than in Mediterranean implications on farmers’ livelihoods, country and Atlantic coasts with risk of storm economy, and food security. Exposure of Climate change risks will have severe surges and adverse consequences for critical coastal assets would have impact implications on farmers’ livelihoods, country infrastructure. on the economy, including tourism. There is economy, and food security. There is a risk risk for accelerated migration flows to urban for accelerated migration flows to urban More heat extremes expected to increase areas and social conflict. areas and social conflict. thermal discomfort, posing risk to labor productivity and health. Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 11 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL water scarcity and higher temperatures which are expected to extremes would occur on average in one of the summer deviate more and more from the temperature optima of several months in each year from the 2040s onward. In a 4°C world, crops (and possibly even exceed their heat tolerance levels). this frequency would be experienced as early as the 2030s, and would increase to two summer months by the 2060s and • Crop yields in the region may decrease by up to 30 percent virtually all months by the end of the century. Unprecedented at 1.5–2°C warming in Jordan, Egypt, and Libya and by almost heat extremes are absent in a 2°C world and affect about half 60 percent (for wheat) at 3–4°C warming in the Syrian Arab the summer months by the end of the century in a 4°C world. Republic. The strongest crop reductions are expected for legumes and maize as they are grown during the summer period. • The period of consecutive hot days is expected to increase, particularly in cities due to the urban heat island effect. For • With 70 percent of agricultural production being rain-fed, the example, in a 2°C warmer world the number of consecutive hot sector is highly vulnerable to temperature and precipitation days is projected to increase annually from four days to about changes and the associated potential consequences for food, two months in Amman, from eight days to about three months social security, and rural livelihoods. Forty-three percent of in Baghdad, and from one day to two months in Damascus. the population lives in rural areas and poor rural farmers are The number of hot days in Riyadh is expected to increase particularly vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition as a direct even more—from about three days to over four months. The consequence of yield loss and high food prices. In combination number of hot days in a 4°C warmer world is projected to with non-climatic pressures the decline in rural livelihood options exceed the equivalent of four months in most capital cities. could trigger further urban migration, potentially exacerbating urban vulnerability and intensifying the potential for conflict. • Heat stress levels can approach the physiological limits of people working outdoors and severely undermine regional • The increase in demand for irrigation water will be dif- labor productivity, putting a burden on health infrastruc- ficult to meet due to the simultaneous decrease in water ture. High temperatures can cause heat-related illnesses (e.g., availability in the Middle East and North Africa countries heat stress, heat exhaustion, and heat stroke) especially for which have traditionally invested in agriculture to improve the elderly, people with chronic diseases or obesity, and preg- the performance in the agriculture sector—about 30 percent of nant women, children, and people working outside. Climate the agricultural land is irrigated whereas agriculture consumes change is expected to undermine human health in other ways 60 to 90 percent of all water used in the region. as well. For instance, the relative risk of diarrheal disease as • Rising food prices that often follow production shocks and a consequence of climatic changes and deteriorating water long-term declines make the growing number of urban poor quality is expected to increase 6–14 percent for the period increasingly vulnerable to malnutrition, particularly against the 2010–39 and 16–38 percent for the period 2070–99 in North background of increasing local food insecurity. Evidence suggests Africa; and 6–15 percent and 17–41 percent, respectively, in that child malnutrition could rise in the event of significant food the Middle East. price increases or sharp declines in yields. Child malnutrition is already high in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, with an Sea-level rise will pose serious challenges to the average of 18 percent of children under age five developmentally region’s coastal population, infrastructure, and stunted. Childhood stunting has been linked to lifelong adverse economic assets. consequences, including lower economic productivity in adulthood. The dense concentration of people and assets in coastal cities • With its high and growing import dependency the region is translate into high exposure to the effects of sea-level rise. particularly vulnerable to worldwide and domestic agricul- • Projections show that all coastlines are at risk from sea-level tural impacts and related spikes in food prices. For example, rise. Depending on the city, sea levels are projected to rise climatic and hydrological events (droughts and floods), together by 0.34–0.39 m in a 1.5°C world and 0.56–0.64 m in a 4°C with global market forces, were contributing factors to high world (medium estimate), with the highest estimate reaching wheat prices in Egypt and affected the price of bread in 2008. 1.04 m in Muscat. • The Maghreb countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya Heat extremes will pose a significant challenge have been identified as among the most exposed African for human health countries in terms of total population affected by sea-level People in the region face a variety of health risks, many of which rise. In Morocco, for example, more than 60 percent of the are exacerbated by the hot and arid conditions and relative water population and over 90 percent of industry is located in key scarcity that characterize the region. coastal cities. For example, Alexandria, Benghazi, and Algiers • A substantial rise in highly unusual heat extremes is expected have been identified as particularly vulnerable to a sea-level in the coming decades. In a 2°C world, highly unusual heat rise of only 0.2 m by 2050. The United Arab Emirates also 12 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY ranks among the ten most vulnerable countries to sea-level to the agriculture-water-energy nexus in Central Asia; climate rise worldwide. extreme in the Western Balkans, and the forests in Russia. While the economic and political profiles of the countries differ greatly, a • Key impacts of climate change in coastal zones include common denominator is their transition from various types of closed, inundation resulting from slow onset sea-level rise, flooding, planned economies to open, market-based systems. The region is and damages caused by extreme events (including storms, characterized by relatively low levels of per-capita annual GDP, storm surges, and increased coastal erosion). The exposure ranging from $800 in Tajikistan to $14,000 in Russia. Agricultural of critical assets may cause other impacts to have repercus- production plays an important role in the national economies of sions for the economy (e.g., where tourism infrastructure the region, particularly those of Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, is exposed). In Egypt, for example, the ocean acidification Uzbekistan, and Albania. Large portions of the population in Cen- and ocean warming threatens coral reefs and is expected to tral Asia (60 percent) and the Western Balkans (45 percent) live in place the tourism industry—an important source of income rural areas, making them dependent on natural resources for their revenue—under severe pressure. livelihoods and thus particularly vulnerable to climate change. • Impacts on groundwater levels are significant, with poten- The parts of the Europe and Central Asia region covered by tial negative repercussions on human health for local and this report are projected to experience greater warming than the migrant populations. The Nile Delta, home to more than 35 global average. The region displays a clear pattern where areas million people and providing 63 percent of Egypt’s agricultural in the southwest are becoming drier and areas further northeast, production, is especially vulnerable to salinization under chang- including most of Central Asia, are becoming wetter as the world ing climate conditions. These impacts will be exacerbated by warms toward 4°C. The projected temperature and precipitation land subsidence, especially in the eastern part of the delta, changes translate into increased risks for freshwater supplies and by extensive landscape modification resulting from both that not only jeopardizes the sustainability of hydropower and coastal modification and changes in the Nile’s hydrogeology. agricultural productivity but also negatively impacts ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration for most of the region. A Europe and Central Asia selection of sub-regional impacts is provided in Box 6. Europe and Central Asia (ECA) in this report covers 12 countries9 Water resources in Central Asia increase during within Central Asia, the Western Balkans, and the Russian Federa- the first half of the century and decline thereafter, tion. The analysis focuses on specific climate challenges related amplifying the challenge of accommodating competing water demands for agricultural production and hydropower generation. 9 The World Bank Europe and Central Asia region in this report includes only the Water resource systems in Central Asia (notably glaciers and following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, the Kyrgyz Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, the snow pack) are sensitive to projected warming; with consequent Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. impacts on water availability in the agriculture and energy sectors. Figure 4: Multi-model mean of the percentage of boreal summer months (JJA) with highly unusual temperatures (normally unlikely to occur more than once in several hundred years) in a 2°C world (left) and a 4°C world (right) in 2071–2099 and relative to the 1951–1980 base line period. 13 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL Box 6: Selected Climate Risks in the Europe and Central Asia Region Increasing precipitation and glacial melt lead to increased water availability and flood risk in Central Asia in the coming decades. After mid-century and especially with warming leading to a 4°C world, unstable water availability poses a risk for agriculture and competing demands for hydropower generation. In the Western Balkans, extreme heat with a strong decrease in precipitation and water availability are projected to lead to large reduc- tions in crop yields, adverse effects on human health, and increasing risks to energy generation for a 4°C world; but would already be present in a 2°C world. The Russian forests store enormous amounts of carbon in biomass and soils. While their productivity may generally increase with warmer temperatures, large-scale forest dieback and the release of carbon resulting from interacting heat stress, insect spread and fire, have the potential to further affect boreal forests in the second half of the century. s i a n F e d e r a t i R u s o n 3RSXODWLRQ'HQVLW\ >3HRSOHSHUVTNP@  l Asia ² Centra Western ² Balkans ² ²  Western Balkans Central Asia Boreal Forests of the Russian Federation Increase in droughts, unusual heat Increasing glacial melt alters river runoff. extremes and flooding. High risks for Risks of glacial lake outbursts, flooding Unusual heat extremes and annual agriculture, human health and stable and seasonal water shortages. Increasing precipitation increase, rising risks of forest hydropower generation. competition for water resources due to fires and spread of pests leading to tree rising agricultural water demand and mortality and decreasing forest productivity. Risks for human health, food and energy demand for energy production. Possible northward shift of treeline and security. changes in species composition. Risks of Risks for poor through rising food prices permafrost melt and methane release. particularly affecting women, children and the urban poor. Risks for human health Risk for timber production and ecosystem due to spreading disease, heat waves and services, including carbon capture. Risks of flooding. substantial carbon and methane emissions. Data sources: Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University; United Nations Food and Agriculture Programme; and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical—(2005). Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 (GPWv3): Population Count Grid. Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). This map was reproduced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 14 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY Central Asia is increasingly likely to be a hotspot for heat stress for Kazakhstan. Overall, energy demand is projected to rise for agriculture and human settlements as warming proceeds to together with population and economic growth. 2°C and 4°C especially as temperatures are not moderated by • Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which are located upstream oceanic winds. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Central of the Syr Daria and Amu Darya, produce nearly 99 percent Asian glaciers have already seen a one-third reduction in glacier and 93 percent, respectively, of the total electricity consumed volume. Glacier volume is projected to decline by about 50 percent from hydropower. These upstream countries would have to in a 2oC world, concurrent with a 25 percent decrease in snow manage the impact of climate change on their hydropower cover for the Northern Hemisphere, and by up to 80 percent in a generation capacity, which is the backbone of their power 4°C world. Reductions in water availability are predicted to occur systems; downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and contemporaneously with an increase in demand for irrigation water. Turkmenistan), meanwhile, would be hit particularly hard by • River runoff will increase in the coming decades due to competing demands for agricultural and energy production. enhanced glacial melt rates but flows are expected to decrease for the second half of the century. By the end of Climate extremes in the Western Balkans pose the 21st century a distinct decrease in the water volume of major risks to agricultural systems, energy and the Syr Darya, and an even more distinct decrease in the Amu human health. Darya River, is expected because of declining glaciers that sup- The Western Balkans are particularly exposed to the effects of ply most of its flows. Critically, also the timing of high flow extreme events, including heat, droughts, and flooding. Heat volumes changes. For example, available data for a headwater extremes will be the new norm for the Western Balkans in a 4°C catchment (Panj) of the Amu Darya River reveal that the timing world. In a 2°C world, highly unusual heat extremes are projected of peak flows is projected to shift toward spring, leading to for nearly a third of all summer months compared to virtually all a 25 percent reduction in discharge during the mid-summer summer months in a 4°C world. Unprecedented heat extremes are (July-August) period in a 3°C world. As a result, less water projected to occur for 5–10 percent of summer months in a 2°C world will be available for agriculture during the crop-growing season compared to about two-thirds of summer months in a 4°C world. while at the same time higher summer temperatures lead to • The risk of drought is high. Projections indicate a 20 per- higher water demand for plants. cent increase in the number of drought days and a decrease • Crop productivity is expected to be negatively impacted by in precipitation of about 20–30 percent in a 4°C world. increased heat extremes and variability of supply/demand Projections for a 2°C world are uncertain. At the same time, for water that poses substantial risks to irrigated agricultural projections suggest an increase in riverine flood risk, mainly systems. Rain-fed agriculture is likely to be affected by uncer- in spring and winter, caused by more intense snow melt in tain rainfall patterns and amounts, including where irrigation spring and increased rainfall in the winter months (precipita- is important, and coupled with rising maximum temperatures tion projections are, however, particularly uncertain). can lead to the risk of heat stress and crop failure. • Most crops are rain-fed and very vulnerable to projected • Rural populations that are especially dependent on agri- climate change. While there are no projections that encompass culture for food are likely to be increasingly vulnerable to the entire region, and projections for individual countries remain any reductions in agricultural yields and nutritional quality uncertain, clear risks emerge. For example, projections for FYR of their staple food grains. Macedonia indicate potential yield losses of up to 50 percent • Unstable water availability is likely to increase the chal- for maize, wheat, vegetables, and grapes for around 2°C global lenge of competing requirements for hydropower genera- warming by 2050. Pasture yields and grassland ecosystems for tion and agricultural production at times of rising overall livestock grazing may be affected by sustained drought and demand due to projected population and economic growth in heat, and decline over large parts of the Western Balkans. Central Asia. The projected increase in highly unusual and The effects of extreme events on agricultural production are unprecedented heat extremes during the summer months (see mostly not included in assessments, but observations indicate Figure 4) can be expected to simultaneously increase energy high vulnerability. demand. As the efficiency of hydropower plants depends on • Energy systems are very vulnerable to extreme events and inter- and intra-annually stable river runoff, the potential, for changes in river water temperatures; changing seasonality example, of installed hydropower plants for small catchments of river flows can further impact hydropower production. is projected to decrease by 13 percent in Turkmenistan and by Most countries in the Western Balkans depend on hydroelectric 19 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic at around 2°C warming by sources for at least one-fifth of their electricity production. the 2050s, while an increase of nearly seven percent is projected Reductions in electricity production would be concurrent with 15 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL an increase in cooling demand which is projected to increase • At lower latitudes the forest is likely to give way to steppe by 49 percent in a 4°C world. ecosystems. If (partly uncertain) CO2 fertilization effects do • Extreme climate events and the appearance of new disease not enhance water-use efficiency sufficiently, the risk of fire, vectors pose serious risks to human health. The increased particularly in southern Siberia and Central Yakutia, will increase incidence and intensity of extreme heat events could cause and could lead to increased carbon emissions. Projections for the seasonality of temperature-related mortality to shift from this area indicate an increase in the annual number of high winter to summer across continental Europe. Albania and fire danger days of an average of 10 days in a 3°C world, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are considered 20–30 days in a 4°C world. The effects of heat waves promoting particularly vulnerable to heat waves. The net total number forest fires, and the increasing spread of pests and diseases, as of temperature-related deaths is projected to increase for the well as the interaction of these factors, may lead to decreased period 2050–2100 above 2°C warming levels. Further health productivity and even increased tree mortality. risks are likely due to climate change resulting in favorable • In a 2°C world, the thawing of the permafrost is projected conditions for the insect vectors transmitting diseases, such to increase methane emissions by 20–30 percent. The as dengue fever and Chikungunya fever. projected perturbations to Russian forest ecosystems are of global importance. If pushed beyond critical thresholds and Impacts of projected warming on Russian boreal into positive feedback with regional and global warming, forests and the permafrost can have severe large carbon stocks in the boreal forests and methane in the consequences for forest productivity and global permafrost zones may be released into the atmosphere—with carbon stocks. major implications for the global carbon budget. The boreal ecosystems of the Russian Federation that account for about 20 percent of the world´s forest cover large permafrost regions (carbon and methane-rich frozen soil layers) are likely to be quite Consequences for Development sensitive to projected warming and heat extremes. Perturbations Climate change risks undermining development and to the forest or permafrost could result in severe consequences for poverty reduction for present and future generations local ecosystem services and the global carbon budget. Although Climate change poses a substantial and escalating risk to develop- slightly warmer average temperatures may increase forest produc- ment progress that could undermine global efforts to eliminate tivity, there is a risk of increasing disturbances, such as fires and extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity. Without strong, pests, leading to widespread tree mortality. early action, warming could exceed 1.5–2°C and the resulting Above-average temperature rises and an overall increase in impacts could significantly worsen intra- and inter-generational annual precipitation is projected. In a 2°C world, highly unusual poverty in multiple regions across the globe. heat extremes are projected to occur in 5–10 percent of summer Severe threats to development outlined in this report are months, increasing to 50 percent of all summer months in a 4oC beginning to occur across many sectors in all three regions. The world. Precipitation is expected to increase by 10–30 percent in a analysis presented in this report reveals that amplified risks are 2°C world and by 20–60 percent in a 4°C world. Permafrost in the emerging from multi-sectoral impacts in particular connected to region is highly vulnerable to warming, with projected permafrost food security due to projected large and severe crop yield losses thawing rate of 10–15 percent over Russia by 2050 in a 2°C world. for warming levels above 2°C. • A northward shift of the tree line is projected in response As warming approaches 4oC very severe impacts can be to warming, causing boreal forests to spread into the northern expected to trigger impact cascades crossing critical thresholds of tundra zone, temperate forests into the present boreal zone, environmental and human support systems. Climatic conditions, and steppes (grassland plains) into temperate forests. In a 4°C heat and other weather extremes considered highly unusual or world the Eurasian boreal forest area would reduce around unprecedented today would become the new climate normal—a 19 percent and the temperate forest area increase by over world of increased risks and instability. 250 percent. With warming limited to around 1.5°C, boreal Every effort must be made to cut greenhouse gas emissions forests would decrease by around two percent and the tem- from our cities, land use, and energy systems now and transition to perate forest area would increase by 140 percent. This would a clean, low carbon pathway. Action is urgently needed on climate lead to a net gain in total temperate and boreal forest area in change, but it does not have to come at the expense of economic Eurasia of seven percent in a 4°C world and 12 percent in a growth. Immediate steps are also needed to help countries build 1.5°C world. The potential carbon gains from the expansion resilience and adapt to the climate impacts being felt today and of boreal forests in the north are likely to be offset, however, the unavoidable consequences of a rapidly warming world over by losses in the south. the coming decades. 16 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY The task of promoting human development, of ending pov- be avoided by holding warming below 2°C. This will require erty, increasing global prosperity and reducing global inequality substantial technological, economic, institutional and behavioral will be very challenging in a 2°C world, but in a 4°C world there change. And, most of all, it will require leadership at every level is serious doubt whether it can be achieved at all. Many of the of society. The time to act is now. worst projected climate impacts outlined in this report could still Box 7: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Latin America and Caribbean Region Warming levels are relative to pre-industrial temperatures. The impacts shown here are a subset of those summarized in Table 3.15 of the Main report. The arrows indicate solely the range of warming levels assessed in the underlying studies, but do not imply any graduation of risk unless noted explicitly. In addition, observed impacts or impacts occurring at lower or higher levels of warming that are not covered by the key studies high- lighted here are not presented (e.g., coral bleaching already occurs earlier than 1.5°C warming but the studies presented here only start at 1.5°C). Adaptation measures are not assessed here although they can be crucial to alleviate impacts of climate change. The layout of the figure is adapted from Parry (2010). The lower-case superscript letters indicate the relevant references for each impact.10 If there is no letter, the results are based on additional analyses for this report. 1°C 1.5°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C Land area affected by highly unusual heat Heat & 10% 30% 30-40% 65% 90% Drought Drought longer by(a) 1-4 days 2-8 days 8-17 days Glaciers Tropical glacier volume loss(b) 78-94% 66-97% 91-100% Southern Andes glacier volume loss(b) 21-52% 27-59% 44-72% 20- 40% 60- 80% Sea Probability of annual coral reef bleaching in Caribbean (high risk of extinction) (c) Sea level rise 0.27-0.39m, max 0.65m 0.46-0.66m, max 1.4m Fish catch potential(d) Up to +100% in South; up to -50% in Caribbean Water 10-30% decrease of mean runoff in Central America(e) Mean river discharge decreases in Northeast Brazil(f) Increasing biomass and carbon losses in Amazon(g) Forests & Increasing species range shifts/contractions and/or extinctions for mammals, marsupials, Biodiversity 10 birds, plants, amphibians (h) Rice and sugarcane yields possibly increase but high yield declines for wheat and maize (i) Food Beef cattle numbers in Paraguay(j) -16% -27% +5-13% Risk of diarrheal diseases(k) +14-36% Health +12-22% Increase in dengue (Mexico)(l) +40% Malaria increases in extra-tropics and highlands and decreases in the tropics (m) 10 a) Sillmann et al. (2013b); (b) Marzeion et al. (2012); Giesen and Oerlemans (2013); Radic et al. (2013); (c) Meissner et al. (2012); (d) Cheung et al. (2010); (e) Hidalgo et al. (2013); (f) Döll and Schmied (2012); (g) several studies without considering C02-fertilization, see Table 3.1; (h) several studies, see Table 3.1; (i) several studies, see Table 3.1; (j) ECLAC (2010); (k) Kolstad and Johansson (2011); (l) Colon-Gonzalez et al. (2013); (m) Beguin et al. (2011); Caminade et al. (2014); Van Lieshout et al. (2004). 17 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL Box 8: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Middle East and North Africa Region Warming levels are relative to pre-industrial temperatures. The impacts shown here are a subset of those summarized in Table 4.10 of the Main Report. The arrows solely indicate the range of warming levels assessed in the underlying studies; but do not imply any graduation of risk unless noted explicitly. In addition, observed impacts or impacts occurring at lower or higher levels of warming that are not covered by the key studies highlighted here are not presented (e.g., increase in drought and aridity is already observed, but the respective study does not assess impacts below 1.5°C). Adaptation measures are not assessed here although they can be crucial to alleviating the impacts of climate change. The layout of the figure is adapted from Parry (2010). The lower-case superscript letters indicate the relevant references for each impact.11 If there is no letter, the results are based on additional analyses for this report. 1°C 1.5°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C Heat Land area affected by highly unusual heat 5% 25% 30% 75% allmost all Drought & Moderate drought in Maghreb and Mashrek < 0.5 months per year ~ 1.5 months per year > 6 months per year Aridity Area classified as hyper-arid or arid 84% 87% Sea Level Sea level rise above present 0.20-0.64m 0.38-1.04m Food Loss of rainfed agriculture land(a) over 8,500 km over 170,000 km Reduction in crop yields(b) up to 30% up to 57% Decrease in snow melt water affecting the Water Euphrates and Tigris basin(c) by 55% by 77-85% by 87% 11 17% reduction in daily runoff for the tributaries of the Jordan River(d) Health Risk for diarrheal disease Increase in thermal discomfort by 35-70 days(e) increase by 6-15%(g) Risk for diarrheal disease increase by 16-41%(g) More people exposed to risk of malaria(f) 20-34 million 39-62 million Coast People affected from Egypt: 1.9 million Egypt: 3.6 million Morocco: 1.8 million Morocco: 2.1 million flooding(h) Loss of 25% of Nile Delta´s land area(i) 11 (a) Evans (2008); (b) several studies, see Table 4.1; (c) Bokurt and Sen (2013); (d) Samuels et al. (2010); (e) Giannakopoulos et al. (2013); (f) van Lieshout et al. (2004); (g) Kolstad and Johansson (2011); (h) Brown et al. (2011); (i) Dasgupta et al. (2009). 18 E X ECU TI VE S U MMA RY Box 9: Projected Impacts of Climate Change in Key Sectors in the Europe and Central Asia Region Warming levels are relative to pre–industrial temperatures. The impacts shown here are a subset of those summarized in Table 5.7 of the Main report. The arrows solely indicate the range of warming levels assessed in the underlying studies but do not imply any graduation of risk unless noted explic- itly. In addition, observed impacts or impacts occurring at lower or higher levels of warming that are not covered by the key studies highlighted here are not presented (e.g., an increase in Tien Shan glacier melt is already observed, but the respective study does not assess the observed impacts). Adaptation measures are not assessed here, although they can be crucial to alleviating the impacts of climate change. The layout of the figure is adapted from Parry (2010). The lower-case superscript letters indicate the relevant references for each impact.12 If there is no letter, the results are based on additional analyses conducted for this report. 1°C 1.5°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C Heat & 5% 10% 15% 50% 85% Land area affected by highly unusual heat Drought 60% aridity increase in Western Balkans Aridity in Russian Federation: 10-40% decrease up to 60% decrease Glaciers 31% of Tien Shan 50% (31-66%)(b) 57% (37-71%)(c) 67% (50-78%)(d) glaciers melting(a) Central Asian glacier mass loss Significant runoff formation Water Strong river runoff 30-60 days peak shifts in decline in Central Asia(f) reduction in the Syr Dara basin(a) 45-75% increased water discharge in Balkans(e) North-Eastern Russia(s) Soil desertification and salinization (g) Food Yield declines due to 20% grape and droughts and floods in Increasing length of growing (i) 20-50% yield olive yield losses 30% yield drop Western Balkans(h) season in Albania(j) losses in in Tajikistan(k) Uzbekistan (j) Health 12 Balkans become suitable Increased vulnerability of Western Balkans to dengue and Heat mortality increased for dengue-transmitting (l) Tenfold increase in to 1000 per million(m) chikungunya mosquito(l) mudflow risk in Kazakhstan(m) 6-19% less capacity of nuclear and Energy 2.58% increase in hydropower fossil-fueled power plants in Europe(o) 35% decreased hydropower potential in Central Asia(n) potential in Croatia(p) Boreal Increase in timber Large decreases in timber harvest(q) harvest for larch and Dramatic changes in vegetation(r) Forests pine(q) 10 days increase in fire risk(r) 20-30 days increase in fire risk(r) 12 (a) Siegfried et al. (2012); (b) Marzeion et al. (2012); (c) Marzeion et al. (2012); Giesen and Oerlemans (2013); Radic et al. (2013); (d) Marzeion et al. (2012); Giesen and Oerlemans (2013); Radic et al. (2013); (e) Dimkic and Despotovic (2012); (f) Hagg et al. (2013); (g) Thurmann (2011); World Bank (2013f); World Bank (2013d); World Bank (2013a); (h) Maslac (2012); UNDP (2014); (i) Sutton et al. (2013a); Sommer et al. (2013); (j) Sutton et al. (2013a); (k) World Bank (2013m); (l) Caminade et al. (2012); (m) BMU and WHO-Europe (2009); (n) Hamududu and Killingtveit (2012); (o) van Vilet et al. (2012); (p) Pasicko et al. (2012); (q) Lutz et al. (2013b); (r) Tchebakova et al. (2009); (s) Schewe et al. (2013). 19 Abbreviations °C degrees Celsius JJA June, July, and August (the summer season of the $ United States Dollars northern hemisphere; also known as the boreal AI Aridity Index summer) AOGCM Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model LAC Latin America and the Caribbean AR4 Fourth Assessment Report of the LDC Least Developed Countries Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change MAGICC Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas AR5 Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Induced Climate Change Panel on Climate Change MCMA The Mexico City Metropolitan Area BAU Business as Usual MENA Middle East and North Africa CaCO3 Calcium Carbonate MGIC Mountain Glaciers and Ice Caps CAT Climate Action Tracker NAO North Atlantic Oscillation CMIP5 Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 NDVI Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index (used as CO2 Carbon Dioxide a proxy for terrestrial gross primary production) DGVM Dynamic Global Vegetation Model NH Northern Hemisphere DIVA Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment NPP Net Primary Production DJF December, January, and February (the winter OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and season of the northern hemisphere) Development ECA Europe and Central Asia PDSI Palmer Drought Severity Index ECS Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity PgC Petagrams of Carbon (1 PgC = 1 billion tons of ENSO El-Niño/Southern Oscillation carbon) FAO Food and Agricultural Organization ppm Parts Per Million FPU Food Productivity Units PPP Purchasing Power Parity (a weighted currency GCM General Circulation Model based on the price of a basket of basic goods, GDP Gross Domestic Product typically given in US dollars) GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery RCM Regional Climate Model GLOF Glacial Lake Outburst Flood RCP Representative Concentration Pathway HCS Humboldt Current System SCM Simple Climate Model IAM Integrated Assessment Model SLR Sea-level Rise IEA International Energy Agency SRES IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change SREX IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme ISI-MIP Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Project Adaptation ITCZ Intertropical Convergence Zone 21 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL TgC Teragrams of Carbon (1 TgC = 1 million tons of UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees carbon) USAID United States Agency for International UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Development Desertification WBG World Bank Group UNDP United Nations Development Programme WGI Working Group I (also WGII, WGIII) UNEP United Nations Environment Programme WHO World Health Organization UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 22 Glossary Aridity Index: The Aridity Index (AI) is an indicator designed for CO2 fertilization: The CO2 fertilization effect refers to the effect identifying structurally arid regions; that is, regions with a long- of increased levels of atmospheric CO2 on plant growth. It may term average precipitation deficit. AI is defined as total annual increase the rate of photosynthesis mainly in C3 plants and increase precipitation divided by potential evapotranspiration, with the water use efficiency, thereby causing increases in agricultural pro- latter a measure of the amount of water a representative crop type ductivity in grain mass and/or number. This effect may to some would need as a function of local conditions such as temperature, extent offset the negative impacts of climate change on crop yields, incoming radiation, and wind speed, over a year to grow, which although grain protein content may decline. Long-term effects is a standardized measure of water demand. are uncertain as they heavily depend on a potential physiological long-term acclimation to elevated CO2 and other limiting factors, Biome: A biome is a large geographical area of distinct plant and including soil nutrients, water, and light. (See also Box 2.4 on the animal groups, one of a limited set of major habitats classified CO2 fertilization effect on crop productivity.) by climatic and predominant vegetative types. Biomes include, for example, grasslands, deserts, evergreen or deciduous forests, CMIP5: The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 and tundra. Many different ecosystems exist within each broadly (CMIP5) brought together 20 state-of-the-art GCM groups, which defined biome, all of which share the limited range of climatic generated a large set of comparable climate-projection data. The and environmental conditions within that biome. project provided a framework for coordinated climate change experi- ments and includes simulations for assessment in the IPCC AR5. C3/C4 plants: C3 and C4 refer to two types of photosynthetic biochemical pathways. C3 plants include more than 85 percent Development narratives: Development narratives highlight of plants (e.g., most trees, wheat, rice, yams, and potatoes) and the implications of climate change impacts on regional devel- respond well to moist conditions and to additional CO2 in the opment. The Turn Down the Heat series, and in particular this atmosphere. C4 plants (e.g., savanna grasses, maize, sorghum, report, discuss the potential climate change impacts on particu- millet, and sugarcane) are more efficient in water and energy use larly vulnerable groups along distinct storylines—the so called and outperform C3 plants in hot and dry conditions. development narratives. These development narratives were developed for each region in close cooperation with regional CAT: The Climate Action Tracker is an independent, science- World Bank specialists. They provide an integrated, often cross- based assessment that tracks the emissions commitments of and sectoral analysis of climate change impacts and development actions by individual countries. The estimates of future emissions implications at the sub-regional or regional level. Furthermore, deducted from this assessment serve to analyze warming scenarios the development narratives add to the report by allowing the that could result from current policy: (i) CAT Reference BAU: a science-based evidence of physical and biophysical impacts to lower reference business-as-usual scenario that includes existing be drawn out into robust development storylines to characterize climate policies but not pledged emissions reductions; and (ii) CAT the plausible scenarios of risks and opportunities—showcasing Current Pledges: a scenario additionally incorporating reductions how science and policy interface. currently pledged internationally by countries. 23 TUR N DO W N THE HE AT: CONF R ONT I N G T HE NE W CLI MATE NO R MAL GCM: A General Circulation Model is the most advanced type The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) was published in 2007. The of climate model used for projecting changes in climate due to Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) was published in 2013/2014. increasing greenhouse gas concentrations, aerosols, and external forcing (like changes in solar activity and volcanic eruptions). ISI-MIP: The first Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison These models contain numerical representations of physical pro- Project (ISI-MIP) is a community-driven modeling effort which cesses in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, and land surface provides cross-sectoral global impact assessments based on the on a global three-dimensional grid, with the current generation newly developed climate Representative Concentration Pathways of GCMs having a typical horizontal resolution of 100–300 km. and socioeconomic scenarios. More than 30 models across five sectors (agriculture, water resources, biomes, health, and infra- GDP: Gross Domestic Product is the sum of the gross value added structure) were incorporated in this modeling exercise. by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the product. Pre-industrial Level (what it means to have present 0.8°C warm- It is calculated without deductions for depreciation of fabricated ing): Pre-industrial level refers to the level of warming before/at assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. the onset of industrialization. The instrumental temperature records show that the 20-year average of global-mean, near-surface air GDP PPP: This is GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided temperature in 1986–2005 was about 0.6°C higher than the aver- by population. Whereas PPP estimates for OECD countries are age over 1851–1879. There are, however, considerable year-to-year quite reliable, PPP estimates for developing countries are often variations and uncertainties in the data. In addition, the 20-year rough approximations. average warming over 1986–2005 is not necessarily representa- tive of present-day warming. Fitting a linear trend over the period Highly unusual and Unprecedented: In this report, highly 1901–2010 gives a warming of 0.8°C since “early industrialization.” unusual and unprecedented heat extremes are defined using Global mean, near-surface air temperatures in the instrumental thresholds based on the historical variability of the current local records of surface-air temperature have been assembled dating climate. The absolute level of the threshold depends on the natural back to about 1850. The number of measurement stations in the year-to-year variability in the base period (1951–1980), which is early years is small and increases rapidly with time. Industrializa- captured by the standard deviation (sigma). Highly unusual heat tion was well on its way by 1850 and 1900, which implies using extremes are defined as 3-sigma events. For a normal distribution, 1851–1879 as a base period, or 1901 as a start for linear trend 3-sigma events have a return time of 740 years. The 2012 U.S. analysis might lead to an underestimate of current and future heat wave and the 2010 Russian heat wave classify as 3-sigma warming. However, global greenhouse-gas emissions at the end of and thus highly unusual events. Unprecedented heat extremes the 19th century were still small and uncertainties in temperature are defined as 5-sigma events. They have a return time of several reconstructions before this time are considerably larger. million years. Monthly temperature data do not necessarily fol- low a normal distribution (for example, the distribution can have RCP: Representative Concentration Pathways are based on long tails, making warm events more likely) and the return times carefully selected scenarios for work on integrated assess- can be different from the ones expected in a normal distribution. ment modeling, climate modeling, and modeling and analysis Nevertheless, 3-sigma events are extremely unlikely and 5-sigma of impacts. Nearly a decade of new economic data, informa- events have almost certainly never occurred over the lifetime of tion about emerging technologies, and observations of such key ecosystems and human infrastructure. environmental factors as land use and land cover change are reflected in this work. Rather than starting with detailed socio- Hyper-aridity: This refers to land areas with very low Aridity Index economic storylines to generate emissions scenarios, the RCPs (AI) scores, generally coinciding with the great deserts. There is are consistent sets of projections of only the components of no universally standardized value for hyper-aridity, and values radiative forcing (the change in the balance between incoming between 0 and 0.05 are classified in this report as hyper-arid. and outgoing radiation to the atmosphere caused primarily by changes in atmospheric composition) that are meant to serve as IPCC AR4, AR5: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change inputs for climate modeling. These radiative forcing trajectories (IPCC) is the leading body of global climate change assessments. are not associated with unique socioeconomic or emissions It comprises hundreds of leading scientists worldwide and on a scenarios; instead, they can result from different combina- regular basis publishes assessment reports which provide a com- tions of economic, technological, demographic, policy, and prehensive overview of the most recent scientific, technical, and institutional futures. RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6 and RCP8.5 refer, socioeconomic information on climate change and its implications. 24 GLOS S A RY respectively, to a radiative forcing of +2.6 W/m², +4.5 W/m², making different assumptions about the driving forces determining +6 W/m² and +8.5 W/m² in the year 2100 relative to pre- future greenhouse gas emissions. Scenarios were grouped into four industrial conditions. families (A1FI, A2, B1 and B2), corresponding to a wide range of high- and low-emissions scenarios. RCP2.6: RCP2.6 refers to a scenario which is representative of the literature on mitigation scenarios aiming to limit the increase of SREX: The IPCC published a special report on Managing the global mean temperature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change emissions path is used by many studies that have been assessed Adaptation (SREX) in 2012. The report provides an assessment of for the IPCC 5th Assessment Report and is the underlying low the physical and social factors shaping vulnerability to climate- emissions scenario for impacts assessed in other parts of this related disasters and gives an overview of the potential for effective report. In this report, the RCP2.6 is referred to as a 2°C world disaster risk management. (with the exception of sea-level rise, where the subset of model used actually leads to 1.5°C world—see Box 2.1, Definition of Tipping element: Following Lenton et al. (2008), the term tipping Warming Levels and Base Period in this Report). element describes large scale components of the Earth system pos- sibly passing a tipping point. A tipping point “commonly refers to RCP8.5: RCP8.5 refers to a scenario with a no-climate-policy base- a critical threshold at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively line with comparatively high greenhouse gas emissions which is alter the state or development of a system” (Lenton et al. 2008). used by many studies that have been assessed for the IPCC Fifth The consequences of such shifts for societies and ecosystems are Assessment Report (AR5). This scenario is also the underlying likely to be severe. high-emissions scenario for impacts assessed in other parts of this report. In this report, the RCP8.5 is referred to as a 4°C world Virtual water: A measure of the water resources used in the pro- above the pre-industrial baseline period. duction of agricultural commodities. International trade in such commodities thereby implies a transfer of virtual water resources Severe and extreme: These terms indicate uncommon (negative) from one country to another embedded in the products. consequences. These terms are often associated with an additional qualifier like “highly unusual” or “unprecedented” that has a WGI, WGII, WG III: IPCC Working Group I assesses the physical specific quantified meaning. scientific aspects of the climate system and climate change. IPCC Working Group II assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic SRES: The Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, published by the and natural systems to climate change, negative and positive IPCC in 2000, has provided the climate projections for the Fourth consequences of climate change, and options for adapting to it. Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate IPCC Working Group III assesses the options for mitigating climate Change. The scenarios do not include mitigation assumptions. The change through limiting or preventing greenhouse gas emissions SRES study included consideration of 40 different scenarios, each and enhancing activities that remove them from the atmosphere. 25